Warsaw Institute Review Issue 4 2020

qr. 4. 2020 no. 15 ISSN 2543-9839

US Presidential Election from the Perspective of Poland and Central and Eastern Europe

Editorial

Dear Readers,

O

ver the past few weeks, all eyes were on the United States where incumbent Donald Trump (Republican Party) stood against Joe Biden, the Democratic nominee and US vice president (2009–2017) in the presidential race. While the liberal Democratic candidate is projected to win the presidency, the results are not official until the US Electoral College meets on December 14. Poles closely watched the US election as the United States remains one of Poland’s top partners worldwide, also in strategic security projects, including the permanent US military presence in Poland, a joint strategy to stop the construction of Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, or Washington’s support for the Three Seas Initiative. Read more about the vote and its outcome for Central and Eastern Europe in the text by Wojciech Kwiatkowski, PhD, titled US Presidential Election from the Perspective of Poland and Central and Eastern Europe.

I also encourage you to familiarize yourself with the article

by Paweł Paszak on the Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) for the Development of the People’s Republic of China. The blueprint is also important from the US perspective as it comes as a response from China’s communist authorities to the increasing pressure from the United States. It is also vital for China’s domestic affairs, serving as a remedy for the slowing economic growth. The Chinese authorities expect the strategy to be a step towards victory in the global struggle for influence and position in the world’s economic system.

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Editorial

The Warsaw Institute Review © Copyright 2020 The Warsaw Institute Review Warsaw, Poland

The issue contains some articles on domains such as relations with the European Union, economy, and security.

Please be informed that starting from 2021, The Warsaw Institute Review quarterly will no longer be available as free copies. I encourage you to support our mission and purchase or subscribe to the first issue of our quarterly in 2021. We hope that you find our articles interesting.

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I encourage you to carefully read the articles in this issue.

Editor-in-Chief Izabela Wojtyczka

izabela.wojtyczka@warsawinstitute.review

Editing Łukasz Biernacki

Izabela Wojtyczka

Editor-in-Chief The Warsaw Institute Review

Translations Paweł Andrejczuk Aleksandra Iskra Aleksandra Tomaszewska Cover and Layout Katarzyna Dinwebel Jacek Kotela DTP and Printing www.sindruk.pl

Publisher

The Warsaw Institute Review Sp. z o.o. Świętokrzyska 18/410, 00-052 Warsaw, Poland

Public purpose co-financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic od Poland in the competition "Cooperation in the Field of Public Diplomacy 2020".

www.warsawinstitute.review editor@warsawinstitute.review President Berenika Grabowska The opinions given and the positions held in the materials published in the Warsaw Institute Review solely reflect the views of the authors and cannot be equated with the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland and Ministry of Culture and National Heritage of the Republic of Poland.

ISSN 2543-9839

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland

Co-financed by the Minister of Culture and National Heritage from the Promotion of Culture Fund.

Partners: Foundation based in Warsaw, Poland

Foundation based in United States

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CONTENTS

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UNITED STATES

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Wojciech Kwiatkowski: Tomasz Grzegorz US Presidential Election Grosse: from the Perspective of Poland and Central and Eastern Europe

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EUROPEAN UNION

HISTORY

Jerzy byczyński:

Ideology or Pragmatic Approach? State of the Union Address 2020

INTERVIEW Adrienne Körmendy Polish-Hungarian Solidarity

I waited for World War III

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Łukasz Janulewicz and Zsombor Zeöld The Three Seas Initiative after the Tallinn Summit: Progress with Unfinished Business

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Michał Oleksiejuk Brexit Wars: The Kingdom Strikes Back

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EUROPEAN UNION Marcin Łukaszewski Political Parties in Malta and Liechtenstein in view of European Integration and Foreign Policy Directions

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UNITED STATES Wojciech Kwiatkowski, PhD US Presidential Election from the Perspective of Poland and Central and Eastern Europe

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CHINA Paweł Paszak Five-Year Growth Plan of the People's Republic of China: Marching towards Self-Sufficiency and Technology Superpower

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HISTORY Jerzy Byczyński I waited for World War III

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BELARUS Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski Belarus's Revolution in the International Game

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EUROPEAN UNION Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse Ideology or Pragmatic Approach?

State of the Union Address 2020

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ECONOMY Paweł Kolczyński 25 Years of Special Economic Zones in Poland: A Chance for Investors

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Grzegorz Kuczyński Nagorno-Karabakh War: A New Deal

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ECONOMY Aneta Parys-Kępińska, Anna Artemiuk-Błaszkiewicz In Markets Across the World – Polish Food Then and Now

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Jakub Lachert US Presence in the Western Balkans After Joe Biden’s Victory

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ECONOMY Coverage of the Economic Forum 2020 “Europe after the pandemic: Solidarity, Liberty, Community?”

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Interview

POLISHHUNGARIAN SOLIDARITY

Berenika Grabowska's interview with Consul General of Hungary in Poland, Prof. Adrienne Körmendy

Consul General of Hungary in Poland, Prof. Adrienne Körmendy, began her mission at the Consulate General of Hungary in Cracow in March 2014. She is a graduate of Eötvös Lóránd University in Budapest. She earned a PhD in historical sciences in Hungary and a postdoctoral degree (habilitation) at the Institute of History of the University of Warsaw.

For many years she was involved in building Polish-Hungarian friendship. In our interview, she talks about Polish-Hungarian solidarity, cooperation between both countries, and challenges for the future.

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Polish-Hungarian Solidarity

ADRIENNE KŐRMENDY, CONSUL GENERAL OF HUNGARY IN CRACOW, POLAND, AT THE CEREMONY OF UNVEILING THE MONUMENT OF STEFAN BATORY. GLIWICE, POLAND, SEPTEMBER 30, 2014.

© Andrzej Grygiel (PAP)

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© Darek Delmanowicz (PAP)

Interview

ADRIENNE KŐRMENDY, CONSUL GENERAL OF HUNGARY IN CRACOW, POLAND, AT THE OPENING CEREMONY OF THE “EUROPE OF THE CARPATHIANS” (EUROPA KARPAT) CONFERENCE IN KRASICZYN. KRASICZYN, POLAND, FEBRUARY 16, 2019.

BERENIKA GRABOWSKA: HOW DID YOU FIND OUT THAT YOU WERE GOING ON A MISSION TO CRACOW? WAS IT A SURPRISE FOR YOU?

Adrienne Körmendy: I was just on my way to Poland in the summer of 2013 when Zsolt Németh, former Secretary of State at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called me to inform that the Consulate General of Hungary in Cracow would be reopened and Minister János Martonyi was going to appoint me as the Consul General. He asked if I would accept the assignment and with great emotion, I gave the Minister a positive answer. Years spent in Cracow were the best period of my professional life, even though they were associated with hard work, which nevertheless brought me tremendous satisfaction, a lot of joy, and above all – real friends.

I entered diplomacy in 1990 – just after returning from West Germany and Vienna where I won the Humboldt scholarship – thanks to Professor Gyorgy Szabad, the president of the first democratic parliament of Hungary, and Ákos Engelmayer, the first ambassador of democratic and sovereign 8

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Hungary to Poland. In 2004, I decided to end my service in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was related to the results of the 2002 election, but I was still “socially” active in building good Polish-Hungarian relations, trying to serve the cause if needed. Professionally, however, I focused on the academic career – in Hungary, in addition to my PhD, I gained a degree of a “candidate in historical sciences” while in Poland I hold a postdoctoral degree (habilitation) at the Institute of History of the University of Warsaw. Thanks to the fact that in 2004 our countries became members of the EU, I was able to teach in Poland – at the University of Warsaw and at the Aleksander Gieysztor Academy of Humanities – while still living permanently in Budapest.

WHY THE INTEREST IN POLAND? WHAT INSPIRED YOU?

My family had a lively tradition of respect and appreciation for the Poles, seeing them as noble, idealistic, and exemplary people.

During the war, my family helped the Poles living in Hungary. However, my professional interest in Poland appeared later, as a result of the topic

Polish-Hungarian Solidarity of my master’s thesis. I started to study history and follow medieval studies. I was inspired by István Bibó’s book The Poverty of Eastern European Small States. I wanted to discover the solid foundations of the structure within which historical processes took place to understand the history of our region. In my master’s thesis I dealt with the history of settlement in the northern territories of the Regnum Hungariae (Kingdom of Hungary) in the 13th – 14th centuries, a part of a huge settlement process taking place on the area stretching from the Netherlands to Lithuania and Transylvania. This required me to know Polish. As a result, I started to work hard to quickly learn how to read in Polish.

A few years later I received a one-year UNESCO scholarship at the Institute of History of the University of Warsaw. This is how my adventure with Poland began.

YOU HAVE DONE A LOT TO BUILD POLISH-HUNGARIAN FRIENDSHIP. WHAT WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT FOR YOU DURING YOUR MISSION IN CRACOW?

The main difference between the embassy and the consulate is that the former is supposed to represent the interests of the sending country in the host country while the latter devotes its activities to the matters of citizens (natural or legal persons).

The consulate general – as part of its duty to represent the interests of its own citizens – should try to create the best possible mutual contacts in such domains as social sphere, culture, trade, economy, tourism, etc.

Geopolitical and historical conditions show that good relations between the countries belonging to this region, including Poland and Hungary, depend on our ability to build and develop close intellectualspiritual and economic-infrastructural ties. Establishing such relations, resistant to political and economic shocks, always requires the will and support of broad social strata. I believed that my most vital task was to awaken in people the internally existing

need to strengthen the ties with Hungary – which is not always conscious – and then to develop them. The consular district of the Consulate General of Hungary in Cracow, in addition to Małopolskie, covers the provinces of Lower Silesia, Opolskie, Silesia, Świętokrzyskie, and Podkarpackie, so those regions of the Republic of Poland that have had the most intense trade, economic, social, and political links with Hungary over the centuries. Here you can often find evidence of these interactions, even in the most unexpected places. Art can reach deep layers of memory and sentiment. Music, fine arts, and dance constitute a universal language, equally understandable for the Poles and the Hungarians. For this reason, in the beginning, I focused attention on cultural relations, thanks to which social contacts developed quickly, serving already a good foundation for the intense development of contacts in spheres like tourism, trade, and economy.

HOW DO THE HUNGARIANS PERCEIVE THE POLES NOWADAYS? DOES POLAND SPARK INTEREST AMONG YOUR COMPATRIOTS?

The Hungarians have always considered the Poles a noble nation, as noble people, exemplary gentlemen and patriots, and true, proven friends. “A Pole and a Hungarian – in each other’s company – are better people, a better Pole and a better Hungarian,” President János Áder said in his speech in Katowice in 2015. After the establishment of Solidarity in 1980, the propaganda machine of János Kádár tried to slander the Poles in the eyes of the Hungarians, but it failed to do so, although some effects could be noticed. Today, the Hungarians admire the Poles for their energy, entrepreneurship, and ingenuity, appreciating how quickly they were able to emerge from the crisis of the 1980s and build a rapidly developing country.

At the same time, the Hungarians hope that together with the Poles they will defend a Europe of values.

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Interview THE POLISH-HUNGARIAN FRIENDSHIP WAS CULTIVATED

BY BOTH COUNTRIES IN EVERY CENTURY. THE POLES MOSTLY REMEMBER HUNGARY’S HELP DURING THE POLISH-BOLSHEVIK WAR. THANKS TO THE SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DEFEND WARSAW. WHICH POLISH AID DO THE HUNGARIANS REMEMBER BEST?

The struggle of Polish troops for the freedom of Hungary in 1848-49 and the activity of General Józef Bem (for the Hungarians – “Father Bem”) are a permanent element of Hungarian historical and social memory. All demonstrations in solidarity with the Poles or protests against foreign interference in the sovereignty of Poland or Hungary took place and are still taking place at the Bem monument. The Hungarians remember the solidarity and help of the Poles during the 1956 uprising very well. The image of the Pole as a true friend has recently been strengthened when several hundred Poles came to Budapest on March 15, 2012, to participate in a peaceful rally where several hundred thousand people gathered to express solidarity with the Hungarians.

THE PERIOD OF COMMUNISM WAS A SIGNIFICANT MOMENT OF MUTUAL SOLIDARITY AND HELP BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. THE POLES HAD A GREAT INFLUENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN OPPOSITION, ITS PROGRAM AND THE WAY OF THINKING. THE HEROIC RALLY OF THE POLES IN THE ANTI-COMMUNIST REBELLION IN POZNAŃ IN JUNE 1956 AND THAT OF THE HUNGARIANS’ DURING THE UPRISING IN HUNGARY IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 1956 ONCE AGAIN INTERTWINED THE HISTORY OF BOTH NATIONS. WOULD YOU AGREE THAT WE DO NOT TALK ENOUGH ABOUT POLISH-HUNGARIAN

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SOLIDARITY AND WE SHOULD REFER TO IT MORE OFTEN?

I have already quoted the words of President János Áder showing how much positive energy lies in this unique quality of Polish-Hungarian contacts. You have beautifully mentioned Hungary’s help during the Polish-Bolshevik war while I would like to recall September 1939, when Hitler demanded that Hungary allowed German troops attacking Poland to pass through its territory. Then Pál Teleki, Prime Minister of Hungary, with the consent of Regent Horthy, categorically refused to do so. “It is a matter of national honor for Hungary not to take part in any military action against Poland,” he wrote.

Teleki and Horthy did not know how Hitler would react to such an attitude and whether this refusal would be followed by occupation of Hungary. On the other hand, they knew that Hungarian society was in favor of their decision and preferred the occupation to the loss of honor due to the betrayal of a friend. Nowadays, if we ask the Hungarians what is a concrete, substantial advantage gained by “rocking the spheres of ideals” and bringing up the nation in the spirit of friendship to another nation, as was the case of Hungary and Poland, they would give the example of 1939 as proof of this attitude. I believe, therefore, that we should talk more about Polish-Hungarian solidarity.

We should come back to it more often, not only because of the need to strengthen our self-complacency, but in order to educate the next generations in the same spirit. Likewise, to preserve this unusual, extensive ideological and political capital for them too. As President Áder said in Katowice “only a nation that can look beyond its own interests has a future.”

YOU KNOW THE POLISH-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS VERY WELL, NOT ONLY FROM THE ACADEMIC, HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL POINT OF VIEW, BUT ABOVE ALL FROM PERSONAL

Polish-Hungarian Solidarity

ADRIENNE KŐRMENDY, CONSUL GENERAL OF HUNGARY IN CRACOW, POLAND, AT THE OPENING CEREMONY OF THE “EUROPE OF THE CARPATHIANS” (EUROPA KARPAT) CONFERENCE IN KRASICZYN. KRASICZYN, POLAND, FEBRUARY 16, 2019.

EXPERIENCE. IN YOUR OPINION – ARE THERE ANY CHALLENGES IN POLISH-HUNGARIAN COOPERATION?

The first challenge is that we – the Hungarians and the Poles – must remember the historical necessity of permanent and strategic cooperation, which does not mean that we always have to do the same and have the same opinions on all issues, but that we build a deep, mutual trust and always coordinate our activities in such a way that they contribute to strengthening the position of the partner and help to achieve a common goal. We must be aware that the weakness of Hungary or Poland always means a great danger for the other country even if we were promised to benefit from it because it would significantly worsen the geopolitical conditions of the entire region. The second challenge is to intensify economic cooperation even more, both at the level of small and medium-sized enterprises and in terms of high-tech development. Furthermore, the cooperation should help Polish and Hungarian companies to become major enterprises on the global market. Last but not least, I indicate, in my opinion, the basic challenge that is the sine qua non of efficient cooperation: developing energy and communication infrastructure in terms of

© Darek Delmanowicz (PAP)

air, road, rail and water transport. The work has already started, the will to pursue the goal consistently and to cooperate wisely to succeed is needed. As Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said “Central Europe exists in our hearts and minds, in art and literature, it is high time that we also realize it in material reality.”

WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE AND WHAT CAN WE DO TO DEVELOP THIS PROJECT?

When we talk about the necessity of strategic cooperation between Poland and Hungary, from a historical perspective it has to be understood as the need of cooperation among the regions between the Baltic Sea and the Adriatic Sea, thus regions located both north and south of the Carpathian Mountains. For several hundred years, especially during the period when our countries were experiencing a boom, these regions were located on the territories of two countries, Poland and Hungary, which were cooperating closely. Today, in the south there are already seven countries. Since one of the most significant conditions for the rapid development of Central and Eastern Europe is the organic cooperation 4/2020

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Interview of the whole region, the collaboration between Poland and Hungary is fundamental, but not sufficient enough.

The Hungarian government is aware of this, therefore the goal of Hungary’s active policy in Central Europe is to rebuild the harmonious cooperation and synergy of the countries of the Carpathian Basin, mainly in economic terms. Consequently, the Hungarian efforts go perfectly with the Three Seas Initiative, especially since the Hungarian government considers the development of transport and energy infrastructure its primary goal while the Three Seas Initiative has declared this its central task. Accordingly, it is essential to do everything to speed up the implementation of these plans and to create long-term, favorable political conditions for the Three Seas Initiative in all countries of the region. Within the framework of this project it is vital to build real trust among the countries located south of the Carpathian Mountains.

Poland has a great responsibility to convince itself and its partners about the need for the Three Seas Initiative as well as to emphasize that the goal of an active Central European policy of the Hungarian government is not to rebuild the so-called Greater Hungary – as some Polish analysts also suppose – but to reconstruct the Central and Eastern Europe, in which no nation dominates, but they respect each other. The Three Seas Initiative, which focuses on building infrastructure that connects the countries of the region, creates favorable conditions for the nations to get rid of their fears, thus releasing the powerful energy that has been long stuck among the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. As a result, one of the themes of Polish-Hungarian strategic cooperation should be to coordinate efforts for the effectiveness of the Three Seas Initiative.

AS A CONSUL GENERAL YOU WERE ALSO COMMITTED TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION

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OF THE CULTURES OF BOTH COUNTRIES. WHAT CONNECTS THE POLES AND THE HUNGARIANS? CAN WE FIND ANY COMMON FEATURES IN OURSELVES?

It is not easy to give a clear answer to this question. As far as the sources of these mysterious ties connecting the Poles and the Hungarians are concerned, we certainly have to search for them in shared cultural codes, mostly influenced by Christianity and adopted by the Poles and the Hungarians almost simultaneously.

Implementation of the Latin rite, which brought the achievements of ancient Rome, along with its ideals and the Latin language – the official language of the Hungarian state until 1844 – affected us most. Ideals and models emerged on the basis of this Latin Christian culture. Firstly, they became standard for the Hungarians belonging to the nobility and later for all those who wanted to be part of the nation.

These requirements and ideals are nearly identical for the Poles and the Hungarians: patriotism, primacy of freedom, common good and honor. Moreover, among the mutual features there is a strong sense of duty to defend the whole Europe (the Christian world) against the threat of extermination. This quality has developed gradually over the centuries as a result of the fact that Poland and Hungary – located on the periphery of Latin Europe – were the first ones to face repeated attempts of armed conquest of Europe by the aggressive Eastern powers. It is worth noting that these common traits are most evident in difficult and tragic moments, both in private life and in the history of the nation. When it was supposed that the rapid progress of postculture had wiped out “old, unfashionable sentiments,” any tragedy of one of our nations always evoked extraordinary solidarity, generosity and readiness to help “brothers” from the other one.

Berenika Grabowska December 2020

US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLAND AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Wojciech Kwiatkowski, PhD

The US presidential election was held in November 2020. It was a significant event not only for America and its citizens, but also for the whole world. The candidates, put forward by the two largest parties in the United States, included the incumbent President Donald Trump, the Republican Party nominee, and Joseph Biden, representing the Democratic Party. In this year’s election, the position of Vice President was more important than usual, as the VP is second in line of presidential succession (which is relevant given the age of both candidates), performs the tasks assigned by the President on a daily basis and is a natural candidate of the party in the 2024 election.

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United States

DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE AND FORMER VICE PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN SPEAKS AT HIS ELECTION NIGHT EVENT. WILMINGTON, DE, USA, NOVEMBER 3, 2020.

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s a preliminary matter, it should be noted that there is a bipartisan consensus among the American politicians on the general course of US foreign policy and the protection of broadly defined US interests beyond its borders. Therefore, even a possible shift in the White House should not significantly affect the perception of Poland or other Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) by the USA. Since regaining its sovereignty, Poland has been able to maintain good relations with the USA regardless of the political background of the American President’s administration. On the other hand, a change in the Oval Office always translates into some novelties in the foreign policy – especially since it is not conducted on an ongoing basis by one person only, but a number of people forming the administration.

This is especially important in the current situation as the liberal (“progressive”) left wing of the Democratic Party has been significantly strengthened, and its

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© Jim Lo Scalzo (PAP/EPA)

political ideology is entirely different from that of Donald Trump.

US POLICY TOWARDS THE EU AND NATO

If Donald Trump won, his presidency would actually be a continuation of his relations with Europe. They latter are based on the principle that certain issues, established decades ago in a slightly different state of affairs and considered irrefutable, must be redefined in order to maintain American leadership in the world. With regard to economic issues, such actions are relevant. In the European context, the America First policy, promoted by Donald Trump, is a consequence of the permanently negative balance of US trade with the EU. Likewise, it is supported by the assumption that countries, such as Germany, have begun to use the EU’s economic potential to weaken the US economy and thus undermine the dominant position of the US in the world. Moreover, Donald Trump’s unfavorable words about NATO should

US Presidential Election from the Perspective of Poland and Central and Eastern Europe also be understood rather as a call for European countries, especially Germany, to review their position to date with regard to financing mutual security. In fact, this system cannot be based on the strength of a single entity alone. Especially if it bears the vast majority of the costs while the beneficiaries of this solution invest in the growth of their economies and develop social programs for their citizens without even covering the substantial cost of American troops stationing on their territory. Additionally, it is impossible not to notice that the economically strongest EU country – Germany – ruthlessly and without an agreement with the US and multiple European countries, is enhancing its economic relations with the Russian Federation, the best example of which is currently the Nord Stream 2 project.

Furthermore, the bone of contention in relations between numerous EU countries and the United States turned out to be a completely different attitude towards Iran (breaking the nuclear agreement in addition to introducing sanctions against EU companies doing business there by the USA), securing the position of Israel in the Middle East (the matter of recognizing the capital of Israel turned out to be divisive), or fighting climate change (the best example of which was the withdrawal of the USA from the Paris Agreement).

It is difficult to make an unambiguous assessment about whether Poland can gain anything from this type of animosity in the long run, especially since it has been a member of the European Union for several years and it exports more than 80% of its goods to this market. During Donald Trump’s term, Poland signed economically beneficial long-term gas contracts with the USA. This matter may be treated as a promotion of American LNG export to Europe (after the decision of the

current administration to develop the shale gas sector and open the domestic extraction sector, America has become a key player in the global oil and gas market). However, for Poland and many CEECs, it is a vital element of energy sovereignty. Furthermore, without regard to the EU position, the Americans have expressed their willingness to support the Polish government in developing nuclear energy in Poland. This is substantial because, according to more and more liberal and left-wing European politicians, it is necessary to move away from this source of energy. Likewise, it should be emphasized that thanks to the current administration, the United States has been actively involved in the infrastructure and energy concept of the Three Seas Initiative, which is crucial for Poland and CEECs. This scheme is also considered by the Americans as an alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. However, the desire to eliminate development inequalities in Europe and deepen the integration of CEECs with the West without the direct participation of Germany was in a way backed by the USA with one billion dollars transferred to the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund.

Separately, it should be mentioned that equally crucial decisions to significantly increase the contingent of American troops in Poland and to sell highly advanced military technology were made under the current administration.

This fact alone, of course, will not guarantee Poland’s security, but it is an important sign that Poland is a reliable partner of the US as well as that certain infrastructure and military equipment will be fully compatible with the American one. The idea of reducing the American contingent in Germany by 12,000 soldiers should be considered a negative consequence of the policy of the Trump administration towards 4/2020

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United States Germany and NATO. This is dangerous for Poland and other CEECs because this administration rarely comments on the transfer of troops withdrawn from there, e.g., to the country on the Vistula, which in turn might significantly weaken NATO’s eastern flank.

As for the second candidate, it seems that Joseph Biden will return to the traditional American foreign policy of supporting integration processes in Europe. It will be much more welcomed by the liberal left-wing European politicians, especially the German ones.

In the opinion of Biden’s associates, the adoption of such an approach will ensure that Europe is able to solve some problems (that are important for it) on its own, or with little involvement of the USA. Furthermore, it will be able to effectively unburden or support the USA in the international arena in solving global problems (such as the growing status of China). It seems that the Biden administration will particularly count on the Federal Republic of Germany in the process of implementing these goals – due to ideological similarities and the fact that it is the strongest country in Europe. Consequently, the relations of the United States, Poland, and CEECs will be seen by this administration from the angle of the relations with the authorities in Berlin. Undoubtedly, however, the aforementioned economic and trade projects with Poland will be continued. Given the fact that they bring measurable financial benefits to America, relatively stabilize jobs in the USA, or are an element of a policy towards China and Russia, they are backed by both the Republicans and the Democrats.

However, the need to allocate large sums of money in the federal budget to fix the national economy after the pandemic will require a thorough review of the most expensive modernization programs for the army. Hence, it can be assumed that the potential new administration should maintain the demands of the previous one, which concern greater expenditure of the European allies on the modernization of their armies, following the Wales Summit Declaration of 2014.

The reconstruction of the US economy may also force Biden’s administration to freeze or even limit the number of US troops in Poland – even though this decision was made in the US some time ago as a cross-party consensus and that the Polish side has committed itself to partially cover the costs of this operation.

This would be another small step towards the reconciliation with the authorities in Berlin, which had distanced themselves from this Polish-American project from the very beginning.

It could be expected that the Biden administration will also strive to quickly reach an agreement on nuclear disarmament with the Russian Federation. This correlates with the end of the New START treaty signed by Obama and Medvedev in 2010. The financial matter is not without significance here – extending the program’s provisions for another five years may bring America savings of several billion dollars a year. It can be assumed that possible concessions from Russia in this respect would be rewarded by the American administration, e.g., at the expense of Polish interests.

THE NORD STREAM 2 CASE

Additionally, the role of the USA in the North Atlantic Alliance will return to the status prior to 2017. Most probably, Joseph Biden will clearly confirm the traditional role of the USA in this organization.

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The two candidates take up the issue of preventing the completion of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which is crucial for Poland but also for many CEECs. American politicians from both parties see

US Presidential Election from the Perspective of Poland and Central and Eastern Europe

US PRESIDENT-ELECT JOE BIDEN DELIVERS HIS VICTORY ADDRESS AFTER BEING DECLARED THE WINNER IN THE 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. WILMINGTON, DE, USA, NOVEMBER 7, 2020.

© Jim Lo Scalzo (PAP/EPA)

halting this scheme as an element affecting Europe’s energy independence from Russia, hence the cross-party consensus on American sanctions on this project.

It is also certain that immediately after the election, the administrations of both candidates would like to fine-tune the already existing restrictions (imposed in accordance with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act and Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act).

Certainly, they will take into account the amendments proposed by the Congress this summer to include the so-called pipe laying activities (if adopted by the Congress and signed by the President, they will come into force retroactively from December 20, 2019). This includes, for instance, sanctions for companies providing investment guarantees for this project, in addition to companies offering insurance or reinsurance for ships involved in pipe-laying activities or welding equipment.

Berlin, hand in hand with Moscow, will work on a project undermining the US assumptions concerning security in Europe.

This administration might also continue the rigorous approach to the sanctions and consistency in finding further loopholes.

Moreover, one can expect silent support for the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK), which has imposed a fine of about 6.5 billion euros on Gazprom. However, the response of the administration of the Democratic candidate is unknown. Joseph Biden has repeatedly announced that he is striving to normalize transatlantic relations, which requires an agreement with the authorities in Berlin, for whom the completion of the gas pipeline is a strategic issue. With this in mind, it could be argued that an attempt of the United States to, for example, deviate from a strict approach to sanctions, could be made in exchange for certain concessions from the German side.

The position of the Donald Trump administration is clear on this issue, and no changes are expected – the US will not defend Germany (and provide the financial benefits associated with the US army presence in Germany). The authorities in

A greater threat to the Polish economy could be observed in the implementation of the Biden-Harris electoral promise on climate change, i.e., the decarbonization of the global economy, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and

CLIMATE CHANGE

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United States internationalization of the fight against climate change. According to the Democrats, America’s departure from oil should be coupled with similar actions in the European Union. Therefore, it could be expected that the Biden administration will reach an agreement with Germany quite quickly in this matter. This country is already imposing political discourse regarding this issue throughout the EU and is actively promoting its own “green energy” technology. Consequently, the US may attempt to exert pressure on Poland and CEECs to quickly transform their economies and move away from coal. This action will then be coupled with similar steps taken at the EU level by politicians representing the largest, relatively modern, and developed EU economies.

