Analyzing War Magazine | Sep/Oct 2021

September/October 2021

ADVANCING KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMED UNDERSTANDING OF INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY

C ON T E N T S

7

TRANSNATIONAL ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

13 ONLINE DETECTION OF

HOMEGROWN VIOLENT EXTREMISTS

TRENDS IN WOMEN AND 19 RECENT MILITANCY IN TRANSNATIONAL

JIHADIST GROUPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

PARTNERSHIP 27 INDIA-PHILIPPINES ON COUNTERTERRORISM THROUGH

REGIONAL AND BILATERAL APPROACHES

37

FEATURED SECURITY SCHOLAR:

MATTHEW NANES

EDITORIAL BOARD AND STAFF PUBLISHER SWi Analytics, LLC EDITOR Mark Payumo DEPUTY EDITOR Alyssamae Nuñez MANAGING EDITORS Diana Alarde-Jordan Jacob Morrell Bryner Las Rio Pacit LAYOUT EDITOR Jayrald Vasquez WEB EDITOR Philip Carpentero CONTRIBUTING WRITERS Matthew Nanes, PhD David Bruce Amira Jadoon, PhD Charmaine Willis Nakissa Jahanbani, PhD Don Mclain Gill ANALYZING WAR MAGAZINE www.analyzingwar.org SUBSCRIBE Inside the magazine or issuu LETTERS TO THE EDITOR editor@analyzingwar.org

Photos on these pages via Wikimedia Commons in the public domain in the U.S.: 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35. All others via Shutterstock.

4 September/October 2021

AMIRA JADOON, PHD

is an assistant professor and a research associate in the Department of Social Sciences and the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy at West Point. She specializes in international security, economic statecraft, and political violence, with a regional focus on South, Southeast, and Central Asia.

CHARMAINE WILLIS

is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, University at Albany, State University of New York, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Maine. Her research interests include social movements and protests, international security, U.S. base politics, and political violence, with a regional focus on East Asia.

NAKISSA JAHANBANI, PHD

is a researcher at the Combating Terrorism Center and an assistant professor at the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy at West Point.

At the Center, her research focuses on the Islamic State’s activities in Southeast Asia and, separately, Iran’s support to proxies in various regions, including the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.

MATTHEW NANES, PHD

is an assistant professor of political science at Saint Louis University. His research is on domestic security institutions and citizen-state relations, particularly in places plagued by violent intergroup conflict. Before coming to SLU, he was a postdoc at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. He received his Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego in 2017, and proudly holds a B.A. from Rice University in Houston, Texas.

DAVID BRUCE

is a career federal law enforcement officer with assignments in counterterrorism investigations and tactical instructor positions. As a task force officer for the Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), he has spent over five years investigating domestic and international terrorism cases and responding in the aftermath of terrorism attacks. Prior to his assignment on the JTTF, he served as the lead instructor for the Boston Office of the Federal Air Marshal Service, teaching antihijacking tactics, firearms, law enforcement response to active shooter, and tactical surveillance.

In 2019, David graduated from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst with a degree in journalism. During his studies, he concentrated on news writing, public relations, and writing for social media. Since graduating he has published several magazine articles with a focus on terrorism and adventure travel. Before embarking on a 25-year career in law enforcement, he served in the U.S. Army as a paratrooper/combat medic in the 82nd Airborne Division.

DON MCLAIN GILL

is a Resident Fellow at the International Development and Security Cooperation (IDSC).

He is a geopolitical analyst and author of several significant publications on Indian foreign policy and South Asian geopolitics. He has written for major international affairs publications such as RUSI, Asia Times, DNA India, the National University of Singapore’s China-India Brief, Observer Research Foundation, and Yahoo, among others. He is also currently completing his master's degree in international studies under the Department of Political Science at University of the Philippines Diliman.

5 September/October 2021

EDITOR’S NOTE Strategic communities across the globe are understandably filled with chatter about the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and that certainly includes this publication.

Collectively, they barely toned down by the time this issue was released. But they did vary at different levels of perspective depending on, but not limited to, geography, their country’s level of economic development, the terror threats they are facing, institutional coherence and maturity, freedom from groupthink, and ability to welcome new perspectives beyond traditional entities or individual figures.

While this list is undoubtedly global in scope, it is not just because the U.S.-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) sought to enjoin the whole world to constrict the terrorists’ freedom of maneuver. It can be recalled that by 2001, many countries already had their own policy position in relation to counterterrorism that even New Delhi, for instance, lamented Washington’s indifference to valuable intelligence it was sharing regarding radicalized Indians who helped facilitate the 9/11 attacks.

Global security experts, intellectuals, and enthusiasts have a lot to say in 2021 following U.S. demobilization in Afghanistan because GWOT focused counterterrorism on a more defined target: Al Qaeda in the aftermath of 9/11 and, later, ISIS, which allowed the whole endeavor to resonate even among ordinary citizens of the free world.

They can now, for instance, easily name the threat because defiance against the most powerful nation on earth gives reputational incentives to terrorists in the eyes of their apprentices or potential recruits, which the media would consistently report on. Needless to say, this also includes otherwise obscure terror groups that appeared to pick up on the fad of pledging allegiance to Al Qaeda or ISIS, and sought to amplify that on social media, as was the case with the causes and drivers surrounding the Battle of Marawi.

But when is it authoritative or reputable and not just noise that, at times, merely states the obvious like repeating U.S. President Joe Biden’s carefully crafted public justification that it is costly to fight a protracted war, or the expected shift in focus toward conventional warfare that 20 years of fighting terrorist guerrillas had eroded? How about those that merely restate the purported turn toward the East Asian backyard to keep China in check, which could well be as clear as day? Too much of this noise may primarily

account for why multiple media sources reported in recent weeks on one question that military veterans and active-duty service members now ask: “Where were you in the past 20 years?”

Analyzing War’s core value proposition is its ability to bring together diverse voices from war studies scholars in the Indo-Pacific region. Through the intellectual support of this edition’s contributors, we set out to uncover granular details that further our understanding on the subject of counterterrorism in a truly meaningful way, putting the distinction between real expert knowledge and random noise.

We enjoin you to quiet your mind then, as experts from West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center offer a genderbased lens through which counterterrorism can be pursued.

