Analyzing War Magazine | Mar/Apr 2022

Deep Dive Series #2 March/April 2022

SECURING THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

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ADVANCING KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMED UNDERSTANDING OF INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY

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SECURING THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PHILIPPINES

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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN PEACETIME AND IN WAR FEATURED SECURITY SCHOLAR SHARMAINE MARMITA

EDITORIAL BOARD AND STAFF PUBLISHER SWi Analytics, LLC EDITOR Mark Payumo DEPUTY EDITOR Alyssamae Nuñez MANAGING EDITORS Diana Alarde-Jordan Jacob Morrell Bryner Las Rio Pacit LAYOUT EDITOR Jayrald Vasquez WEB EDITOR Philip Carpentero CONTRIBUTING WRITER Sherwin E. Ona, PhD ANALYZING WAR MAGAZINE www.analyzingwar.org SUBSCRIBE Inside the magazine or issuu LETTERS TO THE EDITOR editor@analyzingwar.org

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Sherwin E. Ona, PhD is an associate professor and chairperson of the political science and development studies department of De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines. He is also a fellow of the Philippine Public Safety College-Department of the Interior and Local Government, and the Stratbase-Albert Del Rosario Institute. Dr. Ona is an officer of the Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary with the rank of Commander and has previously served with the Philippine Air Force as a reservist officer.

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CONTRIBUTO

SHERWIN E. ONA, PHD

FOREWORD One important thing that needs to be clearly understood about information warfare is that it is carried out in conjunction with other warfare areas. As Sherwin Ona of De La Salle University in Manila rightly points out, the information environment is both a resource and an ecosystem that a nation can leverage as an instrument of national power. However, it is easy to see information through the lens of technology and communications where the distinction between data and influence occasionally gets blurred. After all, the phrase, “information technology” is widely used today that could generate different conceptions and meaning on the individual level.

As a result, joint warfighting doctrines in the West and their Asian allies including the Philippines, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan make a clear and layered distinction when approaching multi-domain operations whether in peacetime or in war. Cyber space, for example, may be distinguished from the information domain, but both cannot exist in silos that separate them from the conduct of war on land, sea, air, and space. That multi-domain joint warfighting serves an overall unifying mission is an important point that cannot be overemphasized, and it is not difficult to imagine that to think to the contrary is considered fatal.

Developments in firepower and their technological enablers partly account for this increasing sophistication in warfare, while weapons of mass destruction such as the nuclear deterrent expanded the continuum across the full spectrum of war.

But one thing is certain: The nature of war has not changed—it remains brutal in pursuit of a political objective. Its character evolved, however, as shaped by the anxious decades of the Cold War towards the turn of the 21st century, which saw the consummation of China’s patient integration into the world stage when it joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 with one motivation in mind: “rich nation, strong army.”

The manner by which China manages its internal affairs ostensibly spilled over to the outside world, and Taiwan bears the full brunt of this campaign that President Tsai Ing-Wen calls it “cognitive warfare,”

which is known in Beijing as “intelligentized warfare.”

There is no doubt that China’s willingness to go to war over its core interests is there, foremost of which is Taiwan’s bid for independence. The question is whether it will prevail regardless of the costs notwithstanding its home court advantage.

As in the game of chess, no one is sitting idly by, waiting for that to happen. While the international community is actively taking steps to deter a war that nobody wants, ordinary citizens are caught in the crossfire of the struggle for influence, leaving the truth the foremost casualty in its wake. Even the COVID-19 pandemic was not spared when China felt compelled to steer the narrative in its favor when questions pertaining to the origins of the coronavirus in Wuhan persisted. Unfortunately, Beijing responded with a firehose of misinformation while refusing to open the Chinese city to investigators, going on to accuse U.S. Army soldiers that COVID-19 actually originated from them when they visited Wuhan in October 2019 for the World Military Games.

Yet, the world in general was unprepared for the pandemic and the ensuing misinformation campaigns that took place. Developing countries, however, were far less resistant to such pressures and the Philippines was no exception. As Dr. Ona brings the nuances of the Philippine experience to the surface in this edition, he positions the information environment front and center as the key for Manila to avoid repeating past mistakes (and avoid unnecessary loss of lives). As previously stated, this century is an era of intense strategic competition that features increasing sophistication in warfare capabilities. That said, information warfare and the struggle for influence take place in an environment that demands a wholeof-nation, civil-military line of effort, without which the Philippines along with the free world could be destroyed.

No one is exempt and we owe it to ourselves and future generations to take ownership of it. This edition is a first step.

Mark Payumo Mountain View, CA 6 January/February 2022

SECURING THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PHILIPPINES Sherwin E. Ona, PhD

“Information operations is basically a war of ideas…it is fought by people who think and understand the audience and its needs.” – Robert R. Reilly, author and former adviser on Information Strategy, U.S. Department of Defense.

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INTRODUCTION Ubiquitous access to information through digital technologies created new opportunities and challenges. It is undeniable that digitalization transformed societies, making them more productive through the integration of economies and by improving social cohesion. Despite its benefits, it also resulted in increased marginalization and created new vulnerabilities. For example, while social media became a space for advocacy and political dissent, it also became a potent source of disinformation. This resulted in adverse impacts on the traditional roles of media and governments. Even with its promise of equity and productivity, the dark side of digitalization presents security and privacy issues that threaten not only personal liberties, but the society at large.

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The COVID-19 pandemic gave us a glimpse of how this can play out. The spread of conspiracy theories, so-called “alternative truths,” and fake news among others, has shown its ability to undermine public health interventions. Social media has become a breeding ground for various groups that seek to undermine democratic institutions. In addition, cybercrimes continue to increase at an alarming rate.

These ominous trends have shown the ability of adversaries to weaponize the information environment (IE). It is for this reason that policymakers and security experts around the world should examine this phenomenon and encourage stakeholders to be part of the solution.

Looking at the Philippines as an example, the country’s current national security strategy has serious shortcomings on how to protect its IE. Specifically, the importance of IE in national security remains vaguely defined. This can partly explain why the country continues to experience challenges in information management related to its COVID-19 pandemic response. Meanwhile, the pandemic hastened the adoption of digital services, work-from-home arrangements, and online education among Filipinos. This migration from physical to digital has not only exacerbated the country’s digital divide but it also illustrated its vulnerability to cyberthreats.

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In this paper, the author argues that the 21st century’s information environment has now become a battleground.