This phenomenon would have been unlikely if Donald Trump remained in the Oval Office for the next four years.

Already during the election campaign, he was against the abandonment of oil and gas extracted from shales by the US as well as the imposition of strict greenhouse gas standards, considering them factors that limit the development and competitiveness of the US economy. Moreover, he strongly emphasized the financial interests of the countries promoting the Green New Deal.

OTHER ISSUES

Regardless of who will be sitting in the White House in January 2021, one should not expect a softening of the US position on the annexation of a part of Ukrainian territory by Russia or recent events in Belarus. The existence of these countries and their relative independence from Russia is an important component in ensuring the security and stability of the whole of Europe. Supporting them is also consistent with the American ethos as well as crucial for the security of Poland and other CEECs. Both administrations will take a similar stance on Jewish claims against Poland for 18

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the so-called “heirless property.” The US seems to be immune to the fact that the Polish law is compatible with the generally accepted rules of inheritance, according to which if the deceased has no heirs, the property is transferred to the state.

Therefore, further pressure from the US in this regard should be expected.

It is also of little importance who will be sitting in the Oval Office when it comes to matters such as protecting American corporations and technology giants in Europe. The issue of blocking the adoption of the so-called digital tax by European countries becomes particularly significant. Moreover, the rationale of protecting American companies will be important in the context of obstructing activities of the Polish authorities aimed at limiting the participation of foreign entities in the Polish media market. It is worth noting that the incumbent President regularly falls victim to manipulation and other reprehensible practices by the largest American media corporations or social networking sites. In contrast, in the United States, media are subject to strict regulations of federal antitrust law and supervision by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).

It can be stated with a great deal of certainty that the Biden administration will regularly raise the issue of whether Poland or some CEECs are violating “democratic standards” or the principles of the “rule of law.” These matters, which have been repeatedly mentioned by the politicians of the Democratic Party over the past several years, were vaguely raised by him during the current election campaign. This is remarkable because these allegations come from a politician who is actively supported by the people participating in acts of vandalism and violence (or justifying them) that could be witnessed in America nowadays. This includes those who incite violations of federal immigration and

Š Erin Schaff (PAP/ EPA)

US Presidential Election from the Perspective of Poland and Central and Eastern Europe

US PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP (R) MEETS WITH POLISH PRESIDENT ANDRZEJ DUDA (L) IN THE OVAL OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON, D.C., USA, JUNE 24, 2020.

electoral laws or who show far-reaching contempt for the work of law enforcement.

Moreover, this politician sees no threat to democracy or freedom of speech in his own country where social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, censor the posts of right-wing and conservative users, vaguely referring to the protection of personal rights of undefined individuals in the process.

CONCLUSIONS

Looking at the history of relations between Poland and the USA, one must bear in mind that, for the latter, they were always a part of the US strategy for Europe. Therefore, in the case of both candidates, it could be expected that the subject of having good relations with Poland will not be a priority. The bipartisan arrangements of American politicians to protect the American interests in this region will be implemented regardless of who is ultimately sworn in as the president. Certainly, the key issue for the US during this term will be to rebuild the economy after the COVID-19 pandemic as well as to establish a stable and predictable front against China and, to some extent, against Russia. In these matters, the role of Poland and other CEECs seems to be quite marginal. However, Poland should consistently make its voice

heard (especially when it comes to the threat from Russia or the construction of Nord Stream 2). Furthermore, it should strive for closer relations with the US in military and economic terms. The victory of any candidate will give Poland such opportunities, and this is undoubtedly excellent news. Over the past decades, Poland has proven that it can establish good relations with politicians from both American parties. Nevertheless, if Joseph Biden wins, the Polish authorities should take into account that the current ability to build relations with the US would be put to the test. Firstly, because of dissimilar views of a large part of his staff from those prevailing among the current administration in Poland. Secondly, due to the announcements about reaching an agreement with Europe on the basis of arrangements with the economically strongest EU countries. From this perspective, the victory of Donald Trump would be more favorable, especially since he does not hide his sympathy for Poland.

Moreover, we know most of his closest associates.

Wojciech Kwiatkowski December 2020

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China

FIVE-YEAR GROWTH PLAN OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: MARCHING TOWARDS SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND TECHNOLOGY SUPERPOWER Paweł Paszak INTRODUCTION

Between October 26 and 29, 2020, the fifth plenary session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China took place in Beijing.

The Central Committee is one of the key constitutional bodies in the People‘s Republic of China (PRC), responsible for setting directions for the country‘s development policy. At the meeting, Chinese officials submitted proposals to both the latest five-year blueprint and National Economic and Social Development and the Long-Range 20

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Objectives Through the Year 2035.

Unlike in the past years, no specific growth rate target for the coming five years was outlined, although in his November 3 speech, Xi Jinping said it is „completely possible“ for China to double the size of its economy over the next fifteen years. Putting his ambitions into practice would mean overtaking the United States in terms of its nominal gross domestic product – a symbolic turning point in world politics and the success of China‘s propaganda machine.

But the doubling the size of the economy

Five-Year Growth Plan of the People's Republic of China: Marching towards Self-Sufficiency and Technology Superpower

A FLAG OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS DISPLAYED OUTSIDE THE WEST KOWLOON LAW COURTS BUILDING IN HONG KONG. HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. NOVEMBER 23, 2020.

remains somewhat an economic reverie as it would require an average growth of 4.7% per year. With current challenges having ther origin in the growing debt, social inequalities, or demographic crisis, it will be extremely difficult to achieve this result.

Beijing hopes to achieve its bold albeit little realistic plan through the highquality development scheme, paving its way for both satisfying aspirations of the Chinese society and claiming victory in the country‘s systemic competition with the United States. Behind these efforts – as their conceptual framework – is China‘s „dual circulation“ strategy signalling Beijing‘s tilt towards further increasing the role of consumption and that of its domestic

© Jerome Favre (PAP/EPA)

market while relying less on imports and goods critical for the country‘s security.

Trade and investment cooperation with the outside should serve as a complementary „circuit.“ The idea behind this brings an ambition to forge ties with other countries to benefit from mutual partnership while not excessively restricting the decisionmaking hub. If Chinese officials manage to put these plans into practice, Western and Asian democracies will find themselves under mounting pressure – economic, political, and military – resulting in progressive erosion of the liberal order worldwide. Xi Jinping and the Party‘s top leadership will seek to create a „new state system“ (新型 举国体制) to harness the growing potential of the private sector to achieve party goals.

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China

A MAN WORKS IN DONGFENG YUEDA KIA MOTORS FACTORY IN JIANGSU PROVINCE. YANCHENG, CHINA, OCTOBER 15, 2020.

MAIN DEVELOPMENT DIRECTIONS

The key for ensured growth is „development through innovation,“ with domains like digital technologies, artificial intelligence, integrated circuits, robotics, and high-tech playing a major role. The move continues the shift in China‘s development policy that occurred at the end of the first decade of the 21st century and consisted in creating domestic potential in both sciences and technology – as opposed to earlier strategy focused on bringing tech solutions from the outside. What underscores the pivotal role of the sectors as mentioned in the introduction are various initiatives undertaken under Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. These include such schemes as Made in China 2025, New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (新一代人工智能的发 展计划), China Standard 2035 (中国标准 2035) or Guidelines to Promote National Integrated Circuit Industry Development 22

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© Alex Plavevski (PAP/EPA)

(国家 集成电路 产业 发展 推进 纲).

Furthermore, September 2020 saw the announcement of a blueprint laying out China’s priorities for the development of strategic emerging industries. In the document, the emphasis was placed on major industrial hubs, poised to become “growth poles.”

In line with these guidelines, Beijing has been consistent in boosting its R&D (research and development) spending over the past decades. It now stands at over $300 billion. However, the rise in figures did not always go hand in hand with a quality change – in many cases, funds were either spend ineffectively or even massively embezzled by local party officials. The priority for the coming years is to improve this state of affairs and spend the funds more wisely so that the loans and subsidies flow to businesses capable of bringing real value to China‘s tech advancement. Without this,

Five-Year Growth Plan of the People's Republic of China: Marching towards Self-Sufficiency and Technology Superpower a huge mobilization of resources will not facilitate genuine progress in the field of technological innovation.

Washington‘s more assertive policy over technology transfers to China has been a major strategic factor to step up efforts to achieve self-sufficiency. On August 17, 2020, the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) in the Department of Commerce further restricted access

by Huawei and its affiliates to items produced domestically and abroad from US technology and software. Foreign chip manufacturers were banned from selling those developed or produced using US technology to Huawei without a special license. The Shenzhen-based company might thus encounter serious obstacles to build processing units for its cuttingedge devices as all plants rely on US tech solutions. This pushed both Huawei‘s management staff and the Chinese authorities towards even greater efforts to develop own software and critical electronic components.

Chips/semiconductors are tech branches exerting decisive influence on the ability to exploit the potential of 5G and 6G networks, artificial intelligence, or quantum computers. In 2019, Chinese companies purchased $304 billion worth of foreign-made semiconductors, while, according to the world‘s leading consulting businesses, the global market will witnesss dynamic growth in the coming years, reaching the value of $600 billion by 2022. On August 4, 2020, China‘s State Council responded to these trends with its paper titled Several Policies for Expediting High- quality Growth of the Integrated Circuit Sector and Software Sector in a New Era (新时期促进集成电路 产业和软件产业高质量发展的若干政策).

It offers new tax incentives for 28nm chip manufacturers being on the market for more than 15 years. It serves as an example of far better targeted state aid intended to

strengthen „national champions.“ Perhaps the blueprint – due to its economic and strategic importance – alongside the ambitious plan to form an independent chip industry – will become one of the pillars of the latest five-year plan.

Besides the emphasis on the bigger fund-spending efficiency, infrastructure projects will occupy their traditional major role in China‘s economic policy.

However, unlike in past decades, more money will be earmarked for what is referred to as „new infrastructure“ (新型 基础). At its May meeting, the National People’s Congress agreed to push $1.4 trillion worth of financial package to sustain seven selected areas by 2035.

According to the government-run think tank CCID, an institution under the Ministry of Science and Industry, between 2020 and 2025, spending may stand at between 10 and 17.5 trillion yuan ($1.43–2.51 trillion). The scheme includes 5G wireless network, industrial Internet, modern transport, data centers, artificial intelligence, high voltage transmission infrastructure, and electric vehicle charging stations. Both how much China is intending to spend and on what domains indicates that Beijing is developing an actual framework of a digital economy to serve its 1.4 billion people. The rollout of 5G base stations will allow broad implementation of smart city and e-commerce solutions and robotize production facilities while increasing the reach of the Internet of Things and creating a huge database to develop artificial intelligence. For their part, electric vehicle charging stations might facilitate the spread of the world‘s biggest electric vehicle market.

China‘s blueprint for tech expansion by 2035 includes the Beijing-devised vision of a „green deal“ that allows the country to hit peak emissions before 2035 and carbon neutrality by 2060, 4/2020

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China according to President Xi Jinping. China‘s energy transition is expected to both enhance environmental conditions and the state‘s image worldwide, as well as to create a cutting-edge sector of renewable and nuclear energy and that of electric vehicles. Taking advantage of their gigantic market potential adds an opportunity to strengthen Beijing‘s development dynamics while curbing tech domination of Western nations.

Environment-friendly technologies may turn into a critical part of export and investment schemes under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Energy projects often come as the core of economic cooperation with emerging economies in Latin America, Africa, and Southeastern Asia. According to data from the Global Development Policy Center (GDCP), between 2000 and 2018, Chinese companies and banks invested funds to construct or modernize 777 power plants with a total capacity of 186.5 GW in 83 countries across the globe.

Efforts to improve the quality of air, soil, and water are a nod towards the Chinese middle class, for whom environmental degradation has become an increasingly burning issue in recent decades.

Incorporating eco-related demands is all the more critical that the Chinese middle class is the basis for legitimizing steps by the Communist Party of China.

Maintaining the support of this evergrowing group, the number of which may exceed 500 million people by 2035, thus becomes the must for the Party. For these reasons, the building of an „ecological civilization“ in recent years has become a permanent element of Xi Jinping‘s speeches and official messages from state institutions and the media.

The scale of the challenge is massive as China remains responsible for around 30% of global greenhouse gas emissions while the proportion of coal in its energy mix stands at 57.5%. By 2020, China will 24

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© Gu Feng (PAP/EPA)

have 1,100 GW of coal-fired power plants – far more than other same-type energy plants combined worldwide. However, Beijing plans to curb its proportion of coal in the energy mix to 40% by 2040, notably by putting much money into renewable and nuclear energy.

One should thus take seriously Chinese declarations on climate neutrality.

The progress achieved so far while implementing the environment-friendly policy suggests that China is able to attain that goal. If this were only about the environment, there will be many more doubts, yet the Chinese-made „green deal“ is also a business venture poised to send an extra economic stimulus and ease social discontent. In addition to how rapidly it will be implemented, there comes social pressure from the Chinese middle class and the desire of Chinese officials to improve the image of the People’s Republic of China worldwide.

Five-Year Growth Plan of the People's Republic of China: Marching towards Self-Sufficiency and Technology Superpower

THE MSA SHIP HAIXUN-31 OF CHINA'S MARITIME SAFETY ADMINISTRATION LEAVES THE PORT AFTER A BRIEF STOP FOR SUPPLIES IN HAINAN PROVINCE. SANYA, CHINA, MARCH 9, 2014.

These factors make the green transition a permanent element of both the five-year plan and long-term activities carried out by both the state and top party officials. „Critical point“ in the history of the People‘s Republic of China, or why tech transformation has become a strategic imperative for Beijing The Chinese authorities focused on hightech development, gaining a top position in global value chains and energy transition amid the worsening social and international situation and deficiencies in the existing growth model. According to Secretary General Xi Jinping and strategic papers such as the 2019 Security White Paper, China is now at a “critical moment” in its whole contemporary history. It is hard not to disagree with these statements as the Chinese state faces complex challenges going far beyond

the domestic or international domains.

Both the future of the Communist Party of China and the outcome of China’s long-term competition with the United States depend on whether the Chinese authorities are able to stimulate the tech and resource-related progress of the People’s Republic of China. With economic intertwines between these two and their military and nuclear potential, any all-out conflict could bring about dramatic losses to both participants and those not being involved. This makes domains like economics, financial markets, and technology the key areas of competition to win the position of the world’s most powerful state.

The intensified rivalry between superpowers stands as one of the top factors making it difficult for Chinese businesses and the state to expand its influence across the world. As Donald 4/2020

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China Trump took office in January 2017, a new, far more confrontational chapter opened in the US-China ties. Since the early days of the 21st century, political elites have raised mounting awareness of China‘s growing threat to the position of the United States. It was nevertheless Donald Trump who unequivocally recognized China as the biggest challenge for the US policy and introduced the issue to the broad public discourse. In yet another example of harsh and rulebreaking rhetoric toward China – even Joe Biden allowed himself during his presidential campaign to call Xi Jinping „a thug.“ Trump‘s four years in office (2017–2021) brought a global diplomatic offensive, a bigger US defense budget, and economic efforts to contain the growing influence of the People‘s Republic of China. While what is known as the trade war failed to bring any goals, a package of sanctions on Huawei restricting its access to semiconductors and software dealt a serious blow to the Chinese tech company. As the United States exerted pressure on its partners and allies over the rollout of 5G technology, the Chinese telecoms giant faced barriers for its further expansion in Europe and production of cutting-edge mobile devices. As for the above, in their speeches, Xi Jinping, Prime Minister Li Keqiang, and China‘s Technology Minister Wang Zhingang tend to mention the issue of the country‘s tech self-sufficiency in the context of China‘s sovereignty in foreign policy. As long as China is reliant on foreign-made goods, its policies are constrained.

In Beijing‘s immediate vicinity, the countries of Quad (short for Quadrilateral Security Dialogue group) – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – have noticeably strengthened their defense ties. As they held high-level dialogue, conducted joint military drills, shared intelligence data, 26

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and were involved in logistical cooperation, Beijing feared the group being an Asia-based NATO-like structure tasked with containing China.

Although it is an exaggeration to make such comparisons, the very dynamics of cooperation and its course comes as unfavorable for the People‘s Republic of China. China‘s breakdown in ties with India over skirmishes on the disputed border areas of Eastern Ladakh push the latter country into greater cooperation with the US, Japan, and Australia to mitigate threats from a more powerful neighbor.

Uncomfortable shifts are not only relevant to the United States or some Indo-Pacific states. Amid China‘s increasingly confrontational policy, the country‘s image worldwide worsened sharply in the eyes of highly developed nations. A survey that Pew Research carried out in October 2020 found that 70% of respondents from OECD states had a negative view of China – a result mirroring the growing antipathy of the West towards actions by the Chinese authorities. However, it is not the image that determines the rank in the international hierarchy, but the state‘s material power channeled in offensive capabilities of the armed forces as well as the economy, with both its condition and structure. Nevertheless, social reluctance will naturally affect policies in developed countries that will be increasingly cautious about cooperation with China. This could hinder investment prospect and obstruct efforts to build critical infrastructure, allow technology transfers, and shape technical standards.

As for domestic affairs, the authorities have to deal with the structural problems of the Chinese economy, for which in many cases they hold personal accountability. What stands out is the rapidly growing level of household

Five-Year Growth Plan of the People's Republic of China: Marching towards Self-Sufficiency and Technology Superpower indebtedness. Since 2008, its level has increased from 17.87% of GDP to over 56%, and from 40% to 120% of disposable income. While the rate of 56% is still lower than in many developed economies, the mere fact of how rapidly it goes up is disturbing for the authorities in Beijing.

Similar processes also tend to occur at the state level. Total Chinese debt rose from 302% of GDP to nearly 318% in the first quarter of 2020, according to estimates published by the Institute of International Finance (IIF). The group expected that ratio to reach 335% of GDP in Q2.

With these problems come others, including ineffective government investment schemes, shadow banking sector, and risky loans (some 15–16%).

Entrepreneurs voice concerns over the Party‘s efforts to expand control on other domains of the private sectors as these attempts might run the risk of subordinating companies to the political agenda of the People‘s Republic of China.

For many years now, disproportions have grown between the country‘s wealthiest provinces in the east and those in both west and center. Despite Beijing‘s prosocial rhetoric having its roots in the ideological legacy of the People‘s Republic of China, this gap is likely to maintain, and even grow bigger as the country‘s richest areas in the east are capable of generating both growth and innovations to start an equal rivalry with the United States. Doubts arise also over China’s pension system that is likely to see increasing pressure with the country’s rapidly ageing population.

CONCLUSIONS

China‘s five-year plan (2021–2025) comes as a deliberate response from the country‘s authorities to the ever-bigger pressure from the United States as well as the slowdown in economic growth, and the expectations from the Chinese. The new strategy is to be a step towards victory in the global struggle for influence and position in the global

economic system. The stake is extremely high – gaining domination worldwide while keeping the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China at home. The top goal is to introduce a quality change in the Chinese economy to move China from being the „world‘s largest assembly facility“ to the hub tasked with designing and producing the highest added-value goods.

Strengthening the Party‘s social mandate and efforts to develop a high degree of self-sufficiency will lead to Beijing‘s evergrowing confrontational policy. A lesser degree of dependence will boost the extent to Beijing‘s sovereignty in foreign policy and thus unlock actions that would be too costly under the current circumstances.

Those that would first acknowledge China‘s new assertiveness will be Asian nations locked in territorial disputes with Beijing.

The implications of China‘s growing power will not be limited to this region only. For Europe, China‘s „long march“ towards becoming a tech superpower means mounting economic competition of the Europe-based high-tech industry. With the growth in China‘s power, the liberal world order will continue to erode. As for now, international institutions or individual states hold very limited powers to enforce worldwide standards and human rights protection. As China will boost its capacity to shape the situation worldwide, other system-alike regimes will grow in power while human rights protection will weaken.

Despite their relative vulnerability, Western nations are still holding a position of power in many domains. Maintaining the lead in critical technologies is important not only to provide development opportunities, but also to preserve and promote the values that should guide humanity. However, it will require closely coordinated actions and cooperation – both transatlanticeand between partner democracies around the globe.

Paweł Paszak December 2020 4/2020

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Belarus

BELARUS'S REVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL GAME

Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski, Professor

Significant political processes never have a single cause. The ongoing revolution in Belarus also results from multiple factors; it is complicated and constantly changing. It is taking place in a country located at the meeting point of the West and the postimperial sphere of influence of Russia. Therefore, it contributes to the preservation or the collapse of a Russian neo-imperial agenda. For this reason, its outcome is crucial for the security of Russia's European neighbors, and, as such, it engages the interests of the members of the European Union and NATO, including the US – the transatlantic alliance's hegemon.

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Belarus's Revolution in the International Game: Causes, Nature, Effects, and Interests of Major Players

© ITAR-TASS

BELARUSIAN PRESIDENT ALEXANDER LUKASHENKO IN A MILITARY UNIFORM DURING MILITARY EXERCISES ON THE TRAINING GROUND NEAR GRODNO. BELARUS, SEPTEMBER 7. 2001.

REASONS – THE LEGACY OF HISTORY

Since the 13th century, Belarus was a part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Since 1385, the two countries, as well as Poland, shared the same rulers. In 1569, it became part of the Duchy and thus formed, together with the Kingdom of Poland, the Commonwealth of Both Nations. Belarus has long democratic and parliamentary traditions – dating back to 1445.

The Moscow invasion of 1654–1667 resulted in a demographic ruin of the country (with the population loss reaching from 13% to 80%, depending on the region) and the disappearance of its elites. As a result, in the second half of the 17th century, Belarus became Polonized

to a great extent – especially with respect to high culture1. At the end of the 18th century, Belarus was conquered by Russia and profoundly Russified in the following centuries. This process was combined with the destruction of the national achievements of previous eras – first by the tsarist rule, later by the communist USSR, and the periods of genocide, conducted by Russia during the Stalinist and German–Russian periods of World War II. In 1812, between 1916 and 1921 as well as 1941 and 1944, Belarus served as the battlefield of the fighting powers, the clashes of which were destroying the country.

Sahanowicz H., Historia Białorusi do końca XVIII wieku, Lublin, 2002, pp. 272–284.

1

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Belarus The elites of Belarus took part in the Polish national uprisings against Russia in 1768–1772, 1794, 1812, 1831, and 1863–1864. The last of these uprisings – partly of a folk character – has become a legend of modern Belarusian national identity. An important moment of a mental breakthrough, which contributed to the current national awakening in Belarus, was discovering the remains of its lost leaders. Among them was a national hero Konstanty Kalinowski, hanged by the Russians in Vilnius in 1864, secretly buried, found in 2017. He was then solemnly buried in 2019 in the presence of the presidents of Poland and Lithuania and the mass participation of Belarusians.

The West does not know this; they do not teach it in schools. For the average Westerner, Belarus is a “Western Russia,” having for centuries belonged to the Russian state. Lithuanians and Poles look at Belarus differently. It is hard to convey the intricacies of this way of thinking in such a short text, so let it suffice as an explanation to say that, for us, it is like Scotland for the English – except that 200 years ago, a foreign power (also a tyrant) would have detached it from Great Britain and tortured it in various ways. The Belarusian opposition rejected the Lukashenko flag’s post-Soviet symbolism and reached for the old Lithuanian Pahonia (lit. pursuit).

The Lithuanians feel what the English would have felt if, after 200 years of foreign rule over Scotland, the Union Jack had appeared, and Scottish citizens, who had been reduced to slavery for generations, had called out: “We want Parliament!” and added: “We were with you at Blenheim and Waterloo, at Balaclava and Omdurman, in Flanders and Somme, at Dunkirk and El Alamein.

Here are our banners. Do you still remember them?” Between 1569 and 1863, a sign of the Lithuanian Pahonia was placed next to the Polish Eagle on all the banners of the Republic of Poland and Lithuania, as 30

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well as on those carried by the insurgents.

Today, it flies over the awakened Belarus.

It is not difficult to deduce how Lithuanians and Poles perceive this situation. This is how the English would look at Scotland awakened from captivity. “Were not our hearts burning within us” (Luke 24:32) as now in Poles and Lithuanians? History matters. Without knowing it, it is not easy to understand the current commitment of Poland and Lithuania to the situation in Belarus.

CAUSES – A SYSTEMIC CRISIS

The sources of the crisis of the political system in Belarus are multidimensional.

Lukashenko took office in 1994. He has now been in power for 26 years. When reaching for his position, he dealt with a society that grew up under Soviet totalitarian dictatorship – isolated from contacts with the outside world for several decades. Today Belarus has a new active generation, born and raised in an independent Belarus; watching the world either directly, for instance, when traveling to Poland and Lithuania, or on the Internet – by participating in the global circulation of information. The dictator – the former director of a kolkhoz – understood his compatriots a quarter of a century ago and was able to manipulate their mentality.

Now, he has trouble understanding the current generation Likewise, his secret services do not understand that – in the era of digitization – covering the faces of police officers with masks, when they are beating the demonstrators, does not prevent them from being identified.

This is usually done by comparing photos from social media with the photos of the regime’s advocates, taken by reporters or witnesses. They are no longer anonymous.

Their neighbors and families might now see them “in action”2.

Hakerzy walczą z reżimem: co białoruscy “cyberpartyzanci” mogą osiągnąć w konfrontacji z Łukaszenką?, Biuletyn Informacyjny Studium Europy Wschodniej UW, September 17, 2020, 2

Belarus's Revolution in the International Game: Causes, Nature, Effects, and Interests of Major Players At least since 2011, the economic situation in Belarus has been systematically deteriorating3. Russia cannot afford to subsidize this economy with cheap energy resources. In 2016, the US evolved from an importer of crude oil and natural gas to their exporter; Russia came into conflict with OPEC, and all this was compounded by the fuel price crisis caused by the COVID-19 lockdown. The lack of reforms has been weakening the Russian economy for decades. The allied Belarusian economy ceases to provide a standard of living,4 which guarantees social peace and stability of power5. The maneuver to shift responsibility for the current reality onto the predecessors is not feasible after 26 years of dictatorial rule.

Other factors destroying the image of the caring batka (father of the nation) in recent months included: Lukashenko’s grotesquely primitive disregard of the coronavirus health crisis, manifested in his recommendations to drink vodka and not forget about physical activity, the drastic course of the pandemic in the inefficient post-Soviet healthcare system, and the situation where the pandemic severely affected the elderly – his most faithful advocates to date6. https://studium.uw.edu.pl/hakerzy-walcza-zrezimem-co-bialoruscy-cyberpartyzanci-mogaosiagnac-w-konfrontacji-z-lukaszenka/.

Kłysiński K., On the verge of crisis? Mounting economic problems in Belarus, OSW Commentary 51, April 6, 2011, pp. 1–6.

3

Kłysiński K., Belarus: a wave of social discontent before presidential elections, OSW Analyses, June 1, 2020, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ analyses/2020-06-01/belarus-a-wave-socialdiscontent-presidential-elections.

4

Kłysiński K., Lukashenko›s difficult choices, OSW Analyses, July 29, 2020, https://www.osw.waw.pl/ en/publikacje/analyses/2020-07-29/Lukashenkosdifficult-choices.

5

Olchowski J., Białoruś wobec COVID-19 – bezradność i bezczynność, Komentarze IEŚ, 180 (83/2020), April 30, 2020, pp. 1–3; Kłysiński K., Białoruś wobec pandemii koronawirusa: zaprzeczanie faktom, Analizy OSW, March 18, 2020, https:// www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2020-03-18/ bialorus-wobec-pandemii-koronawirusa6

The insolence of electoral fraud was a profoundly humiliating experience for every rational Belarusian. Perhaps the election results in which the dictator received 50.7% of votes or 53%, would be easier to believe. However, the authorities announced that 80.2% of Belarusians voted for Lukashenko, and only 9.9% for his opponent Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, which was an extreme arrogance7. As a nation, the Belarusian people were first humiliated by the apparent lies they were told to believe and then subjected to brutal police terror. Such things simply cannot be forgiven.

Heavily experienced by history, Belarus greatly appreciates peace, understood as the absence of war. The assessment of Lukashenko’s dictatorship from the position of minimalistic expectations of masses of people, the older generation, in particular, could be expressed in this sentence: “Let him rule as he wishes as long as there was no war.” Meanwhile, as a result of the course of action adopted after August 9 to strengthen ties with Russia “within the framework of a Union State,” the Belarusians are increasingly offered the prospect of a country that is entangled in Russian military conflicts – from Syria and Libya to Ukraine. The memory of young Belarusians who were killed in Afghanistan at the command of Moscow has not yet faded. No one would like such a situation to happen again.

There were no significant anti-Russian sentiments in Belarus, which was internationalized and Sovietized to an even greater extent than Russia8. Now, people are zaprzeczanie-faktom; Kłysiński K., Żochowski P., Zaklinanie rzeczywistości: Białoruś w obliczu pandemii COVID-19, Komentarze OSW 324, April 3, 2020, pp. 1–5.

