What lessons are learned as a child advocate? Page 3
Collaborative divorce can help couples keep decisions private. Page 4
Low-income Georgia Mother sues to halt Child support fees. Page 6
SUBMITTED
PHOTO
Julie Landau is a partner at Landau, McGee and Glickman, and is the president of the Anne Arundel County collaborative law group.
Vol. XXXVI, No. 9
TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
200 St. Paul Place Suite 2480
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
Main Number: 443.524.8100
Suzanne E. Fischer-Huettner
Managing Director
Ben Jacobs Interim Editor
Patrick Brannan Managing Editor
Contributing Writers
Hope Keller
Ian Round
Maryland Family Law (ISSN 2373-7255) is published monthly (12 issues per year) by Bridgetower Media, 200 Saint Paul Place Suite 2480, Baltimore, MD 21202. e standard Digital+Print subscription is $399 per year. Periodicals postage paid at BALTIMORE, MD 21233-9998, and additional entry o ces.
POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Maryland Family Law Subscription Services, P.O. BOX 1051 WILLIAMSPORT, PA 17703-9940
To order a subscription go to: https:/thedailyrecord.com/ maryland-family-law/subscribe/ or call 877-615-9536 or by email: service@bridgetowermedia.com.
To renew. change your address or to temporarily stop service. go to: https:/thedailyrecord.com/maryland-family-law/ manage-account-fc/ or call 877-615-9536 or by email support@bridgetowermedia.com.
Maryland Family Law Update is a review of events as they a ect the practice of domestic relations in law in the state of Maryland published by e Daily Record, 200 St. Paul Place, Suite 2480, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.
3 Child Advocacy: Lessons learned in a career as a child advocate
4 Cover Story: Collaborative divorce in Maryland
6 In the News: Low-income mother in Georgia sues to halt child support fees
A mother filed a civil rights lawsuit against Georgia after hundreds of low-income parents whose kids were sent to foster care were billed years of child support they say they can’t afford. Her lawsuit seeks to end the practice completely.
8 Monthly Memo
Years of activism resulted in Hong Kong same-sex bill, but challenges still ahead … Jury convicts Florida matriarch in murder-for-hire killing of her former son-inlaw … Rhode Island father is ordered to contribute to son’s private school tuition … Wisconsin kayaker who faked his death and fled to Asia says plan was a ‘crazy, emotional dream’ … Woman seeks compensation from South Korea over her forced adoption to France in 1984. 10 Family Law Digest 12 Full Text Unreported
Lessons learned in a career as a child advocate
After my first few years as a child’s advocate in Child In Need of Assistance proceedings, it became clear to me that most of my work would involve not only legal advocacy before the juvenile court, but also social support of my clients and their caregivers.
Even the juvenile court’s abbreviated timeline is often much longer than child clients could tolerate for the resolution of an issue so, acting quickly and efficiently to advance my client’s interests is imperative.
Now, 19 years in, below are some thoughts on critical, non-legal aspects of a child advocate’s work.
First, and most critical, is becoming a trusted resource for both clients and their caretakers.
As the child’s attorney, you must establish that you are someone who can be relied upon to honor one’s promises and commitments. That reliability will help you to create a relationship with both the child client and their caretakers that can advance the client’s goals and interests.
Second, there are a multitude of moving parts inherent in representing a child; it is essential to have a good tracking system so that nothing falls through the cracks.
Depending on the number of clients one has, there can be 400-700 items that need tracking at any one time; memory is not enough.
I use a standard calendar application and alarm every entry to sound an alert 15-30 minutes before action is needed on that item.
Items include, but are not limited to, all hearings, non-legal deadlines (e.g. Youthworks or FAFSA, college financial aid applications), commitments made to a caretaker or client, applicable Department of Social Services policy requirements (e.g. the need for family meeting
STAVE MARK
Child Advocacy
before changing the permanency plan), and any personal vacations/ days off.
Using a tickler to remind my client to complete the FAFSA in advance of the due date, resulted in a timely submission and a waiver of college tuition.
What system is used is not important, provided it offers a quick way to enter, or modify, items, has an alarm function, is easily portable and, most importantly, is used for every single promise made to a client or caregiver.
The most common failure, in my experience, is empowering the thought that one would, of course, remember that particular item.
Next, a child’s attorney must work with the client and client’s caretaker to explain the ins and outs of working with the assigned case manager, the DSS, and the court.
The first step in this is asking questions and actively listening to learn what they already know and what you need tell them.
Without sufficient explanation, information about licensing requirements, the timeline and various proceedings in a CINA case, how the local DSS works, how often the case manager needs to visit and, most importantly, what your role as child’s counsel is could all, in their experience, come out of left field, causing upset.
Give them both your contact information and permission to reach out to you when they have questions, want to talk, or have a request.
At the same time, ensure they are both clear about your work-life boundaries – and establish these
boundaries clearly for yourself and family first.
Assuming the local DSS has afterhours emergency personnel, provide both the child client and the caretaker with that contact information, and brief them on what to expect if they do contact the emergency/after-hours staff.
Specific to the child client’s caretaker, ensure that they are familiar with statutes that empower them to care for the in their child as they would with their own children – and the limits on their rights and responsibilities as foster parents.
Ensure your client understands the various permanency plans –such as reunification, adoption, and custody – as well as what and who are involved in different proceedings such as guardianship and termination of parental rights.
Specific to the tween or teen client, ensure they know about the Maryland college tuition waiver, which allows youth in foster care to attend state college tuition-free, emphasizing that they could be the only person in their graduating college class that walks away with a degree or certificate and no debt. Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 15106.1 (West 2025).
Invite them to talk about their dreams for their future, and connect those dreams with high school accomplishment, and post high school education, begin to build with them a vision for their future that will inspire effective action in the present.
Using a broad-minded holistic approach to representation and producing an informed, aware, communicative client/caretaker combination is the most effective path towards achieving the best permanency for your CINA client.
Mark Stave is a Staff Attorney at Maryland Legal Aid.
Collaborative divorce aims for ‘creative problem solving’
By Ian Round IRound@TheDailyRecord.com
A lot of people contemplating the end of their marriage think there’s only one way to go about it: in a messy, scorched-earth, expensive divorce. If the divorcing couple is very wealthy and co-owns property or a business, for example, they often expect to hire aggressive lawyers who fight to win as much as possible in a long trial.
Practitioners of collaborative law say there’s a better way.
“You can solve a lot of problems if you’re not in court so much,” said Ilene Glickman, partner at Landau, McGee and Glickman, who is also the president of Collaborative Professionals of Baltimore.
Julie Landau, Glickman’s partner and president of the Anne Arundel County collaborative law group, said divorce litigation can
be traumatizing, especially to children.
“It’s just not the right way to solve family problems,” Landau said. The collaborative process is about “creative problem-solving as opposed to winning.”
In a collaborative divorce, the couple hires lawyers trained in collaborative law and agrees to follow certain principles, including a commitment not to sue. Those
SUBMITTED PHOTO
Julie Landau is a partner at Landau, McGee and Glickman, and is the president of the Anne Arundel County collaborative law group.
principles, according to a sample contract which Landau provided, include “honesty, cooperation, integrity, civility and full disclosure, and a focus on the future well-being of the whole family.”
The parties talk to each other, their lawyers and experts in mental health, finance, business or other areas, and they seek to avoid the strategic negotiating techniques common in litigation.
At the end, they sign a collaborative settlement agreement and get an uncontested divorce, and their dirty laundry is not aired publicly.
“They are seizing the power to settle their matter privately for all the world to not see,” said Chris Panos, a family law expert and retired Baltimore City Circuit Court judge who now works as a medi -
ator with The McCammon Group, an alternative dispute resolution firm.
“The process by which decisions are reached is more important than the decisions themselves,” Panos said.
Collaborative divorce is fairly new, having been popularized in the 1990s and formalized in the Maryland Uniform Collaborative Law Act of 2015. Landau and Glickman said that while collaborative law is thriving in Montgomery County and Washington, D.C., relatively few people in other parts of Maryland are aware that it’s an option.
Collaborative divorces aren’t always successful; if the couple can’t reach a solution and proceed to litigation, they have to hire different lawyers. And they’re not for every -
one, especially those with histories of domestic violence, coercion or financial secrecy.
Rockville-based collaborative lawyer Darcy Shoop said the collaborative process requires trust between the parties. One person has to agree, for example, not to use the other person’s substance use disorder as a “sword” to force more favorable terms.
Shoop began practicing collaboratively fairly early, in 2004, and hasn’t looked back. She said aggressive litigation can be stressful for lawyers in addition to their clients.
“I’ve found it way more rewarding than litigating cases,” Shoop said. “People are generally relieved to know that they don’t have to do it that way.”
SUBMITTED PHOTO
Ilene Glickman is a partner at Landau, McGee and Glickman and is the president of Collaborative Professionals of Baltimore.
Photo courtesy The McCammon Group.
Chris Panos, a retired Baltimore City Circuit Court judge who now works as a mediator with The McCammon Group.
Low-income mother in Georgia sues to halt child support fees
By Charlotte Kramon
Associated Press
ATLANTA — Hundreds of low-income parents in Georgia whose kids were sent to foster care have been billed years of child support they say they can’t afford, and one mother filed a civil rights lawsuit against the state this week seeking to end the practice completely.
Between fiscal years 2018 and 2022, Georgia removed children from 700 families because of “inadequate housing” — likely meaning they were either homeless or didn’t have stable housing much of the time — the class action lawsuit says, citing reporting from WABE and ProPublica.
The lawsuit filed Tuesday argues that state agencies knew these families were impoverished and couldn’t afford to pay the foster care fees but charged them anyway.
“Georgia’s system is one of the most onerous and punitive that we’ve seen,” said Phil Telfeyan, executive director of Equal Justice Under Law, which is representing the mother, Annalinda Martinez, who lives north of Atlanta.
Advocates nationwide have long criticized child welfare agencies for removing children from low-income families for causes rooted in financial struggles, all while states fail to help them provide for their basic needs, they say.
The federal government in 2022 advised child welfare agencies to limit how often they ask for child support.
States such as California and Michigan pulled back on the practice, and Georgia did the same in 2024. However, the new rules in Georgia doesn’t apply to older cases like Martinez’s.
The lawsuit also asks the state to stop seeking child support for most children who have aged out of the system or have been adopted, saying those fees — which Martinez has been asked to pay — violate state law.
Martinez, whose story was first reported by WABE, sought help from Georgia’s Division of Family and Children Services in 2018 after she and her six daughters became homeless. Her ex-boyfriend was arrested after she learned he was sexually abusing one of them. Despite working three jobs, Martinez couldn’t afford rent, so they were evicted.
The agency placed her children in foster care instead of offering housing help, the lawsuit says. Martinez paid $100 per month until fall 2019, when she was ordered to pay $472 per month despite living below the federal poverty line.
She eventually gave up parental rights for all six daughters at the agency’s urging, the lawsuit says, “shattering any hope of eventual reunification and causing irreparable trauma for her children and herself.”
The lawsuit also asks for compensation for child support payments that didn’t account for Martinez’ and others’ circumstances.
The lawsuit primarily targets
the Division of Family and Children Services, which is under the state’s Department of Human Services. A spokesperson for the department said the state has not been served with the lawsuit, but “it is not our practice to comment on pending or active litigation.”
Two of Martinez’ daughters have been adopted, three have aged out of foster care and one is expecting adoption soon, the lawsuit says. Yet the state still seeks $472 per month. Martinez now stays home to care for the two children she has custody of. Her partners’ income can’t cover child care, but much of it goes to child support. Last year, Martinez received letters from the Division of Child Support Services saying she owed over $13,000 and threatening jail time. A nonprofit raised money to cover that, but Martinez still lives in “constant fear” that her two kids will be removed.
Martinez eventually learned she could ask for smaller child support payments, but was told this year she would need to show her daughters’ adoption certificates, the lawsuit says, but wasn’t able to get those without parental rights.
The Division of Family and Children Services has said the agency’s goal is reunification, but Telfeyan said charging low-income families child support is a “perverse” practice that “delays the outcome that everyone wants.”
Lawsuit dismissed in funding dispute over kinship caregiver law in Kentucky
By Bruce Schreiner Associated Press
FRANKFORT, Ky. — A judge on Monday dismissed a lawsuit against Kentucky Gov. Andy Beshear’s administration in a funding dispute that has delayed a kinship caregiver law, which aims to support adults willing to care for young relatives who endured suspected abuse or neglect at home.
The Democratic governor signed the legislation in 2024, and his administration has praised the measure for seeking to help children in bad situations be placed with relatives or close family friends. The dispute revolves around whether funding is accessible to carry out the state law’s intent — enabling relatives who take temporary custody of children to become eligible for foster care payments. Kinship caregivers are raising an estimated 55,000 children in Kentucky.
Beshear warned in 2024 that the state’s Republican-led legislature had not approved the necessary funding. More than a year later, he maintains those funds are still needed for the state Cabinet for Health and Family Services to put the measure into action.
“It is simple: The state cannot implement programs and policies if we don’t have the funding needed to do
so,” Beshear said in a news release Monday.
The two-term governor is widely seen as a potential presidential candidate in 2028.
Republican state Auditor Allison Ball said she will continue her fight. She filed the lawsuit, claiming the law was in limbo because Beshear’s administration refused to put it into action.
The suit says Beshear’s administration is required to “do whatever it takes” to carry out state laws and asked a judge to “remind” them of that duty. It also sought access to information as part of the auditor’s investigation into the matter. That review is looking at whether it would cost about $19 million, as estimated by the administration, to carry out the law and whether the cabinet had funds to implement it.
In his decision Monday, Franklin Circuit Judge Thomas Wingate noted that no subpoenas had been sought, the cabinet had complied with many of the auditor’s requests, and the cabinet had indicated the auditor “need only provide a name and CHFS will set up an interview.”
“This indicates a willingness by CHFS to cooperate with the investigation, contrary to the auditor’s assertion that CHFS has no intention of cooperating with or participating
in any further investigation,” Wingate said.
The judge added that the auditor “has not yet exhausted administrative means to obtain documents and the matter has not yet ripened into a concrete dispute.”
Responding to the ruling, Ball has directed the issuance of subpoenas as the “necessary next step” in the matter, her office said Monday in a news release. The judge’s ruling affirmed the auditor’s authority to subpoena officials and any withheld documents, the release says.
“These subpoenas will reveal the truth about the actual cost and all available resources to fund this program,” Ball said in the release.
The governor said he plans to include the necessary funding in his next budget proposal to lawmakers “so we can get these policies moving forward to help these children.” Lawmakers will begin their 2026 session in January, and passing the state’s next two-year budget will be their biggest task.
The 2024 law is meant to fix what child welfare advocates say is a flaw in the support system. It gives people considerably more time to apply to become foster parents for their young relatives, and thus eligible for foster care payments to help support the children already in their care.
RALEIGH, NC -- The North Carolina Supreme Court held that escalating conflict between parents that poses a risk of harm to a child constitutes a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of an existing custody order. The decision reverses the Court of Appeals and reinstates the trial court’s modified custody order.
The 25-page opinion is Durbin v. Durbin.
The case arose after the trial court found that the father had failed to attend to his son’s medical needs, including asthma treatment,
Years of activism resulted In Hong Kong same-sex bill
HONG KONG — At her wedding, Jaedyn Yu felt her father’s tears marked a subtle yet touching shift in his attitude toward love between two women.
Yu’s family initially struggled to accept her partner after they fell in love in 2019. Seeking both family recognition and legal rights, the couple decided to marry.
But rather than waiting for Hong Kong to establish its framework for recognizing same-sex partnerships, citing the uncertain timeline, they opted to marry via Zoom with a U.S. officiant in May and held their ceremony in Bali, Indonesia.
Their concern proved prescient. Despite the top court ruling in favor of recognizing same-sex partnerships in 2023, the government’s proposed framework, unveiled in July, has met fierce opposition in the legislature.
Associated Press
Jury
convicts Florida matriarch in murder-for-hire killing of her former son-in-law
TALLAHASSEE, Fla. — The matriarch of a wealthy South Florida family was con-
which resulted in missed medication doses and additional medical care. The court also found an increasing pattern of conflict and the father’s refusal to reasonably communicate with the mother or the parenting coordinator. The trial court concluded these circumstances adversely affected the child’s health and were not in the child’s best interests.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the evidence did not show a substantial change in circumstances. The Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing that while conflict is often present in custody matters, esca -
lating conflict that risks harm to the child is a sufficient change. The Court explained that a parent’s unwillingness or inability to communicate reasonably about the child’s health, education, and welfare can justify modifying custody
The justices further deferred to the trial court’s unique position to evaluate witness credibility and the overall impact of the parents’ behavior on the children. Because the trial court determined the modified custody arrangement served the children’s best interests, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion.
Monthly Memo
victed Sept. 4 of murder in the killing of her former son-in-law, a prominent law professor who was locked in a bitter custody battle with his ex-wife when he was gunned down in 2014.
Jurors returned guilty verdicts in the weekslong trial of Donna Adelson on charges of first-degree murder, conspiracy and solicitation in the killing of Florida State University law professor Daniel Markel in Tallahassee where he taught. The case had riveted attention in Florida for more than a decade amid sordid details of a messy divorce, tensions with wealthy in-laws and custody fights leading to the killing.
When the judge announced that the jury had convicted Adelson of first-degree murder, the defendant exclaimed, “Oh!” and started shaking and crying.
The jury was then taken out of the courtroom and Florida Second Judicial Circuit Judge Stephen Everett gave Adelson a two-minute break to collect herself.
Associated Press
Father ordered to contribute to son’s private
school tuition
PROVIDENCE, RI — A magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion by ordering a high-earning father to pay just $500 a month over the minimum child support guideline
amount to contribute to his son’s private school tuition, a Family Court judge has ruled.
Both of the boy’s parents, who were never married, were in favor of him attending private school.
When the child first enrolled during fourth grade, the defendant father was earning $55,000 a year as a medical resident. The plaintiff mother agreed at the time that the father could reduce his half of the tuition by the amount he was paying in child support.
Within a couple of years, by which time the father was earning approximately $350,000 a year as a physician, the mother, who earned a similar income as a therapist and whose husband apparently paid most of her living expenses, sought an increase in the amount of child support plus half the $4,000 monthly tuition.
BridgeTower Media Newswires
Wisconsin kayaker who faked his death says plan was a ‘crazy, emotional dream’
MADISON, Wis. — A Wisconsin kayaker who faked his own death so he could start a new life with a woman in the country of Georgia texted his wife he loved her on the night he executed the plan, telling
her he had gone to the lake to watch the northern lights.
Emily Borgwardt woke up alone the next morning, her desperate texts of “Where are you????” and “Babe?” going unanswered. By that point her husband, Ryan Borgwardt, had already overturned his kayak on Green Lake and biked through the night to catch a bus to Canada, the first leg on his journey to the Georgian capital of Tbilisi to meet a Ukranian woman he was secretly courting online.
The texts were among a massive file of case documents the Green Lake County Sheriff’s Office released to The Associated Press this week that offer a glimpse into the couple’s tense marriage. In one included interview, Borgwardt told detectives that he was a failure and called his plan to abscond to the country at the crossroads of Europe and Asia a “crazy, emotional dream.”
Borgwardt, 46, was convicted of obstruction last month. His wife divorced him in May. The AP left a phone message Tuesday for her attorney, listed in online court records as Andrew Griggs. Associated Press
Monthly Memo
Minor not required to testify in open court during visitation hearing
RICHMOND, VA -- Where credible evidence in the record supported the court’s finding that it was not in a minor’s best interest to testify in open court, based upon her mental and emotional fragility, its decision was affirmed.
Background
Alexandra Mulvey appeals the circuit court’s orders striking her motion to modify visitation and requiring her to pay one-half of the guardian ad litem, or GAL, fees. Mother disputes several evidentiary rulings made by the court and argues that the evidence supported modifying visitation with her child. She also challenges the court’s failure to transfer venue for future proceedings to Louisa County.
BridgeTower Media Newswires
Woman seeks compensation from South Korea over her forced adoption
SEOUL, South Korea — A 52-year-old woman who was adopted to a French family
in 1984 without her biological parents’ consent has filed for compensation from South Korea’s government, citing how authorities at the time fraudulently documented her as an orphan although she had a family.
The rare petition filed by Yooree Kim came months after South Korea’s truth commission recognized her and 55 other adoptees as victims of human rights violations, including falsified child origins, lost records and child protection failures.
Her case was highlighted last year in an Associated Press investigation in collaboration with FRONTLINE (PBS). The investigation found that South Korea’s government, Western countries and adoption agencies worked in tandem for decades to supply some 200,000 Korean children to parents overseas through questionable or downright unscrupulous means.
Their stories have triggered a reckoning that has shaken the international adoption industry, which took root in South Korea before spreading worldwide. Under pressure from adoptees, the Seoul government launched a fact-finding investigation, and hundreds submitted their cases for review.
Associated Press
Family Law Digest
Use the topic and case indexes at the back of this issue to find the full-text opinions that are of most interest to you.
IN THE MARYLAND APPELLATE COURT: FULL TEXT UNREPORTED OPINIONS
MARITAL PROPERTY; VALUATION; DIVISION
Matthew Titus v. Bonnie Titus
No. 758, September Term 2024
Argued before: Berger, Nazarian, Ripken, JJ.
Opinion by: Nazarian, J.
Filed: July 15, 2025
The Appellate Court vacated the St. Mary’s County Circuit Court’s decision dividing marital property. The circuit court erred when it ordered the sale and division of the parties’ property without valuing it first.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Howard County Circuit Court’s contempt finding against husband for failure to make child support and alimony payments owed to wife, and judgments related to the modification of the parties’ amended custody order. The circuit court did not clearly err in finding husband had willfully avoided making payments.
The Appellate Court vacated the Caroline County Circuit Court’s order denying mother’s motion to revise the prior order modifying child support. The circuit court abused its discretion in denying mother’s motion because the prior ruling was based on a clearly erroneous factual conclusion regarding the existing custody arrangement.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court’s removal of one of the co-guardians of the person and property of his adult son. The circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion when it found that the evidence that it heard at the May 10, 2024, hearing—as well as what it heard from the adult son himself some months earlier—constituted “grounds for removal.”
The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s award granting sole physical and legal custody of two minor children to father, and limiting mother’s access with the minor children to three hours of supervised visitation every other weekend. It is not unreasonable to find that a person who suffers from untreated paranoia, has a history of wielding a firearm in front of a minor child and has testified that she would use that firearm on the minor child’s father, poses a great danger to the health and safety of that child. Thus, the circuit court acted within its discretion in imposing a reasonable limitation on mother’s visitation rights.
The Appellate Court dismissed father’s appeal of the Charles County Circuit Court’s order granting the Charles County Child Support Administration’s motion to establish arrears. The arrears order was not a final judgment because, at the time it was entered, father’s motion to modify child support had been held in abeyance without adjudication, and at the hearing on father’s motion to modify child support, the court suggested that it would address the arrearages, which it is able to do. And none of the exceptions to the final judgment requirement apply.
DISCOVERY; SANCTIONS
Georgia Rose Bayly v. Brendan O’Donnell Rapp
Nos. 2035, September Term 2024
Argued before: Berger, Nazarian, Ripken, JJ.
Opinion by: Berger, J.
Filed: June 25, 2025
The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s sanctions award, which precluded wife from presenting evidence during the parties’ contested divorce trial to support her request for alimony. Wife failed to respond to husband’s interrogatories in their entirety, and only produced - more than six months after the discovery deadline - three documents related to her financial circumstances
TEMPORARY ORDER; MOOTNESS; WAIVER
Alisha Lynn Stephens (Bethoulle) v. Jesse Willard Price III
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s temporary custody order. Because a subsequent order prohibits any contact between mother and child, her arguments regarding the limited amount of contact allowed by the temporary custody order are moot. Her remaining arguments were not adequately briefed and are thus waived.
CRAWFORD CREDITS; CALCULATION; EXPLANATION
John Kirlan Joseph v. Alicia Jones Joseph
Nos. 2247, September Term 2023
Argued before: Berger, Nazarian, Ripken, JJ.
Opinion by: Ripken, J.
Filed: June 25, 2025
The Appellate Court vacated the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s calculation of Crawford credits. The trial court did not explain the basis of its calculation of the contribution credits owed by husband.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s orders finding that a disabled person’s sister had misappropriated her assets. The sister’s failure to provide necessary transcripts thwarted appellate review. And the limited record showed no basis to disturb the judgments of the circuit court.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
Cite as 09 MFLU Supp. 12 (2025)
Marital
property; valuation; division
Matthew Titus v.
Bonnie Titus
No. 758, September Term 2024
Argued before: Berger, Nazarian, Ripken, JJ.
Opinion by: Nazarian, J.
Filed: July 15, 2025
The Appellate Court vacated the St. Mary’s County Circuit Court’s decision dividing marital property. The circuit court erred when it ordered the sale and division of the parties’ property without valuing it first.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
value and ownership of their assets. As the court remarked early on, this was “purely[,] truly [a] property case.”
The parties submitted written closing arguments after the hearing. In her argument, Wife requested a monetary award, attorneys’ fees, and seven years of rehabilitative alimony at $2,500 per month dating back to April 1, 2022. (Her complaint had sought indefinite alimony). In his closing argument, Husband requested Crawford credits to account for his payment of the mortgage on the marital home during the separation. He asked the court to split the money in the parties’ retirement accounts equally and to deny Wife’s request for any further monetary award. He also argued that the court should not grant Wife’s request for alimony but that, if it did, it should award no more than three years of rehabilitative alimony at $289 per month. Finally, Husband asked the court to deny Wife’s request for attorneys’ fees.
The Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County granted Bonnie Titus (“Wife”) and Matthew Titus (“Husband”) an absolute divorce on June 5, 2024. On appeal, Husband challenges the court’s determination of certain property as marital and its decision to order the sale and division of that property without valuing it first. Husband also challenges the court’s decision to deny his request for Crawford credits and to award Wife rehabilitative alimony. We hold that the court erred when it ordered the sale and division of the parties’ property without valuing it first, and we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. And because the remaining issues are likely to recur, we address them as well.
I. BACKGROUND
Husband and Wife were married on May 14, 2011. They lived in the marital home together until December 7, 2021, when Wife moved out. Wife believed the separation would be temporary, but Husband soon made clear he wanted a divorce. Wife filed a complaint for an absolute divorce on March 14, 2022, on grounds of adultery, cruelty of treatment, excessively vicious conduct, and separation. Husband filed a counter complaint for absolute divorce on April 22, 2022, alleging desertion. He later filed an amended counter complaint that modified the grounds for divorce to separation for more than a year. The court held a two-day merits hearing on November 21, 2022 and September 26, 2023.1 Husband and Wife filed joint statements identifying the property they agreed was marital or nonmarital and the property in dispute. They also filed individual financial statements listing their respective incomes and expenses. Both Husband and Wife testified at the hearing and introduced several exhibits into evidence, many of which pertained to the
On June 5, 2024, the court filed written findings and an order granting the parties an absolute divorce. The court denied Wife’s requests for indefinite alimony and attorneys’ fees but awarded her seven years of rehabilitative alimony at $2,500 per month dating back to October 1, 2023. The court denied Husband’s request for Crawford credits. The order does not mention a monetary award explicitly, but the court ordered that the proceeds of the sale of the marital home—to which the parties had stipulated—and the sales of the parties’ vehicles—to which they hadn’t—would go towards the marital debt and that the parties would split the remainder (if any) equally. The court also awarded Wife a 50% share in Husband’s investment accounts and awarded each party 50% of the value of all their retirement accounts on an if, as, and when basis. And the court divided Husband’s Navy Federal Credit Union (“NFCU”) savings account and Money Market account equally but ordered that the remaining bank accounts would remain in the possession of the person in whose name they were titled. Husband noted a timely appeal on June 14, 2024.
We include additional facts in the Discussion as necessary.
II. DISCUSSION
Husband presents four questions for our review, which we reorder and recast:
1. Did the court err in ordering the sale and division of the marital property without first determining the value of that property?
