September - October 2023

New era in Francophone Africa

nexus substantive?

The challenge of contemporary oil governance Zimbabwe and Zambia fall out over elections report

PUBLISHER’S NOTE

Navigating the complex terrain of anti-French sentiment in Francophone Africa

IN recent years, anti-French sentiment has been on the rise across several Francophone African nations, revealing a complex web of historical, political, and socioeconomic factors that underlie these sentiments. While it would be an oversimplification to categorise this sentiment as solely an outburst of frustration against a former colonial power, it is crucial to examine the various facets of this multifaceted issue.

Historical legacy

The roots of anti-French sentiment in Francophone Africa can be traced back to the era of colonialism. For decades, European powers, including France, held sway over vast territories in Africa. The legacy of colonisation continues to cast a long shadow over the continent. France, in particular, maintained close ties with its former colonies, often intervening in their domestic affairs. These historical ties, while complex, have left behind a legacy of resentment in some quarters.

Economic exploitation

One of the central grievances fuelling anti-French sentiment is the perception of economic exploitation. Critics argue that France continues to benefit economically from its former African colonies. The CFA franc, a currency used by 14 African countries, is pegged to the Euro and managed by the French Treasury. Critics see this as a form of economic neocolonialism, where France exerts significant control over the economies of these nations. The sentiment is that these countries are unable to exercise full economic sovereignty as long as they are tied to the CFA franc.

PUBLISHER’S NOTE

Political interference

Publisher

Jon Offei-Ansah

Editor Desmond Davies

Contributing Editors

Stephen Williams

Prof. Toyin Falola

Tikum Mbah Azonga

Contributors

Justice Lee Adoboe

Chief Chuks Iloegbunam

Joseph Kayira

Zachary Ochieng

Olu Ojewale

Oladipo Okubanjo

Corinne Soar

Kennedy Olilo

Gorata Chepete

Designer

Africa bucks global economic trend

Jon Offei-Ansah Publisher

Desmond Davies Editor

France has also faced criticism for its political interventions in Francophone Africa. In some instances, French governments have supported or toppled African leaders, often in pursuit of their interests. These actions have fuelled suspicions of neo-imperialism and have given rise to allegations that France is manipulating the political landscape in its former colonies to maintain control.

Simon Blemadzie

Country Representatives

Language and culture

Angela Cobbinah Deputy Editor

South Africa

Perceived inequality

In 2018, six of the 10 fastest-growing economies in the world were in Africa, according to the World Bank, with Ghana leading the pack. With GDP growth for the continent projected to accelerate to four per cent in 2019 and 4.1 per cent in 2020, Africa’s economic growth story continues apace. Meanwhile, the World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business Index reveals that five of the 10 most-improved countries are in Africa, and one-third of all reforms recorded globally were in sub-Saharan Africa. What makes the story more impressive and heartening is that the growth – projected to be broad-based – is being achieved in a challenging global environment, bucking the trend.

Contributing Editor

Stephen Williams

The French language and culture also play a role in shaping anti-French sentiment. While French remains the official language in many of these countries, there is a growing movement to promote African languages and cultures. Some view the continued prominence of French as a symbol of colonial oppression and cultural imperialism. This sentiment is not solely about rejecting the French language but is part of a broader push for cultural independence and identity.

Michael Orji Director, Special Projects

Contributors

Justice Lee Adoboe

Edward Walter Byerley

Top Dog Media, 5 Ascot Knights

47 Grand National Boulevard Royal Ascot, Milnerton 7441, South Africa

Tel: +27 (0) 21 555 0096

Cell: +27 (0) 81 331 4887

In the Cover Story of this edition, Dr. Hippolyte Fofack, Chief Economist at the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), analyses the factors underpinning this performance. Two factors, in my opinion, stand out in Dr. Hippolyte’s analysis: trade between Africa and China and the intra-African cross-border investment and infrastructure development.

Chuks Iloegbunam

Joseph Kayira

Zachary Ochieng

Olu Ojewale

Oladipo Okubanjo

Many Africans in Francophone countries feel marginalised and excluded from the benefits of development. Economic disparities and unequal access to resources have contributed to a sense of injustice. Some see France as complicit in propping up corrupt regimes that exacerbate these inequalities. This perception has led to resentment not just against domestic leaders but against external powers like France that are perceived to enable such regimes.

Email: ed@topdog-media.net

Ghana

Nana Asiama Bekoe

Much has been said and written about China’s ever-deepening economic foray into Africa, especially by Western analysts and commentators who have been sounding alarm bells about re-colonisation of Africa, this time by the Chinese. But empirical evidence paints a different picture.

Corinne Soar

Leadership and governance

Kingdom Concept Co.

Despite the decelerating global growth environment, trade between Africa and China increased by 14.5 per cent in the first three quarters of 2018, surpassing the growth rate of world trade (11.6 per cent), reflecting the deepening economic dependency between the two major trading partners.

Gloria Ansah Designer

Country Representatives

South Africa

Leadership and governance failures in Francophone African countries have also contributed to anti-French sentiment. When governments fail to deliver essential services, uphold the rule of law, or protect human rights, citizens often look for scapegoats. France, as a historical power with continued influence, can become an easy target for frustrations. Political leaders, too, sometimes deflect blame by invoking anti-French sentiments, diverting attention from their own shortcomings.

Tel: +233 243 393 943 / +233 303 967 470 kingsconceptsltd@gmail.com

Nigeria

Empirical evidence shows that China’s domestic investment has become highly linked with economic expansion in Africa. A one percentage point increase in China’s domestic investment growth is associated with an average of 0.6 percentage point increase in overall African exports. And, the expected economic development and trade impact of expanding Chinese investment on resource-rich African countries, especially oil-exporting countries, is even more important.

Edward Walter Byerley

Top Dog Media, 5 Ascot Knights

Nnenna Ogbu

#4 Babatunde Oduse crescent

Geostrategic considerations

47 Grand National Boulevard Royal Ascot, Milnerton 7441, South Africa

It's essential to recognise that anti-French sentiment does not manifest uniformly across all Francophone African nations. The extent and nature of these sentiments vary widely. Geostrategic considerations also play a significant role. France's military presence in some countries is seen as a stabilising force, while in others, it is viewed with suspicion. Nations with natural resources may have different dynamics than those without.

The resilience of African economies can also be attributed to growing intra-African cross-border investment and infrastructure development. A combination of the two factors is accelerating the process of structural transformation in a continent where industrial output and services account for a growing share of GDP. African corporations and industrialists which are expanding their industrial footprint across Africa and globally are leading the diversification from agriculture into higher value goods in manufacturing and service sectors. These industrial champions are carrying out transcontinental operations, with investment holdings around the globe, with a strong presence in Europe and Pacific Asia, together account for more than 75 per cent of their combined activities outside Africa.

Tel: +27 (0) 21 555 0096

Cell: +27 (0) 81 331 4887 Email: ed@topdog-media.net

Ghana

Nana Asiama Bekoe

Kingdom Concept Co.

Isheri Olowora - Isheri Berger, Lagos

Tel: +234 803 670 4879 getnnenna.ogbu@gmail.com

Kenya

A survey of 30 leading emerging African corporations with global footprints and combined revenue of more than $118 billion shows that they are active in several industries, including manufacturing (e.g., Dangote Industries), basic materials, telecommunications (e.g., Econet, Safaricom), finance (e.g., Ecobank) and oil and gas. In addition to mitigating risks highly correlated with African economies, these emerging African global corporations are accelerating the diversification of sources of growth and reducing the exposure of countries to adverse commodity terms of trade.

Tel: +233 243 393 943 / +233 303 967 470 kingsconceptsltd@gmail.com

Nigeria

Anti-French sentiment in Francophone Africa is a complex and multifaceted issue that cannot be boiled down to a single cause or explanation. It is born from a blend of historical grievances, economic inequalities, political manipulations, cultural aspirations, and governance failures. While some view France as a benevolent partner, others see it as a lingering shadow of colonialism.

Taiwo Adedoyin

MV Noble, Press House, 3rd Floor

Patrick Mwangi

Aquarius Media Ltd, PO Box 10668-11000

Nairobi, Kenya

Tel: 0720 391 546/0773 35 41

This makes me very bullish about Africa!

27 Acme Road, Ogba, Ikeja, Lagos Tel: +234 806 291 7100 taiadedoyin52@gmail.com

Kenya

Naima Farah

Addressing these sentiments requires nuanced and context-specific approaches. France and African nations must engage in open dialogue to address legitimate concerns and build partnerships based on mutual respect and cooperation. Acknowledging the historical context and working toward economic and political reforms that empower African nations is essential to finding a path forward. Ultimately, resolving anti-French sentiment in Francophone Africa will require a concerted effort from all stakeholders to navigate this complex terrain.

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LEADER COMMENT COVER STORY

Politics aside, France’s economic prowess in its former African colonies has been gradually dwindling as other world powers, notably the US and China, continue to make strong inroads in various financial sectors, writes

George Ola-Davies

France

In pursuit of the country’s interests in Africa, successive French governments have made little secret of their contempt for all independent and populist reasons while upholding puppet regimes, writes

Toyin Falola

There has been a governance deficit in response to conflict, especially in the last decade and this directly affects the quality and quantity of collective decisions and interventions made to address shared security threats, argues

Kayode Fayemi

With Russia under Western sanctions, increasingly becoming isolated and its promises from the 2019 meeting with African leaders having fallen flat, the declarations of the second such gathering are unlikely to yield concrete security outcomes for the continent, writes

Hubert Kinkoh

BOOKS BUSINESS & ECONOMY

Given that the voices of African oil-producing countries do not really count when it comes to managing the production and sale of their fossil fuel, the continent’s political leaders must take steps to change this because Africa has enormous energy resources to participate in decisionmaking, argues

Saliou Diallo

As African countries become increasingly entangled in the complex nature of the war in Ukraine, a new publication looks at how the links between Russia and the continent will now evolve in the wake of the conflict. Africa Briefing publishes excerpts from the book

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The problem with military interventions

AS the clamour for military intervention in Niger, where the soldiers grabbed power in July, appears to be subsiding, it would make sense for leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to sit back and reflect on their knee-jerk reaction to the coup. By every reckoning, any military intervention will yield serious negative effects. There are only two pro-sanction ECOWAS members, Benin and Nigeria, sharing borders with Niger.

Apart from this, there is the legal aspect. Legal experts agree that under international law and the UN Charter, the use of force is only legitimate if it is either authorised by the UN Security Council or is in exercise of individual or collective self-defence in response to an armed attack on the state using force, as provided for under Art. 51 of the Charter. But Niger has not threatened any of its neighbours.

So, on the face of it, unilateral military intervention by ECOWAS without Security Council authorisation would be illegal under the Charter, as Kofi Annan famously pointed out when the UK and US went ahead with their military adventure in Iraq in 2003.

The threatened move by ECOWAS is apparently based on its previous interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. But those interventions were couched in humanitarian terms aimed at stopping the civil wars in those countries, and to act as peacekeeping forces; not to reverse military coups and reinstate ousted governments.

In the debates that followed at the UN in those two situations, there was unanimity in the Security Council that ECOWAS, as a regional organisation, had no legal basis to mount a military intervention without such authorisation. But the Security Council reluctantly agreed because both interventions were to save civilian lives.

This was seen as a post facto validation of what ECOWAS had done, but not a proposition that regional organisations can authorise or use force without the say so of the Security Council. So, when NATO bombed Kosovo in 1999,

the Security Council denounced that act, too.

However, if ECOWAS were to seek UN authorisation, it would be vetoed in the Security Council, and probably not by Russia alone. The US, for that matter, has not come out to clearly encourage or support ECOWAS sabre-rattling, and nor has the AU either.

An analogy has been made with the small ECOWAS military force that was sent to The Gambia in 2017 to force the defeated Yahya Jammeh to step down. He was threatening not to hand over power to the winner of the presidential election who was then stuck in neighbouring Senegal.

But in that case, ECOWAS was more nuanced: it didn't say its mission was to attack the Gambian military, but to

In any case, there is also the international criminal law issue. The crime of aggression became part of the International Criminal Court in 2017, years after the Rome Statute of the ICC entered into force in July 2002. It took so long because of strong resistance to its inclusion from Western powers that had the propensity to commit such acts.

Thus, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and US President George W. Bush got away with the illegal occupation of Iraq. These two countries are now leading the call for Russia’s Vladimir Putin to face the ICC for his country’s invasion of Ukraine.

Would an intervention by ECOWAS amount to a crime of aggression under the ICC? That would depend on the actual elements, nature and consequences of the intervention.

provide security to the returning newly elected President Adama Barrow, who had requested ECOWAS assistance to enable him to assume office.

That action had the blessings of both the AU and the UN, because it was "intervention by invitation" by the newly elected and legitimate president. The Niger situation is utterly different. That's why even those who might sympathise with ousted President Mohamed Bazoum are cautious about setting a precedent: would ECOWAS want to mount armed intervention whenever there is a military coup?

Most politicians and policy makers are savvy enough to sense that such a development could have unintended consequences. So, as we have now seen, ECOWAS was merely sabre-rattling and will never act militarily. In time, Niger and ECOWAS will reach a compromise on an acceptable transition period and move on.

But even for the crime of aggression, the ICC can only prosecute individuals responsible for the acts of aggression – political or military leaders involved or implicated in the planning, initiation and execution – but not the states or organisations. The crime of aggression is a leadership crime. So, such crime would be imputed to ECOWAS political leaders and their chiefs of staff.

Given Africa’s controversial relationship with the ICC, this could just compound things. Those ECOWAS leaders who think they will be backed by Western countries to break international law in Niger will be surprised to see how quicky they are thrown to the wolves when the ICC steps in to exercise jurisdiction.

Diplomacy should have a much bigger role to play now than a chaotic military intervention if jihadists are not to overrun the region.

Niger has not threatened any of its neighbours to warrant armed intervention

Undiplomatic interference in elections in Africa

AS Liberia prepared for presidential and legislative elections on October 10, the US embassy in Monrovia announced that it wanted unfettered access to polling stations and the counting of votes for observers of the polls. In June, the US ambassy in Freetown was equally upfront while passing judgement on the presidential and parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone.

This has been the norm in the last 30 years or so since the second wave of democracy in Africa. However, given the disruptive nature of elections on the continent, it makes sense to have monitors who will try to ensure the democratic interests of the electorate are well protected.

Naturally, African politicians – mainly on the government side – have taken umbrage at the manner in which the US and the European Union mainly have jostled their way into the forefront of elections on the continent and making undiplomatic pronouncements. Surely,

in order. Take, for example, the recent statement signed by 13 US presidential centres and libraries expressing dismay at the direction American democracy is taking.

