Ghoshal: New South Korean president’s balancing act with the North Andrew Watts: Southern Ocean and Antarctic patrol – an alternative to Navy Our panel of experts assesses 2025 Defence Capability Plan and Budget 2025
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The programme of study consists of two 30-credit courses:
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A critical examination of intelligence theory and practice, focusing on key concepts and methodologies of intelligence collection and analysis, analytical tools, frameworks and concepts applied to investigations and operations in the contemporary international security environment.
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EDITOR’S NOTE
Kia ora and welcome to the Winter 2025 edition – and 36th issue – of Line of Defence Magazine!
In this edition, we’re privileged to be joined by contributing writers Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO, Assoc Prof Shannon Bosch of Edith Cowan University, Editor-at-Large Dr Peter Greener , former RNZN Officer Andrew Watts , former New Zealand Army officer Graeme Doull , former RNZN Chief Petty Officer Jonathan Brooke , international security specialist Debalina Ghoshal , IFS’ Chris Morton and Bianca Nobilo , and Wesco Anixter’s Robbie Jones
A big shout-out and thank you to this edition’s headline sponsors Babcock , General Atomics Aeronautical Systems , and new sponsor Indra . The support of these organisations is a critical enabler for the continued publication of Line of Defence Magazine
How quickly things change. As recently as my Editor’s Note to the previous issue of Line of Defence I had written that our pattern of Defence spending reflected complacent placidity and that an updated Defence Capability Plan was the subject of continued delay.
Well, DCP 2025 has dropped, as well as major Defence investment announcements in Budget 2025. Grand statements and big promises have been made. Now for the delivery.
In the first of his two articles in this issue, Andrew Watts notes that the DCP text mentions Australia 33 times in the context of the alliance and the need for interoperability. Importantly, the document states that each individual investment business case will now start with four key considerations, the first being “what is the Australian approach, and is there any reason for New Zealand to take a different approach.”
Dr Peter Greener similarly notes that the DCP gives significant recognition to New Zealand’s alliance relationship with Australia, with an imperative of New Zealand being a force multiplier, and the potential future “development of a more greatly integrated ‘Anzac’ force.”
Dr Wayne Mapp argues that although it seems inevitable that there will be a substantial increase in New Zealand’s defence budget over the next decade in line with our strategic partners, these decisions are not yet locked in stone. He writes that a lot will depend on the broader strategic picture.
According to Graeme Doull in his first article for Line of Defence, the DCP envisages a conservative and conventional defence budget, distributing funds broadly across many areas, with only a modest commitment to new technologies and a focus on replacing and maintaining existing assets and capabilities. Are we failing to invest in capabilities relevant to 21st century warfare?
And there’s plenty more in this 36th issue of Line of Defence Magazine
Nicholas Dynon, Auckland.
CONTRIBUTORS
Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Assoc Prof Shannon Bosch
Dr Peter Greener
Mr Andrew Watts
Ms Debalina Ghoshal
Ms Bianca Nobilo
Mr Nicholas Dynon
GA-ASI
Mr Jonathan Brooke
Mr Graeme Doull
Mr Chris Morton
Mr Robbie Jones
SIPRI
Indra
SPONSORS & PARTNERS
Babcock
IndraGA-ASI
ASIS International
Massey University Centre for Defence & Security Studies
COVER IMAGE
Cover image courtesy NZDF, New Zealand Army Soldiers.
UPCOMING ISSUE
SPRING: September 2025
Main themes: Information domain, information security, cyber, space
Publication: 1 September 2025
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36 South Korea’s new president faces new balancing challenges with North Korea
38 2025 SIPRI Yearbook: Nuclear risks grow as new arms race looms
41 PM Luxon discusses security and trade in Beijing
42 Are Israel’s actions in Iran illegal? Could it be called self-defence?
HOMELAND SECURITY
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Mission-Ready: Indra revolutionises rapid deployment with Democl3s command and control solution
Indra, a global leader in technology and innovation, announces the launch of its ground-breaking Deployable Modular Command, Control and Communications Shelter (DEMOCL3S). This revolutionary system sets a new benchmark in the realm of mission-critical infrastructure, offering unparalleled capabilities for military operations, emergency response, and industrial applications worldwide.
DEMOCL3S represents a paradigm shift in rapid deployment capabilities, allowing to establish a fully functional command and control centre within just thirty minutes. Engineered for agility and efficiency, the system streamlines deployment procedures, managed adeptly by a compact team of four operators. This rapid deployment capability is crucial for quickly establishing command and control centres in response to emergencies, military operations, or crises.
The Armed Forces and emergency services prepare every day to respond immediately to any threat or risk situation. And one of the decisive elements to be able to do so is having a command and control centre that meets their needs.
Indra’s new centre has been designed to offer a space capable of housing the growing number of information and communications systems that enable these types of operations. The centre is modular, scalable and fully adaptable to the needs of any army or security corps.
At the heart of DEMOCL3S lies its modular architecture, designed to adapt seamlessly to diverse operational environments. Whether deployed on land, aboard vessels,
or in tactical settings, its scalable configuration ensures optimal performance across varied mission requirements. The system is designed to fulfil the highest versatility and efficiency requirements to offer a 3-in-1 deployment option. It can come into operation immediately, whether it is fully extended, semiextended or folded. Once at the destination, it can be deployed and picked up in a matter of minutes, with the help of just four operators.
Inside, the command and control centre provides a climate controlled air-conditioned workspace with
autonomous power supply systems, integrated satellite links, robust servers, and a comprehensive network infrastructure facilitate real-time information exchange and enhance joint situational awareness. This technological sophistication enables seamless coordination among deployed units, enhancing operational effectiveness in dynamic and challenging scenarios
DEMOCL3S is capable of self lifting and levelling with two configurable systems that can be fitted. During all stages of deployment the system can be
self-contained for transportation within the confines of the ISO20 Foot configuration. Signature management can be managed with Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) reduction, remote antenna farming and camouflage systems installed.
The work area is adaptable to the needs of each mission and, being modular, can be expanded to accommodate the number of personnel required. For enhanced security in high-risk zones, DEMOCL3S can be fortified with ballistic protection and weapon systems, safeguarding personnel against potential threats. This enhances safety for personnel operating within the command centre.
Indra thus meets the needs of increasingly advanced armies and security forces, which operate in digitized environments where the constant exchange of information is key. This requires the ability to move to any location, however
remote or inhospitable it may be, an infrastructure that ensures the correct operation of a large number of systems and provides the appropriate working and protection conditions for extended periods.
While primarily designed for military and emergency response operations, DEMOCL3S can also serve as a fixed installation for industrial activities such as mining, leveraging its robust infrastructure and modular design. By leveraging DEMOCL3S capabilities, industrial operations can benefit from enhanced command, control, and communications infrastructure, supporting efficiency and safety in challenging operational environments.
“We are proud to introduce DEMOCL3S, a game-changing solution that redefines rapid deployment and operational resilience,” stated Adam Taylor, Head of Business Development at Indra in Australia. “This innovative command
Tech for trust
and control centre exemplifies Indra’s dedication to pushing the boundaries of technology, providing our global customers with the tools they need to succeed in dynamic and demanding environments.”
Indra is a leading Spanish multinational and one of the foremost global defence, air traffic and space companies that, through technology, protects our current way of life and anticipates the needs of the future. Its committed team of experts, its in-depth knowledge of the business and the latest technologies, and its unique innovation and systems integration capabilities make it the trusted technology partner for key operations and digitalization for its customers around the world. Thanks to its leadership in major European programs and projects, as well as its spirit of collaboration and partnership strategy, it drives the industrial and innovative ecosystem in these sectors.
Cutting-edge technological solutions for Land, Sea, Air, Space and Cyberspace
Budget 2025: National security brings economic benefits
With a total investment in Defence of $4.2 billion, Budget 2025’s boost for Defence is about pulling our weight in an increasingly volatile world, says Minister.
Hon Judith Collins KC, AttorneyGeneral, Minister of Defence, Minister for Digitising Government, Minister responsible for the GCSB, Minister responsible for the NZSIS, Minister for Science, Innovation & Technology, Minister for Space, Lead Coordination Minister for the Governments Response to the Royal Commission’s Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques.
According to Defence Minister Judith Collins, pulling our weight in an increasingly volatile world will keep New Zealanders safe while boosting New Zealand’s domestic economy.
“To achieve this, the Government has allocated $2.7 billion of capital and $563 million of operating funding for priority projects identified in the Defence Capability Plan we released last month,” she stated as part of the government’s Budget 2025 announcements.
“This includes the replacement of maritime helicopters and complements the $957 million for defence activities, personnel and estate previously announced. This previous announcement, and today’s commitments, brings the total investment in Defence to $4.2 billion in Budget 2025.”
According to the minister, the government will be looking “to use New Zealand businesses where it makes sense to do so,” supporting those “who are innovative and capable of developing tools and capability that Defence needs.”
“Ultimately, spending on Defence will result in economic benefits to everyday New Zealanders and New Zealand businesses,” she said.
“I look forward to seeing our Defence industry grow in a range of areas, whether through New Zealand designed or built products, particularly in the advanced technology area, infrastructure development, or domestic contractors supporting high-value military procurement.”
The $2.7 billion in capital and $563 million in operating funding announced on 22 May for priority Defence projects is to cover essential items including:
• replacing the two Boeing 757s to support military operations and deployments, humanitarian and disaster relief support, and trade and diplomatic missions.
• replacing the Seasprite maritime helicopters to operate from Navy ships (previously announced).
• replacing the Javelin antiarmour missile system launch units with new units to ensure interoperability with partner militaries and provide the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) with the ability to fire at longer ranges.
• encrypted radios to provide deployed Army units with secure voice communication.
• a counter-UAS that can be set up in fixed locations and is able to disable drones/UAS that could pose a threat to personnel, aircraft/ vehicles and infrastructure.
• detailed design work for the future of Devonport Naval Base; and.
• investment in homes for Defence families, Defence infrastructure, modernising the Defence vehicle fleet and digital and information management projects.
“These investments are critical to enable Defence to increase its lethality, protect New Zealand, and deliver what we expect of them,” stated Ms Collins.
Budget 2025 signals government commitment to the 2025 Defence Capability Plan, which outlines planned commitments of $12 billion over the next four years, $9 billion of which is new spending. Subject to future Budget decisions and Cabinet approvals, the Plan is set to take Defence spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2032/33.
“Our people are being called upon to go more places, more often and for longer to play New Zealand’s part in contributing to global security. This funding will enable them to do that.
“We will pull our weight.”
Budget 2025 Defence Funding at a glance
Overall budget package: $4.2 billion, most of it over four years.
NZDF Operating: $957 million over the next four years.
Defence projects: $2.7 billion of capital and $563 million operating funding for priority major projects identified in the 2025 Defence Capability Plan.
Defence projects (capital and operating):
• Maritime helicopter replacement: Replacing the Seasprite maritime helicopters with a new fleet of maritime helicopters to operate from Navy ships (previously announced).
• Replacing the Boeing 757 fleet: Replacing two Boeing 757s to support military operations and deployments (including to Antarctica), humanitarian and disaster relief support, and trade and diplomatic missions.
• Javelin anti-tank missile upgrade: Replacing the Javelin anti-armour missile system launch units with the newer variant. The new units will ensure interoperability and provide the NZDF with the ability to engage targets at longer ranges.
• Network Enabled Army (NEA): New encrypted radios to provide deployed units with secure voice communication and additional equipment for deployable headquarters. This expands on the network developed by earlier investment in the NEA programme, and ensures NZ remains interoperable with Australia and other partners.
• Counter Uncrewed Aerial Systems: The counter-UAS system is a deployable system that can be set up in fixed locations and is able to disable drones/ UAS that could pose a threat to personnel, aircraft/vehicles and infrastructure.
• Enhancing cyber security capabilities: Investment to further develop defensive cyber capabilities to ensure the NZDF can continue to defend against cyber threats posed by
adversaries, while they are on deployment.
• Vehicles for NZDF – Garrison and Training Support (GATS): The NZDF operates a fleet of vehicles which move people, equipment and supplies between and within bases, support emergency services and disaster response, and support airfield operations.
• Design for Naval base enhancements at Devonport: This is the first of multiple tranches of investment and will allow for detailed design work to begin on specific and immediate infrastructure issues, as well as the demolition of some facilities that are no longer fit for use, making way for future construction.
• Defence housing programme –homes for families: To provide new housing and renovate housing at various defence locations.
• Information Management: Investment to continue to improve the NZDF’s ability to store and retrieve information, and to share information with our ally Australia, partners and other government organisations.
• Consolidated Logistics Project Infrastructure – Burnham Regional Supply Facility: The Burnham Regional Supply Facility will replace a range of existing logistics buildings with modern, fit for purpose facilities. The facility will enable the distribution, storage and organisation of equipment required to the support the training and deployment of NZDF’s personnel.
Funding has been allocated subject to Cabinet approval of final business cases. Specific project funding totals are commercially sensitive while business cases are under development and are not included above.
Image courtesy New Zealand Government.
DEFENCE CAPABILITY PLAN 2025
The Defence Capability Plan 2025 is the Government’s plan to rebuild the NZDF and prepare for an increasingly volatile world. While this plan has been designed with a 15-year horizon in mind, it deliberately focuses on critical investments in the next four years to ensure we can adapt as the world around us changes.
To respond to the deteriorating strategic environment the NZDF needs to be increasingly combat capable, interoperable with our partners, able to act as a force multiplier with Australia, and make the most of innovations which allow us to be more effective. To do this over the next 15 years we will invest in:
A focused and combat capable Navy with a mixture of combat, patrol, and multirole ships.
An Army that can operate independently, integrate with Australia, has improved strike capabilities, and is fully networked.
An Air Force that operates globally, with select combat capability, and which provides situational awareness and intelligence.
Strengthened cyber and information capabilities to protect the NZDF’s networks and systems, and provide defensive cyber, electronic and information warfare effects.
