AfricaBriefing - March - April 2023 Edition

On Africa’s political and economic governance

ON pages 24-27 of this edition, is a an abridged version of a speech by Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the AU High Representative on Silencing the Guns, at the ministerial meeting of the Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa on March 10. Titled:

Governance, Social Contract, and Economic Development in Africa: Looking Back, Projecting into the future, Chambas’ speech traces Africa’s political and economic development from independence in the 1960s to the present day and laments that the lofty dreams of Africans at independence are yet to become reality.

Chambas’ speech is another in the never ending discourse on the region’s political and economic woes and the need to find lasting solutions to them.

Political and economic governance in Africa has been a subject of much scrutiny and debate, particularly in recent decades as the continent has experienced both progress and setbacks in various areas. Africa has a complex and diverse political and economic landscape, with over 50 countries that have a range of cultures, languages, religions, and historical backgrounds.

Publisher

Jon Offei-Ansah

Editor

Desmond Davies

Contributing Editors

Stephen Williams

Prof. Toyin Falola

Tikum Mbah Azonga

Contributors

Justice Lee Adoboe

Chief Chuks Iloegbunam

Joseph Kayira

Zachary Ochieng

Olu Ojewale

Oladipo Okubanjo

PUBLISHER’S NOTE

In terms of political governance, Africa has faced several challenges over the years. Many countries on the continent have experienced a history of authoritarian rule, with leaders that have clung to power for decades, stifled political opposition, and suppressed dissent. This has often resulted in weak democratic institutions and limited political freedoms, with little to no accountability for those in power. Such a lack of accountability has led to corruption, mismanagement of resources, and often resulted in social unrest.

Africa bucks global economic trend

Jon Offei-Ansah Publisher

Desmond Davies Editor

However, in recent years, there has been a positive shift towards more democratic governance in Africa. Many countries have held regular, transparent elections, and are taking steps to establish independent judiciaries and a free press. This change has been supported by civil society groups, media, and international organisations like the African Union, the United Nations, and the European Union. There have been some successful transitions to democracy in Africa, such as in Ghana and Botswana, where peaceful transfers of power have occurred.

Corinne Soar

Kennedy Olilo

Gorata Chepete

Designer

In 2018, six of the 10 fastest-growing economies in the world were in Africa, according to the World Bank, with Ghana leading the pack. With GDP growth for the continent projected to accelerate to four per cent in 2019 and 4.1 per cent in 2020, Africa’s economic growth story continues apace. Meanwhile, the World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business Index reveals that five of the 10 most-improved countries are in Africa, and one-third of all reforms recorded globally were in sub-Saharan Africa. What makes the story more impressive and heartening is that the growth – projected to be broad-based – is being achieved in a challenging global environment, bucking the trend.

Deputy Editor

Angela Cobbinah

Contributing Editor

Stephen Williams

Nonetheless, there are still many challenges to be addressed in African politics. There are still many authoritarian regimes in power, often supported by external actors with their own interests in the region. Many governments continue to suppress opposition, restrict press freedoms, and fail to uphold human rights. This often results in social unrest and a lack of trust in the democratic process.

Director, Special Projects

Michael Orji

Contributors

Justice Lee Adoboe

Simon Blemadzie

Country Representatives

South Africa

Edward Walter Byerley

Top Dog Media, 5 Ascot Knights

47 Grand National Boulevard Royal Ascot, Milnerton 7441, South Africa

In addition to political governance, economic governance is also an important aspect of African development. African countries have historically been reliant on primary commodities such as oil, gold, and diamonds. The over-reliance on commodity exports makes African economies susceptible to global commodity price volatility, which often leads to macroeconomic instability and social unrest.

In the Cover Story of this edition, Dr. Hippolyte Fofack, Chief Economist at the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), analyses the factors underpinning this performance. Two factors, in my opinion, stand out in Dr. Hippolyte’s analysis: trade between Africa and China and the intra-African cross-border investment and infrastructure development.

Much has been said and written about China’s ever-deepening economic foray into Africa, especially by Western analysts and commentators who have been sounding alarm bells about re-colonisation of Africa, this time by the Chinese. But empirical evidence paints a different picture.

Chuks Iloegbunam

Joseph Kayira

Zachary Ochieng

Olu Ojewale

Oladipo Okubanjo

Tel: +27 (0) 21 555 0096

Cell: +27 (0) 81 331 4887

Email: ed@topdog-media.net

Ghana

Despite the decelerating global growth environment, trade between Africa and China increased by 14.5 per cent in the first three quarters of 2018, surpassing the growth rate of world trade (11.6 per cent), reflecting the deepening economic dependency between the two major trading partners.

Empirical evidence shows that China’s domestic investment has become highly linked with economic expansion in Africa. A one percentage point increase in China’s domestic investment growth is associated with an average of 0.6 percentage point increase in overall African exports. And, the expected economic development and trade impact of expanding Chinese investment on resource-rich African countries, especially oil-exporting countries, is even more important.

To address this challenge, African governments have initiated a range of economic reforms, such as promoting regional integration, strengthening public-private partnerships, and supporting entrepreneurship and innovation. Many African countries are implementing policies aimed at creating more diversified economies, reducing poverty, and increasing economic growth. One of the most significant initiatives in recent years has been the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, which seeks to create a single market for goods and services across the continent. Despite these efforts, Africa still faces several economic challenges. The continent has a large informal sector, with many people working in the informal economy, outside of the formal legal framework. This informal economy can make it difficult to collect taxes, monitor economic activity, and enforce regulations. African countries also face challenges with access to finance and technology, as well as a lack of infrastructure such as roads, electricity, and water. Furthermore, corruption remains a significant challenge in African economic governance. Corruption in Africa affects both the public and private sectors and often stifles economic growth and development. Many African countries rank low on corruption indices, and bribery and fraud are widespread in many sectors.

Corinne Soar

Gloria Ansah Designer

Country Representatives

South Africa

Edward Walter Byerley

Top Dog Media, 5 Ascot Knights

Nana Asiama Bekoe

Kingdom Concept Co.

Tel: +233 243 393 943 / +233 303 967 470 kingsconceptsltd@gmail.com

Nigeria

The resilience of African economies can also be attributed to growing intra-African cross-border investment and infrastructure development. A combination of the two factors is accelerating the process of structural transformation in a continent where industrial output and services account for a growing share of GDP. African corporations and industrialists which are expanding their industrial footprint across Africa and globally are leading the diversification from agriculture into higher value goods in manufacturing and service sectors. These industrial champions are carrying out transcontinental operations, with investment holdings around the globe, with a strong presence in Europe and Pacific Asia, together account for more than 75 per cent of their combined activities outside Africa.

47 Grand National Boulevard Royal Ascot, Milnerton 7441, South Africa

Tel: +27 (0) 21 555 0096

Cell: +27 (0) 81 331 4887 Email: ed@topdog-media.net

Ghana

Nana Asiama Bekoe

Kingdom Concept Co.

To address the issue of corruption, African governments have implemented several measures such as strengthening anti-corruption laws, increasing transparency in public procurement processes, and promoting accountability in the management of public funds. However, progress has been slow, and much more needs to be done to combat corruption and promote good economic governance in Africa.

A survey of 30 leading emerging African corporations with global footprints and combined revenue of more than $118 billion shows that they are active in several industries, including manufacturing (e.g., Dangote Industries), basic materials, telecommunications (e.g., Econet, Safaricom), finance (e.g., Ecobank) and oil and gas. In addition to mitigating risks highly correlated with African economies, these emerging African global corporations are accelerating the diversification of sources of growth and reducing the exposure of countries to adverse commodity terms of trade.

Nnenna Ogbu

#4 Babatunde Oduse crescent Isheri Olowora - Isheri Berger, Lagos

Tel: +234 803 670 4879 getnnenna.ogbu@gmail.com

Kenya

Tel: +233 243 393 943 / +233 303 967 470 kingsconceptsltd@gmail.com

Nigeria

Taiwo Adedoyin

Patrick Mwangi

Aquarius Media Ltd, PO Box 10668-11000

MV Noble, Press House, 3rd Floor

27 Acme Road, Ogba, Ikeja, Lagos

Nairobi, Kenya

Tel: 0720 391 546/0773 35 41

Email: mwangi@aquariusmedia.co.ke

Political and economic governance in Africa is a complex and multifaceted issue, influenced by a range of historical, cultural, social, and economic factors. While there have been positive developments in recent years, such as the promotion of democratic governance and economic reforms, there are still significant challenges to be addressed. African countries must work to strengthen institutions, improve infrastructure, and combat corruption, in order to promote sustainable and inclusive growth. The international community also has a role to play.

Tel: +234 806 291 7100 taiadedoyin52@gmail.com

Kenya

Naima Farah

Room 22, 2nd Floor West Wing

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March-April 2023

LEADER COMMENT COVER STORY

Why Africa must come first and foremost Sham elections as terminal throes for a disastrous dispensation

Peace and security: what will the AU prioritise in 2023?

In hindsight, 2022 was a challenging year for stability in Africa, and against this backdrop, the AU played a constructive role, achieving some notable gains, although tangible outcomes remain marginal or susceptible to breakdown, writes Hubert Kinko

Wagner Group poses fundamental challenges for protection of civilians by UN peacekeeping operations

The recent resurgence of activity by private military and security companies in conflict areas comes at a time of unprecedented contestation within the multilateral peace and security architecture in the post-Cold War period, writes Dirk

Druet

ANALYSIS

The reality of independence 60 years on

It is an indisputable fact today that the great majority of Africans have not enjoyed the benefits – the rights, liberties, prosperity and good life – in whose name their freedom from colonial rule was sought, writes

Baba Galleh Jallow

BUSINESS & ECONOMY

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Leveraging international finance centres (IFCs) to support investment flows in Africa

AFRICA ABROAD REVIEW

US-Africa building solidarity one brick at a time

6 08 10 16 20 50 52

Since the beginning of March, an initiative to “reclaim and rebuild a grassroots solidarity movement” connecting Africa and the US, has been progressing around America. Nunu Kidane reports

Sixty-five years on - the Bank of Ghana in a nation’s history

Agnes Gitau examines the crucial role international financial centres can play in attracting much needed capital to the region

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Why Africa must come first and foremost

IN this edition, we publish an abridged version of the Adebayo Adedeji Memorial Lecture delivered in Addis Ababa in March by Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the African Union High Representative on Silencing the Guns. He made one salient point that every African leader should heed: “While acting together, we should not shy away from making friends or allies outside the continent. But we should always act in our own interest as Africans first and foremost. That is our social contract with our people.”

Chambas knows what he is talking about. He is a seasoned Ghanaian politician and diplomat, having served as President of the Economic Community of West African States Commission, and as the Under-Secretary General and Head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel, among other important global roles.

We make this point because the African continent is caught in the middle of a yet another reordering of global politics that is not of its own making. Since the start of the Ukraine-Russia war in February last year, which has completely rearranged international relations, the big powers from the East and West have been intensifying their efforts to win the continent round

Last December, the American President, Joe Biden, convened a USAfrica Leaders Summit – the second since Barack Obama organised the first one in 2014. Donald Trump, on the other hand shifted America’s focus away Africa.

But then, we wonder, what new thing would African leaders have learnt from Trump who was behaving like some of the despotic presidents in Africa? Unleashing his militia against the seat of power in Washington because he was not too happy with the result of a democratic election seems like what we have seen in some African countries.

Now, with Biden at the White House, and with the Chinese and Russians, among others, making huge inroads into Africa, the US has upped the ante. In the last few months Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, US ambassador to the UN Linda ThomasGreenfield and the Vice President herself, Kamala Harris, have all made their way to

the African continent offering a stronger economic partnership that many view as a challenge to the Chinese presence in Africa.

What does this really portend? It clearly means that Africa is important to the rest of the world, which it has always been. But Africans appear not to have been wise to this, and have allowed outsiders to claim a huge chunk of this rich and massive cake at the expense of Africans themselves.

What is happening is that Africans have lost the mind games that are being played internationally. The subliminal messages being sent out by outsiders is that the continent cannot stand on its own two feet, and that it is only through external assistance that progress will be made.

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This is why the dependency syndrome is so acute in Africa, with an immensely wealthy continent, in terms of natural resources, regularly going cap in hand begging for funds. It has reached a stage where diplomats representing donor nations brazenly interfere in the politics of African countries.

The politicians mainly keep quiet, but when some complain, these diplomatic representatives refer to the largesse their countries have been handing out to help African states. Other secondary nations such as India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, who not too long ago were themselves struggling economically, are also throwing their weight about in Africa.

The mindset has to change. This is what Chambas is talking about. Yes, there is no harm in African countries making

friends with outsiders; but they must make sure that they get what they want. After all, these foreign friends need Africa for their own survival in this new world order.

There is already a playbook that African leaders can copy from: divide and rule that the colonialists used with such devastating effect to take control of Africa. Yes, use the Chinese against the Americans; use the Russians against the Americans, but make sure that Africa gets the best deal.

In the process, these leaders must now put aside their own policies of divide and rule: playing the tribal card that is the cause of most of the political chaos in Africa. This calls for leaders who are committed to their countries and the continent as a whole. Commitment means,

as Chambas says, putting Africa first and foremost.

They should also learn from the playbook of Sun Tzu, the legendary Chinese general who wrote The Art of War centuries ago. Clearly, this is what the Chinese used when they arrived in Africa in a big way.

This is one pertinent quote that Africans need to take note of from The Art of War: “In the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity.” Disorder in Africa is opening the door for outsiders who see a very good opportunity to make good for themselves.

Another relevant quote from Sun Tzu notes: “If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

It is as clear-cut as that for Africa.

COMMENT

Diaspora remittances and industrial development in Africa

LAST year, Africans in the diaspora sent almost $100 billion home to friends and relatives. These remittances went on education, health and social security –areas that African governments have a rather ambivalent attitude towards.

For others, the money they received went on ostentatious living. There is no harm in such spending as long as it is done within limits.

Most of remittances spending – apart from on education, health and social welfare – goes on consumer goods, which are a not even manufactured in Africa. They come mainly from China and, to a certain extent, the Gulf States, especially Dubai where the products are imported.

There should now be a rethink of how remittances are spent in Africa. This was raised recently at an African Development Bank forum at which AfDB President Akinwumi Adesina said that “the development of Africa must be a priority for all Africans in the diaspora”.

to “create the conditions for those living and working overseas to contribute meaningfully to national development or, even better, not to leave in the first place”.

Adesina hit the nail on the head when he called on governments to create a more conducive climate for their citizens to prosper at home. The majority of those who have left Africa in the last 20 to 30 years have done so because of political or economic pressure.

So, the idea of giving Africans in the diaspora the vote appears to be a nonstarter. This is because governments know that most of their citizens abroad would invariably vote them out of power. There would be no vote-rigging to sway the outcome.

Nevertheless, the pressure most be maintained on these self-seeking politicians. They must not be allowed to have their cake and eat it, too.

In the meantime, Africans in the diaspora should focus on investing heavily in their countries, where there is an acute

How does AfCFTA deal with traders who grease the palms of customs officers at land borders?

“The African diaspora has become the largest financier of Africa. And it is not debt; it is 100 per cent gifts or grants, a new form of concessional financing that is the key for livelihood security for millions of Africans,” he noted.

This all well and good. But what clout do members of the African diaspora have in bringing political change to their home countries? Even though they are bankrolling the various governments – that is, doing the job they should be doing to aid their citizens – those abroad are denied the vote.

This was not lost on Adesina who called on African governments to give members of their diaspora the right to vote in elections. He urged these governments

Desmond Davies

Trade Area (AfCFTA). African countries therefore need to increase their production. Current figures indicate that intra-Africa trade is just 15 per cent of the continent’s total trade, while for Asia, it is 80 per cent. Slow growth of Africa’s economy – at an average of 4.6 per cent as opposed to 7.4 per cent in Asia – is another hindrance to a successful AfCFTA.

As it plods ahead, the need for investment from the African diaspora is crucial, if the continent wants to make free trade a roaring success. It is clear that if Africa cannot produce things that it needs, foreign goods will keep flooding the market.

That is why the AfCFTA Rules of Origin are there to “ensure that goods entering a particular country from another member state within the AfCFTA have actually been made or produced with sufficient local content to qualify for preferential tariff treatment”.

If these checks are not in place. it would be difficult for state parties to protect their local production and competitive domestic industries against competition from non-member countries, AfCFTA noted. But how does this deal with traders who grease the palms of customs officers at land borders?

need for funds for infrastructural and industrial development. Figures show that the continent has massive infrastructure development shortfalls: it needs annual financing of between $130 billion and $170 billion, but there is a gap of between $68 billion and $108 billion every year.

Adesina wants African governments to maximise remittances: “Because the flow of remittances to Africa is high, rising, and stable, it offers huge opportunities to serve as collateral to secure financing for African economies. African countries should securitise remittances to promote investments, especially for infrastructure on the continent.”

Industrial development is germane to the success of the African Continental Free

It will be all down to governments creating the enabling environment that will encourage Africans in the diaspora to invest in their countries. They would need to ensure that locally produced goods are cheaper than imports from, say, China, that has been receiving the brunt of criticism from African traders.

