STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
GROUP’S STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES 2021 1
STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
RELEVANT REGULATIONS
REMUNERATION SYSTEM FOR FINANCIAL ADVISORS
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
MATERIAL RISK TAKERS POPULATION
REMUNERATION: PRINCIPLES AND GOVERNANCE
PERFORMANCE SHARES
INTERNAL GOVERNANCE PROCESS
DEFERRAL MECHANISM
COMPONENTS OF REMUNERATION
SEVERANCE AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES
MEDIOBANCA REMUNERATION FRAMEWORK
CONSENSUS FOR REMUNERATIONS POLICIES FOR 2016-20
WHOLESALE BANKING DIVISION
SHAREHOLDER VOTES: BENCHMARKING 2020
PRIVATE BANKING DIVISION
MB CEO AND GM SCORECARDS AND MB GROUP BONUS POOL
CONSUMER BANKING AND WEALTH MANAGEMENT / AFFLUENT & PREMIER
GROUP PAY MIX AND VARIABLE/FIXED REMUNERATION RATIO 2020
HOW THE INCENTIVE PLAN WORKS
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
RELEVANT REGULATIONS NEW
30 March 2011
BANK OF ITALY • Identified staff rules 9 June 2021 Instructions on remuneration and incentivization policies and practices at banks and banking groups
• EBA Guidelines 2 July 2021 • B.I. Instructions expected end 2021
December 2011
26 October 2018
18 November 2014
CONSOB
2013 2011
2 April and 25 September 2009
November 2010
FSB: PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND COMPENSATION
EU: DIRECTIVE 2010/76/ EC (CRDIII)
The FSB, following the financial crisis, proposes reforms to corporate governance, global standards on compensation and greater disclosure and transparency
Directive on capital requirements 10 December 2010
CEBS: GUIDELINES ON REM POLICIES AND PRACTICES
November 2009
EU: DIRECTIVE 2009/138/ CE (SOLVENCY II)
Directive on solvency principles
Updated instructions on remuneration and incentivization policies and practices at banks and banking groups
New instructions on remuneration and incentivization policies and practices at banks and banking groups
• Article 6 of Issuers’ code of conduct (revised July 2015 / January 2020)
2010
11 December 2020
BANK OF ITALY
• Article 133-ter of Italian Finance Act
2009
5 December 2019
BANK OF ITALY
BANK OF ITALY
2015 2014
26 June 2013
4 March 2014
CONSOB
Combined regulations AIFMS/UCITS V
2018
2019
Update Regolamento Emittenti according SRD II
2020
2017 21 December 2015
1 January 2017
2021 1 January 2018
April 2019
EU: DIRECTIVE 2013/36/EU (CRDIV) REGULATION 575/2013 (CRR)
EU: REGULATION 604/2014 IDENTIFIED STAFF
EBA GUIDELINES ON REM POLICIES AND PRACTICES
ESMA
ESMA
EU: DIRECTIVE 2019/878/EU (CRDV) REGULATION 2019/876 (CRRII)
New Directive and Regulation on capital requirements (CRD IV and CRR)
Identification of staff with a material risk on an institution’s risk profile
EBA publishes guidelines on sound remuneration, with effect from 2017
New ESMA guidelines on remuneration and incentivization for GEFIA and UCITS
Guidelines on remuneration policies and practices related to the sale and provision of retail banking products and services
New Directive and Regulation on capital requirements (CRDV and CRRII)
European Directives: AIFMD/GEFIA July 2014 UCITS V March 2016
MIFID II
17 May 2017 CEBS (later to become EBA) issues guidelines on sound remuneration
EU: DIRECTIVE 2017/828
Shareholder Rights Directive II
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 2009 - G20: Financial Stability Board: Principles and Implementation Standards for Sound Compensation Practices Global Regulation
March 2018 - Supplementary Guidance to the FSB Principles and Standards on Sound Compensation Practices The use of compensation tools to address misconduct risk EU Directives Guidelines
Multinational Regulation
EU Regulation
Shareholders’ Rights Directive 2
CRD IV – CRR CRD V – CRR II
EBA Guidelines
AIFMD ESMA Guidelines
UCITS V ESMA Guidelines
Solvency II
Applies to:
Listed Companies
Banks, Banking Groups, Investment Firms (in Italy this includes brokers or SIM)
Banks, Banking Groups and Investment Firms
Alternative Investment Management companies
Società di gestione di investimenti “armonizzati”
Insurance Companies
Implementation Date
3 September 2018
1 January 2014 CRD V to be implemented by end2020 (Local transposition by Bankit currently under consultation)
31 December 2021 (published 2 July 2021)
Regulation in Italy
TUF - updated by Dlgs 49/2019 on 10 June 2019 Regolamento Emittenti – 11 December 2020
Other Regulations
Bank of Italy Supervisory Instructions – circular no. 285, 25th update, 23 October 2018 (New consultation opened on 18 November 2020 for CRD V local transposition)
ESMA Guidelines on Remuneration Policies under the UCITS Directive and AIFMD 31 March 2016 (1 January 2017)
Bank of Italy Regulation – 5 December 2019
In line with CRD V, update of Bank of Italy Circ. 285 (currently under consultation) foresees for SGR included in Banking groups the prevalence of sector regulation (vs Banking regulation)
1 January 2016
Non-EU: Domestic Regulation
Some countries have drafted guidelines based on FSB principles (USA, Australia, Switzerland, Russia, etc.). Other countries, especially non-EU IVASS regulation no. member states, have not issued any 38 of 3 July 2018 regulation.
