Analyzing War Magazine | Jul/Aug 2021

ADVANCING KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMED UNDERSTANDING OF INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY

C ON T E N T S

9

INFORMATION, DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES, AND PANDEMICS

17 THE SATELLITE DOESN'T LIE

23 MISUNDERSTOOD

31 SEEING RED

39

FEATURED SECURITY SCHOLAR:

CLARISSE DACANAY

EDITORIAL BOARD AND STAFF PUBLISHER SWi Analytics, LLC EDITOR Mark Payumo MANAGING EDITORS Diana Alarde-Jordan Jacob Morrell Bryner Las Rio Pacit LAYOUT EDITOR Jayrald Vasquez WEB EDITOR Philip Carpentero CONTRIBUTING WRITERS Sherwin E. Ona, PhD Harrison Prétat Dionne Searcey Marites Dañguilan Vitug ANALYZING WAR MAGAZINE www.analyzingwar.org SUBSCRIBE Inside the magazine or issuu LETTERS TO THE EDITOR editor@analyzingwar.org

Photos on these pages via Wikimedia Commons in the public domain in the U.S.: 1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, and 36.

All others via Shutterstock.

4 July/August 2021

SHERWIN E. ONA, PHD

is an associate professor and chairperson of the political science and development studies department of De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines. His current engagements are in the areas of human security, cybersecurity, digital government, and disaster informatics. He is also a fellow of the Philippine Public Safety College-Department of the Interior and Local Government, the La Salle Institute of Governance and the Stratbase-Albert Del Rosario Institute. Dr. Ona is an officer of the Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary with the rank of Commander and has previously served with the Philippine Air Force as a reservist officer.

HARRISON PRÉTAT

is a research associate with the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His research interests include maritime disputes, U.S.-China relations, economic engagement in Asia, and challenges to international institutions in the 21st century.

DIONNE SEARCEY

is the former West Africa bureau chief for The New York Times and winner of the 2020 team Pulitzer Prize for international reporting.

MARITES DAÑGUILAN VITUG

has been a journalist for almost four decades and is one of the Philippines’ most accomplished journalists. A bestselling author, Marites has written eight books on Philippine current affairs. She is the former editor of Newsbreak, a pioneering political magazine. Currently, she is editor-at-large of Rappler. Her latest book, Rock Solid: How the Philippines Won Its Maritime Dispute Against China, won the National Book Award for best book in journalism in 2019.

5 July/August 2021

EDITOR’S NOTE To say that truth is fungible could well be

eggs are good for your health, while some

considered sacrilege, a desecration of sacred

were filmed smoking in their white lab coat to

ground and seen as a tacit admission of

validate gender activists’ claims that cigarettes

one’s character flaw. Yet, the long arc of

are “torches of freedom.” But these are

human history shows how entire populations

only peacetime pursuits, a mere extension

relinquished their right toward self-

of its application to wartime mobilization

determination and endowed monarchs with

that convinced an isolationist America to

the “divine right of kings.” At the same time,

fight during World War I. The fungibility

it is curious how men will kill and die and

of truth also deposed an unsuspecting but

challenge an established order based on an

legitimate leader of Guatemala in 1954, and

ideology—no matter how abstract—while

led Washington to believe that the same

rallying behind its proponent.

methodology would succeed in the Vietnam War.

That truth is eroding in the 21st century no longer comes as a surprise as “fake news”

Meanwhile, Vladimir Lenin’s weaponization

or “misinformation” now appear to be the

of his ideology took place simultaneously

norm as shorthand terminologies in both

with Edward Bernay’s work as the Father

mainstream and professional settings. Hiding

of Propaganda, and endures to this day in

in plain sight, however, is the process by

present-day Russia, North Korea, and China.

which this unfolds. Initially advanced as a

But due to man’s natural proclivity to uncover

discipline in the field of marketing, reshaping

the truth, it was only a matter of time before

truth had its roots in propaganda, which

propaganda evolved into public relations—

quickly evolved into a distasteful terminology

this time with stronger emphasis on the

owing to its unethical but purposeful manner

integrity of the truth albeit with imperfections

of promoting information with questionable

more or less intact.

accuracy as a means of advancing a cause.

This evolution is arguably a cycle that follows It is now common knowledge that thousands

a pattern of crests and troughs—the high

of doctors once endorsed that bacon and

points being akin to the moral high ground

6 July/August 2021

The publishers of Analyzing War honor the service and sacrifice of Philippine Air Force Major Michael Benolerao who was among the fatalities in the C130 plane crash in Jolo, Sulu on July 4, 2021. Major Benolerao also belonged to the Philippine Military Academy Class of 2006.

7 July/August 2021

while the low points are the opposite—a

in managing the flow of information will be

struggle between truth and lies and between

to balance personal opinions and facts as

good and evil. This is nowhere more evident

they add up and form a complete picture.

in the eventual decline of tabloids as

The recent C130 plane crash in the Southern

mainstream newspapers prevailed over them,

Philippines, for instance, placed Philippine

and in democracy’s triumph over communism.

military and government officials with zero flying background in a complicated position,

To be sure, the digital era can be equally

when they reflected to reporters on record

problematic as the world becomes saturated

regarding the circumstances surrounding the

with large volumes of data. Algorithms

accident even before an investigation has

haven’t kept pace with ethics that ought to

concluded.

come with it and, in this sense, are rendered obsolete owing to the urgency of maintaining

In the end, upholding the truth may belong to

societal stability and cohesion. The January 6

a pattern of struggle between accuracy and

insurrection in the U.S. Capitol; the genocide

falsehood, but it doesn’t happen by default.

of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar; and how

It remains at least a generation away before

Cambridge Analytica’s machine learning

algorithms can fix a bug by themselves, while

models assisted Brexit campaigners and a

pieces of legislation should not be allowed to

Filipino presidential candidate as a matter of

remain set in stone indefinitely. We present

experimentation are among valid points of

this issue with these in mind and attempt

concern.

