May/June 2021
ADVANCING KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMED UNDERSTANDING OF INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY
C ON T E N T S
9
THE GEOPOLITICS OF RARE EARTHS AND IMPLICATIONS TO DEFENSE INDUSTRIES
17 PHILIPPINE DEFENSE
TECHNOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS
25 THE JOSE RIZAL-CLASS FRIGATES 35 ATMANIRBHARTA AND INDIA’S STRATEGIC OUTREACH TO THE PHILIPPINES
44
FEATURED SECURITY SCHOLAR:
AUSTIN MCKINNEY
EDITORIAL BOARD AND STAFF PUBLISHER SWi Analytics, LLC EDITOR Mark Payumo MANAGING EDITORS Diana Alarde-Jordan Jacob Morrell Bryner Las Rio Pacit LAYOUT EDITOR Jayrald Vasquez WEB EDITOR Philip Carpentero CONTRIBUTING WRITERS Eliza Massi, PhD Chester Cabalza, PhD Joshua Espeña Don McLain Gill ANALYZING WAR MAGAZINE www.analyzingwar.org SUBSCRIBE Inside the magazine or issuu LETTERS TO THE EDITOR editor@analyzingwar.org
Photos on these pages via Wikimedia Commons in the public domain in the U.S.: 1, 2, 7, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, and 39. All others via Shutterstock.
4 May/June 2021
ELIZA MASSI, PHD
works on energy and critical minerals at the Trade and Investment Department of the Embassy of Brazil in London. She was awarded a doctorate from SOAS, University of London in 2015. Her research focuses on the political economy of development, industrial policy, energy economics, and the mobilization of finance for development in Latin American and East Asia. She has published on political economy of natural resource development, energy politics, and development banks. She also serves on the Board of Advisors of the European Research Council funded research program on rare earth materials and industrialization – Green Industrial Policy in the Age of Rare Metals (GRIP-ARM)
CHESTER CABALZA, PHD
is the founder and president of the Manila-based think tank, International Development and Security Cooperation.
JOSHUA BERNARD B. ESPEÑA
is a scholarly professional with diverse experience in the academia, think tank, and defense sector. He recently accepted the offer to become a Lecturer of Political Science and International Studies at Polytechnic University of the Philippines. Joshua is concurrently a Resident Fellow at International Development and Security Cooperation (IDSC), a think tank based in the Philippines who formerly served as a defense analyst in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He has written extensively on the great power politics of the Indo-Pacific, Philippine strategic culture, and ASEAN studies.
DON MCLAIN GILL
is a resident fellow at the International Development and Security Cooperation (IDSC). He is a geopolitical analyst and author of several significant publications on Indian foreign policy and South Asian geopolitics. He has written for major international affairs publications such as RUSI, Asia Times, DNA India, the National University of Singapore’s China-India Brief, Observer Research Foundation, and Yahoo (among others). He is also currently completing his master's in International Studies under the Department of Political Science at University of the Philippines Diliman.
5 May/June 2021
EDITOR’S NOTE Military modernization doesn’t happen overnight. Even for nations with robust military-industrial complex, superior relative combat power is sometimes deemed achieved after over a decade as was the case with the F-35 stealth aircraft. Sometimes it only takes under five years from laying a warship’s keel to sending it to sea trials before officially commissioning for duty as the America class of aviation-centric amphibious warships demonstrates. There’s a confluence of factors that affect developments in defense technology particularly those utilized by a country’s navy and air force, which are at the forefront of projecting a nation’s power hundreds or thousands of miles away from its sovereign shores. But a vibrant economy doesn’t necessarily lead to defense technological innovation, while a strong political will on the part of a nation’s leaders doesn’t necessarily translate to indigenous technological expertise, which generates proprietary military technology that bestows monopoly of qualitative advantage against potential adversaries. It is easy to get in the thick of details when tracking down a comprehensive picture of what drives effective defense technological innovation. But one thing is certain: Staying technologically ahead of one’s adversaries is far more difficult than merely catching up. The 21st century is an era of heightened strategic competition among great powers notably Russia, China, and the United States—and technology will ultimately settle their differences if peacetime diplomacy collapses. But still, alliances matter and in between are the middle powers and, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, China’s navy as of the latter part of 2017 accounted for less than 30 percent of Asia’s naval tonnage. Meanwhile, Asian nations that contest the nine-dash line
have collectively matched China’s procurement of modern submarines, warships, aircraft, and coast guard cutters over a period of two decades from 1997 to 2017. However, as it stands, ASEAN, for one, is a fragmented bloc of Southeast Asian countries that will not openly challenge the Chinese military in a unified manner, owing fundamentally to their non-interference principle and how they are economically co-opted by China, which is the largest trading partner of any one Southeast Asian country as well as ASEAN as a whole. Notwithstanding the prospects of a Quad Plus that is nimble given the absence of a formal alliance treaty, the U.S. and China are going head to head technologically. This is characterized among others by America’s Third Offset, trade sanctions against Huawei, prohibiting Chinese access to the International Space Station, and the creation of a new military branch of service, the Space Force. China, on the other hand, has been accused of stealing U.S. military technology by way of, but not limited to, Advanced Persistent Threats from cyber hacking, launched its Made in China 2025, in the process of constructing its own space station, and launched its own GPS satellites—all in aggressive pursuit of halting reliance on the West in terms of military technology, which is in line with its leapfrogging policy of civil-military fusion that’s aimed at replacing the U.S. as the leader in defense technological innovation. Meanwhile, even while vastly lagging behind in terms of GDP by purchasing power parity (a more accurate measure of the amount of military hardware a nation can procure), Russia occasionally reminds the world that it is still a great power to be reckoned with after announcing successful development of its hypersonic missile. 6 May/June 2021
Given these geostrategic realities, it could well be an understatement to say that it is a tall order for late arrivals such as the Philippines to embark on the modernization of its military. But determining how late is too late is already out of the question. It is widely believed that the military gap between the U.S. and China is narrowing by the day. Hence, in view of the Philippines’ strong sense of nationalism that had been an unfortunate vehicle for Manila’s strategic complacency, this is a window of opportunity that should be kept in mind as the country pursues its own military buildup. Additionally, taking into account the common knowledge that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) wields considerable influence in relation to the Office of
7 May/June 2021
the President, the AFP should also watch out for how Manila’s policymakers and local government politicians are now widely seen to have used the legendary resilience of their Filipino constituents as an excuse for inadequate development and economic opportunities, which continue to fuel communist- and secessionist-backed rebellions. That being said, we dedicate this work to keep the conversation going on military modernization in the Philippines as well as the possibilities in terms of defense technological innovation that Filipinos are potentially capable of. In so doing, questions should be continually posed in terms of rare earth elements (REEs) that Eliza Massi is bringing to the fore particularly China’s dominance of its
supply chain and the difficulty in harnessing these precious minerals. If, say, the Philippines does become a major source of a strategic mineral that is Scandium, is it open to Beijing’s overtures and exploitation? We also give credit to Joshua Espeña for being the first non-military analyst from the Philippines who has begun to make sense of military technology and the prospects of a viable kill chain for the AFP. This is a welcome development in terms of gaps in Filipino international relations expertise because geopolitics has become overrated (in the Philippines): Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is accordingly becoming increasingly devoid of any meaningful contribution to the complete picture of strategic competition other than "style points"; "personal advancement"; and clique factionalism due to the clamor for taxpayers’ money for “research.” In the same vein, domestic politics has also been noted to hamstring meaningful engagement between the military and the real experts who do meaningful work quietly. Notwithstanding the long list of strategic issues that the AFP requires data-driven analyses on, military executives therefore yearn for answers on what to do next and how their respective branch of service can be relevant in a joint warfighting fashion in relation to the Philippines as a First Island Chain nation. Policy assessments and recommendations in relation to military modernization are no longer adequate. A civilmilitary fusion of technological expertise that is honest is direly needed. Stopping short of diving deep into confidential details, Chester Cabalza puts forth prescriptions vis-à-vis current strategic responses by the Philippines. While he demonstrates how Manila, the AFP, and the Philippine Coast Guard are working on the double in terms of their strategic posture, more work can be done to remain proactive and position the country’s defense at the cutting edge of defense technological