EBA Guidelines on remuneration policies and practices related to the sale and provision of retail banking products and services (18 January 2018) Bank of Italy: Regulations on transparency of operations and banking and financial services – proper conduct in relations between intermediaries and clients (19 March 2019)
EIOPA Opinion on the supervision of remuneration principles in the insurance and reinsurance sector – ESMA Guidelines – MiFID II (Institutions providing investment services: Banks, Asset Managers, 7 April 2020 Brokers, etc.) – June 2013 MiFID II - January 2018
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT MEDIOBANCA’S GOVERNING BODIES DEVOTE PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO STAFF AND REMUNERATION POLICIES, ALSO IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED BY THE SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES.
These include, in particular: The European Capital Requirements Directive (CRD V), already in place and currently in adoption by the individual European Union countries, which updates the previous CRD IV. The new regulatory Technical Standards to identify risk takers published by EU on 9 June 2021 and based on EBA RTS of 18 June 2020 effective from January 2021; The document issued by the European Banking Authority (EBA) on 2 July 2021 and effective from 31 December 2021 containing the new guidelines on remuneration formulated pursuant to CRD V, and providing guidance for standardized implementation of the regulations at European level. “Instructions on remuneration and incentive policies and practices in banks and banking groups” issued by the Bank of Italy on 26 October 2018 (the “Instructions”), which implement the European regulatory framework and are the new benchmark regulations, incorporating and building on the principles and standards agreed internationally, as part of measures designed to ensure the stability and proper functioning of the banking and financial system (currently under revision). Some Group companies (notably MB SGR, Cairn and RAM) are also subject to the AIFMD/UCITS regulations. Other relevant documents are EBA/Bank of Italy regulations about retail banking product and transparency of operations and upcoming ESG documents and guidelines. As listed company Mediobanca needs to be compliant to Regolamento Emittenti, SRD II and Italian Corporate Governance Code. The Mediobanca Group remunerations policies are the result of ongoing alignment versus the supervisory authorities via the Joint Supervisory Team, with whom the key aspects have been gradually shared in the course of time with reference in particular to the performance metrics and models adopted.
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT The fundamental points of the regulations provide that: Variable remuneration is calculated based on performance indicators which factor in risk (otherwise referred to as risk-adjusted metrics) For Group staff members identified as Material Risk Takers, at least 40% of the variable remuneration payable to them must be paid over a period of at least three years, four with the new regulations (or 60% over five years for senior management staff), and at least 50% must be paid in the form of shares (this applies both to the upfront and deferred components) The variable component may not exceed 200% of the beneficiary’s fixed salary, unless otherwise provided by the Articles of Association and approved by shareholders in annual general meeting. Exceptions are put in place for Asset Management Sector (in Mediobanca Group cap of 500%). According new CRD V regulation, firms in a Banking Group regulated by specific sectorial rules (Asset Management, Investment firm) are subject to them; entities without specific regulation (Fintech, Advisory/M&A) are fully subject to banking Group rules/CRD. Variable remuneration payable to members of the control units must be limited and related exclusively to the achievement of general sustainability objectives Provision must be made for malus and clawback mechanisms to reflect performances delivered over time and/or individual conduct The treatment of remuneration for staff members who cease to work for the Mediobanca Group is negotiated and agreed in accordance with the criteria set by the shareholders in annual general meeting
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
REMUNERATION PRINCIPLES AND GOVERNANCE
GUIDELINES
PRINCIPLES
TRANSPARENCY AND SUSTAINABILITY
COMPETITIVENESS
VALUE MERIT & PERFORMANCE
NO “PAY FOR FAILURE”
GOVERNANCE & COMPLIANCE
Attract and retain talent. Guarantee adequate pay mix.
Variable compensation strongly related to results.
Significant equity component. Variable remuneration deferral (performance conditions, malus and claw back clauses).
RISK-ADJUSTED
SHORT-TERM REMUNERATION
LONG-TERM APPROACH
SEVERANCE
Gateways linked to Risk Appetite Framework, Bonus Pools calculated based on Economic Profit/ROAC/risk adjusted metrics. Malus conditions applied. Claw back in the event of damages on MB’s capital base, profitability, financial results and/or reputation.
Targets set at the beginning of the FY (budget targets and quantitative KPIs). Non-financial and qualitative criteria applied to foster l/t value creation. Cap applied to mitigate risk appetite. Mandatory deferral policy.
Performance targets to ensure a solid capital base, adequate liquidity ratios, profitable results and appropriate risk management. Total variable compensation vesting over no less than 3Y, 5Y for senior executives.
No golden parachutes for directors in the event of voluntary or involuntary termination. Severance for Executives and MRT population: max 24 months of remuneration capped at €5m.
Structure of remuneration in line with the Italian law and market practices.