2. Did the court abuse its discretion when it found that the parties’ NFCU bank accounts were marital property?
3. Did the court abuse its discretion when it denied Husband’s request for Crawford credits?
4. Did the court abuse its discretion in awarding rehabilitative alimony to Wife without first making specific findings on the relevant factors?2
We hold that the court erred when it ordered the sale and division of the marital property without first valuing that property. Although that decision requires us to vacate the allproperty judgment in its entirety, we discuss the remaining issues that Husband raises to provide guidance to the circuit court on remand.
A. The Court Erred When It Ordered The Sale And Division Of Marital Property Without First Determining Its Value.
Husband argues that the court erred in ordering the sale and division of the marital property, specifically the parties’ cars, their bank accounts, and the marital debt, without first valuing that property. In response, Wife contends that the court relied properly on the parties’ joint statements in determining the value of the marital property and that the court didn’t err in ordering the sale and division of that property. We hold that the court erred because it didn’t value the marital property before ordering its sale and division.
In a divorce proceeding, the circuit court must determine which of the parties’ property qualifies as marital, Md. Code (1999, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 8-203(a) of the Family Law Article (“FL”), then “‘determine the value of all marital property’ for equitable distribution.” Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 534 (2008) (quoting FL § 8-204(a)). On appeal, the value of marital property is a question of fact that we review for clear error. Id. at 521. The court’s valuation of the parties’ property is not clearly erroneous if it is supported by substantial evidence. Abdullahi v. Zanini, 241 Md. App. 372, 413 (2019) (citation omitted).
The court in this case completed the first step: it identified the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. The court also stated that “both Parties are each responsible for the marital debt.” But the court’s findings contain no values for the marital property or the debt or the net value available to distribute. Wife claims that the court relied properly on the parties’ joint statements in determining the value of the marital property and that the joint statements disposed of the need for additional evidence demonstrating those values. Although Wife is correct that joint statements filed under Maryland Rule 9-207 “may be considered as evidence without the necessity for the formal introduction at trial” of other evidence showing the properties’ values, Beck v. Beck, 112 Md. App. 197, 206 (1996),3 they’re only evidence: the statements, joint or otherwise, are not findings of fact. To be sure, Rule 9-207 statements assist the court in making those findings. See id. (filing joint statements “‘will greatly assist the court in understanding and resolving’” property disputes in divorce proceedings (quoting 13 Md. Reg. 2305 (1986))). In fact, in discussing the benefits of the proposed Rule S74 (the predecessor to Rule 9-207), the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure explained that the filing of joint statements is meant to aid trial courts in fulfilling their obligation under FL § 8-204 of determining the value of all marital property. Id. (citing 13 Md. Reg. 2306 (1986)).
In this case, though, the court didn’t determine the value of the marital property. Even if it relies on the parties’ joint statements in determining those values, the court must make the final determination, see FL § 8-204(a), particularly where, as here, the parties filed two joint statements that contain disputed values of property that the court found to be marital. We must, therefore, vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. On remand, the court should determine the value of the parties’ marital property and debt and state explicitly its findings on the matter. And because this is, as the court recognized, purely a property case, this holding requires us to vacate the judgment as a whole and remand for the court to consider the other financial decisions as a package. See Sims v. Sims, Md. App. , No. 1787, Sept. Term 2024, slip op. at 26–27 (filed June 30, 2025).
B. The Court Did Not Err When It Designated The Parties’ NFCU Bank Accounts As Marital Property
Because The Parties Did Not Exclude Those Bank Accounts In A Valid Agreement.
As to the remaining issues, Husband argues first that the court abused its discretion when it found that the parties’ NFCU bank accounts were marital property. Although he concedes that marital property includes assets that either spouse acquired during the marriage, he contends that because Husband and Wife kept their finances separate before and during their marriage, they agreed implicitly that they didn’t intend their bank accounts to be marital property. Wife responds that the court found correctly that the parties’ bank accounts, which contained only income that they acquired during their marriage, were marital property. We agree with Wife.
Under FL § 8-203(a), if the parties in a divorce proceeding dispute whether certain property is marital or nonmarital, the circuit court must determine how to classify it. Like the court’s valuation of marital property, we review the question of whether property is marital or nonmarital for clear error. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 521. If the court’s determination is supported by substantial evidence, it is not clearly erroneous. Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 413 (citation omitted).
Marital property includes property that either or both spouses acquired during the marriage as well as any interest in real property that the spouses held as tenants by the entirety, unless the parties agreed otherwise. FL § 8-201(e)(1)–(2). Marital property does not include property that either spouse “acquired before the marriage,” “acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party,” “excluded by valid agreement,” or that is “directly traceable to any of these sources.” FL § 8-201(e)(3) (i)–(iv). Importantly, “the party who asserts a marital interest in property bears the burden of producing evidence as to the identity of the property. And conversely, ‘[t]he party seeking to demonstrate that particular property acquired during the marriage is nonmarital must trace the property to a nonmarital source.’” Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 227 (2000) (citation omitted) (quoting Noffsinger v. Noffsinger, 95 Md. App. 265, 283 (1993)). If they can’t trace the property to a nonmarital source, that property is considered marital. Id.
To exclude property from the marital category by “valid agreement,” the agreement must be “sufficiently specific as to make clear that the property is to be ‘non marital’ or, in some
other terms, specifically exclude the property from the scope of the Marital Property Act.” Thomasian v. Thomasian, 79 Md. App. 188, 203 (1989); see, e.g., Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 530–31 (clause in parties’ joint statement that “all issues with regard to the remaining property” other than four assets they identified as marital had been “resolved” constituted a valid agreement by which the parties excluded the remaining property from the Marital Property Act). In Golden v. Golden, 116 Md. App. 190 (1997), for example, the parties testified that their premarital homes belonged to each spouse separately, that each paid their own mortgages, and that they maintained separate bank accounts but for one joint account to which they both contributed. Id. at 195–99. The husband claimed that he and the wife had an oral agreement that “what’s mine was mine and hers is hers,” id. at 200, but the wife said they had no agreements other than that their pre-marital homes were their individual responsibilities and assets. Id. at 199. The circuit court found that the parties had agreed that all property other than the home that they had bought and lived in together was nonmarital property. Id. at 193–94. We vacated the court’s order on appeal, holding that the court erred clearly in finding an agreement because the evidence had not demonstrated that the parties entered into a binding agreement. Id. at 201–03. We noted further that “[w]e would doubt, although we do not now specifically hold, that a ‘what is hers is hers and what is mine is mine’ oral agreement, no matter how often repeated, could ever contain the degree of specificity required” to be a valid agreement excluding certain property as nonmarital. Id. at 203.
In this case, Husband asserted in his joint statement that the parties’ NFCU bank accounts were nonmarital property, whereas Wife believed those accounts were marital property. Husband testified that he and Wife maintained separate finances throughout their relationship. They had no joint bank accounts, no joint retirement or brokerage accounts, and no shared loans. Neither party had access to or status as an authorized payee on the other’s credit card accounts, and neither contributed to the other’s credit card payments. And the bank statements that the parties introduced into evidence confirmed that Husband and Wife were not joint holders on each other’s accounts. Husband acknowledged that “there was never anything in writing” about the separation of their finances and that maintaining individual accounts was simply how they’d always managed their money. In its order, the court stated that “merely holding separate accounts through the course of a marriage does not constitute an agreement that property be considered nonmarital,” and found that the bank accounts were marital property.
We see no error in the court’s finding. Husband admitted no evidence that traced the NFCU bank accounts to a nonmarital source. See FL § 8-201(e)(3)(iv). Instead, he relied solely on the fact that the parties always maintained separate accounts, which to him suggested that they had agreed to treat all the accounts as nonmarital property. But he pointed to no written or oral agreement that excluded the accounts from their marital property, or any other documentation or memorialization of such an understanding. And the fact that Wife claimed the accounts were marital property suggested exactly the opposite, that she had never agreed that the accounts weren’t marital property. Again, there was no evidence that any account contained premarital or plausibly non-marital assets. As in Golden, there is
not enough evidence in this case to demonstrate an agreement at all, let alone one sufficiently specific to exclude the NFCU bank accounts as nonmarital property. 116 Md. App. at 201–03. And if we expressed doubt in Golden that an oral agreement was insufficient, id. at 203, this case creates greater doubt that an implicit agreement, one never communicated orally or in writing, could satisfy the valid agreement exception. See FL § 8-201(e)(3)(iii). The court did not err in designating the NFCU bank accounts as marital property.
C. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Husband’s Request For Crawford Credits Because He Had Sole Use And Enjoyment Of The Marital Home During The Separation And Wife’s Standard Of Living Is Lower Than His.
Next, Husband claims the court abused its discretion when it denied his request for Crawford credits because it made no specific findings as to why he shouldn’t receive contribution for his payments on the mortgage and other expenses following the separation. Wife counters that the court found correctly that Husband had “exclusive use and enjoyment of the marital home since separation” and that, as a result, Husband should not receive contribution. We see no abuse of discretion in this decision.
The concept of “Crawford credits” emerged in 1982 when our Supreme Court held that a spouse may receive contribution when, after the parties have separated, the spouse makes payments that “preserve[] the [marital] property and, therefore, accrue[] to the benefit of” the other spouse. Crawford v. Crawford, 293 Md. 307, 313 (1982). A trial court is not required to award Crawford credits to the paying spouse and may exercise its discretion to reach what it considers an equitable result. See Gordon v. Gordon, 174 Md. App. 583, 641–42 (2007); Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 541 (“contribution is an equitable principle,” and the “test” for determining whether to award Crawford credits is “whether the total disposition is equitable” (citation omitted)). Because “the award of contribution is an equitable remedy within the discretion of the court,” we won’t disturb the court’s award of Crawford credits unless the court abused its discretion in granting (or denying) such an award. Gordon, 174 Md. App. at 642.
A trial court is not obligated to award Crawford credits, but “‘there are four exceptions that preclude contribution; namely (1) ouster; (2) agreements to the contrary; (3) payment from marital property; and (4) an inequitable result.’” Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 540 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Caccamise v. Caccamise, 130 Md. App. 505, 525 (2000)). In Broseus v. Broseus, 82 Md. App. 183 (1990), for example, we affirmed the circuit court’s decision not to award the husband Crawford credits because he “was receiving the benefit of the use of the residence” during the separation period, and the wife’s “standard of living was considerably lower than his.” Id. at 191, 193–94. The husband also hadn’t claimed that “the expenses of the house exceeded the value of use of the premises,” and he had paid for the house using marital funds. Id. at 193.
Like the court in Broseus, the circuit court in this case stated explicitly that it was not granting Husband’s request for contribution because he “had the sole use and enjoyment of the
Marital Home during the duration of the separation.” Although the court didn’t include other findings relating to this decision, the record supports the conclusion that this is an equitable result. Wife testified that her standard of living had declined since the separation, that she took on a second, part-time job to keep up with her expenses (although her health issues prevented her from continuing that job past early 2023), and that her monthly rent was $1,775 at the time of the hearing (approximately $200 greater than the monthly mortgage payment for the marital home). Wife’s financial statement also revealed that she was running a $2,602.11 deficit each month, while Husband ran a $3,122 surplus each month according to his financial statement. Given the inequities in the parties’ living situations and the fact that Husband “had the sole use and enjoyment of the Marital Home” throughout the separation, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to deny Husband’s request for contribution.
D. We Cannot Determine Whether The Court’s Alimony Award Is Equitable Because It Is Unclear Whether The Court Considered All The Required Factors.
Finally, Husband argues that the court abused its discretion when it awarded seven years of rehabilitative alimony to Wife because the court didn’t make specific findings as to each factor enumerated in the statute that governs the amount and duration of alimony. See FL § 11-106(b). Wife counters that the court need not articulate every reason why it decided to grant alimony and that the court’s statement that it “considered and weighed all of the factors under Maryland Law in determining rehabilitative alimony” was sufficient. Although Wife is correct that the court need not include in its ruling a separate section or paragraph about each of the statutory factors, the court’s ruling in this case didn’t include findings that support its alimony award and we are unable to discern whether the alimony award is appropriate. On remand, the court should provide a more thorough explanation as to why a $2,500-per-month award for seven years is equitable.
Trial courts have “broad discretion in awarding alimony,” Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. at 246, and we will not disturb an alimony award unless the court abused its discretion in granting it. Goicochea v. Goicochea, 256 Md. App. 329, 357 (2022) (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs “when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court, or when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court.” Id. (cleaned up).
“[A]limony awards, though authorized by statute, are founded upon notions of equity,” which “requires sensitivity to the merits of each individual case without the imposition of bright-line tests.” Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 393 (1992). That said, the court must consider the twelve factors listed in FL § 11-106 before determining whether to make an alimony award and, if so, its amount and duration:
(1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-supporting;
(2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment;
(3) the standard of living that the parties established during their marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family;
(6) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(7) the age of each party;
(8) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(9) the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet that party’s needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony;
(10) any agreement between the parties;
(11) the financial needs and financial resources of each party, including:
(i) all income and assets, including property that does not produce income;
(ii) any award made under [FL] §§ 8-205 and 8-208 of this article;
(iii) the nature and amount of the financial obligations of each party; and
(iv) the right of each party to receive retirement benefits; and
(12) whether the award would cause a spouse who is a resident of a related institution as defined in § 19-301 of the Health-General Article and from whom alimony is sought to become eligible for medical assistance earlier than would otherwise occur.
FL § 11-106(b).
When considering these factors, “the court ‘need not use formulaic language or articulate every reason for its decision with respect to each factor. Rather, the court must clearly indicate that it has considered all the factors.’” Digges v. Digges, 126 Md. App. 361, 387 (1999) (quoting Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 356 (1995)); Simonds v. Simonds, 165 Md. App. 591, 604–05 (2005) (“‘[A]lthough the court is not required to use a formal checklist, the court must demonstrate consideration of all necessary factors.’” (quoting Roginsky v. Blake-Roginsky, 129 Md. App. 132, 143 (1999))). But a court that “‘fails to provide at least some of the steps in [its] thought process’” “‘leaves [itself] open to the contention that [it] did not in fact consider the required factors.’” Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 430 (2003) (quoting Campolattaro v. Campolattaro, 66 Md. App. 68, 81 (1986), superseded on other grounds by rule, Md. Rule 9-207).
We came across a similar issue in Freedenburg v. Freedenburg, 123 Md. App. 729 (1998). In that case, the court awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony of $5,000 per month for five years but “did not give any hint as to how [it] arrived at the $5,000-a-month alimony figure nor did [it] give [its] reasons as to why [it] thought permanent alimony was unjustified.” Id. at 739. As to the division of the marital property, the court stated simply that it “‘considered all applicable factors in deciding a marital property award,’” and awarded the wife “‘(45%) of the remaining assets of the marital property after payment of the marital debt previously found.’” Id. at 737. We held that the alimony and marital awards were based on erroneous findings of fact and remanded the case. Id. at 742. We agreed with the wife that the court also had “‘erred in failing to make specific findings of fact with regard to’” her income before awarding rehabilitative alimony, as the court had stated simply that it considered all the
factors in FL § 8-205. Id. at 749. This “mere lip service” to the relevant factors left us “in the dark (1) as to what future income the trial judge thought [the wife] would have and (2) as to the exact amount of the marital award,” id. at 750 (cleaned up), both of which are important to the determination of an equitable alimony award. See Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. 487, 535 (1985) (There is an “‘interrelationship between a monetary award . . . and an award of alimony’” such that “‘[i]n determining the amount of alimony, equity courts must consider any monetary award,’” and vice versa. (quoting McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 347 (1984))); FL §§ 11-106(b)(11)(i)–(ii) (factors in determining alimony award include parties’ incomes and any monetary award). Without further explanation on how the court reached its decision, we were unable to decide whether the court erred in granting rehabilitative alimony rather than permanent alimony. Freedenburg, 123 Md. App at 750. So too here. The circuit court in this case granted Wife’s request for seven years of rehabilitative alimony at $2,500 per month, the exact amount and duration she had requested. In doing so, the court stated that it considered the required factors in determining the alimony award: [T]he Court will award 7- years of rehabilitative alimony. Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 11-101(a)(2)(iii). The Court has considered and weighed the factors under Maryland law in determining rehabilitative alimony. . . . [S]ome of those factors include the duration of the marriage, the age of the Parties, the physical and mental condition of the Parties, and the standard of living that the Parties established during their marriage. Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 11-106(b); Crabill v. Crabill, 119 Md. App. 249, 261, 704 A.2d 532, 538 (1998) (“Although the Court is required to give consideration to each of the factors stated in the statute, it is not required to employ a formal checklist, mention specifically each factor, or announce each and every reason for its ultimate decision.”); Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 356, 664 A.2d 453, 466 (1995)[;] Hollander v. Hollander, 89 Md. App. 156, 176, 597 A.2d 1012, 1022 (1991). Some of the court’s findings, although not tied explicitly to
the section 11-106 factors, were relevant to this determination. Specifically, the court found that the parties were married on May 11, 2011 (about thirteen years prior to the entry of the court’s order) (FL § 11-106(b)(4)); that Husband suffered from health issues (FL § 11-106(b)(8)); that both parties were responsible for the marital debt (FL § 11-106(b)(11)(iii)); and that the parties each have a 50% interest in the pension and retirement accounts that they acquired during the marriage (FL § 11-106(b) (11)(iv)). As we discussed in Section II.A, however, the court’s findings make no reference to the values of any of the parties’ marital property or debt, some of which were disputed in the parties’ joint statements. It’s unclear, then, whether the court considered the financial needs and resources of the parties, or even whether the court could do so without confirming the values of the marital property and debt.
It’s also unclear whether the court considered the time necessary for Wife to obtain sufficient education to increase her income, the standard of living the parties enjoyed during their marriage, or the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties, see FL § 11-106(b)(2)–(3), (6), all of which came up during the hearing and sometimes in conflicting testimony. For example, Wife testified that for her to make more money in her current position, she would have to take college courses on government contracts, which would take “[a] couple of years at least.” On cross-examination, however, Wife testified that she hasn’t sought or obtained any certifications through her employer even though she believes such certifications could improve her pay. Based on this testimony, and the lack of other pertinent findings, it’s unclear why the court found seven years to be an equitable length of time for rehabilitative alimony.
The record may well support an award of $2,500 per month for seven years, and this opinion should not be read as casting doubt on the possibility or to express any view on the merits. We note only that the court’s findings make it difficult to discern whether the court considered all the necessary factors in granting that award. On remand, the court should provide a more thorough explanation of its thought process in reaching this award or make findings that support whatever award it might decide to make.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ST. MARY’S COUNTY VACATED AND CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. APPELLEE TO PAY COSTS.
FOOTNOTES
1 The months-long gap between the two hearing days was the result of discovery issues that are not challenged on appeal.
2 Husband phrased his Questions Presented as follows:
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it found that the Appellant’s (and Appellee’s) Navy Federal Credit Union bank accounts were marital property?
II. Did the trial court err in ordering the sale and division of marital property without first determining the value of all marital property and marital debt?
3. Did the trial court err in awarding seven (7) years of rehabilitative alimony to the Appellee in the amount of $2500 per month by failing to articulate the alimony factors in its award of alimony?
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the Appellant’s request for Crawford Credits?
Wife stated the Questions Presented as follows:
1. Did the Circuit Court Abuse Its Discretion in Determining that the Navy Federal Credit Union Accounts were Marital Property.
2. Did the Circuit Court err in Ordering the Sale and Division of Marital Property without First Determining the Value of Marital Property Pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Family Code Section 8-204.
3. Did the Circuit Court Abuse its Discretion in Awarding Rehabilitative Alimony.
4. Did the Circuit Court Abuse its Discretion in Denying Appellant’s Request for Crawford Credits. 3 The Court in Beck v. Beck, 112 Md. App. 197 (1996), discussed Rule S74, the predecessor of Rule 9-207, Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 528, which contained the same requirements as the current version of Rule 9-207. See Beck, 112 Md. App. at 203–04 (Rule S74 required parties to file a statement that identified and valued marital and nonmarital property and listed any property whose classification or values the parties couldn’t agree on); Md. Rule 9-207(a)–(b) (same).
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Howard County Circuit Court’s contempt finding against husband for failure to make child support and alimony payments owed to wife, and judgments related to the modification of the parties’ amended custody order. The circuit court did not clearly err in finding husband had willfully avoided making payments.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Mr. Ross presents four questions for our review, which we have recast and rephrased as follows:2
I. Whether the trial court erred in declining to consolidate the contempt with the merits trial and failing to retroactively modify alimony and child support.
II. Whether the court erred in declining Mr. Ross’s request for a jury trial for the civil contempt proceedings.
III. Whether the court erred in finding Mr. Ross had willfully avoided making payments.
Appellant, Jared Ross (“Mr. Ross”) and appellee, Jennifer Ross (“Mrs. Schwab”) 1 were granted an absolute divorce in December 2019 and have been engaged in continuous litigation since. This consolidated appeal arises out of the Circuit Court for Howard County following the most recent finding of contempt against Mr. Ross for failure to make child support and alimony payments owed to Mrs. Schwab, and judgments related to the modification of the parties’ amended custody order. On February 10, 2023, the court entered an order holding Mr. Ross in contempt for failing to pay $38,000 of the alimony and child support. Mr. Ross filed a motion to alter or amend and noted an appeal. The court denied the motion, and Mr. Ross noted the present appeal.
The merits trial began in June 2023. Mr. Ross was awarded physical custody of the children after the parties entered a consent order on September 28, 2023. On December 11, 2023, the court entered an order finding Mrs. Schwab in contempt for various actions and ordered the outsider reverse piercing of the corporate veil of MKB Ross, LLC -the corporation Mr. Ross set up to receive payments from his employer -- for the sole purpose of collecting child support arrearages owed to Mrs. Schwab. The court ordered Mrs. Schwab to pay Mr. Ross $1,071 per month in child support, and ordered that alimony terminate at the end of December 2021 due to Mrs. Schwab’s remarriage. The court denied additional requests by Mr. Ross to retroactively modify the alimony or child support. A second appeal followed and was consolidated with the appeal from the contempt finding.
IV. Whether the court erred in ordering the outsider reverse piercing of the corporate veil of Mr. Ross’s LLC. For the following reasons, we answer the first three questions in the negative finding no error by the trial court. We hold, however, that the trial court erred in ordering the outsider reverse piercing of the corporate veil of MKB Ross, LLC. We, therefore, vacate the decision of the trial court only with respect to its order of the outsider reverse piercing of the corporate veil, and remand to enter judgment against Mr. Ross in the amount of $38,000.
BACKGROUND
Parties’ History
Mr. Ross and Mrs. Schwab were married in November 2003. They share three children, born in 2006, 2007, and 2010. Mr. Ross filed a complaint for limited divorce on April 6, 2017, requesting sole physical and legal custody of the children. On August 11, 2017, Mrs. Schwab filed a counter-complaint for limited divorce requesting that she be awarded sole legal and physical custody of the children, and that Mr. Ross be ordered to pay child support, alimony, and any attorney’s fees. The court appointed a best interest attorney for the children in April 2018. In October 2018, the parties amended their pleadings to request an absolute divorce. The merits hearing took place over an extended period, and in September 2019, the court issued a custody order which granted Mrs. Schwab sole physical and legal custody of the children, with Mr. Ross permitted visitation. On December 20, 2019, the court entered a judgment of divorce and an amended custody order, with Mrs. Schwab retaining custody and Mr. Ross permitted visitation. The court also imposed conditions including: requiring Mrs. Schwab to abide by various alcohol monitoring programs and attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings; requiring either party to notify the other and abide by the requirements of § 9-106 of the Family Law Article if relocating; prohibiting either party from making or exposing the children to derogatory remarks
about the other parent; and prohibiting either parent from allowing romantic partners to stay overnight with the children for one year. The court awarded Mrs. Schwab child support of $6,000 per month, rehabilitative alimony of $4,000 per month for 18 months, $3,000 per month for the subsequent 18 months, $38,593.16 in alimony arrearages, half the proceeds from the sale of the family home, a monetary award of $312,936, and attorney’s fees of $80,000. In determining the amounts of the payments, the court considered Mr. Ross’s income the previous three years and projected that Mr. Ross’s income for 2019 would be $483,048. This was based, in part, on the commissions he received in previous years from his employer, CBRE: Global Commercial Real Estate Services, where he had been employed as a “commercial real estate broker” since 2017.
On January 8, 2020, Mrs. Schwab filed a petition for contempt against Mr. Ross, alleging that he failed to make the court-ordered child support and alimony payments. On February 3, 2020, the court entered an earnings withholding order, directing Mr. Ross’s employer, CBRE, to withhold and forward support payments due to Mr. Ross’s failure to pay. In turn, Mr. Ross petitioned for contempt against Mrs. Schwab on February 29, 2020, alleging that she failed to produce the children for visits, made derogatory remarks about Mr. Ross to the children, and allowed her romantic partner, Joshua Schwab, to stay overnight while the children were present. Mrs. Schwab petitioned for contempt again on March 30, 2020, alleging Mr. Ross failed to make mortgage payments on the family home. On April 2, 2020, Mr. Ross petitioned for contempt and requested a modification of child support, alimony, and custody of the children. On September 9, 2020, Mrs. Schwab requested that Mr. Ross fulfill the $392,936 judgment against Mr. Ross that still had not been satisfied. Mrs. Schwab petitioned to eliminate Mr. Ross’s visits on October 5, 2020.
On October 13, 2020, the court again entered judgment against Mr. Ross for $392,936. On June 22, 2021, the magistrate recommended that Mr. Ross be found in contempt for failure to pay $86,975.41 in child support and alimony. Both parties filed exceptions to the recommendations of the magistrate, and the court held the matter sub curia. On July 29, 2021, Mr. Ross formed a business, MKB Ross, LLC, where he was the sole owner, member, director, and employee. Beginning in January 2022, Mr. Ross directed his earnings from CBRE to MKB Ross, LLC.
Mr. Ross again petitioned for contempt and modification of custody, visitation, and support on February 18, 2022. In his petition, Mr. Ross alleged that the parties’ financial situations had changed significantly, and a modification of child and spousal support was required. Additionally, Mr. Ross alleged that alimony should be terminated because Mrs. Schwab began living with Mr. Schwab almost immediately following the divorce, and they were ultimately married in December 2021. A hearing on the merits of Mr. Ross’s petition was scheduled for June 2023. The court entered a writ of garnishment of wages on March 18, 2022, to which CBRE responded requesting dismissal, noting that “Jared
Ross is an LLC” and was not employed by CBRE.
Proceedings Giving Rise to the Present Appeal
On August 19, 2022, Mrs. Schwab filed a motion to pierce the corporate veil of MKB Ross, LLC in an effort to recover outstanding child support and alimony, arguing that Mr. Ross created MKB Ross, LLC to direct his earnings from CBRE to purposefully evade the earnings withholding order and writ of garnishment that had been served on CBRE. Mr. Ross responded, arguing that he was a “Qualified Real Estate Agent” of CBRE, not an employee, and that CBRE encouraged Qualified Real Estate Agents to “form [their] own business entity to receive [their] CBRE commissions and other compensation, while providing for tax-withholding and other benefits as [their] employer.” As such, CBRE paid Mr. Ross’s commissions to MKB Ross, LLC, which in turn paid Mr. Ross his net salary after withholding certain taxes and support to Mrs. Schwab. Mr. Ross noted that a court should only order the piercing of the corporate veil in “exceptional circumstances.”
On September 21, 2022, Mrs. Schwab petitioned for contempt alleging Mr. Ross failed to make alimony and child support payments totaling $160,771.61. In the petition for contempt, Mrs. Schwab requested that Mr. Ross be incarcerated until he purged the contempt against him. In his response, Mr. Ross requested that the contempt petition be denied. Mr. Ross also requested that should the court proceed with a hearing, that he be provided with “all protections and procedures required by the Maryland Rules and Due Process of Law, including his Constitutional right to a jury trial” because Mrs. Schwab had demanded that he be incarcerated. Mr. Ross also requested that the hearing on Mrs. Schwab’s contempt petition be consolidated and heard with the contempt and modification hearing that was already scheduled for June 2023. The court heard Mrs. Schwab’s contempt petition on January 17, 2023, declining to postpone the hearing to the already- scheduled June 2023 trial. In addition, the court denied Mr. Ross’s motion to dismiss the contempt petition, thereby denying Mr. Ross’s request for a jury trial.
