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Judith Collins: Testing the waters: Global focus sharpens on the IndoPacific
Wayne Mapp: Will we invest in the capability to protect our Future?
Josh Wineera: Canadian technology helps NZ Navy track Chinese warships
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EDITOR’S NOTE
Kia ora and welcome to the Autumn 2025 edition – and 35th issue – of Line of Defence Magazine!
In this edition, we’re privileged to be joined by contributing writers Defence Minister Hon Judith Collins KC MP , former Defence Minister Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO , Professor Alexander Gillespie from the University of Waikato, Dr John Battersby from the Massey University Centre for Defence & Security Studies, former New Zealand Army officer J osh Wineera , former RNZN Chief Petty Officer Jonathan Brooke , and Aura Principal Security Consultant Alastair Miller
It’s become cliché that we are living in uncertain or turbulent times. Our government, through successive Defence-focused strategic policy documents, has for several years been beating that drum. The return of Donald Trump to the White House has added credence to this narrative, as has a continuing conflict in Ukraine and the recent transiting of the Tasman by Chinese naval vessels.
Yet, here we are. Our pattern of Defence spending reflecting complacent placidity. An updated Defence Capability Plan the subject of continued delay. Big acquisition questions needing to be answered sooner rather than later.
In an increasingly unstable environment, it is critical our NZDF are able to work closely with like-minded partners, writes Defence Minister Judith Collins , as we did with the ADF when the PLA-N task group entered our region. In his inaugural article for Line of Defence, Josh Wineera agrees, but suggests it is worth our while focusing on our historically overshadowed relationship with Canada.
Dr Wayne Mapp argues that New Zealand should be looking to maintain proportionality with Australia when it comes to Defence spending, suggesting we should look to keep pace with increases in Australia’s surface fleet at a ratio of 5:1. In his first Line of Defence article, J onathan Brooke makes the argument that it’s time to align with Australia’s procurement strategy in deciding on an Anzacclass frigate replacement.
From an intelligence perspective, despite the uncertainties of the Trump administration, Five Eyes membership is of enduring value, writes Dr John Battersby Five eyes, he suggests, are better than none.
And, back to those PLA-N vessels in the Tasman, Professor Alexander Gillespie suggests that Beijing may have scored an own goal by unwittingly pushing Wellington closer to AUKUS. In my contribution to this issue, I take a different perspective, writing that the south seas cruise was a pantomime that had very little to do at all with our quiet part of the Pacific… and that the own goal was, in fact, ours.
I hope that your 2025 is progressing well, despite its continuing uncertainties.
Nicholas Dynon, Auckland.
Hon Judith Collins KC MP Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO
Professor Alexander Gillespie Mr Jonathan Brooke
Mr Nicholas Dynon LTCOL (Ret) Josh Wineera
Dr John Battersby Mr Alastair Miller
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COVER IMAGE
Cover image courtesy NZDF. HMNZS Aotearoa in Auckland
UPCOMING ISSUE
WINTER: July 2025
Main themes: Land Domain, Terrorism, Border Security, Critical Infrastructure
Publication: 10 July 2025
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6 Testing the waters: Global focus sharpens on the Indo-Pacific
8 A Chinese own goal? How war games in the Tasman Sea could push NZ closer to AUKUS
10 Collaborative Combat Aircraft in the Royal New Zealand Air Force: Shaping the Future of Autonomous Airpower
12 New Zealand’s Frigate Future: Time to align with Australia’s procurement strategy
14 Wayne Mapp: Will we invest in the capability to protect our Future?
18 Showboat Diplomacy: Chinese navy mousetrap mission achieves Tasman objective
22 Canadian technology helps NZ Navy track Chinese warships
23 UROVESA partners with EPE New Zealand for Protected Mobility Capability Project
24 Government accused of hypocrisy over proposed NZDF’s civilian workforce cuts
WOMEN IN SECURITY
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Five Eyes or No Eyes? 32 US dominance of global arms exports grows as Russian exports fall
36 IATA Annual Safety Report criticises conflict zone fatalities
38 Aviation Security Leaders Call for Digital Identity
39 Battle-ready medical drones to join Australian Army’s ranks
HOMELAND SECURITY
Auckland Airport sees massive drug seizures
Threat of AI cyber-attacks a top concern for NZ businesses
Study reveals flaws in animal protection laws
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Testing the waters: Global focus sharpens on the Indo-Pacific
In an increasingly unstable environment, it is critical our NZDF are able to work closely with like-minded partners, writes Defence Minister Hon Judith Collins.
Hon Judith Collins KC, AttorneyGeneral, Minister of Defence, Minister for Digitising Government, Minister responsible for the GCSB, Minister responsible for the NZSIS, Minister for Science, Innovation & Technology, Minister for Space, Lead Coordination Minister for the Governments Response to the Royal Commission’s Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques.
There have been moments in my nearly 18 months as Minister of Defence when I have wondered whether I am witnessing a defining moment in history.
One such moment was just a few weeks ago at the Munich Security Conference in Germany, where differing approaches to Russia’s illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine dominated discussions.
For the record, New Zealand very much stands with Ukraine and has done so since it was invaded more than three years ago. We, like the rest of the world, hope for peace and a return to the rules-based order.
At the conference I participated in a panel discussion on the interconnected nature of security events in Europe and the IndoPacific.
Japan Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi, Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Cho Tae-Yul, NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Šekerinska and I discussed how security challenges in these two theatres are increasingly interlinked.
We agreed that many of the issues we face, such as geostrategic competition, cyber-attacks, climate change and terrorism, are transnational in nature. They know no borders.
That means that what happens in the Indo-Pacific can have a rapid impact on Europe, and vice versa.
In particular, we are all impacted by challenges to the international rules-based order, which is under the greatest threat since World War II.
Working together
It is in the interest of us all to work together towards solutions, given the global impacts of the issues.
For this reason, a number of our likeminded partners are increasingly focussed on the Indo-Pacific. European governments have released Indo-Pacific strategies and increased their engagement in the region, and the new US Administration has repeatedly said the Indo-Pacific will be a key focus.
The US has indicated this includes continuing to work with their partners and allies in the region to uphold security and stability.
Similar themes of interconnectedness were discussed at the NATO Defence Ministers’ Meeting that I attended in Brussels last year.
Perhaps as a sign of the times, this was the first opportunity Defence Ministers and officials from the NATO group known as the IndoPacific 4 had the opportunity to exchange views directly with NATO Allies.
I reiterated to my IP4 counterparts from Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea that New Zealand is committed to working with its partners to uphold the international rules-based order.
Deployments
That is why the Government continues to deploy hundreds of our highly trained and professional NZDF personnel overseas on multinational missions. It is important we send our people to do our bit in upholding the norms and rules upon which we rely for security and prosperity.
One current example, which I believe is very significant, is the NZDF team deployed to command the Combined Task Force 150 in the Middle East. The Task Force is part of the 46-nation naval partnership called the Combined Maritime Force and is focused on the promotion of security and stability in some of the world’s busiest maritime trading routes.
I n February the New Zealand-led task force discovered nearly twoand-a half tonnes of hashish on a vessel off the coast of Oman, and in March in the north Arabian Sea it seized 318kg of heroin and 83kg of methamphetamine with a street value of $NZ332 million.
The New Zealand contingent will soon be joined by HMNZS Te
Kaha to conduct ocean patrols and boarding operations.
A s a small nation primarily reliant on trade, we require a safe and interconnected world in order to prosper, including open and secure maritime trading lanes.
I ndo-Pacific shipping lanes are especially important to New Zealand’s economic success. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development estimates that 60 percent of global maritime trade passes through Asia and onethird through the South China Sea.
S ome 50 percent of New Zealand’s export goods go to the 14 countries that make up the IndoPacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, including South Korea, Singapore, the Philippines, Australia and the United States.
Military activities in our region escalating
Recent events in the Indo-Pacific reinforce that global challenges and tensions are increasingly having direct impacts on our security and stability.
Late last year, the People’s Republic of China test fired a nuclear capable intercontinental ballistic missile into the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.
It was an act not seen in the region for more than 40 years and one that runs counter to regional interests and expectations. Pacific leaders, including New Zealand’s, have clearly articulated they want a peaceful, secure and prosperous region.
Then, last month a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) task group made up of three warships conducted live-fire drills in international waters off Australia’s east coast.
I n an increasingly unstable environment, it is critical our NZDF are able to work closely with likeminded partners, as we did with the Australian Defence Force when the PLA-N task group entered our region.
No one country can face today’s challenges on its own.
We must be ready to step up to protect our security, economic interests, and democratic values, in partnership with other countries who share our interests.
NZDF-led Combined Task Force 150 seized 318kg of heroin and 83kg of methamphetamine in the Middle East
A Chinese own goal? How war games in the Tasman Sea could push NZ closer to AUKUS
China’s naval drills in the Tasman may just be the boon that proponents of increased defence spending have been looking for, writes the University of Waikato’s Professor Alexander Gillespie.
The appearance of three Chinese naval vessels firing live rounds in the Tasman Sea has caused understandable alarm in New Zealand and Australia . But this has more to do with the geopolitical context than the actual event.
I n fact, the Chinese navy is allowed to conduct exercises in the Tasman and has wide freedoms on the high seas in general. So far, China appears to be acting in accordance with both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea .
W hile New Zealand would have preferred more notice of the Chinese navy’s intentions, there was no obligation to provide this.
Nor is what is occurring in the Tasman similar to the more
aggressive sabre-rattling the Chinese military has displayed around the South China Sea, most recently involving both the Australian and Philippine navies.
A nd in September last year, just a few days after Australian and New Zealand vessels sailed through the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese test-fired a nuclear-capable intercontinental missile into the South Pacific
For China, of course, Taiwan and parts of the South China Sea are highly disputed territory. The Tasman Sea is not. But what is disputed is China’s role and influence in the Pacific – and this, rather than a minor naval exercise, is what is causing headaches in Canberra and Wellington.
The People’s Liberation Army-Navy Jiangkai-class frigate Hengyang
Alexander Gillespie is Professor of International Law at the University of Waikato.
The Cook Islands factor
The surprise agreement signed by the Cook Islands and China under a fortnight ago, aimed at “ deepening blue economy cooperation”, is the immediate context for that concern. The deal avoids controversial areas such as security and policing. But it moves Chinese influence into infrastructure support for wharves, shipbuilding and repair, and ocean transportation.
What really challenges New Zealand’s foreign policy is how this opens the South Pacific up to even greater Chinese influence and activity. Foreign Minister Winston Peters has signalled it is time to reset the relationship with the Cooks.
For its part, China has asserted that its relationship with the Cook Islands “is not directed against any third party and should not be subject to or disrupted by any third party”. In other words, China has told New Zealand to butt out of a major development in the historically close
diplomatic and political relationship with its Pacific neighbour.
A Chinese own goal?
All of this is happening within a rapidly shifting geopolitical sphere. US President Donald Trump is unilaterally attempting to upend the old US-led world order, and other major powers such as Russia and China are adapting.
New Zealand’s relations with China were already difficult. The Security Intelligence Service and Government Communications Security Bureau have both identified state-sponsored Chinese interference in domestic affairs, breaches of the parliamentary network and other malicious cyber activity
The question now is whether China has scored an own goal with its recent actions. Because while it might prefer New Zealand to operate a more independent foreign policy –balancing its relations with east and west – the opposite may now be more likely.
In times of international stress and uncertainty, New Zealand has always tended to move towards deepening relationships with traditional allies.
Whether it is the fear of Russian invasion in the 19th century, or Japanese invasion in the 20th century – and whether or not those threats are real or imagined – New Zealand reverts to form.
It has been this way for nearly 150 years and is likely to occur again. New Zealand is already grappling with how to respond to the Trump administration’s redrawn global system and will be looking for ways to deepen the friendship.
At the same time, the government now seems committed to joining a new arms race and increasing defence spending as a proportion of GDP. And the supposed benefits of joining the second tier of the AUKUS security pact may now become that much easier to sell politically. This article was first published in The Conversation on 24 February 2025.
HMNZS Aotearoa (L) and HMAS Sydney (R) sailed through the Taiwan Strait
Collaborative Combat Aircraft in the Royal New Zealand Air Force: Shaping the Future of Autonomous Airpower
Artist rendering of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems’ (GA-ASI) Collaborative Combat Aircraft.
Aerospace leaders are gathering in the Southern Hemisphere to attend the Avalon Australian International Airshow against a backdrop of ever-growing uncertainty about the outlook for world security. One thing is certain: traditional ways of doing business won’t work anymore.