The recently released statement, spearheaded by the George W. Bush Presidential Centre, is signed by institutions established by Democrat former presidents Barack Obama and Bill Clinton, and Republican ex-presidents George H. W. Bush and Ronald Reagan, and eight similar bodies. The statement said poignantly: “Americans have a strong interest in supporting democratic movements and respect for human rights around the world because free societies elsewhere contribute to our own security and prosperity here at home.

“But that interest is undermined when others see our own house in disarray. The world will not wait for us to address our problems, so we must both continue to strive toward a more perfect union and help those abroad looking for US leadership.”

Desmond Davies

was in power, to restrict the presidency to two five-year terms. There you are: politicians are all the same, aren’t they?

In all this though, one is not holding a brief for errant African politicians. Far from it. They continue to game the democratic system and when they are caught out, they take offence. Why do these politicians complain about external interference in their countries’ internal affairs? After all, they are the ones who are responsible for this. Can they explain the reason behind sending copies of letters written to, say, the national electoral body to the various Western diplomatic missions in their countries?

Did Trump, when he was trying to illegally overturn the presidential election result, inform the different African embassies in Washington about his action? Somehow, I don’t think so.

This is where African politicians have a problem. They are always seeking external endorsements for doing things – for better or worse – that should really be of more concern to the people these politicians represent rather than outsiders.

They are not representing foreign interests. But by the way some of them carry one would think that they are foreign agents.

under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations this behaviour is contrary to the code of non-interference in the domestic affairs of countries in which diplomats are based?

Civil society organisations, on the other hand, can monitor governments and electoral processes without being accused of interference – although most of the time they are. With the increasing global move to strengthen human rights law, the issue of diplomats interfering in the internal affairs of countries they are posted to has become problematic.

But if foreign governments want to read the riot act to African countries on the matter of democracy, they should first of all make sure that their own houses are

This is a wake-up call for Americans to move on from the disruptive democratic system engendered by former President Donald Trump who attempted to illegally overturn the result of the presidential election, which he lost in 2020. The 13 presidential centres did not directly accuse the Republican Trump of undermining American democracy, but the implication is quite obvious.

France is another case in point. President Emmanuel Macron, who has been critical of African leaders trying to subvert the democratic process, is caught up in a rather undemocratic tussle. He is seething because he cannot run for a third term contrary to the Constitution. It was amended in 2008 when Nicholas Sarkozy

It is a clear case of the dependency syndrome that is gradually eroding African agency. The continent needs to up its game to deal positively with issues from African perspectives that lead to socio-economic development, and a stronger voice internationally, rather than constantly looking for outside commendation.

To achieve this, there is a need for more transparency and two-way communications between those who govern and the governed. The failure of African governments to talk regularly to the people is one reason why there are so many constraints on African societies and the democratic process.

This is why there is a growing increase in diplomatic interference in elections on the continent. Until African politicians themselves change the way in which they carry on, their complaints about such meddling will not be taken seriously. AB

Did Trump complain to African embassies in Washington when he was trying to illegally overturn the election result?

New era in Francophone Africa

GENERAL Albert Brice Oligui

Nguema has settled down to business in Gabon. If anything, history will credit him with thrusting aside the Bongo name from the political landscape in this small but very important Central African country after the family’s more than five decades of dominance.

The coup d’état that brought him to power bore the hallmark of other coups on the continent. It took a little over 24 hours to ascertain that negative forces will not thwart the action of the soldiers. This was the third such act since Ali Bongo Ondimba came to power; the earlier two were thwarted.

International condemnation was swift, if only for diplomacy’s sake. The African Union, China, France, the European Union and the US were among those that voiced their opinion about the coup. The AU immediately suspended the country from its ranks until constitutional order is restored. The Central African Economic Union (CEMAC) rather belatedly did likewise.

Among the majority of Gabonese, the coup was welcome. The ousted Bongo had served his two seven-year terms, but had manoeuvred his way through a referendum that changed the Constitution that allowed him to serve a fresh five-year term.

He could have even done a second term since this was a new beginning. But he had become a shadow of the vibrant character he was when he assumed office 14 years earlier after the death of his father, Omar Bongo Ondimba.

In October 2018 he suffered a stroke while attending a conference in Saudi Arabia. That took him out of public glare for almost a year. Surprisingly, after a month in Riyadh, he sought further medical

treatment, not in France, but in Morocco where he spent nine months.

Those 10 months while Bongo was out of the country led to a number of speculations. Was he going to continue and if he did, would he not be playing a back seat role? Who would have succeeded him if not another Bongo? But as time went on, he successfully masterminded the

referendum which gave him the legitimacy to contest again.

Bongo’s first public appearance after the stroke was in August 2019 during the country’s independence celebrations. He was closely monitored as he strode with a walking stick with aides at the ready for any eventuality. His speech was slurred, his pace alarmingly slow, he was emotionless

Politics aside, France’s economic prowess in its former African colonies has been gradually dwindling as other world powers, notably the US and China, continue to make strong inroads in various financial sectors, writes George Ola-Davies

as he sat next to his wife, Sylvia; public appearances became extremely rare and information about the evolution of his health was not forthcoming either.

Prior to his illness, Bongo had been gradually limping out of the evertightening Franco/Gabonese relationship which epitomised his father’s four decades in office. First, the younger Bongo took Gabon into the fold of the British Commonwealth; then he swerved over to the Chinese who today are the principal investors in the country’s economic sector.

He hardly visited France like his father before him. Although Bongo’s wife is French, none of their children studied in France as would have usually been the case. They were either educated in the US or the UK.

With a population of just 2.3 million people, Gabon had been a key player in Franco-African relations for more than

half-a-century. Omar Bongo was a constant interlocutor whenever political cleavages hit another Francophone African nation.

The French military base in Gabon had taken part during many interventions, including those in neighbouring Central African Republic, Chad and Togo. During the 1990 Franco-African Summit in La

of Morocco and Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo were closest to the then French President, Francois Mitterrand, throughout the sessions. Bongo was in fact one of two African leaders that addressed the final press conference alongside Mitterrand.

But if it was thought that the conference signalled the beginning of

Baule, Southern France, which ushered in a new spate of multi-party democracy after a series of National conferences, the likes of Omar Bongo, King Hassan

much tighter ties, the recent coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger and now Gabon told a different story. They reinforced the seemingly anti-French sentiments within most of the Francophone Africa bloc, especially among the youths.

Evidently, the trend in recent years clearly demonstrated a shift from the status quo. The Central African Republic kick-started it all when the government of President Faustin Archange Touadéra brought in Russian paramilitaries to help him fend off rebel groups advancing on Bangui.

French troops had been in the country since 2013 under Operation Sangaris. They were supposed to have been doing what the Russian Wagner Group was invited to do. Sangaris was France’s seventh military intervention in the CAR since the country gained independence in 1960. However, French troops pulled out and gave way to Wagner which still attracts strong criticism not for its military presence but for its role in the CAR’s economic sector.

Early last year, Paris withdrew the last of its troops from Mali, nine years after it established Operation Barkhane in the north of the country to fight off a jihadist insurgency. Relations between France and Mali plummeted after the military seized power in Bamako in August 2020 and eventually brought in Russian paramilitaries. The military leadership reviewed the country’s Constitution and struck out French as its official language.

In February this year, Burkina Faso ordered France to withdrew its military

Gen. Albert Brice Oligui Nguema: dislodged the Bongo dynasty

The Bongo family has dominated Gabon’s political landscape for more than five decades

personnel in the country, following in the footsteps of Mali. The final withdrawal of the 400-strong troops under Operation Sabre ended a long-standing military cooperation between both countries. The Burkinabé authorities confirmed to their French counterparts that they would not turn to the Russian private military contractor for support. Rather they said they would defend their territory with “our men and women”.

France’s waning influence on the continent became pronounced during the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy and that

trajectory grew even stronger under the Socialist President, Francois Holland. That it lost its grip was seen in its inability to encourage the civilian leaders to relinquish power after their constitutionally limited two terms. This was the case in Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire before the Bongo episode.

Politics aside, France’s economic prowess has also been dwindling in a mathematical progression in most of these countries as other world powers, notably the US and China, have been making very strong inroads in the areas of infrastructure development, the industrial and mining

sectors and even the running of small-scale businesses. In Gabon, for example, the Chinese are the driving force in the forestry and mining sectors.

Last year alone, Gabon exported close to $4 billion worth of commodities to China, which accounted for more than half of its total exports. Among the exports are crude oil, manganese ore and sawn wood. China has been in the forefront in financing a huge chunk of Gabon’s infrastructural projects. These include the two hydroelectric dams and a 22km road project which, though small, provide a foundation for new economic activities. In his 14 years in office, Ali Bongo paid five visits to China. Not that many to France.

In the case of Senegal, Paris had come in for strong criticism for not advising President Macky Sall against changing the Constitution to allow him to stand for a third term, as was done in both Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. But desperate Senegalese made it clear they were not interested in another term and the president succumbed.

French President Emmanuel Macron had clearly stated that France’s policy toward its former colonies was going to change radically. Without any doubt there are historic economic links, and France continued to be a privileged partner until

Early last year, Paris withdrew the last of its troops from Mali

French President Emmanuel Macron had clearly stated that France’s policy toward its former colonies was going to change radically

younger leadership emerged that wanted radical departure from those policies. But such a change, however much needed, will not happen overnight as the entangled legal intricacies binding them will take years, if not decades, to be untangled.

Mali, Burkina Faso and, most recently, Niger had all made a determination to strike out all military cooperation with France, and they are all on track. Given the continent’s fragile democracies it will be difficult for now to say that these

Niger coup: what’s new?

THE scenario was all too familiar to watchers of military coups in Africa, and Niger in particular. Nigeriens are no strangers to coups d’état since the country’s independence from France in 1960.

Lieutenant Colonel Seyni Kounché overthrew the first civilian leader, President, Hamani Diori, on April 15, 1974. Kounché was himself to abort three coup attempts in 1975, 1976 and 1983 before his death following a brain tumour in 1989.

He was succeeded by his Chief of Staff, General Ali Saibou, who in 1991 – following international pressure – organised a national conference that gave birth to democratic rule. Two years later, in 1993, President Mahamane

military regimes will last for long, as there is no clear picture of the future leadership, civilian or otherwise, that will be able to hold sway in the current situation.

Mali has gone as far as ceasing to use French as its official language preferring, instead, to use some of its local languages. That in itself has been posing a huge challenge as some of these languages remain largely unwritten.

It is true that these countries under

Ousmane was voted in as a civilian head of state but was there for less than two years. On January 27, 1997, he was overthrown by Colonel Ibrahim Barré Mainasara who spent only two years in office before he was killed in yet another coup in April 1999. His successor, Colonel Dauda Malam Wanke, decided to hand over power to civilians.

The presidential election in November that year was won by Mamadou Tandja. He would stay in office for 10 years before being ousted through the barrel of a gun in 2010. When the soldiers took over, they promised to hand power to a civilian regime after elections, and they honoured that deal. The next election, held early in 2011, was won

military rule are in transition and will be coming out with new constitutions. But that they have been suspended from the AU and the regional bodies of ECOWAS and CEMAC do not seem to augur well for their immediate future.

Can they go it alone? Will these African groupings bend over backwards and come to their aid in charting new paths? Are the military leaders ready to weather the storm? The only arbiter will be time.

by Mahammadou Issoufou and his Parti Nigerien pour la democratie et le Socialisme. Issoufou became the first Nigerien president to fulfil the constitutional two-term mandate and step down from office.

President Mohamed Bazoum survived a first military coup barely a month into his term in office on the night of March 30-31, 2021, but was not so lucky this time. Apparently, he was overthrown by the man he trusted so much that he was made head of his presidential guard.

The road ahead for the new leadership will not be a smooth one. Although junta supporters have been burning French flags and waving Russian ones, no clear alignment has been made so far.

Macky Sall: Senegalese made it clear they were not interested in another term and he succumbed

France and its permanent colonies

FRANCE ruined Haiti, the first black country to become independent in 1804. France is still on course to ruining its former African colonies. It is no coincidence that the recent spate of coups in Africa has manifested in former French African colonies (so-called Francophone Africa), once again redirecting the global spotlight on France's activities in the region. The commentaries, especially amongst Africans, have been most critical of France and its continued interference in Africa.

France's meddling in the economic and political affairs of “independent” Francophone countries has invariably seen it embroiled, both directly and indirectly, in a series of unrests, corruption controversies and assassinations that have bedevilled the region since independence. Unlike Britain and other European countries, which had colonial possessions in Africa, France never left – at least not in the sense of the traditional distance observed since independence by the other erstwhile colonial overlords. Instead, it has, under the cover of a policy of coopération within the framework of an extended “French Community”, continued to maintain a perceptible cultural, economic, political and military presence in Africa.

On the surface, the promise of coopération between France and its former colonies in Africa presupposes a relationship of mutual benefit between politically independent nations. This is whereby the former would, through the provision of technical and military assistance, lead the development/ advancement of its erstwhile colonial “family”; commendable and perhaps even worthy of emulation.

However, when this carefully scripted façade is juxtaposed with the reality that has unfolded over the decades, what is revealed is an extensive conspiracy involving individuals at the highest levels of the French government. Along with

In pursuit of the country’s interests in Africa, successive French governments have made little secret of their contempt for all independent and populist reasons while upholding puppet regimes, writes Toyin Falola

Charles de Gaulle: he had an ambition to see France maintain its status as a world power

other influential business interests – also domiciled in France – they have worked with a select African elite to orchestrate the most extensive and heinous crimes against the people of today's Francophone Africa. A people who, even today, continue to strain under the weight of France's insatiable greed.

The greed that drove the European nations to abandon trade for colonialisation in Africa is alive today as it was in the 1950s and 1980s. The decision to give in to African demands for independence was not the outcome of any benevolence or civilised reasoning on the part of Europe, but for economic and political expedience.

Thus, when the then French President, Charles de Gaulle – who nurtured an ambition to see France maintain its status as a world power – agreed to independence for its African colonies, it was only a pre-emptive measure to stop the further loss of French influence on the continent. In other words, the political liberation offered “on a platter of gold” was a means to avoid the development of other costly wars of independence, which a World War II-depleted France was already fighting in Indochina and Algeria.