innovation. Rightly so, Filipinos take pride in being an intellectual lot who are known to excel in various fields beyond Philippine shores if only given the chance to show what they’re made of. A policy response in this realm, particularly one that generously rewards scientific talent for remaining in the Philippines and builds tolerance for repeated failures in pursuit of innovation, is timely. There is no dispute that partnerships are likewise indispensable and India can provide that meaningful first step to the Philippines as it builds on a baseline of military technological capabilities that will put teeth to how the oversaturation of geopolitical knowledge in Manila could be applied. Don McLain Gill notes New Delhi’s strategic outreach to the Philippines while modeling how political will could spawn meaningful policy instruments to benefit a country’s defense technological innovation. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile that was developed in partnership with Russia is a testament to this. Needless to say, this ought to bring to mind that strategic imagination should not be limited to indigenous innovation, and should also include technology transfers similar to how China modeled the Japanese example on the latter’s successful attainment of global technological supremacy. Military modernization is not easy to begin with much less when starting out from scratch. But just as John F. Kennedy provided the motivation for the United States to launch a rocket into space and land on the moon, the Philippines should build and maintain a modern military not because it’s easy, but because it's hard. In the end, the sheer difficulty of the endeavor bestows benefits to a country’s defense posture even while raising the quality of living of its citizens as a civilized nation-state. – Mark Payumo, Editor 8 May/June 2021
The Geopolitics of Rare Earths and Implications to Defense Industries
N
Eliza Massi, PhD
atural resource challenges have been a feature throughout human history. Technological innovation and economic development are confined by natural resource use. In the industrial age, coal played a central role in the rise of the Western World from the 1800s onwards. During the 21st century, dependence and access to foreign supply of oil and gas shaped both global and regional geopolitical ambitions of states.
9 May/June 2021
Today, the challenge is to secure the
name, REEs are relatively abundant in
group of about 30 different minerals
more than two hundred and fifty mineral
supply of critical raw materials (CRMs)—a necessary for key industrial applications. The most critical of these metals, rare earth elements (REEs), is at the heart of the new geopolitical competition between China and the US. Rare
earths are a set of seventeen chemical elements, consisting of scandium,
yttrium and 15 lanthanides elements,1
ranging from atomic number 57 to 71. The REEs are all metals, have similar
properties, and are often found in the
same geologic deposits. Despite their
the earth’s crust. They can be found in substances. However, only in some of
these substances, such as monazite and bastnaesite, do rare earth elements
occur in sufficient concentrations to
justify extraction. Therefore, the low
concentration of deposits makes REEs
costly and difficult to extract, requiring capital intensive and potentially
environmentally damaging processes.
Large deposits are found mostly in China, the United States, Brazil, Australia, India, South Africa, and Greenland.
Countries with large deposit of Rare Earth Elements.
10 May/June 2021
WHY RARE EARTH ELEMENTS ARE SO IMPORTANT
Rare earths captured the world’s
attention in 2010-2011 when world prices increased more than tenfold in response
to China’s reduction of its export quotas. Although subsequently prices went
through a correction and have steadily stabilized in the period 2011-2016,
concerns did not disappear as regards the future access to these minerals,
especially in the context of Chinese
control of about 80 percent of global output. 11 May/June 2021
REEs are an essential part of many
sophisticated technologies and modern engineered materials, with both
commercial and military applications. Currently REEs and alloys that
contain them are present in several
commercial products and processes such as rechargeable batteries in
electronic devices like mobile phones
and computers. They are also found in traction motors of electric vehicles, in
permanent magnets used as generators for wind turbines, and as catalysts and phosphors.
The guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) launches a Standard Missile-3 as part of a joint ballistic missile defense exercise in the Pacific Ocean.
In addition to their economic importance,
earth magnets currently available on
the defense industry as they are found
(SmCo) and the neodymium-iron-boron
rare earth elements are also critical for in fighter planes, precision-guided
weapons, communication equipment,
guidance systems, night vision goggles, and in the alloys used in armored
vehicles. The importance of rare earths to permanent magnets technology
and their military applications cannot be overstated. According to Sophia Kalantzakos, “magnetic technology
is perhaps one of the most important uses of rare earth both commercially and militarily.”2 Permanent magnets are crucial for electric motors and power generators, providing not
only for thermal stability and greater
magnetic power but also allowing for miniaturization. The two leading rare
the market are the samarium cobalt
(NdFeB) magnets. The SmCo magnets, for instance, retain their magnetic
resistance at high temperatures and are ideal for military technologies
such as precision guided missiles and
aircraft. The criticality of REEs is further
amplified by the fact that some minerals do not have clear substitutes and
when they do, as in the case of non-
rare earth permanent magnets, they
are less effective, negatively impacting performance and, in the case of the
defense industry, military superiority. REEs, therefore, are of strategic
importance for the maintenance of a country’s high-tech and military industrial complexes.
12 May/June 2021
CHINESE DOMINANCE OF THE RARE EARTH INDUSTRY
Before 1965, the demand for rare earth elements was relatively small. Most
of the world’s supply originated from
deposits in Brazil, India, and South Africa. The advent of color TV in the mid-1960s brought the first jump in demand. The
Mountain Pass mine in California, which
began small-scale production in the early 1950s, expanded production, becoming
the world’s main supplier between 1965 and the late 1980s.
China entered the rare earth market in the 1980s. It recognized early on the economic and strategic importance
of rare earths elements. In 1990, the Chinese government declared REEs
a “protected and strategic mineral,”
forbidding foreign participation in the
exploration, mining, and beneficiation of REEs.3 Chinese production and
exports grew substantially causing prices to plunge worldwide, driving many
competitors out of business. By the late 1990s, China was the leading producer of rare earths. It subsequently further
strengthened its control of the industry by investing heavily in new recovery
methods and rare-earth technologies. It
also sought ways to increase control and verticalization of the industry by seeking to monopolize rare earth resources
globally and by attracting high-tech
companies and building supply chains inside China.4 In this process, China
managed to capture the permanent
magnet market. Until the late 1990s,
the world’s production of magnets took place in the United States, Japan, and
Europe; a decade later, the bulk of the
industry had relocated to China.5 China essentially controls all the stages of
rare earth production, from mining and
processing to refining and production of magnets.6
Cargo ships loaded with rare earth soil for export in China.
13 May/June 2021
China’s dominance over the industry peaked in 2010 when it was responsible for about 95 percent of global output of REEs. In the same year, consuming countries were caught off guard when China decided to restrict exports in order to curb illegal mining and environmental degradation domestically. Yet, many saw China’s export restrictions as a response to a maritime dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands. The rise in prices and the perceived willingness of China to use its dominance over the industry to punish rivals was a wake-up call to REEs consumers and governments in major importing countries.