to put a balance of perspectives between academics and career journalists, taking

It is in this light that traditional offline tools

context from the African continent to the

such as legislation and basic human decency

Asia-Pacific, and enjoining our readers in

and honesty may well remain relevant.

search of a meaningful strategy to address the

Section 230 of the Communications Decency

challenges of misinformation in the digital era

Act, for instance, is under legislative pressure

and beyond.

from at least two proposed bills in the U.S. Congress, which aim to hold Big Tech

Mark Payumo

accountable for misinformation that occurs on

Mountain View, CA

their platforms. Another measured approach

8 July/August 2021

Information, Digital Technologies, and Pandemics CREATING AN INFORMATION STRATEGY FOR PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES Sherwin E. Ona, PhD “In an interconnected world, safeguarding the global f lows of goods and services, information, infrastructural hubs and systems – is of the utmost importance. In a world of transnational connections, protecting the national territory against hostile armies is not enough.”- Ballin, Goede and Dijstelbloem (2020) on the “Extension of the Concept of Security”

T

he COVID-19 pandemic has placed tremendous pressure on public health care systems around the world. Partly because of the fragmented nature of these systems, the outbreak has revealed gaps in the capacity of states to mitigate its effects.

Furthermore, the virulence and lethality of the virus have brought fear and anxiety, thus opening the doors for the malicious spread of rumors and false information that can undermine disease mitigation 9 July/August 2021

efforts. This article discusses the information aspect of a pandemic response and maintains that the current information environment does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it is composed of various players with varied interests, needs, and sophisticated capabilities. As such, it is important for policymakers and planners to be aware of this and understand the need for an information strategy that combines national security, public health, and technology perspectives.

An important feature of this emerging view is the need to understand the complex nature of non-traditional threats (NTTs) such as a pandemic. Because of global interdependence, the ubiquitous access to digital technologies and information together with the mobility of peoples, NTTs are more pervasive and multifaceted. It also has the capacity to exacerbate existing socio-economic problems associated with poverty, hunger, and the marginalization of sectors. At the same time, these threats transcend national borders, making the traditional nation-state concept of using its military forces to mitigate threats inadequate.1 Digital technologies have also created more porous borders.

Therefore, protecting the information environment during health crises is a vital element of any disease mitigation effort.

In addition, digital technologies are often viewed as double-edged swords. On

the one hand, its power to streamline supply chains, create virtual markets and empower citizens has been crucial in a world plagued by COVID-19. Data analytics and geospatial technologies have been beneficial in supporting emergency governance. However, its weaponization through disinformation, cybercrimes, and distributed denial of online services can destabilize states. Emerging hybrid and grey area warfare practices show that our dependence on information and digital technologies can be exploited, especially during public health emergencies. Widespread cyberattacks combined with a deliberate disinformation campaign can easily undermine disease mitigation activities, exacerbate existing social cleavages as well as weaken democratic institutions.2 Similarly, these activities can also be part of a broader military campaign.

10 July/August 2021

In general, information and digital

will use the outbreak to declare martial

for the public good or resources for

suggested that the U.S. is using Africans

technologies may be seen as tools

this new type of warfare. Examples of the latter show that adversaries

law. Likewise, Iranian television further

as “guinea pigs” for its new bioweapon.3

capitalize on the ambiguity of grey zone

Meanwhile, recognizing digital and

political outcomes without resorting to

of the overall national response can

strategies with the desire to achieve

armed conflict. For non-state actors,

this strategy is useful for asymmetrical

fighting and cybercrimes. On the other

hand, best practices from countries such as Vietnam and Thailand have shown

that these resources are enabling tools

to achieve public health and governance objectives.

THE EBOLA AND COVID-19 OUTBREAKS

The weaponization of information

and digital technologies can be an inexpensive alternative that can

undermine legitimate activities and diminish the credibility of actors.

Such was the case with the 2013

Ebola outbreak in Africa, where Allied humanitarian operations in the region were subjected to misinformation attacks aimed at undermining its

mission. Online reports have accused

the US of militarizing the Ebola outbreak and that the Obama administration 11 July/August 2021

information assets as an essential facet be rewarding. For instance, Vietnam’s

COVID-19 mitigation strategy labeled its

national response as the “Spring General Offensive of 2020.” This prompted

its government to use its information infrastructure to promote awareness

and trust and quell misinformation, thus, controlling the spread of the virus.4

Similarly, Thailand adopted a strategy driven by science and data combined with a communication strategy that

sought the participation of its citizens.5

COVID-19 border checkpoint in Muntinlupa City.

COVID-19 IN THE PHILIPPINES In the Philippines, its highly securitized,

The March 2021 viral surge in the

the world’s longest pandemic-related

provinces revealed the government's

top-down strategy has led to one of

lockdowns. Plagued by poor leadership

and resource limitations, gaps in the use of information resources can be seen through the following problems: (a)

unreliable health data from hospitals and communities; (b) inability to coordinate contact tracing data from the local

governments to national agencies; and (c) failure to aggregate data from multiple

sources.6 This is further compounded by

the spread of fake news about its current vaccination program and the alarming increase in cybercrime cases.7 8

National Capital Region and adjacent inability to monitor and control

the disease. Due to the country's

fragmented public health systems,

its national contact tracing software remains on the “work in progress”

stage, while its capacity to develop an integrated system to match hospital

resources and medical inventories to

demand is highly doubtful. This is further complicated by the government's

unidirectional public messaging, which tends to treat its citizens like wards rather than partners.

