Analyzing War Magazine | Mar/Apr 2021

ADVANCING KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMED UNDERSTANDING OF INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY

C ON T E N T S

7 15

INDO-PACIFIC GOVERNMENTS MARKETS AS TOOLS

21 A NEW DEMOCRATIC AWAKENING 29

MOVING FORWARD

39 LEADERSHIP CHANGE AND

RENEWAL IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

47 ADAPTING MEGATRENDS AND NARRATIVES TO THE

EVOLVING INTERNAL PHILIPPINE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

56

FEATURED SECURITY SCHOLAR:

STEPHEN NAGY

EDITORIAL BOARD AND STAFF PUBLISHER SWi Analytics, LLC EDITOR Mark Payumo MANAGING EDITORS Diana Alarde-Jordan Jacob Morrell Bryner Las Rio Pacit LAYOUT EDITOR Jayrald Vasquez WEB EDITOR Philip Carpentero CONTRIBUTING WRITERS Satoru Nagao, PhD Alvin Camba Hunter Marston Michael van Ginkel Lucio Blanco Pitlo III Gabriel Honrada ANALYZING WAR MAGAZINE www.analyzingwar.org SUBSCRIBE Inside the magazine or issuu LETTERS TO THE EDITOR editor@analyzingwar.org

Photos on these pages via Wikimedia Commons in the public domain in the U.S.: 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 63, and 64. All others via Shutterstock.

4 March – April 2021

SATORU NAGAO, PhD

is a non-resident fellow at the Hudson Institute, based in Tokyo Japan. His primary research area is U.S.-Japan-India security cooperation. Dr. Nagao holds numerous other research positions at the Institute for Future Engineering, Research Institute for Oriental Cultures in Gakushuin University, Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, Society of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies, Security and Strategy Research Institute for Japan, Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka, and at the Indian Military Review. He was also a first lieutenant of the Japan Ground Self Defense Forces (Japanese Army). Dr. Nagao has authored numerous books and articles on security issues, and contributes to the column, “Age of Japan-India ‘Alliance’” at Nikkei Business.

ALVIN CAMBA

is a PhD candidate in Sociology at Johns Hopkins University and an Assistant Professor in international studies at the Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. Alvin has been awarded multiple best graduate research paper awards by sections of the American Sociological Association, funded by foundations or research institutions (e.g. The Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation, The Smith Richardson Foundation, Southeast Asia Research Group), and contributed to think tank reports (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Center for Integrated and Private Enterprises).

His research on Chinese capital in Southeast Asia has been published in top development journals, such as Development and Change, Environmental Policy and Governance, and Extractive Industries and Society. He has presented his work at the World Bank, AidData, the US Embassy in Manila. He has been interviewed by The Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg, as well as consulted by Southeast Asian politicians and policy makers about China’s growing role in Southeast Asia.

HUNTER MARSTON

commenced his PhD at the Australian National University (ANU) in July 2019. His research is focused on great power competition in Southeast Asia. In particular, he explores how small states in Southeast Asia form hedging strategies to manage their relations with the United States and China, with particular focus on Singapore, Vietnam, and Myanmar. His main research interests include state-society relations and political change in Southeast Asia, U.S. foreign policy, and U.S.-China competition.

MICHAEL VAN GINKEL

conducts Indo-Pacific research for the Stable Seas program at One Earth Future (OEF) Foundation, a non-profit organization that focuses on international conflict and governance. He specializes in conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations.

LUCIO BLANCO PITLO III

is a Research Fellow at the Manila-based Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation, Inc. He has written for CSIS-AMTI, China-US Focus, Pacific Forum, South China Morning Post, and The Diplomat among others. He is graduating from the Master of Arts degree program in international affairs at the American University School of International Service in Washington, D.C. this spring of 2021. Lucio holds a prior Master of Law (LLM) degree from Peking University and took graduate courses in Asian Studies from the University of the Philippines.

GABRIEL HONRADA

is an international relations graduate student at the People’s Friendship University of Russia under the Russian government scholarship. His research focuses on Indo-Pacific military affairs and Russia in the Indo-Pacific. Gabriel writes for Analyzing War as part of his internship at SWi Analytics.

5 March – April 2021

EDITOR’S NOTE The Indo-Pacific region has a timeline to pull through from 2019 to 2022: power transitions. Unlike mainstream perceptions, however, students of war understand that this does not merely involve change in or continuation of national leadership. This may also usher in a radical shift in relations that span the prevailing hierarchical distribution of power in the international order.1 For instance, a gradual strengthening of rudimentary alliances in the region that were originally meant for humanitarian assistance during natural disasters or pandemic response was seen since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012.

Widely regarded as a realist leader, he defied the tradition of presenting a potential successor during the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 19th National Congress on October 2017, and effectively became leader for life after the CCP removed his two-term limit as President, Secretary General of the Party, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission.2 This was not lost to the four Indo-Pacific democracies—Australia, Japan, India, and the United States—that by November 2017, they met on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summits in Manila and convened around the theme of a “free and open IndoPacific” following a ten-year hiatus.3 They came to be known as the Quad that by 2021, the proposition for a Quad Plus is no longer anything new.

In between, and barely a year into his presidency, is Donald Trump’s “fire and fury” and “rocket man” rhetoric toward Kim Jong Un, which was formally communicated as the end of the era of strategic patience on North Korea. It was a clear departure from the Obama administration’s foreign policy orientation vis-a-vis Pyongyang and, later, Tehran.4 Hawaii would be put on edge for several weeks as a result, which has not heard the wail of nuclear bomb warning sirens for many decades until 2017.5 Nonetheless, “America is Back,” according to Joe Biden and it remains to be seen how he will deliver in terms of building on or reversing some of the policy choices that Trump made while in power.

Meanwhile, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte is 1 2 3 4 5

widely credited for shaking up the status quo along the First Island Chain, and demonstrated that a weak nation with weak institutions can be turned into a vassal state to the second largest economy in the world virtually overnight.

But while realities in the twenty-first century could certainly draw lessons from Thucydides and Abramo Fimo Kenneth Organski, Alvin Camba warns that a singular focus on heads of state is simplistic and misses opportunities that looking at a complete picture offers. This ties in with Hunter Marston’s nuanced examination of how democracy is currently held hostage

by Myanmar’s Tatmadaw, and that freedom may well have a chance over the long-term at the hands of an emerging generation of junior military officers.

But what about megatrends, as highlighted by Gabriel Honrada, and the way world leaders behave in relation to their domestic and foreign policies that utilize military power as an instrument of policy? It is interestingly rare for anyone to highlight the fact that a quantified anticipation of battle deaths—both civilians and combatants—is part of any military planning that follows the collapse of peacetime diplomacy.

This issue and, more broadly, Analyzing War are therefore meant to balance the overly saturated world of geopolitics by mainstreaming strategic studies during a highly competitive era. War is never real until it happens, and we’ve seen it and it’s ugly. The theme for this issue is precisely an encouragement on how to navigate shifts in power relations and transitions without having to resort to conflict. Strategic communities across the Indo-Pacific have a role to play, which is to allow the sword and the pen to come together in order to give way for cooler heads to prevail especially in a stressful pandemic. But if that still fails, the free world owes it to itself to anticipate on how to emerge victorious and maintain a future that is stable, rules-based, and ethically prosperous.

– Mark Payumo, Editor

Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, “The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation,” in Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Routledge, 2011): 171-194, https://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~fczagare/PSC%20346/Kugler%20and%20Organski.pdf.

“China’s Xi allowed to remain ‘president for life’ as term limits removed,” BBC, March 11, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-43361276.

Ankit Panda, “US, Japan, India, and Australia Hold Working-Level Quadrilateral Meeting on Regional Cooperation,” The Diplomat, last updated November 13, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/us-japan-india-and-australia-hold-working-level-quadrilateral-meeting-on- regional-cooperation/ Kevin Liptak and Jeremy Diamond, “Trump says ‘era of strategic patience is over’ for North Korea,” CNN, last updated November 6, 2017, https://www.cnn. com/2017/11/06/politics/president-donald-trump-north-korea-japan.

Jaweed Kaleem, “As North Korean threat grows, Hawaii prepares for nuclear attack,” Los Angeles Times, https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-hawaii-nuke2017-story.html.

6 March – April 2021

INDO-PACIFIC GOVERNMENTS SHAPING CHINA POLICY DURING POLITICAL TRANSITIONS Satoru Nagao, PhD

T

ension in the Indo-Pacific has risen as China’s maritime expansion escalated in the region. In 2020, China exploited the COVID-19

pandemic situation and increased its military activities. In the East China

Sea, Beijing has increased its military and paramilitary activities around the

Senkaku Islands of Japan and pursued Japanese fishing boats inside of Japan’s territorial sea. The Chinese air force has also been expanding its activities. In

2019-2020, the number of scrambles against Chinese aircrafts rose to 675.1 In

Taiwan, a Chinese Coast Guard ship shot in the air and rammed a Taiwan Coast

Guard ship from the rear. Chinese fighter jets have repeatedly entered Taiwan’s air space. As for Hong Kong, China passed a national security law to crack down on the democratic movement supported by most of the residents.

7 March – April 2021

In the South China Sea, China has

Malaysia’s exclusive economic zones

court in 2016 by deploying both military

China dispatched an aircraft carrier battle

ignored the verdict of an international

and paramilitary forces and constructing seven artificial islands with three

runways. Despite claiming that these

artificial islands have no military purpose China has, in fact, deployed missiles and military planes on them while sinking a

Vietnamese fishing boat in April 2020. On the disputed islands that it built, Beijing recently established new districts and

two research facilities in an attempt to

legitimize its own claim while fortifying them through the deployment of new military aircraft that include airborne

early warning and control aircraft and electronic warfare aircraft. A Chinese

survey vessel escorted by coast guard ships also entered Vietnam’s and

to further military research. Moreover, group around Japan, Taiwan, and the

South China Sea to hold exercises and intimidate the countries in the region.

In yet another incident, a Chinese fleet dispatched to an area about 380 miles west of Guam targeted a U.S. military plane with a laser in international

airspace.2 In the Indian Ocean, China

sent twelve drones to collect information that can be used for Beijing’s submarine activities. In the Indochina border area,

5,000 Chinese troops entered the Indian side and clashed with Indian forces. At least 20 Indian soldiers sacrificed their lives. After that, China continued to

redeploy fighter jets and missiles from other areas of China.

8 March – April 2021

Given these demonstrations of

the flouting of international law. On

China, it is logical to ask how to deal with

asserting historical rights to an island

provocative behavior on the part of

them. It helps to examine the motivation behind in order to contextualize China’s actions and indicate how Japan, India, and Australia should respond to these provocations.

THREE FEATURES OF CHINA’S TERRITORIAL EXPANSION China’s recent territorial expansion

has three features. The first involves

Activists of Rashtriya Bajrang Dal burn posters of Chinese President Xi Jinping along with his country’s flag during a protest in Guwahati.

