Maintaining National Identity Through Division: What Korea May Learn from Poland
Abstract
When political borders divide nations, national identity often becomes the invisible thread that holds the promise of reunification together, or on the contrary, the force that cements permanent separation. This study briefly examines how divided nations preserve and transform national identity through comparative analysis of Poland’s partition period (1795-1918) and Korea’s ongoing division since 1945. The central claim is that the preservation of a shared national identity amid political division facilitates prospects for reunification, whereas the formation of divergent identities legitimizes continued political separation. Poland’s experience demonstrates how maintaining unified national consciousness across
political boundaries facilitated successful reunification in 1918, despite 123 years of occupation. In contrast, Korea’s division has produced two distinct national identities that, while sharing cultural and historical roots, have developed competing claims to authentic Korean nationhood, thereby deepening the political divide. This comparative analysis reveals that national identity functions not merely as cultural preservation but as a political tool that can either enable or disable reunification process. The findings have implications for understanding contemporary Korean reunification prospects and broader influence of national identities on inter- and intranational conflicts.
Introduction
National identity preservation in divided nations represents one of modern political history’s most complex challenges, with profound implications for reunification and state formation, but also inter- and intranational conflicts. When established political entities face territorial partition, national consciousness evolution within separated communities critically determines whether such division remains temporary or becomes permanent.
National identity functions as both response to division and factor with the potential of providing for its resolution. Unlike cultural identity encompassing traditions and customs, national identity concerns political dimensions of collective belonging and self-determina-
tion (Anderson, 1991; Connor, 2018). However, prolonged political split can generate distinct national identities within formerly unified populations, transforming temporary political divisions into permanent boundaries.
This study addresses two central questions:
1. How did Poland maintain national identity through 123 years of political occupation and partition?
2. What lessons from Poland’s experience can inform Korean unification approaches?
Poland offers an example of unified national identity surviving prolonged political division. Polish national identity not only survived but evolved into a powerful reunification force
(Davies, 1981; Jedlicki, 1999; Walicki, 1994). The country’s experience demonstrates that identity preservation during territorial and political division functions not merely as cultural resistance but as active preparation for political restoration.
Contemporary Korea presents a contrasting case which shows how division can generate competing identities which compete with each other. Since 1945’s division between Allied forces, Korea has not achieved unification despite its relatively short period of the Soviet and American occupations. Two distinct political cultures emerged from imposed systems rapidly (Park, 2019), with political differences proving stronger than shared Korean heritage. Eventually, each state developed its own Korean national identity form (Shin, 2006).
While coherence of Polish national identity to much extend provided reintegration frameworks when partition powers weakened, Korea’s division created a situation in which reunification would require not merely political-economic integration but fundamental reconciliation between competing Korean nationhood concepts. This article presents modest introduction to the research on comparative politics of preserving national identity’s unity despite political division. It investigates the cases of Poland and Korea using content analysis methods and comparative analysis. The sources used in the research are mostly secondary and include scholarly literature on history, political science, and cultural aspects related to national identity, as well as surveys conducted in South Korea.
National identity in European and Asian context
Understanding divided nations requires clear foundational concepts, particularly the definitions of “nation” and “national identity” that have shaped both scholarly discourse. Moreover, recognition of historical and cultural differences is also necessary, as an introduction to comparative analysis of cases such as Poland and Korea.
Various nationalism scholars offer different perspectives on the phenomena mentioned above. Benedict Anderson, representing the modernist school of thought, described nations as “imagined communities” – socially constructed political communities that are simultaneously limited and sovereign. Nations are imagined because members will never know most fellow-members yet together they create a common group. Anderson’s emphasis on print capitalism as enabling
shared consciousness across territories provides crucial insights into how national imagination transcends physical boundaries (Anderson, 1991). Another modernist, Ernest Gellner, offers a definition grounded in modernization theory, arguing that nations are artifacts of nationalism. For Gellner, nationalism represents a political principle emerging from industrial society’s requirements. He also believed that a group of people becomes a nation only when, by virtue of belonging to it, these people have duties and rights towards each other (Gellner, 1983). On the other hand, Anthony Smith’s ethnosymbolist approach defines nations as named communities possessing shared historical territories, common myths and historical memories, mass public cultures, common legal rights and duties, and common economies. Smith argues that modern
nations are built upon pre-existing ethnic foundations that provide cultural materials for national construction (Smith, 1986). The theories allow for conceptualisation of national identity, which in the context of this article, refers to the subjective dimension of belonging to a national community, therefore the psychological identification with national characteristics and values (Smith, 1991). Such scholarly frameworks provide complementary insights for the research.