12 July/August 2021

THE NEED FOR AN INFORMATION

adversaries can use cyberspace to

EMERGENCIES

zone warfare. Developing an information

STRATEGY FOR PUBLIC HEALTH

Public health crises highlight the need for decision-makers and security planners to understand the benefits of using

digital technologies and information. It is also critical to realize that pervasive

access to these technologies can pose a significant threat. Today’s tech savvy

engage in both asymmetrical and grey

strategy that combines public health and national security while treating digital

technologies as tools to address future

threats is vital for the Philippines. Figure 1 illustrates the intersection between

the two facets, while digital technologies are depicted as enabling tools for both facets.

Figure 1: Components of an information strategy for public health emergencies

President Rodrigo Roa Duterte holds a meeting with members of the Inter-Agency Task Force on the Emerging Infectious Diseases (IATF-EID).

13 July/August 2021

The public health component of the

and social media venues can be

following:

and quell misinformation. This calls

proposed strategy consists of the

i. Establish an integrated public

health command system. This system should have the ability to monitor and control the spread of any disease.

This is envisioned to be a national system that has the capability to aggregate health datasets from

community health stations and local governments. Health facilities and

medical inventories are expected to

be part of the system. The results of integration can be used to support policy development.

ii. Promote public awareness. A

program that uses traditional online

pursued to promote public awareness for the creation of digital content

that can address specific needs and concerns. A good example of this

is the publication of video content on common home remedies and

symptoms of COVID-19. This also

underscores the importance of having reliable and accurate information to counter the spread of fake news. iii. Promote transparency and

openness as well as encourage

participation. Public confidence and trust are important commodities in

a public health emergency. For this,

special emphasis must be placed on transparency to eradicate doubts

COVID-19 Community Quarantine Checkpoint in Cagayan.

14 July/August 2021

Ninoy Aquino Stadium COVID-19 quarantine inspection.

and allegations of corruption.

useful in creating a digital portfolio for

health data in an open data format

the development of data interoperability

For instance, the publication of

encourages both the private sector as well as civil society organizations to

participate in good governance and innovation efforts. Another issue in

public health emergencies. It also entails and governance standards that

can ensure seamless integration of government agencies.

this category is the need to achieve a

At the same time, its national security

individuals and the public good.

address the following challenges:

balance between the privacy rights of

In addition, viewing digital technologies as enablers requires the development

of a secure information infrastructure.

For example, emerging digital mapping, data analytics, semantic technologies,

and artificial intelligence applications are 15 July/August 2021

component highlights the need to

i. Address the adverse effects of

misinformation and disinformation. It is possible to counter misinformation by making a deliberate effort to respond to citizens' information

needs. Strategies such as emergency

communication, fact checking, and

the professionalization of this area

the spread of malicious rumors.

positions and technical specialties

consistent messaging can prevent Disinformation is more difficult to

address because of its sophisticated

nature. One must be steps ahead by

identifying the intentions, goals, and capabilities of potential adversaries. ii. Anticipate the impact of

asymmetrical and grey zone

warfare. Sophisticated adversaries can disrupt a nation's information

infrastructure and undermine disease mitigation efforts. For this, planners should develop the necessary competencies and doctrines.

Security, law enforcement, and

public safety organizations should develop their own practices to

address future threats. For instance,

through the development of career should be explored. Conducting

a cybersecurity audit to enhance

strengths and address weaknesses is another technique that can be used for this purpose.

Finally, we should all realize that nontraditional threats are here to stay.

For its part, the Philippines must learn

from its shortcomings and embrace this reality by developing an information

strategy to rapidly adapt to this new

normal. We cannot afford to wait for a

new pandemic or the next “big one” to act decisively.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.

NOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Ernest Ballin, Huub Dijstelbloem, and Peter De Goede, “Extension of the Concept of Security,” in Security in an Interconnected World (Springer Open Access, 2020), 13-29.

Andrew Drowse and Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, “The Explainer: what is ‘hybrid warfare’ and what is mean by the ‘grey zone’?” The Conversation, June 17, 2019.

Melia Pfannestiel and Louis L. Cook, “Disinformation and Disease: Operating in the Information Environment During Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Missions,” Joint Force Quarterly 98, 3rd Quarter (July 2020): 20-27.

Minh Vu and Bich T. Tran, “The Secret to Vietnam’s COVID-19 Response Success: A review of Vietnam’s response to COVID-19 and its implications,” The Diplomat, April 18, 2020.

Busaba Sivasomboon, “Thailand Eases More Coronavirus Restrictions, Ends Curfew,” The San Diego Union Tribune, June 12, 2020.

Sherwin Ona, “COVID-19 and Security Governance: An Initial Examination of the Philippine Experience and Its Implication to Policy Development” (Special Study, Rex Publication-Stratbase ADRI, 2020).

Benjamin Pulta, “Online Child Exploitation Reports in PH Surge Amid COVID-19: DOJ,” Philippine News Agency, May 25, 2020.

Karen Lema, “Rumours and fear dog Philippine plan for coronavirus vaccine drive,” Reuters, last updated January 27, 2021.

16 July/August 2021

THE SATELLITE DOESN'T LIE TRUTH DECAY AND REMOTE-SENSING DATA Harrison Prétat

T

echnology is continually changing how people receive information and perceive events outside of their own personal experience. Today there is more information available to the general public about any given subject than ever before in history, and yet populations continually find themselves disagreeing on the basic facts about current events.

As barriers to broadcasting and publishing have fallen, publics have become dispersed into separate, narrow audiences, hooked into partial streams of information and vulnerable to being misled. The consequences of this phenomenon have been felt keenly in the fight against COVID-19, where governments across the globe have struggled to dispel misinformation and deliver consistent guidance to their citizens.