The dangers of dependence on a single supplier cannot be emphasized enough. If the dominant producer decides to curb exports of a critical resource, the entire domestic supply chain can be cut off, causing economic disruption and endangering national security. This becomes even more problematic given the years it takes for a rare earth mine to enter production. China’s dominance over the industry gives it not only the power to influence prices and discourage investments elsewhere, but also to maximize harm to its rivals by blocking the flow of rare earth materials and of magnets. For
14 May/June 2021
instance, early this year, the Financial Times reported that China is examining the possibility of limiting the exports of rare earth metals and components essential to the American military industry.7
consumption. However, China’s control of the separation and refining capacity is complete. Except for the Australian Lynas Corporation, which operates a separation facility in Malaysia, there is no alternative outside China.
ESTABLISHING A RARE EARTH SUPPLY CHAIN OUTSIDE CHINA
Therefore, ore extracted on Mountain Pass as well as in any other rare earth mine across the globe will eventually be sent to China, where it will be refined into concentrate or other products. Another major hurdle in attempts to build an alternative supply chain outside China is the lack of end-use consumers since the bulk of the magnet industry is located in China. Currently, with the exception of Japan, there is limited magnet manufacturing capacity outside China. This leaves companies that eventually advance to the different stages of the rare earth value chain with only one customer, China. Thus, although it is possible to disperse rare earth extraction across countries, the fact is that China accounts for more than 90 percent of the world’s rare earth refining capacity and nearly 90 percent of global production of permanent magnets.
The steep rise in prices of REEs caused by China’s export restrictions in 20102011 and the perceived vulnerability of REEs supply chain led to different approaches at the industry and government level. Users outside China tended to follow one or a combination of approaches: (1) develop new suppliers of rare earth outside China; (2) improve use efficiency; (3) develop substitute for rare earth elements; (4) increase recycling rates; and (5) develop products and processes that do not require REEs. The efforts by governments and the industry to diversify the supply has in fact weakened China’s dominance in the first stage of the global rare earth value chain. This is due to the resumption of production of the Mountain Pass mine in the U.S., investments in new projects such as Mount Weld in Australia, as well as due to the relocation of China’s highly polluting rare earth mining to Myanmar. In fact, the production capacity outside China of light rare earth elements is already larger than the 15 May/June 2021
The establishment of a rare earth supply chain outside China will take time. It will require collaboration between countries and between private and state sectors as well as governmental support, as multiple stages of the supply chain will have to be developed.
Rare-earth oxides are used as tracers to determine which parts of a watershed are eroding. Clockwise from top center: praseodymium, cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, samarium, and gadolinium.
NOTES 1
2 3 4 5 6 7
The lanthanides elements are lanthanum (La), cerium (Ce), praseodymium (Pr), neodymium (Nd), promethium (Pm), samarium (Sm), europium (Eu), gadolinium (Gd), terbium (Tb), dysprosium (Dy), holmium (Ho), erbium (Er), thulium (Tm), ytterbium (Yb), and lutetium (Lu). REEs are further divided into two groups: light rare earth elements – lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, and samarium – and heavy rare earth elements – europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium. Sophia Kalantzakos, China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths (Oxford University Press, 2018), 120. Pui-Kwan Tse, China’s Rare Earth Industry (Reston, Virginia: U.S. Geological Survey, 2011), 5. Sophia Kalantzakos, China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths (Oxford University Press, 2018). Sophia Kalantzakos, China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths. The stages of the rare earth production are mining, separating ore into individual rare earth oxides, refining oxides into metals, manufacturing of alloys, and manufacturing of end-use products such as magnets. Yu Sun and Demetri Sevastopulo, “China Targets Rare Earth Export Curbs to Hobble U.S. Defence Industry,” Financial Times, February 16, 2021.
16 May/June 2021
PHILIPPINE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS ADVANCING THE ARMY’S STRATEGIC BASING, AIR FORCE’S MODERNIZATION AERODROME, NAVY’S ACTIVE ARCHIPELAGIC DEFENSE STRATEGY, AND SURVIVAL OF THE NATIONAL COAST GUARD WATCH Chester Cabalza, PhD
T
he Philippines is preparing for the National Territorial Defense Framework that is meant to take the country past the 2022 presidential elections through the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) Modernization Program. Transitioning to the final leg of its modernization road map in order to achieve a minimum credible defense posture by 2028, the AFP should tremendously invest in state-of-the-art defense technologies as it advances the Army’s Strategic Basing, the Air Force’s Modernization Aerodrome requirements through the Air Force Base Operations, the Navy’s Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy, and the survival of the National Coast Guard Watch.
17 May/June 2021
These colossal and considerable tasks to
the full spectrum of military procedures
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) to achieve
doctrines and proactive strategies.
beef up the arsenals of the AFP and the
a respectable territorial defense strategy
that are rightfully coded in effective
are central to the objectives of upgrading
The Army Strategic Basing 2028 will
necessities to attain a comparable
plan that’s aligned with future force
the country’s defense technological
deterrence that’s on par with the region’s robust defense posture and spending. Acceleration of the Army Strategic Basing 2028 emanated from the
National Security Policy that cements the Philippines’ vision to defend its
national interest, territorial integrity, and sovereign rights. It is supported by the
National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy that sets the goal of
achieving full defense intentions across
deliberately enhance the master basing structure and capability development plan by locating vantage points as to where best to posture land power to
address threats on territorial defense. This reference to future military bases aimed at addressing cybersecurity challenges and future defense
technical gaps could be extended
to the acquisition of refined armed hardware—impliedly articulated in
Philippine laws to guard the country’s sovereignty.
Headquarters Philippine Army
18 May/June 2021
A Philippine Air Force FA-50 takes off during the Bilateral Air Contingent Exchange-Philippines (BACE-P) at Cesar Basa Air Base.
The country’s air defense, through the
with robust aircraft procurement and
(PAF) in 1947, came into being to train
bases. Aerodrome safety is a vital link in
establishment of the Philippine Air Force and conduct prompt air operations
with a strategy designed to sustain
responsiveness in pursuit of the PAF
Flight Plan 2028—a transformational plan aimed at aligning all activities within the ambit of good governance. The robust procurement of platforms in its flight plan comes from the modernization
process essential to base support system capabilities.
The nexus of base operations to
readiness should be orchestrated under
the vision of a more capable and credible air power, which should be programmed 19 May/June 2021
world-class aviation technology and air
aviation safety of pilots in a resilient and trusted air force. By providing adequate and suitable facilities, it maintains
a safe operational environment for
warfighting aircraft that can also be used for humanitarian and disaster response efforts. It entails a lot of advanced and technological innovation to achieve
efficient base operations, oftentimes
strained by increasing the number of
flights while sustaining performance and
safety. At present, the current aerodrome requirements of base operations are insufficiently equipped and barely surviving.
As an archipelagic nation, the Philippines
security concerns. Brave marines and
status despite its strategic location in
wearing two hats in terms of their military
has yet to reach an upright maritime
Southeast Asia and its pivotal role in the geopolitically concocted Indo-Pacific region. After the Philippine Navy’s
(PN) attempt to launch the “Offshore
Territorial Defense Force 2020,” Chinese incursions using its combined armada of the People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN), China Coast Guard (CCG), and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime
Militia (PAFMM) continuously swarmed around the contested West Philippine Sea (WPS).
