AfricaBriefing: MAY - JUNE 2025

TRUMP’S TARIFFS AND AFRICA News. Analysis. Comment.

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May-June 2025

Vol.8 No.38

Congo’s silent war on women Ghana sets gold standard in ethical governance Captain Traoré redefines African power Sudan conflict: no military solution Eurozone 5 euros UK £3.00 North America $6.50 CFA Zone CFA2,600 Ethiopia R90 Ghana GHC12.00 Kenya KSh350 Rwanda RWF3,000 Sierra Leone LE20,000 South Africa R40.00 (inc. tax) Other Southern African Countries R35.10 (excl. tax) Tanzania TSh6,500 Uganda USh10,700 Zambia ZMK45

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PUBLISHER’S NOTE

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Congo’s war on women intensifies

Publisher Jon Offei-Ansah Editor

T

HE Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) continues to suffer under the weight of one of the most brutal, under-reported wars of our time—a war where women’s bodies are not just casualties, but targets. As our cover story by Valerie Msoka lays bare, sexual violence in eastern DRC is not incidental. It is methodical. It is widespread. And it is devastating.

The statistics are as grim as they are numbing. In just the first two months of 2025, UNICEF recorded nearly 10,000 cases of rape and sexual violence in the eastern DRC—35 to 45 percent of those victims were children. That translates to a child being raped every thirty minutes. Behind each number is a life irrevocably altered—and that’s only what’s been reported. Countless others remain silent, either out of fear, shame, or isolation.

Dr. Cécile Mubalama of the Panzi Foundation has seen the worst: babies as young as six months, elderly women in their eighties, all brutalised by armed actors who use rape as a weapon. Militias, including the M23, have weaponised sexual violence to break communities, force displacement, and instil terror. As Msoka rightly highlights in her investigative piece, these are not acts of individual depravity—they are part of a calculated strategy of war.

Disturbingly, this brutality is fuelled by dangerous myths. Some perpetrators believe PUBLISHER’S NOTE raping infants cures diseases; others think attacking elderly women brings strength or Publisher

protection. These beliefs, compounded by impunity and the near-total absence of justice, Jon Offei-Ansah Africa bucks global create a climate where rape becomes not only tolerated, but inevitable.

Editor economic trend James Elder of UNICEF warned that this situation is spiralling into a full-scale

I

Desmond Davies

humanitarian Medical services are overwhelmed. In Goma—home to over two n 2018, six of thedisaster.

10 fastest-growing Deputy Editor economies in the world were in million people—only three hospitals can adequately treat survivors.

UNFPA reports that Africa, according to the World Bank, Angela Cobbinah with Ghana leading the pack.

With medical supplies are routinely looted, leaving clinics without the basics to provide care GDP growth for the continent projected to Contributing Editor or prevent infections post-assault. accelerate to fourHIV per cent in 2019 and 4.1

Stephen Williams per cent in 2020, Africa’s economic growth Meanwhile, theMeanwhile, displaced are caught in Doing a vicious cycle. story continues apace. the World Bank’s 2019 Business Index As Msoka’s reporting reveals, Director, Special Projects reveals that five of the 10 most-improved countries are in Africa, and one-third of camps that are meant to be refuges have become new grounds for exploitation. Women all reforms recorded globally were in sub-Saharan Africa.

Michael Orji

are coerced into sex for food, denied privacy when bathing or using toilets, and left with

What makes the story more impressive and heartening is that the growth real protection from further abuse.

–no projected to be broad-based – is being achieved in a challenging global environment, bucking the trend.

Contributors Justice Lee Adoboe Legal justice remains elusive. MONUSCO and Congolese authorities have made Chuks Iloegbunam In the Cover Story of this edition, Dr. Hippolyte Fofack, Chief Economist at the strides with mobile courts and analyses ad hoctheprosecutions, but too Kayira underAfrican Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), factors underpinning thisthey are too few and Joseph performance. Two factors, in my opinion, stand out in Dr. Hippolyte’s analysis: Zachary Ochieng resourced.

Survivors long travel distances, and a judicial system that trade between Africa and China face and theintimidation, intra-African cross-border investment and Olu Ojewale infrastructure too often development. retraumatises rather than supports. Paper reforms exist. Enforcement does not.

Oladipo Okubanjo Much has been said and written about China’s ever-deepening economic foray into And especially yet, amid this despair, there is resilience.

As Valerie Corinne Soar Africa,

by Western analysts and commentators who have been sounding Msoka notes, survivoralarm bells about re-colonisation of Africa, Women this time by who the Chinese. empirical in silence are now leading led movements are growing. onceBut suffered Designer evidence paints a different picture.

grassroots campaigns, building clinics, offering counselling, and lobbying for reform.

Gloria Ansah Despite the decelerating global growth environment, trade between Africa and Networks SEMA des Femmes and Panzi Foundation are China increasedlike by 14.5 per cent and in the organisations first three quarters oflike 2018,Voix surpassing Country Representatives the of world women trade (11.6 heal—they’re per cent), reflecting the deepeninggovernments economic notgrowth justrate helping pushing and global institutions to dependency between the two major trading partners.

act.

South Africa

Empirical evidence shows that China’s domestic investment has become highly Edward Walter Byerley linked with economic expansion in Africa. A one percentage point increase Dog Media, 5 Ascot Knights But support for these efforts is paltry. A 2024 International Rescue Top Committee report in China’s domestic investment growth is associated with an average of 0.6 47 Grand National Boulevard Royal Ascot, percentage increase overall exports.

And, the expected economic violence funding goes directly revealedpoint that less inthan 1 African percent of global gender-based Milnerton 7441, South Africa development and trade impact of expanding Chinese investment on resource-rich to local women’s organisations.

Theisinternational community continues route aid555 0096 Tel:to+27 (0) 21 African countries, especially oil-exporting countries, even more important.

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through bodies or large foreign NGOs, bypassing the very women best The resiliencemultilateral of African economies can also be attributed to growing intra-African Email: ed@topdog-media.net cross-border investment andresponse infrastructureefforts. development. A combination of the positioned to lead two factors is accelerating the process of structural transformation in a continent Ghana where and services account for to a growing share of GDP. The industrial Africanoutput Union is beginning act—albeit tooAfrican slowly. Through the Great Lakes Bekoe Nana Asiama corporations and industrialists which are expanding their industrial footprint across Kingdom Concept Co. Women’s Platform and justice frameworks, it is offering tools. But as Msoka Africa and globally are leading the transitional diversification from agriculture into higher Tel: +233 243 393 943 / +233 303 967 470 value goods in manufacturing and service sectors. These industrial champions argues in our cover story, initiatives without funding, enforcement, and political will are kingsconceptsltd@gmail.com are carrying out transcontinental operations, with investment holdings around the globe, a strong presence in Europe and Pacific Asia, together account for more littlewith more than symbolic gestures.

Nigeria than 75 per cent of their combined activities outside Africa.

Taiwo Adedoyin Ending conflict-related sexual violence in DRC will require more than sympathy.

It

A survey of 30 leading emerging African corporations with global footprints and MV Noble, Press House, 3rd Floor combined revenue of more courage, than $118 billion shows that they are investment, active in several and recognition demands political survivor-centred women 27 Acmeof Road, Ogba, Ikeja, Lagos industries, including manufacturing (e.g., Dangote Industries), basic materials, Tel: +234 806 291 7100 not as passive (e.g., victims as agents of(e.g., peace.

“Weanddo telecommunications Econet,but Safaricom), finance Ecobank) oil not need pity. We need power,” taiadedoyin52@gmail.com and gas.activist In additionChantal to mitigating risks highly African said Kanyere atcorrelated a 2024with forum ineconomies, Kinshasa. That message, echoed by these emerging African global corporations are accelerating the diversification of Kenya Msoka’s powerful reporting, must be heeded. sources of growth and reducing the exposure of countries to adverse commodity Naima Farah terms of trade.

Room 22, 2nd Floor Rape in war is not inevitable. It is a choice made by perpetrators—and tolerated

by West Wing Royal Square, Ngong Road, Nairobi institutions. The time to end that tolerance is now.

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Africa Briefing Ltd 2 Redruth Close, London N22 8RN United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0) 208 888 6693

Desmond Davies Contributing Editors Prof. Toyin Falola Tikum Mbah Azonga Prof. Ojo Emmanuel Ademola (Technology) Valerie Msoka (Special Projects) Contributors Justice Lee Adoboe Chief Chuks Iloegbunam Joseph Kayira Zachary Ochieng Olu Ojewale Oladipo Okubanjo Corinne Soar Kennedy Olilo Gorata Chepete Designer Simon Blemadzie Country Representatives South Africa Edward Walter Byerley Top Dog Media, 5 Ascot Knights 47 Grand National Boulevard Royal Ascot, Milnerton 7441, South Africa Tel: +27 (0) 21 555 0096 Cell: +27 (0) 81 331 4887 Email: ed@topdog-media.net Ghana Nana Asiama Bekoe Kingdom Concept Co. Tel: +233 243 393 943 / +233 303 967 470 kingsconceptsltd@gmail.com Nigeria Nnenna Ogbu #4 Babatunde Oduse crescent Isheri Olowora - Isheri Berger, Lagos Tel: +234 803 670 4879 getnnenna.ogbu@gmail.com Kenya Patrick Mwangi Aquarius Media Ltd, PO Box 10668-11000 Nairobi, Kenya Tel: 0720 391 546/0773 35 41 Email: mwangi@aquariusmedia.co.ke ©Africa Briefing Ltd 2 Redruth Close, London N22 8RN United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0) 208 888 6693 publisher@africabriefing.org

Contents

Vol.8 No.38 May-June 2025

LEADER

6

Another botched attempt to bring peace to Sudan

COMMENT

07

Beware, counterfeiters are on the move

COVER STORY

08

Congo’s war on women

12

Trump’s Congo deal: peace for minerals

08

As the conflict in eastern Congo intensifies, women and children are suffering unspeakable violence. In this urgent report, Valerie Msoka examines how rape is being used as a weapon of war, the staggering scale of sexual abuse in 2025, and the courageous women fighting back against impunity and silence

Jon Offei-Ansah dissects how Donald Trump’s push for peace between the DRC and Rwanda doubles as a bold play for Africa’s mineral wealth and US strategic influence

14

ANALYSIS

14

Ghana sets Africa’s gold standard for ethical governance

20

Resorting to arms won’t end political disputes

With its new Code of Conduct and enforced asset declaration penalties, Ghana is redefining transparency and leadership accountability—offering a model for governance reform across the continent, writes Jon Offei-Ansah

Kenya has strongly and consistently advocated for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, such as the ongoing one in Sudan that may not end any time soon if we continue prioritising military solutions, says Musalia Mudavadi

BUSINESS & ECONOMY

32

Trump’s tariffs and Africa

If the continent is to survive in the fast-changing global trade system, it must unite and adopt a coherent industrial policy that will identify those economic sectors that it wishes to excel in, and then subordinate social and economic policies to achieve those ends, writes Adotey Bing-Pappoe

38

A new era: Africa breaking free from dependency

With the global financial order shifting, the continent is in a position to forge a new economic path, one based on self-sufficiency, innovation and African-led solutions, writes Anatu Ben-Lawal

32

TECHNOLOGY

40

5G is Africa’s fast track to power

As nations race to lead in the digital age, Ojo Emmanuel Ademola argues that 5G technology offers Africa a gamechanging opportunity to drive innovation, close the digital divide, and redefine its global competitiveness

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LEADER

Another botched attempt to bring peace to Sudan

T

HE London Sudan Conference conceived by the British government laboured and brought forth a mouse in April. NonAfrican countries – especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – ensured that there was no joint communique because they were intransigent in their support for opposing sides in the conflict.

Instead, the conference ended with a statement by the co-chairs. Even an attempt to establish a new contact group failed.

The recalcitrance of the Arab nations can be seen clearly through the point made by Dr Musalia Mudavadi, the Prime Cabinet Secretary and Cabinet Secretary for Foreign and Diaspora Affairs of Kenya, in his statement at the conference: “We need to confront the challenge of multiple and parallel peace initiatives that impair commitment because parties engage in forum shopping, opting to choose processes that suit their selfish interests rather than the common good. Without collective peace, the net effect of partial negotiations is partial solutions.”

He was spot on. The conflict that erupted in April 2023 continues to wreak havoc in a country that has become the world’s biggest humanitarian disaster with tens of thousands killed and 12 million people internally displaced or seeking asylum as refugees. This is down to the UAE backing the paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), headed by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, which is pitted against the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

On May 6, the UAE was exonerated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, which dismissed Sudan's case accusing the Gulf state of complicity in genocide. The UAE denied the accusations, arguing that the case was “a cynical publicity stunt”.

The ICJ ruled that the case could not go ahead because the UAE had opted out of Article 9 of the Genocide Convention, which means that it cannot be sued by other states over genocide allegations. The litigation was different in that it targeted an alleged sponsor of atrocities, not the direct perpetrators. It was seen as a test of 6

whether states can be held responsible for fuelling atrocities abroad While the case was being heard, the RSF was undertaking days of drone attacks on Port Sudan, causing power cuts, disruptions to flights and major fires.

On the same day of the ICJ ruling, Sudan severed diplomatic ties with the UAE. The African Union has made moves to end the carnage in Sudan. Its Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, Adama Dieng, has been working relentlessly in the interest of civilians caught in the middle of the war.

He has expressed concern about atrocity crimes committed by the RSF during its occupation of ZamZam internally displaced persons (IDP) camp on April 13. These include targeting of civilians, destruction of humanitarian and medical infrastructure, sexual and genderbased violence and looting of critical food and medical supplies.

These acts of impunity represent a brazen disregard for international humanitarian law (IHL) and civilian welfare. The legal wranglings notwithstanding, the fact that the UAE exercises significant influence on the RSF should force the Gulf state to resume serious diplomatic engagements that could play a crucial role in de-escalating the violence and advancing efforts towards

‘

Even more troubling are the summary executions by the RSF of nine humanitarian workers from the non-governmental organisation, Relief International, and the killing of the manager of the Sudanese Physicians Association’s Hope Oasis Centre. These acts and the targeting of civilians, especially medical staff and humanitarian facilities, are war crimes and crimes against humanity.

They not only violate fundamental human rights but also threaten the stability of the region, with devastating consequences for Sudan’s future. It is now up to the leaders of the SAF and RSF to de-escalate the fighting, to refrain from dangerous and inflammatory hate speech, fully comply with international humanitarian and human rights laws and fulfil their responsibility to protect civilians from genocide and crimes against humanity.

The London Sudan Conference was a brave attempt by the British government to end the misery of the people of Sudan.

But the UAE and Saudi Araba, with their immense wealth, totally controlled proceedings that ended in a stalemate.

All, though, is not lost. The AU should use the full weight of its diplomatic capacities to pressure parties to the conflict to end human rights violations, enact an

SAF and RSF leaders must fulfil their responsibility to halt genocide and crimes against humanity

a peaceful settlement of this bloody civil war.

There is deep concern about the deteriorating security situation and the failure of efforts to ensure the protection of civilians, especially in Darfur, Khartoum, South Kordofan, White Nile and other conflict-affected provinces. Reports from humanitarian organisations, eyewitness accounts and independent investigations indicate systematic targeting of ethnic communities, mass killings and the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian aid.

AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

’

immediate ceasefire and come to the table for peaceful, negotiated settlement of the conflict. International actors must also support the documentation of atrocities and ensure that those accountable will face the full force of international law to end cycles of violence and impunity, including by pressing combatants to allow safe access for investigators and monitors and implement rapid, effective and safe delivery of humanitarian aid to the AB beleaguered people of Sudan.

COMMENT

Beware, counterfeiters are on the move A

REPORT released by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) on May 7 said the global trade in fake goods had reached a staggering $467 billion in 2021, posing risks to consumer safety and compromising intellectual property. The report pointed out that this was clearly a major threat to economies, consumers and supply chains worldwide.

The figures were for four years ago. One wonders what they will be in the current climate of uncertainty overshadowing the global trade in goods in the wake of Donald Trump’s tariffs antics.

It will obviously get worse.

Naturally, as the demand for affordable goods rises, counterfeiters exploit the market, often at the expense of local businesses and international brands. In all this, African countries are the weakest link. Over the years, the continent has been hit hard by counterfeit goods flooding the market.

While many businesses in Africa have struggled to counter the counterfeiters, the more serious aspect of the problem is the threat to health posed by fake drugs and medicines. Take the case in The Gambia in 2022 when 70 children died after being given Indian-made syrups that contained “unacceptable” quantities of diethylene glycol and ethylene glycol, commonly used as antifreeze, according to the World Health Organisation.

The fatal chemicals caused acute kidney failure in the children who died.

The Gambian government recalled all cough and cold syrups in circulation, as well as all products manufactured by the Indian firm, Maiden Pharmaceuticals, where the contaminated syrups came from.

The Indian government shut down the company.

In The Gambia, officials discovered that the dodgy medicines had not been registered with the medicines control agency prior to being imported, as required by the regulations. What’s new? All over Africa, quality control is a joke, and it’s not just restricted to medicines.

The OECD report said clothing, footwear and leather goods remained among the most affected sectors, accounting jointly for 62 per cent of seized counterfeit goods. It noted that counterfeiters were expanding into new sectors reaching nearly every aspect of daily life: hazardous fakes, including automotive parts, medicines, cosmetics, toys and food were increasingly prevalent, posing serious risks to consumer health and safety.

“Illicit trade threatens public safety, undermines intellectual property rights and hampers economic growth, and the risks could increase as counterfeiters leverage new technologies and techniques to avoid detection,” OECD Secretary-General Mathias Cormann said. “The OECD’s continued monitoring and mapping of the global trade in fakes shows the need for authorities to adopt new tools and step up their cooperation and information sharing.”

‘

Desmond Davies down on the purveyors of fake goods, in Africa the counterfeiters are beginning to make a killing. Cloak and Cover, which specialises in helping brands protect their trademarks and combat counterfeiting across emerging markets, has noted that counterfeiters are now moving their operations to Africa.

The firm pointed out that with global enforcement efforts intensifying in traditional counterfeiting hubs like China and Southeast Asia, infringers were shifting their operations to new, less-regulated regions. Africa, it says, has become an emerging hotspot for counterfeiting activity, with an increasing number of illicit operations targeting local and international markets.

According to Cloak and Cover, Africa is becoming a counterfeiters’ paradise as a result of several factors such as growing Chinese investment, expanding e-commerce networks, weak enforcement mechanisms and rising consumer demand.

Counterfeiting does not augur well for the fledgling African Continental Free Trade Area

According to the OECD, while China remains the dominant source of fake goods, accounting for 45 per cent of all reported seizures in 2021, other countries in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America are also involved in the counterfeit trade.

The report also highlights how trade routes are evolving. Counterfeiters are increasingly using international waterways and adopting “localisation” strategies, shipping unassembled parts or packaging to assemble fake products closer to end markets, further complicating detection.

They are also becoming clever at quickly producing fake versions of in-demand products, advertising online and taking advantage of less scrutinised shipping methods; around 65 per cent of seizures involve small parcels and mail, showing a shift toward distribution channels that offer speed, convenience and lower risk of inspection.

As Europe and North America clamp

AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

’

This clearly does not augur well for the fledgling African Continental Free Trade Area, which aims to create a single market for goods and services across the continent. But it is not just about boosting intra-African trade. It is about selling more African produced goods.

This is where the battle against the counterfeiters in Africa should be waged.

The continent must place robust checks in place that will encourage genuine foreign companies to transfer their operations to Africa to take advantage of the continent’s growing market.

It is not just governments that have to be alert. Businesses need to stay vigilant by working closely with specialist lawyers to navigate both the civil and criminal procedures involved in countering this illegal trade. African consumers should also do their research on the dangers of buying counterfeit products and to learn how to spot imitation products. AB 7

COVER STORY

Congo’s war on women As the conflict in eastern Congo intensifies, women and children are suffering unspeakable violence. In this urgent report, Valerie Msoka examines how rape is being used as a weapon of war, the staggering scale of sexual abuse in 2025, and the courageous women fighting back against impunity and silence

T

HE Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) continues to endure one of the world’s longest-running and most devastating humanitarian crises. For more than two decades, the eastern provinces of North Kivu, Ituri, and South Kivu have been ravaged by violent conflict, leaving millions displaced and entire communities shattered. But while this violence affects every Congolese citizen, women and girls face a unique and horrifying dimension of suffering—one that turns their bodies into battlefields, and their silence into a weapon of war.

a tool of terror, but as a weapon of control.

Rape is used to punish, to intimidate, and to displace. It is part of a deliberate strategy of warfare that seeks to destabilise entire communities by destroying their women.

In 2025, this war on women has reached a new level of brutality. In the first two months of the year alone, UNICEF reported nearly 10,000 cases of rape and sexual violence in eastern DRC, with children making up between 35 to 45 percent of the victims. That figure, staggering in its own right, means that a child is raped every thirty minutes in this conflict zone. And these are just the documented cases—many more go unreported due to fear, stigma, or the sheer absence of access to help. Behind each statistic lies a personal tragedy, often unspoken and unnoticed.

James Elder, spokesperson for UNICEF, has warned the world that the

The cruelty of these crimes defies belief. Dr. Cécile Mubalama, a gynaecologist working with the Panzi Foundation in Bukavu, has seen the worst.

“We have treated babies as young as six months and grandmothers over eighty,” she said. “This is not incidental—it’s systematic.” The perpetrators, often members of armed groups like the M23 rebels or local militias, use rape not only as 8

And there are disturbing beliefs that fuel this savagery. Local myths persist that raping infants cures diseases, or that assaulting elderly women can transfer wisdom or strength. These falsehoods, coupled with the general lawlessness and absence of justice in many regions, have created an atmosphere of impunity where women and girls are endlessly targeted.

situation in eastern Congo is spiralling.

“Based on initial data… during the most intense phase of this year’s conflict in eastern DRC, a child was raped every half an hour,” he said. “This is not just a violation of rights. It’s a humanitarian catastrophe.”

The toll of such violence extends far beyond the physical injuries, although those are severe and often permanent.

Many survivors suffer fistulas, infertility, or damage to their digestive and reproductive systems. Survivors frequently report attacks involving multiple assailants, sometimes with weapons or blunt objects.

Some victims die from their wounds.

Others carry the psychological scars for a

AU backs Great Lakes Women’s Platform to empower women peacebuilders in DRC, Rwanda and Burundi

AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

COVER STORY

The toll of such violence extends far beyond the physical injuries

lifetime—made worse by the rejection and shame often heaped on them by their own families and communities.

Adding to this trauma is the overwhelming scale of displacement.

As of early 2025, more than 6.9 million Congolese have been internally displaced—the highest number ever recorded in the country. In displacement camps around Goma and elsewhere, women and girls face new forms of abuse.

They are extorted for food, coerced into sex by men in power, and denied even the most basic security.

“For women in the camps, there is no safe place,” said Marie-Claire Muloko, director of the Goma-based NGO Voix des Femmes. “They fled violence only to face it again—this time from those who are meant to protect or assist them.” Women in these camps often lack access to toilets or bathing facilities that offer privacy, making them vulnerable to assault even when attending to basic needs.

The healthcare infrastructure meant to care for survivors is buckling under the pressure. In Goma, a city of more than

two million people, only three hospitals are currently able to provide clinical care for survivors of sexual violence. UNFPA reports that looting of medical supplies has left hospitals without essential materials

‘

Dr. Denis Mukwege, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and founder of the Panzi Hospital, has issued one of the strongest condemnations of the international community’s inaction. Speaking earlier

We have treated babies as young as six months and grandmothers over eighty. This is not incidental—it’s systematic

to treat injuries or provide post-exposure prophylaxis to prevent HIV. Many survivors, especially those in remote or insecure areas, have no access to care at all.

’

AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

this year, he criticised the West’s silence and what he called “a shocking double standard” in foreign policy. “Rwanda’s support for the M23 is no different from what Russia is doing in Ukraine,” he 9

COVER STORY

Nobel laureate Dr Denis Mukwege condemns global silence, calling out the international community’s failure to act

said. “Yet one conflict dominates global headlines while the other is ignored. Our women are dying in silence.”

Mukwege warned that many women are too afraid to come forward, fearing retribution or disbelief. “The trauma is not just physical,” he said. “It’s institutional.

It’s embedded in systems that fail to protect or even acknowledge survivors.”

He added that real change will only come when rape is no longer viewed as a tragic inevitability of war, but as a deliberate crime that demands global condemnation and action.

While the United Nations and its agencies have deployed multiple interventions—from safe spaces to mobile health units—many are underfunded or lack sustained political support. UNFPA alone recorded over 8,000 cases of genderbased violence in 2024 and expanded its network to over 90 safe spaces and mobile teams. But with the needs growing exponentially, these efforts feel like a drop in the ocean.

Justice for survivors remains elusive.

10

The MONUSCO Joint Human Rights Office works with Congolese authorities to prosecute sexual violence, and mobile courts have brought convictions in some cases. But these mechanisms are chronically under-resourced. Survivors often have to travel long distances, face intimidation, or relive their trauma in unsympathetic courts. Legal reforms exist on paper but have yet to be enforced in a way that systematically dismantles impunity.

At the grassroots level, local NGOs continue to do extraordinary work in the face of enormous odds. Organisations like Panzi Foundation, HEAL Africa, Femmes Solidaires, and Voix des Femmes offer trauma counselling, legal support, skills training, and reintegration programmes.

Many of these groups are led by survivors themselves, who are reclaiming agency and working to prevent others from enduring what they suffered.

The African Union has historically lagged in its response to gender-based violence in conflict zones, but in recent AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

years it has taken tentative steps towards engagement. Through its Continental Framework for Transitional Justice and the work of the AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security, the AU has begun to speak out. Following a 2023 fact-finding mission to Goma, AU Envoy Bineta Diop remarked, “The trauma in Congo is not just physical—it’s institutional. Women need healing, but they also need justice and power.”

The AU’s support for the Great Lakes Women’s Platform is one such promising step, aimed at bolstering women peacebuilders across the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi. Yet critics say these initiatives lack sufficient funding and enforcement. Without political will from member states, regional institutions will remain sidelined in this fight.

Sudan and South Sudan provide cautionary examples. There, the AU has convened peace talks and issued declarations, but the daily realities for women—rape, forced displacement, early marriage—remain unchanged. In both

COVER STORY international conventions, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Yet these frameworks are rarely enforced. Perpetrators of wartime sexual violence, including those in leadership positions within armed groups, continue to act with impunity. International sanctions regimes often fail to include sexual violence as a trigger for targeted measures.

Rwanda backing M23 mirrors Russia’s war in Ukraine

countries, as in the DRC, women are often locked out of decision-making, even though they serve as the first responders and peacebuilders in their communities.

What is needed now is not more reports or declarations, but bold, coordinated action. Justice must no longer be optional. Survivor-centred services must become the norm, not the exception. And above all, women must be seen not only as victims, but as leaders in the peace and recovery process.

Chantal Kanyere, a survivor-turnedactivist who spoke at a 2024 forum in Kinshasa, put it plainly: “We do not need pity. We need protection. We need power.

And above all, we need the world to stop watching and start acting.”

Rape is not a natural by-product of war. It is a weapon. And like any weapon, it can be disarmed—if there is the will to do so. That means ending impunity through justice reform. It means expanding trauma care and safe spaces as a central part of humanitarian aid. It means giving women economic tools and leadership roles. And it means ensuring that when the world says, ‘never again’, it means it—everywhere.

Yet amid this despair, women are refusing to be silent. Across conflictaffected regions of the DRC, survivorled movements are gaining momentum.

Groups like SEMA, a network of survivors supported by Nobel Laureates, are advocating directly to national and international institutions. These women— many of whom once hid their trauma in silence—are now using their voices as tools of change. They document abuses, challenge stigma, and demand political representation. In their view, healing is not

only physical—it is political.

One survivor-advocate from North Kivu, who asked to be identified only as Julienne, recounted her experience at a community forum held in Goma in February 2025. “I used to feel like I had died. But when I spoke my truth and other women listened, I came back to life,” she said. “We are the evidence, we are the testimony, and we are the change. If they do not hear us, they will never fix this.”

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Experts argue that until rape is treated as a red-line atrocity—like genocide or ethnic cleansing—the global response will remain inadequate. Calls have grown louder for the International Criminal Court to open new investigations into mass rape as a war crime in the DRC. However, progress has been slow, and survivors are growing weary of waiting for justice that never arrives.

This moment demands more than sympathy. It requires bold political will, a redistribution of resources to those closest to the crisis, and a reimagining of peacebuilding that centres the experience and leadership of women.

Congo’s women are not waiting to be saved. They are building solutions every

We do not need pity. We need protection. We need power. And above all, we need the world to stop watching and start acting

But these grassroots movements face formidable obstacles. Access to funding remains a major barrier, with most international aid still routed through large multilateral organisations or foreign NGOs. Only a small percentage reaches local women-led initiatives directly, despite evidence that these groups are often the most trusted and effective actors on the ground. A 2024 report by the International Rescue Committee found that less than 1 percent of gender-based violence funding in humanitarian settings globally is directed to local women’s organisations.

There is also a pressing need to close the accountability gap at the international level. The DRC is a signatory to numerous AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

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day—in the camps, in clinics, in courts, and in communities. What they need is partnership, not paternalism; action, not apathy.

If the world continues to look away, the violence will not stop—it will deepen.

But if we listen to women like Julienne, Chantal Kanyere, and Dr. Mubalama, if we resource their courage and replicate their strategies, we might just begin to reverse the tide.

Ending rape in conflict is not an impossibility. It is a choice. And now, as Congo bleeds and women rise, that choice belongs not just to the perpetrators or AB the policymakers—but to all of us.

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COVER STORY

Trump’s Congo deal: peace for minerals Jon Offei-Ansah dissects how Donald Trump’s push for peace between the DRC and Rwanda doubles as a bold play for Africa’s mineral wealth and US strategic influence

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N a bold diplomatic play reminiscent of Cold War-era great power politics, President Donald Trump is tying peace in the conflict-ridden Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to a sweeping economic and strategic agenda aimed at reshaping American influence in Africa. At the heart of this initiative lies a plan to stabilise the Great Lakes region through a peace accord between the DRC and Rwanda—while simultaneously securing access to the DRC’s vast reserves of critical minerals vital for the future of US energy, defence, and technology sectors.

