Ukraine Heads Into the Second Year of the Defensive War

— SPECIAL REPORT —

2023/12/21

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM? MARIUSZ PATEY

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM?

2

Special Report

www.warsawinstitute.org

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM?

“War is the continuation of policy with other means.”

Carl von Clausewitz

Russian advances stalled in Ukraine despite some gains in the early days of the invasion that had taken Ukrainian forces by surprise on February 24, 2022.

In various locations, Ukrainian forces have effectively launched counteroffensives, resulting in the recapture of portions of the previously occupied territory. In 2023, Ukraine’s armed forces made another effort to retaliate and retake Russianoccupied land. Regrettably, despite tactical successes, the Ukrainian military failed to achieve a breakthrough in breaking through Russian defense fortifications. Numerous voices, including some within the Ukrainian military, suggest that attaining complete success might prove challenging, and it is evident that the Russians have yet to have the final say.

In the text, the author endeavors to address questions such as: What are the Kremlin’s objectives in the war?

What could be considered Russia’s definition of victory in the war? What risks does the conflict pose for Poland, the neighboring countries, and NATO as a whole?

What are Kyiv’s goals amidst the conflict?

Ukraine stand a chance to expel the Russian army from its territory and compel the Kremlin into peace?

What steps must be taken to ensure the permanent withdrawal of Russian troops from the entirety of Ukraine’s territory?

With limited additional support from friendly countries compared to previous aid, does

Conclusions: Both sides of the conflict, the aggressor and the aggrieved, draw conclusions and learn lessons throughout the hostilities.

A comparison of the demographic and economic potential between Russia and Ukraine reveals that if the Kremlin succeeds in isolating Kyiv from Western aid, Ukraine could face significant challenges.

Russia swiftly reacts to emerging opportunities, adjusting its strategy to suit the present circumstances and leveraging every possible advantage.

Once enacted, the plan remains consistently www.warsawinstitute.org

implemented until it no longer yields benefits for Russia. At the tactical level, Moscow readily adjusts to the situation, modifies operational models, and extends the timeline to achieve its intended goals. The conflict against Ukraine encompasses not only fluctuating military activities but also employs a range of hybrid tools, including diplomatic, economic, psychological, and political corruption tactics.

A potential Russian victory could trigger another wave of mass emigration from Ukraine and potentially instigate further regional conflicts Special Report

3

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM?

incited by the Kremlin. Georgia, Moldova, the former Central Asian republics, the Baltic states, and the former Soviet satellite states, including Poland, might perceive a sense of threat.

To deter further acts of armed violence by the Kremlin, the collective Western nations should strive to ensure that aggressive warfare results only in political, economic, and social costs rather than gains, especially in terms of territorial expansion. The evident and irreversible losses incurred from current policies could serve as a discouragement against future armed aggression toward neighboring countries.

Russia should not be underestimated. Additionally, it is vital not to display fear, instability, or a lack of determination. A genuine reduction in Kremlin aggression will only occur if Russians believe there are no gains to be made. Forcing avoidance of a clash with the Russian Federation only serves to affirm the Kremlin’s belief in the righteousness of its policies.

Russia is less likely to employ nuclear weapons against states capable of retaliating against such an attack. Despite potential setbacks in the war, economic burdens, or even minor territorial losses, Russia is not inclined towards self-destruction.

Introduction Kremlin officials once lamented the collapse of the Soviet Union three decades ago as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”

Ukraine held primary importance for a burgeoning Russia, marked as a priority for appropriation due to ideological and doctrinal reasons.

Vladimir Putin elaborated on his assertion that Ukrainians and Russians are one and the same people.1 Many political scientists saw that as a warning to Ukrainian authorities, they seek to maintain independence from the Kremlin. Kremlin officials have made allusions and tribulations to the era of Peter I and Catherine II and statesmen and philosophers, including Pavel Andreevich Shuvalov, Alexander Ivanovich Dubrovin, Ivan Ilyin, and Vasily Romanov, the author of 2The Apocalypse of our Time. Rozanov, as for him, openly criticized Russian Orthodoxy and, like Ilyin, was a Russian nationalist.

The current actions of the Kremlin embody a fascination with totalitarianism, a strong belief in historical determinism, and a steadfast conviction in the pivotal role of the Russian mission. Anti-Ukrainian sentiment emerges from frustration, stemming from Kyiv’s reluctance to embrace the role as a member of the ‘Russian world’ imposed upon it. Popular Russian politicians on many occasions spoke against what they named an absolute evil, embodied in Western civilization.

Inspiration can be drawn from contemporary Russian theorists such as Konstantin Krylov, Dmitry Galkovsky, and Alexander Dugin, who have contributed to the concept of the ‘Russian world’.3 Reintegration efforts involved the utilization of multiple methods encompassed within the framework of hybrid warfare. The strategy involved corrupting local elites and fostering economic dependence on Russian raw materials

1. https://poland.mid.ru/web/polska_pl/newsy/-/asset_publisher/3psDnrqSiRBY/content/artykul-prezydenta-federacji-rosyjskiej-wladimiraputina-o-historycznej-jednosci-rosjan-i-ukraincow-opublikowany-12-lipca-2021-roku-?inheritRedirect=false [accessed: September 9, 2023].