However, the historical distinction between cases analysed is crucial. Poland’s partition occurred during late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, overlapping with the rise of modern nationalism and nation-state system emergence in Europe (Hobsbawm, 1992). This timing created both challenges and opportunities, because while the old imperialistic tendencies contributed to the occupation of Polish state, emerging nationalist ideology offered intellectual foundation for its nation’s resistance (Wandycz, 1974; Przeździecki, 2012). Korea’s division occurred in
fundamentally different historical context after nation-states became dominant in the international system. The Cold War context further complicated Korean national identity by embedding division within broader ideological competition (Cumings, 2005).
European and Asian contexts differ in cultural traditions. Europe developed sophisticated intellectual traditions for conceptualizing national unity, drawing upon Enlightenment, liberal self-determination concepts related to the Age of Revolution, and later, industrialisation (Storm, 2022; Mylones & Tudor, 2021; Anderson, 1991). Although the emergence of extra-European nationalism may be also explained with the rise of modernism, East Asian political traditions developed different unity and legitimacy concepts, with Confucian political thought emphasizing cultural and moral unity under legitimate authority (Ziliotti, 2022; Zhao, 2009; Kim, 2018).
Comparative analysis: divided paths of divided nations
Poland and Korea share remarkable structural similarities that make their contrasting histories interesting. Both nations experienced involuntary division imposed by foreign powers and endured prolonged struggles against external domination during periods of major geopolitical transformations. Yet despite these fundamental parallels, their political fates after regaining independence seem much differing.
Poland’s partition period represents history’s most remarkable example of national identity preservation without statehood. Three territorial divisions (1772, 1793, 1795) by Russia, Prussia,
and Austria progressively reduced Poland until complete political dissolution. Yet Polish national identity not only survived but emerged strengthened, ultimately providing state restoration in 1918.
Polish language preservation served as the most fundamental identity maintenance mechanism. Despite occupying powers’ attempts to suppress Polish in public education and administration, communities developed alternative preservation networks. Through informal educational networks, Poles continued teaching their mother tongue. Moreover, Polish literature played crucial
roles in maintaining and developing national consciousness, creating common narratives regarding Poland as “Christ among nations” –a messianic nation destined to suffer for others’ sins and eventually resurrect to lead humanity toward spiritual redemption (Porter-Szűcs, 2014; Walicki, 1970). This messianic nationalism, articulated by poets like Adam Mickiewicz and Juliusz Słowacki, present partition not as historical accident but as divine sacrifice with spiritual significance (e.g. Mickiewicz, 1832; Słowacki, 1834).
The aforementioned narrative was fuelled by the strong relation between Polish nation and the Roman Catholic Church, which emerged as the most important institutional guardian of Polish national identity during partition. Catholic liturgy conducted in Polish, religious education transmitting historical narratives, and church-sponsored cultural activities maintained community cohesion across three different empires (Gaworski, 2019; Przeździecki, 2012). Moreover, Polish communities cultivated detailed historical memories, emphasizing Polish political traditions’ distinctiveness and partition illegitimacy. Failed uprisings (1830-1831, 1863-1864), while unsuccessful in achieving immediate goals, contributed to sacrifice narratives strengthening national identity and providing moral justification for continued resistance (Davies, 2005).