The peace talks, hosted by the United States in Washington in late April, culminated in a tripartite declaration signed by representatives of the DRC, Rwanda, and the US government. While much of the public discourse focused on efforts to halt the advance of M23 rebels in eastern Congo, the finer print reveals a deeper motive: leveraging peace to unlock multibillion-dollar mineral deals with Kinshasa and Kigali.

Massad Boulos, President Trump’s senior advisor on African affairs, confirmed that the US plans to host a formal signing ceremony at the White House within the next two months. On that day, both peace and minerals agreements would be inked—ushering in a new era of American corporate and diplomatic engagement in one of Africa’s most volatile but resourcerich regions.

widespread civilian displacement and threatening global supply chains for cobalt, lithium, and tantalum.

President Félix Tshisekedi, facing political and military pressure at home, reached out to Washington earlier this year with a simple but consequential proposition: help us silence the guns, and we’ll open the doors to our mineral wealth.

The Trump administration responded with characteristic bluntness. According to diplomatic sources, Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame was privately warned of looming US sanctions unless Kigali withdrew support for the M23—a group widely believed to receive logistical and military backing from Rwanda, despite official denials.

For the United States, the Congo gamble is a chance to reverse years of strategic inertia in Africa and to challenge China’s commanding presence in the DRC’s mining sector. It’s a textbook example of transactional diplomacy: offering peace, investment, and international legitimacy in exchange for exclusive access to resources

and geopolitical leverage.

What makes the DRC so important?

Beneath its soil lies an estimated $24 trillion in untapped mineral wealth. The country produces over 70 percent of the world’s cobalt, a key material in the production of electric vehicle batteries, jet engines, smartphones, and advanced military hardware. It is also a major source of lithium, copper, tin, tantalum, and gold.

Yet for years, American companies have found themselves sidelined. China, using opaque infrastructure-for-resources deals, has quietly cornered the market— securing mining concessions, refining capacity, and logistical infrastructure that tie the DRC’s future to Beijing.

That may be changing. In April, KoBold Metals—a US company backed by Bill Gates and Silicon Valley powerhouse Andreessen Horowitz—announced a major expansion of its DRC portfolio. The firm is bidding for control of the Manono lithium project, one of Africa’s largest known reserves, and is actively exploring cobalt and copper sites near the Zambian border.

‘When we sign the peace agreement... the minerals deal with the DRC will be signed on that day, and then a similar package, but of a different size, will be signed on that day with Rwanda,’ Boulos said in an interview in Doha.

The timing is strategic. Eastern Congo’s instability has long been a barrier to meaningful economic development. The resurgence of the M23 rebel group since 2021 has plunged North Kivu and Ituri provinces into renewed chaos, prompting 12

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosts signing ceremony with DRC’s Therese Kayiwamba Wagner (left) and Rwanda’s Olivier Nduhungirehe (right). (AP Photo/Jacquelyn Martin)

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COVER STORY

With Western investors eyeing major mining deals and diplomats pressing for final accords, global attention intensifies

KoBold’s move follows broader US investment in the Lobito Corridor, a USbacked infrastructure initiative connecting Angola, Zambia, and the DRC to global export markets via the Atlantic Ocean. This corridor, supported under both the Trump and Biden administrations, is more than a logistical project—it’s a strategic attempt to build a trade route free from Chinese and South African port influence.

The goal is clear: to connect central Africa’s mineral-rich provinces directly to ports like Lobito and bypass congested or politically sensitive export corridors through South Africa and Tanzania.

‘This is not just about logistics—it’s about leverage,’ said an Africa-USA Business Council official. ‘Controlling the corridors means influencing the flows of critical minerals. That translates to power.’

While the mineral focus is on the DRC, Rwanda also stands to gain. Boulos confirmed that the US is preparing a separate, though smaller, investment package for Kigali—focused on building Rwanda’s capacity in midstream and downstream mineral processing.

Beyond economic ties, Washington may be eyeing a more direct role in Congo’s security architecture. Sources familiar with ongoing negotiations say Tshisekedi’s government is exploring military cooperation with the US, potentially including American advisors, training, and logistical support in rebel-affected zones.

transparency, civil society involvement, and parliamentary oversight, its efforts risk replicating the same patterns of exploitation seen under previous regimes.

There is even speculation about a possible ‘minerals-for-bases’ arrangement, echoing past US foreign policy models in resource-rich but unstable regions. A visit

by Boulos to Kinshasa in the coming weeks could confirm this trajectory.

Stephanie Wolters of the South African Institute for International Affairs shares that concern. ‘M23 isn’t just a rebel group—it’s a geopolitical lever. Peace won’t come from a press release in Washington. It requires real buy-in from all regional actors, including Uganda and Burundi.’

Justice Minister Constant Mutamba has already laid the political groundwork, accusing former President Joseph Kabila of collusion with M23 rebels and calling for his parliamentary immunity to be lifted.

The move signals Kinshasa’s determination to use this moment to consolidate political control—with US backing in the wings.

Despite Kagame’s presence at the peace table, few believe Rwanda has truly relinquished its ambitions in eastern Congo.

M23 remains well-equipped and continues to hold significant territory, while civilians in the region remain displaced, vulnerable, and often forgotten in high-level diplomacy.

The model being pursued has clear historical echoes. During the Cold War,

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The road to peace—and prosperity—is narrowing.

This is not just about logistics— it’s about leverage. Controlling the corridors means controlling the minerals.

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resource-rich but unstable countries often became sites of transactional alliances— offering access in exchange for security guarantees. The Trump administration appears keen to revive this playbook, but ‘Rwanda has a lot of resources and potential in mining—not just upstream, but with a modern twist: the focus is not oil or in refining and trading as well,’ Boulos said. arms, but the minerals that power the green economy and defence innovation.

But Washington’s offer to Rwanda The contrast with China’s approach comes with strings attached. The US is stark.

Beijing has poured billions expects Kigali to end any support to the into the DRC since the early 2000s M23 and to withdraw any forces operating inside Congolese territory. Simultaneously, through state-linked corporations under opaque agreements that often exchange Kinshasa is being asked to address infrastructure for long-term mining Kigali’s long-standing concerns about concessions. Critics argue these deals the Democratic Forces for the Liberation lack transparency and have resulted in of Rwanda (FDLR), a militia with ties to perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. environmental damage and community displacement.

A four-nation oversight committee— By contrast, Trump officials say comprising the US, France, Qatar, and Togo they are promoting ‘clean deals’ that (representing the African Union)—has been emphasise Western norms of accountability, tasked with monitoring compliance. Their governance, and private-sector investment. role will be to ensure that both countries adhere to the peace roadmap and create conditions conducive to long-term stability and investment.

‘We’ve seen this play before with China,’ Okenda said. ‘If the US wants to be different, it must do better than just changing the flag on the contracts.’

Yet not everyone is convinced.

Jean-Pierre Okenda, a Congolese mining expert, warns that unless the US insists on

AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

If successful, Trump could claim a rare foreign policy win in Africa and gain a strategic foothold in a region that has long been considered peripheral to Washington’s global ambitions. If it fails, the initiative could collapse under the weight of its own contradictions—reigniting conflict, displacing more civilians, and pushing Kinshasa back toward China’s orbit.

For President Tshisekedi, the American offer is a lifeline—militarily, politically, and economically. But the stakes are equally high: failure could undermine his fragile ruling coalition and embolden both domestic rivals and armed insurgents.

As Western investors circle key mining projects and diplomatic teams push for final signatures, the world watches. Is this the dawn of a new mineral alliance rooted in peace and transparency—or another chapter in Congo’s long, tragic history of foreign entanglement?

Whatever the outcome, one thing is certain: America’s gamble in the heart of Africa is now fully in play. AB 13

ANALYSIS

Ghana sets Africa’s gold standard for ethical governance With its new Code of Conduct and enforced asset declaration penalties, Ghana is redefining transparency and leadership accountability—offering a model for governance reform across the continent, writes Jon Offei-Ansah

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HEN President John Mahama announced in May 2025 that political appointees who failed to declare their assets would forfeit four months of salary, it wasn’t just another anti-corruption soundbite. It was a decisive, symbolic, and potentially transformative act in Ghana’s political history—one that places transparency and ethical governance at the heart of public service. In a region long plagued by weak enforcement of accountability laws, Ghana may now be signalling a serious shift in how governance is conceived and enforced.

This bold initiative coincides with the launch in early May of a new and far-reaching Code of Conduct for all executive appointees, including ministers, deputy ministers, presidential advisers, and even the president himself. It represents a new social contract between the state and its citizens—one that calls for public trust, personal integrity, and a renewal of leadership ethics in Africa.

Historically, many African countries have been criticised for producing wellcrafted governance documents that rarely translate into action. Laws around asset declaration, ethics, and public finance management exist in abundance. However, without teeth—without real sanctions or enforcement—they often fail to generate meaningful change. Ghana itself has long had constitutional requirements for public officials to declare assets, but until now, the absence of enforcement mechanisms has rendered them largely ceremonial.

President Mahama’s approach changes the game. Not only has his government imposed a clear deadline—March 31, 2025—for asset declarations, but it has also introduced robust sanctions for 14

President John Mahama leads a new era of accountability in Ghana, enforcing tough ethical standards to restore trust in public office

noncompliance. Appointees who missed the deadline will forfeit four months’ salary—three as a penalty, and one as a standard donation to the Mahama Cares Trust Fund. Even more striking is the decision that failure to declare assets will now trigger automatic dismissal from public office.

This level of political resolve is rare and sends a powerful message: transparency is no longer optional. It is an expectation of service, and failure to meet it has consequences.

The new Code of Conduct is a sweeping governance document designed not only to regulate behaviour but also to instil a culture of ethics at the highest levels. President Mahama has insisted that the code is not symbolic but a "living and enforceable framework", and it applies to everyone—including himself and Vice President Jane Naana Opoku-Agyemang.

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Key tenets of the code include: • Putting the public interest first: Personal or party interests must never supersede the national interest.

• Zero tolerance for misuse of office: Public office cannot be used for private enrichment or political favouritism.

• Mandatory disclosure of conflicts of interest: Appointees must declare any business or family ties that could influence decision-making.

• Ban on the purchase of state assets: Appointees are prohibited from buying public land, vehicles, shares, or property, either directly or through proxies.

• Regulation of gifts and favours: Any gift exceeding GH¢20,000 (approximately $1,480) must be declared. Hampers and corporate gifts may only be accepted under strict guidelines and with prior approval.

ANALYSIS • Accountability in public spending: Every cedi spent must be traceable, justifiable, and aligned with national priorities.

• Pre-approval for all official expenditures: Retroactive approvals, long a loophole for corrupt practices, are now banned.

The code also calls for humility, restraint, and respect from public officials in their interactions with citizens, reminding appointees that public office is a service—not a platform for dominance or privilege.

One of the most groundbreaking components of the new governance framework is the introduction of a digital public portal that will allow citizens to report breaches of the code in real time, and anonymously. This initiative decentralises accountability and transfers a portion of oversight power to the very people being governed.

When citizens can directly report misconduct—and when those reports lead to visible consequences—trust in the democratic process is strengthened. If implemented effectively, this portal could serve as a model for interactive, citizen-led governance across the continent.

However, the portal must be protected against misuse. Mechanisms must be in place to verify claims, avoid politicisation, and prevent frivolous or malicious reporting. Striking this balance will be critical to its success.

Ghana’s reforms land at a time when much of the continent is grappling with questions of governance legitimacy.

From Nigeria’s complex anti-corruption battles to South Africa’s post-Zuma era reckoning, there is a continental urgency to reimagine public leadership.

Leadership ethics in Africa is not simply a legal concern—it is existential.

It determines whether citizens feel safe, whether investors feel confident, and whether young people see futures worth staying for. Corruption, impunity, and poor governance have been cited as the root causes of capital flight, brain drain, and citizen apathy.

Ghana’s model is particularly significant because it reframes governance as value-driven rather than power-driven.

By codifying humility, responsibility, and service as expected traits in leadership, the country may be sowing the seeds for a more holistic form of political accountability.

This matters because Africa’s demographic surge—particularly its

Ghana’s bold governance reforms aim to rebuild public trust through transparency, accountability, and citizen empowerment

expanding youth population—demands not just jobs and infrastructure, but integrity and hope. A new generation of voters and leaders is watching. Ghana is offering them something more substantial than slogans.

Analysts across West Africa are closely watching Ghana's experiment. In a region where military coups, third-term bids, and elite impunity have weakened democratic norms, Ghana’s initiative could offer a blueprint for institutional reform.

If successful, it may pressure other ECOWAS members to follow suit.

Countries with fragile public institutions could look to Ghana not just for inspiration but for actionable frameworks. Moreover, regional bodies like the African Union may eventually use such standards as benchmarks for leadership within member states.

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There is also the question of equal application. Will the code be enforced even when it affects powerful allies or politically connected figures? If not, public disillusionment could return quickly.

Hypocrisy is often more damaging than corruption itself, especially when reform promises are broken.

Another concern is sustainability.

Will this code outlive the Mahama administration? Or will it be quietly shelved by a future government less committed to transparency?

To guard against this, the code must be institutionalised in law—not just executive policy—and integrated into the civic education curriculum, public sector training, and the national development plan.

Ultimately, Ghana’s new governance model touches on a deeper truth: that ethics is a form of infrastructure. Like roads and power lines, it forms the foundation for national progress. Without ethical leadership, institutions crumble, development stagnates, and democracy deteriorates.

By tying salary, appointment, and job security to conduct and compliance, Ghana is making it expensive to be unethical.

And that is perhaps the most significant innovation of all.

Ghana’s newly enforced Code of Conduct and salary forfeiture policy could

Transparency is no longer optional—it’s the price of public trust

Globally, Ghana’s reforms may also shift how international development agencies, donors, and investors perceive risk in the region. When anti-corruption laws are not only passed but enforced— and when leaders subject themselves to the same rules they impose—credibility improves, and so does access to funding and partnerships.

Despite the momentum, the road ahead is not without obstacles. The implementation of such a far-reaching framework requires political will, institutional capacity, and unwavering impartiality. Rules are only as effective as the bodies that enforce them. Ghana will need a strong, independent AuditorGeneral, a fearless judiciary, and a committed civil service to see this through.

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be a watershed moment—not only in the country's political journey but across the African continent. It represents a conscious shift from declarations to deliverables, from promise to enforcement, from theory to lived reality.

As Africa stands at the crossroads of digital transformation, demographic change, and economic renewal, governance will be the deciding factor in whether the continent rises or falters. Ghana’s message is clear: leadership without ethics is no longer acceptable.

President Mahama’s warning was stern: “This is not cosmetic… Do not put me in a position where I have to act. But I will act.” Africa is watching—and so AB is the world.

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ANALYSIS

Why Captain Traoré is redefining power in Africa Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traoré is no ordinary head of state. As Jon Offei-Ansah writes, his defiant rise, pan-African rhetoric, and revolutionary policies are shaking the foundations of African leadership—and setting a new standard for power on the continent

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N an era of scripted summits and choreographed diplomacy, the thunderous reception for a man who wasn’t even present—Captain Ibrahim Traoré—during Gabon’s recent presidential inauguration tells a deeper story about a continent at a crossroads.

Traoré, the 37-year-old military captain and transitional president of Burkina Faso, is increasingly becoming the new yardstick by which African leadership is measured.