2. https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2021-07-13/putin-ukraincy-to-rosjanie-ukraina-to-anty-rosja [accessed: September 9, 2023].

3. https://defence24.pl/geopolityka/to-on-przekonal-putina-by-uderzyc-polityczne-kulisy-rosyjskiej-inwazji-analiza [accessed: September 9, 2023].

4

Special Report

www.warsawinstitute.org

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM?

and infrastructure. Simultaneously, these actions fuelled economic crises and undermined state structures, reinforcing society’s belief in the indispensability of the Kremlin’s organizational role.

This was reinforced by the enduring sentiment toward the Soviet Union in post-Soviet territories, coupled with the perceived success of the Kremlin in combating corruption and other crimes. Social resistance was yet palpable despite ephemeral triumphs. The Kremlin adeptly attempted to isolate the affected parties from potential aid coming from the West.

There were attempts to portray Russia as a victim of NATO’s purported plans for expansion.

Russia’s actions, such as the occupation of Crimea, are perceived by the Kremlin as defensive measures aimed at countering perceived threats posed by the United States. The right of Russia to defend its compatriots in the former Soviet republics is the key element of the process of Russia’s re-imperialization4.

Regrettably, numerous politicians in the West embrace these propaganda narratives, attributing blame within their own countries’ politics rather than acknowledging Russia’s role. These ‘useful idiots’ under the guise of political realism, despite their resemblance to genuine realism, might inadvertently contribute to a heightened actual threat from Moscow in the future. No longer afraid that NATO states could meddle in Moscow’s re-imperialization, Putin follows any policy he wishes. NATO’s planned reintegration of its members, notably the Baltic states, or the potential resurgence in Central Europe, causes evident discomfort for Russia. States that have not benefited from NATO’s protective umbrella have to cater for all their own security needs. Adding new states to the military bloc has raised the ire of Russia that sought to increase its influence and make new territorial gains.

The determination to remain separate from Moscow’s influence was notably pronounced in Ukraine. The subsequent protests not only accumulated social capital but also undermined the power of pro-Russian oligarchic ruling elites Ukraine’s young people are boldly looking up to the West. Following the Revolution of Dignity, which was paid for with the blood of numerous Ukrainian patriots, the Kremlin came to understand that despite significant funds allocated to inf luence agencies, it was steadily losing support. Despite the ongoing armed conflict in the Donbas, economic pressure from Russia, the hurdles posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and initial trade barriers from developed Western economies––which have admittedly been lifted in stages––the Ukrainian economy has shown signs of development. Russia seemed to have acknowledged that the potential for restoring political control over Kyiv through hybrid means had been depleted. 5 The Kremlin has invaded Ukraine, trying to subjugate its neighbor to an iron rule. There is no immediate necessity for this plan to be executed within a short timeframe. It can be inferred that Russia’s objectives in the war encompass securing territorial acquisitions, permanently undermining Ukraine’s economy and demographics— thus diminishing its defense capabilities—and thwarting its integration into NATO and the EU structures.

Russia’s success, even if partial, runs the risk for the countries of the region, including Poland, and fellow NATO states. A more robust Russia is likely to pursue increasingly ambitious plans, aiming for further territorial expansion within the post-Soviet countries in the years ahead. The West’s insufficient response could potentially prompt an attempt to challenge NATO’s commitment to safeguard its Central and Eastern European members, including the Baltics.

4. https://czasopisma.marszalek.com.pl/images/pliki/pomi/03/pomi201702.pdf [accessed: September 9, 2023].

5. https://www.rp.pl/dane-gospodarcze/art19142191-ukraina-konczy-2021-rok-najwyzszym-pkb-w-historii [accessed: March 14, 2023].

www.warsawinstitute.org

Special Report

5

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM?

The first phase of Russia’s full-scale aggression of Ukraine

(February 24, 2022 – September 6, 2022) The plan aimed to swiftly seize Kyiv, install a Kremlin-compliant regime, and legitimize the annexation of territories claimed by Moscow as its own. A territorially, economically, and demographically weakened Ukraine could potentially face integration into the Russian Federation, akin to Belarus, in subsequent years. If faced with resistance, the Kremlin might pursue another

military intervention with a more controlled strategy already in place. 6 Kyiv’s objective has been, and remains, the restoration of its territorial integrity, the expulsion of Russian troops from its soil, and the establishment of conditions conducive to lasting peace, including integration into NATO and the EU.

The second phase of the war Ukraine launched a major counter-offensive in the Kharkiv region on September 6, 2022, with Kyiv’s forces recapturing roughly 8,500 square kilometers. Russian President Vladimir Putin on September 21, 2022, ordered a partial military mobilization, as Moscow’s troops battled a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Back in October

2022, Ukrainian troops liberated the key eastern city of Lyman (Donetsk oblast). Ukrainian forces swept into the key city of Kherson on November 11, 2022, as Russian troops retreated from the area. However, the Ukrainian military no longer could launch further offensive actions.

Battle updates (December 2022 – June 2023) In late 2022 and early 2023, the city of Bakhmut endured some of the heaviest fighting of the war. Moscow, however, aligned their tactics and ramped up attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. This scenario resembles an attempt to replicate NATO tactics during the “Allied Force” operation conducted by the North Atlantic Alliance from March 24 to June 20, 1999. The aerial campaign in the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia aimed to compel the government in Belgrade to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and promote democratization within Yugoslavia.