Kłysiński K., Mass protests in Belarus, OSW Analyses, August 10, 2020, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/ publikacje/analyses/2020-08-10/mass-protests-belarus 7

Marples D. R., Belarus: a denationalized nation, Amsterdam, 1999, p. 140. Menkiszak M., Gdy 8

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“UNION OF LUBLIN” (UNIA LUBELSKA) – AN OIL PAINTING BY JAN MATEJKO IN THE LUBLIN MUSEUM. THE PAINTING COMMEMORATES THE 300TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE POLISH–LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH ESTABLISHED BY THE UNION OF LUBLIN IN 1569. LUBLIN, POLAND, JANUARY 10, 2019.

rising up. Not as fiercely as in neighboring Ukraine, invaded by Russia – after all, there is no war in Belarus. However, it is hard not to notice who stands in the way of the nation’s will and is an ally of the hated dictator. Russia is mentally losing Belarus. The process has not yet taken place. It is in progress, but its direction and perspectives are clear. We, the Poles, remember the mental breakthrough of 1978 (the election of John Paul II) and 1980–1981 (the establishment of “Solidarity” and the introduction of the martial law). Once a nation is awakened, it cannot be easily put to sleep. Repressions can contain the movement – enforce a conspiracy, like “Solidarity” from 1981–1988, but without Europa choruje, Rosja nie jest lekarstwem, Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 72 (4/2019), pp. 41–57.

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© Wojciech Pacewicz (PAP)

conducting a genocide similar to the one ordered by Stalin, they will not break it anymore. It will win. It is now a matter of price and time.

RUSSIA IN THE FACE OF THE REVOLUTION IN BELARUS

According to a study carried out by a Russian sociologist Olga Krysztanowska, 58.3% of Russia’s political elite originates from the GRU and the KGB9. This fact and the clan-like nature of the system of power in Russia contribute to the threedimensional structure of overlapping Russian interests in relation to the situation in Belarus. Minimizing costs Miecik I. T., Czujne oczy czekisty, Polityka, 38 (2470), September 18, 2004, p. 6; Kacewicz M., Czekiści kontratakują, Newsweek, 4 (2003), January 26, 2003, pp. 40–41.

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Belarus's Revolution in the International Game: Causes, Nature, Effects, and Interests of Major Players (including the expenses of confrontation with the West regarding the Belarusian case) and maintaining the sympathy of Belarusian society is in the best interest of Russia understood as a state. As such, this is contrary to the interest of Russia as an empire, which entails the maintenance of Russian control over Belarus while also reducing the costs. Hence the low probability of Moscow’s open military intervention, but, in fact, at any necessary price. Continuing cooperation with Lukashenko, who is widely hated by the Belarusians, is therefore contrary to both the national and imperial interests of Russia. However, the latter is governed primarily by the clan interest of the Kremlin’s siloviks (the KGB members) around Putin. The President of Russia demands that his nation does not see a street rebellion that could overthrow the country’s leader, as witnessed is Belarus.

Therefore, Moscow chooses to support Lukashenko, although it is also aware of the price it is paying for this support.

He will probably be removed when it exploits the political opportunity created by the current situation – Lukashenko’s full dependence on Russia. However, due to the interest of the Kremlin clan, it must be done in a way and within a timeframe that would not allow making any assumptions that Lukashenko surrendered under the pressure from the “street”10.

By then, Moscow will have taken over strategic enterprises in Belarus and tighten military control of the country (already so strictly supervised by the Kremlin) although there is no permanent Russian operational force there, only strategically important military installations – the ballistic missile early warning radar Kamińska A.M., Carte blanche dla Kremla?

Ekspert: Putin pozwolił Łukaszence grać rosyjską kartą wojskową – pytanie, za jaką cenę, Polskie Radio 24.pl, September 24, 2020, https://www.polskieradio24. pl/5/1223/Artykul/2588658,Carte-blanche-dlaKremla-Ekspert-Putin-pozwolil-Lukaszence-gracrosyjska-karta-wojskowa-pytanie-za-jaka-cene 10

station in Hantsavichy and an underwater communications hub of the Russian Navy in Vileyka11. Belarus, squeezed in between Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine, is of fundamental military importance for Russia. Although, at first glance, the marshes along the Pripyat River separate its territory from Ukraine, creating an operationally dead area, this is a misleading observation.

The possible deployment of large Russian operational groups to the western borders of Belarus would mean crossing this border, potentially providing a basis for effective military blackmail against Kyiv.

Moreover, it would weigh on the northeastern flank of NATO (Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland). So far, however, there have been no significant changes in the military situation in Belarus. The ongoing RussianBelarusian maneuvers are a military and political demonstration, but they do not fundamentally change the balance of power in the region12.

LUKASHENKO’S TACTICS

Until the outbreak of the protests, Lukashenko created the impression of weaving between Russia and the West.

It was all a strategy. He has always been fundamentally connected with Russia. Until 1999, he hoped to become a successor to Yeltsin and pushed for close integration of Belarus and Russia.

After Putin took power in the Kremlin, he defended his freedom of decision and power in Belarus. In both cases, he was motivated by personal interest. This also continues today, and this very interest dictates his reliance on Russia – there is no Rogoża J., Chawryło K., Żochowski P., A friend in need. Russia on the protests in Belarus, OSW Commentary 349, August 20, 2020, pp. 2–3.

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Wilk A. (OSW expert) in an interview for Kamińska A.M., Carte blanche dla Kremla? Ekspert: Putin pozwolił Łukaszence grać rosyjską kartą wojskową – pytanie, za jaką cenę, Polskie Radio 24.pl, September 24, 2020, https://www.polskieradio24. pl/5/1223/Artykul/2588658,Carte-blanche-dlaKremla-Ekspert-Putin-pozwolil-Lukaszence-gracrosyjska-karta-wojskowa-pytanie-za-jaka-cene.

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Percentage of the Polish population on the territory of the Republic of Poland and east of its borders.

90%-100% 75%-89,9% 33%-47% 20%-32,9% 15%-19,9% 10%-14,9% 8%-9,9% 5%-7,9% 3%-4,9% 1%-2,9% 1% <

other option. By sending his son to a high school in Moscow in mid-September, he actually gave the Kremlin a hostage and now has no room for maneuver. At the same time, he refuses any dialogue with the opposition13. He considers the protests to be an American-Polish-Lithuanian intrigue, sometimes extending the circle of the “guilty parties” to other countries in the region. Thus, provocations evidencing a foreign inspiration for the protests and presenting Lukashenko as a defender of the country against hostile aggression by NATO (Poland and Lithuania) are very likely to happen.

Zygiel A., Łukaszenka wywiózł syna do Moskwy.

Kola będzie się uczył pod zmienionym nazwiskiem, RMF24, September 17, 2020, https://www.rmf24. pl/raporty/raport-bialorus-po-wyborach/newslukaszenka-wywiozl-syna-do-moskwy-kola-bedziesie-uczyl-pod-,nId,4737355.

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Russia is helping Lukashenko in this propaganda game. Such stories as the shooting down of an American sports balloon on the Polish-Belarusian border in 1995 and the death of two of its pilots – a provocation that was supposed to hinder Poland’s integration with NATO – may be repeated14. Lukashenko needs an armed incident at the borders to justify “a state of emergency due to external aggression.” Since 2009, the RussianBelarusian military maneuvers Zapad include a training scenario in which a Polish uprising in the Grodno region is suppressed (between 400,000 and 800,000 Poles live in Belarus; they constitute about 25% of the population around Grodno and Lida, sometimes being the local majority Federation Aeronautique Internationale. Press Release – Belarus Baloon Tragedy, September 15, 1995, http://www.unm.edu/˜mbas/fai.html.

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Belarus's Revolution in the International Game: Causes, Nature, Effects, and Interests of Major Players in the southern part of the belt along both sides of the Belarusian-Lithuanian border.

Consequently, it is likely that repressions against Poles in Belarus will take place under the slogan of fighting the fifth column. The relations between Poles and the Belarusian national movement are excellent. Historically, there was no hostility between the Poles and the Belarusians. There is no threat that provocations of the authorities in this area will inflame ethnic hatred, but they may turn out to be painful for Poland.

Polish citizens would demand an adequate response from the government of the Republic of Poland should any large-scale repression of the regime against Belarusian Poles occurred. Lukashenko and Moscow may, therefore, take advantage of the situation and play this card.

POLAND IN THE FACE OF THE SITUATION IN BELARUS – ALLIANCE WITH THE BALTIC COUNTRIES, SUPPORT IN THE REGION, AND THE REACTION OF THE EU

Poland and the Baltic States – especially Lithuania and, albeit with a delay, Ukraine – reacted the most to the situation in Belarus15. Starting from the reunion of the Weimar Triangle (Poland-GermanyFrance, August 7, 2020) until the decision of the European Council to adopt the Polish Prime Minister’s plan for Belarus, the so-called Morawiecki’s Plan (October 2, 2020), multiple activities took place on the initiative of Poland. They included: the meetings of the Lublin Triangle (Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine), and the Visegrad Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), an online conference of EU foreign ministers and a meeting of this group in the Gymnich format, Iwański T., Ukraine: relations with Belarus suspended, OSW Analyses, September 2, 2020, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ analyses/2020-09-02/ukraine-relations-belarussuspended.

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two meetings of the European Council, the Polish-Lithuanian, Polish-Baltic and Polish-Lithuanian-Romanian interpresidential declarations, consultations between the President of Poland and the Secretary-General of NATO in addition to talks between the advisors to the Presidents of Poland and the USA16.

The Polish-funded Belsat TV and Radio “Racja” (Radio Reason), as well as blogger channels such as Nexta created by the Belarusian emigration and operating from Poland, break the information monopoly of Lukashenko and Russia17.

Morawiecki’s Plan for Belarus, unanimously adopted by the 27 EU countries, is the topmost achievement of this group of activities. It is currently of primarily political importance in two aspects18. First, it demonstrates Poland’s ability to push through its projects in the EU and is a signal from the EU as well as Poland and Lithuania to the Belarusians that they are not alone and can count on serious support from the West after overthrowing the dictator. Neither the project of infrastructure investments with the use of EU financial institutions nor the consent for liberalization of the EU visa system for Belarusian citizens can be implemented unilaterally by the EU. They require the cooperation of the Belarusian state, and – as long as it is governed by Lukashenko – it will not agree to such collaboration. Therefore, it is an instrument prepared for a political situation that will come after overturning the dictatorship in Belarus, and not a Żurawski vel Grajewski P., Orzeł obok znaku Pogoni. Białoruś jako wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej, Rzeczy Wspólne, 33(2), 2020.

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Nexta wyrosła na główne źródło informacji o Białorusi, Rzeczpospolita, September 1, 2020, https:// www.rp.pl/Media-i-internet/308319886-Nextawyrosla-na-glowne-zrodlo-informacji-o-Bialorusi. html.

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Polish plan for Belarus has become EU policy – Polish PM, PAP, October 2, 2020, https://www.pap.pl/ en/news/news%2C728526%2Cpolish-plan-belarushas-become-eu-policy-polish-pm.html.

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Belarus solution that can be applied today. The EU sanctioned only 40 representatives of the regime, but not Lukashenko. Certainly, this symbolic act will not affect the Minsk’s agenda. Since 1997, the EU has administered various similar punishments on the regime, yet they have never had the expected outcome. Russia has not been penalized in any way. This is a mistake and, as a result, it is encouraging the Kremlin to intensify its interference19.

The reason for this is the position of the major EU powers – Germany and France. Supporting or opposing sanctions by other countries is of secondary importance.

GERMANY – GROWING REPUTATIONAL COSTS OF COOPERATING WITH RUSSIA

Germany, linked with Russia by a shared network of interests, the most important manifestation of which is Nord Stream 2, has acted in solidarity with this country already during the Belarusian crisis (Heiko Maas’s visit to Moscow on August 11 and his joint conference with Lavrov, at which they both criticized the US for sanctions introduced on the gas pipeline project)20. However, further defense of Putin’s Russia became quite costly for Germany’s reputation after the recent attempted murder by poison of Alexei Navalny. For this reason, Germany had to openly condemn Russia and the Belarusian regime supported by Moscow.

However, Maas’s visit to the Kremlin was undoubtedly seen as a sign that Berlin’s real political agenda will aim to pursue

common German-Russian interests.

Freeing Belarus from Russian influence would probably strengthen Poland and the eastern flank of NATO in general, consolidating it on the basis of fears of Russian revisionism and confirming its pro-American orientation. Given the state of German-US relations, this would mean further emancipation of the eastern flank of the EU from Berlin’s influence. It is doubtful that this would be the wish of the latter.

FRANCE – RUSSIA AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO US DOMINATION

Paris, with its traditional anti-American attitude, is looking for a counterbalance to US influence in Russia. France recognizes Belarus as a Russian sphere of influence, as confirmed by President Macron’s visit to Lithuania (September 28, 2020), which involved his verbal condemnation of Lukashenko, but also an appeal to cooperate with Russia in the name of “peace in Europe”21. The pursuit of collaboration with Russia is customary for French policy and there is no reason why it should change22.

THE UNITED STATES – SUSPENSION UNTIL THE ELECTION

The revolution in Belarus has started when the USA was at the end of the presidential election campaign. Until the election, Trump will not take any steps that might cost him support.

Unless Russia strikes US interests in a way requiring a direct response from Washington – for which Belarus could E. Macron w Wilnie: współpraca z Rosją jest konieczna dla trwałego pokoju, TVP Wilno, September 29, 2020, https://wilno.tvp.pl/50089299/ emacron-w-wilnie-wspolpraca-z-rosja-jestkonieczna-dla-trwalego-pokoju.

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Council Conclusions on Belarus, General Affairs Council, Brussels, September 15, 1997, Press: 269, 103-68/97.

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LIVE: Lavrov and German FM Maas hold press conference in Moscow, August 11, 2020, https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=jGEKnx55hXk – 1h 18 min – 1 h 23 min.; Ivanov A., #Russia – #Germany – A lot in common or still at odds?, Eureporter, August 14, 2020, https://eureporter.co/frontpage/2020/08/14/russiagermany-a-lot-in-common-or-still-at-odds/.

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Menkiszak M., Gdy Europa choruje, Rosja nie jest lekarstwem, Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 72 (4/2019), pp. 41–57; Żurawski vel Grajewski P.,Śmierć mózgowa” Francji?, Klub Jagielloński, December 30, 2019, https://klubjagiellonski.pl/2019/12/30/smiercmozgowa-francji/.

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Belarus's Revolution in the International Game: Causes, Nature, Effects, and Interests of Major Players be used instrumentally – the US reaction in the coming months will remain verbal and symbolic. On September 29, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom acting in concert considered the election in Belarus to be rigged23. On the same day, sanctions against the regime in Minsk were imposed by Canada and the United Kingdom24. The US refrained from taking this step in anticipation of the European Union’s common position.

It did so immediately after EU’s decision – on October 2, introducing restrictions on eight senior officials of the regime25.

However, the small number of people subject to British, Canadian, and US sanctions, just as in the case of EU, leads to a conclusion that their importance is purely symbolic.

CONCLUSIONS

The revolution in Belarus is a complex process and the first great national deed of the Belarusian people since 1918. In fact, given its scale, the first one since the 16th century. It is, therefore, a nationbuilding process in the mentality of the citizens, an oeuvre of the new generation that grew up in Belarus after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Mohammed A., Spetalnick M., Emmott R., Exclusive: US, UK, Canada plan sanctions on Belarusians, perhaps Friday, Reuters, September 24, 2020, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-belaruselection-sanctions-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-ukcanada-plan-sanctions-on-belarusians-perhapsfriday-idUKKCN26F2A4.

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Smith J., Ljunggren D., Britain and Canada impose sanctions on Belarus leader Lukashenko, Reuters, September 29, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-belarus-election-sanctions/britain-and-canadaimpose-sanctions-on-belarus-leader-lukashenkoidUSKBN26K2R1.

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US Held Back on Belarus Sanctions, Hoping for Joint Move With EU, VOA, September 30, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/europe/us-heldback-belarus-sanctions-hoping-joint-move-eu.; Washington hits Belarus with sanctions as Minsk retaliates against EU measures, Reuters, October 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/ukbelarus-election/washington-hits-belarus-withsanctions-as-minsk-retaliates-against-eu-measuresidUKKBN26N33N. 25

What is happening in Belarus is irreversible and will eventually win, resulting in the democratization of this country and its reorientation towards the West. The moment when this happens, however, will not be due to the efforts of the Belarusian people themselves, but to the collapse of the Russian control over the situation in their country, resulting from the general condition of Moscow.

Consequently, the success of Belarus will have to wait for an appropriate international window of opportunity.

However, the mental changes taking place among the Belarusians right now, unlike in 1991, will allow them to take advantage of this situation to build a truly democratic and independent state – naturally having to deal with all of its problems. The process of democratization will be long, and its main obstacle is going to be Russia. Moscow will strive to maintain full control over Belarus at the lowest possible cost, which presages removing Lukashenko from power in the medium-term (in a non-revolutionary manner). The nature of relations with Moscow determines the standpoints of its neighbors – the closest and the other ones, including the major EU powers and the United States. The countries of the eastern flank of NATO as well as Ukraine, which face the Russian threat, already support the Belarusian movement and will continue to do so. In the case of Germany and France, the “Russia first” principle will be dominant in their political agendas. The actions of the EU will remain symbolic, with no significant influence on the course of events in Belarus. As regards the United States, Washington’s approach will be defined after the US presidential election.

Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski December 2020

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IDEOLOGY OR PRAGMATIC APPROACH? STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS 2020 Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, Professor

On September 16, 2020, the President of the European Commission delivered the State of the Union address1, the leitmotiv of which was to move the European Union from fragility to viability. While much of what she said was right, von der Leyen's remedies might be nothing but wishful thinking – or too ideologysaturated – to offer an efficient solution to the problems.

State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen at the European Parliament Plenary, September 16, 2020, European Commission, Brussels.

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Ideology or Pragmatic Approach? State of the Union Address 2020

EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRESIDENT URSULA VON DER LEYEN DELIVERS A STATEMENT AFTER RECEIVING THE HONORARY PRIZE OF THE GERMAN SUSTAINABILITY AWARD FOR HER COMMITMENT TO THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL. BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, OCTOBER 14, 2020.

T

he Commission president gave her emotion-imbued speech in the European Parliament (EP). The institution is specific as it is more and more taking extreme political stances while being subject to the fervent election competition.

At the same time, it is overwhelmingly influenced by both left-wing and liberal milieux, whose members made their political ideas the sole weapon to protect Europe from falling apart. That is why Eurosceptic, nationalist, and populist movements come under fire there, with this criticism being visible even among the Christian Democrats who represented a top political grouping in the Parliament. Such was the case of some member parties of the European People’s Party2. Here, the European De La Baume, M., MEPs adopt resolution targeting corruption in Borissov’s Bulgaria, “Politico,” October 8, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/ bulgaria-borissov-meps-adopt-resolution-targetingcorruption/ [October 29, 2020].

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© Yves Herman (PAP/EPA)

Parliament seems to hold a scarcer interest in the strategy and pragmatic actions while being far more involved in waving ideological disputes and political marketing.

EUROPEAN HEALTH UNION

The European Commission believes that centralizing power into Brussels’s hands is the remedy for the problems that are grappling the bloc. As the pandemic turned out as a huge challenge for Europe, Ursula von der Leyen suggested a number of EU-wide measures, collectively named the European Health Union. The top EU official was aware of its being incompatible with how competencies are divided under EU treaties; hence she suggested that the upcoming Conference on the Future of Europe change the whole situation, thus handing more powers to the Commission at the expense of EU member states.

Von der Leyen’s statement might once again stir a Europe-wide debate over whether the bloc shall serve a subsidiary 4/2020

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRESIDENT URSULA VON DER LEYEN DELIVERS HER FIRST STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS AT A PLENARY SESSION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, SEPTEMBER 16, 2020.

(auxiliary) role in the health crisis, and thus back its member states, or whether to make Brussels take a firm grip on power by forcing national governments to adopt anti-crisis measures. In November, Commissioner Stella Kyriakides proposed, among other things, that the Commission should monitor national pandemic prevention plans, as well as the possibility for EU agencies to propose recommendations to Member States with regard to healthcare3. All this exceeds the Commission’s subsidiary role, and, in fact, interferes with the competences of the member states. Furthermore, the bold health policy agenda of the European Commission might see some financial curbs under the future multi-annual budget adopted at the July summit.

The President of the European Commission urged to deepen the four freedoms and strengthen the Schengen area. Just to recall here that German Remarks by Commissioner Stella Kyriakides at the press conference on Building a European Health Union, November 11, 2020, Brussels.

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© Olivier Hoslet (PAP/EPA)

officials were among those voicing concern over closing the bloc’s internal borders as the pandemic gained momentum across the continent4. In turn, concern for the four treaty freedoms in the internal market was expressed by politicians from Central Europe, including Poland. Von der Leyen also announced steps to finish eurozone reforms. There are some strains between EU member states on all the issues above, which might make the Commission’s declarations tough to push through.

CLIMATE POLICY

Another step to remedy the EU situation was to be a visionary climate policy – packed with both emotions and ideas on sustainability. Von der Leyen proposed to increase the 2030 target for emission reduction to at least 55%, down from 40%.

But even these grandiose goals received criticism, some Green MEPs calling to raise Coronavirus: German officials say EU internal borders should stay open, “Deutsche Welle”, July 28, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-germanofficials-say-eu-internal-borders-should-stayopen/a-54358391 [September 29, 2020].

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Ideology or Pragmatic Approach? State of the Union Address 2020 the bar much higher and demanding a 65% cut in greenhouse gas emissions5.

In October 2020, the European Parliament called the bloc’s member states to adopt a 60% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions6. This exhibits a firm ideological approach that some members of the European Parliament adopted on climate protection that yet did not include how much this eventually might cost. What might stop this vision is resistance – both internal and external. On the one hand, at the European Council summit in July 2020, European officials decided to cut financial aid for the regional energy transition, which means a reduction in EU financial assistance to European regions that bear the greatest costs of the climate transition.

On the other, though, the prospect of introducing an EU carbon border tax levied on goods from outside the EU’s territory might spark hostile reactions from the bloc’s biggest trading partners.

DIGITAL PROGRAM

Another facet of the EU’s economic recovery is its wide digital scheme embracing both the bloc’s data collection systems and research on artificial intelligence and other cutting-edge technologies. The Commission intended to hand the collected data on consumers and citizens in Europe to multinationals and researchers, adding that “80% of industrial data is still collected and never used.7” Is the European Union able to Herszenhorn, D.M., de la Baume, M., Von der Leyen challenges EU capitals to step up, “Politico”, September 16, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/ ursula-von-der-leyen-state-of-the-european-unionnational-capitals-step-up/ [September 29, 2020].

5

Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on October 8, 2020 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law) (COM(2020)0080 – COM(2020)0563 – C9-0077/2020 – 2020/0036(COD)), P9_TA-PROV(2020)0253.

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State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen at the European Parliament Plenary, op. cit.

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ensure the protection of both personal and sensitive data, also that of a person’s medical history? This is the more so that the Commission set the goal of developing an EU-wide digital identity framework for anyone living on the continent. The President of the European Commission sees the digital as a solution to better control online content, also to eliminate what is known as hate speech, something that raised serious concerns about the excessive control of democracy by European officials. This might also be used to curb critical voices on new European policies put forward by the Commission.

Thus, an economic development project may also bring about vital political goals that may seek to restrict the democratic debate on public affairs on the pretense of introducing new digital solutions.

FOREIGN POLICY

What is another mission of the Commission – shared by both German and French diplomats – was to offer more possibilities of the qualified majority voting in any issues of foreign policy.

The pretext for reviving the discussion was rather symbolic sanctions on the Belarusian regime, initially vetoed by Greece, and then Cyprus. Although the majority voting in the Council may enhance the EU’s actions abroad, it comes first and foremost in line with the interests of the bloc’s biggest countries. Nonetheless, this is why smaller countries might find it challenging to accept, especially if they grasp some strategic situations differently – as Warsaw and Berlin tend to do, for instance.

The top reason for the EU’s wariness over the Belarusian crisis, and then social unrest following the rigged presidential vote, was yet not the stance adopted by Greece and Cyprus. Western European elites were fearful of a Russian response to a more determined position of the West. It was not merely since the leading EU states – 4/2020

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The President of the European Commission branded China “an economic competitor and a systemic rival” of the European Union notably France and Germany – hoped to cement geopolitical and economic ties with Moscow, and they certainly did not want to jeopardize their economic interests in relations with Russia. Equally important was the fear that the crisis might exacerbate to the point it did in Ukraine a few years ago when Western support for people gathered at the Euromaidan and escalating political events then led to Russia’s armed intervention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine8. Thus, in the early days of the Belarusian crisis, both Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron were in talks with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, perhaps to prevent military intervention in Belarus, also in the desire to make Russia exert influence on Alexander Lukashenko to stop repression and start a dialogue with Belarusian society9. What is not without significance for Western European leaders was their fear that the unrest could – at least to some extended – be stirred up

by Vladimir Putin to permanently cut the Belarusian regime off from the West, also to force Lukashenko to become closer to Russia. Fears mounted that a fragile relationship between the European

Union and Belarus might further weaken while paving Putin’s way for establishing a common Union State of Belarus and Russia10.

Also, von der Leyen called on EU member states to adopt a more consistent foreign policy on Russia, pointing out that the Kremlin will not change its behaviors over plans to build energy pipelines running between the EU and Russia – as the Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine, intervention in the Syrian civil war, and the series of nerve agent attacks show. In this way, the Commission president watereddown arguments raised by some German politicians who claimed the expansion of economic relations serves to improve democratic standards and the promotion of European values11. It seems, however, that Germany is not likely to revise its policy in this respect.

The President of the European Commission branded China “an economic competitor and a systemic rival” of the European Union. She also expected China to live up to its climate commitments, an issue being of top importance for equaling the competitiveness of the European Union production and that of the Middle Kingdom. This comes the more so that the European Union was imposing more and more ambitious climate targets. Furthermore, von der Leyen called China out over Hong Kong and its treatment of minority Uighurs. As it once again turned out, EU member states are pushing some uncomfortable global issues onto representatives of EU See Benedyczak, J., Dyner, A. M., Belarus-Russia: Towards Gradual Integration, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Bulletin no. 200 (1630), September 29, 2020.

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Momtaz, R., Macron wants to avoid a repeat of Ukraine in Belarus, “Politico,” August 28, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macronwants-to-avoid-a-repeat-of-ukraine-crimea-inbelarus/ [September 29, 2020].

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Merkel i Macron rozmawiali z Putinem o Białorusi, “Defence24”, August 18, 2020, https:// www.defence24.pl/merkel-i-macron-rozmawiali-zputinem-o-bialorusi [September 29, 2020].

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Wirtschaftsminister Altmaier: “Ich bin nicht der Oberlehrer der Welt”, “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”, July 11, 2020, https://www.faz.net/ aktuell/wirtschaft/konjunktur/wirtschaftsministerpeter-altmaier-zu-china-corona -undmaskenpflicht-16855438.html [September 29, 2020].

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Ideology or Pragmatic Approach? State of the Union Address 2020

EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRESIDENT URSULA VON DER LEYEN ADJUSTS HER PROTECTIVE MASK BEFORE DELIVERING A STATEMENT AHEAD OF THE SECOND FACE-TO-FACE EU SUMMIT SINCE THE CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK. BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, OCTOBER 1, 2020.

bodies while seeking to secure the best possible ties with Beijing12. For instance, Charles Michel recently said that with Washington’s growing rivalry with Beijing, the European Union was deeply connected with the United States. “We share ideals, values, and a mutual affection that have been strengthened through the trials of history13,” he added. Nonetheless, the past few months showed EU states being at odds with the United States in 2020 over a number of issues, which gives an insight into how declarations from European officials might differ from their actual political deeds.

Recent months brought new strains between the European Union and some countries from outside the bloc – the United Kingdom, the United States, China, and Turkey. Sanctions against Russia were still in force while the See Michalski, A., Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: The Case of Denmark’s and Sweden’s Relations with China, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2013, 51(5), pp. 884–900.

12

See D.M. Herszenhorn, In global power contest, Charles Michel says EU takes US over China, “Politico” September 25, 2020, https://www.politico. eu/article/in-global-power-contest-charles-michelsays-eu-takes-us-over-china/ [September 29, 2020].

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© Johanna Geron (PAP/EPA)

European Union was considering new measures over the nerve agent poisoning of opposition leader Alexei Navalny.

Sergey Lavrov even said that relations between Russia and the European Union were rapidly deteriorating14. In her State of the Union address, the President of the European Commission noted the EU’s crumbling ties with the outside, notably its closest partners. Yet, her declarations to redefine transatlantic relations may face implementation difficulties, even with the new Democratic administration in the US. The same was true of her assurances to regulate those with the United Kingdom that worsened sharply in the fall of 2020.