9 March – April 2021

the Senkaku Island of Japan, China is

it has not claimed before 1971. In the

South China Sea, China has expanded its claim and ignored the verdict of an international court. In the case of the India-China border, where 20 Indian

soldiers sacrificed their lives in a clash with China this year, the Tibetan exile government stated that these areas belong to India.3 China has ignored

current international law and expanded its territorial claim in all three areas.

The second feature of China’s territorial

the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,

situation whenever it finds a “power

expenditure by 85 percent, compared

expansion is timing. It exploits the

vacuum.” For example, China occupied half of the Paracel Islands just after France withdrew in the 1950s, and

expanded its presence to all of the

Paracel Islands after the U.S. withdrew

from 2010-19 China increased its military with India’s 37 percent and Japan’s 2

percent. There is a strong possibility that China is doing so because it believes

there is a power vacuum in these areas.

from South Vietnam in the 1970s. China

A third feature of China’s territorial

Islands after the Soviet Union decreased

outsiders. In issues surrounding the East

occupied six features of the Spratly

its military presence in Vietnam in the

1980s. Shortly after, Beijing laid claim to

Mischief Reef after U.S. troops withdrew from the Philippines in the 1990s.

Recently, China has tried to expand its territorial claims not only in the South

China Sea, but also in the East China Sea

and the India-China border. According to

expansion is its insistence on excluding

China Sea, the South China Sea, and the India-China border, China has blamed

the involvement of non-regional powers as contributing to the problem. China

wants to solve these territorial issues on

a bilateral basis without the involvement of the U.S. or of the international community.

Paracel Islands

10 March – April 2021

The USS Antietam and the USS Blue Ridge sail with South Korean, Japanese and Australian navy ships in the Philippine Sea during Pacific Vanguard 2019, an exercise that focuses on improving capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.

THREE POLICIES TOWARD CHINA What should Japan, India, and Australia do in dealing with China? In short, they should do the opposite of what China wants. First, if China ignores current

international law, other countries should uphold the law strongly and refuse China’s new territorial claims. For

example, the U.S. and Australia have

already refused China’s territorial claim

in the South China Sea. Second, Japan,

India, and Australia need to fill the power 11 March – April 2021

vacuum militarily by increasing their

military expenditures. Infrastructure cooperation to build strategic road

projects is also useful while supporting countries, including Vietnam,

Philippines, and Taiwan that face

Chinese intimidation.4 Third, Japan,

India, and Australia should continue to enhance security cooperation with the U.S. and other like-minded countries.

But how should Japan, India, and

Australia cooperate with the United States?

The Indian navy destroyer INS Kolkata steams alongside the guided-missile destroyer USS Sterett (DDG 104) during Malabar 2020.

Currently, the U.S. is requesting

and stand-off weapons. India is importing

Australia both militarily and economically.

middle transport planes, heavy transport

cooperation from Japan, India, and

Militarily, the U.S. wants these partner countries to share the security burden by increasing their defense budgets, participating in military activities

and importing American weapons.

Economically, the U.S. is requesting that Japan, India, and Australia adopt the same tough policies against China.

airlift equipment such as heavy and

helicopters, and air-liftable howitzers

from the U.S. in order to establish air-

mobile offensive capability against China.

Australia also recently published its plan

to possess long-range strike capabilities.5 These offensive capabilities will give

these countries more flexible choices when they need to deal with China.

Japan, India, and Australia should

Economic requests are more complicated

than think of it as a burden. Recently,

rated trading partner for Japan, India,

consider this as an opportunity rather Japan decided to purchase limited

offensive capabilities, including small

aircraft carriers, F-35 stealth fighter jets,

because China is the first or second-

and Australia. However, if Japan, India, and Australia depend too heavily on trade with China, the economies of

12 March – April 2021

these countries will be like passengers

out of China in April 2020.7 India

or risk diversifying is necessary. Indeed,

government approval on foreign direct

of a sinking ship. Therefore, decoupling Japan has already begun to do so.

Because Japan has relocated its factories from China to Southeast Asia and South Asia, the number of Japanese citizens

adopted a new rule that requires prior

investment from the countries that share a land border with it in order to deter opportunistic acquisitions.8

living in China has decreased from

The security situation will demand that

the same time, the number of Japanese

changes. This will also give them

150,399 in 2012 to 120,076 in 2018. At living in the U.S. has increased from

410,973 in 2012 to 446,925 in 2018.6 In

addition, Japan earmarked $2.2 billion of its record economic stimulus package to

help local manufacturers shift production

these three countries make drastic an opportunity to cooperate more

deeply with the U.S. and to form a new partnership. Now is the time for the

Quad (US-Japan-India-Australia) to do so.

Japanese Vice Adm. Hideki Yuasa and Capt. Takuro Koroki are pictured with their delegation and Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) leadership in front of the electromagnetic railgun prototype launcher.

13 March – April 2021

Then Vice President Joe Biden participates in a US-Australia Business Roundtable discussion at the Opera House as part of a three-day visit to Australia in July 18, 2016.

NOTES 1

Brad Lendon and Yoko Wakatsuki, “Japan’s airforce faces a ‘relentless’ burden, imposed by China,” CNN, last updated July 29, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/28/asia/japan-china-fighter-jet-scrambles-intl-hnk-dst/index.html.

2

Megan Eckstein, “Chinese Destroyer Lases U.S. Navy P-8A Plan Operating Near Guam,” USNI News, last updated February 27, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/02/27/chinese-destroyer-lases-u-s-navy-p-8a-plane-operating-near-guam.

3

Central Tibetan Administration, “‘Ladakh belongs to India’: Tibet sides with India, exposes China’s expansionist tactics”, June 5, 2020,

https://tibet.net/ladakh-belongs-to-india-tibet-sides-with-india-exposes-chinas-expansionist-tactics/.

4

Satoru Nagao, “The Quad must strengthen and support Taiwan,” Sunday Guardian Live, August 2, 2020,

https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/quad-must-strengthen-support-taiwan?fbclid=IwAR3d-coKESelX3xD9HNH1iwiD2BUQyHRI TJFcHquVEN36mWRNrn1WnIEBI0#.XybByXzvNjc.facebook.

5

Prime Minister of Australia, “Long Range Strike Capabilities To Maintain Regional Security,” July 1, 2020, https://www.pm.gov.au/ media/long-range-strike-capabilities-maintain-regional-security.

6

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Annual Report of Statistics on Japanese Nationals Overseas,” 2019 (data is based on the number on October 1, 2018), https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/toko/page22_000043.html.

7

Isabel Reynolds and Emi Urabe, “Japan to Fund Firms to Shift Production Out of China,” Bloomberg, April 8, 2020,

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-08/japan-to-fund-firms-to-shift-production-out-of-china.

8

Aftab Ahmed and Aditya Kalra, “Exclusive: India foreign investment rules aimed at China to include Hong Kong—sources,” Reuters, April 20, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-india-investments/exclusive-india-foreign-investment-rules-aimed-atchina-to-include-hong-kong-sources-idUSKBN2221H3.

14 March – April 2021

MARKETS AS TOOLS POWER TRANSITIONS AND ECONOMIC ELITES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC Alvin Camba

T

he question of power transition in the Indo-Pacific generally refers to the reelection of leaders. Specifically, the 2019 reelection of India’s Narendra Modi and Indonesia’s Joko “Jokowi” Widodo (2014-) resulted in several projections about the continuity of policies by both leaders in the 2021. Modi has been an avid opponent of China in particular issues, such as the border disputes, 1 the “debt” train in South Asia, and investment disputes. In contrast, Widodo has been able to strategically bargain with China, 2 particularly in receiving several investments favorable to Indonesia in key sectors. Indonesia has also been able to push back against China’s intrusion to the Natuna Islands, a maritime domain in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Elsewhere in the region, surveys in the Philippines put Sara Duterte as the victor of the 2022 elections, presumably continuing her father’s contentious legacy and dalliance with the Chinese leadership. The Thai and Burmese military have an iron grip over their countries, 3 constraining civil rule and any expansion of democratic norms in Southeast Asia. 4

15 March – April 2021

These trends and patterns of leadership

Singapore or Malaysia. These actors

focusing on the actual leader—

with political elites in order to pursue

focus on the leader in power. However,

presidents, prime ministers, military chief in a junta—in power under-examines the role that elites and political coalitions play in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed,

leaders are not simply actors that

impose a veto to override preexisting

preferences. Rather, leaders consolidate and negotiate existing preferences by multiple players in order to arrive at a

who own assets will need to negotiate stance. Leaders, particularly presidents, leaders, or military junta generals, need economic elites to stimulate growth,

generate employment, and contribute

revenues to the state.5 Economic elites

need the political leaders to protect their assets from expropriation and maintain a general level of business stability.6

clear position. Following this premise,

This interdependence between political

power transition partly comes from the

analysis that exclusively focuses on

the future of the Indo-Pacific and the

influence of economic elites, particularly oligarchs in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, political actors with

significant investments in different

sectors in Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, or government-led enterprises in

and economic elites means that an

the leaders without attending to the changing character of the economic

elites of the country, if any, is incomplete.

Here, I discuss two underlying trends in the character of economic elites

in several Indo-Pacific states and the

Makati City, the financial hub of the Philippines.

16 March – April 2021

Vale nickel plant, in Sorowako, South Sulawesi, Indonesia.

potential implications that they might have on the region.

First is that Chinese foreign direct

investments (FDI) and construction

contracts have increased across the IndoPacific. These capital inflows do not just mean the expansion of China’s assets

over host countries, bargaining power

over states, and hold over economies,

but also the rapidly expansion of social

relationships between Chinese state and private firms owned by economic elites in host countries. These social ties and

bonds between the Chinese actors and host country economic elites will shape

the engagement of political elites in the 17 March – April 2021

Indo-Pacific. For instance, the funders of the Indonesian political elites, the

Indonesian oligarchs, have stable and firm partnerships with Chinese firms in nickel

processing,7 coal-fired power plants,8 and palm oil.9 Though these same elites have sought multiple partnerships across East

Asia, Western Europe, and North America,

the increasing importance of Chinese firms as investors and the Chinese population

as a market ties the profitability of these

oligarchs to China. While we can observe

some pushback by Jokowi on the Natuna

Islands conflict,10 the question of whether or not he or any future Indonesian leader could take China seriously on other issue remains a question.

Norochcholai Coal Plant of Sri lanka.

The same goes for many other Indo-

generates increasing interdependence,

depend on the contribution of economic

who could constrain political action

Pacific leaders whose political fates

elites to the country. The increasing importance of China as a source of

particularly from the economic elites, against China.

tourist or export market for fruits have

Second, the wave of authoritarianism

Asian economic elites.11 Political elites

The coup in Myanmar, the military

constrained the choices of Southeast

will then follow suit due to the need to earn campaign contributions and the general need for money to circulate in the economy. This can be seen in

multiple fronts, such as the expansion of manufacturing in Malaysia and

Thailand,12 telecommunications in the Philippines,13 an economic corridor in Pakistan,14 infrastructure in Sri Lanka, and construction projects in Nepal.15

The expansion of Chinese capital inflows

and populism is increasingly alarming. crackdowns in Thailand, the police

violence in the Philippines, the fascism in India, and many other instances paint a gloomy picture for democratic politics.

