Nixon: Digital, data and decision making in the NZDF
Mapp: Is the NZDF resourced to respond to disaster?
Borroz: IP strategies and challenges for space startups
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Kia ora and welcome to the Autumn 2023 issue of Line of Defence Magazine ! Ongoing war in Ukraine, flooding and cyclone at home, economic pressures mounting, and a national election just months away, and we’re only one quarter into the calendar year!
In this 27th issue of Line of Defence we continue our new addition to the magazine – the Aerospace section –with an excellent brief on intellectual property for space startups from Rotoiti’s Dr Nicholas Borroz , and the latest spaceplane milestone achieved by Dawn Aerospace.
In Defence, with Cyclone Gabrielle and flooding devastating large tracts of the North Island, disaster response is a key theme.
General Atomics Aeronautical makes the case for the long-range, long-endurance MQ-9B SeaGuardian Remotely Piloted Aircraft System’s humanitarian assistance and disaster response capability. SeaGuardian’s ability to provide lengthy time on-station could prove extremely valuable to first responders and save lives.
Featured contributor Dr Wayne Mapp writes that Cyclone Gabrielle has highlighted the need for action on a range of big-ticket personnel and equipment issues, and a quicker paced Defence Review would help. With the Australian Army about to sell their version of the NH90, is this an ideal opportunity to bolster the RNZAF’s lift capability?
With the NZDF and a range of government agencies delivering an all-of-government response to the devastation wrought by the cyclone, we feature volunteer organisation Taskforce Kiwi . Since February, TFK’s teams have completed over 4,000 hours of skilled volunteer work, the equivalent of 500 workdays, assisting worst-hit communities.
Also in Defence, we are delighted to be welcoming NZDF CIO Carl Nixon ONZM as a contributor to the magazine. The days of a separate frontline and back office are gone, writes AIRCDRE Nixon. In both peace and conflict, and the grey zone in between, the Defence Force is exploiting a digital ecosystem to deliver domain mastery.
In International Security Inside this issue, I play devil’s advocate in relation to the demonising of Chinese branded CCTV cameras, picking holes in the hawkish narratives that are pushing Five Eyes governments to curb their use of hitherto trusted brands. We’re being fed science fiction stories about Beijing backdoors, and it’s become apparent that we’re having difficulty sorting fact from fiction.
In Homeland Security, we feature the insights of Professors Paul Spoonley and Paul Morris on the underpinnings of far right ideology in New Zealand, and we explore the recent launch of NZ Police’s Tactical Response Model – will it make communities safer?
If you haven’t already, consider subscribing to our twice-weekly eNewsletter THE BRIEF. It’s a great way to keep up-to-date with the latest. Details are on the Defsec website.
Nicholas Dynon, Auckland.
CONTRIBUTORS & INTERVIEWEES
Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Chris Kumeroa
Jackson Calder General Atomics Aeronautical
Dr Nicholas Borroz AIRCDRE Carl Nixon ONZM
Nicholas Dynon Prof Paul Spoonley
Prof Paul Morris
General Atomics Aeronautical Centre for Defence and Security Studies
Massey University
ASIS International New Zealand Chapter
RNZAF Hercules aircraft at Napier airport loading supplies and generators for Gisborne 24.02.2023.
Image courtesy of New Zealand Defence Force.
Winter – June 2023
Main themes: Land domain, terrorism, border security Copy
Deadline: 01 June 2023
Publication: 10 June 2023
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Cyclone Gabrielle was one of the worst storms ever to hit New Zealand. It resulted in the loss of precious lives and property damage worth billions of dollars. Additionally, 300-400mm of rainfall, wind gusts of 130-140 km/h, wave heights up to 11m and a storm surge greater than 0.5m punished communities on the North Island. These effects were exacerbated by a serious flooding event just one month earlier.
New Zealand’s response to the disaster was rapid and involved a whole-of-government effort. A storm of this magnitude and the unprecedented damage it caused would have tested any government’s response and it certainly proved challenging for New Zealand authorities. Through courage, determination and skill, the authorities and first responders -assisted by everyday New Zealanders -- responded magnificently to save lives, assist those in danger and aid in the recovery process.
Much can be learned from the response to this disaster, including on the provision of additional systems which may have assisted in mitigating its impacts. This article outlines how the MQ-9B SeaGuardian® contributes to disaster responses, whilst also providing a range of other all-of-government capabilities, including resource protection, border surveillance and roles for Defence.
The MQ-9B SeaGuardian is a longrange, long-endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS), capable of carrying a range of powerful payloads on missions exceeding 30 hours. It can take off and land automatically from 4,000foot airstrips, with a small-deployed footprint and a maintenance turnaround time of two hours or less. SeaGuardian can operate in all weather, due to its rugged design, lightning protection and both antiice and de-ice systems. Nothing else in its class offers the same high reliability, availability, and cost effectiveness compared with humancrewed systems.
Humanitarian assistance and disaster response is a core capability for unmanned aircraft
like SeaGuardian. Earlier-model variants have proven themselves time and time again in wildfires, after storms, amid floods and more. They can loiter high above affected areas and provide priceless real-time intelligence as well as other vital services in the early minutes and hours after a major incident.
MQ-9B can show live, fullmotion video any time of day or night. Its Lynx multi-mode radar produces high-resolution imaging through clouds, mist or smoke. And it can carry a number of highly valuable payloads in addition to its onboard equipment.
A SkyTower pod to provide broadband communication services to thousands of high-priority users, including first responders, is one example. The aircraft is flown via
satellite communication and it also can connect with airborne and seaborne responders across broad areas. Real-time video transmission to tactical platforms and emergency response headquarters staff could also be provided.
The operating altitude of the SeaGuardian could range from 1,000-35,000 feet depending on environmental conditions, and sensor or communications requirements. During the approach of a cyclone, the SeaGuardian can operate above the cloud layer with plenty of range and endurance for flexibility in choosing its flight path. Immediately after the storm impacts the coast, the SeaGuardian can be back on-station, employing a flexible flight profile to maximize its sensor and communications performance.
A range of tasking opportunities would have been available for a SeaGuardian during this disaster. Noting that Cyclone Gabrielle formed 10 days prior to striking the North Island, and its track was known with reasonable certainty a few days prior, the opportunity existed for SeaGuardian to perform pre-disaster surveying of coastlines and inland areas using very highresolution Synthetic Aperture Radar mapping. This would have provided a valuable baseline for post-disaster analysis of the damage to infrastructure and inundation. Communications with first responders could have also been refined during this period.
Immediately after the disaster, the SeaGuardian could have commenced post-disaster mapping and surveillance (one 24-hour sortie per day), using its high-resolution radar and electronic surveillance sensors to monitor storm damage and to search for distress signals.
Synthetic Aperture Radar and the employment of coherent change detection (CCD) algorithms would be employed to rapidly identify
areas of damage and inundation. SeaGuardian could also monitor for Search and Rescue emergency beacons and identify people in distress over land or at sea using its EO/IR system. Its pervasive presence could have provided valuable information to first responders on people in imminent danger and allowed for the rapid prioritisation of the many pressing rescue and response tasks.
Beyond emergency response, the SeaGuardian roles, include, but are not limited to, maritime, littoral, and overland surveillance; fisheries and resource protection; overland and maritime search and rescue; fire and emergency support; environmental and infrastructure monitoring; support to law enforcement and Defence applications. These operations could be undertaken across the vast NZ area of interest from the Equator to the Southern Ocean. SeaGuardian is currently in operation in the Indo-Pacific, including with the Japan Coast Guard.
New Zealand can expect to have severe weather events like Gabrielle with increasing frequency, and
it is no stranger to other natural disasters, including earthquakes. With an MQ-9B SeaGuardian system, New Zealand could be much better postured for responses to such disasters.
For regular military or civilian overland, littoral, maritime surveillance and communication support roles, the MQ-9B SeaGuardian has flexible and proven capabilities. With this capability comes the ability to provide rapid and flexible response options across a wide range of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief scenarios. During disasters like Cyclone Gabrielle, the SeaGuardian could provide valuable and cost-effective surveillance and communications support in the lead up to any disaster and during the vital days and weeks following. SeaGuardian’s ability to provide lengthy time on-station could prove extremely valuable to first responders and save lives.
In addition to providing a vital tool for first responders, SeaGuardian’s contribution to New Zealand for operations across the broader South Pacific or in the Southern Oceans warrants close consideration. It is available now, through acquisition or lease.
NZDF Chief Information Officer Carl Nixon discusses the importance of cultivating a digital ecosystem to ensure the success of NZDF’s strategy, describing what digital really means for the NZDF.
The days of a separate frontline and back office are gone. In both peace and conflict, and the grey zone in between, the Defence Force exploits a digital eco-system to deliver domain mastery, and operational and organisational excellence objectives as part of its strategy.
Today’s world is undeniably digital. As the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence observes in its Digital Strategy for Defence, “digital is all-pervasive and is relentlessly changing the character of warfare and politics because data-driven capabilities change the way we communicate, live, and work. It is also changing the character of competition and conflict.”
Warfare is expanding from platforms to digital capabilities that support the delivery of integrated communication and information management across warfighting domains, single Services, government agencies, partners and allies, and even commercial collaborators. This new style of warfare relies on improved decisionmaking in a complex environment that involves huge amounts of data, computing, network and processing power, instantly accessed and secured so it can be relied upon and trusted.
Compared to even the recent past, commanders are receiving massive volumes of data that is arriving at literally the speed of light, to help them make important decisions both on and off the battlefield.
The NZDF’s strategy is centred on multi-domain integration, ensuring that every part of Defence and our partners, can work seamlessly together to deliver desired outcomes. Practically, it means that all operational activity is connected through communications, and data from all platforms (whether it be in land, sea, air, or cyberspace) is collected, analysed and available to decision makers and users.
Our strategy has three key lines of effort:
• operational mastery across three combat-ready domains and integrated information capabilities,
• operational excellence, and
• organisational excellence
The tangible expression of the NZDF being an integrated Defence Force will be our ability to generate, deploy, operate, sustain and regenerate as a data-centric, networked, combat force. Core to delivering this strategy is the application of digital technologies and the exploitation of the data they create or capture.
Digital is less of a thing and more a way of doing things. The Defence Digital Eco-system is an evolving collection of digital platforms and products, allowing our Force to connect and interact in ways that create value for participants. A digital eco-system (‘digital’) has
three attributes: it creates value for the future, for our core business, and for the foundational capabilities that support the entire structure. These attributes align and add value to Defence’s current strategy of domain mastery, operational and organisational excellence.
Creating value for the future –domain mastery
Digital creates value for our future operations by examining new frontiers of domain mastery, so our warfighting domains are assured of operational advantage in changing types of conflict. Unlocking value from emerging digital capabilities will be critical to creating competitive advantage for our combat forces. We have a responsibility to maximise value from our current and future capabilities and investments, thereby earning the trust of the war fighter and New Zealanders.
Two examples of how the NZDF will be exploiting its digital ecosystem to ensure mastery is
realised are the on-board analytical and Operations Centre’s processing capabilities that increase the speed and precision of decisions by our P8A Poseidon crews; and, the use of sensors, big data, metrics, and analytics that will improve the efficacy of our supply chain operations and deliver insights from future enterprise resource applications.
Creating value in our core business – operational excellence
Digital causes us to rethink how to use new capabilities to improve our core business: operational excellence. Decision-making speed is the warfighting currency of the digital age. As Australia’s Assistant Defence Minister said at the launch of the Data Division within the Department of Defence last year, “we know that information and data underpins all effective military operations and decision-making”.
Decisions are being made in more complex environments (the so-called grey zone) and require knowledge
drawn from a greater volume and breadth of relevant streams of intelligence sources. Blending data from multiple trusted channels into a coherent and accurate narrative is critical to operational and strategic decision making. This now requires extensive automation, customisation, real time learning, improved resilience, and tools to anticipate reactions. We can use digital to shift our old ways of making decisions that try to make sense of siloed data, into real-time decisioning that uses evidence-based and analytical-based practices.
Creating value in our foundational capabilities – organisational excellence
The final element of how digital delivers value to our strategy is the foundational technology and organisation processes that allow us to be agile and fast. Changing mindsets allows us to use data to make better and faster decisions, devolving decision making to smaller teams, and developing much more iterative and rapid ways of
doing things. The NZDF’s Defence Digital Group (DDG) – the new name for Communications and Information Systems Branch –calls this Mission Command for Information Technology (MCfIT). DDG practices mission command by devolving decision making to smaller teams, and developing more iterative and rapid ways of doing things. We are institutionalising cross-functional collaboration, flattening hierarchies, and building an environment that encourages automation and process optimisation to release and iterate quickly. In short, creating a digital workforce.
But it is not enough for only the IT department to be agile; the whole Defence Force needs this mindset to accelerate the connections between sensors and deciders. As Adobe considers in their Digital Trends 2022 paper, “senior executives should liberate their team members from routine and mundane tasks by capitalising on existing intelligent automation and by investing in the most valuable skills…”. Properly applied, a digital mindset does that.
Paraphrasing Amazon’s Jeff Bezos, in today’s volatile world speed and agility are major competitive differentiators – everything else you create can be replicated by our adversaries. Speed and agility are essential and attainable attributes for a small nation’s Defence Force to perfect. Digital permits highly integrated operational environments to be created and refreshed at pace and scale – including alongside like-minded partners. This approach reduces technology debt and security vulnerabilities, and increases interoperability where it matters.
The NZDF is focussing on the changes we need to make to ensure our strategic goals are enabled by a digital backbone that operates at speed, and is secure, sustainable, scalable, and simple. A secure,
singular, modern, digital foundation will connect combat power with decision-makers across military and business domains and with partners, driving integration and interoperability across domains and platforms.