Meanwhile, a U.S. Army veteran tells the story about the challenges of undercover operations to contain the growing threat of domestic violent extremism (DVE) in America, which top U.S. law enforcement officials have identified as the greatest domestic threat facing their country. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security also noted in its latest national terrorism advisory bulletin that foreign actors such as Russia and China—likely encouraged by the Capitol riots on January 6—have increased efforts to exploit DVE and sow discord among Americans. Hence, it is no small wonder why former U.S. President George W. Bush stated during the 20th anniversary of 9/11 that violent extremists whether at home or abroad are “children of the same foul spirit.” Donald Trump vehemently disagreed.

This edition also hosts a research professor from Saint Louis University in Missouri who encourages intellectual skepticism amid speculations about the Taliban, as the group increasingly consolidates its power to govern Afghanistan under their own terms. Lastly, the only Manila-based scholar who understands India-Philippines relations writes about building on the bilateral relationship pertaining to counterterrorism that began in response to GWOT. It is, indeed, a tough world. Navigating it requires reputable knowledge. That knowledge is power.

Mark Payumo Mountain View, CA 6 September/October 2021

TRANSNATIONAL ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IMPLICATIONS AFTER THE FALL OF AFGHANISTAN Matthew Nanes, PhD

7 September/October 2021

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) evacuation at Hamid Karzai International Airport.

T

he U.S. military’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and the subsequent capture of the country by the Taliban signals a new chapter in governance by Islamic extremists, just three years after the Islamic State’s demise in Iraq and Syria. The Taliban’s resurgence has potential implications for violent extremism elsewhere, including Southeast Asia. Violence by self-styled Islamists has become increasingly common in Southeast Asia in recent years. High profile incidents like the Abu Sayyaf Group’s (ASG) 2017 siege of Marawi in the Philippines, Jemaah Ansharut

Daulah’s (JAD) 2018 terror attacks in Surabaya, and Jemaah Islamiyah’s (JI) 2002 bombing of a Bali pub are just a few of the hundreds of attacks perpetrated by Islamist extremists over the past two decades. 1 Previously, links between regional groups and the Islamic State contributed to violence in Southeast Asia. How might we expect the current landscape of transnational Islamic extremism to affect these groups’ operations?

Should security officials worry about similar links redeveloping now that the Taliban has taken control in Afghanistan?

8 September/October 2021

To fully understand these groups, their future alliances, and the violence they perpetrate, we must move beyond the simplistic designation of “Islamists” or “extremists.” Important differences in ideology and geopolitical goals delineate these groups and place bounds on their potential cooperation with one another.

Despite their shared desire to capture territory and govern by fundamentalist Islamic law, the Taliban’s ideology and goals differ substantially from IS or even al-Qaeda, making serious collaboration with Southeast Asia’s regional extremist groups unlikely.

Numerous reports from 2016 through 2020 raised the alarm about cooperation

between Middle East-based transnational organizations and a slew of regional Islamist movements operating in Southeast Asia.2 The Abu Sayyaf Group publicly pledged allegiance to IS in 2014 and began using the group’s flag and iconography in its public messaging.

Other groups, including those mentioned above as well as the Maute Group in the Philippines, Mujahidin Indonesia Timor (MIT), and others have at times claimed operational links with IS, al-Qaeda, and other transnational terror organizations.3 Intergroup cooperation has included instances of joint financing, exchanges of training and expertise, and the deployment of foreign fighters to other countries.

Flag used by the ISIS.

9 September/October 2021

Filipino soldiers involved in the Marawi crisis.

The nature of these partnerships reveals several limitations. First, material cooperation between publicly allied groups is actually quite limited. Asian fighters in Syria during the height of that conflict numbered only in the hundreds, and the number of IS affiliates who have traveled from the Middle East to fight in Asia is even lower. One analysis estimates that 90 percent of militants who fought in the siege of Marawi were native to the Philippines, while the “overwhelming majority” of funding came from local sources like kidnappings for ransom, extortion, and drug trafficking.4 These minimal operational links suggest that transnational partnerships have greater implications for public relations than they do for battlefield performance.

Second, many of these partnerships are relationships of convenience formed

around shared short-term political objectives, not ideology. Al-Qaeda seeks to defend Islam against Western, mainly American, incursions into Muslim land. They do not currently seek to overthrow secular governments in the Middle East or elsewhere. The Islamic State broke from al-Qaeda over two key disagreements, one political and one religious. Politically, IS was far more concerned with governance and control of territory compared to al-Qaeda.

Religiously, IS prioritizes enforcement of the “proper” way to practice Islam, branding members of other sects as apostates and carrying out violent jihad against them. IS’ ideological brand of Islamism placed it on a collision course not just with the West but also with governments throughout the Muslim world, including in Indonesia and Malaysia.5 10 September/October 2021

Whereas IS and al-Qaeda seek global jihad, the most dangerous militant groups in Southeast Asia hold staunchly local goals—for example, Moro independence from the Philippines, or the installation of a more conservative Islamic government in Indonesia. These groups are largely unconcerned with the Islamic State’s goal of creating a global caliphate, or with alQaeda’s confrontation with the West.

Why, then, did Southeast Asian extremists jump to publicly affiliate themselves with transnational organizations? These were strategic attempts to gain legitimacy by linking the political, often materialistic goals with a sense of global Islamic jihad and common purpose. Attachment to global jihad boosts leaders’ credentials

Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) chief of staff Carlito Galvez Jr. (left) shakes hands with Moro Islamic Liberation Front Chairman Al-Hajj Murad Ebrahim.

11 September/October 2021

and makes for splashier international headlines.6 It follows similar logic as the New People’s Army’s (NPA) attempts to link their insurgency against the Philippine government with transnational communist movements elsewhere. In reality, though, many of Southeast Asia’s most violent “Islamist” groups are simply separatists who happen to be Muslims. While cooperation between militant groups presents a threat to global security and must be taken seriously, the flying of the Islamic State’s flag over Marawi does not indicate an expansion of a global caliphate. Such a label vastly overstates the level of alignment between global Jihadist organizations and Southeast Asian Islamists.

This strategic use of affiliation explains why the Islamic State suddenly became so popular among Southeast Asian groups between 2014 and 2018. The wave of allegiances did not signal a sudden increase in the desire to become part of a global caliphate. Rather, it followed from IS’ ascension as the splashiest, most talked-about Islamist organization, making affiliation with it a powerful public relations tool.