We saw this recently in Nairobi where local traders protested against a Chinese shop selling the same China-made products at half the price being asked by Kenyan stores. The Chinese know how to source their products better then Kenyans – and they use economies of scale to get very good deals.

So, African governments need to make their countries competitive by enacting watertight business laws that will protect investors – both African and foreign.

COMMENT

Sham elections as terminal throes for a disastrous dispensation

PEOPLE knew that, as was invariably the case with every Nigerian election, multiple ligations would follow the February 25 and March 11, 2023 presidential and general elections. Still, it came as a rude shock that virtually every contested seat – whether presidential, gubernatorial or assembly – has generated a welter of suits before the Election Tribunals. Of the presidential ballot, two of the three leading contestants have filed suits claiming that Professor Mahmood Yakubu, the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), committed a constitutional blunder by declaring Alhaji Bola Ahmed Tinubu of the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC), the president-elect.

In another remarkable suit, Professor Haruna Yakubu and five other aggrieved Nigerians have sued the INEC chairman, all national commissioners of the Commission and a staggering 177,606 polling officers plus the Inspector General of the Police (IGP) over the conduct of the general election. Specifically, those sued are to answer charges that they deliberately refused to follow the electoral laws of the country and INEC’s set guidelines in the conduct of the general elections.

To underscore the mess that is the recent elections, the scandal that played out in Nkanu East constituency of the Enugu State gubernatorial ballot needs to be cited. The number of registered voters here was 36,976. The number of those that collected their permanent voter’s cards (PVC) after registration was 27,594. But on March 18, 2023, the gubernatorial Election Day, the number of accredited voters was a mere 7,453. Without accreditation, nobody can vote

Chuks Iloegbunam

because accreditation is the lot only of the would-be voter that physically showed up at a voting centre. It was at this juncture that the INEC magic started.

Upon the collation of the votes cast in all Enugu State constituencies save Nkanu East, the results stood thus: Chijioke Edeoga (Labour Party): 155,697 votes.

the votes of the other “also rans” were added, the tally came to 19,237 votes.

Assuming that all the 7453 registered voters had cast their votes for Mr. Mbah, Mr. Edeoga would still have defeated him by 4,306 votes. Yet, INEC rode on the corrupting wheels of vote padding to declare Mr, Mbah the governor-elect!

Nigerians saw this unmitigated infamy, as did international observers and media organisations

Peter Mbah (Peoples Democratic Party): 143,938 votes. This meant that the Labour candidate had scored the highest number of votes of all the contestants, leading his PDP counterpart with 11,759 votes. Nkanu East is the home of Mr. Mbah. Strangely, INEC announced that Mbah had won Nkanu East by 30,560 votes to Mr. Edeoga’s 1,855 votes. When it got pointed out to INEC that their figures showed over-voting by a staggering 24,962 ballots, it announced the suspension of votes collation – to review things. After its review, INEC posted new figures thus: Mbah: 16,956 votes. Edeoga: 1,855 votes. This meant that in this constituency of 7,453 accredited voters, just two of the candidates garnered 18,811 votes. When

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This sort of aggravating criminality was replicated across the length and breadth of Nigeria.

But one Electoral Commissioner refused to join the rigging train. Professor Nnenna Oti, (64), the Vice Chancellor of the Federal University of Technology, Owerri, acquitted herself creditably as the returning officer in Abia State. She is currently the toast of Nigeria’s honest flank. She was welcomed back to her university campus by enthusiastic thousands, with brass band, gospel music, dancing. She took the microphone:

“I had never in my life participated in any election as an election officer. But duty came calling. I made my enquiries from Abuja and I said, ‘If I perish, I perish.’

They came with their threats. They came with their money. They came with their intimidation. I didn’t start today. [But I am unshakeable, she said in Igbo.] I stand here before God…Jesus Christ! I have never defrauded anyone. I stand here. I declared a riot act as follows: Under me, votes must count. Under me, the people’s mandate will be upheld. Because Professor Nnenna Oti, a mother of three children, the wife of Nnanna Oti, the daughter of Ibegbo, the daughter of Afikpo, the daughter of Ebonyi State, the daughter of Ndigbo, the daughter of Nigeria can never do evil.”

In contradistinction, civil society organisations have drawn up a list of 50 professors and Vice Chancellors who were also electoral commissioners but whose feeblest weakness turned out to be putting up resistance to the temptations of political buccaneers and entrepreneurs. Lawyers are being briefed to drag the entire shameless lot to tribunals to answer to charges of electoral malpractices.

Talking about the courts, the trendiest Nigerian imperative in the face of the sham elections is “Go to court!” Whoever felt their electoral mandate had been stolen was told to seek judicial redress. But it is not as straightforward as it seems. Any rogue unlawfully declared winner of a governorship poll would sit inside Government House and deploy government finances to buy up corrupt judges and favourable judgments. That explains the scant regard Nigerians now have for the judiciary. Countless dubious and baffling verdicts on election and election related matters have tumbled out of the courts. The Supreme Court, the highest seat of judicial arbitration and adjudication, is the most offending culprit in the desecration of justice. In 2020, it “elected” Hope Uzodimma as the Governor of Imo State by trashing an authentic INEC election result in which Uzodimma had come a distant fourth. The seven Supreme Court justices that delivered this horrendous amputation of common sense, natural justice and constitutional provisions were not embarrassed that, in cooking up figures to deliver Uzodimma in the Imo State Government House, the posted votes many times more than the number of registered voters!

That is not all. Alhaji Ahmad Lawan (Yobe North Senatorial District) is the President of the Nigerian Senate. He did not participate in the APC senatorial primary ballot for his constituency. He had his eye on the main deal – his party’s presidential ticket, which he lost woefully. He travelled post-haste to Yobe and demanded that Mr, Bashir Machina, who had won the senatorial primary, should surrender the ticket to him. Manchina refused. The Appeal Court sided with him. Senator Lawan fled to the Supreme Court, which instantly pronounced him the winner of the Yobe North APC senatorial primary in which he had not participated. He since “won” the senatorial election and would return to the National Assembly, presiding over the deliberations of the Upper Chamber. What society operates this terribly?

While the people wait to see whether the courts will redeem their battered and shattered image this time around, a more worrying issue is the perversity of the general elections. INEC introduced electronic voting which was sanctioned by the National Assembly and accented to Law by President Buhari. Electronic voting meant the usage of both the BVAS or Bimodal Voting Accreditation System, and the IReV or INEC Result Viewing Portal. The use of these machines was to ensure transparency. Once a voter’s

intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes and the posting of fictitious election results across the country.

Nigerians saw this unmitigated infamy, as did international observers and media organisations.

The worldwide negative reports on the general elections mean one thing: the N305 billion deployed into the sham was money tossed down the drain. Tinubu was not supposed to have been declared winner because the Nigerian Constitution states unambiguously that a presidential election winner must earn 25 percent of the votes cast in 24 of the 36 States and Abuja. Tinubu scored a miserable 19.76 percent of the votes cast in the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. What will the courts say? The answer blows in the wind.

Meanwhile, demonstrations against Tinubu’s declaration as president-elect continue daily in Abuja and sporadically in other parts of the country. The national media is awash with misgivings. Still, the country continues its heedless march under Muhammadu Buhari. A national census is planned for May, which the government says will consume a colossal N869 billion, which is more than double what the sham elections gobbled. How could this be excusable for a country groaning under a crippling debt overhang of N44.06 trillion?

details were captured, they got entitled to vote; once they voted, their vote registered on IReV, making manipulation of votes near impossible. But, on the presidential Election Day, both the BVAS and the IReV went inexplicably out of commission. Without warning, voting and collation of results returned to the primitivity of manual enumeration! This paved the way for vote buying, results fabrication, voter

How could this be tolerated where there are no visible signs of readiness for the headcount? How could a divisive issue like national census take centre stage in the same month that the inception of a brand new administration is to take place? The rational are calling for the postponement of the exercise that would otherwise be an expensive farce. Who is going to pay attention?

One Electoral Commissioner, Professor Nnenna Oti, refused to join the rigging train

Peace and security: what will the AU prioritise in 2023?

Kinkoh

WHERE progress was made last year in dealing with conflicts and security threats in Africa, the risks of backsliding have spilt into 2023, leaving the outlook precarious. As such, this year promises to be another challenging one for policymaking on peace and security in Africa.

The outlook was defined by some worrying dynamics. The scourge of armed conflict and generalised violence manifested in Ethiopia, South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), and in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

(DRC) following the resurgence of the March 23 Movement (M23).

The threat of violent extremism and activities of terrorist groups intensified in the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, Somalia and the northern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado.

Meanwhile, unconstitutional changes of governments (UCGs) persisted across the continent, with five coups staged, two of which succeeded in Burkina Faso while three failed in Guinea Bissau, The Gambia and Sao Tome and Principe.

This signalled a continuation of the

trend in 2021 where coup attempts in Chad, Mali, Guinea, Sudan and Niger slowed democratic gains on the continent. This outlook further rendered political transitions complex and protracted.

In Sudan, South Sudan, CAR, Chad and Libya, the timelines for implementation of peace agreements in this regard have been delayed. Further tainting this outlook are ramifications of the converging fiscal fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russo-Ukrainian war, prolonged drought in the Horn of Africa and climate change-related shocks.

In hindsight, 2022 was a challenging year for stability in Africa, and against this backdrop, the AU played a constructive role, achieving some notable gains, although tangible outcomes remain marginal or susceptible to breakdown, writes Hubert

A session of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council

Within this context, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) stepped up conflict management

partnership for realising peaceful elections on the continent.

The continental body is also directly

and democratic consolidation efforts with relative success especially in terms of AUled diplomacy, AU-backed Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and the development of normative frameworks relating to governance like the Accra and Malabo Declarations.

From the AU’s engagements in Ethiopia and Sudan, noticeable progress was registered in the signing of peace agreements to end years of internal conflict. Its constructive role in elections observation was evident following relatively successful elections and peaceful transfers of power in Kenya, and elsewhere, highlighting the utility of AUREC (Regional Economic Commission)

engaged in finding solutions to various country- and region-specific conflicts via different mechanisms, missions and representatives. Several country- and region-specific conflicts that were a priority for the AU over the last few years still show signs of needing greater attention in 2023.

The PSC met 32 times last year to discuss various conflicts and countries in transition, with nearly half (47 per cent) of the Council’s deliberations (15 out of 32) focusing on the situation in the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea and Mali).

Discussions with PSC members indicate that its agenda will continue to be

Ethiopia-Tigray peace treaty - from the AU’s engagements in Ethiopia and Sudan, noticeable progress was registered in the signing of peace agreements to end years of internal conflict

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dominated by the situations in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region, Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Ethiopia, CAR and the Sahel. We expect these conflicts to become a central theme in the AUC Chairperson’s communiqués.

The alarming uptick of violence in eastern DRC and the resurgence of the

M23, whose attacks have sharply widened the rift between the DRC and Rwanda, will certainly keep the DRC high on the PSC agenda. The precipitous escalation of tensions between the two neighbours, risks reigniting what could become the sole interstate conflict on the continent, heightening instability in the Great Lakes region in its wake.

Meanwhile, the deteriorating situation in the east could also be used as a pretext to postpone planned presidential and national assembly elections slated for the end of December.

Myriad crises in the Sahel and elsewhere will also occupy central place on the Council’s agenda. Failed and successful

The alarming uptick of violence in eastern DRC and the resurgence of the M23, whose attacks have sharply widened the rift between the DRC and Rwanda, will certainly keep the DRC high on the PSC agenda

military takeovers in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Chad and Sudan have all connived to drive instability and complicate political transitions on the continent.

Slow implementation of peace agreements in South Sudan, CAR and Libya and the delay in meeting the timetable for complex political transitions in Sudan and Chad continue to increase chances of military actors’ disengagement

from processes underway, thus heightening the risk of military takeovers and protracted civil unrest.

The AU will also continue to contend with the threat of violent extremism and terrorism in various regions of the continent. In the Sahel, jihadists have expanded their activities to the region’s coastal states including Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, and Togo.

Al-Shabaab remains a potent military

force across significant parts of Somalia despite the progress registered under President Hassan Sheik Mohamud. Repeated attacks by Boko Haram splinter groups will continue to wreak havoc in the Lake Chad Basin.

The surge in armed attacks on military posts, civilian population and basic infrastructure by an Islamist insurgency in Mozambique’s northern province of Cabo Delgado continues to undermine the smooth operationalisation of the transition process underway in the country.

High on its agenda will also be the AU’s management of ongoing peace processes in South Sudan, Libya, CAR, and Ethiopia. Ongoing conflict and sporadic violence in South Sudan, exacerbated by tensions and military confrontations between armed and opposition groups, continues to undermine stability, and has led to the extension of the timeline for implementing the fragile peace deal signed in 2018.

In Libya, the political and security situation had deteriorated since the indefinite postponement of elections in December 2021, deepening the political stalemate and division in the country. It still lacks unified national institutions, a widely accepted constitution, and an electoral framework.

Despite the implications of this situation for North Africa, Southern Africa and the Mediterranean the AU has not prioritised it. Last year, Libya only made it to the PSC agenda once, in June.

The political climate in CAR largely remains tense and charged with contestations between the government, opposition political parties and armed groups intensifying. Despite the convening of a dialogue process and the launch of other peace and reconciliation efforts by President Faustin-Archange Touadéra in March 2022, violence is likely to increase after the Constitutional Court cleared the way for a constitutional referendum that could see Touadéra potentially run for third term.

In Ethiopia, political stability remains fragile despite the AU-led mediation that culminated in the November agreement ending the two-year-long war in the northern Tigray region, although some progress is observable.

The AU will also aim to scale up efforts to promote electoral democracy

in Africa with at least 15 countries set to hold presidential, parliamentary and local elections in 2023. The fragile political context in which elections in Guinea Bissau and DRC will be held, and the lack of trust in electoral management bodies (EMBs) in countries such as Zimbabwe could create flashpoints for electoral dispute and violence taking various forms, including political protests, mass demonstrations, strikes and riots which are usually met with heavy-handed responses by security forces.

Despite this worrying outlook, the PSC has the capacity to address these issues. In the DRC, various international, continental and regional mediation initiatives have adopted resolutions and roadmaps although they are facing implementation challenges.

In addition to these efforts, the East African Community (EAC) heads of state summit held on February 4 stressed the

need for parties to de-escalate tensions and use established mechanisms to resolve disputes in the implementation of peace in eastern DRC. The leaders also called on all parties to cease hostilities; for all foreign armed groups to withdraw; and the development of appropriate deployment matrix by chiefs of defence forces in DRC, to be accompanied by dialogue.

The AU also has a role to play in terms of supporting dialogue and regional peacebuilding initiatives by fostering inter-regional cooperation between EAC, ICGLR and SADC in the spirit of complementarity of efforts. As a guarantor of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) agreement for the DRC and the region, signed in Addis Ababa in February 2013 (alongside ICGLR, SADC and UN), the AU should urge the actors to sustain the momentum for peace and stability in order to stop

the risk of prolonged interstate conflict between Rwanda and DRC. It should also facilitate constructive dialogue between Kinshasa and Kigali under the framework of the Luanda Roadmap.

The AU will need to demonstrate its unwavering commitment to addressing drivers of UCGs and guiding the return to constitutional order in countries facing protracted and complex political transitions. The AU’s decision not to sanction Chad following the UCG in 2021 set a dangerous precedent that has seen countries currently sanctioned clamouring for a repeal of the suspension from the AU.

But there does not seem to be evidence that sanctions are producing their desired effect, so there is no guarantee this approach will work. As such, the AU will need to resist the temptation of readmitting suspended countries into the AU before the security and political challenges leading to

Repeated attacks by Boko Haram splinter groups will continue to wreak havoc in the Lake Chad Basin

their suspension have been addressed.

Within this context, expediting the activation of the sanctions sub-committee to standardise the engagement with sanctioned countries and developing a monitoring and evaluation framework to guide the repeal of sanctions and readmission into the AU will be critical. The AU should step up implementation of the outcomes of the Accra and Malabo declarations by pressing all actors to abide by their commitments, while also deploying preventive diplomacy efforts through the Panel of the Wise.

Providing political, technical, and financial support to all the countries in political transition (including Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan) to prepare for and hold inclusive, transparent and credible elections at the end of their

respective transitions will be equally important. The support should also extend to speedily addressing issues relating to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR), and institutional reform and inclusive dialogue to ensure peace and stability and the legitimacy of civilian governments formed post-transition.

Despite AU-led and AU-backed PSOs in the countries and regions affected by violent extremism, attacks by terrorists continue to drive displacements, and human rights violations by armed groups and military personnel. Beating back violent extremists in all regions of the continent will constitute another priority for the AU in 2023 as will ensuring PSOs are carried out within a framework of respect for human rights.

But limited financing for peace support operations will challenge the extent to which AU efforts will be successful. Mobilising sustained financing for PSOs, therefore, will have to be a key priority for the AU within a context of shrinking EU support for PSOs in Africa. Expediting the operationalisation of PSC mechanisms to combat terrorism will be critical in this regard.

