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enough force to overwhelm the enemy defences and as such 6,939 vessels were utilised to deploy over 160,000 troops over five beaches on the 6th June.11 The lack of surprise and secrecy during the lead up to the Dieppe raid meant that the momentum of the invasion was lost from the start and as such a monumental emphasis was placed on deception and the element of surprise for the DDay landings. Operation BODYGUARD was a high-level World War II deception plan to mislead German High Command to the exact date and location of the invasion. The main Operation within BODYGUARD was Operation FORTITUDE which was the creation of fake field armies, being the 1st U.S Army Group (FUSAG), to mislead the enemy into believing the invasions would happen in Norway and Calais. German double agents within Britain were used to send false information back to the Fatherland, unencrypted wireless traffic from nonexistent units were sent freely and dummy airfields, infrastructure and equipment were established on the SouthEast coast of England in order to further deceive the enemy. The tactics were so effective that in a decrypted message between the Japanese Government and Hitler, Hitler stated: “I think that diversionary actions will take place in a number of places - against Norway, Denmark, the southern part of western France, and the French Mediterranean coast but with the main attack force will invade across the Straits of Dover.”12 Operation BODYGUARD was a huge success ensuring surprise was maintained for the D-Day landings. Hitler was so concerned with the proposed invasion of Calais that he was convinced that the Normandy landing were in fact a deception and delayed sending reinforcements to Normandy which gave the Allies enough time to secure an effective beachhead. General Omar Bradley, Field commander of US Forces in Europe quoted Operation Bodyguard to be “The single biggest hoax of the war.”13 In conclusion, the Dieppe raid was a tactical and operational disaster and suffered from a myriad of problems that led to its downfall. Lack of accurate reconnaissance, failure of communication and surprise and outdated assault tactics all played an integral part in its failings. However, without these failings it is argued that D-Day would have not been the success that it was, New York Times stated in 1943: “…Dieppe, where brave men died without hope for the sake of proving that there is a wrong way to invade. They will have their share of glory when the right way is tried.”14 Without the sacrifice of the soldiers on the 19 August 1942 on a small and unknown beach in France the advances in technology, in regards to Hobart “Funnies” and newly designed assault crafts, new and radical assault tactics, the creation of Mulberry harbours and deception operations could not have been possible. A very negative outcome on the 6 June 1944 on another spot of the French coast could have become a reality. Bibliography Arnoldt R (1981), The Dieppe Raid, a failure that led to success, July-August 1981, Armour Journal.
History Contribution
Dummy Sherman tank and Dummy Aircraft, Douglas A-20 Havoc as part of Operation FORTITUDE, 1943 Atkin R (1980), Dieppe 1942, Macmillan London Limited, London. Ford K (2003), Dieppe 1942; Prelude to D-Day, Osprey Publishing, Oxford. Holt T (2010), The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War, Skyhorse Publishing, New York. Kirkpatrick L (1969), Captains without eyes; intelligence failures in World War II, Macmillan London Limited, London. Latimer J (2001), Deception in war, John Murray publishing, London. Liddell-Hart B (1959), The Tanks, Cassell publishing, London. Maguire E (1963), Dieppe; August 19, J. Cape 1963, the University of California. http://www.britannica.com/dday/article-236192 (accessed 22/04/2017) www.Historylearningsite.co.uk/mulberry_harbour.htm (accessed 23/04/2017)
Footnotes Figures taken from Ford K (2003), Dieppe 1942; Prelude to D-Day, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, Pg.91 2 Atkin R (1980), Dieppe 1942, Macmillan London Limited, London, Pg.253 3 Atkin R (1980), Dieppe 1942, Macmillan London Limited, London, Pg.24 4 Arnoldt R (1981), The Dieppe Raid, a failure that led to success, JulyAugust 1981, Armour Journal, Pg. 19 5 Kirkpatrick L (1969), Captains without eyes; intelligence failures in World War II, Macmillan London Limited, London, Pg.178 6 Maguire E (1963), Dieppe; August 19, J. Cape 1963, The University of California, Pg. 190 7 Maguire E (1963), Dieppe; August 19, J. Cape 1963, The University of California, Pg. 181 8 Figures taken from http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/mulberry_ harbour.htm (accessed 23/04/2017) 9 Liddell-Hart B (1959), The Tanks, Cassell publishing, London, Pg.332 10 Ford K (2003), Dieppe 1942, Prelude to D-Day, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, Pg. 92 11 Figures taken from http://www.britannica.com/dday/article-236192 (accessed 22/04/2017) 12 Holt T (2010), The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War, Skyhorse Publishing, New York, Pg. 565-566 13 Latimer J (2001), Deception in war, John Murray publishing, London, Pg.238 14 Atkin R (1980), Dieppe 1942, Macmillan London Limited, London, Pg.XIII 1
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