On February 10, 2023, the court entered an order holding Mr. Ross in contempt for failing to pay $38,000 of the alimony and child support. Mr. Ross filed a motion to alter or amend and noted an appeal. The court denied the motion, and Mr. Ross noted another appeal. The merits trial took place over the course of 18 days between June 5, 2023, and November 13, 2023. The parties settled the custody dispute on September 28, 2023, with Mr. Ross receiving physical custody of the children.
On December 11, 2023, the court entered an order finding Mrs. Schwab in contempt for allowing Mr. Schwab to spend the night within the first year, denying Mr. Ross visitation, exposing the children to derogatory remarks about Mr. Ross, and moving the children to Virginia without providing written notice to Mr. Ross. The court pierced the corporate veil of MKB Ross, LLC -- the corporation Mr. Ross set up to get paid by his employer sometime after the court ordered garnishment of his wages -- only for the purpose of collecting child support arrearages. The court further ordered Mrs. Schwab to pay Mr. Ross $1,071 per month in child support, and ordered that alimony owed to
Mrs. Schwab terminate at the end of December 2021 due to Mrs. Schwab’s remarriage. The court denied additional requests by Mr. Ross to modify the alimony and denied legal fees. This second appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“When an action has been tried without a jury, an appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence.” Md. Rule 8-131. We “will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. “A factual finding is clearly erroneous if there is no competent and material evidence in the record to support it.” Anderson v. Joseph, 200 Md. App. 240, 249 (2011).
“When a trial court decides legal questions or makes legal conclusions based on its factual findings, we review these determinations without deference to the trial court.” Caldwell v. Sutton, 256 Md. App. 230, 263 (2022). A court’s interpretation of the Maryland Rules is one such legal conclusion which we review de novo. Xu v. Mayor of Balt., 254 Md. App. 205, 211 (2022).
DISCUSSION
I. The trial court did not err in declining to consolidate the contempt hearing with the merits trial, or in declining to retroactively modify or terminate alimony or child support.
Mr. Ross first alleges that the court erred in declining to consolidate the contempt and merits trials. Mr. Ross further contends that the court erred in denying his petition to retroactively modify child support and alimony based on the parties’ financial situations coupled with his allegation that following the granting of absolute divorce Mrs. Schwab immediately began living with Mr. Schwab in a “marriage type relationship” in violation of the divorce order. Inasmuch as both the decision to consolidate the contempt and merits hearings, as well as the decision to retroactively modify child support and alimony, are discretionary actions, we must determine whether the court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Ross’s requests.
A. The trial court did not err in declining to consolidate the contempt and merits trials.
On February 18, 2022, Mr. Ross petitioned for contempt and modification of custody and support determinations. The court set a hearing on the merits to begin June 2023. On September 22, 2022, Mrs. Schwab petitioned for contempt. In response to Mrs. Schwab’s September 22 contempt petition, Mr. Ross requested that the court “consolidate this proceeding [] with the 14[-]day merits trial, and postpone the resolution of any disputed matters necessary to resolve Mrs. Schwab’s contempt petitions until such hearing.” Mr. Ross’s response was effectively a motion to postpone the contempt hearing. At the January 17, 2023 hearing, Mr. Ross argued in favor of postponing the contempt hearing to June, particularly because he sought to modify and reduce the amount that he owed in arrears. Mrs. Schwab responded that Mr. Ross was required to obey the current support order, and his continuous refusal to make payments was apparent and should
be heard immediately since any payment that Mrs. Schwab had received had been recouped from Mr. Ross’s garnished wages rather than his willing compliance with previous court orders. The court declined to postpone the hearing and consolidate it with the contempt and merits hearing scheduled for June, and it decided to hear Mrs. Schwab’s contempt petition on January 17, 2023. The court found Mr. Ross in contempt for failure to pay $38,000 in child support and alimony.
A trial court’s decision to postpone or consolidate multiple actions, and, particularly, a petition for contempt with another hearing, is governed by Maryland Rule 2-508 and Maryland Code (1973, 2020 Repl. Vol.) Section 1-202 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”). Maryland Rule 2-508(a) provides: “On motion of any party or on its own initiative, the court may continue or postpone a trial or other proceeding as justice may require.” (Emphasis added). CJP § 1-202 provides in part: “A petition filed prior to actual adjudication of contempt may be consolidated in the discretion of the court and heard with a citation for contempt, if the petition is at issue and ready for disposition in accordance with the practice in the court in which the matter is pending.” (Emphasis added). As such, both Maryland Rule 2-508 and CJP § 1-202 indicate that the court may postpone and consolidate actions when it sees fit but is by no means required to do so. The decision to postpone an action is an entirely discretionary action. Das v. Das, 133 Md. App. 1, 31 (2000) (“[W]hether to grant a continuance is in the sound discretion of the trial court, and unless [the court] acts arbitrarily in the exercise of that discretion, [its] action will not be reviewed on appeal.”). As we have indicated time and time again,
[a]n abuse of discretion occurs “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court[ ] ... or when the court acts without reference to any guiding principles, and the ruling under consideration is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court [ ] ... or when the ruling is violative of fact and logic.”
Sibley v. Doe, 227 Md. App. 645, 658 (2016) (quoting Bacon v. Arey, 203 Md. App. 606, 667 (2012). The court heard arguments from both parties regarding whether the contempt hearing should be postponed. Considering all of the pertinent facts, and particularly Mr. Ross’s repeated refusal to comply with the order, the court denied Mr. Ross’s request to postpone and consolidate the contempt action with the merits trial. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in opting to resolve Mrs. Schwab’s contempt petition.
B. The trial court did not err in declining to modify child support.
On December 11, 2023, following the merits hearing, the court declined to retroactively modify Mr. Ross’s child support obligations. Mr. Ross argues that this was in error. As support, Mr. Ross contends that the trial court failed to give appropriate consideration to Mr. Schwab’s residing with Mrs. Schwab and possibly contributing to the family’s finances, the financial contributions from Mrs. Schwab’s family, an incorrect calculation based on Mr. Ross’s estimated income which he argues was far greater than his actual income at the time, and reductions in Mr. Ross’s present income and ability to pay.
The modification of child support is governed by Maryland Code (1988, 2019 Repl.Vol.) Section 12-104 of the Family Law Article (“FL”). Although a court may modify a child support award following a showing of a “material change of circumstance,” FL § 12- 104(a), “[t]he court may not retroactively modify a child support award prior to the date of the filing of the motion for modification.” FL § 12-104(b). “The decision to make a child support award retroactive to the filing of the second complaint is a matter reserved to the discretion of the trial court.” Petitto v. Petitto, 147 Md. App. 280, 310 (2002).
At trial, the court heard arguments about the parties’ current financial situations, and particularly, Mr. Ross’s ability to pay. The court made specific findings of fact regarding Mr. Ross’s income at various points over the prior three years, and additionally stated that Mr. Ross’s testimony regarding his income was not credible. As Mr. Ross points out in his brief, Mrs. Schwab alleged in her contempt petition that Mr. Ross owed a total of $160,771.61 in both outstanding alimony and child support. Even so, the trial court ordered that Mr. Ross make child support and alimony arrearage payments of only $38,000. Furthermore, the trial court did find that a “material change in circumstances” occurred, namely the transfer of custody of the children from Mrs. Schwab to Mr. Ross, and ordered that Mrs. Schwab pay Mr. Ross $1,071 per month in child support. We cannot say that the court’s failure to retroactively modify the child support owed by Mr. Ross was an abuse of discretion.
C. The trial court did not err in declining to modify or terminate alimony at an earlier date.
The court declined to modify Mr. Ross’s alimony obligations. In its December 11, 2023 order, the court stated “that any alimony award from Plaintiff to the Defendant, as described in the Judgment of Absolute Divorce dated December 20, 2019, terminated at the end of December, 2021, and any additional request by Plaintiff to modify and/or terminate alimony is hereby denied.” Mr. Ross argues that the court erred in declining to modify alimony because immediately following the grant of absolute divorce, Mr. Schwab began cohabitating with Mrs. Schwab, in direct violation of the divorce order which specifically prohibited the overnight visits of paramours for one year following the divorce.
The modification of alimony is governed by FL § 11-107, which provides: “the court may modify the amount of alimony awarded as circumstances and justice require.” The termination of alimony is governed by FL § 11-108. Alimony terminates upon the remarriage of the recipient. FL § 11-108(2). “An alimony award will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion or rendered a judgment that was clearly wrong.” Reuter v. Reuter, 102 Md. App. 212, 229 (1994). Thus, although the termination of Mrs. Schwab’s alimony award is statutorily required, the retroactive modification is a decision that lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Mr. Ross argues that Mrs. Schwab’s “marriage type relationship” with Mr. Schwab began shortly after the divorce was granted, and therefore, he should not have been required to pay alimony to Mrs. Schwab. Notably, FL § 11-108 only addresses actual remarriage, and does not provide that “alimony cannot be awarded, or, if awarded, terminates, or must be terminated, if the recipient lives in a ‘marriage type relationship’ with another
person.” Whittington v. Whittington, 172 Md. App. 317, 341–42 (2007). Although the presence of a marriage type relationship is a factor for the court to assess when considering the financial status of the recipient, a marriage type relationship “does not preclude an award of alimony.” Id. at 342. As noted above, the decision to retroactively modify alimony or terminate the alimony at an earlier date is subject to the discretion of the trial court. The court considered the financial positions of both parties, and did not find that Mrs. Schwab’s residence with Mr. Schwab prohibited the receipt of alimony payments. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in declining to retroactively modify or terminate the alimony award.
II. The trial court did not err in denying Mr. Ross’s request for a jury trial for the constructive civil contempt proceedings.
Mr. Ross contends that he was entitled to a jury trial at the January 17, 2023 contempt hearing because Mrs. Schwab had demanded that he be incarcerated until he purge the contempt against him. Mrs. Schwab disagrees, arguing that individuals subject to constructive civil contempt actions -- as Mr. Ross was here -- are not entitled to a jury trial.
Contempt may be categorized as either “direct,” when it is “committed in the presence of the judge presiding in court or so near to the judge as to interrupt the court's proceedings,” or “constructive,” when it occurs in any other circumstance. Md. Rule 15-202. “An obligor’s failure to pay court-ordered support payments can constitute constructive contempt.” Bradford v. State, 199 Md. App. 175, 193 (2011). Once it is determined if the contempt is direct or constructive, the court must determine whether the contempt is either criminal or civil. Fisher v. McCrary Crescent City, LLC, 186 Md. App. 86, 114 (2009) (citing State v. Roll, 267 Md. 714 (1973)). Although the actions giving rise to either type of contempt may be the same, “the purpose of civil contempt is to coerce present or future compliance with a court order, whereas imposing a sanction for past misconduct is the function of criminal contempt.” Dodson v. Dodson, 380 Md. 438, 448 (2004) (citing Roll, 267 Md. at 728, 730). As such, a civil contempt sanction is remedial in nature, while a criminal contempt sanction serves a punitive purpose. Sayed A. v. Susan A., 265 Md. App. 40, 77 (2025).
It is well settled that a party in a constructive civil contempt action is not entitled to a jury trial. See, e.g., Bryant v. Howard Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Costley, 387 Md. 30, 47–48 (2005) (“A defendant in a constructive civil contempt action is not entitled to a jury trial.”) (citing Dodson, 380 Md. at 453); Lee v. State, 56 Md. App. 613, 623 (1983) overruled on other grounds by Cherry v. State, 62 Md. App. 425 (1985) (“There is no right to a jury trial in civil contempt proceedings.”). Conversely, a defendant in a constructive criminal contempt action is entitled to a jury trial. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 356 Md. 324, 348 (1999) (holding that defendants who were held in constructive criminal contempt for failure to pay child support obligations were entitled to a jury trial); Ashford v. State, 358 Md. 552, 567 (2000) (holding that “in any circuit court criminal case . . . a defendant is entitled to a jury trial if the offense charged is subject to imprisonment”).
In its order, the court noted that this was a “proper [] civil contempt proceeding” and that “[t]he proceeding and any
sanction the Court may impose is intended to coerce compliance with an order to pay child support and spousal support rather than to punish [Mr. Ross] for failing to pay that support.” Despite the abundant case law instructing that a party is only entitled to a jury trial in a constructive criminal contempt action, Mr. Ross argues that he was entitled to a jury trial in this contempt proceeding. Mr. Ross alleges that the distinction between civil and criminal contempt is merely “hair-splitting,” and because Mrs. Schwab “demanded his indefinite incarceration” until he paid the outstanding alimony and child support awards, he was entitled to a jury trial.3
The purpose of a constructive criminal contempt finding is to punish the party for his or her noncompliance with a court order. In contrast, the purpose of a constructive civil contempt finding is to coerce the party into complying. This is why civil contempt sanctions “must provide for purging.” Dodson, 380 Md. at 449. As such, “[o]nly a civil contemnor with the present ability to purge, and who chooses not to pay, may be incarcerated.” Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 567 (2001). See also Jones v. State, 351 Md. 264, 277 (1998) (“Imprisonment of the civil contemnor is conditional. It is based entirely upon the contemnor’s continued defiance, and thus, the civil contemnor is said to hold the keys to the jailhouse door, and may terminate the incarceration any time he or she satisfies the purge provision.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In her petition for contempt, Mrs. Schwab urged the court to find Mr. Ross in contempt for failure to pay child support, requested that the court “order that [Mr. Ross] may purge his contempt by paying [Mrs. Schwab] that entirety of the arrearage owed by [Mr. Ross] to [Mrs. Schwab] for his court ordered child support payments,” and requested that Mr. Ross “serve jail time until he purges the contempt against him.” The court entered an order finding Mr. Ross in contempt for failure to pay $38,000 in outstanding child support and alimony payments, and set a purge of $19,000. The court did not order Mr. Ross’s incarceration. Inasmuch as the underlying proceeding was a constructive civil contempt proceeding, Mr. Ross was not entitled to a jury trial. Finding no other procedural error with the contempt proceedings of January 17, 2023, we hold that that the court did not err in denying Mr. Ross’s request for a jury trial.
III. The trial court did not err in finding Mr. Ross in contempt for his failure to make his court-ordered child support and alimony payments.
Mr. Ross next contends that the trial court erred when it found him in constructive civil contempt on February 10, 2023 for failing to pay child support and alimony. Mr. Ross argues that the court’s finding that he had willfully disobeyed court orders was not supported by the evidence, particularly in the court’s finding that he had the past and present ability to pay the ordered support amounts. Mrs. Schwab disagrees, contending that the court did not err, as it properly considered Mr. Ross’s ability to pay and his behaviors, such as the creation of MKB Ross, LLC, which indicated he was willfully evading his support obligations.
Maryland Rule 15-207(e) delineates the conditions under which a court may make a finding of constructive civil contempt based on an alleged failure to pay spousal or child support. Maryland Rule 15-207(e) provides in pertinent part:
(2) Petitioner’s Burden of Proof. Subject to subsection (3) of this section, the court may make a finding of contempt if the petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor has not paid the amount owed, accounting from the effective date of the support order through the date of the contempt hearing.
(3) When a Finding of Contempt May Not Be Made. The court may not make a finding of contempt if the alleged contemnor proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
(A) from the date of the support order through the date of the contempt hearing the alleged contemnor (i) never had the ability to pay more than the amount actually paid and (ii) made reasonable efforts to become or remain employed or otherwise lawfully obtain the funds necessary to make payment, or (B) enforcement by contempt is barred by limitations as to each unpaid spousal or child support payment for which the alleged contemnor does not make the proof set forth in subsection (3)(A) of this section.
(4) Order. Upon a finding of constructive civil contempt for failure to pay spousal or child support, the court shall issue a written order that specifies (A) the amount of the arrearage for which enforcement by contempt is not barred by limitations, (B) any sanction imposed for the contempt, and (C) how the contempt may be purged. If the contemnor does not have the present ability to purge the contempt, the order may include directions that the contemnor make specified payments on the arrearage at future times and perform specified acts to enable the contemnor to comply with the direction to make payments. Thus, for a court to properly find a party in contempt, the petitioner must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the alleged contemnor failed to make support payments, and the contemnor must be both able to pay the required amount, and willfully neglecting to make required payments. See Arrington v. Human Resources, 402 Md. 79, 97 (2007) (“If the petitioner proves that the defendant failed to pay the amount owed and the defendant fails to prove . . . that he or she could not have paid more than was paid . . . the court may find the defendant in contempt.”).
Pursuant to the December 20, 2019 judgment, Mr. Ross had been ordered to pay $6,000 per month in child support and $4,000 per month for the first 18 months and $3,000 per month for the following 18 months in alimony support, which terminated December 25, 2021 due to Mrs. Schwab’s remarriage. The child support obligation terminated on September 28, 2023, when Mr. Ross was granted physical custody of the children. Neither party contends that Mrs. Schwab did not present clear and convincing evidence to prove that Mr. Ross had failed to make his support payments. Md. Rule 15-207(e)(2). As a result, the burden shifted to Mr. Ross to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that from the date of the support order through the date of the contempt hearing, he “never had the ability to pay more than the amount [he] actually paid,” and that he “made reasonable efforts to become or remain employed or otherwise lawfully obtain the funds necessary to make payment” of support to Mrs. Schwab. Md. Rule 15-207(e)(3).
The court found that Mr. Ross failed to pay $38,000 due under the support order, and “failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence either defense allowed under Rule 15-207(e)(3).”
The court found Mr. Ross in contempt and ordered that he may purge the contempt finding by paying $19,000, finding that Mr. Ross was “presently able to meet that purge and has willfully refused or failed to do so.” The court stated as follows:
The court does not find [Mr. Ross] to be credible in his testimony with respect to his finances or ability to pay.
The Court reaches this conclusion based on [Mr. Ross’s] demeanor on the witness stand, evasiveness in answering questions, lack of evidence of tax returns to corroborate his testimony, as well as the suspicious timing of the creation of [Mr. Ross’s] company one week after being recommended for contempt by a Magistrate.
As such, this Court finds that at several points, [Mr. Ross] has had the money to pay his obligations, but has failed to do so.
Mr. Ross specifically contends that the court erred in finding that he had willfully violated the court’s order during the period in which he underpaid the alimony and child support, and that he had both the past and present ability to make the support payments. Mr. Ross claims that prior to December 31, 2021, CBRE withheld all appropriate amounts from his wages for support payments, and beginning in January 2022 when Mr. Ross directed his payments to MKB Ross, LLC, it did the same. At the January 17, 2023 contempt proceedings, Mr. Ross testified that in 2022, he received $204,139 in payments from MKB Ross, LLC. Mr. Ross could not say how much MKB Ross, LLC received in payments from CBRE, but acknowledged it was more than $204,139 because MKB Ross, LLC also needed to pay business expenses. Mr. Ross could not state how much MKB Ross, LLC retained in excess of what was paid out to Mr. Ross.4 Mr. Ross contends that he has significant debts, and he does not have the ability to pay the outstanding $38,000 in support payments, and that his failure to make the outstanding payments is solely because he has never made the income the court projected when it determined the appropriate support obligations in December 2019.
Mrs. Schwab contends that Mr. Ross demonstrated an ability to pay, citing the income that he received from MKB Ross, LLC in 2022, and alleges that Mr. Ross claimed certain expenses on his financial statement that he is not actually paying. Mrs. Schwab further contends that Mr. Ross’s diminished earnings is willful, implying that he is hiding funds by funneling payments from CBRE to MKB Ross, LLC, and notes that Mr. Ross has not provided direct payments for his support obligations and instead payments must be garnished from his wages.
“The decision to hold a party in contempt is vested in the trial court.” Cnty. Comm’rs for Carroll Cnty. v. Forty W. Builders, Inc., 178 Md. App. 328, 394 (2008). We “will only reverse such a decision upon a showing that a finding of fact upon which the contempt was imposed was clearly erroneous or that the court abused its discretion in finding particular behavior to be contemptuous.” Id.
Critically, constructive civil contempt is for the purposes of coercing a party to comply with a court order. “[N]ormally in a constructive civil contempt action there cannot even be a finding or adjudication that the defendant is in contempt unless
the defendant has the present ability to comply with the earlier court order or with the purging provision.” Dodson v. Dodson, 380 Md. 438, 450 (2004). “The only exception to this general rule [requiring a present ability to comply] is set forth in Maryland Rule 15-207(e), which permits a finding of contempt, and the issuance of certain court orders, where a defendant has failed to comply with spousal or child support orders under conditions specified in the Rule.” Id. at 451. Thus, even if a contemnor does not have the present ability to pay the total amount owed, he or she may still be found in contempt. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 544 (2001) (“Rule 15-207(e) . . . authorizes the court to make a finding of constructive civil contempt even though the alleged contemnor may not have the present ability to pay the ordered child support.”).
Contempt findings must provide for a chance for the contemnor to purge the contempt by paying a specified amount. If the contemnor does not have the present ability to satisfy the purge provision, “the [contempt] order may include directions that the contemnor make specified payments on the arrearage at future times and perform specified acts to enable the contemnor to comply with the direction to make payments.” Md. Rule 15–207(e)(4).
We review for clear error the facts relied upon by the trial court to determine whether a party was in contempt. Cnty. Comm’rs for Carroll Cnty., 178 Md. App. at 394. The court found that Mr. Ross was not credible in his testimony regarding his finances or ability, past or present, to pay his outstanding support obligations. We defer to the trial court’s determination of credibility because it has “the opportunity to gauge and observe the witnesses’ behavior and testimony” throughout the proceedings. Barton v. Hirshberg, 137 Md. App. 1, 21 (2001) (quoting Ricker, 114 Md. App. at 592). It is “not our role, as an appellate court, to second-guess the trial judge’s assessment of a witness’s credibility.” Gizzo v. Gerstman, 245 Md. App. 168, 203 (2020). The parties offered extensive evidence regarding Mr. Ross’s current income, including, at minimum, an income in 2022 of $204,169, and Mr. Ross’s current expenses and financial state. The court found that Mr. Ross had the present ability to meet the purge amount of $19,000. Based on this record, the trial court’s determination of Mr. Ross’s present ability to pay was not clearly erroneous.
The willfulness of the alleged contemnor’s frustration of a court order “must be established by evidence, and cannot simply be ‘assumed.’” Dorsey v. State, 356 Md. 324, 352 (1999). However, “evidence of an ability to comply, or evidence of a defendant’s conduct purposefully rendering himself unable to comply [with a court order], may, depending on the circumstances, give rise to a legitimate inference that the defendant acted with the requisite willfulness[.]” Id.
Mr. Ross alleges that his failure to comply was not willful, as he is simply unable to comply with the order due to his inability to pay. The trial court was not convinced. Not only did the court find that Mr. Ross had the present ability to pay, the court also expressed concern about the “suspicious timing of the creation of [Mr. Ross’s] company [MKB Ross, LLC], one week after being recommended for contempt by a Magistrate.” The court heard testimony that the creation of MKB Ross, LLC was merely to streamline taxes and deductions and was encouraged by CBRE, but also heard that Mr. Ross began his employment with CBRE
in 2017 and did not create MKB Ross, LLC until 2021. To the court, the timing of the creation of MKB Ross, LLC indicated that Mr. Ross’s failure to comply with his court ordered support obligations was willful. This finding was not clearly erroneous. As such, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding Mr. Ross’s failure to pay child support contemptuous.
IV. The trial court erred in ordering the outsider reverse piercing of the corporate veil of MKB Ross, LLC for the purpose of collecting child support arrearages.
Finally, Mr. Ross contends that the court erred when it ordered the outsider reverse piercing of the corporate veil of MKB Ross, LLC for the purposes of recovering his outstanding child support obligations. In the December 11, 2023 order, the court found as follows:
(1) that MKB Ross, LLC was organized for the purpose of avoiding [Mr. Ross’s] legal obligations; (2) [Mr. Ross] is failing to observe the sanctity of the corporate entity, by treating corporate assets as his own; and (3) that the “alter ego” doctrine applies to this matter, in that [Mr. Ross] and MKB Ross, LLC are one and the same. The court further found: by clear and convincing evidence, that the corporate veil of MKB Ross, LLC shall be, and hereby is, pierced by [Mrs. Schwab] for the sole purpose of collecting any child support arrearages due herein, and specifically not for any outstanding alimony, monetary award or attorney’s fees. At the time the court entered its order, Mr. Ross had been determined to have accumulated arrearages of $38,000. Of note, although the trial court found that the creation of MKB Ross, LLC was “suspicious,” it did not make a particular finding that MKB Ross, LLC’s existence was to perpetuate fraud, only that Mr. Ross sought to avoid his legal obligations.
Piercing the corporate veil is “[t]he judicial imposition of personal liability on otherwise immune corporate officers, directors, or shareholders for the corporation’s wrongful acts.” Piercing the Corporate Veil, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Thus, when a corporation commits wrongful acts, those to whom the corporation is indebted may be permitted to pursue recovery against the shareholders, officers, and directors in certain circumstances. Conversely, reverse piercing of the corporate veil is “[t]he judicial imposition of liability on a corporation for the wrongful acts of an officer, director, or shareholder who is using the corporation as a shield.” Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
There is similarly a distinction between “insider” and “outsider” reverse veil- piercing. “Insider reverse piercing applies when the controlling [member or shareholder] urges the court to disregard the corporate entity that otherwise separates the [member or shareholder] from the corporation.” Sky Cable, LLC v. DIRECTV, Inc., 886 F.3d 375, 385 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, outsider reverse piercing “applies when an outside third party, frequently a creditor, urges a court to render a company liable in a judgment against its member.” Id. at 386; C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. Partnership, 306 F.3d 126, 134 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Outsider reverse veil-piercing extends this traditional veil-piercing doctrine to
permit a third-party creditor to ‘pierce[ ] the veil’ to satisfy the debts of an individual out of the corporation’s assets.”).
In describing the standard for permitting the piercing of the corporate veil, the Supreme Court of Maryland has stated as follows:
“[T]he most frequently enunciated rule in Maryland is that although the courts will, in a proper case, disregard the corporate entity and deal with substance rather than form, as though a corporation did not exist, shareholders generally are not held individually liable for debts or obligations of a corporation except where it is necessary to prevent fraud or enforce a paramount equity.”
Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 310 (1975). “Thus, a Maryland court may pierce the corporate veil only based on fraud or proof that it is necessary to enforce a paramount equity.” Residential Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley, Inc., 126 Md. App. 294, 306–07 (1999).
“This standard has been so narrowly construed that neither this Court nor the [Supreme Court of Maryland] has ultimately ‘found an equitable interest more important than the state’s interest in limited shareholder liability.’” Serio v. Baystate Properties, LLC, 209 Md. App. 545, 559–60 (2013) (quoting Residential Warranty Corp., 126 Md. App. at 307 n. 13).
As both parties acknowledge, Maryland courts have never addressed the outsider reverse piercing of the corporate veil. Mrs. Schwab cites several other states which permit the outsider reverse piercing of the corporate veil, and encourages us to extend the doctrine to permit the outsider reverse piercing of MKB Ross, LLC for the purpose of recovering Mr. Ross’s outstanding child support obligations. Mr. Ross contends that the corporate veil of an LLC may not be pierced, even in the traditional sense. Even if it may, he further contends that Mrs. Schwab failed to prove that the outsider reverse piercing of MKB Ross, LLC was “necessary to prevent fraud or enforce a paramount equity.” Assuming without deciding whether outsider reverse piercing of the corporate veil of an LLC is authorized, we hold that the trial court erred in ordering the specific outsider reverse piercing of the corporate veil of MKB Ross, LLC.