The AU’s response to the Ethiopian conflict, although belated, showed that with political will, it can fulfil its conflict management role effectively. The AU will have to do more to support Ethiopia-led parallel initiatives of national dialogue, transitional justice and DDR to de-risk possibilities of renewed conflict and increase prospects of building sustainable peace.

While the AU brokered a peace deal between the CAR government and 14 armed groups in 2019, it faces considerable implementation challenges. The AU should consider exploring options for inclusive dialogue to resolve some of the country’s political differences and advance national reconciliation for peace and economic recovery for CAR. It should talk with armed groups to determine the conditions that could persuade them to lay down their arms.

The primary concern of the Libyan people at the moment is security. This

would guarantee the creation of a conducive environment for the organisation of free, fair and credible elections. Given the importance of, and complexity surrounding, the conduct of elections in Libya, the AU may also prioritise engaging the parties to reach consensus on a constitutional framework and timeline for credible elections, ceasefire monitoring, and assisting the Libyan 5+5 Joint Military Commission in overseeing the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Disputed elections will heighten questions around the utility of AU elections observer missions. The AU should prioritise implementing previous recommendations from its own observer missions and step up preventive diplomacy and early warning engagements by supporting the work of the members of the Panel of the Wise.

While the AU can effectively address these peace and security challenges, its efforts are likely to be frustrated by dynamics within the PSC. In recent years, member states obstructed attempts to raise issues affecting them at PSC sessions, making it hard to find common ground on critical matters.

As such, conflict/crisis situations in Tunisia, Mozambique and Cameroon, among others, did not feature on the Council’s agenda despite indications of political crises and armed conflict escalating. These countries are again conspicuously absent from the PSC’s annual indicative programme of activities for 2023, sparking questions about the AU’s institutional reform and its institutional capacity for peacebuilding.

Sovereignty was also often invoked to repel PSC efforts to intervene in conflicts, and this principle of non-interference saw the AU’s peacebuilding mandate being handed to regional economic communities like ECOWAS, SADC and the EAC. This dynamic complicated the Council’s decision-making on conflicts, and is likely to complicate prospects for the resolution of peace and security challenges in 2023.

How the AU manages these will be important in determining the extent to which it can deliver on its mandate to bring peace and stability to the continent.

Hubert Kinkoh is Researcher, African Peace and Governance Programme at the Institute for Security Studies based in Addis Ababa.

Wagner Group poses fundamental challenges for protection of civilians by UN peacekeeping operations

AS new forms of geopolitical competition crop up around the world, a recent trend in the use of state-affiliated private military and security companies (PMSCs) has seen these actors deployed into a growing number of civil conflicts. While by no means the only PMSC active in conflict zones today, the Russian governmentaffiliated Wagner Group has gained widespread public attention for its brutal tactics in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, among other locales.

Less well understood are the implications that Wagner’s presence on

the battlefield has for UN peace operations and their protection of civilians (PoC) mandates. As the use of private forces in civil conflict expands to include other state sponsors such as China and the Gulf states, it is ever more important for the international community to understand the consequences of modern mercenaries for peace operations environments and the effectiveness of these missions in protecting civilians from harm.

For political leaders struggling to consolidate power in states with weak security institutions and active insurgencies, the definitive military

effects dubiously promised by the Wagner Group offer an appealing alternative to traditional international peace and security interventions. In CAR, President Faustin-Archange Touadéra signed a defence cooperation agreement with the government of Russia in late 2017 in an effort to expand his government’s influence beyond the limits of the capital, Bangui.

In Mali, Wagner forces began deploying in December 2021 following a strategic turn away from France accelerated by interim President Assimi Goïta, who took power in a coup earlier that year.

Private military and security companies are hardly a new phenomenon in Africa, nor are they a new factor in the strategic considerations for peace operations. In the 1990s, the UN deployed peacekeeping missions in Angola and Sierra Leone in the aftermath of decisive but short-lived battlefield victories against insurgent groups delivered by the South African and British firms, Executive Outcomes and Sandline International.

In the 2000s, the UN became embroiled in the fallout from a scandal in the Balkans involving allegations of human trafficking by DynCorp contractors. And since the US invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, UN special political missions have struggled to investigate and promote accountability for human rights abuses carried out by Western security contractors such as Blackwater and G4S Global.

However, the recent resurgence of PMSC activity in the operating environments of UN peace operations comes at a time of unprecedented

The recent resurgence of activity by private military and security companies in conflict areas comes at a time of unprecedented contestation within the multilateral peace and security architecture in the post-Cold War period, writes Dirk Druet

Wagner Group has gained widespread public attention for its brutal tactics in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, among other locales

contestation within the multilateral peace and security architecture in the post-Cold War period. In this context, the Russian government’s use of the Wagner Group in CAR and Mali appears to be intended to undermine the ongoing UN presence in those countries, including through the use of disinformation and influence campaigns seeking to erode popular support for the UN.

This strategy has dovetailed with frustration within many peacekeeping host states over the perceived reticence of peacekeepers to aggressively pursue insurgent groups. Indeed, Malian President Abdoulaye Maiga justified the more aggressive operations enabled by military cooperation with Russia by citing the failure of the UN operation there, MINUSMA, to impose a military solution to the conflict.

The implications of these developments are nowhere clearer than for the protection of civilians and the promotion of human rights, where the PMSC’s counterinsurgency objectives stand in sharp contrast to the missions’ mandate to balance the restoration and extension of state authority with concerns for the safety and rights of the population.

The Wagner Group’s activities in Mali and CAR pose serious and novel challenges for the missions’ PoC mandates in at least

seeming to indiscriminately associate them with the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) militia and other armed groups

three distinct ways.

First and foremost, the Wagner Group poses a serious threat to the protection of civilians. Since its deployment in CAR and Mali, the group is alleged to have carried out numerous atrocities, including the massacre of approximately 300 civilians in the Malian town of Moura in March 2022. The UN has also reported serious daily violations at a lower level of intensity, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention and rendition, and the occupation of protected spaces such as schools and hospitals.

In CAR, the UN Panel of Experts has suggested that Wagner forces target Muslim Fulani communities in particular,

active in the country.

If the Wagner Group constitutes a threat for the protection of civilians, it follows that peacekeeping missions with PoC mandates such as MINUSMA and the UN operation in CAR, MINUSCA, should be using all necessary means to protect civilians from this threat, up to and including the use of force. To achieve this, MINUSCA’s mandate, for example, calls for the mission to “maintain a proactive deployment and a mobile, flexible and robust posture, including by conducting active patrolling, in particular in high-risk areas”.

In practice, the security and diplomatic risks associated with the use

Malian President Abdoulaye Maiga justified the more aggressive operations enabled by military cooperation with Russia by citing the failure of the UN operation in his country

It is important for the international community to understand the consequences of modern mercenaries for peace operations environments

of force or other physical PoC actions against the Wagner Group – as well as their association with national armed forces – seem to mean these options are off the table, allowing the forces to largely dictate the mission’s freedom of movement. Between February and June 2022, for example, MINUSCA recorded 23 violations of its status of forces agreement by the national forces and “other security personnel,” though the situation has since reportedly improved somewhat.

While PoC activities extend well beyond the physical realm to include public advocacy, quiet diplomacy, and local capacity building, the military capacities and political status of the Wagner Group appear to constitute a distinct type of protection threat that presents UN missions with considerable limitations in the execution of their PoC mandates.

Limitations on missions’ freedom of movement have also impaired their capacity to monitor, investigate and report human rights violations, including at the sites of alleged atrocities. Moreover, the

unique operating model of the Wagner Group presents novel challenges for mission efforts to attribute human rights abuses to its forces.

Until recently, both the Kremlin and Russian oligarch and Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin formally denied any association with the group, making it difficult to establish command responsibility and deflecting political accountability. In CAR, Wagner’s very presence has been shrouded in ambiguity, since its personnel and equipment arrived in parallel with the deployment of Russian military trainers provided for by the 2017 security cooperation agreement between Russia and CAR.

In the field, it has rarely been possible to distinguish between “Russian trainers” and Wagner personnel, though the trainers are meant to be unarmed. Amid this confusion, missions and the UN Secretariat have elected to refer to “other security personnel” to describe what is widely understood to include Wagner forces.

This is not to say that the missions in Mali and CAR have been inactive or

ineffective in reporting on human rights abuses. On the contrary, jointly MINUSCA and OHCHR have courageously published accounts of abuses committed by forces believed to be Wagner – either operating independently or jointly with the Central African Armed Forces (FACA).

These activities are not without risk, as was made plain in early February when the Malian government expelled MINUSMA’s long-serving human rights director after he selected a Malian civil society activist to brief the UN Security Council, who in turn echoed the recent call by UN experts working under the special procedures of the UN Human Rights Council for an independent investigation into possible war crimes committed by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) and Wagner Group since 2021.

The operations of the Wagner Group in CAR and Mali have raised serious new risks for the safety and security of peacekeepers. The aggressive posture adopted by these forces, their apparent disregard for the inviolability of UN personnel, and their frequent imposition of

MINUSCA recorded 23 violations of its status of forces agreement by the national forces and “other security personnel”

limitations on freedom of movement place UN peacekeepers and Wagner forces in regular tension with one another.

Wagner’s association with the Russian government appears to render any confrontation a potentially catastrophic outcome for the mission in both security and political terms. And yet, their proximity to one another, the wanton behaviour of Wagner’s forces, and the complexity of the operating environments all make an armed confrontation impossible to exclude from the realm of possibility, if only due to an accident or miscalculation.

Risks of confrontation aside, the proximity in which PMSC and UN forces operate poses significant challenges for operational coordination and deconfliction, especially when the operations have little communication with one another. In Timbuktu, for example, Russian forces have occupied a base vacated by French forces which is directly adjacent to MINUSMA’s regional sector headquarters.

Unannounced and uncoordinated use of airspace raises serious risks of accidents or impediments to the missions’ logistics, medical evacuation, reconnaissance, and close air support. This is particularly true in CAR, where air traffic control outside of Bangui is limited.

Safety and security concerns such as these, in addition to political and financial considerations, have caused some troopcontributing countries to rethink their participation in UN peacekeeping missions

operating alongside Wagner forces. In March 2022, Sweden announced that it would pull its forces out of the mission in Mali a year earlier than planned, following statements that the presence of the Wagner Group in the region was making the presence of Swedish forces untenable.

The UK, Germany and Côte d’Ivoire have since made similar announcements. These withdrawals, which will deprive the mission of key enablers such as special operations forces and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, reduce the mission’s effectiveness and embolden armed groups, further threatening civilians.

The operational realities of, and political contexts surrounding, the presence of the Wagner Group in CAR and Mali offer peace operations and the UN Secretariat precious little room to mitigate the myriad risks these forces pose. With the right configuration, a diplomatic confrontation with Russia over the Wagner Group’s behaviour could have a restraining effect.

Some in the Security Council, especially France, have begun taking an increasingly direct tone in attacking the group’s modus operandi. However, the strength of any international diplomatic pushback related to the risks they pose to peace operations will likely depend heavily on the diversity of the coalition of states involved in such action, with non-Western troop-contributing countries such as Bangladesh, China, and Rwanda holding

important sway.

While these countries’ interests in safety and security issues are clearly being affected, these concerns will inevitably be overshadowed by the international politics surrounding member states’ responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China will no doubt be watching the response to the Wagner Group closely as its security presence in Africa grows, including through the recent sale of military drones to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, reportedly to be operated by European security contractors.

Second, UN peace operations can continue to take important steps to adapt their PoC strategies to maximise their impact wherever possible, particularly at the political level through advocacy with host governments and their security forces that work with and, ostensibly, exert control over the Wagner Group. Missions will need to adapt to manage the constraints and risks the group poses to POC activities, particularly for the safety and security of personnel.

This could include efforts to establish technical deconfliction and information mechanisms to avoid transportation accidents and crossfire incidents, although any such move would need to take into account the risk of lending legitimacy to Wagner forces.

Finally, it is critical that UN peace operations continue to steadily monitor, investigate, and report on the human rights abuses of the Wagner Group as actors in the conflicts, even if these activities are made more difficult by limitations on missions’ freedom of movement. In the short term, these reports help to raise awareness of the impact of Wagner operations on civilians and counter disinformation campaigns that aggrandise the group.

In the longer term, as the evolving politics surrounding the Wagner Group’s activities in Ukraine have shown, the PMSC’s legal and political status may change over time, potentially opening up room for future efforts at accountability. Indeed, politics far away from Bamako and Bangui are likely to be decisive in the future of the Wagner Group’s presence in the countries, their posture toward UN peace operations, and the viability of these missions’ efforts to protect civilians at risk.

Dirk Druet is Adjunct Professor at McGill University and Non-resident Fellow at the International Peace Institute (IPI): https://www.ipinst.org/ This article by the IPI’s Global Observatory is republished under a Creative Commons licence.

Some in the UN Security Council, especially France, have begun taking an increasingly direct tone in attacking Wagner Group’s modus operandi

The reality of independence 60 years on

SOME 60 years after African independence, every year all across the continent, governments preside over glamorous and expensive ceremonies celebrating “victory” over colonial rule. The reality is that with a few exceptions, African countries were handed their “freedom” from colonial rule on a silver platter.

Even more tragically, the great majority of African countries, if not all of them, are free only in name from colonial occupation, exploitation and repression. Governments have to beg and borrow to keep their countries running, while carrying backbreaking loads of debt that they can barely finance, year in, year out.

It is an indisputable fact that the great majority of Africans have not enjoyed the benefits – the rights, freedoms, prosperity and good life – in whose name their independence was sought. In 2023, the culture of colonial autocracy and financial exploitation of the poor continues to manifest itself in the parochial mentalities of many African leaders.

Like the old colonialists, most African leaders today are more preoccupied with their own political survival and economic wellbeing than with the welfare of their people. Thus, the majority of Africans are living under the most unimaginable poverty and difficulties, rendered more insidious by the relentless cancer of corruption and greed in government circles in cahoots with unscrupulous private sector actors.

In the face of these baffling contradictions, it helps to revisit the story of African independence and its aftermath. By the end of the 1940s, no one needed much convincing of the need for decolonisation. The US was insisting on an end to imperialism as a precondition for aid to war-ravaged Europe; and the European colonial powers were themselves finding

the burden of colonial rule too heavy to carry.

The political glamour and material benefits of colonialism had significantly declined, and Europe saw that maintaining colonial territories had outlived its usefulness. Europe also knew that through their colonial policies and future plans, they were assured that Africans could only be independent politically, not economically.

The emergent world economic system had firmly relegated Africa to the status of dependency, a status African governments have proven incapable of outgrowing. This is not because Africa lacks the capacity or

resources, but because the politics of greed, selfishness, corruption, marginalisation and exclusion became the order of the day immediately after independence.

American insistence on decolonisation and European disenchantment with colonial rule aside, there emerged during and immediately after the Second World War an array of newly minted international rights instruments from which African nationalists freely drew to justify their demands for independence. They cited the universal rights and freedoms in the Atlantic Charter, they reaffirmed their subscription to the egalitarian creeds of the European

It is an indisputable fact today that the great majority of Africans have not enjoyed the benefits – the rights, liberties, prosperity and good life – in whose name their freedom from colonial rule was sought, writes Baba Galleh Jallow

Gambia’s founding father, Sir Dawda Jawara

enlightenment and the Commonwealth, and brandished these in the face of the colonial powers as evidence that Africans had a right to govern themselves.

The Atlantic Charter’s affirmation that all peoples have a right to selfdetermination was particularly potent in the hands of the eager African nationalists. In addition to the Atlantic Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was a favourite hobby horse for African nationalists and they rode it to good effect. In the end, self-rule was granted to African countries either as a result of agitation and peaceful diplomacy or because of armed conflict, as happened in some settler and all Portuguese colonies on the continent.

Thus, the late 1950s and early 1960s gave birth to the glittering spectacles today called independence celebrations across the continent. Especially in former British colonies such as The Gambia, the independence era nationalist leaders helped organise the first such glittering spectacles and kept them going for as long as they stayed in power. Successive African leaders have uncritically mimicked their political ancestors.

For Gambia’s independence on February 18, 1965, the Queen dispatched the Duke and Duchess of Kent as her official representatives. The speeches made by both colonial and local officials during the handover of power were revealing.

It was not only chiefs and colonial officials who made strange statements during such ceremonies around Africa. Taking a cue from their leadership, ruling party stalwarts and newspapers loudly exhorted their countrymen to put all their political differences aside and join the ruling party.

In Bathurst (now Banjul), The New Gambia, which was backing the Progressive People’s Party (PPP), declared: “All politicians of all tendencies should rally round the government of the masses, the PPP, so that the country’s concerted efforts will bear golden fruits. We must not allow factions to undermine the real issues of the day.”

In effect, immediately after independence, the real issues of the day were parochialized and defined in absolute, narrow terms by the emergent African leadership and its supporters. Paradoxically, the emergent African nation

Jammeh could pound his chest and proclaim to the world that Gambia belonged to him

ANALYSIS

was seen at once as a monolith, a single entity encompassing everyone, as well as a fractured entity composed of the government and its supporters on the one hand, and everyone else on the other. This politics of marginalisation and exclusion continues to wreak havoc on African nations to this day.