MIGRATION POLICY

The EU Commission chief backed a human approach to the migration policy while very strongly condemning racism in the European Union. Subordinating the EU’s migration policy to combatting racism sought to settle hash all those being against Rosja kontra Unia Europejska. Jasny sygnał ze wschodu. “Relacje wyraźnie ulegają degradacji”, „Niezależna”, October 9, 2020, https://niezalezna. pl/356755-rosja-kontra-unia-europejska-jasnysygnal-ze-wschodu-relacje-wyraznie-ulegajadegradacji [October 29, 2020].

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European Union admitting migrants into EU countries or questioning permanent relocation schemes.

But will making the migration policy an ideological matter, by subordinating it to universal human rights, increase the problem-solving efficiency, notably for those issues resulting from excessive migration and assimilation difficulties?

It is worth adding that a large group of immigrants did not share the left-wing interpretation of European values – like those on the rights of sexual minorities, as state secularism, and the separation of religion and public affairs. French scholars – who keep a watchful eye on some disturbing changes in social fabric influenced by non-European migration – argue that it is impossible to admit too many people having a totally different cultural background without imperiling own culture15. French President Emmanuel Macron was helpless while fighting against radical Islam, a movement that rejected the values of a secular republic when even seeking to change France’s systemic order and political values. Thus, Macron took a legislative initiative to curb the influence of radical Islam in France, focusing on limiting foreign influence in the country16.

In late September, the Commission put forward a new set of measures to respond to the migration crisis17.

Its advantage was the strengthening of the EU external border protection allowing for non-asylum returns more effectively. However, many pointed out that the Commission gave up its idea of establishing immigrant-processing centers Delsol, Ch., La haine du monde, Warsaw 2017, p. 268.

15

Momtaz, R., Macron vows to fight radical Islam with crackdown on foreign influence, “Politico”, October 2, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/ macron-france-islam-separatism/ [October 29, 2020].

16

A fresh start on migration: Building confidence and striking a new balance between responsibility and solidarity, European Commission, Brussels, September 23, 2020.

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outside the EU18. At the same time, EU officials planned a set of measures to hand in powers to EU institutions, a move related to implementing the integrated border procedure – such as granting asylum or deciding to return migrants to their countries. The Commission has increasingly interfered with member states’ competences in the field of migration policy, including the launch of legal immigration schemes to the EU and talent pool partnerships outside the bloc.

The Commission insisted on compulsory solidarity between EU member states that have the choice between relocating asylum seekers and shouldering responsibility for illegal migrants returning to their home countries. In a crisis, however, the Commission was due to enforce solidarity schemes far more rigorously.

The EU Council is likely to see tough negotiations while discussing these measures. Sending illegal migrants back to their countries was both extremely challenging and requires lengthy legal procedures, as evidenced by the fact that only 20% of deportations proved effective. This means that mostly the task could end up with forced relocation of migrants across the bloc19. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe found this difficult to accept20 – a fresh opening in the Commission’s migration policy was thus more of a negotiation and marketing trick rather than a new approach to the migration crisis. Furthermore, declarations on a stronger sealing of the Zolan, E., Commissioner: No one will like new EU migration pact, “EUobserver”; September 18, 2020, https://euobserver.com/migration/149475 [September 29, 2020].

18

Nielsen, N.,’ Sponsored returns’ may shuffle failed asylum seekers around EU, EUobserver, September 29, 2020,https://euobserver.com/migration/149566 [September 29, 2020].

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Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic ‘oppose EU’s new migration pact, Euronews, September 24, 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/24/hungarypoland-and-czech-republic-oppose-eu-s-newmigration-pact [September 29, 2020].

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Ideology or Pragmatic Approach? State of the Union Address 2020 EU’s external borders are contradictory to a humanitarian attitude toward immigrants and bigger accessibility of Greek and Italian ports to migrants found in the waters of the Mediterranean.

“People who have the right to stay are integrated and made to feel welcome21,” the President stressed in her address.

The Commission also proposed to establish a European Border and Coast Guard to ensure management of the external borders, controlling whether the fundamental rights of immigrants were respected22.

An additional challenge for the European Commission was the series of terrorist attacks in France and Austria in the fall of 2020. Following these attacks, Emmanuel Macron proposed another change in the migration policy of the EU, including an increase in control over the external borders of the Schengen area. By doing so, the French president made reference to the idea of protecting the EU’s borders, formulated from 2015 by the Visegrad countries. At the same time as the Commission called for the respect of humanitarian rights of illegal immigrants, Macron urged to tighten the borders of the Schengen area. The chairman of the Bundestag, Wolfgang Schäuble, also argued with the new migration policy proposed by the Commission23. He noted that people with no right for asylum and who cannot be returned home may have to be send to facilities outside Europe, an idea that echoes positions held by Visegrad countries and was completely omitted in the Commission’s proposal of its new migration policy. All this puts von der State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen at the European Parliament Plenary, op. cit.

21

Barigazzi, J., 5 things to know about Brussels’ new migration plan, “Politico”, September 23, 2020, https:// www.politico.eu/article/5-things-to-know-aboutbrussels-new-migration-plan/ [September 29, 2020].

22

N. Nielsen, EU migration system relies on despots, Schäuble says, “EUobserver”, November 20, 2020, https://euobserver.com/migration/150132 [27.11.2020].

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She also announced that the Commission would interfere in EU countries' national competences, namely by promoting to recognize the rights of same-sex families across the EU – irrespectively of what local constitutions say in this respect Leyen’s declarations from the State of the Union address a big question mark.

IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES

In her speech, Ursula von der Leyen placed an emphasis on ideological issues intertwined with European values.

There, she decried LGBTQI-free zones while being in favor of financial sanctions imposed on anyone violating EU values.

She also announced that the Commission would interfere in EU countries’ national competences, namely by promoting to recognize the rights of same-sex families across the EU – irrespectively of what local constitutions say in this respect.

Thus, she suggested how the Commission might interpret the EU-wide rule of law. The question was not whether the national government respected its own constitution, but whether it obeyed the political values preferred by the Commission and the left-liberal elite of the European Parliament. In November 2020, the European Commission issued a strategy on supporting sexual minorities.

As part of it, and in contravention of the 4/2020

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European Union division of powers between the member states and the EU in the European treaties, it promoted the recognition of marriages of same-sex couples as well as their children in all EU countries24.

Commissioner Helena Dalli announced financial sanctions against countries rejecting this European strategy as it would constitute, in her opinion, a violation of the rule of law25.

Some scholars earlier argued that the Commission had no right to investigate the rule of law on fundamental rights and the quality of democracy in EU member states – as this restricts the sovereignty of national democracies26. The Commission had no appropriate treaty basis to perform such tasks – as once reminded the Legal Service of the EU Council27. Thus, the Commission is no longer an impartial arbiter in disputes between the bloc’s countries while becoming a party to the conflict defending some political ideas and visions of European integration.

However, will placing such a firm focus on ideological spats within the EU make the bloc more powerful or – just the opposite – will it make it even more fragile and unstable? As Chantal Delsol noted, subordinating EU public policies to ideology-imbued consideration makes it Union of Equality: LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020–2025, European Commission, COM(2020) 698 final, Brussels, November 12, 2020, pp. 16–17.

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Wanat, Z. Respect LGBTQI rights or lose EU funds, says equality commissioner, Politico, November 12, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/lgbtqi-rightsrule-of-law-funds-equality-commission-helena-dalli/ [27.11.2020].

25

G. Palombella, Beyond Legality – Before Democracy: Rule of Law Caveats in the EU Two-Level System, [In:] Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, eds. C. Closa, D. Kochenov, Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2016; D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality. Pre-Accession Conditional in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2008.

difficult to look for a pragmatic solution, and thus dooms Europe to further trouble. “We live in a fictional world: all commonsense reasoning that does not conform to a mandatory ideology is eliminated and is considered to be reactionary, outdated and dangerous, thus views that must be destroyed.”28 CONCLUSION

An ideological feud over European values was supposed to defend the EU against falling apart, but instead, it stirred up political emotions first in the European Parliament, and then in the European Commission. EU institutions violated the autonomy of some countries while also encroaching into the competences of national democracies. The result was the eroded authority of the European Commission and the European Parliament, as well as mounting Eurosceptic moods among right-wing voters. Excessive meddling by the EU institution into the state autonomy sparked disputes between member states that lost the sense of mutual trust and solidarity and saw fissures appearing between Central Europe and the northwestern part of the European Union. A surprising feature was no tolerance for political opponents, especially those from the bloc’s new member states. As one commentator put it, “the EU has been successful in creating a single market, a single currency and a passport-free travel zone. But it did not eradicate a false sense of moral superiority. That belief is a northern specialty29.”

Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse December 2020

26

Opinion of the Legal Service, Council of the EU, 10296/14, May 27 2014.

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28

Delsol, Ch., La haine du monde, op. cit., p. 268.

See: W. Münchau, North versus south, “Eurointelligence”, October 4, 2020, https://www. eurointelligence.com/column/north-and-south [October 29, 2020].

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NAGORNOKARABAKH WAR: A NEW DEAL

Grzegorz Kuczyński

Militarily, Azerbaijan won the second war in Nagorno-Karabakh, thus taking retaliation for its defeat against Armenia in the first war.

Although Moscow's formal ally lost miserably, Russia is also among the winning parties.

It moved its military into the region while basically removing Western forces from there.

Nonetheless, Turkey – a new dangerous actor – has entered the theater. This may wreak revenge on Russia in the long run.

“This document does not settle the Nagorno-Karabakh issue; it only puts an end to the war,” said Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in his address to the nation, shortly after a trilateral war-ending deal was announced by his country, Azerbaijan, and Russia. This sentence also pinpoints the core of the events that unfolded over the six fall weeks in the South Caucasus. The NagornoKarabakh dispute is not solved yet as

the agreement concluded on the night of November 9 and 10 left unmentioned the issue of the final status of the enclave.

Its lion’s share is now in the hands of Armenia, with Russia playing the role of its security guarantor. The reason for both the conflict and the Azerbaijani-Armenian skirmish over the past three decades has not faded. The fighting may resume soon. What occurred after Azerbaijan’s undeniable military triumph was just 4/2020

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ARMENIAN NATIONAL FLAG WAVES ON THE GRAVES OF SOLDIERS KILLED IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH CLASHES. YERABLUR MILITARY MEMORIAL CEMETERY, YEREVAN, ARMENIA, NOVEMBER 12, 2020.

the change in actual borders and shifts in the international balance of power in the South Caucasus. Baku reclaimed all Armenian-occupied territories of Azerbaijan around the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh along with a chunk of the enclave. Is this a permanent solution? It is rather doubtful.

The Kremlin-brokered truce further complicates the territorial conundrum by adding two corridors – one between the Armenian part of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia and the other one connecting Azerbaijan to its enclave of Nakhchivan.

Russia will control both, which is, perhaps, one of the reasons behind creating these passages. Moscow seeks to benefit from the new situation arising from both Azerbaijan’s military advantage and Russia’s sluggishness towards a streak of defeats of its Armenian ally.

Having made a successful attempt to negotiate the ceasefire and sent its 48

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© Lusi Sargsyan (PAP/EPA)

“peacekeepers” to Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia undeniably comes as the biggest winner in the war. This is especially against the backdrop of its cautious stance it had shown for more than a month, the one that many had recognized as its weakness. What became the Kremlin’s success was pushing the West out of the area. In the light of recent events, the so-called OSCE Minsk Group eventually confirmed its inertia and the reason for existence. However, Moscow had to give a green light for admitting Turkey as a new actor in return. Although the peace deal certainly fails to satisfy meet the expectations that come along with Ankara’s intense involvement in the war on the side of Azerbaijan, it is rather the opening of the door towards Turkish expansion regionwide. This is no longer the success of Russia, but rather its failure.

Moscow lost its de facto monopoly to control the course of the conflict and admitted other actors into its no longer exclusive sphere of influence. Certainly,

Nagorno-Karabakh War: A New Deal Russia is on good terms with Turkey but who knows what the future holds.

BLOODY WAR

Since 1994, Armenia and NagornoKarabakh, the unrecognized Armenian quasi-state, jointly controlled roughly a fourth part of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory, including the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding Armenianoccupied districts. For twenty-five years, the authorities in Baku have sought to reclaim these territories. This became was possible only now, although they failed to attain accomplish its their top goal priority – of occupying the whole Armenianowned territory. Baku provoked the outbreak of the 44-day war. Fighting flared in the morning of September 27 and lasted until November 9. According to Armenia, at least 2,300 Armenian of their soldiers and 50 civilians were killed. Azerbaijan did not report its military casualties but said 93 civilians had lost their lives.

Russian President Vladimir Putin informed about over 4,000 people dead and more than 8,000 injured in the clash.

Besides, there are thousands displaced by the conflict.

Azerbaijan’s military successes came as a surprise to many. Some believed that the Armenian military and Karabakh fighters hid well enough in their trenches to resist an attack from Azerbaijan, as was the case in the spring of 2016. It seemed that fighting that erupted on September 27 would terminate like earlier escalations – like that in the summer of 2020 when the Azerbaijani army managed to regain a couple of square kilometers and one or two foothills, a move that prompted them to claim success and stop the fire. But it was different. The Turkishsupported military of Azerbaijan was far better equipped and organized than the Armenian forces. From the first to the last day of the flare-up, Azerbaijan showed the

initiative while the mobilized Armenian military reserves proved not ready for modern warfare – neither technologically nor psychologically. On the frontline, the Armenian military was nothing but cannon fodder, slaughtered by hostile unmanned aerial vehicles. Armenian troops could not respond to the large-scale use of combat drones by their enemy.

They lacked adequate sensors, electronic warfare cover, or counter-drone weaponry.

As a result, the Armenian forces had to withdraw from the frontline positions they had been occupying since 1994.

Three factors tipped the scale in favor of Azerbaijan: technological advantage, tactics, and Turkey’s support. It was no coincidence that Azerbaijan chose the southern direction to perform the decisive strike. Unlike in the mountainous north, much of the terrain is flat. Furthermore, Armenia saw the northern part, located closer to Stepanakert, as its priority on the battlefield. There it had built more solid ground fortifications and sent more troops. In turn, the southern direction was treated secondarily, with its defense being far weaker. Azerbaijan’s armed forces defeated the Armenian military by breaking through the southern part of the frontline and marching westwards – slowly yet steadily – to capture territories with a flanking maneuver in the Aras River Valley, off the Iranian border.

Having reached the frontier of Armenia proper, the Azerbaijani army headed north toward the mountains of Karabakh while bypassing main Armenian fortifications located farther east and forcing the enemy into an open-field battle. Little numerous yet mobile groups of Azerbaijani infantry in lightly armored and Israeli-upgraded tanks got support from Turkish-built Bayraktar TB2 combat drones, Israeli-made loitering munition, long-range artillery, and missile systems.

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International Affairs The Azerbaijani military advanced towards the cities of Shusha and Stepanakert. Militarily, the seizing of the former on November 7 was critical for the fate of the whole war. Capturing Shusha meant winning domination over Stepanakert, the capital of the enclave, and crossing the city’s main transport route to Armenia. The collapse of the capital was just a matter of time, but then Azerbaijan halted the offensive and agreed to call a truce. It did so while having the biggest advantage over the enemy since the beginning of the campaign. Pashinyan insisted that if he had not agreed to halt the conflict, the enemy could have rapidly besieged a group of up to 25,000 Armenian servicemen.

Why did Aliyev not decide to turn down the Russian proposal and push with the offensive until recapturing the whole enclave? There are several reasons for this.

Among them was the fear of the massacre of civilians in Stepanakert during the attempt to reclaim the city, a move that would severely undermine Azerbaijan’s image worldwide. One might wonder whether Aliyev sought to snatch the whole Nagorno-Karabakh. Even without this, Azerbaijan is beset with a difficulty to relocate tens of thousands of displaced persons to the regained areas. This poses a gigantic logistical and financial challenge as the Armenians demolished and burnt houses and whole infrastructure when fleeing the grounds, they had occupied a quarter of a century ago. Perhaps Aliyev did not want to incorporate the area inhabited by the Armenian “fifth column” into his country, which would possibly require granting them autonomy and amending the constitution.

FRAGILE PEACE

What is in the November 9 deal that ended the second Nagorno-Karabakh war?

Under the nine-point truce agreement, Armenia ceded control of roughly 70% of 50

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© Roman Ismayilov (PAP/EPA)

formally Azerbaijani-owned lands it had controlled so far, namely the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven Azerbaijani districts around. After twenty-six years, Azerbaijan reclaimed all the occupied lands around the NagornoKarabakh district – except for the Lachin corridor – along with its southern part, including the city of Shusha.

What are the top provisions of the deal?

First, the trilateral agreement “froze” the frontline. Azerbaijan retains the area it managed to seize from Armenia in the sixweek war, namely the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and seven Azerbaijani-occupied districts (since 1994) nearby. But the winner made more territorial gains.

Nagorno-Karabakh War: A New Deal

AZERI PEOPLE CELEBRATE THE RECAPTURE OF THE CITY OF SHUSHA BY AZERBAIJANI TROOPS. BAKU, AZERBAIJAN, NOVEMBER 8, 2020.

By December 1, Armenia was expected to cede to Azerbaijan the rest of the lands neighboring Nagorno-Karabakh that it clutched until the ceasefire between the warring parties. There is, however, an exception.

Another issue is to keep a strip of land between the modest albeit still Armeniancontrolled enclave of Karabakh and Armenia. The five-kilometer wide Lachin corridor is poised to serve as the bridge between the two. The deal stipulates Armenia and Azerbaijan shall submit a plan to build a new road connection between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh within three years. The existing link between Stepanakert and Armenia runs

through Shusha while the new one should bypass the city. Armenia keeps control of the northern chunk of the enclave along with its capital city and the Lachin corridor. The status of this area has not been clarified and it should be assumed that it would be subject to additional arrangements in which Azerbaijanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s negotiating position will be incomparably stronger than that of the Armenians.

In practice, the agreement implements most of the Madrid Principles, first discussed back in 2007, as peace settlements of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, suggested by the OSCE Minsk Group and accepted by the two warring parties yet later dismissed by Armenia.

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A VIEW OF DAMAGED MEDICAL CENTER AFTER ALLEGED AZERBAIJANI SHELLING IN STEPANAKERT. NAGORNO-KARABAKH, OCTOBER 28, 2020.

Madrid Principles set forth a proposed formula that called for handing over the Armenian-occupied Azerbaijan proper surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Baku.

The same applied to a land link connecting the exclave and Armenia or the right of all refugees and the internally displaced to return home. But some discrepancies show that the OSCE Minsk Group has lost its raison d’être while the war and its truce terms brought a diplomatic defeat of Western countries. In Madrid, talks touched upon international security guarantees, including a multinational peacekeeping mission, but now only Russia offers any such guarantees and peacekeeping forces.

Both Moscow and Yerevan assured that the agreement did not indicate the Turkish presence in peacekeeping forces deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh. Notwithstanding that, a clip published on the official website of the president of Azerbaijan contains a video talk between Aliyev and Putin.

The former said Turkey would take part in the mission whereas Putin did not object to that. What was the reaction of Russia?

It said Turkey would monitor the truce from a joint peacekeeping center instead of sending its forces to the line of conflict.

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© Vahram Baghdasaryan (PAP/EPA)

Russia has taken on the main military role in the area. Under the deal, the country began deploying 1,960 “peacekeepers,” 90 BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, 380 vehicles as well as special military gear along the Armenia-Azerbaijan line of contact and the corridor linking Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Russian “peacekeepers” are to be stationed on the spot for five years, with the possibility of extending their stay for further five-year periods, provided that the two parties to the conflict give their consent. The rotation of forces will occur twice a year. Russians will be tasked with controlling the passage between Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan. The mission will be carried out by the FSB border forces, not a regular army.

Under the truce agreement, the actual borders shifted much in favor of Azerbaijan, Russia introduced its forces to the region – with Turkey’s symbolic involvement, at least for now. But neither the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh nor its status is solved. Formally, it is still the Azerbaijani-owned autonomous enclave while partly being a territory under the Armenian administration, holding close links to Armenia. The conflict

Nagorno-Karabakh War: A New Deal was “unfrozen” for a while. Then Azerbaijan claimed some territorial gains, and Russia sent its military to the area, before “freezing” it again. The origins of the conflict remained. A lasting peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia is not at all closer, compared to the situation a couple of months ago.

“NEW” CAUCASUS

The truce is an undeniable success of Baku.

The narrative on the displaced returning home after nearly thirty years of exile will overshadow disappointment over halting the operation before regaining control of the whole Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Armenia saw the provisions of the peace deal as a humiliating battlefield defeat.

It sparked an outrage in Armenia where people flooded the streets of Yerevan and stormed the seat of government. The mob assaulted Araray Mirzoyan, the speaker of the National Assembly. Undeniably Pashinyan’s position is in grave danger.

Of course, Aliyev also came under fire over not ending the war with a total anti-Armenian pogrom and allowing Russian troops into the area. But there are some positive points for Baku. First and foremost, it is now Russians, and not the Azerbaijani, who will hold responsibility for the security of ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. If anyone attempts ethnic cleansing, Moscow will have to handle that. Besides, that it is doubtful that whether any ethnic Armenians would still like to reside in the enclave in the next five years, under the current deal.

Nonetheless, along with Azerbaijan’s victory in the war, Russia emerged as the biggest winner in the flare-up of fighting.

This raises no doubt at first glance, yet, gives grounds for discussion upon a deeper analysis and from a longer time perspective. By brokering the BakuYerevan deal, Russia retained its status as an actor in the South Caucasus, although it is not the only one playing this role.

Not only has Moscow won leverage against Azerbaijan, but it also made Armenia virtually fully reliant on itself while discrediting Pashinyan and punishing Yerevan for its 2018 revolution. Although Russia will pay for this with its trust, it does not care about this, believing that with their teeth clenched, Armenian officials have no other choice but to ally with Russia. What elevated Moscow’s role in the conflict was sending troops to the area and seizing control of two major corridors –between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia as well as Nakhichevan and Azerbaijan. Consequently, Russia solidified Armenia’s presence in its sphere of influence while boosting its leverage on Azerbaijan.

Undeniably, Russia made a thrilling diplomatic move that many promptly named as a massive success of the Kremlin. However, it also took on enormous responsibility and either side could blame Moscow for any possible mishap. Moving its military into such a tension-imbued region could be seen as somewhat its downfall too. If it needs to mobilize its troops, this means other measures did not work. Russia completely failed to bar Turkey from stepping into the South Caucasus, although it managed to diminish its military presence to a joint peacekeeping facility.

Turkey “thawed” the “Russian-frozen” skirmishes, reclaiming its status of a critical ally, almost that of Azerbaijan’s patron saint, it had lost back in the early 1990s. The terms of the agreement cannot come as the success of Ankara, but Turkey adopted a long-term strategy, reaping some profits too. An example is that the Azerbaijan-Nakhichevan link through the Armenian region of Meghri may in theory open Turkey’s land route to both Azerbaijan and whole Central Asia. Turkey will push for expanding its influence in the Caucasus and elsewhere.

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International Affairs Erdogan’s ambition is to make Turkey the prevailing power in the Black Sea region.

Although Turkey did not take part in the formation of the peace contingent, it has proved its essential role in the Russiandominated area. Turkish influence is likely to grow in Azerbaijan and Georgia as well as in the whole Black Sea area.

Now, despite their cordial relations, Moscow will have to compete with Turkey in areas the Kremlin saw as its traditional sphere of influence.

held no particular interest in how events unfolded in the Caucasus. Furthermore, Emmanuel Macron’s calls for a ceasefire were completely disrespected. So were all international institutions; it was only a few days later that they were noticed. “Russia is in talks with Armenia and Azerbaijan on the deployment of United Nations structures in Nagorno-Karabakh,” Russia’s foreign minister said on November 13.

He mentioned the UN office for refugees and its development program.

Armenia’s battlefield failure and Turkey’s involvement are also vital for Georgia.

Tbilisi has always been in good terms with Ankara. Little is known whether this might advance Georgia’s chance of becoming part of the NATO Membership Action Plan.

Certainly, much will depend on the Biden administration. In addition to solidifying Turkey’s presence (a NATO state) in the Caucasus, there are two arguments in favor of this scenario. Certainly, much will depend on the Biden administration, but there are two arguments in favor of this scenario – in addition to solidifying Turkey’s presence – as a NATO state – in the Caucasus. These include the increased importance of the Black Sea region in the eyes of the military bloc – which already translates into some decisions to strengthen this flank – and a more compliant NATOlinked policy of Paris and Berlin towards the United States, with the latter being more likely.

Pushing the West out of the picture is a cornerstone of a new regional order.

What Russia demonstrated that it still enjoys a huge influence in the region and could negotiate a truce agreement. Firstly, it came as the most efficient mediating power in the post-Soviet area. Secondly, it boosted military presence in the Caucasus, turning into a top peacemaking force in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

Meanwhile, however, Moscow had to acknowledge it does not have an exclusive right to the area. Baku’s victorious war with its arch rival revealed a critical role of Turkey in the region while Moscow had to greenlight Ankara’s being part of their joint monitoring center. With the dominant position of the United States in Georgia as well as the growing influence and prestige of Turkey in Azerbaijan, Russia remains with an Armenian ally – defeated, weakened, and betrayed. Both the war and the terms of the peace deal seem like Moscow’s great success at first glance but may prove troublesome for it in the long turn. The post-Soviet era is ending and that was when Russia was the natural hub, the attitude which determined policies in most of the remaining former republics. Now Moscow must change the way it conducts its policy on other chunks – it is just one out of a few actors while other competitors might outplay it.

The West is however the second-biggest loser of the latest Nagorno-Karabakh war only to Armenia. Moreover, the outcome of the fighting brought also a breakdown in Europe’s diplomatic efforts. Set up by the OSCE in Europe in 1992 to mediate the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region, the Minsk Group – with France and the United States as its two co-chair countries – was completely marginalized. During the presidential campaign, the United States 54

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Grzegorz Kuczyński December 2020

US PRESENCE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS AFTER JOE BIDEN’S VICTORY

Jakub Lachert

T

he United States’ presence in the Western Balkans began when the war in former Yugoslavia had ended.

The American administration developed the Dayton Agreement, regulating the post-war order in the region. In recent years, the main reason for the US interest in this area has been its integration into NATO, which included Montenegro, North Macedonia and Croatia, the last not being considered a Western Balkan state after its accession to the European Union. The US presence in the region also serves a military purpose. Approximately 7,000 American soldiers are stationed in Camp Bondsteel, the main American base in Kosovo, which is under the supervision of the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

This facility is used by allied forces,

including Polish troops under the KFOR mission until 20141.

After the November US presidential election, one should present the potential changes to the Western Balkans policy under the administration of the President-elect Joe Biden in comparison to the accomplishments of the outgoing President Donald Trump.

The new US administration is likely to put an emphasis on greater collaboration with the European Union (EU) on the Western Balkans. During Donald Trump’s presidency, American diplomacy was focused on conducting independent https://www.army-technology.com/, accessed November 18, 2020.

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This could pose a problem in relations between Serbia and the European Union because, according to the Bloc, diplomatic missions should remain in Tel Aviv until the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved.

JOE BIDEN’S ACTIONS IN RELATION TO THE WESTERN BALKANS TO DATE

The future position of Joe Biden on the Western Balkans can be outlined by taking into account the President-elect’s approach towards the region over the last thirty years when he held prominent positions in the United States administration.

In the 1990s, he advocated American intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina and involvement in Kosovo. His son Beau Biden served there as an advisor to the US Department of Justice on matters related to the rule of law. During Barack Obama’s presidency, Joe Biden, as the Vice President, was actively involved in the peace process between Kosovo and Serbia. He visited these places both at the beginning and at the end of his term.

The new administration of Joe Biden as President of the United States is likely to look for different solutions from those implemented by Donald Trump, who treated the policy towards the Western Balkans as an opportunity to promote his office. The agreement signed between Kosovo and Serbia, although quite spectacular in the media, did not result in any breakthrough. Assigning Richard Grenell, a diplomat inexperienced in the sensitive issues of the dispute, to the peace

process might have been a sign of some ad hoc American actions in the region.

The peace talks in the Western Balkans require a lot of political experience and patience in building alliances. The continuation of the peace efforts between Kosovo and Serbia seems a fundamental challenge for all parties. Without resolving the dispute between Belgrade and Pristina, the EU will not be able to continue the integration process of these countries.

However, from Washington’s perspective, the enduring political instability in the Western Balkans is a threat to American interests. Abandoning the region by the United States and the EU would create favorable conditions for China and Russia to expand their spheres of influence.