In terms of political and ideological goals, the Taliban resembles the ASG, Maute Group, MIT, and other regional organizations more than al-Qaeda or IS. The Taliban’s geopolitical goals are largely limited to Afghanistan and neighboring territories. It readily allowed al-Qaeda to use its territory as a base from which to attack the United States, but the Taliban themselves had little

interest in participating in global jihad.

In other words, we are unlikely to see a slate of alliances between Southeast Asian groups and the Taliban like those with IS or al-Qaeda. Claims of affiliation or cooperation, should they emerge, should be viewed with skepticism. While the Taliban’s resurgence causes many security and humanitarian challenges, it is unlikely to fundamentally impact the security landscape in Southeast Asia.

Taliban fighters in Kabul.

NOTES 1

2 3 4 5 6

Amira Jadoon, Nakissa Jahanbani, and Charmaine Willis, Rising in the East: A Regional Overview of the Islamic State’s Operations in Southeast Asia (West Point, NY: USMA Combating Terrorism Center, 2020), https://ctc.usma.edu/rising-in-the-east-a-regional-overviewof-the-islamic-states-operations-in-southeast-asia/.

Joshua Spooner, “Assessing ISIS Expansion in Southeast Asia,” Asia Program Publications at the Wilson Center, (December 2016), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/assessing-isis-expansion-southeast-asia-major-threat-or-misplaced-fear.

Amira Jadoon, Nakissa Jahanbani, and Charmaine Willis, Rising in the East: A Regional Overview of the Islamic State’s Operations in Southeast Asia.

Joseph Felter, “ISIS in the Philippines: A Threat to US Interests,” The Caravan, no. 1715 (September 2017), https://www.hoover.org/ publications/caravan/issue-1715.

Daniel L. Byman, “Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different targets,” Brookings Institution, April 29, 2015, https://www. brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets/.

Julie Hwang, “Relatives, Redemption, and Rice: Motivations for Joining the Maute Group,” CTC Sentinel 12:8 (2019) in Amira Jadoon, Nakissa Jahanbani, and Charmaine Willis, Rising in the East: A Regional Overview of the Islamic State’s Operations in Southeast Asia.

12 September/October 2021

ONLINE DETECTION OF HOMEGROWN VIOLENT EXTREMISTS A STORY OF UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS IN ACTION David Bruce

13 September/October 2021

C

ounterterrorism undercover operations are unpredictable and involve relying on informants or confidential human sources (CHS) to be the eyes and ears for investigators. CHSs are not employees, they are paid informants who conduct operations for a variety of different motivations. Critics often opine that the Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI) or other intelligence agencies and their sources overstep their bounds and introduce plots that subjects might not have pursued without federal intervention. The reality is sources are one of the most valuable tools when it comes to detecting rapidly evolving terror plots early and preventing attacks against the homeland.

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A recent case that played out in a California court two weeks ago highlights the speed in which a homegrown violent extremist (HVE) progress from hateful rhetoric to operationally carrying out attacks. It also demonstrates the value of human intelligence assets online. The FBI’s sworn affidavit provides a glimpse into the threat posed by HVEs and the opportunity to detect them online.

In March and April of 2019, Mark Steven Domingo, a U.S. military veteran and resident of Reseda, California, planned and took steps to “manufacture and use a weapon of mass destruction in order to commit mass murder.” His target was a United Patriot Front Rally that was set to take place in Long Beach in late April 2019.

A little more than a month before accepting what he thought was an explosive device from an undercover agent, Domingo came to the attention of an online covert employee (OCE), when he declared the “shahada” on an online platform. The shahada is a profession of faith, a declaration. It is the first tenet of Islam, a sacred moment for Muslims worldwide. However, what followed was anything but sacred. Domingo made a lightning-fast transformation from new convert to homegrown violent extremist.

His brother, who was happy that Domingo found religion hoping it would bring structure to his life, described him 15 September/October 2021

in interviews as “troubled.” One day after his declaration, Domingo posted “america needs another vegas event tbh.”

NEWLY ADOPTED GRIEVANCES His rhetoric only increased as the days went by. On March 14, he posted, “there were mosque shootings in new Zealand [sad emoji] there mustbe [sic] retribution.”

From there Domingo continued to up the ante. He posted grievances about attacks on Muslims overseas particularly the mass shooting of Christchurch Mosque in New Zealand. When Domingo suggested, “I feel like I should make a Christians life miserable tomorrow [. . .] maybe a jew life idk,” the online covert employee initiated a private online conversation with Domingo. Domingo continued to share his rage about New Zealand and suggested an attack the next day on a nearby Jewish community as worshippers headed to synagogue.

The following day the CHS reached out and asked Domingo how he was feeling.

Domingo responded, “Still mad… I took my AK out.” A database check revealed the Domingo had three registered firearms—one of them a Century Arms, AK style rifle.

Later in the conversation, Domingo suggested that he and the CHS should meet.

The following day, Domingo and the wired-up CHS met for dinner and attended mosque immediately thereafter.

Domingo laid out his philosophy on the differences between Al-Qaeda and ISIS. He characterized Al-Qaeda’s tactics as “hit and run.” He preferred ISIS and their leader al-Baghdadi over Al-Qaeda, stating, “Baghdadi took the direct stance… victory or martyrdom.”

FROM WORDS TO ACTIONS Following this discussion both men went for a ride. With Domingo behind the wheel, they cruised the streets of Southern California. Along the way, Domingo suggested possible victims for his attack. He pointed out Jewish people, police cars, and a National Guard Armory. After hearing some of the targets, the CHS told Domingo, “You can’t just go online and do it, you know. You’re going to end up.” Just then Domingo interrupted the CHS and said, “A Martyr.”

When the CHS warned Domingo that he would be caught, Domingo replied, “Better not to be taken alive. But I have many magazines,” referring to his AK47. The CHS discouraged him from carrying out an attack with his firearms.

Likely buying time and collecting audio recordings, the CHS steered him to a

different plot, one using an improvised explosive device (IED). Before going their separate ways, the CHS told Domingo he knew someone who “used to make IEDs.” Domingo liked this idea and replied, “even better.”

A PATTERN OF INSTABILITY Days later, Domingo called the CHS. He was upset with his neighbor and wanted to kill him. Domingo laid out a plot to kill the neighbor and make it look like burglary. His rationale was he wanted to “start small” and then build up to an attack on a larger scale.

At a follow-up in-person meeting, Domingo expressed support for ISIS and said if ISIS “came here,” he would swear allegiance to them.