China’s role in the region complicates these trends. Though China does not

explicitly support authoritarian states,

China has the tendency to “respect” the politics of the host country, pursuing non-interference across many fronts.

While Western states and Japan could 18 March – April 2021

use several levers to influence the

on the oligarchs in these businesses.

sheer strength of the Chinese market

these products, which could limit the

political direction of those countries, the and potential for firm investments could shield these states from such actions.

The economic elites of these countries

could thus resist the impact of a global response. For instance, Philippine political elites are thinking about

reimposing death penalty on Filipinos,16 which may take away several trade

However, China could be a market for influence of Western markets on host

country economic elites. Political elites will have little reason to rethink their

preferences for the death penalty, other inhumane policies, and anti-democratic initiatives if economic elites do not convince them.

benefits such as the GSP+,17 a series

Overall, political transitions in the Indo-

products exported to the EU. Imposing

the U.S. rules-based order or greater

of preferential tariffs and quotas for the death penalty thus creates an

economic cost on Filipinos, particularly Students of Jadavpur University with Aishee Ghosh giving a call to condemn and resist fasicsm of ABVP and BJP in the university.

19 March – April 2021

Pacific, whether it is the expansion of

Chinese influence, will depend on the role of economic elites whose market

interests prevail over them above all

authoritarianism in the region. Policies

to open the market opportunities for

change, human rights, and gender

else. The way forward for the West is these elites through a series of incentives and policies. For example, the West

could increase incentives for firms to

reinvest in South and Southeast Asian states that follow certain democratic

norms and environmental standards. This could increase the reasons for economic elites to coordinate with their political counterparts in limiting the spread of

that increase participation in climate

equality will also be helpful. The West

ought to dispense with their hypocrisy

when dealing with authoritarian states, particularly in Saudi Arabia and other

states, and pursue a path of supporting

democratically-oriented states. Economic elites are the most important influences

to the political leaders of host countries in the Indo-Pacific.

NOTES 1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Salvatore Babones, “What the West Needs From Modi,” Foreign Policy, September 11, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/11/ india-modi-china-quad-military-alliance/.

Angela Tritto and Alvin Camba, “The Belt and Road: The Good, the Bad, and the Mixed,” The Diplomat, April 15, 2019, https:// thediplomat.com/2019/04/the-belt-and-road-the-good-the-bad-and-the-mixed/.

CNN Philippines, “Sara Duterte leads May 2022 presidential, VP elections survey,” February 23, 2021, https://www.cnnphilippines.com/ news/2021/2/23/sara-duterte-leads-octa-presidential-vice-president-survey.html.

See Doug Bandow, “Thailand’s Military Is Getting Ready for Another Crackdown,” Foreign Policy, December 23, 2020, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/03/thailand-military-crackdown-protests-biden/ and Brie Stimson, “Burma military crackdown on anti-coup protests leaves at least 2 dead,” Fox News, February 28, 2020, https://www.foxnews.com/world/burma-military-crackdown-on-anticoup-protests-leaves-at-least-2-dead.

Fred Block, “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State,” Socialist Revolution 33 (May-June 1977): 6-28, https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/SOC621/RulingClass.pdf.

Michael Albertus and Victor Gay, “Unlikely Democrats: Economic Elite Uncertainty under Dictatorship and Support for Democratization,” American Journal of Political Science Vol. 61, Issue 3 (2016): 624-641.

See website for Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park, https://imip.co.id/.

Eric Sasono, “Sexy killers,” Inside Indonesia, October to December 2020, https://www.insideindonesia.org/sexy-killers.

Morse, I., “The Natural Resource Oligarchy Funding Indonesia’s Election,” The Diplomat, April 11, 2019, https://thediplomat. com/2019/04/the-natural-resource-oligarchy-funding-indonesias-election/.

Yulisman, L., “Jokowi visits Natuna Islands as stand-off with China continues,” The Strait Times, January 9, 2020, https://www. straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/jokowi-visits-natuna-islands-as-stand-off-with-china-continues.

See Globe, August 29, 2014, https://southeastasiaglobe.com/chinese-tourists-south-east-asia-focus-asean/ and Kopf, D., “ASEAN is now a bigger trading partner for China than the US,” Quartz, May 27, 2020, https://qz.com/1861047/asean-is-now-a-bigger-tradingpartner-for-china-than-the-us/.

See websites for Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park, https://www.mckip.com.my/ and Holley, https://www.holley.cn/en/ industry_119.html.

Morales, N. & Lema, K., “Philippines’ new China-led telecom firm surges after Duterte’s ‘chilling’ threat,” Reuters, July 27, 2020, https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-telecoms/philippines-new-china-led-telecom-firm-surges-after-dutertes-chilling-threatidUSKCN24T08D. See website for China Pakistan Economic Corridor, cpec.gov.pk.

Wadlow, T., “China agrees to finance eight major infrastructure projects in Nepal,” Construction, https://www.constructionglobal.com/ epc/china-agrees-to-finance-eight-major-infrastructure-projects-in-nepal.

Conde, Carlos, “Death Penalty Danger in the Philippines,” Human Rights Watch, August 5, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/ news/2020/08/05/death-penalty-danger-philippines#.

Cruz, R. “Reviving death penalty to hurt Philippines-EU trade,” ABS-CBN News, February 13, 2017. https://news.abs-cbn.com/ news/02/13/17/reviving-death-penalty-to-hurt-philippines-eu-trade.

20 March – April 2021

A New Democratic Awakening MYANMAR MILITARY MAY HAVE UNDERESTIMATED THE PEOPLE’S RESOLVE

M

Hunter Marston yanmar’s military coup in early February surprised international observers. Yet,

in retrospect there were clear warning

signs given the deterioration of relations between

Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) and the military after the former’s

resounding electoral victory in November. 1 What

comes next depends on the compounded effect of several underlying trendlines.

21 March – April 2021

The first factor is the internal cohesion of the new military regime, or State Administrative Council (SAC). The

were rumors of high-level resignations,

and speculation of possible defections.3

Tatmadaw, as the military is known in

There is reason to believe significant

unanimity despite massive inequality and

Aung San Suu Kyi. After the Union

Burmese, has a long track record of

corruption and a litany of gross human

rights abuses.2 The success of the coup illustrates the Tatmadaw’s ability to

enforce loyalty within its hierarchy, but it

is not clear that Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing enjoys widespread support in the senior ranks. In February, there

portions of the junior officers support Election Commission moved polling stations off military bases, the NLD

received a sizeable bump in support from townships and regions where active-duty military made up the majority of the population.4

22 March – April 2021

Building of the new parliament of Myanmar is nowadays the centre of country’s government & political power.

It is therefore likely that at least some

Among those appointed are many

with the actions taken by the top brass.

Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)

of the junior officer class do not agree

Lack of support and waning morale could jeopardize the Commander-in-Chief’s

ability to hold onto power. However, the

military is famously inscrutable. Min Aung Hlaing has promised to hold “free and fair elections” before returning power

to the duly elected party after one year.5 His formation of a new cabinet offers clues into the Tatmadaw’s desire to

garner a degree of popular legitimacy.

23 March – April 2021

former officials from the previous Union

government, which guided the country’s democratic transition from military rule before the NLD’s election in 2015, as well as representatives from several

independent political parties and even

ethnic minority parties.6 The junta, calling itself the State Administrative Council (SAC), vowed to hold “free and fair

elections” after one year, perhaps in an attempt to co-opt dissent.7

The second factor is the foreign policy

In Washington, the Biden administration

ostracized by the West and close to

to cut foreign assistance to the regime,

crisis triggered by the coup. Long

Russia and China strategically (both are

major arms exporters to Myanmar), the military must reassess its sources of

international support and opposition.

It will likely find itself relatively isolated by an international community that

had patiently supported Myanmar’s’ democratization.

A number of western governments have

voiced concern over the coup and called on the Tatmadaw to restore democracy.

swiftly condemned the coup and moved freezing $1 billion of the Tatmadaw’s

assets held in the United States.8 The

United States holds little leverage over the generals and has few channels

of communication. Biden reportedly

directed General Mark Milley, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to contact Min Aung

Hlaing – to no avail.9 The U.S. Treasury Department has expanded targeted sanctions against the military, but

economic coercion has failed to compel change in the past.

President Joe Biden, joined

by Vice President Kamala Harris, delivers remarks on the Administration’s response to the military coup in Myanmar.

24 March – April 2021

Protesters demanding Aung San Suu Kyi’s release at Kasumigaseki, Tokyo after the February 2021 Myanmar coup.

Asian democracies like India and Japan

speculation that the Chinese may

on the junta to reverse course.10 Even

military’s move—Foreign Minister

have expressed concern and called

Singapore, Myanmar’s largest foreign investor, has halted major economic

cooperation.11 Despite calls within the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations for action, it is apparent that regional

partners will not intervene.12 The coup

represents a staggering step backward for democracy in the region, which

has grown increasingly authoritarian in recent years. The Tatmadaw will likely draw support from Thailand and may seek to mimic its neighbor’s militarydrafted constitution.13

Beijing also seemed to have been

caught off guard by the coup. Despite 25 March – April 2021

have had advance notice of the

Wang Yi visited Naypyidaw just weeks before the coup in January, meeting with Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing—official Chinese statements

indicate Beijing may not be pleased with the result.14 Foreign Ministry

spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated, “We hope that all sides in Myanmar can appropriately handle their

differences under the constitution

and legal framework and safeguard

political and social stability.”15 A rather substantive declaration by the United Nations Security Council, which both

Beijing and Moscow approved, seems to support this contention.16

Fear of overreliance on China prompted

Tatmadaw had overcome this mistrust to

democratization and recalibration of its

coup. During Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s

Myanmar in 2010 to pursue partial

ties with the West, particularly the United States.17 China is Myanmar’s largest trade partner and has a number of strategic interests in the country, including oil

and gas pipelines as well as a strategic port that give it access to the Indian

Ocean.18 The Tatmadaw was suspicious of Aung San Suu Kyi’s courtship of

Chinese investment and wary of Beijing’s political influence over Myanmar’s peace process.19 Yet, there were signs the

rebuild ties with Beijing in advance of the meeting with Min Aung Hlaing in January, Beijing pledged to “continue to back

Myanmar in safeguarding its sovereignty, national dignity and legitimate rights and interests.”20 Now Myanmar may

be forced back into Beijing’s orbit as

junior partner, but it will chafe under the

asymmetry in the relationship. Ultimately, Naypyidaw’s pariah status weakens its

preference for an independent foreign policy.21

26 March – April 2021

The third factor, domestic resistance

the generals are keenly aware that

exposed a new generation of youth

interconnectivity may restrain the

to the military within Myanmar, has

activists who came of age during a more free and open society. This generation is far more digitally connected than their parents and adept at online

engagement and social media, which was nonexistent during previous

nationwide protests in 1988. Their

digital activism has allowed them to

connect to the global community on Twitter, Facebook, and other social

media. Despite the regime’s internet shutdowns, both the protesters and

27 March – April 2021

the world is watching this time. This generals’ worst impulses and could

empower dissenters within its ranks.