UE ostrzega Serbię i Kosowo przed przenoszeniem ambasad z Tel Awiwu do Jerozolimy, https://studium. uw.edu.pl/, accessed September 10, 2020.

It can therefore be assumed that Joe Biden’s administration will react to

POSSIBLE ACTIONS OF THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION OVER THE WESTERN BALKANS

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US Presence in the Western Balkans After Joe Biden’s Victory

A ROMANIAN MILITARY, BACKED BY A PATRIOT MISSILE LAUNCHER, LOOKS FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE HIGHRANKED OFFICIALS PRIOR THE RECEPTION CEREMONY OF THE FIRST PATRIOT SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM, AT THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER FOR AIR DEFENSE “BRIGADIER GENERAL ION BUNGESCU” FROM CAPU MIDIA SHOOTING RANGE. CONSTANTA COUNTY, ROMANIA, SEPTEMBER 17, 2020.

Chinese and Russian involvement in the Western Balkans mainly in terms of Montenegro and Serbia. Both countries remain most committed to the process of European integration. Additionally, Montenegro also belongs to NATO. Simultaneously, both states pursue a multi-sectoral policy, cooperating with China and Russia. Such a strategy of Podgorica and Belgrade is due to two reasons. Firstly, accession to the European Union is a multi-stage process. The moment when both countries will be able to join the community is still unknown given the attitude of some EU countries.

Secondly, their democratization process should be considered. In recent years, there has been an observable decline in the freedom of the media, the fight against corruption, and the rule of law in these countries. Furthermore, progress

in dialogue between the European Union and the Western Balkan states may depend on the attitude of Washington.

Its close cooperation with the EU on reforms in the countries of the region is likely to have a positive impact on prodemocratic attitudes in societies, which are discouraged from the rise of populism, especially in Serbia.

However, it should be noted that the Western Balkans do not receive considerable attention in the US policy and the region-related actions of the US diplomacy will come down to the issues that are the most significant from the US viewpoint. During Barack Obama’s presidency, a “pivot to Asia” was announced. It focused the efforts of the US diplomacy on building an American sphere of influence in the Pacific.

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FROM LEFT: SLOVENIAN PRESIDENT BORUT PAHOR, CROATIAN PRESIDENT KOLINDA GRABAR KITAROVIC, US VICE PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN, AND EUROPEAN COUNCIL PRESIDENT DONALD TUSK ATTEND A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE DURING THE BRDO-BRIJUNI PROCESS LEADERS MEETING. ZAGREB, CROATIA, NOVEMBER 25, 2015.

These attempts were expected to result in coalitions with countries competing with the People’s Republic of China, a country being the greatest geopolitical and economic challenge for the United States3.

The global rivalry between the US and China is manifested in various domains, primarily in the economic field. During the presidency of Donald Trump, the US administration conducted activities aimed at counteracting economic domination of China, for instance by trying to oust Chinese technology companies from the allied countries.

The American mediation on economic issues between Kosovo and Serbia also involved the limiting of the activities of Chinese corporations, especially in Serbia. Signed in September, an agreement contains a provision that “both parties will prohibit the use of 5G equipment in their mobile communication networks, which is delivered by an unverified seller,” which, of course, includes devices from companies based in communist China such as Huawei and ZTE4.

3 Lieberthal, K. G., American Pivot to Asia, https:// www.brookings.edu/, December 21, 2011.

Domachowska, A., Serbia i Kosowo: porozumienie o normalizacji relacji ekonomicznych, Instytut Europy Środkowej, Lublin, September 8, 2020.

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© Antonio Bat (PAP/EPA)

Undoubtedly, the Western Balkans are within the scope of China’s economic interests. This area is a logistics hub for the Middle Kingdom in trade with Western Europe. Certainly, it will remain under watch of Joe Biden’s administration.

Therefore, it seems that Washington’s strategy towards the plans of Beijing for the Western Balkans will remain consistent with the Donald Trump’s policy.

THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE AS A GEOPOLITICAL BASE OF THE UNITED STATES

On November 18, the US House of Representatives supported the Three Seas Initiative and declared that it would provide one billion dollars for this project.

The initiative came from Democrat Marcy Kaptur and had bipartisan support.

The Three Seas Initiative is a PolishCroatian geopolitical project associating twelve countries (EU members) located in Central and Southeast Europe.

Four of these nations – Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria – border the Western Balkans. The main objective of this scheme is to support energy and infrastructure projects and exert a positive effect on the immediate vicinity, including the countries of the Western Balkans

US Presence in the Western Balkans After Joe Biden’s Victory amid joint projects due to their location.

Moreover, it can be assumed that this initiative could also include the Western Balkan nations which will join the European Union.

The members of the Three Seas Initiative also belong to NATO (with the exception of Austria) and are close allies of the United States, especially Poland and Romania that host American military bases.

It seems that members of the Initiative, given their pro-American attitude in foreign policy as well as an interest in European and transatlantic integration with the Western Balkans, could be vital partners for American diplomacy in its efforts to force Russian and Chinese influence out of the Balkans.

However, American diplomacy under Biden is likely to focus on rebuilding good relations with Western European countries, for instance Germany, with which the incumbent president of the United States had disputes over climate issues or defense spending. Consequently, it can be assumed that throughout Biden’s term, security issues in the Western Balkans will be resolved in partnership with Paris and Berlin.

Most likely, this will not lead to abandoning the Three Seas Initiative and support for it, as this project offers military benefits to the United States. It brings together the countries being part of the eastern flank of NATO, thus providing a buffer zone between Russia and Serbia – nations engaged in military cooperation.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SECURITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

From the US standpoint, eliminating the influence of the Russian Federation in the Western Balkans is crucial.

To achieve this goal, political and economic cooperation with the Republic of Serbia has to be intensified. Belgrade’s policy is aimed at diversifying alliances in international politics. Economically, Belgrade is strengthening cooperation with the European Union, China, and Turkey. During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, Serbia received help and medical assistance from China.

On the other hand, Russia provides equipment for the Serbian army and cooperates with Belgrade by organizing joint military maneuvers. However, the European Union and the United States are capable of counteracting this collaboration. Feeling pressure from the EU, Serbia boycotted the military maneuvers, which took place in Belarus in September in parallel to mass protests against the rigged presidential election.

The greatest difficulty in establishing positive relations between the United States and Serbia was continuing hostility from part of the Serbian population to the US intervention in Serbia in 1999 (within the framework of NATO). The country was then bombed, causing multiple civilian casualties. This military operation was triggered by the intensification of hostilities in Kosovo, where Serbian troops were carrying out ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians. Consequently, it can be assumed that during Joe Biden’s presidency, Serbia’s attitude towards NATO will not change. The more so that the majority of Serbian society is against this organization – approximately 79% of the population opposes joining the alliance5. However, Belgrade participated in North Atlantic Alliance initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace.

Consequently, from the standpoint of Joe Biden’s administration, it seems that involvement in Serbia will be limited to Political parties in Serbia support cooperation with NATO, but without membership, https:// europeanwesternbalkans.com/, December 25, 2019.

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BULGARIA AND THE US ARE HOLDING THE JOINT MILITARY TRAINING AT THE NOVO SELO SITE IN EASTERN BULGARIA, AS PART OF THE BULGARIAN-AMERICAN PLAN FOR JOINT MILITARY TRAININGS AND EXERCISES. NOVO SELO, BULGARIA, 2015.

economic initiatives and efforts to reach an agreement with Kosovo.

SUMMARY

The United States’ policy towards the Western Balkans during the presidency of Joe Biden will be based on two pillars.

Firstly, it will concern the cooperation with the European Union and NATO (in the region) to build a common security zone. The main challenges for the US administration will be to counteract the economic, political, and military influence of China in the Western Balkans. Secondly, in terms of the strategic dimension, Washington will rely on the alliance with France and Germany to strengthen relations between the United States and the European Union, strained during Donald Trump’s presidency.

The cooperation between the United States and the countries of the Three Seas area will depend on security challenges in the region. The members of the project may turn out to be an important ally of the United States in case of increased tensions 60

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© Vassil Donev (PAP/EPA)

between Washington and Moscow amid the Western Balkans. Furthermore, the countries of the Three Seas region are vital for eliminating the influence of the Chinese economic expansion as Chinese infrastructure projects run through their territories. Through investments such as a high-speed rail link between Belgrade and Budapest, China wants to extend its sphere of influence in Western Europe. From an American perspective, China’s economic expansion in Europe threatens political and, of course, economic interests.

It can be assumed that with regard to the main goals of American diplomacy there will be no significant change in policy regarding the core alliances in the Western Balkans. However, the United States is likely to abandon attempts to build relations with the region independently of the EU, while it will coordinate dialogue with these countries with Brussels.

Jakub Lachert December 2020

THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE AFTER THE TALLINN SUMMIT: PROGRESS WITH UNFINISHED BUSINESS

Łukasz Janulewicz, PhD and Zsombor Zeöld

Representatives of the Three Seas Initiative (TSI) gathered on October 19, 2020 for a fifth annual summit, which has been rescheduled from June 2020 and was held online due to the ongoing COVID-19 crisis. The Tallinn Summit was a crucial moment for the Initiative to address outstanding issues: the lack of wherewithal and a firm roadmap for implementing its infrastructure projects, challenges to political leadership and internal cohesion as well as questions regarding the roles in the initiative of the United States, Germany, and the European Commission.

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© Igor Kupljenik (PAP/EPA)

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PRESIDENT OF SLOVENIA BORUT PAHOR (7-R) WELCOMES (FROM LEFT) PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER, HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR TO SLOVENIA EDIT SZILAGYINE BATORFI, PRESIDENT OF LATVIA RAIMONDS VEJONIS, AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR TO SLOVENIA SIGRID BERKA, PRESIDENT OF ROMANIA KLAUS IOHANNIS, GERMANY STATE SECRETARY OF THE FEDERAL FOREIGN OFFICE ANDREAS MICHAELIS, PRESIDENT OF LITHUANIA DALIA GRYBAUSKAITE, SLOVAK FINANCE MINISTER LADISLAV KAMENICKY, US ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS PHILIP T. REEKER, PRESIDENT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC MILOS ZEMAN, BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR TO SLOVENIA MLADEN PETROV CHERVENYAKOV, PRESIDENT OF CROATIA KOLINDA GRABARKITAROVIC, ESTONIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS EVA-MARIA LIIMETS, AND PRESIDENT OF POLAND ANDRZEJ DUDA AT THE OPENING OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE SUMMIT. BRDO PRI KRANJU, SLOVENIA, JUNE 6, 2019.

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ounded in 2016 on the initiative of the Polish and Croatian Presidents, Andrzej Duda and Kolinda GrabarKitarović, TSI brings together twelve EU member states (the founders plus Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) with the aim to improve the underdeveloped NorthSouth connectivity in the region, boost intra-regional trade, and foster digital transformation of national economies.

At the same time, several infrastructure projects promoted by the format have the potential to contribute to resilience on NATO’s Eastern Flank by contributing to energy supply diversification and cyber security as well as military mobility.

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TSI emerged in a changing geopolitical landscape. Brexit shifted the political center of gravity in the EU towards the German-French tandem. The United States has increasingly challenged Russian and Chinese influence in the region, particularly in the energy and digital sectors, making TSI an attractive transatlantic forum. This put TSI into a double role of a European and transatlantic format.

TSI has long sought a unique added value for the implementation of connectivity projects and moved beyond political declarations. For this purpose, an investment fund has been set up and national governments gradually took on a larger role. Despite strong US interest over the past years, clear deliverables

The Three Seas Initiative after the Tallinn Summit: Progress with Unfinished Business will be necessary to ensure long-term US involvement in the format. TSI still has to battle allegations of an anti-EU nature despite close entanglement in EU infrastructure frameworks and ongoing support from the European Commission.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE INVESTMENT FUND

The key challenge for TSI so far has been to prove its added value. The vast majority of the projects on its priority list have not been set up by the initiative, being rather already at various stages of planning or implementation. Almost all energy and transport projects are also included in the EU’s Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and Project of Common Interest (PCI) frameworks.

TSI’s initial role was political agenda setting, promoting the issue of NorthSouth connectivity in the eastern half of the EU. Even within the region, enthusiasm was limited at the outset as Polish intentions were viewed with scepticism. The project was criticized as a revived Intermarium, Poland’s failed interwar-era plan for a bloc between Germany and the Soviet Union under Polish hegemony. With a focus on the economic aspects and growing US and EU involvement, TSI has successfully established itself as a political forum to promote regional connectivity and key related infrastructure projects.

This does not solve the added value problem, however, as the question remains what the format itself can contribute to project implementation. The answer given by member states has been the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund (TSIIF). Given that EU funds will no longer be able to fuel infrastructure development in the region to the same degree, in 2019 the national development banks of Poland and Romania set up the fund to attract

The United States has increasingly challenged Russian and Chinese influence in the region, particularly in the energy and digital sectors, making TSI an attractive transatlantic forum private investment for TSI-supported infrastructure projects. Over the course of 2020, several member states followed suit to join the fund: by October 2020, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Croatia, and Slovenia formally joined or explicitly pledged their funding to TSIIF. MAINTAINING US SUPPORT

US involvement has been crucial to the progress of TSI so far. President Trump’s presence at the 2017 Warsaw Summit increased political interest across the region and reduced concerns among Poland’s neighbours. The TSIIF’s received a significant boost in 2020 when Secretary Pompeo announced Washington’s willingness to contribute $1 billion. While Pompeo’s recent visit to Central and Eastern Europe demonstrated ongoing US commitment, TSI members will need to ensure they maintain longterm US interest in what has become an important format for their relations with Washington. That the US attached conditions to its funding offer early on highlights that it expects clear deliverables and that TSI members to step up their own commitments.

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But this has not been uniformly perceived as an immediate security issue across the board. Unlike Poland and the Baltic States, other TSI members like Austria or Czechia support the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. In such cases, diversification is mainly an economic issue to lower prices rather than motivated by concerns over Russia’s reliability as a supplier or its perception as a direct national security threat.

EUROPEAN ANCHORING AND THE ROLE OFBERLIN

As a market, the TSI region is currently not separable from the presence of German, French, British, and other European companies. Berlin tried to join the initiative after initial reluctance as a mean to re-engage with Central Europe as part of Foreign Minister Heiko Maas’s New Ostpolitik. Germany became a TSI partner in 2018, a status like the United States and European Commission. Unlike Washington, however, Berlin has neither pursued specific issues nor announced any direct contributions. Its unwavering support for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline remains contradictory to TSI’s aims on energy security, even if, as stated above, some TSI members are not opposed to the project themselves. Furthermore, even just a symbolic German involvement has been deemed important by countries like like Czechia or more recently Croatia, for their own engagement in TSI. In the absence of clear political initiatives, German business interests are involved in several TSI priority projects. The TSIIF has also confirmed talks with potential German investors, reflecting Germany’s status as the region’s main trading partner. Part of TSI’s rationale 64

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is to diversify trade within the region to tap growth potential beyond its current strong focus on Germany. Nevertheless, Berlin will certainly seek to maintain its strong economic interests in the region, while taking advantage of investment opportunities provided by TSI related projects, such as the enlargement of the Świnoujście LNG terminal.

The new European Commission played a more prominent role in the proceedings than Germany did. The Commission remains a key partner for implementing TSI-promoted projects through the TEN-T and PCI frameworks. After initial reluctance towards the initiative, the Commission engaged in it similarly to Germany following President Trump›s presence at the 2017 Warsaw Summit.

The EU budget will remain an important part of infrastructure financing in the region. In return, the potential of TSI to provide external funding for EU goals like cohesion and connectivity is likely to maintain Brussels’s political support for the initiative.

TSI AFTER TALLINN

Following several breakthroughs for the TSI in 2020, the Tallinn Summit was not able to fully resolve the aforementioned issues.

Financial contributions to the TSIIF highlight a strong imbalance so far and can raise doubts about political commitment and credibility of TSI member states. Poland initially provided €500 million for TSIIF, which it announced in Tallinn to increase to €750 million. Every other TSI member has provided or pledged only €20 million each, or €23 million in the case of Slovenia.

Together with €300 million pledged by the United States as part of its match funding for existing contributions, the fund now stands at €1.2 billion. With three quarters of TSI members now on board,

The Three Seas Initiative after the Tallinn Summit: Progress with Unfinished Business

A WORKER OF THE UNIVERSITY PHARMACY CARRIES OUT A CORONAVIRUS ANTIGENIC SWAB TEST, DECEMBER 3, 2020.

the fund can claim to take off from Tallinn with some momentum. Nevertheless, the disproportionally modest financial contributions on behalf of most TSIIF members dilutes this success.

© Tino Romano (PAP/EPA)

The concrete US financial commitment in combination with recent bilateral agreements on 5G and nuclear power cemented US engagement in Central Europe shortly before an unpredictable US presidential election. Despite being closely tied to the Trump presidency, the election of Joe Biden is unlikely to significantly alter US policy towards TSI. Washington’s involvement enjoys broad bipartisan support in Congress and Biden’s foreign policy advisor Michael Carpenter expressed ongoing support for the format.

€10 million in the fund to demonstrate its confidence in the undertaking.

The first formal investment decision was announced a few days later. It was the acquisition of a major Poland-based rolling stock company. For the time being, it is a good first life-sign but hardly a flagship project. With a long-term endeavor like infrastructure investment, it will take some time to assess the fund’s added value and its contribution to major infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, future updates about investments and investor interest will indicate a trajectory.

As it serves as a wholly commercial endeavor, officials are kept outside of the decision-making process, which may make them hesitant to earmark more public funds to that purpose.

It had initially been announced that the fund’s UK-based investment advisor, Amber Infrastructure Group, would present a few flagship projects at the summit. Amber stated it had itself invested

It remains unclear how far the increased role for governments will transform TSI into a platform for cross-border coordination and the implementation of concrete project. Most member states’ 4/2020

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CORONAVIRUS IN POLAND. TEMPORARY ISOLATION HOSPITAL AT THE PGE NATIONAL STADIUM IN WARSAW (PGE NARODOWY).

WARSAW, POLAND, NOVEMBER 18, 2020.

interest in TSI tied to the promotion of a few key projects of major national importance. Smaller and more flexible formats like the Visegrad Group are more likely to have a direct impact on project implementation, with TSI remaining mainly a consultative forum that might take up a stronger coordination function alongside the investment fund with a more effective intergovernmental component.

The Tallinn Summit has not given any clear indication of fundamental structural reforms of TSI. Among possible solutions discussed beforehand were reducing the frequency of high-level summits to a bi-annual schedule and the creation of permanent working groups that could make an ongoing contribution to project implementation. With Bulgaria officially tasked with hosting the next 66

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© Leszek Szymański (PAP)

annual summit, the annual schedule has prevailed for now. The technical secretariat, set up by the Estonian government to support the organization and public profile of the summit has proven successful. TSI members approved in the Summit’s final declaration that a secretariat will remain operational. It remains to be seen whether this means a permanent secretariat, which Hungary has expressed an interest in hosting, or whether subsequent rotating summit hosts will maintain their own secretariats as a best practice. A permanent institution performing as strongly as the Estonian one would be important in upholding the international profile and visibility of TSI independently of political circumstances in individual host nations. Taking into account the political crisis in Bulgaria, this might prove a very immediate concern.

The Three Seas Initiative after the Tallinn Summit: Progress with Unfinished Business Nevertheless, the Bulgarian foreign minister has already started heading the work of the TSI coordination group.

What should concern policy-makers are four outstanding issues: • Tallinn highlighted that TSI remains unsuccessful in providing a cohesive political platform for the security concerns of some of its members and those of the United States. 5G and the digital pillar of TSI have been on the US agenda in Tallinn, explicitly referring to Chinese influence in the region. However, one needs to clearly disentangle the utility of TSI as a forum for US declarations on the matter from any substantial contribution that TSI can make in this regard. The signing of numerous joint declarations on 5G security between the US and several TSI members resulted from bilateral contacts, not joint participation in TSI. In turn, TSI members––Austria and Hungary––maintain their openness towards Huawei. Just one day after the summit, Hungary’s government announced a major Huawei investment in the country. Such limits on internal cohesion have also meant that TSI did not become a major format for energy security vis-a-vis Russia. For several member states supply diversification remains a purely economic issue to reduce prices while Russia is neither seen as a direct threat nor an unreliable supplier; • The Tallinn Summit joint statement referred to the US-led Blue Dot Network, a counterproposal to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.

This could pave the way for showcasing the framework through TSI infrastructure projects successfully undergoing the network certification process. This would

strengthen the transatlantic element of TSI and geopolitical signalling while not impinging on the EU frameworks supporting the projects.

Despite its mentioning in the joint statement, fully embracing the Blue Dot Network might not prove possible given divergent national positions on Russia and China; • During the Tallinn Summit, the notion of TSI being directed against the EU re-emerged. This issue seemed to have been firmly put to rest, particularly with regular participation from EU institutions and the German government. However, it was notable that speakers in Tallinn repeatedly felt compelled to deny any such notion.

While a Euronews report saying that TSI might be ‘an American-funded alternative to the EU’ can be seen as an extreme outlier, yet suspicions regarding TSI seem to persist. The US role might be perceived as less divisive under the Biden administration, viewed as keen to re-embrace the EU after the tumultuous years with Trump in office. A clearer German stance on its role and involvement in the initiative could further benefit TSI’s perception.

• The 2020 Summit further complicated the issue of external partners. The possibility of the TSIIF to invest in projects connecting TSI members with non-members has the potential to make a strong contribution in both the Western Balkans and Ukraine.

The Western Balkan countries had been invited to join previous Three Seas Business Summits to support infrastructure connections amidst a sluggish EU enlargement process, especially with growing Russian and Chinese influence in the region.

To the East, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has expressed 4/2020

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Poland's significant financial contribution confirms its leadership role in TSI interest in TSI. With the potential of US LNG exports to Ukraine via Poland and that of improving Ukrainian infrastructure ties with CEE, Kyiv’s long-term involvement could have sent a strong signal. No visible progress was made on this issue in Tallinn, however. Bulgaria, as the host of the next summit, added some complexity by suggesting a role for Greece and Cyprus. This would expand the format into the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, motivated by ongoing gas exploration, and to underpin the importance of the Alexandroupoli LNG terminal.

CONCLUSION

The Tallinn Summit struggled to deliver a clear vision and roadmap beyond the summitry. Holding the mostly-online meeting reduced the agenda, including the cancellation of the Business Forum.

The public elements clearly underlined the important role the United States is playing in the format. The conditional offer of match-funding member state contributions to the TSIIF highlights that the US expects more from the TSI countries themselves. So far, US incentives have yielded limited results in mobilizing their funds. The Tallinn Summit did not provide further clarification on how Berlin sees its role in the format. Germany seems content with business opportunities for its corporations in TSI projects while

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politically observing from the sidelines after its membership failed in 2018.

Poland’s significant financial contribution confirms its leadership role in TSI. Warsaw will have to convince its partners to increase their financial pledges further to unlock the full US funding offer.

Hesitation towards Polish leadership might not have been overcome quite yet.

Germany, on the other hand, remained invisible in Tallinn after a prominent role it played at the last year’s business forum. Despite repeated reassurances of support, Berlin is not visibly stepping up its engagement. As the host, Estonia promoted the so far underdeveloped digital pillar with its smart connectivity proposal. It remains to be seen to what extent TSI might become a vessel to promote this vision, also as a potential coalition within the EU to influence relevant Digital Single Market frameworks.

More broadly, the main geopolitical question is whether TSI can serve the reinforcement of NATO’s Eastern Flank against Russian and Chinese threats, but also provide a bridge towards the Western Balkans or Ukraine. Notably, attending delegations emphasized the security dimension more firmly than in previous years. The format has not yet shown any signs of influencing national perceptions of Russia and China, however.

TSI remains a work in progress and assessing a single summit is inevitably a snapshot. However, on an initiative that in large parts still exists only in the form of summits, it is not unfair to pass such a momentary judgment. Łukasz Janulewicz, Zsombor Zeöld December 2020

BREXIT WARS: THE KINGDOM STRIKES BACK

Michał Oleksiejuk

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ack in the pre-COVID-19 times of late 19’ and early 20’, the geopolitical scene of Europe was heavily preoccupied with Brexit and the dragging negotiations on the Withdrawal Agreement, also known as the Divorce Bill. Once the agreement has been reached in early 2020, Europe sighed with relief and moved on to ensure that the future relationship between London and Brussels is as smooth and mutually beneficial as possible. However, the global SARSCoV-2 pandemic has driven the attention away from the UK-EU negotiations, and quite rightly so. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the international health crisis has not affected what will happen on the night of December 31, 2020. Despite the looming

end of the transition period and the subsequent full and final departure of the UK from the EU Single Market and the Customs Union, the British PM Boris Johnson seems less determined to agree on a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement then he was just several months ago. If the agreement is not ready by the end of 2020 and the “nodeal” scenario happens, Europe will most likely experience enormous delays in the flow of goods, services and people between the EU and the UK, leading to a paralysis in this part of Europe, lasting for days, if not weeks.

GOOD OLD BREXIT

As such, the issue of the UK willing to leave the European Union has been present in the British politics ever since it 4/2020

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BRITAIN’S PRIME MINISTER BORIS JOHNSON DEPARTS FOR PARLIAMENT. LONDON, UK, DECEMBER 1, 2020.

was admitted to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. Following two successful vetoes of the Britain’s accession by the French President Charles de Gaulle, it took the Kingdom only two years from the time of joining the EEC to the first ever referendum on the possibly of leaving it. Interestingly enough, the 73’ accession pact was negotiated and signed by the conservative government represented

by Prime Minister Edward Heath – a 180-degree change to the current stance towards the EU of the same party1.

Throughout all this time, the Labour Party was heavily split over the British membership in the ECC, experiencing internal clashes on whether to support or criticize the new alliance. This dispute led to including a public promise in the Economic & Social Research Council, “Timeline of the UK in the EU,” What UK Thinks [website], <https://whatukthinks.org/eu/about-the-eureferendum/timeline-of-uk-in-the-eu/>, accessed October 1, 2020.

© Neil Hall (PAP/EPA)

Labour Party Manifesto, stating that the Labour Party should win the 1974 General Election and a referendum on the ECC will be held to determine whether Britons support or reject the British membership in this institution. Similarly to the 2016 referendum, the subject of membership was used primarily as an electoral tool that would allow a certain party to win/stay in power to exploit political sentiments of its voters. In the end, the majority of British citizens opted for remaining in the EEC, which over time became the contemporary European Union2. The support for the European Economic Community in 1975 was quite impressive and reached up to 66% with approximately 34% voters determined to leave the new alliance.

Despite this endorsement, the 1980s have marked the beginning of the increasingly

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BBC, “Brexit: A brief history of Britain and the EU,” BBC [website], January 31, 2020, <https://www. bbc.co.uk/newsround/50166269>, accessed October 3, 2020.

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Brexit Wars: The Kingdom Strikes Back Euro-sceptic approach towards the EU, led by the Conservative Party and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. In 1984, she fought with Brussels to lower the amount of British financial contribution towards the EU. This was due to incoherent and unfair EU agricultural regulations that at some point saw the UK as the biggest financial contributor to the European budget, despite being its third poorest member at the time. Furthermore, in later years, the UK experienced a ban on the exports of its beef to the EU, following health concerns, as well as a debate on the complete rejection of euro as a possible replacement of pound as the British currency3. All of these issues paired with a rising popularity of far-right movements such as UKIP, have further deepened Euroscepticism of the British society and the Conservative Party itself.

THE DECISION

The rest in now history. Back in 2013, upon seeing the increasing discontent of the British society with the uncontrolled migration into the UK, the Prime Minister David Cameron decided to use a technique similar to that of his rival party in 1974.

He promised that should the Conservative Party win the 2015 General Election, he would promptly attempt to renegotiate the terms of the UK’s membership in the EU and then put the new deal to a referendum, giving every citizen a chance to express an opinion on the future of the relationship with the European Union. Two years later, the Labour Party lost the election and so the renegotiation process begun with the new, revised membership agreement being drafted soon afterwards. The PM declared that talks have concluded in February 2016. The EU Membership Referendum of 2016 took place on June 23, following a lengthy and rather aggressive campaign4.

Centre for European Reform, “Brexit Timeline,” Centre for European Reform [website], 2020, <https:// www.cer.eu/brexit-timeline>, accessed October 1, 2020.

3

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A. Sandford, “Brexit Timeline 2016–2020: key

The issue of the British membership in the European Union has largely split the society with polls suggesting a very close race, up until the last hours before the vote. The results that came in the next day showed how close the referendum was.

A total of 51.9% of Britons voted for the departure while 48.1% wanted to remain.