The electrifying public reaction to the mere mention of his name in Libreville, the way he overshadowed 17 sitting heads of state at Ghana’s January 2025 inauguration, and the spontaneous continent-wide protests in his defence in late April, all point to a profound realignment in Africa’s political consciousness.

Traoré, in short, is not just a head of state—he is a symbol. Of defiance. Of sovereignty. Of a new, post-neocolonial vision for Africa.

In Libreville, the stadium crowd’s deafening response to the words “Captain Ibrahim Traoré’s representative” stunned seasoned political observers. Despite his physical absence, the crowd erupted into cheers and chants, eclipsing every leader present. For a continent that traditionally celebrates presence and pageantry, Traoré’s absence was paradoxically a strategic presence.

Only months earlier, during the swearing-in of President John Mahama in Accra, it was Traoré who drew the loudest cheers—not Mahama, not South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, not Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed. His name was met with Ghanaian flags waving in tandem with Burkina Faso’s and ovations that outlasted every other dignitary’s introduction.

The symbolism was unmissable. In 16

a crowd that included presidents with decades in power and others backed by the West, it was Traoré—the pistol-wearing, beret-clad outsider—who commanded the room.

championed anti-imperialist ideals in the 1980s. Like Sankara, Traoré is positioning himself not just as a national leader but as a continental icon of liberation.

Traoré’s draw lies in his radical authenticity. He does not posture as a traditional statesman. He does not cater to Western diplomats or bend to the rhythm of IMF-led policy prescriptions. Instead, he speaks directly to the masses—often in local dialects—and governs with an unyielding focus on self-determination.

Traoré’s appeal transcends Burkina Faso’s borders. In April 2025, when US AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley accused him of misusing gold reserves for personal protection, the backlash was swift. Protesters flooded the streets in Ouagadougou, Accra, Monrovia, and even Paris, denouncing the remarks as neo-imperialist propaganda.

His expulsion of French military bases, termination of exploitative mining contracts, and redirection of national resources toward education, health care, and food security have made him a beacon for those disillusioned by Africa’s postcolonial trajectory.

Under the banner #HandsOffAES—a reference to the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—tens of thousands marched in coordinated protest. It was one of the most synchronised acts of pan-African solidarity in recent history.

In doing so, he has invoked the revolutionary spirit of Thomas Sankara, the slain former president of Burkina Faso who

The protests weren’t orchestrated by ruling parties, NGOs, or opposition figures.

They were grassroots-led, spontaneous,

Traoré’s holstered pistol at Ghana’s inauguration was seen less as bravado and more as a bold symbol of selfreliance—signalling trust in his people, not foreign protection

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ANALYSIS In countries like Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, and Togo, where rulers have clung to power for decades, Traoré’s popularity among their own citizens poses an existential threat. Unlike past populists, he isn’t making promises—he’s making moves.

Even in democratic states like Ghana, where Traoré outshone President Mahama at his own inauguration, his rising star challenges the continent’s established models of legitimacy. It raises a difficult question: Can electoral success alone justify leadership in a continent still struggling with economic injustice and foreign dependency?

In Libreville, the crowd erupted at the mention of Captain Traoré’s name—leaving seasoned observers stunned by the power of his absence

and driven by a shared belief that Traoré represents more than Burkina Faso—he represents Africa's struggle for dignity and autonomy.

Placards read “Our Gold, Not Yours” and “Traoré is Africa’s Hope”, affirming a groundswell of sentiment that Africa must reclaim its resources, define its alliances, and rewrite its role in global politics.

The formation of the AES—an alliance born out of shared experience, military coups, and mutual rejection of French military presence—has reconfigured the geopolitical map of West Africa. While ECOWAS continues to promote dialogue, democracy, and sanctions, the AES has become a nucleus for hardline sovereignty, regional security collaboration, and economic self-determination.

Under Traoré’s influence, the AES is asserting itself not just militarily, but ideologically. It opposes what its members see as the posturing of multilateral bodies that enforce “democratic order” while ignoring economic exploitation and insecurity. In their view, sovereignty is not just about holding elections—it is about reclaiming control over resources, defence, and development strategy.

Traoré’s meteoric rise and grassroots popularity are deeply uncomfortable for Africa’s long-standing political elite. While many continue to derive legitimacy from military alliances, manipulated elections, or foreign backing, Traoré derives his authority from something more elusive— public faith.

His decision to wear a holstered pistol at Ghana’s inauguration, while

controversial, was read by many not as bravado but as a symbolic gesture of selfreliance—a reminder that he trusts in his people’s protection, not foreign security guarantees.

For other leaders—particularly those with entrenched dynasties or foreigndependent regimes—Traoré’s popularity is a warning shot. He exposes a generational chasm between Africa’s rulers and the ruled, particularly its youth, who see in him a leader willing to act, not just pontificate.

Beyond symbolism, Traoré’s policies reflect a coherent if radical rethinking of economic sovereignty. He has sought to renegotiate mining contracts, particularly with French and Canadian companies, ensuring that a greater share of profits remains in Burkina Faso.

While not yet formally rejected, Traoré’s strong hints at abandoning the CFA franc—a colonial-era currency tied to the euro—signal an ideological shift toward breaking monetary dependency and reclaiming economic sovereignty..

His administration has diverted investment into agriculture, energy independence, and basic services, prioritising resilience over rapid foreign investment. And in doing so, he is presenting an alternative model to the debtfuelled, donor-dependent path so familiar in African economic policy.

The reaction of many African presidents to Traoré’s rise has been one of silent discomfort. In diplomatic corridors, there is growing unease about how to engage a figure who is beloved by crowds yet feared by elites.

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Traoré’s pivot toward Russia and cautious engagement with China reflects not ideological purity but strategic diversification. He’s telling the West: Africa will no longer be lectured by former colonisers while being looted through backdoor deals.

The real shock to the West is not Traoré’s rhetoric—but his ability to generate mass loyalty while rejecting traditional diplomatic niceties. This is why AFRICOM commanders, Western diplomats, and multilateral lenders are increasingly wary. If his approach spreads, it will demand a total rethink of how the West engages Africa.

In Washington, Paris, and Brussels, the conversation is shifting from how to contain Traoré to how to respond to a continent that may no longer play by the old rules.

Captain Ibrahim Traoré’s influence marks a rupture in the political status quo.

Whether at summits or in the streets, his name galvanises a movement that is no longer content with symbolic independence and ceremonial sovereignty.

His message is clear: Africa cannot outsource its liberation. It must forge it— from within, through courage, collective sacrifice, and belief in its own destiny.

As the cheers from Ghana to Gabon resound, they are more than applause for a charismatic leader. They are an indictment of decades of failed leadership and a clarion call for a continent ready to reclaim its narrative.

Traoré may have skipped the podium in Libreville, but in doing so, he stood taller than most—elevated not by optics or protocol, but by the voice of the people.

Whether his revolution holds or falters, he has already redefined the conversation— and in doing so, has forced Africa, AB and the world, to pay attention.

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ANALYSIS

Samia’s reform era unravels ahead of Tanzania’s polls Once hailed as a reformist breaking with the repressive legacy of her predecessor, Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan now faces growing accusations of authoritarian backsliding ahead of the country’s 2025 general election. In this analysis, Jon Offei-Ansah examines how the arrest of opposition leader Tundu Lissu and the disqualification of CHADEMA from the race reveal a regime increasingly intolerant of dissent

A

T the outset of her presidency, Samia Suluhu Hassan projected the image of a new kind of Tanzanian leader. Her "Four Rs" doctrine—reconciliation, resilience, reforms, and rebuilding—marked a stark departure from the iron-fisted rule of the late John Magufuli. For many, this signalled a fresh chapter for Tanzania, one in which political dialogue and democratic norms could flourish. But as the 2025 elections approach, that early optimism is crumbling under the weight of rising repression and a political crackdown that seems designed to ensure an uncontested second term.

Nowhere is this shift more visible than in the arrest of Tundu Lissu, the outspoken chair of Tanzania’s main opposition party, CHADEMA. Lissu, once hailed as a symbol of resilience after surviving an assassination attempt in 2017, was arrested in April and charged with treason for a speech that prosecutors claim called for rebellion and disruption of the upcoming elections. He has since been transferred

to Ukonga Prison in Dar es Salaam, with authorities offering no public explanation for his relocation. His party, CHADEMA, had raised alarm after losing contact with him, underscoring the increasingly opaque methods now being used against opposition figures.

The treason charges against Lissu and the recent disqualification of CHADEMA from participating in the 2025 elections reveal a clear pattern: President Samia’s reformist posture was conditional and has now given way to the raw exercise of power. This backsliding is all the more striking given her initial moves to roll back some of Magufuli’s most draconian policies. Under her early leadership, political gatherings were unbanned, media restrictions loosened, and gestures of reconciliation with the opposition offered.

However, CHADEMA’s refusal to sign an electoral code of conduct imposed by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)—which the party

Lissu has been arrested multiple times over the years and narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in 2017 © ERICKY BONIPHACE

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argues entrenches the ruling party’s dominance—led to their exclusion from the upcoming polls. This is despite the fact that the party’s December 2024 resolution, "No Reforms, No Elections", had gained traction with the electorate.

Their central demand: a new constitution and meaningful electoral reform.

What followed was a textbook clampdown. Opposition leaders were harassed. Candidates were disqualified en masse during local elections. The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) won 99 percent of those contests. And the moment the opposition appeared to be gaining public momentum, the government shifted gears—from dialogue to suppression.

Samia's response to opposition demands was, at first, seemingly constructive. In 2022, she commissioned a task force on democracy and political parties to assess the state of political freedoms in Tanzania. The recommendations that followed included many of CHADEMA’s long-standing concerns: the creation of an independent electoral body, judicial recourse for presidential election results, and a review of laws curtailing political freedoms.

But when the government tabled its reform legislation, it became evident that the process had been more performative than transformative. Despite renaming the National Electoral Commission as the "Independent National Electoral Commission", the president retained the power to appoint all its members. The bill also failed to eliminate the role of government-appointed district executive directors in managing election returns— an arrangement widely criticised for undermining impartiality. Crucially, no legal avenue was introduced to challenge presidential election results in court,

ANALYSIS despite a 2020 ruling from the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights that found Tanzania in violation of the African Charter.

These half-measures were more about optics than overhaul. And they have only served to deepen the opposition's mistrust of the process and the public's growing sense that Samia’s early promises were hollow.

Beyond her handling of the opposition, Samia has moved deftly to consolidate power within CCM. In January 2025, during a Special CCM convention, she was announced as the party’s presidential candidate—months ahead of the traditional June or July selection window. The early nomination not only sidelined any potential challengers within CCM, but also sent a strong signal that the party machinery had been tightly secured.

That decision coincided with the electoral commission’s exclusion of CHADEMA from the race, virtually eliminating serious competition in the upcoming general election. Samia’s campaign, once built on inclusivity and reform, now stands poised to benefit from the absence of both internal and external rivals.

Her political ascent had once been viewed as improbable—she is a Muslim woman from Zanzibar, a demographic often marginalised in the mainlanddominated political establishment. But Samia overcame these obstacles, partly with the backing of former President Jakaya Kikwete and other influential party figures. Her political instincts have proved formidable. Yet now, those same instincts appear to be guiding the country toward greater autocracy.

Opposition to the government has been met with more than just legal action.

A port management agreement signed with DP World, a Dubai-based logistics firm, became a lightning rod for criticism after it was revealed to be heavily skewed in favour of the company. Opposition politicians and civil society activists who spoke out against the deal were harassed, arrested, and in some cases, disappeared.

Reports of abductions and political killings have only added to the climate of fear.

Human rights watchdogs have sounded the alarm. Freedom House recently downgraded Tanzania’s status from "Partly Free" to "Not Free", citing a sharp decline in political rights and civil liberties. The disintegration of political openness under Samia has become impossible to ignore,

Samia’s democratic retreat starkly contrasts with her early efforts to undo Magufuli’s harsh policies

and it threatens to erase the limited gains made since the Magufuli era.

Tanzania is not alone in this trajectory.

Across East Africa, democratic erosion is becoming disturbingly routine. In Uganda, veteran opposition leader Kizza Besigye was abducted while in Kenya last November and later charged with treason.

Tanzanian activist Maria Sarungi Tsehai, a vocal critic of the government living in exile in Kenya, was briefly abducted in Nairobi this January. She has publicly suggested Tanzanian state agents were behind her ordeal.

In Kenya itself, a wave of youth-led protests in mid-2024 over rising living

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It remains unclear whether Lissu’s treason charges will be dropped or whether CHADEMA will be reinstated on the electoral roll. What is certain, however, is that the promise of democratic renewal under Samia Suluhu Hassan has been thoroughly undermined.

Her reform narrative has collapsed under the weight of political expediency.

What began as a hopeful shift away from the repression of the Magufuli years now appears to have been a strategic recalibration—an attempt to lull both domestic and international observers into believing Tanzania was on the path to democratic consolidation.

Instead, the country is preparing for

What began as a hopeful shift away from Magufuli’s repression now appears to have been a strategic recalibration—an illusion of reform masking realpolitik

costs and tax increases was met with abductions and forced disappearances— further signs of creeping repression in what was once considered a democratic stronghold in the region.

This regional context highlights a broader trend of shrinking civic space and consolidating authoritarianism. Tanzania, once seen as a model of stability, now finds itself caught in the same downward spiral.

AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

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an election where the ruling party faces no meaningful competition, and its main opposition leader languishes in prison under a politically motivated charge.

If this is indeed the end of Samia’s brief experiment in reform, it will also mark the beginning of a more dangerous chapter for Tanzanian democracy—one defined not by openness, but by AB suppression and silence.

19

ANALYSIS

Resorting to arms won’t end political disputes Kenya has strongly and consistently advocated for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, such as the ongoing one in Sudan that may not end any time soon if we continue prioritising military solutions, says Musalia Mudavadi

T

HE Sudan conflict, which most of us hoped would be resolved soon, is now entering its third year. Yet, unfortunately, the parties appear to be holding to the position that a military solution is possible.

foreign policy. That is why, on April 17, 2023, three days after the hostilities started in Khartoum, Kenya worked through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to convene urgent meetings at the heads of state level.

Meanwhile the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, with a huge number of forced displacements, making Sudan the world's largest internal displacement crisis. Those mostly affected are vulnerable Sudanese people, who can only stay where they are because they cannot afford to move to safer places internally and transnationally.

Furthermore, and bilaterally, Kenya has welcomed every key Sudanese stakeholder from both sides of the divide: top Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leaders, special envoys for the parties, representatives of local communities, civil society, political parties and armed movements.

Additionally, the human cost of the conflict has increased. The civilian protection is weak as populations continue to be victims of indiscriminate shooting and bombardments; women and girls continue to face risks of conflict-related sexual violence and children are subjected to widespread abuse and exploitation.

Despite ongoing humanitarian efforts, there is still severe access constraints, particularly in active conflict zones, and funding constraints continue to hinder aid delivery where it is needed most.

In November 2023, we hosted General al-Burhan, the President of the Sudan Sovereignty Council and Commanderin-Chief of Sudan Forces, in Nairobi to discuss peace efforts. Similarly in January 2024 we hosted the RSF leader, Lt. Gen. Dagalo, to advance the matter of peace in Sudan.

