RUSSIA MONITOR MONTHLY 03/2021

MONTHLY March 2021

CONTENTS

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U.S. DEMAND FOR RUSSIAN OIL AND FUELS HITS RECORD HIGH

GAZPROM CHAIRMAN SAYS NORD STREAM 2 GAS PIPELINE TO BE FINISHED THIS YEAR

RUSSIAN WAGNER MERCENARIES FACE LEGAL ACTION

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AUSTRIAN EX-FOREIGN MINISTER GETS NOMINATION FOR RUSSIA’S ROSNEFT

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COULD PUTIN LAUNCH NEW “SHORT VICTORIOUS WAR?” YES, BUT…

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A FUTURE FSB DIRECTOR? PUTIN MAKES PERSONNEL DECISION

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RUSSIA RESUMES BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN SYRIA

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RUSSIA PLEASED WITH OPEC+ DECISION

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A GAME OF THRONES IN LUBYANKA

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BELARUS BEGINS SHIPPING FUELS THROUGH RUSSIAN PORTS

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RUSSIA REVEALS AMBITIOUS PLANS FOR ITS LNG SECTOR

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RUSSIA’S INTELLIGENCE SERVICE FUELS GEORGIAN TURMOIL

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PUTIN FOR LIFE: STATE DUMA RESETS PRESIDENTIAL TERM-LIMIT CLOCK TO ZERO

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RUSSIAN LOSSES AFTER A DECADE OF SYRIA WAR

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VOLODIN’S CLOSE ASSOCIATE GETS A JOB IN NOVATEK

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RUSSIAN WAGNER MERCENARIES FACE LEGAL ACTION

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RUSSIA’S GOVERNOR HUNT: SPRING SEASON HAS BEGUN

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DONBAS CEASEFIRE COMES TO ACTUAL END

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MORE SOLDIERS KILLED IN UKRAINE’S DONBAS

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BULGARIA BREAKS UP RUSSIAN SPY RING

30 GAZPROM CHAIRMAN SAYS NORD

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DISPUTE OVER NAVALNY’S ELECTION PLAN: NO UNITED OPPOSITION IN RUSSIA

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STREAM 2 GAS PIPELINE TO BE FINISHED THIS YEAR

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U.S. DEMAND FOR RUSSIAN OIL AND FUELS HITS RECORD HIGH

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SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU

4 March 2021

AUSTRIAN EX-FOREIGN MINISTER GETS NOMINATION FOR RUSSIA’S ROSNEFT Austria’s former foreign minister Karin Kneissl – as another European official – has been chosen for a seat on oil giant Rosneft’s board of directors. In August 2018, the Austrian politician made headlines when she invited Putin to her wedding.

Nominating Kneissl for a post in Rosneft could come as the Kremlin’s appreciation of Austria’s rather favorable policy toward Russia and the country’s consistency in defending the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project.

K

arin Kneissl is an attorney and an analyst for energy affairs and the Middle East.

Between 2017 and 2019, she served as the Austrian foreign minister, nominated by the

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far-right and pro-Russian Freedom Party of Austria (FPOe). In August 2018, Putin stopped by the Austrian foreign minister’s wedding in Austria. Kneissl said she had invited the

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Russian president “spontaneously” when he Faisal Al-Suwaidi (Qatar Foundation), Hamad was on an official visit in Vienna while she Rashid Al-Mohannadi, and Bernard Looney, happened to be giving wedding invitation cards the CEO of BP, a company that has shares in to other colleagues. Her nomination featured a Rosneft. A job in the board of directors means government decree of the Russian Federation high remuneration, for which the company has on candidates for the board of directors in come under fire. Schroeder earned $600,000, a company where the Russian state holds Al-Mohannadi – $530,000 while Warnig – majority stakes. Kneissl is not the only Western $580,000 for 2019. Gerhard Schroeder is an European candidate nominated to the Rosneft outstanding example of the Russian strategy board as an independent director as suggested of bribing European officials. While serving as by the government. The list also includes the top officials, these make decisions being of vital former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, importance for Russian interests whereas upon who is also the chairman of the shareholders’ retirement, they are offered well-paid posts in committee for Nord Stream 2, Matthias Warnig Russian energy companies or banks. Before (the chief executive office of Nord Stream 2 AG stepping down as the German chancellor (1998– and former Stasi intelligence officer), and Hans- 2005), Schroeder made a slew of decisions that Georg Rudloff, who chairs Marcuard Holding. helped the Nord Stream gas pipeline achieve Other candidates as representatives of the success. After quitting the job as the chancellor, government are Russian Deputy Prime Minister he became the chairman of the board of Alexander Novak, Putin’s aide Maxim Oreshkin, directors in the company operating the Nord and the CEO of Rosneft Igor Sechin. In addition Stream gas pipeline. In 2017, he was appointed to Sechin, Novak, Oreshkin, Schroeder (as the board chairman of Rosneft. For Moscow, it chairman), Warnig, and Rudloff, the board of is also vital that officials like Schroeder still have directors of Rosneft includes Professor Oleg some political influence in their countries. ■ Vyugin, Robert Dudley (former CEO of BP),

5 March 2021

A FUTURE FSB DIRECTOR? PUTIN MAKES PERSONNEL DECISION After a months-long hiatus, General Alexander Bortnikov, the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), finally has the main deputy. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree appointing Colonel-General Sergey Korolev for the post of the first deputy director of the FSB. Korolev has so far served as the director of the FSB’s Economic Security Service. His subordinates have pursued a series of high-profile anti-corruption investigations over the past few years.

Korolev’s another promotion makes him shortlisted to potentially become the director of the FSB in the future, alongside such figures as Yevgeny Zinichev.

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SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU

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e has in the past worked in the Service for Economic Security (SEB) in St. Petersburg.

Between 2007 and 2011, he was an aide to Anatoly Serdyukov, a former defense minister and an St Petersburg official. According to unofficial sources, he was in charge of the GRU military intelligence service on behalf of the minister. Serdyukov was dismissed amid a corruption scandal, but this did not hit Korolev. In 2012, he became the head of the Internal Security Department (USB). While Korolev was responsible for the USB, the Sixth Service played a pivotal role in his department.