Russian propaganda also utilized components of the rhetoric NATO had used to justify the assault on Yugoslavia. It is undeniable that Russian propaganda can be viewed as nothing but a pastiche.

The genuine objectives were veiled behind Russia’s ‘Ukrainian Nazis’ propaganda.

6. https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/niezbity-dowod-na-fiasko-planu-putina-wpadka-agencji-z-rosji-6742127344458240a [accessed: March 14, 2023].

6

Special Report

www.warsawinstitute.org

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM?

Russian forces also conducted an offensive operation on the eastern Ukrainian city of Avdiivka. In May 2023, Russian troops captured Bakhmut. On June 6, 2023, they blew up the dam

and hydroelectric power station in an incident that threatened a nearby nuclear power plant and hundreds of thousands of people.

Ukraine’s war updates since June 2023 In June 2023, Kyiv launched a campaign aiming to recapture Russian-seized territories. Later that month, land had been retaken near the Russian-occupied village of Krasnohorivka (Donetsk oblast). The area had been under Russian control since separatist forces backed by Moscow took control of it in 2014.

Ukraine saw the first few weeks of limited progress on the ground. In late August, Ukrainian soldiers liberated the village of Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia region. Russia’s defense lines proved more powerful than virtually everyone expected.

Ukraine’s counteroffensive has failed to achieve big breakthroughs over months of hard fighting.7

Attempts at peace talks Ukraine has made efforts to resolve the war through diplomacy. Ceasefire talks began in Minsk and later moved to Istanbul as the military strikes continued. The Russian side demonstrated an unwillingness to recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty and the borders established and affirmed in agreements such as the Budapest Memorandum8. The Kremlin also rejected the recognition of Kyiv’s autonomy. Russia contested Ukraine’s right to freely opt for membership in international organizations of its choice. The Kremlin also disregarded Kyiv’s authority to determine its own

educational, cultural, and historical policies.

The absurd demands for Ukraine to renounce Nazi ideology, despite its citizens enjoying more freedoms and rights than Russians in their own state, have been interpreted by the Ukrainian side and its political allies as a pretext for negotiations aimed at an operational deadlock. That permitted the Kremlin to reorganize, strengthen its forces, and potentially launch another attack on a vulnerable Ukraine at a time of Russia’s choosing.

7. https://belsat.eu/pl/tag/okupacja [accessed: September 9, 2023].

8.

Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, an international agreement signed in December 1994 in Budapest. It binds the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom to uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, committing to abstain from any threats or use of force against its independence and territorial integrity.

www.warsawinstitute.org

Special Report

7

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM?

The demographic and economic potential of Russia Although the population of the Russian Federation has declined noticeably, the country still maintains a significant demographic edge over most neighboring nations, barring China and Japan. With a total population of 145 million people, Russia has a vast reserve force of 25 million people. 9

the preceding year, there was an increase in the number of employees across the majority of industries. In 2021, the information and communications technology (ICT) industry in Russia accounted for three percent of the total employed workforce. In comparison to 2017, this represented an increase of 0.5 percent.11

The total number of Russians employed in the economy was estimated at 74.9 million people in 2022, indicating an increase in the workforce. The energy sector employed more than 2.7 million people in 2021, up from last year.10

Russia has been striving to overcome its technological backwardness for some time now. Restricting the utilization of foreign patents for domestic innovations was already a key focus of Russian economic policy in 2015. There is uncertainty regarding whether the Russian R&D sector can meet the demands and create replacements for scarce technologies and products. 12

Russia can independently secure its industry with the required raw materials. The challenge lies in obtaining access to technologically advanced components. In that respect, Russia relies on support from friendly states such as Iran, North Korea, China, certain BRICS member countries, and CIS nations. Yet, when combined, their potential falls short of that in the West.

Over 13 million people in Russia were employed in wholesale and retail trade as well as motor vehicle repair services in 2021, making this industry the largest by the number of workers.

This is also crucial for the army’s effectiveness as it has the potential to rejuvenate the armed forces’ transportation resources.

Roughly 10 million employees were engaged in the manufacturing sector. In comparison to 9.

In late 2022, despite temporary challenges, the Russian arms industry managed to augment its production capacity. However, it continues to grapple with persistent staff shortages that pose significant hurdles to overcome. This specific sector of the economy employs some 2 million people. Russian authorities aim to employ an additional 400,000 individuals, yet the extent of these plans remains uncertain due to the scarcity of skilled personnel in the labor market.1314 The arms industry has generated revenues of $60 billion as of 2022, with annual earnings from arms exports ranging from $15 to $19 billion until 2021. Russia encounters difficulty in downsizing the workforce within sectors such as

https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/ilu-rezerwistow-tak-naprawde-ma-rosja-ekspert-wskazal-ogromna-liczbe/kyzdmrt [accessed: September 9, 2023].

10. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1265570/fuel-and-energy-industry-employees-russia/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

11. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1039670/russia-number-of-employed-by-industry/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

12. https://forsal.pl/artykuly/875914,ruja-stawia-na-wlasne-it-specjalny-dekret-ograniczy-import.html.amp [accessed: September 9, 2023].