Digital sits at the heart of our investment options. In an era of persistent competition, Defence must adopt an approach that places the latest technologies in the hands of our operational and business users, while also ensuring that our people, processes and data keep pace with best practice. We are leveraging commercial partners such as Microsoft and Vodafone to deliver commodity information technology, and using the sector’s expertise to help us with the four critical digital capabilities –technology, people, process, and data – to accelerate the military’s ability to respond to changing threats.
Alongside traditional military platforms, future investments that will contribute to a digital eco-system include investments in information management, intelligence processes and systems, cybersecurity, and enterprise resource planning.
The NZDF is transforming its decision making capabilities where it’s digital foundation provides the Force with the freedom to consume and exploit data. Our Defence digital eco-system will create value and advance NZDF’s strategy in three areas: domain mastery (ensuring operational advantage), our core business (improved decision-making), and our fundamental capabilities (a changed mindset). We will know we have succeeded when integration is embedded by design across a datacentric Defence Force.
The NZDF and the Ministry of Defence are asking New Zealanders to help shape the country’s future defence strategy by taking part in the Defence Policy Review.
“Last year the Government commissioned a Defence Policy Review, a process designed to ensure that New Zealand’s Defence policy, strategy, and planned capability investments remain fit for purpose,” Ministry of Defence Deputy Secretary Anton Youngman said.
“We are now asking everyone in New Zealand for their views to help shape this work.”
The Defence Policy and Strategy Statement will express the Government’s Defence Policy interests, objectives, priorities and high level strategy.
It will reflect the Minister of Defence’s priorities of Pacific, People and Infrastructure and leverage the work of Defence Assessment 2021, which outlined two growing threats to New Zealand’s security – strategic competition and climate change.
“The information gathered over the next 10 weeks the survey is open for, will be used to inform a Defence Policy and Strategy Statement and a set of Future Force Design Principles,” said Vice Chief of Defence Force Air Vice-Marshal Tony Davies.
Work to develop Future Force Design Principles, which articulate the Government’s intentions for the future force structure, has also
begun. This will build on the longterm trends and issues identified in the Defence Policy and Strategy Statement and guide decisions on future broad capability (people and assets) required.
Once these documents have been considered later in 2023, the Government will then make decisions as to the next steps.
Feedback is invited from all New Zealanders via an online survey before 4 April 2023. Kantar has been commissioned to develop the online survey, which should take less than 10 minutes to complete.
Participants in the survey will not be required to provide their contact details to complete it, although the
feedback may be published in full. A summary of all feedback will be published on online by Defence later in 2023.
Once a respondent has completed the survey, they also have the option of providing additional feedback via email at engage@defence.govt.nz. All feedback is subject to the Official Information Act.
Online webinars on 8 March and 9 March provided members of the public the opportunity to hear from those leading the defence policy and strategy work, ask any questions and provide feedback directly.
More details around registering for the online webinars will be provided over coming weeks.
From the Auckland Anniversary Weekend floods to Tropical Cyclone Gabrielle and its aftermath, successive rotations of Taskforce Kiwi volunteers have come swiftly to the aid of communities in need.
From flood relief in Auckland to relief and recovery work in Hawke’s Bay following Cyclone Gabrielle, Taskforce Kiwi teams have completed over 4,000 hours of skilled volunteer work, the equivalent of 500 workdays, assisting communities since the beginning of February.
Over the past nine weeks Taskforce Kiwi teams have carried out a massive volume of tasks, including debris removal, plant operations, missing person searches, welfare checks, damage assessments, aid delivery by ground and air, needs assessments, and administrative support.
Over four days in the direct wake of the Auckland Anniversary Weekend floods, 18 Taskforce Kiwi personnel (including four from Disaster Relief Australia) volunteered 467 hours of hard graft, clearing 29 flooded homes, disposing of 20 truckloads of debris, filling 13 skip bins, completing 59 damage assessments, and contributing $24,284 of skilled labour to the relief and recovery effort.
Then, within a matter of days, as Cyclone Gabrielle moved across Aotearoa, the Taskforce Kiwi (TFK) team was on the road in Auckland, delivering communications
equipment to 13 operations centres from Ōtara in the south to Warkworth in the north, on behalf of Auckland Emergency Management.
TFK personnel rapidly deployed to carry out debris clearance and damage assessment tasks across West Auckland in Henderson, Swanson, Ranui and Huapai.
The organisation’s area of operations expanded quickly to include Hawkes Bay, with international partners from Disaster Relief Australia, Team Rubicon Canada, and REACT Disaster Response providing on-ground support, having travelled from
around the world to roll up their sleeves and help in relief efforts.
recovery operations included a varied range of tasks, including impact and needs assessments, plant operations, debris clearance, route reconnaissance, aircraft loading, and ground-based logistical support to impacted communities across a wide area, alongside iwi and Civil Defence.
been some big acts of generosity. Domino’s Pizza and Give for Good, for example, raised over $50,000 for Taskforce Kiwi’s cyclone relief operations, allowing the team to continue to provide on-ground support as the recovery process continues across Hawke’s Bay.
In a recent LinkedIn post, TFK paid tribute to its volunteers and supporters:
“A massive shout out to our volunteers who have put their hands up over the last two months to deploy, taking time away from their lives and families to help people they’ve never met. Our team remains on the ground in Hawke’s Bay throughout the Easter break, doing
everything they can to help Kiwis get back on their feet.
“A huge thank you to all our supporters who have made our work possible: Mitsubishi Motors New Zealand, Royal New Zealand Returned and Services Association, Ranfurly Veterans’ Trust, Dave
Letele, Give for Good, Domino’s, Clare Foundation, Steadfast Group, Kathmandu, Pacific Jets, Strategic Sourcing, Garmin, TrackMe NZ, Mitre 10, Hirepool Vehicle Rentals, Harrison Grierson, Airlink, Rotary Club of Havelock, North Hawkes Bay Racing, NZ Safety Blackwoods, and The ToolShed.”
To find out more about Taskforce Kiwi or to get involved, visit https:// www.taskforcekiwi.org/
Cyclone Gabrielle has highlighted the need for action on a range of big-ticket personnel and equipment issues, and a quicker paced Defence Review would help, writes Wayne
Mapp.
Cyclone Gabrielle has wrought the most destruction that New Zealand has faced since the Christchurch earthquake of 2011. It is not surprising that a National Declaration of Emergency has been required. This has enabled to full resources of the NZDF to be bought to bear.
NZDF personnel have done an impressive job, with the essential skills of working as a well-disciplined team in adverse circumstances. The NZDF have been able to bring a range of capabilities into play that no-one else can. Robust communications not dependent on mains power, heavy helicopters, water purification plants, trucks able to operate on broken roads, plus command and control.
In some ways this disaster presents a more challenging set of circumstances than did Christchurch. The damage is more widespread. Basic services have been destroyed right across the East Coast and Hawkes Bay. Many more of the NZDF resources have been required.
The question arises; is the NZDF sufficiently well resourced, both in terms of personnel and the equipment to carry out the tasks asked of them?
This is particularly pertinent when the effects of climate change
indicate that this type of disaster will become more common in the future. The risks of climate change have been well signaled in various defence reviews and planning documents going right back to the beginning of the Clark Administration in 1999.
The Defence Assessments made when Ron Mark was Minister highlighted climate change as a major risk, though this was primarily focused on the NZDF role in the South Pacific. More importantly for the last quarter century humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) has been seen as a core task of the NZDF.
In the 24 years since 1999, how much has actually been done about HADR preparedness and understanding the significance of climate change?
Probably the major equipment change was the development of the Project Protector fleet which was acquired instead of a third frigate. HMNZS Canterbury is the centerpiece of the Protector fleet. The acquisition of the NH90 helicopter has also bought a new medium to heavy helicopter into national service. More recently, HMNZS Aotearoa has vastly more capability than its predecessor HMNZS Endeavour.
With the exception of HMNZS Aotearoa, which was in heavy maintenance, all of these assets have been pressed into service along with more traditional capabilities such as Army trucks and the frigate HMNZS Te Mana.
In the aftermath of the disaster it is appropriate to ask whether more needs to be done. In short, is the current shape of the NZDF sufficiently well suited to dealing with more events of this scale?
In my view the answer is “no”. More needs to be done.
This is not to forecast a radical redirection. Rather a build-up of existing capabilities, both in terms of personnel and equipment, is required. The upcoming Defence Review could set out the plan.
One of the glaring shortcomings is simply the lack of personnel. More skilled people are required, both within the Regular Force as well as the Reserves. To take the Reserves first.
The Reserves have been rundown for over 20 years. I share some responsibility for this. At the turn of the century there were still over 3,500 army Reserves. Today the figure is about half that. Rebuilding the Reserves would mean more NZDF personnel throughout the regions, particularly in those places
where natural disaster risks are quite high.
A credible goal would be to rebuild back to 3,500 personnel, perhaps over a five-year period. Some of the rebuild could be done by offering attractive terms to permanent NDZF personnel who will be leaving during the next five years. Getting new people will also mean more community recruitment and more full time training intakes. Achieving this will require better conditions of service, with a decent retention payment for people who reach three years efficient service.
In terms of the Regular Force, achieving the recrement targets set by Ron Mark, that is 6,000 personnel, would be an excellent start. Clearly more attractive inducements will be required. One of the questions that could be asked is the focus of the training of the new entrants. Maybe we need more people in Logistics and Military Engineering.
That brings us to equipment. In the Army, a greater depth of engineering equipment. Highly mobile heavy lift equipment and more bridging capability would be a good start.
This is not just an Army issue. The other two services can also be made more robust.
The Air Force NH90 helicopters have done an impressive job, with much greater capabilities than the UH1 Iroquois. But is eight enough?
The Australian Army is about to sell their version of the NH90. It would be an ideal opportunity to acquire at least a dozen of these aircraft, just as we did with the Australian Seasprites. This should not wait for the completion of the Defence Review. The Minister and senior officials will need to be fleet of foot to achieve this.
The Air Force used to have a medium lift aircraft, the Andover, in which I did my basic para course. Retired Air Force Officers say that the Andover could land in
many more airfields than the C130 Hercules and would have been able to bring substantial payloads to isolated communities, provided of course there was a suitable airfield. Given the relatively short distances in New Zealand, it is arguable that more HN90 helicopters could readily fulfil this role.
The Navy will soon have to deal with the renewal of the Project Protector fleet. Much has been learned from the employment of the current fleet over the last 15 years. The IPVs were found to be of limited utility. However, the OPVs have been excellent. Somewhat larger patrol ships would be better still. There is quite a discussion going on whether this role could be fulfilled by a despecc’ed version of the likely next class of frigate.
HMNZS Canterbury has proven to be a highly useful ship. It would have been better still if it had been a military class ship with a well deck. One of the issues is that the Navy only has one such ship. Two would provide essential resilience. HMNZS Canterbury was invaluable during the Christchurch earthquake. Similarly, with various disasters in the South Pacific. Unfortunately, it was not immediately available after Cyclone Gabrielle. With two ships, this gap would be much less likely to occur.
The upcoming Defence Review is an opportunity to seriously consider these issues, and arguably the Review could be bought forward. Many of the personnel in the Review, particularly the Chair Sir Brian Roche, have already done a Defence Review, and know the issues well.
Cyclone Gabrielle has highlighted the need for action. Spending years thinking about it is not necessary. It is time to increase the tempo of completing the Defence Review so that decisions can be made that will have effect within five years, rather than the more typical time frame of a decade or more.
Babcock and Auckland University of Technology have signed an agreement to collaborate on scholarships, internships and joint research projects to grow New Zealand’s maritime engineering sector.
As a part of the new arrangement, Babcock and AUT will develop a range of initiatives aimed at increasing the participation of under-represented groups in technology and engineering studies and research, including women, and Māori and Pasifika students.
The new partnership will also enable more students to enter the maritime engineering sector by ensuring they have the knowledge and skills required to meet New Zealand and global engineering trends and requirements.
The agreement was signed by Babcock’s Program Director, Mark Worsfold, and AUT’s Associate Dean & Director External Engagement, Dr Yvonne Chan Cashmore and Acting Head of School – Engineering, Computer and Mathematical Sciences, Professor Tek Lie, at the Devonport Naval Base.
“Our Principles include kotahitanga (collaborate), kia pākiki (be curious), and whakaaro tukunga iho (think:outcomes),” said Mark Worsfold. “At Babcock we believe that we are greater than the sum of our parts and through curiosity, collaboration and a focus on achievement we can connect with our customers, our stakeholders, and partners to create a safe and secure world together.
AUT shares many of our principles so we are thrilled to partner with them to jointly develop research, expertise, and training to build a stronger maritime sector in New Zealand.
We know that maritime engineering industry thrives when we have diversity of people, cultures, and ideas in our teams. We are proud to continue our work with AUT to support equity in engineering through our sponsorship of the Excellence in Māori and Pasifika Advancement Awards and Women in Technology Awards. We will also
look for opportunity for new scholarships and placements to support students to explore their passion for careers in engineering,” Mr Worsfold said.
AUT Pro Vice-Chancellor and Faculty of Design and Creative Technologies Dean, Professor Guy Littlefair said that the partnership with Babcock will provide students with a range of important hands-on experiences.
“We are excited about the opportunities this new partnership provides for our students to enter the maritime engineering industry.
Students will participate in Babcock hosted industry awareness sessions, internships and projects, which will prepare them well for their future careers in the maritime industry,” Professor Littlefair said.
Professor Littlefair said that the together AUT and Babcock will also focus on the acceleration of technology and knowledge development to find solutions to global problems using local New Zealand capabilities and expertise.