Independence, thus, was only the first step in ensuring the survival of French

interests in Africa and, more importantly, their prioritisation. Pursuant to this objective, De Gaulle also proposed a "French Community" – delivered on the same "golden platter" – as a caveat to continued French patronage. As such, the over 98 per cent of its colonies which agreed to be part of this community were roped into signing coopération accords –covering economic, political, military and cultural sectors – by Jacques Foccart, a former intelligence member of the French Resistance in the Second World War, handpicked by De Gaulle.

This signing of coopération accords between France and the colonies, which opted to be part of its post-independence French Community, marked the beginning

Commonly referred to as Françafrique – a pejorative derivation from Felix Houphouet Boigny's “France-Afrique” describing the close ties between France and Africa – France's neo-colonial footprint in Africa has been characterised by allegations of corruption and other covert activities perpetrated through various Franco-African economic, political and military networks. An essential feature of Françafrique is the mafia-like relationship between French leaders and their African counterparts, which was reinforced by a dense web of personal networks.

On the French side, the former colonies, which had been French presidents' domaine réservé (sole responsibility) since 1958, were now run

of France's neo-colonial regime in Africa, where Africans got teachers and despotic leaders in exchange for their natural resources and French military installations.

by an "African cell" founded and managed by Foccart. Comprising French presidents, influential members of the French business community and the French secret service,

Unlike Britain and other European countries, which had colonial possessions in Africa, France never left

An essential feature of Françafrique is the mafia-like relationship between French leaders and their African counterparts, which was reinforced by a dense web of personal networks

this cell operated outside the purview of the French parliament. This created a window for corruption, as politicians and state officials took part in business arrangements, which amounted to state racketeering.

Those with pro-French sentiments within Africa always argue for France's continuous presence and contributions, particularly in the area of military intervention and economic aid. They claim that these have been critical to security, political stability and economic survival in the region. Such arguments, though, intentionally play down the historical consequences of French interests in the region.

Enjoying free rein in the region –backed mainly by the US and Britain since the Cold War – France used the opportunity to strengthen its hold on its former colonies. This translated into the development of a franc zone, a restrictive monetary policy tying the economies of Francophone countries to France, as well as the adoption of an active interventionist approach, which has produced over 120 military interventions across 14 dependent

states between 1960 and the 1990s.

These interventions, which were either to rescue stranded French citizens, put down rebellions, prevent coups, restore

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order, or uphold French-favoured regimes, have rarely been about improving the fortunes of the general population of Francophone Africa. French interventions have maintained undemocratic regimes in Cameroon, Senegal, Chad, Gabon and Niger. At the same time, its joint military action in Libya was responsible for unleashing Islamic terrorism now threatening to engulf countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria.

In pursuit of its interests in Africa, France has made little secret of its

contempt for all independent and populist arguments for a change of the status quo while upholding puppet regimes. In Guinea in 1958, De Gaulle embarked on a ruthless agenda to undermine the government of Ahmed Sékou Touré – destroying infrastructure and flooding the economy with fake currency – for voting to stay out of the French Community.

This behaviour was again replicated in Togo, where that country's first President, Sylvanus Olympio, was overthrown and murdered for daring to establish a central bank for the country outside the Franc CFA Zone. Subsequently, his killer, Gnassingbé Eyadema, assumed office and ruled from

Togo’s first President, Sylvanus Olympio, was overthrown and murdered for daring to establish a central bank for the country outside the Franc CFA zone

1967 till his death in 2005 – after which he was succeeded by his son, who still rules.

In Gabon, there was the Bongo family who ran a regime of corruption and oppression with the open support of France throughout 56 years of unproductive rule. As for Cameroon, the most promising, panAfricanist and pro-independence leader, Felix Moumie, died under mysterious circumstances in Switzerland, paving the way for Paul Biya, who has been president since 1982. France also backs a Senegalese government, which today holds over 1,500 political prisoners, and had singlehandedly installed Alassane Ouattara as President of Cote d'Ivoire.

Therefore, the widespread anti-France sentiment among the populations of Francophone Africa and beyond is not unfounded, as it has become apparent to all and sundry that these countries have not fared well under the shadow of France. In Niger, where France carried out one

of the bloodiest campaigns of colonial pacification in Africa – murdering and pillaging entire villages – and which is France's most important source of uranium, the income per capita was 59 per cent lower in 2022 than it was in 1965.

In Cote d'Ivoire, the largest producer of cocoa in the world, the income per capita was 25 per cent lower in 2022 than in 1975. Outside the rampant unemployment, systematic disenfranchisement and infrastructural deficits that characterise these Francophone countries, there is also the frustration and anger of sitting back to watch helplessly.

In contrast, the wealth of a country is being carted away to nations whose people feed on this and then turn around to pass judgements and make disparaging comments about these natural-resource African countries. The people are tired of being poor, helpless and judged as thirdworld citizens.

It is indeed overdue for France to cut its losses – whatever it envisages they are –and step back from its permanent colonies to allow the people of Francophone Africa to decide on their preferred path to the future. After nearly 200 years of taking from them, the people have had good reasons to say France should leave.

The restlessness and the coups that have become commonplace in the region are symptoms of deeper underlying social, economic and political problems, including weak institutions, systematic disenfranchisement, poverty, corruption and/or misappropriation of national wealth. And as we call on France to do the honourable thing and withdraw, we should also rebuke Africa's leaders who have not only put their interests above that of their people but have also turned the instruments of regional intervention and development (like the AU and ECOWAS) into tools for ensuring their political survival.

Toyin Falola is Distinguished Teaching Professor at The University of Texas at Austin.

France singlehandedly installed Alassane Ouattara as President of Cote d'Ivoire

Soldiers and citizens: unpacking the resurgence of coups in Africa

OVER the past decade, democracies worldwide have faced numerous challenges, and Africa has not been immune to these issues. One alarming trend has been the sudden increase in military coups on the continent. Between 2020 and 2022, Africa experienced six successful coups and three attempted coups, marking a significant surge compared to previous decades. While support for coup leadership has been initially prominent, it tends to be shortlived.

The wave of democratisation that swept across Africa since the early 1990s brought

progress in upholding constitutional order. Democratic governments were established, and peaceful transitions of power through elections became more common. The African Union (AU) played a key role in promoting democratic governance through initiatives like the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance.

However, the recent resurgence of coups is a cause for concern as it threatens democratic backsliding, political turbulence, and increased military involvement in political affairs. Seizing power through military means poses significant risks to peace and democratic

progress within affected countries, as well as the potential for spill-over effects and wider destabilisation.

In response to this trend, the AU and the United Nations (UN) have strongly condemned unconstitutional changes of government (UCG). The UN SecretaryGeneral, António Guterres, described the "epidemic of coups d'états" unfolding globally and urged effective deterrence from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

As part of the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) commitment to address these events, a new study titled Soldiers and Citizens adopts a development-focused approach aligned with the organisation's mandate. Developed in partnership with the AU Commission, the report aims to support continental leadership efforts in combating UCG. It offers a forward-looking perspective to prevent future coups and foster transformative change and sustained constitutional order.

The research findings are based on an extensive perceptions survey involving 8,000 African citizens. Among the respondents, 5,000 individuals from Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan have experienced coups or UCG events. Their views were contrasted with those of 3,000 citizens from countries on a democratic transition or consolidation path, including The Gambia, Ghana, and Tanzania. The study presents the perspectives of the former as UCG settings and the latter as democratic transition states (DTS). This comprehensive dataset enables a people-centred analysis of critical issues and trends.

Before each coup, the five UCG countries experienced unique dynamics. However, a regional perspective suggests that coup risk is influenced by a multitude of shared factors. “The recent military

A newly-released UNDP study examines factors behind the rise in military coups and the implications for democratic progress and stability in Africa, Jon Offei-Ansah reports

The AU played a key role in promoting democratic governance

coups in Africa have occurred amidst an era of interdependence and complexity, characterised by geopolitical, economic, digital, environmental, and sociocultural transformations. Consequently, simplistic explanations or single-factor approaches are ineffective in unravelling the complexities surrounding coups,” according to the study.

The study also highlights the ephemeral nature of optimism and popular support for military coups. Positive sentiments fluctuated when respondents were asked about their current feelings compared to the time of the political transition. This mirrors trends observed in other contexts where initial support for coups diminished over time. It suggests that support for coup leaders may stem from dissatisfaction with the existing status quo rather than wholehearted endorsement of military rule. “Instances in Guinea and Burkina Faso demonstrate how crowds turned against leaders they had initially cheered into power. This delicate interplay between hope, delivery, and expectation increases the risk of prolonged turbulence in transitional contexts,” it says.

Another factor contributing to declining civic confidence in transitional governments is the limited delivery of promised inclusivity. With the exception of Sudan, all UCG countries established transitional legislative councils to some extent, aiming to reflect the countries' diversity. These councils engaged in dialogues with sociopolitical forces to achieve consensus on transition management. However, criticism grew in all five cases, primarily concerning inclusivity. Hostility between junta leadership and opposition voices intensified as a result.

Divergent views on democracy and the military were evident among respondents. In DTS countries, over two-thirds expressed a preference for democracy over any other form of government. In UCG contexts, just over half shared this view, while the remainder believed that non-democratic governments could sometimes be preferable or that the type of government system did not matter to them. The disappointment with democratically elected governments fuelled the perception that non-democratic governance could be a legitimate alternative, especially in UCG countries. Nevertheless, fewer women than men expressed a preference for a non-democratic system.

The data reveals a desire for change among respondents, particularly among

coup supporters. The need for change was cited as the most significant reason for supporting a military takeover, followed by aspirations for better governance and security. In DTS countries, respondents cited better governance, constitutional mandates, and the desire for change as prominent reasons for supporting the results of the last election.

When respondents were asked to elaborate on circumstances justifying alternatives to democracy, many pointed to instances of abuse or dysfunction within democratic systems. The majority in UCG countries believed that such circumstances warranted alternatives, while a significant proportion in DTS countries highlighted corruption as a key concern.

The study also suggests that coup

study says.

The Soldiers and Citizens research not only sheds light on the factors behind the resurgence of coups in Africa but also highlights vulnerabilities even in states on a path of democratic transition or consolidation. Even in comparatively stable and developmentally advanced countries, frustration, scepticism, and dissatisfaction with governance persist. The study underscores the urgent need to address ongoing inequality, government underperformance, and elite selfenrichment across the continent.

As Africa strives for a brighter future, citizens call for informed engagement in electoral processes and effective governance. It is a collective responsibility

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risk may spread beyond the countries directly affected. Volatility and erosion of constitutional order can persist beyond transition timelines, as evidenced by the warfare between coup instigators in Sudan. “Coups in one country may inspire leaders in other countries to bypass normative frameworks and regional institutions,” the

to build resilient democratic systems that foster inclusivity, transparency, and accountability. By addressing the root causes of coups and advancing transformative change, Africa can forge a path towards sustained constitutional order, democratic progress, and stability.

The recent resurgence of coups is a cause for concern

The leadership-peace nexus in Africa

AFRICA has, unfortunately, witnessed increased insecurity which is manifesting through the outbreak of devastating conflicts, the latest of which are occurring in the Horn of Africa, in Ethiopia and Sudan. The continent is also witnessing increased activities of rogue and/or mercenary groups, whose modus operandi reflects the transnational nature of organised crime, such as the Wagner Group’s operations in the Sahel and parts of the Horn of Africa –further fuelling conflicts.

This is reminiscent of the role of Sandline and Executive Outcomes in the 1990s. Added to this is the increasing occurrence of military coups and unconstitutional changes of governments on the continent.

Many of these changes are also linked to increased geopolitical contests across the globe. For example, Chad enjoys the support of France, while Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso enjoy the support of Russia.

What is not in doubt is that these conflicts have hampered development, perpetuated poverty and shattered the social fabric of our nations. But they have also served as a sobering reminder of the urgent

need to address the leadership-peace nexus.

We have to acknowledge that there has been a leadership deficit in response to conflict, especially in the last decade and this directly affects the quality and quantity of collective decisions and interventions made to address shared security threats, as well as the collective approach to the development of peace and security policies.

The deficit has resulted in limited or no action to deal with the most severe threats to our peace and stability. Two examples: it took the African Union close to a year to work out a formula to tackle the Tigray conflict, the worst global conflict so far in the 21st century. We are also witnessing, rather helplessly, the unfolding carnage in Sudan, without the operationalisation of any framework or roadmap, months after the outbreak of the conflict. This has exposed the weak underbelly of our regional and sub-regional institutions mandated to tackle threats to peace and stability.

We cannot afford to overlook the interplay between effective leadership and sustainable peace if we are to achieve the prosperous future we envision for our continent. There is no doubt that the political will of African leaders has reduced

considerably.

The challenge to the African Peace and Security Architecture and other normative frameworks is not emanating from the lack of quality or proven effectiveness of the APSA. There is empirical evidence on the successes recorded over time in direct peacemaking interventions by African states, by the continental body, the African Union (AU), and by regional economic communities such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The challenge is a lack of political will and action.

To address these challenges and work towards sustainable peace, it is crucial to emphasise the interdependence between leadership and peacebuilding. There is a need for a new generation of leaders who possess the potential to bridge divides and promote peace and security.

Young people fit into this box as they are capable of transcending fixed identities, advocating for diversity, justice, reconciliation, accountability and transparency. By empowering individuals to become agents of change, leadership becomes central to the process of transformation and peace.

Creating a space for non-partisan, unbiased and neutral approaches is essential in fostering unity among people. This requires moving away from divisive narratives and embracing values such as compassion, cooperation and care.

While military interventions and political strategies have often taken precedence in addressing conflicts, it is vital to prioritise a humanitarian approach to healing and social transformation alongside these measures. Rebuilding for justice and peace should involve everyone, replacing impunity and separatist narratives with compassion and dignity for all. It is essential to acknowledge the lived realities of those most affected by conflicts and to engage in meaningful conversations to address the fractures within society.

There has been a governance deficit in response to conflict, especially in the last decade and this directly affects the quality and quantity of collective decisions and interventions made to address shared security threats, argues Kayode Fayemi

The continent is also witnessing increased activities of rogue and/or mercenary groups like the Wagner Group

In recent years, there has been a growing recognition of the significance of leadership in driving sustainable development in Africa. The AU, regional organisations and various initiatives have focused on leadership development programmes, capacity building and promoting ethical and accountable leadership.

ECOWAS is one such body that has successfully brought together official and non-governmental actors in the last two decades. The leadership-peace-development nexus can be observed through the experience of ECOWAS since the late 1980s.

Initially established in 1975 to foster economic and social integration in West Africa, ECOWAS set ambitious goals related to trade expansion, infrastructure improvement, monetary cooperation and strengthening production structures. However, the outbreak of devastating civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire led to a shift in priorities.