A workforce with the physical and digital infrastructure that is fit-for-purpose for a modern defence force.
The Defence Capability Plan outlines indicative spending of $12 billion on major capability and critical supports over the next four years. These indicative investments focus on what is required in the short term to rebuild the NZDF and prepare for future.
INDICATIVE SPEND BY AREA
Peter Greener: A Defence Capability Plan for The Ages
Committing $12 billion over the next four years with $9 billion in new spending, the Government seems intent on ensuring the development of significant capabilities for the New Zealand Defence Force, writes editor-at-large Dr Peter Greener.
On 7 April 2025, quietly, and at a Post-Cabinet Press Conference, Prime Minister Christopher Luxon introduced the long-awaited 2025 Defence Capability Plan
For those of us who follow Defence Capability development, any new CDP is a significant event. The Defence Capability Plan 2025 is more significant than most. This article will explore why this is the case, examining a range of capabilities highlighted in the Plan.
The context
“New Zealand is facing a more challenging strategic environment than we have for decades, with increasing threats to our security.” So said the Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023 , produced under the previous Labour government.
The 2025 Defence Capability Plan echoes such sentiments, but strengthens the language somewhat. It notes that New Zealand is facing “its most challenging and dangerous strategic environment for decades,” and goes on to emphasise the challenges facing the international rules-based order.
It notes that as strategic competition rises globally and regionally, so does the potential for armed conflict.
The rise of China in the IndoPacific, its attempts to broaden its spheres of influence, and the development of its military capability, all heighten concerns about China’s future intentions. Recent
developments in the South Pacific and strategic interest in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica all highlight that “New Zealand’s geographic isolation no longer shelters us from threats to the extent that it once did.”
Perhaps most tellingly, in her Forward to the document Defence Minister Judith Collins highlights that, “We should never rule out that we may need to defend ourselves.”
Particular emphasis is given to the New Zealand Defence Force being tasked with deterring potential threats and in order to do so it is acknowledged that the NZDF needs to be combat capable with enhanced strike capability and enhanced lethality. No previous recent defence capability plan has spelt out the need for such a robust response to the global geostrategic situation.
Significant recognition is given to New Zealand’s alliance relationship with Australia, with an imperative of New Zealand being a force multiplier. The importance of enhanced interoperability and integration of forces is specifically recognised, with the future “development of a more greatly integrated ‘Anzac’ force.”
What capability will New Zealand ultimately be able to contribute to such a force?
Enhanced strike and lethality
Of particular note is that enhanced strike is the first capability element to be listed in the new DCP, and new missiles are to be bought in the near term.
Dr Peter Greener is Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies, VUW, and Honorary Professor, NZDF Command and Staff College. He is Line of Defence Magazine’s Editorat-Large.
“Due to the deteriorating security environment, and the increased threat to New Zealand’s defence interests, the level of strike capability will be increased through the procurement of new missile systems,” states the DCP. “This will provide a deterrent effect to adversaries and an ability to respond to hostile vessels at a greater range.”
Under consideration for enhanced weapons will be the P-8A surveillance aircraft and the Anzac frigates, or the possibility of land-based strike. Enhanced interoperability will be important here, and “Defence will explore acquiring the same capabilities as Australia or partners”.
Future indicative investments suggest the possibility of delivering long range strike from a range of platforms, land-based, sea, or air.
Traditional core capability replacements or enhancements
Of concern for some time has been the reduced operational availability of the SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite helicopters and the need for their replacement .
DCP25 recognises that maritime helicopters are a core component of a frigate’s capability, extending both the ship’s offensive and defensive capabilities. It is also noted though that they have utility for other ships of the fleet, with a capacity for surveillance, ship-to-shore transport and combat capabilities.
The Plan indicates that they will be replaced by 2028, with an indicative cost of approximately $2 billion dollars.
Similarly there have been concerns about the replacement of the frigates. However a commitment is made to maintaining a naval combat capability, with the two current frigates, Te Kaha and Te Mana receiving ongoing upgrades “to extend the life of the Anzac frigates… into the early 2030s.”
A commitment is then made that the frigates will subsequently be replaced with contemporary frigates. Of particular note here is that the Offshore Patrol Vessels Otago and Wellington will also need to be replaced and consideration is to be given to “whether commonality of design or systems with the frigates may be possible.” This is another commitment that many have been advocating for some time .
Given the significant value of work that New Zealand companies secured during the building of the two Anzac frigates, where these ships might be built, and what opportunities there might be for New Zealand input, are important matters for consideration.
Also of concern has been the variable performance in recent times of the Air Force’s Boeing 757s. On 19 December 2024 a Request for Tender was issued ahead of the DCP, citing maintenance costs and
a lack of reliability, coupled with a competitive marketplace as a reason for fast-tracking. Interestingly two contenders were named, with the Boeing 737 Max 8 or Airbus A321 to replace the 757s by 2027.
Questions about the future of New Zealand’s artillery have been raised over time, but with the new focus on enhanced long range strike capability there is to be a renewed focus on land-based strike.
Whilst New Zealand troops have been using the 105mm Light Gun for training Ukrainian soldiers in the United Kingdom, a number of options for the gun’s replacement are to be considered. These include towed or self-propelled artillery, or rocketbased systems.
Australia has just last month received the first two (of 42) High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). With an imperative to have systems in common with Australia it will be interesting to see what replacements will be under consideration.
Army will also have significant investment in the Network Enabled Army programme, with up to $600 million to be spent in the near term, with more beyond.
Innovative solutions
DCP25 highlights that, relative to previous DCPs, it ‘includes further investments in lethality, uncrewed systems, and digital systems.”
Whilst a Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel was foreshadowed in DCP19, the new Plan sees a Southern Ocean patrol capability. With concerns about growing strategic interest in both the Southern Ocean and Antarctica, a multi-faceted response is considered, using uncrewed systems, boarding teams, and platforms.
Persistent surface surveillance (uncrewed autonomous vessels) to help maintain awareness of New Zealand’s vast areas of responsibility is envisaged in the near term, to be followed by sub-surface surveillance.
Long-range, uncrewed, remotely piloted aircraft will complement surface and sub-surface assets. Uncrewed maritime helicopters will also be considered, together expanding significantly the range of uncrewed assets for the NZDF.
Defence Estate and People
Camps, bases and service housing all get individual scrutiny and commitments in DCP25. Despite former defence minister Ron Mark making a commitment in 2019 to defence estate regeneration, the programme has been marked by insufficient funding. Among other initiatives, DCP25 sees a Defence Housing Programme being established to support “operational effectiveness (and) mitigate attrition of key personnel.”
Until recently, high attrition rates have hollowed out many key areas of the Defence Force. Whilst recruitment is now strong there remains a lack of experienced personnel across all three services.
One of the most significant expectations in the Plan is that “the NZDF should be able to sustain land combat operations for at least 24 months.” In order to achieve this Army must grow.
DCP 19 indicated that the Defence Force would grow by 1,500 by 2035, with an increase in the size of Army to 6,000. DCP25 predicts that “to support the delivery of this plan, by 2040 NZDF will have grown by around 2,500 people.” As I commented following the release of the DCP 2025, “A platform isn’t a capability until you’ve got the people to drive it, fly it or sail it.”
This plan commits $12 billion of spending over the next four years with $9 billion in new spending and, in looking at the money that will be spent over the next 15 years, it does seem as though the Government is intent on both addressing the people issue and ensuring the development of significant capabilities for the New Zealand Defence Force.
After Defence Capability Plan
2025 – The Next Generation Navy
The Defence Capability Plan’s signalling of like-for-like replacement for the Anzac frigates has implications for decisions around the rest of the fleet, writes maritime capability specialist and former Royal New Zealand Navy Officer Andrew Watts.
Senior Contributor CAPT Andy Watts RNZN (Ret) is Maritime Defence Capability Consultant, AUSTAL. He was previously Deputy Executive Director, Australian Civil Military Centre, and an RNZN officer for over 30 years.
My initial reaction on reading the DCP document was slight disappointment. Yes, there is a definite commitment to maintaining meaningful naval forces, but I thought the DCP could have gone further in signaling a fresh approach to force design.
On reflection, however, I realised that there is much to be encouraged by and considerable scope for innovation.
In past articles in this magazine, I have discussed the potential benefits of a combat and patrol fleet based on a common, modular platform that could be configured with capability modules for missions across the combat, patrol, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief spectrum.
However, the DCP signals that the frigates will be replaced with “comparable contemporary frigates”. Although it also discusses the advantages that might accrue from a common patrol/combatant platform, specifying frigates for the combat element makes this impractical on acquisition and sustainment cost grounds.
The DCP text mentions Australia 33 times in the context of the alliance and the need for interoperability, including the following statement:
“To drive innovative approaches, and increase interoperability (particularly with Australia), each individual investment business case prepared pursuant to this DCP will now start with four key considerations:
JS Kumano, a Mogami 30FFM frigate. Image: Government of Japan.
1. What is the Australian approach, and is there any reason for New Zealand to take a different approach…”
SEA 3000: Pros and cons
Under the SEA 3000 General Purpose Frigate project, Australia will acquire between eight and eleven frigates to replace the Anzac class. There are a number of reasons why participation in SEA 3000 should be the benchmark against which options for the combat element of the Maritime Fleet Renewal program should be assessed, aside from compliance with the above statement from the DCP.
Firstly, SEA 3000 will be one of the largest naval acquisition programs anywhere in the world. The more ships acquired, the lower the acquisition costs for both Australia and New Zealand. These savings are not trifling – the reduction in the unit procurement cost of each ship when numbers are added to the programme is astounding.
Secondly, we would be able to continue the shared training and logistics arrangements that have
proved so advantageous in the sustainment of the Anzac class, notwithstanding variations in configuration between our ships and the Australian.
Thirdly, the interoperability goals detailed in the DCP would be more than met.
Last, and by no means least, we would be acquiring highly credible and effective combat platforms that could add appreciably to the collective deterrence operations likely to be needed in future if geopolitical developments in our region continue on their current trajectory.
As always, there is a debit side to the ledger. Firstly, there is cost. SEA 3000 ships will be expensive, regardless of the option selected and the economies of scale delivered by a large production run. Operational research has repeatedly demonstrated that a minimum of three ships is needed to ensure the reasonable availability of one fully effective ship at any given time, and the long-term sustainability of the naval combat workforce.
Secondly, our Australian friends have shown a propensity to change procurement tack, regardless of the expense. This is not a criticism, but it should be noted that the Australian capacity to bear the cost of changes in procurement direction exceeds our own by a wide margin.
The Australian Head, Naval Capability has indicated that a SEA 3000 capability upgrade may be considered at some point in the program. This might include replacing the combat management system with the Australian standard 9LV 453, and the radars with the admittedly excellent, but highly expensive, CEAFAR.
If this were to occur and we couldn’t afford or didn’t wish to follow suit, our ships would become partial orphans as our current Anzac class did soon after entering service, when the Australians began their ASMD upgrade program. We would thus lose some of the sustainment advantages described above.
Thirdly, neither of the two SEA 3000 contenders is modular to any appreciable extent. They are thus
HMAS Perth with CEAFAR phased array radars installed as part of the ASMD Project. Image: Australian Government.
DEFENCE
inherently less flexible than the modular options I have discussed in previous articles, and the expensive and technically risky half-life upgrade referred to above will be necessary, regardless of whether or not we are able to adopt the same upgrade package as the Australians.
Arrowhead 140: A contender
If government elects not to participate in SEA 3000, there will be other “comparable contemporary frigate” options available. Most NATO navies have frigate-type programs underway, and joining one of those would deliver acquisition, sustainment, and interoperability benefits. It seems doubtful, however, that those benefits would be on a similar scale to SEA 3000.
A possible exception is the Babcock Arrowhead 140 design adapted from the Royal Navy’s Type 31 frigate. The latter had a target unit procurement cost of GBP250M (NZD563M). Whether or not this target has been achieved is unknown, and it may not include sonar capability, but it represents a dramatic saving against other options.
Arrowhead 140 also incorporates sufficient modularity to provide a meaningful degree of mission flexibility, although not enough to avoid the need for costly mid-
life upgrades for primary systems. If Arrowhead were selected, the commonsense approach would be to adopt a configuration as close as possible to Type 31 so that common training and logistical arrangements could be set up with the Royal Navy.
Fleet design implications
If traditional multi-function frigates are acquired, additional ships will be needed for those naval missions that cannot be performed by frigates, either because frigates are too expensive to form the basis of an entire fleet, or because their nonmodular nature limits their ability to perform the full range of missions required by policy.
In designing a fleet, naval missions should be viewed in their totality without arbitrarily separating combat and patrol functions and assuming that separate ship types are required for each. Modular technology supports this by enabling combat capabilities such as Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) sensors and Mine Countermeasures (MCM) capability to be carried in less expensive ships that can efficiently perform long duration patrol and maritime security operations, enabling “force multiplication” across the combat/ patrol spectrum.
If “comparable, contemporary frigates” are to be acquired,
the balance of naval missions could thus be performed by an innovative, modular, multi-purpose platform.
There are two ways in which this could be achieved. Firstly, if we go down the SEA 3000 route, we could look at the smaller, modular offerings of whichever supplier is selected for the frigate requirement. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, supplier of the Mogami class contender, are delivering an innovative modular OPV to the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force.
TKMS, the other contender with their MEKO A200 offering, have a family of smaller OPV types that might be similarly adaptable. In this way we could create the fleetwide system commonality that the DCP identifies as essential.
Alternatively, we could seek a truly innovative platform designed around modularity and the support of autonomous vehicles. Austal Ltd 1 is one of the world’s leading suppliers of multi-hull commercial and naval technology, and they have core designs that could be adapted to our needs.