Consider the old orthodoxy about airpower: advanced nations are slowing- even pausing- efforts to develop new generations of crewed fighter aircraft and potentially other types as well. These platforms and the big expensive programs behind them have become so cumbersome and costly against an increasingly unpredictable threat environment and uncertain returns on investment that even large U.S. Services have been forced to reconsider their plans from just two years ago.
How will tomorrow’s adversaries fight? With technology changing so quickly, what’s the right mix of crewed and autonomous aircraft needed to meet future requirements amid shrinking national budgets? These are key questions the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) might consider for its future force structure.
To highlight the path to autonomous aircraft, it is useful to examine ongoing initiatives in the U.S. shaping the future fighter force. This path includes not only the development of a major new crewed marquee fighter but also the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), designed by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.
CCA is a highly autonomous armed jet capable of operating
independently or alongside both uncrewed and crewed aircraft. On its own, it is an extremely effective platform for air warfare. When operating in formations or paired with a crewed aircraft, it has the potential to redefine airpower strategy.
With air-to-air munitions on board, CCA is designed to be as effective against hostile aircraft as a legacy fighter. With a high degree of independent operation thanks to its onboard autonomy, it doesn’t need an always-on satellite or radio data link to be controlled by a remote human pilot. This enables it to operate in contested environments, even where communication networks are compromised.
With no human pilot on board, CCA can take risks that wouldn’t be
possible for legacy crews - especially in an era when fighters and pilots are more difficult to replace than ever. It can patrol ahead of crewed platforms, establish first contact, and, if necessary, fire the first shots, all while keeping aircrews safely out of harm’s way.
This approach is made possible not only by the absence of onboard personnel but also by CCA’s advanced capabilities and inexpensive mass. Additionally, the aircraft can be produced rapidly in large quantities. GA-ASI’s CCA features a common core design—similar to
an automobile chassis—that can be adapted to meet specific customer needs, whether as a baseline model or a highly customised platform.
That means allied air forces can procure CCAs in large quantities and incorporate specific refinements or upgrades they require. Its software and modular design make onboard upgrades easy, ensuring the aircraft is scalable, versatile, and highly futureproof—unlike a conventional fighter.
Allied air forces are nearing the limits of what is practical when it comes to investing in expensive next-generation crewed aircraft. This makes now the ideal time to leverage a new autonomous platform that both complements and enhances what crewed aircraft can do. And GA-ASI’s CCA is leading the way in this revolution.
For New Zealand, which has not operated a fighter/ground attack fast jet fleet for some time, consideration could be given to the utility of a CCA capability flying independently and/or in conjunction with the RNZAF’s P-8A Poseidon or other similar aircraft.
Artist rendering of GA-ASI’s Gambit 4 variant.
Artist rendering of GA-ASI’s Gambit Series aircraft in action.
New Zealand’s Frigate Future: Time to align with Australia’s procurement strategy
The Anzac-class model worked, and there’s no reason why a similar approach to the next generation of frigates wouldn’t deliver the same advantages, writes former RNZN Chief Petty Officer (Combat System Specialist – Above Water Warfare) Jonathan Brooke.
New Zealand’s defence procurement process has long been out of step with Australia’s, often leading to delayed decisions, cost inefficiencies, and interoperability gaps.
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has already committed to the Hunter-class frigate for its high-end surface combatants, but it is now exploring a second, lighter frigate— with contenders including the German MEKO A-200 and Japan’s Mogami-class.
Th is presents a rare but not unique opportunity for New Zealand. Instead of waiting years to decide on an Anzac-class replacement, we should align
with Australia now, ensuring commonality and efficiency in both procurement and operational integration.
A Familiar Model: Learning from the Anzac-Class
New Zealand and Australia codeveloped the Anzac-class frigates in the 1990s, leading to joint training, maintenance efficiencies, and cost savings.
Th is bi-national approach worked—both countries operated similar platforms while maintaining sovereign defence policy choices.
The second-tier frigate Australia selects could offer New Zealand
the same opportunity: a smaller but capable combatant that ensures interoperability without forcing a one-size-fits-all approach.
Australia’s Next Move: Why New Zealand must be ready
Australia’s Hunter-class is locked in, but its second-tier frigate decision is still pending. The RAN’s considerations—the MEKO A-200 (German) and the Mogami-class (Japanese)—offer New Zealand a strategic opening to align early.
Waiting too long risks missing the opportunity to benefit from a joint acquisition process, as we did with the Anzac-class.
Commonality
vs Interoperability: Finding the right balance
If Australia selects the MEKO or Mogami-class, New Zealand should strongly consider joining the program.
I nteroperability with Australia is vital, but complete uniformity isn’t always necessary—common platforms can deliver significant efficiencies.
A common hull across Australian and RNZN frigates would still allow flexibility in weapon systems and mission fit-outs tailored to New Zealand’s specific needs.
A lthough current modern tactical data links allow shared battlespace awareness, problems can arise where combat systems differ greatly mostly in logistics, training and compliance (i.e. IFF mode 5 [NATO standard Identification Friend or Foe combat identification protocol]). New Zealand could choose to maintain and integrate its current Lockheed Martin Canada CMS330 Combat system into a future frigate, however the cost and effort in research, design and development may prohibit this as a viable course of action.
The common hull approach ensures New Zealand retains
sovereignty while avoiding the delays and inefficiencies of a completely separate procurement cycle.
The Risk of Delay: Why NZ must decide now
Australia is moving ahead quickly, and if New Zealand waits too long, we’ll be forced to make a decision in isolation, leading to procurement of capabilities that can generate the effects required but may not be interoperable.
Approval to initiate the maritime fleet renewal was granted to the NZDF and RNZN in Nov 2022. The ADF and RAN had chosen the Hunter class tier 1 frigate circa 2018.
A joint approach offers cost benefits, as shipbuilders give better pricing for larger orders.
A ligning now means we can shape the decision to better fit New Zealand’s unique requirements, rather than adapting a platform later.
Conclusion: A window of opportunity we can’t afford to miss
New Zealand’s defence choices are too often made reactively rather than strategically. With Australia
moving towards a second-tier frigate, we have a rare opportunity to align our future fleet with a partner that shares our worldview, operational challenges and security commitments.
The Anzac-class model worked, and there’s no reason why a similar approach to the next generation of frigates wouldn’t deliver the same advantages.
T here is benefit to the RNZN developing detailed and niche user requirements, however history shows us that often the Australian solution is the best solution, with subtle adaptions to ensure New Zealand can meet its independent strategic objectives. This would require a detailed definition of New Zealand’s strategic objectives, which to date are vague and involve maintaining sea lines of communication (SLOC) without a clear definition of how that is to be achieved.
Waiting risks higher costs, reduced interoperability, and a shrinking set of viable options. Now is the time for New Zealand to formally engage in the decision-making process—before the window closes.
HMAS Parramatta, an Anzac-class MEKO 200 type frigate of the Royal Australian Navy. image courtesy of Wikipedia
Wayne Mapp: Will we invest in the capability to protect our Future?
Renewed US focus on the Asia Pacific region will come with expectations that New Zealand increase its defence spending, writes Dr Wayne Mapp. How should we respond?
Senior Contributor Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.
President Trump has been in office for nearly two months. In that time, he has certainly upset the status quo. In many respects he has done just as he said he would do during the presidential campaign. But in other respects, President Trump has gone much further, most notably by treating allied states not as partners, but as client states expected to do as he requires and for the enrichment of the United States. This threatens to shred the NATO alliance.
It is worth considering how things have got to this state. Many Americans, especially those in the MAGA orbit, want to retreat to Fortress America, free from foreign entanglements, except where there is commercial and cultural advantage. From their perspective the last 100 years has bled both American lives and treasure, with no commensurate gain.
Europe stands out, being the major source of the two world wars. The wars of the former Yugoslavia and the more recent war in Ukraine demonstrate to them that Europe is still a fractious region. Rather than the Trans-Atlantic Alliance being a primary source of American economic and strategic leadership, it is seen by many Americans as an economic drain that diminishes American autonomy.
From this perspective, the United States needs to withdraw from Europe, including the irksome obligations of NATO.
The expectation that Europe should collectively shoulder the
lion’s share of European security has been an ongoing theme for decades. President Trump, and his Vice President, neither of whom have much patience with the idea of collective defence, have aggressively advanced this expectation. Collective defence in the model of NATO is seen as a game for suckers, where the weak draw from the strong, without any advantage for the strong, who are quite capable of dealing with any direct threats without assistance.
President Trump’s penchant to treat all security issues, other than those directly affecting the United States, as merely transactional and devoid of reference to shared values is likely to have a profound impact on existing global security arrangements.
If this administration can upend decades of predictable alliance arrangements, can alliance partners
continue to rely on the United States, not just during this administration, but also in the future? If United States security policy can so fundamentally change with each administration, what is the point of being in alliance with the United States?
Thus far, the Trump administration’s strategic change is aimed at Europe. The premise being that Europe is economically and militarily strong enough to look after itself, especially against a weakened Russia.
Unlike all other United States led alliances, Europe has its own nuclear deterrent in the form of the French and British nuclear forces. France has already offered to extend its nuclear deterrent to the rest of Europe. If Europe were to form a European Defence Alliance, backed with a substantial increase in defence spending, then such an alliance could provide effective collective defence for the whole of Europe, including the exposed Baltic states.
Would Russia risk attacking the Baltic states if it knew it was going to be exposed to the equivalent of a NATO Article V response, whereby
all European nations in the alliance militarily respond to such an attack, including with direct attacks on Russian territory?
To what extent does the NATO debacle signal the same tumultuous future for the rest of United States security arrangements, especially those in the Asia Pacific, within which New Zealand belongs?
It is worth noting the fundamental differences between the Asia Pacific and Europe. The United States has direct territorial possessions right across the Pacific, stretching from Hawaii to Guam. Within New Zealand’s area of the South West Pacific, the United States has American Samoa, a point that will be particularly well understood by the new Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, who was born in American Samoa. Her husband is Maori Samoan and is originally from Auckland.
There is also a fundamental difference in the nature of peer competition. Unlike Russia, China is a virtual equal of the United States. The economies of China and the United States are of similar size. China is the world’s largest exporter of manufactured goods. China has
1.4 billion people, ten times more than that of Russia, and it now has the world’s second largest defence expenditure.
Australia and New Zealand have just witnessed the growing extent of China’s naval reach. It was a demonstration of power that would not have been possible a decade ago. It is therefore not surprising that President Trump and his team have declared that their primary focus is on the Asia Pacific. In this he continues in the path of successive United States administrations. However, President Trump has also mooted that he sees an opportunity for the United States to strike a grand bargain with China.
Based on the European precedent, this is likely to be heedless of the security interests of the other nations within the region.
Such a prospect will be of particular concern for the nations of East Asia and South East Asia, all of whom are proximate to China. It is not difficult to imagine that the United States and China might agree to divide the Asia Pacific into spheres of interest, with the two nations having their primary influence in different parts of the Asia Pacific.
DEFENCE
However, this presupposes that the other countries in the region are without agency. Japan, for instance, would not accept being under the influence of China. Vietnam, who has fought successful wars against both China and the United States, will not surrender its independence to any nation.
Given this reality, a grand bargain between China and the United States would be less about determining how other nations act, but more about how the two great nations act with each other. The intent would be to reduce the direct friction between China and the United States in return for more mutually advantageous commercial relationships between them.
How can Australia and New Zealand respond to this change in the security environment?
The first point to note is the nature of the alliance relationships that each country has. Australia’s most important ally, by far, is the United States. Unlike Europe, Australia can’t easily go it alone. Australia simply doesn’t have the population or economy that would
allow it to do so. From the United States perspective, Australia is the bulwark of the West Pacific, providing depth and capability that no Pacific island territory can do.
The mutual depth of this relationship is evident from the fact that the United States has agreed that it will ensure Australia can acquire up to six nuclear submarines. The only other country that the United States has shared this technology is Britain. It seems inconceivable that the United States would abandon Australia as an ally. There is no vexed history as there has been with much of Europe.
For New Zealand, the only ally is Australia. New Zealand has an extensive defence partnership with the United States, but since 1987, with the anti-nuclear standoff, New Zealand has not been a formal ally of the United States. The defence alliance between Australia and New Zealand, formalised in the Canberra Pact of 1944, has its antecedents stretching back the Treaty of Waitangi.