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
REMUNERATION PRINCIPLES AND GOVERNANCE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING Shareholders in general meeting, within the terms set by the regulations in force at the time, approve the remuneration and incentivization policies and compensation schemes based on financial instruments for Group directors, staff and collaborators, and set the criteria for establishing compensation to be agreed in the event of a beneficiary leaving the company or office, including the limits on annual fixed salary and the maximum amounts payable as a result of the policies’ application.
BOARD OF DIRECTORS The Board of Directors compiles the staff remuneration and incentivization policy, reviews it at least once a year and is responsible for ensuring it is applied correctly in practice .The Board also approves the results of the Material Risk-Takers identification process, including any exclusions; ensures that these systems are consistent with the Bank’s overall choices in terms of risk-taking, strategies, long-term objectives, corporate governance structure and internal controls system; and ensures that the remuneration and incentivization systems are able to guarantee compliance with the legal, regulatory and statutory provisions.
REMUNERATION COMMITTEE Composition: 5 non-executive members, all independent. Consultative role regarding General Manager, Executive Directors and staff remuneration and retention policies. Activities include: Reviews and assesses remuneration proposals and guidelines put forward by the CEO. Serves in an advisory capacity for decisions regarding the criteria to be used for compensation payable to all identified staff. Regularly reviews (through benchmarks & market practice analysis, regulatory framework and Bank of Italy recommendations) the adequacy, congruity, adherence and application of remunerations policies. Verifies performance achievements involving all relevant company units in devising and checking the remuneration and incentive policies and practices.
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER The CEO presents the proposed Group staff remuneration and incentivization policies to the governing bodies, is responsible for staff management, and after consulting with the General Manager, determines the variable remuneration based on the criteria established by the Board of Directors and then distributes it. 8
STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
INTERNAL GOVERNANCE PROCESS VARIOUS PARTIES ARE INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS OF DRAWING UP MEDIOBANCA STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES.
In particular: Group HR directs and guides the entire process, with the support of the governing bodies, control units and other teams responsible for verifying the Group’s earnings and financial data. The Planning, Accounting and Financial Reporting unit provides the data for verifying that the gateways have been met and determining the performances of the business lines based on the results achieved. The Risk Management unit helps in setting the metrics to be used to calculate the risk-adjusted company performance, in validating the results, and in checking that these are consistent with the Risk Appetite Framework. The Compliance unit carries out an annual assessment of the remuneration policies compliance with the applicable regulatory framework in order to prevent any legal or reputational risks. Along with the other control units, it is also responsible for verifying compliance breaches which are material for the purposes of performance evaluation and the award of variable remuneration. The Compliance unit is also involved in the processes of reviewing, adapting and managing the remuneration systems to ensure they are in line with current regulations. The Group Audit unit certifies that the staff remuneration and incentive policy adopted by the Bank complies with regulations. It also carries out annual controls on data and process, and brings any irregularities to the attention of the competent bodies so that the appropriate corrective measures can be adopted.
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
COMPONENTS OF REMUNERATION Reflects technical, professional and managerial capabilities, and the related responsibilities.
FIXED SALARY
Adapted to the market environment. Mediobanca avoids excessive reliance on the variable component of remuneration, while at the same time being careful not to make the overall package unduly rigid (balanced pay mix).
Functions as a recognition and reward for targets set and results achieved. Calculated based on risk-adjusted indicators. An important motivational tool.
VARIABLE REMUNERATION
Paid partly upfront and partly in subsequent years, subject to performance conditions being met, as well as a malus condition and clawbacks. Paid partly in cash and partly through equity instruments. Subject to a cap of 200% of fixed remuneration with the exception of asset management companies of the Group (500%).
An integral part of the compensation package for Mediobanca’s staff, in line with market practices.
BENEFITS
Principally consist of pension, insurance, healthcare schemes and company welfare/flexible benefit schemes. May be differentiated according to professional groups and geographical areas, but do not involve individual discretionary assessments.
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
MEDIOBANCA REMUNERATION FRAMEWORK When they are met, these conditions trigger the activation of the bonus pool for Material Risk Takers and its disbursement. The following indicators (“gateways”) must be satisfied. Capital adequacy and liquidity requirements, based on the risk measures adopted in the Risk Appetite Framework (CET 1 ratio, Leverage ratio, AFR/ ECAP, Liquidity Coverage Ratio, Net Stable Funding Ratio). The Risk Appetite Framework is approved by the Board of Directors. It identifies the risks the Bank is willing to assume and sets the objectives and limits for each risk in normal and stressed conditions, identifying the operational measures needed to bring the risk back within the set target. Operating profit at Group level. At the proposal of the Chief Executive Officer and subject to approval of the Remunerations Committee, the Board of Directors may – exceptionally and for retention purposes – authorise disbursement of a bonus pool on an individual basis, even if the gateways are not met.