13. https://tvn24.pl/biznes/ze-swiata/rosyjska-gospodarka-przeformatowana-na-potrzeby-dlugotrwalej-wojny-7107729 [accessed: May 19, 2023].

14. https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/rosyjska-gospodarka-wjechala-na-wojenne-tory-putin-wraca-do-ekonomii-gulagu-6868971402013312a. html [accessed: September 9, 2023].

8

Special Report

www.warsawinstitute.org

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM?

mining, oil processing, electricity production (especially in the nuclear sector), rail transport, and telecommunications. 15 Despite these restrictions, there remains a substantial pool of people available for potential military mobilization. Russia’s economy has not entirely shifted to a wartime footing, as it continues operations in non-military domains.

Maintaining a consumption level acceptable to society is crucial for the Kremlin. The Russian economy is managing reasonably well despite the sanctions, yet the economic indicators would have been more favorable in the absence of these sanctions Russia has found other markets for its oil, notably China, India, and Turkey. Proceeds from oil and gas sales fuel Moscow’s war machine. While the Russian economy is not fully self-sufficient, the Kremlin has adeptly found ways to navigate around imposed sanctions. Naturally, sanctions are meaningful as they elevate the overall cost

to the Russian economy and diminish the accessibility of particular products and components.

The impact of sanctions on the Russian economy is noticeable, but they have not yet prevented meeting basic social needs or supplying the army.

16

Despite its vast scope, the Russian arms industry faces certain limitations in its development. The crucial question remains the extent of material support that the Kremlin can rely on from China and North Korea. The presence of military hardware and ammunition resources, sourced domestically and through imports, unfortunately sustains the potential for extended periods of conventional warfare. Hence, the Kremlin might opt for a protracted conflict that could result in significant destruction within Ukraine. Russia is readying the public for a widespread mobilization, acknowledging that an undisclosed mobilization is currently in progress.1718192021

The demographic and economic potential of Ukraine Ukraine’s economy is more vulnerable to war damage that Russia’s. As a consequence of direct Russian attacks and the annexation of industrial centers, there was a 50 percent reduction in Ukraine’s production capacity. However,

Ukrainian businesses have shown major adaptability and filled all orders, also to export goods and services.22 Ukraine has a population of more than 41 million and could in theory mobilize some 4 million

15. https://biznesalert.pl/rosja-mobilizacja-przemysl-zbrojeniowy-gospodarka-wojenna/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

16. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

17. E. Gregova, I. Tulyakova, V. Dengov, Actual problems and limiting factors in the development of the Russian military-industrial complex, in: https://www.shs-conferences.org/articles/shsconf/pdf/2021/03/shsconf_glob20_07021.pdf [accessed: September 9, 2023].

18. https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/potencjal-dostaw-amunicji-i-uzbrojenia-z-korei-polnocnej-do-rosji [accessed: September 9, 2023].

19. https://www.msn.com/pl-pl/wiadomosci/polska/wywiad-wojskowy-rosja-ma-co-najmniej-585-rakiet-o-zasi%C4%99gu-ponad-500-km/ar-AA1fTgAu?ocid=entnewsntp&cvid=58f1fff89a884511be1b1d77ed7908fd&ei=54 [accessed: September 9, 2023].

20. https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/stan-gospodarki-rosji-rok-po-agresji-na-ukraine [accessed: September 9, 2023].

21. https://mil.in.ua/en/articles/russia-preparing-for-major-war-and-large-scale-mobilization/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

22. https://pie.net.pl/koszt-utraconego-w-2022-r-wzrostu-gospodarczego-ukrainy-to-160-mld-usd/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

www.warsawinstitute.org

Special Report

9

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM?

people for military service 23. While Ukraine cannot mobilize all eligible for military service due to the need to sustain economic activities, it does not require as many workers per 1 million inhabitants as Russia, thanks to Western assistance. Western aid plays a pivotal role in ensuring the functionality of the public sphere in Ukraine.

Even while preserving relative civil and media freedoms within a democratic state, Ukrainian authorities are aware of society’s war weariness and its reduced readiness to sacrifice. Kyiv is able to efficiently mobilize conscripts despite facing

various issues, including the ongoing challenge of corruption. Despite this, there is a looming risk of personnel shortage in the army, particularly considering the ongoing undisclosed mobilization in Russia, estimated at 20,000–25,000 soldiers per month.

In this confrontation, Russia appears to be at the initial stage of escalation, while Ukraine stands somewhat in the middle. The balance of power could significantly alter if NATO were to undertake assertive measures in safeguarding Ukraine and upholding stability in Europe. 24

NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine NATO states, led by the United States, are striving to deter the Kremlin from escalating while concurrently providing support to Ukraine to withstand Russian military pressure. The aid is constrained by apprehensions that the Kremlin may avoid an all-out war, coupled with the hesitation of their own society to sacrifice or curtail consumption to bolster material support for Ukraine’s defense.