The Australian Industry and Defence Network (AIDN) welcomes today’s tripartite announcement on the proposed pathway to the construction of an Australian AUKUS nuclear submarine.
AIDN has congratulated the Australian government for what has been achieved since the AUKUS announcement 18 months ago to get Australia a step closer to acquiring a nuclear submarine fleet.
“AIDN looks forward to having the opportunity to work closely with Government and Defence on ensuring that Australian Industry, in particular the SME community, are able to compete in a fair and equitable way to secure meaningful work in this program,” stated AIDN in a media release.
“Today the Albanese Government committed Australia to becoming the 7th country to operate nuclear submarines, the ultimate deterrent capability for a nation. Today the ADF and industry have begun a journey that will completely redefine these organisations, this is a national transformation program.”
AIDN pointed out that it is imperative that the government commits to ensuring that as much activity as possible is undertaken by Australian companies.
“It is imperative that the Australian Government works closely with our partner Governments to ensure that Australian Industry is front and centre for all discussions. There needs to be a robust mechanism in place to ensure that the required transfer of IP, technical knowledge and knowhow is transferred seamlessly between the partner countries.”
AIDN’s membership, it stated, “provides the full range of capability required, from professional services, engineering services, education, training, manufacturing, program support, combat and electronic systems and componentry that this program will need to utilise, all these companies need is the support of Government to ensure that they can be given the opportunity to do so.”
According to AIDN, looking ahead, there will be a significant requirement to achieve new certifications, the highest levels of cyber and IT security and export/ import requirements, in order to become part of the nuclear submarine chain.
The Australian workforce will be required to upskill in capacity and capability and the numbers of individuals for this program, across all disciplines will be significant.
“It is vital that a robust and auditable policy and procurement framework is implemented to ensure the Albanese Government’s AUKUS capability requirements are achieved as efficiently as possible, particularly in light of the rapidly evolving geopolitical climate. The future of the Australian Defence Industry depends on a framework where their role in delivering capability requirements is clear, and the procurement process is efficient and accessible to local industry and importantly, SMEs.
“Today’s announcement will shape the outcomes for Australia both strategically and for the Australian Defence Industrial base potentially for decades. If there is not careful consideration for the role of the Australian Defence Industry, then this will be a failure for the Australian Defence Industry and the future of defence innovation and sovereign advanced manufacturing.
Latest SIPRI data sees increases in US and French arms exports and a decline in Russia’s, while Ukraine becomes the world’s third largest arms importer.
According to the latest data on global arms transfers from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), imports of major arms by European states increased by 47 percent between 2013–17 and 2018–22, while the global level of international arms transfers decreased by 5.1 percent.
Arms imports fell overall in Africa (–40 percent), the Americas (–21 percent), Asia and Oceania (–7.5 percent) and the Middle East (–8.8 percent)—but imports to East Asia and certain states in other areas of high geopolitical tension rose sharply.
The United States’ share of global arms exports increased from 33 to 40 percent while Russia’s fell from 22 to 16 percent.
“Even as arms transfers have declined globally, those to Europe have risen sharply due to the tensions between Russia and most other European states,” said Pieter D. Wezeman, Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.
“Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, European states want to import more arms, faster. Strategic competition also continues elsewhere: arms imports to East Asia have increased and those to the Middle East remain at a high level.”
Global arms exports have long been dominated by the USA and Russia (consistently the largest and second largest arms exporters for the past three decades). However, the gap between the two has been widening significantly, while that between Russia and the third largest supplier, France, has narrowed.
US arms exports increased by 14 percent between 2013–17 and
2018–22, and the USA accounted for 40 percent of global arms exports in 2018–22. Russia’s arms exports fell by 31 percent between 2013–17 and 2018–22, and its share of global arms exports decreased from 22 percent to 16 percent, while France’s share increased from 7.1 percent to 11 percent.
Russian arms exports decreased to 8 of its 10 biggest recipients between 2013–17 and 2018–22. Exports to India, the largest recipient of Russian arms, fell by 37 percent, while
exports to the other seven decreased by an average of 59 percent. However, Russian arms exports increased to China (+39 percent) and Egypt (+44 percent), and they became Russia’s second and third largest recipients.
“It is likely that the invasion of Ukraine will further limit Russia’s arms exports. This is because Russia will prioritise supplying its armed forces and demand from other states will remain low due to trade sanctions on Russia and increasing pressure from the USA and its allies not to buy Russian arms,” said Siemon T. Wezeman, Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.
France’s arms exports increased by 44 percent between 2013–17 and 2018–22. Most of these exports were to states in Asia and Oceania and the Middle East. India received 30 percent of France’s arms exports in 2018–22, and France displaced the
USA as the second largest supplier of arms to India after Russia.
“France is gaining a bigger share of the global arms market as Russian arms exports decline, as seen in India, for example,” said Pieter D. Wezeman. “This seems likely to continue, as by the end of 2022, France had far more outstanding orders for arms exports than Russia.”
From 1991 until the end of 2021, Ukraine imported few major arms. As a result of military aid from the USA and many European states following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Ukraine became the 3rd biggest importer of major arms during 2022 (after Qatar and India) and the 14th biggest for 2018–22. Ukraine accounted for 2.0 percent of global arms imports in the five-year period.
“Due to concerns about how the supply of combat aircraft and longrange missiles could further escalate the war in Ukraine, NATO states declined Ukraine’s requests for them in 2022. At the same time, they supplied such arms to other states involved in conflict, particularly in the Middle East and South Asia,” said Pieter D. Wezeman.
Asia and Oceania received 41 percent of major arms transfers in 2018–22, a slightly smaller share than in 2013–17. Despite the overall decline in transfers to the region, there were marked increases in some states, and marked decreases in others. Six states in the region were among the 10 largest importers globally in 2018–22: India, Australia, China, South Korea, Pakistan and Japan.
Arms imports by East Asian states increased by 21 percent between 2013–17 and 2018–22. Arms imports by China rose by 4.1 percent, with most coming from Russia. However, the biggest increases in East Asia were by US treaty allies South Korea (+61 percent) and Japan (+171 percent). Australia, the largest arms importer in Oceania, increased its imports by 23 percent.
“Growing perceptions of threats from China and North Korea have driven rising demand for arms imports by Japan, South Korea and Australia, notably including for longrange strike weapons,” said Siemon T. Wezeman. “The main supplier for all three is the USA.”
India remains the world’s top arms importer, but its arms imports declined by 11 percent between 2013–17 and 2018–22. This decline was linked to a complex procurement process, efforts to diversify arms suppliers and attempts to replace imports with local designs. Imports by Pakistan, the world’s eighth largest arms importer in 2018–22, increased by 14 percent, with China as its main supplier.
Three of the top 10 importers in 2018–22 were in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt. Saudi Arabia was the world’s second largest arms importer in 2018–22 and received 9.6 percent of all arms imports in the period. Qatar’s arms imports increased by 311 percent between 2013–17 and 2018–22, making it the world’s third biggest arms importer in 2018–22.
The great majority of arms imports to the Middle East came from the USA (54 percent), followed by France (12 percent), Russia (8.6 percent) and Italy (8.4 per cent). They included more than 260 advanced combat aircraft, 516 new tanks and 13 frigates. Arab states in
the Gulf region alone have placed orders for another more than 180 combat aircraft, while 24 have been ordered from Russia by Iran (which received virtually no major arms during 2018–22).
Arms imports to South East Asia decreased by 42 percent between 2013–17 and 2018–22. This decrease was at least partly because states are still absorbing equipment delivered before 2018. The Philippines bucked this trend, with an increase in arms imports of 64 percent.
European NATO states increased their arms imports by 65 percent as they sought to strengthen their arsenals in response to a perceived heightened threat from Russia.
The USA’s arms exports to Türkiye decreased dramatically between 2013–17 and 2018–22 due to bilateral tensions. Türkiye fell from 7th to 27th largest recipient of US arms.
Arms imports by states in subSaharan Africa fell by 23 percent, with Angola, Nigeria and Mali the biggest recipients. Russia overtook China as the largest arms supplier to the subregion.
Arms imports by three states in the Americas rose significantly: the USA (+31 percent), Brazil (+48 percent) and Chile (+56 percent).
Among the top seven arms exporters after the USA, Russia and France, five countries saw falling arms exports—China (–23 percent), Germany (–35 percent), the United Kingdom (–35 percent), Spain (–4.4 percent) and Israel (–15 percent)— while two saw large increases—Italy (+45 percent) and South Korea (+74 percent).
The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database provides consistent information, often estimates, on all international transfers of major arms (including sales, gifts and production under licence) to states, international organizations and non-state groups since 1950. It is accessible on the Arms Transfers Database page of SIPRI’s website.
SIPRI’s data reflects the volume of deliveries of arms, not the financial value of the deals. As the volume of deliveries can fluctuate signi ficantly year-on-year, SIPRI presents data for five-year periods, giving a more stable measure of trends.
This is the second of three major data launches in the lead-up to the release of SIPRI’s flagship publication in mid 2023, the annual SIPRI Yearbook. The third data launch will provide comprehensive information on global, regional and national trends in military spending.
The announcement of Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines is, according to the Australian Government, the single biggest investment in defence capability in the country’s history, representing a ‘transformational moment’.
AUKUS members Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States have agreed to a phased approach to the submarine agreement that aims to provide significant, long-term strategic benefits for all three countries.
According to a media release by the Australian Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, for Australia the three key elements are:
Increased visits of US submarines commencing in 2023 and UK submarines from 2026, and, beginning in 2027, rotations of UK and US submarines to Australia, which will deliver jobs, infrastructure, technology and preparations to be “sovereign ready”.
From the 2030s, delivery of three US Virginia class nuclear-powered submarines to Australia.
Australia and the UK will deliver SSN-AUKUS, a new conventionallyarmed nuclear-powered submarine, based on a UK design, incorporating cutting edge Australian, UK and US technologies. The UK will deliver its own first SSN-AUKUS in the late 2030s, with the first SSN-AUKUS built in Australia delivered in the early 2040s.
According to the statement, it is expected that the phased approach “will result in $6 billion invested in Australia’s industrial capability and
workforce over the next four years, creating around 20,000 direct jobs over the next 30 years.”
“This whole of nation effort also presents a whole of nation opportunity; for new jobs, new industries, and new expertise in science, technology, and cyber,” it continued. “Businesses right across the country in every state and territory will have the opportunity to contribute to and benefit from these opportunities over decades.”
The government predicts that over the next four years, this will result in $2 billion in expected investment into South Australia, and a further $1 billion in Western Australia.
The Australian Government will need to fund the phased approach to amount to around 0.15 per cent of GDP per year, averaged over the life of the program.
According to the government, the plan “elevates Australia’s industrial capacity to produce and sustain advanced SSNs, alongside our AUKUS partners. Importantly, the SSNs will be an Australian sovereign capability, commanded by the Royal Australian Navy and sustained by Australians in Australian shipyards.”
“Australia and our AUKUS partners are committed to setting the highest nuclear non-proliferation standard for Australia’s acquisition of SSNs, in continued close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
“These enhanced defence capabilities will make Australia and our partners better able to deter conflict, and help ensure stability and strategic balance are maintained in the Indo-Pacific.”
Australian Defence Apparel New Zealand (ADA NZ) is offering NZDF recruits a glimpse into the future by equipping them with the latest innovation in digital fitting technology.
ADA NZ, a subsidiary of Australian manufacturer of high-tech uniforms and equipment (ADA), has partnered with Australian 3D-scanning technology company Bodd, to further revolutionise total apparel management systems to the NZDF.
Bodd’s advanced scanning technology captures rich body data in real-time, and provides instant sizing across the entire defence catalogue of products, matched to each service personnel’s measurements.
As the only sizing solution that can deliver sizing from head to toe from one single scan, the technology will drastically reduce resource requirements, and is significantly faster than manual fitting processes within the defence force.
According to Chief Executive Officer of ADA, Chris Dixon, “ADA’s partnership with Bodd is instrumental in delivering on our commitment to combine leading textiles and new technologies to solve apparel distribution challenges.
“This revolutionary digital fitting technology allows for a seamless user experience, as it drastically reduces time required for fitting and kitting of defence personnel. We are excited to be rolling this out first to the NZDF this year,” Mr Dixon said.
As the largest uniform and equipment provider in Australia spanning military, law enforcement, healthcare and numerous government and corporate industries, ADA will also roll out this digital fitting technology and its benefits across industry.
ADA’s commitment to technological innovation was also showcased at the Land Forces Expo in late 2022, where they unveiled their end-to-end uniform management system incorporating digital and contactless fittings powered by Bodd, click-and-collect lockers, and virtual tours of onshore manufacturing facilities.
“This is one of Bodd’s first Military deployments, following successful implementations globally across a range of protective and Government services and we are
incredibly excited to be rolling out with a local defence partner right here in our own backyard,” said Bodd CoFounder and Chief Executive Rob Fisher.
“With our world-class technology, we can size a recruit to an incredible degree of accuracy. From 30 to 45 seconds of scanning, they can be fitted head to toe, from combat clothing to service dress uniforms, including footwear and accessories.”
“It’s almost limitless what you can do,” he said.
By matching the scanned proportions of the recruit against the inventory of every item of clothing that they require to perform their duties, a unique database is developed as part of their NZDF record. In the future NZDF may also look to tap into the additional wealth of health and wellness information that can also be derived from a scan session.
Bodd’s 3D scanners are manufactured in Australia thanks to the company’s partnership with Bosch Australia Manufacturing Solutions.
For more information, visit https://www.ada.com.au/.