Indeed, almost immediately after independence, African nationalist leaders performed an ideological about-face that was profoundly damaging to the new nations’ political, socio-economic and cultural wellbeing: They now considered the universal and inalienable rights and freedoms of expression and association they deployed against colonialism enemies of independence.

Where they rejected the colonial exceptionalism that Africans were incapable of ruling themselves in democratic fashion, they now claimed that yes, they were Africans and Western forms of government were not suitable for their newly independent peoples.

The evidence suggests that Africa’s

new leaders probably never believed in all the noise they made about Africans being equally deserving of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, or indeed the ideals of the European enlightenment, the Atlantic Charter or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights they earlier championed.

As soon as independence was granted, the new African governments sought to impose a uniformity of views and opinions on all matters political. In perhaps its most damaging misconception, independence was taken to mean the incoming government’s right to assume a monopoly on all political truths, knowledge, decisions and policy directions and options for the new nation.

Dissenting knowledge and opinion, however brilliant, was sacrificed on the altar of selfish political expediency. Witness the sad fates of brilliant people like Diallo Telli in Guinea, J. B. Danquah in Ghana, and Sheikh Anta Diop in Senegal. Their ideas represented a rich fund of intellectual wealth that could have wonderfully

energised their nations. But instead of being rewarded and co-opted into the new national project, they were hated and violently struck down for daring to express their legitimate political opinions.

African nationalist leaders knew that the colonial state collapsed precisely because it tolerated the colonised people’s rights and freedoms of expression, association and self-determination. They understood the power of a free mind expressed in political dissent and organisation, and they proceeded to systematically curb it for their own selfish interests.

They saw what freedom of expression and dissent did to the mighty colonial state; and being too concerned about “losing” power, they made sure that political dissent was either effectively discredited or weakened, as happened in The Gambia under Sir Dawda Jawara, or totally criminalised and abolished as happened in Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, Guinea under Sekou Touré, and elsewhere in Africa.

Political dissent was either effectively discredited or weakened, or totally criminalised and abolished as happened in Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah

The idea of power belonging to the people was only useful as a rhetorical device against colonial rule. Like the international rights instruments the nationalists cited in their UN, Commonwealth and other speeches against colonialism, the African people had also served their purpose and could conveniently be relegated to the margins of national politics.

So rather than opening up the political space and encouraging a free marketplace of ideas, the new African leaders squeezed and stifled their nations’ creative potential, and were content to borrow and mimic their former colonial masters, rather than let their people invent and build, like their Western and Asian counterparts. Thus, Africa remains starved of any form of meaningful inventions to this day.

Independence was also understood to mean that the new African governments were entitled to the material support of private commercial entities operating

within their territorial borders. In Enter Gambia, Berkeley Rice reports that three weeks before independence, the incoming PPP government called a special session of parliament to pass new immigration and naturalisation laws and “to provide the administration and other Members of the House a public opportunity to voice their sentiments at this historic moment”.

The first speaker of the evening, a former Minister of Agriculture, “had a word of ‘advice’ for the commercial firms in Bathurst which, he assumed, were planning to make independence gifts to the government. Essentially, the Gambian MP was saying that in an independent Gambia, private companies were expected to give money to the government – not in the form of taxes into state coffers, but in the form of “cash or kind”. The practice continues to this day.

It needs to be said that Jawara’s utterances on Gambian Independence Day in 1965 itself suggested that he understood

better than most the implications of what was happening. “Remember,” he said, “we will be judged not by the measure of our jubilation, but by the energy we bring to solving the problems of independence.”

In his closing speech for the evening, Jawara also expressed his understanding that “independence brought with it new complex problems which henceforth we shall have to resolve on our own” and “in time, Gambia will prove that a small country can stand on its own feet, and play its own part in world affairs providing an example of stability and progress and good sense”.

After receiving the “Constitutional Instruments” from the Duke, which formally granted The Gambia independence, Jawara said, among other things: “We are very conscious that the task which lies before us is formidable and, this being so, we are the more determined to strive relentlessly to overcome the difficulties that make the task formidable.”

Earlier at the special session of parliament, United Party leader Pierre S. Njie had welcomed independence but warned against “exchanging one set of masters for another”. His warning proved prophetic. Jawara, though, was not a tin pot dictator of the sort in Guinea (Sekou Touré, Lansana Conteh) or Mali (Modibo Keita, Musa Traore) or in The Gambia itself (Yahya Jammeh).

However, the master-servant relations between government and governed that characterised colonial Gambia characterised – if only in a benign form – the PPP’s years in power. Yes, The Gambia, “the improbable nation”, became a nation under the PPP government, and a respected one at that.

Sadly, Jawara exaggerated the democratic credentials of his de facto oneparty state, and one-man rule, which lasted 30 years and eventually gave Gambians a president, Jammeh, who could pound his chest and proclaim to the world that the country belonged to him and that he would rule it for one billion years.

Jammeh was in power for 22 years of brutality before his disgraceful fall and exit. He now lives in exile in Equatorial Guinea, a lonely fugitive from international law.

Dissenting knowledge and opinions, of brilliant people like Diallo Telli in Guinea were sacrificed on the altar of selfish political expediency

Baba Galleh Jallow is Inaugural Roger D. Fisher Fellow in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at Harvard University Law School, and former Executive Secretary of the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) in The Gambia.

Poor management still holding up Africa’s progress

Governance is at the foundation of promoting rapid economic growth, reducing poverty and inequality, achieving social cohesion and promoting political and economic stability, and no country can develop in the context of instability and maladministration, says Mohamed Ibn Chambas, who points out that Africa needs to first and foremost fix its governance challenges to promote political and economic stability

THE African Union, through the Constitutive Act, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the African Governance Architecture as well as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), has emphasised the importance of governance. Different indexes and reports have been developed to measure governance performance,

Our experience in Africa has been mixed and often sloppy in the governance landscape. The independence period in the 1960s was a beacon of hope for improved and inclusive governance in Africa. The immediate post-colonial leaders were mostly committed to the transformation of the continent; indeed, the urgency of rapid economic growth and transformation took precedence over anything else.

Increasingly, political inclusion, voice and participation, human rights, and pluralism were gradually eroded and compromised. In the process, multiparty democracy began to be seen as a distraction and opposition parties seen as obstructing the reconstruction of the new nation-states.

With these pressures, governance began to take a turn for the worse as constitutions were changed to entrench regimes. The result, albeit, inadvertently, was the rise of personalised rule and political dictatorships.

Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of the decline of governance in Africa was the advent of the soldiers who initiated a wave of successive coups d’état against the independence era political leaders. They justified their actions by citing economic hardships, corruption, dictatorship, and oppression.

There were 25 coups from 1960 to 1969, in just one decade. This continued throughout the next two decades, as the rule of the military spread across the continent.

Unfortunately, the governance defects that characterised the previous regimes also bedevilled the military regimes that succeeded them. In some cases, they became worse, with corruption, state capture, and patronage, becoming the order of the day while the people had little or no say, as freedom of speech was one of the main casualties.

With worsening governance came deteriorating economic conditions and

more coups and countercoups. The economic situation was characterised by underperforming public services, huge debts, the balance of payments problems and high inflation.

During the 1990s, we began a new trajectory that saw a slow adoption of reforms in our governance architecture. A lot of initiatives were started to rekindle good governance in the African state with emphasis on a return to multi-party elections, constitutional guarantees of human rights, term limits and freedom of the press.

That decade also saw the global campaign for debt forgiveness through

Mohamed Ibn Chambas: Africa needs to first and foremost fix its governance challenges to promote political and economic stability

which the debts of many Third World countries including African countries were forgiven. We all remember the advent of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative of the IMF/World Bank.

Sadly, two decades later, we seem to have gone full circle and are back to the same situation, if not worse. The total African debt that was forgiven under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative was in the region of $300 billion. In 2023, we are once again in debt to the tune of more than $600 billion. And once again, we are asking for debt relief.

Additionally, millions of our people face food insecurity and poverty while our burgeoning youth population is unable to find decent livelihood due to unemployment. It is estimated that 10 to 12 million young people enter the workforce every year, but only three million formal jobs are created.

I was sad to find out in the wake of

the Russia-Ukraine war that we were so dependent on food imports from Russia and Ukraine that the conflict threatened the food security of the whole continent. At the same time, statistics show that Africa is home to 65 per cent of the world’s remaining arable land.

There are many questions that need answers, but one key point is that in the intervening 20 years we have failed to put in place the necessary reforms of the systems and structures, and to correct the behaviour patterns that got us to Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) in the first place. And at the heart of that are poor governance systems that have failed to produce outcomes of improved livelihood for the people.

The inability to deal with the complexities of governance, has been argued to be at the centre of underdevelopment of African states. The socio-economic implications of the lapse in governance in Africa is easily reflected

by the increased insecurity of lives and properties, downward spiral in the quality of lives or standard of living, profligate spending by the elite on white elephant projects, the prevalence of situations threatening the rule of law, and the lack of visionary leadership to inspire hope.

All indications show that the progress that was made over the last decade is now under threat. In just three years between 2019 and 2022, we have seen eight successful unconstitutional changes in government. According to the 2022 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, key aspects of good governance have either stalled or declined over the previous decade.

For example, the report notes that Security and Rule of Law has declined significantly over the last decade with almost 70 per cent of the population living in a country where security and rule of law were worse in 2021 than they were in 2012. The judiciary is instrumentalised

There were 25 coups from 1960 to 1969, in just one decade

against opponents and constitutions are manipulated to prolong the tenure of governments.

Additionally, we all know the challenges of violent conflicts in different parts of the continent. We have not been able to silence the guns as planned and crises remain in many regions across the continent.

Just like security and the rule of law, participation, civic rights and inclusion have declined over the decade from 2012 to 2021 with more than 60 per cent of Africa’s population living in places where these indicators have declined. The importance of participation in all aspects of governance and development cannot be overemphasised.

Shrinking space for participation in political processes including clampdown on freedom of speech and the press, right of assembly and civic engagement are a dent on our sense of tolerance and readiness to share space. Shrinking civic space is a recipe for crisis.

Good governance is an indispensable part of the quest towards sustained economic growth and development. It embodies the effective, ethical and efficient management of public resources and institutions to meet the needs of citizens.

It is characterised by transparency, accountability, participation, rule of law, stability, responsiveness and consensusoriented decision-making.

Good governance ensures that public policies and decisions are taken in the best interests of the community, while respecting human rights, promoting economic prosperity, and preserving the environment. The political and philosophical concept of social contract resonates with the principles of governance and transparency and accountability to “the people”.

The absence of the principles of good governance – transparency and accountability – erodes the social contract and potentially inhibits the government’s ability to embark on sustained economic development. Thus, the need for good governance and a renewed social contract as an enabler for economic development has only become more urgent.

The need to curb illicit financial flows is quite pertinent in contemporary African development. Addressing this, together with corruption, at least to my mind, is an international issue, given the transboundary nature of illicit capital flows and the role of professions that enable corruption and illicit capital flows transcending boundaries and jurisdictions. From the

African context, recognising the need for strong transboundary institutions within the continent and a collective framework for redressing these should be the way forward.

The focus should build on the initial conception of an Africa-centred approach to Africa’s problems. Institutions must build on the notion of Africa’s own concepts, metrics and recognition of the problems within the continent.

Recent events point to the need for Africa’s leadership in developing its own institutions that resonates with Africa’s concepts and matrices. The recent downgrade of most African countries by Moody and a number of rating agencies based in Europe and North America severely impacts Africa’s quest to engage with global institutions and has serious consequences for economic growth and development.

This is a clarion call on Africa to be potent enough to draw the line on engagements. Strong institutions are however developed on the backbone of good governance, an enforceable social contract, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights and peaceful environment, congenial enough for economic growth and development.

Participation, civic rights and inclusion have declined over the decade from 2012 to 2021

New systems must be developed leveraging technology and other means to allow broad participation of the people in governance at all levels. In addition, to national level governance, regional and continental bodies must encourage participation by the people including in processes of policy formulation and accountability. Our governance system must be inclusive, participatory and empowering.

Elections must be transparent, credible and generally acceptable to the citizens as a mechanism for political succession and leadership change. Elections must reflect the wishes of the people. Term limits must be taken seriously and discussed at the national, sub-regional and continental levels.

Africa’s population is predominantly youth and women. Many studies have shown how this could be a boom or a bane. Significant investments must be made to empower the youth and women and give them space in the development process.

In this way we can harness their energies, skills and capabilities for the rapid transformation of Africa. Unfortunately, there is a greater disaster that may yet hit Africa in the future, if the current spate of migration of some of its best hands and brains is allowed to continue.

African youth must be given a rightful place in the leadership of our respective countries. They reflect a large chunk of our demography; they must therefore be

allowed to lead as well.

In the complexities that accompany the rapidly changing world, continuing in our individual current states only puts us at the mercy of powerful forces who stand ready at all times to extract from us for their own benefits. There is an African saying: “If you want to go fast, go alone, but if you want to go far, go together.”

In this case, going alone does not even

example in Africa in which external efforts have successfully aided/nurtured any of the African Union member states into shared prosperity.

We seem to be at the brink of a climate catastrophe. This has necessitated a slow transition to renewable energy. Luckily, Africa has the resources that are needed to facilitate that transition.

We have copper, lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese, graphite, zinc and rare earths. Currently, the DRC alone accounts for over 70 per cent of all global cobalt production.

Meanwhile Zimbabwe and Namibia are estimated to have the largest reserves of lithium globally. These are critical for the production of batteries for electric vehicles.

When it comes to solar energy, Africa has 60 per cent of the world’s best solar resources, according to the International Energy Agency. We can leverage this to produce clean energy for millions of people across Africa and beyond.

One of the pieces of work towards achieving Agenda 2063 is the African Continental Free Trade Area. The AfCFTA is expected to cause an increase in intra-regional trade – from the mere 17 per cent of total trade it now is to a

help us to go fast. We must accelerate the ideals of Pan-Africanism and break the barriers that separate us and make us weak individually. A united Africa is our best chance to weather the storms and create a prosperous Africa for the future.

While acting together, we should not shy away from making friends or allies outside the continent. But we should always act in our own interest as Africans first and foremost. That is our social contract with our people.

On external dynamics, we need to renegotiate some of the decolonisation agreements and some lingering relationships from our past, the adequacy or inadequacy of post-Second World War institutions that were bequeathed to us. While external dynamics theoretically need not be totally negative, there is hardly any

level approaching that of other successful regions: 31 per cent in North America, 59 per cent in Asia or 69 per cent in Europe.

Without a doubt, effective governance and a strong social contract are critical to the successful implementation of the AfCFTA. By creating an enabling business environment, promoting social inclusion, governments can create a conducive environment for trade and promote economic development and social stability in Africa.

However, it is important to state unequivocally that our goals on trading among ourselves will not be realised if we do not have the productive capacity for goods and services that are necessary for the desired exchanges. To scale up trade among ourselves, we must equally step up the production of

goods and services.

Effective governance and a strong social contract are critical to the successful implementation of the AfCFTA

Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas is the AU High Representative on Silencing the Guns. The above is an abridged version of his 2023 Adebayo Adedeji Memorial Lecture delivered at the ministerial meeting of the Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa on March 10, titled: Governance, Social Contract, and Economic Development in Africa: Looking Back, Projecting into the future.

Governance defects that characterised civilian regimes also bedevilled the military regimes that succeeded them

Nigeria: battle for a cohesive national identity

THE February 2023 presidential poll has proven that although trends and history exist to provide insights into the past and how that relates to future occurrences, they do not fully determine how the future is designed. This message was lost on many analysts who posited that the election this time will go in the way of past elections where the country’s two heavyweight parties will punch heavily during the elections while other contestants scramble for the crumbs.

This was the case when Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari received

about 90 per cent of the votes in 2011, leaving the remaining 10 per cent to the other 18 candidates; or as the duo picked up 99 per cent in 2015, leaving the other 12 contestants with one per cent; or even in 2019 when the two leading candidates garnered 96 per cent of the total, with the other contestants, numbering up to 60, contesting for just four per cent.

Therefore, widespread prediction by most Nigerian analysts was that it would be business as usual and either Bola Ahmed Tinubu or Atiku Abubakar would win the election; that while the bulk of

the votes would be between the two, other candidates, including the favourite of young Nigerians, Peter Obi, will scramble for a small percentage of the total votes.

This prediction was often supported with justifications such as the peculiarity of the Nigerian electoral scene. This involves electoral malpractices, vote-buying, voter intimidation by the country’s major parties, and the use of wealth, whether state-funded or personally amassed, that cannot be traced to any clear legal means of acquisition.