Multihulls offer benefits in terms of internal capacity, seakeeping, fuel efficiency and crewed and autonomous aircraft operation 2 that in my view must be considered. Systems commonality would be more
1 Full disclosure – I consulted to Austal Ltd for a period of eight months in 2023/24. I believe them to be an excellent company, and I hope they remain engaged in Maritime Fleet Renewal.
HMNZS Te Mana. Image: New Zealand Government.
difficult to achieve than with the first option discussed above, but not impossible.
It may even be possible to build such ships in New Zealand – we are not short of high-quality fabricators and suppliers, although we would need external help with systems integration and specialist warship naval architecture.
In the unlikely event that the modular concept was to fail technically, the worst possible outcome is that we would be left with highly capable patrol platforms with the inherent flexibility delivered by large internal volume, very large flight decks, and excellent sea keeping and endurance capability. A serious look at an innovative platform to supplement the comparable, contemporary frigates seems indicated.
Sealift capability
That leaves the all-important sealift capability. Although for some reason sealift is only mentioned once in the DCP, and that in a very general way, it is a pillar of NZDF joint capability.
We must be able to carry our land forces and their equipment to where they are needed.
Airlift is a vital component of our projection capability, but sealift is indispensable when heavy lift is required. It allows land forces to deploy to a region and be held in readiness aboard ships without encroaching on another nation’s sovereign territory, to be landed if, when, and where needed – a valuable characteristic in the politically charged situations in which land force projection is necessary.
Finally, a sealift capability able to project land forces over the shore without any kind of port facility dramatically increases maneuver options for all types of operation.
DCP19 anticipated the acquisition of large amphibious ships known as LPDs. 3 LPDs have a floodable well dock in the stern which enables landing craft operations in sea states where ships without a dock, such as HMNZS Canterbury, are severely constrained. An LPD is a highly capable ship, well
suited to our needs, but the cost per ship could approach or even exceed that of a frigate.
There is an alternative. The US Navy and the Australian Defence Force are acquiring a type of amphibious ship called an LSM. These 3-5,000 tonne ships discharge their payload directly onto a beach by means of a bow ramp. They can be limited by beach gradient but are much less affected by weather than Canterbury and probably less affected than LPDs. Critically, they can unload and reload in a fraction of the time taken by other kinds of amphibious ships.
An LSM would cost much less than an LPD – it might be possible to acquire two without unduly straining the capital programme. This would provide much greater availability for contingency operations such as disaster relief than is possible with a single ship sealift force.
Even more significantly, joining the Australian LSM project would be fully aligned with Plan Anzac, under which the Australian and New Zealand armies aim to achieve interchangeability – a level beyond interoperability.
In summary, acquiring comparable contemporary frigates creates a need for a complementary type of ship that can operate economically in the patrol part of the mission spectrum. Modular technology could enable these ships to perform a wide range of missions including ASW and MCM, thus supplementing the combat force.
Joining the Australian LSM project could provide enhanced sealift capability at a lower cost than other options, while supporting the interchangeability aims of Plan Anzac.
In summary, DCP25 isn’t at all disappointing, but time will tell if the promise it contains can be fulfilled.
2The largest shipboard flight deck in the US Navy apart from aircraft carriers is that aboard the trimaran LCS2 class.
3This is a NATO designator for amphibious transport (dock); it is not an acronym.
Babcock Arrowhead 140. Image: Babcock.
MQ-9B SeaGuardian®: The Future of Maritime Surveillance
Earlier this year, a Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) Task Group (TG), comprised of a cruiser, frigate, and replenishment vessel, completed a circumnavigation of Australia. This was an unprecedented show of force, and the furthest south a PLA-N TG had ever sailed. The live-fire drills that were conducted in the Tasman Sea on 21 February with extremely short notice to the Australian and New Zealand Ministries of Defence raised serious regional concerns.
New Zealand and Australia committed air and sea assets to surveil the PLA-N TG. Both nations had to surge capability to conduct surveillance, raising questions about the adequacy of each nation’s capabilities — particularly if such Chinese operations were to become the norm. And if a PLA-N attack submarine were to accompany the TG, how much more difficult and taxing would it be to detect and track this boat?
This episode highlighted the cost-effectiveness of performing such surveillance with General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.’s (GAASI) MQ-9B SeaGuardian® Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS)
when compared to higher-cost capital ships and aircraft.
The detection and surveillance of a transiting naval task group can be achieved through a range of systems, including satellites, maritime surface vessels (crewed and uncrewed), and airborne surveillance assets (also crewed and uncrewed).
Satellites provide a ready option if access is available and real-time updates are not necessary. However, satellite surveillance can only deliver the awareness component.
For an on-water response capability, maritime surface vessels are a solid option but present relatively high operating costs.
Arguably, costs can be reduced for uncrewed vessels, but such capabilities are still maturing.
Traditional airborne surveillance assets like crewed maritime patrol aircraft have strong dash speed and reasonable endurance but are also costly and present challenges for crewing, particularly if sustained operations are required.
Capable, mature uncrewed aircraft like the MQ-9B SeaGuardian offer a system that exhibits excellent range and endurance, and is far more cost-effective than using capital ships or crewed aircraft for surveillance.
While high-cost assets like navy ships and traditional aircraft are
“The Japan Coast Guard began operating a GA-ASI MQ-9B SeaGuardian in 2022, as a part of a Company-Owned, Contractor-Operated (COCO) agreement
Artist rendering of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI) MQ-9B SeaGuardian® RPAS
effective for short periods, they aren’t sustainable for prolonged operations. This becomes particularly problematic if frequent task group monitoring becomes necessary.
Monitoring a transiting task group requires a continuous presence to demonstrate resolve. In and of itself, the surveillance task is not especially demanding and does not warrant the use of key capital surface or airborne assets and their associated crews. These should be preserved for more complex military and security roles — not exhausted by performing tasks that more costeffective systems can provide.
If a response is needed, especially against a capable maritime TG with long-range and anti-surface capabilities, the survivability of crewed assets must be considered. For offensive action, highly capable joint forces would be necessary.
The SeaGuardian, integrated with advanced air-launched cruise missiles under development, could deliver a valuable stand-off targeting and strike advantage.
The scenario where a PLA-N TG operates within the South Pacific islands might present an
even more challenging scenario than the recent operations. Under such circumstances, New Zealand may need to lead the response and significantly surge its Navy and Air Force. This scenario further strengthens the case for employing a SeaGuardian RPAS.
Similar to task group monitoring, routine civil surveillance should not be performed using high-end military surface or airborne assets.
For the scenario in which the PLA-N TG operated in the Tasman Sea and conducted live-fire drills, SeaGuardian — operating from RNZAF Base Ohakea, for example — could provide the required 18 hours of persistent coverage in the area of operations, delivering a highfidelity radar capability, electrooptical imaging, and electronic surveillance. With two aircraft, effective 24-hour monitoring of the TG could be achieved, delivering pattern-of-life data and a continuous presence. Both standoff and close surveillance could be conducted in all-weather conditions.
If the TG included a submarine presence, it would pose an even greater challenge for the New Zealand and Australian Defence
Forces. Detecting and tracking submarines requires a versatile surface airborne asset like the MQ-9B SeaGuardian that performs at a high operational tempo. MQ-9B can deploy and monitor sonobuoys, detect threats, and localise subsurface contacts while relaying tracking data to networked platforms, making it an ideal complement to existing surface and airborne anti-surface warfare (ASW) assets.
GA-ASI’s MQ-9B SeaGuardian offers a highly cost-effective solution for routine surveillance and is being adopted by an increasing number of other nations, including key regional allies of both New Zealand and Australia.
The need for cost-effective maritime surveillance is likely to increase over time, and current capital surface and airborne assets are not suited for routine, persistent surveillance.
The MQ-9B SeaGuardian RPAS is a practical, cost-effective solution that delivers critical airborne intelligence while preserving higherend assets for demanding military and civil security roles.
Depiction of potential MQ-9B SeaGuardian performance in Tasman Sea
Defence Capability Plan: Investment dependent on strategic picture
Although it seems inevitable there will be a substantial increase in New Zealand’s defence budget over the next decade in line with our strategic partners, these decisions are not yet locked in stone, writes Wayne Mapp
The pressure to increase defence spending has been building for some years; it is not just a phenomena of President Trump’s second administration. There have been a number of drivers.
Most starkly there has been the bellicose attitude of Putin’s Russia, especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. But Russia is not the principal concern within the Asia Pacific. The growth of China over the last two decades has been a far more significant factor.
South China Sea tipping point
The decisive tipping point has been the Chinese militarisation of various atolls and reefs in the South China Sea. This build up started around 2012. The scale of the reclamation has been truly dramatic.
By 2016 a total of 3,200 acres had been reclaimed with the reclamation continuing at pace in the years since. Three complete military bases have been built on Mischief Reef, Subi Reef and Fiery Cross. Each base includes a full length runway, port facilities and a full suite of defensive equipment.
An Arbitral Tribunal, constituted under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, held that China could not unilaterally create a territorial sea or an EEZ as a result of the reclamations. Full
freedom of navigation within the South China Sea was unaffected by China’s actions. China rejected the findings of Tribunal.
In doing so China undermined its reputation within the Asia Pacific as a state that generally accepted that the principles of international law applied to all states, both large and small.
Other actions of China, including the rapid build up of military forces and continuing tensions within the South China Sea, meant that there has been growing distrust about China’s intentions among many Asia Pacific nations.
A response to new Chinese posture
The most notable response to China’s new posture has been the AUKUS Partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, announced in 2021. This partnership, centered around Australia acquiring nuclear powered submarines, envisaged a major increase in both defence spending and defence capability by all three partners.
Although the Trump administration has recently announced a review of AUKUS, it seems unlikely that the United States would unliterally withdraw from a partnership that is so central to United States strategy in the Asia Pacific.
Senior Contributor Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.
The creation of AUKUS is seen as a cornerstone of United States commitments within the Asia Pacific. Inevitably, the nations that are most closely aligned to the AUKUS nations have come under pressure to also step up their level of commitment to defence spending.
New Zealand’s 2025 Defence Capability Plan (DCP) has to be seen within this context. Just as New Zealand’s security partners have been increasing their defence expenditure,
then this is reflected in the defence decisions that New Zealand will also make.
A substantial step up
The DCP signaled a substantial step up in the NZDF. Not immediately, but primarily beyond 2030. The first phase of the DCP through to 2029 includes a $12 billion capital plan. The great majority of this expenditure essentially just replaces ageing equipment. There is no step change in capability before 2030.
However, beyond 2030, when the Minister of Defence envisages that defence spending will reach 2% of GDP, there will be a major increase in New Zealand’s defence capability.
The key reason for the increased spending is the replacement of the naval fleet, most notably the two ANZAC frigates. A simple one-forone replacement would limit defence expenditure to around 1.5% of GDP. However, an additional 0.5% of GDP is enough to buy four new frigates to replace the two ANZAC frigates.
The DCP envisages that the increase in spending will largely occur after 2030. The decisions that will bring this increase about will need to be made in the next term of parliament, that is, between 2026 and 2029. To replace the frigates from 2032 and beyond requires procurement contracts to be let during the next term of parliament.
Even a fast-track decision to simply chose whatever Australia decides to replace their ANZAC ships could not result in new ships being delivered in under five years. More likely sometime between five and ten years. Thus, a procurement contract being let in 2027 or 2028 would mean new ships are unlikely to be delivered until around the mid 2030s.
Although it seems inevitable that there will be a substantial increase in New Zealand’s defence budget over the next decade in line with our strategic partners, these decisions
are not yet locked in stone. A lot will depend on the broader strategic picture.
In particular this will turn on how the strategic relationship between China and the United States develops. At the moment this looks like it can only deteriorate.
However, as the China-United States trade discussions demonstrate, what seems an intractable issue can evolve into a sustainable arrangement. President Trump, perhaps more than some of his Cabinet members, seems willing to entertain such outcomes. Chinese thinkers and strategists are also willing to consider what such an alternative could look like.
Resolving US-China tensions
I was recently invited to participate in the Fourth Wanshou Dialogue, organised by the Chinese Peoples Association for Peace and Disarmament, a government sponsored NGO.
The Dialogue invited 40 participants, mostly from Asia Pacific nations, but also participants from Latin America and Africa. The participants were former senior Officials and Ministers as well as strategists from within the think tank world.
United States participants included LTGEN Karl Eikenberry, former Deputy Chair of the NATO Military Committee and Ambassador to Afghanistan during the Obama administration, and Douglas Bandow, Senior Researcher at the Cato Institute.
The presentations at the Dialogue are a safe way for Chinese officials to hear ideas that could not otherwise be considered within official Chinese circles.
Participants to the Dialogue were concerned that their countries, particularly those in the Asia Pacific, should not be forced to choose sides between China and the United States. Most nations in the region have their closest strategic
relationship with the United States, but their closest economic relationship with China. Asia Pacific nations expressed an expectation that they be able to continue with this dichotomous arrangement – without significant pressure from either of the two great powers.
The resolution to this dichotomy was seen as China and the United States resolving the issues between them in a way that does not disrupt the last 50 years of stability within the Asia Pacific.
The 50-year period of peace within the Asia Pacific was seen as the essential precondition for the continuing peace and prosperity within the region. The two major nations therefore have a special responsibility to all the other nations in the region to manage their specific points of conflict so as not to disrupt this peace.
A successful resolution of the tensions between the two major nations would mean that the continuing pressure to build up the armed forces of the Asia Pacific nations need not be so intense.
Nations naturally expect to modernise and improve the quality of their armed forces, but they wish to do so within the perception of their particular defence needs.
In some cases, this may mean greater expansion of a defence force, particularly where critical capabilities are below minimum sustainable levels. New Zealand’s current total of two frigates is a good example of this given the fact that on occasion this leaves us with no deployable frigates.
The majority of the discussion was centered around the things that could be done that would enable a more constructive dialogue between the major powers. Merely stating this expectation was seen as a way whereby the nations of the Asia Pacific could set out their expectations of the two major powers within the Asia Pacific.