ECOWAS had to de-emphasise its economic objectives and focus on resolving conflicts and restoring peace in the region, with Nigeria playing a key role –particularly at a time that witnessed the loss of the imperial security umbrella. Just as Kofi Annan reflected in the UN Agenda for Peace declaration, it became clear that there can be no peace without development and there can be no development without peace and security.

Sitting at that intersection is the capable state, providing good governance and delivering public goods to the people. This experience highlighted the need to prioritise security before development, prompting ECOWAS to adopt a strategy centred on good governance, human rights and peaceful conflict resolution as the foundations for sustainable development.

Equally, while military interventions and political strategies have often taken precedence in addressing conflicts – and ECOWAS has again been a leader in this regard with its pioneering work in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea Bissau and Cote d’Ivoire – it is also imperative to prioritise a humanitarian approach to healing and social transformation alongside these measures. Rebuilding for justice and peace requires the active involvement of everyone, replacing impunity and separatist narratives

with compassion and dignity for all. It is crucial to acknowledge the lived realities of those most affected by conflicts and engage in meaningful conversations to address societal fractures.

Intellectual elites, comprising academics, researchers and professionals, play a vital role in shaping leadership in Africa. Our expertise, knowledge and critical thinking are instrumental in informing policy decisions and advancing effective leadership practices.

But where does the intersection between academia, activism and politics take place? There exists the impression that there is a difference and that it requires moving from one to the other. If one follows this line of thought, one might be tempted to assume that the three – politics, activism and academia – are mutually exclusive.

There have always been attempts both in recent times and in our not so recent past to make a distinction between those who engage in advanced study, research and intellectual pursuits; those who stand at the barricades seeking change in their quest for a better society; and those who wield power in politics in defence of the state.

I would argue that politics – properly conducted – is a form of social activism and scholarly engagement, and another stage in the struggle to restore the dignity of humankind. The discussion should revolve around fostering effective leadership, nurturing active citizenship and promoting a good society because without direct citizen engagement, the legitimacy of our political

institutions will continue to decline.

It is essential for political leaders, whether politicians or scholars, to be concerned about the erosion of trust and participation from average citizens, as it undermines their ability to lead effectively and jeopardises the governance of our society. Conversely, when people lose trust in leaders or disregard politicians, it weakens our democratic institutions and puts us at risk of becoming ungovernable. This, in part, has been responsible for the conflict-ridden situations in many of our countries.

We believe that effective leadership and good governance are essential for sustained peace and must be relevant to people's lives, addressing issues like corruption, transparency, and improving the wellbeing of citizens. Poverty, oppression and insecurity create fertile ground for violence, and Africans not only desire democracy but also tangible improvements in their lives that create a peaceful and dignified environment.

To revitalise our continent and improve the lives of our people, we must bridge the gap between scholarship, activism and politics, recognising that the engagement of intellectual, academic and civil society is crucial for the health and legitimacy of the state. By strengthening institutions, promoting public participation and pursuing the common good, we can achieve individual contentment and collective progress, ultimately reaching our desired destination in our lifetime.

Kofi Annan: 'there can be no peace without development and there can be no development without peace and security'

In the 1980s and 1990s, a period of heightened dissent and activism in Nigeria, Dr Kayode Fayemi found himself at the forefront of a resistance movement in exile pitted against a Nigerian military dictatorship that sought to stifle democracy and silence opposition. A former two-term Governor of Ekiti State in south west Nigeria, he is currently a Visiting Professor at the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London. The above is an abridged version of his presentation at the ALC this July.

Africa's ascension: the African Union joins G20, shaping the global stage

THE African Union (AU) has achieved a historic milestone by securing permanent membership in the Group of 20 (G20), marking a momentous acknowledgment of Africa's significance in global geopolitics. What are the multifaceted implications of this development, considering Africa's demographic surge, its quest for equitable representation in global bodies, and the challenges and opportunities it brings?

The inclusion of the African Union in the G20 is a resounding testament to Africa's growing prominence. United States President Joe Biden's endorsement of the AU's permanent G20 membership, coupled with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's official invitation, underscores the importance of Africa in global affairs. After seven years of advocacy, the AU has succeeded, with South Africa previously being the sole African representative in the G20.

Permanent G20 membership symbolises the ascent of Africa, home to a burgeoning young population of 1.3 billion. This demographic explosion is projected to double by 2050, constituting a quarter of the world's population. As Africa's influence grows, so does its demand for equitable participation in global decision-making.

The AU's 55 member states, including the disputed Western Sahara, are keen on securing meaningful roles in global institutions. They advocate for reforms in the global financial system, including organisations like the World Bank, which often imposes higher borrowing costs on African nations, exacerbating their debt burdens.

Africa is attracting increased investment and political interest from emerging global powers, extending beyond the traditional influences of the United States and former European colonisers. China stands as Africa's largest trading partner and lender, while Russia serves as

a significant arms provider. Gulf nations have emerged as major investors, and Turkey maintains its largest overseas military base and embassy in Somalia. Meanwhile, Israel and Iran are expanding their outreach in search of partnerships.

African leaders challenge the narrative that portrays the continent as a passive victim of war, extremism, and disaster, perpetually pressured to align with one global power or another. They aspire to be brokers of peace and stability, as evident in African peace initiatives following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

The inclusion of the African Union in the G20 recognises Africa as a global power in its own right, with the potential to assert its interests independently.

Full G20 membership grants the AU a platform to represent a continent housing the world's largest free trade area. Additionally, Africa boasts vast resources

crucial for combating climate change, despite contributing the least to global emissions.

The African continent possesses 60 percent of the world's renewable energy assets and over 30 percent of the minerals essential for renewable and low-carbon technologies. Notably, Congo alone holds nearly half of the world's cobalt, a critical component in lithium-ion batteries, as revealed in a recent United Nations report on Africa's economic development.

African leaders are eager to shift from resource extraction to industrial development within the continent, ultimately benefiting their economies. Acknowledging Africa's vast natural assets, Kenyan President William Ruto emphasised the need for fairer treatment by financial institutions, the fulfilment of rich countries' promised $100 billion annual climate financing for developing nations,

The African Union's permanent membership in the G20 is a landmark moment, highlighting Africa's growing influence on the world stage. Jon Offei-Ansah explores the implications, challenges, and opportunities presented by this historic development

The G20 recognises Africa as a global power in its own right

and the establishment of a global tax on fossil fuels.

While Africa's potential is undeniable, finding common ground among the AU's diverse member states presents a significant challenge. These states range from economic powerhouses like Nigeria and Ethiopia to some of the world's poorest nations. Furthermore, the AU's

rotating chairmanship, changing annually, complicates efforts to maintain consistency in policies and actions.

Nonetheless, unity is imperative for Africa to wield effective influence within the G20. African leaders have demonstrated their capacity for collective action, notably during the Covid-19 pandemic, when they united in condemning the hoarding of vaccines by wealthier nations and collaborated to secure bulk purchases of essential supplies for the continent.

Now, as a high-profile G20 member, Africa's demands carry greater weight and will be harder to ignore, signalling a pivotal moment in Africa's quest for equitable representation and influence on the global stage.

However, Robert Besseling, CEO of Pangea-Risk, and intelligence advisory group based in South Africa and Britain, views the AU's G20 seat as more symbolic than substantive. He emphasises that meaningful action is required to address challenges such as military coups and irregular elections that threaten Africa's democratic progress.

“The AU seat at the G20 will be meaningless,” Besseling said, if the African body cannot react decisively to events that include “the spree of military coups and irregular elections that have set back Africa’s democratic trajectory in recent months.”

Dennis Matanda, an adjunct professor of American politics and international business, sees an opportunity for the AU to assert itself on the global stage. He underscores the significance of Africa's juxtaposition with the European Union and emphasises the importance of generating Africa's own narrative.

While Besseling raises doubts about the AU's cohesion, he acknowledges that geopolitical rivalries have played a role in the G20's evolving dynamics. This development may diversify global alliances and foster new avenues for cooperation.

Matanda calls for African nations to defend their own interests and exert control over their finances. He underscores the need for the AU to assess its opportunities and exercise greater influence, especially as the G20 becomes an increasingly influential global forum.

The African Union's permanent membership in the G20 marks a historic milestone in Africa's pursuit of a more influential role on the global stage. While experts may debate the immediate impact, the AU's presence underscores Africa's growing influence, demographic significance, and vast resources. Challenges lie ahead, but with unity and assertive action, Africa's voice within the G20 and the broader international community will be increasingly challenging to ignore. This development reflects a pivotal moment in Africa's journey towards equitable representation and influence in global geopolitics.

Indian PM Modi greets the AU Chairman, Comoros President Azali Assoumani, at the G20 summit

Strengthening Africa’s post-Cold War security

The University of Pretoria’s Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship (CAS) in South Africa; the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) in Uppsala, Sweden; and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) office in Ethiopia convened a high-level policy dialogue on the state of Africa’s security after the Cold War on May 19 and 20, 2023 in Addis Ababa. Africa Briefing publishes an abridged version of the policy brief based on key discussions and recommendations from the meeting

THE late Kenyan scholar, Ali Mazrui, coined the concept of “Pax Africana” in a seminal 1967 study which called for Africans to create and consolidate peace on their continent through their own exertions. His idea of “continental jurisdiction” urged meddling outsiders to stay out of the continent and let Africans resolve their own problems.

The recent spate of military coups d’état in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Chad were noted as worrying trends that reflect the failure of African governments to tackle the root causes of conflicts by addressing issues of poverty, marginalisation, and the effective management of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity. The conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan have involved diverse identities, ethnicities and religions.

In Sudan, violence between the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) stems from power struggles over Arab, African and Islamic identities. South Sudan's civil war has been similarly fuelled by ethnic tensions. Africa’s “conflicts of identities” thus need to be adroitly managed to achieve effective state-building.

A proposed 25,000-strong African Standby Force (ASF), which should have been established in 2010, remains a work in progress. In order to strengthen Africa’s security architecture, funding and logistics must also be prioritised. The AU Peace Fund has raised $348 million, which should help support African-led missions in Somalia and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

Portuguese UN Secretary-General António Guterres has suggested that a “New Agenda for Peace” must necessarily entail peace enforcement missions led by regional organisations, with predictable funding provided to such missions. Some participants at the Addis Ababa policy dialogue also expressed support for the AU’s initiative of contributing 25 per cent of funds to peacekeeping missions on the continent, while the UN provides the remaining 75 per cent. It was further highlighted that the UN Security Council is not keen to repeat the joint cooperation entailed in the AU/UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID) between 2007 and 2021,

preferring to retain control under a single chain of command.

The fact that funding and logistics were not provided to African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), until the French-backed UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established in 2013, was criticised. The 26-year French dominance of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) – now the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) – at Undersecretary-General level, was also negatively perceived.

The European Union has been the

The late Ali Mazrui advocated for African solutions to African problems

largest external funder of peace and security initiatives in Africa, contributing 90 per cent of the funds to the AU-managed African Peace Facility (APF) between 2004 and 2022, to the tune of Є3.2 billion. Brussels has also supported more than 30,000 African military and police contingents.

The EU has further backed calls for the UN Security Council to use assessed contributions to support African-led missions authorised by the world body. Brussels’s new European Peace Facility (EPF) has set aside €5.6 billion to support African and other peace and security efforts between 2021 and 2027.

The EU has proposed six main building blocks for its renewed security engagement with Africa: strategic cooperation involving joint decision-making; conflict prevention and early warning; respect for governance, human rights and humanitarian law; strengthening the joint fight against terrorism in regions such as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa; supporting African conflict management efforts through capacity-building; and strengthening multilateralism and promoting convergence in multilateral fora.

In relation to peacemaking, the role and interaction of national, regional and external actors was highlighted as critical to successful mediation. It is thus urgent to build trust among domestic parties in mediating conflicts, and this often requires time and patience that is frequently lacking.

The painstaking process of reconciling grassroots communities has sometimes been abandoned for rehabilitation and inadequate

peacebuilding, which has thus sometimes led to the resumption of conflicts. Some of these mediation efforts in Sudan and South Sudan tend to represent elite pacts that do not properly consult grassroots actors, and thus fail to be effectively implemented.

In the DRC, the UN worked closely with the mediation led by the South African President, Thabo Mbeki, which produced the 2003 Global and Inclusive Agreement: a power-sharing deal that envisaged a 24-month transitional period. It was

The inclusion of women in peace processes was particularly difficult to achieve in places such as northern Uganda and the DRC. In some cases, mediators often had to hold meetings at night in displaced persons camps, as women were frequently overloaded with domestic and other chores. There is also a need to ensure that women who are included in negotiating teams are independent, impartial and credible, and not controlled by male-dominated delegations.

IGAD leaders were said to be fatigued with the tortuous South Sudan peace process initiated in 2005. Some governments were also accused of pursuing their own parochial agendas, and backing different sides in the dispute. The 2018 Addis Ababa peace accord on South Sudan was said to be limping along due to a lack of political commitment by the leaders of the domestic parties who are said to have acted as “ethnic warlords” rather than national statesmen. The military roles of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda in Somalia was also said to have heightened historical tensions.

important, in this case, to craft strategies to deal with regional “spoilers” – Rwanda and Uganda – which were intervening in the DRC.

The accords in the DRC were, however, criticised as representing elite pacts in which power was shared to the exclusion of civil society and local communities. It was also noted that President Joseph Kabila was able to use his continued control of the country’s security structures to retain an advantage during the transitional period.

The UN mission in CAR helped create a forum in 2014 in which disputing parties could seek to reconcile their differences in the lead-up to presidential elections in 2015/2016. National actors, however, lacked a common vision for their country, and the UN was thus unable to consolidate peace efforts, as instability continued throughout the country involving religious and ethnic-based militias.

At the external level, powerful actors in the Security Council have sometimes obstructed successful mediation. The

Women must be included in negotiating teams, and not controlled by male-dominated delegations

African Standby Force, which should have been established in 2010, remains a work in progress

case of the US and France in protecting Morocco in the Western Sahara dispute was cited as having stalled implementation of the UN peace accord since 1991. Likewise, the role of the US, Turkey and Gulf Arab states was said to have prolonged the stalemate in Somalia. Washington’s drone warfare and support for the Somali army was further highlighted as having fuelled instability in the country.

Peacekeeping operations in Africa have had mixed results. Their success has depended on having clear and achievable mandates, adequate resources, and coordination and cooperation between the UN, Africa's regional organisations and, in a few cases, the EU.