Its officers carried out operational activities in almost all high-profile corruption cases targeting government officials in recent years, among whom were Nikita Belykh, the governor of the Kirov Oblast, Alexander Khoroshavin, the governor of the Sakhalin Oblast, Vyacheslav Gayzer, the governor of the Komi Republic, or Denis Sugrobov, former chief of the Russian Interior Ministr y’s A nticorr uption and Economic Crimes.

General Sergey Smirnov, who was Korolev’s predecessor at that post, retired in 2020 upon

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Vladimir Putin’s decision. Smirnov started working in the state security structures in 1974. He held the post of deputy director of the FSB since 2003. He supervised the military intelligence department, the Service for Economic Security, and the Service for the Protection of the Constitution. Rumors about his resignation first went around in 2016 when two of his subordinates left the FSB – Yury Yakovlev, the head of the SEB, and Viktor Voronin, the director of Directorate K. Behind their dismissal was Korolev who took advantage of the embezzlement in a construction project on V ladimir Putin’s residence in NovoOgaryovo (or the Mikhalchenko case). Smirnov got another blow in 2019 when Colonel Kirill Cherkalin, a former FSB official investigating banks, was arrested for corruption. What was not helpful for Smirnov was that he attended meetings with bank employees alongside his subordinates. Cherkalin then offered aid to banks, turning a blind eye to any abuse. After Korolev was promoted to the post of the first deputy director of the FSB, Sergey Alpatov, who in the past was the first deputy head of the SEB, has assumed his duties. ■ 5

SOURCE: TWITTER / OPECSECRETARIAT

8 March 2021

RUSSIA PLEASED WITH OPEC+ DECISION Another clash between Saudi Arabia and Russia at the latest meeting of OPEC and non-OPEC countries again ended up with a compromise. Riyadh managed to defend its stance that there should be no risk to boost oil output despite the increase in global oil demand – as this may trigger a decline in crude price.

Moscow has once again been granted an exemption and will be free to produce more oil.

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t the OPEC+ meeting on March 4, the big ge st oi l-m a k i ng cou nt r ie s a nd their allies made an unexpected decision to maintain the current OPEC+ supply cuts, making exemptions for Russia and Kazakhstan.

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They will be allowed to increase production by 130,000 and 20,000 barrels per day, respectively. This means that OPEC countries and their non-OPEC allies reached the same compromise for the second in a row, keeping www.warsawinstitute.org

output curbs for everyone except for Russia and Kazakhstan. Back then, these were allowed to boost production by 65,000 and 10,000 barrels per day, respectively. Oil prices jumped after OPEC and its oil-producing allies said the group would keep production largely steady. The Russian government issued a statement quoting Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak. The Russian official said that with bigger oil output for Russian companies, the country would see higher tax revenues and the whole situation would be beneficial for subcontractors of major energy businesses.

The March 4 meeting was expected to deliver another decision, or to boost oil output by 1.5 million barrels per day, and two-thirds of these were to come from Riyadh’s plan to voluntarily reduce production in February and March.

The cartel of oil-producing cartels agreed to keep oil output unchanged in April while

Saudi Arabia pledged to voluntarily curb oil supplies by 1 million barrels per day. Another argument for not easing the restrictions was that many refineries across the globe are being refurbished in the spring, which – as the oil-producing cartel believes – might trigger a decline in crude oil demand. Russia and Kazakhstan are allowed to do so due to continued seasonal consumption patterns Russia wins most from this solution as it can trade more oil whose price will go up. Thus, in April, OPEC and non-OPEC countries will curb output by 6.9 million barrels per day or 7.9 million barrels with Saudi Arabia’s voluntary cuts. Now Russia and Kazakhstan will be allowed to produce 9.38 million and 1.457 million barrels per day, respectively. Since the adoption of OPEC+ oil cuts in April 2020, OPEC and non-OPEC nations have already “taken” 2.3 billion barrels of oil out of the world market (data as of late January 2021). ■

8 March 2021

BELARUS BEGINS SHIPPING FUELS THROUGH RUSSIAN PORTS This is another sign of tightened cooperation between Belarus and Russia, or the higher level of Minsk’s reliance on Moscow. Alexander Lukashenko began shipping his country’s top export commodity, or oil products, through Russian ports after having withdrawn from the more profitable ports in the Baltic States, notably in Lithuania. The deal with Russia offers comparable trade conditions only in the first years. After that, Moscow has a free hand to dictate the cost of using its ports to ship Belarusian commodities. Officials in Minsk need to be aware of this, but the agreement was necessary to get support from the Kremlin.

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SOURCE: FLICKR / NEERAV BHATT

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n March 8, the Russian port of Ust-Luga in the Leningrad Oblast received the first batch of Belarusian gasoline intended for export. Belarus will ship products from its refineries through Russian ports under an agreement signed by the two governments.

The Portenergro terminal welcomed some 3,500 tons of fuel. The cargo came from the Belarusian refinery in Mozyr a day ahead of the scheduled date. Alexander Drozdenko, the governor of the Leningrad Oblast, said that handling Belarusian fuels and oils corroborated his region’s position as one of the top economic partners of Belarus. The first batch of gasoline produced at the Mozyr oil refinery was transshipped at the Portenergo terminal on March 5. A day later, on March 6, the refinery shipped 3,600 tons of fuel oil to the port of St. Petersburg. Sending oil products from the Mozyr refinery to the ports in Russia is the first step of implementing the Russia-Belarusian agreement on the transshipment of Belarusian oil products for export through the ports in the

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Russian Federation. Under the deal, Russian ports in the Baltic Sea will handle over 9.8 million tons of Belarusian cargo between 2021 and 2023, including up to 3.5 million tons in 2021, 3.2 million tons in 2022, and 3.1 million tons in 2023. It is about oil products such as fuel oil, gasoline, and oil. The deliveries took place within the framework of an agreement on the transshipment of Belarusian oil products for export through Russian ports. In August 2020, when the Baltic States backed the Belarusian protests against the rigged presidential vote, Alexander Lukashenko, seeking to stay in power and counting on Russia, said he would redirect all of his country’s trade flows as well as the transit of foreign goods across its territory from mainly Lithuanian and Latvian ports to those in Russia. In September, the prime ministers of Russia and Belarus discussed some details.