Sudan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Youssef, visited Nairobi in January

2025 and held meetings with President William Ruto and myself to seek a way forward on regional efforts to address the situation in Sudan.

Equally, in February 2025, a group of political, civilian and military Sudanese stakeholders held a meeting in Nairobi to agree on an organised, unified structure that helps parties to engage and generate a common position to salvage Sudan.

Kenya was not part of the Nairobi talks and did not sit in the discussions because we believe Sudan belongs to the Sudanese people and they have their own solutions.

Indeed, looking at the outcome documents of the meeting in Nairobi, we found that there was neither a parallel government nor a government in exile for Sudan that was formed in Nairobi.

The reference to the right to selfdetermination in the Political Charter and Transitional Constitution is considered as a democratic safeguard rather than a call for secession. Still, Kenya continues to adhere

We are deeply concerned about the plight of the displaced populations and will remain focused on supporting humanitarian assistance. Kenya affirms that it will continue to facilitate the humanitarian supply logistics through our country, destined for the Sudanese people. We request the international community to increase coordinated efforts to alleviate the humanitarian crisis.

Kenya’s long-held belief is that indifference to regional conflicts is never an option. Our security and prosperity are interlinked with that of our neighbours, making regional stability central to our 20

Musalia Mudavadi (right) and British Foreign Secretary David Lammy at the London Sudan Conference: ‘Kenya does not support dismembering of sovereign states’

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ANALYSIS

War-affected Sudanese civilians: Sudan is the world’s largest internal displacement crisis. Credit: UNOCHA/Yao Chen

to the UN Charter and the AU Constitutive Act, particularly the principles of noninterference, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.

about creating concrete structures that would address the root causes of the conflict, and usher in democracy and the rule of law.

Notably, the Nairobi meeting was not a military or RSF-only conference. There were more than 24 political and civilian organisations reflecting the diversity of Sudan.

We need to confront the challenge of multiple and parallel peace initiatives that

Kenya strongly and consistently advocates for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Military solutions are unsuitable for political disputes. The conflict in Sudan may not end any time soon if we continue prioritising military solutions.

We need to start shifting focus from military attention to embrace a peace process that reflects the diversity of the Republic of Sudan. This includes bringing together the military groups, civilians and political parties among other stakeholders.

Kenya does not support dismembering or balkanisation of sovereign states, particularly in Africa. We totally support a unified Sudan for the people of Sudan.

Kenya also advocates for a Sudaneseled and Sudanese-owned political process as the best sustainable path to addressing the country’s challenges. The future of Sudan must be determined by the Sudanese people themselves, through inclusive dialogue.

External actors can play a supportive role, but the ultimate responsibility lies with the Sudanese. We must start thinking

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humanitarian aid. We need to beginning pressurising or sanctioning and declaring clear consequences for those who continue to obstruct the work of humanitarian agencies.

We should remain steadfast in

Kenya strongly and consistently advocates for the peaceful resolution of conflicts

impair commitment because parties engage in forum shopping, opting to choose processes that suit their selfish interests rather than the common good. Without collective peace, the net effect of partial negotiations is partial solutions.

That notwithstanding, we welcome the other efforts aimed at pacifying Sudan, while also advocating for a unified and coordinated response from all, including IGAD, the African Union, the Arab League, the United Nations and the broader international community. There is need to mainstreaming the several peace tracks on Sudan into an African-led process that is supported by the international community.

The priority should be on resolving the dire humanitarian situation facing the Sudanese population. Particularly, the vast areas that are not under SAF control seem to suffer more inaccessibility to

’

increasing international attention on the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, including internal displacement, civilian protection and the regional weight of the conflict on neighbouring states: Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, among others.

More importantly, I want to underscore the need for consolidating the several peace tracks on Sudan into a wellcoordinated and harmonised process preferably under the African Union and driven by IGAD, with the support of the UN. I reiterate Kenya’s unwavering commitment to working with all stakeholders to bring an end to the conflict in Sudan. Together, we must act decisively and collectively to prevent further suffering and to build a stable and prosperous AB Sudan for the Sudanese people.

Dr Musalia Mudavadi is Prime Cabinet Secretary and Cabinet Secretary for Foreign and Diaspora Affairs of Kenya. The above is an abridged version of his statement during the London Sudan Conference in April.

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21

ANALYSIS

South Sudan: uneven path to democracy Much of the conflict in the country has been driven by selfish power struggles among politicians who have long preferred physical confrontation as a means to solving perceived individual political challenges, writes Deng’Kur Mading

T

HE Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU), a post-settlement government established on September 12, 2018 by the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), is now at risk of rapid collapse. Extended for a fourth time against its normal timeline, the unity government has gone through a number of internal incongruencies. These range from lack of commitment to its early pledges of sustainable peace and a return to normalcy, services delivery, repatriation and accountability to promises of timely and peaceful transition leading to democratic rule and governance.

With the ongoing political and security developments, in which the principals are mired in what could be similar to the 2013 and 2016 violent conflicts, and the escalating security situation in some parts of the country, the future of the R-TGoNU seems to be hanging by a thread. If not appropriately addressed, these factors could lead to either a premature collapse of the agreement or serve as dangerous indicators to a free, fair and democratic transition. Both point to an ultimate disintegration and potential recurrence of violent conflict.

When it was first signed in 2015 as the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), one particular issue became contentious between the main warring parties, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-inOpposition (SPLM-IO). They could not agree on the unification of their armies under one command.

Riek Machar Teny, the main opposition leader, and his allies insisted on separate armies and that he and his colleagues be protected by their own trusted forces even when under a unified government during the transitional period. This did not sit well with the government led by President 22

Riek Machar and allies demanded separate armies and loyal security forces, even under a transitional unity government

Salva Kiir who maintained that the two antagonistic forces could not be in a single place – Juba.

As a result of mounting regional and international pressures for peace, as humanitarian and economic crisis hit much of the country, the government gave the go ahead, resulting in an armistice which was to be short-lived. The parties retrogressed to a bloody conflict during a Presidential Palace encounter on July 8, 2016, barely two months after the formation of the unity government.

The opposition movement was embroiled in its own internal power struggle in which the former opposition chief negotiator was nominated by some party members – who had disagreed with Machar – to take over the position of First Vice President in the aftermath of the conflict as Machar was fleeing Juba with his allies.

While the ARCSS government, the Interim Government of National Unity (I-TGoNU), was basically structured along the post-settlement politics, war raged on AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

in other parts of the country. This time it affected Central and Western Equatoria States where the opposition forces had fled to. The ARCSS was revitalised through an effort by the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), a mechanism under the ARCSS, when it convened the High-Level Revitalisation Forum a few months into the fresh disagreement. Since September 2018, the R-ARCSS has gone through a lot of complications ranging from limited funding of operational activities to a sheer lack of political will from the parties to keep to their responsibilities and mandate.

Currently, the parties have singlehandedly extended their constitutional tenure for a fourth time against the original timeline.

The R-TGoNU was meant to be fully completed by the end of 2022 through a countrywide election, a process expected by citizens, the region and international community to end nearly a decade of violent politics and governance based on short-lived agreements by warring factions.

ANALYSIS reforming vital transitional institutions that remain under-resourced and divided along party lines. Essentially, there is the need for meaningful regional and international involvement to avert a looming recurrence of violent conflict with its humanitarian and economic consequences

South Sudan’s path to democracy hangs in the balance as key post-conflict institutions face potential collapse

To add to the delayed transition, the internal ructions within the government and the opposition parties led to the unceremonious collapse of the agreement.

On March 26, First Vice President Machar was arrested with some of his close officials in the executive and army.

The government information minister confirmed the arrests and made it clear that investigations would be launched against Machar and his allies who were under detention. Whether this is connected with the recent violence that had erupted in Upper Nile State, one of the states in northern part of the country, remains unclear.

These latest developments seem to play out against the inroads already made, albeit beyond the timelines. Critical transitional institutions like the National Electoral Commission (NEC), National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) and the Political Parties Council (PCC), which were lately reconstituted and launched, are in a precarious position should the R-TGoNU suddenly collapse.

Their mandate is derived from the R-ARCSS which gives the government its administrative legitimacy.

South Sudan’s quest for democratic governance, which has been laid out as the bedrock for post-conflict settlement is in the balance as these critical institutions risk collapse. Given that a couple of mechanisms under the R-ARCSS have gradually weakened, while others appear naturally complacent, the need to revisit these institutions, especially

their operational structures, would be significant to achieving coherent and robust monitoring because timely reporting of political incidences is critical to averting further discrepancies and violations.

The region and international community should engage the parties to spell out the frustration of South

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The ongoing political situation in South Sudan is by no means ideological.

Indeed, much of the conflict has been driven by selfish power struggles among politicians who have long preferred physical confrontation as a means to solving perceived individual political challenges while using such violence to leverage bargaining power. The implications of this politics of violence have been borne by innocent citizens who have been forced, on many occasions, to retreat to their ethnic and tribal identities as protective shields against perceived or targeted reprisals.

The results of such violence have only served to deepen poverty and exacerbate health and economic issues. It is true that many factors led to the current politics in South Sudan, including the country’s historical background that had deprived it

The internal ructions within the government and the opposition parties led to the unceremonious collapse of the transition agreement

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Sudanese as a result of the reluctance of the politicians to pursue their respective responsibilities under the agreement. They should also be reminded of the threat of isolation if they continue to hang on to power while pursuing their own interests.

The parties should prioritise dialogue over violent conflict and retribution as a preferred method of achieving their political ends. They should also agree to

of necessary developmental achievements in education, physical infrastructure and institutional capacity.

It is crucial that the politicians appreciate that the present and future of South Sudan, setting off from a shaky foundation, will depend on democratic governance, which politicians had promised the people throughout the AB struggle for freedom.

Deng’Kur Mading is a freelance researcher who has written on human rights, rule of law and democratic governance in South Sudan. mdengkur@gmail.com AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

23

ANALYSIS

Arms embargoes on shaky ground With over one billion firearms in global circulation, their proliferation is a testament to both the multiplication of security crises around the world and the global reach of illicit arms trade networks, which fuel each other in a vicious cycle of violence and instability, says Adedeji Ebo

W

HEN enforced and coupled with other peace efforts, arms embargoes can be useful tools to hinder the flow of weapons to conflict-affected areas and thus help reduce levels of violence and support efforts to achieve political solutions. Indeed, the most recent Security Council resolution on small arms, resolution 2616 adopted in 2021, called for United Nations peace operations and entities to assist states in combating illicit arms flows and arms embargo violations.

This requires three areas of intervention throughout all stages of the life cycle of weapons, in close cooperation with countries of the region, global partners as well as arms exporters. First, taking adequate measures for data collection and monitoring and tracing weapons.

tracing. Let us seize the opportunity of new technologies to find better ways of both marking and tracing weapons and work collaboratively to share information on techniques and innovations.

Second, it is important to ensure that customs and border control authorities have the necessary equipment and capacity for weapons and ammunition detection and investigations, including through assistance and training. Specialised organisations can be leveraged to provide such assistance.

Regional cooperation is essential in this effort.

We have seen positive progress in

regional initiatives on small arms and light weapons control, such as dedicated roadmaps and action plans in certain regions. The AU’s Silencing the Guns initiative is a particularly commendable effort, and the Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) continues to support its advancement through the joint AU-UNODA Africa Amnesty Month (AAM) project.

The AAM raises awareness of the risks of illicit weapons, strengthens the capacity of law enforcement officials, and facilitates the collection of illicitly held weapons in select African states each September.

Member states must renew their support

In his latest report to the Security Council on small arms, the Secretary General reported that arms embargo regimes continue to face challenges in identifying the origin and supply chain of seized weapons and ammunition. Tracing is necessary to monitor compliance of embargoes as well as the implementation of International Tracing Instrument.

To illustrate the current trends on tracing and handling of illicit weapons, last year, 100 states submitted national reports to the UN on the implementation of the Programme of Action (PoA) on Small Arms and Light Weapons for the period 2022-2023. Among these countries, a total of 860,000 weapons were seized over the two years.

In 41 per cent of these cases, states made tracing requests which is an increase from previous reports. As many as 94 per cent of tracing requests received a response and 30 per cent found a match of the origin of the seized weapon.

Talking small arms: Adedeji Ebo, left, deputy to the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and Michael Kanu, ambassador of Sierra Leone to the UN Credit: JOHN PENNEY/PASSBLUE

We can do more to ensure successful 24

AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

ANALYSIS to this joint initiative through financial contributions.

Third, we should ensure that nationally-led and conflict-sensitive disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes effectively integrate weapons and ammunition management, including stockpile management and handling of seized weapons when requested by states. By partnering together, UNODA and the Department of Peace Operations are jointly supporting DDR practitioners through training and practical guidance to ensure that integrated DDR processes include effective weapons and ammunition management.

The second point is the need to invest in conflict prevention through improved arms control. Sustainable enforcement of arms embargoes requires interventions that can help tackle the root causes of violence and conflict.

Member states reflected this imperative in the Pact for the Future, which made it clear that we should address the risks associated with illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, their parts and ammunition through national prevention strategies and approaches.

The universalisation of arms control

Many of the illicit weapons that are seized are also being destroyed

treaties and instruments, along with their full and effective implementation, is an important first step to prevent the diversion of weapons that fuels instability and contribute to conflict prevention.

These include the Arms Trade Treaty, the Firearms Protocol, the Programme of Action on Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons and its International Tracing Instrument, and the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management.

To support their implementation, the UN has effective tools at its disposal.

These include technical guidance; training and fellowships; and funding facilities to promote international assistance and cooperation.

In March, the presidents of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the General Assembly for the first time co-hosted a joint meeting on small arms and light weapons and their impact on the development agenda. A key takeaway was the need to step up gender-responsive approaches to arms control while also ensuring the active and sustained participation of young people as the voice of next generations.

In the context of the Security Council, we can enhance the effectiveness of these efforts by connecting them to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) agendas, such as within national action plans. Today, only one third of national action plans on WPS references disarmament.

Moreover, between 70 and 90 per cent of incidents of sexual violence in conflict involve small arms and light weapons. I hope that the Council continues exploring the linkages between Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) and small arms in order to prevent such violence, including in the context of sanctions.

Many of the illicit weapons that are seized are also being destroyed. In PoA national reports, states have reported that more than 1.7 million weapons were destroyed between 2018 and 2023.

Yet, there are still over a billion firearms in global circulation. Their proliferation is a testament to both the multiplication of security crises around the world and the global reach of illicit arms trade networks, which fuel each other in a vicious cycle of violence and instability.

The question now is whether we rise to the occasion to tackle illicit small arms and ammunition, or if we allow inaction to deepen global insecurity. The Security Council has a central role to play in turning this trajectory around. I urge the Council to integrate small arms and ammunition considerations into the Council’s products and mandates.

To support this, states can make use of the “Aide-Memoire for integration of weapons and ammunition management in the Security Council decisions”, developed by the UN and publicly available. A revised version of the aide-memoire will be released later this year.

AB

Adedeji Ebo is Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. The above is an abridged version of his presentation during a Security Council meeting on Small Arms Control and Weapons Management in UN Sanctions Regimes in New York in April.