GATEWAYS 2020
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
MEDIOBANCA REMUNERATION FRAMEWORK Total variable remuneration is determined on the basis of the risk-adjusted earnings performance of the divisions by which staff are employed (Economic Profit and/or ROAC and/or other risk-adjusted metrics) and by other secondary quantitative and qualitative objectives. The annual variable remuneration component for CEO and General Manager is included in the aggregate bonus pool and reflects the achievement of the quantitative and qualitative targets assigned in individual scorecards approved by the Board of Directors. In general terms, if the financial objectives are met, the amount of the bonus payable to the them may be between 50% and 150% of their gross annual salary. This amount may be adjusted by the BoD according to whether or not the non financial objectives are also met up to a maximum cap of 160%. The Board of Director has approved a long term incentive plan for CEO and GM related to achievement of the strategic plan’s objectives in a range from 20% to 40% of the value of annual fixed remuneration for each year of the strategic plan’s. For staff employed at units which perform staffing and support duties and at the control units, both for Mediobanca S.p.A. and the Group companies, the variable remuneration is determined based on the general economic sustainability with only a limited correlation to the earnings results, i.e. fundamentally on the basis of qualitative considerations, to strengthen the guarantees of their role remaining independent.
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
WHOLESALE BANKING DIVISION The variable remuneration for the Wholesale Banking division consists of a share of the Economic Profit booked and generated by the division itself during the reference financial year (the “top down” pool). Economic Profit (EP) is defined as the pre-tax profit earned by the division, net of variable labour costs and minus the cost (not booked) of regulatory capital required in order to perform its business: in other words, it measures the extra profit generated once capital has been remunerated. This amount is then compared with the sum of the bonus pools resulting from the scorecards assigned to the individual business units (the “bottom up” pool) which also use Economic Profit or other risk adjusted metrics depending on the nature of the business and activity as their primary metric along with other secondary quantitative metrics (which include cross-selling activities and reference to budget objectives) and qualitative metrics (management of the business/team and compliance issues). A cap is set. Scorecards may be fine-tuned to ensure that overall sustainability is maintained. The aggregate bonus pool thus reflects a balance between the need to reward the value created by the individual products/business units and the need to ensure overall financial sustainability vis-à-vis profits generated.
BUSINESS UNIT SCORECARDS (BOTTOM UP)
WB DIVISION BONUS POOL (“TOP DOWN”)
EQUITY RESEARCH
CIB CLIENT
INVESTMENT BANKING DIVISION
Corporate Finance
Equity Capital Market
DEBT DIVISION
DCM
MARKET DIVISION
DOT Sales
LSF
Syndication
Trading & Structuring
TRADING PORTFOLIO
EQUITY & DERIV. TRADING
Geographies
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
PRIVATE BANKING DIVISION PRIVATE BANKING: SINGLE DIVISION SCORECARD WITH ALLOCATION TO UNITS AND INDIVIDUALS BASED ON MANAGEMENT REPORTING WHICH SHOWS CONTRIBUTIONS OF BOTH TEAM AND INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS
The bonus pool for the Private Banking division too is established by applying a payout to the ex ante results (ordinary gross operating profit), net of the cost of risk, consistent with a performance assessment based mostly on fee-related driver. To determine the bonus pool secondary quantitative metrics (e.g. intercompany cross selling, conversion of liquidity/AUA into more remunerative asset forms, operational risk assessment) and qualitative metrics (e.g. management of resources and compliance with internal and external regulations) are also applied. The division and its bankers are thus incentivized to offer their clients high-quality investments and at the same time to preserve and increase the assets entrusted to them, while guaranteeing growing AUM and a stable revenue base for the Bank itself.
MEDIOBANCA PRIVATE BANKING
Ultra High Net Worth Individuals
High Net Worth Individual PB Network and HNWIs, Milan
International Offering Institutional Clients and HNWIs, Milan
Senior Executive Banker
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
CONSUMER BANKING AND WEALTH MANAGEMENT/ AFFLUENT & PREMIER Mediobanca co-ordinates the activities of the principal Group companies, respecting the specific characteristics of the sectors in which they operate and their respective organizational structures. In particular it presides of the process of defining their identified staff, issues guidelines to be adopted, and contributes to the preparation of the Remuneration policies approved annually by the individual banks in the Banking Group in accordance with the Group policies. At the Group companies too, a variable remuneration component is paid to identified staff in accordance and compliance with the risk profile set in the respective Risk Appetite Framework. The variable component for Identified Staff at Compass and CheBanca! is established on the basis of individual scorecards (MBO) based on risk-adjusted earnings performance indicators (i.e. the Economic Profit metric) and non-financial/qualitative criteria. For headquarters units the decision is made primarily on the basis of qualitative criteria.
COMPASS
CHEBANCA!
The incentivization system is based on the assignment of commercial and credit objectives at branch level rather than for individual staf members.
The system is based on commercial business objectives being set at both individual and team level. No incentives are based on individual products.
The performance criteria for the commercial network are balanced between targets based on volumes and quality of risk taken, with caps set both at branch and individual level.
The weightings for each of the two components and the relevant target bonus are based on the recipient’s role, with a cap set in both relative (percentage) and absolute terms.
Payment of the bonus is subject to deferral, to application of malus conditions and clawback in the event of damages to capital, earnings, financial results and/or reputational issues, in the same way as the remunerations policy of Mediobanca S.p.A.
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
HOW THE INCENTIVE PLAN WORKS The annual cycle of the individual performance evaluation process.
Individual awards
Awards to individual staff are made on the basis of an overall evaluation of the individual’s qualitative and quantitative performance. The annual bonus is allocated to individual beneficiaries through a shared and recorded annual performance evaluation process based on merit and professional quality, with particular attention to issues of compliance.