During research with my team, we

With the recent elections clearly heightening Nigerians’ sense of awareness, with many of them, more than ever before, beginning to question their Nigerianness, President-Elect Bola Tinubu must consider ways to reconcile the people, says Toyin Falola

Tinubu had the lowest percentage of results by any winner in Nigeria’s Third Republic

found out that presidential elections in Nigeria cost aspirants billions of naira — from the outrageous prices of forms to the several money-gulping “mobilisations” that needed to be undertaken. Nigeria is a corrupt country, and so is its electoral system, where all participants — from the electorate to the electoral officers, including party members and agents — expect to get some financial incentives to perform their duties.

Prior to the gubernatorial elections, a video went viral of women who were complaining bitterly that the All Progressives Congress in Lagos promised them money for having voted for the party during the presidential poll, but that since they had yet to receive payment, they would not support the party for the gubernatorial election. Similarly, there were videos of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) ad-hoc staffers saying they would not commence electoral activities if they were not given some monetary incentives by parties, that is aside from the official wages for their job.

It is easy to blame this phenomenon on the gross absenteeism of elected leaders

from the grassroots and grassroots-related issues, which, in turn, makes all participants in the electoral process consider election year as the time to earn some money before the next four years. However, the fact remains that it will only amount to a dog chasing its tails if Nigerians do not make intentional moves to stop this phenomenon.

Regardless of what justifications the electorate might have for selling their votes,

a hopeless adventure. It is a better approach to refrain massively from vote selling, and to elect leaders based on personal choice, demand accountability from them, and then build a reward system — mostly reelection-based — that ensures that a leader who does not do well during their tenure never gets re-elected at any level.

One of the biggest phenomena during analyses, polls, and predictions leading up

waiting on elected leaders to deliver on good governance before deciding to stop vote-selling is tantamount to embarking on

to Nigeria’s 2023 election was the overromanticisation of concepts and factors. This was done by two categories of people

Those who want INEC to be a perfect system forget that nothing else works in the country

‘ ’

— those who predicted an abysmal run by the Labour Party’s Obi and those who predicted that his run would be groundbreaking and he would emerge as the winner.

For the first category of pre-election analysts, they failed to see that since the months leading up to the polls, when Obi’s candidacy began to gain popularity, the election started to position itself as being more similar to the 1979 election than to any that has been held in the Third Republic. I firmly stated this in my preelection analysis (Africa Briefing, JanuaryFebruary March 2023), and it was not surprising to see that the percentage share of the results by the two leading candidates was more in range with what happened in 1979.

The second category of people are those who failed to factor in the peculiarity of the Nigerian electoral scene. The

candidates who had spent hundreds of millions of naira to secure their party’s form and billions of naira to get their party’s tickets would be willing to spend tens of billions to ensure their victory at the polls.

While the dispensing of their tens of billions might not have been through the known widespread vote-buying, which was curtailed to some extent by the cashless economy, the fact remains that there were strategic electoral malpractices, widespread electoral violence, clownish rigging, and voter intimidation and suppression. All the political parties are guilty of this.

This was an election that divided Nigeria across several ethno-religious lines, one where emotions were allowed to fester and grow into hate, tribalism, and bigotry, so much so that these translated into desperation-fuelled violence. It was a classic do-or-die case across the country

for many people, including political godfathers, incumbent leaders, party agents and election contestants.

By emerging as the winner of the 2023 presidential election, Tinubu had the lowest percentage of results by any winner in Nigeria’s Third Republic — at 37.62 per cent of total votes cast. The combined percentage of votes received by him and Abubakar, the two top candidates from the two heavyweight parties, was just a little over average at 67.5 per cent.

When compared to other percentages from this republic, it is safe to say there has been a systemic shift in the Nigerian political landscape, and that there is now a truly nationalist third force, encompassing both old and young but mostly championed by young Nigerians.

The gross irregularities that happened during the 2023 elections are tied largely to the steady dysfunctionality of the Nigerian

The election divided Nigeria across several ethno-religious lines

state. Those who want INEC to be a perfect system forget that nothing else works in the country. Nigeria has the tendency to sink lower and lower.

The New Electoral Act held some promise as voters believed they would be able to follow the results of the election in real-time and that it would help curb rigging and results manipulation. Alas, it is the business of those seeking power to prevent rigging, and the business of the regulators to discover cases and punish people accordingly.

This belief about an imaginary perfect performance of institutions formed a huge part of the interest that new voters had in the expected credibility of the elections. INEC relied on manually collated results in the end. It was business as usual for the manual collation process, where intimidation, rigging, and bribery occurred in some areas.

More interestingly was that presiding officers in some areas across the country attested to the possibility of uploading the results of the National Assembly election directly from the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System to the IReV portal in real-time while encountering issues with doing the same for the results of the presidential election.

There were also unforgivable logisticsrelated issues on the day of the election, and for a body that spent N305 billion on the elections, the widespread lateness of INEC staff at election venues, accreditation issues, and last-minute change of polling units for several voters do not speak well of the organisation that was in charge of the elections. The live broadcast of polling

of lives across the country — from the coordinated attacks in some places to the incineration of the Nigerian National Democratic Party’s headquarters in Kano to the other pockets of violence reported nationwide. So it is that in 2023, Nigeria still battles vote buying, electoral violence, underage voting, and many other shortcomings, all of which can be tied around the neck of the behaviour of political parties. For the shortcomings of the election, INEC, political parties, and party agents have to share the blame.

As with other elections, the results of

Nigeria has to move forward, whether Mr. A is angry or Mr. B is happy. Should Tinubu's win be upheld by the Tribunal and should he be sworn in, added to a crippling economy, he would have to deal with increasing debts, rising inflation, and other conglomerated malaise.

He would also have to face the daunting task of piecing together a nation that has now, more than any other time in recent years, plunged deeper into the abyss of ethno-related grievances and a sense of “un-identity”, and possible separationist agitations fuelled by the over-reliance on ethnic divides and the tribalistic cards played by the leading political parties in the 2023 elections.

units with underage voters in the North was proof that Nigeria is still being haunted by its past. For a country whose independence had been gained for well over 60 years, electioneering processes have seen few positive changes.

Worst of all was the widespread electoral violence that led to the loss

this election are at the Election Tribunal — being contested by both Obi and Abubakar. Three contestants could not have emerged as the three winners. This leaves us with the question: who, then, was the rightful winner? Can the two aggrieved parties claim they consider themselves the rightful but robbed winner of the election?

These elections have heightened Nigerians’ sense of awareness about the lack of a cohesive national identity, and now, more than ever before, many Nigerians are beginning to question their Nigerianness. President-Elect Tinubu must consider ways to reconcile Nigerians and repair ruptured fibres of national consciousness, borrowing from the playbook of several other heads of state before him. Whether you wish Tinubu well or not is the least of my worries: the real worry is the survival of one of the most important countries in the world.

Toyin Falola is Professor Emeritus in the Humanities, Lead City University, Ibadan.

Nigeria has to move forward, whether Mr. A is angry or Mr. B is happy

‘ ’

Waving the flag in a fractured society

Has the war in Ukraine changed Russia-Africa relations?

ELIZA Gomani, a 29-year-old mother of two from Mlongoti village in the Lilongwe district in central Malawi does not understand the reasons behind the rising costs of fertiliser and other food substances like cooking oil.

A subsistence farmer growing maize on a one acre piece of land, Eliza only knows that she has not been able to cultivate enough crop this season because fertilisers were in short supply at selling points.

"I only managed to buy one bag of Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN) fertiliser which was not enough for me

to effectively grow my maize crop,” said Gomani.

Gomani, who we met at the handover ceremony of 20,000 tonnes of Nitrogen Phosphorus Potassium (NPK) fertiliser to the government of Malawi by a Russian fertiliser manufacturer Uralchem-Ukalkali under its first humanitarian consignment from the European Union to Africa, is only hopeful that the fertiliser she will get will help her in the winter cropping as her maize is already past the fertiliser application point.

“The fertiliser has come very late, I am

only hopeful that I will use this fertiliser in winter cropping, as a farmer I don't understand what the Russia-Ukraine crisis is all about, I am only concerned about my farming,” she tells Africa Briefing.

Malawi, one of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which is identified as a hunger hotspot as food inflation remains high in the wake of shocks from the Covid-19 pandemic, the climate emergency and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

“The fertiliser will help Malawi achieve its goals of substantially boosting its agricultural production and

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Africa has witnessed a shift in Russian and Western policy and attention on the continent, writes Madalitso Wills Kateta

Russia donates fertiliser to the government of Malawi

helping families grow more healthy and nutritious food,” said Dimitry Shornikov, representative of the Uralchem-Uralkali Group in Africa.

He said the delivery of the fertiliser shipment was done in close cooperation with the World Food Programme (WFP), which chartered a vessel to transport the fertiliser from the Netherlands to Mozambique, from where it was brought to Malawi by land.

Nikolay Krasilnikov, Russian Ambassador to Zimbabwe and Malawi said the fertiliser donation is part of a Russian major fertiliser donation operation taking place in Africa as a contribution to addressing the global food crisis and supporting efforts to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goal number 2 of ending hunger and achieving food security and improved nutrition.

“Russia wants to ensure food security in Malawi this is part of the announcement made by president Putin to assist poorest countries in the world. This is part of Russia's initiative to support the poorest countries of the world with agricultural commodities,” said Krasilnikov.

Krasilnikov said the donation, which comes amid the rising cost of fertiliser and other food items following disruption of

global supply chains and rising interest rates due to the war in Ukraine, would confidently help Malawian farmers harvest enough food and would boost relations between Russia and Malawi.

Krasilnikov revealed that Russia would be donating 260,000 tons of fertiliser to African countries and was hopeful that African leaders will press for the abolition of international sanctions against Russia when they attend the second Russia-Africa summit to be held end of July.

The war in Ukraine has changed the Russian and Western attention towards Africa. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Africa has witnessed a shift in Russian and Western policy and attention on the continent with the two opposing sides of the morality of the over a year long war trying to reinforce or establish relations with African countries.

Like during the partition of Africa era, Russian and Western diplomats have been crisscrossing the continent, the West trying to re-establish links with countries they ruled during the colonial era, while Russia, a country that had not much influence in the continent has been trying to make new allies through humanitarian assistance and promises of technical assistance to the continent.

Putin also recently announced that Russia would be cancelling over $20 billion debt for African countries in a bid to strengthen relations between Russia and African countries.

As Russia is trying to build African allies, the western front has also been rushing to its African allies most of which were colonised by the western countries. In a bid to renew this relationship, French president Emmanuel Macron, who was recently on a four-nation tour of African countries which were previously under French rule, said the era of French interference in Africa was “well over”.

The sentiments were coming as antiFrench sentiments were high in some of its former African colonies which have turned into diplomatic battle ground with the growing Chinese and Russian influence.

Macron, who was quoted by Reuters as describing Russia's Wagner Group as a group of criminal mercenaries, the life insurance of failing regimes and putschists, accused Russia of feeding anti-French propaganda in Africa to serve "predatory" ambitions.

Meanwhile the Norwegian government has added $8 million to its aid package for Malawi to help cushion the country against the negative effects of the Russia-Ukraine war and Cyclone Freddy.

Norway's Deputy Minister of International Cooperation Bjorg Sandkjaer, who was recently in Malawi, said $6 million of the package will support the agriculture sector while $2 million will be channelled towards the disaster which has claimed more than 500 lives. The additional allocation translates into a 60 percent increase to the $10 million injected into the agriculture sector in 2023.

Sandkjaer said the support was part of a broader support package to alleviate the challenges suffered by vulnerable populations who are harshly impacted by the global consequences of the Russian war on Ukraine.

“This extraordinary support is meant to cushion some of these negative effects to support Malawi in lifting more people out of poverty, food insecurity and distress,” said Sandkjaer.

As the war in Ukraine continues and the West and Russia continue to make allies in Africa, and people like Eliza Gomani continue to be confused about the dynamics of the situation, it is not clear who the winner of this race over relations with Africa is.

The war in Ukraine has changed the Russian and Western attention towards Africa

Africans need to declutter their minds for heightened political consciousness

AFRICA has experienced and continues to go through a profound and long-lasting loss of cultural identity, violence and exploitation. The lingering effects of trauma have all had a significant impact on the current political systems of African countries.

One of the most significant psychological effects of imperialism and colonialism on African people has been the loss of our cultural identity. The imposition of Western culture, customs, and beliefs on African societies has led to the erosion of traditional values and practices. This has had a detrimental impact on the self-esteem and self-worth of many African people, who have been made to feel that our own culture and history are inferior to that of the colonisers.

Another psychological effect of imperialism and colonialism is the trauma that many African people experience as a result of the violence and exploitation that characterise these historical events. The forced displacement of people from their homes, the taking of land, and the use of forced labour and violent distortions of identity have all led to deep emotional and psychological scars for many African people.

These traumatic experiences have had a lasting impact on the mental health of many Africans with deep generational consequences, leading to feelings of hopelessness, depression, and anxiety. This inevitably feeds into our political, economic and social states of being.

The psychological effects of imperialism and colonialism have also had a significant impact on the current political systems of African countries. The legacy of colonialism has led to a lack of trust in government and political institutions, as many African people have come to see these institutions as an extension of the colonisers. This has led to very high levels

of political apathy, as many feel that their voices and concerns are not being heard or considered.

Additionally, the trauma of colonialism has also led to a lack of leadership and direction in many of these countries. Many African leaders have been unable to provide strong and effective leadership largely due to the lingering effects of colonial trauma and the erosion of traditional values and practices. This has led to a lack of stability and progress in many African countries, as well as a lack of trust in the ability of our leaders to provide for our needs.

The decolonial agenda seeks to challenge these legacies of colonialism and imperialism by asserting the right of African peoples to self-determination and by working to reclaim our cultural heritage and traditions. This movement is driven by a deep sense of injustice and a desire to reclaim the dignity and autonomy of African peoples.

It is also motivated by the belief that Africa's future is inextricably linked to its past and that true freedom and selfdetermination can only be achieved by understanding and addressing the historical roots of the continent's current political and economic challenges.

Collective political consciousness is

another critical concept that has played a significant role in shaping the political landscape of Africa. This consciousness refers to the shared understanding and awareness of political issues among a group of people.

This shared understanding and awareness can be used to mobilise people as we take action and work towards common goals and achieve oneness in our process of becoming. In Africa, this consciousness has been shaped by a history of oppression and exploitation, as well as by the ongoing struggle for freedom and self-determination.

Our collective political consciousness has played a critical role in the decolonial agenda in Africa. It has allowed people to come together and organise around a common cause, which has been essential in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

This consciousness has also been critical in the fight against other forms of oppression and exploitation, such as poverty, inequality, and political corruption. The ability to come together and work towards a common goal has been essential in the fight for freedom and selfdetermination in Africa.

The decolonial agenda and collective political consciousness in Africa have been closely intertwined throughout the continent's history. The movement has been driven by a deep sense of injustice and a desire to reclaim the dignity and autonomy of African peoples.

Collective political consciousness has been essential in the fight against colonialism and imperialism and in the ongoing strive for dignity, liberty and selfdetermination. Together, these concepts have played a critical role in shaping the political landscape of Africa and should be consciously included in ongoing conversations and struggle for freedom and true sovereignty on the continent.

Only by recognising the interpersonal effects of imperialism and colonialism can Africans hope to move forward and create a more just and equitable future, argues Ya Sally Njie

Africa continues to go through a profound and longlasting loss of cultural identity

Ya Sally Njie, from The Gambia, is a Fellow at the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London with an interest in decoloniality and state building in Africa.

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The World Bank must refocus its policy in Africa

ONE, the global movement campaigning to end extreme poverty and preventable disease by 2030, says the World Bank is operating with an outdated structure that is out of touch with today's crises in Africa. It adds that the bank's reluctance to take on more risk and engage in financial innovation has prevented capital from being allocated to crisis-hit countries in a timely manner and urges the multilateral lender to take up the five reforms recommended by the G20, which include improving credit rating agency assessments of MDB financial strength, increasing access to MDB data and analysis, and giving more credit to callable capital

THE world is currently facing a critical juncture, with the choice between investing in a better, more secure, and prosperous future for all or continuing with a cycle of crisis and breakdown. The challenges facing countries today, such as the war in Ukraine, natural disasters, climate-related catastrophes, soaring inflation, and a deepening debt crisis, are pushing many lower-income countries to the brink. The struggle is even greater for developing economies that were already struggling to provide education, food, and health services.

The failure of global financial institutions specifically designed to tackle crises and poverty is one of the reasons for the length and depth of economic challenges facing many countries today. Climate change, conflict, pandemics, and other global challenges are not going away, and we need the right tools to confront them.

The Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were established in 1944 to deal with times like these. Initially created to help rebuild Europe after the Second World War, the World Bank has since evolved into a global institution that has shaped the global financial architecture, reducing poverty across the world through assisted development. Africans are at the core of the World Bank, given its mandate to end extreme poverty and boost growth.

In order to address the urgent challenges posed by the Sustainable

Development Goals, these banks must deliver the development finance needed to fund infrastructure to support transformative economic growth, job creation, and the transition to Net Zero.

The World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) was set up to disburse development finance to countries at cheaper rates than they could get on the market. But today they are too slow and too cautious in providing assistance.

Without greater support, governments have had to borrow more to deal with these crises while simultaneously trying to invest in their ongoing economic development. Debt was already a growing concern before the current polycrisis, but it has undoubtedly exacerbated that, too.