In Southern Africa, UN peacekeeping missions in Namibia (1989-1990), Angola (1989-1997) and Mozambique (19921994) all occurred at the end of the Cold War’s liberation struggles. While Namibia and Mozambique succeeded, Angola was a spectacular failure. Southern Africa highlights the importance of the consent of conflict parties, organisational learning, and the capacity of the UN leadership to adapt to changing dynamics. Successful peacekeeping in Mozambique and Namibia was closely tied to the commitment of domestic parties to resolve the conflict and implement peace agreements, while Angolan warlord, Jonas Savimbi, acted as a “spoiler” in rejecting the outcome of the 1992 election.

In West Africa, ECOWAS played a pioneering role in implementing Africanled peacekeeping missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali. Decade-long Nigerian-led ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s helped to stabilise both countries at the cost of over $2 billion and more than 1,000 peacekeeping fatalities. France dominated the intervention in Côte d’Ivoire from 2004 with its own rapid reaction force, and exerted control over the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI). Paris also intervened militarily in Mali through its 2013 Operation Serval, and later Operation Barkhane. The UN mission in Mali was deployed to support the country’s political processes and transitional authorities, along with the EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP).

The UN Security Council expanded its mandate without increasing its resources and capacity to protect civilians and itself, resulting in 309 peacekeeping

fatalities. The French military was forced to withdraw from Mali in August 2022, due to protests by sections of the Malian population and the military regime in Bamako which is increasingly reliant on Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group.

In Eastern Africa, the security complex has involved regional and internationallyled peace processes. UN and AU missions have tried to resolve conflicts between states such as Ethiopia and Eritrea (2000-2008), keep peace in the oil-rich Abyei region between Sudan and South Sudan (since 2011), and end civil wars in Darfur (2007-2021), South Sudan (since 2011) and Somalia (1992-1995; and since 2007). Peacekeeping has helped to bring a temporary end to open hostilities, saving lives and allowing warring parties time to craft new strategies to end conflicts. However, the efforts of African regional bodies and the UN have not always resulted in durable peace.

Finally, in Central Africa: Chad and CAR share a common colonial and postindependence history. The EU deployed a mission in Chad/CAR (EUFOR Chad/ CAR, 2008-2009) and the UN in CAR/ Chad (MINURCAT, 2007-2010). EUFOR Chad/CAR cost over €900 million, but lasted only one year. It built and rehabilitated important infrastructure in

Chad, and secured humanitarian assistance for refugee camps. Chad became a significant player in peace operations in Mali and CAR, but its involvement reinforced autocracy at home. The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in CAR (MINUSCA), since 2014, was a re-hatting of the Africanled International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA). Like previous missions in the country, MINUSCA was mandated to restore state authority. This implies reviving a state that is disconnected from remote rural areas, and is run by elites that do not promote the rule of law and human rights. Russia’s Wagner Group has also played an important role in securing the regime and protecting mines.

Moving from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, in West African states such as Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the UN and ECOWAS took up the core tasks of facilitating peacebuilding. The world body supported civil society organisations, security sector reform and governance, and transitional justice. In Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS has promoted security sector governance processes, trained security actors, and supported the construction of barracks. West Africa’s hybrid courts and transitional justice processes illustrate the role of international experts in peacebuilding,

The EU has been the largest external funder of peace and security initiatives in Africa

and the importance of national ownership. Peacebuilding, however, still has a way to go to succeed, lacking adequate means of effective state-building. Over-centralisation of political authority remains ubiquitous, with poor local participation in decisionmaking amidst an enduring winner-takesall mentality. Peacebuilding thus requires sustained and long-term engagement in the host country; a variety of actors working together; and effective approaches, frameworks and flexibility.

In the Great Lakes, regional and external efforts in the DRC and Burundi have resulted in incomplete democratisation processes. The UN played an important role in facilitating a transition to an electoral system in the DRC in 2006, 2011 and 2018, with Joseph Kabila eventually agreeing to step down in favour of the declared winner, Félix Tshisekedi. Nevertheless, the UN mission (MONUSCO) has often failed to protect civilians, quell violence and maintain stability. This failure has been due to a limited understanding of local dynamics, and the refusal of troop-contributing countries to put their peacekeepers in harm’s way.

Six key policy recommendations emerged from the Addis Ababa policy seminar in May 2023:

• Africa’s security architecture requires an effective division of labour, based on the principle of subsidiarity between the AU and Africa’s sub-regional bodies in which decisions and actions are taken at

well as national ownership and the involvement of local actors, with external actors adopting flexible approaches, maintaining long-term engagement and drawing upon the advice and lessons of strategic partnerships with legitimate national role players.

the level closest to conflicts.

• The UN must maintain its primary global peacekeeping role in Africa, strengthening such missions with the support of African regional organisations; the support package of $1.5 billion that the world body provided to the AU mission in Somalia could be used as a model of capacityenhancement for fledgling African regional bodies.

• Peacemaking initiatives in Africa should actively involve grassroots communities, including independent and capable women negotiators; peace accords should also contain effective monitoring mechanisms with clear timetables, means of implementation and the power of sanctions.

• Peacebuilding efforts in Africa must ensure greater financial resources as

• The military bases which the US, France and China have established in Africa must be dismantled, consistent with the principle of non-alignment that many African governments profess to practice. The scourge of Russianfunded mercenaries is also antithetical to achieving Pax Africana.

• African think tanks and research communities should provide policy advice to the AU on peace and security issues. The AU Network of Think Tanks for Peace (NeTT4Peace), launched in February 2023, could serve as an effective vehicle for promoting such policy-oriented academic advice. Such research must, however, be independent and rigorous, with African think tanks being able to offer constructive criticisms to strengthen Africa’s security architecture.

The policy brief was published in August. Meeting rapporteurs were Professor Adekeye Adebajo, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria; and Dr Angela Muvumba Sellström, Senior Researcher, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala.

ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s helped to stabilise both countries at the cost of over $2 billion

The scourge of Russian-funded mercenaries is also antithetical to achieving Pax Africana

Africa got little out of a much-hyped Russia-Africa Summit

With

THE Russia-Africa Summit, originally slated for October 2022 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia as part of Moscow’s push for influence in Africa, was rescheduled to July 27 and 28 this year in St Petersburg due to the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions against Russia.

The forum was crucial for an increasingly isolated Russia to bolster relations and support among African states, as it needs Africa for votes in the UN General Assembly and to expand its economic, political and geostrategic influence. The summit was also an opportunity for Moscow to demonstrate its capability to circumvent Western efforts to isolate it over its invasion of Ukraine.

Ultimately, the summit confirmed Russia’s role in Africa as a key player in its affairs and led to a declaration outlining some of Moscow’s plans for the continent. However, Russia’s promises are tainted by substantial deficiencies and inherent contradictions. They raise doubts about whether the grand declarations of intent will translate into concrete outcomes on the continent, particularly those related

to food security and peace and security cooperation.

For Africa, this was not just another Africa+1 summit. It was significant for the continent following the disruption to grain exports via the Black Sea and the global effects of Western sanctions on Russian oil and gas exports as a result of the war in Ukraine. African leaders thus presented

themselves as important contributors to effective solutions to the armed conflict and its cascading effects on the continent.

The wider fallout from the war led to low number of African leaders in St Petersburg. Delegations from 49 of the 54 African countries invited attended this year's summit, up from 48 in the first summit in October 2019 in Sochi. This

Russia’s military-security cooperation with the six African states

Burkina Faso Russian mercenaries are purportedly assisting Burkinabe authorities in their war against al-Qaeda and ISILaffiliated armed groups, although interim President Ibrahim Traore dismisses the allegations.

CAR CAR heavily relies on the services of Russia’s Wagner group for escort protection of its President FaustinArchange Touadéra and for training of CAR’s army.

Eritrea Eritrea was the sole African country to vote against two UN resolutions condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. There are also allegations of the Wagner Group’s unspecified presence in Eritrea.

Mali

Following the coup in May 2021, Russia became Mali's principal military partner. Since December 2021, Wagner contractors have been aiding Mali's military with training, close protection, and counter-insurgency operations.

Somalia Despite Somalia's support for Ukraine in a UN resolution, both nations have been striving to improve relations, with Russia proposing to supply Somalia's army with arms in its fight against Islamists.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe, like Russia, is a victim of American and European sanctions; trade relations between Moscow and Harare are based on the US shunning them. Russia seems to be rewarding Zimbabwe for not joining with nations seeking to isolate Moscow for its invasion of Ukraine by donating helicopters.

Russia under Western sanctions, increasingly becoming isolated and its promises from the 2019 meeting with African leaders having fallen flat, the declarations of the second such gathering are unlikely to yield concrete security outcomes for the continent, writes Hubert Kinkoh

Russian President Vladimir Putin at a session of the Russia-Africa summit in Saint Petersburg in July

time round, though, just 17 African heads of state attended the two-day meeting – a 60 per cent decrease from the first RussiaAfrica summit which saw 43 participating.

The low turnout also stems from anger over Putin's withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain initiative as well as controversies around the Wagner Group’s activities in Africa that have damaged Russia’s reputation and laid bare its fraying ties across the continent. But the Kremlin blames the West, particularly the US and France, for exerting unprecedented pressure on African states to prevent the summit from taking place. This narrative downplays the agency of African states in choosing how to engage with their international partners.

A key outcome of the summit was Putin’s offer to send 25,00 to 50,000 tonnes of cost-free grain to Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, Central African Republic (CAR) and Eritrea within three to four months. Putin acknowledged how essential an uninterrupted supply of grain to African countries was for social and

economic development and for maintaining political stability.

But the choice of the six hard-pressed countries – observably owing in part to their close military-security cooperation with Moscow and in part to how they voted on the war in Ukraine at the UN General

In the run-up to and during the summit, African leaders condemned this move. Russia and Ukraine are among the biggest exporters of grain, and the interruption caused by the war continues to drive up food prices across the globe. Africa relies on Russia for a third of its grain supplies. Under the Black Sea Grain initiative,

Assembly – suggests a selective and problematic approach to engaging African states.

Besides, Moscow's offer pales in comparison to the 32.9 million metric tons shipped under the Black Sea Grain initiative to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Kenya, Ethiopia, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti. Russia’s withdrawal from the grain deal casts doubts on whether Putin will deliver on his promise, further deepening food insecurity across Africa.

over 725,000 tons of wheat left Ukrainian ports to five African countries – Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan – plus Yemen and Afghanistan. Since March last year, the initiative has reduced food prices by over 23 per cent

Besides, Russia’s continuous attacks on Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, destroying thousands of tons of grains destined for export, are inconsistent with its intention to help countries in need of grain. The deteriorating insecurity in the Black Sea

A key outcome of the summit was Putin’s offer to send 25,000 to 50,000 tonnes of cost-free grain to Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, Central African Republic (CAR) and Eritrea

Russia’s promises are tainted by substantial deficiencies and inherent contradictions

and overreliance on imports for grain will directly interrupt grain supplies, drive up food prices and heighten the risk of food uncertainty in Africa.

Given the effect on Africa of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the African peace initiative in June was discussed. Albeit not being directly critical of Russia, African leaders pressed Putin to move ahead with their peace plan to help deescalate the war.

Their interventions – with a visible role of the African Union Commission chairperson – on the second day of the summit were more concerted and forceful than previous efforts, highlighting the depth of African concern at the war's

consequences, particularly energy and grain supply disruptions.

Putin’s expression of interest in considering the African peace initiative on Ukraine while also praising China’s efforts in finding a solution to the conflict, represents a notable departure from June – when the Kremlin maintained the peace overture proposed by the African delegation would be very difficult to implement. He argued that the African initiative can serve as the basis for processes aimed at the search for peace, similar to the Chinese proposal.

This demonstrates Africa's ability to play a constructive role in promoting a political solution to the war rather than

being seen merely as victims thereof. The Ukraine-organised peace summit hosted by Saudi Arabia on August 5 and 6 presented another significant opportunity for a better-coordinated African-led mediation to intensify substantive diplomatic efforts to end the war, and address food insecurity on the continent by extension.

But efforts will likely remain tainted by many African countries’ seeming proRussia stance. So far, how African states have voted on UN General Assembly resolutions criticising Russia’s actions in Ukraine has shown the continent remains more divided than any other region on this issue.

The Kremlin's security interests in

Moscow's 2019 summit pledge to expand and diversify its trade with Africa to $40 billion within five years has been unfulfilled

Africa will also hinder efforts. When the Wagner Group leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, attended the summit just before he died in a plane crash, his presence raised questions about the peace and security implications of Russia-Africa military engagement. Wagner Group's activities in Africa have allegedly helped fund Russia's war in Ukraine. The Group has also been accused of pillage and atrocities, leading to accusations of human rights violations against the civilian population.

Moreover, Russia's invitation to the summit of suspended military juntas contradicts its commitment to close security cooperation with Africa, based on

“African solutions to African problems”. This raises questions about whether Russia is indeed respecting Africa’s efforts to address its challenges and how Africa's partnership with Russia should be shaped moving forward.

As the major arms exporter to Africa, Russia will continue to make inroads to sell weapons on the continent and use its private military company, the Wagner Group, to project its influence in countries like CAR, Libya, Mali, Sudan and possibly Niger and Burkina Faso. It is also likely that Russia will confine its military operations to fragile parts of the continent. The AU may need to increasingly take

this into account as Russia consolidates its involvement on the continent.

With Western sanctions in place, the country’s growing international isolation and its offensive on Ukrainian grain ports, there are doubts that Moscow’s promises to deliver grain to African countries and consider the recommendations of Africa’s peace initiative on Ukraine will be followed through in the near to medium term.

Moscow's 2019 summit pledge to expand and diversify its trade with Africa to $40 billion within five years has been unfulfilled, with trade volumes hovering around $18 billion a year and tilting in Russia's favour. Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and South Africa account for over 70 per cent of Russia's total trade with Africa.

Ahead of this year’s summit, the Kremlin announced that a Russia-Africa action plan for the 2023 to 2026 period would be a key outcome. This, alongside other specific outcomes, are yet to be seen. Establishing an institutionalised mechanism for monitoring progress from Africa+1 summits is imperative.

A peaceful Africa is crucial for boosting food security and consolidating peace on the continent. It is time for African leaders to look inward for solutions to Africa’s crises, employing a nexus approach. AU Peace and Security Commission (PSC) sessions dedicated to discussing the vicious cycle between armed conflict and food insecurity and following through on outcomes of the Dakar Summit on agriculture will be essential to break the heavy reliance on Ukraine and Russia for grain. Additionally, mounting food price shocks could fuel public discontent and exacerbate state-society tensions, adding to the complex threats to peace and security in Africa.