The complexity of naval defense paved a way to the precarious demand of
addressing the country’s various maritime
sailors, though consciously baffled by role and constabulary duties, have to
strongly defend the nation’s sovereignty. The PN as a naval force has to adopt an
appropriate force to accomplish national ends within a certain time frame and
cost. But the Philippines is endowed with marine resources that account for 65
percent of its gross domestic product.
These marine assets led to amendments in the Philippine Baseline Law and
the new AFP Modernization Law that
provided the Defense department an
impetus for rethinking its strategic roles and responsibilities particularly when it
comes to Manila’s over national security apparatus.
20 May/June 2021
The centrality of the upgrade and
on other sites. As a direct result, Chinese
focused on its defense equipment and
the Philippines’ weak external defense
technological progress of the AFP, while military materiel, must constantly align
with its strategies to halt past mistakes it
aggression and militarization outwitted posture.
previously implemented. For instance, in
The AFP should explore harnessing the
military force base on one of the islands
that projects the future of the internet
2014, the Chinese government set up a
in the Spratlys area. This drew increased international attention due to the
dredging activities within the Spratlys, drawing speculations that it planned to further develop a strong military presence in the area. Also, in 2015,
satellite imagery revealed that China
was rapidly constructing an airfield on
Fiery Cross Reef within the Spratlys while continuing its land reclamation activities
China's construction of an airfield on Fiery Cross Reef.
21 May/June 2021
benefits of the Internet of Things (IoT)
and universal computing in the defense sector. This technological revolution
represents the future of connectivity and reachability that are substantial
to the increasing dilemma posed by
hybrid warfare and gray zone strategy. To get connected and reached, it uses
radio frequency identification tags and barcodes.
IoT will allow the Philippine military
For instance, the PN and PCG lack
environments by creating digital
“cyber warfare in the maritime domain”
to interact and control systems and representation of the physical world
to the fifth domain that is cyber. The
integration of the internet with wireless
communications and sensor networks will provide a paradigm shift in transforming everyday devices into intelligent and context-aware ones. Unfortunately,
this doesn’t appear to be part of the
considerations under the country’s annual defense spending, which is aggravated by disparities between civilian and
military technology lines and contraction of research and development, both
extensive components of realizing the full potential of defense technological requirements.
research and technology in addressing in spite of the Philippines being a
catalyst for change in the South China
Sea and the Sibutu passage. The PCG, as a premiere maritime enforcement
agency that’s delegated to support the
country’s navy and marines, should invest in technology and training to understand and play a vital role in cyberwarfare in
the maritime domain. Its unique mandate for intelligence-gathering capabilities
and, at the same time, law enforcement will help secure the maritime interests of the Philippines. However, it has to
accept that Manila lacks maritime domain awareness from Luzon to Mindanao.
The PCG should therefore hire experts and continue training its personnel on cybersecurity.
22 May/June 2021
The survival of the National Coast Guard
maritime transportation for goods and
senior military officers and high-ranking
the majority of ports, while private
Watch (NCGW) relies on knowledgeable maritime law enforcers who are adept on international laws and the United
Nations Convention of the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), the implementation of
UNCLOS and its application to Philippine laws, and special issues on the WPS
and understanding of the Sulu-Celebes tri-border. Based on these imperatives, the NCGW should purposely back
up research expeditions to conduct
biological and oceanographic research activities and surveys around the
Kalayaan Island Group and Philippine
Rise in order to generate baseline data
for a wider understanding of changes in the marine ecosystems.
As an archipelagic nation, the Philippines is surrounded by oceans with vibrant
23 May/June 2021
people. The government manages
companies or civilians operate some
small ports. Understandably, some ports are well funded, while others have less capability to address cyber attacks. As the Command continues to improve
its system against a cyber attack visà-vis the maritime domain, it should
encourage the culture of immediate
reporting of a possible attack. Data and information sharing with other agencies and private sectors will address or
replicate other agencies' best practices. Once an attack happens, various
ports, terminals, and vessels can now strengthen their systems against the
attack. If reported, the authorities could develop lessons and procedures for
restoring systems or deterring attacks.
Harmonizing the ultimate goals of
sovereign and territorial integrity.
Force’s Modernization Aerodrome, the
country’s credible defense technological
the Army’s Strategic Basing, the Air Navy’s Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy, and the sustainability of
the National Coast Guard Watch will address the many handicaps of the
AFP and PCG in operationalizing its
intended doctrines and contextualized
strategies in safeguarding the Philippine
Massive investments to meet the
requirements are significantly desirable
that should consistently align with more responsive plans and effective policies
that’s buttressed by the outlined visions of the armed forces and maritime enforcement agencies.
24 May/June 2021
THE JOSE RIZAL-CLASS FRIGATES A STEP CLOSER FOR THE KILL CHAIN?
T
Joshua Bernard B. Espeña he Philippine Navy (PN) pushes further for
modernization. As of March 19, 2021, the PN
possesses two Jose Rizal-class guided-missile frigates,
the BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150) and BRP Antonio Luna (FF-151). 1
As part of the Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Modernization Program (RAFPMP), the PN seeks a total of
PhP500 Billion under the 2012 Philippine Fleet Desired Force Mix. The PN desires to have six (6) guided-missile frigates,
twelve (12) corvettes, eighteen (18) offshore patrol vessels
(OPVs), three (3) submarines, and three (3) anti-mine vessels. 2 25 May/June 2021
After years of bidding for its Frigate
It is important to consider why militaries
Acquisition Project, the Department
buy sophisticated platforms. A general
South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries
their advantage to impose their will on
of National Defense (DND) awarded (HHI) in 2016 to construct the said
frigates. Despite delays caused by the pandemic, the newly commissioned
frigates symbolize the PN’s modern
force. Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said that while a continuous
answer is that militaries buy platforms for the enemy. Time and communication are crucial elements to provide advantage
to an armed force. A better “kill chain”
or structure of action is needed to stand against one’s adversaries.
procurement of the force mix is still
What is the kill chain? What kind of
as a forefront against invaders in the
capabilities of the frigates? A successful
underway, the frigates’ arrival can serve West Philippine Sea (WPS).3
battlespace is expected? What are the
mission rests on its ability to close its kill chain and break that of its adversaries.
26 May/June 2021
THE KILL CHAIN
Militaries cannot make good decisions
"Kill chain" is a military buzzword
first understanding the battlespace
referring to a military’s structure of
action. One must complete a sequence of actions before “attacking” the
adversary and vice versa.4 This means that militaries also need high-tech
platforms necessary for command,
control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance
(C4ISTAR) to create a strategic effect with its weapons systems.