Moreover, the new generation of activists is convinced there is no

going back to the days of dictatorship that their parents lived through. Any

resolution to the current crisis depends

on the interaction of these three factors: whether the regime can maintain internal cohesion; the impact of

international isolation; and the success of Myanmar’s democracy movement.

NOTES 1

2 3 4 5

6 7

8

9 10

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

For preliminary analysis of those warning signs and the pretext for the military coup, see Lee Jones, “Preliminary thoughts on the Myanmar ‘coup,’” Medium, February 2, 2021, https://medium.com/@drleejones/preliminary-thoughts-on-the-myanmar-coup7cc3ff291ad2. Also see Hunter Marston, “Behind the coup: what prompted Tatmadaw’s grab for power?,” New Mandala, February 12, 2021, https://www.newmandala.org/behind-the-coup-what-prompted-tatmadaws-grab-for-power/.

David Scott Mathieson, “Myanmar’s Army of Darkness,” The Nation, February 12, 2021, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/ myanmar-burma-coup-rohingya/.

David Scott Mathieson, “The Story Behind the Myanmar Coup,” New York Times, February 2, 2021, https://www.nytimes. com/2021/02/02/opinion/myanmar-coup.html.

Tint Zaw Tun, “NLD receives more votes in military constituency of Hmawbi,” Myanmar Times, November 12, 2020, https://www. mmtimes.com/news/nld-receives-more-votes-military-constituency-hmawbi.html.

See The Myanmar Times, “Myanmar military announces new State Administrative Council,” The Myanmar Times, February 2, 2021, https://www.mmtimes.com/news/myanmar-military-announces-new-state-administrative-council.html; and May Wong (@ MayWongCNA), Twitter, February 1, 2021, https://twitter.com/MayWongCNA/status/1356063420005539861.

The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar Military Appoints Ex-Generals, USDP Members to New Govt,” The Irrawaddy, February 2, 2021, https:// www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-military-appoints-ex-generals-usdp-members-new-govt.html.

See The Myanmar Times, “Myanmar military announces new State Administrative Council,” The Myanmar Times, February 2, 2021, https://www.mmtimes.com/news/myanmar-military-announces-new-state-administrative-council.html; and May Wong (@ MayWongCNA), Twitter, February 1, 2021, https://twitter.com/MayWongCNA/status/1356063420005539861.

White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the Administration’s Response to the Coup in Burma,” February 10, 2021, https://www. whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/10/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-administrations-response-to-thecoup-in-burma/.

Nahal Toosi and Lara Seligman, “Biden administration officially calls Myanmar coup a ‘coup’,” Politico, February 2, 2021, https://www. politico.com/news/2021/02/02/biden-administration-myanmar-coup-465001.

TNN, “We believe rule of law and democratic process must be upheld, says India on Myanmar coup,” Times of India, February 2, 2021, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/we-believe-rule-of-law-and-democratic-process-must-be-upheld-says-india-on-myanmarcoup/articleshow/80640644.cms; Reuters, “G7 condemns Myanmar coup as thousands protest in Tokyo,” The Japan Times, February 3, 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/02/03/national/myanmar-unrest-coup-japan/.

John Geddie, “Singapore magnate to axe army-linked Myanmar tobacco investment,” Reuters, February 9, 2021, https://www.reuters. com/article/us-myanmar-politics-singapore-idUSKBN2A90BU. See Reuters, “Indonesia, Malaysia seeking Asean meeting on Myanmar after coup,” Bangkok Post, February 5, 2021, https://www. bangkokpost.com/world/2063259/indonesia-malaysia-seeking-asean-meeting-on-myanmar-after-coup.

For more on parallels to the Thai model, see Zachary Abuza, “The Thai Playbook for Myanmar’s Coup Leaders,” The Diplomat, February 9, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/the-thai-playbook-for-myanmars-coup-leaders/.

See Enze Han, “China does not like the coup in Myanmar,” East Asia Forum, February 6, 2021, https://www.eastasiaforum. org/2021/02/06/china-does-not-like-the-coup-in-myanmar/.

Xinhua, “China hopes all sides in Myanmar can appropriately settle differences,” Xinhua, February 1, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2021-02/01/c_139713247.htm.

See “Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Myanmar,” Relief Web, February 4, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/ security-council-press-statement-situation-myanmar.

See for instance Maung Aung Myoe, “Myanmar’s China Policy since 2011: Determinants and Directions,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 34, no. 2 (August 2015): 21-54.

Hunter Marston, “Has the US Lost Myanmar to China?,” The Diplomat, January 20, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/has-theus-lost-myanmar-to-china/.

See Hunter Marston, “China’s Dangerous Double Game in Myanmar,” 9DashLine, May 20, 2020, https://www.9dashline.com/article/ chinas-dangerous-double-game-in-myanmar.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Meets with Myanmar’s Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services Min Aung Hlaing,” January 12, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1846203.shtml.

For more on Myanmar’s history of neutralism, see Andrea Passeri, “’A tender gourd among the cactus’. Making sense of Myanmar’s alignment policies through the lens of strategic culture,” The Pacific Review 33, no. 6 (May 2019): 931-957.

28 March – April 2021

Moving Forward JAPAN’S MARITIME POLICY TRAJECTORY IN THE PHILIPPINES Michael van Ginkle

U.S. Marine, Philippine Marine and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members assault amphibious vehicles line up along the shore following an amphibious exercise as part of KAMANDAG 3.

O

n August 8, 2020, Yoshida Suga replaced Shinzo Abe, the longest serving prime minister in Japanese history, as the country’s new leader. The shift in leadership could impact Japan’s maritime security policies in the Philippines. Japan has built a strong bilateral relationship with the Philippines over the past decade as an investor, export destination, and provider of development assistance. Japan’s consistent engagement has proven especially useful in bolstering ongoing efforts to improve the country’s maritime security. Patterns in Japan’s approach to Southeast Asian security since Suga’s ascension combined with Japan’s history of supporting Philippine maritime security initiatives are indicative of Japan’s intentions to further invest in the Philippine security architecture under its new leadership.

29 March – April 2021

INDICATIONS OF POLICY TRAJECTORY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

overseas, mainly by ship.1 Likewise, over

Asia in the months following his election

Japan to actively engage in outreach and

Suga’s approach to security in Southeast provides a glimpse into his plans for

future engagement in the Philippines.

As Japan is a maritime nation, ensuring the security of its Sea Lanes of

Communication (SLOC) features strongly into Japan’s foreign policy decisions.

Japan’s lack of domestic energy sources means the country places a heavy

dependency on its SLOC. Over 97

percent of all crude oil, coal, and natural gas used in Japan is imported from

99 percent of their exported goods are

shipped through the maritime domain.2 The reliance on SLOC has encouraged capacity building projects in maritime

nations adjacent to its shipping routes, including in the Bay of Bengal littoral

and, more pertinently, Southeast Asia.3

By improving maritime security in these regions, Japan helps protect its SLOC

from disruption by non-traditional actors like pirates, terrorists, and insurgents, as well as contributing to its broader security interests in the region.

The BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150) Frigate of the Philippine Navy (PN) as seen from a Ship of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) at the 2020 Rim of the Pacific Exercise.

30 March – April 2021

With the importance of Southeast Asian

its interest in strengthening the region’s

made diplomatic overtures to continue

plans to export destroyers to Indonesia.7

maritime security in mind, Suga has improving security arrangements in Southeast Asia, which includes

building on the strategic partnerships initiated with Indonesia in 2006 and

Vietnam in 2014.4 Suga has set several important security deals into motion

maritime security in new ways through The deal builds on Japan’s history of

bilateral maritime security arrangements with Indonesia, which culminated in the creation of a Maritime Forum between the two countries in 2016.8

by brokering agreements around the

Japan’s policy trajectory in Southeast

and technology. The export of security

a regional strategy consistent with

export of Japanese security equipment equipment and technology to Vietnam is only the second deal brokered by

Japan since lifting the export ban on security equipment and technology

in 2014.5 Similar talks for exports to

Indonesia and Thailand are ongoing.6

Suga’s government has demonstrated 31 March – April 2021

Asia since Suga’s election points to the approaches of previous prime

ministers. While Suga’s policies have so far shown a predilection for continuity,

understanding Japan’s past engagement in the Philippines is necessary to predict how Japan will approach the bilateral relationship in the future.

JAPAN IN THE PHILIPPINES

Mindoro-Makassar route.10 As Japan

security initiatives in the past has

to a lesser extent liquefied natural

Japan’s support for Philipine maritime

created a strong foundation for further engagement. As described in Violence at Sea: How Terrorist, Insurgents, and

Other Extremists Exploit the Maritime Domain, insurgency groups based in

the Southern Philippines have posed a significant threat to shipping lanes in the Sulu and Celebes seas.9 Roughly

70 percent of goods traded between

East Asia and Australia transit through the Sulu and Celebes Seas via the

obtains the majority of its coal and

gas from Australia, security along the route remains a priority for Japan.11 In addition, under-keel clearance

limitations in the Strait of Malacca can force ships transporting crude oil to

Japan from the Middle East to take a detour through the Sulu and Celebes seas.12 To help protect its SLOC,

Japan has supported attempts by the Philippine government to increase its maritime law enforcement capacity.

Map of major shipping routes through Southeast Asia- One Earth Future Foundation

32 March – April 2021

The Philippine Coast Guard Multi-Role Response Vessel (MRRV) BRP Capones and the Japan Coast Guard Patrol Ship Echigo during anti-piracy exercises off Davao Gulf.

While constitutional restrictions tend

interoperability allows the two nations to

Japanese Navy and Coast Guard

threats moving forward.

to limit direct involvement by the

in counter-insurgency and counter-

coordinate efforts against non-traditional

terrorism operations, with a few notable

Japan has also donated maritime assets

many other aspects of regional security.

effectiveness of the Philippine maritime

exceptions, Japan has contributed to Japan has worked closely with the

Philippines through bilateral training exercises, asset donations, and arm sales to improve regional maritime security after signing a strategic

partnership in 2012.13 In July 2020, Japan conducted a bilateral Coast

Guard exercise with the Philippines

with a focus on anti-piracy and armed robbery. The exercise follows in the 14

wake of a similar anti-piracy and armed robbery simulation conducted by the

two countries in 2015. The increased 15

33 March – April 2021

to the Philippines to enhance the

law enforcement agencies. In 2018, for

instance, Japan funded 85 percent of a contract worth $191 million to provide the Philippine Coast Guard with 10

multi-role response vessels.16 In the

subsequent years, Japan continued to

support Philippine efforts to improve the capacity of its Coast Guard and Navy.

