Introduction
The division of Korea remains one of the most enduring scars of the Cold War - a geopolitical fracture that remains regardless of the dramatic transformations that reshaped the global order in the late 20th century. More than seventy years after the 38th parallel became a boundary and intersection of diverged ideologies, the idea of Korean reunification still continues to attract considerable academic interest, especially in the light of changing regional dynamics. Meanwhile, Europe, once a continent split by devastating wars and national rivalries, has undergone a radical transformation. Through the process of integration - first economic, then political - Europe has reinvented itself as a space of cooperation, shared governance, and collective identity.
Despite the significant cultural, historical, and geopolitical differences between Korea and Europe, the European integration experience provides a wealth of knowledge about how highly divided societies can come together. European nations’ journey from conflict to cooperation
The long way home:
highlights the value of shared norms and the strength of institutions.
While German reunification is often viewed as the most common historical reference point, this paper argues that the more relevant insights, which might offer the most practical roadmap for Korea can be drawn from the process of European Union enlargement, which successfully integrated ten post-communist countries - many of them with much lower GDP levels than East Germany - into a functioning liberal-democratic and market-oriented system.
This paper investigates how long-term considerations of Korean reunification might be influenced by the European integration model, which is based on multiple aspects as: functional cooperation and gradual convergence. It seeks to draw lessons from the collective experience of Europe, providing strategic and symbolic insights that could help the Korean Peninsula “make its own challenging journey home”.
The long way home:
From division to integration: Europe’s long march toward unity
The history of European integration is best understood not as a linear or inevitable process, but as an adaptive response to the continent’s legacy of war, growing nationalism, and ideological fragmentation. The vision of a unified Europe, though often dismissed as utopian in earlier centuries, re-emerged with renewed urgency in the aftermath of two devastating world wars that laid bare the dangers of unchecked national rivalry 1
Earlier thinkers had different visions for a united Europe, starting from figures such as Pierre Dubois, who introduced confederal “Christian Eruope”; Jean-Jacques Rousseau who advocated the European federation; Immanuel Kant to Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, the author of the 1923 manifesto “Paneuropa”, where he outlined a bold vision of regional cooperation embedded within a broader global order as envisioned five major global power blocs 2 . Despite the differences in their specific proposals, all these visions were rooted in a shared foundational idea: Europe required political unity grounded in peace and stability, which will prevent future conflicts. However, it wasn’t until the aftermath of World War II that concrete steps were taken toward this vision. An important turning point was the Schuman Declaration (1950), which proposed the supranational management of coal and steel industries - which are crucial to
warmaking - by pooling French and German production. This was not just a technical arrangement, but it served as the basis for the Treaty of Paris and subsequent emergency of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), the forerunner of the modern European Union 3
European integration was thus conceived both as a peace project and as a functional mechanism for trust-building among former colonizers and enemies. The Treaties of Rome (1957) institutionalized economic cooperation through the European Economic Community, while later treaties - Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997), Lisbon (2007) has expanded the Union’s competence into political, social, and security domains. Over time, the EU matured from political and economic union to advanced normative project grounded in shared commitments to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and multilateral governance 4 .
The institutional architecture of the EU, comprising the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice, and the Council has ensured that integration proceeded through a balance of supranational and intergovernmental mechanisms. Neofunctionalism played a key role: sectoral cooperation (e.g. trade, transport, agriculture, environment) paved the way for deeper political alignment 5
1. Malamud, A. Schmitter, P. (2007) The Experience of European Integration and the Potential for Integration in South America. IBEI Working Paper No. 2007/6.