July/August Objective Planning
The Performance Evaluation process consists of three phases:
Objective Planning Mid Year Feedback Year End Review
Feedback Year End Review
June
Mid Year Feedback
February/March
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
HOW THE INCENTIVE PLAN WORKS THE ALLOCATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL VARIABLE COMPONENT IS THE RESULT OF VARIOUS DECISIONMAKING STEPS
The annual bonus is allocated to the individual beneficiaries through a process that must be recorded and repeatable. 1) At the start of the year, senior staff allocate professional, managerial, personal and company objectives in line with corporate strategies and targets. The objectives are duly weighted and clearly set out and are designed to be both achievable and challenging within a set time frame. 2) the senior staff then evaluate each staff member on the basis of the objectives set. Ongoing feedback throughout the year also allows the line manager and staff to agree on the expected performance, ensuring that each staff member has the right characteristics to ensure achievement of objectives, with an opportunity to objectively discuss individual performance. 3) at the end of the year, the Chief Executive Officer and senior management decide on awarding the individual bonuses, based on the bonus pool set following the performance evaluation for the Group and for the individual business units. The individual bonuses are based on an evaluation that is discretionary, but traceable and guided through the performance evaluation process, based on merit and professional skills.
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
HOW THE INCENTIVE PLAN WORKS THE PAYMENT OF THE VARIABLE COMPONENT OF THE REMUNERATION IS ESTABLISHED BASED ON THE FOLLOWING STRUCTURE
1) A substantial proportion of the variable component is deferred in time and disbursed in the form of equity instruments, in order to link incentives to long-term value creation and to verify the continuity of the company’s results. 2) the upfront component and the deferred variable remuneration are paid 50% in cash and 50% in equity instruments. 3) After the vesting period, the equity instruments are subject to a further retention holding period of one year. 4) Particular emphasis is given to proper individual conduct (compliance breach) in observance of the provisions of the Code of Ethics, the Organisational Model, and Business Conduct Policy, and in general with the principles established by regulations, operational procedures and processes, particularly those considered to be most relevant in terms of reputational risk. 5) A clawback mechanism has been instituted for cases of conduct which have caused the Bank losses, for instances of fraud and wilful misconduct. 6) Staff members are not allowed to use hedging or insurance strategies on their remuneration or other aspects which could alter or otherwise distort the risk alignment effects inherent in the compensation mechanisms, especially if they refer to the variable component paid in the form of financial instruments.
Payment Time Frame (Cash Flow) Since the results are evaluated over a multi-year time frame, part of the bonuses awarded is deferred over time. The deferral currently varies from 3 to 5 years.
Ex-Post Adjustment (Malus – Compliance breach) This is the verification of the performance conditions, aimed at guaranteeing the sustainability of the results achieved, also at the business unit level, maintaining the Company’s solidity and liquidity, and ensuring appropriate conduct by the individual. 18
STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
REMUNERATION SYSTEM FOR FINANCIAL ADVISORS Financial Advisors are professional figures linked to the company by an agency contract which allows them, without representing the company, to promote and sell financial products/services on an independent and exclusive basis, and to provide advice to clients acquired and/or assigned, with all the diligence required in order to achieve the company’s objectives. By virtue of the independent nature of the employment relationship, the FAs’ remuneration is wholly variable, but conventionally it tends to be described as consisting of recurring and non-recurring compensation components.
Recurring compensation (equivalent to fixed remuneration component under normal employment contract) The remuneration component which is distinct from the “non-recurring” component, and represents the most stable and ordinary part of the compensation. It mostly consists of different types of commissions: linked to sale, maintenance or management. Such commissions are not in themselves incentivizing in nature.
Non-recurring compensation (equivalent to variable remuneration component under normal employment contract) The remuneration component which is incentivizing in nature (linked, for example, to the increase in volumes of net deposits, beating certain product benchmarks, launch of new products, LTI schemes over long-term horizons, etc.).
At 31 December 2020 CheBanca! has a network of 429 FAs. Among the non-recurring component , there is currently in place for the FAs of CheBanca! an incentive system linked to the new production developed in a given period (about 100 FA) and a multi-year plan for assessing the performance achieved (about 10 CF). 19
STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
MATERIAL RISK TAKERS POPULATION The criteria used to identify staff with a material impact on Mediobanca Group’s risk profile (material risk takers or “identified staff”) are those published by EU in June 2021. Qualitative, linked to the role held within the company organisation (including non-executive directors), material business units, control and staff functions. Quantitative, based on total overall remuneration received in the previous financial year.
Mediobanca regularly analyses its organisational structure via a documented process to identify staff that have an impact on its risk profile. Based on the criteria established by the current regulations, the Group has 97 identified staff as of July 2021 (the figure increases to 110 if non-executive directors are included). The identified staff (“material risk takers”) comprises of the Directors of Mediobanca, Executives of the Group, senior management and heads of material business units within the Parent Company and its subsidiaries, other staff with managerial responsibilities in material business units, and staff with a total remuneration above €750,000 (or above €500,000 and the average of the TC of Directors both executive and non-executive and senior management). In addition to the staff involved in business operations, the population includes the heads and senior figures of the control functions as well as staff and support areas. 20
STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
PERFORMANCE SHARES The performance share scheme provides for the assignment, under certain conditions, of Mediobanca shares free-of-charge to be allocated at the end of the vesting and/or holding periods.