The United States aims to prevent the conflict from spilling into NATO countries while simultaneously seeking ways to persuade Russia to evacuate its troops from Ukraine. According to U.S. authorities, Russia would notably weaken in a constrained conventional conflict, as its economy would struggle to finance intensive warfare. Caught in entrenched battles, the Kremlin would slowly and subtly lose resources and experienced manpower. As time passes, the Russian Federation would encounter constraints in escalating the conflict further up the ladder.

Thus, the Kremlin might be compelled to agree to

peace terms aligned with Kyiv’s preferences, respecting Ukraine’s 1991 borders and its sovereign right to determine its developmental course.

The author contends that this strategy lacks a thorough assessment of the Kremlin’s capacities and does not foster peace; instead, it offers Moscow a window to prepare its society and economy for the war’s next phase.

Russian centers have the capacity to analyze past military endeavors, enabling them to refine strategy and tactics accordingly.

What deserves attention is the historical context of the Northern War, where Tsar Peter I confronted Sweden and its coalition allies. Despite initial setbacks after attacking seemingly weaker Sweden, the Russian forces leveraged demographic strengths, learned from errors, and secured victory against Sweden at the pivotal Battle of Poltava.

Vladimir Putin is a noted enthusiast of the tsar

23. https://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2022/ds/nas_rik/nas_90-2021.xlsx [accessed: September 9, 2023].

24. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2023/sipri-insights-peace-and-security/russias-military-expenditure-during-its-war-against-ukraine [accessed: September 9, 2023].

10

Special Report

www.warsawinstitute.org

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM?

Peter the First whom he has labeled a national hero. To engage in a large-scale war in the 21st century, it is crucial to secure the backing of one’s society, which is accustomed to a particular consumption level. Allowing the coercion or terror apparatus sufficient time is necessary to quell potential social resistance. In case of failure, Russia’s policy might shift inward, delaying imperial ambitions until fresh opportunities for expansion present themselves.

Presently, an undefeated Russia is delving further into its human and material resources, gearing up for a prolonged war, while the West persists in the illusion that the conflict will somehow conclude, returning to the status quo. For numerous politicians, the key aim is supporting Ukraine’s defense without excessively straining budgets dedicated to social programs. The priority lies in the timeline toward upcoming elections, aiming to prevent dissatisfaction within societies accustomed to prosperity and a relaxed environment.

Leaving Russia under the impression it can win by escalating beyond the West’s limit could result in a full-scale war, causing massive civilian casualties and the advancement of Russian troops towards the Bug and San rivers.

The price of halting such a neighbor could be far greater than our present estimates. NATO could confront challenges as arduous as those witnessed during the peak of the Cold War. The challenge lies in the fact that societies within NATO member states are notably less equipped for war and a united response compared to fifty or sixty years ago.

is unachievable despite utilizing all its available material and human resources. NATO needs to demonstrate resolve and preparedness to directly confront the aggressor. Also, it is crucial to augment Ukraine’s resources by leveraging the capabilities of NATO member states. Under these circumstances, Russia would likely have to halt its expansionist war, given that the level of losses is expected to surpass its ability to recover. There are boundaries that Russian society will not cross in accepting sacrifices. Historical cases, such as the lost wars against Japan in 1905 and Germany in 1917, highlight how extended failures on the frontlines can trigger social revolts and internal power conflicts.

The prospect of Russia employing weapons of mass destruction in a conflict involving Ukraine and nuclear powers is improbable, given the reluctance of the Kremlin to jeopardize cities such as Moscow or St. Petersburg. Opting to wait for the next leadership crisis in the West might be a more prudent approach. “It is essential for the West to realize that Russia responds more to the language of force rather than to reasoned arguments. To secure its safety, the West must assert its strength by granting Ukraine membership in the Alliance,” as stated by Dr. Agnieszka Bryc, a scholar at Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toru25ń26.

The West’s indecisive response could potentially embolden the Kremlin to contemplate employing its nuclear advantage against a denuclearized Ukraine. Overlooking the potential for a fitting reaction from nuclear states could tempt the Kremlin towards unfavorable outcomes...

Russia’s permanent withdrawal of troops from the entire territory of Ukraine will occur only under compulsion. The war will reach its conclusion once the Kremlin acknowledges that victory 25. https://www.msn.com/pl-pl/wiadomosci/polska/ukrai%C5%84ski-wywiad-wojskowy-rosja-po-przegranej-wojnie-b%C4%99dziechcia%C5%82a-rewan%C5%BCu-zaatakuje-po-10-latach/ar-AA1g5Hh9?ocid=entnewsntp&cvid=0f9edc83fb74430dafb84dc5dddbebee&ei=11 [accessed: September 9, 2023].

26. https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/przelamac-bledne-kolo-ws-ukrainy-w-nato-rosja-rozumie-tylko-sile-6936512641193601v?utm_source=combreak [accessed: September 9, 2023].

www.warsawinstitute.org

Special Report

11

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM?

Final remarks The critical query remains whether the Kremlin anticipates a firmer NATO stance in the Ukraine conflict or continues to dismiss the alliance’s potential threat, banking on pacifist public sentiment and societies’ reluctance to sacrifice consumption for preserving Europe’s security order.

The Kremlin’s perception of an ongoing leadership crisis in the United States casts doubt on the possibility of independently deciding to withdraw troops from Ukraine Decisive actions by the West could help reshape its image among the ruling Russian political elite. NATO must demonstrate to the Kremlin its readiness to escalate to Russia’s level if the situation demands.