AIDN calls for the Defence Strategic Review and Nuclear Submarine Task Force reports to provide clarity around the role of defence industry, and pushes for legislation.
The Australian Industry and Defence Network (AIDN) has welcomed the news that the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) has been handed to the Albanese Government.
“AIDN looks forward to having the opportunity to review the report and will engage in a constructive manner with the Albanese Government, Defence and industry stakeholders, to ensure that a role for the Australian Defence Industry is considered in the DSR recommendations and the associated defence integrated investment program,” stated AIDN in a media release.
AIDN stated that its 1000+ strong membership of Australian SMEs supports any Australian Government initiative that affords the Australian Defence Industry the opportunity to secure high end work in all Defence programs.
“A highly capable Australian Defence Industry supports the Albanese Government’s ambition of a more self-reliant and a sovereign industrial base,” it stated. “AIDN is calling for the Albanese Government and the Department of Defence (DoD) to work closely with the 61,000+ workers employed by the Australian Defence Industry, to ensure that a comprehensive policy and procurement framework are put
in place to achieve this intent.”
In particular, the Network argued that the implementation of a robust and auditable policy and procurement framework is necessary to ensure that the Albanese Government’s Defence capability requirements “are achieved as efficiently as possible, particularly in light of the rapidly evolving geopolitical climate.”
The Australian Defence Industry is dependent, it stated, on a framework where their role in delivering capability requirements is clear, and the procurement process is efficient and accessible to local industry.
“It may well be the case that the Albanese Government considers legislating this requirement to ensure compliance by the DoD and the
Australian Defence Force (ADF),” it stated.
Suggesting that the DSR and the report from the Nuclear Submarine Task Force should address the role of Australia’s defence industry, AIDN noted that these reports will shape strategic outcomes for Australia as well as influencing outcomes for the Australian Defence Industrial base potentially for decades.
“If the intent is simply to acquire capability from foreign owned overseas industries, then our nation will have fallen short of what we need to create with our Industry.”
“AIDN is proud to demonstrate to Australia’s political leaders that there is a backbone of national resilience and sovereign defence capability in this country, and we are prepared to work side by side with the Albanese Government and the Department of Defence to accelerate capability delivery and build more durable supply chains here onshore,” said Brent Clark, Chief Executive Officer of AIDN.
“We are keen to ensure that the DSR recommendations ensure our Industry has the opportunity to demonstrate the integral role we play in our national economy through our sovereign supply chains; modern manufacturing practices; research and innovation; skills development; and regional employment,” Mr Clark said.
Kiwi company Exxovantage is deploying wearable robotic solutions and technology that could save Kiwi businesses from losing money to workplace injuries while futureproofing their workforces.
In the current climate of stark skill shortages, lost time to injuries, and a focus on the mental health of the nation’s workforce, supporting manual labour tasks with robotics and data analytics may reduce the cost of staff turnover and close the skills gap — while boosting staff engagement and productivity.
That’s according to Exxovantage, a New Zealand company combining exoskeletons and exosuits, workplace wearables, AI, data analytics and cutting-edge risk management tools to increase operational efficiencies across a range of critical sectors of the economy.
Arnaud Daurat, Founder and Global CEO of Exxovantage, says that supportive structures worn on the body to relieve strain on the musculoskeletal system are the way of the future.
“Worldwide, the use of exoskeletons for rehabilitation purposes has grown,” he said. “With an increase in the number of people with physical disabilities and our ageing workforce, it’s common sense that ergonomic support is used to prevent repetitive stress injuries.
“Our objective is zero harm, to allow workers to perform their daily tasks without injury or musculoskeletal disorders.”
Daurat says Exxovantage solutions have been proven to reduce injury-causing bends by 75%, sprains and strains by 30%, downtime due to injury by 25%, and absenteeism by 25% while increasing staff attraction and retention by 20% and productivity by 16%. With musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs) accounting for almost a quarter of all sick days in New Zealand, the technology has big potential.
“With biomechanical augmentation, we can enhance what people can do with their natural abilities. Exoskeletons support the upper limbs of the wearer, using their strength and saving energy when in motion.”
Passionate about offering organisations workforce solutions based around predictive injury prevention, Daurat works with them early to undertake audits of internal processes and give workers access to wearable devices that inform them of health and safety issues before they happen.
“Our wearable devices are embedded with built-in sensors that keep track of body movements and provide real-time biometric data to help highlight risks to a person’s health due to impacts such as repeated movements and posture at work.
“These devices alert them to efficiencies and flag if they are too close to a hazard. They will even flag dehydration, reminding people to increase their water consumption while working.”
While the deployment of wearables has started to take off in New Zealand, globally, Daurat notes that their manufacturer has already distributed 150,000 wearables to the world’s largest e-Commerce organisation, with an additional 400 warehouses to receive the technology.
Auckland business, Wrapid Man, specialises in commercial and residential shrink wrapping. Their team has consistently been wearing Exoskeleton HAPO back exoskeletons for the last three months since participating in an onsite audit and fitting by Exxovantage.
Director Christo Botha says that while his team were keen to adopt the technology from the start, they were thrilled to see the positive difference the exoskeletons have made in their job - citing increased endurance and a quicker recovery from the day’s work after wearing the supportive structure.
Botha discovered the products at a scaffolding conference and was intrigued to discover a potential solution for reducing the risk of injuries in his team.
“It’s a manual job; it’s hard on your knees and back. We’re lifting heavy materials and do a huge amount of crouching down. The guys tell me wearing it helps to reduce fatigue and gives them strength to stand up from kneeling.”
An Auckland-based oral and maxillofacial surgeon backs up Botha’s experience. After injuring his back in a sporting accident years ago, the surgeon wanted to learn more about the support gained from wearing an exoskeleton.
“It’s an occupation that requires a great deal of leaning over and working in a strained position,” said the doctor.
After trialling an exoskeleton in his everyday work and during surgeries, he found it a good tool to reduce the wear and tear on his back. Comfortable to wear and taking the strain off his back, he plans to keep using his exoskeleton, believing they have a future in his industry.
The meat processing industry is plagued with high absenteeism and injuries due to the physical nature of the job.
Brittany McCauslin works for an Otago-based meat processing business. She led the procurement of different models of exoskeletons after seeing them presented at a Meat Industry Association research and innovation workshop.
“Trialling a few exoskeletons from the Exxovantage range made sense. We want to give our staff longevity in the industry and help injured people return to work,” she said.
During an initial trial with the exoskeletons, McCauslin learnt that one staff member, an older team member with a physically demanding role, was already wearing a back support brace. After one day of trials, he could retire his back brace and fully adopt an exoskeleton.
Dubbed the next generation of integrated solutions and technologies, exoskeletons and exosuits can increase the wellbeing of their wearers, something Brittany was motivated to achieve for their business.
“One of our team found, after using an exoskeleton for one session of 135 minutes, that same night, they had the best sleep in years,” she said. “Their usual tossing and turning from back pain was absent.”
The Exxovantage business has expanded to Australia, the USA, Africa and Singapore, with bold plans to become the global leader in wearable robotics technology.
Daurat is excited about the business’ innovation pipeline and what it means for humankind.
“We are solving human, technical, and business challenges to increase productivity and staff wellbeing. It’s a privilege to partner with sectors and businesses to protect their most important asset - their people.”
In a rush of hysteria and moral panic, Five Eyes governments are ripping out Chinese branded cameras. Five years ago, they couldn’t install them fast enough. What’s changed, asks chief editor Nicholas Dynon.
The realities of a changing geopolitical landscape have recently hit New Zealand’s security industry with all the force of a ram-raiding Mazda Demio. As great power rivalry between US superpower incumbency and an ascendant China becomes a growing source of international insecurity, Five-Eyes governments are curbing their use of Chinese-branded CCTV cameras citing national security concerns.
Australia’s Department of Defence and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade are ripping out Hikvision and Dahua CCTV cameras over spyware fears after an audit found more than 900 of them at government sites. This follows earlier bans on Chinese-branded cameras by Australia’s AUKUS partners the US and UK.
Last year, the US government banned the import of Hikvision and Dahua cameras through its borders, having already for several years prohibited their purchase by government agencies. Several months ago, the UK government also banned its departments from purchasing new Chinese-made cameras but left open the question of what to do with existing installs.
As for the remainder of the Five Eyes grouping, Canada has
not yet banned cameras of Chinese manufacture despite heavy lobbying from pro-ban interests, including the US-based IPVM, an influential security tech news portal and selfstyled “world’s leading authority on physical security technology”.
Radio NZ reported last month that our own government’s main procurement unit said it had “not taken any decisions regarding specific companies”, leaving individual agencies responsible for vetting products and suppliers on security grounds.
In other parts of the Western world, Chinese branded cameras have been the subject of intense debate. In 2021 the EU Parliament voted to remove its Hikvision thermal cameras due to concerns over human rights abuses in China against the Uyghur ethnic minority, and in 2022 the Danish Capital Region banned Hikvision purchases over security concerns.
Outside of the Five Eyes and the EU, apart from an Indian government ban of Hikvision cameras from military and highsecurity areas, most of the rest of the world have not joined the prohibition push.
This has all been occuring within the context of the broader
deterioration in relations between Xi Jinping’s China and the US. China is now viewed as a strategic competitor of the US and its allies, a rising and increasingly aggressive power, a threat to the rules-based international order, a potential adversary.
As a consequence, US supply chains in ‘strategic’ goods and services are decoupling from China. “Ecosystems involving semiconductors, AI, supercomputing, biotech, and quantum science, among others, will continue to decouple as Washington and Beijing engage in technonationalist competition and hybrid warfare,” wrote academic Alex Capri in a recent Forbes article.
The result, writes Capri, is a “bifurcation of the global tech sector” as both camps look to channel their strategic supply chains towards domestic production and ‘friendshoring’.
As trade in strategic goods becomes balkanised and we edge seemingly closer to a new Cold War, we are confronted with the inevitable shrill of hawkish political and media commentary on both sides. Tabloids talk of “Chinese spy cameras”, “Beijing’s bird’s eye”; the aforementioned IPVM posts that it
is proud to impose upon itself a “not made in PRC China” policy.
The poor quality of media commentary has created no shortage of questions and confusion within the New Zealand CCTV market –for manufacturers to distributors, integrators, and end users alike. Can Chinese cameras be controlled by the Chinese government? Are they really able to “phone home”? Are they more cyber vulnerable than other camera brands? Are they complicit in human rights abuses in China?
Before offering perspectives on these questions, it would be prudent to clarify NZSM’s – and my own –position in terms of our objectivity. NZSM’s revenue is generated through advertising, and it is usually the case that Chinese brands advertise in the magazine. We are grateful for their business, but we are not financially dependent on it, and nor are we editorially beholden to it.
As for my position, I trained as a sinologist at university, and lived in the cities of Shanghai and Beijing for a total of five years, most of which as an Australian diplomat. As an academic, my research on the Chinese state’s systems of internal propaganda and social control has been published in several international peer-reviewed journals,
which in more sober times might be considered a fair indicator of objectivity.
Our claims to objectivity, however, are unlikely to fly with the likes of IPVM’s founder and publisher John Honovich, who, according to a fawning September 2022 feature in The Atlantic, holds trade publications in low regard. We have been “bought”, he believes, “by advertisers who hold sway over reviews and content.”
Hikvision has been infamously linked in recent years to several cyber vulnerabilities. Perhaps the most infamous of all, found by security researcher ‘Monte Crypto’ in 2017, is the ‘backdoor’ exploit that made it possible for a remote attacker to gain full admin access to an affected device.
Almost as infamous is the vulnerability found by ‘Watchfull_ IP’ in 2021 and listed as CVE2021-36260 in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database. It could allow an unauthenticated attacker to gain full access to a device and potentially perform lateral movement into internal networks.
It’s vulnerabilities such as
these – combined with Hikvision’s part ownership by the Chinese government – that have fuelled claims that its cameras can be remotely controlled by authorities in Beijing or, in tabloid parlance, “phone home”.
In the meantime, firmware updates have been released, vulnerabilities resolved, and to date, writes SEN’s John Adams, “no Chinese-made video surveillance camera in Australia (or anywhere else in the world) has been found transmitting video streams to the Chinese Government.”
“It goes without saying that no pro-grade network intrusion detection system could fail to alert network engineers to the transmission of big band video signals from secure network ports to an external network location,” Adams states, rubbishing the pseudoscience behind the ‘phone home’ claim. “It would generate an immediate alert, remedial action and public condemnation.”
Vlado Damjanovski, one of the world’s foremost experts and authorities on CCTV, and author of the Australian Security Industry Association (ASIAL) published From Light to Intelligent Pixels, puts it plainly. Just because a camera happens to be of Chinese manufacture, he says, “it doesn’t automatically mean the Chinese can get into it.”
“The same could be feared for any other network product connected to the internet,” he continues. “MS Windows for example. Despite being US made, it can be interrogated by any spy agency if you don’t have policies in place. Would you ban Windows then?”
Despite tabloid news reports crying “Chinese backdoor”, and well-meaning (albeit hawkish) think tank publications doing the same with bigger words, there remains no evidence that Chinese-made CCTV cameras are technically any
more vulnerable to intrusion by the Chinese state than any other camera.
The irony around some governments banning Hikvision from their premises is that government agencies are most unlikely to be hosting their CCTV cameras on networks that are open to the internet. They just don’t do that. Cameras not connected to the internet are immune – by virtue of their separation from the internet –to internet-borne exploits.
But perhaps the greatest irony of all is that Hikvision’s critical vulnerability track record is actually pretty good. In the aforementioned CVE database, which catalogues publicly disclosed cybersecurity vulnerabilities, many big-name non-Chinese security system manufacturers possess comparatively longer lists of vulnerabilities. Despite this, their cameras, video management systems and access control systems are keeping government sites secure from Wellington to Washington.