17 July/August 2021

Truth decay is just as much an issue in the realm of foreign and defense

policy, where powerful international

factual claims can sow confusion during crises and lead to miscalculation.

actors conceal facts or promulgate

REMOTE-SENSING DATA

national security objectives. This poses

While the incentives to misrepresent events

the maritime and territorial disputes in

always remain, there are ways to reduce

self-serving narratives in the pursuit of particular challenges in the context of

the Indo-Pacific. Dispute management and resolution often relies upon

establishing a degree of agreement

upon fundamental facts—when two sides have two entirely different versions of events, it can become impossible for

them to agree on the next appropriate

step to take. Even more dangerously, the existence of contradictory narratives and

occurring in the maritime domain will

the amount of “spin” that can be put on a story, even when it happens in distant waters hundreds of miles from shore.

Commercially available remote-sensing data can serve as a powerful toolset to

obtain a clearer picture of what is actually happening in disputed waters and to put

concrete limits on the possible narratives that interested actors can put forward.

International Space Station.

18 July/August 2021

View of South China Sea.

While top government officials may

opening the door for non-governmental

intelligence, the organizations that

see what is happening in contested

have access to high-quality military

gather this information are inevitably

interested in keeping secret just what

they know, and how they got to know it.

This leaves critical actors that influence public policy, including academia,

business organizations, and the general public, vulnerable to misinformation or

even targeted disinformation about what is really happening in disputed areas.

Commercially available remote-sensing

data such as satellite imagery, automatic identification system (AIS) data, radio

frequency data, and synthetic aperture radar can address this vulnerability. By 19 July/August 2021

organizations and journalists to both

maritime areas and share these findings with a broad audience, commercial

remote-sensing offerings can better educate civil society and political

constituencies about the fundamental

facts, making them resistant to politically or geopolitically-motivated falsehoods.

And while traditional data sources like

statistical surveys and experimental data can sometimes fail to penetrate false narratives, remote-sensing data has

some unique characteristics that make it both more compelling and less easy

to manipulate when compared to other common data types.

A US Soldier analyzing atmospheric and space data information.

THE BENEFITS

peddling contradictory satellite

One of remote-sensing data’s

thing. Redundant providers of the

fundamental strengths is right in the

name: it’s sensing data. It isn’t collected

by an interviewer asking questions, or by a researcher conducting an experiment,

both of whom could be accused of bias: it’s collected by a machine receiving

light or radio waves, a much more direct and objective method of gathering information.

Aside from making the data more

compelling to even resistant audiences, the objective nature of sensing data

means that viewers aren’t faced with a choice between different sources

images—they are all sensing the same same type of data and high frequency of collection largely dispel concerns

about data integrity post-collection—if one provider tried to doctor its data

(or its database was hacked into and

altered), users would immediately spot a disconnect when comparing it to other platforms.

These properties make remote-sensing data a uniquely powerful tool not only

for monitoring activities in the maritime domain, but also for grounding the

public discourse in fact. But like any tool, remote-sensing data has its limitations.

20 July/August 2021

THE LIMITATIONS

incidents that occur between competing

First, while the quality of data and

East China Sea.

frequency of collections are increasing,

claimants in the South China Sea and

at present there are still significant

Second, not all remote-sensing data is as

satellite imagery is collected over

data types require technical knowledge

gaps in coverage. While low-resolution most locations nearly every day, high-

resolution collections are infrequent even over known locations of interest, and

rarely happen over the swaths of open ocean that are often the site of illegal,

unreported, and unregulated fishing and transshipment activity, as well as many

self-explanatory as a photograph. Most

and as well as experience in monitoring activity in a given area to accurately interpret. Audiences also require

knowledge of the surrounding subject matter, whether that be international

maritime law, the history of the South

China Sea disputes, or the composition of a country’s fishing fleets, in order

to contextualize and understand the

significance of a remote-sensing data point.

Third, while accessibility to some data

types has increased substantially, others, including high-resolution satellite

imagery, remain too expensive at

present for independent researchers or journalists without institutional

support. This means that the community of users that can verify each other’s

work is smaller than it could be, and

that ultimately most audiences will still need to be convinced of the data’s

accuracy by the publisher since they Thunderstorms over the South China Sea.

21 July/August 2021

lack the capability to evaluate the data themselves.

USING IT TO THE FULLEST

the audience a chance to appreciate

While issues related to data coverage

sensing data when compared with

and accessibility will eventually be

resolved as new technologies reduce

costs and increase the frequency and

quality of data, the essential challenges of using data types unfamiliar to

most audiences will not be resolved so naturally. Instead, it depends on researchers and organizations that

publish remote-sensing data to pay

the relative objectivity of remoteother data, and can instill greater

confidence in its integrity. And though most remote-sensing research still requires some amount of expert

analysis to interpret or contextualize

the data, providing enough information to allow the audience to evaluate the data themselves is just as important.

special attention to its presentation.

Used in this way, remote-sensing

When researchers or journalists publish

educate broader audiences about

work that makes use of remote-

sensing data, they endeavor to include identifying information about the

data provider, as well as thorough

explanations of how the data is collected.

Transparency about the source and

technical information about the data give

data can be a powerful tool to

developments in contested maritime spaces and reduce the range of

narratives that can be entertained,

making it easier for different groups to agree on facts and, potentially, to achieve progress in dispute management.

22 July/August 2021

MISUNDERSTOOD NIGERIA’S FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBERS AND FLAWED INFORMATION RESPONSE Dionne Searcey, former West Africa bureau chief for The New York Times

I

was driving around Maiduguri, a busy college town

in Northeastern Nigeria, when I passed a roundabout and a giant billboard caught my eye. It was a

painting of a girl with explosives strapped to her body.

The girl had wild eyes and a vicious expression on her face, as though she was grimacing. The intent was clear: she looked like a deranged killer.

“Stop terrorism,” was printed across the billboard.

The text beneath the image urged parents not to hand over their daughters to be suicide bombers.