According to Christian Brose, a kill
chain has three steps, the first of which is to understand what is happening. 27 May/June 2021
or take relevant actions without
context. The second is to decide a
course of action. Understanding the
context and/or engaging the target is
fruitless without the ability to make or
communicate decisions. Last is to take
action that creates an effect to achieve an objective. Without acting, nothing else really matters.5 Once militaries
complete the sequence of actions, this offensive action refers to “closing the
kill-chain.” And if one needs to prevent enemy systems to deliver damage
against itself, such defense is called “breaking the kill-chain”.6
In the 1990s the U.S. Air Force
region. It plays a different game to
would be known by other militaries
by developing its so-called “Assassin’s
developed a kill chain concept that
as find-fix-track-target-engage-assess
(F2T2EA).7 This concept bloomed in the U.S. military when air power became dire to integrate its systems for joint
defeat a more superior U.S. military Mace” (杀手锏) to confront their
vulnerabilities, otherwise known as antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capability.8
capabilities. Sophisticated sensing
For example, China developed early
invented, innovated, and integrated into
to spot an approaching American aircraft,
and communication platforms were
the U.S. military, rendering tactical and operational advantages to hunt down
non-peer state and non-state adversaries. This, in turn, has made the U.S. a
technologically lethal military force. THE BATTLESPACE China invested systems to break the
America’s kill chain in the Indo-Pacific
warning systems and long-range radars and built an integrated network of air
and missile defense systems along with high-powered electronic jammers to
shoot the aircraft and prevent it from
communicating.9 China also boasts its
medium-range, anti-ship ballistic missile,
the DF-21D, that can launch and destroy U.S. aircraft carriers from a thousand
miles launched from land, surface, and subsurface.10
Paracel Islands
28 May/June 2021
China, on top of it all, seeks to make the U.S. “deaf, dumb, and blind” by developing a “systems destruction
can undermine this, and in turn, impose a fait accompli for the Philippines.
warfare” through investing in electronic
The PN, like other services, is
and others. Once the U.S. is denied
constabulary roles. Due to the lack of
and cyber means, anti-satellite missiles, 11
access and freedom of maneuver from the region, China could successfully
deploy its blue-water navy to safeguard
its southern seas in the South China Sea. The RAFPMP seeks a “minimum credible defense” for Manila, which could mean maintaining its ability to protect its
sovereignty in a projected time until
reinforcements arrive from its American ally. But the current Chinese strategy 12
29 May/June 2021
thinly stretched from military to
relevant resources and archipelagic
consciousness, weak institutions, and
shifting priorities, the PN could not fulfill the military role.13 The PN, nevertheless, strives to optimize its military role by
developing joint force capability to deny the use of the country’s maritime zones and defend the national territory. It has now also added and develops its cyber and electromagnetic domains for its
needed capabilities on the battlefield.14
Notwithstanding that the PN could not
ships. It is relatively larger than a
head-on,15 the PN’s newest assets and
than a destroyer. The hull is 107.5 meters
compete with its Chinese counterpart
the AFP should provide ways to break
China’s kill chain and protect one’s own.
THE FRIGATES The PN boasts the frigates as a multirole vessel capable of anti-surface warfare,
anti-air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and electronic warfare. Like any frigate,
the FF-151 is designed as an escort ship to larger naval vessels and merchant
corvette in terms of hull size but smaller long, has a beam of 13.8 meters, a draft of 6.9 meters, and a displacement of around 2,600 tons.
They are the less advanced versions of the Republic of Korea Navy’s (ROKN)
future generation Incheon-class (FFX) and Daegu-class (FFG-II) Frigates designed for coastal defense in the Korean
Peninsula and maritime security interests in greater East Asia.16
30 May/June 2021
The frigates, once all its weapons
systems and munitions are delivered
radar for their sensing platforms. It is
be armed with one (1) Oto Melara 76
tracking system and electronic support
until early 2022, are each expected to mm Super Rapid Gun, one (1) ASELSAN SMASH 30mm Secondary Gun, four (4) S&T Motiv 12.7mm K6 Heavy Machine
Guns, two (2) Twin LIGNex1 SSM-700K
C-Star Anti-Ship Missile, (2) Twin MBDA
Simbad RC with Mistral missiles, two (2)
SEA Triple Trainable Torpedo Launchers, and one (1) AW159 Wildcat anti-
submarine naval helicopter. Additionally, the purchased frigates are fitted for but
not with one (1) close-in weapons system, one (1) towed array sonar system, and one (1) single 8-cell vertical launching system.
17
The frigates have X and S-Band Radars, a tracking radar, and an air surface search 31 May/June 2021
also equipped with an electro-optical measures for their electronic warfare functions. For communications, the
frigates are expected to be equipped
with an integrated platform management system and combat management
systems (CMS).18 In spite of the major issue regarding the frigate’s CMS
incompatibility with the US-NATO
Tactical Data Link 16 (TDL16), the DND, in April 2021, approved to equip the TDL16 to the frigates.19 In this way, the frigates can improve real-time
information-sharing in the battlespace with other naval and cross-service
platforms and interoperability with allies
without an interception and hacking from adversaries.20
But the enemy has a vote in exploiting
a multi-domain battlespace.21 They can
coast guard, and militia vessels plus its
prepare through relevant exercises with
the fog of war. China’s swarming naval, stretched surveillance and supply lines in the artificial islands in the WPS can
delimit PN’s eyes, ears, and brains. Yet this is not to suggest as being mission impossible.
also maximize opportunities to learn and other services, such as the AFP’s Joint Force “DAGIT-PA” Exercise (AJEX)22,
and regional allies and partners, namely
Balikatan and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises.23
As part of the PN’s Offshore Combat
Certainly, the frigates are not alone in the
improve their operational effectiveness
would need to be integrated in a single
Force, the frigates would need to
and combat readiness through rigorous personnel training to understand these multiple systems. This would enable a
smarter military that is flexible to fight in
step for the kill chain. If anything, they
battle network not just to inflict damage, but also to create a strategic effect of deterrence against a more superior Chinese force.
32 May/June 2021
CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is important for the PN, AFP,
The frigates are a welcome development
efforts in protecting and strengthening
to modernize the PN. Advancing the
Philippines’ sea power is a vital interest to utilize the seas for its national
development and the security of its
sovereignty. But this is no easy task. As the future battlespace becomes more disruptive and destructive in multiple domains, adversaries can
disrupt communications and propagate disinformation and, thus, break one’s own kill chain.
and the national government to intensify
its ability to close the kill chain. Although
the frigates are not for competing against China head-on, the PN needs to seriously consider developing its operational
capabilities to break China’s kill chain
to impose costs on their strategy. Aside from the PN’s integration of cyber and electronic warfare domains, there is a
need to explore advantages in adding space warfare as the next generation
domain. Hence, leveraging its alliance
and partnerships is needed for the PNAFP-DND to improve its C4ISTAR.