To address shortcomings in Philippine maritime domain awareness, Japan

recently donated five C-90 patrol aircraft to the Philippine Navy and agreed to train pilots and maintenance crews.17

Philippines to export a radar system

The Future of the JapanPhilippines Bilateral Relationship

2020, making it the first country to

policy of continuity in Southeast Asian

since the ban.18 The deal opens the

cultivating a strong relationship with

sales in the future, as seen in the

maritime initiatives in the Philippines

Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand.

have elicited from Philippine authorities

the Philippines leading up to Suga’s

financial and technological advantages

ability of Philippine law enforcement

new Japanese defense minister, Bobou

threats in the Sulu and Celebes seas.

counterpart, Delfin Lorenzana, in October

take the increased security for Japanese

confirmed, setting the stage for future

consideration in its decision-making

role can Japan play in further improving

In addition to donating assets, Japan

also brokered an agreement with the created by Mitsubishi Electric in early

Given Suga’s general adherence to a

import Japanese defense equipment

security, it seems Japan will continue

door for larger maritime security

the Philippines. The success of past

subsequent ongoing talks held with

and the positive response the activities

Japan’s strong bilateral relationship with

place Japan in a position to maximize its

election has significantly improved the

for the benefit of both nations. The

agencies to address non-traditional

Kishi, has already met with his Philippine

The Japanese administration is likely to

2020 when a strategic partnership was

SLOC and the region as a whole into

maritime cooperation.19 But what unique

process.

maritime security in the Philippines?

34 March – April 2021

An SH-70BSH-60J helicopter from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force lands aboard the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan.

The Philippines could leverage Japan’s

years. A larger contingent of helicopters

security systems. Japan’s adeptness

maritime law enforcement efforts and

technical expertise to improve their in shipborne helicopter operations,

for example, could prove useful for the Philippines moving forward. As

the Philippines expands its maritime capabilities, helicopters can fulfill

a diverse array of roles in maritime

security and rescue-at-sea operations.

Japan itself has conducted shipborne helicopter operations for numerous 35 March – April 2021

requires interoperability with existing more specific tactics and training for aerial operations. The addition of a

helicopter hangar for the newer model of multi-role response vessels, which

the Philippine government purchased as part of the February 2020 procurement

contract, highlights the growing demand

for Japan’s operational experience in this area.20

Two Yamaha High Speed Boat 1202 provided

by Japan for the Philippine Coast Guard.

Maritime law enforcement training in the

evidence of IUU fishing, investigating

Between Japan’s Coast Guard officer

search patterns for lost vessels and

Philippines also remains highly desirable. training program created jointly by the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies and the Japan Coast Guard and the joint training exercise held

crime scenes at sea, and establishing

personnel require specialized training as field techniques develop to match new technologies and methodologies.

between the Japan Coast Guard and

As a well-resourced regional power,

already contributed to enhancing the

the provision of assets and training to

the Philippine Coast Guard, Japan has professionalism of Philippine maritime law enforcement agencies.21 In the

future, similar training exercises will continue to prove beneficial for the

Philippines to ensure improvements

in the technology and assets available to law enforcement agencies that are

matched with adequate levels of training for personnel. Coast Guard specific

skill sets like identifying and gathering

Japan also has the ability to go beyond improving poor coastal welfare in regions

like the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, which is at the root of maritime security issues in the region, by investing in coastal infrastructure.

As pointed out in the Stable Seas: Sulu and Celebes Seas maritime security report, poor coastal welfare and an

underdeveloped blue economy can

encourage inhabitants to partake in 36 March – April 2021

illicit maritime activities and support

domain. Japan’s recent policy initiatives

in infrastructure projects like Philippine

has shown that Suga is inclined to

local insurgencies.22 Japan’s investment President Rodrigo Duterte’s Build,

Build, Build program have boosted the

Philippine economy.23 Similar initiatives in the BARMM under the auspices of

the Japanese International Cooperation Agency could erode support for local insurgency groups like Abu Sayyaf

and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom

Fighters, thus contributing to long term

maritime security. The Stable Seas recent blue economy policy brief released in

November 2020 outlines several areas,

such as strengthening fishery processing infrastructure and seaweed cultivation, that Japan could support.24

Conclusion

The Philippines and Japan have a long history of cooperation in the maritime

in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand,

pursue the Vientiane Vision of practical and operational defense cooperation with ASEAN countries, including the

Philippines.25 Recent deals in defense

equipment, especially plans to export a

destroyer to Indonesia, may foreshadow an increase in Japanese export of major

military assets. Support is also more likely to take the form of sales rather than

training and grants. Moving forward,

Japan can leverage its financial resources, sophisticated training programs, and technological expertise to support

Philippine maritime security initiatives while growing its defense export

systems. The resulting enhancements to

maritime law enforcement capacity in the Sulu and Celebes sea will contribute to the safety of regional shipping lanes.

Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force OsumiClass amphibious assault ship JDS Kunisaki (LST 4003) and two landing craft, air cushion hovercraft steam through the South China.

37 March – April 2021

NOTES 1

2 3

4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

“2019 – Understanding the current energy situation in Japan (Part 1),” Agency For Natural Resources And Energy, August 13, 2019, https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/special/article/energyissue2019_01.html#:~:text=Japan%20depends%20on%20 imports%20from.

“Seaborne Trade,” Japan Maritime Center, http://www.jpmac.or.jp/img/relation/pdf/epdf-p01-p05.pdf.

John Bradford, “Southeast Asia: A New Strategic Nexus For Japan’s Maritime Strategy,” Center for International Maritime Security, September 21, 2020, http://cimsec.org/southeast-asia-a-new-strategic-nexus-for-japans-maritime-strategy/45718#:~:text=It%20 has%20started%20new%20capacity,nexus%20in%20Japan’s%20maritime%20strategy.

Sebastian Strangio, “New Japan PM Planning Visits to Indonesia, Vietnam,” The Diplomat, October 1, 2020, https://thediplomat. com/2020/10/new-japan-pm-planning-visits-to-indonesia-vietnam/ and “Fostering the Vietnam - Japan extensive strategic partnership,” Nhan Dan, October 22, 2019, https://en.nhandan.org.vn/politics/editorial/item/8044002-fostering-the-vietnam-japanextensive-strategic-partnership.html.

Martin Fackler, “Japan Ends Decades-Long Ban on Export of Weapons,” The New York Times, April 1, 2014, https://www.nytimes. com/2014/04/02/world/asia/japan-ends-half-century-ban-on-weapons-exports.html.

Yukio Tajima, “Japan pushes defense equipment exports with corporate expertise,” Nikkei Asia, August 24, 2020, https://asia.nikkei. com/Business/Aerospace-Defense/Japan-pushes-defense-equipment-exports-with-corporate-expertise.

“Japan Plans to Export MSDF Destroyer to Indonesia,” Nippon, November 4, 2020, https://www.nippon.com/en/news/ yjj2020110401186/.

Keita Ikeda, “Japan, Indonesia to set up maritime forum,” Jakarta Post, December 20, 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2016/12/20/japan-indonesia-to-set-up-maritime-forum.html.

Meghan Curran, et al., “ Violence at Sea: How Terrorists, Insurgents, and other Extremists Exploit the Maritime Domain,” Stable Seas, August 11, 2020, https://www.stableseas.org/publications/violence-sea-terrorist-insurgents.

Mohd Hazmi Mohd Rusli, “Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits?,” Nanyang Technological University, 10 February 2012, https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/10220/7566/1/RSIS0242012.pdf.

“2019 – Understanding the current energy situation in Japan (Part 1).”

Sam Bateman, et al., “Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia,” Nanyang Technological University, April 2009, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/ wp-content/uploads/2014/07/PR090427_Good_Order_at_Sea_in_SEA.pdf.

Manuel Mogato, et al., “Philippines, Japan coast guards hold anti-piracy drills,” Reuters, May 26, 2015, https://www.businessinsider. com/r-philippines-japan-coast-guards-hold-anti-piracy-drills-2015-5.

“PH, Japan Coast Guard Units Conduct Anti-Piracy Exercise,” Manila Bulletin, July 13, 2020. https://mb.com.ph/2020/07/13/ph-japancoast-guard-units-conduct-anti-piracy-exercise/.

“PH, Japan Coast Guard Units Conduct Anti-Piracy Exercise.”

Xavier Vavasseur, “MHI To Build 2 Multi-Role Response Vessels For The Philippine Coast Guard,” Naval News, February 19, 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/02/mhi-to-build-2-multi-role-response-vessels-for-the-philippine-coast-guard/.

Jeannette I. Andrade, “PH deploys patrol aircraft from Japan,” Inquirer.net, March 18, 2019, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1096816/phdeploys-patrol-aircraft-from-japan.

Daishi Abe, “Philippines radar deal marks Japan’s first arms export,” Nikkei Asia, August 29, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/ Aerospace-Defense/Philippines-radar-deal-marks-Japan-s-first-arms-export.

Frances Mangosing, “PH, Japan affirm support for freedom of navigation in South China Sea,” Inquirer.net, October 23, 2020, https:// globalnation.inquirer.net/191731/ph-japan-affirm-support-for-freedom-of-navigation-in-south-china-sea.

Xavier Vavasseur, “MHI To Build 2 Multi-Role Response Vessels For The Philippine Coast Guard,” Naval News, February 19, 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/02/mhi-to-build-2-multi-role-response-vessels-for-the-philippine-coast-guard/.

“Maritime Safety and Security Policy Program,” National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, accessed November 25, 2020, https:// www.grips.ac.jp/en/education/inter_programs/maritime/.

Alexandra Amling, et al., “Stable Seas: Sulu and Celebes Seas,” Stable Seas, February 19, 2019, https://www.stableseas.org/ publications/sulu-celebes-seas.

Richard Javad Heydarian, “The Golden Era of Japan-Philippines Relations Has Arrived,” The National Interest, June 16, 2019, https:// nationalinterest.org/feature/golden-era-japan-philippine-relations-has-arrived-62572.

Michael van Ginkel, “BARMM Blue Economy: Policy Proposals For the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao,” Stable Seas, November 24, 2020, https://www.stableseas.org/publications/blue-economy-policy-proposals-barmm.

“Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN,” Ministry of Defense, Accessed November 25, 2020, https:// www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/exc/vientianevision/.

38 March – April 2021

LEADERSHIP CHANGE AND RENEWAL IN THE INDO-PACIFIC SEARCH FOR STABILITY AMID UNCERTAIN TIMES Lucio Blanco Pitlo III Leadership change, periodic or otherwise, is an important development that can alter not only domestic politics, but also regional geopolitics. It is an enduring institution that may herald either policy continuity or break. Not even an unprecedented pandemic as COVID-19 halted this tradition.

39 March – April 2021

In the Indo-Pacific, amid a gripping

the other hand, suggests popular dismay

elections were held in Taiwan (January

platforms and campaign speeches may

worldwide health crisis last year,

11), Republic of Korea (April 15),

Singapore (July 10), Sri Lanka (August 5), and Myanmar (November 8). Early this year, local elections in Bangladesh and

communist party congresses in Vietnam and Laos also went ahead. Legislative

elections were also conducted in Laos

(February 21) and are expected to take place in Vietnam (May 23), Hong Kong (September 5), and Japan (October 22). Nor did the health contagion

with the past administration. Electoral

provide cues as to the security and foreign policy positions candidates may take if

they win. The profiles of people getting

nominated or appointed in key posts offer telltale signs of the priorities the incoming government may likely push. Hence,

watching the campaign trail, intra-party

factional struggles, and related events in

the run-up to the changing of the guards offer valuable insights into the future.

deter domestic political intramurals as

The external environment certainly plays

transitions in Malaysia (March) and Japan

Hence, as U.S.-China strategic competition

evidenced by the unscheduled power (September) last year and the coup in Myanmar last February. Next year, as

many countries continue to roll out their vaccination programs, the Republic of

into domestic debates and deliberations. deepens, the contest for influence in the

vast Indo-Pacific will figure prominently in

leadership changes among regional states.