In essence, the existing defence arrangements of each country will remain. If the United States actually
increases its focus on the Asia Pacific, we may expect these arrangements to be intensified. There is a potential silver lining in President Trump’s ambitions. If the United States is able to conclude a grand bargain with China, then the extensive commercial arrangements that both Australia and New Zealand have with China will remain largely unaffected.
Nevertheless, there will be implications for New Zealand’s defence spending.
Defence alliances carry obligations as well as benefits. The test for New Zealand now is whether it will boost defence spending in the same manner that Australia has done over the last decade. This is not necessarily increasing defence expenditure to the same level of GDP as Australia, but rather retaining a degree of proportionality that has hitherto existed.
Australia is progressively increasing its defence expenditure to 2.5% of GDP. On this basis, New Zealand might be expected to increase expenditure to close to 2% of GDP.
For many decades, in key strategic military assets, New Zealand has maintained a proportionate contribution to that of Australia. Typically, it is a one fifth ratio. This has been the case with maritime patrol aircraft (the ratio for MPA has been closer to one third), with naval surface combatants and with special forces. Of course, with defence expenditure exceeding 2% of GDP, Australia has many capabilities that New Zealand simply does not have, including advanced combat aircraft, airborne early warning aircraft and submarines.
This long held ratio is now at risk, especially in the naval surface combatant fleet. Currently Australia has nine surface combatants, with three air warfare destroyers and six ANZAC frigates (out of an original eight with two having already been withdrawn from service). New Zealand has two ANZAC frigates. Close enough to a one fifth ratio of the Australians.
However, Australia is about to embark on a major increase in its surface fleet, with six new Type 26
ASW frigates and eleven general purpose frigates to replace the ANZAC ships. Within a decade the Australian Navy will have twenty surface combatants. To maintain the longstanding one fifth ratio would require New Zealand to have four frigates, even though they will only in the lowest tier of general purpose frigates.
Prime Minister Luxon has indicated that defence expenditure will progressively increase to 2% of GDP. Acquiring four general purpose frigates to replace the two ANZAC frigates will achieve this goal.
New Zealand’s alliance with Australia is going to be tested. Australia is fully committed to its alliance with the United States and will do whatever is necessary to keep it in good order. That will almost certainly mean an increase in Australian defence expenditure. There will be an expectation, especially from Australia, that New Zealand will follow the same imperative: that as Australia does what is necessary to maintain its
alliance with the United States, so will New Zealand with respect to the Trans-Tasman alliance.
It won’t be just defence expenditure. There is also AUKUS Pillar Two. New Zealand’s engagement with AUKUS will need to be about the Trans-Tasman Alliance – more than the broader strategic issues – if it to receive public acceptance.
The expectations around the strategic arrangements of Australia and New Zealand are mutually reinforcing. The actions of each partner strengthen the whole.
A renewed commitment by New Zealand to its alliance with Australia is more urgent than it has been for many decades. The recent display of Chinese naval strength in the Tasman Sea shows the relevance of Australia and New Zealand having the capability to protect our immediate region.
A Trans-Tasman fleet of 24 surface combatants, with 20 from Australia and 4 from New Zealand, would be a formidable deterrent to any would be adversaries venturing into our region.
Showboat Diplomacy: Chinese navy mousetrap mission achieves Tasman objective
The PLAN task group that set pulses racing on both sides of the Tasman in late February came from afar to test us, and we failed that test, writes chief editor Nicholas Dynon.
Nicholas Dynon is chief editor of Line of Defence, and a widely published commentator on New Zealand’s defence, national security and private security sectors.
In Act III Scene II of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, the eponymous prince, convinced that his uncle Claudius has murdered his father to claim the Danish throne and marry his widowed mother Queen Gertrude, sets out to confirm his suspicions.
A s part of his probe, Hamlet assembles actors and stages a play about a murder – The Mousetrap –to test whether watching it will elicit a guilty reaction from his uncle Claudius.
A s they watch the Queen character in the play-within-a-play melodramatically declare that she would never remarry if her husband were to die, Hamlet turns to his mother to ask what she thinks about the play. She replies with the immortal line, “The lady doth protest too much, methinks.”
I n the 400 years since Hamlet was first performed, the line has become a favoured turn of phrase for conveying the idea that an excessively voiced protestation – overacted indignation – is a giveaway indicator of untruthfulness or deception.
It’s a line that might well have been on the minds of Chinese Foreign Affairs and Defence officials as they clinically critiqued the reactions of the Australian and New Zealand governments to the conduct of live fire drills by three PLAN warships in the Tasman Sea the other week.
The live firing exercises, conducted in international waters approximately 345 nautical miles off the New South Wales coast by a task group of three People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) vessels – a frigate, a cruiser and a supply tanker – provoked an instant tirade of indignation from Canberra and Wellington.
Did the governments Down Under protest too much?
Protest and panic
Both governments were quick to complain over Beijing’s lack of transparency in relation to the deployment of the task group into the region and, in particular, to a lack of notice around the live fire exercise that had led to commercial flights in the vicinity changing course.
“ There was a warning, to civil aviation flights, that was basically a very short amount of notice – a couple of hours, as opposed to what we would consider best practice,” New Zealand Defence Minister Judith Collins told RNZ .
W hile stressing that the task group were not breaking any international laws and that New Zealanders shouldn’t “be worried,” the minister nevertheless implied that perhaps there is good reason for New Zealanders to be at least a bit worried: “The weapons they have are extremely capable,” she suggested.
Journalists and commentators on both sides of the Tasman were quick to weigh in on the issue.
Tim Hurdle, a former National Party senior adviser, and a director of Wellington public affairs consultancy Museum Street, described the exercise as “gunboat diplomacy”.
“China knows exactly what it means to sail one of their most advanced and powerful warships unannounced along the Australian coast,” he wrote in an opinion piece published in The Dominion Post. “Our difficulty to respond shows New Zealand needs to take seriously the threat of Chinese ambitions in our region.”
Dr Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst in defence strategy and capability at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said that the traditional assumption that distance insulated Australia from any foreign threats was “long gone” as a result of China’s Tasman drills. “Here you have a Chinese naval flotilla operating off our coast… close enough to essentially do damage in a crisis,” he told 2GB .
University of Canterbury Professor of Political Science and well-known Chinese politics specialist Anne-Marie Brady opined that the task group’s presence was an attempt to intimidate. “It’s a threat, it’s a signal that China wants to change the strategic order,” she told RNZ .
“These are all deliberate signals to New Zealand, and Australia, and the other Pacific governments with military force, such as Fiji and Tonga, that China is wanting to establish a permanent military presence in the region,” she said.
University of Waikato Law Professor Alexander Gillespie suggested that the controversy would draw New Zealand closer to its “traditional allies”. It was also, he said, “a gift from Beijing” to those pushing for an increased New Zealand defence budget.
Indeed, in news reports from 24 February Defence Minister Collins stated, “we cannot hide at this end of the world anymore,” making the argument for a significant increase in defence spending.
Amid the moral panic, nimbyism, and virtue signalling, however,
several commentators cautioned against overreaction.
Jennifer Parker, an Expert Associate at the ANU’s National Security College, and former RAN officer, cautioned against overreacting . The PLA-N’s Tasman drills were not aggressive, “it’s just what warships do on the high seas”.
“The Chinese naval task group’s deployment in our region is clearly aimed at sending a message and testing Australia’s responses –not only on the military front, but socially and politically,” she wrote. “The worst misstep would be to overreact and hand China a propaganda win that could undermine Australia’s legitimate military activities in the South China Sea and North-East Asia.”
University of Auckland professor of international relations Stephen Hoadley similarly commented that when Western warships are off China, as they frequently are, “we don’t want the Chinese to over-react”.
Former NZDF Chief Information Officer, Air Commodore (Ret) Carl Nixon ONZM, commented on LinkedIn – prophetically perhaps
HMNZS Aotearoa conducts replenishment at sea with HMNZS Te Kaha. Image: NZDF
DEFENCE
– that in the months to come, “this event will be used as a case study on Information Warfare courses and how actions test reactions - both operational and political.”
Actions testing reactions… Hamlet anyone?
The lady doth protest too much
The Chinese Ministry of National Defense was quick to respond to Canberra’s criticisms over the drills, with spokesperson Wu Qian commenting on 23 February that “Australia’s remarks are completely inconsistent with the facts.”
Wu highlighted that the live-fire exercise had been preceded by the repeated issuing of safety notices in advance, that China acted in full compliance with international law and international practices, and that the exercise would not affect aviation flight safety.
“We are deeply surprised and strongly dissatisfied with the unreasonable accusations and deliberate hype [my italics] against China by the Australian side”.
Commenting in major Chinese language newspapers, respected military commentators made various links between the Tasman Sea situation and Australia’s involvement in freedom of navigation operations in disputed waters in the South and East China Seas.
“The Chinese Navy should go to the far seas more often and carry out various training activities to gradually get used to the international community.”
Zhang Junshe, a naval colonel told nationalistic tabloid Global Times. “Some countries are accustomed to the US Navy sailing in their nearby waters for many years, but they are still not very accustomed to the normal sailing of the Chinese Navy in these waters.”
Colonel Zhang emphasised that the task group’s manoeuvres were “completely different” from Australian military aircraft intrusion
into the disputed airspace of the Paracel Islands a few beforehand. “According to international law, a country’s military aircraft has no right to fly over another country’s airspace without authorisation and must obtain the approval or consent of the country where it is located,” he lectured.
Song Zhongping, a Chinese military affairs commentator and former PLA officer, told the Global Times that PLA-N drills in international waters will become more frequent , and that “some countries should adjust to this trend.”
“In fact, the United States and its allies, including Australia, have been conducting joint military exercises in the South China Sea and the East China Sea for many years, with a large number of troops, high intensity, and clear targeting,” he continued. “They are accustomed to this, but they are pointing fingers at the normal training activities of the Chinese Navy.”
The Beijing Daily’s ‘Capital News’ column zeroed in on New Zealand Defence Minister Collins comments about the task group vessels’ “extremely capable” weapons, arguing that Ms Collins was invoking the “China threat” narrative, which Beijing denounces as regressive cold war thinking.
The play within the play
The ‘deliberate hype’ ( xùyì ch ă ozuò) line taken by Beijing in response to Canberra and Wellington’s recent reactions is ordinarily used in official Chinese government statements responding to protestations over controversial PLA-N and PLA-AF manoeuvres in the South China and East China Seas. In fact, it’s something of a mantra.
,
Beijing used the line recently, for example, in response to allegations levelled by Australia of irresponsible and unsafe practices against RAAF and RAN assets operating in the South China Sea. In one such incident, Australia’s defence minister said a Chinese J-16 jet released flares within 30 metres of an RAAF aircraft. In another, Australian Navy divers received minor injuries after being subjected to sonar pulses from a nearby PLA-N vessel.
The problem for Beijing and its ‘deliberate hype’ mantra is that it’s always just been one side’s volley in a war of words with no real substance attached to it. Now, having provoked Wellington and Canberra via its Tasman performance into committing an unequivocal act of overacted indignation, the PLA-N has skilfully given credence to the idea that the governments Down Under are indeed prone to deliberate hype.
Zhang Junshe. Image: Xinhua
The PLA-N’s action tested the trans-Tasman allies’ reaction… and it would appear that the latter did indeed protest too much.
More importantly, their vociferous reaction to the pantomime now enables Beijing to accuse Wellington and Canberra of a ‘double standard’ in relation to the conduct of naval exercises on the high seas. This will serve to undermine the ‘freedom of navigation’ narrative used to explain NZDF and ADF involvement in South China and East China Seas FONOPS.
The PLA-N’s flexing in the Tasman (and subsequent circumnavigation of Australia) was no threat or an act of aggression. Neither was it necessarily a demonstration of power projection. Chinese naval vessels, for example, have been involved in several exercises in the Indian Ocean over the past decade, and it’s been over two decades since a guided missile destroyer and replenishment ship completed the PLA-N’s first circumnavigation of the globe in September 2002. We already knew
that the Chinese Navy’s surface and submarine fleets are capable of long voyages.
Neither does the exercise appear to have served as a demonstration of national power to audiences domestically in China. The event was covered in the Chinese press, but it was not used or amplified as a major media moment.
Nevertheless, the task group’s route, the location of the live fire drills, and the lack of notice appear intended to serve a performative purpose, a pantomimed mockumentary of the ADF and NZDF’s own involvement in South China and East China Seas FONOPS and transits of the Taiwan Strait. And it carried a message of deterrence: that we can expect more frequent Chinese naval presence in our littoral high seas assuming that our involvement in the South and East China Seas remains unchanged.