Our review of Maryland case law on the doctrine of corporate veil-piercing reveals an incredibly high bar that creditors must meet for a court to order that a corporation be liable for the actions of its stockholders or subsidiaries. See, e.g., Hildreth v. Tidewater Equip. Co., Inc., 378 Md. 724, 734 (2003) (“Because piercing the corporate veil is founded on equity, ‘where no fraud is shown, the plaintiff must show that an inequitable result, involving fundamental unfairness, will result from a failure to disregard the corporate form.’”) (citation omitted); Residential Warranty Corp., 126 Md. App. at 307 (“Despite the proclamation that a court may pierce the corporate veil to enforce a paramount equity, arguments that have urged a piercing of the veil ‘for reasons other than fraud’ have failed in Maryland courts.”) (citation omitted); Dixon v. Process Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 645– 46 (1978) (“[W]oe unto the creditor who seeks to rip away the corporate facade in order to recover from one sibling of the corporate family what is due from another in the belief that the relationship is inseparable, if not insufferable, for his is a herculean task.”).
“Maryland is more restrictive than other jurisdictions in allowing a plaintiff to pierce a corporation’s veil.” Residential Warranty Corp., 126 Md. App. at 309. Although Maryland courts have continuously reiterated the validity of the paramount equity rationale, our appellate courts have not permitted the piercing of the corporate veil absent a finding of fraud. Qun Lin v. Cruz, 247 Md. App. 606, 641 (2020); see also, Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc., 275 Md. at 311–12 (“Nor are we aware of any Maryland case where . . . the Court has allowed the corporate entity to be disregarded merely because it wished to prevent an ‘evasion of legal obligations’—absent evidence of fraud or similar conduct.”).
Considering the specific facts of this case, and absent an express finding of fraud by the trial court, or case law to the contrary, we cannot say that Mr. Ross’s creation of and diverting of funds to MKB Ross, LLC constitutes such a paramount inequity to justify the outsider reverse piercing of the veil.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the trial court did not err in consolidating the January 17, 2023 contempt hearing with the merits hearing in June 2023; declining to retroactively modify its previous child support and alimony awards against Mr. Ross; denying Mr. Ross’s request for a jury trial for the January 17, 2023 contempt proceedings; and finding Mr. Ross in contempt for failing to make support payments in the amount of $38,000. We hold, however, that the court erred in ordering the outsider reverse piercing of the corporate veil of MKB Ross, LLC, for the purposes of recovering the outstanding child support owed to Mrs. Schwab. As such, we vacate solely the court’s order granting the outsider reverse piercing of the corporate veil of MKB Ross, LLC, and remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Mrs. Schwab in the amount of $38,000. All other findings of the trial court are otherwise affirmed.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY AFFIRMED, IN PART, AND VACATED, IN PART. COSTS TO BE PAID 3/4 BY APPELLANT AND 1/4 BY APPELLEE.
FOOTNOTES
1 Jennifer Ross married Joshua Schwab in December 2021. We will refer to her as Mrs. Schwab throughout, even when describing events prior to her remarriage.
2 Mr. Ross phrased the questions as follows:
1. Whether the court erred by failing to adjudicate Mr. Ross’s requests to modify its original alimony and child support awards based on his adverse circumstances and Mrs. Schwab’s improved circumstances, including receiving substantial financial support from her live-in paramour and her family, yet almost immediately adjudicating Mrs. Schwab’s contempt petition for unpaid support under these same orders?
2. Whether Mr. Ross was entitled to a jury trial on Mrs. Schwab’s petition for contempt based on his failure to pay $160,771.61 allegedly owed under orders for child support and alimony, and demanding his incarceration until he purged his purported contempt by paying the entirety of such alleged arrearages?
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient for the court to find that Mr. Ross had acted willfully to disobey orders to pay specified amounts of child support
and alimony, and that Mr. Ross had the ability to make such payments?
4. Whether the court erred by ordering the reverse piercing of the “corporate shield” of MKB Ross, LLC, the limited liability company organized by Mr. Ross that received commissions from the real estate brokerage for which he was an agent?
3 . Throughout his brief, Mr. Ross refers to the proceedings in this case as “civil contempt,” arguing that the principle allowing for a jury trial in constructive criminal contempt proceedings “should apply with equal force to civil contempt[].” At oral argument, Mr. Ross instead contended that the January 17, 2023 proceeding was actually a criminal contempt action, and the labeling of the action as civil should not be determinative of his right to a jury trial. For the reasons discussed above, including the intention to coerce compliance and the inclusion of a purge provision, this was a constructive civil contempt proceeding.
4 Mr. Ross’s 2022 tax return indicated that the net income for MKB Ross, LLC was $51,212, seemingly indicating that MKB Ross, LLC did not pay out to Mr. Ross the full amount that it received in compensation for Mr. Ross’s work as a “qualified real estate agent” for CBRE.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court vacated the Caroline County Circuit Court’s order denying mother’s motion to revise the prior order modifying child support. The circuit court abused its discretion in denying mother’s motion because the prior ruling was based on a clearly erroneous factual conclusion regarding the existing custody arrangement.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
had significantly increased. In addition, Mother maintained the amount of child support should be recalculated in the light of the expiration of Father’s obligation to pay alimony.
On June 2, 2023, the court held a hearing on Mother’s motion.1 On January 29, 2024, the court issued a memorandum opinion and order reducing the amount of Father’s child support obligation. The court determined the expiration of the order to pay alimony did not constitute a material change in circumstances for purposes of modifying child support. The court found, however, Father’s income increased from approximately $120,000.00 to $186,429.00 while Mother’s income increased by “some disputed amount.” The court concluded that the increases in the parties’ earnings constituted a material change in circumstances, so it was in the children’s best interest to modify their level of support. The court then ordered Father’s child support obligation be reduced to $1,600.00 per month.
Appellant, Jillian Luna (“Mother”), filed this appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Caroline County denying her motion to revise an order for payment of child support. She contends the court’s calculation of the appropriate amount of child support, and the rationale for later denying her motion to revise the order for child support, was based on an erroneous finding regarding the parties’ custody schedule. Appellee, Alberto Luna (“Father”), concedes the court’s calculation does not accurately reflect the parties’ custody arrangement. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties are the parents of two minor children. On December 12, 2019, the court entered a judgment of absolute divorce which incorporated but did not merge the parties’ marital settlement agreement. Consistent with the agreement, the court awarded the parties joint legal custody of the children. Mother was awarded primary physical custody. Father was granted visitation every other weekend, from Friday evening to Monday morning. Father was ordered to pay Mother $1,500.00 per month in alimony for period of 33 months, and child support in the amount of $1,681.00 per month.
On December 22, 2022, Mother filed a motion to modify child support. As grounds for her motion, she alleged Father’s income
On February 9, 2024, the court issued an amended order for modification that included the Child Support Guidelines Worksheet which, due to clerical error, was not attached to the January 29, 2024, order. According to the worksheet, the children spent 182 overnights with Mother each year, and 183 overnights with Father. The recommended amount of child support, per the worksheet, was $1,665.00, but the amount of child support in the amended order remained $1,600.00.
On March 7, 2024, Mother filed a motion to revise the February 9, 2024, order pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-535. She claimed the court, in calculating the recommended amount of child support per the guidelines, failed to recognize she had primary physical custody of the children. According to Mother, per the custody provisions of the judgment of divorce, which were never modified, she has 261 overnights with the children each year, and Father has 104 overnights, which would make Father’s child support obligation $2,803.00 per month. Mother asked the court to use its revisory power to “correct the number of overnights and resulting support obligation[.]” Father did not file a response to Mother’s motion.
On May 9, 2024, the court issued an order denying Mother’s motion to revise, stating:
The [c]ourt denies [Mother’s] request to revise the child support order on newly alleged facts that parties split overnight visits unequally, with 261 overnights per year with [Mother] and 104 overnights per year with [Father], because the issues of modification and child custody were not before this [c]ourt, [Mother] failed to present at trial any evidence or dispute about the custody and visitation schedule, and the [c]ourt does not find fraud, mistake, or irregularity.
Mother filed this timely appeal from the May 9, 2024, order.2
DISCUSSION
A. Parties’ Contentions
Mother contends the court abused its discretion in denying her motion to revise the February 9, 2024, order modifying child support. She asserts she had no burden to present evidence regarding the parties’ custody schedule because the issue of custody was not before the court. Mother maintains that, per the parties’ custody schedule, she has 287 overnights with the children per year and Father has 78.
Father concedes the court’s allocation of overnights does not accurately reflect the existing custody arrangement. According to Father, however, Mother has 261 overnights per year and he has 104. He asks that we nonetheless affirm the court’s denial of Mother’s motion to revise because the court “likely” reallocated the parties’ respective number of overnights to “offset [a] disparity” which, Father claims, was “created by [Mother’s] refusal to disclose all her income.”
B. Standard of Review
“[F]or a period of thirty days from the entry of a law or equity judgment a circuit court shall have unrestricted discretion to revise it.” Md. Bd. of Nursing v. Nechay, 347 Md. 396, 408 (1997) (quoting Platt v. Platt, 302 Md. 9, 13 (1984)) (some internal quotation marks omitted); see also Md. Rule 2-535(a); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) § 6-408. “[T]he discretion reposed in the trial court ‘is a discretion which must be exercised liberally, lest technicality triumph over justice.’” Nechay, 347 Md. at 408 (quoting Eshelman Motors v. Scheftel, 231 Md. 300, 301 (1963)).
“[A] motion to exercise revisory power will not toll the time for filing an appeal [of the underlying judgment or order] unless the motion is filed within ten days of the judgment or order.” Furda v. State, 193 Md. App. 371, 377 n.1 (2010). Where, as in this case, “a revisory motion is filed beyond the ten-day period, but within thirty days, an appeal noted within thirty days after the court resolves the revisory motion addresses only the issues generated by the revisory motion.” Id.
“An appeal from the denial of a motion asking the court to exercise its revisory power is not necessarily the same as an appeal from the judgment itself. Rather, the standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining to revise the judgment.” Bennett v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Tax’n, 171 Md. App. 197, 203 (2006) (quoting Green v. Brooks, 125 Md. App. 349, 362 (1999)). “A court can abuse its discretion when it makes a decision based on an incorrect legal premise or upon factual conclusions that are clearly erroneous.” Guidash v. Tome, 211 Md. App. 725, 735 (2013).
C. Analysis
In Maryland, if the parties’ combined monthly income is $30,000 or less, as in this case, the court must follow the child support guidelines when awarding child support set forth in Maryland Code Annotated (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol., 2024 Supp.), Family Law (“FL”) Article §§ 12-201 through 12-204. Kpetigo v. Kpetigo, 238 Md. App. 561, 583 (2018). The guidelines establish one formula for cases where
one parent has sole or primary physical custody and a modified formula for cases of “shared physical custody.” Compare FL § 12-204(l) with FL § 12-204(m).
“‘Shared physical custody’ means that each parent keeps the child or children overnight for more than 25% of the year and that both parents contribute to the expenses of the child or children in addition to the payment of child support.” FL § 12-201(o)(1). Both formulas account for the parents’ incomes, but the shared physical custody formula also accounts for “the percentage of time the child or children spend” with each parent. FL § 12-204(m) (2). In cases of shared physical custody, the child support obligation provided in the schedule is “divided between the parents in proportion to their respective adjusted actual incomes.” FL § 12-204(m)(1). Each parent’s share is then “multiplied by the percentage of time the child or children spend with the other parent[.]” FL § 12-204(m) (2)(i).
In denying Mother’s Rule 2-535 motion, the court implicitly found, under the extant custody arrangement, the parties split overnight visits equally. The court did not explain the basis for its finding, and there is no support for it in the record.3 The schedule in the judgment of divorce grants Father three overnights every other week. By the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement, Father has additional overnight custody during the week and on certain holidays, but evidently not enough to support a finding that overnights are shared equally between the parties.
Father concedes the court’s calculation of the recommended amount of child support does not accurately reflect the parties’ custody schedule. He suggests, however, the court properly used its discretion to “allocat[e] more overnights to [him] that he actually exercises in practice” “in [an] effort to offset Mother’s bad faith failure to report all her gross income.” We are not persuaded. “While a trial court may deviate from the [child support] guidelines if application thereof would be unjust or inappropriate, the court must make specific written or oral findings supporting such deviation,” including how the amount of child support ordered by the court varies from the guidelines and how the finding serves the best interests of the child. Shrivastava v. Mates, 93 Md. App. 320, 329 (1992) (discussing former FL § 12-202(a)(2)(iv), currently FL § 12-202(a)(2)(v)). Here, however, the court made no such findings.
We conclude the court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s motion to revise the February 9, 2024, order as the ruling was based on a clearly erroneous factual conclusion regarding the existing custody arrangement. Accordingly, we vacate the May 9, 2024, order denying the motion to revise the February 9, 2024, order, and remand for further proceedings to determine the number of overnights each party spends with the children per year. On remand, the trial court may receive evidence regarding the parties’ current income and any other evidence necessary to determine the appropriate amount of child support. See Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 313 (1986) (observing that, on remand, the trial court “in the
exercise of its discretion may receive additional evidence to supplement the existing record”); Long v. Long, 141
Md. App. 341, 353 (2001) (“On remand, the circuit court, in its discretion, may receive additional evidence.”).
MAY 9, 2024, JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CAROLINE COUNTY REVERSED IN PART. PROVISIONS OF THAT ORDER DENYING MOTHER’S MOTION TO REVISE THE FEBRUARY 9, 2024, ORDER REGARDING CHILD SUPPORT REVERSED. ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE MAY 9, 2024, ORDER REMAIN IN EFFECT. CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CAROLINE COUNTY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. APPELLEE TO PAY COSTS.
FOOTNOTES
1 The hearing also addressed a petition for contempt filed by Mother.
2 The May 9, 2024, order also addressed Mother’s motion to revise provisions of the February 9, 2024, order which related to Mother’s petition for contempt. Neither party challenges the court’s ruling regarding the contempt provisions.
3 It is conceivable the court mistakenly relied on a child support worksheet prepared by Father and filed with the court on July 26, 2019, before the judgment of divorce was entered. In that worksheet, Father indicated he had 183 overnights with the children and Mother had 182.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
Cite as 09 MFLU Supp. 29 (2025) Guardian; removal; grounds
The Appellate Court affirmed the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court’s removal of one of the co-guardians of the person and property of his adult son. The circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion when it found that the evidence that it heard at the May 10, 2024, hearing—as well as what it heard from the adult son himself some months earlier—constituted “grounds for removal.”
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
as the sole guardian of Mr. Wilson’s person and property. That same day, Mr. Caffee filed what he styled as a counter-petition for appointment of a guardian of Mr. Wilson’s person and property. He asked the court to appoint Ms. Hart and him as joint guardians of Mr. Wilson’s person and property.
In October 2020, the parties appeared in circuit court for a hearing on the parties’ petitions. The court found it was “appropriate to appoint both” Mr. Caffee and Ms. Hart as coguardians of Mr. Wilson’s person and property. Ms. Hart moved to reconsider that order in November 2020, but the court denied the motion.
On December 12, 2023, Ms. Hart petitioned the court to remove Mr. Caffee as a guardian of Mr. Wilson’s person and property. Ms. Hart’s petition argued that it was in Mr. Wilson’s best interest for Ms. Hart to be “his sole guardian of his person and property.”
The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County appointed appellant Davian Caffee and appellee Joy Wilson Hart as coguardians of the person and property of their adult son, Najee Wilson.
After several years of serving as a co-guardian with Mr. Caffee, Ms. Hart petitioned to remove Mr. Caffee as one of Mr. Wilson’s guardians. The circuit court granted Ms. Hart’s petition and removed Mr. Caffee as a guardian of Mr. Wilson’s person and property. This timely appeal followed.
The sole issue presented for our consideration is whether the circuit court erred in removing Mr. Caffee as joint guardian of Mr. Wilson. We discern no error and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Wilson was born in May 2002. His primary care physician has diagnosed him with autism spectrum disorder; attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; mild intellectual disability; a genetic disorder; periventricular white matter disease;1 epilepsy; hearing loss; anxiety; and a chromosomal abnormality.
Mr. Wilson’s parents, Davian Caffee and Joy Wilson Hart, are not married. Beginning in 2014, Mr. Wilson would alternate living with Mr. Caffee and Ms. Hart on a weekly basis.
When Mr. Wilson turned eighteen in May 2020, Ms. Hart petitioned the circuit court for appointment of a guardian of his person and property. Ms. Hart asked the court to appoint her as the guardian of both.
In July 2020, Mr. Caffee filed a response to Ms. Hart’s petition. He asked that the court deny Ms. Hart’s request to appoint her
The parties appeared in the circuit court on May 10, 2024, for a hearing on Ms. Hart’s petition. Ms. Hart argued that it was proper to remove Mr. Caffee as a guardian “given the nature of the estranged relationship” between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Caffee. Mr. Caffee argued that any estrangement between him and his son was attributable to Ms. Hart encouraging Mr. Wilson to alienate himself from Mr. Caffee. Ms. Hart testified on her own behalf. She told the court that Mr. Wilson’s relationship with Mr. Caffee had broken down since the court established the co- guardianship. She also told the court that Mr. Wilson has gained a sense of independence since 2020. She testified that Mr. Wilson had decided to enroll in college and had begun to make friends.
Ms. Hart testified that Mr. Wilson had started to become nervous to be around Mr. Caffee and did not want to interact with him. Ms. Hart described a time in 2022 when she accompanied Mr. Wilson to his college orientation. Ms. Hart testified that Mr. Wilson instructed her “not [to] tell [Mr. Caffee] that he was enrolled in school.” Ms. Hart related that Mr. Caffee showed up unexpectedly to Mr. Wilson’s orientation and that Mr. Wilson “became extremely nervous, and he began to hold onto” Ms. Hart’s arm. She also testified that Mr. Wilson began to “physically shake” upon Mr. Caffee’s arrival.
Ms. Hart described a situation in August 2023 when she took Mr. Wilson to an appointment with an eye doctor.2 Ms. Hart testified that, during the appointment, Mr. Caffee interrupted Mr. Wilson’s eye examination and began to tell Mr. Wilson that he missed spending time with him. Ms. Hart said that Mr. Wilson “was making it clear that” he did not want Mr. Caffee at the appointment, and Mr. Caffee replied that his son was rebuffing him because Ms. Hart had told him to do so. Ms. Hart testified that, as a result of this interaction, Mr. Wilson “became
extremely pink or reddish” and he “became stiff . . . and began to stutter.”
Ms. Hart told the court that removing Mr. Caffee as one of the guardians would make it easier to assist Mr. Wilson with the daily tasks. Ms. Hart testified that Mr. Caffee consistently made it difficult to complete the annual guardianship report mandated by Maryland Rule 10-206. She also testified that Mr. Caffee made Ms. Hart “continuously reschedule” Mr. Wilson’s doctor’s appointments, even though she was taking Mr. Wilson to a considerable majority of those appointments.
Mr. Caffee testified on his own behalf. He disputed Ms. Hart’s testimony that Mr.Wilson did not want him to attend college orientation, calling the day in question “a normal day.” He also disagreed with Ms. Hart’s characterization of the eye appointment. He testified that the eye examination occurred at a time when he had not seen Mr. Wilson in months. Because Ms. Hart informed him of Mr. Wilson’s appointment, Mr. Caffee decided to attend. Mr. Caffee testified that Mr. Wilson never said that he did not want him at the appointment and that only Ms. Hart said anything to that effect on the day of the appointment.
Mr. Caffee’s attorney offered into evidence text messages that Mr. Wilson exchanged with Mr. Caffee. In the text messages, Mr. Wilson stated that he did not want Mr. Caffee coming to his appointments and did not want Mr. Caffee contacting him. Mr. Caffee expressed his opinion that those messages, which were in paragraph format with “full punctuation,” could not have been written by Mr. Wilson, but were, in fact, written by Ms. Hart. Mr. Caffee urged the court to “be realistic” when looking at the text exchanges.
On cross-examination, Ms. Hart’s attorney asked Mr. Caffee if his daughter— Mr.Wilson’s half-sister—had ever accused Mr. Wilson of sexual assault. Mr. Caffee said that she had. Mr. Caffee agreed with Ms. Hart’s attorney that Mr. Wilson was arrested and handcuffed as a result of that accusation. He also agreed that Ms. Hart paid for Mr. Wilson to retain an attorney in connection with that accusation and that Mr. Caffee had provided no financial assistance to Ms. Hart or to Mr. Wilson to help pay for the attorney.
Ms. Hart’s attorney also asked if Mr. Wilson had ever petitioned for a temporary protective order against Mr. Caffee. Mr. Caffee said that he had. Mr. Caffee agreed with Ms. Hart’s attorney that he and Mr. Wilson spoke to each other in the aftermath of that temporary protective order hearing and that Mr. Wilson told Mr. Caffee that he “wanted his space” from him.3
After re-direct examination, the court said to Mr. Caffee that Mr. Wilson is an adult and has a right to decide who he does and does not want to see. The court asked Mr. Caffee: “[W]hat reason would there be for the [c]ourt to say it’s in [Mr. Wilson’s] best interest to do something he absolutely doesn’t want?” Mr. Caffee replied that Ms. Hart had “intentionally isolated” him from Mr. Wilson, that he had done all he can to be involved in his son’s life, and that Ms. Hart was not allowing him to be involved.
Mr. Wilson’s attorney testified. She told the court that she had an opportunity to speak at length with Mr. Wilson, who stressed that he wanted to “maintain his independence” as an adult. She also told the court that Mr. Wilson “feels anxious when he has to talk to his father or thinks about needing to talk to his father.” She testified that the incident at the eye doctor “was significant in [Mr. Wilson’s] mind.” She said that Mr. Wilson told her that
he “told [his] dad not to come” to the appointment and that Mr. Caffee “was annoying” at the appointment. Ultimately, she testified that she believed Mr. Wilson was “able to determine emotionally what he wants,” which was for Ms. Hart to be his guardian. She did not believe that Mr. Wilson was, at that time, “ready for a relationship” with Mr. Caffee.
The court ruled from the bench. It stated that it had the opportunity to interview Mr. Wilson at a prior proceeding and that that interview, combined with the hearing testimony, made it “clear . . . that [Mr. Wilson] has a visible physical reaction to his discomfort with being around his father right now.” It ruled that it was not in Mr.
Wilson’s “best interest for his dad to remain as guardian” because it believed that Mr. Caffee was “inhibiting [Mr. Wilson’s] growth[,] which has been [progressing] by leaps and bounds by all accounts.” The court did not find that Mr. Caffee was “a bad parent[,]” but it found that the reunification had to be on Mr. Wilson’s own terms. The court removed Mr. Caffee as the guardian of Mr. Wilson’s person and property.
Mr. Caffee appealed the decision in a timely manner.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[G]uardianship proceedings, whether they involve minors or adults, are equitable proceedings.” Matter of Meddings, 244 Md. App. 204, 219 (2019). In Kicherer v.Kicherer, 285 Md. 114, 11819 (1979), the Court stated that:
a court of equity assumes jurisdiction in guardianship matters to protect those who, because of illness or other disability, are unable to care for themselves. In reality the court is the guardian; an individual who is given that title is merely an agent or arm of that tribunal in carrying out its sacred responsibility.
In Meddings, we described the standard of review when considering the appointment of a guardian for an adult: [I]n reviewing whether a circuit court properly decided to appoint a guardian for an adult, we adopt a tri-partite and interrelated standard of review. Factual findings will be reviewed for clear error, while purely legal determinations will be reviewed without deference, unless the error be harmless. As to the ultimate conclusion of whether an adult guardianship is appropriate, the circuit court’s decision will not be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.
Meddings, 244 Md. App. at 220.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Caffee argues that the circuit court erred by determining that “removing [him] as a joint guardian is somehow less restrictive than [Ms. Hart] serving as sole guardian.” In support of his argument, Mr. Caffee points to Md. Code (1974, 2022 Repl. Vol.), § 13- 705(b) of the Estates and Trusts Article (“ET”). That statute states, in pertinent part, that “[a] guardian of the person shall be appointed if the court determines from clear and convincing evidence that . . . [n]o less restrictive form of intervention is available that is consistent with the person’s welfare and safety.” Mr. Caffee argues that, “[b]y definition,” the
circuit court’s order removing him as a guardian is “exactly as restrictive” as the original order appointing him as a guardian, which, he says, constitutes “an error of law.”
Mr. Caffee’s argument is unconvincing. ET § 13-705(b), by its clear terms, applies to the appointment of a guardian, not the removal of one. Mr. Caffee misreads that portion of the Code to say that a court must find some less restrictive alternative to removing someone as a guardian before doing so. The Code plainly does not mean what Mr. Caffee argues that it means.
The process for removal of a guardian is set forth in Maryland Rules 10-208(d) and 10-712(e), not ET § 13-705(b). Maryland Rule 10-208(d) provides that “[i]f the court finds grounds for removal, it may remove the guardian and appoint a substituted or successor guardian[.]” Maryland Rule 10-712(e) similarly provides that “[i]f the court finds grounds for removal, it may remove the fiduciary and appoint a substituted or successor fiduciary[.]” Mr. Caffee does not argue that there were no grounds for his removal as Mr. Wilson’s guardian. He argues only that it is in Mr. Wilson’s “best interests” that he remain one of the guardians.
Even if Mr. Caffee properly presented an argument that there were no grounds for his removal as Mr. Wilson’s guardian, we would find support in the record for the circuit court’s conclusion that there were grounds. The court heard testimony that Mr. Wilson was considerably uncomfortable when Mr. Caffee attended his doctor’s appointments.
This testimony was echoed by Mr. Wilson’s attorney,
who testified that the incident at the eye doctor’s office was “significant in [Mr. Wilson’s] mind.” The court viewed text messages in which Mr. Wilson told Mr. Caffee that he did not want him at doctor’s appointments and did not want to communicate with him. Mr. Caffee expressed his opinion that Mr. Wilson did not write those text messages, but the court was entitled to give as much weight as it deemed appropriate to the texts themselves. The court heard testimony that Mr. Caffee did not financially support Mr. Wilson when Mr. Caffee’s daughter accused him of sexual assault. The court also heard testimony that Mr. Wilson told his father that he needed space from him in the aftermath of the hearing on the temporary protective order. The court heard testimony from Mr. Wilson’s attorney that she did not feel as though Mr. Wilson was “ready for a relationship” with Mr. Caffee. And, perhaps most important, the court heard from Mr. Wilson himself in a prior proceeding. The substance of Mr. Wilson’s conversation with the court is not in the record, but nobody objected to the circuit court’s reliance on it, and the court was entitled to consider Mr. Wilson’s own feelings and desires.
In summary, the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion when it found that the evidence that it heard at the May 10, 2024, hearing—as well as what it heard from Mr. Wilson himself some months earlier—constituted “grounds for removal” of Mr. Caffee as the co-guardian of Mr. Wilson’s person and property. Md. Rule 10-208(d); Md. Rule 10-712(e).
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
FOOTNOTES
1. Periventricular white matter disease “is associated with abnormalities on tests that involve complex cognitive processes[.]” Charles J. Bae, et al., Neurologic signs predict periventricular white matter lessons on MRI, CAN. J. NEUROL. SCI., May 2004.
2. Mr. Wilson’s attorney testified that this incident occurred in October 2022. The date of the incident does not affect our analysis.
3. Ms. Hart testified that Mr. Wilson agreed to withdraw the protective order by agreement and instead talk things out with his father.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s award granting sole physical and legal custody of two minor children to father, and limiting mother’s access with the minor children to three hours of supervised visitation every other weekend. It is not unreasonable to find that a person who suffers from untreated paranoia, has a history of wielding a firearm in front of a minor child and has testified that she would use that firearm on the minor child’s father, poses a great danger to the health and safety of that child. Thus, the circuit court acted within its discretion in imposing a reasonable limitation on mother’s visitation rights.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
child support, as well as various other demands. In response, Mother filed a “Counterclaim for Absolute Divorce, Custody, Child Support, Alimony, Determination of Marital Property, Monetary Award and for Other Related Relief” on February 16, 2024.