Korea (March 9), Hong Kong (March), and the Philippines (May 9) will choose their highest leaders, while China (October) will convene its 20th communist party congress.

Leadership transition has a huge bearing on which direction the policy pendulum

would swing. A fresh mandate vindicates the policies pursued by the incumbent and signals public support for them. A

landslide victory for the opposition, on 40 March – April 2021

OLD BUT GOLD Administering mass inoculation to achieve herd immunity, fostering

economic recovery from the pandemic, and navigating growing great power

rivalry constitute the key challenges for

the region in the short- to medium-term.

In these turbulent times, preference

for experience becomes apparent. The saying “old is gold” became salient as seasoned leaders draw on their wells of experience to tackle enormous challenges that lie before them.

The search for stability amid shifting sands and geopolitical uncertainties saw regional constituencies lean on steady and familiar hands. Prime

Minister Lee Hsien Loong received a fifth term in Singapore and Nguyen Phu Trong received a third term as 41 March – April 2021

General Secretary of the Communist

Party of Vietnam. Before the onset of

the pandemic in late 2019, Indonesian President Joko Widodo was given a

second serving and Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-Cha likewise won,

allowing him to continue governing the country he and his junta took control

since 2014. Chinese President Xi Jinping got a second term as communist

party secretary general in 2017 with

speculations rife that he may lead the country well until 20351 and possibly

even beyond.2 Before the February coup

reversal, Myanmar State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, whose National League of Democracy overwhelmingly won the

November elections, was set to begin

another mandate, sustaining the gains

she made since the landmark polls back in 2015.

Asian leaders have shown longevity in

Mahathir’s experience in dealing with the

Sheikh Hasina was elected once again

SARS pandemic became handy.

service. Bangladesh’s Prime Minister

in 2018 and is currently her country’s

1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2003

longest reigning leader having started

While young bloods and neophyte

crisis in Malaysia that led to the ousting

power in the West, Asians stuck to

office back in 2008. Before the political of the Pakatan Harapan coalition last

March 2020,3 Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad was likewise the country’s

longest serving leader having served

his country for more than two decades.

Similarly, prior to his resignation due to health reasons last September, Prime

Minister Shinzo Abe was Japan’s longest serving leader having served his country for more than nine years.

Tested leaders edged their peers

in handling the pandemic and the

economic fallout. In Southeast Asia, the

performance of Vietnam, Singapore, and Malaysia are illustrative. Prime Minister Lee’s experience in handling the 2008

global financial crisis and Prime Minister

politicians ascended the hierarchy of seniority. The average age of Southeast Asian chief executives, for instance, was 71 years old with Joko Widodo

(Indonesia) as the youngest at 59 and Nguyen Phu Trong (Vietnam) as the

oldest at 76. Leaders of the Philippines

(President Rodrigo Duterte, 75), Malaysia (Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, 73), Brunei (Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, 74),

Myanmar (State Counsellor Suu Kyi, 75),

Laos (Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith, 75) and Vietnam are all past the 70-yearold mark. Septuagenarian leaders are also in power in India (Prime Minister Narendra Modi, 70), Japan (Prime

Minister Yoshihide Suga, 72), Sri Lanka

(President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, 71) and Bangladesh (Prime Minister Hasina, 73).

Leaders of South East Asian Nations.

42 March – April 2021

President Rodrigo Roa Duterte with People’s Republic of China President Xi Jin Ping.

A DRAGON’S LONG SWIM As the United States and China lock

horns on a wide range of issues, spotlight on Beijing’s growing trade, investment, infrastructure, and aid footprint in the

Indo-Pacific grows. Relations with China

is becoming a major foreign policy issue for regional states from middle powers Australia and Indonesia to small Pacific island states like Kiribati and Vanuatu.

Elections become a battleground for

competing views on how best to deal with the fast-rising superpower.

The 2018 elections in Maldives reversed a China-friendly policy of the previous 43 March – April 2021

Abdullah Yameen administration in favor of an “India First” policy by President

Ibrahim Mohamed Solih.4 Meanwhile, in neighboring Sri Lanka, the 2019 victory of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa,

younger brother of Mahinda, a former president with close ties to Beijing,

is expected to preserve burgeoning

bilateral ties, including in the area of

strategic infrastructure like ports.5 In

the Philippines, disputes over the South China Sea and ties with China, which

improved markedly under the Duterte

administration, will be staples in policy

debates among presidential aspirants in next year’s polls.

Peaceful Taiwan independence demonstration with giant colorful banner flags outside Taipei 101.

In Oceania, the June 2020 re-election

China also looms large in the upcoming

who maintained cordial relations with

third independence referendum for

of Kiribati President Taneti Maamau,

China, ensured that the North Pacific

country, site of a Chinese space tracking station, will stay the course. The lure of aid and economic bonanza led Kiribati

and Solomon Islands to drop recognition of Taipei in favor of Beijing in 2019.6 That decision, however, did not go

uncontested. The diplomatic switch fueled separatist sentiments in pro-

Taiwan Malaita province in the Solomon

Islands.7 In Kiribati, it contributed to the loss of the majority for the ruling party of President Maamau in parliamentary elections held last year.8

Chuuk secession referendum9 and the

New Caledonia,10 both of which will be

held by next year. Chuuk independence from Micronesia raises concerns about possible Chinese military access to

one of the Pacific’s deepest and most

strategic lagoons. It will allow Beijing to break into the second island chain and apply pressure on Taiwan’s remaining

allies in the North Pacific. China funded a government complex in the island group, which is Micronesia’s most

populous, and also underwrote the

construction of roads with pledges for

more infrastructure finance. Meanwhile, 44 March – April 2021

a decision of New Caledonia, a major

challenges confronting them. China’s

France will not be lost to Beijing as it

funding will certainly be welcomed by

producer of nickel, to separate from seeks to expand its influence in the

Pacific. China is the largest importer

of the territory’s mineral exports and

support for independence is growing

among marginalized indigenous Kanaks.

Similarly, a roadmap for independence

of Bougainville, an autonomous region of the Solomon Islands that voted for independence in 2019, adds a new

theater in the brewing great power game over the Pacific.11

All across its broad blue expanse,

Indo-Pacific states will adopt different approaches in addressing the grave

vaccine diplomacy and infrastructure

countries eager to arrest their Covid-19 cases and revitalize their economies.

But while some Pacific island states

become more accommodating toward Beijing, more capacitated Asian

countries unwilling to pick a side and

keen to keep their strategic autonomy will employ more hedging and

balancing actions. Sharp policy swings suggest intense political bickering given the high stakes involved. In

navigating their way out, regional

countries may anchor on experience.

How successful this will be in uncharted waters remains to be seen.

A forklift off-loads boxes of vaccines from a Chinese military aircraft at the Villamor Air Base in Pasay City on February 28, 2021.

45 March – April 2021

NOTES 1

Katsuji Nakazawa, “No successor needed: Xi Jinping’s dream extends to 2035,” Nikkei Asia, November 1, 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/ Politics/No-successor-needed-Xi-Jinping-s-dream-extends-to-2035.

2 Katsuji Nakazawa, “Xi Jinping sends shock waves with his 2035 manifesto,” Nikkei Asia, August 6, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-sPicks/China-up-close/Xi-Jinping-sends-shock-waves-with-his-2035-manifesto.

3 “Malaysia’s political crisis,” Strategic Comments, 26:2, vii-ix, April 17, 2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13567888.2 020.1756352.

4 Nayanima Basu, “Foreign Secy Shringla lauds Maldives’ ‘India First’ policy, assures Covid recovery support,” ThePrint, November 9, 2020, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/foreign-secy-shringla-lauds-maldives-india-first-policy-assures-covid-recovery-support/540699/.

5 Waruna Karunatilake, “UPDATE 1-Sri Lanka’s Rajapaksa draws country closer to China after summit,” Reuters, October 10, 2020, https:// www.reuters.com/article/sri-lanka-china/update-1-sri-lankas-rajapaksa-draws-country-closer-to-china-after-summit-idUSL4N2H0314.

6 Claire Huitt, “Shifting Opportunity: Kiribati and Solomon Islands Establish Diplomatic Relations with Beijing,” Climate Security in Oceania, November 12, 2019, http://sites.utexas.edu/climatesecurity/2019/11/12/shifting-opportunity-kiribati-and-solomon-islandsestablish-diplomatic-relations-with-beijing/.

7 Jonathan Barrett, “Solomons province pushes for independence in ‘China switch’ fallout,” Reuters, September 2, 2020, https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-china-solomonislands-malaita/solomons-province-pushes-for-independence-in-china-switch-falloutidUSKBN25T09U. 8 “Pro-China Kiribati president loses majority over switch from Taiwan,” The Guardian, April 23, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2020/apr/24/pro-china-kiribati-president-loses-majority-over-switch-from-taiwan.

9 Jonathan Barrett, “Chuuk independence vote postponed as China-U.S. Pacific contest builds,” Reuters, February 27, 2020, https://www. reuters.com/article/us-pacific-micronesia/chuuk-independence-vote-postponed-as-china-u-s-pacific-contest-builds-idUSKCN20L09G. 10 Joshua Mcdonald, “China’s shadow looms as New Caledonia decides whether to leave France,” South China Morning Post, September 30, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3103562/chinas-shadow-looms-new-caledonia-decides-whether-leavefrance.

11 Ben Bohane, “‘Where is Australia?’ China makes a bold play for the south Pacific’s ‘Treasure Islands’,” The Sydney Morning Herald, November 17, 2019, https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/where-is-australia-china-makes-a-bold-play-for-the-south-pacific-streasure-islands-20191115-p53b4g.html.

46 March – April 2021

ADAPTING MEGATRENDS AND NARRATIVES TO THE EVOLVING INTERNAL PHILIPPINE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

M

Gabriel Honrada egatrends such as globalization and isolationism, demographic trends, urbanization, technical innovation, climate change, and environmental degradation all impact human life in profound ways. Since warfare

is a human phenomenon, these trends will fundamentally change the way we

think, fight, and win wars. Further, traditional and emerging domains of warfare merge into an integrated battlespace, combining physical, social, information,

and cognitive domains. Due to the integration of the cognitive domain in a joint battlespace, narratives have become front and center in today’s conflicts. As

the Philippines is no exception to these developments, it must rethink how it

conceptualizes warfare in its internal security environment, starting with the search for its own national narrative, applying such narrative to a system-of-systems

security architecture and fostering grassroots-level innovation and cooperation.