In the Chinese strategic maritime universe, there is nothing more important than the consolidation of what Beijing regards as its sovereign territory within the nine-dash line.
In Shakespearian terms, if Beijing’s pursuit of sovereignty claims over Taiwan and the disputed features and waters of the South China and East China Seas represent ‘the play’, then the PLA-N’s Tasman performance is ‘the play within the play’, a piece of theatre envisaged and executed to test the reactions and resolve of its target audiences in Wellington and Canberra.
And that’s the point. The Tasman pantomime is – in itself – of no strategic value to Beijing. Rather, its value resides in its function as the play-within-the-play and the extent to which it performs that function to the benefit of Beijing’s execution of the bigger play.
Should tensions in the South China and east China Seas continue to escalate – and assuming ADF and NZDF vessels continue to participate in FONOPS in those waters – we can expect to see more PLA-N pantomimes (or other equally unwelcome performances) in our neighbourhood into the future.
And ultimately, as Hamlet might quip, therein lies the rub.
RNZAF Boeing P-8A Poseidon. Image: NZDF
Canadian technology helps NZ Navy track Chinese warships
Now is a good time to consider building on our defence relationship with Canada, writes retired New Zealand Army Lieutenant Colonel and director and co-founder of Latent, Josh Wineera.
As the government and the New Zealand Navy responded to the Chinese warships in the Tasman Sea few people would have been aware of the Canadian connection. Canada, or more precisely Canadian technology, helped New Zealand’s naval response, with the frigate HMNZS Te Kaha equipped to follow and track the Chinese fleet.
Te Kaha and her sister ship Te Mana both received a significant capability upgrade known as the Frigate Systems Upgrade (FSU) by prime contractor Lockheed Martin Canada, with final testing completed in late 2023.
This $600 million project not only extended the life of the frigates, but, according to the Ministry of Defence, the upgrade “delivered new radars, electronic detection and other above water systems, the self-defence missile system, decoys against missiles and torpedoes, and upgrade to the hull-mounted sonar, and the combat management system that integrates these”.
While a huge cost, the additional capabilities would have given some comfort to our sailors watching the Chinese fleet at sea. Thank you, Canada.
Acknowledging Canada’s current political and trade tension with the US, what does the security partnership between Wellington and Ottawa look like? Is it enough? Can we do more with each other?
Is this the time to remind each other, and our respective publics, of how important our long-standing defence relationship is?
Asking how much do we value our shared values would be a start point, not least because Canadians share so many of our national traits – they too are adventurers, and explorers of the land, air and sea. They too have a sense of justice, empathy, and humour. And we both share a case of mistaken identity, one many Kiwi travellers know well when being confused as Australian, while Canadians are often mistaken as Americans.
While the New Zealand and Canadian military forces have served alongside each other for over 100 years, it is perhaps on the Korean peninsula where we forged a rocksolid commitment, conviction and support to each other.
74 years ago next month, in a fierce battle during the Korea War, New Zealand gunners from 16 Field Regiment laid down artillery fire to support the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, with Australian, US, UK and Republic of Korea forces also involved.
In what became known as the battle of Kapyong, the Commonwealth Brigade of roughly 2,000 soldiers were able to blunt the advance of 20,000 People’s Volunteer Army Chinese soldiers. A one to ten ratio against!
Josh Wineera is a retired New Zealand Army Lieutenant Colonel and director and co-founder of Latent
More recently we have both deployed to Afghanistan, East Timor, Egypt and routinely exchange personnel for training and military education.
It’s understandable that these activities are overshadowed by our larger relationships with Australia, the US and UK. It’s heartening, however, that Canada’s Army Commander hosted New Zealand’s Chief of Army last month with the overriding sentiment being “in 2025, the old ways of doing things are no longer fit for purpose”.
But, like in all relationships, there are moments that present as opportunities to reaffirm and invest more as the capacity of each allows. Now is that moment. O Canada, we see you.
Kāhore taku toa i te toa takitahi, he toa takitini – We cannot succeed without the support of those around us.
UROVESA partners with EPE New Zealand for Protected Mobility Capability Project
Spanish specialist military vehicle manufacturer URO Vehículos Especiales S.A. (UROVESA) has announced partnership with EPE NZ for the Ministry of Defence’s Protected Mobility Capability Project (PMCP).
New Zealand’s Ministry of Defence signed a contract with UROVESA in November 2024 to replace part of the NZDF’s existing operational utility vehicle fleet. Under this agreement, UROVESA will deliver 40 new medium VAMTAC CK3 vehicles and 20 light VAMTAC ST5 vehicles.
These high-performance platforms are designed to enhance operational effectiveness and safety, in a range of mission environments.
Wellington-based EPE NZ will play a key role as UROVESA’s local partner by providing local experience and comprehensive support for the fleet’s introduction. EPE NZ operates from its headquarters and Maintenance and Supply Hub near Trentham Military Camp, with existing contracts under five Defence Master Service Agreements (MSA).
EPE has committed to undergoing specialized training from UROVESA, expanding its facilities, and growing its workforce to further enhance the support provided by its Through Life Support team.
“At EPE NZ, we are proud and honoured to partner with UROVESA to support the PMCP utility vehicle project,” said Andy Cross, General Manager of EPE NZ. “From the start of our relationship, there was a clear synergy that allowed us to work well together and fully
understand each other’s roles and responsibilities.”
“We are excited about this longterm contract, which, alongside our existing prime contracts and MSAs with New Zealand’s Defence agencies, will enable us to continue supplying and supporting the NZDF in the future,” he said.
“As a company with a proven track record of delivering the highest levels of capability and service to our customers, we are already prepared to take on this additional contract and look forward to working closely with UROVESA, the Ministry of Defence and the NZDF.
“In our extensive, international experience, one of the key factors in ensuring customer satisfaction and the operational capabilities of our vehicles is having a strong local
partner,” commented UROVESA’s CEO and President, Justo Sierra.
“In this case, the background of EPE NZ adds real value, given it has more than 15 years of experience providing technical service support to New Zealand Defence agencies, through multiple active contracts, and a team with not only a technical background but also military expertise. This reinforces our proximity to the client and the high quality of our customer service delivery,” he added.
“This collaboration marks a substantial enhancement of the NZDF’s operational capabilities, providing cutting-edge vehicles to ensure mission success, and further solidifying UROVESA and EPE’s shared commitment to supporting defence forces worldwide.”
Government accused of hypocrisy over proposed NZDF’s civilian workforce cuts
The Labour Party and PSA union have been quick to identify the irony between talk of increased Defence spending and latest staffing cut proposal, writes chief editor Nicholas Dynon.
Nicholas Dynon
is chief editor of Line of Defence, and a widely published commentator on New Zealand’s defence, national security and private security sectors.
In a 20 March media release , the PSA union reported that the NZDF has informed its staff of plans for a major restructure of the civilian workforce resulting in a net reduction of 374 roles.
This, states the union, comes on top of cuts late last year which saw 144 civilian workers take voluntary redundancy. It also comes just weeks after Prime Minister Luxon and Defence Minister Collins indicated in the wake of PLA-N live firing exercises in the Tasman Sea that Defence spending would be significantly increased.
“The Prime Minister is a hypocrite. He said his government would spend more on Defence but is now responsible for cutting critical civilian expertise that are critical to
ensuring that we have a combat-ready Defence Force,” said PSA National Secretary Fleur Fitzsimons.
“This is about saving money, not the security of New Zealand. How can the Government talk on one hand about the need to invest more in defence to counter rising international risks and yet allow these cuts? It’s dangerous and makes no sense,” she said.
“Defence can’t operate without a well-resourced civilian workforce to maintain IT systems, provide healthcare for military personnel, provide engineering support for military equipment and other critical functions. Civilians are the backbone of our Defence Force.”
Filled and vacant roles
In a 21 March update on its Workforce Savings Programme, the NZDF stated that it had on 20 March began a consultation process with staff and unions on proposals “to disestablish 380 currently filled positions, while creating 293 new roles.”
These numbers do not include 287 currently vacant roles, which are to be disestablished as part of the proposal, bringing the total number of potentially affected roles (both filled and vacant) to 667.
The NZDF cited the need to “continue to prioritise its outputs of
Fleur Fitzsimons, National Secretary for the Public Service Association
Defence house in Wellington, courtesy NZDF maintaining combat readiness and delivering on core military activities” in order to stay within its budget as the reason for the proposed staffing cuts.
However, the NZDF expected that under the proposed changes, most people affected would be redeployed into “suitable alternative positions” in the new structure. According to the update, the changes could “lead to a reduction of about 80 employees at the end of the process.”
“It’s important to note that this is a consultation process with staff and unions, and no final decisions have been made, including on whether the proposal in whole or part, will be implemented or whether redundancies will be required,” it said.
A month is a long time
In a 24 February statement, the PSA had urged the Government to stop planned job cuts to the Defence Force civilian workforce “in the wake of promises to increase defence spending”
“We welcome the u-turn on Defence spending by the
Government and urge it to start by stopping any further cuts to the civilian workforce,” said the PSA’s Fleur Fitzsimons.
“It’s ironic that the backdown on Defence spending comes just a year after it ordered the agency to slash spending by 6.5%.”
“It’s great that the Government belatedly realising that the unstable geopolitical environment, underlined by the activities of the Chinese navy off the coast of Australia currently, means we need to invest more in defence.
“ We urge the Government to stop with the reckless cuts and spending decisions like stopping flu vaccines to date. It must do the right thing by its critical civilian workforce if it is really serious about the capability of the Defence Force.”
Labour weighs in
In a 20 March press titled National At Sea Over Defence Jobs , Labour Party Defence spokesperson Peeni Henare was quick to lambast the government over the proposed civilian staffing cuts.
“ National is looking to cut hundreds of jobs at New Zealand’s
Defence Force, while at the same time it talks up plans to increase focus and spending in Defence,” Peeni Henare said.
“If we want more people joining our Defence Force, getting rid of the people who make uniformed personnels jobs easier isn’t a good start.”
According to Mr Henare, rhetoric is not matching reality.
“ What this Government says and does are two entirely different things. They should be encouraging people to join the Defence Force, not giving them reasons not to,” he said.
“ The proposal to cut 374 roles will hurt our Defence Force, there’s no doubt about that. These are roles that enable our Army, Navy and Air Force personnel to do their jobs. You can’t cut this many jobs and expect the front line not to have to pick up the slack and do even more.”
According to the NZDF update, “Feedback from staff and unions is an important part of consultation and will be carefully considered before making final decisions.”
Inspiring female security leaders among 2025 Women in Security Awards Aotearoa winners
An academic, two police intelligence professionals, two security officers, and online harm, financial crime, and terrorist and violent extremism specialists feature in the cohort of 2025 WiSAA winners.
This year’s Women in Security Awards Aotearoa again proved a challenge for its judging panel, with winners across seven categories selected from a high quality field of nominees from across New Zealand’s security and resilience sector. Their award citation narratives will hopefully inspire a cohort of deserving nominees to come forward for next year’s Awards:
Contributing to defence and international security:
Associate Professor Anna Powles, Massey University
Associate Professor Anna Powles has been recognised for her work focusing on international security in the Pacific, and particularly in highlighting Pacific Island Country
security concepts and imperatives within the context of intensifying strategic competition in the region. Anna’s analysis and commentary on the implications of great power competition within the region and Pacific responses to it enriches academic, policy, and public debate on key security challenges facing New Zealand and the region.
Sh e has played a key role in raising awareness of the challenges through traditional mechanisms and via high levels of online engagement. Her involvement in the “Rules of Engagement: Defence Diplomacy in the Pacific Islands Region” project, and her work in giving visibility to recent great power bilateral developments, are of particular note.
Through her commitment, capability, professionalism, advocacy, and leadership, Anna has made a significant contribution to regional security and the security of Aotearoa New Zealand.
Countering incivility and violent extremism:
Kristina Kirk, Christchurch Call Foundation
Kristina Kirk is recognised for her work in leading the Christchurch Call Crisis Response Protocol (CRP) as a Principal Strategic Advisor at the Christchurch Call Foundation. A globally coordinated
Kristina Kirk effort to combat the spread of terrorist and violent extremist content (TVEC) online during online crises, the CRP involves the multistakeholder Call community of governments, technology firms, and civil society.
Over the past 18 months, Kristina has updated and improved the CRP to ensure it delivers better oversight for collective response with the ability to share information at speed, coordinate actions and increase agility. This limits the opportunity of malicious actors to use TVEC to dehumanise victims, intimidate or coerce people, radicalise or recruit others, or inspire and incite further violence.