Under the deal, the port of Ust-Luga is where most Belarusian export flows would be handled.

Other Russian ports are those in Primorsk, Vysotsk, and St. Petersburg. ■ 8

SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU

11 March 2021

RUSSIA’S INTELLIGENCE SERVICE FUELS GEORGIAN TURMOIL The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, known by its Russian acronym SVR, delivered an official message about the internal affairs of a third country. “In Washington, dissatisfaction is growing with the actions of the ruling Georgian Dream party, which is declining to submissively carry out American demands,” according to the statement published on the SVR website. Clearly, the goal is to drive a wedge between Georgia and the United States, its key ally.

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To restore order in Georgia, the Americans are planning to establish a system to support the opposition and at the same time undermine the position of Georgian Dream,” reads the March 9 statement from the Foreign Intelligence Service. “The White House is irritated that the Georgian Dream is not fully implementing the U.S tasking to follow the path of Euro-Atlantic integration without any hesitation,” reads the statement. Stressing that the United States is pushing its European partners into support for the Georgian opposition parties, the Russian foreign spy agency said that Washington is making efforts to force the government in Tbilisi to follow “American instructions.” What adds spice to the statement is a quote from Sergey Naryshkin, the director of the SVR, saying “since the time of Mikhail Saakashvili, the U.S. has become accustomed to hands-on management of the political processes in Georgia, to dictating how the government should function and what line to pursue in relation to the opposition.” Russia has for years sought to fuel tensions between the current government in Georgia and the West as the Kremlin’s top strategic goals are to halt the efforts of the Caucasian country to integrate with NATO and cement its alliance with the United States. Still managed, albeit unofficially, by Georgia’s richest businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili, the ruling team has recently made a couple of decisions that hit

the country’s opposition politicians while raising concerns in the West over the condition of Georgian democracy. The most recent example is the arrest of Nika Melia, chairman of the United National Movement (UNM), which sparked outrage from the embassies of the United States and the United Kingdom, and raised concern in the Baltic States and Poland.

Desperate to remain in power, the Georgian Dream is more and more inclining towards undemocratic activities. This cannot be without bias to the attitude of the West, all the more so as the Georgian opposition has long blamed state authorities for covering its pro-Russian political intentions. Accusations might only grow in force with such steps as the recent statement. This puts the Georgian Dream in an uncomfortable position as the party officially does not change its policy to integrate with NATO, but in fact deviates from the course amid its decisions. Russia is making most of this by fuelling tensions between Tbilisi and Washington, its top ally. What is a new thing is that Moscow engaged its most discreet intelligence service. It is still unclear what the Kremlin thought it was accomplishing with the statement. Perhaps it decided to include the SVR in its diplomatic game, at least in some parts of it. Possibly this is just a political game in Moscow and Naryshkin’s desire to emphasize his position as the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. ■

16 March 2021

RUSSIAN LOSSES AFTER A DECADE OF SYRIA WAR The number of Russian servicemen who died in Syria during the military operation in this country since September 30, 2015, was 112, said Andrei Krasov, First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee. The death toll is surprisingly high as officially only the Russian air forces are involved in the war.

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SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU

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ussia operates a naval facility in Tartus and an air base at Hmeimim. Moscow has also officially admitted sending a small special operations unit, a subunit of the reconciliation center in Idlib, the military police, and marines.

Krasov listed the Russian death toll in Syria during a parliamentary meeting on the tenth anniversary of Syrian protests that first sparked a revolution, and then morphed into a civil war in the whole country. As it turned out, this was one of the – and the bloodiest – chapters of the so-called Arab Spring. The armed conflict that began in 2011 with an uprising against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad spread all over Syria while the regime forces brutally suppressed rallies, killing at least 2,000 and resulting in thousands of arrests. In a tit-for-tat solution, as the regime launched a violent offensive, the opposition parties did the same. Other countries were also involved in the conflict. Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states began to offer money, weapons, and fighters who joined several conflicted groups. The so-called Islamic State took advantage of the conflict, seizing a large portion of Syria in a short time. In 2015, Russia officially entered the Syrian war theater on the pretense of the fight against jihadists. In fact, it was about rescuing al-Assad, a Moscow ally, whose regime was back then on the brink of collapse. Russian military involvement in Syria shifted the balance of power. First, with

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some help from the Russian air forces, alAssad brought to a halt the progress made by rebel fighters, mainly operating within the Free Syrian Army. Only then could he push a counteroffensive, amid a deal brokered by Russia, Iran, and Turkey as part of the Astana triangle. It was possible to implement the idea of de-escalation zones, or rebel-held enclaves.

Then al-Assad, assisted by the Russian army and pro-Iranian militias, went on to eliminate these enclaves one by one. On the pretense of targeting jihadi militants, the Russian air forces have shot Syrian rebels fighting against al-Assad, not the Islamic State. The rebel forces were eventually pulled back to Idlib province, the last rebel-controlled stronghold. Meanwhile, the Islamic State has lost almost all of the territories it had occupied in Syria in the U.S.backed Kurdish offensive. Furthermore, Turkey, or the arch rival of the Kurds, has invaded the northern part of the country. Meanwhile, there are still some rebel fighters in Idlib, mainly thanks to Ankara’s support. The fragile status quo currently relies upon the Russia-Turkey deal and the talks between al-Assad and the Kurds. Yet this will not last long as Moscow and Tehran are both fighting for the control of al-Assad. For now, the Kremlin is somewhat successful as it still exerts some influence on Damascus and it operates a number of military facilities in Syria. ■

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SOURCE: SYRIA.MIL.RU

16 March 2021

RUSSIAN WAGNER MERCENARIES FACE LEGAL ACTION The Wagner Group, a private military company, has for years served the Kremlin’s interests across the globe – from Ukraine’s Donbas, through Syria, to African states. Its people usually sustain local regimes and shield the business interests of the company’s top sponsor, Yevgeny Prigozhin.