Its complex nature calls for a paradigm

shift in how security is defined. Pandemic-related lockdowns also transformed the IE as a venue for information dissemination and service access. Thus, this requires a proactive strategy that can mitigate the dangers to the country’s IE brought about by non-traditional threats (NTTs) such as a pandemic. Aside from understanding the nature of NTTs, this strategy should also underscore the need to adopt traditional information operations (IO), cyber defense, and information management in addressing the challenges.

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BACKGROUND DISCUSSION Since ancient times, IO has been an essential part of warfare. From the plains of Troy to the desert sands of Iraq and Afghanistan, influencing an adversary to achieve deterrence or by limiting its fighting ability comes as the pinnacle of military strategy.

In recent years, IO has gained prominence due to its

employment in both traditional and non-traditional conditions. In its traditional form, IO is a part of warfare or military operation. The practice of combining kinetic actions with non-kinetic approaches (i.e., psychological operations, civil affairs, cyber operations, etc.) is a crucial part of overall campaign planning (Gery, et al., 2017 & McGrath, 2016). However, the challenge now lies in the role of IO in addressing non-traditional threats where conditions are less defined, and the concerns are multifaceted. Due to the accessibility of information and its speed of transmission, contents such as news and rumors among others, can become viral in a matter of minutes.

Today’s globalized economies demonstrate such astonishing feat. Anchored on the idea of interdependent markets, it has shaped the idea of development, commerce, and governance. It has also underscored the importance of digital technologies in strengthening these connections, specifically using high-speed digital infrastructure and innovative applications. For this purpose, digitalization has become an indispensable tool in improving economies, raising the standard of living, and inducing change in business models (World Economic Forum, 2020).

This environment also created a host of challenges ranging from increased competition and new forms of conflict. For one, globalization increased the demand for goods and services, thus resulting in growth in production and consumption. This trend is also characterized by the rise of states with their 11 January/February 2022

newly acquired economic and military powers. Consequently, these nations saw the need to safeguard the flow of goods, services, and information (Ballin, 2020).

This created a competitive environment where states desire to maximize the fruits of globalization while protecting their interests. Furthermore, this networked economy has become a philosophical battleground for states in its goal to establish hegemony. Western democracies and its market-driven economies are being challenged by authoritarian-capitalist models emerging from China and Russia (Lee, 2009).

Another aspect of the globalized economy is its ability to marginalize participants.

Underinvestment in the digital infrastructure and human development widened the gaps between developed and underdeveloped nations (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2017). Aside from inequities, globalization also resulted in propagation of Western values like secularization, democratization, and consumerism, which are often inconsistent with traditional views. This phenomenon is often cited as one of the leading causes of radicalization and terrorism (Cronin, 2003).

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Consequently, this new form of competition brought about by globalization has expanded the concept of security. Its previously classical-linear view of nationstates and the prominence of its military has evolved into its non-linear and dynamic form. This new phenomenon is described as human security centric and underscores the importance of multilateralism as well as whole of society strategies (Ballin, 2020). Therefore, it can be surmised that these conditions created new threats, highlighting the need to develop proactive and innovative strategies. This requires a close examination of a state’s policy related to its national security and how it views its IE. This paper answers the following questions: (a) What are the threats besetting today’s information environment? And (b) for the Philippines, what are the security implications of these threats especially during NTT events?

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DISCUSSION: INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT, INFORMATION OPERATIONS, AND NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS TODAY’S INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT Widespread access to information through the internet enabled by electronic devices significantly changed the digital landscape. From its organizational view of a network of computing resources, the concept of interconnectivity has indeed become global. However, it also evolved from its technology-centric roots to a more societal view. Today’s IE is a complex and evolving ecosystem capable of aggregating social, physical, and cognitive attributes while having a significant impact on knowledge and how it shapes human action (Ehlers and Blannin, 2020).

This nexus can also be viewed as having three intersecting aspects, which pertains to how information is collected, interpreted, and disseminated (informational); how individuals or groups interact and consume information (human); and the boundaries as well as rules that affect information exchange (physical) (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). Table 1 shows the three aspects of today’s IE. Aspects of IE

Description

Informational

This refers to the process of how individuals, systems, and groups communicate and exchange information. It also includes the sensory inputs used by individuals, groups, and systems used to assign meaning to gain understanding of the world.

Human

This pertains to how humans interact with others in an environment. It involves the linguistic, social, cultural, psychological, and physical elements that shape human behavior.

Physical

This pertains to the material characteristics and systems of communities and groups, and how it affects information exchange. This aspect also deals with the factors that enhance or inhibit information flow.

Table 1: Aspects of the Information Environment (Source: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018)

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Today’s IE is further complicated by our continuing dependence on digital technologies. For instance, today’s Internet of Things (IoT) has created a mesh of digital networks that connect our lives to the digital IE. Data aggregated from these networks ushered the development of machine learning models, enabling artificial intelligence-enabled application to mimic human decision making and human preference (Gery, et al., 2017). These developments, albeit exciting, have opened new challenges. For instance, the debilitating cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007 demonstrates how an adversary can exploit the power of digital technologies to serve an adversary’s political goals. Another famous example is the Cambridge Analytica scandal that illustrated how privacy can be easily usurped in the name of profit. This situation warrants an unprecedented response from today’s policymakers and digital warfighters.

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INFORMATION OPERATIONS: DEFINITION AND ITS USE In the traditional sphere, IO is often treated as part of an overall military campaign.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines IO as “military information activities designed to create the desired effect on the will and understanding the capabilities of adversaries, potential adversaries and other approved parties”(North Atlantic Military Committee, 2012). In practice, IO is seen as part of non-kinetic options, often complementing combat operations aimed at generating influence. As such, it is a campaign that is dedicated to obtaining a decisive advantage in the information environment. In its simple form, IO is merely seen as cyber or influence operations. However, there are numerous instances where IO capabilities are used in both the civilian and military sphere to gain an advantage in the information environment (Fecteau, 2019). In addition, experts suggest that the overall aim of IO is to manipulate and influence an adversary by establishing control of the information environment through disinformation, physical attacks, and cyberattacks (Conference on Cyber Conflict 21, 2021). It is also a low-cost alternative that aims to diminish the credibility of an adversary and trust among its allies (Pfannestiel and Cook, 2020).