Kristina successfully delivered the CRP update into service in early December 2024, and since then the protocol has been used nine times to assess terrorist and violent extremist incidents around the world.
Associate Professor Anna Powles
Safeguarding networks and people online:
Andrea Leask, Netsafe Andrea Leask is recognised for excellence in leading Netsafe’s national response service to high resolution rates for harmful digital communications complaints despite significant increases in demand. Currently Netsafe’s Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Andrea was previously Chief Digital Harms Officer leading the delivery of a comprehensive helpline for individuals harmed online.
In t he year ended 30 June 2024, Netsafe received more than 28,468 reports of online harm, including 6,272 complaints assessed as falling within the scope of the Harmful Digital Communications Act – a 25% year-on-year increase. Despite the increase, through processes that Andrea designed and implemented, the Digital Harms team achieved a resolution rate of 95% for harmful digital communications complaints.
Andrea additionally represents Netsafe on the global stage as Chair for the Oceania chapter of GASA –the Global Anti-Scam Alliance. Andrea has also led the Digital Harms team to consecutive wins in the Non-Profit Support Services category at the CRM Awards in 2023 and 2024.
Preventing crime and protecting communities:
Danica Young and Sophia Bogiatto, New Zealand Police Danica Young and Sophia Bogiatto are recognised for their individual and combined analytical expertise, commitment, and intelligenceled approach that significantly contributed to the disruption of serious organised crime in Aotearoa.
As intelligence professionals within the National Organised Crime Group (NOCG) of New Zealand Police, Danica and Sophia played key roles in supporting Operations Embargo and Delta Blue, which targeted the activities of a major outlaw motorcycle gang (OMG). Their contributions, alongside those of their wider team, supported significant enforcement outcomes against organised crime.
The i ntelligence efforts of Sophia and Danica directly contributed to 31 criminal charges laid against the gang and its associates; seizure of highpowered firearms, illicit drugs, and millions in criminal assets; and the dismantling of the gang’s leadership.
Their intelligence products crippled the gang’s ability to function, leading to the voluntary surrender of gang patches by highranking members, and gang leaders being taken into custody – reducing their capability to offend.
Securing organisations and infrastructure:
Shirin Kiff, Transdev Shirin Kiff is recognised for delivering public safety and infrastructure security as a Security Manager with Transdev Wellington Limited. A highly skilled and dedicated Security Manager, Shirin has made significant impact in safeguarding both the public on the Metlink Railway Network and Transdev critical infrastructure.
Shirin has been instrumental in developing security protocols that prevent criminal activities, ensure railway passenger safety, and enhance the overall security of Transdev and Metlink’s operations. Through her leadership, she has fostered a culture of vigilance and accountability,
Andrea Leask Sophia Bogiatto
Shirin Kiff
Danica Young
WOMEN IN SECURITY
which has led to a significant increase in the reporting of security incidents and the training and equipping of all security personnel to respond swiftly and efficiently to emerging threats. Her innovative strategies, such as the implementation of advanced surveillance systems and the development of robust emergency response plans, have improved the organisation’s resilience to security risks. Her leadership has not only empowered her team but has also made a profound and lasting impact on the community.
Combatting fraud and misrepresentation:
Sara Stockley-Smith, Westpac Sara Stockley-Smith is recognised for her exceptional contributions and leadership at Westpac New Zealand as the Service Group Owner of Westpac’s Fraud and
Financial Crime team. Sara has consistently demonstrated excellence within her role, while also actively promoting technology to young girls and breaking down barriers through her involvement in the ShadowTech.
Sara’s work in the fraud and scam prevention programme has had a profound impact on Westpac’s customers and the community generally. Her work and efforts have helped mitigate fraud that could otherwise have seriously disrupted the lives of hardworking New Zealanders.
B y taking a holistic approach to staying ahead of fraudsters and skilfully harnessing the latest fraud prevention techniques and financial crime platforms, Sara has made a tangible difference in the lives of many and has contributed to community resilience against scams.
Responding
to
natural disaster events:
Jill Priest, FIRST Security
Jill Priest is recognised for her work as FIRST Security’s Bay of Plenty Branch Manager, based in Tauranga. In this role, Jill is responsible for customers across the Bay of Plenty, Hawkes Bay and Gisborne. Jill’s holistic and community-minded approach to security and safety puts people first.
Jill has a widely recognised ability to establish meaningful connections with people from all walks of life. She leads by example during business-asusual and in supporting responses to natural disasters, including the direct aftermath to – and long recovery from – Cyclone Gabrielle.
Jill is a previous Women in Security Awards Aotearoa recipient, having won the 2021 ‘Leader’ category, and she was awarded Specialised Security Services Professional of the Year at the 2023 NZSA New Zealand Security Awards. Nominations for the 2026 Women in Security Awards Aotearoa will open later this year and will be advertised on the Defsec New Zealand website and in Line of Defence Magazine. For more information about the WiSAAs, visit the WiSAA pages on the Defsec website.
Sara Stockley-Smith
Jill Priest
Women in Security Awards Aotearoa: Winners Announced!
High calibre category winners and highly commended finalists from across New Zealand’s security and resilience sectors recognised in the 2025 Women in Security Awards Aotearoa.
In its fifth year, Women in Security Awards Aotearoa (WiSAA) has once again proven a challenge for its judging panel with a high quality field of nominees from across New Zealand’s security and resilience sector.
Organised by Defsec New Zealand and supported by the New Zealand Security Sector Network (NZSSN) and several security sector industry and professional associations, the WiSAA initiative was established in 2020 to recognise women who are leading the way in protecting New Zealanders.
Th is year also saw the Awards partner with UN Women Aotearoa New Zealand to raise awareness around issues of security, safety, and resilience in the context of gender equality and women’s empowerment.
“It’s not only inspiring to read the nominations that have been submitted this year but also quite moving to say the least,” said judging panel representative and 2020 WiSAA alumna Ngaire Kelaher CPP PSP.
“ The quality of the submissions have been exceptional and it reinforces why recognition opportunities such as the Women in Security Awards Aotearoa are vital to the sector – not only to provide a means to have these amazing individuals recognised but also to share their stories, uplift and inspire others, and celebrate the amazing work that is being done in Aotearoa.”
Nominees must be women, or identify as women, have more than
three years of experience in a security or resilience-related profession, and be actively practising in Aotearoa New Zealand or working overseas in a New Zealand-focused role. This year’s WiSAAs winners are spread across seven categories.
And the winners are…
1. C ontributing to defence and international security: Associate Professor Anna Powles, Massey University.
2. C ountering incivility and violent extremism: Kristina Kirk, Christchurch Call.
3. S afeguarding networks and people online: Andrea Leask, Netsafe.
4. Preventing crime and protecting communities: Danica Young and Sophia Bogiatto, New Zealand Police.
5. S ecuring organisations and infrastructure: Shirin Kiff, Transdev.
6. C ombatting fraud and misrepresentation: Sara StockleySmith, Westpac.
7. R esponding to natural disaster events: Jill Priest, FIRST Security.
“ The nominees in the 2025 cohort continue to demonstrate the high calibre of security and risk practitioners across Aotearoa New Zealand,” said Andrew Thorburn, WiSAA co-founder and NZSSN representative.
“ These nominees and their stories also provide evidence of how relevant and important these awards are,” he said.
H ighly commended finalists in this year’s awards include Su Kaur, Jacinta Mooney, and Angelina Riley from FIRST Security, and Amber Gillies and Teresa Smith from Vault Security.
According to the organisers, this year’s WiSAA category winners and highly commended finalists have been notified of their achievement, and several of them were presented with their award certificates as part of their organisations’ International Women’s Day events.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Five Eyes or No Eyes?
Despite the uncertainties of the Trump administration, Five Eyes membership is of enduring value, writes Dr John Battersby, Senior Fellow in the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey University.
Dr John Battersby is a Senior Fellow in the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey University and Managing Editor of the National Security Journal.
In the mid 2020s the People’s Republic of China, the sleeping geographical and economic giant, has woken and seems intent on ‘taking its place’ in the world. Like previous empires, China’s is beginning with expeditionary economics – the promise of trade, aid and investment. The warships will follow once the new trading arrangements need securing and just as the 20th was America’s century the 21st will most likely be China’s.
The US has long believed the Pacific Ocean is an American lake –if it ever was, it isn’t any more – now at least they will have to share it. Perhaps the US and China will settle on détente and spheres of influence. Most likely they will compete for dominance of it all.
China’s warships have recently been in the Tasman Sea conducting live fire exercises – an occurrence we can expect to see repeated in the future. Australian and New Zealand naval vessels sailed through the Taiwan Straits in 2024 making
a statement about the freedom of navigation. China has now replied.
New Zealand’s little navy of nine (no make that eight) vessels can do very little. Our ships are not capable enough to muscle up and contest the Tasman Sea, nor could we ask to join the exercises (after all China is not our enemy) – because we probably lack the live ammunition to do so.
We could wake up from our post ANZUS malaise, break with the cadger mentality we have about security, spend actual money on defence, assess what we actually need to secure our economic zone and make an active and innovative contribution alongside likeminded countries to regional security… or we could opt for our usual assumption of remoteness as our safeguard, and pretend that the implications of an economic or military power contest in the Central and South Pacific will not affect us. Only they will.
New Zealanders generally seem to be taking very little notice of the constant tenor of incidents between
Chinese fishing boats, and Chinese coastguard vessels in near collisions in the South China Sea with those of other nations in the region. A Chinese naval station in the Cook Islands and a US militarisation of American Samoa – totally hypothetical at the moment - could fundamentally alter the entire political nature of the South Pacific.
Further north, it is likely a matter of when, not if, mainland China absorbs Taiwan - and most scenarios as to how that will happen involve violence. If that violence is prolonged, a significant number of New Zealand’s sea and air-lanes will be closed by the disruption such a conflict will entail. Live fire exercises had aircraft routes diverted – a war in the Pacific could eliminate them entirely.
The fact that the Mickey Mouse Club appears to have taken over the White House and that Donald and Goofy are in charge, has prompted a number of politicians and academics to question whether New Zealand should remain in the American-led Five Eyes arrangement.
Five Eyes is an information sharing organisation involving intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Assessing its value on the facts is difficult because those who have them stay mum. This situation suits politicians and academics who
present themselves as wise in their challenge of an institution that does not answer back.
But Five Eyes is not an alliance. It allows its members to share information of mutual interest and provides a framework for acting together in intelligence or law enforcement contexts when their interests coincide. Intelligence assessments we receive may well be through a US lens, but the facts they are based on can be locally reassessed by us and conclusions drawn that meet our needs.
Five Eyes does not bind any country to any policy, and it does not presume concerted action or even agreement on any issue. Moreover, despite its previous informal existence, Five Eyes was born within weeks of a major international falling-out between the US and Britain over the Suez invasion in 1956. Then there was the Vietnam War, which Britain stayed out of; then in mid 1970s Australia broke ranks for a time, and then in 1985 New Zealand did.
But Five Eyes survived, demonstrating its resilience to political tumult. Presidents and Prime Ministers have come and gone, and their nations have squabbled occasionally, but Five Eyes has carried on.
Given the potential for massive change in climate, in economic infrastructure and in geo-political tension in the Pacific, it would be unwise to forgo such a long-standing information source even if it has a pro-US bent.
One alternative would be to pay our own way and develop a fullyfledged external intelligence agency to replace the information we now get for little cost. How likely is that?
Or we go with the critics. We op to fly blind, with seas rising and shifting around us, with major powers probably only a few years from building naval and military bases in the South Pacific, and us taking comfort from the natural blindfold our presumed isolation provides us with.
New Zealand’s security conundrum is not that China is our enemy – China is not; nor is it that the American’s are our friends –because of course they are, just not so much that they did not quickly drop us from ANZUS and exclude us from AUKUS.
Our problem is that the South Pacific is no longer benign, the winds of change are gathering pace and what is beyond the horizon is unclear.
The question is - should we look into an uncertain future with Five Eyes? Or no eyes?
US dominance of global arms exports grows as Russian exports fall
Ukraine became the world’s largest importer of major arms in the period 2020–24, according to the latest data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfer Database.
European arms imports overall grew by 155 percent in 2020-24 compared to 2015-19, as states responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and uncertainty over the future of US foreign policy. The US further increased its share of global arms exports to 43 percent, while Russia’s exports fell by 64 percent, according to new data on international arms transfers published by SIPRI in March.