Perhaps that would be the greatest irony if it was’t for the fact that the maintenance of the CVE
database is funded by the National Cyber Security Division of the US Department of Homeland Security, and that Hikvision is a CVE Numbering Authority (CNA) – which means that it is one of a limited number of CERTS, bug bounty providers, researchers and vendors authorised by the CVE Program to publish CVE Records.
So, on the one hand, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has banned the sale of Hikvision equipment due to it posing “unacceptable risks to national security”, yet on the other hand, the US Department of Homeland Security considers Hikvision a trusted cyber security partner.
It’s no wonder that the likes of Adams, Damjanovski, and other internationally respected security systems specialists have publicly rubbished the latest Australian government removal of Chinesemade cameras on “spyware fears”. In the rush to decouple from Chinese security tech, it’s become an area of policy in which politics, they fear, has overtaken logic.
Apart from cybersecurity concerns, the most used justification for Western governments ghosting Chinese camera brands is human rights.
According to the MIT Technology Review, Hikvision was found to have received at least $275 million in Chinese government contracts to build surveillance in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region in China’s west, and that it had developed AI cameras capable of detecting Uyghur physical features.
In 2022, the US Treasury reportedly considered adding Hikvision to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List due to its alleged role in enabling human rights violations against the Uyghurs. This unprecedented move would have outlawed the use of Hikvision by anyone anywhere, effectively confining the company to China’s domestic market.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace describes placement on the SDN list as “the harshest financial penalty in Washington’s tool kit, often used
against terrorists, drug lords, and the worst human rights abusers.” It would, states the Washington-based think tank, “grievously (perhaps fatally) wound the company, depending on how sanctions are implemented,” and represent a major escalation in economic tensions between the US and China.
The US government is yet to push the SDN button on Hikvision – or any other Chinese tech company – although Hikvision and many of its compatriots remain on lesser sanctions lists.
In March last year, New Zealand foreign minister Nanaia Mahuta released a statement voicing “grave concerns about the growing number of credible reports of severe human rights abuses against ethnic Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang”. But in May, the New Zealand Parliament retreated from debating a motion that would have labelled human rights violations against the Uyghurs as acts of genocide.
This put Wellington out of step with the US government and UK parliament, which have both branded
Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang as genocide, and the EU parliament, which has referred to Beijing’s actions as a “serious risk of genocide”.
However, in August, the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) announced that it would no longer accept Hikvision equipment. “MBIE takes matters of human rights very seriously,” stated its workplace general manger Adrian Regnault, “and under Rule 44 of the Government Procurement Rules, will exclude any suppliers that may be in violation of these rights.”
By citing the Government Procurement Rules, MBIE has effectively placed procurement teams across government agencies on notice.
It’s a prickly issue. There appears to be consensus among Western governments that Beijing has perpetrated significant human rights violations against its ethnically Uyghur citizens. On the flipside, Beijing points to its long-running struggle against what it calls the ‘three evils’ (terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism) to justify the range of actions it has taken to thwart the influence of Islamist and East Turkestan independence groups.
Interestingly, allegations over human rights abuses in Xinjiang have been levelled at Beijing by human rights and Uyghur lobby groups for several decades, but it’s only in the last few years that Western governments have started listening… and acting on it.
Rewind 20 years to the aftermath of 9/11 and the early days of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and Beijing had by 2002 successfully lobbied Washington – and then the UN – to have the secessionist Uyghur East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) listed as terrorist group. This was supported by claims by the US Embassy in Beijing that there was evidence the barely known ETIM was working
with al Qaeda and planning a terrorist strike against the US Embassy in Kyrgyzstan.
Washington’s and Beijing’s security interests at that historical moment aligned. Henceforth, the crushing of restive elements within its own Uyghur population effectively became China’s keystone contribution to the US-led GWOT.
Fast-forward to November 2020, and the world had changed. Against the backdrop of a deteriorating US-China relationship, the Trump administration removed ETIM from its terrorist organisations list. Within the space of two decades, Washington’s rampant post-9/11 Islamophobia had been replaced by an emergent Sinophobia.
From GWOT partner to strategic competitor, one can’t help but ponder the possibility that the US’ view of China’s treatment of the Uyghurs may be tied – at least in some measure – to Washington’s prevailing strategic view of China.
Along with the shifting geopolitical sands, political and media focus has clearly shifted to Hikvision’s role as a provider of surveillance technology complicit in the mistreatment of China’s Uyghurs. Unsurprisingly, it’s an accusation that Hikvision denies.
Commissioned by Hikvision in 2019 to investigate its Xinjiang human rights compliance, former US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Pierre-Richard Prosper found that Hikvision had not entered into projects in Xinjiang with the intent to knowingly engage in human rights abuses, or that it had knowingly or intentionally committed human rights abuses or acted in wilful disregard. So far, Western governments aren’t placing much weight on the former ambassador’s report.
With the spotlight pointed at Hikvision with such precision, it would appear prudent to ask: are Hikvision and its compatriot CCTV
brands being disproportionately targeted?
Video surveillance – by its very nature – constitutes a range of technologies that are potentially vulnerable to being deployed in ways that may breach individuals’ rights. Are Chinese brands uniquely vulnerable in this regard? What are the potential associations of video surveillance vendors internationally with public surveillance programs known to have enabled human rights abuses?
A quick, non-exhaustive, google search provides some indication that Chinese brands are by no means the only brands alleged to have enabled human rights abuses:
• In 2014, the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre reported that Sony had provided the Israeli government with cameras that were mounted on missiles that were being fired into the Gaza Strip. At that time, at least 1,942 Palestinians, including 470 children, had been killed and nearly 10,000 injured in the offensive.
• In 2016, a report by Londonbased NGO Bahrain Watch found that Pelco was part of a consortium providing the Bahrain Interior Ministry with enhanced surveillance equipment that could be used to target prodemocracy campaigners.
• In 2019, it was reported by The Intercept that an IBM video surveillance project Davao City in the Philippines enabled police to carry out a campaign involving hundreds of extrajudicial killings a decade previously.
• In 2020, Axis Communications has come under criticism from human rights group Amnesty International for the alleged use of its CCTV technologies in large scale police-led surveillance projects in Chinese cities.
• In 2022, following reports of CCTV cameras being used
by Iranian authorities to help identify women not adhering to the country’s mandatory hijab rule, Iran Wire reported that Axis CCTV cameras were being supplied to the Iranian government by a local distributor and “official representative”.
• In January, Reuters reported rights experts as saying that that a Honeywell smart city surveillance system in Egypt’s New Administrative Capital posed a potential threat to basic rights amid a broader crackdown on dissent and free speech.
But reports of the type listed above don’t appear to find audiences too far beyond the memberships of rights groups. Unlike reports targeting the Chinese brands, they’re not tabloid fare, and they certainly don’t make for non-paywalled IPVM exposés.
With this article, I have not attempted to provide a comprehensive analysis of the issue of Chinese security tech and its discontents. Neither have I attempted to provide a view that is necessarily balanced. What I have attempted to do is play devil’s advocate, to call into question the narratives that have so far dominated discourse on this issue.
To this end, it appears to me that politics has indeed overtaken public discourse on Chinese branded video surveillance systems, and I fear that this does a potential disservice to us all.
In pursuing a decoupling from China and promoting the balkanisation of international CCTV supply chains, our governments not only cause the markets we are left with to become less efficient, more vulnerable to disruption, and more expensive, but ultimately, they hitch us to a bandwagon that edges us closer and lemming-like to a new and dangerous Cold War.
Data presented by Atlas VPN reveals that Russian hackers have been targeting Ukraine’s and allied countries’ government and IT organisations with ever-increasing sophistication.
The Russian government is believed to be behind the cyberattacks, as they appear to be well-funded and well-organised. The attacks have been aimed at stealing sensitive information, disrupting systems, and causing chaos in the targeted countries.
According to the recently published Microsoft Threat Intelligence report, the government sector was by far the most targeted sector by Russian state-affiliated hackers between February 2022 and January 2023.
The team at Microsoft discovered 46 organised cyberattacks on various government bodies. Russian threat actors were also interested in IT & communications companies, launching 17 attacks within the last year. The energy sector was also among the industries most targeted, subject to 16 cyberattacks.
A suspected Russian threat actor named IRIDIUM initiated several phishing activities between 12 and 28 January 2023 to access accounts at Ukrainian businesses in the defence and energy sectors.
This aligns with the traditional targets of Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine since the energy sector provides a significant portion of Ukraine’s revenue, and the government and telecommunications industries are key components of national security.
Russian hackers have been using a variety of tactics to infiltrate government and IT organisations. One of the methods used is spearphishing, which involves sending emails with malicious links or attachments that, when clicked, infect the targeted computer with malware.
The attacks have become increasingly complex over time, with hackers using advanced techniques such as zero-day exploits, which are vulnerabilities in software that are not yet known to the software vendor.
Attacks outside of Ukraine Ukrainian government and IT organisations are not the only targets of these attacks. Russia has also targeted companies in other countries, including NATO member states, to play havoc with their operations and gain access to classified information.
Between 07 and 23 February 2023, Microsoft observed Russian nation-state threat activity against organisations based in 74 countries,
excluding Ukraine.
According to the amount of recorded threats, EU and NATO member countries—particularly those on the eastern flank—dominate the list of the top 10 most targeted states.
In the 74 countries they attacked, Russian threat actors were particularly interested in government and IT sector firms, much like in Ukraine. Government and IT & communications sectors suffered from 100 and 51 cyberattacks, respectively.
Hackers corrupt IT businesses to leverage trusted technical ties and gain access to those firms’ clients in government, policy, and other sensitive institutions. They also paid a lot of attention to the activities of various non-profit organizations and tried to disrupt their efforts by launching 31 cyber threats within the past year.
Sophisticated cyberattacks were launched on companies in the education and energy sectors, with 16 threats targeting each.
Dawn Aerospace announced on 06 April the successful completion of the first rocketpowered flight campaign of its spaceplane, the Mk-II Aurora.
The flights occurred at Glentanner Aerodrome located at the north west end of Lake Pukaki on the 29, 30, and 31 March. Previously tested using surrogate jet engines, last week’s campaign was the first for the Mk-II Aurora conducted under rocket power.
The Mk-II Aurora is designed for aircraft-like operations and is capable of flying multiple times a day. Unlike traditional rockets, Dawn vehicles take off and land horizontally on a runway and do not require a dedicated launch pad.
“To have demonstrated rapid reusability in the first tests is proof of our core philosophy, and confirmation that rocket-powered vehicles can be operated just like commercial jet aircraft, said Dawn CEO, Stefan Powell. “This fact allows us to rapidly test now, but in the future, it will completely revolutionise the economics of space access.”
“These flights were a monumental achievement for Dawn Aerospace, and the result of years of hard work from the team. After conducting three tests in three days, we believe Mk-II is the most rapidly reusable rocket-powered aircraft in operation,” he said.
The flights aimed to validate key systems and capabilities, such as the rocket engine, rather than striving
for maximum speed or altitude. Future tests will look to increase speed and altitude in a ‘build-up’ approach.
During commercial operations, the Mk-II Aurora will fly to 100 km altitude and aims to become the first vehicle capable of such flights twice in a day, laying the foundation for a fully and rapidly reusable first-stage booster.
Initial flights reached altitudes and speeds similar to those demonstrated in previous test flights under jet power, approximately 6,000 feet and 170 knots respectively.
Upon the successful completion of the Mk-II Aurora program, Dawn Aerospace plans to develop the Mk-III, a two-stage orbital vehicle capable of carrying over 1 ton on a suborbital flight or delivering a 250 kg satellite to low Earth orbit (LEO) with an expendable second stage.
“The vast majority of our industry’s carbon footprint is created
in the manufacturing of rockets, not the fuel efficiency,” said Powell. “Our orbital vehicle, Mk-III, is designed to be 96% reusable. This is key to delivering on our vision of a sustainable and future-proof space industry.”
Already the fastest-growing supplier of green in-space propulsion, Dawn boasts over 15 customers in Europe, Asia, and the USA, and hardware on 11 operational satellites.
Dawn’s mission, states Powell, “is to provide scalable and sustainable space transportation - both from Earth to space and from space to everywhere else.”
According to Powell, it’s important to consider both aspects of this mission in order to address the entire transportation challenge – “from launching off Earth’s surface through to controlled deorbit at the end of a satellite’s life.”
“To address the “from space to everywhere else” part of our
mission, we already have a wellestablished business supplying inspace propulsion to satellite builders all over the world,” he wrote in a statement.
“We were the first to demonstrate nitrous bi-propellant propulsion in space, and now are the leading suppliers worldwide of green propulsion with over 50 thrusters in orbit and hundreds more on order. We feel we are well on the way to achieving this part of our mission, and the path forward is clear.”
Providing a rationale for selecting winged vehicles as the basis for the Dawn platform, Powell commented that winged vehicles can land without functioning engines, which gives them a massive reliability advantage. “This makes many kinds of anomalies survivable – even significant ones - dramatically increasing the robustness of the system, even if the mission must be aborted.”
“This is a lesson learned through the ages of aviation and comes out in the raw statistics of rocket vs. aircraft reliability where a chasm of roughly a factor of 10,000 difference exists between rocket and aircraft reliability,” he stated. “We wanted to lean in on these facts to bring aircraft reliability to spaceflight.”
According to Powell, the Mk-II is just the start. The next big step will be getting to the performance limits of this first airframe.