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Syrian national has filed an application with the Russian Investigative Committee seeking the launch of an investigation into the alleged mercenaries from the Wagner private military company (PMC) suspected of murdering his brother in Syria in 2017. Video footage was published two years after showing a group of four Russian-speaking men, possibly Wagner Group mercenaries, torturing a Syrian detainee. The soldiers cut off the man’s head and arms, hang up his body and set it alight.

The victim is believed to have deserted from President Bashir al-Assad’s army and then been captured. The cruel killing took place in Homs province. The independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta even identified one of the perpetrators who reportedly joined the Wagner Group in 2016. The mercenary company has been operating since the conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas. Although Russia bans mercenary

forces, the Wagner Group is believed to be financed by a Kremlin-linked businessman and a friend of Vladimir Putin Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Thus the Wagner Group sends its people where Russia cannot officially dispatch its servicemen.

In Ukraine, they “voluntarily” sided separatists.

In Syria, under the deal with Damascus and in agreement with the Russian military, they shielded oil and gas assets reportedly owned

by Prigozhin. This was the reason behind the slaughter in February 2018. A group of mercenaries sought to seize an oilfield in the Euphrates Valley, watched over by the U.S.allied Kurdish group. Both U.S. artillery and air forces got involved in the clash. Even 200 Russian mercenaries are believed to die as a result. In addition to Syria, the Wagner Group operates in the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, and Mozambique. ■

17 March 2021

DONBAS CEASEFIRE COMES TO ACTUAL END Tensions go high on the frontline in Donbas while the death toll is rising. Both sides accuse each other of provocations and staging a mass-scale offensive.

Concluded back in the summer of 2020 and although formally in force, the truce is actually dead now. The weather will be conducive for resuming military hostilities as spring thaws come to an end, the armies can roll their hardware.

However and most importantly, there is a slew of political arguments in favor of resuming the fighting sometime soon. Never since the beginning of Volodymyr Zelensky’s tenure has the Kremlin had so many reasons to fuel the Donbas conflict.

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SOURCE: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE

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n March 15, Denis Pushilin, a separatist of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic leader from the so-called Donetsk reportedly gave permission to their military to People’s Republic, arrived in a training ground launch preemptive attacks against Ukrainian in the town of Horlivka near the frontline. forces along the frontline. On March 8, a human Media outlets in the Russian-occupied part rights watchdog monitoring the situation in of Donbas publicized the combat readiness eastern Ukraine reported that both rebel inspection conducted in subunits of the fighters and the Russian army shifted their People’s Militia of the Donetsk People’s Republic, military equipment and fuel tanks as well as or an armed separatist group, as they did with boosted their position on the frontline. Due all other frontline-related stories. There is a to weather conditions, if military hostilities blatant rise in propaganda-related messages resume on large scale, this will occur in April before a possible war, both among separatists at the soonest. Rising tensions stem from and in Russia. Both politicians and leading pro- political events in both Ukraine and Russia.

Kremlin journalists bring the conflict in Donbas The incumbent president Volodymyr Zelensky back on the table. Also in Ukrainian media adopted a firm anti-Russian stance while seeing outlets, news stories from Donbas have hit that his concessions over Donbas proved little the headlines, pushing aside any coronavirus- helpful and the pro-Russian group was growing related themes. Tensions are mounting in force in the country to threaten his authority. every single day. The July 2020 deal, also on This disappoints the Kremlin as Russian withdrawing military hardware from the area officials hoped to trade some concessions. On near the frontline, is no longer being observed. top of that are strains in Russian ties with the Russian-controlled separatists dragged their West and the turmoil over Navalny and his self-propelled howitzers and tanks nearby. supporters. Thus Putin may take aggressive Twenty-three Ukrainian servicemen died in action outside though his country is unlikely January and February while throughout the to seize a part of Donbas as it did seven years previous five months only five were killed. On ago in Crimea. ■ March 3, the Russian proxy representatives

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SOURCE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

20 March 2021

BULGARIA BREAKS UP RUSSIAN SPY RING This is another spying scandal between Bulgaria and Russia. The country’s counterintelligence service and the prosecutor’s office detained six Bulgarians who had access to classified information. One of them is a former high-ranking military intelligence officer accused of being in charge of the spy network.

Bulgaria said it was the first time in its recent history that such a ring had been uncovered. The spy scandal may drive a wedge in Russia-Bulgaria ties, but it is also politically imbued. The discovery comes just before parliamentary elections in Bulgaria on April 4, where Borisov’s government will have two challengers: the pro-Russian left-wing party and the incumbent president Rumen Radev who also shows pro-Russian sympathies.

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ulgarian officers arrested members of the ring in the evening of March 18 in Sofia and on a highway where one of the suspects was trying to f lee. He was detained near the embassy of Russia by the State National Security Agency (DANS). Prosecutors on March 19 informed on the arrest of six people accused of passing classified information to Russia.

The leader of the spy was a former officer of a Bulgarian military intelligence agency, whose wife, a joint Russian-Bulgarian national, played the role of intermediary between the ex-officer and the embassy of the Russian Federation. A video of a meeting between some of the alleged spies was shown at the press conference by the prosecution in which he visits the embassy. Many years ago the leader of the spy ring graduated from a Moscow academy of intelligence. The group purportedly recruited Bulgarian officials who had access to classified information about Bulgaria, NATO, and the

EU. Members of the spy network were paid between €1,000 and €1,500 per month. Military prosecutor Elin Aleksov said the spy group had been active for a long time. The spy ring includes military intelligence officers. Six of the six arrested were held in custody while one has been released after having cooperated with the inquiry. The Defense Ministry said two members of Bulgaria’s armed forces were among those detained. Relations between Sofia and Moscow have been hit by several spy scandals in recent years. In the past two years, Bulgaria has expelled six Russian diplomats, the latest case being in December 2020 when Vasily Sazanovich, the Russian military attache, was asked to leave the country. The influential Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev has been banned from entering Bulgaria. Two Bulgarians have been detained and charged with espionage but the trial has not taken place yet. ■

22 March 2021

DISPUTE OVER NAVALNY’S ELECTION PLAN: NO UNITED OPPOSITION IN RUSSIA Russian opposition figure Alexey Navalny never got along with the country’s opposition parties. Their distrust and spats over what strategy to adopt are beneficial for the authorities. The State Duma elections in September will, however, be a challenge for the Kremlin as support for United Russia is dropping.