The overall volume of arms transfers globally remained at roughly the same level as in 2015–19 and 2010–14 (but was 18 percent higher than in 2005–2009), as increasing imports in Europe and
the Americas were offset by decreases in other regions. The top 10 arms exporters in 2020–24 were the same as those in 2015–19 but Russia (accounting for 7.8 percent of global arms exports) fell to third place behind France (9.6 percent), while Italy (4.8 percent) jumped from 10th to sixth place.
At least 35 states sent weapons to Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, and substantial further deliveries are in the pipeline. Ukraine received 8.8 percent of global arms imports in 2020–24. Most of the major arms supplied to Ukraine came from the USA (45 percent), followed by Germany (12
percent) and Poland (11 percent). Ukraine was the only European state among the top 10 importers in 2020–24, although many other European states significantly increased their arms imports in the period.
“The new arms transfers figures clearly reflect the rearmament taking place among states in Europe in response to the threat from Russia,” said Mathew George, Programme Director with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme. “However, some major arms importers, including Saudi Arabia, India and China, saw large declines in import volumes for a variety of reasons,
despite high threat perceptions in their regions.”
European NATO members increase dependence on USsupplied arms
Arms imports by the European NATO members more than doubled between 2015–19 and 2020–24 (+105 percent). The USA supplied 64 percent of these arms, a substantially larger share than in 2015–19 (52 percent). The other main suppliers were France and South Korea (accounting for 6.5 percent each), Germany (4.7 percent) and Israel (3.9 percent).
“With an increasingly belligerent Russia and transatlantic relations under stress during the first Trump presidency, European NATO states have taken steps to reduce their dependence on arms imports and to strengthen the European arms industry,” said Pieter Wezeman, Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.
“But the transatlantic armssupply relationship has deep roots. Imports from the USA have risen and European NATO states have almost 500 combat aircraft and many other weapons still on order from the USA.”
USA increases share of arms exports. Russian exports slide Arms exports by the USA increased by 21 percent between 2015–19 and 2020–24, and its share of global arms exports grew from 35 percent to 43 percent. The USA supplied major arms to 107 states in 2020–24.
For the first time in two decades, the largest share of US arms exports in 2020–24 went to Europe (35 percent) rather than the Middle East (33 percent). Nevertheless, the top single recipient of US arms was Saudi Arabia (12 percent of US arms exports).
“The USA is in a unique position when it comes to arms exports. At 43 percent, its share of global arms exports is more than four times as much as the next-largest exporter, France,” said Mathew George. “The USA continues to be the supplier of choice for advanced long-range strike capabilities like combat aircraft.”
In contrast to the USA, arms exports by Russia fell sharply (–64 percent) between 2015–19 and 2020–24. The decline started before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022: in 2020 and 2021 export volumes were much smaller than in any year in the previous two decades.
“The war against Ukraine has further accelerated the drop in Russia’s arms exports because more weapons are needed on the battlefield, trade sanctions make it harder for Russia to produce and sell its weapons, and the USA and its allies pressure states not to buy Russian arms,” said Pieter Wezeman.
“Two of Russia’s most important arms-trading relationships had already weakened before 2022, with India increasingly favouring other suppliers, and China sourcing more arms from its own burgeoning arms industry.”
Russia delivered major arms to 33 states in 2020–24. Two thirds of Russian arms exports went to three states: India (38 percent), China (17 percent) and Kazakhstan (11 percent).
France became the world’s second largest arms supplier in 2020–24, delivering arms to 65 states.
France’s exports of major arms to other European states almost trebled between 2015–19 and 2020–24 (+187 percent). This was mainly due to deliveries of combat aircraft to Greece and Croatia, and arms supplies to Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Nevertheless, India received by far the largest share of French arms exports (28 percent)—almost twice the share that went to all European recipients combined (15 percent). The second largest recipient of major arms from France was Qatar (9.7 percent of French arms exports).
China was the fourth largest exporter of arms in 2020–24, with 5.9 percent of global arms exports. Despite China’s efforts to increase its arms exports, many large importers do not buy Chinese arms for political reasons.
Asia and Oceania remains largest arms-importing region
The share of global arms transfers going to states in Asia and Oceania fell from 41 percent to 33 percent between 2015–19 and 2020–24. A 21 percent drop in imports to the region was in large part due to arms imports by China shrinking by 64 percent between the two periods, as it increasingly substituted imports— mainly from Russia—with locally designed and produced weapon systems. China’s arms imports are likely to keep falling as the capacity of its domestic arms industry grows.
Four states in Asia and Oceania ranked among the 10 largest arms importers globally in 2020–24: India, Pakistan, Japan and Australia. China dropped out of the top 10 arms importers for the first time since 1990–94. The main suppliers to the region in 2020–24 were the USA, which accounted for 37 percent of regional arms imports, Russia (17 percent) and China (14 percent).
India was the world’s second largest arms importer, with its imports reflecting perceived threats from both China and Pakistan. However, its imports decreased by 9.3 percent between 2015–19 and 2020–24. The largest share of Indian arms imports (36 percent) came from Russia, a significantly smaller share than in 2015–19 (55 percent) and 2010–14 (72 percent).
Arms imports by Pakistan grew by 61 percent between 2015–19 and 2020–24. China became even more dominant as its supplier, accounting for 81 percent of Pakistan’s arms imports in 2020–24, compared with 74 percent in 2015–19.
With the sharp drop in China’s arms imports, and marked decreases in imports by Taiwan (–27 percent)
and South Korea (–24 percent), arms imports by East Asian states shrank by 22 percent between 2015–19 and 2020–24. Japan (+93 percent) was the only East Asian state that saw an increase in its arms imports.
“While arms imports to Europe and the Middle East continue to grab media attention, Asia and Oceania remained the largest arms-importing region in the world in 2020–24, as it has been almost invariably since the early 1990s,” said Siemon Wezeman, Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme. “Threat perceptions concerning China are behind much of the arms procurement in the region.”
Middle East arms imports dip Arms imports by states in the Middle East fell by 20 percent between 2015–19 and 2020–24. Four of the top 10 global importers in 2020–24 were in the Middle East: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Kuwait. Qatar was the world’s third largest arms importer in 2020–24 (up from 10th largest in 2015–19). Between 2015–19 and 2020–24, Saudi Arabia’s arms imports decreased by 41 percent.
More than half of arms imports to the Middle East came from the USA (52 percent), while 13 percent came from Italy, 9.8 percent from France and 7.6 percent from Germany.
“Regional conflicts and tensions continue to drive demand for arms imports in the Middle East,” said Zain Hussain, Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme. “Given the volume of pending deliveries, the Middle East will remain a major armsimporting region.”
Despite the ongoing war in Gaza, arms imports by Israel remained largely stable between 2015–19 and 2020–24. In 2020–24 the USA supplied the biggest share of Israel’s arms imports (66 percent), followed by Germany (33 percent) and Italy (1.0 percent). Israel was the 15th largest arms importer globally in 2020–24, down from 14th in 2015–19.
“Israel has received substantial military aid from the USA following the Hamas-led attack on 7 October 2023,” said Zain Hussain. “However, for its recent military operations, Israel has employed mainly USsupplied weapons it had received earlier. Israel’s adversaries Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis have relied on Iranian arms, and Hezbollah and the Houthis have used Iranian-supplied missiles and drones against Israel.”
Insecurity
and conflict drive increase
in arms imports to West Africa
Arms transfers to West Africa have been rising sharply in the past 15 years as the security situation has deteriorated. The combined arms imports of West African states almost doubled (+82 percent) between 2010–14 and 2020–24. Nigeria accounted for by far the biggest share (34 percent) of arms imports to West Africa in 2020–24.
“The growth in arms imports to West Africa has been striking. While the volume of imports remains relatively small, it has important geopolitical implications,” said Katarina Djokic, Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.
“States like Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal seem to be rapidly increasing their imports,” she said. “Arms suppliers are using arms exports to boost their influence in this part of the world, including emerging suppliers—primarily Türkiye—alongside more established actors such as China, France, Russia and the USA.”
Other notable developments
• African arms imports fell by 44 percent between 2015–19 and 2020–24. This was mainly due to large decreases in imports by Algeria (–73 percent) and
Morocco (–26 percent). Arms imports by states in subSaharan Africa increased by 4.2 percent.
• Combat aircraft are the main long-range strike weapon imported by states, but interest in long-range land-attack missiles is increasing. In 2020–24 the USA supplied 45 percent of global long-range land-attack missile exports, delivering them to 7 states, with deliveries to 13 states pending.
• Arms imports by states in the Americas increased by 13 percent. The USA was the biggest importer in the region (accounting for 3.1 percent of global arms imports and 50 percent of imports by states in the Americas).
• Brazil’s arms imports increased by 77 percent between 2015–19 and 2020–24, and accounted for 49 percent of all arms imports to South America in 2020–24. The main suppliers to South America in 2020–24 were France (accounting for 30 percent of South American arms imports), the USA (12 percent) and the UK (11 percent).
• North Korea exported artillery and missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine. With this, both states violated the United Nations sanctions on North Korea.
IATA Annual Safety Report criticises conflict zone fatalities
According to the International Air Transport Association’s just-released 2024 Annual Safety Report, the aviation sector has had a year of strong safety performance, but conflict zones are contributing to higher fatalities.
2024 saw another year of strong overall performance on safety, according to IATA’s Annual Safety Report published in February. Although there were improvements over a five-year average for several key parameters, aviation safety took a step back from an exceptional performance in 2023.
Among the report’s headline figures:
• The all-accident rate of 1.13 per million flights (one accident per 880,000 flights) was better than the fiveyear average of 1.25 but worse than the 1.09 recorded in 2023.
• S even fatal accidents were recorded in 2024 out of 40.6 million flights. This is higher than the single fatal accident recorded in 2023 and the five-year average of five fatal accidents.
• 2 44 on-board fatalities occurred in 2024 compared to 72 reported in 2023 and a five-year average of 144. Fatality risk remained low at 0.06, below the five-year average (0.10), but double the 0.03 reported in 2023.
“Even with recent high profile aviation accidents, it is important to remember that accidents are extremely rare,” said Willie Walsh, IATA’s Director General.
“A decade ago, the five-year average (2011-2015) was one accident for every 456,000 flights. Today, the five-year average (2020-2024) is one accident for every 810,000 flights. That improvement is because we know that every fatality is one too many,” he said.
The report’s key insights include:
• R ising Conflict Zone Risks: The downing of two aircraft in conflict zones (Kazakhstan with 38 fatalities and Sudan with five fatalities) has reinforced the importance of the Safer Skies initiative, established in the aftermath of the PS752 tragedy (in which an Ukraine International Airlines flight was erroneously shot down by Iranian air defences in 2020) to facilitate safeguards in high-risk airspace.
• Most Common Accidents: Tail strikes and runway excursions were the most frequently reported accidents in 2024, underscoring the importance of take-off and landing safety measures. Notably, there were no controlled-flight-into-terrain (CFIT) accidents.
• A irlines on the registry of the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) (including all IATA member airlines) had an accident rate of 0.92 per million flights, significantly lower than the 1.70 recorded by non-IOSA carriers.
Conflict Zones: Need for Action
Along with growing incidents of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference, accidents and incidents related to conflict zones are a top concern for aviation safety requiring urgent global coordination.
“ No civil aircraft should ever be a target—deliberate or accidental—of military operations. Governments must step up, enhance intelligence-sharing, and establish clearer global protocols to prevent such tragedies and safeguard civilian aviation,” said Walsh.
Sharp Rise in GNSS Interference
Data from the IATA Incident Data Exchange (IDX) highlights a sharp increase in GNSS-related interference, which can mislead aircraft navigation systems.
W hile there are several back-up systems in place to support aviation safety even when these systems are affected, these incidents still pose deliberate and unacceptable risks to civil aviation. GNSS interference is most prevalent in Türkiye, Iraq, and Egypt.
R eports of GNSS interference—including signal disruptions, jamming, and spoofing—surged between 2023 and 2024. Interference rates increased by 175%, while GPS spoofing incidents spiked by 500%.
“ The sharp rise in GNSS interference events is deeply concerning,” said Walsh. “Reliable navigation is fundamental to safe and efficient flight operations.
“Immediate steps by governments and air navigation service providers are needed to stop this practice, improve situational awareness, and ensure that airlines have the necessary tools to operate safely in all areas.”
Regional Safety Performance
North America: With 12 accidents, the all-accident rate improved from 1.53 per million sectors in 2023 to 1.20 in 2024 and was better than the region’s five-year average of 1.26. Fatality risk has remained zero. The most common accident types in 2024 were tail strikes, followed by runway damage and runway excursions.