Equity instrument
Used as a component of the variable remuneration
Free-of-charge assignment of shares to the employee (partly upfront, partly deferred) subject to the achievement of set performance objectives referring to a specific period of time, with the possibility of holding periods.
The shares are made available after a holding and/or vesting period provided the beneficiary is still an employee of the Group and the performance conditions have been met.
In connection with the equity instruments to be used as components of staff remuneration, Mediobanca has adopted a performance share scheme, which was approved by shareholders at a general meeting held on 28 October 2020. The scheme involves the award of shares to employees. The shares are allocated at the end of a vesting period of at least three years – except for the amount envisaged for the upfront portion – provided the beneficiary is still an employee of the Group and the performance conditions have been met regarding the sustainability of the results achieved, also at the business unit level, with the maintenance of the Company’s solidity and liquidity, and appropriate conduct by the individual. The performance shares allocated as the deferred equity portion, after verification of the satisfaction of the performance conditions for the year of reference, are subject to an additional annual holding period prior to their actual allocation. Also the performance shares awarded upfront are subject to a one year holding period prior to their actual allocation. For staff employed in the asset management area, the deferral involves fund stock units or cash instruments linked to them. 21
STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
DEFERRAL MECHANISM IN ORDER TO TIE THE INCENTIVES FOR IDENTIFIED STAFF TO LONG-TERM VALUE CREATION, PART OF THE VARIABLE REMUNERATION IS DEFERRED OVER TIME THROUGH THE DEFERRAL MECHANISM
The deferral mechanism is based on the following rules: The deferral period is actually set at three years (five years for senior management) The deferral amounts are differentiated based on the impact on risks of the categories identified and amount of variable remuneration The equity part of the deferred remuneration has a holding period of 1 year after verification of the performance conditions, before the shares actually become available. The upfront equity part has also a holding period of 1 year Mediobanca also defers 30% over a three-year time period, entirely in cash and subject to a malus condition, to all staff not included in the scope of identified staff who receive variable remuneration equal to or above €100,000.
YEAR T
T+1
T+2
T+3
T+4
Senior management with variable ≥ € 425.000
20% cash upfront
20% equity upfront
13% cash deferred
11% equity deferred
11% equity deferred
Senior management with variable < € 425.000
20% cash upfront
20% equity upfront
11% cash deferred
9% equity deferred
10% equity deferred
Others Material Risk Takers with variable ≥ € 425.000
20% cash upfront
20% equity upfront
15% equity deferred
15% equity deferred
5% cash deferred
10% cash deferred
15% cash deferred
Others Material Risk Takers with variable < € 425.000
30% cash upfront
10% equity deferred
10% equity deferred
10% cash deferred
10% cash deferred
30% equity upfront
T+5 11% equity deferred 14% cash deferred 9% equity deferred 11% cash deferred
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
SEVERANCE AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES There are no provisions for compensation for directors upon termination of their office. As provided by the regulations, the Articles of Association and the Remuneration Policy, the shareholders in ordinary general meeting are responsible to determine the compensation awarded in the event of early termination of employment relationships or early termination of the office, including the limits in terms of annual fixed remuneration entitlements and the maximum amount resulting from their application. The regulations also establish that the compensation agreed in view of or upon early termination of the employment relationship or early termination of the office must be linked to the performance achieved and the risks assumed by the person and the Bank. Amounts agreed and/or paid as severance under the terms of an agreement between the Bank and staff in order to settle a dispute which has already arisen (or at least is feared with good reason) are therefore determined on the basis of the formula defined in the Remuneration policy.
1. Severance
Maximum of 24 monthly payments at full pay.
2. Maximum amount
€5m
3. Means of payment
For identified staff included in clusters 2 and 3 the methods and timescales provided for in making severance payments follow payment’s method of variable remuneration. For the remaining clusters, forms of deferral and risk adjustment can be applied by the most appropriate methods.
4. Malus condition
Court-proven fraud and/or wilful misconduct to the detriment of the Bank with individual liability of the employee concerned.
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STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
CONSENSUS FOR REMUNERATIONS POLICIES FOR 2016-20 Since 2014, a strategy has been launched for consistent engagement with investors and proxy advisors, in conjunction with the other company units responsible for contacting investors (Investor Relations) or involved by other resolutions (Group Corporate Affairs) consistent with the increase in the representation of institutional investors in the share capital. This dialogue with the market has served to improve results at AGMs over the past five years: overall consensus has consistently averaged 97%, at the top of the Italian Banking sector.