The circuit court held a two-day hearing on September 1617, 2024, to decide the custody issues. Over the course of the two-day custody hearing, the parties called nine witnesses, including both parties, Mother’s daycare assistant, three of Father’s friends, Mother’s parents, and custody evaluator Jeanine Bensadon. They also offered several exhibits, including Bensadon’s August 8, 2024, custody evaluation report. In the report, Bensadon expressed concern regarding Mother’s mental health and a recent incident in which Mother pointed a rifle at Father in E.B.’s presence during a drop-off. Bensadon noted in the report that Mother will use her firearms against Father if she feels threatened by him, and that Mother has repeatedly refused to turn over her firearms despite Father’s filing for a protective order against her.2
At one point during the hearing, Mother offered three photographs purportedly showing bruises that she had suffered at the hands of Father during alleged domestic violence disputes. The court questioned Mother as to each photograph, asking her for information such as when the photographs were taken and what happened to cause the bruises in each photograph. Unsatisfied with her answers, the court declined to receive the photographs into evidence. As its basis for excluding the photographs, the court explained:
Appellant, Elizabeth Burgess (“Mother”), appeals an order by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County granting sole physical and legal custody of her two minor children to Appellee, Keith Burgess (“Father”), and limiting her access with the minor children to three hours of supervised visitation every other weekend.1 She presents two questions:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it excluded Mother’s photographic evidence.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it restricted Mother’s access to supervised visitation.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
Mother and Father are the biological parents of two minor children (T.B. and E.B.) and one adult child. The parties were married in Florida on May 28, 2011, and resided together in Montgomery County until they separated in October of 2023.
Father filed a Complaint for Custody and Divorce against Mother on December 15, 2023, seeking an absolute divorce, sole legal and primary physical custody of the minor children, and
I do not believe that the defendant has a basis of knowledge for any of these photographs. You’re guessing as to when they were taken. You’re guessing as to what happened to cause the events. You’re saying, well, it could have been this, it could have been that There has to –they have to be presented with some specificity for me to give them weight and for me to acknowledge them. You can’t just, you know – throw stuff at the wall and see what will stick.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court awarded sole legal and physical custody of the minor children to Father. The court found that Mother could have supervised visitations with the minor children every other weekend but only after she completed a mental health evaluation. The court primarily based this decision on two findings. First, the court found that Mother not only had a firearm in her possession in front of one of the minor children during an exchange with Father, but that she also said repeatedly, on the record, that she would use the firearm on Father if she feels threatened. This gave the court “grave concerns for the safety of [Father] and the safety
of these two children.” Second, the court found that Mother suffers from a mental condition that has elements of paranoia, evidenced by her various allegations that people have tried to murder or poison her. The court found that these allegations were “irrational” and “not supported by fact,” and that her mental condition “gives this Court tremendous concerns about the safety of these two children and [Father].”
The circuit court entered a Custody, Access, and Child Support Order incorporating its oral rulings on September 23, 2024, and this timely appeal followed on October 4, 2024.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Typically, we review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.” Reyes v. State, 257 Md. App. 596, 615 (2023). “We have consistently held that whether or not a photograph is of practical value in a case and admissible at trial is a matter best left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.... A court’s determination in this area will not be disturbed unless plainly arbitrary.” Mason v. Lynch, 388 Md. 37, 48–49 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 502 (1985)). “A court abuses its discretion when it ‘acts without reference to any guiding principles, and the ruling under consideration is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court.’” Reyes, 257 Md. App. at 615 (quoting Sibley v. Doe, 227 Md. App. 645, 658 (2016)). Additionally, this Court will not consider an erroneous evidentiary ruling to be reversible error unless the error resulted in prejudice to the party by “likely affect[ing] the verdict below.” Brown v. Daniel Realty Co., 409 Md. 565, 584 (2009) (quoting Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 91–92 (2004)).
“Custody and visitation determinations are within the sound discretion of the trial court, as it can best evaluate the facts of the case and assess the credibility of witnesses.” Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 223 (1998). For that reason, “when the reviewing court concludes that the factual findings of the trial court are not clearly erroneous and that sound principles of law were applied, the trial court’s decision will not be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. at 225. “In almost every case, the [trial court’s] decision regarding custody and visitation is given great deference ‘unless it is arbitrary or clearly wrong.’” Id. (quoting Hanke v. Hanke, 94 Md. App. 65, 71 (1992)).
DISCUSSION
I. The Circuit Court did not Abuse its Discretion when it Excluded Mother’s Photographic Evidence
Mother contends that the circuit court erred in excluding her photographic evidence as a discovery sanction, without first considering the best interests of the minor children, in violation of A.A. v. Ab.D., 246 Md. App. 418 (2020).3
In A.A., this Court held that a trial court may not impose a discovery sanction that prohibits a party from presenting testimony or evidence in a child custody hearing without first considering the impact that the sanction would have on the best interests of the children. Id. at 447. To hold otherwise, this Court found, would violate the child’s “indefeasible right” to have his or her best interests considered. Id. at 448.
Here, the circuit court clearly did not exclude Mother’s photographic evidence as a discovery sanction. To the contrary, the circuit court explained its reasoning for excluding the
photographs as follows: [T]he reason they’re not being received is not because they weren’t produced in discovery. It is I do not believe that the defendant has a basis of knowledge for any of these photographs.
Thus, the circuit court apparently based its exclusion of the photographs not on a lack of discovery production, but on a lack of authentication.
Before they may be received into evidence, photographs must be authenticated. See Washington v. State, 406 Md. 642, 651–52 (2008) (“Courts [] require authentication of photographs, movies, or videotapes as a preliminary fact determination, requiring the presentation of evidence sufficient to show that the evidence sought to be admitted is genuine.”). Maryland Rule 5–901(b) provides an inexhaustive list of examples by which photographic evidence may be authenticated, including testimony of a witness with knowledge and circumstantial evidence. No matter how the proponent chooses to authenticate their photographs, the ultimate question for the trial judge is whether there is “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the [photographs are] what [their] proponent claims.” Md. Rule 5–901(a). “An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court’s determination as to whether an exhibit was properly authenticated.” Mooney v. State, 487 Md. 701, 717 (2024).
Here, we find no abuse of discretion by the circuit court. The court carefully led Mother—a pro se litigant—through each of the photographs she wished the court to consider. The court asked her questions about each photograph, attempting to ascertain information such as the dates the photographs were taken and the events depicted therein. Mother struggled to give straightforward answers to these questions. For example, the court asked when one photo was taken, and Mother responded, “That photo was taken during COVID.” Asked to elaborate, Mother continued, “More like 2020 – maybe 2021.” Then, when questioned about the date another photo was taken, Mother answered, “probably about five or seven years ago.” Asked to elaborate again, Mother said, “20 – it’s probably right around when [E.B.] was – [T.B.] was born in 2010, was 7 – like 2017. I would say around 2017 that happened.” When the court asked what led to the bruises she allegedly suffered in that photograph, Mother testified, “That was – I believe happened in the kitchen. Another argument, probably over me not cooking what he wanted for dinner.” The court responded, “So you don’t remember what the argument was about?” and Mother answered, “That’s – that is correct, ma’am. I – I do not recall; it was quite a while ago.”
A trial court abuses its discretion where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court or when the court acts without reference to any guiding principles, and the ruling under consideration is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court or when the ruling is violative of fact and logic.
Sibley, 227 Md. App. at 658 (cleaned up). Considering Mother’s vague and inconsistent answers to the court’s questions, we cannot find that no reasonable person would have taken the view, adopted by the circuit court, that Mother failed to present evidence sufficient to support a finding that the photographs were what she claimed they were.
We also reject Mother’s argument that the circuit court excluded the photographs without considering the best interests of the minor children. “[W]e presume that trial judges know the law and correctly apply it.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Jeter, 365 Md. 279, 288 (2001). In announcing its judgment at the conclusion of the custody hearing, the circuit court reiterated that it was applying the best interest of the child standard: [T]he court must consider the best interests of [the minor children], and the best interests of the child is always the standard by which a court must be guided in reaching custody decisions It is not what is in [Father’s] best interest. It is not what is in [Mother’s] best interest. It is what is in the best interest of [the minor children].
Mother has provided no reason to believe that, despite clearly being aware of its obligation to consider the best interests of the children, the circuit court did not do so when it excluded the photographs.
Finally, even if the circuit court did err in excluding the photographs, such error did not prejudice Mother by “likely affect[ing] the verdict below.” Brown, 409 Md. at 584 (quoting Crane, 382 Md. at 91–92). The circuit court was clear that it intended to give the photographs little, if any, weight in its determination. Thus, it is unlikely that admission of the photographs would have affected the verdict below.
II. The Circuit Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Limiting Mother’s Access with the Minor Children to Supervised Visitation
Mother also contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in limiting her access with the minor children to supervised visitation. She asserts that her access to the minor children may only be limited by evidence that she abused or neglected the minor children, and since there was no such evidence in this case, she claims that “she should have been granted shared custody or at a minimum liberal unsupervised visitation[.]”
Mother incorrectly states the standard for granting supervised visitation. While a “non-custodial parent has a right to liberal visitation with his or her child ‘at reasonable times and under reasonable conditions,’ [] this right is not absolute.” Boswell, 352 Md. at 220 (quoting Myers v. Butler, 10 Md. App. 315, 317 (1970)). Limitations may be placed on visitation so long as those limitations are “reasonable.” Id. In determining whether a visitation restriction is reasonable, courts do not have to make a specific finding of abuse or neglect. Rather, courts must consider the best interests of the child and “look to see if the child is endangered by spending time with the parent[.]” Id. “[W] hen the child’s health or welfare is at stake[,] visitation may be restricted or even denied.” Id. at 221; see also id. (“In situations where there is evidence that visitation may be harmful to the child, the presumption that liberal unrestricted visitation with a non-custodial parent is in the best interests of the child may be overcome.”). Thus, contrary to Mother’s assertion, a court need only find that a minor child’s health or welfare may be harmed by visitation to put limitations on that visitation.
In this case, the circuit court based its decision to award
only supervised visitation to Mother on two findings of fact. “[W]e review a circuit court’s factual findings for child custody orders for clear error.” Matter of Meddings, 244 Md. App. 204, 218 (2019). First, the court found that Mother has a history of wielding a firearm in the presence of at least one of the minor children, and that she would use the firearm on Father in the future if she feels threatened. Second, the court found that Mother suffers from a form of paranoia that has led her to believe, irrationally, that at least twenty people have tried to poison or even murder her, including Father’s parents. “If there is any competent and material evidence to support the factual findings of the trial court, those findings cannot be held to be clearly erroneous.” EBC Props., LLC v. Urge Food Corp., 257 Md. App. 151, 165 (2023) (quoting Carroll Indep. Fuel Co. v. Wash. Real Est. Inv. Tr., 202 Md. App. 206, 224 (2011)). Since both findings are supported by competent evidence in the record, we find that the circuit court did not commit clear error.
First, the circuit court’s findings regarding Mother’s handling of firearms are supported by the testimony of Bensadon, Father, and Mother. Bensadon testified that around June of 2024, E.B. was “present . . . for a pickup or a drop off and at that time, [Mother] pointed a gun at [Father].” This type of behavior was apparently so common, Bensadon testified, that E.B. “just sort of nonchalantly kind of accepted the situation as normal.” She added that Mother was “adamant about keeping her guns.” Father also testified about the incident, explaining that he approached the front door of Mother’s house with E.B. to drop E.B. off. Mother opened the door and Father stepped inside to set E.B.’s stuff down. When he looked up, Mother was pointing a rifle at him from about five feet away. When questioned about the incident, Mother admitted to wielding the firearm in front of E.B., and she testified that she would shoot Father if he “threatens [her] life.”
The circuit court’s findings regarding Mother’s paranoia are also supported by the testimony of Bensadon, Father, and Mother. According to Bensadon, Mother believes that Father has tried to poison both her and E.B. Father also testified about Mother’s allegations that he has tried to poison or otherwise kill her and E.B., which he denied. When questioned about her allegations, Mother testified that various other people have also tried to poison or kill her, claiming that as many as twenty people have tried to poison her in the last eleven years. Additionally, in her closing argument, Mother claimed that Father included his family in attempts to “hurt and murder [her].” Mother did not present any proof of these claims.
Given that the circuit court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous, we also find that the court did not abuse its discretion in relying on those findings to limit Mother’s access with the minor children to supervised visitation. It is not unreasonable to find that a person who suffers from untreated paranoia, has a history of wielding a firearm in front of a minor child, and has testified that she would use that firearm on the minor child’s father, poses a great danger to the health and safety of that child. Thus, we hold that the circuit court acted within its discretion in imposing a reasonable limitation on Mother’s visitation rights.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
FOOTNOTES
1 The circuit court’s order also required Mother to pay child support to Father in the amount of $2,400 per month. However, Mother does not challenge the court’s child support
2 Father filed for the protective order on June 14, 2024. However, due to Mother’s refusal to be served, the protective order case remained unresolved by the time of the custody hearing at issue here.
3 Father argues that Mother is precluded from raising this issue on appeal because she indicated at trial, “If you want
to toss it, you can toss it,” in regard to the photographs. This statement, according to Father, clearly indicates that Mother withdrew her request for the court to consider the photographs. However, under Maryland Rule 8–131(a), “an appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court.” Md. Rule 8–131(a) (emphasis added). Here, the issue of the photographs’ admissibility was decided when the circuit court excluded them from evidence. Therefore, we will decide this issue.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court dismissed father’s appeal of the Charles County Circuit Court’s order granting the Charles County Child Support Administration’s motion to establish arrears. The arrears order was not a final judgment because, at the time it was entered, father’s motion to modify child support had been held in abeyance without adjudication, and at the hearing on father’s motion to modify child support, the court suggested that it would address the arrearages, which it is able to do. And none of the exceptions to the final judgment requirement apply.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
the Administration’s motion to establish arrears (the “Arrears Order”), without addressing Father’s motion to modify child support. Father timely appealed the court’s Order.
In his brief, filed pro se, Father presents the following questions:
1. “Did the Circuit Court err by failing to address the October 26, 2022 motion for modification, leaving critical issues unresolved?”
2. “Did the Circuit Court err by issuing the August 5, 2024 order, which directly contradicts the findings in the January 16, 2024 order, without justification?”
3. “Did the Circuit Court violate procedural fairness by not providing Appellant with the promised Zoom link for the August 5, 2024 hearing, thereby denying his right to meaningful participation?”
We conclude that the circuit court’s Arrears Order was not a final judgment. As none of the exceptions to the final judgment requirement apply, we dismiss Father’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction without reaching the merits.
BACKGROUND
To provide proper context for Father’s questions presented on appeal, we start by summarizing the events that preceded entry of the underlying order.1
Entry of the Final Order
Subject to certain exceptions, Maryland law allows an appeal “only after the entry of a final judgment where all claims against all parties are resolved.” Cnty. Comm’rs for St. Mary’s Cnty. v. Lacer, 393 Md. 415, 424 (2006). This is a jurisdictional requirement. See Addison v. Lochearn Nursing Home, LLC, 411 Md. 251, 267 (2009) (calling the final judgment requirement a “bedrock” principle of appellate jurisdiction). Unless there is a final judgment—or an otherwise appealable judgment—we are without jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Md. Dep’t of Agriculture, 439 Md. 262, 277-78 (2014).
In this appeal, appellant Perry Haywood Jr. (“Father”) challenges the Circuit Court for Charles County’s grant of the motion to establish arrears filed by the Charles County Child Support Administration (the “Administration”). In the motion, the Administration claimed that the court miscalculated Father’s child support arrears owed to appellee Jasmine Henry (“Mother”) in one of the court’s interim orders. At the time, Father had filed a motion to modify child support, which was held in abeyance at his own request. Following a hearing that Father failed to attend, the court entered an order granting
Father and Mother have one minor child (the “Child”), born February 2019.2 On August 29, 2019, Father filed a complaint for custody, seeking joint legal and joint physical custody of the Child. 3 On October 24, 2019, Mother filed an answer and a counter- complaint, seeking sole legal and sole physical custody of the Child, as well as “child support pendente lite and permanently.”
Following a final merits hearing on May 19 and October 5, 2021, the circuit court entered an Order of Custody, Visitation and Child Support (the “Final Order”) on October 28, 2021, which, in relevant part: (1) granted Mother sole legal and sole physical custody of the Child; (2) allowed Father scheduled visitations with the Child in person and through FaceTime; and (3) ordered Father to pay $1,384.00 each month in child support, along with $224.00 towards arrearages.4 The court determined Father’s child support arrearages to be $26,880.00 as of October 1, 2021. Neither party appealed the Final Order.
Administration Filed a
Petition for Contempt
On May 4, 2022, the Administration re-opened the case by filing a “petition to cite for contempt,” claiming that Father was “delinquent in the payment of support monies as required
by Order of Court.” Following a contempt hearing on June 13, 2022, the court entered the first Consent Order. This Consent Order (1) rescheduled the hearing for August 8, 2022; (2) required Father to pay $500.00 in child support by July 30, 2022; (3) ordered Father to continue paying $1,384.00 in monthly child support, plus an additional $224.00 per month towards his arrearage; and (4) established his arrearage at $37,452.00 as of June 9, 2022.5
On August 8, 2022, the circuit court entered the second Consent Order. Substantially identical to the first, the second Consent Order rescheduled the contempt hearing to October 17, 2022, and updated Father’s arrearage to $40,220.00 as of August 4, 2022. On October 17, 2022, the court entered the third Consent Order, moving the hearing date to December 21, 2022, and setting Father’s arrearage at $42,688.00 as of October 13, 2022.
Petitions to Modify Custody, Child Support, and for Contempt
On the same day the third Consent Order was entered, Mother filed a petition to modify visitation, alleging Father’s non-compliance with the visitation schedule set forth in the Final Order.
About a week later, on October 26, 2022, Father filed his own petition to modify custody. In the petition, Father checked a box indicating that he “also request[s] a change in the current child support order.” Attached to Father’s petition was his sworn financial statement, listing his “[t]otal monthly income (before taxes)” as “-[$]1100.00[,]” “[c]hild support . . . for . . . other child(ren) each month” as “$300.00,” and “[t]he monthly health insurance premium” for the Child as “$59.00.” Various financial documents, including Father’s past tax returns, were also attached.
Months later, on February 6, 2023, Father filed a “motion for
Original Hearing
June 13, 2022
August 8, 2022
October 17, 2022
December 21, 2022
February 15, 2023
June 21, 2023
June 19, 20238
contempt and request for show cause[,]” alleging, among other things, that Mother violated the Final Order by denying his visitation with the Child and access to the Child’s educational and medical information. The court initially scheduled a hearing on all of the parents’ pending petitions (and motion) for May 22, 2023, but subsequently rescheduled the hearing to September 25, 2023, and finally to January 16, 2024.
The Circuit Court Changed Father’s Arrearage Amount
As the parents’ petitions remained pending, the court continued to postpone the contempt hearing on the Administration’s petition.6 Following each postponement, the court issued an order providing the new contempt hearing date and Father’s updated child support arrearage amount.7 Below is a summary of the circuit court’s postponements and arrearage assessment beginning May 4, 2022—the day the Administration reopened the case by filing the petition for contempt—and ending January 16, 2024, the date of the consolidated hearing for contempt and modification petitions. Notably, the court’s June 21, 2023 order showed Father’s arrearage amount at “$5,864.84 as of June 20, 2023”—over $40,000 less than the amount assessed at the February 15, 2023 hearing. Earlier that day, the court had conducted a brief hearing, which lasted for about two minutes. Father appeared with counsel, and the Administration also appeared, but neither Mother nor her counsel were present.9 Father’s counsel reminded the court that “there were multiple motions filed by both parties, as far as modifications to their custody and child support.” Counsel also stated that Father believes the child support calculations “were inaccurate from the onset” and “there were some adjustments with the calculations.” Without addressing the merits of Father’s claim, the court rescheduled the hearing and excused the parties.
Child Support Arrearage
August 8, 2022
October 17, 2022
December 21, 2022
February 15, 2023
June 21, 2023
CIRCUIT COURT’S VALUATION FINDING
$37,452.00 (as of June 9, 2022)
$40,220.00 (as of August 4, 2022)
$42,688.00 (as of October 13, 2022)
$45,104.70 (as of December 16, 2022)
$5,846.84 (as of June 20, 2023)
July 19, 2023 No calculation
October 18, 2023
(rescheduled to January 16, 2024)
$7,700
Subsequent to the entry of the June 21, 2023 order, Mother filed a letter with the court,10 raising an issue with the change in Father’s arrearage. In relevant part, the letter states: I recently received a signed order regarding child support arrears, and upon careful review, I have discovered that the amount listed is inaccurate. I would like to request a correction of this mistake and provide the correct information for your reference.
The child support arrears listed in the order that was signed on June 21, 2023 reflect an amount to $5,846.84. However, upon a thorough review and confirmation from the Maryland DHS Child Support Case office, I have found that the correct amount of arrears is significantly higher. The accurate arrears amount stands at $54,292.82 (as of date: 7-10-23) which is substantially different from the amount stated in the order[.]
Attached to the letter was a copy of Mother’s child support account summary, provided by the Administration, stating, “[t] he total balance owed is: $54,292.82” as of July 10, 2023. The court, however, did not revisit Father’s child support arrearage until January 16, 2024.
Circuit Court’s Contempt Order and Father’s First Appeal11
At the January 16, 2024 hearing, the circuit court addressed all pending motions for contempt and modification of child support, custody and visitation. Mother’s counsel began by informing the court that the parents had agreed to allow FaceTime access when the child was with the other parent and to refrain from making disparaging remarks about the other parent to the child. Father’s counsel then noted that Father had filed a “motion for contempt on denial of access and failure to provide certain information[,]” requesting “at least . . . information as to where the child goes to school.” The court instructed Mother’s counsel to provide the school information, and counsel complied on the record. The court also determined the parents’ FaceTime access schedule.
The court next turned to Father’s failure to pay child support as required by the Final Order dated October 28, 2021. Asserting that he had not been able to pay child support, Father reminded the court that his request for child support modification—originally part of his October 26, 2022 custody modification petition—was still pending.
[THE COURT]: Right, okay. Alright, so what are we to do about this huge. . . arrearage that you have?
[FATHER]: Well, Your Honor, I filed my amended taxes that pretty much show that just like most businesses in their first two years, that we took a loss. Unfortunately, it wasn’t took into consideration when the—
[THE COURT]: Yeah, but you are in violation of a court order. [FATHER]: Yes, Your Honor.
[THE COURT]: Okay, it is not up to me to tell you, “Oh, poor thing, you can’t do it.” It is a court order, so what are you going to do about it?
[FATHER]: I have . . . filed the modification for child support, I filed the paperwork. I thought we would be addressing that here today to get that relief. * * *
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Yeah, it looks like he filed one on the 18th. [THE COURT]: It says, “Motion to modify custody.”
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Right.
[THE COURT]: Okay. But you are saying you filed a separate motion to modify child support?
[FATHER]: Yes, in that motion to modify custody, I checked the box for it to modify the child support, as well.
After some confusion, the court decided to set a separate hearing for Father’s motion to modify child support. The court told Father:
I don’t know why you haven’t been given a hearing on your motion, why that didn’t happen, and that should happen. I am going to give you a date right now that that should happen. So . . . if we could find a date purely for a modification of child support . . . you need to gather all of that information for [Father’s counsel], and you need to gather it for him in enough time that he can give it to [Mother’s counsel] so that she can review it, so she knows exactly what it is that is going to be presented at the hearing. So, you are not ready for that today, but that is what has to happen to prove . . . you have to prove there has been a material change in your circumstances beyond your control from this court order date, that would qualify you, legitimately qualify you for a change in child support.
The court also noted that if Father’s motion to modify child support is granted, it would “have an impact on the arrears.”
Following a brief discussion with the parties’ counsel, the court announced that it would set a child support modification hearing for March 11, 2024.
The court found Father in contempt. As the court was setting the purge provision, Mother’s counsel interjected, stating, “Your Honor, the total outstanding [child support arrearage] is $61,000[,]” but the court responded that it “d[id]n’t want to get into that[.]” Instead, the court set the purge provision based on Father’s arrearage amount at the time of the Final Order, telling Father as follows:
Okay, so what I am hearing . . . is that I find you in contempt, and at this point I am going to use this figure because we don’t know if there is going to be a modification, which would then change the current arrearage.
So I find you in contempt of court for not paying the $26,880.00 that was your arrearage back in October of 2021. So, you have said, and you are ordered to pay, $1,500.00 directly to [Mother] within fifteen days of today’s date, and another $1,500.00 within thirty days of today’s date.
And that is in addition to your regular monthly child support that you are supposed to be paying, or what you are paying right now, or whatever. So, if you fail to pay that $3,000.00 as you have just said you will do, then the $26,880.00 is going to be reduced to a judgment against you.
* * *
Okay. So, that is done, you have a court date for your modification. You need to make sure that you get [Father’s attorney] all the information he is telling you he needs, because if you don’t, then the judge isn’t going to
have any evidence with which to help you with the modification.
(Emphasis added).
On March 18, 2024, the court entered a written “contempt and modification” order, which found Father in contempt for failure to pay child support and required him to pay $1,500 within 15 days and another $1,500 within 30 days to purge the contempt. The order provided that the court would “enter a judgment for the remaining arrears in the amount of. . . $26,888.00[,]” upon Father’s failure to purge the contempt.12 The court also ordered Father to continue with his child support payment of $1,384.00, and scheduled a separate hearing on Father’s motion to modify child support.13 The order was amended on April 4, 2024, without altering these provisions, and counsel for both parents signed the amended order.14 On May 3, 2024, Father appealed the amended order.
Administration’s Motion to Establish Arrears
While Father’s appeal was pending, Father and Mother jointly filed a motion to hold the child support modification hearing in abeyance “until after [Father’s] [a]ppeal has been heard and ruled on.” The Administration did not file any response. On May 28, 2024, the court granted the joint motion on the record, instructing the clerk’s office to set the mater “for status in 60 days.”
On May 29, 2024, the Administration filed a “motion to establish arrears[,]” claiming that “in the absence of a large payment, the arrears amount set on June 21, 2023, was clearly in error[,]” and that Father was “attempting to capitalize on the error in the . . . June 21, 2023[ ] order which incorrectly assessed arrears[.]” In the motion, the Administration further stated that its “audit f[ou]nd[] an arrearage of $63,334.47, as of May 22, 2024” and asked the court to determine the amount of child support, “given the error on June 21, 2023 . . . and the [Administration’s] actual calculation.” Mother filed a response, asking that the court grant the Administration’s motion to establish arrears and correct the arrearage amount on the June 21, 2023 order. Father opposed, arguing that the Administration’s motion was an improper attempt “to use the [c]ourt’s revisory power” under Maryland Rule 2–535.15
Circuit Court’s Ruling on Motion to Establish Arrears
Following a status hearing, which was held via video conference, the court scheduled a hearing on the Administration’s motion to establish arrears. The notice of hearing, issued on July 30, 2024, required all parties “TO APPEAR before a Judge of the CIRCUIT COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY” on August 5, 2024. That day, however, Father did not appear at all, whereas Mother and her counsel appeared via video conference. Counsel for Father and the Administration both appeared in person. Father’s counsel did not explain Father’s absence.
At the outset of the August 5, 2024 hearing, the Administration confirmed with the court and counsel present that the hearing was solely on its motion to establish arrears. The Administration then represented that Father’s child support arrearage was $66,679.18, as of August 2, 2024, and that “the $5,000.00 arrears [on the court’s June 21, 2023 order]. . . was
a clerical error as far as the [Administration] is concerned.” Mother also testified that her child support account showed a balance of $66,679.18 when she checked her account on August 2, 2024, and confirmed that she believed it was the correct amount of arrears owed by Father. Father’s counsel declined to cross-examine her, and did not object to the admission of any exhibits or offer any evidence on Father’s behalf.