The World Bank has been attempting to reform and move work quicker with partner countries, but its success has been limited. In Africa, countries are losing patience. Some are increasingly turning

The World Bank must ensure that it doesn’t shift focus from poverty reduction as its focus widens to include climate change

to China or the private sector to borrow quicker at higher interest rates and fewer conditions.

Furthermore, the World Bank, and other multilateral development banks, are still primarily lending to country governments. Yet, we are living in a different and more complex global environment. Today’s crises are far more complicated than in the previous century. The Bank’s unsatisfactory response to Covid-19 in Africa has been remembered by the international community. The World Bank must take into account the need for investment in cross-border challenges and global public goods like reducing carbon emissions and preparing for pandemics. However, as echoed by South Africa’s finance minister Enoch Godongwana, the World Bank must ensure that it doesn’t shift focus from poverty reduction as its focus widens to include climate change.

With this being said, in 2021 just 36 percent ( $16.4 billion) of the World Bank’s global funding went to Africa. Over half of flows went to four sectors: Social Infrastructure (15 percent), Energy (14 percent), Governance (13 percent) and Health (10 percent) (Figure 2). Experts say that Africa needs to invest about $100 billion a year in infrastructure if it is to realise the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and make sufficient progress to prevent future crises caused by shocks such as the Pandemic.

Africa has been disproportionately affected by the effects of climate change, pandemic threats, and food insecurity - not to mention how experiencing simultaneous crises are exacerbating already rising geopolitical tensions. Climate change is continuing to have a catastrophic impact on Africa. Parts of Ethiopia and Somalia are experiencing some of the driest conditions recorded since 1981, leaving populations in East Africa with little food available. The situation in Somalia is deteriorating fast, with food insecurity levels edging closer to famine.

Traditional sources of finance are not keeping pace with what’s needed in African regions experiencing crisis, like in East Africa. Likewise, there is also less money available for these economies to invest in more sustainable, less poor futures.

The World Bank needs to step up in its assistance to the African continent.

How should the World Bank refocus its policy in Africa?

The World Bank is operating with an outdated structure that is out of touch with today's crises in Africa. The bank's reluctance to take on more risk and engage in financial innovation has prevented capital from being allocated to crisis-hit countries in a timely manner. Financial experts estimate that reform could unlock between hundreds of billions and one trillion dollars in capital. To achieve this, the World Bank needs to take up the five reforms recommended by the G20, which include improving credit rating agency assessments of MDB financial strength, increasing access to MDB data and analysis, and giving more credit to callable capital.

It’s crucial that World Bank financing goes particularly to LMICs in Africa to support long term poverty eradication and shared prosperity, but additional finance - that could be leveraged through the changes outlined above - could help to scale up investments in traditional priorities and in growing new challenges like climate. Experts see huge potential in World Bank financing addressing the climate finance gaps that the international community has so far failed to fill. Africa faces a financing gap of $41 billion per year for climate adaptation. It can also be used to create stronger agricultural systems so that African countries become food sovereign. This will mean that food security crises like the one happening across the Horn of Africa can end for good. This, paired with AfCFTA implementation, would strengthen infrastructure and health

systems across Africa to advance their economies while making countries resilient to future shocks.

MDB shareholders have the power to implement these recommendations, the major shareholders being the United States, Japan, China, Germany, UK, France, Russia, India, and Canada - collectively holding 49% of voting power. Time will be of the essence. Shareholders should support all five recommendations and push the MDBs to implement them in the next two years, with a clear timeline to set expectations and ensure concrete progress.

African governments should articulate a clear set of demands for reform, including the most critical uses of new financing and for tackling the challenges of speed, flexibility, and responsiveness.

Serah Makka, Africa Executive Director of the ONE Campaign, concluded: “Multilateral development banks should begin making reforms in line with the roadmap by the end of 2024, laying out any technical or political issues for resolution. That process also needs to be much more inclusive of the lower income countries, including on how to continue the current country engagement model while growing investments in global challenges. These small, yet carefully coordinated efforts will give free rein to significant resources that could be a game changer in global efforts for a stronger African economy and a better future for us all.”

Figure 2

Leveraging international finance centres (IFCs) to support investment flows in Africa

DESPITE the ongoing global economic and political uncertainties, Africa’s outlook remains promising, particularly in the financial services sector. The region attracted $83 billion in foreign direct investments (FDI) in 2021. According to UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2022, 45 percent of this investment was channelled to the financial services with $5.2 billion going to the start up sector (Fintech). The private equity industry recorded a total of 429 private equity deals worth $7.4 billion, according to data from Venture Capital Association (AVCA) data tracker.

Most of these deals require a combination of advance finance, legal capacity to facilitate efficient execution of

the deals and flow of capital and are likely to be structured outside the continent, due to the complexity and lack of capacity in the region’s international financial centres.

Whilst the region continues to attract investments, it still requires capital to address long-term recovery. The financing deficit will require a combination of efforts, bringing together capital from the international capital markets, international financial centres and development financial institutions. Governments alone, given the competing financing priorities, cannot fill Africa’s financing needs.

The role of international financial centres in mobilising critical capital to Africa is therefore of great importance. They provide a secure jurisdiction, fund structuring and tax neutrality for investors.

Various countries have established international financial centres to attract investments into the continent, some of the notable IFCs in the region include Johannesburg and Capetown in South Africa, Mauritius, Cassablanca, Nairobi, Nigeria and Kigali.

Analysts predict an exciting new phase developing out of Africa’s financial services eco-system, given the under penetration of financial services compared to other regions. This challenge provides an opportunity to invest and collaborate to promote Africa’s financial services infrastructure.

International financial centres are a crucial and key component of the global economy and have proved to be key drivers in developing international trade

Agnes Gitau examines the crucial role international financial centres can play in attracting much needed capital to the region

Rwanda’s Kigali International Financial Centre is poised to become a leading financial centre in Africa

and finance. The ever-increasing number in IFCs is testament to the success of IFCs globally. We have seen the recent launch of the Rwandan Kigali International Financial Centre (KIFC) and other African states looking to launch their IFCs in the future.

IFCs have both geographic and sectoral appeal, for instance, the British Virgin Islands (BVI) has often been the IFC of choice for Asia and particularly PRC-based investors and shareholders and is the home of hundreds of thousands of holding and operating entities. Labuan is the IFC of choice for Malaysia. The Marshall Islands is one of the most popular jurisdictions for ship registration. Bermuda is one of the world’s leading (re)insurance IFCs. Cayman Islands for investment funds (both closed and open-ended funds) and Jersey for banking, trusts and foundations.

On a macro level, the positive impact of IFCs was evidenced by a 2019 study undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), a global affairs think-tank. The ODI study established that one of the major hindrances to economic growth in developing states was the lack of available financing and concluded that IFCs play a crucial role in mobilising finance. The study estimated that for the period 2007 to 2014 IFCs facilitated financing to developing states of $1.6 trillion, boosting

GDP in those countries by $400 billion and tax revenues by $100 billion during this period. Those tax revenues were largely invested in infrastructure and financial services, thereby ploughing back direct financial benefits to those jurisdictions.

Why IFCs? On a micro-economic basis, these jurisdictions have developed business-friendly environment of laws, professional service providers and creditorfriendly approaches. For example, if a grouping of international investors from different countries are looking to invest in an African project, such as a Zambian copper mine, they may incorporate a Zambian operating entity wholly owned by a Mauritius entity. Mauritius as such offers asset protection treaties, double taxation agreements (DTAs) or tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) and other benefits in structuring.

In addition to the investor’s direct equity investment, they may seek to maximise their investment and possible returns by leveraging their investment by obtaining financing. The lenders in this scenario may insist that a BVI company is the 100 percent parent of the Mauritius entity. This is because the lenders will take security/collateral over the assets in the structure. Taking security at a BVI

level, which operates a private and public security registration regime where first publicly registered security interests guarantee priority of interest (subject to very limited exceptions) and other creditor-friendly business environment factors, provides greater financial certainty and comfort to the lenders. In addition, the group of international investors may come from various jurisdictions and seek a vehicle from an independent jurisdiction that adopts an investor-friendly approach, such as ease of mergers or take-overs or re-domiciling the BVI entity.

Whilst IFCs do, to an extent, compete against each other in seeking to attract investors and international businesses, they also work together in providing optimum investment structures. This is illustrated in the BVI – Mauritius – Zambia structure highlighted above. IFCs have been instrumental in creating value and wealth in the jurisdictions that they serve and should be regarded as creating a mesh to facilitate international trade and investment. The aim is to improve the economies, GDP and general standard of living across the board.

The Global Financial Centres Index ranks IFCs based on a set of factors that boost the success of IFCs. These factors

Casablanca’s business-friendly environment has several factors related to the city’s financial assets

are critical study points for African IFCs. The factors considered in the study are the business environment, human capital, infrastructure, finance sector development, and reputation. These are the critical success factors of an IFC.

In the World Bank report on Business Environment 2020, the following subSaharan Africa IFCs are ranked top five: Mauritius (ranked 13); Rwanda (ranked 38), Kenya (ranked 56), South Africa (ranked 84), and Zambia (ranked 85). Morocco is ranked number 3 in the Middle East and North Africa region and number 53 in the world ranking. These ranking rates several important factors including starting a business, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, paying taxes, and employing workers.

Casablanca’s business-friendly environment has several factors related to the city’s financial assets. Casablanca

is currently home to the largest stock exchange in the North Africa region and boasts a population of more than 3.7 million.

The success of African IFCs is related to the business environment, the policymakers have to work to ensure that it is made easier for a business within limited timelines and with few licences.

The cost of essential power is also critical. Governments should work to ensure cheaper and more affordable electricity to drive economic activity. Access to qualified and skilled labour is essential for the success of IFCs. African countries must invest in quality education that will be an essential part of the success of IFCs. African IFCs may also require globally specialised professionals to assist with putting together policy and infrastructure for those IFCs to thrive.

Infrastructure development is a key

driver for progress across the African continent and a critical enabler for productivity and sustainable economic growth. It contributes significantly to human development and poverty reduction. Investment in infrastructure accounts for over half of the recent improvement in economic growth in Africa and has the potential to achieve even more.

The African continent needs adequate infrastructure, secure energy, efficient transport, and reliable communication systems. These are critical success factors for African IFCs. The African countries have to prioritize this for the success of their own countries as well as that of their respective IFCs.

Among the most important consideration for investors in any jurisdiction, more-so in Africa, is the tax regime (including local tax rates, the availability of tax incentives and

the supportiveness and effectiveness of the institutions). Building capacity for development and enforcement of attractive tax regimes, whilst keeping a country on the positive side of the regulatory international standard is integral. If the institutions are not strong, the regulatory structures will not be strong. Strong capital markets and clarity of regulation is also important for IFCs to thrive. For instance, Kenya’s Capital Markets Authority (CMA) and the Nairobi Securities exchange has grown exponentially over the years.

Other institutions that are important to IFCs are service providers such as fund managers, administration firms, accounting and audit firms and legal services providers.

An efficient and impartial enforcement of contracts is a major consideration for investors, the establishment of dispute resolution centres including commercial courts and Arbitration centers in the IFCs is a positive step.

Environmental and Social Governance (ESG) has become a major topic of consideration for investors in recent years, and ESG is a major risk to consider, at the same level to previously commonly known investment risks like political risk, contract risk, regulatory risk, financial/ credit risk, amongst others. Most if not all of the African countries have various laws that tackle ESG in its various components. For instance, countries have environmental and climate change laws that require environmental and social impact assessments, labour laws that are employee friendly that are based on the International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions, anti-money laundering (AML) laws, and corporate and governance laws, including among others, the requirement for beneficial ownership reporting.

A challenge in start-ups is the awareness and capacity to have in place ESG measures that are relevant at the companies stage, from a climate impact, sustainability and investor- attractiveness perspective. Most of the existing ESG guidelines are extensive and may not be tailor-made or relevant for small startup companies. IFCs can contribute to this awareness and capacity by having guidelines and trainings on the relevant laws and international best practices (such as IFC Performance Standards), and how to easily apply them. A one- stop shop of ESG guidance by IFCs would be most

useful.

While IFCs in Africa are in the nascent stages, establishing strategic relationships with the advanced IFCs will be greatly advantageous for both international and local investors. There does not have to be unhealthy competition. For instance, investment funds or investors registered in the BVI are always looking to invest in Africa, and would explore having feeder funds in African IFCs. A partnership between BVI IFCs and African IFCs would be beneficial for capacity building and cross- alignment of best practices between the centres.

Collaboration through efficient financial and legal systems will allow these centres to attract more investment. In most instances, the reason people engage with IFCs is to gain access to capital financial and legal systems set up around the centres should be enticing to investors as this provides comfortability and confidence.

Global professionals with relevant skills in establishing and managing successful IFCs can be an area of collaboration with the African continent. The professionals can provide the requisite skills to facilitate the growth of African IFCs.

Popular views expressed on IFCs fail to recognise the value they bring to the global economy, and as Africa

struggles to access innovative financing for development, leveraging on IFCs will be an added advantage.

The establishment of the IFCs in the continent demonstrate that the region is ready to provide investment avenues for interested parties, given that most Funds are domiciled in jurisdictions out of the continent, there is a greater opportunity for IFCs to work with stakeholders in public and private sector to develop structured channels to mobilise funds to the continent.

There are many of policies that need to be developed for the IFCs to be properly established. The partnership with international IFCs will assist African IFCs to develop relevant policies.

Financial products in the African continent are still developing and not as advanced as those in Europe and America. The partnership with the established IFCs will enhance accelerated product development within the African continent.

Technology transfer, the African IFCs can benefit from the advanced technology from the well- established IFCs. The technology will help propel the growth of the IFCs.

The IFCs will benefit from the youthful and vibrant workforce from the African continent. The youth have very innovative ideas that the IFCs can benefit from.

Agnes Gitau is the Executive Director, UK & Europe, of the Eastern Africa Association

Rekindling African links: Coumba Toure and Rev Jesse Jackson

How did Ghana get to its severe economic problems?

GHANA is facing severe economic crises, driven mainly by debt and balance of payment problems. The foremost question on the lips of many Ghanaians is how their country got to this tipping point.

Government officials argue that they have done absolutely nothing wrong, blaming the situation on the effects of Covid-19 and the Russia-Ukraine war, and referring to social assistance that was provided during the pandemic. But a significant portion was contributed by foreign and local organisations.

However, many economic experts have blamed the wanton borrowing and unconstitutional printing of money by the Bank of Ghana, at the request of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) administration, for the cause of the debt quagmire, record high inflation and balance of payments deficit.

The recently released AuditorGeneral’s report found almost 50 per cent of all Covid-19 related financial resources raised went on unaccountable government budget support. The fundamental cause of the problem is the absence of an economic blueprint for development by the administration.

The government relied on sloganeering such as “one district, one factory” and “planting for food and jobs”. There are no accessible policy documents and guidelines for implementation of these slogans, yet millions of cedis have been spent on these. Even worse is the jettisoning of the plan by the National Development Planning Commission that operates under the presidency.

A closer look at Ghana’s debt situation prior to 2020, and at present, tells a different story. It is a divergent tale from the official narrative by the NPP administration and its supporters.

Unpacking data available from official sources, the various debt sustainability indicators point to precariously

unsustainable levels prior to 2020. By the end of the 2017 fiscal year, total debt stock climbed from GH¢122.5 billion in 2016 to GH¢142.5 billion (equivalent of 69.8 per cent of GDP).

Also, the total debt to export, total debt to revenue, debt service to export, and debt service to revenue were at 233.99 per cent, 398.71 per cent, 31.87 per cent and 54.31 per cent respectively. This was a clear indication that Ghana was on the verge of a debt default and economic crises prior to the pandemic. These figures, except for debt to GDP ratio, are all above the minimum IMF/World Bank debt burden thresholds and benchmarks for lowincome countries.

In the 2018 fiscal year, the authorities took the decision to rebase the economy by some 24 percentage points, which broadened the GDP base while the key debt sustainability indicators remained virtually above the debt burden thresholds. This

suggested that Ghana was facing imminent and ever-increasing unsustainable debt levels and financial crises.

The fiscal year ended with debt to export at 244.23 per cent, debt to revenue at 442.16 pr cent, debt service to export at 35.31 per cent, while debt service to revenue recorded 63.92 per cent, according to official records. These figures exposed the administration’s poor management of the economy by outdoing all the debt sustainability parameters – without tangible references to policy implementations for which benefits were likely to accrue.

A careful study of the numbers show Ghana was taking in more debt than it could sustain and pay off. The situation was akin to a Ponzi style of debt management. In short, the government was only fixated on borrowing more to pay off existing obligations while doing little to raise enough revenue to match the mounting debt.

A careful study of the numbers shows the government was accruing debt in a situation akin to a Ponzi scheme, whereby it was borrowing more to pay off existing obligations while doing little to raise enough revenue to match the financial liability, write Kafui Tsekpo and Albert Wotorgbui

Finance Minister Ken Ofori-Atta

Just as with any Ponzi scheme, once the source of new funds dried up, everything came tumbling down. Once Ghana was locked out of the International Eurobond market by the last quarter of 2021, the extent of the real debt situation was exposed, as there were no new loans coming in to rollover and service the old and maturing ones.