The defeat of David Cameron’s campaign to keep the UK in the EU under new, revised membership conditions, prompted his resignation. Under the new PM, Theresa May, the Article 50 that formally triggers Brexit has been submitted to the EU on March 29, 2017, beginning the two-year period of negotiations on the exact shape of the future relationship between the EU and the UK. During these turbulent times several drafts of the agreement have been created, all of which have eventually been rejected by the British Parliament or the EU negotiators.

This resulted in a stalemate in the British Parliament as the PM was unable to secure support for any proposal put forward in the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Faced with the inability to fulfil her obligation towards the nation, Theresa May resigned as Prime Minister, making way for one of the architects of the 2016 campaign to leave the EU, the former mayor of London, Boris Johnson5.

Then, after early election, several deadline extensions and intense negotiations, the House of Commons agreed on the Withdrawal Agreement in January 2020, sealing the final departure of the UK from the EU. The United Kingdom left the events in the UK’s path from referendum to EU exit,” Euronews [website], January 30, 2020, <https:// www.euronews.com/2020/01/30/brexit-timeline2016-2020-key-events-in-the-uk-s-path-fromreferendum-to-eu-exit>, accessed October 4, 2020.

D. Acharya, “Brexit in 2016 and 1975: Two historical EU referendums speak of two different ideas of Britain,” Firstpost [website], June 25, 2016, <https://www.firstpost.com/world/brexit-in-2016and-1975-two-historical-eu-referendums-speakof-two-different-ideas-of-britain-2853954.html>, accessed October 2, 2020.

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International Affairs European Union on January 31, 2020 at 11:59 PM CET. TRANSITIONING INTO THE NEW

Starting from February 1 of the same year, a transition period begun. It that saw the UK outside of the EU but still as a member of the Single Market and the Customs Union. This has been done to give both sides plenty of time for negotiating the future EU-UK trade agreement while averting the chaos of United Kingdom leaving the European Union without any deal straight away. This would almost certainly lead to the obstruction of the flow of goods, services and people across the border since border and custom checks would have to be imposed on all border crossings, including air and seaports. However, this highly favorable arrangement, allowing the UK to enjoy some benefits of full membership while remaining outside of the EU will not last forever. London and Brussels mutually agreed that it will last only until the end of 2020, after which the UK will have fully left the European Union, including the Customs Union and the Single Market6.

In the ideal world, a new comprehensive EU-UK Trade Deal would have been agreed by that time, allowing for a smooth transition between leaving the EU’s structures and into an arranged situation where the flow of goods and services is largely deregulated with limited taxation and customs fees. However, because of the lengthy turmoil associated with negotiating the final version of the Divorce Bill and the subsequent postponements of the actual Brexit day, the length of the Transition Period was limited to only 11 months. Together with the outbreak of the SARS-CoV-19 pandemic across the world, this hindered time and caused the

comprehensive trade agreement difficult if not completely impossible to achieve.

The current British PM, Boris Johnson, has mentioned several times that should the agreement not be ready by October 15, there will be no chance to ratify it on time, hence the UK will have to leave the EU without a deal and begin trading on the basis of the World Trade Organization rules without any preferential treatments7.

THE INTERNAL MARKET BILL

At the time of writing this article (the beginning of October) little to no information has been shared by the negotiators of both sides regarding the progress made with regards to the new trade agreement. From time to time various politicians have been sharing vague comments on the matter such as: “negotiations are going well,” “we are on track to meet the deadline” or “that the majority of issues has already been agreed on, as of today we are only working on the last items to be resolved.” However, despite these obvious attempts to create a positive image of the negotiating process in the international media, it is clear that much work still needs to be done and that the key points of disagreement between the sides are yet to be resolved – furthermore all of this has to be achieved within an overall deadline of less than 90 days.

The situation has been further deteriorated in early September when the details of a new proposed legislation, submitted to the British parliament by the Prime Minister, surfaced to the media.

According to its authors, the Internal Market Bill (UKIM Bill) is designed to ensure that all four of the UK’s nations (England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales) will not be limited by regulations E. Anderson, “Boris Johnson: Britain will move on if there’s no Brexit deal,” Politico [website], September 6, 2020, <https://www.politico.com/ news/2020/09/06/boris-johnson-brexit-nodeal-409487>, accessed October 1, 2020.

7

T. Edgington, “Brexit: What is the transition period?,” BBC [website], July 1, 2020, <https://www. bbc.com/news/uk-politics-50838994>, accessed October 3, 2020.

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Brexit Wars: The Kingdom Strikes Back

A WOMAN VIEWS CHRISTMAS DECORATIONS AT A STORE ON OXFORD STREET IN LONDON, UK, NOVEMBER 23, 2020.

determined by other three national governments in terms of internal trade.

The Bill is necessary since the old UK laws, ensuring a free, single market within the borders of the United Kingdom, have lost their powers when the UK joined the European Economic Community in 1973.

Then the UK’s “single market,” alongside dozen other legislative acts were replaced

by EEC’s (now EU) legislation8. However, when the full Brexit finally happens on December 31, 2020, the EU Single Market laws will also cease to have power in the UK, since it will no longer be a member state. The UKIM Bill was therefore designed predominantly to replace this legislation by ensuring a Single Market within the four nations of the United Kingdom that will prevent any of them from introducing rules and regulations favoring goods from one part of the UK over another. Although the premise of the proposed legislation may not seem controversial, it does contain an important

© Neil Hall (PAP/EPA)

clause that has been the source of the EU-UK conflict ever since.

INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC – WHICH LAW WILL BE MORE IMPORTANT TO THE UK?

The UKIM Bill contains a clause stating that the legislation contained within the document will always take precedence over any international law.

This is particularly significant with regards to another crucial document signed in the process of Brexit called the Withdrawal Agreement (WA). The WA was signed by the United Kingdom as well as the European Union with an intent of drawing out basics for the future relationship between the two for the duration and after the Transition Period. This document and the inability to ratify it in both chambers of the British Parliament led to the delay of Brexit on several occasions9. Although Members of Parliament and the UK’s Brexit Al Jazeera, “Brexit: What is the UK’s controversial Internal Market Bill?,” Al Jazeera [website], September 9, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/ economy/2020/09/09/brexit-what-is-the-ukscontroversial-internal-market-bill/?gb=true>, accessed October 5, 2020.

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Herald Scotland Online, “What is the Internal Market Bill, how does it break the law?,” The Herald [website], September 14, 2020, <https://www. heraldscotland.com/news/18720565.brexit-internalmarket-bill-controversial/>, accessed October 6, 2020.

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© Facundo Arrizabalaga (PAP/EPA)

A BUS DRIVES THROUGH THE CITY OF LONDON AS THE UK REMAINS IN LOCKDOWN. LONDON, UK, NOVEMBER 23, 2020.

negotiators in Brussels could not agree on several issues that later became a part of the WA, the biggest one was the Northern Ireland border issue.

This was of particular importance for many reasons with the most significant of all being the sensitivity of the past tensions alongside this exact problematic border that eventually escalated to what is now known as the Northern Ireland conflict. The Troubles, as they are also called, begun in the late 1960s with an exact starting date hard to determine.

The conflict took place on the territory of Northern Ireland and include fights between the Unionists, who wanted Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom and the Irish nationalists, who called for Northern Ireland to leave the United Kingdom and join the Republic of Ireland. The struggle was extremally bloody with over 50,000 casualties on both sides including more than 3,500 fatalities –combatants and civilians. The infamous bomb attacks by 74

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the IRA as well as the brutality of some British soldiers involved made headlines across the world – making the conflict known internationally. The war ended in 1998 when both sides finally decided to sign cease-fire agreement, referred to as the Good Friday Agreement.

Amongst many things, the peace deal included provisions that no hard border or permanent border checks can ever be established between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, allowing for minimal obstruction to the functioning of border communities10.

With that in mind, if no appropriate actions were taken in time before the departure of United Kingdom from the European Union, the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland would suddenly become the EU’s external J. Wallenfeldt, “The Troubles – Northern Ireland history,” Britannica [website], August 21, 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/event/The-TroublesNorthern-Ireland-history>, accessed October 5, 2020.

10

Brexit Wars: The Kingdom Strikes Back border, thus requiring border and custom checks of all arriving and departing vehicles. This would in turn clearly violate the Good Friday Agreement, potentially leading to an outbreak of social unrest, possibly even violence. In order to avoid this scenario, special attention was given to finding a feasible solution – although not perfect, a plan has finally been agreed on at the end of 2019, allowing the Withdrawal Agreement to be signed at the beginning of 2020. The clause related to the regulation of the North-Western border of the UK after Brexit became formally known as the Northern Ireland protocol. Under this arrangement, goods will not need to be checked by customs along the entire Irish border (when traveling between EU and the UK) once the Transition Period ends and the EU-28 becomes the EU-27. Northern Ireland will continue to enforce the EU’s customs rules and follow its premises on product standards (known as the Single Market on goods) despite not being a part of it.

Thanks to this solution, checks on goods travelling from Northern Ireland (a nonEU country) into the Republic of Ireland (an EU country) will be completely unnecessary11. The Northern Ireland protocol is not active yet – it is due to come into force on January 1, 2021, the first day of the new EU-UK relationship.

However, although the Withdrawal Agreement together with the Northern Ireland protocol have already been ratified by both sides and became the international law, the currently discussed Internal Market Bill threatens (at least in the eyes of EU representatives, the Labour Party and national governments of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales) this carefully crafted solution to the Irish

issue by giving UKIM Bill precedence over the Divorce Bill and thus possibly deeming it unusable. Interestingly enough, the administration of PM Boris Johnson is fully aware of the legislative clash between the two documents but does not attempt to hide it from the public. When the Bill has been put forward in the British Parliament in early September, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis told the House of Commons that “the (UKIM) Bill does indeed break the international law in a very specific and limited way.”12 Despite being clearly aware of both domestic as well as international criticism of the Bill, the Conservative Party have decided not to withdraw or amend the document in any way that would satisfy the EU. As a result, the Bill was put to the vote only after a number of insignificant changes and in the end passed with an impressive majority of 84. As many as 340 Members of Parliament (MPs) voted in favor while 256 voted against the proposal.

IT IS NOT AS BAD AS IT SEEMS

Looking at the UK’s government determination one may ask if the UK has grown reckless when it comes to its international politics or rather was the stubborn defense of the Bill a show of confidence, confirming that the Bill will not threaten the peace in the Northern Ireland?

According to representatives of the Conservative Party, it has got to be the second one. The government’s line of defense claims that the Bill is aimed simply at replacing the soon-to-be obsolete EU legislation, acting as a special A. Payne, “Boris Johnson’s government admits that its Brexit plans will ‘break international law’,” Business Insider [website], September 14, 2020, <https://www.businessinsider.com/brexit-brandonlewis-uk-plans-break-international-law-northernireland-2020-9?IR=T>, accessed October 1, 2020.

12

Baker McKenzie, “UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement: Key Implications,” Baker McKenzie [website], December 16, 2019, <https://www.bakermckenzie. com/en/insight/publications/2019/11/uk-euwithdrawal-agreement>, accessed October 1, 2020.

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International Affairs safety net that will protect Northern Irish as well as any other British goods in the unlikely case that European Union will start making unreasonable demands after Brexit. The Bill is supposed to protect Britain from EU legislation that could potentially impede trade between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK by giving British ministers the unilateral power to change or disapply export rules for goods travelling from Britain to Northern Ireland. Its authors wanted the Bill will to make clear that Britain will be able to set its own subsidy regime while Northern Ireland will continue to apply the EU’s state aid rules. Moreover, they wanted to permit the government to provide financial assistance to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – a power previously reserved to the EU, which will no longer be enforced when the Transition Period ends13.

WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF THE UKIM BILL?

Despite these reassurances, the EU officials remained unconvinced of the good intentions behind the Bill proposed by PM Boris Johnson. In early September, when the full document has been revealed, the European Union has immediately threated the UK with severe actions if it goes ahead with the plan to ratify the UKIM Bill. Amongst many, the harshest of the proposed reactions included the EU walking away from the post-Brexit negotiations completely as well as filing a formal lawsuit against the UK to the European Court of Justice for breaking the international agreements.

However, after the Bill has passed through the British House of Commons on September 29, the European Union’s L. O’Carroll, “Why is the UK seeking to unpick the EU withdrawal agreement?” The Guardian [website], September 7, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/ politics/2020/sep/07/why-is-the-uk-seeking-tounpick-the-eu-withdrawal-agreement>, accessed October 3, 2020.

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stance has become less strict than before.

EU officials agreed to continue the negotiation process with the UK, but only after a mutual understanding that even if a deal is negotiated and all problematic issues are resolved, the European Union will not ratify it unless the UKIM Bill is completely withdrawn14.

This has likely been done not to impede the progress that was already achieved over the past eight months while still giving the UK time to rethink its actions and realize (at least in the eyes of the EU) that the international law cannot be broken in the name of providing a safety net to policies that may or may not be pursued in the undetermined future. The President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen expressed similar view in a series of Twitter posts that appeared on her account in early September. In one of these posts der Leyen said that she is “very concerned about announcements from the British government on its intentions to breach the Withdrawal Agreement,” since the passing of the Bill “(…) would break the international law and undermines trust.

Pacta sunt servanda = the foundation of prosperous future relations.”15 Nevertheless, the decision not to withdraw from the negotiations does not mean that the ratification of UKIM has gone unnoticed across Brussels.

Numerous anonymous sources within the EU negotiating team characterized the talks with the UK as tense, especially having in mind that the UKIM Bill is just one of several conflict issues that the J. Rankin, “Is there still time for a Brexit trade deal?,” The Guardian [website], October 2, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/oct/02/ is-there-still-time-for-a-brexit-trade-deal>, accessed October 2, 2020.

14

I. Watson, “Brexit: PM and EU chief agree importance of finding trade deal,” BBC [website], October 3, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/ukpolitics-54397942>, accessed October 3, 2020.

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Brexit Wars: The Kingdom Strikes Back two sides need to resolve before the talks conclude. The most important of them (except from the UKIM Bill) being the fisheries – mainly the policies regulating them as well as the access issues.

CONCLUSION

Although the EU remains open to intensive talks, being aware of the fast approaching deadline, the British PM Boris Johnson has made it clear that should the agreement not be ready

by October 15, 2020 (the date of the EU summit) than the UK may as well dropout of the talks without any deal.

As of the first week of October, Ursula von der Leyen as well as Boris Jonson have both agreed that despite the discussed difficulties, the negotiations should be extended by a month, in what is considered to be a last bid to come up with a compromise on the final unresolved issues, including the already mentioned fisheries and polices regulating them. In the meantime, the EU continues to pressure the United Kingdom on the UKIM issue, reminding the UK negotiators that even if a new free trade agreement is reached, it will not be ratified unless the UKIM Bill is dropped from the agenda16. In a recent show of force, the EU has officially begun its internal legal proceedings against London for the introduction of legislation that is breaching the international law.

An official “letter of formal notice” has been passed to the British PM – this is the first step in the process that the European Commission can employ against countries that it believes have broken the EU law. Although designed to serve as just a warning, the later stages D. Boffey, “Johnson and Von der Leyen extend Brexit talks by a month,” The Guardian [website], October 3, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/ politics/2020/oct/03/johnson-and-von-der-leyenextend-brexit-talks-by-a-month>, accessed October 6, 2020.

of the said process may include a formal lawsuit being filed at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). However, such move is highly unlikely as the UK will only have to adhere to the ECJ ruling until the end of 2020. Any case still in the process after that date may go on for years, thus deeming the entire procedure meaningless. Nevertheless, the threat of the ECJ case may serve as a leverage to somewhat force the UK into finding a compromise with the EU17.

The pressing question still remains: will the Transition Period end with an agreement over a comprehensive trade deal? In the author’s opinion it is difficult if not impossible to assess – even at such a late stage of negotiations.

One has to remember that the issue of finding a compromise is currently much more about politics than it is about any legal procedures. Prime Minister Boris Johnson will be a decisive figure in that case and the process may still go either way. In one of the scenarios the UK agrees on the EU’s proposals and a deal is signed. The expected outrage of Conservative circles and voters claiming that the UK surrendered to Brussels will likely be played down by claiming that some concessions had to be made for the greater good of the country and the attempt to stabilize its economy.

The second scenario could see PM Johnson rejecting the deal with the EU and accepting the possibility of border chaos in order to cement his electoral promises of “taking back control” and thus staying trustworthy to his most loyal supporters.

Michał Oleksiejuk December 2020

16

BBC, “Brexit: EU starts legal action against UK over deal breach plan,” BBC [website], October 1, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/ukpolitics-54370226>, accessed October 6, 2020.

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European Union

POLITICAL PARTIES IN MALTA AND LIECHTENSTEIN IN VIEW OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTIONS

Marcin Łukaszewski, Phd

Having joined the European Union in 2004, Malta is one of the youngest countries among the 27 EU Member States. Liechtenstein, in turn, is the only European micro-state1 closely cooperating within the framework of European integration – it is a member of the European Economic Area (EEA). Apart from the idea of European integration, these two countries are similar in terms of their small population and size, but above all, by a very similar, at least at first sight, parliamentary scene.

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These countries generally include Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and the Vatican.

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Political Parties in Malta and Liechtenstein in view of European Integration and Foreign Policy Directions

MOUNTED SOLDIERS ARRIVE FOR THE SWEARING-IN CEREMONY OF THE PRESIDENT OF MALTA. VALLETTA, MALTA, APRIL 4, 2019.

OUTLINE OF THE POLITICAL SCENE IN MALTA

The Maltese political scene is very much like the British one in some respects.

As regards Great Britain, despite its majority voting system, several other groups are elected to the House of Commons in addition to the members of the two main groups (the Tories and the Labour Party)2. In the case of Malta, the parliament consists of, almost exclusively, members of two parties, as a result of the proportional electoral system using the STV mechanism3. This is surprising as the British system is commonly regarded as the one leading to polarization of the political scene while the STV as the one allowing for the appearance of parties other than the two dominant ones in the parliament.

There were eight of them after the last parliamentary election.

2

Similar conclusions are drawn by A. Dańda.

Dańda, A. (2010) System partyjny Malty, in: Kosowska-Gąstoł, B. (Ed.), Systemy partyjne państw Unii Europejskiej, Cracow, p. 234.

3

© Domenic Aquilina (PAP/EPA)

In the parliamentary elections following the 1962 voting (when there were as many as five parties in the parliament), no party other than the nationalists and the Labour managed to win a seat. What proves the fact that the country’s political scene is petrified in the sense of being dominated by two blocs is the election of two representatives of the newly established Democratic Party as late as 2017. Yet, this was possible mainly thanks to the Nationalist Party, which included representatives of this party on its lists of candidates4.

The reference to the British system is justified as the government in London has been Malta’s decision-making center for a century and a half. Although a constitutional referendum was held in 1964, it is worth noting that taking part in it had, in fact, been a political declaration of support for Malta’s independence. In 1974, This election coalition was established in 2017 and dissolved later that year.

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ALOIS, HEREDITARY PRINCE OF LIECHTENSTEIN DELIVERS A SPEECH DURING A WELCOME CEREMONY. BERN, SWITZERLAND, APRIL 3, 2019.

after a 10-year-long union with the British monarchy, Malta became a republic5.

The two main political factions, the Nationalist Party (Partit Nazzjonalista, PN) and the Malta Labour Party (Partit tal-Haddiema, MLP)6, played a major role in achieving the country’s independence.

However, both blocs had a different idea on how to win it7. In the last 50 years, other parties have been taking part in the elections, but none of them has gained significant public support8. This was caused by the fact that the political scene has been controlled mainly by the Labour and nationalists.

Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the Labour was perceived as the party of the secularized part of society, Although Malta was established as a sovereign state with the British monarch as its head of state in 1964, the symbolic end of Malta’s exit from the influence of the British government took place in 1974.

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6

The first part of the name was removed in 2008.

7

This will be discussed further in the article.

In addition to the independent candidates, since 1971, the following parties, among others, took part in the elections: the Progressive Constitutionalist Party, the Communist Party of Malta, and the Democratic Alternative. The latter took part in every election since 1992. However, it does not pose a threat to the main blocs because it received only several thousand votes (compared to more than 100,000 votes for each of the other two parties).

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© Peter Schneider (PAP/EPA)

workers and trade unions (which also characterizes its British counterpart).

On the other hand, the nationalists represented a part of Maltese society which positively regarded the role of the Catholic Church. This state of affairs represented the Maltese political dispute and reality quite accurately. The MLP had been founded almost 100 years ago, and its members exercised power in institutions established by the British in the 1920s and immediately after World War II. However, as a result of the demands to integrate Malta with Britain, the PN seized power.

OUTLINE OF THE POLITICAL SCENE IN LIECHTENSTEIN

The two main political parties in Liechtenstein were formed at the end of World War I. The entire political scene in the interwar period was characterized by two different visions for the development of the Principality, proposed by these blocs. Consequently, the representatives of these factions won all parliamentary seats. The Christian-Social People’s Party (Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei, VP, later the Patriotic Union)9 and the Progressive Citizens’ Party (Fortschrittliche In 1936, the People’s Party merged with the Liechtenstein Homeland Service, which had been established three years earlier, to form the Patriotic Union (Vaterländische Union).

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Political Parties in Malta and Liechtenstein in view of European Integration and Foreign Policy Directions Bürgerpartei in Liechtenstein, FBP) were founded in the same year. Surprisingly enough, initially, the differences between the blocs were not ideological since they were both right-wing. However, the parties had a different approach to the pace of changes and the search for a new strategic partner, following the defeat of the AustroHungarian monarchy in World War I. The People’s Party demanded democratic reforms, support for workers, and focusing foreign policy of its western neighbor. The FBP established its policy largely on the basis of the relationship with the Catholic Church and support for the monarchy10.

It is worth emphasizing how fundamental were changes in Liechtenstein after World War I. The state, so closely connected to the Austrian monarchy since gaining independence, later entirely refocused its foreign policy from the East to the West, establishing political relations with a new strategic partner – Switzerland in the 1920s.

Some new political parties appeared in the election following World War II. Yet, until 1993, none of them managed to win a single parliamentary seat – the VU-FBP coalition gained them all. From that year on, the two parties were joined by the Free List (Freie Liste, FL), which offered an alternative to the promonarchist, Christiandemocratic, and conservative VU and FBP, by advocating, among others, a limited role of the Prince. The Free List maintained or increased the number of seats in the parliament in each successive election.

However, in 2013 and 2017, the fourth party – The Independents (Die Unabhängigen, DU) appeared in parliament alongside these three groups11.

Marxer, W. (2010), Liechtenstein, in: Nohlen, D., & Stöver, P. (Eds.), Elections in Europe. A Data Handbook, Baden-Baden, p. 1157.

10

During the last parliamentary term, there was a split within the Independent, which resulted in the creation of a new party in 2018 – the Democrats for Liechtenstein (Demokraten pro Liechtenstein), bringing together three former DU members.

11

While the FBP and VU are often described as conservative or Christiandemocratic, the FL seems to be more of a social democratic and ecological party, considering its demands. On the other hand, the Independents are considered to be a moderately Eurosceptic party and rather a right-wing one, which is crucial for this analysis. They are often considered to be a group of populist politicians, as stated by some commentators. The above justifies the clear objections of the authorities of this party to the plans of EU decision-makers to relocate refugees.

The absence of parliamentary opposition between 1938 and 1997 seems to be a phenomenon of the Liechtenstein political scene. For more than half a century, all parliamentary seats belonged to two main parties that formed a joint government.

The establishment of the FBP-VU coalition was influenced by, among others, external threats (for instance Hitler’s aggressive policy and the occupation of neighboring Austria). Additionally, ruling jointly proved to be an excellent idea –this cooperation was continued for nearly 60 years.

Throughout this period, each of the parties formed a single-party government – first the Patriotic Union and then the FBP. After 2005, the FBP-VU coalition was reinstated.

The 2017 election turned out to be the worst for the two main factions in terms of number of seats gained in the parliament (they won a total of 17 seats). However, that election was a great success of the opposition, which claimed as many as eight seats12.

THE IDEA OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE DEMANDS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN MALTA

Surprisingly, unlike in a large number of similar cases in Europe, where rightwing parties were quite skeptical about strengthening European integration 12

The Free List – three, the Independents – five.

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European Union (or possible EU membership), and left-wing parties supported this idea, in Malta, rightwing PN was in favor of strengthening cooperation with European communities, while the MLP was against it. However, such a situation is understandable if we recall the above-mentioned historical background and outline of the political scene. The reluctance of the nationalists to integrate Malta into the United Kingdom was justified by their perception of the British as those who did not allow the sovereign rule of the Maltese and established a form of a royal colony in Malta, which existed until 1964. The nationalists were gaining support thanks to this position and exercised power within autonomous bodies at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. On the other hand, the Labour Party, which ruled Malta immediately after World War II, advocated close cooperation with the British in its manifesto on foreign policy, recognizing the positive aspects of good relations with a strong overseas partner. Because of the reluctance of the Maltese to such a vision of foreign policy, the support of the clergy who were urging people not to vote for the MLP, as well as the ideas of gradually achieving greater autonomy (and ultimately independence), the nationalists remained in power until 1971. Undoubtedly, one of their greatest achievements was the agreement that recognized independence of the island.

What seems to be crucial for this analysis is the approach to European integration.

The members of the Labour Party, after abandoning the idea of close cooperation with London and noticing the reluctance of their voters to former priorities in foreign policy, have reoriented their assumptions.

In the absence of a key partner, they began to advocate the government’s neutrality policy (in 1987, Malta became a neutral state). This resulted in clear opposition to European integration. Additionally, the Labour government abandoned the efforts of the nationalists to strengthen 82

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cooperation with Western Europe and decided to withdraw Malta from the NATO’s Partnership for Peace program13.

It is clear that the two groups had very different demands, which led to quite dissimilar foreign policies. Thus, three years after, following the victory of the nationalists in the 1987 elections, the government began the procedure of obtaining membership in the European Union. The results of the 1992 elections did not change the governing party, which allowed to continue the pro-integration policy. However, already in the subsequent elections (1996), the Labour returned to power – in the same year it blocked the EU membership application. Only two years later, another parliamentary election was held – the PN returned to power.

The consequences of this election seem obvious – the government requested the membership negotiations to start again.

Two key ballots were held in spring 2003 – a non-binding accession referendum (March 8) and a parliamentary election (April 12). Both of them were successful for the PN, which, as it can be inferred from the above, was in favor of Malta’s accession to the EU. In their campaign, the nationalists highlighted mainly the financial benefits of the EU membership (including the possibility of obtaining funds for the renovation of roads) but also pointed out that accession is an opportunity for such a small country, especially in the era of globalization. On the other hand, the MLP drew attention to the risk of losing (limiting) the recently regained sovereignty. The trade unions were also against integration and, along with the Labour, expressed concern about losing jobs. Eventually, despite the Labour’s call to boycott the election and, later, cast invalid or empty votes, the majority of the citizens were in favor of Malta’s EU membership14.

13

Dańda, A. (2010), ibid., p. 237.

14

It is worth noting that even the total number of

Political Parties in Malta and Liechtenstein in view of European Integration and Foreign Policy Directions The result of the referendum did not initially change the attitude of the Labour Party leadership. Yet, after the accession process was over, it accepted the decision of the Maltese people and took part in elections to the European Parliament15.

THE IDEA OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE DEMANDS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN LIECHTENSTEIN

As already mentioned, after World War I, the foreign policies of the two main factions in Liechtenstein were dissimilar.

While the FBP was reluctant to abandon relations with Austria, the VU was in favor of rapprochement with its western neighbor. The defeat of the Central Powers sealed the decision to reorient foreign policy. The stabilized internal situation and the aforementioned choice of a new strategic partner allowed Liechtenstein to apply for membership in the League of Nations, which was done through the Swiss authorities. However, this request was rejected.

It was only in the 1990s that, largely independently, Liechtenstein became clearly involved in the process of European integration. The small territory and population, thus limited resources, as well as the bond with Switzerland, made it impossible to join the structures of the votes against membership (123,628) and invalid or empty votes (3,911) did not exceed the number of votes for integration (143,094). Just over 90% of those eligible to vote took part in the election.

Interestingly enough, they won the election (out of five MEPs in total, three were claimed by the Labour and the remaining two by the nationalists).

In subsequent elections to the European Parliament, the result was identical. In 2014 the total number of seats increased to six (the seats were divided equally between the two groups). In the last election, the Labour took away one seat from the nationalists, claiming four in total. Currently, MEPs of the Labour Party belong to the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) while the MEPs of the Nationalist Party are a part of the European People’s Party (EPP), both of which are pro-integration factions of the European Parliament.

15

Bloc quickly. Liechtenstein was included in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960, as a state bound by the customs union with Switzerland. Yet, it must be emphasized that Liechtenstein did not become a member state of this organization until 1991. After the Swiss rejected the possibility of joining the newly created EEA in a referendum, Liechtenstein continued its willingness to become a member of this body (the first referendum was held in 1991 and the second one four years later). Thus, in 1995, Liechtenstein became the first of the European micro-states to be involved in the European integration process to such an extent16. The next step included accession to the Schengen Area. The decision to do so was made in 2008, and already at the end of 2011, the Principality became the 26th member of the Area.