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eople’s Freedom Party, or Parnas, will not run as an independent candidate in the State Duma vote this September. Yet the party will not back Navalny’s idea of “smart voting,” Mikhail Kasyanov, its leader and former prime minister of Russia (2000–2004), told the party congress in Moscow. Before the last State Duma vote in 2016, Parnas made up a coalition

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of forces that included Navalny’s supporters.

It broke up shortly before the election while Parnas did not manage to win even 1 percent of the vote. Now the congress decided to include the party into the opposition coalition if one is formed. What is “smart voting”? The strategy has the chief goal to enfeeble United Russia. Navalny’s purpose is to endorse the www.warsawinstitute.org

SOURCE: DUMA.GOV.RU

candidate the opposition judges best placed carried out searches on Friday, March 19 at the to defeat United Russia in each race. Anti- Moscow offices of a media outlet MBKh and Kremlin opposition members deem the tactic an opposition group Open Russia associated controversial: it consists of campaigning with Kremlin critic and former oil tycoon for the single most viable United Russia Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Founded in 2014, Open challenger, regardless of their party affiliation Russia seeks to bring together pro-European and viewpoint. That is exactly what Kasyanov forces in Russia to form a united opposition. said while announcing his party would never The movement held a forum dedicated to support the communist party or Zhirinovsky’s discussing parliamentary and local elections associates in the race against United Russia. in Moscow, during which Russian police With the popularity ratings of some parties, detained around 200 people. Also on March the “smart voting” tactic means support for 19, Russian officers made the crackdown on members of the two parties now present in the Navalny’s associates in the Russian Far East.

State Duma and often referred to as “systemic Police have swept through the Far East city of opposition.” Interestingly, on Saturday, March Khabarovsk and detained several journalists 20, Vyacheslav Volodin, the speaker of the State and Navalny activists, including the chief of Duma, said “smart voting” was masterminded Navalny’s team. Meanwhile, the pro-Kremlin

by Western special services.

United Russia party’s ratings are lagging ahead of key legislative elections. United Russia, which The stance adopted by Parnas confirms the enjoys a two-thirds majority in the country’s distrust of Navalny expressed by members lower house of parliament, would receive 27 of the non-parliamentary opposition labeling percent of the vote, according to the Levada itself as liberal, center-right, and democratic.

Center polling agency and its February poll.

In January, Grigory Yavlinsky, the founder of According to Kremlin strategists, the results Russia’s largest liberal political party Yabloko, represent a predictable lull in September. turned his fire on Navalny, accusing him of Implementing Navalny’s scheme on a large political self-interest and rowdiness, a little scale could jeopardize these plans – though helpful attitude while fighting the regime. Six the government must rig the vote without that months from polling day, the regime must first anyway – local and regional elections in some thwart people linked to Navalny and others, far Russian regions proved the effectiveness of the more radical than parties like Parnas or Yabloko, “smart voting” scheme. ■ as both laid down their arms. Russian police

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SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU

22 March 2021

COULD PUTIN LAUNCH NEW “SHORT VICTORIOUS WAR?” YES, BUT… Tensions are rising in Donbas where three Ukrainian troops were killed in three days. Russian-controlled rebel fighters have rolled out heavy weapons while the Kremlin is taking provoking decisions in occupied Crimea. Many say that new strains between Russia and Ukraine are what Vladimir Putin is looking for, notably over domestic reasons.

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s it was often in the past, when Putin’s Donbas war (2014). With these brawls abroad regime encountered further problems – the Kremlin seeks to save the popularity rating whether these be economic or political – now of the Russian leader, integrate Russian people there are rumors whether the Russian leader around authorities attacked by “external forces,” will again reach for that which has worked very and distract them from mundane problems. well to win massive popularity in the country. And there is no shortage of them this year. The Such was the case of the Second Chechen coronavirus pandemic sustained the economic War (1999), the military aggression of Georgia standstill on a macro scale while hitting the (2008), or the annexation of Crimea and the pockets of people in Russian on a micro scale.

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It also depicted that Putin and his closest associates are much alienated from Russian society. On top of that are political issues both at home and abroad. In Russia, there is a problem with Navalny, which grows in danger before the general vote in six months. Outside Russia has to shield Lukashenko, face a new reality in the Caucasus after the ArmeniaAzerbaijan war, and spat with the West.

The recent turmoil over how Joe Biden named Vladimir Putin makes it clear that the world starts to see Russia no longer as a stable and strong partner, but something like a rogue state, a term referring in the past to Moscow’s allies like Iran, Venezuela, and Syria. So if Russia has nothing to lose worldwide, it is easier for its officials to start a new war. The question is with whom and what kind of. Ukraine is the most obvious target for a regular war while both Georgia and even the Baltic States may feel threatened with hybrid activities. It is a certain paradox that Biden’s calling Putin a “killer” and the U.S.-Russia diplomatic spat that

followed reduces the likelihood of Russia’s new incursion somewhere beyond its borders. There is nothing better than Biden’s words on Putin to solidify Russian society around the state leader.

Many people in Russia will see the attack on Putin as an assault on the country. This is how things look like in a country where democratic principles have never worked actually. Also, with the rhetoric adopted by the U.S. president, the Kremlin wins a comfortable excuse to tighten repression in the country, including that targeting Navalny’s movement or independent media outlets (also those having links to the outside) and NGOs. Appointing a new deputy head of the Federal Security Service, or FSB, is a sign that Kremlin officials seek to put the screws on the opposition. That is what Putin’s new “short victorious war” will look like – targeting some of his fellow countrymen. The goal is not to restore trust. Putin no longer cares about this as he is aware that that is impossible. This only goal is to thwart all domestic threats by all means available. ■

23 March 2021

RUSSIA RESUMES BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN SYRIA Recent Russian air raids and the rise in Syrian artillery attacks do not mean the resuming of a land offensive in the last rebel-held province. Agreed on months ago, the balance of power in Syria should not see any shifts. Russia still has to observe its deal with Turkey even though it feels mounting pressure from alAssad to thwart the rebellion by capturing Idlib province.