Even upon achieving the fundamental goal of pushing Russian troops beyond Ukraine’s borders, the threat posed by the Kremlin to neighboring countries will endure.

There remains the query of the cost Russia should endure due to the criminal policies of its elites.

Does preserving the Kremlin’s control over the militarized Königsberg region pose an enduring threat to the security of Central and Eastern Europe? Is it justifiable for Belarusian society to remain under the oppression enforced by Kremlin supporters?

References: 1. https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/07/offthe-map-ukraine-and-the-problems-ofexpanding-nato/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

2. https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/02/theconfrontation-with-russia-and-us-grandstrategy/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

3. https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/ the-top-five-us-priorities-european-policyafter-russias-invasion-ukraine [accessed: September 9, 2023].

4. https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/nato-summit-madrid-reinforcing-deterrencecrucial-time-the-us-national-interest [accessed: September 9, 2023].

5. https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2023/07/21/2023-MATRA-JUNE-ENGL. pdf [accessed: September 9, 2023].

6. https://razumkov.org.ua/image12

Special Report

s/2023/07/10/2023-MATRA-I-KVARTAL-ENGL-8.pdf [accessed: September 9, 2023].

7. https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2023/06/30/2023-MATRA-I-KVARTAL-6-ENGL.pdf [accessed: September 9, 2023].

8. https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/ ukraines-nato-membership-will-strengtheneuropes-security-0 [accessed: September 9, 2023].

9. https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2023/08/03/2023-MATRA-I-KVARTAL-ENGL-13.pdf [accessed: September 9, 2023].

10. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep11949.7.pdf [accessed: September 9, 2023].

11. https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/corking-russian-gas?fbclid=IwAR0p2nq6EsQlqb0 tSNdaMQ03HjoYWBbXTqVHWj4yujL524 vHhib3052485A_aem_Ab4sY_sw1ZjEo3Ywww.warsawinstitute.org

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM?

bq0rVkHwnzyFxveG7_ZzxLmMxNz7xyEvIy8URTN_AotkJuY4aaMw# [accessed: September 9, 2023]. “American libertarians, a specialized faction backing Donald Trump, embrace the pro-Russian narrative, sending a clear signal to Trump’s devotees and similar circles.” According to the paper, “decisions by Poland and Ukraine [to block or limit pipeline gas flow] adversely affect the well‐being of people worldwide.” “Over the last 50 years, importing inexpensive Russian gas has helped solidify Germany’s position as a world leader in industry and commerce, greatly enhancing the well‐being of its people. The Russian standard of living has been improved by export earnings, a mutually beneficial arrangement. Beginning in 2022, there have been calls to reduce or boycott Russian gas to punish Russia for the war in Ukraine and to pressure it to accept a settlement favorable to Ukraine.

Decisions by Poland and Ukraine to block or limit pipeline gas flow, to say nothing of the Nord Stream sabotage, disrupt this energy flow, adversely affecting the well‐being of people worldwide as gas prices rise and lead to higher costs for everything from heating and electricity to plastics and fertilizer, resulting in material declines in average living standards, with more severe outcomes in poorer countries.” Prioritizing the quality of life in countries that have not faced aggression, despite overlooking the criminal policies of the Russian Federation.

12. https://www.parkiet.com/gospodarka-swiatowa/art37985661-rosja-przemysl-wciaz-jest-j eszcze-daleki-od-totalnej-mobilizacji#error= login_required&state=0c5cdd66-a6e1-4f99-8dc0-46ded4b84cb8 [accessed: September 9, 2023].

13. https://obserwatorgospodarczy. pl/2022/12/16/wojny-domowe-majabardziej-destrukcyjne-skutki-niz-wojnymiedzypanstwowe-badanie/?fbclid=IwAR www.warsawinstitute.org

2qbMzivtsXFJFe4aXaYGR8RD07tnCP2wq z81BgDGnAYY-ds78gUGE5yfg [accessed: September 9, 2023].

14. https://cacds.org. ua/%d1%80%d0%b5%d0%b0%d0%bb%d1%8c%d0%bd%d0%b8%d0%b9-%d1%88%d0%bb%d1%8f%d1%85-%d0%b4%d0%be-%d1%87%d0%bb%d0%b5%d0%bd%d1%81%d1%82%d0%b2%d0%b0-%d0%b2-%d0%bd%d0%b0%d1%82%d0%be-%d1%82%d1%80%d0%b8-%d1%84%d0%b0/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

15. https://cacds.org.ua/%d1%8f%d0%ba-%d0%bf%d0%be%d0%b1%d1%83%d 0%b4%d1%83%d0%b2%d0%b0%d1%8 2%d0%b8-%d0%b2-%d1%83%d0%ba%d1%80%d0%b0%d1%97%d0%bd%d1%96-%d0%b4%d1%96%d1%94%d0%b2%d1%83-%d1%81%d0%b8%d1%81%d1%82%d0%b 5%d0%bc%d1%83/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

16. https://cacds.org.ua/%d1%8f%d0%ba-%d0%bf%d0%be%d0%b1%d1%83%d 0%b4%d1%83%d0%b2%d0%b0%d1%8 2%d0%b8-%d0%b2-%d1%83%d0%ba%d1%80%d0%b0%d1%97%d0%bd%d1%96-%d0%b4%d1%96%d1%94%d0%b2%d1%83-%d1%81%d0%b8%d1%81%d1%82%d0%b 5%d0%bc%d1%83/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

17. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348463682_Actual_problems_and_ limiting_factors_in_the_development_of_ the_Russian_military-industrial_complex [accessed: September 9, 2023].