Focusing on the approach of parliamentary political parties to the foreign policy, it should be emphasized that the constitutional system of Liechtenstein comprises instruments of direct democracy, which could be used to stop decisions made in the parliament.

Additionally, the Prince can also block nearly all parliamentary decisions.

This is why reaching a compromise among all parties in parliament plays such an important role in Liechtenstein17.

It should be noted that before the Independents (DU) entered the political scene, none of the three factions was Eurosceptic18. This unanimity of beliefs Koźbiał, K. (2012), Europejskie mikropaństwa w procesie integracji europejskiej. Przykład Liechtensteinu, in Czubik, P., & Mach, Z. (Eds.), Hereditas Mercaturae. Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana świętej pamięci profesorowi Stanisławowi Miklaszewskiemu, Cracow, pp. 21–23.

16

Frommelt, C., & Gstöhl, S. (2011), Liechtenstein and the EEA: the Europeanization of a (very) small state, p. 9 https://www.liechtenstein-institut.li/application/ files/9515/7435/1176/Liechtenstein-and-the-EEA.pdf.

17

18

Ibid., p. 19.

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European Union certainly allowed the government to conduct a firm policy and enabled the opposition, assembled in the Free List, to revise its actions. However, it should be noted that the members of the FL gained seats in the parliament shortly before the second referendum on EEA affiliation.

The outcome of the referendum was clearly influenced by the members of the two main parties and the monarch, who supported the idea of becoming an EU member.

CONCLUSIONS

A difference, which was not explicitly mentioned above, is the matter of policymaking by parliamentary groups.

At this point, it is worth referring to a well-known division into majoritarian and “consensus” democracies by A. Lijphart. Without a detailed analysis of the democracies of both countries, one is able to notice elements of both of these models.

The Maltese political scene clearly resembles the British one, where within the framework of a two-party system, the victory of one of the groups means conducting a policy postulated by that party in pre-election manifestos. A glaring example of this is the subject of European integration, which seems to be a crossparty issue that should be solved through consensus. The Maltese reality was quite different. The change of the parliamentary majority immediately caused a radical reversal of the EU integration process (the Labour Party) or a return to it (the Nationalist Party). This state of affairs caused great instability in foreign policy.

A somewhat different situation could be observed in the case of Liechtenstein.

There, despite the possibilities of building one-party cabinets (with a few exceptions), consensus-based two-party governments were generally established. As a result of including another party in political decision-making, the validity of the decisions made in such a way is less likely to be questioned. Simultaneously, a certain policy must take into account not only 84

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the interests of a given party but also the ones of its coalition partner. Thus, the decisions may constitute a certain form of a nationwide agreement, which is advantageous. However, the disadvantage of such a system is the lack of a constructive critic – the opposition – which has appeared in the politics of Liechtenstein relatively recently.

The analysis of the party systems, political practice, and demands of the parliamentary groups of both countries also provides the subsequent conclusions. The two main Maltese political factions are a phenomenon in terms of their position on European integration. The right-wing party (PN) supports integration, while the left-wing party (MLP) has been against it for many decades19. As a result, every time the MLP obtained a parliamentary majority, the accession process was halted. Only after the accession of the Republic to this organization, the MLP accepted (or perhaps dealt with) the will expressed in the referendum. The examples of both countries indicate two, almost extremely different visions for the resolution of priorities in foreign policy. On the one hand, external affairs may become a major dispute which, if won by one of the parties, might lead to an overturn of the formerly pursued policy (and not only its modification). This is evidenced by the MLP’s approach to the European integration process and Malta’s place in it.

In the case of Liechtenstein, we are dealing with a very stable implementation of foreign policy.It is a result of involving the party that did not win the election in the decisionmaking process. Consequently, the risk of criticism from a strong parliamentary opposition is eliminated.

In Europe, typically, the left-wing parties support European integration (French socialists, Polish Democratic Left Alliance, Hungarian social democrats) while the right-wing parties show reserve or skepticism towards it (French nationalists, Polish Law and Justice, Hungarian Fidesz, British Conservative Party).

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Political Parties in Malta and Liechtenstein in view of European Integration and Foreign Policy Directions

A POLICEMAN STANDS GUARD OUTSIDE THE PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE. VALETTA, MALTA, NOVEMBER 25, 2015.

During 100 years of existence of the two main factions, for the vast majority of time, the Liechtenstein political scene only supported the foreign policy of the government. This is due to a simple reason – the coalition government consisted of all parliamentary groups (i.e., both of them).

There were two exceptions to this rule. The first of them was the initial period when the two parties saw the future relations with their neighbors differently. The second one regards the last few years, when the Independents, a moderately Eurosceptic group, joined the political stage.

In the case of both countries, the most significant notion in foreign policy was not European integration. Instead, it concerned the need to highlight one’s subjectivity while simultaneously maintaining a strategic partnership (and thus political security) with the United Kingdom (in the case of Malta) and Switzerland (in the case of Liechtenstein).

© Facundo Arrizabalaga (PAP/EPA)

In Liechtenstein and Malta, both of which are small countries, a kind of resistance to closer cooperation within the framework of European integration (or perhaps satisfaction with the current status quo and reluctance to change it) seems to be connected with fears of losing or blurring national identity and sovereignty within the common European project20.

Certainly, this defiance has a different intensity in both countries since the two pairs of the main blocs in Liechtenstein and Malta are pro-integration. However, this attitude can hardly be called a full commitment at the same time.

Marcin Łukaszewski December 2020 And this is despite the opportunities that the membership in the European Union offers to such small states. This is indicated by J. Corbett and W. Veenendaal. Corbett, J., & Veenendaal, W. (2018), Democracy in small states. Persisting against all odds, Oxford, p. 140.

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History

I WAITED FOR WORLD WAR III

Jerzy Byczyński's Interview with a Polish resistance member living in the United Kingdom

Major Sergiusz "Kawka" (English: "Jackdaw") Papliński is a 93-year-old living legend for the Polish community in Great Britain.

His turbulent life could make an excellent action movie based entirely on his immeasurable love for Poland.

P

apliński was born on September 9, 1927, in Radom, a town in Poland, and raised in a patriotic family. Throughout his long life, he was a member of the Home Army – the dominant resistance movement in Poland during World War II, a “Cursed Soldier” – a resistance member of the anticommunist underground, a prisoner of the communist detention center, a soldier of Freedom and Independence (Polish: Wolność i Niezawisłość or WiN), a Polish underground anti-communist organization, an emigre, a special force paratrooper (a so-called Silent

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Unseen, Polish: cichociemny), an acrobat, a waiter, and a painter. He also worked in a quarry and a casino. He spent his entire life being a “lone wolf ” and never started a family. Why? We interviewed “Kawka” in his painting studio in South Kensington, London – a place always open to his large group of friends.

JERZY BYCZYŃSKI: MAJOR, HOW DID YOUR RESISTANCE ACTIVITY BEGIN?

Sergiusz Papliński: I supported the Home Army in Radom. My role was to smuggle weapons out of the armament factory in Radom. One day, I received a warning

© private archive

I waited for World War III

that I was at risk of being arrested so I had to escape to the underground resistance.

I could not even go home. I received a contact to the famous commander of resistance units in the Kielce and Radom districts – Antoni Heda “Szary.” But the problem was that “Szary” did not even want to talk to me. He refused, saying: “No, we do not accept children; we do not have diapers.” I was only 14 years old, but at the time it seemed to me that I had enough combat experience to fight for a free Poland. I decided not to give up and said: “The only difference between us is that you are an adult, trained commander, and I am a Polish child. But if each of us takes a gun, we will see who is better.”

I think that this determination convinced “Szary” because he accepted me into the underground resistance – firstly into the minesweeping section. At that moment, the resistance members became my second family.

HAS YOUR UPBRINGING HAD ANY INFLUENCE ON YOUR INFINITE LOVE FOR POLAND?

Of course! I remember the words that my mother said: “The most important thing in every woman’s life is to defend her child.

The worst – to lose it. The only case when a Polish woman can justify the death of her child is when it happens in a fight for homeland.” I was very young; I wanted to fight. I ignored the possible consequences, especially keeping in mind what my mother had said.

YOU TOOK PART IN MANY BATTLES, BLEW UP THE BRIDGE AND RAILROAD TRACKS. WHAT WAS THE MOST NOTABLE MOMENT THAT YOU HAVE EXPERIENCED?

I went through the entire combat route of the resistance unit of “Szary”. I did not think about any trouble; I was too young for that. I took part in the famous raid on 4/2020

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I waited for World War III Końskie prison on June 5, 1944. My task was to plant explosives and blow up the gate. Then I got my first machine gun.

It was a German Bergmann, and I was incredibly proud of myself.

We saved 70 prisoners.

While we were recapturing the village of Radoszyce, I was so willing to fight that Heda shouted: “Come back! Do you want to die?” We managed to save the whole village.

When the Warsaw Uprising broke out, we would stop German trains transporting weapons and ammunition to hand them over to the fighting insurgents.

WHEN DID YOU HAVE TO RUN AWAY FROM POLAND?

Unfortunately, the communist authorities were ruthless. I was arrested and imprisoned in Radom by the communist secret political police. I was repeatedly interrogated and cruelly beaten there. I lost all my teeth. The officer who interrogated me said: “For people like you, there are only two options – ‘white bears’ or a ‘wall’.” The former meant sending me to Siberia, and the latter… a bullet in the head while standing against a wall.

I was lucky because on my 18th birthday, September 9, 1945, I was liberated from prison, together with 300 other colleagues – political prisoners. Soon afterward, at the end of 1945, my escape from Poland was organized. Through Germany, I got to Italy, where I started attending a cadet school. Later on, I made it to Great Britain with the Polish II Corps.

BUT YOU DID NOT REST ON YOUR LAURELS IN GREAT BRITAIN, AM I RIGHT?

Of course, I did not! In England, I was an active member of the underground organization “Freedom and Independence.” Our section cooperated with the American and British army

© private archive

which trained us for special force paratroopers (called the Silent Unseen, cichociemni in Polish). We were all sure that World War III with the Soviets will break out. The sabotage and parachute training were held in England and West Germany, where the Americans gave the entire military camps over to us.

I was in the first group to train there in the early 1950s. The groups of Silent Unseen redeployed to Poland during the war underwent the same training. I was supposed to be in the next group for such redeployment. I was a so-called “sleeper soldier” – on full alert, waiting for further orders. We were supposed to interfere with the Soviets’ communication routes and cut off the flow of arms so that Americans would have more time to organize the defense. There were three options of transfer to Poland: parachuting, for which I was trained, 4/2020

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History

© private archive

overland via Czechoslovakia, or in submarines through the Baltic Sea. Everyone around me would say that the British were ready to fight the Soviets with the support of the Americans.

We were supposed to take Poland back from the communists.

WERE YOU EXPECTING WORLD WAR III TO BEGIN BACK THEN?

Of course. Throughout all this time, we were all ready and waiting for orders.

My friends are still surprised that I never started a family. But how was I supposed to? After all, it would have been completely irresponsible on my part.

My life so far has always been devoted to military actions. For this reason, I could

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not have children. Who would have taken care of them if I had died?

In England, I studied painting. I received a scholarship from General Tadesz Bór-Komorowski himself, who then was Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile. But in my heart, I was still a soldier who was in full readiness to fight for the freedom of Poland. Neither my redeployment there, nor the war with the Soviets have ever happened. Poland was subjugated, and the world forgot about us.

Jerzy Byczyński December 2020

25 YEARS OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN POLAND: A CHANCE FOR INVESTORS

Paweł Kolczyński

Special Economic Zones (SEZ), which have been operating in Poland for over 20 years, have proven to be a very effective tool to attract capital, create new jobs, and modernize the Polish economy. On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the first SEZ – Euro-Park Mielec – we will take a closer look at their history and importance to the Polish economic landscape.

S

pecial Economic Zones are separate areas of the country where entrepreneurs can conduct business while obtaining support in the form of tax exemptions (corporate and personal) from the income earned from an economic activity specified in the act. The goal of creating the zones and introducing such regulations was clear – to accelerate the development

of particular regions by creating new investments and jobs.

THE BEGINNING, LEGAL STATUS, AND THE FIRST ZONE IN MIELEC

The Act on Special Economic Zones came into force in October 1994. Since then, this document, together with its amendments, has served as the basic legal act regulating the activity of SEZs in Poland.

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SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE EURO-PARK MIELEC, POLAND, MAY 5, 2020.

The Act defined a Special Economic Zone as “a separate, uninhabited part of the territory of the Republic of Poland, established in accordance with the provisions of this Act, within which economic activity may be conducted under the rules determined herein.” It aimed to accelerate the economic development of parts of the country’s territory, for instance, by means of developing specific areas of economic activity, boosting export, increasing competitiveness of produced goods and rendered services, as well as developing the existing industrial assets and economic infrastructure.

As stipulated in the Act, the original intention was to establish Special Economic Zones in various regions of Poland. However, only one zone was founded in the beginning – Euro-Park Mielec SEZ (in 1995). Today marks a quarter of a century since its creation.

Therefore, it is a good time to take a closer look at the effects of Special Economic Zones, with the first one being their perfect example.

Based on such analysis, it is possible to determine how promising Special Economic Zones are for investors.

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© Darek Delmanowicz (PAP)

In the past, the role of SEZ administrators was restricted to managing permits and investment land. Over the years, along with the SEZ’s economic development, the range of services provided to investors has been gradually expanding – now including specialized technical, legal, and human resources assistance. Nowadays, thanks to the active cooperation of SEZ authorities with investors, vocational schools, science and technology parks, as well as other entities, SEZ are important centers for the development of innovative enterprises.

Established in 1995, Euro-Park Mielec has enjoyed great interest from both Polish companies and foreign investors from the very beginning. The reason was the economic growth in the zone in addition to the positive experiences of entrepreneurs and investors. All this contributed to the further development of the SEZ. In the following years – by the end of the 20th century – 14 Special Economic Zones were established in total, including 13 new zones: SEZ Kamienna Góra, SEZ Katowice, SEZ KostrzynSłubice, SEZ Kraków, SEZ Legnica, SEZ Łódź, Pomeranian SEZ, SEZ Słupsk, SEZ Starachowice, SEZ Suwałki, TSEZ Tarnobrzeg (“Euro-Park Wisłosan”),

25 Years of Special Economic Zones in Poland: A Chance for Investors SEZ Wałbrzych (“Invest-Park”), and the Warmia and Mazury SEZ. In this article, the character of Special Economic Zones and the effects of their establishment will be described through the analysis of the first of such zones in Poland – SEZ Mielec.

EURO-PARK MIELEC AS A RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS

The beginnings of the Special Economic Zone in Mielec are inseparably connected with the problem of political transformation in Poland. In the first half of the 1990s, the WSK PZL-Mielec factory, which, for almost three decades, served as the region’s economic center, was threatened with bankruptcy. It led to the expected domino effect. The loss of the key sales market, i.e., the USSR, led to the collapse of production. This entailed a drastic reduction in jobs and an increase in unemployment to 22% (compared to the then national average of 16%). For the town, this was almost a disaster.

The economic recession affected many, including highly qualified workers1.

Growing problems in Mielec transformed into the increasing motivation to look for solutions. A decision was made to establish an innovative (for the Polish reality at the time) project to fund a Special Economic Zone – an area with privileged business conditions, which would attract new entrepreneurs and thus revitalize the labor market. The regulation on creating the zone was issued on September 5, 1995, by the Council of Ministers. It was then agreed that it would operate for 20 years.

What is more, the Industrial Development Agency (the IDA; Polish: Agencja Rozwoju Przemysłu S.A.; ARP) became the zone’s administrator2.

Jarczewski, W. Kontekst powstania SSE w Mielcu, in: Dziesięć lat doświadczeń..., op. cit., p. 39.

1

2

Ibid., p. 45.

THE EARLY DAYS OF THE SEZ

The main goal of the Mielec SEZ was to create new jobs and stop the growth of unemployment. To this end, the IDA made specific decisions. The industrial assets and economic infrastructure that remained after the restructuring of WSK PZL-Mielec have been developed. In the first years of the SEZ (1995–1996), a comprehensive investor service system was developed.

Simultaneously, an effective information and promotion campaign was conducted3.

The factor that positively influenced the activities in the initial phase following the establishment of the Mielec zone was the fact that the IDA owns most of the local plots of land dedicated to investments.

This made the decision-making process and providing services to investors very efficient4.

The next two years brought the biggest and most important investments and the highly dynamic expansion of the zone.

Many investors turned out to be crucial for the region: United Technologies Automotive (since 1999 Lear Automotive) and BRW (Black Red White). Although other SEZs were being established in the following years, Mielec continued to attract many companies, including brands such as Krono-Wood, Zielona Budka, Kirchhoff, Onduline, and Frantschach.

After 2000, the Act on Special Economic Zones was amended, allowing to create subzones in other locations. This created an opportunity for further dynamic territorial expansion of Euro-Park Mielec.

The first subzones were located in Chełm, Gorlice, and Dębica, while the following ones in Sanok, Leżajsk, Jarosław, or Pustków, among others. The zone in Micek, G. Rozwój SSE Euro-Park Mielec, in: Dziesięć lat doświadczeń pierwszej polskiej specjalnej strefy ekonomicznej: Mielec 1995–2005, in: B. Domański, K. Gwosdz (Eds.), Cracow, 2005, p. 49.

3

4

Ibid., p. 52.

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Economy Mielec attracted mostly small and medium enterprises. At that time, a progressive diversification in terms of countries of origin of the capital in the zone could also be observed – with German, British, and French companies starting to invest.

Simultaneously, the share of Polish companies was increasing5.

THE FIRST DECADE OF SUCCESS

The first 10 years of the Mielec SEZ clearly showed that the project positively influenced the region’s economic development. There was a dynamic increase in capital expenditures. As early as 1997, their value amounted to around PLN 100 million. A year later, the expenses incurred by investors reached PLN 700 million. The following year’s growth was less dynamic, amounting to about PLN 300 million, but this allowed to exceed the symbolic ceiling of PLN 1 billion in terms of total capital expenditure in the zone. The year 2000 brought another yearon-year increase in capital expenditure, extending it to PLN 400 million.

The following years were not that fruitful, with an annual growth of about PLN 100 million. After 10 years of the zone’s operation, in 2005, the total expenditures mounted up to PLN 2.5 billion. The dynamics of employment growth in the Mielec area was equally positive. The first years of the SEZ’s operation saw a radical expansion in the number of newly created and maintained jobs. In 1997 alone, employment rose almost fivefold – to over 3,500 employees6.

REVIVAL OF THE MIELEC ZONE AND RESISTANCE TO CRISIS

For Euro-Park Mielec, the first years of the 21st century were a period of stabilization.

The development progressed, but, naturally, it could not be as dynamic as at the very beginning. The year 2007 gave

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5

Ibid., pp. 57–62.

6

Ibid., p. 8.

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a new impetus to the project – a decision to enlarge the zone’s area by almost 225 ha (630 ac) – and was a sign of reacceleration.

What is even more significant, in the same year, an extremely important government decision was made to extend the period of operation of the Mielec zone until 2020 (instead of 2015, as originally planned).

Its expansion and the creation of a broader time perspective contributed to attracting investors, and those who were already operating in the SEZ were encouraged to make further endowments. The next amendment to the SEZ Act, in 2008, proved to be a renewed incentive for companies. It provided, among other things, an increase in the allowed size of the SEZ or the possibility of settling a tax loss to calculate the amount of aid used.

Interestingly, for both Euro-Park Mielec and other SEZs, the effects of the 2008 economic crisis turned out to be less severe than initially anticipated. In 2009, the number of valid business permits increased by 20.8%, which was the best result since 2000. The rate of growth of capital expenditures in that year was still higher than in 2002–2005, though it significantly decreased compared to 2007–2008. A result of favorable conditions for doing business in the Mielec SEZ was that although the crisis reached this place as well, it did not translate into a catastrophe, but only a slowdown in the steady growth.

BILLIONS OF INVESTMENTS, TENS OF THOUSANDS OF EMPLOYEES. WHAT ATTRACTS INVESTORS?

After two decades of the Mielec zone, the numbers spoke for themselves.

At the end of 2013, the employment level amounted to 23,500 people, and the total value of capital expenditures incurred by investors since the beginning of the zone’s operation reached over PLN 6 billion. The total number of permits issued over 18 years came to around 180.

25 Years of Special Economic Zones in Poland: A Chance for Investors

MIELEC, POLAND, AUGUST 12, 2017.

During the 20th anniversary of the SEZs, the expenditures exceeded PLN 7 billion, and the employment level – 30,000 employees.

Euro-Park Mielec has permanently changed the region. This would not have been possible without the effective cooperation of several milieux, including state institutions, local authorities, and entrepreneurs.

What factors primarily attracted investors to the Mielec SEZ? It is not easy to establish a hierarchy of criteria. The key factor may have been the synergy of various elements making up a business-attractive investment package. These included: financial incentives, diversified investment offer (e.g., greenfield, brownfield, or buildto-suit investment options), accessibility of the location and media infrastructure,

© Darek Delmanowicz (PAP)

availability and qualifications of employees, low labor costs, education infrastructure, distance from sales or supply markets, as well as good practices in project handling and post-investment services.

As emphasized by Waldemar Barnaś, director of the Mielec branch of the IDA responsible for administering the zone, its attractiveness for investors results from multidimensional economic potential. “Favorable tax rules are only the foundation on which other issues, important for a potential investor, are built. What is fundamental is the logistics and location of the zone at the intersection of the A4 highway and the Via Carpatia road, currently under construction, near the border crossings to Slovakia or Ukraine. The industrial potential of the region is strengthened by developed vocational education, which allows 4/2020

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MICHELIN FACTORY, OLSZTYN, POLAND.

obtaining qualified employees. All this contributes to a friendly ecosystem, which attracts investors,” Barnaś said.

The results of investor surveys confirm all this. A study conducted by KPMG in 2014, concluded that as many as 92% of respondents (representing 14% of all companies in the zone) assessed its functioning positively or very positively.

The quality of cooperation with the authorities of the Euro-Park Mielec SEZ was particularly distinguished – 88% of the investigated companies were satisfied.

THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE

In 2019, the IDA issued other 53 decisions on support for entrepreneurs, 32 in the investment area of SEZ Euro-Park Mielec, and 21 in the SEZ Tarnobrzeg (“EuroPark Wisłosan”). Entrepreneurs declared to incur almost PLN 1.7 billion of capital expenditures and create over 900 jobs7.

Years after their foundation, it becomes clear that Special Economic Zones have https://www.arp.pl/dla-mediow/aktualnosci/dobryrok-w-strefach-ekonomicznych-zarzadzanych-przezarp-s.a.

© Michelin

contributed to the regular growth of the potential of Polish enterprises and building their investment value.

The successes of the SEZs translated into the expansion of the project and the constitution of the Polish Investment Zone in May 2018. From then onwards, entrepreneurs operating all over Poland (and not only in the zones) who have made new investments in both public and private sectors, can count on income tax exemptions (corporate and personal income tax). At the same time, the existing permits for conducting business activity in the Special Economic Zones, as provided for in regulations concerning the Polish Investment Zone (Act on Support for New Investments), remain in force until the end of 20268.

The Polish Investment Zone, administered by the IDA, includes two provinces of Poland – Subcarpathia, and Lublin, as well as the southern part of Mazovia. The IDA also manages the TSEZ Euro-Park Kobierzyce subzone.

7

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https://www.paih.gov.pl/strefa_inwestora/Polska_ Strefa_Inwestycji 8

25 Years of Special Economic Zones in Poland: A Chance for Investors Among the largest declared investments in these areas, the field that deserves particular attention is the furniture industry. Nowy Styl, a manufacturer of chairs and office furniture, declared PLN 150 million of investment in 2019.

Another company, MARMA Polskie Folie, a member of the plastics processing industry, set forth PLN 53 million in the same year. The declared involvement of Varroc Lighting Systems is even more impressive – with the planned spending of almost PLN 230 million in Lublin Province in 2020. These examples show what significant investments can be created within SEZs. The natural question is, therefore, what the future holds for the Special Economic Zones and in what directions they will develop. Their effects are already visible in the Mielec SEZ, which has undergone a thorough transformation in over 20 years. It currently provides entrepreneurs with tax exemptions, a wellprepared communication and technical infrastructure, as well as available qualified staff. As representatives of the IDA declare, the challenge which the zones face during the fourth industrial revolution is to include them in the process of building an economy based on knowledge and innovation.

“For over two decades, Special Economic Zones have contributed to the rebuilding of the industry in many regions of Poland.

Now their effects should reach further.

Therefore, the Polish Investment Zone was established so that entrepreneurs could develop their business on preferential terms, not only in the SEZ. The new model of support responds to the needs of sustainable development of the whole country, which have been enshrined in the Strategy for Responsible Development.

The strategy highlights innovation’s role in creating Poland’s GDP and a long-term change in its structure due to the increased

innovation. In the following years, one of the aims of the IDA is to stimulate this growth by offering Polish companies instruments supporting innovation, such as grants within the Open Innovation Network, supporting technology transfer to companies from the SME sector,” said Cezariusz Lesisz, President of the Management Board of the Industrial Development Agency.

The development of modern, advanced industries and branches of industry hiring highly qualified employees is one of the pillars of the IDA’s activity. As Special Economic Zones are being included in this process, the role of administrators evolves. The challenges that these entities face require implementing instruments of effective cooperation between investors, local governments, and the administrators.

The range of services provided to investors is gradually increasing and now involves specialized support – technical, legal, and in the field of human resources.

The 25 years of the Euro-Park Mielec SEZ’s operations have translated into the creation of 75,000 jobs and PLN 20 billion investments. The presence of the IDA in the regions managed by the SEZ often resulted in a complete socio-economic transformation of the area. Not only did we manage to reduce unemployment, but, above all, to create opportunities for development in the coming years.

Today, the aim is to continue this mission and create other positive prospects – for industry, employees, and investors. In the times of the COVID-19 pandemic, the circumstances are not favorable, but a quarter of a century of SEZ operation has proven that the zones were created for this very purpose – to function under challenging conditions.

Paweł Kolczyński December 2020

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IN MARKETS ACROSS THE WORLD – POLISH FOOD THEN AND NOW

Aneta Parys-Kępińska, Anna Artemiuk-Błaszkiewicz, Export Support Department, National Support Center for Agriculture (KOWR)

Since the beginning of its history, Poland has been an agricultural country, self-sufficient in production of food. As a result of fertile land, favorable climatic conditions as well as location in the center of Europe at the crossroads of west-east and north-south trade routes, the commerce of agricultural products developed well in Poland.

Products from other European countries, including oriental spices and sweets, reached Poland through these channels, also thanks to the contacts with foreign cultures, and enriched native dishes with new flavors.

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In Markets Across the World – Polish Food Then and Now

SEASONAL CHERRY HARVEST IN LUBELSKIE REGION. SKOWIESZYNEK, POLAND, JULY 22, 2011.

THE ABUNDANCE OF POLISH CULINARY TRADITIONS

The Slavs, ancestors of today’s Poles, lived in harmony with nature, to which they attributed divine qualities. The Slavic diet was based on flours and groats from grains such as millet, barley, rye, and wheat, as well as vegetables, fruit, poultry, pork, and fish. Cows were bred mainly for milk.

First references about culinary habits of the Slavs can be found in old chronicles, for instance “The Polish Chronicle” written by Gallus Anonymus in the 12th century. The first information about Polish cuisine (written in Polish) comes from a cookbook published in the 16th century.

The herbariums created at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries are also an interesting source of knowledge about old practices of healthy diet as well as healing properties of herbs, vegetables, and broths.

For instance, in the herbarium published in 1613 by Szymon Syreński, professor of the University of Kraków, there are descriptions of dishes such as broth, rye bread, and groats.

The Polish culinary tradition is rich and varied. Local products enriched with the fruit of the undergrowth, meadows, rivers,

© Wojciech Pacewicz (PAP)

and lakes have been the basis of Polish cuisine for centuries. It is characterized by a common use of mushrooms and wild forest fruit, honey, nuts, venison, and wild herbs. Mushroom picking in forests is a centuries-old tradition, practiced by successive generations of Poles.

The knowledge of edible and poisonous mushroom species is common. It is believed that Polish cuisine is based on a variety of meat dishes. It should be noted, however, that the ancestors, meticulously practicing long religious fasts and in the absence of universal availability of meat, also developed rich vegetarian traditions.

It is worth noting typical Polish fasting dishes, such as dumplings (pierogi) with cabbage and mushrooms.