Nevertheless, one of the most remarkable aspects of Polish identity preservation during the partitions was the maintenance of coherent national consciousness despite significant regional variations in experience under different partitioning powers. Poles in Russian, Prussian, and Austrian territories faced dramatically different policies, opportunities, and challenges, yet maintained sufficient identity coherence. Although differences between former partitioned zones remain noticeable to this day, manifesting in voting patterns, economic development trajectories, and administrative traditions (Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya, 2015), Poland has never experienced
a civil war in the classical sense. Such unity across regional divides reflects not only the strength of cultural and religious foundations for Polish national identity, but more importantly for this analysis, the power of shared values and narratives regarding Polish identity that transcended administrative boundaries (Davies, 2005).
Perhaps most significantly, the experience of partition itself became a defining element of Polish identity, transforming what could have been a fragmenting trauma into a unifying national myth that emphasized resilience, cultural superiority over occupying powers, and an almost messianic destiny for the politically reunited Polish nation.
The foundation of Poland’s resilience lay in its pre-existing national unity, which remained remarkably robust across successive partitions, when Korea’s case demonstrates how shared cultural heritage can become overshadowed by political and ideological polarization. Following the peninsula’s division in 1945, both Korean states embarked on deliberate campaigns to construct identity narratives that prioritized ideological purity over historical unity, gradually eroding the common foundation that had previously sustained Korean civilization for centuries (Shin, 2006).
On the other hand, Korea’s post-1945 division represents enduring postcolonial fragmentation, where ideological split and state-sponsored identity-building transformed unified ethnic identity into two politically and culturally distinct nations. The originally temporal division of Korea between American and Soviet forces became permanent as Cold War tensions escalated, leading to separate emergences of Republic of Korea’s (South) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (North) governments, each claiming legitimate authority over the entire Korean Peninsula (Cumings, 2005; Matray, 1981; Stueck, 1995).
Korean language preservation took dramatically different paths, serving as primary mechanisms for constructing distinct national identities. North Korea purged foreign influences, particularly English and Japanese loanwords, promoting Pyongyang dialect as standard while reinforcing state ideology (Terrell, 2007). South Korea embraced linguistic globalization, incorporating numerous English loanwords, which reflected Western integration (Rüdiger, 2018; Fuqua, 2011).
Furthermore, competing political ideologies fragmented Korean identity where religion unified Polish identity. North Korea’s national identity centres on Juche ideology which evolved from political autonomy doctrine into quasi-religious Stalinism-inspired system emphasizing Kim “dynasty” loyalty, with systematic historical revisionism (Lankov, 2013; Gray, 2023; Cumings, 2005). South Korea’s identity, on the other hand, was shaped by democratic transition after years of military authoritarianism, reorienting national identity around liberal-democratic values and global integration.
Both Koreas developed collective memory narratives justifying division rather than promoting reunification. North Korea promoted revolutionary anti-colonial narratives while portraying South Korea as American puppet state. South Korea emphasized anti-communism, democracy, and Western alignment. The division is further reinforced by the military tensions and mutual untrust remaining after the Korean War armistice (Bleiker & Hoang, 2006; Shin, 2006; Watson, 2012). Moreover, despite shared heritage, profound cultural differences emerged. North Korean culture celebrates revolutionary Marxist themes and collectivism, while modern South Korean culture emphasizes individualism and consumerism. The Korean Wave (Hallyu) projected modern, cosmopolitan South Korean identity internationally, while North Korean isolation solidified monolithic identity based on loyalty to the regime. Generational changes further established identity gaps, with younger
generations growing up entirely within respective systems, creating increasingly different perceptions of “Koreanness” (Chamberlin, 2004).
A significant distinguishing factor between these cases lies in the role of state institutions in identity construction, too. During Poland’s partition era, national identity was preserved mostly by non-state actors including the Catholic Church, underground educational networks, secret patriotic societies, and various exile movements. In Korea, by stark contrast, the newly established states became the primary agents of identity formation after 1948. Both North and South Korea systematically constructed separate national mythologies that emphasized their respective legitimacy while delegitimizing their counterpart. This process of competitive nation-building created contrasting and mutually antagonising versions of Korean identity (Bleiker & Hoang, 2006; Cho, 2011; Heo, 2020; Matveeva, 2020; Son, 2015; Watson, 2012). Furthermore, Korea’s experience reveals how asymmetric civil society development can exacerbate rather than bridge identity gaps. South Korea’s democratization since the 1980s fostered a vibrant civil society, while North Korea’s totalitarian system eliminated independent social organizations entirely.