Later that day, the court entered the Arrears Order, which provides as follows:
Upon consideration of [Mother’s] Response to [the Administration’s Motion] to Establish Arrears in this case, and any objection thereto; it is thereupon, this 5th day of August, 2024;
ORDERED, that the [Administration’s] Motion to Establish Arrears be and the same is hereby GRANTED; ORDERED, that the Order of Court dated June 21, 2023 which incorrectly assessed arrearage at $5,864.84 be corrected to $66,679.18;
ORDERED, that this Court issue an Order assessing the current Child Support Arrears of Plaintiff, [Father] in the correct amount of $66,679.18 as of August 5, 2024. (Emphasis added).
A week later, on August 12, 2024, Father’s first appeal was dismissed for his failure to file a brief, which was due August 5, 2024.
Father filed the instant appeal from the Arrears Order on September 4, 2024.
DISCUSSION
Legal Framework
The “Final Judgment” Requirement
Although neither party challenged the finality of the circuit court’s order granting the Administration’s motion to establish arrears, we must address the finality of the Arrears Order on our own initiative. Stuples v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, 119 Md. App. 221, 241 (1998) (“[A]n appellate court may, sua sponte, raise the issue of non-finality and nonappealability at any time.”). Whether a judgment is final—and whether we have jurisdiction to review that judgment—is a question of law subject to a de novo standard of review. Balt. Home Alliance, LLC v. Geesing, 218 Md. App. 375, 380-81 (2014).
Ordinarily, under Maryland law, appellate jurisdiction may arise “only after the entry of a final judgment where all claims against all parties are resolved.” Cnty. Com’rs for St. Mary’s Cnty. v. Lacer, 393 Md. 415, 424 (2006). Consistent with this principle, section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code (“CJP”) (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.) provides, “[t]he right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court . . . unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly defined by law.” The statute further defines “final judgment” as “a judgment, decree, sentence, order, determination, decision, or other action by a court . . . from which an appeal . . . may be taken.” CJP § 12–101(f). The final judgment requirement serves “to prevent piecemeal appeals and to prevent the interruptions of ongoing judicial proceedings.” Sigma Repro. Health Ctr. v. State, 297 Md. 660, 665 (1983).
In order to qualify as a final judgment, a circuit court’s ruling “must be ‘so final as either to determine and conclude the rights involved or to deny the appellant the means of further prosecuting or defending his or her rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.’” Metro Main. Sys. South, Inc. v. Milburn, 442 Md. 289, 299 (2015) (quoting Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 42 (1989)). Furthermore, the ruling must “leave nothing more to be done in order to effectuate the court’s disposition of the matter.” Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 42. On the other hand, as a general matter, a ruling “that adjudicates less than an entire claim, or that adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties to the action . . . is not a final judgment[.]” Md. Rule 2–602(a). In sum, a circuit court’s ruling does not become a final judgment unless it was “intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy[.]” Rohrbeck, 318 Md at 41.
Exceptions to the “Final Judgment” Requirement
In civil actions, there are three “limited” exceptions to the final judgment requirement: (1) appeals from interlocutory rulings specifically allowed by CJP § 12–303; (2) immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2–602(b); and (3) appeals from interlocutory rulings allowed under the common-law “collateral order doctrine.” Ruiz v. Kinoshita, 239 Md. App. 395, 417 (2018) (citing Kevin F. Arthur, Finality of Judgments and Other Appellate Trigger Issues 37 (3d ed. 2018)); Lacer, 393 Md. at 424-25. We shall discuss these exceptions below.
Exception Under CJP § 12–303
Section 12–303 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides only one exception to the final judgment rule that we need to examine in relation to the appealability of the underlying Arrears Order: The statute provides as follows: A party may appeal from any of the following interlocutory orders entered by a circuit court in a civil case:
(3) An order:
(v) For the sale, conveyance, or delivery of real or personal property or the payment of money, or the refusal to rescind or discharge such an order, unless the delivery or payment is directed to be made to a receiver appointed by the court.
CJP § 12–303(3)(v) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Maryland has explained that an “order for payment of money” means the type of order that traditionally would emanate from a court of equity— namely, “orders for alimony, child support, and related counsel fees.” Anthony Plumbing, 298 Md. at 19-20. According to the Court, such an order “differ[s] markedly from . . . a typical judgment at law for the payment of money” because “[t]he latter type of judgment ‘may settle the respective rights of the parties . . . but it does not purport to order anyone to do anything.’”
Id. at 20 (quoting Della Ratta v. Dixon, 47 Md. App. 270, 285 (1980)); see also Adelakun v. Adelakun, 263 Md. App. 356, 377 (2024) (holding that an order is appealable under CJP § 12–303(3)(v) only where the order “require[s] a party to take affirmative action to pay[.]”). An order for payment of
money appealable under CJP § 12–303(3)(v) is “immediately enforceable” and renders the party against whom it operates “directly and personally answerable to the court in the event of noncompliance.” Anthony Plumbing, 298 Md. at 20 (quoting Della Ratta, 47 Md. App. at 285).
Exception Under Maryland Rule 2–602(b) Maryland Rule 2–602(b) provides: If the court expressly determines in a written order that there is no just reason for delay, it may direct in the order the entry of a final judgment: (1)as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties; or (2)pursuant to Rule 2–501(f)(3), for some but less than all of the amount requested in a claim seeking money relief only.
(Emphasis added). Put differently, “[t]o effectuate the right of appeal, . . . the court must expressly determine in a written order that ‘there is no just reason to delay’ the entry of final judgment.” Ruiz, 239 Md. App. at 417 n.11 (citation omitted). Further, even if the circuit court expressly finds that there is no just reason for delay, such a finding does not turn a nonfinal order—“an order which disposes of only part of a single claim”— into an appealable final judgment. Lacer, 393 Md. at 425-26 (quoting Planning Bd. v. Mortimer, 310 Md. 639, 649 (1987)). As with other exceptions to the final judgment requirement, Rule 2–602(b) may be invoked only in “very infrequent” circumstances. Id. at 425 (quoting Diener Enterprises v. Miller, 266 Md. 551, 556 (1972)).
Exception Under the Collateral Order Doctrine
Lastly, under the collateral order doctrine, we may treat a “narrow class” of interlocutory rulings as final judgments regardless of the posture of the case. In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 326 (2001); see also Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. James, 353 Md. 657,660-61 (1999) (referring to the collateral order doctrine as a “very narrow exception” to the final judgment requirement). For a ruling to be appealable under the collateral order doctrine, it must satisfy the following four elements:
(1)the ruling must conclusively determine the disputed question;
(2) the ruling must resolve an important issue;
(3)the ruling must be completely separate from the merits of the action; and
(4)the ruling must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
Lacer, 393 Md. at 428 (citing Towns of Chesapeake Beach v. Pessoa, 330 Md. 744, 755 (1993)). In Maryland, these four elements are “very strictly applied, and appeals under the [collateral order] doctrine may be entertained only in extraordinary circumstances.” Id. (quoting In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 634 (2003)).
ANALYSIS
The “Final Judgment” Requirement
Applying these principles to the instant appeal, we conclude that the circuit court’s Arrears Order, which established
Father’s child support arrears as of August 2, 2024, was not a final judgment. To begin with, the Arrears Order did not determine or conclude the rights of the parties in the proceedings below. See Milburn, 442 Md. at 299. At the time the Arrears Order was entered, Father’s motion to modify child support had been held in abeyance without adjudication,16 and at the hearing on Father’s motion to modify child support, the court can, and suggested that it would, address the arrearages. The plain language of the Arrears Order also suggests that its purpose was to “correct” an erroneous assessment from a prior hearing, rather than to render a final determination on Father’s pending child support claim.
ORDERED, that the [Administration’s] Motion to Establish Arrears be and the same is hereby GRANTED;
ORDERED, that the Order of Court dated June 21, 2023 which incorrectly assessed arrearage at $5,864.84 be corrected to $66,679.18;
ORDERED, that this Court issue an Order assessing the current Child Support Arrears of Plaintiff, [Father] in the correct amount of $66,679.18 as of August 5, 2024.
(Emphasis added).
At the outset of the hearing on August 5, 2024, the Administration’s counsel established with the circuit court and opposing counsel present that, despite “other things going on[,]” that hearing was limited solely to adjudicating the Administration’s motion to establish the correct amount of arrears. Accordingly, we conclude that the Arrears Order was not “intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy[]” Rohrbeck, 318 Md at 41, because, as we noted above, Father can address the arrearage issue at the hearing on his motion to amend child support.
The Arrears Order also fails to “leave nothing more to be done in order to effectuate the court’s disposition of the matter.” Id. at 42. Rather, in Father’s own words, the Arrears Order left “critical issues unresolved” by not addressing his motion to modify child support. Even after the court granted the Administration’s motion to “establish” arrears, Father’s motion to modify child support remained pending, and the court indicated during the January 16, 2024 hearing, that the adjudication of the motion for child support modification may result in amending the arrears as well. Had Father asked the court to consider his motion along with the Administration’s motion, the court could have reassessed the arrears based on his modified child support obligation. See Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Article (“FL”), § 12–104(a)(b) (only allowing modification of a child support “subsequent to the filing of a motion for modification[,]” not “prior to the date of the filing of the motion for modification”). Instead, the court updated Father’s child support arrears based on the child support obligation set forth in the Final Order, without mentioning his pending motion. Therefore, the Arrears Order
did not, in this case, constitute a conclusive determination of the child support arrearage that Father owed to Mother. Father may appeal and challenge the arrearages when the court enters a final judgment on Father’s motion to modify child support.
Exceptions to the “Final Judgment” Requirement
None of the exceptions to the final judgment requirement apply here. First, the Arrears Order is not an order for payment of money under CJP § 12–303(3)(v). It merely “corrects” the court’s error in the June 21, 2023 order and updates Father’s arrearage amount as of August 2, 2024. The Arrears Order does not contain language ordering Father to pay anything. See Anthony Plumbing, 298 Md. at 19-20 (noting that, unlike orders appealable under CJP § 12–303(3)(v), “typical judgment at law for the payment of money” are “not immediately enforceable[.]”). If Father fails to pay towards the arrears, such noncompliance will constitute a contempt of the Final Order—which specifically required him to pay $224.00 towards child support arrears—not the Arrears Order. Because the Arrears Order does not require Father to “take an affirmative action to pay[,]” his appeal does not satisfy CJP § 12–303(3)(v)’s exception to the final judgment requirement. Adelakun, 263 Md. at 377.
Second, Rule 2–602(b) is inapposite because it only applies where “the court expressly determine[d] in a written order that there is no just reason to delay” the entry of a final judgment. Here, the circuit court made no such determination (and we are not suggesting that it could have).
Third and finally, the Arrears Order fails to satisfy the requirements for appealability under the collateral order doctrine. See Lacer, 393 Md. at 428 (listing conditions that a non-final judgment must satisfy to become appealable under the doctrine). Proceeding directly to the third element of the doctrine—whether an order is “completely separate from the merits” of the underlying action—we conclude that the Arrears Order is not separate from the merits of the underlying case, which centered upon Father’s ability, or lack thereof, to bear his child support obligation. If the court considers and grants Father’s pending motion to modify child support, that could change the arrearage amount set forth in the Arrears Order. On the other hand, if the court denies Father’s motion, the amount may remain the same. Because the Arrears Order was not “completely separate from” Father’s pending claim for modifying child support, it is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
For these reasons, we conclude that the circuit court’s Arrears Order was not a final judgment and does not meet any of the exceptions to the final judgment requirement. Accordingly, we dismiss Father’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction without addressing the merits.
1 Because Father only challenges the circuit court’s grant of the motion to establish his child support arrears, we focus on the facts relevant to the issue of child support.
2 The parties were never married.
3 Although Father’s complaint for custody shows two children with the same first name and date of birth, it appears that he listed the same Child twice, once with his last name and once with Mother’s.
4 Specifically, the Final Order provided Father’s child support obligations as follows:
ORDERED that commencing November 1, 2021, [Father] shall pay to [Mother] the sum of $1,384.00 per month for the support of the parties’ minor child, payable by wage lien through the Office of Child Support Enforcement; and it is further ORDERED, that child support arrearages be and hereby are assessed at $26, 880.00 of October 1, 2021 that [Father] has pay [sic] and additional $224.00 per month commencing November 1, 2021 and continuing until the arrearage is paid in full[.] (Emphasis added).8 There was no order from this hearing. However, the record indicates that Father requested postponement “in order to simultaneously address all pending matters before the court.”
5 In the First Consent Order, the court also noted that Father was “self-employed . . . since 2019” and “receiving help from his family for daily expenses.” Additionally, the court required the parties to make or receive “any current or delinquent support payments . . . through the Maryland Child Support Account” only and warned that “[a]ny current or delinquent payments made directly to [Mother] may not be credited towards the child support account.”
6 In the Administration’s brief, the Administration explains that the contempt hearing was postponed because the court wanted to hear the Administration’s contempt petition and the parents’ petitions together, and the parties needed more time to present their cases.
7 The orders from June 13, August 8, and October 17, 2022 hearings, all signed by a family magistrate, were titled “Consent Order.” These three Consent Orders were identical in substance to each other, differing only in their hearing dates and the updated arrearage amount. The orders from December 21, 2022, February 15, 2023, and June 21, 2023 hearings, which were
signed solely by a judge, were also substantially similar, varying only by their hearing dates and updated arrearage amounts.
8 There was no order from this hearing. However, the record indicates that Father requested postponement “in order to simultaneously address all pending matters before the court.”
9 At the hearing, counsel for the Administration represented that Mother and her counsel were not able to appear because they did not receive the “reset [hearing] date from the court.”
10 The letter is dated July 10, 2023, and was filed the next day, but was not docketed until August 11, 2023.
11 The propriety of the court’s contempt order is not before this Court in this appeal.
12 At a subsequent hearing on August 5, 2024, the Administration represented that “[t]he purge amounts, the $1,500.00 payments, were made.”
13 The hearing was originally scheduled for March 11, 2024, but was rescheduled for May 28, 2024.
14 The amendment accurately reflected the court’s announcement at the January 16, 2024 hearing by (1) increasing the length of Father’s FaceTime visitation with the Child from 10 to 20 minutes, (2) allowing Mother’s FaceTime access during the Child’s visit with Father, and (3) adding a provision prohibiting both parties from making “disparaging remarks” to the Child.
15 Maryland Rule 2–535 provides, in relevant part, that “[o] n motion of any party filed at any time, the court may exercise revisory power and control over the judgment in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity.” Md. Rule 2–535(b). However, “non-final orders are ‘subject to revision . . . without regard to Rule 2–535.’” Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Md. Dep’t of Agriculture, 439 Md. 262, 277 (2014) (quoting Albert W. Sisk & Son, Inc. v. Friendship Packers, Inc., 326 Md. 152, 159 (1992)).
16 Recently, though in a different context, Justice Angela M. Eaves of the Supreme Court of Maryland discussed the meaning of “abeyance,” noting that the term is “defined as ‘[t]emporary inactivity; suspension[,]” and therefore “placing a matter in ‘abeyance’ does not mean you have exercised discretion and made a decision; it means you have avoided for another day or put off that matter to a later time[.]” State v. Thomas, 488 Md. 456, 513-14 (2024) (Eaves, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Abeyance, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)); see also Abeyance, Merriam-Webster (2025), https:// www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/abeyance (defining “abeyance” as “a state of temporary inactivity” or “suspension”).
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
Cite as 09 MFLU Supp. 43 (2025)
Discovery; sanctions
Georgia Rose Bayly
v.
Brendan O’Donnell Rapp
Nos. 2035, September Term 2024
Argued before: Berger, Nazarian, Ripken, JJ.
Opinion by: Berger, J.
Filed: June 25, 2025
The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s sanctions award, which precluded wife from presenting evidence during the parties’ contested divorce trial to support her request for alimony. Wife failed to respond to husband’s interrogatories in their entirety, and only produced - more than six months after the discovery deadline - three documents related to her financial circumstances.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
initiated divorce proceedings against Rapp. At a November 2023 scheduling hearing, the discovery deadline was set for February 1, 2024. On January 2, 2024, Rapp submitted his discovery requests. These requests included twenty-one interrogatories and a request for the production of forty-two documents. According to the record, on August 11, 2024, Bayly produced “a social security statement, a letter from the Social Security Administration pertaining to benefits she has received on behalf of the parties’ minor child, and an ‘income verification’ letter that purports to be from [Bayly]’s employer.” On August 22, 2024, Bayly also filed a long form financial statement. Bayly did not otherwise respond to Rapp’s discovery requests and Rapp did not file a motion to compel discovery.
This appeal arises following the Circuit Court for Montgomery County’s granting of Appellee Brendan O’Donnell Rapp’s (“Rapp”) Motion in Limine for Sanctions following Appellant Georgia Rose Bayly’s (“Bayly”) failure to respond to Rapp’s discovery requests. In granting this motion, the court precluded Bayly from presenting evidence during the parties’ contested divorce trial to support her request for alimony and awarded Rapp attorney’s fees.
On appeal, Bayly presents three questions for our review, which we have recast and rephrased as follows:1
I. Whether the trial court erred in precluding Appellant from presenting evidence without first making a finding of willful or egregious misconduct.
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider lesser sanctions.
III. Whether the trial court improperly awarded attorney’s fees without evidence of bad faith conduct by the Appellant. For the following reasons, we answer all three questions in the negative and, therefore, affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Bayly and Rapp were married in November 2017. The parties had one son together in April 2018. In August 2023, Bayly
The parties appeared before the circuit court on November 18, 2024, for a contested divorce trial. Ahead of the trial, Rapp filed a Motion in Limine for Sanctions requesting that Bayly be precluded from presenting evidence and testimony at trial concerning any matter for which she did not produce timely discovery. The motion also requested attorney’s fees in the amount of $743.00 for one hour and forty-five minutes of work completed by Rapp’s attorney in preparing the motion. In response to this motion, Bayly indicated that the documents she provided “were and are the only documents that [she] intends to introduce at trial,” and that if Rapp “ever needed any documentation other than what was provided in order to move forward after settling custody they would have been provided.”
During the trial, Rapp argued that, due to Bayly’s discovery violations, a trial on the issue of alimony would not be possible and asked the court to “preclude her offering any evidence or any testimony going to . . . that issue.” Rapp premised this argument on the fact that, without the information he sought in his discovery requests, there was no way to know the full picture of Bayly’s financial situation. Rapp explained, We’ve asked questions. We’ve gotten no information. So we are under the belief that there could be other information out there regarding other income sources, streams that Ms. Bayly is benefiting from, and we don’t have any information as to those numbers or whether it exists or it doesn’t exist. And we ask direct questions, and we ask for documents directly to those points.
Rapp argued that Bayly’s financial statement “lists expense after expense that we cannot verify in any way, even though we’ve asked for those underlying documents.”
As a result, Rapp contended, “we have a right to the information we asked for so that we can have a fair trial, and we can meaningfully prepare and defend and crossexamine Ms. Bayly. And we’re not able to do that.”
In response, Bayly argued that, although discovery had
closed six months earlier, Rapp had not filed a motion to compel discovery or otherwise “prod” Bayly for documents. Bayly’s counsel continued that he had “exchanged the only three relevant documents to my client’s income,” and that the “fact is there’s nothing else.” For this reason, counsel argued, this “wouldn’t be trial by surprise. It would have taken me about 10 minutes to go through Ms. Bayly. She doesn’t have anything except what I gave them.”
After hearing both sides, the court explained that “to decide alimony, there’s a list of factors that I need to consider.” The factors include, “the educational background of the requesting party, the employment background of the requesting party,” which were “directly asked by defense counsel in interrogatories number 2 and number 4 that went unanswered.” In making an alimony decision, the court also considers “contributions each made toward the marriage and what was the downfall of the marriage,” questions that were posed in interrogatory 17, “which went unanswered.” Also significant is the “ability of someone to work right now and efforts made to get full time employment, which was largely asked in question 15 of the interrogatories that went unanswered.”
The court explained that the purpose of discovery is not “just turn over what you’ve got. It also answers certain questions. And those questions were tailored toward . . . getting information about these factors that I am to consider in an alimony determination.” The defense asked these questions, as was their right, “and got no response, so they would be, potentially, operating based on unfair surprise. They could be surprised at what she might say.” Based on this, the court found that, for the failure to comply with discovery . . . not answering any interrogatories at all that were submitted January 2nd of 2024, and only providing three documents with no answers as to the request for production of documents that was submitted on January 2nd, 2024, I am going to sanction the plaintiff with regards to the alimony claim and preclude that request for those reasons.
In granting the motion, the court also granted Rapp’s request for $743.00 in attorney’s fees. This timely appeal followed. 2
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's decision to impose, or not impose, a particular discovery sanction for an abuse of discretion. Dackman v. Robinson, 464 Md. 189, 231 (2019). “Where a discovery rule has been violated, the remedy is, in the first instance, within the sound discretion of the trial judge . . . Generally, unless we find that the lower court abused its discretion, we will not reverse.” Cole v. State, 378 Md. 42, 56 (2003) (citations omitted). An abuse of discretion exists “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by” the trial court, or when the court acts “without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185, 198 (2005) (citation omitted). To be reversed, the “decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what the court deems minimally acceptable.” Id. at 199. An abuse of discretion, therefore, “should only be found in the extraordinary, exceptional, or most egregious case.” Id.
I. The court did not abuse its discretion by precluding Appellant from presenting evidence in support of an alimony claim.
On appeal, Bayly argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by precluding her from presenting evidence in support of her alimony claim because it did not make a finding of willful or egregious misconduct or first explore lesser sanctions. “One of [the] fundamental and principal objectives” of Maryland’s discovery rules is “to require the disclosure of facts by a party litigant to all of his adversaries, and thereby to eliminate, as far as possible, the necessity of any party to litigation going to trial in a confused or muddled state of mind, concerning the facts that gave rise to the litigation.” Baltimore Transit Co. v. Mezzanotti, 227 Md. 8, 13 (1961) (emphasis omitted).
To this end, Maryland Rule 2-432(a) provides in relevant part that, “[a] discovering party may move for sanctions under Rule 2-433(a), without first obtaining an order compelling discovery . . . if a party fails to serve a response to interrogatories under Rule 2-421 or to a request for production or inspection under Rule 2-422, after proper service.” Md. Rule 2-432(a). Maryland Rule 2-433(a) provides that upon “a motion filed under Rule 2-432(a), the court, if it finds a failure of discovery, may enter such orders in regard to the failure as are just, including . . . (2) [a]n order refusing to allow the failing party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing designated matters in evidence[.]” Md. Rule 2-433(a)(2).
The trial court has broad discretion to impose sanctions for discovery violations, “and the decision whether to invoke the ‘ultimate sanction’ [of dismissal] is left to the discretion of the trial court.” Valentine–Bowers v. Retina Grp. of Washington, P.C., 217 Md. App. 366, 378 (2014). Sanctions may be justified even without “willful or contumacious behavior” by a party. Warehime v. Dell, 124 Md. App. 31, 44 (1998); see also, Hossainkhail v. Gebrehiwot, 143 Md. App. 716, 725 (2002) (“The power to impose sanctions is not dependent on a finding that the defaulting party acted willfully or contumaciously.”). A trial court may order a default judgment on issues of the case, even if other less stringent alternatives are available. Lakewood Engineering and Mfg. Co., Inc.v. Quinn, 91 Md. App. 375, 383 (1992).
In exercising its discretion to impose sanctions for discovery violations, the trial court considers, (1) whether the disclosure violation was technical or substantial; (2) the timing of the ultimate disclosure; (3) the reason, if any, for the violation; (4) the degree of prejudice to the parties respectively offering or opposing the evidence; and (5) whether any resulting prejudice might be cured by a postponement and, if so, the overall desirability of a continuance. The factors often overlap and do not lend themselves to a compartmental analysis.
Valentine-Bowers, 217 Md. App. at 378-79.
Here, Bayly failed to respond to Rapp’s interrogatories in their entirety and only produced -- more than six months after the discovery deadline -- three documents related to her financial circumstances. Bayly did not provide any explanation for why she failed to respond to these requests other than to say the three documents she produced were “the only three
relevant documents” related to her income. This explanation did not speak to why Bayly failed to provide answers to Rapp’s interrogatories regarding her education background, contributions toward the marriage, reasons for the downfall of the marriage, or ability to work now and in the future.
In ruling on Rapp’s Motion for Sanctions, the court properly considered the necessary factors. First, the court laid out the substantial nature of Bayly’s discovery violations by expounding on how the lack of discovery would prevent the court from making an informed ruling on alimony. The court also addressed the prejudice these violations caused Rapp, who had properly requested information to support his defense and would now potentially be “operating based on unfair surprise.”
Timing of disclosure here was of little relevance given that Bayly had still not responded to Rapp’s interrogatories or requests for production of documents at the time of trial. The three documents she did provide had been filed more than six months after the discovery deadline. Although the possibility of a continuance was not discussed, Bayly’s assertion that she had nothing more to offer beyond the three documents already provided suggests that additional time would not have cured this violation. Pursuant to this analysis and the facts of this case, the court did not abuse its discretion by granting Rapp’s Motion for Sanctions and precluding Bayly from presenting evidence in support of her alimony claim.
II. The court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees.
On appeal, Bayly argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees without first making a finding that she acted in bad faith or deliberately obstructed
discovery. Although there are circumstances in which a finding of bad faith is required before attorney’s fees may be awarded, there is no case law in Maryland that requires a court to make such a finding before making such an award pursuant to Rule 2-433(d).
Rule 4-233(d) clearly provides that if a motion filed under . . . 2-432 . . . is granted, the court . . . shall require (1) the party . . . whose conduct necessitated the motion . . . to pay to the moving party the reasonable costs and expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney’s fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award or expenses unjust. Here, Rapp filed a motion for sanction pursuant to Rules 2-432 and 2-433. In this motion, Rapp requested attorney’s fees in the amount of $743.00 for “one hour and forty- five minutes” of work done in “drafting the instant motion and accompanying order.” The court properly granted Rapp’s Motion for Sanctions. In granting this motion, the court was required, pursuant to Rule 2-433(d), to award Rapp “the reasonable costs and expenses incurred in obtaining the order[.]” The court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in awarding Rapp the specific amount requested in his Motion for Sanctions.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting Rapp’s Motion for Sanctions, precluding Bayly from presenting evidence in support of her alimony claim, and awarding Rapp attorney’s fees to cover the time spent preparing and filing his motion.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
FOOTNOTES
1 Bayly phrased the questions as follows:
1. Did the trial court err in precluding Appellant from presenting evidence as a discovery sanction without a finding of willful or egregious misconduct?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to consider lesser sanctions, as required under Maryland precedent?
3. Did the trial court improperly award attorney’s fees without evidence of bad faith conduct by Appellant?
2 In his brief, Rapp argues that this court is empowered to dismiss this appeal due to Bayly’s failure to include a complete record extract in her brief as required by Maryland Rule 8-501. We exercise our discretion not to dismiss on these grounds and, instead, reach the merits of this case.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s temporary custody order. Because a subsequent order prohibits any contact between mother and child, her arguments regarding the limited amount of contact allowed by the temporary custody order are moot. Her remaining arguments were not adequately briefed and are thus waived.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
complaints for modification of the custody arrangement. On August 25, 2015, the parties entered into another consent order, giving Father primary physical custody with stipulated visitation by Mother, and joint legal custody to the parties with Father to have tie-breaking authority. Mother was to pay Father $450 in child support a month, which reflected a downward deviation of $52 a month under the child support guidelines, plus $100 a month in arrearages. See Md. Code Ann., Family Law Article § 12-204.
In 2020, Father and Mother again petitioned the court to modify custody. While the motions were pending, the court issued a final protective order after finding reasonable evidence of sexual abuse of Child by Mother’s sister. Under the final protective order, Mother’s visitation was reduced to two, sixhour days a week, and Child was to have no contact with Mother’s sister while Child was in Mother’s care. A BIA was appointed for Child. In 2022, the parties again entered into a consent order and agreed that Mother was to have supervised in person visitation with Child one hour a week.