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25

ANALYSIS

AU left out in the cold in war against small arms Right now, one of the most glaring deficiencies in current arms control regimes is the limited formal role of the African Union in UN sanctions and embargo implementation, says Mohamed Ibn Chambas

T

HE consequences of unchecked arms proliferation are painfully impeding socio-economic development, with vivid scars of war evident everywhere. In my capacity as the African Union High Representative for Silencing the Guns, we are challenged, through preventive diplomacy, to preempt and find lasting solutions to the scourge of wars, often exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms.

To be clear, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) by themselves are not the cause of conflicts in Africa. But their widespread availability continues to fuel violence by providing easy access to the tools of war, particularly for non-state actors such as rebel groups, militias and criminal networks operating across difficult terrains.

security. In the Great Lakes Region, the continued circulation of illicit arms fuels tensions among armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), compounding the already challenging security landscape. In Sudan, SALW continue to fuel the fratricidal war there with horrific humanitarian consequences.

What is surprising is that despite the existence of UN arms embargoes in several African contexts, enforcement remains far from achieving its goals. This may owe to recurring deficiencies, some of which include diversion of government stockpiles as a result of battlefield losses, theft and corruption and unsecured depots; civilian armament in response to weak public safety mechanisms, with

communities self-arming for protection and vigilantism; and weak benchmarking and monitoring resulting from a lack of realtime transparent data sharing and political selectivity in enforcement.

To address these challenges, the AU has developed frameworks and adopted a multi-pronged approach to tackle SALW proliferation on the continent. The AU Strategy on Control of SALW (2020–2030) encourages synergy between member states, regional economic communities (RECs) and partners on harmonising legislation, marking and tracing, destruction of surpluses and obsolete arms and building national stockpile management capacity.

The Africa Amnesty Month (AMM)

Indeed, small arms are easy to use, conceal and transport, while light weapons are capable of causing mass casualties and extensive damage, making them effective tools for groups seeking to assert dominance through violence. No wonder Kofi Annan once referred to them as “Africa’s weapons of mass destruction”.

In the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and Central Africa, the presence and illegal circulation of SALW often transform localised political crises into cross-border conflicts that pose regional threats. For example, in the Lake Chad Basin, weapons smuggled across porous borders have empowered non-state actors like Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) undermining state capacity to protect civilians and state institutions.

In the Sahel, arms flow from Libya post-2011 have exacerbated insurgencies in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, with catastrophic consequences to human 26

Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas: making a case for Silencing the Guns

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ANALYSIS establishing regional arms registries to track the movement and storage of weapons more effectively.

• Providing economic incentives and development support to affected regions, addressing the underlying conditions that make communities vulnerable to armed groups’ recruitment; • Increasing international cooperation and pressure to dismantle illicit arms trafficking networks and hold violators accountable.

• Formalising AU-UN collaboration mechanisms on embargo enforcement and supporting member states to strengthen their arms control frameworks through legislation, stockpile security and tracing systems.

In search of peace: Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas (right) with a representative of Sudan’s rebel Rapid Support Forces after a meeting at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa

commemorated in September every year in close collaboration with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs seeks to reduce the illegal circulation of small arms and light weapons on the continent. It encourages citizens who are in possession of illicit firearms to voluntarily surrender them to the competent authorities during this month without disclosure of identity and/ or prosecution as a guarantee for safety and immunity.

The AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) incorporates issues of SALW in conflict risk analysis and undertakes joint field assessments with RECs to map out the illegal flows of SALW and risk hotspots in member states.

Illicit trafficking, corruption and monitoring difficulties undermine our ability at both international and regional levels to enforce arms embargoes effectively. As a result, embargoes are often violated with impunity, exacerbating the very conflicts they are meant to constrain.

To succeed in the fight against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, we must encourage coordination and collaboration in our efforts. Right now, one of the most glaring deficiencies in current arms control regimes is the limited formal role of the African Union in UN sanctions and embargo implementation.

Despite being at the forefront of early warning, mediation and peace operations, the AU is rarely consulted on embargo

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• Investing in border management cooperation, including joint AUREC border control initiatives while promoting data transparency and real-time sharing through regional monitoring platforms.

• Expanding AU technical assistance to fragile and post-conflict states for

Small Arms and Light Weapons by themselves are not the cause of conflicts in Africa

design or monitoring, with lack of supervisory or coordination role or joint enforcement efforts.

In light of these challenges, the following practical approaches are needed to strengthen embargo regimes and reduce the flow of SALW: • Strengthening border security and implementing stricter customs controls to detect and intercept illegal arms transfers. This can be done by the UN and AU in conjunction with member states.

• Enhancing regional cooperation mechanisms, including intelligence sharing and joint military operations to combat trafficking networks and

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enhanced DDR programmes.

• Empowering the media to raise awareness of the Africa Amnesty Month throughout the continent to encourage all civilians who have illicit SALW to voluntarily surrender them to the competent authorities, without arrest or prosecution.

Implementing these measures will require not only political will but also sustained financial commitment and partnerships. Evidently, as we are aware, the cost of inaction is far greater, measured in human lives and regional instability, coupled with the erosion of peace and security governance across our continent.

This must come to an end.

AB

Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas is African Union High Representative for Silencing the Guns. The above is an abridged version of his presentation during a Security Council meeting on Small Arms Control and Weapons Management in UN Sanctions Regimes in New York in April.

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27

ANALYSIS

EU funds and migrant rights abuse in North Africa Though financial support from the European Union to help stem the flow of irregular migration from Africa appears to be well-meaning, security forces in the countries receiving the funding are committing mass atrocities against the migrants, says Adama Dieng

W

E have to address an extremely serious issue: the abuses committed against sub-Saharan African migrants by the security forces of several North African countries and the responsibility of European Union decision-makers in these crimes, due to the funding, partnerships, or equipment provided by the EU to them.

I do not intend to minimise the responsibilities of member states of the African Union in this matter. My appointment in April 2024 as African Union Special Envoy for the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities on the African continent illustrates a growing awareness and an urgent need for action, given the mass atrocities against civilian populations in Africa.

These have been widely documented for several years, primarily as a result of violent conflicts affecting four of its regions: the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, the Sahel and North Africa. In these regions, atrocities are perpetrated by both state actors and armed groups.

But I also cannot ignore the other major crisis facing the African continent today: the poverty that drives people to flee and the criminal atrocities suffered by sub-Saharan migrant populations in several North African countries for several years.

Those directly responsible for this violence are, of course, the first to face their criminal responsibilities before the courts, and I welcome the fact that the International Criminal Court is considering opening an investigation into the crimes committed

by Tunisian security forces against subSaharan migrants in recent years.

I will work tirelessly to mobilise the necessary support to ensure justice is done in this matter before national and international courts. I will also continue to denounce and condemn, before the African Union authorities, the unspeakable hate speech that has increased in recent months in Tunisia and Libya against sub-Saharan migrants, including from senior political and administrative officials, and to call for prosecution of its perpetrators.

Dehumanising hate speech is often one 28

African migrants are human beings with rights (Image: UNICEF/Ashley Gilbertson)

of the first steps toward the commission of mass atrocities. But the urgency of bringing cases before these same jurisdictions to address the responsibility of European partners financing and equipping repressive forces in North Africa is also necessary, for at least four fundamental reasons.

Firstly, the mass atrocities committed are extremely serious and documented, and testimonies seem to indicate that EU officials were aware of them for many years, since 2019 in some cases, but nevertheless continued and expanded their policy of outsourcing the control of migration flows in North Africa, disregarding the risks of serious violations affecting migrants.

Several investigative reports have highlighted systematic violence perpetrated against sub-Saharan African migrants in Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya over the past three or even five years.

Arbitrary arrests, beatings, acts of torture, systematic sexual violence, complicity with smuggling networks, the sale of individuals to human traffickers who then extort their families, abandonment in the desert, homicides; these crimes are committed with horrifying recurrence and unacceptable impunity.

The EU finances and subcontracts migration controls in these North African countries under the guise of combating irregular migration and dismantling trafficking networks and, officially, with AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

the strictest respect for human rights. Yet security institutions funded and equipped by the EU, such as the Tunisian National Guard, the Libyan Coast Guard and the Moroccan and Mauritanian police, are responsible for serious crimes. The principle of “complicity by assistance” can therefore be invoked against European leaders who, through their financial and logistical support, facilitate criminal atrocities against migrants.

Secondly, African migrants are human beings with rights. We must defend their dignity and show them that they are neither forgotten nor abandoned by demanding that their rights be respected; and that their almost systematic brutalisation by the repressive systems of North African countries concerned, financed and equipped by the EU and its member states, cease immediately.

Reaffirming the primacy of this human dignity is all the more essential given that the populist and reactionary anti-migrant rhetoric circulating in the media and among European political classes tends to dehumanise them. It is imperative to return to humane policies for the concerted management of migration flows, in which the human rights and dignity of migrants are preserved and placed at the heart of partnerships between Europe and Africa, including effective and transparent mechanisms for monitoring, evaluation, rectification, sanctions and prosecution of

ANALYSIS offenders if necessary.

Thirdly, why are legal proceedings necessary? Quite simply, because the efforts to reform, revise and improve security partnership policies between the EU, its members and African nations for almost two years have failed or remained totally insufficient to prevent these mass atrocities.

The 2024 report of the European Court of Audit on the use of the €5 billion fund, which notably finances the subcontracting of migration controls, demonstrates this. The conclusions of this report were reinforced by those of the EU Ombudsman last December. The Ombudsman expressed concern about the lack of effective monitoring and control mechanisms for the use of funds in compliance with respect for human rights.

However, regardless of these alarm signals, these cooperation agreements with Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia are being renewed without fundamental revisions and are now being extended to Egypt. It is therefore necessary today to move to a more incisive stage of accountability: judicial indictment and criminal accountability.

But what are the underlying reasons for this EU blindness? What European leader today would take the risk of facilitating, and thus becoming complicit in, roundups, beatings, violent evictions, rapes and torture of homeless people in their own countries?

Emerging from the Second World War, Europe committed itself to freeing itself from its methods of managing the most deprived and the poor, practices that were common during the Industrial Revolution.

These practices were also extended by fascist regimes against their internal enemies. After the Second World War, these violent practices persisted only in colonial empires and in the metropolises where overly turbulent colonised populations bore the brunt. Let us not forget the Algerian protesters thrown into the Seine in Paris in January 1961 by security forces.

Migrants today are sometimes treated like the colonised people of yesteryear, without rights. It is high time Europe frees itself from its colonial past and from any support or complacency with such violent practices, because they affect impoverished, foreign and unprotected populations.

Funding governments today to manage migrants violently is no more acceptable than colonial crimes were. Given the rise of populism and reactionary political forces in Europe, dehumanising narratives and the denial of complicity or any responsibility,

Adama Dieng welcomes potential ICC probe into Tunisian security forces’ crimes against sub-Saharan migrants

confidence in promises to reform established agreements is also untenable.

Fear of criminal justice, the humiliation of prosecution, the risk of conviction and the possibility of incarceration must be factored into the equation for preventing atrocities against migrants.

My fourth and final point is that in a world today where international law is being challenged, Europe presents itself as one of its most fervent defenders. To be credible, these narratives of support for the principles of human dignity, brought to international bodies and integrated into the language or projects of financial partnerships with other continents, and particularly in Africa, cannot accommodate the suspicion of hypocrisy, or a policy of double standards.

It is precisely this perception of inconsistency and inadequacy between actions and words that has caused the hardening of geopolitics in the Sahel.

Europe must learn from this. Today, we need Europe and its leadership on the international stage to carry, with Africa, the banner of multilateralism, international law and human rights.

But international law and human rights, if they are effectively supported and respected, must be practiced and honoured without exception. And this effective practice must begin at home, by assuming, if necessary, criminal responsibility for one's actions and policies, not just for the benefit of one's own nationals, but also for all the wretched of the earth.

I would like to encourage the creation of an international coalition to support the prosecution of crimes against migrants.

It is essential to thoroughly document

these crimes, identify the victims, collect their testimonies and compile the necessary files for complaints that will enable prosecutions, first before the competent African and European courts and subsequently, if necessary, before the ICC. The findings of the Independent FactFinding Mission on Libya, presented to the UN Human Rights Council in March 2023, underline that the EU and its member states may not have committed crimes, but that the support they provide amounts to aiding and abetting the commission of crimes against migrants. Under no circumstances should we trivialise or minimise the responsibility of EU member states and institutions.

This is why, particularly in the context of strengthening calls for justice by providing a platform for survivors, it is important to emphasise the need to further raise awareness among EU institutions and member states that provide oxygen, and sometimes crucial funding, to the commission of these crimes. The legal and moral responsibilities of these entities must be highlighted and could be the subject of proactive awareness-raising and legislative and regulatory initiatives by the EU. I also call for a renewed dialogue between the EU and the new AU Commission leadership to establish a partnership framework for the management of migration flows based on an approach that respects human rights and not on a violent and dehumanised security-based outsourcing of migration control. Current agreements must be suspended and revised to ensure they are given the necessary guarantees of implementation, in full respect of the most fundamental AB human rights.

Adama Dieng is former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General for the Prevention of Genocide and currently African Union Special Envoy for the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities. The above is an abridged version of his presentation at a side event during the 58th Session of the UN Human Rights Council in March.

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Rwanda: lessons still to be learnt from the genocide The fight to bring perpetrators of the 1994 slaughter to justice must continue, while at the same time survivors must be helped to heal and recover, says Adama Dieng

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HE consequences of the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi in Rwanda are not only about dealing with the past. They are about dealing with the present and about dealing with the future.

We have a responsibility to do everything in our power to prevent these crimes from happening again.

The commitment not to forget and the commitment to prevent are two sides of the same coin.

The fight to bring perpetrators of these crimes to justice must continue. This remembrance is in memory of the victims and for the survivors who require our support to heal and recover.

When we at the African Union remember the genocide, we do so with much humility and regret, as we acknowledge our failure to prevent this crime; this tragedy.

The genocide is a clear reminder of the failure of not only the international community but also of our own institution, the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The United Nations failed the Tutsi; the OAU also failed the Tutsi. There are lessons learned from this failure.

Just as the UN undertook reforms in light of its failures in Rwanda in 1994, the OAU was also reformed, and the African Union was born. Its Constitutive Act demonstrated a critical shift from the principle of “non-interference” in the affairs of states to one of “nonindifference” to the suffering of the African peoples.

This principle gives the AU the right to intervene in “grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. In 2000, the AU effectively became the first institution to articulate and institutionalise what we now refer to as the principle of the responsibility to

yesterday by preventing another genocide in the future.

They are not forgotten: genocide memorial in Kigali Credit: Andrew Sutton

protect (R2P): the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This was later adopted by all member states of the UN at the World Summit in 2005.

The appointment of the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities reflects a deepening commitment of the Peace and Security Council to acting as early as possible and resolving risks before they turn into systematic and widespread violations of human rights. We are now better prepared to provide early warning, to help states and regional organisations to build the skills and capacities required to prevent genocide and to respond in a timely and decisive manner when faced with such risk. When this does not happen, the cost is way too high.

Despite this progress, the AU must do much more. Far too many current crises feature acts that may constitute atrocity crimes, by which I mean genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing.