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he Russian air force resumed missions in Syria after a long break. Russian jets hit rebel training camps in northwestern Syria near the Turkish border on March 21. The Syrian artillery on the same day also attacked a hospital in a rebel-controlled province, killing

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seven people and wounding 14 health care staff. A woman and a child were among the seven civilians killed when mortar rounds hit the hospital in the city of Atareb. The fire hit the hospital’s main entrance and courtyard inside a cave. The health facility was evacuated.

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SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU

The European Union and the United States have condemned the attack while the latter also expressed criticism of the Russian air raid near the Turkish border crossing in Bab al Hawa.

Moreover, a gas facility was hit near Sarmada city in Idlib province. Moscow and Damascus have said the offensive was targeted solely at jihadi fighters while Turkey has urged Russia to stop the attack.

The air raid and the joint Russian-Syrian artillery attack on Sunday fit into the recent rise in military tensions in the Idlib enclave.

Before the raid, Russia warned against what it named as “false-flag” attacks prepared by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) terrorist group in Idlib. But by doing so, Moscow again fabricated pretexts for acts of aggression in the province.

Russian jets are believed to have struck a “rebel training camp” and trailers carrying goods near the border crossing of Bab al Hawa. Turkey

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condemned the attack by Russia and al-Assad but traditionally used them to achieve its goals. Its forces have neither responded nor encourage the allied group of jihadists in Idlib to take military reaction by assaulting government targets. The Turkish military took advantage of the whole situation by hitting targets elsewhere in Syria. As always, these were the forces of the mostly-Kurdish SDF coalition in northeast Syria. This confirms that Ankara treats the Idlib rebels instrumentally. Turkey, Russia, and Iran have an informal deal that allows Russia, alAssad, and Shia militias to have a free hand to attack targets in Idlib and permit Turkey to fight with the Kurds. It is little important for Ankara to see Syrian opponents of al-Assad die as long as it can commit ethnic cleansing in the occupied northern part of Syria and to strike Syrian Kurds near the towns of Tell Rifaat or Ayn Issa. ■

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SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU

24 March 2021

A GAME OF THRONES IN LUBYANKA Only recently has it been announced that General Sergey Korolev would become the first deputy director of the Federal Security Service, or FSB. Now it turns out that a former senior officer charged with bribery has made a deal with investigators. Who will he rat out and will this influence the process of appointing a new director of the agency? Nobody knows. What is known is that Colonel Kirill Cherkalin was arrested as a result of actions taken by the incumbent deputy director of the FSB.

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ccused of accepting an $850,000 worth of bribe, the former FSB officer pleaded guilty and went to cooperate with investigators, asking them to examine his case on special terms. A former head of Department K, the

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FSB’s financial sector unit, Kirill Cherkalin was in charge of overseeing Russia’s banking sector. As it later turned out, he abused his position to accept bribes from bank officials to give a silent nod to their interests. In 21

April 2019, Cherkalin was detained along with two other officers Dmitry Frolov and Andrey Vasilyev. Officers found some cash worth a total of millions of dollars in various currencies in his apartment. Prosecutors then froze his bank accounts and seized all cash and premises, including five apartments, two cottages, and six land plots with a total area of 7,000 square meters. Cherkalin’s choice to collaborate with his investigation may be linked to the fact that General Sergey Korolev was promoted to the rank of the first deputy director of the Federal Security Service. Since the summer of 2016, Cherkalin reported to Korolev in the Economic Security Service of

the FSB (SEB). Cherkalin was the last senior officer in this branch of the FSB who managed to retain his position after personnel reshuffles in 2016 when Korolev installed his team. He was in service for no longer than just three years. His decision to go on to cooperate with prosecutors can be understood differently.

Nobody knows what Cherkalin will say and whether this will be favorable for Korolev’s team or that one earlier removed from power in Lubyanka. Any testimony may weigh on the strife between candidates for a new FSB head.

The incumbent director of the FSB, General Alexander Bortnikov, will reach retirement age in September this year. ■

25 March 2021

RUSSIA REVEALS AMBITIOUS PLANS FOR ITS LNG SECTOR The Russian government approved a development program for liquefied natural gas (LNG), as earlier prepared by the Ministry of Energy. The paper sets LNG exports as a priority and stipulates the opening of as many as ten new gas liquefaction facilities.

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n March 22 , Russia’s gover nment accepted the countr y’s long-term development program for liquefied natural gas, expecting production capacity to rise threefold from current levels to 140 million tons per year by 2035. “The program is based on a comprehensive approach, aimed at diversification of gas supply sources and first of all at an active use of resources of the Arctic shelf and the Far East,” Russia’s Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin said at a meeting with deputy prime ministers. Russia is also targeting increased LNG exports, considering

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the expectations of sustained growth in LNG demand and trade globally, Mishustin added.

Global LNG demand is set to almost double from 360 million tons last year to 700 million tons by 2040, thanks to continued solid demand from Asia and a rise in gas use for powering hard-to-electrify sectors, Shell, the biggest LNG trader, said in its annual LNG Outlook 2021. Russia aims to grab part of that growing demand, and its energy strategy for LNG envisages a 20-percent market share on the global LNG market by 2035. Russia is now the world’s fourth-biggest LNG exporting country

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SOURCE: SOVCOMFLOT.RU

after Qatar, Australia, and the United States.

The country’s biggest producer of liquefied natural gas in Novatek, a privately held gas company, currently involved in its flagship Yamal LNG project. The firm is building or planning to construct other gas liquefaction facilities such as Arctic LNG 2, Cryogas-Vystosk, and Obskiy-LNG. Other energy tycoons are becoming more engaged in the sector, an example of which are state-run Rosneft and, most importantly, Gazprom as the latter energy giant plans to open Vladivostok LNG and Baltic LNG upon its completion of the Sakhalin-2 gas project. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak believes that Russia will see the most

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favorable environment for new LNG projects within the next five to 15 years. According to Wood Mackenzie’s research director Giles Farrer, Russia’s Arctic LNG projects would have one of the lowest costs with low breakeven prices, alongside the massive new project that LNG export heavyweight Qatar has just stated. “At a long-term breakeven price of just over $4 per million British thermal units (BTU), it is right at the bottom of the global LNG cost curve, alongside Arctic Russian projects,” Farrer said while commenting on Qatar’s LNG expansion project set to raise the Gulf country’s LNG production capacity from 77 million tons per annum now to 110 million tons by 2026. ■

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SOURCE: DUMA.GOV.RU

25 March 2021

PUTIN FOR LIFE: STATE DUMA RESETS PRESIDENTIAL TERMLIMIT CLOCK TO ZERO The State Duma, the lower chamber of the Russian parliament, has approved a law that gives the incumbent president the right to run for two more terms.