“This airframe was built to be extremely hard-wearing and reconfigurable from jets to rocket power. It has undergone many small repairs and unplanned modifications, which all add weight. Naturally, it is not as high-performance as an optimized vehicle could be.
He anticipates that this first version, which is being referred to as the “Mk-IIA,” will reach a maximum altitude of 60kft (20 km) as it has limited propellant capacity.
“The Mk-IIB will be a highly optimised version, using the same aerodynamic shape and basic architecture but pushing every parameter to achieve maximum performance,” he continued. “Upgrades will include wing box tanks to increase propellant storage, a higher thrust engine, a lighter structure, and an RCS system.”
He envisages that the Mk-IIB will be capable of flying supersonic, outside of the atmosphere and, ultimately, to an altitude of over 100km.
“Once the Mk-II mission - to be the first vehicle to fly to space twice in one day - is complete, we will have the skill, team, and confidence to invest in the next step: the full-scale Mk-III vehicle, capable of deploying an expendable second stage which delivers a 250 kg satellite to orbit. We will also be in a prime position to commercialise the Mk-II capability, something we are already fielding much interest in.”
Informed by interviews with intellectual property experts, Dr Nicholas Borroz writes that space firms’ IP strategies should be tailored to business objectives, and that space poses unique uncertainties for IP strategies.
There are two common types of IP – patents and trade secrets –which each have advantages and disadvantages. Patents give filers rights to exclude other parties from making, using, or selling technologies without permission for a set time period. They are furthermore easily quantifiable and thus help attract financing.
A major drawback of patents is they entail making details about technologies public, which enables other parties to recreate technologies (illegally before rights expire, and legally afterwards). Patents also cost time and money to file.
Trade secrets, on the other hand, are confidentially held information. Their major benefit is they do not entail making details public, which is particularly useful if a technology will still be valuable after a patent would expire. A drawback of trade secrets, though, is it can be difficult to control information flows, and there is moreover little protection if competitors recreate technologies. There’s an art to patent-writing in terms of deciding how much information to reveal. One can selectively withhold information from filings to prevent the recreation of technologies. This approach
partially depends on understanding the capabilities of the individuals in patent offices and relying on one’s own superior technical knowledge.
A shortcoming of patents is that, even if they disclose a significant amount of information, that information alone may not be enough to replicate a technology. A patent is like a recipe; to be useful there must also be a skilled cook. This is why acquirers will often not only buy firms and their patents, but also employ firms’ staff.
Trade secrets are protected in most countries, though the extent of protection varies. Different conditions must be met in order to secure protection. Such conditions are often why firms require NDAs –to enable protection of trade secrets.
But trade secrets do not necessarily preclude competitors from recreating technologies; they only penalise theft. If there is no clear line of causality showing a competitor’s technology resulted from theft, then competitors will not face penalties for creating the technology.
Patents and trade secrets are assets with value, and awareness of this value enables advancement of business goals. If asymmetry exists in terms of awareness of IP’s value, the better-informed party has an advantage.
Assume a space startup is seeking financing for non-recurring engineering (NRE) costs, for instance. A savvy financier may understand better than the space startup how NRE leads to the creation of valuable IP, and offer financing that is cheap up-front, but include stipulations that the space startup must transfer or license resulting IP to the financier.
If the startup is relatively unsavvy, it may perceive the cheap financing as a good deal, being unaware that
it is undermining its ability to make significant profits with later IP.
There are many scenarios in which information asymmetries about IP’s value can help advance business goals, particularly in terms of accounting. If the goal is to achieve a certain outcome on a balance sheet that helps with taxes or shareholder relations, for instance, when is it best to purchase IP?
The answer to this question partially depends on awareness of IP’s value and how much longer that IP will likely continue to be useful. Better awareness helps refine preferences in terms of when IP should be purchased.
There are costs to using IP illegally, but such costs do not mean counterparties will not infringe patents or steal trade secrets. Net benefits of infringement or theft are more important than costs.
If infringing patents, for instance, yields a net benefit, then infringing may well be worth the cost. Particularly if a counterparty deems IP holders as unable to defend themselves, it may assess that costs will not be particularly onerous.
If a large firm is aware of a small firm with valuable patents that is close to bankruptcy, for instance, then the large firm may simply infringe those patents and offer to pay the smaller firm so it avoids bankruptcy.
Patent filings should focus on relevant markets. Filing patents requires time and money, so space firms should focus on filing patents in markets that are relevant to their business. This may mean focusing on markets where: they have operations; competitors have a presence; there are significant numbers of customers importing the relevant technologies; or there is capacity to produce similar technologies.
In the space industry, some markets play outstanding roles in terms of importance, so space firms should consider those markets when filing patents.
Space industry supply chains are often divided along geopolitical fault lines. Chinese firms, for instance, face significantly more difficulty supplying the US space industry than do American firms.
This means apparent “competitors” on other sides of fault lines may actually be selling into entirely separate supply chains, so filing patents in jurisdictions on other sides of geopolitical fault lines may be less useful than it might first appear.
IP strategy should also entail efforts to avoid allegations of infringement. Just as a space firm should consider taking measures to protect its intellectual property, its competitors should also consider taking similar measures.
For a space firm, this means that besides deciding on its own particular combination of patents and trade secrets to protect IP, it should be aware of competitors’ IP strategies. Being aware of what other patents exist and where they exist can impact strategy (e.g. deciding which technologies to pursue in which markets).
Awareness helps avoid infringement allegations and litigation, which can be costly and reputationally damaging.
The concept of jurisdiction is problematised off Earth, which arguably undermines patents’ usefulness. To what extent do patent laws extend into space?
Parties to the International Space Station have an agreement in place that defines different modules as falling under the jurisdictions of different governments, but what will jurisdictional situations be like on future space stations?
What about outside space stations? What about within satellites? Or within satellites from one country, which are in turn located aboard launch vehicles from yet another country? How do patent laws interact with international treaties which limit governments’ ability to make sovereignty claims
in space? Answers to all of these questions are debatable.
Jurisdiction is clearer (though still confusing) in other areas of the space industry. With space insurance, for instance, space objects are usually linked to governments that are responsible for damages the objects may cause.
With spectrum use, on the other hand, governments file and authorise use for different systems that are orbiting Earth. In the realm of IP, similar conventions or rules may coalesce that assign objects to certain governments and apply those governments’ IP law and jurisdiction to those objects.
Patents can cover either products or processes. Processes are particularly problematic in terms of jurisdiction in space. Whereas products tend to be made on Earth in clearly defined jurisdictional contexts, processes often happen entirely in space, starting and ending off Earth.
Even if one can argue that a process is subject to a jurisdiction, it is still difficult to monitor what happens in space and to know if infringements are occurring.
Even if patents are arguably invalid in certain space contexts, filing them can still be to a firm’s advantage because patents force competitors to spend resources. Though one might question if a patent is valid, and thus whether it would enable infringement claims, it may still be worth filing patents.
The reason is that if a firm has a slew of patents, this gives competitors pause; competitors will want to be certain that they are not infringing valid patents. To have such certainty, they will need to spend time and money to assess patents’ validity. And if consultants are working with IP consultants who seek to stoke customers’ uncertainty, then this means that competitors
are unlikely to quickly and certainly know whether patents are valid.
The remoteness of space also has benefits for trade secrets compared to Earth. Whereas patents may be less useful in space than they are on Earth, the converse point is arguably true for trade secrets.
It is arguably more difficult for leakage of trade secrets to occur off Earth than on Earth. If a firm can control the flow of information on Earth, then information about what happens in space is difficult to access.
Processes occurring aboard satellites, for instance, are difficult for competitors to observe. This is especially true if comms systems are designed to be secure – if uplink/ downlink entails optical comms or quantum key distribution, for instance.
Many countries have exemptions for patent law pertaining to vehicles temporarily passing through their territories; this may apply to satellites being transported to launch sites. Such exemptions originate in governments’ desire to not impede international trade.
To understand why, consider the following scenario: without such exemptions, if ships were to temporarily enter a country using engines that are patented in that country, the ships might be accused of patent infringement. Uncertainty about whether they are infringing patents might cause ships to avoid the country.
On a macro level, such uncertainty about infringements in other countries would have a cooling effect on international trade. This is why vehicles temporarily passing through countries are generally exempt from patent law. Satellites are sometimes considered similarly, but there is less international consensus on their status than for terrestrial vehicles.
NZSkydive Ltd announced on 29 March that is has delivered the first of two 750XL aircraft to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF).
The PNGDF and Australian Defence Force announced at the Avalon Airshow in March that they are continuing to partner on joint training and capacity building activities, aviation safety, maintenance, and sustainment through their joint Flights of Excellence program. This includes the gifting two 750XL aircraft to the PNGDF.
“Having the ADF & PNGDF as our first customers has been a huge inspiration for everyone at our company” said Stephen Burrows, CEO of NZSkydive Ltd (NZS).
“CAA NZ certification to manufacture at the Hamilton Airport factory was received a little over one year ago,” Burrows said. “Everyone at NZS has huge commitment in the work they do manufacturing this world-renowned utility, 8-seater turbo prop, single engine airplane and to see the first one roll out of the hangar and fly to its new mission fills everyone with pride.”
Throughout the operational life of the aircraft in PNG it will carry personnel, freight, perform supply and personnel drops in responding to domestic and regional incidents in some of the most remote and difficult terrain areas in the Southern Hemisphere.
The 750XL has impressive short take-off and landing (STOL) ability, able to take-off fully loaded in 721 feet and landing in only 543 feet. It is
this capability that makes the 750XL ideal for the many rough strips and landing sites that it will operate to throughout Papua New Guinea.
Alongside the aircraft’s STOL capabilities the 750XL also has an outstanding ability to uplift more than the aircraft’s own weight, an accomplished, adaptable, efficient, and reliable airplane – a true workhorse.
There are seventeen 750XL aircraft operating in PNG performing transport, supplies, skydiving and surveying activities. The first aircraft will be flown to PNG in April 2023 and the second will be delivered by September 2023.
NZSkydive Ltd. is a CAANZ certified Manufacturing, Design and Supply Organisation. Established
in April 2021 this privately owned company purchased the business assets of Pacific Aerospace Limited through a liquidation process.
In 2022, NZSkydive celebrated the production of the 700th Pacific Aerospace aircraft. Our aircraft now operate in 55 countries and on 6 continents including Turkey, Syria, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Uruguay, Singapore, Switzerland, England, United States of America, Nepal and New Zealand.
The business employs fifty personnel at the factory located at the southern end of Hamilton Airport, a site that has produced aircraft for approximately seventy years.
A recent evaluation by the Evidence Based Policing Centre of New Zealand Police’s Tactical Response Model fails to identify evidence that TRM will make communities safer, writes Nicholas Dynon.
In a 29 March media release, newly warranted police minister Ginny Andersen announced the launch of the Tactical Response Model, stating that “the Government is backing Police and making communities safer with the roll-out of state-of-the-art tools and training to frontline staff.”
“The Tactical Response Model being launched today will make it safer for Police on the job by applying smart Policing to anticipate dangerous and high-risk situations before they arise,” she said.
“The model uses Police intelligence to risk-assess situations early, builds decision-making and critical thinking skills while under pressure and backs that with Offender Prevention Teams and twoperson Tactical Dog Teams coming on board in each district.”
The TRM, states the minister aims to provide front-line Police a “higher level of protection without changing New Zealand’s community policing approach – which we strongly believe is effective and appropriate for our country.”
By mentioning the community policing approach and ‘appropriateness’ of TRM, it’s likely the minister was making implied reference to the Armed Response Team (ART) pilot that ran from
October 2019 until it was halted by incoming Police Commissioner Andrew Coster in April 2020. The highly armed – and armoured –ARTs were seen as not in keeping with the aesthetics of New Zealand’s Peelian philosophy of policing by consent.
Of the ill-fated ART trial, New Zealand Police Association President Chris Cahill said at the time that the “initiative was hobbled from the start because of a lack of consultation on the concept of ARTs, and no clear communication on the aim of the trials.”
“If you don’t build solid foundations on issues as potentially volatile as armed police, you can’t
possibly hope to take the community with you, and that is exactly what has happened in this case,” wrote Mr Cahill.
In his remarks, the NZPA president pointed to mis-steps, including ART vehicles “that looked pretty sinister in comparison to the police vehicles we are familiar with, despite the fact that those everyday police patrol cars have Glock pistols and Bushmaster rifles in them for officers to use when needed.”
Police interest in the ART model found renewed legitimacy after Constable Matthew Hunt was shot dead and his partner Constable David Goldfinch was shot and seriously injured following a vehicle
stop in the Auckland suburb of Massey on 19 June 2020.
This, according to the November 2022 Tactical Response Model: Evaluation Report by the Evidence Based Policing Centre (a joint partnership between NZ Police, the University of Waikato, the Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR), and Vodafone New Zealand) resulted in feedback from hundreds of frontline police officers suggesting “that ART needed to be reinstated”.
This time, however, it appears that NZ Police has taken a more careful approach incorporating community consultation, including with Māori, Pacific and ethnic community leaders, and an evaluation of a four police district (Northland, Counties Manukau, Waikato, and Central) trial of the TRM conducted by the Evidence Based Policing Centre with support from the University of Waikato and Victoria University Wellington.
Among other things, in response to the lessons learned from the ART trial, the TRM envisages specialist
tactical teams wearing blue uniforms and driving standard Police vehicles, and that these teams neither selfdeploy nor are routinely armed in the course of their normal duties.