This provides a valid interest for Africa’s leaders to want an end to the war; but their mediation efforts will need a new approach. The war’s consequences on the continent mean it can no longer be viewed as a ‘non-African conflict’.

A PSC discussion, at the level of heads of state, could carefully consider Africa's mediation efforts to end the war. Relatedly, with African states under AU suspension attending and addressing the summit, the AU should inform its partners not to invite sanctioned actors into a forum such as this, if they are indeed respecting Africa's efforts to address its challenges.

Hubert Kinkoh is as an analyst in peace, security, development and leadership at the Institute for Security Studies in Ethiopia.

Rethink of Sudan mediation process needed

APART from the tragic loss of lives and the thousands of injured civilians in the ongoing armed conflict in Sudan, an estimated 15 million people, including refugees, are experiencing acute food insecurity exacerbated by extreme weather shocks and rising food prices. Some 2.4 million people have been displaced throughout the country as a result.

Countries in the region are urgently calling for all sides involved in the conflict to address outstanding issues and work towards an end to the fighting. The humanitarian crisis in Sudan requires immediate action to alleviate the suffering of millions of vulnerable individuals and ensure the delivery of essential assistance to those in need.

The outbreak of violence in Sudan on April 15 is rooted in a power struggle at the heart of the country's political landscape. The conflict emerged after weeks of rising tensions between the Sudanese army and the formidable paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Notably, both were previously allies and had jointly orchestrated a coup to seize power in 2021.

Soon after, however, there were disagreements over the proposed integration of the RSF into the military. The main point of contention was over who would assume control as the military's commander-in-chief after the integration process. This power struggle for control over the nation's armed forces has become a critical issue and has fuelled the ongoing violence and instability.

The epicentre of the fighting is primarily concentrated in the capital, Khartoum, but clashes have been reported in various locations across the country. The magnitude of the conflict is evident in the significant toll it has taken on human lives, with at least 500 people killed and thousands more injured in a span of three weeks.

As the violence persists, it has also led to a substantial displacement of people, both internally and across borders.

Communities are being uprooted, and many are seeking refuge in neighbouring countries.

The RSF was established in 2013, originating from the Janjaweed militias, which have been accused of committing war crimes during the Darfur conflict in the 2000s. The Sudanese government used this group as an auxiliary force to aid the army in suppressing the rebellion in the Darfur region. In 2017, a law was enacted which officially recognised the RSF as an independent force, granting it formal status within the country's security apparatus.

The Sudanese army, possessing superior resources such as air power and an estimated 300,000 soldiers, has had to watch the RSF grow significantly over the years, expanding into a well-equipped group of around 100,000 personnel. They have been extensively deployed throughout the nation and have become entrenched in various neighbourhoods across Khartoum, further amplifying their influence and

presence.

As the fighting broke out, the RSF became a significant player. Its involvement has added complexity and intensity to the situation, making it a critical factor in understanding the dynamics of the current unrest in the country.

Upon the invitation of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, a summit was convened in Cairo in July: the Sudan's Neighbouring States Summit. It brought together leaders from the Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya and South Sudan, alongside the Chairman of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States who explored potential solutions to address the crisis.

However, there are other efforts taking place in Jeddah, in Saudi Arabia with other actors involved, including the US. There is the possibility of a proxy war in Sudan with the presence of the Russian private

Just as the South Sudan peace agreements reached in 2015 and 2018 were facilitated by regional actors, a similar approach can be adopted for the fighting in Sudan to ensure a more effective and contextually relevant negotiation process, writes Ahmed Ibrahim

The RSF originated from the Janjaweed militias

military contractor, the Wanger Group, and other external actors.

Legal scholar Thomas Franck predicted the growing reliance of citizens on international law and international organisations to protect their democratic entitlements. International and regional organisations were expected to assume a pivotal leadership role in promoting democracy by establishing it as a prerequisite for membership and imposing sanctions on states that deviated from democratic principles.

In the case of Sudan, the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) has emerged as the responding leader and suspended Sudan's participation in AU activities. This action aims to support the aspirations of the Sudanese people for a constitutional framework and institutions that foster democratic progress.

Alternatively, the use of coercive power by the AU assuming full authority to intervene and halt the fighting could have been a more assertive approach. But the AU leadership failed to acknowledge the Sudan issue as a complex and highly challenging matter; difficult to define and solve due to its interconnectedness, multiple stakeholders’ involvement and constantly changing dynamics.

Furthermore, Sudan's strategic location along the Red Sea, bordering the Middle East, including Yemen, exposes it to

the possibility of terrorist organisations exploiting the existing authority vacuum and crossing the maritime border. Additionally, internal historical political grievances may escalate, leading to massacres.

Therefore, mere suspensions alone do not suffice to address the situation. There is now a need for direct action to prevent

positive results in stabilising a fragile state. Similarly, looking at the situation in Somalia, the absence of a functioning state poses a lifelong threat to neighbouring countries like Djibouti and Kenya, each facing their own challenges.

To restructure the mediation process, it is essential to involve regional actors like the Intergovernmental Authority on

further escalation of the conflict. It has become imperative for the AU to deploy a regional standby force to safeguard Sudan and its people from the multifaceted dangers and regional ramifications.

While several peace talks are underway in different locations involving various actors representing their own interests, the crisis in Sudan is likely to have farreaching consequences on neighbouring countries such as South Sudan and Chad. Instead of being passive observers, these frontline countries should take the lead in addressing the situation.

Drawing lessons from Uganda's intervention in South Sudan in 2013, where it successfully prevented state collapse, it is evident that decisive action can yield

Development (IGAD), particularly Somalia and Djibouti, given their significant links with Sudan. Just as the peace agreements in South Sudan in 2015 and 2018 were facilitated by regional actors, a similar approach can be adopted for the Sudan crisis to ensure a more effective and contextually relevant mediation process.

This will help address the possible complexities associated with the crisis that may not be fully understood or addressed by external actors like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and the US. The active involvement of regional actors with a deep understanding of the regional dynamics will be instrumental in finding a sustainable solution to the crisis in Sudan.

Sudan’s warring generals: Burhan (left) and Dalgado

Ahmed Ibrahim from Somalia is undertaking an MSc in Global leadership and Peacebuilding at the African Leadership Centre in the School of Global Affairs, King’s College London.

The RSF’s involvement has added complexity and intensity to the situation

Tortuous wait for families of massacre victims in Guinea

Fourteen years after the stadium killings in Conakry, and a year after the trial of 11 men accused of the atrocities, the ongoing case has come as a relief for relatives who have waited long for justice. Africa Briefing looks at how things are progressing

THE landmark trial of Guinea’s former President, Moussa Dadis Camara, and 10 others, including former ministers, accused of responsibility for a massacre and rapes in a stadium, resumed in July after being suspended for a month-and-a-half. It is the first trial involving human rights violations on this scale in Guinea.

In one of the most brutal incidents in the country’s history, the security forces opened fire on protesters during a peaceful political rally at a stadium in Conakry on September 28, 2009. More than 150 were killed and over 100 women were raped, after which security forces engaged in a cover-up, moving bodies to mass graves.

Prior to the trial’s suspension – which was over a boycott by the defence counsel with solidarity from the victims’ lawyers, and then a nationwide prison guard strike – the judges had heard all 11 accused and moved to a second phase of the case, during which they heard dozens of victims. The trial is being broadcast live on Guinean television and has riveted the nation. Its resumption is a relief for victims and their families, who have long-awaited for justice for the crimes.

The proceedings took a surprise turn when the hearing of victims by the judges was interrupted to give the floor to one of the accused, former presidential guard member Captain Marcel Guilavogui, who requested to appear a second time. This led to one of his lawyers ceasing his representation immediately before Guilavogui refuted his previous testimony.

In his new statement, Guilavogui said former President Camara, along with others, had planned and executed the 2009 crimes. Camara’s lawyers have continued to deny he had any responsibility for crimes committed in connection with the massacre.

Guilavogui earlier indicated he had no personal knowledge of what happened during the carnage.

One lawyer who represents victims told Human Rights Watch that Guilavogui’s statement offered new information, which would allow for further examinations that

Justice Ministry until the end of July to provide the requested assistance.

The boycott began after the lawyers asked for financial assistance for their legal representation, given their clients’ limited resources and the “scope of the tasks, complexity of the trial, and the amount of

could help ensure the truth was uncovered.

The trial’s resumption appears to have been possible because Guinea’s Justice Ministry agreed to make financial assistance available to the lawyers, who say they lack adequate resources. The Guinean Bar Association helped facilitate negotiations on the issue, and the lawyers had given the

time the trial is taking”. Guinea’s Justice Minister, Alphonse Charles Wright, noted that the one defendant who requested a court-appointed lawyer was provided one. He said that “if the [other accused] parties … say they can no longer afford to pay the lawyers, the state will take over,” but the Justice Ministry would “not budge one

Guinea’s former President Moussa Dadis Camara

Those at the Conakry stadium were protesting against a bid for the presidency by then coup leader Camara

iota” for existing defence counsel. The controversy around assistance for counsel was taking place amid reports of an overall depleted trial budget and concerns that resources were insufficient for the trial’s completion.

The long-awaited opening of the trial since the killings took place in 2009 generated hope for victims of the massacre and their families. Prior to the hiatus, the judges in the proceedings heard all the accused – including Camara and ministers – and dozens of victims in proceedings that have been closely followed in Guinea.

“The victims have been waiting so long for those responsible for Guinea’s 2009 stadium massacre to be held to account,” said Elise Keppler, associate international justice director at Human Rights Watch. “The opening of the trial brings the victims closer to much needed justice for the horrific crimes committed in the stadium.”

Those at the Conakry stadium were protesting against a bid for the presidency by then coup leader Camara. Witnesses described to Human Rights Watch in 2009 that bodies were strewn across the field, crushed against gates, draped over walls, and piled outside locker rooms where doors had been pulled shut by the terrified few who had got there first. Some victims were then knifed or bayoneted to death.

Women said they were pulled from hiding places in the stadium, including from under chairs, and raped, often by multiple men from the security forces. Witnesses said that four women were shot dead after being sexually assaulted. Security forces then engaged in an organised cover-up

of the crimes, sealing off the entrances to the stadium and mortuaries and removing bodies to bury them in mass graves.

Some of the 11 suspects facing trial have been in detention for years, far longer than prescribed legal limits, while others

‘ ’

sought to constructively engage with the authorities to press them to deliver on their early commitment to bring justice in this case, part of what is known as “positive complementarity”.

The Office of the Prosecutor noted

The trial is the first involving human rights violations on this scale in Guinea

have not been detained or arrested, such as Camara, who has been living in exile in Burkina Faso. Trials in absentia constrain the ability of accused persons to exercise their rights to a defence and should be avoided, Human Rights Watch said. Camara has indicated that he intends to participate in the trial and the other accused are barred from leaving the country, according to a spokesperson for the justice ministry.

“For justice to be realised, this trial should be conducted in a manner that is fair and includes the presence of the accused,” said Keppler. “Genuine, credible proceedings are needed, in which victims can participate fully in the proceedings without fears for their security.”

Guinean authorities committed to ensure justice for the crimes and opened an investigation in early 2010, but many obstacles impeded progress which was slow and inconsistent. After the investigation ended in 2017, groups increasingly denounced delays to the start of the trial and raised concerns about a lack of will to hold it.

Representatives of victims’ associations, and local and international human rights organisations, including the Association of Victims, Relatives and Friends of September 28, 2009 (AVIPA), the Guinean Organisation for the Defence of Human Rights (OGDH), International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch have been actively watching the manner in which the trial has been moving.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) opened a preliminary examination of the situation in Guinea in October 2009 and has monitored progress in this case since the beginning. As a court of last resort, the ICC will only step in when national courts are unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute serious crimes. Over the years, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor

in December 2020 that the Guinean authorities had not yet taken any concrete steps to organise the trial, despite repeated commitments to proceed. Representatives of the office most recently visited Conakry in November 2021 and September 2022. A UN expert from the Office of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict in Guinea also has worked with the judicial authorities for a decade to support justice efforts.

Respect for human rights in Guinea is facing significant challenges since the National Committee for Reconciliation and Development (Comité national du rassemblement et du développement, CNRD) took power in a coup in September 2021. The coup unseated President Alpha Condé. Under him, human rights abuses escalated, including attacks on the opposition.

The CNRD leader, Mamady Doumbouya, has signalled support for justice efforts and attended the 2021 commemoration of the massacre. He had then indicated that the trial should open before the 2022 anniversary of the crimes.

This trial should be part of broader measures to ensure respect for human rights, including removing a ban on public protests and dissolution of the opposition, which are in effect, Human Rights Watch said. It noted that a return to democratic rule, and trials for other serious crimes, such as killings and other abuses committed in response to nationwide protests in 2007 was needed.

“The trial is an unprecedented step for justice for victims in Guinea, which should be accompanied by reforms to enable respect for rights and more prosecutions of abuses,” said Keppler. “The ICC Prosecutor’s office has played a vital role in spurring forward this landmark trial through its ongoing monitoring and frequent visits to Conakry, which it should continue.”

Guinea’s Justice Minister Alphonse Charles Wright

Why Zimbabwe and Zambia fell out over elections report

Criticism of the outcome of the August polls in Zimbabwe by an African regional economic organisation did not go down well with the powers that be within the ruling ZANU-PF, writes

Zenge Simakoloyi

DAYS before the presidential and parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe on August 17, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) held its annual heads of state summit in Luanda, Angola. Zambia’s President Hakainde Hichilema was elected chairman of the SADC Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security.

Hichilema’s first act was to appoint Nevers Mumba as chairman of the SADC Electoral Observer Mission (SEOM) to witness the Zimbabwean elections. Nevers, who was Zambian Vice President between 2003 and 2004, is seen as a political ally of Hichilema.

As polls eventually closed and results were trickling in on August 25, the SEOM chairman read out the preliminary report at a joint press briefing alongside the African Union’s electoral observer mission. The 11page report outlined what the 50 observers deployed across Zimbabwe’s 10 provinces on election day found.

The key findings included extensive constituency gerrymandering; election day voter intimidation through ZANU-PF linked organisations like Forever Associates Zimbabwe (FAZ); and lopsided media coverage in favour of the ruling ZANU-PF party.

Overall, the report concluded that while the environment was “peaceful and calm” the elections “fell short of the requirements of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the Electoral Act, and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2021)”.