The CHS warned him that law enforcement in Europe had caught the Turkish man who had killed three people in the Netherlands. Domingo argued that the Netherlands was small and crowded, and the operation probably was not planned right. He began drawing diagrams of possible targets. In one scenario, he could attack the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers while they were in their squad car. His plan was to kill the officers and then burn the vehicle using gasoline. He ended this 16 September/October 2021

attack planning by saying, “Inshallah, if that’s all I can do to these kaffir.”

On April 9, 2019, Domingo met with the CHS. This time Domingo arrived wearing camouflage pants and a backpack, which contained an AK47 with a modified stock that made it more concealable. The CHS was alarmed by the rifle. Diego told him, “I just want to show you that I am serious.” By now Domingo had identified a target: the upcoming April 28, 2019, White Nationalist Rally, in Long Beach at Bluff Park. Diego talked about using his rifle and the CHS steered him back to the IED plot. Diego agreed, “the IED will do more damage… Remember the Tsarnaev brothers, the Boston bombers, it stirred up a hornet’s nest.”

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On April 29, the CHS messaged Domingo and told him, “The brother [IED maker] said he’s willing to help us, but we have to get him the stuff tonight.” The CHS agreed to buy the pressure cooker and Domingo agreed to purchase Christmas lights and shrapnel. A surveillance team watched as Domingo purchased several boxes of 3.5-inch nails using his debit card.

At this point an undercover agent (UC) was introduced into the plot as the bomb maker. With the components of the device ostensibly ready, Domingo told the UC that he would send the UC a meme when he wanted the IED to be assembled.

Days later the UC received the meme by text—a crescent moon and skyline.

The three men met the night before the planned attack. The plan was to arrive at the location early dressed as counter-protestors, and set the backpack containing the device in a location where it would do the most damage. The UC introduced the inert device, hidden in a backpack and the men inspected it.

Domingo then carried the device outside to place it in the UC’s vehicle, where he was arrested, device in hand by the Joint Terrorism Task Force.

In the shadowy world of online hate, opportunities present themselves to those assets that recognize signs of radicalization. The threats evolve rapidly from words to action. Early detection is key to spotting and assessing unstable individuals and disrupting plots before they come to their disastrous fruition.

Sworn statement of Special Agent Tasha Coolidge assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force, FBI.

18 September/October 2021

Charmaine Willis, Nakissa Jahanbani, PhD, and Amira Jadoon, PhD Disclaimer: The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not an official policy or position of the Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

19 September/October 2021

A

midst the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, two alleged female combatants carried out a suicide bombing in Jolo, Philippines, resulting in the deaths of at least 15 military personnel and injuring numerous others. 1 This was not the first incident of its kind either in the Philippines or Jolo itself; in 2019, an Indonesian couple conducted twin suicide bombings at a cathedral in the city. 2 These attacks were notable for several reasons. First, despite its history of insurgency and militancy in the southern region of Mindanao, suicide bombings are relatively rare in the Philippine modern history. 3 However, these attacks were attributed to foreign fighters from within the region (Indonesia) suggesting the perils of transnational linkages. Second, historically, women tend to serve in noncombatant support roles, particularly in jihadist groups like the Islamic State (IS) for ideological

and practical reasons. 4 However, as these incidents suggest, there has been an increase in the number of women in active militant roles in the region. This article contextualizes such incidents by examining the nature of women’s participation in militant attacks or plots in the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. In our previous research, including studies presented here, we found that there has been an increase in women’s participation in terrorist attacks in these countries since 2014. Notably, we have found that this increase is linked to the arrival of IS in the region, which has manifested in both female participants linked directly to either IS in Iraq and Syria (what we term “IS-Central”) or local groups affiliated with IS. Several sources suggest that the 2019 and 2020 attacks in Jolo align with this pattern, as IS allegedly claimed responsibility for both attacks. 5

Aftermath of the Jolo Cathedral bombings.

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RECENT TRENDS IN FEMALE MILITANCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA We find several notable trends in female militancy from 2014 to 2019 that are consistent with these events in our recent study, “Breaking the Glass Ceiling? Female Participation in Militant Organizations in Islamic State Affiliates in Southeast Asia.”6 Through examining open-source accounts about women who were killed or arrested in Indonesia, Malaysia, or the Philippines, we first found that there was a general increase in women associated with militant groups over this time period, approximately 115 women in total.7 Of these women, a little over half were in the Philippines (59), while the other 56 were split between Indonesia and Malaysia.8 The largest increase occurred between 2015 and 2017, rising from approximately nine women over all three countries in 2015 to 34 women in 2017, largely driven by the 2017 Battle of Marawi in the Philippines.

Second, we found that the increase in women’s association with militant groups in these three countries notably coincided with IS’ arrival in the region, which is reflected in women’s group affiliations. In our data, more women were associated with IS (either directly with IS-Central or IS affiliates in the region such as Abu Sayyaf Group’s Basilan faction in the Philippines) than with militant 21 September/October 2021

groups unaffiliated with IS such as the Communist Party of the Philippines– New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) in the Philippines (91 women in total).9 Interestingly, women linked to IS were more likely to be linked to IS-Central than any single regional group, such as Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) or Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) (37 women). However, women were more often linked to the latter (54 across six groups in Indonesia and the Philippines).10 Furthermore, female militants associated with IS in Malaysia were almost entirely associated with IS-Central (26 out of 28) and not regional affiliates.11

Indonesian President Joko Widodo checked the aftermath of the multiple suicide bombings in Surabaya.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, we found that women’s organizational affiliations were important indicators of their roles. Overall, most female participants (for whom we could find information about their roles) were in noncombatant roles.12 However, a third of the women were in combatant roles, an increasing trend in our data, and most of them were linked with IS.13 Interestingly, the trend of IS-linked women in combatant roles deviates from the supporting roles typically ascribed to women in IS-Central.14 While some groups in our dataset unaffiliated with

IS had female combatants (all of which operate in the Philippines), the nature of their roles differed from female combatants linked to IS. Specifically, female combatants linked to IS either served as suicide bombers or otherwise carried out bombings, while female combatants in unaffiliated groups were either involved in firefights or assassinations.15 Taken together, our findings suggest that this trend of ISlinked female combatants in Southeast Asia is a byproduct of the combination of IS’ modus operandi and the local militant landscape.16 22 September/October 2021

NOTABLE CURRENT TRENDS IN FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN TRANSNATIONAL JIHADIST GROUPS Recent work has highlighted multiple notable trends in female participation in jihadist groups in Southeast Asia.