2. McCormick, J. (2021) Understanding the European Union: A concise introduction. 8th ed. London: Red Globe Press.
3. Ibidem.
4. Olsen, J. (2021) The European Union: Politics and policies. 7th ed. New York: Routledge.
5. Ibidem.
The long way home: Insights from European integration for the Korean peninsula
IMAGE: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2014) EU PARLIAMENT OF EUROPEAN UNION 2014. FLICKR. LICENSED UNDER CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. HTTPS://WWW.FLICKR.COM/PHOTOS/EUROPEAN_PARLIAMENT/13064833244/
One of the most influential theoretical frameworks for understanding the dynamics of European integration is neofunctionalism 6 . It hold that, integration does not solely depend on the actions of sovereign states, but rather evolves through the increasing role of non-state actors. While member states set the initial parameters of regional agreements, they do not exercise complete control over the trajectory of integration. Over time, supranational bureaucraciessuch as the secretariats of regional organizations - and transnational actors, including interest groups and social movements, emerge as crucial drivers of integration. These actors take advantage of “spill-over effects”, whereby cooperation in one area generates pressures and incentives for
cooperation in others, expanding the scope of integration beyond its original boundaries 7. As integration deepens, citizens begin to transfer their expectations and demands to regional institutions. Meeting these expectations often leads to a shift from economic and social cooperation toward political integration. Thus, neofunctionalism highlights how integration may take on a self-reinforcing character, producing outcomes that go beyond the intentions of national governments 8
However, neofunctionalism has been widely debated and frequently misunderstood. On the contrary, many scholars have favored intergovernmentalism, a theory rooted in neo-realist
6. See: Haas, E. (1958) The Uniting of Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Haas, E.B. (1964) Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford University Press, Stanford; Lindberg, L.N. and Scheingold, S.A. (1970) Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
7. Haas, E. (1958) The Uniting of Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
8. Ibidem.
The long way home: Insights from European integration for the Korean peninsula
assumptions about state behavior. From this perspective, national governments remain the sole actors capable of steering integration. The pace and direction of the process are understood to reflect the calculations of state power and national interest. Integration, therefore, is seen not as a transformative force, but as a tool to strengthen rather than weaken state sovereignty 9
In contrast, many European scholars approach the EU through comparative politics and thus adopt a wider range of perspectives. Building on these earlier theories, the concept of multi-level governance (MLG) emerged in the 1990s to better capture the complex reality of European decision-making. MLG challenges both the top-down logic of neofunctionalism and the state-centrism of intergovernmentalism by emphasizing the
simultaneous influence of multiple levels of government - supranational, national, regional, and local—in shaping EU policies. Rather than seeing power as concentrated at either the EU or state level, MLG stresses the dynamic interaction and interdependence of actors across levels, including civil society and regional authorities 10
Despite the existing challenges - linguistic fragmentation, uneven economic development, and rising Euroscepticism, the EU succeeded in expanding its model to include post-socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe. Their accession in 2004 – 2007 - 2013 is often cited as proof of the EU’s capacity to transform deeply divided societies through gradual convergence, institutional socialization, and normative alignment.
The legacy of division in Korea: structural and symbolic challenges
Over 70 years after the 1953 armistice, the Korean Peninsula is still a deeply divided region with no formal peace treaty, no normalized diplomatic relations between the two states, and ongoing military tension. The sharp contrast between DPRK and ROK makes reconciliation even more complex to accomplish: North Korea is a dynastic authoritarian regime with a nuclear program and command economy, while on the contrary South Korea is a democratic, capitalist society and one of the leaders in technology worldwide.
The international sanctions regime imposed on North Korea, primarily because of its nuclear activities, further isolates the North and restricts
opportunities for people-to-people contact and economic cooperation. Despite previous engagement efforts, such as the Sunshine Policy or Hanoi Summit, the lack of consistent trust-building mechanisms is preventing sustained dialogue. Additionally, divergent national narratives and internal political dynamics in both Koreas reinforce symbolic fragmentation and hinder the development of a shared future vision 11
While German unification is a a hopeful precedent, its context differs fundamentally. East and West Germany, despite being separated by ideology, maintained a degree of compatibility and cultural continuity. More importantly, re-
9. Hoffmann, S. (1966). Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe. Daedalus, 95(3); Moravcsik, A. (1993). Introduction: Integration international and domestic theories of international bargaining. In P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson, & R. D. Putnam (Eds.), Double-edged diplomacy: International, bargaining and domestic politics. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
10. Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2001) Types of Multi-Level Governance. European Integration online Papers, 5(11).