DEFENCE
A Shield, Not a Sword –Strengthening defence through deterrence
Is it time for New Zealand to add a Naval Strike munition to its inventory? writes former RNZN Chief Petty Officer (Combat System Specialist – Above Water Warfare) Jonathan Brooke.
Jonathan Brooke is a former RNZN Chief Petty Officer (Combat System Specialist – Above Water Warfare).
On arriving at the Devonport Naval Base by road, the first thing you will notice is a large naval turret. The 6-inch BL MKXXII naval gun is ‘Y’ turret — one of the main turrets on HMNZS Achillies, a ship famously involved in the Battle of the River Plate against the ‘pocket battleship’ Admiral Graf Spee in the South Atlantic on 13 December 1939.
The reason I mention it is that this gun alone didn’t win the battle. The collective weight of fire from multiple ships overwhelmed the German commander’s initiative, leading him to scuttle the Graf Spee to avoid futile engagement and probable loss of his crew.
For decades post-WWII, New Zealand has maintained a defence posture centred on a primarily defensive capability. However, as global threats evolve and strategic competition in the Pacific intensifies, the recently released 2025 Defence Capability Plan (DCP) signals a long-overdue but critical shift: New Zealand will now pursue a strike capability.
This opens the door to an essential question: what is the right tool for a modern surface engagement? If the 6-inch gun was the right tool in 1939, what meets our needs in a multi-domain, dispersed, high-threat maritime environment today?
Strategic Context: Evolving threats in our region
The Pacific, once considered a relatively benign environment, is now marked by increasing geopolitical competition as widely reported. With growing tensions and challenges to regional stability, it is entirely appropriate that New Zealand is moving to acquire the means to conduct over-the-horizon strikes against hostile — though not exclusively maritime — targets.
A naval strike munition for AntiSurface Warfare (ASuW) — capable of being directed by space assets, RNZAF P-8A Poseidon’s, Army or allied Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs), or deployed on future surface combatants, crewed or uncrewed — will provide a key enhancement to New Zealand’s maritime defence strategy.
Why the Kongsberg Naval Strike
Missile (NSM)
makes strategic sense
The Kongsberg NSM, already fielded by key allies and will be manufactured in Newcastle, Australia in a brand new factory, emerges as a logical and timely choice. This local production drastically improves logistical support, sovereignty of supply, and sustainment. It is: • Field-proven with warships operated by the U.S., Norway, Australia, and others.
• Stealthy, sea-skimming, and network-enabled, with a proven ability to evade modern air defences.
• Easily integrated into existing NZDF command systems and adaptable for deployment across air, land, and sea platforms.
New Zealand’s proximity to the Newcastle manufacturing facility means shorter supply chains, enhanced resilience in wartime conditions, and ease of replenishment — all while supporting regional defence industry.
How this enhances deterrence
The addition of a naval strike munition increases our effective engagement range and adds complexity for any adversary planning to neutralise NZDF combat power. Instead of being restricted to reactive coastal defence, we gain the ability to strike at distance — taking the fight beyond the horizon and deterring threats before they reach our shores.
In military exercises over many years, the NZDF has trained for these scenarios — over-thehorizon targeting (OTHT), joint
fires coordination, and simulated maritime strike — all without ever possessing the munition to execute them in reality. Transitioning from simulated “paper missiles” to a true strike capability is not a radical change, but rather the final step in operationalising decades of professional training.
The user requirements for a modern naval strike capability should be:
• Interoperable – Easily integrated into coalition task groups and exercises.
• Modular and adaptable – Suitable for both current and future combatants.
• Flexible – Employable via multiple platforms across the joint force.
Allied navies are already advancing concepts for at-sea reloading via heavy jackstay, potentially enabling forward replenishment and longer deployments.
Strategic and policy alignment
Integrating a naval strike capability reinforces New Zealand’s commitment to the international rules-based order and the collective
security of the Indo-Pacific. It moves us from being a passive participant to an active contributor with a credible deterrent. The benefits are manifold:
• More resilient task group operations.
• Greater leverage in alliance-based deterrence.
• Reduced reliance on others for precision strike during crises.
Conclusion:
A logical next step in defence evolution
With the Defence Capability Plan’s shift toward acquiring strike capability, New Zealand stands at a decision point. The Naval Strike Missile, backed by trusted partners and soon produced just across the Tasman, is the right tool for the job.
It is a weapon that enables defence-in-depth, expands operational flexibility, and places New Zealand firmly within a future-focused coalition deterrence architecture. This is not about being aggressive — it is about ensuring credible deterrence, this was demonstrated by ‘Y’ turret and the naval lesson is still applicable.
Now, more than ever, it is time to move forward, a shield can only protect if it is backed by reach.
Launch of a Naval Strike Missile
Southern Ocean Patrol – An Alternative to Navy
A Southern Ocean and Antarctic patrol capability need not be operated by the Navy. On the contrary, a civilian vessel would be a better option, writes maritime capability specialist and former Royal New Zealand Navy Officer Andrew Watts.
Senior Contributor CAPT Andy Watts RNZN (Ret) is Maritime Defence Capability Consultant, AUSTAL. He was previously Deputy Executive Director, Australian Civil Military Centre, and an RNZN officer for over 30 years.
Sometime in the mid-2010s, it was determined that the Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) of the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) had proven to be very useful and that a third ship should be acquired to meet the increasing demand for OPV capabilities.
At about the same time, or shortly thereafter, it was decided that it would a good idea if the third vessel was strengthened for operations in the Southern Ocean, where ice is often encountered (the ice protection features in the design of the Otago class OPVs having been overtaken by new regulatory regimes introduced by the International Maritime Organisation).
Thus, the Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel project was born.
The 2019 Defence Capability Plan (DCP 2019) stated that the delivery of a specialised Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel would enable fisheries patrols to monitor a greater area of the Southern Ocean. “With the ability to refuel at sea from HMNZS Aotearoa, this vessel will also improve the ability of the Defence Force to maintain fisheries patrol throughout the fishing season.”
Thus, DCP 2019 included the delivery of a dedicated Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel. “The capabilities of this vessel will be primarily for use towards supporting other agencies in the Southern Ocean and around New Zealand,” it stated. “Built to commercial specifications, the vessel will have minimal specialist military capabilities.”
OPVs HMNZS Otago and HMNZS Wellington in 2010. Image courtesy NZDF.
In the recently released 2025 Defence Capability Plan (DCP 2025) we see this watered down considerably. “The Navy’s existing patrol capabilities do not fully meet New Zealand’s requirements, particularly in the Southern Ocean,” states the document.
“A new Southern Ocean patrol capability would close this gap. It would broaden the patrol area and enhance our awareness of what is occurring in the Southern Ocean. This could include a combination of uncrewed technologies, deployable boarding teams, and platforms.”
Like much else in DCP 2025, this change in scope is reassuring, reflecting as it does a more realistic appreciation of the nature of our interests in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica, and a potential move away from a focus on a ship operated by the Navy.
It is also a classic illustration of the danger of momentum in defence procurement, a requirement for a third OPV having morphed into something a great deal more demanding through a sequence of decisions that in themselves were perfectly reasonable, until the reality of the new requirement was finally confronted.
Antarctica and Southern Ocean role
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) is the lead government agency for Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. “New Zealand’s environment is connected to Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, states its website. “We prioritise the environmental protection of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean; we value healthy and productive ecosystems; and we are committed to protecting biodiversity.”
The website further states that MFAT will:
• Follow environmental best practice in our activities in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.
• Advocate for the establishment, protection and management of representative special areas in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.
• Take precautionary and ecosystem approaches to the conservation and sustainable management of living marine resources in the Southern Ocean, particularly in the Ross Sea, supporting strong environmental standards and sustainable economic benefits, and contributing to scientific understanding.
• Be an international leader in efforts to eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the Southern Ocean.
I suggest that these high-level policy aims translate to investment in the types of capabilities that might deliver the following:
1. The building of environmental knowledge, which can perhaps be divided into knowledge of the permanent, physical environment, affecting critical eco-systems and climate; and the building of knowledge concerning patterns of human behaviour, including fishing, tourism, and those activities proscribed under the Antarctic Treaty System, including military activity and minerals extraction.
2. A means of intervening – to the extent allowed by international law – when human activity proscribed by the Antarctic Treaty System or by other international agreements is detected. This applies most particularly to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
Image courtesy NZDF.
DEFENCE
3. A means of demonstrating New Zealand’s commitment to the Antarctic Treaty System and the upholding of the rules-based order as it applies more broadly to the Antarctic and Southern Ocean.
Of these, the only one that bears directly on defence capability is the second – the provision of a means of intervention. This will require crewed surface ships for the foreseeable future.
Intervention operations irrelevant
As New Zealand maritime security and resource protection capability is currently constituted, the only surface ships able to carry out maritime intervention operations are the ships of the RNZN – hence the reasonable assumption that if intervention capability is required, the Navy must provide it. However, as the policy people might say, let’s unpack that assumption.
Firstly, the type of intervention most likely to be required in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean relates to IUU fishing. However, these are not waters over which national jurisdiction applies.
Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982, warships only have the “right to visit” (board) ships on the High Seas without the permission of the flag state (the country where a merchant ship is registered) when there are reasonable grounds to suspect the vessel of involvement in slavery, piracy, or unauthorised broadcasting; where the ship is without nationality; or when it is flying a foreign flag but is suspected on reasonable grounds to be subject to the same national jurisdiction as the warship. IUU activities on the High Seas do not fall under these definitions unless the fishing vessel is without nationality.
Additionally, a warship detecting a vessel fishing in contravention of
the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Living Resources (CCAMLR) [part of the Antarctic Treaty system] cannot legally board the vessel on any other grounds. All it can do is collect evidence for transmission to the vessel’s flag state – prosecution being a flag state responsibility.
In summary, as things stand, boarding capabilities of the type maintained by navies are superfluous in the context of IUU activities in the Southern Ocean. Any vessel capable of operating safely in the areas where IUU fishing vessels operate is equal to the only form of intervention action allowed by international law – provided its crew includes people trained and authorised to gather evidence.
Secondly, the greater part of New Zealand national interest in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica is scientific. The Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences (GNS), the National Institute for Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA), the Ministry for Primary Industries, Antarctica New Zealand, and a number of universities all have significant research programs that support national aims related to Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.
I was the Operational Requirements Lead for the Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel project for a
short period in 2020, and am aware that the requirements of these programs had a significant bearing on requirements development for the Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel project.
Thirdly, the demonstration of national commitment to the Antarctic Treaty System though a regular presence requires a national (state controlled) vessel, but it doesn’t require a warship. In fact, a warship (or naval vessel) presence is arguably inconsistent with the prohibition on military activity that is a main feature of the Antarctic Treaty. If tensions were to increase, the presence of even a lightly armed warship could be regarded as escalatory.
NIWA better placed DCP25 has it right. Our national interests in Antarctica require a means of gathering information about human activity in the region, and this will impact the shape of our national intelligence capability. However, the platform component of the southern ocean system does not need to be a warship.
I suspect that not many people are aware that New Zealand has a small but highly efficient fleet of marine science vessels operated by NIWA under civilian regulatory regimes.
Image courtesy NZDF.
Its long serving personnel have acquired immense expertise in operating ships in support of science programs in every kind of weather and sea state, including the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. Naval personnel, on the other hand, circulate between ship types in order to acquire the full range of naval competencies, and are never likely to approach the same level of familiarity with Southern Ocean conditions as NIWA seafarers.
NIWA ships’ companies are also adept at accommodating the varied demands of varied scientific research platforms, including the interface of complex scientific equipment with ships systems, simply because they have been doing it for so long.
NIWA’s ocean going research vessel RV Tangaroa is now 35 years old. Although well maintained, its continued ability to support oceanic scientific research must become problematic at some point in the nottoo-distant future.
As things stand, NIWA will need to develop a business case for Tangaroa replacement based on national science needs. I argue that this would duplicate the acquisition of a Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel for the Navy, and that the two requirements should be combined in a single national ship operated by NIWA.
In addition to reducing the burden on the taxpayer by several hundred million dollars, such an approach would extend the multiagency synergies that Defence has already realised in cooperation with MPI, Customs, DOC, and other agencies.
If properly authorised as a national vessel, the ship could embark MPI officers for fisheries patrol, both in the Southern Ocean and around New Zealand, and in support of our Pacific partner nations, noting that Southern Ocean operations in the Austral winter are impractical anyway.
It could likewise support MPI and Customs border protection operations as a force multiplier, noting that the more challenging of these operations would still require warship patrol vessel capabilities. If fitted with the necessary sensors and networking capability, and with the necessary personnel aboard, it could form a part of the capability network that builds maritime domain awareness in whichever part of the ocean it operates.
Unsustainable requirements
During operational requirements definition for the Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel requirement, we found that in addition to having to meet the demanding requirements of the
IMO Polar Code Class 5, the design of the ship would have to take into account extreme sea states, even during the Austral summer operating period.
Most ice capable ships are designed with Arctic as opposed to Antarctic conditions in mind. We believed that most if not all those ships would not meet the seakeeping requirements of a ship intended to operate in the Antarctic. That meant that a one-off design would be required. Given that climatic conditions also required special machinery, that in turn would mean that the Navy would have another orphan ship with its own myriad supply chains for support.
In my view, this would exacerbate an already stretched logistics enterprise almost to the point of unsustainability, if not beyond. Another compelling reason to adopt the national approach outlined above.
In conclusion
The need for a Southern Ocean and Antarctic capable vessel to be naval operated is not supported by a dispassionate examination of the requirement and the factors that bear upon it.
The dominant national drivers for a Southern Ocean and Antarctic surface ship presence are scientific, not defence related. If operated by NIWA, such a ship would have utility over a wide range of national maritime activity, and could support other agencies throughout our region, including the Pacific.