Annual general meeting Mediobanca - Vote “For” of shares for which a vote has been expressed
In Italy, in the past five years there has been a general reduction in institutional investor support for remuneration policies. The number of negative recommendations expressed by ISS in 2020 AGMs, was 32% for Remuneration Policy and 38% for Reports of the total companies included in the FTSE MIB index. The main points being challenged as in the past are the following: Lack of or insufficient disclosure of performance indicators and/or specific targets of incentivization schemes (short- and/or long-term, ex ante and ex post); Lack of clear alignment between remuneration and company performances Overall amount, including in absolute terms, of severance pay for the posts of General Manager and CEO Possibility of paying discretionary bonuses (which must be limited and subject to adequate disclosure) Lack of ESG indicators both quantitative and qualitative 24
STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
SHAREHOLDER VOTES: BENCHMARKING 2020
ITALY
EUROPE
FOR - Remuneration Policy 2020 - 2017 100%
97,9% 97,1%
96,7%
97,0%
96,8%
95% 90,1%
90%
98,0% 97,1%
95,7% 94,9%
90,6%
FOR - Remuneration Policy 2020 99,4% 93,7% 95,1% 93,5%
97,5% 96,5% 94,8%
98,9% 95,9% 95,0%
98,36%
97,36%
97,30%
96,79%
96,70%
96,29%
94,80%
94,38%
91,69%
88,33%
85,80%
Commerzbank
HSBC
SocGen
Deutsche Bank
Mediobanca
BARCLAYS
BBVA
SANTANDER
Natixis
Credite Agricole
BNP Paribas
89,7%
87,8%
87,1%
85% 80%
FOR - Remuneration Report 96,4% excl. Delfin
100% 95%
FOR - Remuneration Report 95,8%
92,4%
98,6% 94,7%
95,9%
96,661%
96,71%
96,47%
95,78%
93,74%
92,46%
91,09%
86,90%
81,10%
BARCLAYS
SANTANDER
BBVA
Natixis
BNP Paribas
Me diobanca
90% 85%
81,1%
80%
*
75% 70%
96,4% Credite Agricole
SocGen
HSBC
Mediobanca excl. Delfin
Vote “For” of shares for which a vote has been expressed
25
STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
MB CEO – GM SCORECARDS FY 2020 CEO Total compensation evolution / GOP (€m) 10
1.140
1.057
8
949
855
6
736
4 2 0
2,1
2,7
2,5
2,7
1,9
1,9
1,9
1,9
1,8
15/16
16/17
17/18
18/19
19/20
Base salary + Emolument
Variable
FY 2020 CEO PARAMETER
GM Total compensation evolution / GOP (€m) 1350
1,0
1150
8
950
6
750
4
550 350
Gross Operating Profit
2 0
35%
ALMOST MET
RWA density
25%
EXCEEDED
Total fee revenues
20%
% of AUM/AUA/AUC on TFA CSR development initiatives WM, Consumer, CIB distribution platform enhancement
qualitative
1350
1.140
1.057
949
855
750 2,1
2,1
1,9
1,6
1,6
1,6
1,6
1,5
15/16
16/17
17/18
18/19
19/20
1,1
1150 950
736
Base salary + Emolument
WEIGHT ASSESSMENT
Gross ROAC adj. Banking activities
FY 2021 CEO PARAMETER
10
Variable
FY 2020 GM PARAMETER
1,2
550 350
Gross Operating Profit
WEIGHT ASSESSMENT
Gross ROAC adj. Banking activities
35%
RWA density
20%
EXCEEDED
ALMOST MET
Banking activities cost/income ratio
20%
ALMOST MET
20%
ALMOST MET
Wealth Management ROAC
25%
EXCEEDED
qualitative
MET
IT projects (Data Quality & IT Growth to the business)
qualitative
MET
MET
WM sinergies (proprietary factories with distribution)
qualitative
MET
WEIGHT
FY 2021 GM PARAMETER
ALMOST MET
WEIGHT
Gross ROAC adj. Banking activities
30%
Gross ROAC adj. Banking activities
25%
Cost of risk
30%
Cost of risk
25%
RWA density
20%
Banking activities cost/income ratio
20%
Total Fees/banking revenues
20%
Wealth Management ROAC
30%
CSR development initiatives on diversity, inclusion & engagement
qualitative
Developement of Agile and smart working platform & initiatives
qualitative
WM & Consumer distribution platform enhancement
qualitative
WM sinergies (proprietary factories with distribution)
qualitative
STOCK OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENT CEO and GM are obliged to reinvest in Mediobanca shares and retain for their entire mandate an equivalent amount of twice fixed remuneration for the CEO and one times for GM
CEO / STAFF PAY RATIO 2020 CEO’s gross total compensation / average gross total compensation for Group staff members approx. 33x (vs 55x last year)
PEER GROUP For the CEO the peer group comprises a mixture of midcap firms which are comparable to Mediobanca in terms of either business model taken as a whole or individual segment of activity represented within the Group (i.e. advisory, asset management, innovative retail, etc.): these include Close Brothers, Lazard, Julius Baer Group, Macquarie, Vontobel, Bankinter, Schroders, Fineco Bank and Banca Generali.