According to the Evidence Based Policing Centre’s November 2022 Tactical Response Model: Evaluation Report, the Tactical Response Model (TRM) intends to achieve the following three outcomes:
1. Frontline staff [police officers] feel safer and more confident in their day-to-day duties;
2. Frontline staff are safer in their day-to-day duties; and
3. Communities are safer.
These outcomes, states the report, would be achieved through three ‘pillars’ of the model:
1. four days of additional tactical safety training
2. the creation of tactical dog teams (TDTs) and tactical prevention teams (TPTs), and
3. new risk-based deployment processes (Tactical Intelligence,
Tasking and Coordination, 24/7 DCC, coverage and double crewing after 9pm).
The Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) was tasked with providing an independent evaluation of the TRM trial, which ran from 01 January to 30 June 2022. The evaluation focused on quantifying the actual and perceived impact of the TRM on frontline safety and assessing the implementation of the TRM within the districts in which it was being trialed.
Included within the evaluation was an assessment of the trial against the above-listed three intended outcomes of TRM: (i) frontline staff feel safer and more confident in their day-to-day duties; (ii) frontline staff are safer in their day-to-day duties; and (iii) communities are safer.
According to Minister Andersen, the trial delivered “impressive results” and elicited “strong support from frontline staff.” So, how exactly did the trial perform against each of its three intended outcomes?
In terms of the outcome “frontline staff feel safer and more confident in their day-to-day duties”, the report found that increased feelings of safety were most clearly seen in qualitative data, “but that increases were not seen so strongly in quantitative data.”
Based on baseline survey responses of 2,158 frontline staff and follow-up survey responses of 2,035 frontline staff, positive effects were seen for some safety and confidence measures, however, most survey responses showed no observable effect of the TRM in the four police districts taking part in the trial.
Despite the lack of objective supporting evidence, however, the report stated that “there are indications the TRM will move staff to a greater sense of safety when the model is more widely embedded and its intent better understood.”
In terms of the outcome “frontline staff are safer in their day-to-day duties”, the report found green shoots of potential success, but no conclusive evidence of it.
Among the positive signs, it noted that there was not a single use of a firearm at police offence in any participating district during the TRM trial. It also found that TRM “through TPTs and risk deployment pathways, has likely reduced the rare but serious events of firearms use at police.”
“Despite there being some very positive impacts and outcomes attributable to the individual pillars, it is too early to interpret most system level outcome results regarding the safety of frontline,” stated the report.
In terms of the outcome
“communities are safer”, the report found “insufficient evidence to draw firm conclusions about the TRM’s effects on community safety and
feelings of safety.”
In particular, it found:
In terms of community safety outcomes, firearms victimisation results were mixed, depending on victimisation type. Gang tensions and violence escalated during the PoC period, resulting in a spike in firearms victimisations in Counties Manukau. Because the TRM is not aimed specifically at reducing gang conflict, a short-term spike in these does not imply the TRM is not working. Consistent with a lack of impacts with regard to methamphetamine seizure, there was no apparent effect of the TRM on methamphetamine consumption, based on wastewater results. However, this result is to be expected given the short time frame of the evaluation period. Effects of the TRM on these measures are likely to take considerable time to come to be seen in the data.
On the positive side, the report noted a lack of evidence of any unintended consequences, and several indicators of “potential emerging benefits to the community”, which included fewer complaints about use of force by Police; fewer AOS deployments (which may have a positive impact on community feelings of safety); and reductions in some firearms victimisations compared to what would be expected had the TRM not been implemented.
In the long run, states the report, “the TRM should more tangibly affect community safety and feelings of safety for the better as high-risk offenders, drugs and weapons are increasingly removed from the environment.” That’s a big call. Appropriately, the report states that ongoing monitoring of both TRM activity and community sentiment is required to see if this expectation proves correct.
Despite a six-month trial period (01 January to 30 June 2022) and a 129page evaluation report, the clearest
conclusion of the TRM trial is that “it’s too early to tell.” Nevertheless, states the report, its “findings suggest that full implementation of the TRM—with all components working together—would lead to more complete safety outcomes than so far detected.”
And that’s the basis – it appears –upon which the four-district trial of TRM has been considered a success and has led to an official launch of the model across all police districts.
In terms of its objectives relating to improving the safety of frontline police officers, there are some indicators that the model’s mix of new training, processes, equipment and organisational design may deliver better safety outcomes for officers, but the metrics on this remain sketchy.
In terms of its objective of improving community safety, however, there is no clear indication that the model will have any real effect. From the structure of the Evidence Based Policing Centre’s evaluation report to the supporting narratives from the police minister’s office, this third TRM objective comes across as something of a ‘bolt on’, or perhaps a hoped for consequence that might cascade from success in the preceding officer safety objectives.
It is hard not to reflect on the irony of the Evidence Based Policing Centre finding “insufficient evidence to draw firm conclusions about the TRM’s effects on community safety and feelings of safety” [my italics].
This re-imagining of the ART concept is – by design – an exercise in making frontline police officers feel safer in their roles. That’s a good thing. But a model designed to improve community safety it is not. Only time will tell whether a model that delivers on the imperative of police officer safety will ultimately have a positive or negative effect on the safety of the communities they are deployed in the service of.
Released on 06 April, the latest Youth Justice Indicators Summary report shows offending rates for children and young people has decreased by 63% and 64% respectively since 2011/2012.
According to the report, the number of children who offended each year over the past decade has decreased from 4292 to 1791.
The number of young people who offended decreased each year from 11,557 to 5,765 over the same time period, despite the inclusion of 17-year-olds in the Youth Court since July 2019.
“These statistics are evidence the youth justice system is continuing to work as intended for most children and young people,” Justice Minister Kiri Allan said.
“It’s pleasing that the concerted effort over the past 10 years has seen a significant reduction in youth offending, which is a testament to the joint work of successive governments, government agencies and the community.”
The report also showed a small increase in police proceedings against children in 2021/22 compared to 2020/21.
“The increase was not driven by more children offending but because those that have offended did so more often,” said the minister. “This reveals what we already know, there is a small number of high risk children with complex needs who we need to continue to work with to reduce their offending.”
The data, captured by the Ministry of Justice, Police and Oranga Tamariki, was collated up until June 2022.
“Since then, we have seen a spike in some youth offending, which will be captured in next year’s data,” she said. “To respond to this, the Government introduced a number of measures, which are showing very promising results in reducing reoffending.
“Research consistently shows us that youth offenders have complex needs and factors which increase the risk of offending behaviour are cumulative. Many of these factors were compounded during the pandemic, particularly in Auckland.
“The Government is determined to continue to address these needs, which evidence shows is the best way to address youth offending and make our communities safer,” Kiri Allan said.
The report is the fifth edition of the Youth Justice Indicators, which provides insight into the performance of the youth justice system from July 2011 to June 2022 (2011/12 to 2021/22). The report’s purpose is to help those involved in youth justice understand system wide trends and issues.
The indicators collated measure volumes and patterns for children and young people across key stages in the youth justice system, which allows readers to understand when children and young people that offend enter the system, how they interact with the system, and if they reoffend.
The indicators include children (tamariki) aged 10 to 13 at the offence date, and young people (rangatahi) aged 14 to 16 (14 to 17 from 1 July 2019) at the offence date.
Massey University’s Distinguished Professor Paul Spoonley and VUW’s Emeritus Professor Paul Morris explore the underpinnings of contemporary far right ideology in New Zealand.
The massacres of March 15 2019 at two Christchurch mosques confirmed the far right remains a constant threat to public order and safety in New Zealand, and that this threat was largely overlooked by security and intelligence agencies.
Both elements were corroborated by the findings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the attacks that was released in November 2020. The country was not exempt from such activist, murderous politics, despite widespread complacency.
While the perpetrator exhibited many of the longstanding ideological beliefs and violent tactics of white supremacists, his “manifesto” reflected the influence and rise of the alt-right, with a focus on the “great replacement”, the participation in online subcultures and new versions of conspiracies (as well as old ones).
We trace the development of the alt-right as a series of disparate coalitions of far-right and (white) ethnonationalist groups, activists and ideologies – secular and religious – and their use of online platforms to proselytise, recruit and radicalise. We are particularly interested in the rise of identitarian movements and ideologies, and their transnational influence and reach.
How has ethnonationalism been (re-)radicalised? How have new motifs and symbols been used to attract and explain, especially in identifying groups – the “deep state”, mass media, groups such as Muslims or Jews – as an existential threat facing the “white race” or “European civilisation”?
What role does religion play in these new coalitions and their selection of religious enemies and targets? How significant is the neglect of religion in the failure to recognise religious motivations and ideologies by security and intelligence agencies in secular polities? And how have online platforms and possibilities been utilised in the cause of these new politics?
The alt-right is a product of the ideological mixing of traditional far-right politics and conservative populist movements. As David Neiwert writes in Alt-America: The Rise of the Radical Right in the Age of Trump, key elements began to appear with the Tea Party after 2010 in the US: nativist anti-immigrant views, specifically in relation to “ ‘parasitic’ minorities and immigrants”, a “hostility towards ‘liberal’ elites” and the “supposed ‘tyranny’ of the president”. Neiwert writes:
These populist movements have created an “[a]lternative universe [and] a set of alternative explanations [which are] amplified by a panoply of conspiracy theories [including] a New World order [which is] plotting to enslave all of mankind in a world government that permits no freedom […] In this alternative universe, facts and the laws of political gravity do not apply.
The term “alt-right” was first coined in 2009 by Richard Spencer, an American white nationalist disillusioned with contemporary conservatism and who became director of the National Policy Institute, a lobby group for racebased policies where “race is the foundation of identity” – a farright response to, and version of, contemporary identity politics. A year later, Spencer established his own webzine, The Alternative Right.
By the 2016 US presidential election, the views and activities of the alt-right had become well established and provided a contrast to more traditional far-right politics – in two particular ways.
First, the alt-right were firmly internet-based. Secondly, many followed the Spencer tradition of the “suit-and-tie image” of white nationalism, the preppy look of middle America. The term gained
traction when Hillary Clinton, as a presidential candidate, used it in a speech in August 2015 to critique white supremacy and her opponent, Donald Trump.
‘Networked white rage’ Explanations for the rise of the alt-right vary. Some, such as the author Jessie Daniels, see it as a “manifestation of the angry white male who has status anxiety about his declining social and economic power”.
There is certainly some evidence of a high degree of disillusionment and feelings of marginalisation in white communities in the US that then translates into support for an angry and exclusive nationalism through the second decade of the 21st century. Arlie Hochschild chronicles this in her compelling book, Strangers in Their Own Land.
The second explanation is that it is a product of the echo chambers of the internet – or “an informal and ill-defined collection of internetbased radicals”. Jessie Daniels goes on to argue:
The rise of the alt-right is both a continuation of a centuries-old dimension of racism in the US and part of an emerging media ecosystem powered by algorithms […] The ideology of the contemporary altright is entirely consistent with
earlier manifestations of extremist white supremacy with only slight modifications in style and emphasis […] This iteration is newly enabled by algorithms [which] deliver search results for those who seek confirmation for racist notions and [which] connect newcomers to like-minded racists […] providing networked white rage.
The ideological positions of the alt-right are just as likely to be embedded in video games or music videos.
The red-pilled alt-right A third component is the demographic profile of the alt-right. Many are young white males, some of whom are university graduates or students. Milo Yiannopoulos, a key US alt-right activist and commentator who, with Allum Bokhari, wrote “An establishment conservative’s guide to the alt-right”, described the movement as “born out of the youthful, subversive underground edges of the internet”.
In many ways, this is no different from earlier neo-fascist and neoNazi movements, such as skinheads, but the image and membership have changed: more intellectual (or claiming to be), more skilful messaging (by Canadian YouTube activists Stefan Molyneux and Lauren Southern, for example) and a more carefully managed appeal to conservatives, nationalists and populists.
The alt-right had been growing and evolving for some time, but the US presidential campaign in 2016 and the subsequent election of Donald Trump confirmed the presence and influence of the alt-right as a “mass movement” that hinged on the radicalising potential of the internet, especially of “disenfranchised and mostly anonymous, young white men”. As David Neiwert noted:
Alt-righters see [getting redpilled] as a metaphor for what they consider to be the revelatory power
of their ideology, which cuts through the lies of “social justice warriors” (SJWs), “cultural Marxists” and the mainstream media.
A new phase, and a variation on far-right political traditions and activism, had emerged by 2015–16. One element of this, which appeared alongside the alt-right, was identitarianism, which places the threat to the “white race” or “European civilisation” at the core of alt-right activism.
This term has been largely defined by Generation Identity, a Europeanbased movement that arose from Bloc Identitaire, which was founded in 2002 in Nice. A youth wing was established a decade later, and was most apparent in Austria, Germany and Italy.
Generation Identity, one of whose leaders is Martin Sellner, an Austrian and former neo-Nazi, is a European analogue of the largely American alt-right. A core ideological concern is the “great replacement” and, specifically, as Julie Ebner wrote in Going Dark: The Secret Social Lives of Extremists , the belief that a mix of “pro-abortion and pro-LGBTQI+ laws had lowered birthrates of native Europeans, and pro-migration policies […] have allowed minorities to engage in a ‘strategic mass breeding’ .”
American identitarians formed Identity Evropa, which was renamed the American Identity Movement in the US in 2019. It has close links to Generation Identity in Europe and with the alt-right in the US.
European identitarians have adopted some of the strategies of the alt-right, especially the Breitbart belief (a reference to Andrew Breitbart, an influencer of the alt-right and founder of the website that bears his name) that changing cultural narratives precedes political change.
In particular, there is the Breitbart argument that activists
“need to create counter-cultures that attract young people [in order] to increase public pressure on mainstream politics”.