Poland’s case highlights cultural continuity, which enabled political integration after regaining independence. Korea, however, lacks a similarly unified cultural framework, which paradoxically stems from Korean political sovereignty and the aforementioned need for self-legitimisation. The Polish experience suggests that cultural and educational programs operating independently of state ideology may serve as essential long-term mechanisms for maintaining shared national narratives. Contemporarily, both Korean states possess deeply rooted institutional identities, requiring the development of unifying visions of nationhood that currently appear beyond reach given mutual antagonism.
Moreover, the heavily militarized peninsula and the complexity of the Korean war lasting for more than seven decades, poses unique security obstacles absent from the Polish case. The Cold War dynamics have evolved into complex regional security dilemmas and further involved regional actors (China, Japan, Russia, and the United States) into the inter-Korean conflict, making bilateral reconciliation processes to some extent dependent on multilateral diplomatic coordination (Pietrewicz, 2022; Fuqua, 2011).
Perhaps most significantly, contemporary South Korean public opinion increasingly reflects diminishing interest in reunification, particularly among younger generations who view North Korea as essentially foreign and potentially burdensome (Fuqua, 2011; Park et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2023). This phenomenon represents a fundamental difference from the Polish experience, where cultural unity persisted through generations despite political division, suggesting that Korea’s path forward may require entirely different approaches to reimagining national solidarity across ideological boundaries.
Identity reconciliation strategies from Poland
Korean reunification strategies must address ideational and symbolic foundations through comprehensive approaches that recognize the profound psychological and cultural divisions that have emerged from the prolonged division of the Korean Peninsula. Poland’s successful preservation and restoration of national unity offers several strategic frameworks that, while requiring adaptation to Korean contexts, provide valuable insights for overcoming ideological fragmentation and rebuilding shared national consciousness:
• Cultural infrastructure development: Poland’s experience demonstrates that unified cultural infrastructure transcending political boundaries serves as the foundation for eventual reunification. For Korea, this suggests developing cultural programs that operate independently of state ideologies while emphasizing shared heritage elements that predate division. Educational exchanges represent the most promising platform for cultural infrastructure development. Academic partnerships between South Korean universities and international institu-
tions with North Korea could gradually create scholarly networks focused on pre-division (and eventually, post-division) Korean history, language, and culture. These programs should emphasize historical periods of Korean unity, particularly the Joseon Dynasty’s cultural achievements and resistance movements against Japanese colonization, thereby creating shared narratives that transcend contemporary ideological divisions. Language standardization initiatives offer another strategic opportunity. While both Koreas have developed distinct linguistic practices, coordinated efforts to preserve classical Korean literary traditions and promote linguistic unity through cultural programming could be beneficial.
• Civil society engagement: Poland’s success stemmed from organic nationalism maintained by non-state actors, suggesting that Korean reunification requires robust civil society engagement operating independently of government initiatives. This approach faces significant challenges given North Korea’s authoritarian
structure, but gradual civil society development through international partnerships could create conditions for organic identity reconciliation. In this case, humanitarian cooperation represents the most viable pathway. In addition, professional and academic associations could play crucial roles in maintaining intellectual connections. Scientific collaboration, joint historical research projects, and cultural preservation initiatives could create networks of professionals committed to Korean unity regardless of political circumstances.