In 2020, Alisha Bethoulle (“Mother” and appellant) and Jesse W. Price, III (“Father” and appellee) both filed petitions to modify custody of their minor child (“Child”). Following an evidentiary hearing, the court entered a temporary custody order that, among other things, granted Mother limited supervised visitation with Child, and ordered monetary awards, including child support to Father and fees to the assigned best interest attorney (“BIA”). The court stated it would issue a final custody order after it held a second evidentiary hearing, for which it set a date. The circuit court subsequently held the second evidentiary hearing and issued a final custody order that, among other things, prohibited any visitation between Mother and Child, and affirmed the earlier child support award. Afterward, the court issued an order addressing the BIA fees. Mother appealed the temporary order to our Court arguing that it contains “legal errors.”1 For the following reasons, we shall affirm the circuit court’s temporary order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 5, 2010, Child was born to the unmarried parties. Three years later, the parties entered into an amended consent order in which they agreed to shared physical and legal custody of Child. Within a few months, Father and Mother both filed
On February 26-27, 2024, a hearing was held on the parties’ motions to modify custody. The court heard testimony from the parties and other witnesses and received argument from the BIA. The court orally issued a temporary custody order from the bench that it rendered into a written order a few weeks later. In the temporary order, the court, among other things: 1) awarded Mother supervised, one hour a week video-conferencing access with Child, 2) ordered a psychiatric/psychological evaluation of both parties and a substance abuse evaluation of Mother, and 3) ordered Mother to pay $450 a month in child support, an additional $100 a month toward her arrearages, and $2,602.50 to the BIA. The court stated that it was reserving on the final award of fees to the BIA. The court further ordered a one-hour hearing set for July 12, 2024, to address the psychiatric evaluations and “any revision” of the order, with the court specifically stating that any violation could result in modification or recission of it. Mother filed a notice of appeal of the temporary order.
On July 12, 2024, the circuit court conducted the evidentiary hearing, and a few weeks later entered a written final custody order. Finding that a material change of circumstance had occurred, and that abuse/neglect of Child by Mother was likely in the future, the court determined, after addressing the Taylor/ Sanders2 factors, that it was in Child’s best interest for Father to have full physical and sole legal custody of Child and for Mother to have no contact with Child. The court ordered the prior child support order to remain in effect.3 Several weeks later, the court issued a final order, awarding $1,080 to the BIA, with each party to pay half of the total amount. Additionally, Mother was to pay $2,602.50 in unpaid attorney’s fees to the BIA.
We subsequently dismissed Mother’s appeal of the temporary custody order because she failed to file an appellate brief. See Md. Rule 8-502(a). Mother filed a motion for reconsideration, which we granted. She then filed a fifty-five-page brief, which she revised and refiled after we advised her of the requisite fifteen-page limit. See Md. Rules 8-504(a) and 8-112. Father subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that many of her arguments related to events that occurred after the issuance of the temporary custody order on March 14, 2024. We denied the motion to dismiss but limited the scope of Mother’s appeal to those events after the temporary order.4
DISCUSSION Standard of Review
We apply a three-part standard when reviewing child custody cases. In re Adoption of Cadence B., 417 Md. 146, 155 (2010).
“When the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard . . . applies. [Secondly,] if it appears that the [circuit court] erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the [circuit court] founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the [circuit court’s] decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.”
Id. (quoting In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “ruling is clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result, when the ruling is violative of fact and logic, or when it constitutes an untenable judicial act that defies reason and works an injustice.” Alexis v. State, 437 Md. 457, 478 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A]n abuse of discretion should only be found in the extraordinary, exceptional, or most egregious case.” Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185, 199 (2005).
What arguments, if any, are properly before us?
Section 12-303(3)(x) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code provides that a party may appeal an interlocutory order entered by a circuit court in a civil case that deprives a parent “of the care and custody of his child[.]” However, an appeal of a temporary order that is superseded by a permanent order is generally considered moot for the reason that we can no longer provide an effective remedy should we find the temporary order in error. See In re Riddlemoser, 317 Md. 496, 502 (1989); see also In re Joseph N., 407 Md. 278, 303 (2009) (following a juvenile court’s order for shelter care, the juvenile court held a second de novo hearing and issued an opinion and order denying continued shelter care, therefore the juvenile court’s second order superseded the first, and as a result, the first order is moot and “vacating [it] will provide no relief what[so]ever to appellants” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); In re Iris M., 118 Md. App. 636, 643 (1998) (holding that court orders prohibiting contact between father and daughter were rendered moot when they were superseded by subsequent order continuing the no contact between father and daughter).
A question is moot if, when it is before the court, there is no longer any existing controversy between the parties. In re Riddlemoser, 317 Md. at 502. This is because “courts do not sit to give opinions on abstract propositions or moot questions; appeals which present nothing else for decision are dismissed as a matter of course.” Id. “An exception to this rule exists only in rare instances which demonstrate the most compelling of circumstances.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The “rare instances” are as follows:
[O]nly where the urgency of establishing a rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern is imperative and manifest, will there be justified a departure from the general rule and practice of not deciding academic questions. [I]f the public interest clearly will be hurt if the question is not immediately decided, if the matter involved is likely to recur frequently, and its recurrence will involve a relationship between government and its citizens, or a duty of government, and upon any recurrence, the same difficulty which prevented the appeal at hand from being heard in time is likely to prevent a decision then the Court may find justification for deciding the issues raised by a question which has become moot, particularly if all these factors concur with sufficient weight. Id. at 503 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, following a two-day evidentiary hearing, the circuit court issued a temporary custody order. In its order, the court, among other things: 1) granted Mother supervised, one hour a week video-conferencing access with Child, and 2) ordered Mother to pay $450 a month in child support, an additional $100 a month toward her $12,150 arrearages, and $2,602.50 to the BIA but reserved on the issue of a final award to the BIA. The court made clear that the order was temporary, and it would issue a final custody order following a second evidentiary hearing. The order stressed that any violation of the temporary order could result in modification or recission of it. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal to our court of the circuit court’s temporary order.
Roughly four months later, on July 30, 2024, the circuit court entered a final custody order, which was preceded by an evidentiary hearing at which the parties introduced evidence and made argument. In its final custody order, the court awarded full physical and sole legal custody of Child to Father and ordered no contact between Child and Mother. The court ordered that the prior temporary child support award shall remain in place.5 Less than a month later, the court issued a written order awarding the BIA $1,080 in attorney fees, with each party to pay half of the total amount, and ordering Mother to pay $2,602.50 in unpaid attorney’s fees to the BIA.
The merits of Mother’s argument regarding the court’s temporary custody order as to access to Child is moot, and the limited exceptions to the mootness doctrine do not apply. This is because her visitation argument as to the temporary order in which she was granted a one hour a week video call from child has no remedy where the superseding and now governing order prohibits any contact between Mother and Child. See Cabrera v. Mercado, 230 Md. App. 37, 85 (2016) (“Ms. Cabrera’s service issue is moot because the final custody order is the current governing order and would still govern even if we vacated the emergency temporary custody order[.]”).
Although the vast majority of Mother’s informal brief addresses the court’s custody award and visitation, she makes a few additional arguments. She briefly states that the circuit court in its temporary order erred in ordering her to pay $550 a month in child support because the court disregarded the Maryland’s guidelines and Father’s counsel’s “suggestion for minimum wage-based calculations due to [Mother’s] financial hardship.” Additionally, she states briefly that she has already paid the $3,000 obligation to the BIA so that the awards of $2,602.50 and $1,080 to the BIA are incorrect. Lastly, she also states briefly that the BIA’s attorney fee award should be vacated because the BIA provided inadequate representation to Child and misreported its fees. Other than the above bald statements, Mother does not provide any support for her
JUDGMENT
FOOTNOTES
arguments. Accordingly, we decline to address them. See Md. Rule 8-504(a)(4) (stating that an appellate brief shall contain a “clear concise statement of the facts material to a determination of the questions presented” and “[r]eference shall be made to the pages of the record extract or appendix supporting the assertions”); Md. Rule 8-504(a)(6) (stating that an appellate brief shall contain “[a]rgument in support of the party’s position on each issue”); see also Conrad v. Gamble, 183 Md. App. 539, 569 (2008) (declining to address an issue raised by appellants because they failed to cite any authority in support their position, as it is axiomatic that our function is not to seek out law to support an appellant’s argument). In sum, for the reasons set forth above, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
1 Mother has appealed pro se. The Maryland Supreme Court has stated that, although we shall liberally construe the contents of pleadings filed by pro se litigants, unrepresented litigants are subject to the same rules regarding the law, particularly, reviewability and waiver, as those represented by counsel. Simms v. State, 409 Md. 722, 731 n.9 (2009).
2 See Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 304-11 (1986) and Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 420 (1978).
3 Mother filed a motion for reconsideration of the final custody order, which the court denied. Mother then filed an en banc appeal of the final custody order in the circuit court.
When the panel ordered her to file the entire transcript of the proceeding, Mother moved to withdraw her request for en banc review, which the panel granted.
4 Mother subsequently filed motions to expedite the appeal and to reconsider our order regarding the scope of the appeal, each of which we denied.
5 On August 5, 2024, Mother filed a motion for reconsideration of the final custody order, which the circuit court denied. Although Mother filed a timely en banc appeal to the circuit court, she ultimately moved to dismiss her motion, which the court granted. Accordingly, the final custody order was not appealed.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
Cite as 09 MFLU Supp. 49 (2025)
Crawford credits; calculation; explanation
John Kirlan Joseph v.
Alicia Jones Joseph
Nos. 2247, September Term 2023
Argued before: Berger, Nazarian, Ripken, JJ.
Opinion by: Ripken, J.
Filed: June 25, 2025
The Appellate Court vacated the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s calculation of Crawford credits. The trial court did not explain the basis of its calculation of the contribution credits owed by husband.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
Husband moved out of the marital home in March of 2022. The children continued to reside with Wife in the marital home. In April of 2022, Wife filed a complaint seeking an absolute divorce, which she amended in August of 2022. In August of 2022, Husband filed a counter complaint also seeking an absolute divorce. Both parties sought sole legal custody of the children; Husband sought shared physical custody of the children, and Wife sought primary physical custody. Both parties sought child support and the division of marital property. During the pendency of the litigation, Husband did not pay child support or contribute to the mortgage.
In January of 2024, Alicia Joseph (“Wife”) and John Joseph (“Husband”) were granted a judgment of absolute divorce by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Husband filed a timely notice of appeal, and seeks review of the following issues:1
I. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in declining to order a marital award.
II. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding Crawford credits. Although we shall hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the first issue, for the reasons to follow, we shall vacate the judgment of the circuit court so that, as to the second issue, the court may more fully explain its exercise of discretion in relation to the award of Crawford credits.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Background and Issues Resolved Before
Trial
The parties were married in August of 2004. They had two children born to the marriage in 2005 and in 2009. During the course of the marriage, the parties purchased a marital home in Baltimore County, Maryland, where they resided with the children. Both parties were jointly obligated on the mortgage encumbering the home. Both parties contributed portions of their monthly earnings to cover the household expenses, including the mortgage. Both parties contributed to parenting the children.
The parties eventually reached an agreement regarding custody of the minor child.2 They also reached an agreement regarding the division of certain marital assets, including a timeshare and proceeds from real property in North Carolina. They further agreed to mutually waive any claims for alimony or legal fees and agreed that each party would be responsible to pay any debts in his or her name. Several issues remained for trial, including division of property—which was comprised of the marital residence; the contents of the marital residence; the automobiles; various savings and checking accounts; and the parties’ retirement accounts—as well as child support payments and child support arrearages.
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
A trial was held to resolve the remaining issues over two days, one in October of 2023 and the other in January of 2024.
The parties agreed that they were married in 2004 and had two children together. Wife testified that another child was born during the marriage between Husband and another woman. Wife testified that the child was brought to the marital home in 2017, and that Wife took care of the child from that time until Husband took that child and left the marital home in March of 2022. Wife testified that following the separation, Husband utilized some visitation time with the children; however, he did not spend overnights with them. Wife testified that apart from school shopping and sports training for one of the children, Husband did not contribute to child-related expenses following his departure from the marital home. Husband acknowledged that he did not have overnight visits with the children subsequent to the separation. He testified that apart from the contribution to his son’s sports camp, he did not provide any child support.
Wife testified that prior to the parties’ separation, they both contributed funds each month to a joint checking account from
which bills, including the mortgage, were paid. Wife testified that she contributed $4,000 per month while Husband contributed $2,000 per month. Husband initially testified that he contributed $3,000 per month to the joint account. He also testified that he contributed his entire regular paycheck to this account, less any amounts earned via overtime, which he withdrew with the intention of starting a business with a coworker. Husband later acknowledged that in the year preceding the separation, he left only slightly over half his income in the joint account, withdrawing the remainder of the funds which he intended to use to start a business. In the thirteen-month period preceding the separation, Husband, via direct deposit, contributed $60,540.66 to the joint account and withdrew $29,141.00, leaving the balance of $31,399.66 as the sums he contributed to the joint account.3 Husband acknowledged that he did not start the purported new business. Husband testified that he deposited the withdrawals into his Wells Fargo account; however, according to the joint property statement filed by the parties, that account held only $413 in October of 2023.
Wife testified that Husband had not contributed any funds to the joint account since he moved out of the marital home in March of 2022. Husband acknowledged that he stopped depositing money in the joint account in 2022.
In relation to the request for use and possession of the family home, Wife testified that she made the request because the children had lived there for their entire lives, and maintaining a stable environment was in the children’s best interest. Wife also introduced a mortgage amortization schedule identifying the principal and interest she paid on the mortgage each month as $1,998.96. Evidence was admitted at trial that in January of 2024, the outstanding mortgage balance encumbering the property was $266,112.10. Husband introduced evidence of an appraisal conducted in October of 2023 valuing the property at $421,000.
With respect to the parties’ personal property, Wife testified that the parties had an agreement that Husband could retain property she valued at $6,000, which included a pool table, a weight set, and other personal items. In accordance with that agreement, Husband removed these items from the personal property itemized. She valued the remaining personal property that had not been part of the agreement at $6,000 and testified that most of the other personal property in the house, including furnishings and television sets, had been purchased used. Husband agreed that the value of the property he removed per the agreement equaled $6,000. Husband estimated that the other personal property in the house was valued at $25,050; however, he did not provide a basis for this estimation. He acknowledged that the furniture was purchased secondhand.
Both parties agreed that Husband drove a 2007 Toyota Tundra and Wife drove a 2011 Toyota Camry. Wife testified that she estimated the value of each vehicle—at $10,000 and $4,000 respectively—based on use of the Kelley Blue Book in consideration of the mileage and VIN numbers. Husband did not testify concerning the value of the vehicles.
In relation to the parties’ other financial accounts and assets, Wife testified that she had a federal pension4 and a Thrift Savings Plan (“TSP”). The value of the TSP fluctuated with the market. At the time of the second day of trial the TSP had a value of $331,288.58. Wife testified that during the
marriage, she had on occasion withdrawn funds from her TSP: for a down payment on the family home; to fund the purchase of the parties’ rental property in North Carolina; and to cover household expenses. Wife also testified that she had a loan against the TSP, a substantial portion of which had been used to cover tuition expenses for the parties’ daughter. Some funds from the TSP loan had also been used to cover a portion of Wife’s attorney’s fees.
Husband testified that he had a retirement account valued at approximately $34,000. He testified that at one point he had bought and sold stock through Robin Hood; however, his testimony was unclear as to the value of the stock. Husband testified that he had sold $10,000 in stock at some point and used the proceeds to finance a trip to Las Vegas or to take the children to an amusement park. However, when the court inquired further, Husband also stated that he may have used part of the $10,000 to cover his attorney’s fees. Wife testified that in terms of non-economic contributions to the household, although Husband sometimes contributed to household responsibilities such as cleaning, Wife bore primary responsibility for managing the children’s extracurricular activities, household maintenance, cooking, and managing the finances. Husband testified that he helped the children with homework, provided them advice, took the children to visit family and amusement parks, spent time with them, and was generally available to talk to them if they needed to talk.
Concerning the circumstances leading to the divorce, Wife testified that prior to the separation, the parties disagreed on financial matters. Specifically, Husband wanted to invest in real estate, while Wife believed other expenses should be prioritized. Wife also testified that during the marriage, while she was saving for retirement, Husband had called her “cheap” and accused her of not taking financial risks. She further testified that she had suggested Husband start an additional retirement account when he commenced his work for the Department of Corrections; however, Husband declined, indicating that “he would do what he wanted to do with his money.” Wife additionally identified as a factor contributing to the separation Husband’s relationship with one of his coworkers.5
Husband testified that there were “a multitude of things” that led to the breakdown of the marriage. Husband first testified at length that a primary reason for the breakdown of the marriage was Wife allowing her brother to live in the parties’ rental property in North Carolina. Husband acknowledged that the decision to have Wife’s brother live in the property had been made approximately ten years previously; he later acknowledged that Wife’s brother had lived at the property for only three years, and that the property had been vacant for seven years thereafter. When testifying, Husband made disparaging remarks concerning Wife’s hygiene before discussing his extramarital affair. Husband additionally stated that “finances” were another basis for the breakdown of the marriage.
Wife testified that her annual income was roughly $165,000; Husband testified that his annual income in 2023
was $74,171. In their joint financial statement, the parties acknowledged and agreed upon the existence of the various bank accounts and the contents of those accounts.
Judgment of Divorce and Appeal
Subsequent to the trial, the court issued an opinion and a judgment granting the absolute divorce. Based on the parties’ incomes, their agreed parenting access schedule, and the child support guidelines, the court ordered Husband to pay child support in the amount of $875 per month for the parties’ remaining minor child. The court also established a child support arrearage for the months during which Husband did not contribute to the support of the minor children.
The court then assessed and divided the marital property that had not yet been previously agreed upon by the parties. The court first evaluated the value of the family home. The court accepted Husband’s estimated valuation of the property as $421,000, which was encumbered by a mortgage in the undisputed amount of $266,112. The court then calculated the net value of the marital asset at $154,888. The court further considered whether to award Crawford credits with respect to the home. The court noted that it was undisputed that Wife had paid the mortgage alone over a twenty-two-month period in the amount of $43,977.12. The court concluded that it was equitable to award Crawford credits, and ordered that upon sale of the home, Wife would be entitled to a credit of $43,977.12 from Husband. The court further “award[ed] credit for any payment made by either party” from the date of the order until the sale of the home. Finally, after considering the appropriate factors, the court concluded that it would be in the minor child’s best interest to remain in the marital home for another year, and therefore awarded use and possession of the home to Wife for one year.6
Next, the court considered the value of the personal property. The court observed that Husband had claimed the personal property was worth $10,000 at one time and $25,050 at another time. However, Husband acknowledged that the furniture, other than a single couch, had all been purchased secondhand. The court indicated that there was “no other testimony offered as to the specifics of any items within the home or the value of any such items.” Based on the “variations in [Husband’s] estimations and the lack of specificity,” the court did not find Husband’s estimations of the value of the property to be credible. The court, acknowledging that Wife managed the parties’ financial affairs, relied on Wife’s estimation of the value of the personal property which was $6,000. Because the parties both agreed that Husband had taken with him $6,000 of marital property when he departed the home, the court ordered that the remaining $6,000 of marital property would remain with Wife; therefore, the parties would each retain the $6,000 worth of marital personal property already in their separate possession.
The court then considered the parties’ automobiles. The court found credible Wife’s testimony that she had used the vehicles’ mileages and VIN numbers to obtain estimations as to their value from the Kelley Blue Book. The court valued the vehicle Husband routinely operated at $10,000 and the vehicle Wife routinely operated at $4,000. The court ordered that each party retain the vehicle they routinely operated.
The court then considered the parties’ financial accounts, all
of which the court concluded contained “negligible” sums.7 The court ordered that each party would retain the accounts that were in his or her own name. The court ordered that Wife would retain the single joint account.
The court next examined the parties’ retirement accounts. The court indicated that Husband’s retirement account with the State of Maryland was valued at $33,986.43, while Wife’s Thrift Savings Plan account was valued at $331,288.58. The total value of all the marital property assessed by the court equaled $548,695.91.
The court then considered several factors listed in section 8-205(b) of the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.) (“FL”) in determining whether to transfer ownership of any interest in property or to grant a monetary award.
Based on the court’s consideration of the factors, the court found that the equities did not require retitling of any property; nor did the court grant Husband a marital award. The court found that the “equitable considerations dictate[d] that each party retain the retirement plans and savings accounts currently held or titled in their individual names[.]”
The court then entered a judgment of divorce consistent with the memorandum opinion. Husband noted this timely appeal. Additional facts will be introduced as they become relevant to the analysis.
DISCUSSION
I. THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DECLINING TO GRANT A MARITAL AWARD TO HUSBAND.
A. Party Contentions
Husband asserts that the circuit court abused its discretion in declining to grant Husband a marital award. He asserts that the court failed to identify the equitable considerations it contemplated when determining that retitling marital property was unnecessary. He further claims that the court’s decision resulted in a distribution that left him with “less than 20% of the marital property.”
Wife contends that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its division of the marital property. Wife asserts that the division of property, no matter the ratio, is an equitable decision within the trial court’s discretion. She argues that the trial court’s decision was consistent with its factual findings and was fair and equitable.
B. Analysis
The purpose of a marital award “is to correct any inequity created by the way in which property acquired during marriage happened to be titled.” Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 349 (1995). “The monetary award is thus an addition to and not a substitution for a legal division of the property accumulated during marriage, according to title. It is intended to compensate a spouse who holds title to less than an equitable portion of that property.” Id. (quoting Ward v. Ward, 52 Md. App. 336, 339 (1982)).
When a party requests a monetary award as part of a divorce proceeding, a trial court must evaluate that request using a three-step process. Wasyluszko v. Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App.
263, 279 (2021). The trial court must first categorize each item of disputed property as marital or non-marital. Id. (citing Abdullahi v. Zanini, 241 Md. App. 372, 405 (2019)). Second, the court must determine the value of all the marital property. Id. Finally, the trial court must decide if division of marital property according to title would be unfair; if so, the court “may make a monetary award to rectify any inequity created by the way in which property acquired during the marriage happened to be titled.” Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 519–20 (2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In evaluating the final step, the trial court must consider the factors outlined in FL section 8-205(b). Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App. at 280.
Determining whether an asset is marital or non-marital property and determining the value of each item of marital property are “question[s] of fact.” Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 521. “Findings of this type are subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard embodied by Md. Rule 8-131(c).” Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App. at 269 (quoting Collins v. Collins, 144 Md. App. 395, 408–09 (2002)) (further citation omitted). We review the ultimate decision of whether to grant a monetary award for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 407).
Here, the parties did not disagree over the marital character of any of the assets. Further, while there were disagreements at trial concerning the value of some of the assets, neither party presents an argument that the court erred in valuing the property. The issue raised by Husband is that the court abused its discretion in determining that equity did not require retitling any of the marital property or the granting of a marital award. We examine that argument.
As discussed supra, the trial court valued the marital property, resulting in a total of $548,695.91. The court then discussed the FL section 8-205(b) factors for determining what would be an equitable distribution and whether to transfer ownership of any interest in property or to grant a monetary award.
In reviewing the factors, the court considered the contributions of each party to the well-being of the family.8 The court found that although both parties had contributed to the family, Wife had contributed more financially while also serving as the primary caregiver for the children and managing the cooking, cleaning, extracurricular activities, and the household finances. The court found that Husband had withdrawn marital income to start a business and to invest in the stock market; however, the business was not started, and the stock market funds were depleted. The court noted that Husband had served in a parental role for the children and had helped them with homework. The court also noted that for several years, Wife had also helped raise Husband’s daughter whom he had fathered with another woman during the marriage. The court concluded that Wife had “contributed more significantly to the well-being of the family both in monetary and non-monetary ways.”
The court next considered the value of the property interests of each party that had been outlined.9 The court noted that the parties’ economic circumstances reflected that Wife earned more than Husband and that she also saved more financially. The court indicated that it considered the parties’ financial statements.
With respect to the length of the marriage and the circumstances leading to the parties’ estrangement,10 the court noted that the parties had been married since 2004. The parties grew apart for a variety of reasons, including Husband’s infidelity as well as disagreements over “family, finances, the children and their lifestyles.” The court next considered the parties’ ages and physical and mental conditions.11 The court found that both parties generally had good health, and that any health conditions were managed through medication that did not impact employment or lifestyle.
The court next considered the manner in which certain marital property was acquired and the efforts expended by each party in accumulating the marital property.12 The court noted that to acquire the marital residence, the parties used a down payment drawn from Wife’s TSP account. The court noted that Wife also withdrew funds from her TSP account on other occasions for the benefit of the family, including when the parties purchased the North Carolina rental property and again for household expenses at times finances were strained. The court noted that Wife had encouraged Husband to open a supplemental retirement account, but that he had declined. The court observed that Husband used income to invest in the stock market, but that the funds used for that investment had been depleted, as Husband had withdrawn money “for a trip to Las Vegas and other activities.” The court also credited Husband’s testimony that he had withdrawn income from the parties’ joint account to place into a savings account with another individual to start a business. The court noted that the business was never started and that the funds were gone. The court also noted Husband’s testimony that Wife was “cheap and would not buy name brands.” The court further indicated that Wife had made “sacrifices” to save for retirement, and that she had borrowed against her retirement account to pay for the college tuition of the parties’ daughter.13,14
Based on the court’s consideration of these factors, the court found that the equities did not require retitling of any property; nor did they warrant granting Husband a marital award. The court found that the “equitable considerations dictate[d] that each party retain the retirement plans and savings accounts currently held or titled in their individual names,” and ordered that Wife would retain the full value of her TSP.
The parties’ retention of the marital property held in their own names resulted in the following division:
This distribution resulted in Husband retaining slightly more than 23% of the marital property, without consideration of the further reduction from the Crawford credits awarded
to Wife. On the other hand, Wife retained nearly 77% of the marital property.
“In Maryland, as in the majority of equitable distribution states, ‘equitable’ does not necessarily mean ‘equal.’” Jackson v. Sollie, 449 Md. 165, 196 (2016) (quoting Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 508–09 (1993)). Courts are not required to equally divide marital property. See Ward v. Ward, 52 Md. App. 336, 339 (1982). A trial court, “after a consideration of the factors listed in [FL section] 8-205, may decree an unequal division and state the reasons for such an allocation.” Caccamise v. Caccamise, 130 Md. App. 505, 521 (2000). “Although the law does not require a court to divide marital property equally between parties, the division of such property must be ‘fair and equitable.’” Brewer v.Brewer, 156 Md. App. 77, 105 (2004) (quoting Long v. Long, 129 Md. App. 554, 577–78 (2000)).
Here, the trial court provided reasons as to why allocating the marital assets according to title in a fashion that was not equal was equitable. The court explained that Wife “contributed more significantly to the well-being of the family in monetary and non- monetary ways” as demonstrated by her contributing more to the household finances than Husband, and by contributing more to managing the household as well as being the primary caregiver to the children. The court found that Wife’s retirement accounts were “the result of her prioritization” and careful saving habits. The court further noted Wife’s “sacrifices” and contributions to the family outside the course of routine bills, including the loans she took against her TSP account to provide for the family, to fund the purchase of other marital property, and to aid the parties’ daughter in attending college. The court noted that “[b]oth parties benefitted” from Wife’s spending decisions during the marriage.
The court contrasted Wife’s saving habits, which benefitted the family, with Husband’s spending practices, which were limited to his sole benefit. The court took note that Husband withdrew marital income to start a business and to invest in the stock market, observing that the business was not started, and that “those funds are gone.” The court further took note that Husband had depleted marital funds to fund his trip to Las Vegas and “other activities.”
The court therefore provided substantial explanation as to the reason that the unequal allocation of marital assets was fair and equitable under the circumstances.
Husband relies on Ward and Long to support his assertion that because the court’s division of marital property led to a substantial disparity between the parties, the result was inequitable and therefore an abuse of discretion. Ward and Long are distinct from the facts of this case.
As relevant to this appeal, we vacated the marital award in Ward in part because the FL section 8-502(b) factors analyzed by the trial court suggested that “the inescapable conclusion” flowing from a consideration of the factors was that “the balance was even.” 52 Md. App. at 342–43. Based on the trial court’s findings as related to the factors, we held that there was “nothing fair or equitable” in the five-to-one division of property ordered by the trial court. Id. at 343–44. In other words, we vacated the award because the trial court’s explanation of its consideration of the factors did not support
the award. Id. at 343–44.