Without timely and decisive action, situations deteriorate and the risk of the horrors of atrocity crimes rises. We must and can do better. This should be our greatest homage to the victims of the 1994 genocide. Let us honour the victims of

When we remember the events and the victims of the genocide, we are telling their families that their losses matter. The act of memorialising past events is more than simply revisiting the past. It is also about providing support to the survivors, the families of those who died and the communities that were broken. Their losses and experience matter not only to them as direct victims and survivors but to society as a whole.

We have also witnessed African NGOs and civil society proving very often to be invaluable watchdogs, detecting warning signals and systemically documenting human rights violations, despite the risks associated with such an endeavour. In this light, I am pleased to mention the recent establishment in Kigali of the Africa Regional Centre for the Prevention of Genocide. It will primarily provide in-depth research and training on the prevention of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

The Centre will serve diplomats, officials from the AU, UN and regional organisations, high-level police and military officials, religious and faithbased leaders and leaders among NGOs and civil societies. They will assume leadership or advisory roles in countries where mass atrocities could be unfolding.

This understanding is borne from the recognition of the fact that no country is immune from mass atrocities, irrespective of its economic and social circumstances.

All of us share the same objective: to work towards a peaceful Africa in which crimes such as the ones that were committed in Rwanda 31 years ago no longer happen; an Africa that has learnt the lessons of the past and where all populations can live in peace and AB dignity.

Adama Dieng is African Union Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities. The above is an abridged version of his presentation at the commemoration of the Rwandan genocide, held at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa in April.

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BUSINESS & ECONOMY

Trump’s tariffs and Africa If the continent is to survive in the fast-changing global trade system, it must unite and adopt a coherent industrial policy that will identify those economic sectors that it wishes to excel in, and then subordinate social and economic policies to achieve those ends, writes Adotey Bing-Pappoe

I

N a speech he delivered on what he termed Liberation Day, US President Donald Trump imposed a two-tier tariff system on the world. The first was a 10 per cent tariff on all imports into America from almost all countries.

The second (now paused for 90 days for all countries except China) added another layer of tariffs on top of the uniform level imposed by the tier-one tariffs.

short answer to the first is that justification is not valid. There is no law that declares that America has the right to be the world’s provider of manufactured goods. Only an adherent to the idea of American (or for that matter European) exceptionalism could justifiably hold that position.

Many decades ago, England was considered the “Workshop of the World”,

a title that America in effect wrested from the UK between 1914 and 1918 and 1939 and 1945, when two wars were fought to determine which among the European imperialist powers, the UK or Germany, would have global pre-eminence. By the end of the second of those wars, America had in effect claimed that mantle.

So, the US and the UK, with the

The main reason offered was that the policies were intended to end the unfairness that America had been suffering under the current international trading system. The specific unfairness was that many countries were deemed to have imposed tariffs on American imports that were higher than the tariffs that America imposed on imports from those countries.

Trump’s action suggested that in his view there would be fairness if tariffs in both countries were the same, or perhaps tariffs levied by America on imports were higher than those levied by foreign countries on their American imports. This raises the question of what constitutes a fair tariff.

In addition, these measures were being taken to ensure what Trump and his advisers considered to be “fair” within the international trading system. They were pursuing these policies to encourage companies, be they American or foreign, to move their production factories, from wherever they might be outside of the US, into the country.

The result of such moves would be to restore America’s position in the international division of labour as the main supplier of manufactured or finished goods, and the rest of the world as the providers of semi-processed or raw materials.

Two questions arise from this. Is the justification valid, and will the measures work regardless of their justification? The 32

On ‘Liberation Day’, US President Donald Trump announced a two-tier global tariff system during a major policy speech

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BUSINESS & ECONOMY latter now a junior partner, worked in collaboration with the former colonised countries to establish a system based on rules, rather than might, to regulate relations between the colonising countries and the colonised. The main pillars of that system were supposed to be the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the International Trade Organisation (ITO).

The first two were established but the third was not, because the US Congress would not agree to its provisions, especially those that related to labour rights in the former colonies. Instead, the role of regulating international trade was taken up in an ad-hoc manner by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

This is what became the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in January 1995.

In any event, the role of these three organisations was to use rules to ensure that the economic predominance of the former colonial powers would be preserved going forward.

The answer to the second question –

will the measures introduced by Trump work – is: perhaps. It has become an economic orthodoxy that protectionism does not work. But the evidence is that, done correctly, it can.

Between 1651 and 1849 the English

‘

onwards, Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) introduced a system of measures to take advantage of what it considered to be the best opportunities for export promotion on the one hand, and to manage the decline of

There is no law that says the US has the right to be world’s provider of manufactured goods

parliament passed and maintained a series of laws that came to be known as the Navigation Acts. Their general purpose was to protect and promote the English empire and economy, and more specifically to enable the growth of English shipping. This it did by restricting trade between Britain’s colonies and other European powers. When this trade did take place, England passed laws to stipulate that it must be carried out mainly in English ships with English crews.

It even required at one point that trade between Britain’s colonies should pass through an English port. Over the 300year period when these acts were in place they helped to make the British navy the strongest in the world and stimulated a range of economic sectors within England.

In 1791, Alexander Hamilton, at the time in effect the Minister of Finance of America, produced the Report on Manufactures in which he proposed a series of tariffs and other measures which, though opposed by some, were implemented, and laid the basis for America to industrialise after its 1776 declaration of independence from England.

During the 19th century when Germany was attempting to catch up with the other European powers, Friedrich List developed a theory that led to Germany implementing a policy to protect what it termed “infant industries” through a system of tariffs and subsidies. That system allowed these socalled infant industries to be protected from external competition, at least until they had become “adults”.

His ideas were the basis for Germany’s ability to industrialise and catch up with the leading European powers. In the 1960s AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

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what were deemed to be “sunset” sectors, or those sectors for which the MITI could see no positive future.

The measures taken were complex but involved tariffs and subsidies. The tariffs made imports more expensive to benefit local producers, and subsidies and other measures stimulated local production.

China has systematically used the infant industry argument to put in place a sophisticated and effective system of tariffs and subsidies in support of its own push for industrialisation. Policies whereby a government seeks to develop certain sectors of its economic structure, and which are generally termed Industrial Policy, have been adopted by many countries that, for whatever reason, feel that they must take measures to rebalance the international division of labour.

Despite the pronouncements of Adam Smith and spokespersons for countries that have attained strategic economic dominance, Industrial Policy properly adopted, as the few examples outlined above show, does indeed work. We need to look past the short-term effects and look to the long-term effects.

As South Korean economist Ha-Joon Chang has demonstrated, many countries, especially the now developed countries, adopted protectionist policies to put themselves in a commanding position and then having achieved that position, became free trade advocates. As the late Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, famously put it: allowing free trade between countries of differing economic capabilities is like putting a featherweight and a heavyweight into the same ring and asking the 33

BUSINESS & ECONOMY

Julius Nyerere likened free trade between unequal economies to a featherweight and a heavyweight forced into a boxing match—an unfair and uneven fight

featherweight to punch the heavyweight; and then asking the heavyweight to punch the featherweight.

We do not have to know much about boxing to correctly guess the outcome.

Sadly, too many Africans, whether schooled in Europe, America, or indeed Africa, have followed Adam Smith in this regard.

able to challenge the former colonisers for leadership of the global order.

It is this challenge that Trump is finding too hard to swallow. But the question should be asked: why should the formerly colonised countries not be able to become leaders of the world economy?

A key tenet of the GATT, and after it the WTO, was to reduce the level of tariffs globally. This it succeeded in doing spectacularly. In 1947, the average level of tariffs has been estimated at 40 per cent.

By 1995, when the WTO was formed, the average level of tariffs was just under 11 per cent. Last year the average level of tariffs was around six per cent.

The major beneficiaries of these reductions have been the former European colonisers and America. They have been able to use their muscle to get the former colonies to open their economies to their exports.

But not just that; the system was also geared to ensure that the former colonised countries remained producers of raw materials. So, in this system, tariff levels rise steeply if the goods that “developing” countries export are processed or semifinished while they attract much lower tariffs if they are in their raw state.

Thus, the system of international trade has operated to open the markets of both developing and developed countries to imports. But this is a situation that benefits the developed countries more than it does the developing countries, because they have technical capabilities that the developing countries do not yet have.

In addition, smaller countries are not able to punish richer countries that break international trade rules. America and others have been able to force their often-subsidised agricultural products and manufactured goods into the markets of developing countries, while encouraging those countries to remain producers of raw materials.

So, if Trump implements his Industrial Policy in a focused manner for long enough (say 15 to 20 years), then he is likely to be able to transform the international division of labour to America’s advantage. He would need to make his tariffs targeted, and to use the additional payments received by the government, as well as other measures, to improve the competitiveness of the relevant home sectors. But that would not make it fair or just.

The international trading system that the US and the colonisers constructed after the war to decide who would hold sway over the world’s economy was designed to allow the imperialist countries to change the leadership of the world economy without having to fight wars. It was not designed to allow the former colonies to be 34

The global trade system has opened both developing and developed nations to a flood of imports

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BUSINESS & ECONOMY

A united Africa must craft a focused industrial policy—aligning all strategies to build excellence in chosen economic sectors

Despite this, some developing countries have used Industrial Policy to industrialise.

Unless one thinks that the formerly colonised countries do not deserve to be producers of manufactured or knowledgebased goods, then that is what something resembling free international competition produces. The actions by Trump demonstrates to the whole world that when imperialist countries are no longer able to get their way, they either seek to change the rules or they stop playing by them.

In this light, what should Africa do? It should first of all act to unite. Individuals, consumers, companies and countries can improve their bargaining position by collaborating or forming associations with one another. This action provides benefits whether you are selling or buying together or both.

The solution was suggested to Africa’s leaders at the time of the formation of the Organisation of African Unity. It is simple, but not simplistic: Africa must unite. It is still valid today. Not only has Africa not united, but individual African countries have signed trade agreements to progressively open their borders to imports, sometimes over the period of 10, 15, or 20 years. They will regret this when the timelines they have agreed to fall due.

The second thing a united Africa can do is to adopt a coherent industrial policy that will identify those economic sectors that

should formerly ‘ Why colonised countries not become leaders of the world economy?

the continent wishes to excel in and then subordinate its social and economic policies to achieving those ends. Next, national companies capable of operating efficiently in those sectors should be established. They can be state, cooperative or even privately owned companies.

The people required to operate in the sector need to be suitably trained. The supply chains required to provide for the sector need to also be established. The tariffs charged and paid to the government of a united Africa should be set so that they make the local industries efficient, but they must be progressively removed, to

’

ensure that the local industries retain their international competitiveness.

Meanwhile the exported raw materials must be sold through associations that can demand prices that are more favourable than has been the case in the recent past.

Finally, the policy should be implemented for long enough for the continent to gain from the dynamic effects of Industrial Policy. This will require a united Africa playing by the rules set by international organisations advantageously, but by playing smart. Meanwhile the politicians should act honestly in the continent’s AB strategic interest.

Adotey Bing-Pappoe is Senior Lecturer, University of Greenwich Business School in London.

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The quiet collapse of AGOA As the US retreats under President Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine, Africa’s most important trade pact with Washington faces collapse. Jon Offei-Ansah analyses what the rollback of AGOA means for African economies, jobs, and the future of US–Africa relations

T

HE African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)—the landmark legislation that has underpinned US–Africa trade relations for nearly a quarter century—is now teetering under the weight of President Donald Trump’s protectionist trade policies and diplomatic pullback.

At a time when African economies are striving to diversify and compete globally, the potential rollback of AGOA threatens to unravel years of hard-fought economic progress. Analysts warn that the continent may lose more than just market access—it could forfeit a strategic partnership with one of the world’s most influential powers.

Enacted in 2000 under President Bill Clinton, AGOA was designed to provide qualifying sub-Saharan African countries with duty-free access to the US market for over 6,000 goods. The programme was intended not only to boost exports, but also to stimulate industrialisation, strengthen economic ties, and promote democratic governance.

what he calls an ‘America First’ trade agenda has weakened the foundations of AGOA without formally dismantling it.

Recent moves, such as broad tariff hikes on steel, aluminium, and agricultural goods, have created uncertainty among African exporters who rely on stable access to US markets. While AGOA’s legal framework remains intact, experts say its practical impact is being steadily undermined.

‘We’re seeing a quiet dismantling of AGOA by default,’ said a trade analyst with the African Trade Policy Centre.

‘Tariffs are up, compliance requirements are stricter, and political will has all but evaporated.’

Compounding the pressure on African economies, the Trump administration in January 2025 froze all USAID-managed foreign aid for 90 days, affecting billions in funding for health, education, and agricultural programmes.

Critical services—like HIV/AIDS

treatment under PEPFAR, maternal health clinics, and malaria prevention initiatives—were either halted or severely scaled back. In regions already strained by economic challenges and post-COVID recovery efforts, the impact has been swift and far-reaching.

For example, in Uganda, over 100 rural clinics supported by US health aid have reported medicine shortages. In Ghana, agricultural training programmes funded through USAID have been suspended indefinitely, threatening food security for thousands of smallholder farmers.

Adding to these tensions is a reported plan to close US embassies in Eritrea, Gambia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, and the Central African Republic, along with consulates in Cameroon and South Africa.

Diplomats say the closures send a dangerous signal of disengagement and risk isolating Washington from key political and commercial partners. Critics

Over the years, AGOA has helped African countries develop robust sectors in apparel, agriculture, and automotive components. South Africa has used it to export cars, Kenya for flowers and textiles, Ethiopia for garments, and Ghana for cocoa-based products. In Lesotho, apparel exports to the US—fuelled by AGOA— have become the backbone of the country’s economy.

According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, total non-oil AGOA exports reached nearly $4.8 billion in 2019, benefiting over 30 countries.

However, since taking office, President Trump has made no secret of his disdain for multilateral agreements. His administration’s shift toward unilateral tariffs, renegotiated bilateral deals, and 36

Delays in US orders hit Ethiopia’s Hawassa Industrial Park, as AGOA apparel makers face rising shipping costs and tariff uncertainty

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BUSINESS & ECONOMY Policymakers and trade experts say any replacement must go beyond preferences and focus on building real industrial capacity and resilience. There are calls for the next phase to incorporate digital trade, services, and climate-smart agriculture— areas where Africa is poised to grow.

‘AGOA needs to evolve, but it also needs political commitment,’ said a Ghanaian trade ministry official. ‘We can’t industrialise on promises alone.’

argue that such moves could damage the US's soft power and create openings for rival global actors.

partnership,’ said a senior executive at a Johannesburg-based carmaker. ‘This uncertainty is dangerous.’

Indeed, as the US pulls back, China has wasted no time deepening its footprint across the continent. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has committed billions to infrastructure, telecommunications, and mining deals in Africa. China has also built new consulates, launched media outlets, and trained thousands of African bureaucrats and engineers.

Despite repeated calls from African governments and the US Congressional Black Caucus for clarity on AGOA’s future, the Trump administration has remained largely silent.

While AGOA was meant to be a tool for economic empowerment, China’s approach is more infrastructure-led and state-to-state driven. Many African leaders are now weighing these contrasting models of engagement.

‘If the US won’t show up, China is more than happy to take its place,’ said one West African diplomat. ‘And China isn’t asking us to jump through democracy hoops.’

African exporters and investors are already feeling the heat. In Ethiopia’s Hawassa Industrial Park—a major AGOA beneficiary—several apparel manufacturers have reported delays in US orders, compounded by rising shipping costs and tariff ambiguity.