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There are numerous examples that illustrate the non-kinetic, supporting role of IO in a military campaign. For instance, military planners during the 1991 Gulf War convinced the Iraqi Army that the U.S. Marines would conduct an amphibious assault on its coast. In a classic deception strategy using mainstream media networks, this highly publicized move triggered the redeployment of Iraqi units to its coast, waiting for an assault that never came. This feint was created to conceal the main attack, which is the 150-mile westward sweep by Allied units to cut off the Republican Guard (Wyatt, 2016). Another example is the 2008 invasion of Georgia by Russia. Weeks before the main invasion, Georgia was subjected to widespread cyberattacks targeting prominent government websites like the Office of the President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its parliament. These attacks also inflicted damage on the country’s National Bank and TBC, one of its largest commercial banks (Rondeli Foundation, 2019 & Markoff, 2008).

The popularity of social media also opened opportunities for non-state actors to use IE for propaganda and crime. Berger and Stern (2015) illustrated how ISIS utilized Facebook and Twitter for propaganda and recruitment. By posting inspirational quotes from the Quran and the use of hashtags, the terror group was able to expand its online network. This gave sympathizers a direct source of news and updates from the group (Stern and Berger, 2015).

PANDEMICS, BIG POWER COMPETITION, AND THE WEAPONIZATION OF INFORMATION The COVID-19 pandemic ushered in a new era of information warfare. It also showed that global health emergencies are not exempt from geopolitical competition.

Global interdependence and the ubiquitous access to digital

technologies and information mitigated the adverse impact of the pandemic.

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However, it is this very same quality that transformed today’s IE into a perfect battleground. In this fight for influence and perception, authoritarian regimes are challenging the liberal and rules-based order built by Western democracies (Bachmann, et al., 2020). Furthermore, the nature of today’s digital IE has led to new strategies and techniques that enabled actions to be below the threshold of armed (kinetic) conflict. Often referred to as grey zone or hybrid warfare, this novel approach allowed states and non-state actors to exploit the interconnected structure of the global economy (Gery, et al., 2017). Grey zone warfare is viewed as coercive activities that are designed not to reach the threshold of a kinetic or full-blown military confrontation. In short, it is a “short of war” toolkit that includes economic coercion, interference or disruption, and disinformation to achieve political objectives (Price, 2021).

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For instance, even with the pandemic, China’s grey zone approach can be observed through a menu of economic coercion, cyberattacks, misinformation, and the militarization of the West Philippine Sea (Layton, 2022). Moreover, its desire to weaponize information and control the narrative of the pandemic was shown in how it censured reports of the virus and its attempts to highlight its robust national response (Chan and Loftus, 2020). It also blamed the U.S. Army for the spread of COVID-19 (Gan and George, 2021). In the U.S., social media has become the preferred venue for disinformation aimed at controlling the narrative and fomenting social unrest during the Black Lives Matter protests.

This was done through profiling and manipulating the hearts and minds of a target online population (Gamberini, 2020).

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SECURITIZING PANDEMICS AND THE NATURE OF NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS Branding pandemics as existential threats is not new. Due to its novelty, states have securitized public health emergencies to enable the mobilization of resources.

Securitization allows political actors to tap public resources and improve their response capabilities. Viewed as a process that allows the labeling of crisis events as existential threats, this self-referential practice allows political leaders to convince the audience of its dire security implications (Lemon, 2018). It also justifies the elevation of the issue beyond the normal realm of politics and, thus, requiring extraordinary measures (Baele and Thomson, 2017) and the breaking of rules (Floyd and Croft, 2011). However, this practice is not without its frailties.

Casting health crises as similar to an invasion or war may lead to a garrison mentality and may divert resources from public health to security agencies (Palomba, 2018). Furthermore, lessons from past outbreaks point to the need to go beyond the rhetorical process. In fact, the World Health Organization (2015) supported this argument by highlighting the need to adopt a citizen-centric,

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development-oriented approach by strengthening the public health systems through surveillance, sharing of information, enabling community participation, and building trust (World Health Organization, 2015). In addition, this emerging nexus between securitization, information, and pandemics can be observed in the COVID-19 initiatives of select ASEAN economies. Many countries showed early signs of securitization but they were able to quickly normalize their economies. Innovative strategies like the use of information resources and digital technologies for active surveillance, and information sharing among others were used to great effect. These techniques contributed immensely to the efficacy of public health interventions. For instance, Vietnam’s strategy was seen as highly securitized as it labeled its response as the “Spring General Offensive of 2020”.

Its aggressive approach also used the state’s digital apparatus to promote awareness and trust, quell misinformation, thus controlling the spread of the virus (Vu and Tran, 2020). Similarly, Thailand initially

adopted

a

securitized

strategy

driven by science and data combined with a communication strategy that sought the participation of its citizens (Savisomboon, 2020). The benefits of these innovative practices led to ominous results. Instances of disinformation, widespread cybercrimes, and even cyberattacks during disease outbreaks are well-documented in many parts of the world. These threats were intended to sow mistrust and undermine the credibility of the actors as well as intensify social discord and weaken institutions (Pfanenstiel and Cook, 2020).

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Another aspect of the securitization argument is understanding the nature of NTTs. NTTs are perceived as multidimensional and multifaceted (Nihas, 2020). At the same time, these threats transcend national borders, making the traditional nation-state concept of using its military forces to mitigate threats inadequate (Ballin, et.al., 2020). Such is COVID-19’s ability to exacerbate existing socioeconomic problems associated with poverty, hunger, and the marginalization of sectors. Thai, Vietnamese, and Philippine experiences illustrate that controlling the virus requires the use of information management applications for contact tracing, case management, monitoring of hospital inventory, among others.

Overall, these examples show the penchant of state and non-state actors to weaponize IE. Big power competition and marginalization to satisfy the hegemonic desires of states have turned today’s IE into a battleground for greyhybrid and asymmetric warfare. This insidious act is an inexpensive alternative to advance its political interests and gain a military advantage. Furthermore, combining the IE’s weaponization with NTTs such as a pandemic can further worsen existing societal divides, thus weakening the capacity of governments to mount an effective response. It can also undermine legitimate activities and diminish the credibility of the actors as well as institutions. This has, therefore, turned the IE into a legitimate security concern for states.

In addition, states often securitize threats, and this is true with COVID-19.