In Long, we vacated the trial court’s ultimate award where the fact finder’s consideration of the factors contradicted the result of the ultimate award. 129 Md. App. at 577–78. We noted that the trial court’s findings reflected that: [w]here the facts were controverted, the chancellor generally found [the wife’s] evidence more credible than that of [the husband], including [the wife’s] information regarding the acquisition and valuation of the train collection and valuation of the business. The chancellor noted that [the husband] was the source of the marital fault. He noted [the wife’s] mental health problems, her present unemployment and lack of job training, and her non-monetary contribution to the marriage.
Id. at 577. We held that “when the chancellor weighed the equities, he failed to give adequate force to his own findings about [the wife’s] mental condition, unemployment, dearth of personal resources, real marital contribution, and lack of marital fault.” Id. at 578.
We noted that the factfinder had found certain assets to be marital and that the wife participated in the acquisition, yet the final award “short-chang[ed] [the wife] of her benefit for the expenditure of marital resources.” Id. This Court vacated the order of the trial court where the order was contradicted by the trial court’s factual findings; we remanded so the trial court could give “adequate force” to those findings. Id. at 578–79. We further noted in Flanagan that this Court has overturned monetary awards “when the trial court’s disposition demonstrated a great disparity in light of the statutory factors.” 181 Md. App. at 527. We noted that the trial court did not explain the reason for the disparity. Id. We held that “the sizeable, unexplained disparity resulting from the monetary award” required this Court to vacate the award. Id. (emphasis added).
Ward, Long, and Flanagan therefore do not suggest that an equal disposition of marital property is required; the holdings in each of these cases indicate that a trial court’s ultimate award must be supported by the court’s factual findings and consideration of the statutory factors. Ward, 52 Md. App. at 343–44; Long, 129 Md. App. at 578; Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 527. If there is a disparity in the marital property retained by each party, the disparity must likewise be consistent with and explainable by the trial court’s factual findings and consideration of the statutory factors. Ward, 52 Md. App. at 343–44; Long, 129 Md. App. at 578; Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 527.
As explained earlier in this analysis, the trial court here considered the appropriate statutory factors. The trial court’s findings explained the equitable basis for declining to make a marital award, including Wife’s more significant contributions to the well-being of the family, both financial and otherwise; Wife’s careful saving and contributions for the benefit of the family; and Husband’s use of marital funds for his personal benefit. The decision not to make a marital award was therefore consistent with the trial court’s findings, rendering the facts of this case inapposite with the facts of Ward, 52 Md. App. at 343–44, Long, 129 Md. App. at 578, and Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 527 (where disparate marital awards were either
inconsistent with the trial courts’ factual findings or otherwise unexplained).
We perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s declination to order a marital award.
II. THE CIRCUIT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING CRAWFORD CREDITS.
A. Party Contentions
Husband asserts that the court erred in awarding Crawford credits. First, he claims that a trial court is prohibited from awarding Crawford credits when the paying spouse has made the payments for the jointly owned property from marital funds. Second, he contends that even if an award of Crawford credits is legally permissible, the trial court in this case abused its discretion by ordering Husband to pay 100% of the mortgage payments paid by Wife during the twenty-two-month separation period. Finally, he asserts that the trial court’s order awarding contribution credits for either party during the use and possession period was an abuse of discretion because, in Husband’s view, the effect of that order makes one party responsible for the entirety of the mortgage.
Wife asserts that an award of Crawford credits is an equitable determination that is within a trial court’s discretion. She asserts that Crawford stands for the proposition that once married parties separate, the presumption that a payment towards jointly owned property constitutes a gift ceases; therefore, she asserts, even if a payment for jointly owned property is made from marital funds, the paying spouse may still be entitled to contribution. She next argues that the calculation of the amount of Crawford credits was within the discretion of the trial judge. Finally, she asserts that the award of credits during the use and possession period was not in error because both parties were responsible for half of the mortgage payment and would therefore receive credits that would be equally divided.
B. Analysis
“Generally, one co-tenant who pays the mortgage, taxes, and other carry charges of jointly owned property is entitled to contribution from the other.” Abdullahi v. Zanini, 241 Md. App. 372, 423 (2019) (quoting Crawford v. Crawford, 293 Md. 307, 309 (1982)). Under this doctrine, a trial court may apply the general law of contribution between cotenants of jointly owned property to married parties when they separate. Id. at 423–24. Crawford credits allow a trial court to take into consideration the preservation of jointly owned property and the benefit accrued to the non-paying cotenant. See Gordon v. Gordon, 174 Md. App. 583, 641 (2007). “A married, but separated, cotenant is, in the absence of an ouster (or its equivalent) of the nonpaying spouse, entitled to contribution for those expenses the paying spouse has paid.” Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 424 (quoting Gordon, 174 Md. App. at 641) (further citation omitted). “A trial judge is not obligated, however, to award contribution at the time of divorce.” Id. Contribution “is an equitable remedy within the discretion of the court.” Id. (quoting Gordon, 174 Md. App. at 642).
i. Whether payments made from marital funds are eligible for the remedy of contribution under Crawford.
In Crawford, the Supreme Court of Maryland explained that ordinarily, advancements and payments by one spouse during
a marriage towards the purchase or improvement of jointly owned property is “presumed to be a gift to the other spouse” to the extent of the other spouse’s interest in the property. 293 Md. at 311 (internal citation omitted). The Court explained that the presumption of the gift doctrine only applies while the married couple is living together. Id. at 314. This Court later recognized that Crawford “abolished the presumption of [a] gift between separated spouses and permitted a spouse to seek contribution in those instances when married parties were not residing together and one of them, or the other, had paid a disproportionate amount of the carrying costs of property.”
Baran v. Jaskulski, 114 Md. App. 322, 328 (1997).
Husband relies on four cases to support his argument that payments made by one spouse using marital funds—in this case, income earned by Wife during the separation period—are ineligible for a contribution award under Crawford. Each of these cases is distinguishable from the facts of the present case, and we evaluate each in turn.
In Wassif v. Wassif, the husband was employed as an anesthesiologist earning over $400,000 in 1987; the wife held a high school diploma and had no substantial work history due to caring for the parties’ children. 77 Md. App. 750, 754–55 (1989). During the marriage, the mortgage payments were necessarily paid solely from the husband’s salary, as that was the only source of marital property. See id. at 754. During the three-year divorce proceeding, the wife was granted pendente lite use of the family home. Id. at 766. In the final judgment of divorce, the trial court also granted the wife use and possession of the family home; however, the court also awarded Crawford credits in favor of the husband for both the pendente lite period and the post-divorce use and possession period. Id. This Court eliminated the award of Crawford credits for payments made by the husband during the pendente lite period, reasoning that the source of those payments was marital property. Id.
Wassif is factually distinguishable from the present case. Whereas in Wassif, only one party contributed to the financial acquisition of marital property during the marriage, here, both Husband and Wife worked throughout the marriage, jointly acquiring marital property and jointly contributing to the mortgage. Further, this Court’s ruling in Wassif maintained the status quo of the parties’ previous arrangement through the pendente lite period. Conversely here, Husband and Wife had an arrangement whereby each mutually earned and contributed to the mortgage obligation; Husband then unilaterally elected to cease contributions to the mortgage obligation, even though he continued financially earning.
Husband next cites to Broseus v. Broseus, 82 Md. App. 183 (1990). Husband asserts that in Broseus, this Court “approved the denial of Crawford credits to the payor spouse on the ground that his payments had been made from marital funds[.]” We read Broseus differently. In Broseus, the issue decided by this Court was whether a trial court was required to award contribution credits. Id. at 191–92. This Court held that “entitlement to contribution is an equitable matter and not a matter of right[,] and is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. at 192. As further support for the conclusion, this Court noted that the payments “were made from marital funds and contribution was not mandated.” Id. at 193 (emphasis added). This Court did not suggest that a contribution order was precluded, and
further noted that the issue of the source of funds used to pay the mortgage was not raised in Crawford. Id. at 194 n.4.
Husband’s reliance on Woodson v. Saldana, 165 Md. App. 480 (2005) is likewise misplaced. In Woodson, after the wife moved out of the family home, the husband continued to make the mortgage payments, pay community association dues, and make home improvements via his military housing allowance. Id. at 492. Without considering equitable factors and based upon its incorrect understanding that contribution credits were mandatory, the trial court awarded the husband Crawford credits. Id. at 493. This Court vacated the trial court’s award of Crawford credits and remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion in determining whether Crawford credits were warranted. Id. This Court did not devote any part of its disposition to a determination of whether the housing allowance income was marital or not; nor did it direct the trial court to do so on remand. See id. at 492–93.
Finally, Husband cites to Caccamise v. Caccamise, 130 Md. App. 505 (2000). In Caccamise, this Court affirmed Crawford credits awarded to a husband for mortgage payments made towards real properties which were marital. Id. at 524–25. In discussing the history of contribution credits, the Caccamise court stated that “[t]here are four exceptions that preclude contribution; namely (1) ouster; (2) agreements to the contrary; (3) payment from marital property; and (4) an inequitable result.” Id. at 525.16 However, neither this Court, nor the trial court in the excerpt of its order examined on appeal, discussed the source of the husband’s mortgage payments. Id. This Court simply affirmed the award of Crawford credits and stated that the decision reached by the trial court “was not clearly erroneous.” Id. This outcome suggests that the source of a payment being from marital property is not necessarily dispositive on the issue of whether a Crawford contribution is warranted. See id. at 524–25.
From our review of these cases, the source of the funds used to pay the mortgage for the period between separation and divorce is not dispositive in a trial court’s determination of whether to award Crawford contribution credits. Rather, the decision of whether to award Crawford credits is an equitable, non-mandatory decision left to the trial court; the source of the funds used to pay the mortgage or other property upkeep may be one factor a trial court considers in determining what is equitable. Compare Wassif, 77 Md. App. at 766, with Broseus, 82 Md. App. at 193–94 and Woodson, 165 Md. App. at 492– 93; see also Caccamise, 130 Md. App. at 524–25. To hold otherwise would lead to a result that eliminates discretion of trial courts in a decision which at its core is premised in equity. Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 424 (“Rather, contribution ‘is an equitable remedy within the discretion of the [trial] court.’” (quoting Gordon, 174 Md. App. at 642)). Allowing contribution credits only where the source of the payment is non-marital funds is contrary to the holding in Crawford that a spouse may be entitled to contribution for “payment of the carrying charges of property” made after the parties separate because the presumption no longer exists that such a payment is a gift. 293 Md. at 312.
This understanding of Crawford credits is supported by this Court’s decision in Gordon, wherein we addressed an award where one spouse argued that the subject mortgage payments were ineligible because they were comprised of marital funds.
174 Md. App. at 639. Judge Hollander, writing for this Court, reasoned that preservation of real property accrues a benefit for the cotenant, which supports entitlement of the paying spouse to contribution for mortgage and tax payments. Id. at 641. This Court noted, however, that trial judges are not obligated to award such a contribution between spouses at the time of divorce because “the award of contribution is an equitable remedy within the discretion of the court.” Id. at 641–42. This Court noted that in the case before it, one spouse had paid for “virtually all of the expenses” for the family home, while the nonpaying spouse retained and utilized a benefit with respect to tax deductions related to the home. Id. at 642. We acknowledged Caccamise’s statement that payment from marital property was an exception that precluded contribution. Id. at 639. However, we noted that Caccamise “affirmed the decision of the circuit court, without discussing the source of the funds used to make [the mortgage] payments, stating that ‘the decision reached by the trial court . . . was not clearly erroneous.’” Id. at 643 (quoting Caccamise, 130 Md. App. at 525). In Gordon, despite that the payments subject to contribution were made with marital funds, this Court affirmed the award of Crawford credits. Id.
This Court likewise remanded a Crawford award in Flanagan, where we determined that payments made on a home equity line of credit were eligible for contribution credit consideration, even though the payments were made from employment income that “technically [was] marital property[.]” 181 Md. App. at 540 n.17, 543.
Based on the above, a trial court is not precluded, as a matter of law, from awarding Crawford credits solely because the paying spouse made the carrying cost of the property from marital funds. Here, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Crawford credits to Wife for mortgage payments she made from income earned during the marriage (i.e., marital property).
ii. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of the Crawford award.
As described above, the decision to award contribution credits under Crawford is an equitable determination, subject to a trial court’s exercise of discretion. Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 424; see also Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 541. Because review of contribution awards requires appellate courts to examine the trial court’s exercise of discretion, trial courts should also explain the basis of the contribution award and why the award is warranted. See Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 542–43.
Here, the parties did not dispute that for the twenty-twomonth period between the date of separation and the date of the divorce, Wife solely paid the mortgage payments. There was also evidence in the record that the amount of principal and interest paid by Wife towards the mortgage during this period totaled $43,977.12. The court found that it was equitable to award contribution credits in this case, as Wife, who resided at the family home with the parties’ minor son, had paid the entirety of the mortgage during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. The court found that “the carrying costs of this marital asset [had] not been borne equally during the pendency of the litigation.” However, the court did not explain why it determined that Husband’s contribution should equal 100% of the carrying cost of the property, or why that figure was equitable. The basis for this decision is difficult to understand
considering the remainder of the court’s decision, which ordered foregoing payments towards the maintenance of the property, as well as proceeds from the sale of the property, be divided equally. The absence of an explanation is further compounded by the evidence regarding the parties’ division of finances prior to the separation—both parties acknowledged that during the marriage Wife contributed more to the monthly expenses than Husband.
Because the trial court did not explain the basis of its calculation of the contribution credits owed by Husband, we vacate the award and remand for the trial court to reconsider and explain what, if any, portion of the $43,977.12 carrying costs is an equitable sum for Husband to contribute.
iii. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Crawford credits for the duration of the use and possession period.
Husband’s final assertion is that the trial court’s award of Crawford credits during the use and possession period was an abuse of discretion because the award results in “one party . . . being responsible for the entirety of the mortgage.”17 We disagree. The Crawford provision had the effect of making the parties equally responsible for the carrying costs of the property. This interpretation is confirmed by the trial court’s
accompanying order that clarified the following with respect to the property:
During the [u]se and [p]ossession [period], all taxes, major repairs on the house, and all mortgage payments are to be split equally between the parties[.] * * *
The proceeds [of the sale of the family home] are to be distributed in the following order of priority: (1) all mortgages and outstanding liens on the property; (2) all commissions, fees and closing costs associated with the sale;
(3) $43,977.12 to [Wife] as reimbursement for mortgage payment previously and solely incurred; (4) credit to either party for any taxes and mortgage payments made but not equally shared pursuant to [the prior paragraph]; (5) credit to either party for any major repairs not equally shared pursuant to [the prior paragraph]; (6) any remaining proceeds shall be split equally between the parties[.]
The effect of these provisions is that each party equally bears the carrying costs of the family home for the one-year use and possession period. We perceive no abuse of discretion in this decision.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY VACATED FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO RECONSIDER AND EXPLAIN WHAT, IF ANY, PORTION OF THE $43,977.12 CARRYING COSTS IS AN EQUITABLE SUM FOR HUSBAND TO CONTRIBUTE. COSTS TO BE EVENLY SPLIT BY APPELLANT AND APPELLEE.
FOOTNOTES
1 Rephrased and reordered from:
1. Did the court commit legal error in awarding “Crawford Credits” to Wife from the proceeds of the marital home?
2. Did the court abuse its discretion in failing to adjust the equities in awarding a monetary award to Husband?
2 By the time the parties reached this agreement, their older child had turned eighteen. The record does not reflect when the older child completed high school.
3 This sum results in an average monthly contribution by Husband of $2,415.35 per month.
4 Wife introduced evidence that the estimated monthly pension payment would be $2,757, with a net amount of $1,468.22. Wife testified that this estimate was provided by her counselor and reflected what was “currently available to [Wife], if [Wife] was to retire” on the day the benefit report was made.
5 Wife specifically testified concerning an incident where Husband’s coworker had an accident, and Husband went to the hospital and waited with the coworker’s family for several hours. This incident occurred after Husband’s extramarital affair that resulted in the birth of a child. Wife indicated that Husband had provided this coworker money to purchase a residence and had given the coworker dishes from the marital home. Husband asserted that the relationship between himself and his coworker was that of business partners. Husband also testified that after the separation, he moved into the same coworker’s basement and paid rent to her.
6 The court’s order accompanying the opinion clarified that upon the sale of the home, after the mortgage obligation, closing costs, Crawford credits, and other costs were paid, the parties would equally divide the remaining proceeds from the sale of the home.
7 The accounts described by the court included $8.90 in a joint checking account; $413 in a savings account in Husband’s name; $50 in another savings account in Husband’s name; $2,051 in a checking account in Wife’s name; and $10 in a Robinhood stock account in Husband’s name.
8 See FL § 8-205(b)(1).
9 See FL § 8-205(b)(2)–(3).
10 See FL § 8-205(b)(4)–(5).
11 See FL § 8-205(b)(6)–(7).
12 See FL § 8-205(b)(8).
13 FL section 8-205(b)(10) requires consideration of “any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home[.]” The court did not expressly consider this factor; however, “a trial judge’s failure to state each and every consideration or factor” does not constitute an abuse of discretion if the record demonstrates that “appropriate factors were taken into account in the exercise of discretion.” Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 533 (quoting Cobrand v. Adventist Healthcare, Inc., 149 Md. App. 431, 445 (2003)). Here, the trial court’s opinion in totality demonstrates that it considered use and possession of the family home, as its award of that asset appeared one page prior to its marital award analysis.
14 The circuit court did not consider FL section 8-205(b) (9)—contribution of non-marital assets towards the acquisition of real property held as tenants by the entirety— which was not relevant to the court’s analysis because neither party contended that any contribution to marital property was made with non-marital funds.
15 This sum does not reflect any reductions with respect to the Crawford credits awarded by the court.
16 We note that the Caccamise court did not cite to authority
in listing these exceptions; nor was “payment from marital property” at issue in the case. See id. at 524–25.
17 Husband also asserts that this decision was legal error; however, he presents no authority to support that contention. We note that this Court has on several occasions affirmed orders that awarded Crawford credits or apportioned carrying costs during use and possession periods or pending sale of property. See, e.g., Baran, 114 Md. App. at 327–29; Wassif, 77 Md. App. at 766; Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 424.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s orders finding that a disabled person’s sister had misappropriated her assets. The sister’s failure to provide necessary transcripts thwarted appellate review. And the limited record showed no basis to disturb the judgments of the circuit court.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
2. Did the circuit court violate Bates’ right to a fair trial by preventing her from presenting key evidence?
3. Was the evidence sufficient to find Bates liable?
4. Did the circuit court apply the incorrect law when deciding the case?
5. Did the circuit court err by accepting alleged hearsay and unfounded evidence from Leahy?
6. Did the circuit court err in denying Bates’ motion to reopen the case to admit additional evidence?
For the reason to be explained, we shall affirm the judgments of the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
The Previous Appeal
Sharon D. Bates (“Bates”) appeals from judgments, after a trial, that the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County entered in favor of the appellee, Timothy P. Leahy (“Leahy”). Leahy is the court-appointed guardian of Thelma Floyd, Bates’ sister. The circuit court entered the following judgments against Bates: (1) $50,000 for conversion; (2) $331,000 for conversion, jointly and severally liable with Bates’ co-defendant, Rose Harper (“Harper”);1 (3) $50,000 for unjust enrichment; (4) $444,870 for constructive fraud and breach of fiduciary duty; (5) $85,613 for civil conspiracy, jointly and severally liable with Harper; and (6) $70,206.20 in damages, $8,860.73 in prejudgment interest, and $103,658.30 in attorney’s fees under the Maryland Statute Against Financial Exploitation (known as the SAFE Act, Md. Code, EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-601 to -609), all related to financial exploitation of Ms. Floyd.
Bates, who represents herself in this appeal, failed to comply with Md. Rule 8- 411(a)(2), which requires an appellant to secure relevant transcripts for appellate review. Bates claims this failure was due to financial hardship. We decide this appeal, however, without the transcripts, addressing as best we can the merits of some of Bates’ claims.
Bates presents the following questions for our review, which we have rephrased as follows2:
1. Did the circuit court err in assigning the trial judge to preside over this case?
This appeal is related to an earlier case, In the Matter of Thelma Floyd, No. 1960, September Term, 2022, 2024 WL 412257 (filed unreported 5 Feb. 2024) (“Matter of Floyd”). In Matter of Floyd, we affirmed the circuit court’s appointment of Leahy as guardian of Ms. Floyd’s property and Karen Sylvester (of the Prince George’s County Department of Family Services) as guardian of Ms. Floyd’s person. Matter of Floyd, at *1. Ms. Floyd, who was seventy years old when the guardianship petition was filed in August 2021, suffered from frontotemporal dementia, rendering her unable to make decisions about her health and property. Id. at *1. In Matter of Floyd, we upheld the circuit court’s decision that Ms. Floyd was a disabled person in need of guardianship services and that Bates, who had Ms. Floyd’ power of attorney, was derelict in her care of Ms. Floyd.3 Id. at *2.
The Fraud Trial
Following his appointment as guardian of Ms. Floyd’s property, Leahy sued Bates, alleging that she committed fraudulent financial transactions involving Ms. Floyd’s assets. The court ruled in favor of Leahy, finding that Bates had misappropriated Ms. Floyd’s funds.
Post-judgment, Bates, through counsel, filed a “Motion to Open Judgment to Admit Evidence and to Reconsider Court Decision.” In that motion, she sought to introduce additional evidence, including documentation showing allegedly that her Bank of America Home Equity Line of Credit (“HELOC”) balance had been transferred to Select Portfolio Servicing (“SPS”) rather than paid off with Ms. Floyd’s funds, as Leahy claimed. The court denied Bates’ post-judgment motion.
Proceedings on Appeal
After Bates appealed timely, this Court directed her to order the transcripts of the relevant proceedings in the circuit court.
Bates did not comply with that directive. We issued then an order to show cause regarding her failure to provide the transcripts. In response, Bates stated that, as “a senior citizen who cannot afford the estimated $1,000 transcript cost[,]” she could not comply with our order to provide transcripts.
Our Chief Judge ruled that the show cause order was “satisfied,” but ordered Bates to “take all necessary steps, including submitting payment, to cause the relevant transcript(s) to be filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on or before November 8, 2024.” Bates did not cause the relevant transcripts to be filed in the circuit court; nor did she provide the transcripts to this Court.
ANALYSIS
Bates’ failure to provide transcripts of relevant proceedings constrains our ability to consider most of her claims of error. See Md. Rule 8-411(a)(2) (requiring appellants to provide this Court with “a transcription of any portion of any proceeding relevant to the appeal”). Appellants must ensure that the record on appeal contains the transcripts necessary for this Court to issue a decision. Md. Rule 8-413(a) (listing the required contents of the record on appeal); Md. Rule 8-602(c)(4) (granting this Court the discretion to dismiss an appeal when the record does not comply with Rule 8-413). It is Bates’ burden “to put before this Court every part of the proceedings below which [are] material to a decision in [her] favor.” Lynch v. R. E. Tull & Sons, Inc., 251 Md. 260, 262 (1968). She has not satisfied that burden.
In Kovacs v. Kovacs, 98 Md. App. 289 (1993), the Court held that the party asserting error has the burden to show “by the record” that an error occurred. Id. at 303. “Mere allegations and arguments . . . , unsubstantiated by the record, are insufficient to meet that burden.” Id. Indeed, “[t]he failure to provide the court with a transcript warrants summary rejection of the claim of error.” Id.
Being mindful, however, of our Chief Judge’s order, which required Bates to provide the transcripts, but determined also that she had “satisfied” the show cause order, we shall address the merits of Bates’ claims, to the extent possible, without the benefit of the transcripts.
We cannot evaluate properly Bates’ allegations regarding evidentiary rulings, witness testimony, or judicial conduct during the trial. Nonetheless, the incomplete record allows us to address certain aspects of Bates’ appeal.
Bates’ central claim is that Leahy “intentionally misled the [circuit court] by submitting . . . inaccurate information and documentation.” More to the point, she alleges that Leahy
accused falsely her of using approximately $50,000 of Ms. Floyd’s money to pay-off Bates’ Bank of America HELOC. Bates contends that the HELOC balance was transferred to SPS and later paid-off when she sold her house in December 2023. She posed this contention for the first time in an untimely post-trial motion under Md. Rule 2-534, which requires such motions to be filed within ten days. See also Md. Rule 1-203 (governing time computation).
In any event, the limited record available, including the post-trial motions, clarifies this dispute. Bates’ post-trial motion sought to introduce a 6 February 2019 letter from SPS confirming allegedly the transfer of her HELOC balance to SPS. During discovery, Bates declined to produce information about that alleged SPS transfer, despite Leahy’s interrogatories and document requests related to the $50,000 transaction. Thus, Bates, declining to produce this evidence in discovery, claimed later that the same “evidence” exonerates her.4
Even without the transcripts, we deduce that Bates had ample opportunity during discovery and at trial to present evidence regarding the disposition of her Bank of America loan. Her decision not to provide financial documentation, followed by her belated attempt to introduce additional evidence posttrial, does not bolster her claim of fraud or misrepresentation by Leahy.
Bates alleges also that the circuit court erred by: (1) its assignment of the trial judge to the case; (2) violating her right to a fair trial; (3) determining she was liable based on insufficient evidence; and (4) applying the incorrect law. These claims challenge primarily the conduct of the trial and the sufficiency of the evidence, which are matters that we cannot review meaningfully without the relevant transcripts. Indeed, without these transcripts, we must presume that the trial court acted properly. See, e.g., Medley v. State, 386 Md. 3, 7-8 (2005) (recognizing the presumptions that trial judges know the law, apply it correctly, and perform their legal duties properly).
CONCLUSION
Although we are not unmindful of Bates’ claims about her financial circumstances, the responsibility for providing transcripts necessary for meaningful appellate review remains with her as the appellant. Based on the limited record before us, we are unable to find any basis to disturb the judgments of the circuit court. The record available indicates that Bates had a full and fair opportunity to present her case at trial. Her allegations of misrepresentation by Leahy appear to lack merit.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
1 Harper is Ms. Floyd’s former neighbor and caregiver.
2 Bates phrased the questions presented as follows:
1. Did the Court err by assigning Judge White to this case? Did the Court violate the Judge’s Code of Conduct?
2. Did the Court violate Sharon D. Bates’ right to a fair trial? Did the Judge’s reasoning and Order show bias and unfair treatment toward Ms. Bates?
3. Did the Court err when it determined Ms. Bates was guilty when the evidence did not support the Judge’s decision/Order?
4. Did the Court apply the incorrect Law when deciding this case?
5. Did the Court err by accepting the hearsay and unfounded evidence from a Court appointed guardian when deciding this case?
3 For context, in Matter of Floyd, the circuit court ruled that Bates was “derelict in her responsibilities with power of attorney.” 2024 WL 412257, at *2. In that case, the circuit court
determined also that, if it disbelieved Bates’ “testimony as to her lack of knowledge about Ms. Floyd’s financial transactions, then Ms. Bates was [complicit] in how the funds were used.” Id.
4 To be sure, the SPS account opening letter refers to Bates’ Bank of America HELOC account number. Leahy alleged, however, that the interest accrued on the SPS account in the payoff statement shows that the SPS loan originated in July 2020, eighteen months after the pay-off of the Bank of America HELOC. In trying to reconcile these assertions, one might imagine Bates used Ms. Floyd’s money (withdrawn in December 2018) to pay down Bates’ HELOC in January 2019. Realizing later perhaps that she needed to “cover her tracks,” Bates might have opened the SPS account in February 2019. She re-borrowed then against the HELOC when the investigation loomed, and transferred the new HELOC debt to SPS to masquerade as the old debt that was paid off in January 2019. This is not necessarily a view we could adopt on the record before us. Our mention of such possible scenarios is illustrative only of Leahy’s contentions.