18. https://mil.in.ua/en/articles/russiapreparing-for-major-war-and-large-scalemobilization/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

19. https://cberuk.com/cdn/conference_proceedings/conference_15218.pdf [accessed: September 9, 2023].

Special Report

13

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM?

20. https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/ russia-vs.|||UNTRANSLATED_ CONTENT_START|||-ukraine%3A-an-economic-comparison [dostęp 9.09.2023].|||UNTRANSLATED_ CONTENT_END||| 21. https://defence24.pl/przemysl/rosyjski-przemysl-zbrojeniowy-bedzie-pracowaldzien-i-noc-7-dni-w-tygodniu-komentarz [accessed: September 9, 2023].

22. http://en.ria.ru/russia/20090602/155148607. html [accessed: August 18, 2023].

23. https://pl.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gospodarka_Rosji [accessed: September 9, 2023].

24. https://defence24.pl/geopolityka/ przymusowa-praca-dla-rosjan-wprzyfabrycznych-zakladach-poprawczych [accessed: September 9, 2023].

25. https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/rosyjska-gospodarka-wjechala-na-wojennetory-putin-wraca-do-ekonomii-gulagu6868971402013312a.html [accessed: September 9, 2023].

26. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/what-is-russias-strategy-in-ukraine/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

27. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/ russia-vs-ukraine/?am [accessed: September 9, 2023].

28. https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/ analizy/2021-07-13/putin-ukraincy-to-rosjanie-ukraina-to-anty-rosja [accessed: September 9, 2023].

29. https://ptgeo.org.pl/2022/03/cywilizacyjnepodstawy-geopolitycznej-orientacji-ukrainy/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

30. https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/ files/eurazja_1995_nr_3.pdf [accessed: September 9, 2023].

31. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/p [accessed: September 9, 2023].

14

Special Report

32. https://getliner.com/pdf/checksum/c21e6a7ff646cbb31a4086771c2903bb3b7caaec534be8f61462afd641cfbe84 [accessed: September 9, 2023].

33. https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2023/08/03/2023-MATRA-I-KVARTAL-ENGL-13.pdf [accessed: September 9, 2023].

34. https://razumkov.org.ua/statti/vpered-u-mynule-abo-deiaki-rysy-novoizovnishnopolitychnoi-kontseptsii-rf [accessed: September 9, 2023].

35. https://www.aljazeera.com/ opinions/2023/6/1/why-ron-desantis-cantfollow-trumps-foreign-policy [accessed: September 9, 2023].

36. http://angelus.com.pl/2014/10/aleksandersolzenicyn-slowo-do-ukraincow-ibialorusinow/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

37. https://www.deutschland.de/pl/topic/ polityka/ukraina-wojna-niemcy-sprawdzanie-faktow-putin [accessed: September 9, 2023].

38. https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1544823%2Cputin-wierzyl-ze-wojnaw-ukrainie-dopradza-do-rozpadu-natozachod-bedzie [accessed: September 9, 2023].

39. https://amp.dw.com/pl/rosja-jakzmieniaj%C4%85-si%C4%99-jej-celew-wojnie-z-ukrain%C4%85/a-62623928 [accessed: September 9, 2023].

40. https://www.komputerswiat.pl/artykuly/ redakcyjne/porownanie-potencjalumilitarnego-rosji-i-ukrainy-starcie-dawidaz-goliatem/khrnk44 [accessed: September 9, 2023].

41. https://wnpism.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/ uploads/2022/09/Raport_specjalny.pdf [accessed: September 9, 2023].

42. https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/stan-gospodarki-rosji-rok-po-agresji-na-ukraine [accessed: September 9, 2023]. www.warsawinstitute.org

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM?

43. https://psz.pl/117-polityka/lukasz-tuzrosyjska-obecnosc-militarna-na-terytoriumukrainy [accessed: September 9, 2023].

44. https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/rddc-drdc/D68-3-057-2012-eng. pdf [accessed: September 9, 2023].

45. https://jamestown.org/program/russiasdefense-industry-growing-increasinglyturbulent/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

46. https://zbiam.pl/rosja-zwieksza-produkcje-czolgow-wideo/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

47. https://kolejnictwopolskie.pl/baza-wiedzy/rekordowa-kolej-rosyjska [accessed: September 9, 2023].

48. https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/ swiat/2225594,1,553-dzien-wojny-kiedyrosja-moglaby-zrezygnowac-z-agresji-naukraine-mile-czasy-sie-skonczyly.read [accessed: September 9, 2023].

49. https://forsal.pl/swiat/bezpieczenstwo/ artykuly/9113557,waits-our-rozpad-rosji-irywalizacja-z-niemcami-wojczal-wiekszypote.html.amp [accessed: September 9, 2023].