23 July/August 2021

This was 2017, and, at the time,

state where a harsh interpretation

Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram.

military were targeted as the enemy and

Maiduguri was under siege by the

The group was not well known in the

Western world yet it had been named more deadly than ISIS just two years

earlier by The Institute of Economics &

Peace, around the same time the globe

was focused on the Islamic State and its

horrific attacks in Paris that killed dozens of people.

People in Maiduguri didn’t need a think tank designation to know how deadly

Boko Haram was. They lived the terror every day.

The group was founded in their city, intent on returning the region to a

of Islam ruled. The government and

considered emblems of Western, sinful leanings. Anyone who had anything

to do with the government—police,

soldiers, bureaucrats, even teachers and students—were considered by terrorists to be fair targets. In 2014, nearly 300 schoolgirls were kidnapped by Boko

Haram in an incident that gained global

attention when celebrities and politicians circulated the social media slogan

#BringBackOurGirls. Many of them are

still missing and the kidnapping moved off the international radar.

The government was struggling to get

control of the war, but Nigeria was not

24 July/August 2021

Nigerian Army conducted military drills in the Sambisa Forest which previously had been a stronghold for Boko Haram.

winning. The president was holding on

But in 2017, the war took a terrible turn

by repeatedly declaring victory on his

of them shockingly carried out by young

to the semblance of victory, however, social media accounts. He apparently

was banking on the fact that for much

of the rest of the country, and, notably,

as a rash of bombings broke out, most women and girls. The war was back in the global spotlight.

for the nation’s power brokers in big

The bombings were horrendous.

of mind as they went about their daily

mosques and even the gates of the main

cities, the war was out of sight and out lives.

By the time I arrived in Maiduguri, Boko Haram had long ravaged the city, going

on violent sprees of killing all the young men who didn’t join their ranks, and

kidnapping women and girls. Buildings

Explosives tore through markets,

university in the city where a professor

of veterinary sciences was killed. He was

just one of dozens of people going about their day who lost their lives during this awful spate of violence that spared no one in the bombs’ vicinity.

were in tatters. Relatives still combed

But the fact that most of these bombings

ones who had disappeared.

girls was startling.

the morgues to find traces of loved

25 July/August 2021

were being carried out by women and

It was an inexplicable phenomenon in

the numerous military and police

were nearly invisible in all strata of

contorted into a form of a curtsy as a

a part of the country where women

societies. Not just in Nigeria but in the

region in general, men overwhelmingly were decision-makers in homes, in

companies, in corporate boardrooms,

and in government. The idea that women

checkpoints set up all over the city, they way to let soldiers know they weren’t carrying bulky explosives that would have prevented them from bending down.

and even teenage girls were making

Humanitarian workers were scared

as heinous as blowing themselves up,

food collection points. The woman of

headlines at all, let alone for something was nothing short of shocking.

The bombings set off a certain paranoia about women and girls, and even panic in some parts of the city. Pedestrians started crossing the street to avoid

being near any young woman wearing a

long, flowing hijab—perfect for hiding a suicide belt. When women approached

and began rethinking how to set up

a household was typically in charge of

gathering the free food so badly needed by the farmers and fishermen who had

fled their livelihoods to move into camps

where they felt safe. Women had started bathing more often and taking special care to comb their hair and wear nice clothes to avoid looking suspicious.

Suicide bomber girls were filthy and wore

Paracel Islands

26 July/August 2021

Refugees in Nigeria.

tattered dresses because of their harsh

conditions in Boko Haram camps deep in

the forest. “Haggard” was how everyone

her hijab. Kids as young as 8 years old were blowing themselves up.

described them.

Military intelligence hadn’t uncovered

All the suspicion had tragic

choosing to push the detonator, despite

consequences. One aid group

documented innocent children who had

been killed at checkpoints in the region, mistaken by nervous soldiers who were afraid that the kids were concealing bombs.

The Nigerian military was in the process of spending millions to buy high-tech

information about why the women were the thousands of people streaming across the border and into refugee

camps, each with their own tale of horror and many of whom knew exactly what was happening in their communities to the young women, because they

themselves had been kidnapped by Boko Haram and escaped.

war planes from the United States. Yet

And so the government went on a public

rudimentary pipe bomb fastened under

of disinformation based on a failure of

it couldn’t stop a Nigerian tween with a

27 July/August 2021

service campaign that itself was a form

intelligence and of basic warfare. TV and

that? But apparently to the government,

of young girls who had been arrested

admission of defeat.

radio spots were filmed with the voices

before they could detonate their bombs,

to explain otherwise would have been an

portraying them as vicious killers. The

My common sense radar told me

from getting the same idea and running

find the truth.

idea was to keep other young women off to become bombers themselves.

The public service campaign helped

explain the billboard I spotted that day driving around Maiduguri. But the text imploring parents not to give away

daughters to become suicide bombers stuck with me. What parent would do

something was just…off. So I set out to

With the help of my colleague, the local journalist Shehu Abubakar, and our

security sources, we tracked down 18

women and girls who had been recruited as suicide bombers but failed to carry

out their missions to find out what would convince a woman to push a detonator.

Nigerien National Guard Soldier in Zenam Kelouri.

28 July/August 2021

Refugees in Nigeria.

What we found was a set of terrified,

I sat in a safe house and talked to the

been kidnapped by terrorists. Some of

drenching everyone in the room with

traumatized young women who had

them had seen their mothers and fathers brutally murdered before their eyes.

Some had been beaten. Others had been raped. Each had a particularly terrifying story of explosives being forcibly tied to them, or of being marched to their bombing targets at gunpoint. Some

women for hours, the stifling heat

sweat. Tears flowed from the girls, and some of them stopped to catch their

breath as they talked. It was the only

time anyone had asked them what had

happened, and importantly, the only time anyone listened to what they had to say.

were told they were doing God’s will

Each woman was clever enough to find

told relatives would be killed if they

night, feigning illness, surrendering

by pushing a detonator. Some were

didn’t carry out their mission. Many of

the women were told that if they didn’t

detonate a bomb they would be forced

to “marry” a Boko Haram fighter, and do his bidding at a terrorists’ camp.