Asia-Pacific: With seven accidents, the all-accident rate increased from 0.92 per million sectors in 2023 to 1.04 in 2024 but remained below the five-year regional average of 1.10. Fatality risk was unchanged from 2023 at 0.15. Accidents included tail strikes, runway damage and turbulence, among others.
Africa: With 10 accidents in 2024, the all-accident rate rose from 8.36 per million sectors in 2023 to 10.59 in 2024, exceeding the five-year average of 8.46, although the fatality risk remained at zero for the second year in a row. The most common accident types were runway excursions, followed by those related to landing gear.
Middle East and North Africa: With two accidents in 2024, the all-accident rate improved from 1.12 accidents per million sectors in 2023 to 1.08 in 2024, bettering its five-year average of 1.09. Fatality risk has remained zero since 2019. While no accidents were related to GNSS
interference, it has emerged as a critical area of concern in the region.
Commonwealth of Independent States: With no accidents in 2024, the all-accident rate improved from 1.05 accidents per million sectors in 2023 to zero in 2024, an improvement over the region’s five-year average of 2.49. Fatality risk has remained zero since 2022. GNSS interference and security risks linked to regional conflicts remain key concerns for aviation safety in the area.
Europe: With nine accidents in 2024, the all-accident rate increased slightly from 0.95 per million sectors in 2023 to 1.02 accidents in 2024, which is on par with the region’s five-year average accident rate of 1.02. The fatality risk rate increased from zero in 2023 to 0.03 in 2024. The largest proportion of accidents were related to tail strikes followed by runway excursions.
North Asia: With a single accident, the all-accident rate increased slightly from zero accidents per million sectors in 2023 to 0.13 in 2024. This was better than the region’s five-year average of 0.16 accidents per million sectors. Fatality risk has remained zero since 2022. The accident was related to a tail strike.
Latin America and the Caribbean: With five accidents in 2024, the all-accident rate increased from 0.73 accidents per million sectors in 2023 to 1.77 accidents in 2024. This was better than the five-year average of 2.00. The fatality risk increased from zero in 2023 to 0.35 in 2024. The largest proportion of accidents was related to tail strikes.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Aviation Security Leaders Call for Digital Identity
International Air Transport Association (IATA) calls for the rapid adoption of digital identity technologies to enhance aviation security and operational efficiency.
Leading government and industry stakeholders in aviation security participating in a key aviation sector conference in March made the push for digital identity adoption, emphasising the need for collaboration in implementing Verifiable Credentials (VC) and Decentralised Identifiers (DIDs).
Attending the Sydney Leaders Week Conference, hosted by Qantas, were industry experts and government representatives from Australia, Canada, China, New Zealand, the UK, and the US.
According to IATA, it is widely accepted that digital identity can benefit aviation security through:
• Stronger Document Integrity: Reducing fraud and unauthorised access.
• Global Trust: Enabling secure, cross-border, interoperable identity verification.
• Operational Efficiency: Streamlining document verification for a smoother passenger experience, strengthening regulatory oversight, and optimising resource allocation.
“Global cooperation keeps flying secure. Adopting Verifiable Credentials and Decentralised Identifiers standards is a natural next step in reinforcing security, trust, and efficiency,” said Nick Careen, IATA’s Senior Vice President, Operations, Safety and Security.
“Every aviation stakeholder wants flying to be even more secure—which crosses geopolitical divides. The technology is ready and proven. We now need to take the momentum of this meeting and work towards obtaining a recommendation at the upcoming ICAO assembly later this year,” he said.
Strengthening security through digital transformation
Aviation security leaders at the conference identified several key actions for governments to drive the industry’s digital transformation, including:
• Fast-Track Technology Integration: Incorporate VC and DID technologies into national and international
security frameworks, aligning with ICAO Annex 17 and Aircraft Operator Security Programs (AOSP).
• Prioritise Aviation Digital ID Use Cases: Integrate aviation digital identity solutions into national digital strategies to enhance global cooperation.
• Invest in Capacity Building: Allocate resources to equip industry stakeholders with the necessary knowledge and infrastructure for seamless implementation.
• Increase Stakeholder Engagement: Promote awareness and industry-wide adoption of digital identity solutions through targeted education and outreach.
Industry working to support governments
IATA’s One ID initiative promotes globally interoperable digital identity standards, enabling passengers to verify their travel documents before departure and move through the airport using biometric recognition instead of physical documents.
One ID works together with ICAO’s Digital Travel Credential to deliver security and efficiency while maintaining privacy and compliance with global regulations.
IATA is also advancing its Aviation Security Trust Framework, which sees regulatory alignment, cross-sector collaboration and infrastructure as critical components to realise the benefits of digital identity in global aviation.
Battle-ready medical drones to join Australian Army’s ranks
A new drone delivery project led by Charles Darwin University (CDU) will aim to revolutionise healthcare in modern warfare.
The project, led by the North Australia Centre for Autonomous Systems (NACAS) at CDU and supported by the Queensland Defence Science Alliance (QDSA), will focus on solving the technical, logistical and regulatory challenges of integrating large, heavy-fuel cargo drones into the battlefield operating system.
NACAS will work with Queensland uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) manufacturer SAIDYNAMICS to adapt their hybrid 2-stroke engine drone for long-range, cold-chain cargo operations.
The project will also partner with Griffith University’s Centre for Enterprise Architecture Research and Management to develop navigation algorithms for drones to locate drop-off locations in GPSdegraded environments.
Visual line-of-sight trials are set to begin over the coming months in the Northern Territory, with longer beyond-visual line-of-sight trials (BLVOS) to start with regulatory approval.
NACAS Professor Hamish Campbell said the Australian government was investing heavily into sovereign capability for the manufacture of UAS, but far less attention was being paid to solving the challenges of integrating these platforms into existing operating systems and the national airspace.
According to Professor Campbell, the Northern Territory’s low ground infrastructure and sparse population
made it an ideal location for the project’s flight trials.
“NACAS is one of the leading organisations in Australia for research into UAS airspace integration, and this will be bolstered by the opening of the new Airspace Integration Research Facility (AIR-F) later in 2025,” Professor Cambell said.
QDSA Director Stuart Blackwell said the Alliance was focused on collaborating with the best minds in the Northern Territory, Queensland, and Defence industry to solve key challenges faced by the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
“QDSA believes this particular project has real potential to solve some of the logistics distribution challenges in remote locations of Northern Australia that will benefit Defence, Queensland and the Northern Territory,” Mr Blackwell said.
CDU Deputy Vice-Chancellor Research and Community
Connections Professor Steve Rogers said the University was well-placed to contribute to advancing defence capabilities.
“Australia needs to be at the forefront of defence research and innovation, and our researchers will provide strategically vital experience to these projects,” Professor Rogers said.
“Charles Darwin University became a member of the Queensland Defence Science Alliance less than a year ago and the beginning of these projects are a testament to our world-leading knowledge and capabilities.”
Northern Territory Chief Minister and Minister for Defence NT Lia Finocchiaro congratulated the grant recipients.
“This research reinforces the importance of the Northern Territory to our nation’s defence security and strategic importance in the Indo-Pacific,” Mrs Finocchiaro said.
HOMELAND SECURITY
Auckland Airport sees massive drug seizures
In the first two months of this year, Customs officers at Auckland Airport seized over 183 kilograms of drugs, and the figure is growing.
On 20 March, New Zealand Customs announced it had arrested three airport workers for smuggling 58 kilograms of methamphetamine off an international flight.
Customs, working with industry partners, identified suspicious activity within airport precincts. Investigations established that the three workers had moved a container off a flight from Malaysia at Auckland International Airport on 12 March 2025.
The men were arrested and appeared in the Manukau District Court on the same day. They faced multiple charges for the importation of methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine for supply and were remanded in custody.
Customs with assistance from Police also searched five properties in Auckland, finding a number of items of interest, including a quantity of cocaine.
The seized methamphetamine equates to close to 2.9 million individual doses, with a potential street value of up to NZ$21.7 million. The seizure is estimated to have prevented up to NZ$61 million in social harm and cost to New Zealand.
Customs Investigations Manager, Dominic Adams, said that this case sends a clear warning to those who are willing to abuse trust and access at the New Zealand border.
“Customs has zero-tolerance for anyone taking advantage of their privileged security access and we will not hesitate to prosecute those caught abusing it,” he said.
“We’re sending a clear message to transnational and serious organised crime groups that we are always on the lookout for signs of suspicious behaviour across the supply chain and have eyes on everyone trusted to work in secure areas.
“These arrests highlight the ongoing great work of our frontline Customs officers at the border in addition to Customs efforts in building trusted networks with border and industry partners to protect the integrity of our supply chain,” says Mr Adams.
“Police will take any opportunity to disrupt or prevent the harm that illicit drugs wreak across communities,” added Detective Inspector Tom Gollan, National Organised Crime Group.
“It is particularly pleasing to have this suspicious behaviour identified enabling the quick detection of the methamphetamine and the prompt arrest of the three people involved.”
“Again, it highlights the importance of the collaborative approach by Customs, Police and the Airport to detect and stamp out insider threats.”
100 kilograms of cocaine at Auckland Airport
In what is believed to be the largest seizure at a New Zealand airport to date, Customs seized an estimated 101 kilograms of cocaine at Auckland International Airport over the weekend of 15-16 February,
During routine border enforcement activities, Customs officers identified a number of bags arriving on the Hawaiian Airlines flight on Saturday night (15 February).
On examination, Customs officers located 85 bricks of a substance that had been wrapped in black film and clear plastic wrapping. Initial testing indicated positive for cocaine.
This amount of cocaine would have had a street value of up to NZ$35.4 million and caused up to NZ$37.8 million of social harm and cost to New Zealanders.
“Customs officers are highly trained and cognisant of how transnational organised criminal groups operate,” said Group Manager Border Operations Dana McDonald.
“We work hard to stop the supply of illegal drugs, with an aim to hit criminal profits, reduce the ability to cultivate user demand, and disrupt their goal to exploit New Zealand communities,” he said.
“While this seizure is a fantastic result that has stopped a significant amount of drugs from reaching and
harming our communities, what is of Customs concern is that seizures at Auckland Airport have increased steadily in recent years. We have adapted accordingly to this threat.
36 kilograms of methamphetamine in unaccompanied luggage
Customs officers at Auckland International Airport seized more than 36 kilograms of methamphetamine found in unaccompanied bags.
The two bags arrived on Wednesday 5 March on a flight from LAX and were referred to Customs for further inspection.
A search of both bags identified a number of plastic-wrapped, vacuum-sealed parcels. Testing of the substance within those parcels returned positive for methamphetamine.
“Criminals are trying to get drugs through our airport in increasingly large volumes, but our intelligence and partnership networks are alert to their tactics,” said Customs Auckland Airport Manager Paul Williams.
“Customs will continue to work across the industry to secure the supply chain, and our team will act swiftly to identify and stop risks as part of our focus of protecting the border.”
It is estimated the amount of methamphetamine seized would have
had a street value of up to NZ$13.5 million and caused around NZ$37.9 million in potential harm and cost to New Zealand.
Passenger jailed for six-and-ahalf years for 4.4 kgs of drugs
A 69-year-old man was sentenced on 28 January to six-and-a-half years’ imprisonment after attempting to smuggle approximately 4.4 kilograms of methamphetamine through Auckland International Airport.
The Dutch national was sentenced in the Manukau District Court and convicted with the importation of the Class A controlled drug.
The methamphetamine was seized by Customs officers in September 2024 after it was found under the lining of the man’s hand luggage. The 4.4 kilograms located would have been worth a street value of up to NZ$1.6 million dollars.
According to Customs Auckland Airport Manager, Paul Williams, stopping this quantity of methamphetamine from entering the country has prevented approximately NZ$4.9 million worth of social harm and cost to New Zealand.
“Drug couriers may be willing to take the risk of trying to smuggle illegal drugs, but they should understand that Customs’ training and access to intelligence means there is a good chance we will catch and arrest them,” said Williams.
Threat of AI cyber-attacks a top concern for NZ businesses
New research from Kordia reveals that 28% of large New Zealand organisations consider AI generated cyber-attacks to be a top threat to their businesses, despite only 6% of breaches being attributed to an AI-generated attack.
Alastair Miller, Principal Security Consultant at Kordia owned Aura Information Security
Of the 295 businesses with more than 50 employees surveyed as part of Kordia’s annual New Zealand Business Cyber Security Report:
• A lmost two thirds (59%) of New Zealand businesses were subjected to a cyber-attack or incident in 2024.