50. https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/Zdolno_ci_ rakietowe_Rosji__potencja__i_ograniczenia [accessed: September 9, 2023].

51. https://belsat.eu/pl/news/02-09-2023ukraina-dokonuje-korekty-planowwojennych?fbclid=IwAR3I_kWinXSGadDGv15EcBeU48mx9G5eQRZ48LQ6JJrixRlAL2-4Pi_mkO8_aem_ATuM3jVNAMwf13djx04p_YflVrAQts-9hIFDFBM6LwYgrpHngzslWTm3LlOheFertbY [accessed: September 9, 2023].

52. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2023/ sipri-insights-peace-and-security/russiasmilitary-expenditure-during-its-waragainst-ukraine [accessed: September 9, 2023].

53. https://www.msn.com/pl-pl/wiadomosci/ www.warsawinstitute.org

polska/ukrai5%84ski-wywiad-wojnieb%C4%99dzie-chcia%C5-rewan%C5%BCuzaakuje-po-10- latach/ar-AA1g5Hh9?ocid =entnewsntp&cvid=0f9edc83fb74430dafb 84dc5ddbee&ei=11 [accessed: September 9, 2023].%82a 54. https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/przelamac-blednekolo-ws-ukrainy-w-nato-rosja-rozumietylko-sile-6936512641193601v?utm_source=combreak 55. https://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/ operativ2022/ds/nas_rik/nas_90-2021.xlsx [accessed: September 9, 2023].

56. https://pie.net.pl/koszt-utraconego-w-2022r-wzrostu-gospodarczego-ukrainy-to-160mld-usd/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

57. https://www.msn.com/pl-pl/wiadomosci/ polska/wywiad-wojskowy-rosja-ma-conajmniej-585-rakiet-o-zasi%C4%99guponad-500-km/ar-AA1fTgAu?ocid=entnewsntp&cvid=58f1fff89a884511be1b1d77ed7908fd&ei=54 [accessed: September 9, 2023].

58. https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/potencjaldostaw-amunicji-i-uzbrojenia-z-koreipolnocnej-do-rosji [accessed: September 9, 2023].

59. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/policies/ sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

60. https://biznesalert.pl/rosja-mobilizacjaprzemysl-zbrojeniowy-gospodarka-wojenna/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

61. https://tvn24.pl/biznes/ze-swiata/rosyjskagospodarka-przeformatowana-na-potrzebydlugotrwalej-wojny-7107729 [accessed: May 19, 2023].

62. https://forsal.pl/artykuly/875914,ruja-stawiana-wlasne-it-specjalny-dekret-ograniczyimport.html.amp [accessed: September 9, 2023].

Special Report

15

UKRAINE HEADS INTO THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DEFENSIVE WAR WITH RUSSIA IS IT REAL TO FINALLY STOP MOSCOW’S EXPANSIONISM?

63. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1039670/ russia-number-of-employed-by-industry/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

69. https://czasopisma.marszalek.com.pl/images/ pliki/pomi/03/pomi201702.pdf [accessed: September 9, 2023].

64. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1265570/ fuel-and-energy-industry-employees-russia/ [accessed: September 9, 2023].

70. https://defence24.pl/geopolityka/to-on-przekonal-putina-by-uderzyc-politycznekulisy-rosyjskiej-inwazji-analiza [accessed: September 9, 2023].

65. https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/ilu-rezerwistow-tak-naprawde-ma-rosja-ekspertwskazal-ogromna-liczbe/kyzdmrt [accessed: September 9, 2023].

66. https://belsat.eu/pl/tag/okupacja [accessed: September 9, 2023].

67. https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/niezbity-dowodna-fiasko-planu-putina-wpadka-agencji-zrosji-6742127344458240a [accessed: March 14, 2023].

71. https://poland.mid.ru/web/polska_pl/ newsy/-/asset_publisher/3psDnrqSiRBY/ content/artykul-prezydenta-federacjirosyjskiej-wladimira-putina-o-historycznejjednosci-rosjan-i-ukraincow-opublikowany12-lipca-2021-roku-?inheritRedirect=false [accessed: September 9, 2023].

68. https://www.rp.pl/dane-gospodarcze/ art19142191-ukraina-konczy-2021-roknajwyzszym-pkb-w-historii [accessed: March 14, 2023].

Author: Mariusz Patey is a graduate of the Faculty of Physics at the University of Warsaw. A journalist specializing in the issues of the Intermarium economy and energy security. Former advisor to the Lubuskie Voivode, former member of supervisory boards of commercial companies related to transport, IT solutions for transport.

16

Special Report

www.warsawinstitute.org

© COPYRIGHT 2023 Warsaw Institute The opinions given and the positions held in materials in the Special Report solely reflect the views of authors.

Warsaw Institute Wilcza St. 9, 00-538 Warsaw, Poland +48 22 417 63 15 office@warsawinstitute.org

Warsaw Institute Wilcza St. 9, 00-538 Warsaw, Poland +48 22 417 63 15 office@warsawinstitute.org

THE TASK IS FINANCED BY NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FREEDOM - CENTER FOR CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE GOVERNMENT PROGRAM FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS FOR 2018-2030, PRIORITY 4.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIC THINK TANKS, EDITION 2022.