This process is due to the novelty of the threat, which led states to adopt extraordinary measures. However, in a securitized environment, trust is a commodity while disruption should be minimized. At the same time, the ability of states to manage the outbreak requires the active monitoring of cases, ensuring the readiness of hospitals, among others. This necessitates the use of information management systems which are integrated and accessible through 22 January/February 2022

a variety of means. For these reasons, the need to get ahead of the information game is vital.

THE PHILIPPINES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES Like many countries, the Philippine government pursued a highly securitized approach in its pandemic response. The country is known as having one of the world’s longest lockdowns. It enacted laws that expropriate powers to control resources with minimal oversight.

The securitization of COVID-19 should have given the government the opportunity to strengthen its pandemic strategy and build a proactive response. However, these emergency powers have resulted in widespread panic and confusion. This is due to its inability to come up with adequate guidelines and ensure proper coordination among national agencies and local governments. Furthermore, it also exposed the inadequate supply of personal protection equipment and testing kits. This hampered the government’s ability to adequately monitor and control the spread of the virus (Ona, 2020).

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On the information aspect of its pandemic response, the government’s inability to accurately identify social aid recipients proved to be an unfortunate oversight.

In fact, at the onset of the pandemic, government agencies struggled with its distribution of cash aid due to a lack of a consolidated database of recipients.

Only to later discover that the roster of recipients was based on a 2015 list provided by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (Abad, 2021).

The said government agency’s failure to use a single contact tracing application complicated the matter resulting in reporting inconsistencies. Moreover, the pandemic has also seen an increase of 260% in cybercrimes during the period of April-July 2020 alone (Pulta, 2020). According to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (“Philippine Central Bank”), there were 42,000 reported complaints related to online financial transactions from 2020 to 2021 with an estimated cost of up to PHP540 million (Ramos, 2022). Meanwhile, the spread of misinformation did not spare even the government’s vaccination program. Rounds of fake news spread through social media about the government’s plan to arrest unvaccinated individuals while another rumor says that the unvaccinated will not be able to go

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to work or receive their social aid. This apparently caused chaos in vaccination sites (Moaje, 2021).

In the next few sections, the author presented the National Action Plan against COVID-19 to examine how it viewed the importance of the country’s IE. The three intersecting aspects of IE (informational-physical-human) are used to discuss the characteristics of the government’s response. Moreover, the ensuing discussion includes an overview of the country’s National Security Agenda and the National Security Strategy (NSS). The purpose of this is to identify the possible policy oversights and propose recommendations on how to address them.

NATIONAL ACTION PLAN The National Action Plan (NAP) against COVID-19 is the Philippine government’s main disease mitigation strategy. It underscored the importance of adopting a whole-of-government approach in controlling the spread of the virus as well as addressing its socioeconomic and security impacts. For its implementation, the plan had three phases to better address the evolving ground situation. Box 1 presents a snapshot of the main operational phases of the NAP (National Task Force Against COVID-19, 2020).

Box 1: NAP Operational Phases • •

•

Phase 1 (March-June 2020) focused on disease control and mitigation through testing, tracing, and treatment (T3).

Phase 2 (July-September 2020) reiterated the T3 concept while strengthening the country’s ability to detect and isolate COVID cases. This phase highlighted the importance of the reintegration of infected individuals and the gradual opening of the economy using the Hammer and Dance concept. Overall, Phase 2 underscored the importance of effective containment strategies, public and private partnerships, while reiterating the need for testing and contact tracing.

Phase 3 (October-December 2020) envisioned a balance between health safety and economic recovery. This Phase included the implementation of the National Vaccination Roadmap.

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The March 2021 viral surge and the spread of the Delta variant prompted the government to implement the Crisis Action Plan. The plan was expected to address the projected spike in the number of cases. It also called for the creation of special task forces in three areas, namely: communities, international borders, and health facilities. Moreover, the plan followed a four-door strategy which focused on the following: (1) disease prevention and control; (2) implementation of travel bans; (3) aggressive implementation of T3, combined with a robust vaccination program; and (4) quick response to surges (Kabagani, 2021; Sadongdong, 2021).

INFORMATION ASPECT On the aspect of information, the NAP states the need to provide "clear, accurate, and timely" information to support the government’s response to the pandemic.

Through digital and tri-media platforms, the NAP intends to publish any reports on pandemic-related information. It also includes the use of digital technologies and information systems that are essential in controlling the outbreak (National Task Force Against COVID-19, 2020; Tomacruz, 2020). Specifically, the plan underscored the need to develop a nationwide surveillance system, an integrated logistics management system as well as a strategic risk communication strategy.

To achieve this, the plan stressed the need to standardize health surveillance data, develop a national hospital command system, and foster the sharing of information across agencies and local governments among others (National Task Force Against COVID-19, 2020; Dayrit,et.al., 2021).

However, a weak point of this impromptu and highly structured approach is its inability to maximize the use of information resources and digital technologies.

Plagued by capacity and resource limitations, problems are usually manifested through the following: (1) unreliable health data from hospitals and communities; 26 January/February 2022

(2) the inability to process the contact tracing data from the local governments to national agencies; and (3) the failure to aggregate data from multiple sources.

These challenges can be traced to the fragmented nature of the country’s public health structure. Moreover, the country’s previous health devolution strategy along with the capacity-related disparity between public and private health institutions made information management more difficult.

A woman presents her QR code for contact tracing purposes during the COVID-19 outbreak in the Philippines.

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SOURCING OF DATA The sourcing of data has been a major challenge in the country’s public health response. During the first five months of the pandemic, the Department of Health (DOH) struggled to source reliable data from hospitals and barangay (village) health centers. The COVID-Kaya online system, which was intended to consolidate community and hospital data, faced some challenges mostly on data migration.

Another problem was the use of the case investigation form (CIF) as a data capture tool. It is a physical form intended for self-reporting. An examination of the three-page CIF revealed that the form contains multiple data fields, which is not easy for non-medical users to accomplish. Thus, its use proved to be tedious and prone to errors. In addition, the form does not tag any person with a unique number or identifier, which means that it cannot track multiple or redundant submissions.

A man wites his name and information for contact tracing purposes during the COVID-19 outbreak in the Philippines.

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As a physical form, the contents of the CIF are transferred to an electronic file.

This manual encoding step is time consuming and can lead to errors due to inaccurate visual appreciation. Despite questions on the accuracy of its content, these forms are tallied and uploaded to the DOH data drop online facility for data aggregation.