33 May/June 2021
NOTES 1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14
15 16 17
18
19
20 21
22 23
Xavier Vavasseur, “The Philippine Navy Commissions New Jose Rizal-Class Frigate BRP Antonio Luna,” Naval News, March 19, 2021, accessed March 19, 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/03/philippine-navy-commissions-new-jose-rizal-class-frigatebrp-antonio-luna/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=philippine-navy-commissions-new-jose-rizal-class-frigate-brpantonio-luna. Jaime Laude, “Philippine Navy needs P500B to upgrade war capability,” The Philippine Star, May 24, 2012, accessed March 19, 2021, https://www.philstar.com/2012/05/24/809955/philippine-navy-needs-p500b-upgrade-war-capability. Bea Bernardo, “DND formally commissions BRP Antonio Luna (FF-151),” PTV News, March 19, 2021, accessed March 19, 2021, https:// www.ptvnews.ph/dnd-formally-commissions-brp-antonio-luna-ff-151/. Adm. Jonathan Greenert & Gen. Mark Welsh, “Breaking the Kill Chain,” Foreign Policy, May 17, 2013, accessed March 21, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/17/breaking-the-kill-chain/. Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare, New York: Hachette Book Group, Inc., 2020. Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare. Mike Benitez, “It’s About Time: The Pressing Need to Evolve the Kill Chain,” War on the Rocks, May 17, 2017, accessed March 21, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/its-about-time-the-pressing-need-to-evolve-the-kill-chain/. Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare, New York: Hachette Book Group, Inc., 2020. Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare. Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare. For more information about the DF-21D, see Missile Defense Project, “DF-21 (Dong Feng-21/CSS-5),” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 23, 2016, last modified January 02, 2020, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-21/. Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare. Francis C. Domingo, “The Contexts of Strategy as a Guide for Defense Planning in the Philippines,” Defense and Security Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2015: 162, DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2015.1069109. Dianne Faye C. Despi, “Sea Power in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities for the Philippine Navy,” Asian Politics and Policy, Vol. 9, No. 4, (2017): 590-592. Cdr Xylee C Paculba PN, Ltjg Cris Alessandro O Cabanilla PN, Lt Johnson P Lamug PN, Moses Isaiah B. Palces, Lt Kurl Winston T Layugan PN, and MSgt Robert P Chuidan PN(M) (Res), “The Future of Philippine Naval Warfare,” The President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare, Vol. 1. (2021): 62. Renato De Castro, “The Philippines Discovers its Maritime Domain: The Aquino Administration’s Shift in Strategic Focus from Internal to Maritime Security,” Asian Security, 12:2 (2016): 123, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2016.1195813. Vavasseur, “The Philippine Navy”; and Ian Bowers, The Modernisation of the Republic of Korea Navy: Seapower, Strategy, and Politics (Switzerland: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2019), 89. “Philippine Navy approves the delivery of future BRP Antonio Luna Jose Rizal-class guided missile frigate,” Navy Recognition, February 07, 2021, accessed March 19, 2021, https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2021/february/9659philippine-navy-approves-the-delivery-of-future-brp-antonio-luna-jose-rizal-class-guided-missile-frigate.html. Philippine Defense Resource, “The Hyundai HDF-2600 Jose Rizal-class frigate of the Philippine Navy,” Philippine Defense Resource, June 21, 2019, last modified March 19, 2021, accessed, April 20, 2021, https://www.phdefenseresource.com/2019/11/the-hyundai-hdf2600-jose-rizal-class.html. Frances Mangosing, “PH Navy gets green light to install US-compatible operating technology on new warships,” Inquirer, April 14, 2021, accessed April 20, 2021, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1419195/ph-navy-gets-green-light-to-install-us-compatible-operatingtechnology-on-new-warships. Frances Mangosing, “PH Navy gets green light to install US-compatible operating technology on new warships.” See Cpt Diane Faye C Despi PROF, Erick Nielson C. Javier, Rowena S. Tatad, and Joshua Bernard B. Espeña, “Short, Sharp, and Multidimensional: Future Wars and Considerations for Philippine Defense and Deterrence,” The President’s Papers: The Future of Philippine Warfare, Vol. 1. (2021): 84. See Priam Nepomuceno, “AFP opens ‘DAGIT-PA’ Exercise,” Philippine News Agency, November 23, 2020, accessed April 20, 2021, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1122635. The Balikatan Exercises 2021 did not have any “at sea” events in this year because the crew of the FF-150 and FF-151 “are undergoing various training and systems testing before their deployment.” See “BRP Jose Rizal joins naval exercises in Hawaii,” Inquirer, August 19, 2020, accessed April 20, 2021, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1323812/brp-jose-rizal-joins-naval-exercises-in-hawaii; and Priam Nepomuceno, “No at-sea events for this year’s Balikatan: PH Navy,” Philippine News Agency, April 13, 2021, accessed April 20, 2021, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1136596.
34 May/June 2021
Atmanirbharta and India’s Strategic Outreach to the Philippines
T
Don McLain Gill he India-Philippines strategic partnership has received a major boost since 2014. Both countries have reinvigorated their
partnership in several fields; however, the security domain
continues to stand out the most at a time when China has been
increasing its assertive actions across the Indo-Pacific. However, due
to the crippling effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, India is faced with an urgent challenge to recalibrate its strategic policies to achieve its
national and regional goals. Accordingly, the Modi government unveiled its vision for Atmanirbharta or self-reliance, especially in the defense sector to enhance its national security ambitions and cement its
partnership with like-minded and friendly countries like the Philippines. 35 May/June 2021
TOWARDS ATMANIRBHARTA IN DEFENSE
India’s quest for self-reliance in the
defense realm has received a major boost
attributed to the Modi government’s
efforts to recalibrate export policies and granting permission to both public and private sectors.
during the Narendra Modi government
Before 2014, there was no robust
incredible jump. As per the data
policy. Moreover, exports were carried
where arms exports received an
published by the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on March 2020, India is ranked 23rd as a major
arms exporters from 2015-2019 and 19th for the year 2019.1 The annual report 2018-19 of the Ministry of Defense
highlighted that the defense exports were at a significant Rs 10,745 crore,
which is a growth more than 100 percent from that of 2017-18, which amounted to INR 4,682 crore, and over
700 percent since 2016-17 (INR 1,521
crore).2 This significant increase can be
attempt to enhance India’s export
out under the Foreign Trade Policy
after obtaining a no-objection certificate (NOC) from the Ministry of Defense. However, in September 2014, the
Modi government crafted a crucial
strategy for expediting defense exports, which focused on export promotion and export regulation.3 It was thus
decided that India will set up an Export
Promotion Body with participation from
both public and private sectors to assist the government and promote exports with friendly countries.
36 May/June 2021
In addition, the Defense Export Steering Committee headed by the Secretary,
Department of Defense Production (with representation from the armed forces,
the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), the Planning and International Cooperation Wing, and Acquisition Wings of the Ministry of
Defense, the Ministry of External Affairs, and the Director General Foreign Trade) was set up to boost exports.4 In line
with this, the Ministry of External Affairs facilitated lines of credit for countries to
import defense products. Moreover, the
Prime Minister Modi
process for granting NOCs for exports
of Defense also outlined a goal, which
efficient and user friendly.
(USD 25 billion) in defense manufacturing
Amid the Covid-19 pandemic, Prime
of Rs 35,000 crore (USD 5 billion) worth of
was revamped to make procedures time
consists of a turnover of Rs 1.75 lakh crore in the next five years and an export target
Minister Modi emphasized and reiterated
military hardware.6
production during his announcement of
In a continuous effort to bolster
Furthermore, he openly outlined five
government has created a “negative list”
economy, infrastructure, systems, vibrant
101 weapons and military systems in a
The defense sector of India has been
items like assault rifles, light machine guns,
achieve self-reliance; moreover, the Modi
surface-to-air missiles, shipborne cruise
India” can also be tapped to materialize
helmets, ultralight howitzers, light combat
the need for a self-reliant India in defense a Covid-19 related economic package.
indigenous defense capabilities, the
important pillars of Atmanirbharta, mainly:
in August 2020 to restrict the import of
demography, and demand.5
step-by-step manner.7 This list includes
established as a critical area that needs to
sniper rifles, land variant of short-range
government’s flagship project, “Make in
missiles, bullet-proof jackets, ballistic
this vision. In line with this, the Ministry
aircraft, and light combat helicopters.8
37 May/June 2021
In line with this, the defense minister
Additionally, the Ministry of Defense
period of time these items will not be
budget for FY 2020-2021 between
Rajnath Singh said that, “After a certain procured from outside. This list is the beginning of a process that has the potential to transform the defense
industry. This list of 101 items includes not only minor parts but also warfare systems, integrated platforms, combat vehicles.