National interests in the Southern Oceans and Antarctica do include defence. However, the role that defence should play is in providing the intelligence and information management capabilities needed to support national interests in the region. The surface ship element should be provided by the agency best placed to operate it, which is the National Institute for Water and Atmospheric Research.
RV Tangaroa. Image courtesy Stu Mackay, NIWA.
Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine frontline
The Russia-Ukraine conflict demonstrates that autonomous vehicles, AI-driven logistics, and quantum-enhanced defence security are recalibrating military strategy, writes IFS’ Chris Morton and Bianca Nobilo.
Chris Morton is Global Industry Director for Aerospace & Defence at IFS and retired attack helicopter pilot with 21 years of military and aviation experience.
Bianca Nobilo leads AI ethics, and government relations on the Executive Board at IFS. She has been a CNN correspondent and worked across Aerospace & Defence in the UK Parliament.
The war that shattered assumption
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, now entering its third year, continues to expose persistent vulnerabilities in Western military readiness — from munitions stockpiles to supply chain resilience and procurement agility.
What was initially predicted by Moscow to be a swift campaign has evolved into a grinding, highintensity war that is reshaping global assumptions about force structure, deterrence, and the future of military power.
The conflict has demonstrated the battlefield potency of blending lowcost asymmetric technologies with traditional kinetic operations.
Ukrainian drone swarms have disrupted Russian armour formations; long-range artillery such as 155mm howitzers remains decisive, yet Western production capacity has struggled to meet ongoing demand. Wars of attrition, once thought relics of the 20th century, have returned to centre stage.
As the war continues, nations are recalibrating their force posture and defence planning — not just to support Ukraine, but to prepare for the new contours of prolonged, multi-domain conflict. The next chapter of military evolution will be shaped by AI, quantum computing, and automation — technologies that are already altering not only tactical outcomes, but the deeper question of which nations can sustain war over time.
Defensive Industrial Base: Unprepared for protracted war
Ukraine’s artillery consumption outstripped NATO’s production capacity within months, underscoring a fundamental issue: Western defence industries had become structured for peacetime efficiency, not wartime urgency.
For decades, spending priorities reflected counterinsurgency operations, not large-scale conventional warfare. Defence manufacturers followed slow, bureaucratic procurement cycles, building to long-term program specifications rather than operational needs. This model is no longer tenable.
A key lesson from the Ukraine conflict is the critical link between battlefield endurance and industrial adaptability. Russia’s defence industrial base was not built for a prolonged war and has struggled to pivot under pressure. In contrast, Ukraine’s ability to draw on external support networks has created a more resilient long-term position — underscoring the strategic value of a flexible, modernised defence industrial base (DIB).
AI-driven logistics and quantumenhanced simulations will determine which militaries can sustain modern war. Predictive logistics, already in use in Ukraine, anticipates battlefield demands, ensuring supplies are replenished before critical shortages occur. Indeed, in the context of contested logistics at the strategic
level, variables that include a dynamic quickly changing threat environment require analysis at the speed of AI.
At the operational and tactical levels, commanders on the battlefield who have access to sophisticated pattern analysis that incorporates political, military, social, and the physical environments – among others – can sustain combat operations in theatre and force the enemy to consider multiple, complex dilemmas.
AI-driven supply optimisation will analyse real-time battlefield conditions to adjust production and distribution dynamically. Nations that fail to integrate AI into logistics, manufacturing, and deployment will be less responsive and fall behind.
The Defence Industry’s AIpowered reboot
Mass production of high-tech weaponry has failed under wartime conditions. The US Replicator Initiative is attempting to reverse this inefficiency by integrating AI-driven automation into defence production.
This shift mirrors World War II when industries like Ford, Hershey, and Singer Sewing Machines pivoted to war manufacturing. The difference now is that software-defined warfare demands companies capable of real-time iteration, rapid scaling and autonomous system integration.
Ukraine is already deploying AI-driven drone manufacturing, battlefield analytics and smart munitions at speeds that outstrip traditional defence manufacturers. At the Munich Security Conference, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen warned: “We have a problem, friends, if a country at war can produce faster than the rest of us.”
The future of defence production will favour firms that leverage AI to shorten the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act), accelerating design, testing and manufacturing cycles.
AI-Driven Asymmetric Warfare: Cost vs complexity
Traditional military platforms are being undermined by low-cost, highimpact technologies. A $500 drone
can disable a $10 million tank. Onethird of the Russian Black Sea Fleet has been neutralised by Ukrainian drones.
AI-powered swarm warfare— networked, autonomous loitering munitions—has forced militaries to reconsider large, centralised command nodes, which now serve as easy targets. Ukraine’s success in AI-assisted reconnaissance, drone coordination and battlefield analytics has compelled Russia to adopt similar tactics, signalling the rapid evolution of AI in modern conflict.
Speed and scale now outweigh cost and complexity. Monolithic, exorbitant and slow-moving weapons programs—designed for decadeslong procurement cycles—are being reconsidered in an asymmetric context where AI is already embedded in ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), autonomous drone targeting and automated force coordination.
In previous conflicts, nations without the resources to repel a larger, wealthier adversary were at a significant disadvantage. Whereas
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Ukraine has demonstrated that through the precise application of low-cost asymmetric capabilities, they can effectively even the stakes against a much larger foe.
Many smaller nations will likely take note and look to apply this same acquisition strategy as a hedge against aggression. Larger, wealthier nations cannot ignore this trend – they will not only need to counter this asymmetric threat, but they will need to develop these capabilities to work alongside major weapon systems.
Power projections and global deterrence still require the employment of “majestic” type weapon systems on a global scale; however low-cost AI-driven asymmetric capabilities allows a military to present multiple dilemmas to a potential adversary.
A great example is CCA’s –collaborative combat aircraft –autonomous uncrewed aircraft that are developed in concert and as a part of traditional fighter development.
AI in Command and Control:
Humans in charge?
Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) are no longer theoretical.
AI-assisted targeting is already operational, with Ukraine leveraging AI-enhanced ISR to predict enemy movements.
The debate is no longer about whether AI will be used in battlefield decision-making, but rather how to ensure its use remains ethically constrained, legally accountable, and aligned with international human rights norms.
The key ethical and legal distinction now lies between human-in-the-loop (oversight required), human-on-theloop (oversight optional), and humanout-of-the-loop (fully autonomous lethal decision-making).
A shift toward removing human oversight in lethal engagements risks violating the fundamental principles of proportionality, accountability and distinction in warfare. If AI decision loops become too fast for meaningful human intervention, we risk ceding moral and legal responsibility to algorithms, diminishing the very accountability that underpins the laws of war.
A nation that first entrusts realtime combat decisions to AI would not just redefine military power but could also fundamentally alter
the rules of engagement, setting a dangerous precedent for warfare devoid of human ethical judgment.
This shift would mark the most profound military transformation since nuclear weapons, but unlike nuclear deterrence—where human deliberation remains central—fully autonomous weapons could remove the last safeguard between war and unchecked machine-driven violence.
Any integration of AI in lethal force must be bound by strict legal frameworks and international oversight to prevent an irreversible slide toward algorithmic warfare without moral restraint — a step closer to the cliff-edge of dehumanised conflict.
Quantum Computing: The coming cyber arms race
Quantum computing’s military potential remains largely theoretical but its long-term implications are existential.
The most immediate concern is encryption: current cryptographic systems will be obsolete the moment quantum decryption achieves practical deployment. NATO, China, and Russia are already
racing to develop quantum-resistant security protocols. The winner of this race will have a significant advantage in the future of digital warfare.
Technology is not just reshaping the theatre of war, but the preparation and context: Quantum-enhanced simulations could transform military planning, allowing strategists to model complex, multi-variable conflicts with more granular precision.
Not to mention, AI-driven cyber warfare is already escalating -deepfake disinformation campaigns as a part of a broader psychological operation, automated hacking and AI-enhanced cyberattacks are becoming standard tools of statecraft.
Who is Leading the AI-powered arms race?
The AI-powered arms race is unfolding on multiple fronts. Traditional defence firms are struggling to match the speed and adaptability of AI-driven warfare, while AI-native companies, from agile startups to tech giants, are rapidly moving into defence.
China and Russia have embedded AI into military doctrine at a
strategic level, ensuring tight integration across defence, intelligence, and cyber warfare. However, the US, the UK, Israel, and key European nations are also integrating AI into military operations through private-sector partnerships, autonomous weapons programs, and AI-enhanced command-and-control systems.
The outcome of this race will determine who dictates the future of military power in the 21st century—not just through AI adoption, but through the ability to scale, iterate, and operationalise AIdriven capabilities faster than their adversaries.
As the war in Ukraine continues, it has become a live testing ground for the future of conflict—one where asymmetric tactics, real-time decision systems, and digital capabilities are recalibrating how power is projected and sustained. The states that will shape the 21st-century security order are not simply those that integrate AI first, but those that can scale it fastest—across defence, logistics, manufacturing, and industrial resilience.
Just as nuclear weapons redefined deterrence in the 20th century, AI and quantum technologies are redefining the conditions for strategic endurance today. The future of warfare is not about which nation fields the most advanced fighter jets or missile systems; it is about who fuses intelligence, autonomy, and agility across the entire defence ecosystem.
Beyond its direct military applications, AI’s economic leverage is equally decisive, as nations that harness AI for industrial productivity, financial systems, and technological innovation will generate the economic surplus necessary to fund sustained defence efforts. A nation’s ability to sustain a war economy is inextricably tied to its domestic AI capacity, as AI-driven efficiencies in manufacturing, energy, and resource management form the productive base that underwrites long-term military power.
In an AI-dominated era, economic resilience and defence capability will be inseparable, reinforcing the idea that technological supremacy is not just a battlefield advantage—it is the foundation of strategic endurance.
Opinion: Without crucible of combat, capability must evolve through competition
Preparing for the remotely fought battlefield will require the NZDF to take a new approach to simulation, wargaming and the development and testing of drone and counter drone technologies, writes former New Zealand Army officer Graeme Doull.
New Zealand’s Defence Force is on the cusp of a once-in-a-generation investment. The Government has proposed a conservative and conventional defence budget, distributing funds broadly across many areas, with only a modest commitment to new technologies. It appears to be a plan shaped by competing bids, compromises, and trade-offs - money spread fairly, with a focus on replacing and maintaining existing assets and capabilities.
Yet warfare in the 21st century is anything but conventional. Success increasingly depends on rapid
innovation and close integration between operational units and technology partners. Technology has transformed tactics. Both have evolved together through the unforgiving Darwinism of the battlefield.
The nature of conflict has changed. Drone and counter-drone warfare now dominates, with forces rarely operating at company or larger unit levels. The remotely fought battlefield has become the norm, where soldiers often engage not with other soldiers, but with machines.
So how should the Army prepare? First, by learning from active conflict
Graeme Doull is a former New Zealand Army officer.
zones - Ukraine, Sudan, Kashmir, and other flashpoints. But that’s just the beginning.
Capability must evolve through competition. While we don’t have the crucible of combat to shape our forces, we can create a competitive environment and adopt agile development methods, working in tight collaboration with technology partners to wage drone and counterdrone warfare.
This isn’t about buying a few drones and bolting them onto an existing force structure. This is about building an entirely new capability.
We need hundreds of uniformed drone technicians and operators, supported by an equal number of civilian engineers developing new drones and counter-drone systems. Success should be measured not in platforms purchased, but in thousands of bombs dropped and hundreds of drones neutralised annually.
Simulation, opposed exercises, and wargaming must become core Army activities. Units should serve as each other’s opposing forces, with technological success rewarded by direct investment.
We should see continuous cycles of technology and tactics evolving -
being proven, defeated, refined, and replaced in rapid succession. Rather than relying on static frameworks and assumptions, we must embrace iterative, real-world experimentation. Units must be empowered to innovate - in both technology and tactics.
We should actively harness the diverse perspectives and experience of the Reserve Force to challenge the Regular Army’s thinking.
Technology partners should be embedded at the unit level, developing and testing low-cost, mass-produced drone and counterdrone platforms as fast as the technology allows. The drone battle should be fought as realistically as possible: human vs machine, chalk bombs instead of grenades, but live rounds for human participants to test systems under genuine pressure.
The Defence 2025 budget includes reference to spending for counter unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) - without providing details. At the risk of being pessimistic, this has the sound of many other previous NZDF investments where a system is purchased but we have failed to develop a capability, with the actual system safely held in storage untouched until the weapons expire.
Modern warfare has fundamentally changed. Our approach must evolve accordingly. The investment outlined in the Budget offers a rare opportunity to be bold, to think beyond the conventional, and to build a force truly capable of meeting the challenges of the modern battlefield. Conservative strategies will not suffice. To be ready, we must think differently - and act decisively.
Buying a system is not developing a capability. Drone and counter drone needs to be a new way of working for the NZDF, not a toy wheeled out for visiting dignitaries and school groups. Waiouru nights should be lit up by drone and counter drone fire rivalling Tehran or Tel Aviv.
The Minister of Defence Awards of Excellence highlight contribution of industry
Defence and Industry converged in May to celebrate excellence and recognise the New Zealand defence industry’s contribution to New Zealand’s defence, economy and workforce.
Defence Minister Judith Collins announced on 19 May the recipients of the Minister of Defence Awards of Excellence to Industry, highlighting the significant contribution they make to New Zealand’s security, economy and workforce.
“Congratulations to this year’s winners, whose work strengthens New Zealand’s defence capabilities and demonstrates the highest standards, skills, innovation and impact on local communities,” Ms Collins said.
“The winners include a New Zealand and Tonganbased construction company, which built the Pacific Leadership Development Programme classrooms and fale in Tonga, and an augmented and virtual reality developer who built simulated training courses with the Royal New Zealand Navy.
The Minister of Defence Awards of Excellence for Industry are administered by the New Zealand Defence Industry Advisory Council on behalf of the Minister of Defence.
Every year the New Zealand defence industry is acknowledged for its contribution to New Zealand’s defence, economy and workforce at the Minister of Defence Awards of Excellence to Industry event.