This was received with excitement by opponents of ZANU-PF on social media given that it was a rare occasion

of an African regional body criticising an election. Although the report was primarily aimed at the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), ZANU-PF officials, on the other hand, responded swiftly by dismissing the message and the messenger. The party’s spokesperson, Christopher

Mutsvangwa, reduced the report to the “ramblings and mouthing of Nerves Mumba” and specifically raised questions about a possible conflict of interest.

Mutsvangwa claimed that Mumba was an associate of Nelson Chamisa, the presidential candidate for the opposition

Nevers Mumba criticised outcome of Zimbabwe’s August polls

Citizens Coalition for Change. He was implying that Zambia wanted to see Chamisa get elected president, suggesting Zambian interference in Zimbabwe’s democratic process.

Mumba denied this on Zambian TV. Zambia’s foreign ministry also dismissed this after the same claim was made by Fred M’membe, President of Socialist Party in Zambia, a pro-ZANU-PF party. However, the wider perception of Zambia interfering in Zimbabwe’s domestic affairs is not a new phenomenon.

On a September evening in 1977, as Zambia’s first President, Kenneth Kaunda, was publicly supporting armed liberation struggles against white minority rule in southern Africa, he secretly met Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith in State House, Lusaka to find a way to end the Rhodesian Bush War.

This was the second time this had happened. In 1975, Kaunda, Smith, black

Zimbabwean liberation group delegates and apartheid South Africa’s Prime Minister, John Vorster, met onboard a train on the Victoria Falls bridge. The immediate reaction by those opposed to sort a move was to label Kaunda a “Western puppet”.

However, this dual approach of supporting the armed struggle while undertaking diplomatic moves to end the fight for independence eventually paid off. It paved the way for the hard-nosed stand by African leaders during the August 1979 Commonwealth Heads of State Conference in Lusaka that ultimately led to the Lancaster House Agreement of December 1979 that brought about Zimbabwe’s independence in April 1980.

Yet another Zambian president had earlier found himself in the crosshairs of ZANU-PF. As chairman of the SADC, Levy Mwanawasa in 2007 spoke out against Zimbabwe’s economic crisis that saw record hyperinflation of over 1,700 per cent and increasing economic migrants.

In April 2008 he called an emergency meeting to deal with Zimbabwe’s election due to suspicions of malpractice with almost two weeks of delayed results. This electoral impasse was ultimately resolved in a unity government stewarded by the SADC. However, Mwanawasa was labelled

a Western stooge by Robert Mugabe.

Now, Hichilema is being accused of interference and doing the West’s bidding in Zimbabwe. A veteran opposition leader, Hichilema became president on his sixth attempt in 2021.

At his inauguration, apart from inviting regional heads of state, he welcomed key opposition figures, Nelson Chamisa and South Africa’s Musi Maimane.

But just as liberation parties such as ZANU-PF and the ANC in South Africa stick together in solidarity, those in opposition are saying that it is quite unfair to deem opposition camaraderie as a Western plot.

So, to conclude that the SEOM is a Zambian appendage with a Westernsponsored plan to dislodge all postindependence ruling parties in southern Africa stretches the bounds of credulity. In fact, it obscures the real purpose of these types of evaluations: to pre-empt more threatening consequences.

Moreover, evidence proves that ignoring electoral malpractices can contribute to coups born out of frustration, as seen recently in Gabon and Niger in the aftermath of their elections.

Zenge Simakoloyi is the host of the African political/economic affairs podcast, Africa 4 Dummies.

President Emmerson Mnangagwa: won re-election

As Africa builds a sustainable future, banks will be crucial partners

Christian Toben, Head of Financial Institutions for Emerging Markets at Commerzbank, evaluates

FOR some years now, sustainability has become increasingly embedded in regulation and corporate behaviour, with environmental, social and governance (ESG) strategies a regular feature in boardroom discussions across the world.

For African markets, this global focus on sustainability comes at a sensitive time – one when the continent has begun to take a more prominent role on the global economic stage. This is especially the case as many African economies remain heavily weighted towards raw commodity exports, such as agricultural products, crude oil and minerals; industries that are under scrutiny from an environmental perspective.

As countries in the region look to further develop and support their growing middle-income societies, reconciling their existing economic model with evolving global priorities will be crucial. Indeed, many African nations are being required to assess and modify their economic growth strategies and trajectories – many of which were set to follow a path similar to that already well-trodden by developed markets – in order to adhere to sustainability requirements.

For Africa to reach its potential, a balance must therefore be met that enables emerging markets to implement sustainability standards, while also achieving socioeconomic progress and safeguarding the wellbeing of their citizens.

While countries, sectors and companies in the region evaluate their ESG strategies, there are other factors at play that also must be considered. From a regulatory perspective – which fundamentally drives business processes and requirements across the world – ESG is a fast-moving area, with over 220 new or revised policy instruments identified in 2021 alone. From the perspective of emerging markets, ESG regulations drawn up in advanced markets often have too great a focus on environmental aspects, and not enough on social and governance. Indeed, it is these

“S” and “G” components that are the more pressing priorities in many geographies. Africa is, after all, responsible for less than 4% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, while approximately half of the population remains unbanked or underbanked. It goes without saying that this emission share might raise drastically with an increase of industrialization on the African continent.

But importantly for local companies, government regulation and industry-led ESG commitments made in one part of the world can have far reaching implications for businesses – big and small – everywhere. Consequently, as international trade encourages the uptake of sustainability standards that transcend national borders, those involved in global supply chains will need to incorporate sustainability measures into their strategies accordingly, no matter where they operate, or potentially risk losing their place in the chain.

African markets are by no means strangers to the importance of ESG. The continent includes many geographical areas that are particularly exposed to the speed and destructive impact of climate change, and it is home to nations with a vested interest in improving social and working standards. As such, Africa has much to gain from the implementation of ESG goals. And, with the right support, it is also equipped with the tools to seize the opportunities promised by the sustainable transition.

Taken as a whole, the continent has access to immense resources that can be leveraged to produce clean energy –whether through solar, wind, geothermal power or hydropower – and in turn drive economic growth. The continent is vast, and each country has its own distinctive profile that lends it a unique competitive advantage. For example, harnessing the power of the river Nile, Ethiopia has built a number of large hydroelectric dams – including Africa’s largest, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which began generating power in 2022 despite ongoing

political implications for the region.

Elsewhere, Morocco has become home to the world’s largest concentrated solar power farm, and already obtains a third of its electricity needs from renewables . The country is also fast becoming regarded as a global hub for green hydrogen production, and attracting significant investment from international companies in the development of green hydrogen plants. Recognising its potential, the Germany-Morocco Hydrogen Agreement was formulated in 2020, with Germany investing €300 million into the joint venture that will allow green hydrogen to be sourced from Morocco.

Of course, building sustainable industries and infrastructure in Africa will require significant capital. The African Development Bank (AfDB), for example, estimates that the continent will require $170 billion a year by 2025 to finance its infrastructure development needs. Financial institutions (FIs) have a pivotal role to play in directing funding and facilitating investment in the region, especially in the context of an enduring, and significant, financing gap – which the AfDB also in turn projects to be around $100 billion annually.

Certainly, systemic barriers continue to exist in many developing economies, hindering access to finance. These include substantial upfront capital and transaction costs, and perceived project and/or country risk. In the context of ESG, the role of FIs is to help business to overcome these challenges – supporting and facilitating the transition by unlocking and delivering finance opportunities and solutions that allow emerging markets to focus on their own unique priorities and developmental goals.

And as the need for sustainable financing options grows, the financial markets are responding accordingly. According to recent estimates, ESG-related debt issuance more than tripled in 2021 to $190 billion. What’s more, emerging markets’ share of global bond issuance increased during the same year (see Figure

the importance of the sustainable transition to African markets and the outlook for sustainable financing in the continent

1), most notably for sustainability-linked bond and loan instruments. It was also the first year that developing economies gained market share at the expense of their more advanced counterparts. Investments in ESG now total 18 percent of foreign financing for emerging markets – and that figure is set to grow. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) predicts green bond issuance in emerging markets will reach more than $100 billion in 2023.

Explained: Green, blue, climate and social bonds

Most green bonds, and their subsets, are earmarked for specific sustainabilityfocused projects or assets.

• Green bonds: financial instruments that finance green projects

• Blue bonds: raise capital for marine and ocean-based projects

• Climate bonds: linked to climate change solutions

indirectly, in partnership with local and international FIs alike – in local businesses and projects. MDBs can mobilise private financing by structuring sound investment projects, coinvesting alongside commercial investors, and developing new financial products to unlock additional flows. They can also encourage sustainable development by transforming existing infrastructure – for instance, by prioritising energy efficiency in the projects they finance.

The AfDB, for example, has raised funds for projects across Africa under its Green Bond Framework, promoting green growth by building resilience to climate shocks, providing sustainable infrastructure, creating ecosystem services and making efficient and sustainable use of natural resources. This includes water – a resource central to growth but most affected by climate change.

One project funded by an AfDB bond

such as the Islamic Development Bank, to provide resources to help countries in the region achieve these NDCs. A number of parallel industry initiatives also exist, including the Annual Africa ESG, Impact Investing & Sustainable Finance Summit Forum, which brings together FIs, investors, development finance institutions and other stakeholders to help co-ordinate an African approach to ESG investment.

Export credit agencies (ECAs) are also crucial partners for banks looking to finance investment in Africa. The structure of ECA finance lends itself well to tangible projects like infrastructure. In fact, perceived project risk means that emerging market infrastructure projects typically have no other funding options for long tenors. Especially with the increased costs of raising finance on the international capital markets through bond issuances, ECAbacked financing is not only becoming more competitive – it is fast turning into a strategic requirement.

Partnerships between FIs and ECAs are increasing, with ECAs providing high-quality collateral to the covering bank against bad debt losses through export credit guarantees. This creates cost-effective long-term financing – with benefits all round.

A recent example from our own books is a large renewable energy project in Angola, where Commerzbank together with German ECA Euler Hermes supported the government in its electrification programme. In May 2023, Commerzbank also acted as lead arranger for a €178 million loan to the Cote d’Ivoire’s Finance Ministry, for the construction of watersupply systems in rural areas, with the backing of Swiss and Dutch ECAs.

• Social bonds: for projects with a positive social outcome

• Sustainable bonds: can address a combination of green and social issues

• Sovereign green bond: a green bond issued by a sovereign government

• Sustainability-linked bonds: unlike sustainable bonds, their proceeds are not earmarked for a specific project. Instead, the financing conditions of the bond are structurally linked to the issuer’s achievement of agreed-upon climate or sustainable development goals

As FIs work to deliver ESG solutions to help enable the sustainable future, they cannot do it alone. Multilateral development banks (MDBs), for example, have an important role to play in directing green finance in emerging markets by supporting and investing – directly or

is Egypt’s Gabal El-Asfar Wastewater Treatment Plant (GAWWTP). The plant will improve public health and environmental protection – ultimately improving sanitation for the eight million people living in Cairo East. Largescale infrastructure projects such as the GAWWTP also represent how AfDB’s environmental goals are balanced with its aims to protect livelihoods and spur innovation, job creation and economic development.

The AfDB has also been active in driving broader, industry-wide sustainable initiatives. Under the Paris Agreement, each signatory country has delineated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) –specific climate action goals that need to be met. In 2018, the AfDB established the Africa NDC Hub with 18 international partners, including other partner MDBs

For African businesses to adapt to and succeed in an ESG-driven future, they need to be positioned with the right financial tools to navigate the changes, overcome obstacles and capture the opportunities on offer. FIs therefore need to be positioned to create and deliver effective sustainable finance solutions. There is no one-size-fitsall – solutions must be suited to the unique needs of the market and the project in question.

With new regulation always in the works, the ESG landscape is constantly shifting – but it is steadily moving forward. If Africa is to ensure that it moves forward towards a sustainable future, it will need investment. One thing is clear: FIs, MDBs and ECAs will be instrumental in supporting the transition, helping African economies to achieve their development goals.

Figure 1: Climate Bond Growth Source: Climate Bond Initiative

The challenge of contemporary oil governance for Africa

Given that the voices of African oil-producing countries do not really count when

comes to managing the production and sale of their fossil fuel, the continent’s political leaders

take steps to change this because Africa has enormous energy resources to participate in decision-making, argues Saliou

Diallo

SPEAKING of oil governance, the first institution that comes to mind is the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) created in 1960 during the Baghdad conference. Initially, it consisted of five member countries: Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Venezuela. OPEC then expanded, and is now made up of 13 members, including seven in Africa: Algeria, Angola, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya and Nigeria.

The first structure of governance constituted private oil companies during the interwar period. The second governance structure emerged with the creation of OPEC; and from 1970 the governments of consumer countries were forced to intervene to create a third structure of governance to lower prices. So, they created the International Energy Agency (IEA).

OPEC member countries meet regularly to decide on the price of oil by reducing or increasing production. According to their level of production there are countries more influential than others within the organisation. Countries with much more influence are those with high levels of oil production.

The creation of OPEC therefore resulted from the desire of oil-producing countries themselves to set oil prices, which had been imposed on them by international private companies. However, most OPEC member countries were politically unstable or affected by armed conflict; and given that the OPEC countries alone produce about 40 per cent of the world's crude, the problem of global oil security arises.

What economists call the “resource curse” indicates that the extreme

profitability linked to oil puts the countries which produce it in a very vulnerable situation. Experts argue that OPEC measures, which many have described as a weak cartel aimed at reducing the supply of oil, do not sufficiently explain the evolution of prices. Talking about oil governance means, among other things, talking about the management of oil reserves.

But several studies have highlighted the lack of access to information on the reserves of OPEC countries. Unlike oil companies, whose stocks are examined and audited by international bodies, there is currently no instrument for verifying the reserves of OPEC members.

Effective governance of global oil involves rethinking policies on both the supply and demand sides. In recent decades, the world oil market has undergone

extraordinary change. Emerging countries like China and India have growing energy demands. China, to fuel its growth, is importing more and more oil and is therefore looking for long-term supply contracts all over the world.

This completely changes the geopolitics of oil and leads some countries like the US to think that this has implications for both its economy and national security. The energy demand of these two economic giants is absolutely enormous and they therefore become extremely important playgrounds for international oil companies.

This is why today in Europe international energy companies, with the support of their governments, seek by all means to merge with Chinese and Indian companies. European countries have put in place a policy framework that encourages

it

must

Talking about oil governance means, among other things, talking about the management of oil reserves

this.

Setting up oil governance means setting up market rules that players must follow. The strategy of the stakeholders therefore consists of changing these rules. Each oilproducing country therefore seeks to ensure these rules are in its favour to maximise profit.