The Polish culinary culture also includes regional cuisine. For example, Podlasie region is famous for sękacz – a cake baked over an open fire on a rotating spit, smoked dry sausages and potato dishes such as potato babka (cake made of hash potatoes), kartacze (meat stuffed potato dumplings), or kishkas. The specialty of Wielkopolska region is goose meat, croissant with white poppy seeds (rogal świętomarciński, also known as St. Martin’s croissant), gingerbread, fried 4/2020

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Economy cheese, and smoked plum jam. The cuisine of the highlanders is famous for oscypek, a unique smoked sheep’s cheese, as well as excellent lamb and mutton. Some of these products have been officially recognized as the European culinary heritage and are registered in the EU protected quality scheme of regional and traditional goods.

Nowadays, when food is produced on a mass scale, Polish products, made using modern machinery and in accordance with rigorous EU safety standards, still retain their unique character. Polish producers are inspired by old recipes when developing new products. They uphold traditions, combining them with innovative ideas and technological novelties. Traditional methods of product preservation such as drying, pickling, and smoking are still used. Dried Polish meats find enthusiasts around the world.

Meat, fish, cheese, and even plums are smoked, which gives them a distinctive strong aroma and taste. Moreover, Poles are the champions in pickling vegetables such as cucumbers, cabbage, and beets, which are also used to obtain fermented juices, known for their excellent health properties. In the past, other fruit and vegetables, including radishes, turnips, onions, or lemons, have also been pickled.

We are reminded about it more and more, often thanks to old recipes. Currently, pickled vegetables are a fashionable culinary trend due to their health benefits and are used by numerous famous chefs.

High quality trusted products, often unique recipes and modern production methods make Polish foods increasingly noticeable on world markets.

POLISH FOOD SPECIALTIES DAIRY PRODUCTS

For centuries, dairy products were considered to be synonymous with prosperity. Not without a reason, Poland was repeatedly described as a land of 100

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“flowing milk and honey.” It is worth noting, however, that until the early 20th century cows gave milk mainly in the summer. In order to protect it from spoilage, it was processed into butter and cheese. Cottage cheeses were typical of the lowland areas, while rennet cheeses were produced by the inhabitants of Carpathian Mountains, who learned this craft from Italian shepherds.

The tradition of cheese-making is so strong in Poland that cheeses (mainly rennet ripened) and curds are the most important export goods in the category of dairy products. Poland is currently 7th in the EU and 10th in the world in terms of dairy products exports1. About 30% of all dairy products manufactured in Poland are sold abroad. Apart from the above-mentioned cheeses and curds (which account for 35% of country’s milk products exports), the Polish foreign trade of dairy products is dominated by: milk and cream (19%), condensed and powdered milk (13%), as well as butter and milk fats (10%).

Moreover, Poland is a significant exporter of whey, ice cream, fermented beverages, and casein. Polish dairy products can be found all over the world. Most frequently, they reach the EU markets, but are also gaining in popularity in other countries such as China, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia.

It is worth noting that three cheeses typical for Polish mountains: bryndza podhalańska, oscypek, and redykołka, have been registered in the EU quality scheme of Protected Designation of Origin (PDO), while wielkopolski ser smażony (fried cheese from Wielkopolska) and ser koryciński (cheese from Korycin) – in the Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) scheme.

The United Kingdom left the European Union on January 31, 2020. From February 1 to December 31, 2020, the United Kingdom remains in a customs union with the EU and is a member of the European single market, thus, it is included in EU trade statistics.

1

In Markets Across the World – Polish Food Then and Now MEAT

In the Polish tradition, meat has long been treated as a luxury product, which only the most privileged could afford.

It is worth noting, however, that not every kind of it enjoyed the same recognition.

For centuries, the idea that all food products were arranged in a logical, vertical hierarchy from earthly beings to heavenly ones was respected – the closer to heaven, the more noble the product. Following this approach, the hog, which was burrowing in the ground and rolling in the mud, was placed at the very end of the chain, and was treated as meat for the poor. On the other hand, the noble often consumed winged poultry or wild birds. In Polish cooking books, pork starts to appear in the 18th century, mainly in recipes for pork cold meat, sausages, and offal, which over time have become so deeply rooted in our tradition that today we cannot imagine Polish cuisine without them. It is worth emphasizing that sausages such as kabanos (dry sausage) and Old Polish sausages such as kiełbasa myśliwska staropolska (hunters’ sausage), kiełbasa jałowcowa staropolska (juniper sausage), kiełbasa krakowska sucha staropolska (dry sausage from Cracow), kiełbasa biała parzona wielkopolska (white steamed sausage from Wielkopolska), and kiełbasa piaszczańska or lisiecka (whose names come from their places of origin: Piaski Wielkie and Liszki, respectively), produced mainly on the basis of pork, have been included in the EU schemes protecting regional products – Traditional Specialty Guaranteed (TSG) and Protected Geographical Indication (PGI).

Perhaps echoes of old ideas can still be heard today. Poland is the largest producer and exporter of poultry in the EU as well as the 4th largest exporter of this meat in the world. Around 66% of production is destined for export. The offer of Polish producers includes not only chicken meat, but also duck, turkey, and goose meat, particularly valued on the German market.

In 2019, the European Union was the largest recipient of Polish poultry. Significant amounts of this product were also exported to Ukraine, South Africa, China, Ghana, and Cuba. It is worth adding that not only meat, but also feathers and down from Polish geese is a highly valued product, especially on Asian markets, while Poland is among the world’s leading exporters in this sector.

Moreover, Poland is a significant player on the market of pork, of which we are the 4th producer and 6th exporter in the EU, as well as beef – 7th place among EU producers and 5th among the exporters.

About 84% of domestic beef production is sold abroad, primarily in EU countries and Israel. Smaller quantities of Polish beef also reach Japan, Hong Kong, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, among others. On the other hand, Polish pork has enthusiasts in EU countries, the USA, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Ukraine, as well as Africa (Ivory Coast, Congo), and other parts of the globe.

APPLES

Apples have always been perceived as a Polish national treasure. Their cultivation dates back to pre-Slavic times, however, it became widespread thanks to the monks in the 12th century. Fruit farming was supported by Polish rulers. The harvest was personally supervised by, among others, the Polish king, the famous winner from Vienna – John III Sobieski, who made sure that his beloved wife had an adequate supply of her favorite Kosztela apples for the winter.

The care of the royals and the church brought long-term benefits to the Polish fruit farming. Currently, in terms of apple production, Poland is the largest in EU and 3rd in the world. Most of the fruit grown in Poland are table varieties, intended for direct consumption. Climatic conditions and the experience of fruit growers, benefiting from centuries of tradition, make 4/2020

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PRODUCTION OF BUTTER IN THE DAIRY PRODUCTS PLANT OF “BIELUCH” DAIRY COOPERATIVE. CHEŁM, POLAND, NOVEMBER 30, 2017.

Polish apples stand out with their unique taste and huge variety. The most popular of them comprise: Champion, Jonagold, Ligol, Gloster, Golden Delicious, Gala, and Cortland. Additionally, Poland is one of the largest world producers and exporters of concentrated apple juice, manufactured from the varieties intended for industrial purposes. The main export destinations for fresh apples in 2019 included: Belarus, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Romania, Germany, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Spain, Jordan, and Ukraine.

CONFECTIONARY

In the modern period, Europe fell in love with exotic drinks (chocolate, coffee, tea) as well as sugar and confectionary. In 17th century Poland, sugar was a desirable and at the same time an exclusive product; enjoyed to such an extent that it was often consumed in an unprocessed or little changed form. Sugar was the most important ingredient in recipes for candies, while additives such as fruit, herbs and spices were only supposed to emphasize its delicious taste, available only to a handful of chosen ones.

The love for sweet flavor in Poland continues to this day. Fortunately, it is 102

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© Wojciech Pacewicz (PAP)

much easier to satisfy the appetite for sweetness now than a few centuries ago.

Poland is a significant EU and global producer of various types of confectionary – cakes, cookies, chocolates, bonbons, and candy. In 2019, we were ranked 6th in terms of production and 5th in terms of export of confectionery products in the EU. We were also the 8th exporter of these products worldwide. The majority of export products included cocoa as the ingredient. Polish candy is present on the markets of over 140 countries in the world, the main recipients of which are: the EU countries, Russia, the USA, Ukraine, and Saudi Arabia.

Confectionary produced in Poland ranges from traditional Polish delicacies such as cream fudge, kukułki, irysy and michałki candies, plums in chocolate, ptasie mleczko (chocolate covered marshmallows known as bird’s milk), delicje (jaffa cakes) and gingerbread, to modern, innovative products developed in response to changing consumer needs and preferences. For example, candy made on the basis of xylitol, i.e. birch sugar, others with sparkling filling containing vitamins, fruit jellies without gelatin and lactose or high protein bars made from ground cocoa beans.

In Markets Across the World – Polish Food Then and Now CEREAL AND GRAIN MILL PRODUCTS

ALCOHOL

Groats, flatbreads, or prażmo (dried ears of grain, crushed and baked in ash) were the basic ingredients of Slavic cuisine. With time, breads were also baked on Polish soil.

One of the oldest ones is chleb prądnicki (prądnicki bread), originating from Cracow,(stil) made from rye sourdough, rye and wheat flour, boiled potatoes, bran, and fresh yeast. According to the legend, the first loaf of prądnicki bread, baked after the harvest, was given to the king. In 2011, it had been recognized on the EU forum and registered as Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) by the European Commission. It is worth mentioning that unique regional bakery products from Poland such as: obwarzanek krakowski (a ring-shaped bread roll), cebularz lubelski (a wheat dough pancake topped with diced onion and poppy seed, characteristic for Lublin cuisine), rogal świętomarciński (St. Martin’s croissant), and andruty kaliskie (lightly sweet flat wafers from Kalisz region), have also been registered as PGIs.

When listing Polish food specialties, one cannot forget about alcohol. The history of alcohol production in Poland is very long.

Traditions of brewing and wine making go back to the beginnings of the state. Polish beer was described by medieval chroniclers such as Jan Długosz, Gallus Anonymus as well as Thietmar, who, at the beginning of the 11th century, called King Bolesław I the Brave “a beer drinker.” Production of vodka is also strongly rooted in Polish tradition.

The first written evidence of “vodka” dates back to 1405. Years of tradition have led to the development of original recipes for this alcohol in Poland. According to the legally protected definition of “Polish vodka,” it can only be produced on the basis of Polish cereal grains and potatoes.

Poland continues a centuries-old tradition of growing cereals annual amounting to nearly 29 million tons. The main cereal grown in Poland is wheat, whose significant part is exported to the EU and worldwide. Grains from Poland go mainly to Germany and Saudi Arabia as well as Egypt, Kenya, Cuba, Norway, the Netherlands, andyAlgeria. Polish export offer of cereal and farinaceous goods includes various types of bread and grain mill products such as flour, groats, breakfast cereals, muesli, or bran.

Furthermore, Poland manufactures a wide range of high-quality pasta products from wheat flour, including durum and rye wheat as well as buckwheat flour. These products are exported primarily to the EU market, especially Germany, Great Britain, France, and Czech Republin. Outside the EU, Polish cereal and grain mill products are exported to Russia, Senegal, Saudi Arabil, Ukraine, and the USA.

Today, Polish vodka is known all over the world whilst Poland has become its largest producer in the EU and 4th in the world. Furthermore, Poland has achieved a high rank in beer production: 3rd in the EU and 9th in the world. It is worth adding that Poland is a producer of original alcohols such as meads, cider, nalewkas(alcohol made by macerating fruit, roots, flowers, spices, herbs or nuts in strong alcohol produced exclusively in Poland), fruit wines, and high-quality grape wines. Several Polish alcohols have been registered in the EU scheme of Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) and Protected Geographical Indication (PGI). They comprise: Polish vodka (polska wódka), herbal vodka from the North Podlasie Lowland aromatized with an extract of bison grass (żubrówka), Old Polish meads (półtorak, dwójniak, trójniak, and czwórniak) as well as podpiwek kujawski, containing a small amount of alcohol.

FOOD FROM POLAND – NEW EXPORT TRENDS

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Economy EU food industry. Polish entrepreneurs enter global markets with a wide export offer, including top-quality items, basic agricultural products, traditional food and modern, innovative products with high added value, whose share in the export is growing year by year.

In the face of competition in the form of global agricultural giants, often offering lower prices, the sale ofkprimary and unprocessed products cannot guarantee long-term export success. One of the most significant factors determining prosperity on foreign markets is the constant readiness to learn and develop, including monitoring markets and adjusting the offer to the needs of consumers.

Thus, more and more manufacturers are targeting niches, offering solutions that respond to market trends.

Polish entrepreneurs have both fresh ideas and modern technologies at their disposal; they often build their brands abroad, focusing on product innovation. It is worth noting that consumers are increasingly becoming aware and demanding. The modern world promotes multitasking, which also translates into food trends.

A growing number of people are looking for products that are not only tasty and healthy, but also take into account the diverse needs of body and soul.

Thus, Polish producers offer a number of commodities adjusted to the requirements of the modern lifestyle, manufactured with social responsibility and care for the natural environment, including ecological goods.

An example of this is a wide range of functional foods which improve biochemical and metabolic parameters of the body as well as contribute to the quality of performance and well-being.

Polish producers, often in cooperation with institutes and research centers, introduce new products of this type to the market. Their offer includes candy 104

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and snacks, milk products, drinks, or cereal products devoid of harmful or allergenic elements, yet enriched with ingredients that give them additional health properties. Popular supplements include well-known Polish superfoods such as chokeberry, blackcurrant, mulberry, or sea buckthorn. The products combining top-quality chocolate with â&#x20AC;&#x153;superfruits,â&#x20AC;? probiotic bacteria and algae extracts are extremely popular. Protein foods as well as healthy candy and snacks from unprocessed ingredients are also becoming increasingly trendy. These goods usually have an additional ecological certificate, guaranteeing the lack of synthetic substances and the highest care for the environment.

Another trend boldly used by Polish manufacturers is the interest in food of plant origin. These products are not immediately associated with Polish cuisine, one of the symbols of which is the pork sausage, famous, among others, in the USA. It turns out, however, that Polish plant-based sausage can taste equally good, and, at the same time, be one of the fastest growing trends on the Polish food market. Consumers of plantbased products are not only vegetarians and vegans, but also people interested in diversifying their diet. In order to meet their needs, the largest Polish producers are expanding their classic portfolio, already valued by consumers, with new, plant-based options. Moreover, there are startups and small manufacturers of plantbased food on the Polish market, including veganized classics of Polish cuisine, such as kabanosy and various types of sausages, bacon, ham, or lard. The return of Poles to their culinary roots, including regional peasant foods, largely based on plants, is also an interesting phenomenon.

To experience this aspect of Polish cuisine, it is worth coming to Warsaw, which for years has been one of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s most vegan-friendly cities.

In Markets Across the World – Polish Food Then and Now

HARVEST OF CORN AT MIROSŁAW OSTROWSKI’S FARM. ŁOZISKA, POLAND, NOVEMBER 2, 2020.

GROWING INTEREST IN POLISH FOOD IN THE WORLD

Polish companies are engaged in intense export activity, steadily achieving better and better results. For 10 years now, we have been observing further records in terms of income from agri-food exports.

Poland ranks high among the European food exporters. In 2019, the value of foreign sales of agri-food products from Poland amounted to 31.8 billion euros – 7% more than the year before and over six times more than in the year of Poland’s accession to the EU (2004). Polish products go mainly to the EU countries, including the most demanding consumers in Germany (24% of all agri-food exports in 2019), Great Britain (9%), the Netherlands (6%), Italy (5%), or France (5%). The most important recipients of Polish products from outside the EU include the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries (5%), as well as the USA (2%) and Saudi Arabia (1%).

Polish export offer includes a wide range of products, both basic and modern, processed ones. The majority of Polish beef and poultry, a significant part of pork, fruit, dairy products and grain production is allocated to export. The most important goods, exported in 2019, comprised: meat and processed meat (21%), grains and refined grains (12%), tobacco and tobacco products (12%), sugar and confectionery products (7%), dairy products (7%), fish

© Mateusz Marek (PAP)

and fish products (7%), vegetables (including mushrooms) and vegetable preserves (6%), fruit (including nuts) and fruit products (4%), coffee, tea, cocoa (2%), oilseeds and vegetable fats (2%), fruit and vegetable juices (2%), alcohol (2%).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, there were serious fears that Polish agri-food exports would suffer from restrictions and the trend of supporting domestic producers noticeable in Europe, among others. However, trade results show that Poland proved to be quite resilient to the effects of the pandemic. From January to August 2020, the foreign sale of agri-food goods increased by 6%, compared to the same period last year, reaching 21.9 billion euros. Faced with the pandemic and restrictions associated with it, fruit and vegetable producers as well as the meat industry, which is mostly dependent on exports, have experienced the greatest difficulties. The biggest beneficiary in the current economic situation was the tobacco industry. Export growth was also recorded in the following industries: grain, oil plants and vegetable fats, alcohols and, to a lesser extent, all other food industries.

What influenced this surprising scenario?

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Economy opportunities that appeared on many markets as traditional supply chains broke down. Furthermore, they sold a significant part of production surpluses to third markets, among others. The increase in export of Polish agri-food products was also influenced by the situation on the financial markets. The depreciation of the Polish złoty (PLN) against the euro (EUR) and the US dollar (USD), which took place in the first quarter of this year, in addition to the exchange rate of the złoty between April and August, which was favorable for exporters, contributed to the competitiveness of Polish products.

For several years now, a gradual increase in the export rate of Polish agri-food products to third markets has been visible.

This process has significantly accelerated during the pandemic. Export of agri-food products to third countries in the first eight months of 2020 increased by 18%.

The main export directions, apart from EU countries, included Ukraine and Saudi Arabia, as well as Russia, the USA, Belarus, Algeria, Israel, South Africa, Norway and ChinA. It is worth noting that the value of Polish agri-food exports to Ukraine increased by 32%, compared to the same period in 2019. Already at this point, it is certain that a historical result of Polish agri-food export to Saudi Arabia will be achieved in 2020. In the first eight months of 2020, the its value amounted to a record 419 million euros, half of which was wheat export.

It is difficult to predict how the situation will develop in the last months of 2020.

Yet, so far, the trade performance gives reason to believe that 2020 will be much better than initially expected.

SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN COOPERATION

The success of Polish agriculture, processing industry, and trade is supported by promotional activities 106

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conducted systematically on the domestic and foreign markets. The main institution that implements policies promoting the agri-food sector in Poland is the National Support Center for Agriculture (KOWR) – a government executive agency reporting to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. The mission of the KOWR is to provide comprehensive support to Polish entrepreneurs in export and promotion of agri-food products in Poland and on foreign markets.

Within the framework of its promotional activities, the KOWR organizes, among others, economic missions and national stands at the most significant international food fairs. In 2019, together with Polish entrepreneurs, we participated in the largest agri-food conferences in 17 countries worldwide.

In 2020, due to restrictions related to the coronavirus pandemic, the KOWR focuses on virtual events. These include business meetings between entrepreneurs and foreign trade partners conducted online, trainings and webinars aimed at supporting trade cooperation, promotional and informational activities in Polish and foreign social media, etc.

These activities are aimed at building a strong brand of Polish food products domestically and worldwide under the slogan “Poland tastes good.”

The National Support Center for Agriculture establishes and develops contacts with entities interested in cooperation with the Polish agri-food sector and trade expansion. We cordially invite you to contact us at the following email address: eksporter@kowr.gov.pl.

Aneta Parys-Kępińska, Anna Artemiuk-Błaszkiewicz December 2020

COVERAGE OF THE ECONOMIC FORUM 2020 “EUROPE AFTER THE PANDEMIC: SOLIDARITY, LIBERTY, COMMUNITY?” On September 8-10, 2020, Karpacz hosted the 30th Economic Forum, organized by the Foundation Institute for Eastern Studies, under the slogan “Europe after the Pandemic: Solidarity, Liberty, Community.”

The Warsaw Institute had the pleasure to participate in this event as a media partner.

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FROM LEFT: LUCA STEINMANN, SVIATLANA TSIKHANOUSKAYA, VINCENZO BASSI, JACEK CZAPUTOWICZ, MARKUS MECKEL AT THE ECONOMIC FORUM 2020. KARPACZ, POLAND, SEPTEMBER 9, 2020. © The Warsaw Institute Review

Despite COVID-19 pandemic, the Economic Forum took place as planned. This year, however, it was organized at the Gołębiewski Hotel in Karpacz instead of Krynica, as in previous years, which was caused by circumstances related to the COVID-19.

The new venue of the event had a partial impact also on the scale of the Forum. The 30th summit was noticeably smaller than the previous ones, mainly because of sanitary measures, epidemiological restrictions as well as hygienic standards. Nevertheless, this year’s Forum assembled over 2,500 guests from Europe, Central Asia and North America. They had the opportunity to participate in panels, debates and other events concerning economy, politics, business and culture, among others. The majority of the discussions concerned the reality and society after the coronavirus pandemic, which reflected the main theme of the conference.

It is worth recalling that this is the largest forum of its kind in Central and Eastern 108

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Europe. Certainly, it provides an opportunity to meet representatives of countries, institutions and aspiring companies at a scale that only such events as the Davos summit can offer. Despite the modification of the venue, all distinctive elements of the Economic Forum were preserved.

Numerous influential people took part in the conference, including politicians and government officials. Furthermore, the Forum was attended by countless representatives of local authorities as a part of the theme titled “30 years of Polish local government.” The panel discussions included a wide-array of topics and focused mainly on the future – decisions to be made and changes to come, also referring to the key theme of the summit.

Throughout the 30th Forum, much attention was devoted to the protests in Belarus.

Among the attendees was Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, a candidate in the recent presidential election, which initiated mass protests in that country. Tsikhanouskaya

In Markets Across the World – Polish Food Then and Now had the opportunity to speak during the discussion panels, in which she emphasized the peaceful nature of the Belarusian social changes that are met with a brutal reaction of the authorities. Moreover, she underlined the will to transfer power in a sovereign and democratic way, which will have mainly positive effects on the relations with other countries. Tsikhanouskaya and her husband were awarded a special prize for the efforts to democratize the Belarusian society. Upon receiving it, she spoke about the enormous personal costs that her family had incurred as a result of the efforts to make a change in her country. She also expressed sincere gratitude for the support of the societies and countries west of Belarus.

On the first day of the Forum, as every year, awards were given out. The Man of the Year Award was handed over to Daniel Obajtek, CEO of PKN Orlen. He is the author of the development plan of this company, consistently implementing the concept of building a multi-energy group.

The network of PKN Orlen gas stations is expanding year after year both in Poland and abroad. Obajtek’s nomination is especially interesting because he is the first representative of business, not politics, in the history of the Forum who received this accolade. The Company of the Year award was given to the state-owned corporation Polish Oil Mining and Gas Extraction S.A. (PGNiG). This nomination was justified by the effective fight against Gazprom before the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, which resulted in lowering the prices of gas flowing through the Yamal pipeline, which resulted in savings valued at about PLN 6 billion. The Scouting Association of the Republic of Poland became the Non-Governmental Organization of the Year for its mission to creatively and effectively combine tradition with the challenges of the contemporary world as well as educating over 100,000 young people for the past 30 years. Additionally, the Economic Award of the Warsaw School of Economics

(SGH) was earned by the President of the Management Board of PKO Bank Polski S.A. Zbigniew Jagiełło.

Furthermore, representatives of the Warsaw Institute actively participated in this year’s Forum. Apart from partaking in numerous panels and debates, as the media partner of the event we promoted the activities of the Foundation and the quarterly The Warsaw Institute Review. Moreover, we moderated discussions with representatives of local authorities – Elżbieta Anna Polak, President of Lubuskie Region and Marcin Krzyżanowski, Deputy President of Lower Silesia Region.

Despite the nature of matters discussed this year, the participants of the Forum were optimistic about the economic forecasts for Poland and the region as well as about the moderate impact of the pandemic on the implementation of further investments in the country on the Vistula. Above all, the good spirit of the conference was due to the very possibility of authentic and personal contact. It provided an opportunity to discuss cooperation and development in the environment, which is changing because of the pandemic. This year’s Forum was organized seamlessly, especially given the unprecedented times.

The organizers ensured appropriate sanitary measures as well as access to personal hygiene equipment and products, so that all participants felt safe. The Forum did not fall short of expectations, providing an opportunity for fruitful debates and exchange of opinions on the most important issues for Poland and the world.

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Author Biographies PROF. ADRIENNE KÖRMENDY

JAKUB LACHERT

Born August 13, 1946 in Külsővat,

PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political

Hungary. She is a graduate of Eötvös

Sciences and International Studies

Lóránd University in Budapest and

at the University of Warsaw. His

the University of Warsaw. In 1988

research interests include: European

she received a scholarship from the

Neighborhood Policy (ENP), Eastern

Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.

policy, Eastern Partnership, EU

Between 1990 and 2004 she worked

integration of Western Balkans. p. 55

for the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, many of which she spent in

PROF. TOMASZ GRZEGORZ

Warsaw. In 2000s she was a lecturer of

GROSSE

Hungarian history and international

Sociologist, political scientist, and

relations at the Department of Hungarian

historian. He is a professor at the

Studies, University of Warsaw and

University of Warsaw and the Head of

Aleksander Gieysztor Academy of

the Department of European Union

Humanities in Pułtusk, Poland. Between

Policies at the Institute of European

2014 and 2020 she served as Consul

Studies. He specializes in the analysis

General of Hungary in Cracow.

of economic policies in the EU and the p. 6

GRZEGORZ KUCZYŃSKI, PhD Graduate of history at the University of Białystok and specialized Eastern studies at the University of Warsaw. Expert on Eastern affairs. For many years a journalist and analyst. Author of many books and publications on Russian politics. p. 47

PAWEŁ PASZAK Graduate of International Relations (East Asia Studies) at the University of Warsaw, former grant holder at the University of Kent (United Kingdom) and Hainan University (PRC). PhD candidate at the University of Warsaw and the War Studies University, researcher of the Poland’s Ministry of National Defense projects.

Expert at the Institute of New Europe

in public management, geoeconomics, Europeanisation and theoretical thought on European integration.

p. 38

DR HAB. PRZEMYSŁAW ŻURAWSKI VEL GRAJEWSKI Professor at the University of Łódź in the Department of Theory of Foreign and Security Policy. In 2005 and 2006, he was an EPP-ED expert at the European Parliament, where he was responsible for monitoring Eastern policy of the EU. From 2006 to 2012, he was an analyst at the Natolin European Centre. From 2006 to 2009, he was a visiting professor at the Belarusian European Humanities University in Vilnius. In 2015, he was a member of the National Development Council appointed by President Andrzej

(INE), author of analyses and articles

Duda. Moreover, he was a member of the

concerning US-China trade war, China’s

political cabinet of Foreign Minister Witold

economic transformation as well as

Waszczykowski. Author of many books and

technological rivalry.

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member states. Moreover, he is an expert

The Warsaw Institute Review

p. 20

scientific articles.

p. 28

Author Biographies them, i.e. Vatican, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino.

MICHAŁ OLEKSIEJUK Expert in British Politics, European defense and role of airpower in modern conflicts. Graduate of MA and BA in International Relations and Politics at Queen Mary University of London.

Gained work experience at the British Embassy in Warsaw and the Polish National Security Bureau. Currently works as Coordinator for USA, UK and the Commonwealth of Nations at the Institute for Eastern Studies in Warsaw.

p. 69

JERZY BYCZYŃSKI Editor-in-chief of the British Poles portal. He is an adviser to the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Poland in the United Kingdom and a founder of the British Polish Law Association. He studied International Politics at Brunel University (BSc) and International Law at University of Westminster (LLM).

p. 86

WOJCIECH KWIATKOWSKI, PhD Doctor of law (2011, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, UKSW) specializing in American law.

Currently, an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law and Administration at the UKSW. Author of numerous publications

p. 78

ŁUKASZ JANULEWICZ, PhD Political analyst specializing in Central Europe, currently Research Fellow at the Global Europe Centre, University of Kent. His work focusses on regional cooperation and the Three Seas Initiative.

He previously worked at the Central European University in Budapest and at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) in Warsaw. Obtained his PhD in International Relations from the University of Kent, graduated in Political Science from the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich.

p. 61

ZSOMBOR ZEÖLD Obtained his MA in Central and Eastern European Studies from the Jagiellonian University, and from Eötvös Loránd University Budapest in International Relations. Former CEPA–HIF Andrássy Fellow in Washington D.C. His main research topic is the Three Seas Initiative. Currently, he is the Program Director of the Budapest Fellowship Program, a US-Hungarian academic exchange initiative. p. 61

(monographs, scientific articles), as well as legal opinions on broadly understood US law and political culture.

p. 13

MARCIN ŁUKASZEWSKI, PhD Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences and Journalism of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. His scientific interests focus primarily on the political systems of European countries, with particular emphasis on the smallest ones of

4/2020

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