This year there were 15 finalists across four categories, nominated by Ministry of Defence staff, NZDF personnel and staff, and defence industry. Ten companies and individuals were presented with an award, recognising their high standards, skills, innovation and impact on local communities.
According to Associate Defence Minister Chris Penk, this year’s recipients demonstrate that industry is a trusted partner to Defence.
“About 800 companies supply critical products and services to New Zealand’s Defence industrial base, bolstering its resilience,” Mr Penk said. “Defence is a major contributor to the economy, spending hundreds of millions of dollars locally on engineering and commercial services, maintenance, repair and training support.”
2024 Category Winners
Category A - Prime Contractor of the Year: Hawkins Hawkins partnered with the Ministry of Defence to construct new facilities for the P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft fleet at RNZAF Base Ohakea. This includes a range of facilities including two hangars, a flight simulator, office space, flight stores, ground service equipment storage, and an apron to the runway.
The complicated construction process required a number of bespoke solutions to meet strict compliance requirements and a high earthquake standard. The nominators described the Hawkins team as flexible, perseverant, and collaborative, with health and safety a part of the culture.
Category B - Sub-contractor/Small to Medium Enterprise of the Year Product: Build N Concrete and Seipp Construction (two winners)
From 2023 to 2024 Build N Concrete helped to design and build classrooms, office space, kitchen, storage, and ablutions in Tonga for the Pacific Leadership Development Programme, which is a multi-agency initiative of the New Zealand Defence Force and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
The Auckland- and Tonga-based company, went above and beyond, navigating local customs and practices, representing Defence’s interests, and providing experts such as an engineer early in the design process. Throughout the project they also built skills in the local Tongan workforce, incorporated local cultural design and tsunami design considerations.
As part of Ohakea’s infrastructure upgrade, Christchurch-based Seipp construction completed Civil works including potable water, the North-East quadrant wastewater pump station, and wastewater pipeline. Their dedication and commitment was evident as significant challenges were navigated, such as unexpected geotechnical conditions and minimising operational disruption to roads and infrastructure from trenching. A percentage of their profits were made available for educational grants for staff families.
Category C – Sub-contractor/ Small to Medium Enterprise of the Year Service – The Sysdoc Group Sysdoc delivered the design and development of the learning system for the Seamanship Combat Specialist workforce review and the Engineering Training Reform. This work aimed to enhance the knowledge retention and training state of Royal New Zealand Navy sailors and to refresh training packages as old as 15 years.
The Seamanship Combat Specialist project involved a lengthy process of developing job scalars and working through a process to review and replace the approach and content. Sysdoc brought strong contemporary experience in the pedagogy of adult learners, and their revision of the curriculum across all ranks ensures a holistic programme of training is delivered.
2024 Special Award Winners
• Tū Kaha (Courage) – Dr Laura Robichaux (Beca)
• Tū Tika (Commitment) - (two winners) Krystal Paraone (StaplesVR) and Rodney Bosch (PAE)
• Tū Tira (Comradeship) – Paul Grant (Kuehne + Nagel Limited)
• Tū Māia (Integrity) – Damian Little (Hawkins)
• Kotahitanga (Unity) – Annette Smith (The Sysdoc Group)
Finalists for Prime Contractor of the Year
• ADA New Zealand
• Beca
Finalist for Sub-Contractor or SME of the YearProduct
• Beca
Finalists for Sub-Contractor or SME of the YearService
• Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington
• South Pacific Scaffolding
Build N Concrete
Seipp Construction
The Sysdoc Group
South Korea’s new president faces new balancing challenges with North Korea
New president Lee Jae-myung sees the need for strengthened relations between Pyongyang and Seoul, but the United States and Japan continue to play a critical deterrence role, writes international security specialist Debalina Ghoshal.
Debalina Ghoshal is a specialist in nuclear policy, missile systems, and space security. She is a NonResident Research Fellow with the Council on International Policy.
In June 2025, the Republic of Korea (ROK) witnessed the snap election of its fourteenth President, the Democratic Party of Korea’s (DPK) Lee Jae-myung, following the impeachment of incumbent president Yoon Suk Yeol.
The new president has several domestic challenges to overcome, including political and economic shocks. Lee will also have to ensure that South Korea’s relations with North Korea are normalised – a major foreign policy task that will put his diplomacy skills to the test.
Prior to Yoon Suk Yeol, the then president Moon Jae-in ensured that Seoul’s relations with Pyongyang were strengthened. This had the result in 2017 of North Korea announcing a self-imposed
moratorium on its nuclear and missile tests. Nevertheless, amid cooling relations between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Yoon, Pyongyang announced in 2022 the possibility it could move away from the moratorium citing apparent military provocations from the South.
Pyongyang, which had closed tunnels in its nuclear site in 2018, then commenced work to restore them. It also conducted tests of nuclear capable missiles – reactions to the hawkish policies of a Yoon government adamant on strengthening military ties with the United States through the conduct of military exercises.
Nevertheless, the new president is keen to improve Seoul’s relations with Pyongyang and also resolve the
New ROK President Lee Jae-myung. Image: Korean Culture and Information Service.
nuclear conundrum through an open “communication channel with North Korea” and establish peace on the Korean Peninsula through “talks and cooperation”.
Balanced approach needed
While campaigning, Lee had laid stress on co-prosperity with North Korea, yet he is having to balance this with South Korea’s need for ‘pragmatic diplomacy ’ through its trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan and South Korea.
In short, while the new president realises the need for strengthened relations between Pyongyang and Seoul, he also realises the relevance of the United States and Japan in helping South Korea maintain the deterrent posture crucial to its national security.
Lee’s pragmatic understanding of the need for a communication channel with North Korea signifies his keen interest in opening dialogues with Pyongyang to sketch out possible ways to ensure peace and stability between the two Koreas.
It’s an approach that could be seen as revival of the Sunshine Policy, which aimed at reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea and had become a pillar of South Korean foreign policy in 1998-2008 (and again in 2017-2020). However, this reconciliation may not be an easy
task, requiring astute diplomacy from Lee’s side to persuade Pyongyang to roll back to its selfimposed moratorium on nuclear and missile tests.
Moon had managed to persuade North Korea towards the moratorium by restricting Seoul’s military relations with the United States. Lee, however, may not be so keen to do this – something he has made clear in his statements.
On a positive note, given his belief that peace is “not achieved through superiority, but mutual understanding,” Lee likely views South Korea’s conventional deterrence posture as the way forward. It is unclear, however, whether he would look to strengthen this posture or adopt a more dovish approach.
Key appointments signal diplomatic approach
On the day of his inauguration, Lee chose Lee Jong-seok as his pick for director of the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS). Lee Jong-seok had been a unification minister during the Kim Dae-jung administration, which had been a proponent of Sunshine Policy. The appointment may signal that Seoul is keen to adopt a more dovish approach to inter-Korean relations.
In addition, Lee has chosen seasoned diplomat Wi Sung-lac, a former ambassador to Russia
and Seoul’s chief negotiator in the now-defunct six-party talks on Pyongyang’s denuclearisation, as his national security adviser.
Pyongyang would expect Seoul to cancel the military exercises it organises with the United States and Japan as a precursor to peace and security in the region. Moon was willing to take this step, while Yoon was unwilling to do so. Lee’s choices will define his foreign policy goals with not only North Korea but also with the United States.
Lee is likely to consider the inconsistencies of US foreign policy approaches towards South Korea under President Donald Trump, including criticisms by Trump of US-South Korea military exercises. Lee has already pointed out , however, that Seoul’s interests “transcend personalities”.
Given the ruling Democratic Party of Korea holds a majority, they are unlikely to face any challenges on decisions relating to foreign policy objectives.
In conclusion
The major foreign policy challenge for the new South Korean president is North Korea. It remains to be seen how President Lee will transcend geostrategic and geopolitical imperatives to ensure a peaceful and strengthened relationship with Pyongyang.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
2025 SIPRI Yearbook: Nuclear risks grow as new arms race looms
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s latest annual assessment of the state of armaments and disarmament, a new nuclear arms race is emerging amid weakening arms control regimes.
World’s nuclear arsenals being enlarged and upgraded
Nearly all of the nine nuclear-armed states—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Israel—continued intensive nuclear modernisation programmes in 2024, states the 2025 SIPRI Yearbook
Of the total global inventory of an estimated 12,241 warheads in January 2025, about 9,614 were in military stockpiles for potential use. An estimated 3,912 of those warheads were deployed with missiles and aircraft and the rest were in central storage.
Around 2,100 of the deployed warheads were kept in a state of high operational alert on ballistic missiles. Nearly all of these warheads belonged to Russia or the USA, but China may now keep some warheads on missiles during peacetime.
Since the end of the cold war, the gradual dismantlement of retired warheads by Russia and the USA has normally outstripped the deployment of new warheads, resulting in an overall year-on-year decrease in the global inventory of nuclear weapons. This trend is likely to be reversed in the coming years: the pace of dismantlement is slowing while the
deployment of new nuclear weapons is accelerating.
“The era of reductions in the number of nuclear weapons in the world, which had lasted since the end of the cold war, is coming to an end,” said Hans M. Kristensen, Associate Senior Fellow with SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). “Instead, we see a clear trend of growing nuclear arsenals, sharpened nuclear rhetoric and the abandonment of arms control agreements.”
Russia and the USA together possess around 90 per cent of all nuclear weapons. The sizes of their respective military stockpiles (i.e. useable warheads) seem to have stayed relatively stable in 2024 but both states are implementing extensive modernisation programmes that could increase the size and diversity of their arsenals in the future.
If no new agreement is reached to cap their stockpiles, the number of warheads they deploy on strategic missiles seems likely to increase after the bilateral 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) expires in February 2026.
The USA’s comprehensive nuclear modernisation programme is progressing but in 2024 faced planning and funding challenges that could delay and significantly increase the cost of the new strategic arsenal. Moreover, the addition of new non-strategic nuclear weapons to the US arsenal will place further stress on the modernisation programme.
Russia’s nuclear modernisation programme is also facing challenges that in 2024 included a test failure and the further delay of the new Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and slower than expected upgrades of other systems. Furthermore, an increase in Russia’s non-strategic nuclear warheads predicted by the USA in 2020 has so far not materialised.
Nevertheless, it is likely that both Russian and US deployments of nuclear weapons will rise in the years ahead. The Russian increase would mainly happen as a result of modernising the remaining strategic forces to carry more warheads on
each missile and reloading some silos that were emptied in the past.
The US increase could happen as a result of more warheads being deployed to existing launchers, empty launchers being reactivated and new non-strategic nuclear weapons being added to the arsenal. Nuclear advocates in the USA are pushing for these steps as a reaction to China’s new nuclear deployments.
World nuclear forces, January 2025
SIPRI estimates that China now has at least 600 nuclear warheads. China’s nuclear arsenal is growing faster than any other country’s – by about 100 new warheads a year since 2023. By January 2025, China had completed or was close to completing around 350 new ICBM silos in three large desert fields in the north of the country and three mountainous areas in the east.
Depending on how it decides to structure its forces, China could potentially have at least as many ICBMs as either Russia or the USA by the turn of the decade. Yet even if China reaches the maximum projected number of 1,500 warheads by 2035, that will still amount to only
about one third of each of the current Russian and US nuclear stockpiles.
Although the UK is not thought to have increased its nuclear weapon arsenal in 2024, its warhead stockpile is expected to grow in the future, after the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh confirmed earlier plans to raise the ceiling on warhead numbers.
During election campaigning, the Labour government elected in July 2024 declared its commitment to continuing to build four new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), maintaining the UK’s continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence, and delivering ‘all the needed upgrades’ to the UK’s nuclear arsenal in future. However, the government now faces significant operational and financial challenges.
In 2024 France continued its programmes to develop a thirdgeneration SSBN and a new airlaunched cruise missile, as well as to refurbish and upgrade existing systems, including an improved ballistic missile with a new warhead modification.
India is believed to have once again slightly expanded its nuclear arsenal
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in 2024 and continued to develop new types of nuclear delivery system. India’s new ‘canisterised’ missiles, which can be transported with mated warheads, may be capable of carrying nuclear warheads during peacetime, and possibly even multiple warheads on each missile, once they become operational. Pakistan also continued to develop new delivery systems and accumulate fissile material in 2024, suggesting that its nuclear arsenal might expand over the coming decade.
In early 2025 tensions between India and Pakistan briefly spilled over into armed conflict.
“The combination of strikes on nuclear-related military infrastructure and third-party disinformation risked turning a conventional conflict into a nuclear crisis,” said Matt Korda, Associate Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and Associate Director for the Nuclear Information Project at FAS. “This should act as a stark warning for states seeking to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons.”
North Korea continues to prioritise its military nuclear programme as a central element of its national security strategy. SIPRI estimates that the country has now assembled around 50 warheads, possesses enough fissile material to produce up to 40 more warheads and is accelerating the production of further fissile material.
South Korean officials warned in July 2024 that North Korea was in the ‘final stages’ of developing a ‘tactical nuclear weapon’. In November 2024, the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, called for a ‘limitless’ expansion of the country’s nuclear programme.
Israel—which does not publicly acknowledge possessing nuclear weapons—is also believed to be modernising its nuclear arsenal. In 2024 it conducted a test of a missile propulsion system that could be related to its Jericho family of nuclear-
capable ballistic missiles. Israel also appears to be upgrading its plutonium production reactor site at Dimona.
Arms control in crisis amid new arms race
In his introduction to SIPRI Yearbook 2025, SIPRI Director Dan Smith warns about the challenges facing nuclear arms control and the prospects of a new nuclear arms race.
Smith observes that bilateral nuclear arms control between Russia and the USA entered crisis some years ago and is now almost over”. While New START—the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty limiting Russian and US strategic nuclear forces—remains in force until early 2026, there are no signs of negotiations to renew or replace it, or that either side wants to do so.