47 March – April 2021

Relationship Between Megatrends and the Modern Battlespace

trends, urbanization, technological

A megatrend is defined as a major shift

environmental degradation.4

in environmental, social, and economic

innovation, climate change, and

conditions that will substantially change

As megatrends impact almost all aspects

and call for strategies for adaptation

phenomenon is not an exception. The

the way people live.1 They are global rather than strategies for effecting change to the trends themselves.2

Globalization has led to the integration of world political systems, economies,

societies, and culture, but isolationism as a countertrend has given rise to

quasi-governmental institutions, global terrorism, and questions that explore alternatives to prevailing global

governance systems.3 Further, the UN mentions other megatrends that will

shape our time such as demographic

of human life, warfare as a human

increasing complexity of modern warfare has prompted the replacement of the term “battlefield” to “battlespace”,

reflecting the increasing integration and interdependence of multiple domains

of war.5 Over the last half century, the

domains of air, space, and cyberspace

have joined the traditional warfighting domains of land and sea, becoming a

unified battlespace.6 Other conceptions of the modern battlespace include the human element in addition to physical

48 March – April 2021

and information domains. In this view,

the battlespace can be conceptualized

Implications of Megatrends to Philippine Internal Security Challenges

as the convergence of social, cognitive, information, and physical domains.7

Globalization and isolationism can

be observed in Philippine non-state

Military operations in this integrated

battlespace encompass the traditional physical, social, cognitive, and information domains that now

characterize Fifth Generation Warfare

(5GW). 5GW is a battle of perceptions

and information wherein violence is so dispersed that the victim is unaware that it is at war and is also unaware

that it is losing the war.8 It also involves distorting public perception to give

a manipulated view of world politics,

harnessing cultural, social, or religious icons to manipulate narratives using a

constructivist framework of international relations.9

actors, particularly the Moro separatist movement and Communist Party of

the Philippines (CPP). In the lead-up to

the 2017 Marawi Siege, several Islamist militant groups pledged loyalty to

ISIS, portraying themselves as part of a larger global terrorist movement.10

But paradoxically, ISIS’ ideology can be

described as religiously or ideologically conservative, isolationist, politically

radical, and confrontational.11 Likewise, the CPP has been actively organizing revolutionary movements among

overseas Filipinos and in international

organizations of communist and workers’ parties.12 Yet, the CPP has also been

anti-globalist, opposing the activities

President Rodrigo Roa Duterte conducts an inspection inside the Cathedral of Our Lady of Mount Carmel in Jolo, Sulu on January 28, 2019 where two explosions occurred inside and outside the church last January 27.

49 March – April 2021

of international mining firms in the

2.12% compared to average growth

military exercises.

Philippines’ poorest provinces, Lanao Del

Philippines13 and U.S.-Philippines joint

A young population coupled with lack of social and economic opportunities make countries more susceptible to anti-state political violence led by

youthful firebrands and revolutionaries.14 That said, the Philippine population is projected to hit 142 million by 2045,

rate of 1.21%.15 Further, three of the

Sur, Maguindanao, and Sulu are in the

BARMM.16 Thus, a large youth population and lack of social and economic

opportunity will most likely drive internal conflict and fuel the long-running

separatist insurgency in the Southern Philippines.

with 49 million people added to the

The shift from rural to urban armed

the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region

increasing urbanization, as with rapid

population from 2010 and 2045, with

in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) having the highest annual growth rate of

conflicts reflects the megatrend of urbanization comes uncontrolled

population growth, increased economic

Protesters and activists in the Philippines.

50 March – April 2021

inequalities, and political instability.17

foreseeable future are artificial

urban areas ideal breeding grounds for

blockchain, drones, Internet of Things,

Consequently, these factors make

radicalization, extremism, and terrorism.

Also, traditionally rural-based terrorist groups are increasingly targeting

urban areas.18 In many ways, the 2013

Zamboanga Siege was a dress rehearsal

for the 2017 Marawi Siege, which turned out to be the Philippines’ largest urban battle since World War II. In a similar change of operations, the CPP has

announced the formation of urban hit

squads to target police officers, military men, and government officials.19

Technology is evolving at an exponential pace in the 21st century. Some of the essential technologies for the 51 March – April 2021

intelligence, augmented reality,

robots, virtual reality, and 3D printing.20 Non-state actors have been utilizing

these technologies, relying on open-

source design, off-the-shelf commercial components, and their own ingenuity.

During the 2017 Marawi Siege,

journalists noted the presence of ISISoperated commercial drones in the

city.21 Also, dispersed terror cells or selfradicalized individuals can acquire 3D

printing technology to self-manufacture firearms. 3D printing facilities can be

constructed within a terrorist area of

operations, greatly simplifying terrorist

logistics.22 Cyber-operations will become as necessary as physical operations,

A Filipino soldier stands guard at the village of Guiuan in the aftermath of Super Typhoon Haiyan.

as destroying terrorists’ networks

rainfall anomalies can exacerbate social

schematics, 3D printing facilities, and

agricultural systems, which implies a

to transmit and download weapons

rudimentary C4ISTAR capability will

become integral to military operations.23

unrest and violence by destabilizing

disproportionate impact on agricultural regions such as BARMM.25

Climate change and environmental

Adapting Narratives to the 21st Century degradation can worsen or start conflicts. Internal Philippine Security Landscape The Philippines faces a high risk of

Narratives are at the front and center

floods, and earthquakes. The BARMM is

narratives are the embodiment of wills.

natural disasters, such as typhoons,

highly dependent on coastal resources, which are highly susceptible to climate change; physical and economic

vulnerability to climate change leads to greater deprivations, which fuel

conflict dynamics in the region.24 Further,

of 5GW. War is a contest of wills, and Thus, a contest of narratives should

aim to deny cognitive space, discredit opposing narratives, and disrupt its propagation. Thus, any discourse

of the Filipino way of war in a 5GW

battlespace will touch on primordial 52 March – April 2021

questions of Filipino national narratives

national narrative from the writings of

narratives are marked by philosophical

and the like.27

and identity. However, national

poverty and incoherence.26 In the

Filipino nationalists, language, culture,

case of the Philippines, profit-driven

Another task is to integrate national

masquerade as the national narrative,

security and organize the country’s

and transactional elite interests often formalized, and institutionalized by

society through laws, national symbols, and power structures. The intellectual challenge in constructing a Filipino national narrative is to create an

egalitarian one that has a unique Filipino worldview, defines the Filipino, and

has a vision for the Filipino future. One of many approaches in creating such a Filipino narrative is to dis-embed a

President Rodrigo Roa Duterte presides over a meeting with the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC).

53 March – April 2021

narratives to a wide framing of national national security architecture into a

system of systems. Different government agencies and civil society sectors can

be organized into a system of systems,

delivering useful results when integrated into a larger system.28 Further, Filipino foreign, defense, and development

strategies are reactive, in the sense that they are crafted in response to security challenges, rather than shaping the

security landscape in a proactive way

where members share tools for

long-term vision. In terms of defense,

into defense and security planning.29

due to a lack of guiding narrative for

the national narrative must be integrated through kinetic and non-kinetic military operations throughout an integrated

battlespace. Concerning the proliferation of disinformation, a national narrative

focusing on truths and enduring values can be part of the foundation of the

country’s counter-disinformation strategy.

The internet has allowed individuals unparalleled access to information, enabling individual innovation

and collaboration. The concept of

makerspaces—community workshops

professional gain—could be integrated Makerspaces can be a powerful concept for bringing together government and civil society sectors to craft low-cost, cost-effective, specialized solutions to interconnected internal security

concerns. In terms of integrating national narratives to makerspace innovation,

national narratives can be used to frame the research direction in makerspace

efforts. That said, this narrative can be

part of the framework that connects and coordinates national strategy, policy, military operations, civil society, and

grassroots makerspace research efforts.

54 March – April 2021

NOTES 1 2

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27 28 29

Stefan Hajkowicz, Hannah Cook, and Anna Littleboy, Our Future World: Global Megatrends that will Change the Way We Live (Canberra: CSIRO, 2012), https://publications.csiro.au/rpr/download?pid=csiro:EP126135&dsid=DS2.

Francois Retief, Alan Bond, Jenny Pope, Angus Morrison-Saunder, and Nicholas King, “Global megatrends and their implications for environmental assessment practice,” Environmental Impact Assessment Review 61 (2016):52-60, https://doi.org/10.1016/j. eiar.2016.07.002.

Luke Amadi, “Globalisation and the changing liberal international order: A review of the literature,” Research in Globalization 2 (2020):1-9, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resglo.2020.100015 Shaping the Trends of Our Time, (United Nations, 2020), https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/wp-content/uploads/ sites/10/2020/09/20-124-UNEN-75Report-2-1.pdf.

Ravindra Singh Panwar, “21st Century Warfare: From Battlefield to Battlespace,” published October 6, 2017, http://futurewars. rspanwar.net/21st-century-warfare-from-battlefield-to-battlespace/.

Jeffrey Caton, The Land, Space, and Cyberspace Nexus: Evolution of the Oldest Military Operations in the Newest Military Domains (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2018), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17662.

David Alberts, John Gartska, Richard Hayes, and David Signori, Understanding Information Age Warfare (Arlington, VA: Command and Control Research Program, 2001), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235025539_Understanding_Information_Age_Warfare.

Waseem Quereshi, “Fourth- and Fifth-Generation Warfare: Technology and Perceptions,”San Diego International Law Journal 21, no. 1 (2019):187-216, https://digital.sandiego.edu/ilj/vol21/iss1/.

Waseem Quereshi, “Fourth- and Fifth-Generation Warfare: Technology and Perceptions.”

Ashley Rhoades and Todd Helmus, Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020), https://www.rand. org/pubs/research_reports/RRA233-2.html.

Gavin Brookes and Tony McEmery, “Correlation, collocation and cohesion: A corpus-based critical analysis of violent jihadi discourse.”

Discourse and Society 31, no. 4 (2020):351-373, https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926520903528.

Jose Maria Sison, “Great Achievements of the CPP in 50 Years of Waging Revolution,” Philippine Revolution Web Central, August 23, 2018, https://cpp.ph/2018/08/23/great-achievements-of-the-cpp-in-50-years-of-waging-revolution/.

Joshua Wayland, “The New People’s Army and Neoliberal Mining in the Philippines: A Struggle Against Primitive Accumulation,” Capitalism Nature Society 25, no. 3 (2014):61-83, https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2014.922109.

Ragnhild Nordås and Christian Davenport, “Fight the Youth: Youth Bulges and State Repression,” American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 4 (2013):926-940, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23496665.

“Ten Regions Expected to Grow Faster Than the National Average,” Philippine Statistics Authority, December 29, 2015, https://psa.gov. ph/content/ten-regions-expected-grow-faster-national-average.

“Ten Regions Expected to Grow Faster Than the National Average,” Philippine Statistics Authority.

Margarita Konaev, The Future of Urban Warfare in the Age of Megacities (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 2019), https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/konaev_urban_warfare_megacities_2019.pdf.

Margarita Konaev, The Future of Urban Warfare in the Age of Megacities.

Dexter Cabalza, “Reds set to revive urban hit squads,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 3, 2021, https://newsinfo.inquirer. net/1378754/reds-set-to-revive-urban-hit-squads.