29 July/August 2021

a way to escape—running off in the

to sympathetic soldiers and mosque

attendees, or lying to fighters that they had set off their bomb and somehow

didn’t die. Their ruses worked and they had made it to safety.

Far from being a threat or a gift to

Boko Haram from willing parents as

the Nigerian government would have had citizens believe, these women

were national heroes and should have been lauded as such for having saved

countless lives for their defiance. And the Nigerian military and government forces would have known that if they, too, would have listened.

30 July/August 2021

IN COUNTERINSURGENCY, PHILIPPINE MILITARY SHIFTS FROM HEARTS-AND-MINDS CAMPAIGN TO DISINFORMATION Marites Dañguilan Vitug

I

n April, more than a year after

COVID-19 hit the Philippines and as new cases surged, sending

residents in Metro Manila and

nearby urban centers hunkering down in yet another round of lockdown, an idea was born.

Ana Patricia Non, a 26-year old entrepreneur, set up a bamboo

cart on a busy street in suburban

Quezon City, filled it with canned goods, vegetables, bags of rice, and tacked a makeshift sign:

“Community Pantry. Magbigay ayon sa kakayahan, kumuha batay sa

pangangailangan. Give what you can. Take what you need.”

31 July/August 2021

Soon after, long queues formed on the

as the handiwork of local communists.

lost their jobs during the pandemic

hardline army officer and spokesperson

street, among them workers who have and residents of nearby urban poor

communities. Donors started pitching in, bringing sacks of rice, boxes of assorted goods, and bags of vegetables.

This simple act of generosity, like a waterfall in a desert, captured the

public’s imagination. Images of Non

Lieutenant General Antonio Parlade, a

of a government body tasked to end the communist insurgency in the Philippines (officially called the National Task Force

to End Local Communist Armed Conflict or NFT-ELCAC), likened the millennial

Non to Satan: “Satan gave Eve an apple.

That’s where it all started.”1

and volunteers filling up the pantry and

National security adviser Hermogenes

social and mainstream media. The idea

was explicit. They were probing Non’s

attending to those in need exploded on spread like wildfire with hundreds of

community pantries sprouting in various parts of the country.

But for one group, this phenomenon was a national security threat. The

military pounced on it, discrediting it

Esperon, who runs the NFT-ELCAC,

community pantry for any links to an “organization that would be traced

to the legal fronts… of the CPP-NPA

(Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army).” 2 Other community

pantries were also profiled and surveilled by the police.

32 July/August 2021

RED SCARE

What the country is seeing is the effect

Demonizing the community pantries

violent fist. Duterte has given the military

was the most dramatic example of

red-tagging, a move that surprised

and angered many. It is reminiscent of McCarthyism in the US in the 1950s

when witch-hunts were launched against suspected communist subversives.

This comes as state security forces in the Philippines continue to fight the CPP-

NPA, now on its 52nd year, the longest running insurgency in Asia. The CPP

today is a pale shadow of what it used to

be in the 1970s, with only a few thousand members.

33 July/August 2021

of a commander-in-chief who rules with a and police their marching orders: “Finish off” and “kill” communist rebels.3 This

puts premium on the military approach coupled with propaganda offensives laden with disinformation.

Red-tagging is now the default mode

of the military in its counterinsurgency campaign, labeling people and

organizations. This is dangerous because, as it has turned out, a number of activists publicly denounced as communists were

killed by the police, claiming the suspects were resisting arrests.4

Cesar Garcia Jr., national security adviser

showed.6 There have also been no official

that red-tagging makes potential allies

of the NPA.

to President Benigno Aquino III, told me hostile. “What is important,” he said, “is

reports or proof that they were members

to have strategic communication that is

This red scare spilled into the judiciary

isolate insurgents. In other words, don’t

Ignacio, ordered the release of two

principally aimed at building alliances to make more enemies.”5

The military has ditched the classic

hearts-and-minds principle. On social

media, soldiers actively spread unverified information. Among those they have red-tagged are journalists, activists,

human rights defenders, organizations

when a judge, Monique Quisumbingdetained activists in March, clearing

them of charges by the police that they illegally possessed firearms. A tarpaulin with the logo of the CPP thanking the judge for setting their comrades free

was hung on a major highway in Metro Manila.7

of government employees, a judge,

In Cagayan de Oro in Mindanao, army

and universities which they insist are

media accounts to label activists and

party-list members of Congress,

recruiting grounds for the CPP-NPA. The case of former activists starkly illustrates the recklessness of the

military. A Facebook account of the

officers use false names on their social journalists, “creating an anti-communist hysteria grounded on half-truths and

falsehoods,” Herbie Gomez, editor of Mindanao Gold Star Daily, wrote.8

Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

posted a list of former University of the

Philippines students who joined the NPA and “are now dead or captured by the

AFP.” At least eight people on the list of 27 are public figures who are still alive— journalists, former government officials, an academic, playwright, and lawyers—

and have not been captured as members

of the NPA, a fact-check done by Rappler 34 July/August 2021

behind this activity coordinated with one another and used fake accounts

as a central part of their operations to mislead people about who they are

and what they are doing... When we

investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behavior rather than

content, no matter who’s behind them, what they post, or whether they’re foreign or domestic.”9 TAKEDOWN BY FACEBOOK

The military-linked accounts were traced

Social media is a new and fertile

Alexandre Cabales, chief of the Army

battleground for the military to pursue its information warfare against the

communist insurgents. "If before we

restricted our soldiers from engaging much in social media, now it is

encouraged. The AFP has to win this

propaganda fight being waged by the

CPP and they are miles ahead," Parlade was quoted by Rappler.