Another data sourcing concern is the ability to collect contact tracing data. In an interview on the ABS-CBN News Channel (ANC), the government’s contact tracing czar Benjamin Magalong, admitted that the current process does not go beyond the household. He further revealed that local governments are unable to use their contact tracing systems (ABS-CBN News, 2021). Furthermore, this difficulty in contact tracing is complicated by the delays in obtaining the testing results.

According to Dr. Maricar Limpin, co-convenor of the Healthcare Professionals against COVID-19 (HPAC), local governments have different contact tracing practices and systems. She noted that due to the delay in the testing results, the tracing process only starts 10-14 days after a positive diagnosis, which explains the rapid spread of the virus (ANC, 2021).

PHYSICAL AND HUMAN ASPECTS In examining the physical-human aspects, this particular section looks at the structure and policies that were implemented to operationalize NAP. It is therefore important to understand the underlying organizational and operational context related to the Philippine pandemic strategy. The country’s experience from the SARS and MERSCOV outbreaks resulted in the creation of the Interagency Task Force on Emerging Infectious Disease (IATF-EID). Chaired by the Secretary of Health, the IATF’s authority included both planning and implementation functions. Moreover, the IATF-EID is authorized to deputize the Armed Forces of 29 January/February 2022

the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to implement quarantine rules and other restrictions. The order also recognized the importance of soliciting the participation of national agencies and local governments, government owned and controlled corporations as well as the private sector. However, during the COVID-19 outbreak, the IATF-EID mission changed from a planning and implementing body to a policy-making body. IATF Resolution No. 15 (s. 2020) reflected the said shift of function, which transferred its operational mandate to the National Task Force on COVID-19 (NTF). For its structure, the NTF is composed of smaller task groups focusing on response operations, resource management, logistics, and strategic communications. Secretary of Defense (Sec. Delfin Lorenzana) heads the NTF, co-chaired by the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments (Sec. Eduardo Año). The head of the COVID-19 joint task force is Sec. Carlito Galvez. All men were former army generals and graduates of the Philippine Military Academy. These changes in the IATF mission and the prominence of former military officers resulted in criticisms that the government President Rodrigo Roa Duterte holds a meeting with members of the Inter-Agency Task Force on the Emerging Infectious Diseases (IATF-EID) at the Matina Enclaves in Davao City on June 4, 2020.

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Manual and computerized contact tracing system in Bulacan, a province in the Philippines.

had militarized the country’s COVID-19 strategy. Treating the virus as an enemy to be eliminated through a “search-and-destroy” process clearly shows its predisposition for adopting reactive solutions (Rappler, 2020).

Meanwhile, DOH issued administrative orders calling for the use of digital technologies. These orders also underscored the need to enhance its data management practices. Specifically, DOH issued Department Circular 2020-0197 instructing its offices and attached agencies to use the COVID-Kaya system for its COVID-19 data management. COVID-Kaya is an online system that can monitor cases, laboratory test results, and provide limited decision support. The system also integrates the country’s pandemic data to the WHO global surveillance network.

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Although policies and plans are important, its implementation presents another challenge. For instance, the first seven months of the outbreak revealed that DOH lacked an integrated hospital management system. This means that the agency cannot immediately view the status of COVID-19 cases in hospitals.

The launch of the One Hospital Command Center (OHCC) in August 2020 was supposed to address this deficiency. However, its implementation revealed that the system lacks the needed functionalities and human capacity to manage the cases. For instance, in the March-April 2021 surge, a recorded 300-400 calls per day reportedly overwhelmed the OHCC. In an interview, Health Undersecretary Leopoldo Vega explained that the problem stemmed from the absence of a realtime hospital database management system that can show hospital capacity.

Moreover, the OHCC does not have a call forwarding facility (ANC, 2021).

Dr. Aileen Espina of HPAC stressed this gap, indicating that the OHCC is not capable of monitoring real-time hospital admissions and is unable to conduct effective triage. Dr. Espina further surmised that the current organizational data silos contribute to the lack of unity of command in the country’s public health strategy (ANC, n.d.).

In addition, the first year of the pandemic saw the absence of a national contact tracing system. In fact, it was only in March 2021 that the government was able to launch the Stay Safe.Ph national contact tracing system. Even with its introduction, DOH refused to use the application due to its incomplete functions and scalability problems. Similarly, the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) refused to accept the software due to the same reason (Gonzales, 2021). As of this writing, the Department of the Interior and Local Governments (DILG) solely utilize Stay Safe.Ph. Another significant gap in the physical-human aspect is the difficulty of sourcing data from local governments and testing centers. During the onset of the 32 January/February 2022

pandemic, there were inconsistencies between the DOH and local government COVID-19 infection rates. These lapses can be traced to the absence of a dedicated local Disease Surveillance Officer (DSO) that can serve as the local point person in organizing local epidemiological data and build capacity in data management (Dayrit, et.al., 2021).

Overall, DOH Spokesperson Undersecretary Rosario Vergeire acknowledged in September 2021 that the department did not fully address the information management. In the interview, Dr. Vergerie cited the disconnect between government data on hospital bed occupancy and the situation on the ground (Gonzales, 2021). Meanwhile, WHO Philippine representative, Dr. Rabindra Abeyasinhe, stressed the importance of a strong data governance regime and cited the weakness of the country in this regard (Rodjel, 2021).

33 January/February 2022

IMPLICATIONS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA It is important to reiterate the urgency of reviewing the country’s 12-point National Security Agenda, taking into consideration our COVID-19 experience.

The shortcomings of the Philippine pandemic response must now open opportunities to reexamine the country’s security priorities and how it views its IE. For instance, Agenda 1 (Human Security) and Agenda 2 (Health Security) underscore the importance of strengthening institutions in light of emerging human security threats. This is necessary to ensure the preservation of our national values and the protection of our people. Due to COVID-19, it must now stress the importance of strengthening institutional capacity of line agencies.

For Agenda 7 (environmental security), disaster preparedness should be part of a whole-of-society effort rather than a government-centric, organizationspecific response. Moreover, the three-agenda items failed to underscore the importance of harnessing and protecting the country’s IE. It also means that it should be a crosscutting or common resource. This implies that there is a high dependence on this resource across sectors and among individuals. Moreover, activities that protect and improve the IE (i.e., use of information resources, strategic communication, proactive cyber defense, cyber security, etc.) should be part of the country’s response to major security threats. Meanwhile, Agenda 11 underscored information and cybersecurity to protect the country’s digital infrastructure. However, it is important to view an IE as an ecosystem of users (i.e., their intentions, behaviors, culture, needs, etc.), standards, systems, policies, and organizations rather than technical expertise or skill. Table 2 provides a list of selected agenda items that address NTTs and the possible policy opportunities related to the IE. 34 January/February 2022

National Security Agenda (2017-2022)

Agenda 1: Human and Political Security

Agenda 2: Health Security

Description “To effectively respond to the complexity of both old and new security threats to the safety, welfare, and well-being of Filipinos.