This list is just a beginning, so that in the coming time, defense equipment worth Rs 1.40 lakh crore will be purchased domestically.”9
has divided the capital procurement domestic and foreign purchases,
allotting INR 52,000 crores for the
domestic sector.10 Moreover, great
importance has been placed on higher indigenous content in new purchases
in the Defense Acquisition Procedure
(DAP) 2020.11 Additional steps made by the government towards self-reliance in the defense sector include the bid
to privatize the Ordnance Factory Board 38 May/June 2021
(OFB),12 and increase the limit on foreign
Defense. The list is based on the inputs
from 49 percent to 74 percent.13
and Posts in the Indian Ocean Region
direct investment in the defense sector
On a separate note, DRDO chairman G. Satheesh Reddy emphasized that
there will be a noteworthy increase in
India’s exports in the coming years. He
highlighted that, “Within next 4-5 years,
this country will have a lot of indigenous content in the Indian armed forces and
we will be seeing tremendous amount of increase in exports.”14
INDIA’S STRATEGIC OUTREACH TO THE PHILIPPINES
To achieve its USD 5 billion target in
Defense exports, a list of 152 indigenous defense platforms to be exported
has been released by the Ministry of
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte and India Prime Minister Narendra Modi declare their joint statement following a successful bilateral meeting on January 24, 2018.
39 May/June 2021
from Defense Attaches in Indian Missions and other friendly countries.
Among the items on the list, the IndoRussian BrahMos supersonic cruise
missiles, Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, and the Combat
Management System for the navies
significantly stand out. In addition, there are also around 85 different equipment and 47 other sub-systems.15 Besides
several countries from Africa and the
IOR, many countries from the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) have also been expressing interest in several Indian platforms. Among the ASEAN
countries, the Philippines seems to be
one of the most highlighted recipients of Indian defense platforms.
The Philippines serves as a crucial pillar
to a change in perception among
must be noted that the 1990s up until
towards India. As a result, both countries
in India’s Act East Policy. However, it
the early 21st century illustrated a lack of momentum in the strategic bilateral
relationship between the two countries. However, since the establishment of
the Act East Policy, the significant rise of India in both economic and military
realms and increasing assertiveness of
China in the Western Pacific contributed
Manila’s elites and decision makers
saw a major breakthrough in bilateral
ties, especially in the strategic level, since 2014. Among the key developments between the two countries is the
ongoing discussion of the export of
major Indian defense platforms including the BrahMos cruise missile to the Philippines.
40 May/June 2021
On March 2, 2021, India and the
Philippines signed a key pact that
will lead the way for government-
WILL THE BRAHMOS BENEFIT PHILIPPINE DEFENSE?
to-government deals on defense
The BrahMos is the only supersonic
about supersonic BrahMos cruise
three times the speed of sound. It is very
equipment including the much-talkedmissile. The Implementing Arrangement that revolves around the procurement of defense material and equipment was signed by the two countries at
the Camp Aguinaldo, headquarters of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines.16
However, despite not being an exclusive contract for the BrahMos, The Straits Times quoted Philippine Defense
Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, saying, “We are buying the BrahMos missiles.”17
41 May/June 2021
cruise missile in the world that flies at
desirable because of its multi-functional
use for both coastal defense and ground attack. Moreover, the BrahMos can be
fired from ships, submarines, and aircraft and ground launchers. Accordingly, the missile is equipped with cutting-edge stealth technology and an advanced
guidance system. The BrahMos, which
has a range of 290km was tested several times by the Indian armed forces at sea and on land. The initial versions
of the missile go up to the range of
launch them, actually.” He also added
an extended range of around 400
from South Korea, and the Hamilton
290km; however, India has also tested kilometers, with more versions of higher ranges currently under development. If the deal officially materializes, the
Philippines will be the first buyer of the BrahMos.
that, “We have the platforms, like frigates cutters from the US, but we don’t have the budget to configure the ships.”19
In line with his last comment, India has reportedly offered Manila a USD 100
million soft loan to acquire the missiles.20
According to Jose Antonio Custodio,
The BrahMos will be a great boost to the
a non-resident fellow of the Stratbase
especially for coastal defense. Moreover,
a security and defense consultant and ADR Institute, he said that, “Obviously
the opponent here is China. We do need
these missiles to strengthen our defence against China.” Custodio emphasized
that the “very lethal” BrahMos missiles were usually mounted on land-based
mobile platforms, but the Philippines can also effectively mount them on ships.
18
He said, “We have the modern ships to
military capabilities of the Philippines,
with an eye on China, the defense system can serve as a crucial deterrent vis-à-
vis the latter’s assertive position in the
South China Sea. Though the Philippines still has a long way to go in terms of
bolstering its defense capabilities, the
addition of the BrahMos will be pivotal in enhancing Philippine defense and IndiaPhilippines strategic partnership.
42 May/June 2021
NOTES 1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8 9 10
11
12
13
14 15
16 17 18
19 20
Rajat Pandit, “2nd biggest arms importer, India 23rd on exporters' list,” Times of India, March 10, 2020, http://timesofindia.indiatimes. com/articleshow/74559063.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst. Manu Pubby, “India’s defence exports more than double,” Economic Times, June 18, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes. com/news/defence/indias-defence-exports-more-than-double/articleshow/69835284.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_ medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst. Sushil Chander, “India’s Defence Exports: Status, Strategy and Solution,” Center for Land and Warfare Studies (2019), no. 89, https:// www.claws.in/static/India%E2%80%99s-Defence-Exports.pdf. Lieutenant General H S Panag (Retd), “Modi govt made defence exports jump 700%. Now it must radically reform ordnance factories,” The Print, March 19, 2020, https://theprint.in/opinion/modi-govt-made-defence-exports-jump-700-now-it-must-radically-reformordnance-factories/383476/. India Today Web Desk, “PM Modi shares 5 pillars that will make India self-reliant in Covid-19 times,” India Today, May 12, 2020, https:// www.indiatoday.in/india/story/pm-modi-speech-5-pillars-atm-nirbhar-india-self-reliance-covid-19-lockdown-1677293-2020-05-12. PTI, “India will see tremendous increase in defence exports in next 4-5 years: DRDO chairman,” Business Today, January 21, 2021, https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/india-will-see-tremendous-increase-in-defence-exports-in-next-4-5-yearsdrdo-chairman/story/428653.html. Snehesh Alex Philip, “Artillery guns, assault rifles, AFVs — Here’s a list of 101 items MoD won’t import in future,” The Print, August 9, 2020, https://theprint.in/defence/artillery-guns-assault-rifles-afvs-heres-a-list-of-101-items-mod-wont-import-in-future/478066/. Snehesh Alex Philip, “Artillery guns, assault rifles, AFVs — Here’s a list of 101 items MoD won’t import in future.” Press Information Bureau, “Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh highlights Atmanirbhar Bharat initiatives of MoD at Defence Industry Outreach Webinar,” Press Information Bureau, August 27, 2020, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1649023 Press Information Bureau, “MoD's big push to Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative; Import embargo on 101 items beyond given timelines to boost indigenisation of defence production,” Press Information Bureau, August 9,2020, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage. aspx?PRID=1644570 Press Information Bureau, “Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh unveils Defence Acquisition Procedure – 2020; New DAP incorporates several measures to boost domestic Defence industry and Make in India; Procedures simplified to reduce time delays and enhance ease of doing business,” Press Information Bureau, September 28, 2020, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1659746. Major General AB Asthana, SM, VSM, “Why Corporatisation Of Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) Is Inescapable Strategic Need Of India,” Businessworld, October 9,2020, http://www.businessworld.in/article/Why-Corporatisation-Of-Ordnance-Factory-Board-OFB-IsInescapable-Strategic-Need-of-India/09-10-2020-329564/ Hindustan Times, “FDI in defence sector hiked from 49% to 74%, says FM Nirmala Sitharaman,” Hindustan Times, May 16, 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/nirmala-sitharaman-live-conference-fdi-in-defence-production-raised-to-74-to-attractinvestors-to-make-in-india/story-hB7LB8rLavTaPQF2NGCmYM.html