• 4 3% of all cyber-attacks and incidents were caused by email phishing.
• A lmost 1 in 10 businesses compromised by a cyber incident paid a ransom or extortion demand.
• 16% of cyber incidents resulted in the compromise or theft of personally identifiable information (PII) .
• 2 2% of cyber incidents caused operational disruption.
• 19% of cyber incidents related to a breach or attack on a thirdparty.
According to Alastair Miller, Principal Security Consultant at Kordia owned Aura Information Security, the findings reflect the proliferation of AI technology, resulting in an increase in social engineering and phishing attacks against businesses.
“AI has lowered the cost of entry and time investment needed by cybercriminals to craft, refine and adapt social engineering campaigns,” said Miller. “As a result, we’re seeing a surge of businesses reporting
attacks involving sophisticated email phishing, something that we expect will continue to increase.”
He says the report reveals that financial gain is a clear motivator behind attacks on Kiwi businesses.
“Money is the motivator. That’s why it’s unsurprising to see stolen personal information, IP, commercially sensitive data and business disruption amongst the list of impacts faced as a result of a cyber incident. These are all things that cybercriminals can leverage to put pressure on businesses to pay a blackmail or extortion demand.”
D espite this, many of the businesses surveyed are still not implementing basic cyber security, or elevating cyber security as a top risk for the company’s board.
“It’s disappointing to see New Zealand businesses lagging behind –around one third of businesses say they don’t do any reporting on cyber risk to their board of directors, and around half haven’t practiced their cyber security response plan,” said Miller.
“ This report reveals that despite concerns around cybercrime and the devastating impacts it can have on Kiwi businesses, it’s still not being taken seriously enough. Building and maintaining a strong cyber security posture comes down to doing the basics right, taking a risk-based approach, and always keeping one eye on the horizon for new and evolving threats.”
The rise of AI: A double-edged sword for businesses
The report reveals the extent to which AI is reshaping behaviours and attitudes around cyber security for New Zealand businesses, as well as the evolving nature of cybercrime.
Miller refers to AI-generated cyber-attacks as “the new frontier of cybercrime”, arguing that the “democratisation of increasingly sophisticated AI technology has catapulted the effectiveness and speed of cybercrime to extraordinary new heights.”
He points to the recent uptake of large language models in AIgenerated phishing attacks as an example. Not only has it enabled greater personalisation and adaptability by mimicking writing styles or contextualising messages in a timely manner, but it’s also enabled greater levels of automation, resulting in a highly scalable and efficient tactic for cybercriminals.
Of the 59% of respondents who said their business suffered a cyberattack or incident in 2024, 43% of those were compromised by an email phishing attack.
“Those numbers are high, and we know that they can be attributed in large part to a rise of AI-generated cybercrime tactics,” said Miller.
But cybercriminals aren’t the only cause for concern for New Zealand businesses when it comes to AI. More than a quarter (28%) of respondents
cited AI generated cyber-attacks as a threat to their business’s security posture.
Miller says that shadow AI –the unsanctioned use of AI tools by employees in the workplace –has heightened concerns around employees putting businesses at risk. One in four (25%) respondents cited employee awareness and behaviour as a top challenge to improving their cyber security posture, and one in six (16%) respondents cited improper use of AI as another top challenge.
“Employees are either accessing AI tools like ChatGPT without company knowledge or are not following any guidelines around data management to prevent exposure of company data to AI training models, for example, by feeding the AI with commercially sensitive or private information. In fact, our report indicated 6% of cyber incidents involved an AI-related data breach, so… we’re already seeing some of the consequences of poor AI usage in this country,” he explained.
“Vendors are increasingly incorporating AI technologies into enterprise software and moving towards an “opt out” model, meaning their AI functionality is automatically switched on. So, businesses really need to have some sort of policy or guidelines around proper AI usage for their business, because it is in fact becoming ubiquitous.”
According to Miller, for many New Zealand businesses the focus has been on leveraging AI to create cost and resource efficiencies.
AI can be a useful tool in cyber defence, he says, such as AI-integration in monitoring solutions that can help improve threat detection, streamline security operations and ease the manual workload of security and IT teams.
“There’s been much hype around what AI cyber security can achieve for a business’s security defences, and while AI absolutely has its place when it comes to defending against cybercrime, it still requires human oversight to ensure that it’s working effectively,” he said.
“Our advice is to take a strategic approach to AI cyber security tools with proven use cases, rather than buying into trends and bold claims. These should supplement, not replace, the cyber security basics.
“Our research reveals that almost half of all New Zealand businesses lack any sort of policy or guidelines to protect their business from AI data breaches. For businesses that’re concerned about the threat of AI, this is a fantastic place to start when implementing AI successfully.”
Weighing the costs of recovery, rebuild and ransoms
The survey reveals that around one in six (14%) cyber incidents affecting New Zealand businesses involved
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financial extortion, while one in ten (9%) cyber incidents resulted in the victim paying a ransom or payment demand.
Miller says that while the numbers appear small, they are likely to be much higher.
“Financial gain is the primary motivator for cybercriminals, and the reality is that many New Zealand businesses are ill-prepared, or unable, to respond and recover to incoming attacks and find themselves in a position where paying is the easiest way to make the problem go away,” said Miller.
“Unfortunately, it’s sometimes cheaper to pay a ransom or payment demand, than fork out for the cost of operational and wider business disruptions that commonly result from these types of attacks, not to mention the expenses associated with recovery and rebuild.”
Miller says that the report’s findings are indicative of the type of data malicious actors are after, flagging personal information as a lucrative target for cybercriminals financially extorting their victims.
One in six (16%) respondents revealed that personally identifiable information (PII) was accessed or stolen as a result of a cyber-attack or incident, which Miller says reflects what cybercriminals are motivated by when breaching businesses.
“Data is currency, and double extortion has become the new norm as attackers have evolved their tactics to squeeze even more from their victims,” he commented. “Rather than simply encrypting a business’s data to force a payment, cybercriminals are also stealing PII and commercially sensitive material, adding reputation damage and privacy breaches to their list of threats.”
Miller says that not only does paying a ransom incentivise cybercriminals to continue to extort their victims, but there’s also no guarantee that paying a ransom will
achieve the desired result, or that those same cybercriminals won’t exploit those known vulnerabilities and simply attack again.
Australia recently introduced legislative reforms to tackle the issue of rising ransomware and cyber extortion payments. The Cyber Security Act introduces mandatory reporting requirements for Australian businesses to enhance transparency and enable authorities to understand the scale of the problem and combat cyber threats more effectively.
“New Zealand does not currently have an equivalent to Australia’s Cyber Security Act which came into force in November 2024,” said Miller. “While the New Zealand Government has issued strong guidance and policies on the issue, without some sort of mandatory reporting, it’s very hard to get a sense of the true impacts of cybercrime and cash flowing to cybercriminal entities.”
Complacency is a cyber-risk: room for improvement
According to Miller, New Zealand businesses that want to improve
their security posture should ensure they’re doing the basics right. But the results from the survey suggest this isn’t the case. Of the 295 businesses surveyed:
• Two thirds (67%) have not performed a penetration test in the past 12 months.
• One in five (20%) do not monitor or log activity in their network.
• Less than half (39%) always conduct a risk assessment when onboarding new technologies.
• One quarter (26%) do not have any cyber security awareness/ training in place.
• One third (33%) were unaware if there was a single source of identity management for the business.
• One third (33%) were unaware of any vulnerability management programme in the business to support activities like patching.
“Cyber security works best with a layered approach – so if one control fails, there is another in place to continue protecting your most important data and systems. For example, having multifactor authentication on logins is one
simple way to add an extra layer of defence against identity attacks,” said Miller.
“We know that cybercriminals often log in with stolen credentials, rather than hacking their way into your business, so having a single source of identity management, for example, would significantly reduce the likelihood of an attacker slipping in unnoticed.”
He says that conversations about cyber security should begin in the boardroom. “The good news is that New Zealand businesses are increasingly recognising that cyber security isn’t an ‘IT problem’, it’s both a strategic business enabler and an enterprise-wide risk management issue.”
Cyber-attacks are a case of “when, not if” and Miller says that given boards play a critical role in a company’s incident response management before, during and after an incident, getting this right is a great place to start for businesses and boards who want to strengthen their security posture.
“We know that nearly two thirds of Kiwi businesses have suffered a cyber-attack in the past year, so
having a cyber incident response plan should be imperative,” he stressed.
“But the work doesn’t stop there; you must also regularly practise your plan to verify it is fit for purpose. Unfortunately, New Zealand businesses have succumbed to complacency here too.
Our survey has revealed that despite 86% of businesses having a cyber security incident response plan, only around half have practised it.
Cyber smarter, not harder: Core focus areas for New Zealand business in 2025
In addition to “getting the basics right”, Kordia recommends New Zealand businesses focus on five core areas in 2025:
• Risk assess AI, and other emerging technology: Major breakthroughs in AI present both risk and opportunity for cyber security. Businesses should assess what data or systems may be impacted by AI usage and determine whether their benefits outweigh any risk, and privacy considerations, as well as be across
any upgrades to those tools or changes in policy.
• Factor third-parties into business continuity plans: Third-party cyber threats are becoming more commonplace as more New Zealand businesses adopt SaaS platforms and cloud-based operations. All organisations should have a robust business continuity and cyber response plan in place which can be activated in the event of a major provider suffering a cyber-attack or incident.
• Take a risk-based approach to security investments: Businesses should prioritise cyber security investment where it will be most effective, and this requires first assessing and understanding their core cyber risks.
• Treat identity as a security foundation: Reviewing identity and access management processes and systems, implementing single sign on, segregating admin functions and enforcing phishing resistant MFA (multi-factor authentication) are some of the ways businesses can secure the perimeter from identity-based attacks.
• Prepare for quantum, the next wave of encryption: Increasingly advanced quantum computers have the ability to break through encryption currently used to protect electronic communications. While quantum may seem like tomorrow’s problem, organisations - particularly those in industries such as critical infrastructure, finance and health - should consider what impacts quantum might have on their risk profile, and on the data they store.
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Study reveals flaws in animal protection laws
New Zealand’s animal welfare system is failing – and in urgent need of a dedicated police unit, warns University of Auckland law Associate Professor Marcelo Rodriguez Ferrere.
The animal protection system in Aotearoa is ineffective, underfunded, and at risk of collapse, according to new research.
Associate Professor Marcelo Rodriguez Ferrere warns that without major reform, animals will continue to suffer harm without adequate legal consequences.
His doctoral thesis with the University of Alberta, which compares New Zealand’s system with Alberta, Canada, identifies deep structural flaws. These include overlapping responsibilities, jurisdictional confusion, and a reliance on the SPCA - an underresourced charity - to carry out much of the enforcement.
“The effect of this enforcement gap is clear: breaches of animal welfare laws go consistently undetected and under-prosecuted,” said Rodriguez Ferrere.
“Not only does this directly harm animals, but it weakens the deterrent effect of the law, allowing a cycle of neglect and cruelty to continue. In this way, animal welfare underenforcement frustrates the rule of law.”
A lack of financial support for the sector has resulted in inadequate training for animal protection officers, reactive and delayed enforcement, and areas where no enforcement occurs at all.
In New Zealand, three agencies - police, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(SPCA), and Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) – theoretically share responsibility for enforcing the Animal Welfare Act. But in reality, that enforcement falls to MPI and the SPCA and neither of them, Rodriguez Ferrere argues, have the resources to do the job effectively.
“The SPCA has been given the responsibility to enforce animal welfare legislation with regards to companion animals, even though police and MPI also have jurisdiction,” he said. “It’s a strange quirk of our system that we rely on a charity with limited funding to do this work. They do their best, but it’s not working.”
He believes New Zealand should consider removing enforcement responsibilities from the SPCA, which remains one of the few charities in the world still conducting private animal welfare prosecutions. Instead, he argues that their expertise could be shifted to
state-funded enforcement bodies dedicated to animal welfare.
“The SPCA has done an amazing job, despite limited resources, but our reliance on private enforcement is outdated and the biggest flaw in the system,” he said. “We need a specialised animal welfare unit within the police.”
Rodriguez Ferrere also sees broader issues at play, linking New Zealand’s weak enforcement to ‘institutional speciesism’. He says people prioritise the interests of their own species, while treating other animals as ‘property’.
“The legal classification of animals as property is speciesism in action,” he said. “As long as animals are treated as commodities, their well-being is directly linked to the value they represent to their owners and society.”
A properly funded police unit focused on animal welfare, he argues, would go a long way toward ensuring the law is upheld.
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