It is an important element to protect the core of human lives and institutions that enhance peace, unity, freedom, democracy, and people’s dignity.”

“Enhance the quality of life of Filipinos by preventing and mitigating the effects of infectious diseases as well as interdicting illegal and hazardous agents.”

Agenda 7: Environmental and Disaster Security

“Enhance our disaster preparedness through preventive and mitigating mechanisms of natural and/or human-induced emergencies that may impact on our environment and the safety of our citizenry.”

Agenda 11: Informational and Cyber Security

“Safeguard classified action plans, sensitive government intentions, etc. Shield the country from computer generated attacks that could cause massive crises in our economy.”

Policy Opportunities

•

View the country’s information environment as a crosscutting concern for major security threats

•

Review and implement the National Cyber Security Plan

•

Develop and operationalize the National Critical Infrastructure Plan

•

Recognize that protecting the country goes beyond its national borders. Thus, there is a need for international cooperation.

Table 2: Selected agenda items of the National Security Policy

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY Completing the country’s national security framework is the National Security Strategy (NSS) (2017-2022), which aims to lay down the approaches and resources for operationalizing the NSA. The plan seeks to address the gaps of previous security plans through its proactive and forward-looking agenda. Furthermore, the NSS defines national security as “the state or conditions wherein a nation’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, people’s values and way of life, the state and its institutions are protected and enhanced” (National Security Council, 2018). The 35 January/February 2022

document also cited the emerging security challenges besetting the Philippines.

These security concerns are the following: (1) attaining equitable economic

development and addressing poverty; (2) internal conflicts; (3) transnational crimes; (4) climate; and (5) regional security concerns.

Another aspect of the NSS is its recognition of the informational aspect as an

expression of national power, underscoring the importance of protecting this domain against misinformation and deceitful propaganda (National Security Council, 2018). Moreover, the plan also acknowledged the significance of

protecting its cyber infrastructure. Box 2 illustrates the specific line of action enumerated in the NSS.

Box 2: Strategic Action Points for Cyber Infrastructure & Cyber Security • • • • • •

Protect the business and supply chains via the implementation of the National Cybersecurity Plan's (NCSP) National Common Criteria Evaluation Program.

Establish the National Cyber Intelligence Platform for shared situational awareness and strengthen the capabilities of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) to assess our vulnerabilities and to improve the country's protection profiles in cyber space.

Conduct a continuing cyber security education campaign to raise public awareness especially among the youth on the terrorist activities in the cyberspace.

Increase the supply of national cybersecurity professionals and experts.

Work with the global community to address the gaps and ongoing improvement in our national cyber security posture and coordinate law enforcement, investigation, and prosecution of cyber criminals.

Provide a predictable and sustained clarity of roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders during the cyberattacks.

NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY PLAN (2005) The National Cyber Security Plan (NCSP) is a document developed by the

Commission on Information and Communications Technology (CICT). The CICT is the precursor organization of today’s Department of Information and

Communications Technology. The plan recognized the vital role of information

and communications technology (ICT) in attaining the country’s development goals. Thus, it underscored the importance of protecting the country’s cyber

infrastructure by identifying gaps that can be addressed by both the government 36 January/February 2022

and the private sector. The NCSP was also envisioned to be part of the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan.

The plan also defined the Philippine cyber space as “the space where information is posted, exploited, manipulated, traded and accessed, created by the interaction, communication and collaboration of people and organizations via the network

of information and communication system infrastructures." The document also contains a survey of cyber threats besetting the Philippines like cyber terrorism, cybercrimes, information warfare, among others.

A significant part of the NCSP is its activities on how to protect the country’s cyber infrastructure. Table 3 provides a snapshot of the strategic action points of the NCSP.

Strategic Action Points

Description This phase includes the need to map the cybersecurity environment of the Strategy 1: Philippines. It also intends to conduct Understanding the Risk risk and threat analysis to determine the vulnerabilities of the country’s cyber domain.

Proposed Activities & Programs • • •

Strategy 2: Risk Control

Strategy 3: Organization and Mobilization for Cybersecurity Strategy 4: Institutional Build Up

Following the results of Strategy 1, the • plan involves enhancing the decisionmaking abilities of responders. This phase focuses on enhancing the country’s • intelligence and response capabilities.

The third action point is to strengthen the ability of the private and public sector to protect its vital functions against the threats. It also includes mobilizing the various sectors of society through awareness and educational programs.

The last action point addresses the need to strengthen the capacity of public institutions through legal, technical, and R&D interventions.

• • • • • • • • •

Conduct a national assessment and security audit Conduct impact analysis Develop the country’s cyber intelligence capability Inclusion of cyber threats in the daily National Intelligence Estimates Creation of a cyber special operations unit Develop a hackers’ database Strengthen public-private partnership International cooperation Develop advocacy and awareness programs Establish nationwide focal points Passage of the Cyber Crime Law Adopt security standards Research and development Administration of justice

Table 3: Strategy options of the NCSP 37 January/February 2022

THE WRITING IS ON THE WALL Today’s geopolitical situation has led to the weaponization of information and that the battle for IE has become an ominous reality. The penchant of state and

non-state players to control and manipulate this ecosystem is now inevitable.

Adversaries and criminals can easily take advantage of the complexity of this environment to advance their interests. On the other hand, a country’s IE

is a crosscutting resource that can interconnect organizations and citizens to information systems and databases. It also has the capability to aggregate data

from various sources. With this double-edged nature of the IE, policymakers must now realize the importance of protecting and enhancing this environment.

In the Philippines, it is unfortunate that the informational, human, and physical aspects of the country’s IE-related pandemic response leaves little to be desired. Therefore, it is vital for the new political administration to go beyond the securitization of a threat and adopt a proactive stance in strengthening

the country’s IE. Incoming leaders, policymakers, and digital warfighters must

realize that IE is a crosscutting resource. Any disruption, failures, or malicious 38 January/February 2022

manipulation of this resource can lead to undesirable or even catastrophic outcomes.