PTI, “India to see tremendous increase in defence exports in next 4-5 years, says DRDO chairman,” The Print, January 21, 2021, https:// theprint.in/defence/india-to-see-tremendous-increase-in-defence-exports-in-next-4-5-years-says-drdo-chairman/589667/. Huma Siddiqui, “Boost for Make in india in Defence; India gets ready to export military platforms to friendly nations,” Financial Express, February 16, 2021, https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/boost-for-make-in-india-in-defence-india-gets-ready-to-export-militaryplatforms-to-friendly-nations/2195788/. Snehesh Alex Philip, “India, Philippines sign key defence pact, set ball rolling for BrahMos missile sale,” The Print, March 3, 2021, https://theprint.in/defence/india-philippines-sign-key-defence-pact-set-ball-rolling-for-brahmos-missile-sale/615300/ The Straits Times, “Philippines signs agreement with India for world's fastest supersonic missiles,” The Straits Times, March 3,2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/philippines-signs-agreement-with-india-for-worlds-fastest-supersonic-missiles Alan Robles and Raissa Robles, “Will buying India’s BrahMos missiles give the Philippines an edge in South China Sea dispute with Beijing?” South China Morning Post, March 5,2021, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3124135/will-buying-indiasbrahmos-missiles-give-philippines-edge-south. Alan Robles and Raissa Robles, “Will buying India’s BrahMos missiles give the Philippines an edge in South China Sea dispute with Beijing?” WION, “India-Philippines BrahMos pact: A deal that sends message to China,” WION, March 5,2021, https://www.wionews.com/indianews/india-philippines-brahmos-pact-a-deal-that-sends-message-to-china-368326
43 May/June 2021
FEATURED SECURITY SCHOLAR:
AUSTIN MCKINNEY A Mark Payumo
ny service member or military veteran regardless of his or her service branch of origin understands the value of leadership. Downrange in the field of land, air, or sea battle, leadership spells the difference between preparedness and complacency, victory and defeat, and ultimately, life and death. Leadership is both an art and science, a pathway to finding solutions to problems by balancing competing variables. In military leadership, however, this means that a decision is required of the leader to accomplish the mission when absolutely everything is on the line. Putting a premium on mitigating risk without being risk averse is of paramount importance. This is because these decisions are barely limited within the main battle area and invariably have strategic implications that carry the hopes of millions. But merely being in charge doesn’t bestow preordained options. In fact,
it is exactly the opposite. The road to favorable outcomes—or at times, the lesser evil—is full of landmines that could derail the best laid plans even with the best of intentions. That being said, it takes humility to pool together the collective expertise of the team, distribute ownership of the mission, practice decentralized command, and routinely search for constructive criticism to effectuate successful mission execution over and over again. Austin may or may not agree with my appraisal of him as precisely this humble leader who can check his ego in pursuit of mission accomplishment. He is, after all, a major in the U.S. Air Force Reserve. To be sure, much of our engagement has only been in the professional realm, but his sincerity as a person does encourage one to respond in kind, a reminder that character and humble confidence still go a long way even in the 21st century.
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45 May/June 2021
Our life trajectories are very different, but it is likely that common interests and values allowed for our paths to cross when we were both selected to participate in a fact-finding research trip to Manila, which was organized and facilitated by the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. Austin also began his professional journey in a regimented institution of higher learning and graduated as valedictorian from the U.S. Air Force Academy. But the commonality stops in the way he values education. Austin holds master’s degrees from
two of the world’s top institutions: the London School of Economics and Harvard Business School. His journey to become a Foreign Service Officer of the U.S. Department of State is discussed in-depth in a podcast interview with him on Analyzing War as a way to encourage more Americans to find their place in U.S. diplomacy. For now, he shares his thoughts with us on being organized, the value of education particularly in national security, and briefly touches on his love of reading and travel.
During “Flag Day” with my family after I found out that my first assignment will be Mexico.
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AW: My understanding is that your professional journey began when you joined the U.S. Air Force Academy. How did it shape you as a person that motivated you to become a Foreign Service Officer years later even after working as a civilian? Austin: My experience in the active duty Air Force set the foundation for my future career. First, the military taught me valuable skills at a young age, such as how to work well with others, manage my time effectively, and communicate clearly. It also solidified my passion for public service, as I learned that dedicating my professional career to a larger purpose gives it meaning. Finally, the military gave me a window into the wider world of international affairs. I first learned about the opportunities in the State Department by meeting Foreign Service Officers while working as a military officer at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia. After much reflection, I realized that pursuing a diplomatic career made the most sense for me. AW: It is rare to meet a service academy valedictorian and as if that wasn't enough, you earned graduate degrees from LSE and HBS. How fulfilling is this intellectual journey? Would you advise others to take the same route? 47 May/June 2021
Austin: I always encourage national security professionals to attend graduate school. It certainly has its costs, in terms of time and financial resources, but I consider it well worth it. Graduate school enables you to go far deeper into a subject than the traditional American undergraduate curriculum would allow. This helps you develop real expertise which you can apply in your career. Also, a graduate school program typically brings together a wide variety of students from different professional, academic, and other backgrounds. You
can learn much from your classmates as a result, which can help you see the world through different viewpoints. AW: How do you keep yourself organized? Any tools of the trade?
Austin: In terms of organization, I find that simple, consistent habits work best. When assigned a complex project, I start by making a rough outline of the various tasks and assign deadlines for each component. That way, I can hold myself
The day my wife was naturalized as an American Citizen.
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accountable for progress as I move forward. In terms of time management, I live and die by my calendar. Creating events, reminders, and time constraints helps keep me on track. Finally, it's old school, but I bring a notebook with me throughout the workday. Jotting down notes during a meeting or writing out a request from a colleague helps me keep things straight at the end of the day. AW: What is your favorite book and why? Austin: There is recency bias at play, but I have to recommend War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy for all national security professionals. I read it during the early stages of the pandemic when we all were stuck at home, and it was just so enjoyable. You are completely transported into early-nineteenthcentury Russia, but the issues with which the story deals are all essential elements of the human condition: love, fear, hubris, madness, grace, etc. Tolstoy has definitive opinions about the role of individual agency which I do not entirely agree with, but the narrative is so enthralling. It's a tomme, but I promise you will not regret the investment. For what it's worth, I read the Anthony Briggs translation and consider it superb. 49 May/June 2021
AW: Could you tell us about your favorite city in Asia? Any travel tips? Austin: My favorite destination in Asia so far has been Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (also referred to as Saigon). It has an energy that's hard to describe. The economy is growing quickly, society is changing, and people are on the move. As a history buff, I also appreciated the opportunity to visit many nearby sites associated with the conflict between the United States and Vietnam. Most importantly, the food is straight up delicious. From eating pho on the sidewalk curb, to fine dining with French fusion, you won't be disappointed.
First day in foreign service.
When evil men plot, Good men must plan. When evil men burn and bomb, Good men must build and bind. When evil men shout ugly words of hatred, Good men must commit themselves to the glories of love. Where evil men would seek to perpetuate an unjust status quo, Good men must seek to bring into being A real order of justice. Martin Luther King, Jr.