However, a backlash against the military’s aggressive use of social media jolted the institution. In September 2020,

Facebook took down 57 accounts and

31 pages linked to the Philippine military and police for violating its policy against “coordinated inauthentic behavior” against activists and legal groups.

Facebook announced: “…the people 35 July/August 2021

to the social media operations of Captain Social Media Center. Two soldiers from

the Philippine Army were also identified to be among the operators of the fake

pages. They are members of the Army's

Civil-Military Operations Regiment, which recruits communities and civilian groups

in its counterinsurgency campaign as well as to help in major disasters.10

But things didn’t start this way. The AFP first tapped social media in 2014, convening experts and about a thousand uniformed men and women to talk about its role in counterinsurgency. Lieutenant General Emmanuel Bautista, then the AFP Chief of Staff, recalled in an e-mail interview: “We had to retool the AFP’s communications capability…The purpose was to fight the information battle. After all, counterinsurgency is a battle for hearts and minds…Most often, the solution for us was to simply give the correct information…Red-tagging was a taboo as a matter of policy.”

Today, the military’s information warfare has vastly drifted away from alliancebuilding into disinformation.11 COLLAPSED PEACE TALKS How did the political atmosphere become so toxic?

The story has its roots in Duterte and the CPP’s love story gone bitter. It shows how personal relations intertwined with local politics worked in temporarily abating conflict in a city—but this brittle formula fell apart in the national stage.

As Davao City mayor for 22 years, Duterte was regarded as a friend by the CPP and its military arm, the NPA operating in Davao. He entered into an agreement with them. “The CPP-NPA will not launch any military operation—ambush, raids, kidnappings, bank robberies—within his jurisdiction,” Earl Parreño, author of a biography of Duterte, said in an e-mail interview. “In exchange, he will ‘protect’ them if their forces are in his territory…He allowed them to collect ‘revolutionary taxes,’ he took care of their sick, and he accommodated some of the leaders’ personal requests such as pocket money, scholarships for their children, employment for family members.”

36 July/August 2021

A few weeks before his victory as president in 2016, Duterte promised a ceasefire with the CPP-NPA. “Since 1970 I'd been listening to (Jose Ma.) Sison,” then-candidate Duterte said. “He was my teacher, so I told him, sir, please come home, let's talk. So he promised to me if I win the presidency, he will come home and I will bring him here, let's have a program.”12 Sison never returned to the Philippines but Duterte kept his promise of

initiating peace talks with the CPP.13 Duterte appointed four leftist activists— nominees of the CPP—to his cabinet who didn’t last long: two were rejected

by Congress, one was fired by Duterte, and one resigned.14 It turned out to be a fragile coalition.

Duterte terminated the talks in Nov. 2017, triggered by an ambush of policemen by the NPA.15 Since then, the fog of war has thickened, making a negotiated settlement elusive.

NOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15

“Parlade likens rapid spread of community pantries to work of ‘Satan’,” Rappler, April 22, 2021, https://www.rappler.com/nation/ntfelcac-parlade-says-ana-patricia-non-same-satan “Esperon: Gov’t looking into pantry organizers’ possible links to rebel groups,” Rappler, April 21, 2021, https://www.rappler.com/ nation/esperon-says-government-looking-community-pantry-organizers-links-rebel-groups “’Kill them’: Duterte wants to ‘finish off’ communist rebels,” Al Jazeera.com, March 6, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2021/3/6/kill-them-all-duterte-wants-communist-rebels-finished “Bloody Sunday: 9 dead, 6 arrested in Calabarzon crackdown on activists,” Rappler, March 7, 2021, https://www.rappler.com/nation/ dead-arrested-calabarzon-crackdown-progressives-march-7-2021 “Rappler Talk: Cesar Garcia Jr on counterinsurgency in PH,” YouTube, Feb. 1, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UysjtOsSKHU “FALSE: List of dead, captured former UP students who became NPA,” Rappler, Jan. 23, 2021, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/ fact-check/list-dead-captured-former-up-students-npa “After freeing activists, Mandaluyong judge gets red-tagged in an EDSA tarp,” Rappler, March 16, 2021, https://www.rappler.com/ nation/after-freeing-activists-mandaluyong-judge-red-tagged-edsa-tarpaulin-march-2021 “[Pastilan]: ‘Badoyistic Parladeism’ and mutations in the AFP,” Rappler, May 6, 2021, https://www.rappler.com/voices/ thought-leaders/pastilan-badoyistic-parladeism-mutations-afp?utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_ source=Facebook#Echobox=1620270126 “Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior,” Facebook, September 22, 2020, https://about.fb.com/news/2020/09/removingcoordinated-inauthentic-behavior-china-philippines/ “Two more Army soldiers identified as operators of fake Facebook network,” Rappler, Sept. 24, 2020, https://www.rappler.com/ technology/more-army-soldiers-identified-as-operators-fake-facebook-network “On social media, PH military declares war vs rights defenders,” Rappler, October 16, 2020, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/indepth/social-media-philippine-military-declares-war-versus-rights-defenders “Duterte, Joma on Skype: Ceasefire if Davao mayor becomes president,” Rappler, April 27, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/nation/ elections/duterte-joma-skype-ceasefire “Peace talks with communists set for August 20-27, Rappler, July 19, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/nation/government-peacenegotiations-communist-party-august “Duterte fires last leftist in government,” Inquirer.net, Oct. 3, 2018, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1038554/duterte-fires-last-leftist-ingovernment “Duterte formally ends peace talks with communists,” Rappler, Nov. 23, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/nation/duterte-formally-endspeace-talks-communists

37 July/August 2021

FEATURED SECURITY SCHOLAR:

CLARISSE DACANAY A Mark Payumo

braham Lincoln, Albert Einstein, and several others are credited for saying or some variation of the quote, “The only way to predict the future is to create it.” Fear of losing control is man’s universal predisposition and this may well explain why such words resonate across generations.