US President Donald Trump insisted during his first term and has now repeated that any future deal should also include limits on China’s nuclear arsenal—something that would add a new layer of complexity to already difficult negotiations.
“The signs are that a new arms race is gearing up that carries much more risk and uncertainty than the last one,” said Smith.
The rapid development and application of an array of technologies—for example in the fields of artificial intelligence (AI), cyber capabilities, space assets, missile defence and quantum— are radically redefining nuclear capabilities, deterrence and defence, and thus creating potential sources of instability. Advances in missile defence and the oceanic deployment of quantum technology could ultimately have an impact on the vulnerability of key elements of states’ nuclear arsenals.
Furthermore, as AI and other technologies speed up decision making in crises, there is a higher risk of a nuclear conflict breaking out as a result of miscommunication, misunderstanding or technical accident.
Smith argues that, with all these new technologies and variables in play, “the idea of who is ahead in the arms race will be even more elusive and intangible than it was last time round. In this context, the old largely numerical formulas of arms control will no longer suffice.”
More states considering developing or hosting nuclear weapons
Revitalised national debates in East Asia, Europe and the Middle East about nuclear status and strategy suggest there is some potential for more states to develop their own nuclear weapons.
In addition, there has been renewed attention on nuclear-sharing arrangements. In 2024 both Belarus and Russia repeated their claims that Russia has deployed nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory, while several European NATO members signalled their willingness to host US nuclear weapons on their soil, and France’s President Emmanuel Macron repeated statements that France’s nuclear deterrent should have a ‘European dimension’.
“As the recent flare-up of hostilities in India and Pakistan amply demonstrated, nuclear weapons do not prevent conflict,” said Korda. “They also come with immense risks of escalation and catastrophic miscalculation—particularly when disinformation is rife—and may end up making a country’s population less safe, not more.”
PM Luxon discusses security and trade in Beijing
Prime Minister Christopher Luxon wraps up China visit with meetings with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Mr Luxon’s 20 June meeting with Chinese counterpart Premier Li Qiang produced a Joint Statement of Outcomes and witnessed the signing of 11 new government-togovernment arrangements covering climate change, cultural linkages, tourism and a range of trade initiatives.
During the meeting, the Prime Minister raised “the need for engagement in the Pacific to take place in a manner which advances Pacific priorities,” a point that echoed comments in his earlier meeting with President Xi Jinping.
The heads of government also discussed a range of security, climate, and trade challenges.
“The ongoing security and prosperity of the Indo Pacific region is vital to New Zealand interests, and I raised concerns with rising tensions in the Indo Pacific, including in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait,” said Mr Luxon.
Prime Minister Luxon noted that his meeting with President Xi Jinping was a valuable opportunity to reflect on the depth and breadth of the relationship, “and to reaffirm our bilateral ties.”
“I outlined how our strong and innovative economic relationship has grown to cover a broad range of areas. Our trade and economic links are complementary and contribute to prosperity in both countries. These links also directly support New Zealand’s ambition to grow our economy.
“We discussed the diversity of our people-to-people ties – from business, education, to cultural and science – and how they help build mutual understanding. I also welcomed progress made in increasing aviation links and tourism connections between our two countries.”
Mr Luxon emphasised the importance of open, direct dialogue at the leader level to navigate challenging regional and global developments.
“Engaging to share perspectives is more important than ever in a rapidly changing world. Where we have different views, our comprehensive and mature relationship allows New Zealand and China to speak frankly and constructively,” he said.
“I raised the importance to New Zealand of the international rulesbased system, as well as the key role that China can play in helping to resolve global challenges, such as the war in Ukraine.
“I also discussed the necessity of a stable region and reduced tensions in the Indo-Pacific” Mr Luxon said.
During his three-day visit, Mr Luxon worked with a business delegation to promote New Zealand’s premium food and beverage, and health and wellbeing products.
“The visit has reinforced for me that New Zealand remains wellplaced to meet the evolving needs of Chinese consumers, particularly in premium and niche categories that support higher-quality lifestyles,” he said.
In Beijing, Mr Luxon also promoted New Zealand as a world class tourism and education destination and celebrated new and long-standing air connections that underpin these.
“We’re committed to welcoming more Chinese visitors and students to New Zealand and strengthening the ties between our two countries,” he said.
Prime Minister Christopher Luxon stressed the importance of trade ties with China in a meeting with Xi Jinping
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Are Israel’s actions in Iran illegal?
Could it be called self-defence?
Israel’s claim to be acting in preventive self-defence must be rejected on the facts available to us, writes international law expert Associate Professor Shannon Bosch of Edith Cowan University.
Dr Shannon Bosch is an Associate Professor of Law at Edith Cowan University. She was previously Academic Leader of Research and Higher Degrees in Law at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban.
Israel’s major military operation against Iran has targeted its nuclear program, including its facilities and scientists, as well as its military leadership.
In response, the United Nations Security Council has quickly convened an emergency sitting. There, the Israeli ambassador to the UN Danny Danon defended Israel’s actions as a “preventative strike” carried out with “precision, purpose, and the most advanced intelligence”. It aimed, he said , to: dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme, eliminate the architects of its terror and aggression and neutralise the regime’s ability to follow through on its repeated public promise to destroy the state of Israel.
So, what does international law say about self-defence? And were Israel’s actions illegal under international law?
When is self-defence allowed?
Article 2.4 of the UN charter states: All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
There are only two exceptions: 1. when the UN Security Council authorises force, and 2. when a state acts in self-defence.
This “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence”, as article 51 of the UN charter puts it, persists until the Security Council acts to restore international peace and security.
So what’s ‘self-defence’ actually mean?
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has consistently interpreted self-defence narrowly.
In many cases , it has rejected arguments from states such as the United States, Uganda and Israel that have sought to promote a more expansive interpretation of selfdefence.
The 9/11 attacks marked a turning point. The UN Security Council affirmed in resolutions 1368 and 1373 that the right to selfdefence extends to defending against attacks by non-state actors, such as terrorist groups. The US, invoking this right, launched its military action in Afghanistan.
The classic understanding of selfdefence – that it’s justified when a state responds reactively to an actual, armed attack – was regarded as being too restrictive in the age of missiles, cyberattacks and terrorism.
This helped give rise to the idea of using force before an imminent attack, in anticipatory self-defence.
The threshold for anticipatory self-defence is widely seen by scholars as high. It requires what’s known as “imminence”. In other words, this is the “last possible window
of opportunity” to act to stop an unavoidable attack.
As set out by then-UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan in 2005: as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate, this would meet the accepted interpretation of self-defence under article 51.
As international law expert Donald Rothwell points out, the legitimacy of anticipatory selfdefence hinges on factual scrutiny and strict criteria, balancing urgency, legality and accountability.
However, the lines quickly blurred
In 2002, the US introduced a “preemptive doctrine” in its national security strategy
This argued new threats – such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction – justified using force to forestall attacks before they occurred.
Critics, including Annan, warned that if the notion of preventive self-defence was widely accepted, it would undermine the prohibition on the use of force. It would basically allow states to act unilaterally on speculative intelligence.
Annan acknowledged : if there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to support them, they should
be put to the Security Council, which can authorise such action if it chooses to.
If it does not so choose, there will be, by definition, time to pursue other strategies, including persuasion, negotiation, deterrence and containment – and to visit again the military option.
This is exactly what Israel has failed to do before attacking Iran.
Lessons from history
Israel’s stated goal was to damage Iran’s nuclear program and prevent it from developing a nuclear weapon that could be used against it.
This is explicitly about preventing an alleged, threatened, future attack by Iran with a nuclear weapon that, according to all publicly available information, Iran does not currently possess. This is not the first time Israel has advanced a broad interpretation of self-defence.
In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor, which was under construction on the outskirts of Baghdad. It claimed a nuclear-armed Iraq would pose an unacceptable threat. The UN Security Council condemned the attack.
As international law stands, unless an armed attack is imminent
and unavoidable, such strikes are likely to be considered unlawful uses of force.
While there is still time and opportunity to use non-forcible means to prevent the threatened attack, there’s no necessity to act now in self-defence.
Diplomatic engagement, sanction, and international monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program – such as through the International Atomic Energy Agency – remain the lawful means of addressing the emerging threat posed by Tehran.
Preserving the rule of law
The right to self-defence is not a blank cheque.
Anticipatory self-defence remains legally unsettled and highly contested.
So were Israel’s attacks on Iran a legitimate use of “self-defence”? I would argue no.
I concur with international law expert Marko Milanovic that Israel’s claim to be acting in preventive selfdefence must be rejected on the facts available to us.
In a volatile world, preserving these legal limits is essential to avoiding unchecked aggression and preserving the rule of law.
This article was originally published in The Conversation on 18 June 2025.
SECURITY
Invisible Risk: Outdated tech leaves NZ Government physical security exposed
The physical security of agencies in New Zealand’s public sector is in a state of dangerous neglect, writes Robbie Jones, Wellington-based Enterprise Solutions Specialist at Wesco Anixter.
Robbie Jones is an Enterprise Solutions Specialist at Wesco Anixter and a specialist in government security.
While digital threats dominate headlines, experts warn that New Zealand’s public sector is facing a quieter, more insidious crisis: a breakdown in the management of its physical electronic security systems.
From outdated access cards to mismanaged surveillance infrastructure, many government agencies are relying on aging, insecure technology to protect sensitive facilities—without the technical expertise needed to properly oversee it.
Old systems, new threats
Many government buildings still use legacy physical access control systems—platforms that are no longer updated or supported. These systems often have unpatched vulnerabilities and operate on
outdated protocols, leaving backdoors into wider networks.
It’s not uncommon to find access panels with default passwords, surveillance systems exposed to the internet, or intruder alarms that haven’t been tested in years. The assumption that these systems “just work” has left them dangerously neglected.
Cards that can be cloned in seconds
Perhaps the most glaring issue is the continued use of 125kHz proximity cards to gain access to premises—a decades-old technology that can be cloned in seconds using inexpensive tools. With no encryption or authentication, they provide little resistance to anyone with malicious intent.
In many agencies, there’s no central control over who gets access cards or when they’re revoked. Lost or duplicated cards often go unnoticed, and even modern smart card systems are frequently misconfigured or paired with outdated readers.
The CIO conundrum Responsibility for these systems often defaults to Chief Information Officers (CIOs), whose expertise lies in enterprise IT—not physical security.
“Most CIOs understand cloud infrastructure and software contracts, not the nuances of door controller protocols or access credential design,” says a security consultant familiar with the issue. As a result, crucial decisions are made without the depth of knowledge required—leaving vendors to design and deploy systems with little oversight.
No enforced national standards, no oversight
Unlike countries such as the US or the UK, where strict government security standards apply, New Zealand lacks a unified approach to physical security. Agencies are left to
interpret requirements on their own or via a consultant with the same lack of knowledge due to the lead governing agency being critically understaffed.
All this is leading to inconsistent practices and vulnerable infrastructure, while also creating an “I know more than you culture” within government circles. Some in positions of influence have no place advising on what’s right or wrong with the government security space as they think they know more than they actually do—and this can cause a new set of issues.
Procurement by familiarity, not fitness
The problem is compounded by procurement practices that favour familiar vendors over functional solutions. Systems are often chosen based on historical use or existing relationships rather than what’s best suited to an agency’s needs.
This “vendor lock-in” stifles innovation, drives up long-term costs, and limits interoperability. Some agencies continue renewing outdated systems simply because they always have—even when better options exist.
Consultants: Cutting corners, not risk
Another blind spot is the heavy reliance on security consultants who may not fully understand the unique demands of government operations. Instead of tailoring solutions to each agency’s needs, many propose onesize-fits-all options that are quick to deliver but poorly suited to complex environments.
Typically, this means consultants picking security products based on ease or “that’s what they use” rather than capability. This leads agencies down a rabbit hole for the next guy to fix.
While electronic security needs to move at a quicker pace to keep up with IT, consultants also need to reeducate themselves on products that best suit the end user and not be led by manufacturers looking for a quick sale without the end user being front of mind.
These shortcut solutions often fall short in scalability, integration, and long-term resilience.
Call for reform
Many security practitioners I have talked to suggest that the solution may start with building internal capability. Government agencies need trained specialists who understand both cybersecurity and physical systems. They also suggest:
• Standardised security frameworks
• Regular audits and testing
• Open, interoperable systems
• Procurement reform focused on risk, not convenience
• Dedicated roles for physical security—not just CIOs
In today’s threat landscape, access control and CCTV systems aren’t just hardware—they’re networked technologies vulnerable to the same exploitation as any server or database.
Without change, the weakest link in New Zealand’s national resilience may not be a firewall—but a door left unlocked by outdated tech.
SECURITY
Supermarket trial of FRT: Privacy Commissioner Inquiry results announced
New Zealand’s Privacy Commissioner has announced the trial by Foodstuffs North Island of live facial recognition technology to have been in compliance with the Privacy Act, but improvements needed.
Privacy Commissioner Michael Webster has found that the live facial recognition technology model trialled in 25 Foodstuffs North Island (FSNI) supermarkets is compliant with the Privacy Act.
His Inquiry report released on 04 June , however, shows that any business considering or using FRT needs to make sure it sets things up right to stay within the law.
“While the use of FRT during the trial was effective at reducing harmful behaviour (especially reducing serious violent incidents) it has also shown that there are many things that need to be taken into account,” said Mr Webster.
“FRT systems have potential safety benefits, but they do raise significant privacy concerns, including the unnecessary or unfair collection of people’s information, misidentification, technical bias which can reinforce existing inequities and human bias, or the ability to be used for surveillance”.
“These issues become particularly critical when people need to access essential services such as supermarkets. FRT will only be acceptable if the use is necessary and the privacy risks are successfully managed”.
The Privacy Commissioner’s Inquiry into Foodstuffs North Island’s trial use of live FRT set out to understand its privacy impacts, its compliance with the Privacy Act,
and to evaluate if it was an effective tool in reducing serious retail crime compared with other less privacy intrusive options.