Fortunately, the Philippines does not need to start from scratch. The current NSS have acknowledged that cyberspace can be a venue to perpetuate crimes and terrorism. However, this reactive and often law enforcement-centric response is not enough to protect the country from more sophisticated threats.

For this purpose, the author believes that a proactive IO strategy will enable the country to address the emerging challenges to its IE. This approach goes beyond

the traditional influence-driven goal of IO to include information management and cyber defense practices that are necessary to respond to a threat. Figure 1 shows the proposed components of a proactive IO strategy that can strengthen

O

A

GE

SE

NT E M

Proactive IO Strategy

CYB E R DEFE N

T R A DIT

ION

I

TI O N O P E A M RA OR F TI N

NS

AL

the country’s pandemic response.

IN F

O R M AT I O N

M

AN

Figure 1: Elements of a Proactive IO Strategy 39 January/February 2022

Based on the country’s pandemic experiences, this approach can include the following: Strategic communication initiative – As part of the traditional IO, this program aims to address the information needs of the various segments of the society.

This initiative can also adopt techniques on how to counter misinformation and disinformation through active surveillance of the country’s IE. Furthermore, public confidence and trust are important commodities in a public health emergency.

For this, special emphasis must be placed on transparency to eradicate doubts and allegations of corruption. A dedicated public awareness campaign through tri-media and online platforms is also part of this approach. a) Information sharing – Sharing and sourcing of health data became a huge challenge in the country’s pandemic response. To address this weakness, IO professionals should identify the vital activities of the pandemic response and how it uses IE. The government needs an information management technique of mapping data flows and dependencies to identify the areas of sharing and collaboration. Developing standards for information sharing is another requirement of the strategy. b) Integrated health systems – Integrated health systems must complement information sharing. For instance, an integrated contact tracing and testing management system linked to a centralized hospital command system could have eliminated bottlenecks, wastages, and unnecessary deaths. Updated databases of local governments pertaining to its constituents would have made the distribution of social aid less politicized and corruption-free.

In addition, part of the proposed IO strategy is the importance of adopting a cyber defense posture instead of the current reactive and law enforcementcentric response. For this purpose, the National Cybersecurity Plan (2005) is a good starting point to determine the basic elements of how to protect the 40 January/February 2022

country’s IE. Another option to attain this proactive stance is to create a dedicated agency that will oversee the country’s cyber defense. Ideally, this agency should have a mandate to craft a Philippine cyber defense roadmap that will contain the important milestones, tasks, and competencies to achieve its desired goals.

Finally, the incoming administration must be cognizant of the various security threats in our region and beyond. For this, it is important to anticipate the impact of grey zone and hybrid warfare. The possible spillover of conflict in Asia and Europe leaves the country in a vulnerable position. For this purpose, putting the IO strategy into action is vital. Security, law enforcement, and public safety agencies as well as the private sector should develop their own standards, competencies, and practices to address these emerging threats. For instance, the government should professionalize this area by developing career positions and technical specialties in security and defense agencies. Another equally important option is for the country to finalize its critical infrastructure protection plan to guide the concerned agencies on its security priorities.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.

41 January/February 2022

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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN PEACETIME AND IN WAR FEATURED SECURITY SCHOLAR SHARMAINE MARMITA Mark Payumo 46 January/February 2022

47 January/February 2022

Discussions on artificial intelligence as a matter of cybersecurity and data privacy ostensibly gain more attention compared to the actual physical harm it can inflict on armed participants in a conflict. Even the ongoing war in Ukraine, with all the modern weaponry involved such as Russian hypersonic missiles and drones, has yet to surface the lethality of AI when employed in warfare. To be sure, AI remains an emerging technology and a lot of work is currently being done to solidify its place across the full continuum of war, including military doctrines that incorporate its application as well as the ethics involved.

However, there is a dearth of real expertise in AI for defense beyond military circles, particularly in the Filipino public sphere, that puts the long-term trajectory of Philippine military modernization efforts in serious doubt. There is far less discussion about technology than the question of Chinese presence in the South China Sea through the lens of domestic politics. For warfighters, policy and activism are mere noise and distraction if the nation cannot put teeth to diplomacy to create a viable deterrence against any aggressor threatening its freedom.

The role of AI during a kinetic conflict is expected to change the character of warfare as we know it. It could enable swarm intelligence, for instance, to overwhelm and disable an aircraft carrier, or accurately pinpoint surrogate Filipino forces operating in support of a larger U.S. task force attempting to repel a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. To make matters worse—and considering the war in Ukraine and China’s partnership with Russia that has “no limits”—there is a consensus among national security scholars in many countries that the coming war in Asia where China is a major belligerent could happen in the next five years.

Given that the Philippine military remains weak while its modernization efforts to harden missile defense in Luzon are painfully slow, the aforementioned wartime role of AI is a likely scenario. Indeed, it is increasingly becoming a tall order for the Philippine military to turn itself from a security free rider and liability into a security asset in the region, especially within the context of the mutual defense treaty with the United States.

48 January/February 2022

In peacetime, however, AI’s impact is cognitive that leads to the erosion of truth and further complicates the idea of freedom in flawed democracies such as the Philippines. As a prime example, China’s mass incarceration of over a million Uyguhrs in Tibet is enabled by Huawei’s AI algorithms such as those used in its facial recognition technology. This is among the various reasons why Huawei has since been banned in key Western countries. Unfortunately, Huawei had become ubiquitous in the Philippines where it can track the movement of the country’s decision-makers and elites through hand-held devices, wearables, and mobile WiFi, while the aggregated data from these devices—notwithstanding TikTok—may provide Beijing the ability to map Filipino perceptions and political orientation.

The possibilities in making predictions out of this data are endless to further the interests of the Chinese Communist Party, and we have not even taken quantum computing into consideration yet that in time will crack open national security secrets of those who refused to take action today. AI that’s powered by quantum computing is AI on steroids, and that is actually an understatement. To put this in context, Meta unveiled its AI Research SuperCluster earlier in January 2022

49 January/February 2022

and the company promised that it will be the fastest supercomputer in the world once it is fully built out by mid-2022. U.S. Big Tech has the need for speed to use

it for business. Google, in fact, began offering remote access to their quantum processors and simulators for approved research projects, but what about the Chinese Communist Party that is wildly addicted to civil-military fusion?