• Memory and narrative reconstruction: Poland’s transformation of partition trauma into unifying national mythology suggests that Korea must address how division memory shapes contemporary identity. Rather than perpetuating antagonistic narratives, reunification strategies should promote historical interpretations emphasizing division as temporary disruption of natural Korean unity. Joint historical commissions could gradually develop shared narratives about Korean history that acknowledge both states’ perspectives while emphasizing common experiences and values. These efforts should focus particularly on pre-division periods and shared struggles against foreign domination, creating historical foundations for renewed unity. Educational materials developed through such collaborations could eventually influence how younger generations understand Korean identity and division
• Generational reconciliation strategies: Poland’s success occurred partly because generational transmission of national identity continued despite political suppression. Korea faces the opposite challenge: younger generations in-
creasingly view division as natural state. This requires strategies to cultivate reunification consciousness among youth who lack direct memory of unified Korea. Youth exchange programs, while currently limited, represent crucial long-term investments in identity reconciliation. Cultural festivals, sports competitions, and educational initiatives that bring together young Koreans from both sides could gradually normalize inter-Korean contact while building personal relationships that transcend political boundaries.
Poland’s strategies require significant adaptation to Korean contexts, acknowledging structural differences that complicate direct application. North Korea’s totalitarian control system makes civil society development and cultural exchange depending and difficult, and maybe nearly impossible. Nevertheless, Poland’s experience demonstrates that national identity preservation and reconstruction remain possible even under hostile circumstances. The key insight is that reunification preparation must begin long before political conditions permit actual unification, requiring sustained commitment to cultural, educational, and civil society initiatives that gradually rebuild shared identity foundations.
Korean reunification strategies based on Polish experience must therefore emphasize patience, persistence, and long-term vision while recognizing that identity reconciliation represents condition for, rather than result of, political unification. Success will require coordinated efforts across multiple domains (cultural, educational, religious, and institutional) sustained over generations and adapted to evolving political circumstances.
Conclusions
This comparative analysis provides comprehensive answers to two central research questions regarding national identity preservation and reunification strategies.
How did Poland maintain national identity through 123 years of political occupation and partition?
Poland preserved national identity through four critical mechanisms. First, the Polish language and romantic literature served as primary vehicles for cultural continuity, with informal networks ensuring linguistic transmission despite imperial suppression. Second, the Roman Catholic Church functioned as the most crucial institutional guardian, providing unified spaces for Polish identity expression across territorial boundaries through liturgy, education, and cultural activities. Third, extensive civil society networks including literary societies, professional associations, and underground schools created “organic institutions” that substituted for absent state apparatus. Fourth, drawing from the aforementioned points, Poland transformed partition trauma into unifying messianic mythology, thereby strengthening rather than weakening cohesive national consciousness.
What lessons from Poland’s experience can inform Korean unification approaches?
Polish experience offers several strategic insights for Korea, though requiring careful adaptation. Most crucially, successful reunification demands comprehensive cultural infrastructure transcending political boundaries, simultaneously supported by and supporting shared narrative on division and unification. The transformation of trauma of division into unifying narratives would
require inter-Korean historical reconciliation. In this regard, Korea needs educational exchanges, professional associations, and religious partnerships to rebuild shared foundations. Poland’s civil society model suggests developing humanitarian cooperation and grassroots networks creating personal relationships across ideological divisions. However, Korean challenges differ significantly, as both states on the Korean Peninsula possess political sovereignty, North Korea’s totalitarian control limits civil society development, and regional great power competition complicates bilateral processes. Nevertheless, Poland’s fundamental principle remains applicable – identity reconciliation must begin immediately as generational preparation for eventual political integration when circumstances permit.
This comparative analysis suggests several directions for future research. First, the framework could be expanded to include other divided nations such as Germany, Cyprus, or Ireland to better understand when national identity helps or hinders reunification. Second, longitudinal studies could track how younger generations in divided societies view national identity and reunification over time. Third, empirical research could test the effectiveness of specific reconciliation strategies like educational exchanges and joint cultural programs. Fourth, future studies could examine how digital media and social networks influence national identity formation in divided societies. Finally, interdisciplinary approaches combining political science with psychology and sociology could provide deeper insights into how collective memory shapes identity reconstruction after division. Such research would inform not only Korean reunification efforts but also broader understanding of nationalism and conflict resolution in divided nations.
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