Most notably, there is an overall rise in female terrorist operatives in Southeast Asia. The rise indicated that since 2015 more than 90 women were arrested for terrorist activity in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, compared to fewer than six in the 15 years before.17 Our study of female militant arrests in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia indicates that the rise has primarily been driven by the influence of the Islamic State, especially between 2014 to 2018.18 This is even more pronounced in the context of

suicide attacks in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore specifically, where “females have now taken part in eight out of the 11 suicide attacks committed from May 2018 through May 2021. This is far above the global female participation rate of one out of every 10 attacks from 2018 to 2020.”19 Women have participated in recent attacks either as lone wolves or as part of families. In an example of the former, in September 2019, Reda Mohammad Mahmud, an Egyptian woman, detonated a suicide bomb near a detachment in Indonesia’s Sulu province.20 Interestingly, her husband and two sons were also involved with terrorist attacks on troops in the months after her attack.21 Indonesia is unique among Southeast

President Rodrigo Roa Duterte pays his last respects to one of the victims who died during the twin bombings at the Cathedral of Our Lady of Mount Carmel in Jolo, Sulu.

23 September/October 2021

Asian countries in the number of families involved in terrorist attacks, all of which have been linked to IS in 2018.22 More recently, in March 2021, a married Indonesian couple linked to JAD detonated a pressure cooker bomb on a motorcycle as people were leaving a Palm Sunday Mass at a church in Makassar.23 Turning towards women’s specific roles, our study of female militant arrests in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia highlighted a variety of roles between 2014 and 2019. Combatant roles, such as attackers, were the most common in Indonesia, while non-combatant roles, such as financiers or recruiters, were more

common in Malaysia and the Philippines.24 Of these, the militants were either involved exclusively with the Islamic State or its affiliates.25 When looking at specific role types in all three countries over the entire time period, female militants with IS affiliation were most commonly involved as attackers, travelers, or facilitators, while those with non-IS affiliations were overwhelmingly attackers followed by leaders.26 Due to the lack of recent data, we cannot determine if roles were consistent from 2018 onward, however, of the cases reported in the open sources, there is anecdotal evidence of women’s continued role in combat roles, notably suicide attacks.27

Victims of suicide bomb explosion at the cathedral church in Makassar, Indonesia receive treatment.

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CONCLUSION AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS This overall rise in female operatives, particularly as lone wolves, has complicated detection and counterterrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives.28 Inattention to upward trends of female militants can influence both detection and the effectiveness of CT and CVE initiatives, generating serious security lapses. Additionally, because female bombers tend to receive more media attention than their male counterparts, there is a risk of copycat events.29 At the same time, a gendered approach can contribute to more holistic CT approaches. There is a growing need to apply a gendered approach to terrorism studies. Women’s participation in terrorist groups has gained considerable academic and policy-related research in recent years, but remains a largely overlooked factor.30 Mostly, stereotypical views of women continue to focus on them as victims as opposed to perpetrators.31 This traditional approach overlooks gendered differences in terrorist radicalization, recruitment, and deployment,32 and, in turn, this can affect how governments allocate resources to combat terrorism.

Analyzing a terrorist group’s age and operational needs can help analysts 25 September/October 2021

understand its need to diversify its human capital.33 Groups may adapt to including female combatants in response to counterterrorism campaigns targeting their main fighting forces. In the longterm, lacking a gender-specific CT approach can also affect the prosecution of female perpetrators.34

NOTES 1 2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

23 24

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

“Women Linked to Abu Sayyaf Suicide Bombings Arrested in Sulu,” Al Jazeera, February 23, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2021/2/23/nine-suspected-female-suicide-bombers-arrested-in-sulu.

J.C. Gotinga, “AFP Confirms Report: Indonesian Couple behind Jolo Cathedral Bombing,” Rappler, July 24, 2019, https://www.rappler. com/nation/236181-afp-confirms-report-indonesian-couple-behind-jolo-cathedral-bombing.

Amira Jadoon, Nakissa Jahanbani, and Charmaine Willis, “Rising in the East: The Evolution of the Islamic State in the Philippines” (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 30, 2020), https://ctc.usma.edu/rising-in-the-east-the-evolution-of-the-islamicstate-in-the-philippines/.

Amira Jadoon, Julia Lodoen, Charmaine Willis, and Nakissa Jahanbani, “Breaking the Glass Ceiling? Female Participation in Militant Organizations in Islamic State Affiliates in Southeast Asia,” Terrorism and Political Violence (2020), DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2020.1838904, 4-5.

Guillaume Lavallee, “Islamic State Group Claims Twin Suicide Bombings of Jolo Cathedral – SITE,” Agence France Presse, January 28, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/nation/islamic-state-group-claims-suicide-bombing-of-jolo-cathedral-site; Jeoffrey Maitem, “IS Militants Claim Responsibility for Sulu Blasts,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 25, 2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1326794/ismilitants-claim-responsibility-for-sulu-blasts.

Jadoon et al., “Breaking the Glass Ceiling.”

Jadoon et al., “Breaking the Glass Ceiling,” 3.

Jadoon et al., “Breaking the Glass Ceiling,” 10.

Jadoon et al., “Breaking the Glass Ceiling,” 10.

This count is derived from Table 2 on page 10 of Jadoon et al. However, if disaggregating groups like ASG into IS-linked factions, the count is around seven distinct groups.

Jadoon et al., “Breaking the Glass Ceiling,” 16.

Jadoon et al., “Breaking the Glass Ceiling,” 10.

Jadoon et al., “Breaking the Glass Ceiling,” 11.

Jadoon et al., “Breaking the Glass Ceiling,” 16.

Jadoon et al., “Breaking the Glass Ceiling,” 17.

Jadoon et al., “Breaking the Glass Ceiling,” 16.

“Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia: Emerging Trends and Dynamics,” The Soufan Center, (June 2021), 5, https:// thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/TSC-Report_Terrorism-and-Counterterrorism-in-Southeast-Asia_June-2021.pdf.

Jadoon et al., “Breaking the Glass Ceiling,” 1-3.

“Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia,” 7.

“Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia,” 20; Teofilo Garcia, “Foreign terrorist, 2 Abu Sayyaf killed in Sulu clash,” Philippine News Agency, April 17, 2021, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1137109.

“Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia,” 20; JC Gotinga, “DNA tests on Sulu suicide bombers confirm Abu Sayyaf’s ISIS links – military,” Rappler, November 14, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/nation/military-says-dna-tests-sulu-suicide-bombers-confirm-abusayyaf-isis-link.

“Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia,” 7, 14-21; Herdi Sahrasad, Dedy Tabrani, Muhammad Ridwan, Al Chaidar, “Women and Terrorism: A Sketch on Women and Transnational Terrorism in Southeast Asia and Indonesia,” Konfrontasi Journal 9:1 (March 2020), http://download.garuda.ristekdikti.go.id/article.php?article=1464439&val=17712&title=WOMEN%20AND%20TERRORISM%20 A%20SKETCH%20ON%20WOMEN%20AND%20TRANSNATIONAL%20TERRORISM%20IN%20SOUTHEAST%20ASIA%20AND%20 INDONESIA. “Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia,” 20.

Jadoon et al., “Breaking the Glass Ceiling,” 13. Combatants are individuals ​​ who were arrested prior to an imminent attack (i.e. had plans, materials, etc. to carry out an attack), killed while perpetrating an attack, or captured following a successful or failed attack. Individuals that were found to be involved in both combatant and non-combatant roles were binned with combatants. Noncombatants are individuals arrested for terrorism-related offences who was not the direct perpetrator of an attempted, failed, or successful attack.

Jadoon et al., “Breaking the Glass Ceiling,” 13.

Jadoon et al., “Breaking the Glass Ceiling,” 14. Travelers are individuals who actively tried to travel to another militant group.

Facilitators are individuals who smuggle, hide, or in any way facilitated the travel of a militant individual, or a person who helps in preparation of an attack, but does not participate.

For example, see the: “Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia”; Ana P. Santos, “Women of the Eastern Caliphate Part 2: By Blood and Marriage,” Pulitzer Center, January 2, 2020, https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/women-eastern-caliphate-part-2-blood-andmarriage.

“Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia,” 5.

“Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia,” 8.

Hilary Matfess and Robert U. Nagel, “Women and Rebel Legitimacy” in “Policy Roundtable: How Gender Affects Conflict and Security,” Texas National Security Review (October 27, 2020), https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-gender-and-security/.

Amira Jadoon “Gendering Recruitment into Violent Organizations: Lessons for Counter-Terrorism Operations,” in “Policy Roundtable: How Gender Affects Conflict and Security,” Texas National Security Review (October 27, 2020), https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policyroundtable-gender-and-security/.

Jadoon, “Gendering Recruitment into Violent Organizations.”

Jadoon, “Gendering Recruitment into Violent Organizations.”

Jadoon, “Gendering Recruitment into Violent Organizations”; Jessica Trisko Darden and Izabela Steflja, “Women and War Crimes: Finding Accountability for Female Perpetrators,” in “Policy Roundtable: How Gender Affects Conflict and Security,” Texas National Security Review (October 27, 2020), https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-gender-and-security/.

26 September/October 2021

INDIA-PHILIPPINES PARTNERSHIP ON COUNTERTERRORISM THROUGH REGIONAL AND BILATERAL APPROACHES Don McLain Gill 27 September/October 2021

September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the Pentagon in which terrorists hijacked a commercial airliner and crashed the plane into the side of the building.

The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 reshaped how countries perceived security threats in the international system. The event catalyzed two distinct lessons. First, the dawn of globalization and technological advancement has given non-state actors the ability to inflict significant damage on national security. Second, not even superpowers such as the United States are free from the disastrous impact of this emerging phenomenon.

The outcome of the 9/11 attack resulted in varied strategies from different countries. One highly distinct response was former U.S. President George W. Bush’s Global War on Terror (GWOT), which led to a major shift in Washington’s foreign policy toward the Middle East. Another crucial event took place in September 2006 when the United Nations (UN) General Assembly unanimously adopted the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, which attempted to outline a holistic approach to address counterterrorism through local and regional efforts.

28 September/October 2021

The case of counterterrorism cooperation between the Philippines and India is defined by both local and regional dimensions. At the regional level, although ASEAN provides an important framework to address counterterrorism cooperation between India and the Philippines, it remains rather limited due to the institutional constraints present within the regional bloc. As the IndoPacific construct ties both India and the Philippines in one strategic geographic space, it is inevitable that there will be growing convergences on how traditional and nontraditional security threats are addressed by both countries.

Terrorism has significantly challenged how security issues are perceived and addressed. Moreover, the influx of foreign fighters and separatist or secessionist groups greatly turn the spotlight toward how countries can effectively respond and contain such threats. India and the Philippines are

embroiled in this particular security threat, and it will be a practical step for both countries to strengthen cooperation multilaterally and bilaterally to address this growing issue.

ASEAN COUNTERTERRORISM FRAMEWORK Prior to 9/11, ASEAN as an institution did not spearhead any comprehensive framework to tackle terrorism. However, once GWOT was underway, bringing U.S. military might to bear against the Taliban in Afghanistan, ASEAN member countries issued the November 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism. But what is interesting is that the declaration represented a significant departure from the notion that terrorism should be viewed from the origination of a particular religion. Instead, ASEAN’s approach rejected the connection between terrorism and religion or race.

Flags of the ASEAN member states.

29 September/October 2021

The devastating 2002 Bali bombings further pushed the ASEAN countries to make a more serious commitment in the fight against terrorism. This was seen through the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime. Moreover, the ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism (ACCT) was adopted in January 2007, which served as a key regional framework for cooperation to control the spillover of terrorism and improve inter-agency cooperation among member countries.

Other initiatives include the ASEAN Our Eyes Initiative (AOEI), which involves the sharing of intelligence that began with

Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Under the AOEI, each country is responsible for the development of a hub for intelligence sharing, which would be utilized for the collection of relevant information.

However, despite these initiatives and frameworks, there remains significant impediments in the implementation of collective action against terrorism. The ACCT, for example, remained dormant for several years before it came into force in 2011. Interestingly, the majority of responses to terrorism from ASEAN countries have been unilateral due to the institutional limitations of a collective action approach.

List of victims of the 2002 Bali bombing in Indonesia.

30 September/October 2021

ASEAN-India Summit 2018.

ASEAN-INDIA Despite certain limitations within the organization, ASEAN can significantly benefit by engaging with its key partners not only in the realms of economics and politics, but also in the aspect of security.