11. Kim, K. et al. (2014) Global Expectations for Korean Unification. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification.
The long way home: Insights from European integration for the Korean peninsula
NECESSITY OF UNIFICATION BY COHORTS: 2014–2024. AUTHOR’S OWN COMPILATION BASED ON: LEE, S. ET AL. (2024) KINU’S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE RESULT OF THE 2024 KINU UNIFICATION SURVEY: NORTH KOREA’S TWO-STATE CLAIM / US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OUTLOOK AND ROK-US RELATIONS.
SEOUL: KOREA INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL UNIFICATION.
unification occurred within a broader geopolitical transformation - the collapse of the Soviet bloc alongside with mass engagement. In contrast, Korea remains embedded in a volatile regional security architecture dominated by strategic rivalries involving China and the U.S. Moreover, the economic disparity between North and South Korea is significantly greater than that between East and West Germany in 1990, and the DPRK’s isolation is far deeper 12 .
Despite the South Korean government’s continued commitment to a principle-based unification policy grounded in liberal democracy and human rights, public enthusiasm for unification has significantly declined in recent years. Since the fail of the Hanoi Summit in 2019, public perception of
the necessity of unification has steadily dropped reaching a low of 52.7% in 2020 and only slightly improving to 52.9% in the 2024 survey - marking the lowest levels of support since such data has been collected. The differences between generations are especially noticeable: only 46.5% of millennials agree with the war generation, which still holds that unification is crucial, at 73.6%. While 45.1% of older respondents cited ethnic kinship as the primary justification for unification, only 26.1% of younger respondents agreed. Younger South Koreans who do support unification, however, typically do so because they want to lessen the likelihood of war, indicating a change from sentimental or patriotic reasons to practical worries about regional security 13 .
12. Snyder, S. (1998) ‘Managing Integration on the Korean Peninsula: The Positive and Normative Case for Gradualism With or Without Integration’, in Noland, M. (ed.) Economic Integration of the Korean Peninsula. Washington, D.C.: PIIE Press.
13. Lee, S. et al. (2024) KINU’s Announcement of the Result of the 2024 KINU Unification Survey: North Korea’s Two-State Claim / US Presidential Election Outlook and ROK-US Relations. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification.
The long way home: Insights from European integration for the Korean peninsula
This growing generational ambivalence coincides with an even more radical transformation in North Korea’s position. In December 2023, Kim Jong-un publicly declared the abandonment of his country’s long-held unification policy, asserting that the two Koreas are no longer “one people” but rather “two separate states” 14 . However, the North Korean side rather describes it as a “new
stand on the North-South relations and the reunification policy.” This Two-State Policy marks a profound shift: Kim Jong Un’s rejection of the earlier unification policy distances him from the legacy of his predecessors - particularly Kim Il Sung - possibly to reinforce his own personal legitimacy 15
Lessons for Korean unification
The experience of European integration serves as a reminder that achieving unity requires a series of carefully planned steps rooted in long-term vision, institution-building and functional cooperation rather than sudden, dramatic changes. European model highlights how crucial it is to have a strong pre-unification phase - a preparatory phase that could last for decades and does not necessitate an immediate political agreement. Decisions made during this phase - particularly those that reduce future transition costs and foster trust can profoundly shape the eventual outcome of unification 16 .
The European experience points to a more nuanced course, whereas Korean unification literature frequently combines gradualism with instant unification 17. The institutional trajectory of the EU demonstrates that functional integration, starting in less politically charged areas like infrastructure, education, or health, can establish shared interests without immediately demanding political convergence, despite the fact that scholars have occasionally called for a quick transition in Korea.