Importantly, the new legislation resets all presidential terms held before the updates came into effect. This means that Vladimir Putin is eligible to serve as Russian president for two more terms once his current one expires. Also, the law effectively deletes Dmitry Medvedev’s term in office he held between 2008 and 2012.

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On March 24, the Russian parliament’s lower chamber approved the third and final reading of a bill allowing the president to seek a third term.

Relevant provisions were introduced to the election law “On the election of the President of the Russian Federation.” The restriction does not apply to those who held the post of head of state before the amendments to the Constitution came into force. Thus both Putin and Medvedev will be eligible for two more terms. The document says that any Russian citizen who has had foreign citizenship or overseas residency permit is barred from running for the state’s highest office. The change in the number of presidential terms was included among other constitutional reforms that Russians backed in a vote on July 1, 2020.

A candidate for office must be a citizen of the Russian Federation who is at least 35 years old, according to the law. The current legal updates

are in the line with the process launched a year ago to consolidate Putin’s grip on power. In January 2020, Vladimir Putin submitted draft amendments to the Russian State Duma. The new legislation introducing a rule to zero the term-clock, theoretically allowing Putin to stay in power until 2036, came at the last minute while the State Duma approved amendments to the law in March 2020. The updates were finally adopted via the nationwide referendum that lasted a few days and ended on July 1. According to the results of a poll by the independent Levada Center, a pollster enlisted as an NGO under the recent law on foreign agents, 41 percent of Russians do not want Putin to stay in power after his current term expires in 2024.

Half of those opposed to Putin’s next term say he has been at the helm for too long, is tired of his job, and needs to retire. ■

26 March 2021

VOLODIN’S CLOSE ASSOCIATE GETS A JOB IN NOVATEK Tatyana Voronova, a senior official in the State Duma of the Russian Federation, has got a lucrative job in the private energy giant Novatek. Voronova has long been a protege of Vyacheslav Volodin, the speaker of the lower chamber of the Russian parliament. These two in the past worked together in the Kremlin.

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atyana Voronova got a job in the State Duma right after Volodin was appointed speaker of the chamber in 2016. She will be replaced by Igor Diveikin, first deputy chief of staff, according to Volodin, who personally informed about the reshuffle. The speaker of the State Duma said he had known Diveikin for ten years when they both worked for the government and the presidential administration.

It is not known what position Voronova will take in Novatek, but she is more likely to have

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one in the board of directors rather than the management board. The latter involves people having wide experience in the gas sector. Before Voronova began working in the State Duma in October 2016 as chief of staff, he served as head of the president’s domestic policy department for a year and a half. This is one of the most important positions for internal policy in the Kremlin. Tatyana Voronova, born in 1975, is a member of a group of young-generation officials who have made their careers under 25

SOURCE: DUMA.GOV.RU

Vladimir Putin’s leadership, owing them only to their loyalty to the Kremlin. Voronova began her political career in the regional parliament of Irkutsk Oblast. From 2005 to 2007, Voronova headed the youth section of Putin’s ruling United Russia party and served as a lawmaker in 2007–2011. She then served in the presidential administration as the first deputy head of the domestic policy department

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in charge of a regional policy before heading the whole directorate in 2015. Perhaps Voronova’s experience from that period is of key importance for Novatek. Also, this is about friendly ties with Volodin who, due to his hawkish views, is growing in importance among senior government officials as the Kremlin set a tight course. ■

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SOURCE: DUMA.GOV.RU

26 March 2021

RUSSIA’S GOVERNOR HUNT: SPRING SEASON HAS BEGUN The arrest and then the removal of the governor of the Penza region on suspicion of taking a bribe suggests a new wave of criminal cases against senior officials in Russia. Right before the election, the Kremlin seeks to accomplish two goals: show people that the government is ruthlessly pursuing high-level corruption cases and discipline local elites ahead of the State Duma vote in September this year. Targeting the governor of Penza shows that even those officials who are most loyal to the Kremlin cannot feel secure in their positions.

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utin signed a decree dismissing Ivan Belozertsev, 62, is a member of the ruling Belozertsev, the governor of the Penza United Russia party and has led the Penza region, “due to a loss of trust,” on March 23. region since 2015. He made an excellent The day before, a court in Moscow ordered election result in September 2020 when he won Belozertsev to pretrial detention at least until by a landslide, grabbing 78.7 percent of the vote.

May 20, 2021. Russia’s Investigative Committee So the Kremlin is not removing an unpopular has accused the former governor of the Penza leader. Nikolai Simonov was appointed the region in the Volga Federal District in central acting governor of the Penza region. In recent Russia of accepting a bribe worth of 31 million years, several regional governors in Russia have rubles ($420,000). Local businessmen allegedly been dismissed, detained, and convicted mostly bribed the governor in exchange for getting on corruption charges. These are Nikita Belykh, the inside track on business agreements with the governor of the Kirov region, Aleksandr the local government. Several individuals were Khoroshavin, the head of the Sakhalin region, detained, among whom was Local businessman and Vyacheslav Gayzer, the governor of the Boris Shpigel, who heads up the BIOTEK Komi Republic. The most high-profile case was pharmacy group. On March 23, Shpigel was the arrest of the governor of the Far Eastern placed in pretrial detention for two months. Khabarovsk region, Sergei Furgal. Furgal They pleaded not guilty. Media reports said was charged with being involved in several earlier that the bribes were given to Belozertsev murders that took place in the past decade. in 2020 and included an expensive Mercedes- His detainment sparked rallies in the region. ■ Benz automobile, a Breguet watch, and cash.