This development started Ghana’s balance of payments challenges, as more foreign holders of its domestic bonds began pulling out and refusing rollover offers. The consequence has been to fall back on the country’s international reserves in order to meet these obligations.

This, in turn, meant a significant chunk of much-needed foreign exchange, which should have gone into supporting domestic imports, was being used to meet obligations to foreign creditors. The direct effect was pressure being brought on the cedi, which saw one of its fastest depreciations in recorded history.

A fast-depreciating currency for a country that is heavily import dependent only means fast appreciating prices resulting in high levels of inflation, again one of the highest in Ghana’s history. Inflation rose to more than a threedecade high in December 2022 at a rate of 54.1 per cent. January and February 2023 saw a gradual easing of escalating inflation at 53.6 per cent and 52.8 per cent respectively.

The hope is to see more decline

once global inflation eases and a fruitful agreement is reached with China over debt restructuring, and a subsequent IMF Board approval of Ghana’s pending programme with the Breton Woods Institution. This will see the Bank of Ghana easing its policy rate hikes that were meant to fight inflation.

Another reason for Ghana’s economic crisis is the fact that the government had significantly cut down on investment in capital expenditure, and by extension the productive sectors of the economy. Capital expenditure between 2017 and 2020 averaged 1.3 per cent of the total compared to an average of 5.4 per cent prior to 2017.

What this meant, is that more than 90 per cent of all borrowing went on consumption, leaving little to be invested in ventures that would have generated enough revenue to pay-off the initial capital investments. Not surprisingly, Ghana is now lumbered with a debt overhang.

In all this, the government has been busy trying to show how good GDP figures are looking while borrowing huge amounts that have resulted in the massive debt figures.

It did this by manipulating and classifying some debt-related figures as above the line items while others were classified as below the line items, with no need for such figures to be added to the overall debt stock. This was done ostensibly to conceal the real debt picture and to make the debt situation look good

on the surface while the undercurrents were telling a different story.

Addressing the consequences of such bad policies would demand bold and painful actions with concrete internally generated benchmarks by any new government. This must be kicked-off with actions to unpack the actual picture of the debt and economic situation of the country before proceeding with the approach that will be effective in ameliorating the situation.

The situation is indeed dire, and the NPP administration must take immediate steps to drastically reduce expenditure by first cutting down the size of the government. Virtually every Ghanaian agrees that it is too big for the size of the economy.

A critical look at the current wage bill and staff of the public sector is equally important. The government must similarly realign expenditure with priority being placed on essential and productive sectors of the economy than the continued focus on spending on consumption. The government must also find innovative ways of increasing revenue above the current low levels. This again calls for focusing on pushing more finances into productive sectors to engender growth in revenue and the economy as a whole.

The authorities must also be bold to set and maintain strict fiscal targets that will drastically bring down Ghana’s high debt levels. Achieving sustainable fiscal surpluses must be the new target. Achieving this in the short- to mediumterm will establish a strong fundamental for Ghana to maintain its debt within sustainable levels.

The authorities must place serious focus on the financial sector to avoid a meltdown and another crisis caused by the domestic debt exchange programme. The GH¢15 billion financial sector stabilisation fund established by the government may not be adequate for a sector that was expecting revenue from these government instruments in excess GH¢30 billion to fund its programmes in 2023. The government should also channel a significant amount of inflow expected from the IMF programme into the financial sector to ensure its stability.

Kafui Tsekpo is Lead Researcher, Governance and Policy and Albert Wotorgbui is Lead Researcher, Economic, Trade and Finance, both at the Centre for Socioeconomic Studies in Accra.

Ghana - Real GDP Growth, % y-o-y. Source: Fitch Solutions

Cooperatives can provide a better economic future

BY 2050, one out of every four people will be African. Africa will have about 2.37 billion people, half of whom will be under 25 years of age. They should constitute a major source of productive, creative energy. They should be capable of producing products and services for themselves and the world. However, they are not likely to be doing so.

Around 60 per cent of Africa’s school aged youth will not be enrolled in school, and around 60 per cent of the youth will be unemployed, with the majority being female.

As adults, these young people, especially the females, will be either underemployed or unemployed. How will they get the knowledge, skills, and opportunities to function effectively in the Fourth Industrial Revolution?

And yet the value of Africa’s economic output is expected to grow in future decades. Many of the world’s fastest growing economies are and will be African. But given these disappointing figures on education, as well as the prevailing development model, this growth is likely to result in high levels of inequality and dependent development.

On the one hand, we may distinguish between cooperatives as associations that exist to increase their members’ bargaining power as buyers or sellers. For example, these may be farmers associating to buy inputs, or sell their produce together, or they may be individuals associating to consume some goods or services together in, for example, credit unions, cooperative shops and housing associations.

On the other hand, we can identify cooperatives as being unions – or a coming together – of individuals in producer or worker cooperatives to form a business and thereby simultaneously create their own

employment and capacity to produce goods and services.

Some theorists hold that in developing economies, having more producer cooperatives can have several benefits. These include more national businesses being established, greater production of what nationals eat, drink, wear, listen to, live in, and watch. In short, a stronger national culture.

This, in addition to greater environmental sustainability, employment, investment, and development of science and technology. Finally, by increasing the capacity of the economy to provide for national needs and wants, the demand for foreign currency to purchase imports should fall. The status of the local currency and the balance of payments should benefit as a result.

All cooperatives are based on the principle of one-person, one vote

and therefore embed the economy in democracy, which should reduce the contradiction between an economic system based on wealth, (one person, many votes and the many people, no vote) and a political system based on one person, one vote.

Africans are considered by many to have a collective disposition, evidenced by rural systems of reciprocal labour for harvesting, house building, implement usage, and novel forms of social insurance. African collective modes of financing have become famous the world over.

Yet there is also in Africa an appetite for accumulation through private property, which is done within the context of our very own entrenched systems of authority and hierarchy underpinned by age, patriarchy, semi-feudal relations and ethnicity.

Meanwhile in the workplace, the few

The idea of people pooling their resources and working together in a business owned by them all is not the default idea of a business in Africa, says Adotey Bing-Pappoe

Adotey Bing-Pappoe: Development should seek to overcome the distortions of history

are used to giving orders, and the many to taking them. And yet (or because) there is an appetite for more democracy.

Even as some African leaders claim to be building democratic societies based on the principles of free association and free speech of their citizens, many of the same citizens regard their government’s behaviour as excessively controlling and authoritarian.

Africa needs to overcome the distortions imposed on its economy by the centuries of enslavement and export of its human capital, followed by colonialism and now extended by neo-colonialism. Developing African economies places an existential responsibility on leaders to redress the historical distortions, as a necessary condition for improving the standard of living of citizens.

However, many African leaders compete with one another, instead of joining forces to transform their economies from outward-looking and dependent to Africa-looking and inter-dependent. Many local industries as well as state budgets have thereby been sacrificed on the altar of so-called free trade and globalisation.

Development should seek to overcome the distortions of history, through industrialisation based on the rapid development of science and technology from within, supplemented by knowledge from outside. The proposition is that an economy with a significant number of producer cooperatives will help achieve this.

The African Continental Free Trade Area, set up to facilitate trade between African countries, will most likely initially benefit foreign enterprises which will now be able to extend their operations across Africa’s colonially established internal borders. Meanwhile local companies are facing great difficulty establishing continental networks, not least the ability to remit revenues across borders without involving foreign currencies.

By 2019, out of 1.3 billion people in Africa, 91 million, or seven per cent of the population, were members of cooperatives. However, the global figure is about 12 per cent. Nevertheless, by 2015, cooperatives had created an estimated 5.1 million jobs on the continent.

But Africa’s cooperatives tend to be small. Most cooperatives are associations

for joint procurement, marketing, housing, or financing. Few are businesses to provide self-employment and opportunities for production.

Soon after independence, governments established cooperative monopolies to purchase farmers’ produce. Farmers soon became aware of the (unexplained) differential between the prices they received and the foreign currency equivalent the country received.

During the period of neoliberal ascendancy in the 1980s, governments withdrew from, and then liberalised, rural markets. Cooperatives and the rural population went through difficult times, but between 2005 and 2008 there was an uptick in cooperative numbers in Africa.

Nevertheless, there is widespread

national level. Nor are the cooperatives as autonomous as they should be.

Also, the bulk of the people trained in cooperative affairs are not the actual cooperators, but instead staff of the government departments regulating cooperatives. Those school leavers who are trained are not provided with enough of the support they would need to set up their own cooperative businesses.

Cooperation Africa is a civil society initiative to encourage and support cooperatives in Africa and its Diaspora. Its founding members are businesspeople, academics, and activists.

Our vision is: “A vast network of cooperative enterprises providing Africans with secure livelihoods and high standards of living and wellbeing.”

ignorance of the producer cooperative model across the continent. The idea of people pooling their resources and working together in a business owned by them all is not the default idea of a business on our continent.

Recent studies have pointed out that African cooperatives do not have strong networks from the grassroots to the

The first phase in our plan is to build a membership organisation of likeminded people. In the second, we will encourage members to join, or establish, cooperative financing bodies, in which they will be able to invest. Finally, these cooperative financing institutions will support cooperative formation and development.

Adotey Bing-Pappoe, a lecturer at the University of Greenwich Business School in London, is Co-Chair of Cooperation Africa, which was registered in Ghana in March 2022 as a public limited company.

There was an uptick in cooperative numbers in Africa between 2005 and 2008

‘ ’

Tackling West Africa’s electricity crisis

ARRIVING at Ahmed Sekou

Touré International Airport in Conakry, Guinea not too long ago, one of the first things you noticed in the central car park was the presence of students studying under the lampposts. The airport was for several years one of the only places in Conakry where electricity was almost permanent.

Many countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region have limited access to electricity. With over 16 per cent of the world’s population and a land area of 20 per cent (the world’s second largest continent), Africa has less than two per cent of the world’s industrial capacity, and consumes only six per cent of world energy.

In 2004, the World Energy Council highlighted that Africa had huge capabilities to cover all its energy requirements. Despite this, the continent, more specifically Sub-Saharan Africa is starved of electricity.

Energy resources are unequally distributed in Africa. North Africa is the region most endowed with oil and gas. Most of the coal is in South Africa and the hydro potential is made up of the Congo, Niger, Nile, Volta and Zambezi rivers.

This inequality also exists in West Africa. So, any initiative to establish regional integration that will allow countries to sell energy to each other, should aid the continent’s economic development.

Electricity is far too expensive in some African countries, and this is one reason that is preventing people from accessing it. But a simple policy in favour of competition (to reduce prices) can easily create the right conditions for entry into the market, enhance past investments and strongly encourage future investors.

The West African Power Pool (WAPP) was established in 2000 to address West

Africa’s poor access to electricity by creating a regional electricity market. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) aims to exploit the enormous energy potential of countries such as Guinea and Nigeria to make electricity available to countries less endowed with the necessary resources such as Mali and Burkina Faso.

Guinea, a water rich country, can play a central role in the development of the WAPP. Indeed, several rivers in the subregion (Niger, Gambia and Senegal) have their source in Guinea. The construction and commissioning of the Kaleta hydroelectric dam in 2015 has provided electricity to millions of Guineans and the country exports energy to its neighbours.

Guinea launched a second dam in 2021, the Souapitti hydro plant, with a capacity greater than that of Kaleta. The WAPP should help manage these two dams and encourage similar projects in other countries with hydropower resources.

In 2021, Remy Tehero from the Department of Economics at the Felix Houphouët-Boigny University in Abidjan, analysed the determinants of access rate to electricity in West Africa by taking the case of WAPP countries. His results highlighted the importance of income per capita and the efficiency of institutional framework. Urban population rates and density were also significant.

Although renewable energies (solar, hydro) play an important role within the WAPP, their integration should be built on grid security and stability due in particular to the intermittency that may occur because of weak infrastructure and management.

Other interconnected electricity systems exist elsewhere in Africa. There is the Central African Power Pool (CAPP), which was set up in 2003. The Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) was inaugurated in 1995.

The literature on regional power integrations shows that almost all the systems set up in Sub-Saharan Africa are based on the hydro potential of the regions in which they are located. Thus, the WAPP, for example need to adopt robust policies to make the most of this resource.

Some policy recommendations that I would suggest are for the WAPP to promote competition in the energy sector in West Africa to reduce electricity prices; the need for national regulatory agencies to be better coordinated with periodic reviews of regulatory compatibility with the WAPP objectives to be put in place.

Furthermore, some countries have already built hydroelectric dams but the lack of maintenance often leads to breakdowns causing power cuts. People need to be trained to maintain and monitor these facilities.

One of the challenges of national electricity companies in West Africa is that they are unable to generate revenue. Costumers do not pay for the electricity they consume. So, national electricity companies operate on state subsidies and aid from international institutions. Therefore, agencies in charge of electricity billing must be set up in each country. This will make it possible to collect revenue which can be spent on improving the electricity network.

With 600 million people in Africa, out of 800 million worldwide, without power, Mamadou Saliou Diallo looks at one regional initiative to address the problem

The West African Power Pool

Mamadou Saliou Diallo, from Guinea, is undertaking an MSc in Global Leadership and Peacebuilding at the African Leadership, King’s College London, with an interest in energy policies in West Africa.

CORRUPTION: WHERE ARE

Contradictions of the ‘blood diamonds’ governance mechanism

THE Kimberley Process (KP) is the international governance mechanism for the global diamond production market. Yet, the effectiveness of the KP has been challenged by reports of human rights violations in the Chiadzwa-Marange diamond fields in Zimbabwe.

The country expects to increase production from 3.2 million carats in 2022 to 11 million this year. But at what cost?

In 2021, the total global production volume of rough diamonds stood at approximately 120 million carats –representing $13.99 billion in production value declared by diamond-exporting countries. Most rough diamonds are used for industrial purposes (46 per cent), while a smaller proportion (19 per cent) is produced into high-quality, polished stones. The figures quoted here only cover “legitimate” diamond-mining activities.

In the late 1990s, diamonds were used to finance the activities of rebel movements in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola. The international NGO campaign against “blood diamonds” placed pressure on the diamond industry to take action and cease buying stones from illicit channels.

These events set in motion what became known as the KP, a series of inter-governmental meetings led by three African diamond-exporting governments, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, that set out, through a multilateral endeavour, to stop the trade in conflict diamonds.

The internationally binding Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS)

maps the origins of rough diamonds implemented through a set of trade mechanisms aimed at preventing conflict diamonds from entering the legitimate global market. It increased legalisation and transparency in diamond production.

The KP has been incredibly effective in preventing conflict diamonds from entering the international supply chain. Key actors in the establishment of the KP laud its successes. For instance, diamond magnate Nicky Oppenheimer estimates that 99 per cent of world diamond production is “conflict-free”.

Yet, two decades on, the shortfalls of

the KP defines these as “rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments”.

The KP overlooks violence that is embedded in the regulatory interventions of some governments, such as the forceful eviction of local populations and artisanal miners from diamond fields. The narrow “conflict diamond” definition does not confront repressive regimes or combat human rights abuses. Nor does it recognise environmental pollution and degradation, and the conflicts that arise out of the dispossession of communities through the

the KP have become increasingly visible. These are related to how the KP defines conflict diamonds. The Core Document of

loss of property, land and livelihoods.

These issues are especially relevant to

It is widely acknowledged that rough diamonds enter the global market through duplicitous means and corrupt channels – at great human cost – but the process of stopping such stones from reaching the market does not seem to be effective when it comes to Zimbabwe, argues Shannon Leslie Arnold

The narrow “conflict diamond” definition does not confront repressive regimes or combat human rights abuses

the Chiadzwa-Marange alluvial diamond fields in Zimbabwe. In June 2006, massive deposits of alluvial diamonds were discovered in Marange, a very poor, rural area near Zimbabwe’s eastern border with Mozambique.

The diamond deposits in ChiadzwaMarange are found on or near the surface, span across a large area and they are easily mined. As “lootable” resources they have proven to be incredibly difficult to secure.

Following the discovery, there was an influx of thousands of informal miners, traders and dealers into the area – all desperate to escape extreme poverty and deprivation. In 2008, President Robert Mugabe's party, the Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), deployed the military to the fields through Operation Hakudzokwi Kumunda, which translates to: “You will not come back from the fields alive.”

The military operation resulted in the killing of about 200 miners in the space of five weeks. In the years that followed,

soldiers and police officers developed pathways for the illicit smuggling of diamonds to external traders, and the securitisation of the fields came to be “associated with significant loss of life and human rights abuses, including torture, rape, beatings, abduction, irregular detention and imprisonment”.

Following civil society action, the KPCS Review Mission of Zimbabwe was initialised in mid-2009, following which the KP plenary suspended diamond exports from Marange. After a three-year review process, the appointed Kimberley monitor, Abbey Chikane from South Africa, declared that the mines met the KPCS criteria.