Privacy safeguards make the difference
The Inquiry found while the level of privacy intrusion was high because every visitor’s face is collected, the privacy safeguards used in the trial reduced it to an acceptable level.
“Foodstuffs North Island designed the privacy safeguards used in the trial with feedback from my Office,” said the Privacy Commissioner. “This has provided some useful lessons for other businesses which may be considering using FRT.”
Key privacy safeguards in place during the trial included
• Images that did not result in a positive match were deleted immediately, as recommended by OPC – this meant there was very little privacy impact on most people who entered the trial stores.
• The system was set up to only identify people who had engaged in seriously harmful behaviour, particularly violent offending.
• Staff were not permitted to add images of children or young people under 18, or people thought to be vulnerable, to the watchlist.
New Zealand Privacy Commissioner
Michael Webster
• There was no sharing of watchlist information between stores.
• During the trial, the operational threshold that triggered an FRT alert was raised from 90% to 92.5% likelihood of the images matching, reducing the chances that people would be misidentified while managing down the “computer says yes” risk.
• Match alerts were verified by two trained staff, ensuring that human decision making was a key part of the process.
• Access to the FRT system and information was restricted to trained authorised staff only.
• Images collected were not permitted to be used for training data purposes.
• Systems were reviewed and improved during the trial where misidentifications or errors occurred.
Improvements needed
“There is still some work to do to increase the safety and effectiveness of FRT software use in the New Zealand context, as FRT technology has been developed overseas and has not been trained on the New Zealand population,” he said.
“As a result, we can’t be completely confident it has fully addressed technical bias issues, including the potential negative impact on Māori and Pacific people. This means the technology must only be used with the right processes in place, including human checks that an alert is accurate before acting on it.”
“Some improvements will also need to be made by FSNI before the use of FRT is made permanent or expanded to more stores. These focus on ensuring the documented processes and system settings are updated to match what happens in practice, including ongoing review of the use of FRT to make sure its use is justified as an effective tool for reducing serious harm offending.
“I also expect that Foodstuffs North Island will put in place monitoring and review to allow it to evaluate the impact of skin tone on identification accuracy and store response, and to provide confidence to the regulator and customers that key privacy safeguards remain in place.
“The trial findings will help other businesses to ask the right questions about whether FRT is necessary and appropriate for them and to understand what they would need to do to set FRT up and run it in a privacy protective way.”
Minister welcomes result
The Government h as welcomed the report, with Justice Minister Paul Goldsmith calling it “great news”.
“[The report] found the technology is effective at reducing harmful behaviour towards retailers, especially serious violent incidents,” he said. “This is great news for businesses that are considering using the technology as a means to protect their livelihoods.
He added that the report notes that privacy concerns must be carefully safeguarded.
“I expect our Ministerial Advisory Group will continue to look at this technology as an option to be used more widely and engage with the sector on it. I’ll be encouraging the MAG to take this report into serious consideration.”
The FSNI FRT trial started on 8 February and ended on 7 September 2024 and was conducted in 25 supermarkets. During the trial, 225,972,004 faces were scanned (includes multiple scans of the same person). 99.999% of these deleted within one minute, and there were 1,742 alerts of which 1,208 were confirmed matches. OPC is currently developing a Biometric Processing Privacy Code, which applies to biometric information, including a photo of someone’s face used in a Facial Recognition System. The new Code is expected to be published in mid-2025.
Facial Recognition in Supermarkets: It’s legal, but do New Zealanders actually want it?
The Privacy Commissioner has concluded that the live FRT model trialled by Foodstuffs North Island is compliant with the Privacy Act, but New Zealanders remain uncomfortable with the use of the technology by retailers, writes Nicholas Dynon.
Nicholas Dynon is chief editor of Line of Defence, and a widely published commentator on New Zealand’s defence, national security and private security sectors.
It’s been an interesting few weeks for observers of facial recognition and privacy in Aotearoa, if not a little confusing.
On 04 June, Privacy Commissioner Michael Webster released his finding that the live facial recognition technology (FRT) trialled by Foodstuffs North Island (FSNI) in 25 of its supermarkets is compliant with the Privacy Act.
The 74-page inquiry report provided reasonable detail relating to the finding, listing the privacy safeguards put in place during the trial that reduced the privacy risks of the FRT deployment to “an acceptable level”. It also identified improvements that would need to be made before deployment of the technology by FSNI can be made permanent or expanded.
It’s a big win for FSNI and for various organisations championing the use of FRT in retail, including Retail NZ, members of the Ministerial Advisory Group (MAG) for Victims of Retail Crime, and advocates of the tech among security vendors and service providers.
It’s also an outcome welcomed by Justice Minister Paul Goldsmith, who lauded the result of the Privacy Commissioner’s report as “great news” and now expects the MAG to “continue to look at this technology as an option to be used more widely”.
Yet it’s not such great news for the 41% of New Zealanders canvassed in a survey published by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) just three weeks previously who stated that they are ‘concerned’ or ‘very concerned’ about the use of FRT in retail stores to identify individuals.
Ironically, the OPC has crunched the legislative data on the supermarket trial and found it to be compliant, yet it’s also crunched the public sentiment around retail FRT and found it to be unequivocally deficient.
So, although it may be legal, is FRT in retail stores something that New Zealanders actually support?
OPC privacy survey reveals massive misgivings
The survey of over 1,200 New Zealanders found that 41% of respondents are ‘concerned’ or ‘very concerned’ about the use of facial recognition technology (FRT) in retail stores to identify individuals. A total of 25% are neutral on the topic, 31% are either not so concerned or not concerned at all, and 3% are unsure. 49% of Maori respondents indicated concern over FRT in retail.
Removing the responses of respondents who were either unsure or uncommitted (neutral) in relation to their thoughts on FRT in retail, the results indicate a significantly
higher proportion of respondents are concerned about the use of the technology in retail (41%) compared to those who are not (31%).
For comparison, in last year’s survey, 49% of respondents stated that they were concerned or very concerned about the use of facial recognition technology in retail stores. 22% were neutral, 25% were either not concerned or not really concerned, and 11% were unsure. Those aged 30-44 were more likely to express concern about retail use of facial recognition (55%), and women and Maori were more likely to say they were concerned.
These headline figures indicate a marginal decline in concern over the past year, but without understanding the underlying data or survey framing, it is not possible to confidently draw insights from this.
What insight we can confidently draw from both surveys is that the proportion of New Zealanders concerned about the use of FRT in retail is significantly greater than the proportion who are not.
OPC
and Foodstuffs data contradictory
This year’s OPC survey results come six months after the results of a survey commissioned specifically by FSNI to gauge public support of its 25-store trial.
As part of the trial, the supermarket cooperative commissioned the survey to gauge how “New Zealand consumers feel about the use of facial recognition (FR) in retail settings”. Among its results, the survey claimed that 66% of respondents were accepting of the use of FRT, “even if the impact it has on reducing harm from incidents of retail crime is minimal.”
Conducted on behalf of FSNI by branding and consumer insights consultancy One Picture, the survey of 1,007 shoppers also found that 79% of respondents would accept the use of FRT even if it only achieved a 0.7% reduction in harm, 86% would accept it if it achieved a 3% reduction in harm, and a staggering 89% would accept FRT if it achieved a 10% reduction in harm.
As I wrote last December, these results wildly contradicted the results of the survey conducted by the OPC earlier in 2024, and they were also inconsistent with established international data on FRT public acceptability published in several peer-reviewed survey-based academic research studies.
The results now also contradict the findings of the OPC’s latest survey.
Social licence for FRT in retail remains low
Like other comparable jurisdictions, the available statistics indicate that the New Zealand public remains divided in relation to their acceptance of FRT generally and the deployment of FRT by retailers in particular.
While the Foodstuffs trial and the media around it is likely to have contributed to raising the public profile in New Zealand of FRT in retail and perhaps contributed in some part to differences between the 2024 and 2025 OPC survey results, it nevertheless does not appear to have shifted the public support dial in favour of FRT in stores.
On the contrary, despite FSNI’s contention that FRT in supermarkets
“has strong public support”, the OPC’s most recent findings indicate the clear absence of widespread public support for FRT in retail.
The 25-store trial does not appear to have convinced New Zealanders generally of the value of offering up their biometric privacy so that retailers can derive loss prevention and security efficiencies via FRT.
Not even the intense problematisation of retail crime by our political leaders, the media, and lobby groups has done much to sway the New Zealand public towards widespread acceptance of having their facial biometrics being read when entering their local supermarket.
In the meantime, FSNI has reported winning two categories at the 2025 New Zealand Retail Risk Fraud Awards “for its work trialling facial recognition and its commitment to crime prevention, staff safety, and working with law enforcement.”
The awards, which took place in Auckland in March, are organised by international retail events company Retail Risk, which organises events that are free for retailers and paid for by sponsor/exhibitor vendors, which include providers of facial recognition solutions.
Given the impressive developments in facial recognition technologies in recent years, no one should reasonably doubt its efficacy. It is extremely good at identifying potential matches for the purposes of loss prevention and other security-oriented applications. It is simply great tech. It is, in a word, revolutionary.
And now retailers have been given confidence that it can be compliant with privacy legislation – if they deploy it correctly.
Effective, absolutely. Legal, yes. But as the OPC’s own data makes clear, surveyed public sentiment suggests that FRT in retail is a long way from being acceptable.
HOMELAND SECURITY
New research reveals ideology is “essential” to understanding terrorism
The UK Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE) has published research demonstrating that ideology plays a central role in driving terrorism.
Sacred Violence: the enduring role of ideology in terrorism and radicalisation by Dr Donald Holbrook forensically analyses 6,000 pieces of content consumed by 100 UK terrorists between 2004 and 2021.
The findings show that terrorists are deeply immersed in extremist ideology – consuming, debating and often producing their own material that justifies their actions.
“Terrorists take ideology deadly seriously. As government starts to grip the litany of challenges it faces on counter extremism, that means it must do so too,” said the UK’s Commissioner for Countering Extremism, Robin Simcox.
“This research provides clear evidence that ideology explains why terrorists fight, what they hope to achieve, and what they consider permissible in their struggle.”
According to Dr Holbrook’s research, terrorism and its permissive environment cannot be understood without reference to ideology. Over half the subjects in the study produced their own ideological content justifying their involvement in terrorism
The research found that terrorists display broad ideological interests. Islamist ideology tends to be more theological while extreme rightwing content is often more explicitly hostile and violent.
Half the extreme ideological material in Islamist terrorism cases originated in the West (i.e. the
UK, USA, and Europe). The most influential Islamist clerics among the terrorists studied were Anwar al-Awlaki, Abu Hamza al-Masri and Abdullah el-Faisal. Also popular was Muslim Brotherhood ideologue, Sayyid Qutb.
Among the extreme right wing, music groups – from folk musicians to heavy metal bands – produced the highest volume of ideological content. The most prolific authors of ideological content proved to be National Action, founded in 2013 and proscribed in the UK in December 2016.
The report’s findings suggest that counterterrorism and counter extremism policy within the UK must incorporate an understanding of ideology and its function in transitions to terrorism.
Dr Donald Holbrook is an Associate Fellow at the International
Centre for Counter Terrorism (ICCT). He also runs a research consultancy working with governments and law-enforcement on matters relating to counterterrorism and countering violent extremism. He serves on the editorial board of the journal Terrorism and Political Violence.
The Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE) provides the UK government with impartial, expert advice and scrutiny on the tools, policies and approaches needed to tackle extremism. It supports the public sector, communities, and civil society to confront extremism wherever it exists; and promotes a positive vision around core, shared values.
Published 20 March 2025, the full report is available on the Commission for Countering Extremism website.
Long-awaited HB167 Security Risk Management update ‘about to drop’
Security consultants and security risk management professionals have waited a long time for an updated edition of the landmark HB 167 handbook. According to one of its authors, the big day is arriving.
HB 167:2006 Security Risk Management author Dr Carl A. Gibson reported via LinkedIn earlier this month that the publication proof for a new HB 167 has dropped and is now awaiting approval by the Standards Australia MB025 technical committee for security and resilience.
According to Dr Gibson, it was 2005 when he and Mike Rothery (Australian Attorney General’s Department) had a conversation in a Thai restaurant in Canberra about the challenges of applying the joint Australian and New Zealand Risk Management Standard AS/NZ 4360 to security.
“With neither of us having a notebook with us, we eventually (after many hours) left the restaurant with about a hundred napkins and a tablecloth covered in dense notes and conceptual diagrams,” he wrote.
“I spent the following couple of weeks transcribing and translating (my handwriting) and developing a proposal for a new Standards Handbook, that was eventually published in 2006 as HB 167 Security risk management.”
The task of revising the document started almost a decade later, but it would take several more years and a pandemic before a Working Group was established with Standards Australia and the process of rewrites started.
Last year, Dr Gibson states, a draft Handbook was released for detailed peer review, which received about 450 reviewer comments.
“After several months of meetings, the comments were finally resolved, and the almost as long process of professional editing by Standards Australia and the back and forth with the Working Group was underway and a Final Draft was finally agreed upon.”
According to Dr Gibson, the updated Handbook is due to be published late June, and is likely to be available to the public in early July.
He comments that the new HB 167:2025 will be the largest and most comprehensive risk-related Standards publication ever, including 162 pages of practical guidance and 48 figures to help explain key concepts and processes.
“The Working Group has pushed a number of boundaries in risk thinking over the last few years, and HB 167 will be one of the foundation documents for the recently formed Working Group of OB007 that a few months ago started the process of developing a new Standards Australia practitioners’ guide on managing risk.”
Dr Gibson points out that everyone involved in the writing of HB 167 and the peer review did so on a voluntary basis, their contributions amounting to “hundreds of thousands of dollars in time, travel, and other expenses in the development and sharing of such knowledge over the years.”
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