India has solidified its position as a vital partner for ASEAN in a wide range of areas. In line with counterterrorism, both have collaborated on a number of programs such as the signing of the ASEAN-India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism in 2003. Moreover, at the 16th ASEAN Regional Forum in 2009, ASEAN and India agreed to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Work Plan on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime.

31 September/October 2021

Furthermore, the establishment of the Delhi Declaration in 2018 was a significant example of the growing importance of counterterrorism cooperation between India and ASEAN. The document aimed to “deepen cooperation in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, violent extremism and radicalization through information sharing, law enforcement cooperation and capacity building” through a series of existing frameworks such as the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime + India Consultation, the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Counterterrorism, and the 2003 ASEAN-India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism.

There continues to be an unrealized potential for collaboration between ASEAN and India in the field of counterterrorism because of shared threats between the two. However, this should not end here; looking beyond a regional framework, bilateral cooperation is also worth exploring particularly between India and the Philippines.

AN EMERGING INDIAPHILIPPINES PARTNERSHIP ON COUNTERTERRORISM During the independence of both India and the Philippines, the security environment was altered by the bipolar structure of the Cold War. India

established itself as one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. It was fashioned to remain segregated from the power politics of the two superpowers during the Cold War. The Cold War period also marked the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was a defense organization led by the United States. The Philippines was a member of this organization, which did not serve well for New Delhi due to Pakistan’s involvement in the arrangement. In a similar vein, when ASEAN was formed in 1967, India did not show much enthusiasm in welcoming the newly established regional bloc.

Rodrigo Roa Duterte, President of the Philippines.

32 September/October 2021

India’s firm stance on the NAM signaled that forging close relations with a proU.S. bloc defeats the ethical purpose of the movement. Moreover, ASEAN members were uncertain at the outset with the idea of extending a partnership to India for a variety of reasons. After the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation between India and the Soviet Union in 1971, ASEAN countries became suspicious of the possible role the Soviet Union will play in the foreign policy of India, particularly regarding Vietnam. This perception of mistrust between India and ASEAN continued throughout the Cold War. As a result, it was inevitable that India-Philippines relations suffered a significant setback.

However, as the Cold War era came to an end, a new shift occurred in the global security landscape. The 9/11 attack signaled a new era in international security.

The period that followed the attacks saw a series of catastrophic terrorist activities throughout the globe, such as the attacks on the Indian Parliament in 2001, suicide attacks in Indonesia in 2002 and 2005, and the explosion in Super Ferry 14 in the Philippines in 2004. As countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, began recalibrating their counterterrorism policies, India was given the opportunity to enhance its cooperation with them.

Moreover, these countries began to recognize India’s importance as a nation with one of the richest experiences in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.

Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India.

33 September/October 2021

Interestingly, the 9/11 terror attack paved the way for a flurry of political and diplomatic engagements between Manila and New Delhi as an indication that more cooperative security mechanisms, particularly in the areas of counterterrorism were in development. Nevertheless, it was after the establishment of the Act East Policy

by Prime Minister Narendra Modi that both countries began fast-tracking their strategic and security partnership.

In 2016, the first India-Philippines Joint Working Group Meeting on Counter

Terrorism was held in New Delhi. This provided a significant platform for both countries to formally and constructively engage in addressing the growing concerns brought by terrorism. In 2017, India was among the first countries to send aid to the Philippines during the disastrous terrorist siege of Marawi. The Modi government immediately provided financial assistance worth of US$500,000 for the rehabilitation of the residents in Marawi. Furthermore, India conducted cyber security training with a special emphasis on deradicalization for the security personnel of the Philippines.

Transitory shelters built by the government's Task Force Bangon Marawi initiative.

34 September/October 2021

In 2020, a virtual meeting of the joint commission on bilateral cooperation was co-chaired by Indian external affairs minister, Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and the Philippine secretary of foreign affairs, Teodoro Locsin Jr. Both officials agreed to enhance bilateral defense engagement and maritime cooperation with a specific focus on intensifying information-sharing on counterterrorism.

Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar

Teodoro Locsin Jr.

India and the Philippines are natural partners in the fight against the many dimensions of terrorism in the region.

However, both countries will have to maximize their cooperation within existing frameworks, and perhaps continue expanding their partnership in other areas within the security realm.

As India-Philippines relations are set to deepen and broaden in the years to come, it is worth exploring the many ways both democracies can enhance their strategic partnership.

NOTES 1 2 3 4

5 6 7

ASEAN, “ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism,” U.S. Department of State Archive, November 2001, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/65902.htm.

ASEAN, “ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism,” ASEAN, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ACCT.pdf.

Prashanth Parameswaran, “ASEAN Our Eyes Meeting Spotlights Counterterrorism Cooperation,” The Diplomat, March 10, 2020, https:// thediplomat.com/2020/03/asean-our-eyes-meeting-spotlights-counterterrorism-cooperation/.

Indian Ministry of External Affairs, “Delhi Declaration of the ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit to mark the 25th Anniversary of ASEAN-India Dialogue Relations,” Indian Ministry of External Affairs, January 25, 2018, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29386 Delhi+Declaration+of+the+ASEANIndia+Commemorative+Summit+to+mark+the+25th+Anniversary+of+ASEANIndia+Dialogue+Relations.

Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, “First India-Philippines Joint Working Group Meeting on Counterterrorism in New Delhi,” Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, May 13, 2016, https://dfa.gov.ph/news-from-our-foreign-service-posts/9273-first-indiaphilippines-joint-working-group-meeting-on-counterterrorism-in-new-delhi.

ABS-CBN, “India donates P25-M for Marawi rehab,” ABS-CBN, July 11, 2017, https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/07/11/17/india-donatesp25-m-for-marawi-rehab.

Indrani Bagchi, “Eye on China, India works to enhance Philippines ties,” Times of India, November 9, 2020, http://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/articleshow/79119960.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.

35 September/October 2021

36 September/October 2021

FEATURED SECURITY SCHOLAR

MATTHEW NANES O Mark Payumo

n the day the World Trade Center vanished in the thick cloud of burning jet fuel and concrete dust, I was nearly impervious to this terrorist attack that was unfolding halfway around the world. Like all plebes or freshman cadets at the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) who were busy with a bottleneck of hectic schedules on September 11, 2001, it was less about training to become a warrior than survival.