How AI is developed in peacetime serves as the foundation for its application in a major war, and the free world needs to get this right with the right people. This is

where Sharmaine, our featured security scholar for this Deep Dive edition, comes in. Russia and its culture are unfamiliar terrain for Filipinos like her who is more accustomed to Western ways. But she is the personification of grit, intellect, and

kindness rolled into one that allowed her to earn her doctorate in international relations (with an interest in cybersecurity and AI) from Saint Petersburg State University. We hope that the defense strategic community in the Philippines will

take notice of her because it is important to value character over talent. There is so much talent in Manila (albeit not so much in AI) but character is arguably in

short supply. Meanwhile, those with talent but lacking in character and ethics are unnecessarily incentivized. Sharmaine is our answer to that.

AW: What made you decide to pursue your PhD in Russia?

Sharmaine: I think I’ve always found Russia quite intriguing, growing up in a

country which knows so little about it. If we only look at Russia through movies or news in the international stage, the impressions they build don’t always turn

out to be flattering. I’m a bit of a skeptic so I wanted to see it for myself, hence the move to Russia. It was a difficult choice because I needed to study PhD fully in the Russian language, but I got a lot of support from my professors and

classmates, so it became easier. Majoring in International Relations, I got to see things from a different perspective through my education here. Thanks to my outstanding professors, I found research and education in Russia to be a unique and great experience.

50 January/February 2022

AW: Can you talk about living in Russia for several years? What do you do for recreation during your free time? Any travel suggestions?

Sharmaine: I’ve been living in Russia for about six years now and I really enjoy it.

As I mentioned earlier, coming from a country that has little information about Russia made it quite a challenge for me at first. Unlike other countries, it wasn’t really a popular destination for both educational and tourism purposes. Probably it’s because of the negative stereotypes from movies and other media that still wrap the image of Russia. Some of my friends back home still ask me if bears really do loiter around cities or if the people here don’t smile at all —both of which are false.

Perhaps it was the language that made it difficult for me at first, but I found most Russian people to be friendly and helpful. The major cities are magnificent and there’s always a lot to explore (it is the biggest country after all!). My recreational activities would depend on the season. I usually travel outside Russia during 51 January/February 2022

winter break to escape the freezing temperatures (which could reach up to -50°C during winter) but since the pandemic started, I learned to enjoy Russian winter.

There’s a lot to explore in here so I usually visit museums during autumn, go camping during summer, and enjoy Russian traditional festivals during spring. I also hang out with my friends a lot or keep myself busy with foreign language studies when I have a lot of free time.

For the adventurous souls who would like to visit Russia, I recommended going on a cross-country trip using the Trans-Siberian Railway! It’s a long train ride that starts from Moscow and stretches up to Mongolia and China. Of course, you have the option to choose your route and stop by different cities along the way for a few days. I tried it one summer, by myself, and not only did it improve my Russian language skills, it also helped me meet new friends, discover historical places outside touristy cities, and learn more about the “Russian soul”. For those with limited vacation time, you may enjoy the “white nights” (almost 24hrs 52 January/February 2022

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sunlight) of Saint Petersburg or if you dream to see the dancing northern lights, you may spot them in northern Russian cities such as Murmansk.

AW: What is the number one book that you would recommend that relates to your scholarly or personal passion?

Sharmaine: Ironically speaking, I wouldn’t consider myself as an avid reader and do not find myself particularly attached to books that I go through for my studies. I do, however, would like to recommend a very simple book that highly resonated with me ever since I was a kid: Dr. Seuss’ “Oh, the Places You’ll Go!”. Though it may seem like a very simple children’s book, I found it particularly encouraging and relevant to readers no matter what age they may be and regardless of whatever field they choose to pursue.

Nowadays, people are so preoccupied with finding their purpose and a lot are hesitant to take a big leap due to the fear of the unknown, the possibility of losing their financial foothold, or simply by getting used to being told of their limits. I wouldn’t discount the fact that everyone is subject to these different circumstances, and they could really affect an individual’s capabilities and desire to explore further. It’s really subjective. Personally, though, I would say that this simple book gave me more wisdom and courage to pursue my goals way more than any other brilliant and sophisticated work ever did.

AW: How did you find yourself pursuing studies in cybersecurity?

Sharmaine: Our professors encouraged us to pursue research on relevant issues which made me choose the field of security. It’s a broad field so I started my research with counterterrorism, and which eventually progressed to cybersecurity. It’s important to keep ourselves up-to-date when doing research and I observed that the security problems we face are getting more and more integrated into the cyber world to the point that it seems inescapable. During my studies in Russia, I got the opportunity to work for 54 January/February 2022

an AI company which made me understand the field better and look at this security issue from a whole new perspective.

AW: How can we harness artificial intelligence toward an equitable future?

Sharmaine: Artificial intelligence is indeed a breakthrough development in this era yet still a very sensitive topic when considering where the paths of ethics and advancement cross. This technology offers the chance break the limitations to what humans are capable of performing, especially when we add speed and efficiency to the equation. The promise of increased productivity and lower expenses seem ideal and rather enticing for businesses and organizations, but its opaque and inevitable costs bring unease to the society, especially when, in some cases, it could stray from normative moral values. It is natural to fear the unknown and the threat of losing jobs and humanity to AI is a major issue that wraps people with apprehension.

With regard to harnessing AI towards an equitable future, I don’t think there is a solid solution to this issue yet. Hypothetically speaking, good practice and corporate responsibility would play major roles in paving AI’s successful integration into our society and lowering people’s doubts. The higher the amount power and responsibility we delegate to these algorithmicallyrun systems, the more prepared we ought to be. Concrete accountability and continuity measures should be in place. The presence of voluntary commitment through digital responsibility could be a good step towards the ethical and successful incorporation of AI in the future. The development of AI’s holistic usage framework and limitations from a collaboration among experts, organizations, business owners, and developers would be ideal.

However, the possibility of nonconformity would still be present though as it is an inevitable part of human nature. In this case, proper knowledge and training for AI-related security measures would be an indispensable necessity to keep things at bay when the society chooses to fully embrace AI in the future.

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When evil men plot, Good men must plan.

When evil men burn and bomb, Good men must build and bind.

When evil men shout ugly words of hatred, Good men must commit themselves to the glories of love.

Where evil men would seek to perpetuate an unjust status quo, Good men must seek to bring into being A real order of justice.

Martin Luther King, Jr.