Whether in peacetime or in war, even the world’s militaries ensure that appropriate procedures and controls are in place because more often than not, these actions that anticipate the future had been written in blood.

For nations constantly engaged in armed conflicts short of a general war, green horns have a high turnover rate toward becoming combat veterans due to the high likelihood of exposure to “baptism of fire,” putting their training to the test in the field of battle. For those who find themselves serving in the infantry, marines, or special operations forces, the reality almost invariably means that it’s not a question of “if”; it’s a question of “when.” As if running on

auto-pilot, anticipatory contingencies are triggered even as new ones are developed depending on the situation on the ground.

Another side to this logic of taking control of the future is less of an abstract idea than a perceptible or tangible alternative, one that the world was admonished for and alluded to by Jose Rizal as the “nation’s hope.” Faced with certain death by execution at 35 in December 1896, Rizal looked to the “youth” as the ones who should carry on the fight against tyranny. Rightly so, this same imperative crystallized in Ronald Reagan’s mind 70 years later during his inauguration as governor of California: “Freedom is a fragile thing and it’s never more than one generation away from extinction.

It is not ours by way of inheritance; it must be fought for and defended constantly by each generation, for it comes only once to a people. And those in world history who have known freedom and then lost it have never known it again.”

38 July/August 2021

39 July/August 2021

Nevertheless, it is common knowledge that the 21st century’s preliminary decades are characterized by disruptions in the global information landscape, a challenge that this generation will have to deal with along with a multitude of other threats such as climate change.

But having Clarisse around and her colleagues gives us a sense of assurance that the future is in good hands. Graduating from Ateneo de Manila University in 2017 with a double degree in legal management and diplomacy and international relations, her undergraduate time at the Philippines’ top private school was well-balanced by her active participation in competitive softball. Her interest in international

security affairs eventually led her to do research as an analyst for Bower Group Asia and Stratbase Albert del Rosario Institute. She now works in the same role for a U.S. transnational software company that’s headquartered in Herndon, Virginia.

We are thankful to Clarisse for appearing on this issue especially as a way to inspire young people like her to introduce innovative solutions to the challenges we face, and find meaningful work in international security. Through young folks like Clarisse, we can take control of and usher in a future that is more just, stable, and prosperous. Read on to learn more from her and the work that she does.

40 July/August 2021

AW: What drew your interest in international security and military affairs? How did your journey in this field begin?

I have always been fascinated by international security and military affairs. I can probably connect that fascination to the fact that I have brothers who allowed me to play the same strategy video games growing up, and from the stories of my father who did service at one point. However, what really drew my appreciation for it began in the 41 July/August 2021

university when I took up an elective on Comparative Peace Processes.

The elective was focused on postconflict analysis to create mechanisms and resolutions based on the level of priority issues in order for the same violence and dispute not to happen again. Connecting this elective to the rest of my university days studying international politics and foreign relations, the interest had a life of its own really.

From there, it just clicked that this is the field I want to build a career

on. I began in the human rights part of the field working on gender violence and transitional justice. The interest grew more when I had a short stint working in the Philippine Navy

which exposed me to naval affairs.

Then, when I worked at Stratbase Albert Del Rosario Institute, it was just that golden opportunity to be able to expand the Institute’s defense and security program, and simultaneously increase my learning curve about this field.

AW: Why do you make time for sports and to live an active lifestyle?

The active lifestyle became inherent being an athlete from high school up until college. It was a part of me that I could not just discard and forget. It built my selfdiscipline in terms of stress and time management which has served me well in a lot of endeavors. It allows me to have the energy and concentration for the work that I have to do within the day. And, it keeps me youthful—from not getting winded running up the stairs to lessening my proneness to sickness.

A healthy body goes hand in hand with a healthy mind. The investment that I make for my body by eating healthy and keeping it in top shape has an equal impact on my mental well-being, which 42 July/August 2021

directly affects the way I engage and interact with people, work, learning, among others. There is some science and philosophy to it to back it up.

AW: What is your favorite book and why?

I don’t really have favorites in terms of books or written work. I take everything that I read for what it is and try to understand and apply it to current events. I would be more of a podcast person and my favorite is called “Philosophize This!” by Stephen West. I think understanding how individuals, societies, and states function is very crucial in knowing the how’s and why’s of the developments and issues in the field of international security.

AW: What do you see yourself doing five years from now?

I see myself building on my expertise and/or specialization in the business side of security and military affairs, whether in consulting or contracting.

By then, I would have finished taking up my master’s related to the field, gearing more on strategic studies, and continuing to contribute to policy and do research work in the same field.

43 July/August 2021

AW: Would you share some tips on how you stay on top of things in the middle of this pandemic?

This pandemic has exhausted and burned people out because of the forced shift to a work-from-home setup, the limited movement, and the lack of interaction. My best advice would be balancing life by identifying your priorities and the amount of effort and time to put into it. This does not just entail work but also personal, family, social, leisure and rest time. The amount could go as detailed as down to the hours and minutes, or as broad as days and weeks.

Another tip that goes with the first one would be to create healthy, productive habits that serve you.

For example, on a work day, my morning starts with working out, either reading articles/news/books or listening to podcasts/music, and having a good cup of coffee.

Then, I dedicate the rest of the morning for outputs that require more attention and details or demand more urgency. Afternoons are for work outputs that have farther deadlines or are more supplementary by nature.

When evil men plot, Good men must plan.

When evil men burn and bomb, Good men must build and bind.

When evil men shout ugly words of hatred, Good men must commit themselves to the glories of love.

Where evil men would seek to perpetuate an unjust status quo, Good men must seek to bring into being A real order of justice.

Martin Luther King, Jr.