During his first 100 days in office, Trump offered only vague support for a potential visit to Africa, saying he would ‘absolutely’ consider it. However, no trip has been scheduled, and no new Africa policy has been articulated.

Unlike his predecessor Barack Obama—who visited Africa multiple times and championed initiatives like Power Africa and the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI)—Trump has so far avoided making Africa a visible policy priority.

AGOA is due to expire in 2025, unless renewed by the US Congress. Without strong executive support, its renewal is far from guaranteed.

For African countries, the uncertainty surrounding AGOA has injected urgency into regional integration efforts. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), launched in 2021, is now seen as a crucial platform for building internal markets and reducing reliance on external preferences.

Already, the AfCFTA Secretariat is working with member states to streamline cross-border logistics, harmonise tariffs, and enhance infrastructure investment.

‘AGOA was always meant to be a stepping stone, not a permanent crutch,’ said a Nigerian economist. ‘Now we have to stand on our own feet.’

As 2025 approaches, the fate of AGOA hangs in the balance. Whether President Trump renews the programme, replaces it, or allows it to lapse will have consequences far beyond trade metrics.

For African workers, exporters, and policymakers, AGOA has meant more than market access—it has symbolised partnership, dignity, and possibility.

Its erosion represents not just a policy reversal, but a withdrawal of American belief in Africa’s potential.

Unless decisive action is taken soon, the US risks not just losing market share in Africa, but ceding long-term influence on a continent where global competition AB is only intensifying.

‘We invested in our factory based on AGOA stability,’ said one textile firm manager. ‘Now we’re stuck in limbo, and Washington isn’t talking.’

In South Africa, the automotive industry has warned of potential job losses if duty-free access to US markets is revoked. ‘AGOA was never just a trade preference—it was a long-term

AGOA represents more than trade—it embodies partnership, dignity, and opportunity

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A new era: Africa breaking free from dependency With the global financial order shifting, the continent is in a position to forge a new economic path, one based on self-sufficiency, innovation and African-led solutions, writes Anatu Ben-Lawal

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OR decades, Africa has been treated as a source of raw materials and a market for Western goods rather than a continent capable of forging its own economic destiny. The Trump administration, unlike previous US governments, is largely ignoring Africa in its foreign policy, exposing the continent’s longstanding reliance on external actors for trade, aid and economic stability.

economic path. The IMF’s failures have left many African economies in cycles of debt, unable to build sustainable industries or invest in long-term growth.

However, this shift in US engagement has exposed a deeper issue: Africa’s economic model, largely dictated by institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, has kept the continent dependent on foreign capital and resources rather than fostering selfsufficiency and industrialisation.

The IMF’s approach to African economies has been deeply flawed.

Countries that have relied on IMF loans have seen their social services cut, local industries weakened and sovereignty compromised. The IMF often imposes austerity measures, reducing public spending, privatising essential services and increasing taxes; all of which disproportionately harm working class communities, particularly women.

Today, with the collapse of IMF-led financial policies and increasing instability in the global market, African nations face a critical opportunity to redefine their

The debt burden, coupled with structural adjustment programmes that prioritise foreign debt repayment over local development, has created a system where African nations are forced to export raw materials cheaply while importing expensive finished goods.

Rather than supporting industrialisation

or value addition within Africa, the IMF and other Western financial institutions have promoted extractive economies, where Africa’s resources, such as gold, coltan, cocoa and oil, are mined, processed abroad and then sold back to Africa at inflated prices. This model keeps Africa trapped in economic servitude, unable to break free from neocolonial control.

However, with the global financial order shifting, Africa is in a position to forge a new economic path; one based on self-sufficiency, innovation and African-led solutions. Africa has the resources, talent and knowledge to transform its economies from being raw material exporters to producers of globally competitive brands.

The key lies in creating and enhancing African value chains that produce goods for both local and global markets. Africa’s biodiversity is one of its greatest untapped assets.

For example, the sector within the global wellness industry that is fuelled by medicinal plants, natural oils and skincare ingredients from Africa is worth over $35 billion. Yet the continent benefits minimally from this bonanza.

Instead of allowing Western companies to patent and profit from Africa’s natural resources, African researchers, entrepreneurs and governments must invest in Research and Development (R&D) by creating laboratories and innovation hubs to study and refine African plant-based wellness products.

Leading from the front: Anatu Ben-Lawal, a passionate agroecologist, heads a movement of rural women farmers across the north of Ghana

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A system of standards and certification will ensure that African products meet international quality and safety standards, making them competitive in global markets. This should be backed by intellectual property rights to protect African resources from exploitation through patents and trademarks.

BUSINESS & ECONOMY and logistics to connect African markets efficiently.

Efforts should also be put into social innovation and reviving traditional knowledge systems in agriculture, health and industry. There should be support for research on African technologies and inventions that can drive local economies; and promoting social enterprises that focus on sustainability and cultural preservation.

Economic independence will only be achieved through value addition, which means that governments must implement policies that require local processing of natural resources before export.

Developing African brands in skincare, wellness, fashion and food that can compete internationally will need building strong export networks to connect African businesses to global markets.

Africa urged to invest in R&D to develop plant-based wellness products and stop Western firms profiting from its natural resources

By developing African-owned wellness and beauty brands, the continent can shift from being a supplier of raw ingredients to a leader in the global skincare and health industries.

One of Africa’s biggest economic challenges is its lack of production infrastructure. Many African countries export raw materials only to buy back finished products at a premium. This must change.

Yet, they continue to face economic barriers, from limited access to credit to exclusion from major industries.

A sustainable way forward for Africa must centre on women’s economic leadership through women’s credit unions and financial cooperatives that will provide direct funding and low-interest loans to women entrepreneurs, freeing them from exploitative banks.

Business incubation and training programmes are needed to support women-led startups in sectors such as agribusiness, fashion, beauty and technology. Women must also be encouraged to move beyond small-scale farming and into agro-processing and They should also develop e-commerce export businesses. By investing in women’s platforms and global distribution networks financial independence and business skills, that allow African businesses to sell directly Africa can unlock its economic potential to international consumers, bypassing and ensure wealth is distributed at the Western middlemen. community level.

If Africa can process its own raw Moving beyond dependency and materials, it will generate millions of jobs, breaking free from Western financial increase GDP and strengthen intra-African control and IMF-driven policies, Africa trade under the African Continental Free needs to adopt a Pan-African economic Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). approach that prioritises standardisation Crucial in all this is the role of and market integration that will establish women-led social enterprises and female African-led certification bodies to ensure economic empowerment. African women have historically been the backbone of their products meet international standards.

Strengthening regional trade agreements to countries’ economies, running businesses, make African products more competitive leading agricultural production and globally calls for investing in infrastructure sustaining local markets.

African countries need to invest in local manufacturing to produce finished goods from raw materials; and create regional production hubs that specialise in different industries such as textiles, agriculture, cosmetics and technology.

The future of Africa’s economic success depends on embracing self-reliance and rejecting dependency. With the IMF model collapsing, it is clear that Africa cannot continue following Western financial prescriptions.

The time has come to prioritise African-led solutions by empowering women through social enterprises and financial independence; investing in local production, indigenous knowledge and innovation; and strengthening intra-African trade and building strong Pan-African economies.

If Africa moves in this direction, it will not only survive, but thrive. By creating sustainable jobs, transforming indigenous plants into billion-dollar industries and promoting African brands, Africa will reclaim control over its economic destiny – not as a supplier of raw materials but as a global powerhouse of innovation and enterprise.

Africa’s future is in African hands. For too long Africans have accepted an identity of being victims. That narrative or identity is something we reject at Social Innovation Africa. While we do not deny the injustices of the past, we are convinced that our greatest era is upon us. Like other nations that started from nothing, African countries, too, can rise and be purposeful about their development; working hand in hand with the African Diaspora communities who are an essential part of this trajectory.

The world has changed. Africa must rise to the challenge. Africa must AB lead.

Anatu Ben-Lawal is founder of Social Innovation Africa, a feminist think tank that designs governance systems for a new Africa. anatu@siafrica.online; www.siafrica.online AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

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TECHNOLOGY

5G is Africa’s fast track to power As nations race to lead in the digital age, Ojo Emmanuel Ademola argues that 5G technology offers Africa a game-changing opportunity to drive innovation, close the digital divide, and redefine its global competitiveness

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N today’s digital landscape, the competition for 5G technology is essential and critical for nations striving to secure a competitive advantage. African countries are seizing the opportunity presented by 5G to drive inclusive growth and innovation.

By making strategic investments in connectivity, smart manufacturing, entrepreneurship, and sustainable urban solutions, these nations are positioning themselves to lead in the digital age.

This article reveals the profound impact of 5G on Africa’s digital transformation and economic prosperity, showcasing the abundant opportunities that await.

The rollout of 5G technology is absolutely critical for transforming Africa’s digital infrastructure and accelerating industrialisation. This groundbreaking technology delivers ultra-fast internet, lower latency, and higher capacity, all of which are essential for elevating innovation and competitiveness. Africa must adopt 5G without delay to stay relevant in the global digital landscape.

5G will fundamentally change industries—including manufacturing, healthcare, agriculture, and transportation— by empowering the development of smart factories, remote healthcare solutions, precision farming, and autonomous vehicles. The efficiency and productivity gains from these innovations will not only create jobs but also drive substantial economic growth.

5G technology is vital for closing the digital divide in Africa by providing reliable internet access to underserved areas. This connectivity will empower individuals and businesses in online education, e-commerce, and e-health services, promoting inclusive growth and reducing inequalities.

Immediate action is necessary, as the opportunity to adopt 5G is shrinking. We must invest in the spectrum, infrastructure, and regulatory frameworks while fostering collaboration among governments, industry leaders, and international partners for a fast rollout.

Prioritising cybersecurity and data 40

Africa on the move: Urban infrastructure and connectivity fuel the continent’s digital and economic acceleration

protection is essential for a secure digital infrastructure. The rollout of 5G technology will boost economies and enable new industries like IoT and smart cities. With faster speeds and lower latency, 5G drives innovation and economic growth, fostering trust among users and investors. Now is the time to act.

5G is transforming industrial efficiency and sustainability by implementing innovative technologies that optimise production, significantly reduce energy consumption, and eliminate waste in smart factories. In agriculture, it revolutionises practices to boost crop yields and drastically cut water usage, thereby ensuring food security.

Moreover, 5G is critical for enhancing access to essential services like healthcare and education, especially in underserved rural areas. Telemedicine powered by 5G facilitates remote consultations and diagnostics, leading to improved healthcare results and lower costs. Additionally, 5G-enabled online education platforms are bridging the digital divide, offering quality AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

education to students in remote locations and unlocking new opportunities for future generations.

The deployment of 5G technology presents exciting opportunities along with important considerations. A key challenge is the investment required for network infrastructure and spectrum licenses, which can be mitigated through collaboration and support for broader access.

While 5G may increase energy consumption and electronic waste, this underscores the need for innovative sustainable solutions, such as enhancing energy efficiency and promoting responsible recycling practices.

Additionally, more excellent connectivity raises cybersecurity and data privacy risks. We can safeguard sensitive information and build trust in the digital landscape by prioritising strong cybersecurity measures and robust data protection frameworks.

Despite these challenges, 5 G's transformative potential can drive economic growth and sustainability. With careful risk

TECHNOLOGY

Harnessing the power of 5G: High-speed connectivity transforms everyday digital experiences across Africa

management, countries and stakeholders can fully leverage this technology's benefits to create a more inclusive and prosperous digital future.

There are several funding opportunities available for African nations working towards implementing 5G technology and achieving all-inclusive transformation in the digital age. Some of the key sources of funding include: 1. International Development Banks like the World Bank, AfDB, and IFC offer financial support for infrastructure projects, including telecommunications and digital infrastructure investments.

2. Many global technology companies, such as telecom providers and software developers, offer funding and support for projects that drive African digital transformation. This includes grants, partnerships, or in-kind contributions for deploying 5G networks and services.

3. Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Africa bring together government agencies, private companies, and non-profits to fund and support 5G projects. These collaborations leverage the strengths of diverse stakeholders to foster innovation, infrastructure development, and economic growth.

4. African governments and regional organisations may create funds to support investments in 5G technology and digital transformation. These funds can offer grants, loans, or subsidies to help deploy 5G networks and services.

5. Research and Innovation Grants: Academic institutions and innovation hubs worldwide provide funding for research

projects exploring 5G technology and its applications. These grants support cuttingedge research, pilot projects, and capacitybuilding in telecommunications and digital technologies.

6. Impact Investment Funds: Impact investors and social venture capitalists may fund 5G projects in Africa that promote inclusive growth and sustainable development. These funds aim for positive social and environmental outcomes alongside financial returns.

African nations can leverage funding from international organizations, technology companies, public-private partnerships, and impact investors to harness 5G technology. Strategic collaborations will accelerate digital transformation and socio-economic progress, providing a competitive advantage in innovation, economic growth, and industrial development.

Here are some key ways in which 5G can offer a competitive edge to African nations: 1. 5G networks provide ultra-fast speeds and low latency, improving internet connectivity and expanding broadband access in African countries.

This enhanced connectivity can boost productivity and innovation in sectors like telecommunications, e-commerce, finance, healthcare, and education.

2. 5G networks support the advancement of smart manufacturing and Industry 4.0 technologies like IoT, AI, and big data analytics. By adopting 5G, African nations can modernise industrial infrastructure, automate processes, and AFRICA BRIEFING MAY - JUNE 2025

optimise supply chains, leading to increased efficiency, productivity, and sustainable growth in manufacturing.

3. The adoption of 5G technology can spur entrepreneurship and innovation in Africa. By offering high-speed connectivity and advanced data analytics, 5G networks empower startups and SMEs to create and expand innovative solutions. This digital ecosystem fosters creativity and collaboration, driving technological advancements and job creation in the digital era.

4. 5G networks enhance the development of smart cities and sustainable infrastructure, improving residents’ quality of life and promoting environmental sustainability. African nations implementing 5G can create smart transportation systems, energy-efficient buildings, and digital healthcare services, addressing urban challenges. This emphasis on smart city development can attract investment and talent, making African cities appealing for business and innovation.

5. By embracing 5G technology and digital transformation, African nations can enhance their competitiveness in the global digital economy. Leaders in 5G adoption can attract foreign investment, foster international partnerships, and establish themselves as hubs for technology and talent. This advantage opens new market opportunities, drives economic diversification, and elevates Africa’s position in the global landscape.

African nations have a unique opportunity to leverage 5G technology for digital transformation and economic growth. These countries can lead in the digital landscape by investing in high-speed connectivity and innovative infrastructure. Embracing 5G is crucial for driving economic growth, creating jobs, and improving citizens’ quality of life. By building robust digital infrastructure now, Africa can secure a competitive future in the global digital economy.

The adoption of 5G technology empowers African nations to leap into the digital future, significantly enhancing their global competitiveness and paving the way for sustainable development. By embracing high-speed connectivity and fostering innovation, these countries will achieve a distinct competitive edge. Strategic investments and robust partnerships will propel Africa toward inclusive growth and establish its position as a technological leader. As the continent harnesses the transformative strength of 5G, it is poised to redefine its narrative on the global stage, driving innovation and sustainability in the digital economy with confidence and AB determination.

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