26
STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
MB CEO/MB GM/CEO COMPASS-CB! LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN FINANCIAL TARGETS … EVALUATION TIMEFRAME
BENEFICIARIES
STI/LTI PAY MIX
The 4 FY from FY 2019-20 to FY 2022-23
CEO, Mediobanca GM, Mediobanca CEO CheBanca!/Compass
On an annual basis, pay mix maximum 80% STI -20% LTI (maximum of 160% STI/40% LTI given the 2:1 cap)
KPI
Growth
Profitability
Capitalization
EPS Growth
Group ROTE
CET 1 ²
Weighting
33%
34%
33%
Target KPI Plan 2023
4%
11%
13.5%
OTHER FEATURES ACCORDING TO REMUNERATION POLICY RULES Gateways Payment (2023-2028) Malus and Clawback
Assessment criteria KPI threshold
% fixed annual salary – plan time horizon¹
> 5%
40%
4-5%
30-40%
4%
30%
3-4%
20%
< 3%
0
> 12.1%
40%
11-12.1%
30-40%
11%
30%
10-11%
20%
< 10%
0
>13.5%
40%
13-13.5%
20-40%
< 13%
0
1) Where a range is stated, the figure is quantified by linear interpolation 2) Conditional upon shareholder remuneration of up to €2.5bn over four years (€1.9bn cash dividends and €0.3-0.6bn share buyback with cancellation) and assuming no change in regulatory requisites
27
STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
… AS WELL AS NON-FINANCIAL IN ORDER TO SPEED UP THE EVOLUTION OF ESG CULTURE WITHIN THE GROUP The BoD may adjust the variable LTI component by a percentage that ranges from -10% to +15% (without prejudice to the annual 40% cap in relation to achievement of the financial objectives) according to the achievement of the non-financial/qualitative objectives. The non-financial/qualitative objectives have equal weighting, to be assessed individually.
KPI
Assessment criteria
Average hours training up 25%
Corporate Social Responsibility Targets (Global Goals SDG UN)
AM: 100% of new investments selected using ESG and financial criteria €700m to be invested in outstanding Italian SMEs 30% increase in ESG products in clients’ portfolios €4m per annum earmarked for projects with positive social/environmental impact
-5% / +7.5% quantitative financial results
Customer satisfaction: CheBanca! CSI in core segments @73, NPS @25 - Compass: CSI @85, NPS @55 Energy: 92% from renewable resources, CO2 emissions to be cut by 15%; hybrid cars @90% of MB fleet CheBanca! green mortgages up 50%
Relative performance Total shareholder return
MB stock relative performance vs Total Shareholder Return index (TSR: assumes dividends are reinvested) for 26 leading European banks (Euro Stoxx Banks – code SX7GT-STX), of which Mediobanca is part
-5% /+7.5% quantitative financial results 28
STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
FY20 MAIN BONUS POOLS STABLE ON RESULTS WHOLESALE BANKING (€m) Consistency of the “pay for performance”: • pool down for WB • stability for the main divisions despite positive results, in line with the general performance of the Group The variable component assigned to the MRT Groups affects CET 1 by approximately 3 bps (€ 20.5 million vs. € 31.7 in 2019, -35%)
60
9,2%
6,6% 47,6
20 0
FY18 Bonus pool
0,7% 8,7%
19,2
30,5
FY19
4% 11,0
FY20
di cui MRT
2% 0%
0,7%
14
6,7
6 4
0,6%
12
1,6
2 0
1,0
FY18 MBP B
2,1 FY19
SG R
di cui MRT
1,7
2,0 2,0 FY20 Bonus pool/reven ues
4 2 0
7,0 1,6
7,3 1,8
6,4 1,3
FY18
FY19
FY 20
Bonus pool
di cui MRT
5%
3,7%
15
3,6%
4% 3%
10 5
11,5
0,7
0,4
0
FY18
1%
0,6
FY19
Bonus pool
2%
11,2
11,0
0%
FY20
di cui MRT
Bonus pool/revenues
HOLDING FUNCTION, PI, MB MAAM (€m)
8 6
7,7
7,2
3,9%
Bonus pool/revenues
10
10 8
6%
48,2 19,4
10
8%
20
COMPASS (€m)
10,7%
9,7%
10%
40
MBPB-MB SGR (€m) 14 12
12%
10,0%
50 30
CheBanca! (€m)
Bonus pool/revenues
1% 1% 30 1% 25 0% 20 0% 15 0% 10 0% 0%5 0%0
14,5
14,1 8,3 2,1
2,5
FY18 Holding functions
8,2 2,1
10,2
2,0
FY19 Tesoreria
5,5 1,8
1,5
FY20 PI+MB MAAM
di cui MRT
29
STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
GROUP PAY MIX AND VARIABLE/FIXED REMUNERATION RATIO 2020 VARIABLE REMUNERATION DISTRIBUTION BY MB GROUP ACTIVITY (% ON TOTAL BONUS POOL)
CEO & GM 2%
Central and Control functions 18%
Asset Management 8% Private banking 16%
VARIABLE REMUNERATION/FIXED SALARY BY ACTIVITY 1(%)
Investment banking 40%
Retail& Consumer 16%
Investment banking (business) CEO & GM
Central & ctrl. functions (non business)
65,0%
200% variable limit
1) EBA classification
16,4% 46,5%
56,2%
FY20 avg.: 25% FY19 avg.: 31% Retail& Consumer (business)
9,8% 44,2%
Private banking (business)
Asset Management (business)
30
STAFF REMUNERATION POLICIES
CONTENTS ARE BASED ON MEDIOBANCA GROUP REMUNERATION POLICY APPROVED BY AGM OF 28TH OCTOBER 2020
GROUP HR GROUP HR GOVERNANCE AND REWARD JULY 2021
31