Generally, these rules concern tax and licensing regime (operating permits), sovereign taxation and dispute settlement. After the first structure of governance, of which the principle of sharing profits in equal parts was the rule, two types of governance systems have developed.

The first was a policy of nationalisation, which the oil-producing countries put in place to maximise their land rent. The second type of governance stems from the reaction of oil-consuming countries, which reject the legitimacy of ownership of natural resources by anyone.

Since then, exporting countries have continued to claim the management of oil while consuming countries reject the relevance of this argument. Thus, oil governance is torn between two main stakeholders: OPEC members and consuming countries.

Oil governance includes the supply (reserves, production) and demand sides. The oil industry has generally operated with high prices although the recent trend has seen a downward slide in early 2023 due in particular to a slight increase in OPEC production and related concerns about demand. As long as oil supply in the market is greater than demand, there will be falling prices. This is what happened in 2015 when the US and Canada boosted world oil supply through shale oil production.

Oil is an energy resource with a strong geopolitical dimension, serving as a lever to weaken the economy of a country. One of the methods Western countries have used against the Russian economy is to ask the OPEC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, to increase their oil production in order to lower prices at the international level.

Similarly, tensions with Iran and Venezuela are very often linked to oil. Even the creation of the IEA has a geopolitical connotation because it was the developed countries, in particular members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), that decided to set up this structure in 1974 when they realised that international oil companies

were unable on their own to guarantee their energy security; and also, to counter OPEC control on world oil.

The policies of the IEA have been to try to reduce the dependency of OECD countries on OPEC. These policies essentially consist of adopting demand restriction measures and promoting the development of new technologies for energy efficiency.

The geopolitical dimension is a central element in long-term oil management. In the short-term, it is above all what happens on the market that determines the orientation of energy policies. Geopolitics is essential to understanding oil and is taken very seriously by industry observers because geopolitical events are unpredictable.

Indeed, one cannot predict coups, ruptures or popular uprisings while two-thirds of known oil reserves are in OPEC countries, especially in the Persian Gulf. So, geopolitics is fundamental in the governance of world oil. And the conflict in Ukraine is an example of the unpredictability of geopolitical events.

Oil is an energy resource that is also involved in polluting the environment. Thus, talking about the effectiveness of its governance it naturally comes down to whether this can make it possible to avoid wars and whether it protects the environment from the harmful effects of the exploitation of this resource.

It is clear that this is far from the case. Wars and diplomatic tensions are increasing in exporting countries: Libya, Iraq, Iran, South Sudan, Qatar and Yemen, for instance. Nevertheless, the world is still

unable to reduce its oil consumption.

The IEA, which was created to counter the influence of OPEC, is unable to put in place a coherent policy to get out of oil, and the OECD countries are still dependent on OPEC countries for their oil supplies. At the international level, countries are far from reaching a consensus on reducing such dependency.

Each country supports its companies to be more competitive internationally by deliberately neglecting the impacts that their actions could have on the environment. Hydraulic fracturing, for example, which has devastating effects on the environment, continues to be carried out in full view of everyone, especially if it is done in Africa. A blind eye is turned to the actions of international companies as long as they serve vested interests. And the transport sector, which alone represents more than half of world oil consumption, is not at the centre of the priorities of decision-makers. This therefore shows that at the international level, oil governance mechanisms are far from effective.

In the final analysis, a lot of effort remains to better manage world oil and reduce dependence on it. At the international level, there is no governance structure that can be described as effective in the management of oil.

Clearly, the voices of African countries do not really count in the governance of oil. Within OPEC, these members weigh less compared to Saudi Arabia. African political leaders must therefore take steps to make their voices count because the continent has enormous energy resources to give it the necessary clout in decision-making.

Saliou Diallo is an MSc student at the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London.

OECD countries are still dependent on OPEC countries for their oil supplies

Unmasking the social media revolution in Africa: trends and insights from four nations

IN today's interconnected world, social media has transcended geographical boundaries to become an integral part of our daily lives. Nowhere is this transformation more evident than in Africa, a continent known for its diverse cultures and a rapidly expanding digital landscape. This digital revolution has made social media an indispensable part of millions of Africans' lives. To gain deeper insights into the evolving social media landscape across Africa, GeoPoll, the global leader in remote research, conducted a comprehensive survey in four key nations: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, in August 2023. With a sample size of 4,170 participants, this report unveils

a detailed analysis of social media usage across the continent, focusing on critical trends that include:

The leading social media platforms, mobile dominance and usage patterns, e-commerce and advertising and mental health and social media.

As of the latest available data in 2022, Statista reports a continuous surge in Africa's social media users, reaching over 384 million users by 2022. Notably, social media penetration varies across regions, with Northern and Southern Africa boasting higher rates, at 56 percent and 45 percent, respectively. Meanwhile, Central Africa lags significantly behind, with a mere 8 percent penetration.

Leading social media platforms

Facebook: Standing tall as Africa's uncontested social media giant, Facebook boasts a staggering 170 million users. Its ubiquity transcends cultural and linguistic boundaries, serving as a bridge connecting individuals from diverse backgrounds. In GeoPoll's survey, Facebook emerged as the leader in active user engagement, with a remarkable 82 percent of participants actively using the platform. Reasons for usage included staying in touch with friends and family (79 percent), discovering news and current events (68 percent), and making new friends (49 percent).

TikTok: Emerging as the second most popular social media platform, TikTok garnered a significant 60 percent active user rate. The survey highlighted TikTok's versatility, with 73 percent of respondents primarily using it for watching and sharing short-form videos. Additionally, 72 percent turned to TikTok for entertainment and humour, while 61 percent used it to acquire new skills and discover ingenious life hacks.

Instagram: With an impressive 54 percent user engagement rate, Instagram solidified its status as the go-to platform for visual content sharing. Remarkably, 62 percent of users leveraged Instagram to explore creative content and stay abreast of emerging trends. An additional 61 percent primarily used it to follow influencers and celebrities, while 59 percent actively engaged by sharing their own photos and preserving visual memories.

Twitter: Securing the fourth position, Twitter (now called X) had 49 percent of respondents actively using the platform.

A comprehensive survey conducted recently by GeoPoll across Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa explores the rapid evolution of social media in in the region. It delves into platform preferences, mobile dominance, e-commerce impact, mental health considerations, and more, reports Jon Offei-Ansah

Within this group, a significant 78 percent used Twitter to follow news sources and journalists, while 59 percent employed it to connect with like-minded individuals and engage in thought-provoking discussions and debates. Additionally, 55 percent of users actively shared updates and personal thoughts.

LinkedIn: Demonstrating its strength as a professional networking platform, LinkedIn boasted a 28 percent active user rate. Impressively, 87 percent of users considered LinkedIn a powerful tool for job hunting and career advancement. Moreover, 83 percent used the platform to forge connections with fellow professionals, and 69 percent leveraged LinkedIn to establish and strengthen their professional online presence.

Snapchat: Maintaining a respectable 25 percent active user base, Snapchat users primarily shared quick moments of their day (68 percent), sent ephemeral photos and videos to friends (63 percent), and explored the platform's filters and features (56 percent).

Pinterest, Threads, and Reddit: These platforms experienced slightly lower levels of active users, with 18 percent, 10 percent, and 6 percent, respectively. Pinterest users primarily employed the platform to unearth and organise creative ideas (81 percent), delve into DIY projects and crafts (71 percent), and discover fashion and style inspiration (70 percent). Threads, Meta's new social

media platform, garnered a 10 percent active user base, with 73 percent of active users primarily using it to follow news sources and journalists. Similarly, Reddit had 6 percent active users, with 75 percent actively discussing specific interests or hobbies and 73 percent participating in niche communities (subreddits).

These insights provide valuable information on social media platform preferences and usage patterns among surveyed individuals in Africa. The dynamic growth of social media usage on the continent, driven by mobile accessibility and a youthful population, underscores the pivotal role of platforms like Facebook as communication tools, news sources, and entertainment hubs.

In Africa, mobile devices serve as the primary gateway to social media. With smartphones becoming increasingly accessible, respondents reported spending an average of 3 to 6 hours daily on social platforms. This substantial time is dedicated to communication, content consumption, and entertainment. Social media plays a dynamic role as an information-sharing platform, with users frequently turning to it for communication, entertainment, news, and updates.

The influence of social media extends beyond personal connections to encompass e-commerce and advertising. Businesses have recognised the potential of these platforms for marketing, capitalising on

their massive user base for brand exposure and customer engagement. The rise of influencer marketing, driven by local content creators, has further transformed the advertising landscape. Notably, 80 percent of respondents acknowledged purchasing a product or service advertised on social media.

The intricate relationship between social media usage and mental health remains a subject of research and debate. According to survey findings, 61 percent of respondents expressed a notably positive impact of social media on their mental well-being, with an additional 23 percent finding the impact somewhat positive. For 16 percent, their experiences fell into a neutral zone. However, 2 percent reported a somewhat negative effect, and 1 percent indicated a very negative impact.

This exclusive survey was conducted through the GeoPoll mobile application from August 12th to 20th, 2023, in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa. The survey sample included 4,170 participants aged 18 to 60, randomly selected from app users. Due to the random distribution of the survey, the results slightly skew towards younger respondents.

The African social media landscape is evolving at a remarkable pace, driven by mobile accessibility and the enthusiasm of a youthful population. Platforms like Facebook, TikTok, Instagram, Twitter, and LinkedIn have established themselves as pillars of communication, information sharing, and entertainment. Moreover, these platforms have become vibrant spaces for e-commerce and advertising, with influencer marketing playing a pivotal role.

As social media continues to shape the African digital landscape, it remains crucial to explore its impact on mental health and well-being. While many respondents reported positive experiences, ongoing research and awareness are essential to address potential challenges.

This survey offers valuable insights into the dynamic social media trends and behaviours that are reshaping the continent's digital landscape. Africa's digital revolution is ongoing, and social media will undoubtedly play a central role in its future development.

The future of Africa-Russia relations

DURING the post-1991 period, Russia has transformed its position in Africa from a decidedly second-tier power to a virtual great power, which boasts continent-wide ambitions but has uncertain material resources to advance its goals. Despite dire predictions of international isolation, regime collapse and economic implosion, Russia’s influence in Africa is poised to weather the storm-clouds that followed its invasion of Ukraine.

As the decade progresses, Russia is likely to continue harmonising the tactics that originated during the 1990s and crystallised during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency. By combining counterinsurgency operations, arms sales, autocracy promotion and soft power tools, such as media outreaches, educational diplomacy, debt forgiveness and humanitarian aid, Russia could remain an attractive partner for African countries and preserve a unique niche between France, the United States and China.

The elevation of Africa’s importance for Russian foreign policy suggests that Moscow is unlikely to abandon its footholds in Libya, Mali, Sudan or the Central African Republic, even as casualties mount in Ukraine and untrained Wagner Group PMCs surface on eastern Ukraine’s frontlines.

As the Russian media environment coalesces around a state-sponsored narrative, optimism that Russia could make an illusory transition from a virtual great power to a genuine great power in Africa is at an all-time high. An article in Vzyglad of 28 July [2022] gleefully proclaimed that “Russia wins against the West in the fight for Africa”, and that the West is reacting sharply to the growing array of competitors in African affairs, such as Turkey, Arab countries, Russia and China.

Beyond the poor efficiency of its conversion of rhetorical pledges into deals, Russia’s power projection in Africa can no longer be advanced in its preferred underthe-radar fashion. The erosion of Russia’s stealth advantage was exemplified by the immediate reactions of France, the US and the EU to [Russian Foreign Minister Sergei] Lavrov’s Africa tour [in July 2022].

[French President Emmanuel] Macron lambasted Russia as “one of the last

imperial colonial powers’, as it invaded a neighbouring country to defend its interests.

Ukraine’s increasingly pronounced public diplomacy efforts in Africa complement Western efforts to counter the Kremlin’s first-mover advantage in the continent’s information war. After Ukraine’s belated and largely inconsequential engagement with Egypt and South Africa, France and Germany cajoled African leaders to attend a Zoom call with [President Volodymyr] Zelensky on 20 June [2022].

This back-channel pressure yielded few results, as only the leaders of Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Congo and Libyan Presidential Council head Mohammed al-Menfi attended the call. Despite this setback, Ukraine has doubled down on its diplomatic outreaches to Africa as it tries to isolate Russia in the Global South.

Notwithstanding these signs of progress, African experts are split on the long-term efficacy of Ukraine diplomatic outreaches. Rashid Abdi [a former Horn of Africa project director at the International Crisis Group] believes that Ukraine’s diplomatic activities could spur African countries to “modernise our view of Russia” and recognise Russia as an imperial power.

Horn International Institute for Strategic Studies Director Hassan Khannenje believes that embracing

Ukraine will undermine Africa’s partnership with China and raise doubts in Beijing about how African countries might position themselves in the event of a Taiwan conflict.

In stark contrast to the adulation that he has received in Western countries, Zelensky is a highly polarising figure in Africa, where he is regularly subjected to fierce criticisms. In August 2022 an article in Nigeria’s Premium Times decried Zelensky as a “divisive figure and warmonger” before his ascension to the presidency, and lambasted his alleged efforts to undermine the rights of African students in Ukraine.

Zelensky’s criticism of neutrality, which included the pointed response to South Africa’s position that “I don’t’ believe there can be a neutral position in war’, and warning that Pretoria was diminishing its international standing by not condemning “the racism, the Nazism and Russism” also clashes with the consensus amongst Africa’s leading regional powers.

While African countries are unlikely to embrace Ukraine in a unified fashion, their willingness to entertain Ukrainian narratives suggests that Russia’s informal offensive will face more stringent resistance as the war endures.

Russia is struggling to reconcile its growing ambitions with its increasingly limited material capability. This chasm forces Russia into an uncomfortable choice between overextension and retrenchment in Africa.

The attritional erosion of Russia’s economic and military capabilities due to NATO military support for Ukraine and Western sanctions exacerbates the Kremlin’s policy dilemma. The Global South’s growing alienation from US and European foreign policy diktats provides Russia with a durable soft power foundation, and will ensure that Africa does not isolate Moscow but consignment to virtual great power status remains a virtual certainty.

Given these limitations, the story of Russia’s post-Communist policy towards Africa is one of an incremental resurgence that culminates in unfulfilled promises and foiled dreams.

As African countries become increasingly entangled in the complex nature of the war in Ukraine, a new publication looks at how the links between Russia and the continent will now evolve in the wake of the conflict. Africa Briefing publishes excerpts from the book

Excerpted from Russia in Africa: Resurgent Great Power or Bellicose Pretender? by Samuel Ramani and published by C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. © Samuel Ramani 2023.

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