27 March 2021

MORE SOLDIERS KILLED IN UKRAINE’S DONBAS Tensions are on the rise on the frontline in Donbas. Last Friday, on March 26, four Ukrainian soldiers were killed in shelling as Russian forces and proRussian separatist fighters opened fire. Among the killed was Lieutenant Colonel Serhiy Koval. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy urged the leaders of the so-called Normandy Format, a diplomatic process involving Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and France aimed at resolving the conflict, to tackle the conflict amid the increase in fighting in Donbas.

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he Wa r s aw In st it ut e rep or t ed on escalating tensions in Donbas on March 17. Since then the situation has worsened. Four soldiers died and two others were injured in a bombing in eastern Ukraine on Friday, March 26. The incident took place near the

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settlement of Shumy, northwest of Horlivka in the Donetsk region. The attack targeted the positions of Ukrainian forces with 82-mm mortars, automatic grenade launchers, and large-caliber machine guns prohibited by the Minsk agreements. The incident marks the www.warsawinstitute.org

SOURCE: FLICKR / MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE

worst loss of life in the region since a ceasefire deal came into force in late July 2020. The settlement of Shumy has long been among the most vulnerable areas to a Russian attack on the frontline. Analysts believe that after the shelling last Friday, this is where the enemy may hit if a Russian-orchestrated attack takes place in the coming weeks. Zelensky said that Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Ruslan Khomchak immediately flew to the scene. A Ukrainian delegation to the trilateral contact group in charge of resolving the Donbas conflict is to urgently convene a meeting of a subgroup for security issues. Within the delegation, aides to the Normandy Four leaders will be responsible for discussing the incident. Zelensky also added

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he would be in talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron, and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

It is to be expected that Kyiv could tighten its stance and take action targeting proRussian opposition parties, among others. The skirmish brings the total number of Ukrainian servicemen reported killed since the beginning of the year to 16 and the death toll might stand even higher. Officials in Kyiv have no other choice but to respond to the use of artillery by rebel fighters by rolling out the same weapons near the frontline. Recent attacks appear to mark the end of a fragile ceasefire that had held since July 2020. ■

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SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU

27 March 2021

GAZPROM CHAIRMAN SAYS NORD STREAM 2 GAS PIPELINE TO BE FINISHED THIS YEAR The Russians are sure to complete the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline on time. As the U.S. administration has not introduced any new sanctions, Russia is going ahead with the construction of its controversial energy link. Construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline for carrying Russian natural gas to Europe will be completed this year, Viktor Zubkov, the chairman of Gazprom’s board of directors, said on March 26 while visiting Berlin. Gazprom’s board chairman said that work on Nord Stream 2 was already 92.5 percent complete while intense work was underway to complete the link.

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he Russian energy giant confirmed the plan to finish the construction of Nord Stream 2 in 2021. A 183-kilometer stretch needs to be completed to finalize the construction, according to permits from both Denmark and Germany. These also show that construction works should be complete by late September 2021, according to a notice from the Danish Maritime Agency, or DMA. That from Germany is valid until late May 2021 so either Russia must hurry up or it will ask to extend the deadline yet the latter solution is risky amid protests from environment groups. The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline has a total length of 2,460 kilometers. When the construction was suspended in December 2019 as the Swiss pipelaying company Allseas stopped the works due to U.S. sanctions, some 2,300 kilometers of the double pipeline were complete. Last December, construction resumed in Germany’s exclusive

economic zone, where the Fortuna, a Russian pipelaying vessel, built a portion of the pipeline.

On February 6, 2021, it started laying pipes in Denmark’s exclusive economic zone. Around 180 kilometers are now left, 125 kilometers of which is the first line of Nord Stream and some 58 kilometers is the second one. There is more to complete in Denmark’s exclusive economic zone: 108 kilometers and some 44 kilometers, respectively. But completing pipelaying activities along the sea does not put an end to the project. Several other steps are also required to launch the pipeline. These include hydraulic, commissioning, and operational tests for units and systems, as well as filling the pipeline with gas and other related tasks. The gas pipeline will also receive a certificate while providing such services to Nord Stream 2 may trigger U.S. sanctions, a move that will hamper the entire procedure. ■

29 March 2021

U.S. DEMAND FOR RUSSIAN OIL AND FUELS HITS RECORD HIGH Throughout 2020, U.S. companies bought a great deal of crude oil and related products from Russia. Nonetheless, this is a brief situation and has no political background. The United States remains self-sufficient for fuels and the recent increase in imports from Russia stems mostly from its struggle to keep output at a constant level amid the coronavirus pandemic. Importantly, these are just temporary problems.

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he volume of imports of Russian oil and petroleum products last year amounted to 538,000 barrels per day, according to data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the U.S. Department of Energy. The share of Russian oil commodities in the U.S.

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import figures hit a record 7 percent. In 2020 imports of Russian crude oil and petroleum products to the United States grew by 3.5 percent year on year. Russia has grown as the second-biggest oil and fuel supplier to the United States, surpassing Saudi Arabia as a top

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SOURCE: SOVCOMFLOT.RU

energy provisioner. Twenty years ago, the share of Russia in the U.S. imports of crude and oil products did not surpass 1 percent, a threshold Russia crossed in 2011. The figure reached 5.5 percent in 2011 before seeing a decline and jumping to 5.7 percent in 2019. American refineries use Russian oil to replace oil from Venezuela, which has been under U.S. sanctions.

Most of the American refineries are designed to process heavy Venezuelan oil. According to its characteristics, it can be replaced by Russian Urals crude. Record high energy commodity shipments from Russia result notably from a surge in the share of petroleum products in

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the total figure. Russian crude deliveries to the United States went down by 45 percent in 2020. Sending 73,000 barrels per day is a return to the 2018 baseline. Russia is only the eighth-biggest oil supplier to the United States.

The increase in the imports from Russia came mostly from a drop in output in the United States amid the coronavirus pandemic and OPEC production cuts. Perhaps the imports from Russia will go down as U.S. output rises and OPEC+ gives its nod to relax production cuts. There is no embargo on Russian oil and fuel imports so U.S. businesses can purchase energy commodities freely. ■

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