In this view, trust-building institutions play a central role. The EU evolved through formalized venues of dialogue, such as inter-parliamentary assemblies and councils of ministers, where representatives could engage regularly in structured, confidential negotiations. These institutions provided meaningful influence in decision-making for participants and political flexibility to compromise for political leaders without domestic backlash. For the Korean Peninsula, adapting such mechanisms as establishing permanent platforms could stabilize communication and prepare the ground for deeper collaboration, even amid continued geopolitical tensions.
The symbolic dimension of integration is equally vital. The European project was never purely economic or institutional; it relied on narratives of reconciliation and shared destiny, despite linguistic, historical, and cultural differences. In order to solve what became known as the EU’s “democratic deficit,” a common symbolic repertoire - including the European flag, anthem, and citizenship was gradually created 18 . For legitimacy and resilience to be guaranteed in Korea,
14. Lee, S. (2024) North and South Korea are diverging on their unification policies ISPI, 8 April. URL: https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/ north-and-south-korea-are-diverging-on-their-unification-policies-169144#intro
15. Frank, R. (2024) North Korea’s new unification policy: Implications and pitfalls. 38 North, The Stimson Center, URL: https://www.38north. org/2024/01/north-koreas-new-unification-policy-implications-and-pitfalls/.
16. de Bruyn, M. and Bae, S. (2009) Trust Building through Institutions: European Lessons for Korean Unification. Korea Economic Institute, Academic Paper Series, 4(1), January.
17. Ibidem.
18. Misa, T. J., & Schot, J. (2005). Introduction: Inventing Europe:1 Technology and the hidden integration of Europe. History and Technology, 21(1).
The long way home: Insights from European integration for the Korean peninsula
GET BACK TO SIX PARTY TALKS? COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. 15 MAY.
HTTPS://WWW.CFR.ORG/BLOG/IT-REALLY-POSSIBLE-GET-BACK-SIX-PARTY-TALKS
narrative development and public participation will be crucial. Social cohesion could trigger from transforming the trauma of division into a narrative about a shared future, similar to how postwar Europe reimagined its violent past.
External actors played a quiet but stabilizing role in European integration, acting as mediators and guarantors. For Korea, support from global partners - particularly those involved in the Six-Party Talks will be essential, not only in the security domain but also in ensuring economic, diplomatic, and normative continuity.
The European experience shows that regional integration can happen when supranational mechanisms and intergovernmental cooperation are used in a balanced way. The EU’s institutions are
not a fully adaptable model that can be used in all regions, but rather their operation provides useful information about how coordination and joint policy-making can become institutionalized over time. One important lesson for the Korean Peninsula is that it is important to build institutional frameworks early, even if the two Koreas do not unify politically. This could mean setting up places for people to discuss, like dialogue forums or joint commissions, in areas that both sides are interested in, especially with “low political visibility” areas that offer real benefits and help build trust over time 19 .
The theory of neofunctionalism suggests that integration does not rely solely on state-level decisions but may be advanced by non-state actors, buareaucracies, and social stakeholders
19. de Bruyn, M. and Bae, S. (2009) Trust Building through Institutions: European Lessons for Korean Unification…
IMAGE: SIX PARTY TALKS, 2006: SNYDER, S.A. (2014) IS IT REALLY POSSIBLE TO
The long way home: Insights from European integration for the Korean peninsula
who exploit the momentum generated by functional cooperation. Applied to Korea, this would imply enabling cross-border academic, cultural, and civil society exchanges that while modest, can generate “spill-over effects” into broader areas of collaboration. At the same time, multi-level governance, which recognizes the role of actors at various levels (supranational, national, regional, and local) underscores the value of decentralized dialogue and the involvement of diverse societal actors in shaping integration-related policies. A Korean approach that allows for local governments, defectors’ communities, and international
partners to participate in shaping unification-related initiatives may enhance legitimacy and adaptability.
The accession of post-socialist Central and Eastern European countries to the EU shows how institutional preparation and importantly rule-of-law alignment can facilitate the long-term transformation, even among formerly divided or authoritarian societies. While the contexts differ significantly, the Korean Peninsula may draw a inspiration from the EU’s to manage asymmetric development.