Tech breakthroughs megatrends: How to prepare for its impact (PwC India, accessed January 14, 2021), https://www.pwc.in/assets/ pdfs/publications/tech-breakthroughs-megatrend/tech-breakthroughs-megatrend-how-to-prepare-for-its-impact.pdf.

Don Rassler, The Islamic State and Drones (West Point, NY: Combatting Terrorism Center, 2018), https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/ uploads/2018/07/Islamic-State-and-Drones-Release-Version.pdf.

Christopher Flaherty, “Employment of 3D Guns in the 5D Battlespace,” Journal of Information Warfare 15, no. 1. (2016):29-43, https:// www.jstor.org/stable/26487479.

Christopher Flaherty, “Employment of 3D Guns in the 5D Battlespace.”

Jackson Ewing, Converging Peril: Climate Change and Conflict in the Southern Philippines (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2009), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282672009_Converging_Peril_Climate_Change_and_Conflict_ in_the_Southern_Philippines.

Sofia Caycedo, “Bracing for conflict with the onset of climate change: a story from the Philippines,” Yale Environment Review, November 5, 2018, https://environment-review.yale.edu/bracing-conflict-onset-climate-change-story-philippines.

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), 5.

Ronaldo Gripaldo, “Philosophy in Culture: Embedded and Disembedded,” Φιλοσοφια: International Journal of Philosophy 41, no. 1.

(2012):60-65, https://ejournals.ph/article.php?id=464.

Judith Dahmann, Systems of Systems Characterization and Types (NATO S&T Organisation, 2015), https://www.sto.nato.int/ publications/STO%20Educational%20Notes/STO-EN-SCI-276/EN-SCI-276-01.pdf.

Eric Joseph van Holm, What are Makerspaces, Hackerspaces, and Fab Labs? (Rochester, NY: SSRN, 2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.2548211.

55 March – April 2021

FEATURED SECURITY SCHOLAR:

STEPHEN NAGY

T

Mark Payumo

here is a glaring similarity

To say that to become a scientifically

and security scholars: a sedentary

understatement. Stephen Nagy, however,

between computer programmers

professional lifestyle. To be sure,

academics who made a living out of

pelting typebars on a paper to produce scholarly work that they’d hope would

change the world began as early as the 1880s. But what resonates with deeper familiarity among twenty-first century mortals is the advent of the personal

inclined security scholar is hard is an

makes it look easy (but humbly denies it).

You’ll know what I mean if you connect

with him on LinkedIn and understand his level of activity and involvement in the

Indo-Pacific strategic community. He also

managed to speak on our podcast before granting us this interview.

computer in the late 1970s and 1980s

Stephen talks about how he built on his

word processing software.

following a study tour in China in 1994,

along with the subsequent creation of

This leads to another common trait that to produce anything meaningful, both the coder and security scholar draw on scientific nuance that is meant to

withstand testing or scrutiny to a certain extent. That said, the pandemic also

encourages one to look at a split screen of the before-and-after, and almost

nothing changed for our two characters who are extraordinarily trained to sit in

nascent interest in international relations and explains the rest of his journey that brought him to International Christian

University in Tokyo as a senior associate

professor with the Department of Politics and International Studies. In sum and as in the tech industry, what Stephen

validates here is that it’s all about getting started, keeping your sleeves rolled

up, and iterating your way through to success.

front of a computer for long hours.

56 March – April 2021

57 March – April 2021

Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong.

As it was in 1994, we were exposed to issues at the time including the succession to Deng Xiaoping, the

Hong Kong handover, what socialism with Chinese characteristics meant,

reunification, and in general the meaning of China’s re-emergence in the region.

His personal connections and anecdotal

stories about Mao ZeDong, Zhou EnLai, the Cultural Revolution, and changes in

China since his engagement in the 1950s brought color to a very black and white understanding of China and the region.

AW: What drew your interest in

international relations that made you decide to pursue a PhD?

I can still recall vividly the stories he

shared on our long train rides and over dumplings in the busy streets of Xi’an and Beijing.

Stephen: My interests in international

Having traveled to Japan before and now

as an undergraduate student in 1994

the world as we know it was going to be

relations dates back to my final year at the University of Calgary. While I

majored in Biochemistry, I also studied

Japanese language and culture and took an intensive course on contemporary

Chinese politics and history with Professor Mohammed Yunus, a former Pakistani Ambassador to China in the 1970s.

The course included a study tour to

China. We visited Beijing, Xi’an, Yan’an,

China, I was left with the impression that centered in Asia, or today’s Indo-Pacific and that countries like Canada needed citizens with deep experience in the region.

That thinking was cemented in my

mind on the Peak in Hong Kong as

I overlooked Hong Kong’s stunning

skyscrapers that dominated the skyline and the sprawling urban landscape. To

58 March – April 2021

be part of this story, I needed to shift

Stephen R. Nagy, PhD is a Senior Associate Professor at the Department of Politics and International Studies, International Christian University, Tokyo.

Upon returning to Calgary, Canada

He is a Distinguished Fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation (APF) in Canada, a Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, and a Visiting Fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA).

course.

to take up an MSc degree in Medical

Biochemistry at the University of Calgary, my afternoons were spent taking IR classes and classes on Asia while I

formulated a path to PhD studies and

becoming an “expert” in the region. Part of that formulation included language acquisition and cultural immersion in

several Asian countries, work experience in the region, completing an MA and PhD, and quitting my studies at the University of Calgary.

My journey included studying and

working in Japan and Hong Kong.

Both places were a platform to travel throughout Northeast, Southeast

Asia, and Nepal repeatedly and for an extensive period of time.

AW: Many Asians prefer to go to school in Canada, Europe, or the

U.S. Why did you choose Waseda University?

Stephen: As a Canadian, the university hierarchies in Asia had much less meaning than for Asians. When I

was choosing universities to study in 59 March – April 2021

He obtained his PhD from Waseda University in International Relations 2009 and worked at the Department of Japanese Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong as an Assistant Professor from December 2009 to January 2014.

His recent research projects have included SinoJapanese Relations in the Wake of the 2012 Territorial Disputes: Investigating changes in Japanese Business’ trade and investment strategy in China and Nontraditional security Cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Currently he is investigating Chinese Perceptions of Japan’s Foreign Policy under PM Abe since 2012, and Middle Power Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

In conjunction with his research focus on Asian regional integration, in March 2010 he was appointed a Senior Fellow with the Global Institute of Asian Regional Integration (GIARI), Waseda University. He is also a member of the Hong Kong Institute of Asia Pacific Studies’ International Affairs Research Centre (IARC) at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

the region, I considered the level of

AW: You seem like a very busy

the size of the economies, influence on

everything. How do you manage your

development of countries at that time,

the international stage, and the programs that were available for foreign students.

person but still able to stay on top of time? Any tools of the trade?

Waseda was a good match. Its Graduate

Stephen: To be honest, I don’t but I

had bilingual education, many of its

11:00 by blocking out that period from

School of Asia-Pacific Studies (GSAPS)

faculty were not only academics but also practitioners in international relations, and the university was tremendously

supportive of go-getters. This led me to choosing Waseda but that was just the

do try. I do most of my writing before

meetings and administration. Hardwork and discipline is important but so is my ritual coffee and Cello, playing Bach in the background.

start.

To be productive, you need to think

While at Waseda I received several

I enhance this by listening to podcasts,

scholarships to facilitate my studies such as the MEXT scholarship and support to attend academic conferences. The highlight was becoming a Research

Fellow at the Global Institute of Asian Regional Integration (GIARI) and a

Research Fellow for the Institute of AsiaPacific Studies. The former exposed me to the concepts of regionalism and top scholars and mentors such as Satoshi

Amako, Shujiro Urata, and Tsuneo Akaha amongst others.

It was their mentorship that deepened

my interest in regionalism, Sino-Japanese relations, and the U.S.-Japan-China triangular relationship.

and write at least as much as you read. watching webinars, and attending as

many conferences as possible to listen,

learn, and exchange ideas with scholars and importantly policy makers. They

have overlap but are not the same. If you want to be policy relevant, you must be speaking to practitioners and write in policy venues.

AW: What do you like about teaching at International Christian University?

Stephen: ICU has great students and

student support. For example, I wanted to expose my undergraduate students

to China so I applied for a grant to the

Japan ICU Foundation to support a two60 March – April 2021

week study tour that was in many ways similar to mine in the 1990s.

Other aspects that make ICU a unique place amongst universities in Japan is

Most students leave ICU at least bilingual, having international

experience, and close personal friends and relationships with professors.

its diverse student body and faculty, its

AW: What is your favorite book and why?

and a commitment to supporting

Stephen: It’s hard to choose a favorite

commitment to liberal arts education, diversity and inclusion.

61 March – April 2021

book. John Mearsheimer’s Tragedy of

Great Power Politics is a clear-eyed view of international relations. It provides a lot of insight as to the machinations of U.S.-

Nagy, S. R. 2020. “Quad-Plus? Carving out Canada’s Middle Power Role.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Special Issue. Quad

China relations today.

Plus: Form versus Substance, vol. 3, no. 5:

Yan Xue Tong’s Leadership and the Rise

537X (Online).

of Great Powers is a provocative book on why some countries rise and others fall. It echoes Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, another favorite, but focuses on how the CCP continues to

179–195. ISSN 2576-5361 (Print); ISSN 2576-

Nagy, S. R. 2020. “Pivoting Towards Neo-

Middle-Power Diplomacy: Securing Agency in an Era of Great Power Rivalry.” Policy Perspectives, Canadian Global Affairs

rethink and refine its governance.

Institute. (November 26).

Lastly, I always found the Watsuji

Nagy, S. R., and J. Berkshire Miller. 2020.

Tetsurō 1935 book called Fudo (climate) to be something to think about. He writes on the relationship between the environment and human culture. Its ideas have much to disagree with but at the same time, we see some of his ideas being resurrected in today’s self-

“Why Canada Must Embrace a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Policy Brief. Japan

Institute for International Affairs (JIIA).

(November).

Nagy, S. R. 2020. “Accommodation versus

Alliance: Japan’s Prospective Grand Strategy

narratives emerging out of China.

in the Sino-US Competition.” Frameworks

Check out Stephen’s recent work:

Pandemic Sino-US Rivalry. Asan Forum,

Nagy, S. R. 2021. “Sino-Japanese Reactive

from Asia’s Northern Tier on the Post-

vol.8, no. 5: 1–18. ISSN 2288-5757 (October).

Diplomacy as seen through the Interplay

Nagy, S. R. 2020. “Middle Power Alignment

and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific

through Neo-middle Power Diplomacy.”

of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

Vision (FOIP).” China Report: 1–15. DOI: 10.1177/0009445520984735.

in the Indo-Pacific: Securing Agency

East Asia Security Centre, vol. 1: 1–14.

(August).

62 March – April 2021

When evil men plot, Good men must plan.

When evil men burn and bomb, Good men must build and bind.

When evil men shout ugly words of hatred, Good men must commit themselves to the glories of love.

Where evil men would seek to perpetuate an unjust status quo, Good men must seek to bring into being A real order of justice.

Martin Luther King, Jr.