This is sometimes referred to as “strategic polarisation” or forcing bystanders to take a position either of support or against altright or identitarian ideological positions. The intent is to radicalise individuals or communities and to implement their own local or national campaigns.
Here is an example of seeking to alter the “Overton window” (changing the spectrum of politically acceptable views) and to move the political spectrum to the right so that alt-right and identitarian ideas become normalised.
Julie Ebner infiltrated Generation Identity groups in the United Kingdom and provided an excellent account (in her book Going Dark) of how such identitarian politics operate – and how such politics were a major influence on the March 15 terrorist.
Identitarianism is a movement that primarily advocates for a contemporary ethno-nationalism, is typically exclusive (hence, “re-migrating” non-natives and immigrants) and that portrays Islam as the key threat (therefore “deIslamisation”).
This position was espoused by Renaud Camus in his book, Le Grand Remplacement (2011), which introduced the idea of “white genocide” and “reverse racism”, and has had a major influence on the ideological preoccupations of the altright. As Eibner writes:
The Great Replacement theory combines all four features of a violence inciting ideology [or] so-called “crises narratives”: conspiracy, dystopia, impurity and existential threat. The idea is that Europeans [sometimes labelled the “white race”] are being replaced with racially and culturally
distinct migrants (impurity) by a cabal of global elites and complicit actors in governments, tech firms and media outlets (conspiracy), leading to the gradual decay of society (dystopia) and the eventual extinction of whites (existential threat).
This theory, along with its four components, is found in a range of contemporary alt-right groups such as Action Zealandia. It was also a preoccupation of the March 15 terrorist whose manifesto, “The Great Replacement”, draws heavily on Renaud Camus’ You Will Not Replace Us! (2018), as well as the earlier work that also provided the rallying call to the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017.
The terrorist also valorised Anders Behring Breivik and referenced the Norwegian’s manifesto alongside the justificatory confessions and statements of other terrorists, in particular highlighting the tradition of Christian crusader knights doing God’s work defending Christendom and Christianity against their enemies, mainly Muslims and Jews.
These precursors provided the symbols, memes, framework, inspiration and preemptive-strike strategy for the March 15 attacks.
This is an edited extract from Histories of Hate: The Radical Right in Aotearoa New Zealand, edited by Matthew Cunningham, Marinus La Rooij and Paul Spoonley (Otago University Press). Article originally published in The Conversation, 10 March 2023.
MASSEY’S POSTGRADUATE CERTIFICATE IN INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED AS AN ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE PRACTITIONERS COURSE WHICH CRITICALLY EXPLORES STRUCTURED ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES AND THE INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THEY APPLY.
The qualification develops and advances critical research, critical thinking and writing, analytical best practice as well as exploring relevant twentieth and twenty-first century intelligence operations. It is aimed at those wishing to develop advanced critical skills in relation to their existing or prospective intelligence sector careers in New Zealand.
Graduates of this year long programme will possess an advanced knowledge of intelligence analysis processes, be grounded in relevant previous operational intelligence experiences and have a critical understanding of the ethical and professional issues involved
The programme of study consists of two 30-credit courses:
Qualification Requirements
A critical examination of intelligence theory and practice, focusing on key concepts and methodologies of intelligence collection and analysis, analytical tools, frameworks and concepts applied to investigations and operations in the contemporary international security environment.
Course Controller: Dr Rhys Ball, Centre for Defence and Security Studies (Auckland)
A comprehensive grounding in the operational intelligence environment in the second half of the 20th century, into the 21st century. Participants will consider the development of intelligence practices both in New Zealand and around the world, and the evolution of intelligence contributions from the end of World War Two, to the intelligence challenges of the 2020s. Intelligence operations are critically reviewed, including intelligence success and intelligence failure, espionage against friends and allies, policing and private intelligence formats.
Course Controller: Dr John Battersby, Teaching Fellow, Centre for Defence and Security Studies (Wellington)
To enroll in this qualification, students must have been awarded or qualified for a relevant Bachelor's degree, or be able to demonstrate scholarly work in conjunction with extensive relevant professional experience for Admission with Equivalent Status. For further information, please contact CDSS@massey.ac.nz
New report on attacks on public and semi-public places is tragically timely as the US rings in a new year marred by mass shooting after mass shooting, writes chief editor Nicholas Dynon.
The 70-page report Mass Attacks in Public Spaces: 2016 – 2020 published in January by the United States Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) analyses 173 targeted attacks in public or semi-public locations in the US, including businesses, schools, houses of worship, open spaces, and other locations.
With attacks in public places in the US already having made international headlines in the first month of the year, the January release date was as timely as ever.
In a shooting in California’s Monterey Park on Saturday 20 January, a 72-year-old man is accused of killing 11 people while they were celebrating the lunar new year at a dance hall. It’s the deadliest of the dozens of mass shootings that have occurred in the US since January 1st.
According to the US-based Gun Violence Archive (GVA), the US witnessed a staggering 39 mass shootings in the first three weeks of 2023 alone. These resulted in 73 deaths and 165 injured. The GVA’s records indicate that over the five years of 2016-2020 the annual
number of mass shootings in the US increased from 382 in 2016 to 611 in 2020.
“The report is the latest entry in a series of reports that examine attacks during which three or more individuals were injured or killed,” wrote Kimberly A. Cheatle, Director of the US Secret Service in her foreword. “By applying NTAC’s unique behavioural analysis to incidents of targeted violence occurring over a five-year period, Mass Attacks in Public Spaces: 2016 - 2020 . represents NTAC’s most comprehensive examination to date of mass violence and its perpetrators.”
Perhaps somewhat ambitiously, the report claims that its examination of the attacks indicates that “targeted violence is preventable when communities are equipped with the appropriate tools, training, and resources to intervene before violence occurs.” In doing so it points to the importance of behavioural threat assessment programs in community violence prevention efforts.
These programs, state the report’s authors, “are not designed to predict
who will become violent, but rather to identify, assess, and intervene with individuals who display threatening or other concerning behaviours that indicate they may pose a risk of harm to themselves or others.”
The 173 attacks studied by the report impacted a variety of locations, including workplaces, schools, houses of worship, military bases, non-profit services, residential complexes, public transport, and open spaces, and in many cases, the attacker had a known affiliation with the site of the attack.
The two most common locations types (by a long way) were businesses/workplaces (88) and open spaces (60), with education sites (13) a distant third. The two most common workplace types were restaurant/bar (25) and retail (21).
Key findings of the report include:
• Most of the attackers had exhibited behaviour that elicited concern in family members, friends, neighbours, classmates, co-workers, and others. In many cases, those individuals feared for the safety of themselves or others.
• Many attackers had a history of physically aggressive or intimidating behaviours, evidenced by prior violent criminal arrests/charges, domestic violence, or other acts of violence toward others.
• Half of the attackers were motivated by grievances, and were retaliating for perceived wrongs related to personal, domestic, or workplace issues.
• Most of the attackers used firearms, and many of those firearms were possessed illegally at the time of the attack.
• One-quarter of the attackers subscribed to a belief system involving conspiracies or hateful ideologies, including antigovernment, anti-Semitic, and misogynistic views.
• Many attackers experienced stressful events across various life domains, including family/ romantic relationships, personal issues, employment, and legal issues. In some of these cases, attackers experienced a specific triggering event prior to perpetrating the attack.
• Over half of the attackers experienced mental health symptoms prior to or at the time of their attacks, including depression, psychotic symptoms, and suicidal thoughts.
In their concluding remarks, the report’s authors state that “the background and behaviours of the attackers demonstrate a continued need for public safety resources to be directed toward addressing threatening behaviour, stalking, harassment, domestic violence, violent extremism, and violence in general. The findings further emphasise the increased need for community resources to address mental health needs, social isolation, substance abuse, and individuals in crisis.”
Based on its analysis, NTAC highlights several operational implications that should be considered when developing community violence prevention programs:
• Communities must encourage and facilitate bystander reporting and be prepared to respond when reports of concern are received.
• Communities should not wait for a direct and specific threat before taking action.
• Individuals displaying an unusual interest in violent topics, especially past attackers, should elicit concern.
• Businesses should consider establishing workplace violence prevention plans to identify, assess, and intervene with current employees, former employees, and customers who may pose a risk of violence.
• Public safety, school, workplace, and community service professionals should consider strategies for resolving interpersonal grievances.
• Individuals tasked with community violence prevention must understand the impact of violent and hateful rhetoric while protecting the constitutional right to free speech.
• Misogyny and domestic violence deserve increased attention from those tasked with mass violence prevention.
• Online platforms may be utilised by individuals to make violent communications and to share violent rhetoric and ideas.
• Individuals sharing final communications or engaging in other final acts may warrant immediate intervention.
• Community violence prevention efforts require identifying and promoting appropriate resources for individuals who are managing stressful life circumstances, experiencing mental health issues, or facing a personal crisis.
• Mass shootings have been perpetrated by those who were legally prohibited from possessing firearms.
“The prevention of mass violence in America remains as critical as ever. Far too often, communities and families have been devastated by the impact of these tragedies, and public safety professionals continue to work toward preventing future attacks,” said Director Cheatle. “We encourage our public safety partners to review the information within this report and apply it to their own practices for providing a safe environment in communities across the country.”
The report is available at https:// www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/ files/reports/2023-01/usss-ntacmaps-2016-2020.pdf
Risk consultancy Global Risk Consulting (GRC) Group has released its 2023 New Zealand Country Risk Report, an all-hazards analysis charting a challenging past year and uncertainties ahead.
Auckland-based GRC Group has released its inaugural country risk report for New Zealand, and according to Managing Director Chris Kumeroa, it marks the first edition of what will be an annual publication.
“We’re excited to announce today’s release of the 2023 Global Risk Consulting (GRC) Group New Zealand Country Risk Report,” he said at the report’s launch. “This new report presents GRC Group’s thinking around what’s driving risks to New Zealanders and what hazardscape our nation can expect to be exposed to.”
The report can be purchased online, and also available online is a free-of-charge excerpt of the first nine pages of the report, which covers its table of contents, foreword, and methodology sections.
The methodology section itself makes for engaging reading, featuring vignettes that illustrate GRC’s foresight analysis on the potential threat posed by foreign interference in 2025, and what climate change might look like in 2035.
“One of the elements of our methodology that we found to be particularly powerful is our unique Hazard Layer Model (HLM), which
provides a framework through which we can see how often distant macro sources of risk, such as climate change, geostrategic competition, and COVID-19, can manifest harmfully across our communities,” said Kumeroa.
Following an overview of New Zealand’s economic, demographic, defence and political situation, the report progresses to an analytical deep-dive across seven hazard categories, including natural disasters, transnational organised crime, COVID and biological threats, foreign interference, infrastructure failure, cyber threats, and terrorism and extremism.
“To our knowledge, this 52-page report is the most comprehensive New Zealand risk report on the market,” commented the report’s lead analyst Jackson Calder.
“Heading into the uncertain waters of 2023, the report provides insights into the cascading effects of natural disasters on our communities and our infrastructure, the ground-level impacts of foreign interference in politics, the economy, and the disinformation space, the tactics and impacts of transnational organised crime groups, our vulnerability to biological threats, and more,” he said.
Futures visualised
“It has become almost cliché to mention the ‘uncertain times’ in which we are living,” stated Kumeroa. “Commentators and policy makers have become accustomed to talking about our current risk landscape as being ‘unprecedented’, ‘unchartered’ and characterised by ‘black swans’, ‘extreme events’, and ‘wicked problems’. And while there is an almost unanimous perception that we face greater risks that what may have been the case, for example, prior to the outbreak of COVID-19, there is less understanding of what that means for our communities and the people who inhabit them.”
This lack of understanding is something the GRC team have an antidote for, going so far as to paint vivid illustrations of potential future risk scenarios for Aotearoa, describing in detail the world we may inhabit within our foreseeable futures:
In 2035, the effects of climate change are being felt acutely by New Zealanders. Between December and April each year the prices of fruit and vegetables rise sharply as regular storms and tropical cyclones decimate traditional agricultural land. The adoption of vertical farming
technology is lagging behind other comparable countries due to the influence of powerful agricultural lobbying, but industry experts predict a mood change over the next twelve months.
And of the state of foreign interference in 2025, the GRC team suggest:
Fuelling of fringe antiauthority and conspiracy groups by overseas agents has expanded from disinformation to funding and equipment to carry out disruptive activities designed to consume police, media, and political resources. Members of these groups receive this indirectly through proxies and remain unaware that they are targets of foreign interference.
These may be rather dystopian pictures, but they nevertheless present as the result of a robust and multidisciplinary analysis of the swirling historical currents that characterise the uncertainties of the present.
If a major critique of pre-9/11 risk assessments was that their failure was due – in the words of Donald Rumsfeld – to a failure of imagination, then GRC’s approach is one that eschews traditional in-thebox thinking and that places the ability to imagine at its core.
“The report is unique because of its scope and how interdisciplinary it is,” Calder told Line of Defence. “A lot of expert analysis of New Zealand’s risk environment ends up being siloed but we have really strived to bring it together in one place and explore how the risk profiles are interconnected, then released it into the public domain to stimulate discussion.”
“We didn’t shy away from combining a range of methodologies to create a novel approach,” he said. “We leaned into the Hazard Layer Model, the ISO 31000, the concept of Macro Risk Drivers, and even futures modelling techniques like Horizon Scanning and Critical Uncertainties Matrixes.”
Although a broad range of subject-focused professionals will likely find the report worthwhile, Calder says that the report is particularly useful for companies and agencies with a broad, complex scope. “Sectors like insurance, healthcare, national security, criminal justice, and even construction will get immense value out of exploring the interconnectivity of risk profiles, especially the way in which they may converge in the future,” he said.
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