Conclusion
It is obvious that Europe does not offer a readymade template for Korean reunification. Its integration process - complex and at times contested was shaped by its own historical contingencies, institutional evolution, and geopolitical constraints. Nonetheless, the European journey holds valuable insights that transcend context. It demonstrates that reconciliation is not a singular event but a sustained, iterative process that requires mutual recognition and long-term commitment.
For Korea, this means that the path toward unity cannot rely on a single breakthrough moment or top-down imposition. Instead, it must emerge through gradual steps: functional cooperation,
institution-building, shared narratives, and strategic patience. The Korean Peninsula’s history, demographics, and security context are unique but the underlying logic of Europe’s experience remains relevant. Trust can be constructed and integration, if approached pragmatically and inclusively, can succeed.
This offers a source for optimism: even though the obstacles remain apparent, history demonstrates that regions that are divided don’t have to stay that way. Adaptive strategies can quietly lay the groundwork for future unification, even when things are at a standstill.
The long way home: Insights from European integration for the Korean peninsula
Bibliography:
• de Bruyn, M. and Bae, S. (2009) Trust Building through Institutions: European Lessons for Korean Unification. Korea Economic Institute, Academic Paper Series, 4(1), January.
• Frank, R. (2024) North Korea’s new unification policy: Implications and pitfalls. 38 North, The Stimson Center, URL: https:// www.38north.org/2024/01/north-koreas-new-unification-policy-implications-and-pitfalls/.
• Haas, E. (1958) The Uniting of Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
• Haas, E.B. (1964) Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
• Hoffmann, S. (1966). Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe. Daedalus, 95(3)
• Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2001) Types of Multi-Level Governance. European Integration online Papers, 5(11).
• Kim, K. et al. (2014) Global Expectations for Korean Unification. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification.
• Lee, S. (2024) North and South Korea are diverging on their unification policies ISPI, 8 April. URL: https://www.ispionline.it/en/ publication/north-and-south-korea-arediverging-on-their-unification-policies169144#intro
• Lee, S. et al. (2024) KINU’s Announcement of the Result of the 2024 KINU Unification Survey: North Korea’s Two-State Claim / US Presidential Election Outlook and ROK-US Relations. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification.
• Lindberg, L.N. and Scheingold, S.A. (1970) Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
• Malamud, A. Schmitter, P. (2007) The Experience of European Integration and the Potential for Integration in South America. IBEI Working Paper No. 2007/6.
• McCormick, J. (2021) Understanding the European Union: A concise introduction. 8th ed. London: Red Globe Press.
• Misa, T. J., & Schot, J. (2005). Introduction: Inventing Europe:1 Technology and the hidden integration of Europe. History and Technology, 21(1).
• Moravcsik, A. (1993). Introduction: Integration international and domestic theories of international bargaining. In P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson, & R. D. Putnam (Eds.), Double-edged diplomacy: International, bargaining and domestic politics. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
• Olsen, J. (2021) The European Union: Politics and policies. 7th ed. New York: Routledge.
• Snyder, S. (1998) ‘Managing Integration on the Korean Peninsula: The Positive and Normative Case for Gradualism With or Without Integration’, in Noland, M. (ed.) Economic Integration of the Korean Peninsula. Washington, D.C.: PIIE Press.
The long way home: Insights from European integration for the Korean peninsula
Photos:
• European Parliament (2014) EU Parliament of European Union 2014. Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
URL: https://www.flickr.com/photos/ european_parliament/13064833244/
• Necessity of Unification by Cohorts: 2014–2024. Author’s own compilation based on: Lee, S. et al. (2024) KINU’s Announcement of the Result of the 2024 KINU Unification Survey: North Korea’s Two-State Claim / US Presidential Election Outlook and ROK-US Relations. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification.
• Six Party Talks, 2006: Snyder, S.A. (2014) Is it really possible to get back to Six Party Talks? Council on Foreign Relations. 15 May.
URL: https://www.cfr.org/blog/it-reallypossible-get-back-six-party-talks.
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