In March 2011, the sale of ChiadzwaMarange diamonds was approved by the KP despite objections from civil society that they did not meet KPCS standards, and that dubious deals and human rights abuses were still rampant.

As the KP failed to entrench an expanded definition of “conflict diamonds” to include a human rights-based framework,

it also failed in its nominal commitment to ensure that diamonds contribute toward Zimbabwe's development – with up to $15 billion in diamond revenue alleged to have disappeared without trace into the international informal markets.

The “formalisation” of the ChiadzwaMarange field has not transformed the economy and living standards of the community, nor Zimbabweans more broadly, in any significant way.

The KP, as an African-led process, made major inroads in uniting disparate groups (civil society, governments and the diamond industry) around a common cause: the need to starve insurgent groups from diamond revenues used to fund conflict.

Nevertheless, the KP has yet to develop an expanded definition of conflict diamonds. This puts many local, artisanal mining communities at risk of state repression, such as in Zimbabwe. And so, the question becomes: why are the Zimbabwean diamonds on the international market not considered “blood diamonds”?

The KP has been incredibly effective in preventing conflict diamonds from entering the international supply chain

Shannon Leslie Arnold, from South Africa, is a Fellow at the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London with an interest in security issues in Southern Africa.

US-Africa building solidarity one brick at a time

WHEN Coumba Touré first visited the US in March 1996, she was a young woman from Senegal and her first stop was in Selma, Alabama. Selma is a city that rarely makes the news, and does not fit the assumptions most Africans have of a city in America. It has a rich and proud history, however, in the Civil Rights Movement

that continues to be celebrated today.

Over the course of three decades, Coumba has built ties in the city and beyond, in neighbouring states and multiple communities, on a journey to form “ties that bind” between continental Africans and African Americans.

Farafina: The Black Link Tour is an

extension of all that history and more that brought her back to Selma, for the 58th anniversary of the Voting rights Act. Many in Africa may not know the history of Africans in America that goes back to 1619. The stories told by the standard media and the reality of their live experiences differ vastly.

Since the beginning of March, an initiative to “reclaim and rebuild a grassroots solidarity movement” connecting Africa and the US, has been progressing around America. Nunu Kidane reports

On Sunday March 5, 2023, as thousands gathered in Selma to commemorate the fight for Black voting rights and remember the violence that took place there on March 7, 1965, Coumba Touré and the Farafina Tour delegation joined in the March to cross the Edmund Pettus Bridge above and bottom right, page 51 in an effort to reclaim and rebuild a grassroots peoples’ solidarity movement linking Africa and the struggle of people of colour in the US.

Black people in the US were not allowed to exercise their constitutional rights to vote until August 6, 1965. It did not come about from the benevolence of the government but from people who resisted oppression and demanded to be seen and heard.

These are the stories Coumba has been making visible since her first visit. The social and cultural work she has done over the years has built relationships and make connections, one person at a time, one community at a time.

In Selma when she first arrived, she found a family. Lawyers Hank Sanders and Faya Rose Touré and their children became her family by extension. And the 21st century youth leadership movement became even the larger family. Over the years, Coumba stayed with her sister, Malika, and started a “conversations across the waters” – a series of mails which tell the personal, social and political changes on both sides of the continents.

Over many years, Coumba built these connections to learn about the history of African Americans, (the one that Hollywood does not show or tell) and brought insight to those who visited her in West Africa. The stories they share on both sides try to build bridges and speak to the 300 plus years of family separations of Africans in America and Africans on the continent. They shared not only the atrocities, injustices and resistance, but also the celebrations and victories that have infused people with hope. They went even further to look at the fundamentals of

African society today all the way to prepharaonic KMT (the Black land).

Farafina: The Black Link Tour is yet another attempt to build bridges between continental Africans and African Americans. As bridges, it goes both ways. There are stories in Africa of farmers, students, democracy activists and human rights advocates that Black people need to know about and forge alliances with. Similarly, there are stories of Black lives in the US that many people in Africa do not know about.

When there is unjustified killing of a Black man by a police officer, as in the case of George Floyd in 2020, the world takes notice. The Black Lives Matter movement that started with the murder of a young Michael Brown in 2014 has also claimed global attention. These are not sporadic events but indicative of systemic

racism the US continues to struggle to rectify.

The solidarity by people across the African continent is critically important to hear. These are not only US problems but a global struggle that demands to view Africans in the Diaspora in our full humanity. From those on the continent the minimum mandate expected is to know, to acknowledge you hear our voices.

Indeed, Coumba told Africa Briefing: “It is very important to make a connection between Africans on the continent and Africans in the Diaspora because we share the same type of struggles against white supremacy and exploitation and the dismissal of our lives.”

She acknowledged the “many years of solidarity between communities of Africans in the Diaspora and Africans on the continent”. Coumba, a children’s book writer and storyteller, noted the strong contribution to the struggle against apartheid in South Africa by members of the African Diaspora, and earlier support for the independence of African countries. “We need more today,” she said.

Thus, bridge building attempts by activists from West Africa begin a process of remembering Africans building “the Black Link” between two continents across the Atlantic. It is not a short undertaking but one demanding all of us to take part, especially the youth and women and across all sectors. It is a transnational and intergenerational movement building agenda that we are committed to building, one brick at a time.

Be the link. Be the bridge.

Nunu Kidane is Director of Priority Africa Network (PAN), an advocacy organisation based in Oakland California. In 2012, she was recognised by the Obama administration and received the “Champions of Change” award for her work with diasporic communities.

Sixty-five years on - the Bank of Ghana in a nation’s history

Review by Kwame Pianim

IVOR Agyeman-Duah has put together a well-researched and felicitously penned history of central banking in Ghana. In the process, he gives the reader a broad brush of economic development through the establishment and growth of the Bank of Ghana. The 553page book of 23 chapters, Central Banking in Ghana and the Governors: Institutional Growth and Economic Development, recounts the life and challenges of the 14 governors (aside the establishment governor) who have directed policies over the past 65 years.

This book is about one of the soft power elements of Ghana's pretensions to exceptionalism as the shining Black Star of Africa; a symbol of hope and great expectations in the intoxicating early days of political independence.

Since the beginning of the 21st Century, central banking has been one of the dazzling achievements showcasing Ghana’s claim as the Bank became the gold standard for inflation targeting, a Monetary Policy Committee with its much-awaited monthly Press Release on the state of the economy. And Ghana Interbank Payments and Settlements (GhIPS), a subsidiary of the Bank, has established itself as the premier and pioneering electronic payments system providing advisory services for other African regulators.

This exquisitely written book on a complex and difficult subject, has been made easy to read. The author’s multi-faceted and eclectic professional background allows him to take the reader through fascinating and unexpected detours such as ancient Zimbabwean inspired artworks, insights into currency design and printing and into political drama behind economic policy decision-making after an introduction of money as a medium of exchange.

A felicitous book

The book should have been published when the Black Star of Africa was indeed

shining brightly on the global stage, borne aloft and fuelled by our exceptionalism.

It deals with institution-building

Central banking in Ghana

and growth; engagement of people with systems which determine the success of nations. We therefore need men and women of deep professional competence and personal courage. For instance, Governor Amon Nikoi’s observation (p. 220) will remain hauntingly valid; that the issue of independence of the central bank is “not possible to have in a developing country especially under military or dictator regimes.” This was in response to the lamentation of Adu-Boahen, history professor turned politician during the regime of Flt-Lt Rawlings. His query was why central bankers could not simply tell the military dictators that they would not implement “some of their crazy and disastrous ideas.” (page 220).

The book, published by Hawkes Design and Publishing in Britain, with the Ghana edition by Digibooks Limited, is filled with iconic photographs with each telling their own stories of former heads of state and their ministers of finance and governors long departed, from 1957 when the Bank was established as a currency

issuing entity. In 2002 and at 45 years, it attained effective operational independence under Dr Paul Acquah, the monetary economist and eleventh Governor whom the author introduces as (p.343) “The Governor who Finally came from the IMF.”

By a happy coming together of events, the Minister for Finance then was Yaw Osafo-Maafo. A mechanical engineer trained as a banker in Germany, Yaw had become ingrained with the German post Second World War obsession with fiscal prudence and central bank independence and helped with the enactment of the 2002 Bank of Ghana (Act 612).

Ivor characterised this event as “an unprecedented operational independence” (page 368). In the words of Paul Acquah, the autonomy meant it could pursue its mandate and objectives as assigned by the enabling Act, “independent of instructions from the government or any authority” (page 348).

Acquah, a thoroughbred from the IMF,

arrived at the BoG with Fund orthodoxy and 44 years after the bank’s establishment. He was hopefully to end Ghana’s flipflopping and return to fiscal prudence and relative macro-economic stability. He shaped the institution into a full-fledged modern central bank.

The book is voluminous but holds attention and is also far from ordinary in terms of its coverage and content. Ivor’s eclectic and amazingly broad professional background is imprinted all over the pages and shapes his narrative.

Perhaps the author’s most peculiar and arresting background that brings an unexpected and exotic twist is his work as visiting scholar in history of Numismatics at The British Museum. If, not unlike me, you have not come across the word numismatics, (I had to Google it) it deals with the history of coins, currency bills and issued medals. So, he begins Chapter 6 on Art and Design of Currency with our national currency, the Cedi, named after “S3de3,” the cowrie in Twi. This

Dr Kwesi Botchway was a great strategist and a social engineer

was our ancient medium of exchange for transactions and for store of value before the 15th century.

Ivor delights us with currency printing from Samoa and Seychelles where emphasis is on natural beauties, architecture and where carbon neutrality in currency printing is important due to climate change concerns. In Ghana the focus is on “enhancement of security details on the banknotes” (p.130) to minimise counterfeiting. Who else but this author, would have known and regale us that the Samoa $5 tala banknote depicting the Villa Vailima beachfront, was (p.130) “the adopted home of the Scottish novelist, Robert Louis Stevenson” who’s classic, Treasure Island, was a must read for my generation.

The book is divided into four sections each with an artwork from the collections of Governor JH Frimpong-Ansah, himself a painter of note and a collector of art and old maps. The sculptures are inspired by traditional artworks by the Shona ethnic group in Zimbabwe. Frimpong-Ansah acquired these works of Richard Mteki and Albert Nathan Mamvura whose sculptures include iconic ones such as Zimbabwe’s gift to President Nelson Mandela entitled “Freedom at Last.” The author wants to portray the governors as normal people with life interests other than just central banking (p.xx - xxi).

The Governors

These narrations start with tantalising judgmental chapter headings such as (page 69) under Halm, “In thy Hands we Give Thee - First Ghanaian Governor.” It’s pregnant with foreboding. Was this signaling the shift of the bank from the Minister of Finance of independent Ghana, K A Gbedemah’s envisaged (p.69) “merit based” board and management into a development bank under the direction of Nkrumah?

Gbedemah was replaced in 1964 with Dra Gokah. And Halm was expected to tow the new line. He came to the Bank of Ghana as a businessman. The Bank had taken a gamble. There was a bumpy ride ahead!

The shift in gears was under Albert Adomakoh, the first Ghanaian professional Governor. His tenure is under Section 2 under the title, “Decade of the Bank

and Fall of Curtains.” After ten years in operation, a dramatic change was envisaged. The “Fall of Curtains” signaled the overthrow of President Nkrumah and his socialist one-party state. But before this change, Kwasi Amoako-Atta, a socialist ideologue had become minister for finance and the “hawks had assumed total control and ideological rigour was all pervading” (p. 145). Adomakoh had returned to the Bank after three years of establishing the National Investment Bank on Nkrumah’s invitation.

By August 1965, the economic situation was dire. A sobering report stated that “Ghana will enter 1966 therefore with no reserves and all obvious borrowing possibilities exhausted” (p. 149). And recurrent expenditures were ballooning as a result of the high development outlays for economic and nation-building infrastructure. Five days after the overthrow of Nkrumah, Adomakoh’s action “to

assist a transition from a state-controlled economy to a liberal one” (p.150) with private sector participation was swift, bold and very public.

Governor Frimpong-Ansah was a key player in the 1972 devaluation of the Cedi that created the jinx and made it a no-go policy area for decades. For the last two months of the Busia administration, he was effectively the minister for finance. Alongside Amon Nikoi then at Finance, they led the devaluation team teleguided by Professor Babu Niculescu, Busia’s economic advisor from Oxford university. Frimpong-Ansah worked closely with Niculescu and Dr Jones Ofori-Atta.

Alex Ashiagbor was governor through one of the most difficult periods, 1977 to 1982 when attempts were made to secure details of bank accounts and balances in order to expropriate them. Alex is quoted as saying (p.250 - 251); “Memories tend to be short. Today we take for granted the

Ivor’s eclectic and amazingly broad professional background is imprinted all over the pages and shapes his narrative

right to life and property, press freedom, freedom of debate and dissent, freedom of association and all the basic rights of a modern civil society enshrined in our constitution. But lest we forget, those who lived through 1977 - 1982 have different memories.”

He has the unique record for being the only person “to have been appointed Deputy Governor through a radio announcement in 1977 and just when he was about to be confirmed two weeks after, he was appointed the substantive governor, again by radio announcement” (p.250). His appointment coincided with the 20th anniversary of the Bank’s establishment.

Diminutive in stature but stood ten feet tall when it comes to personal courage and fearlessness in speaking truth to power, the author writes (p.247) about Ashiagbor as: “Few governors spoke angrily to powerful politicians as Ashiagbor did and got away with it...”

Governor Dr Amon Nikoi’s tenure under “Child of Labadi and Equity of a Public Policy Consul” is his key conception and establishment of rural and community banks with his wife Gloria. This was to give the rural and urban poor access to modern banking services. He also envisaged these as instruments for (p .221) “mobilization of savings into agricultural development and cottage industries which had been two major preoccupations. The first one was established in 1976. And now all regions and districts of Ghana boast of rural and community banks. “

The tenure of Dr. G K Agama, the

longest serving governor witnessed two major institutional developments: the establishment of the Banking College and other infrastructure and appointment of the first woman Deputy Governor, Mrs. Theresa Owusu. It will take over three decades for a second woman, Mrs. Elsie Addo Awadzi to follow in her footsteps.

Ideology, The Bank and the IMF

The second perspective is to view economic development through our revolving-door relationship with the IMF. It is recounted in encyclopaedic detail in this book: 16 engagements of bail-out programmes for debt relief, debt cancellation and restructuring and adjustment programmes. They read like the medical history of a hypochondriac. The policy burden and sacrifices from these programmes are endured by the poor people of Ghana. And our persistent and recurrent economic mismanagement are responsible for our inevitable resort to the Fund. These as set out in anodyne acronyms belie the pain they inflict on the poor.

The tenure of Dr Kwesi Botchway, covered some very difficult times. He was a great strategist and a social engineer. Paradoxically it was the revolutionaries, Rawlings and Botchway who focused on cutting the umbilical cords of the economy from its socialist moorings from the first Republic. With the exchange rate jinx and then small gradual periodic adjustments, they created the forex bureau to tame the parallel market. The same people who had flogged and jailed Ghanaians for selling above control prices now prepared the foundation for a market economy.

The third perspective is the critically important collaborative or competitive relationship between ministers of finance and governors. And the fact that two governors also came to serve as ministers of finance evidence this tricky relationship; rivalry relationship between JH Mensah and Frimpong-Ansah was not necessarily on economic policy.

Even the more collaborative relationship between Paul Acquah and Yaw Osafo-Maafo had a few moments of anxiety whenever the governor had discussions with the presidency with the minister fearful of a potential policy ambush.

The Addison Team

Ivor has a knack as a chronicler of minute but interesting details. He recounts that Dr Mahamudu Bawumia became deputy governor at the age of 39; the same age as the first English deputy governor in 1957 and points out rightly the importance of having certain under-represented groups such as women in the decision-making chain.

A few points that need clarification as the Ghana patois goes. Why is Governor Dr Kofi Wampah characterised as a career insider when appointed governor? He had been seconded to WAMI and returned as Ivor himself chronicles. Why do Governors Adomakoh, FrimpongAnsah and Ashiagbor, recruited into the bank as permanent employees and appointed governors, not qualify as Insider appointments? Why is Governor Paa Kwesi Amissah-Arthur, our first Governor to transition to the vice-Presidency of the Republic, characterised as a socialist and from the ivory tower?

The book ends with the new orthodoxy and a way of doing business. One is invited to go through this book to figure out the mentoring relationship between the Acquah and Addison and his team.

Governor Addison leads in a very difficult and challenging policy decision making terrain and like the author’s metaphor of chrysalis of a butterfly, distorted by “the ugly noises” of partisan politics. The noise is made more deafening by the amplifying megaphone of social media. How they cope and maintain the operational autonomy and technical competence will alter the nature and character of the bank for years. We are at a historic and potentially tipping point moment. The publication of Ivor’s book will be a source of encouragement and provide a map and a searchlight to guide their path forward.

The book is not only to be read and put aside. It is to serve as a major source of reference for researchers, students and others in academia for all manner of studies in the humanities. And also, as a policy manual for those charged with the management of the political economy of Ghana and other developing countries.

Adu Boahen