The grueling demands of first year at the PMA to earn your rightful place in the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines (CCAFP) are unforgiving to say the least, and the way that the unfortunate realities of this experience had reached the media bears testimony to how this is true. In addition, I also found by way of analyzing empirical data that on average, the CCAFP suffers at least one casualty from hazing deaths every 20 years but trails behind the University of the Philippines System (UP), which has the most number of hazing deaths since 1950 based on publicly available data on Wikipedia:

37 September/October 2021

six deaths from UP versus four from PMA; San Beda College comes in third with three hazing deaths. At least on the surface, anecdotal evidence suggests that hazing is a widely accepted norm in Philippine higher education due to the enduring presence of student fraternities and sororities. The nature of the beast that is the CCAFP, however, is different, and I leave it to another curious scholar who could shed light on the subject for our intellectual benefit.

As a result, by the time the U.S. went to war in Iraq in 2003, my PMA classmates and I were past our plebe year and had fully immersed in the regimented life inside the academy, looking forward to embracing a life of fighting upon graduation a few years later. It can be recalled that just a year earlier in 2002, the al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah was responsible for 202 people dead during the Bali bombings in Indonesia. This was also around the time that, as our featured security scholar would later recount in these pages, a 13-year-old Matthew Nanes

watched U.S. forces embark on one military campaign after another, tried its hands at democratizing a Middle Eastern country with a divided population, and came back home 20 years later with questionable gains after tremendous costs in blood, treasure, and prestige in the eyes of many Americans today.

In the same manner that 9/11 pulled the freedom-loving peoples of the world together, it sparked the same intellectual curiosity and passion in many war studies scholars, which certainly include Matthew and this author (who are both alumni of the University of California, San Diego).

More than anything, however, there is a real sense of fulfillment in this field that comes from being able

to move the policy needle for the common good, and it doesn’t matter how long it takes or how difficult.

Because as soon as your efforts come through, whether by educating the next generation of leaders or influencing policymakers in whatever capacity, the world becomes a better place. After all, you don’t do something because it’s easy, but because it’s hard.

AW: How did you find yourself doing the work that you do?

I was 13 years old when the United States invaded Iraq, which means I spent my young adult years watching the tragic failures of policy and statecraft that followed from the invasion. To an outside observer, it

38 September/October 2021

to apply them to the questions of security that had been puzzling me for the better part of a decade.

AW: What motivates you to keep taking part in solving the world's problems? What is your "why"?

often seemed like policy decisions were being made based on who could shout the loudest on TV rather than on evidence or data. I was deeply troubled that the U.S. and its allies knew they were going to have to build democratic institutions in a country with a divided population, but seemed so unprepared to do so.

When I went to college, I majored in political science primarily because I found international politics interesting, not because I planned to become a researcher. However, I quickly discovered the discipline’s use of the scientific method to answer questions about politics, and I was hooked. I learned how to use these analytic tools and decided I wanted 39 September/October 2021

I’m committed to the idea that policy should be evidence-driven, and that knowledge about politics is best learned through rigorous scientific analysis. I truly believe that whether we’re talking about war, voting rights, or policing, a lot of pain and suffering can be avoided by letting evidence drive our political decisions.

We have the tools to figure out what works and what doesn’t, but we need to do a much better job of applying those tools to questions that matter, and communicating the answers to people who are empowered to do something with them.

AW: Hello fellow Triton! Why did you choose UC San Diego for your doctoral journey? What can you share about your time at La Jolla?

Go Tritons! Growing up in the eastern U.S., I was always fascinated with California. When I applied to graduate schools, the stars aligned for me to be able to move to this idyllic place. UCSD has a fantastic political science program with great faculty and advisers working on

issues I cared about. A lot of the canonical research on democratic institutions in divided societies was written by UCSD faculty. It was pretty cool to learn from the scholars whose work had motivated me to ask a lot of these questions in the first place.

Of course, La Jolla has more than just great political scientists! I certainly miss being able to stare out at the Pacific and smell the ocean breeze.

It is hard to beat a morning run on the cliffs overlooking the ocean, or heading down to the beach to watch the sun set.

California also has a special connection with Asia. I knew very little about the region when I arrived

at UCSD, but my colleagues and classmates introduced me to the awesomeness to our west, especially the Philippines. After having never been to the Philippines for the first 25 years of my life, I think I went four or five times in the next couple of years, in addition to trips to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Hong Kong during the same period.

AW: What is your favorite book and why?

I really enjoy The Count of Monte Cristo. The narrative takes so many unexpected twists and turns, and Dumas is a master at bringing his characters to life. Most of all, I love how seemingly unimportant events 40 September/October 2021

early in the novel are tied back in hundreds of pages later.

AW: Any current or future work of yours that we should be on the lookout for?

My most recent book, Policing for Peace: Institutions, Expectations, and Violence is out this October from Cambridge University Press. It asks how the demographic makeup of the police affects security in divided societies. Drawing on interviews, surveys, and original data from Iraq and Israel, I show that diversity among police officers has profound effects on security. In Iraq, minority Sunnis who perceive the police to be more inclusive are less likely to consider using violence to express grievances against the government.

In Israel, local increases in the percentage of Arab police officers are associated with lower crime rates.

One of the interesting things that came out of this research has to do with the impact of diversity compared to representation. We often think that people inherently prefer to be policed or governed by people just like them, but at least in these cases, that turns out not to be quite right. Iraqis express feeling most secure when they are policed by a mix of Sunnis and Shias, even more secure than they feel when 41 September/October 2021

they are policed only by members of their own group. In Israel, local increases in the proportion of Arab police are associated with lower crime victimization not just among Arab civilians, but also among Jewish civilians. There seems to be something about officers from different groups serving side by side that has a profound, positive impact on security. In the book, I explore a few possible explanations that might be behind these patterns.

This project has been eight years in the making, and I’m excited to see it finally come to fruition. Although the book is aimed mainly at researchers, most of it is accessible (and hopefully interesting) to policy makers and practitioners as well. Policing is a hot topic right now, and I hope my work brings some evidence to bear on these important policy questions.

When evil men plot, Good men must plan.

When evil men burn and bomb, Good men must build and bind.

When evil men shout ugly words of hatred, Good men must commit themselves to the glories of love.

Where evil men would seek to perpetuate an unjust status quo, Good men must seek to bring into being A real order of justice.

Martin Luther King, Jr.