Cathedral of Christ the Savior and Russian memory policies since 1991 / Thomas Tournade

R6 The (un)workings of architecture

Ecole Nationale Supérieure dʼArchitecture de Paris-Malaquais Brent Patterson 2022

Making immaterial materialize

the reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior and the Russian memory policies since 1991

Thomas Tournade

On the morning of 25th April 2007, Boris Yeltsin’s funeral was presided under the golden dome of Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior. Yet, it might seem unsettling for those aware of Russian history of the late 20th century to picture such obsequies. Some of a man who was a communist dignitary 15 years ago, and in a cathedral that, around the same time, was a longlost building. In fact, on one hand, Boris Yeltsin, former Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a notably anti-religious country, and later President of the Russian Federation; had undergone a surprisingly late Christian baptism in 1992, at the age of 61. He thus aimed to acquire “clean(liness)” and a “different world outlook”.1

On the other hand, this precise cathedral in which he was ultimately buried, Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior was a large open-air swimming pool at the time he got baptized, despite its neo-byzantine golden domes and bronze statues. Actually, the original Cathedral was consecrated in 1883, and built to commemorate the historical victory over French armies in 1812, under the Tsar’s orders.2 Just 50 years later though, the then-biggest orthodox cathedral in the world, Christ the Savior was stripped and ultimately spectacularly dynamited, by the new Soviet regime.3 The government aimed to make place for the tallest building in the world, the Palace of the Soviets, in honor of the people and the ideal. The funds and resources necessary to undergo such project were eventually lacking, and the foundations were ultimately turned into an open-air swimming pool. Only in 1991 emerged the idea to rebuild the original cathedral as it was before, in both liberal and nationalist circles. In such years of political instability and deep economic crisis, the decision was made and the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was consecrated for the second time, on 19th August 2000.4

In Russia though, as historian William Brumfield observes, “every facet of culture, architecture included, could ultimately be related to a struggle between competing political ideologies”.5 And the history of this Cathedral, of this central square in Moscow, shows that it has been a place for conflicts between memories, an “urban palimpsest” where certain visions of society would clash. The latest one though, has been aiming to erase the Soviet “mistake” off the “Great Russian history”, by means of directly reconnecting contemporary Russia with its Imperial Heritage, thus wiping the Revolution and the 70 following years off, the same way it does street signs, city names and public buildings. Still, while implementing this “amnesia” of a huge part of what modern Russia is, the reconstruction of the Cathedral canonizes a precise part of the country’s history, thus making the nationalist memory (subjective in essence) appear as the whole of Russian’s history (supposedly objective). This paradox, one of simultaneous elation of parts of history and denial of others, while aiming for the emergence of a precise national narrative and identity, brings light to the Russian memory policy since the fall of the Soviet Union. A narrative of religious and nationalist resurgence, of despotic nostalgia, all precisely embodied in the architectural object that is the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. How then, is this heritage paradox contained within the cathedral’s reconstruction, symptomatic of Russia’s memory policy since 1991?

1 Michael Parks, “Yeltsin Sheds Atheism, Get Religion Again,” Los Angeles Times (June 15, 1992).

2 Ekaterina V. Haskins, “Russia’s Postcommunist Past,”History & Memory, Spring-Summer 2009, 32.

3 Samizdat, The Destruction of the Church of Christ the Saviour (Photographs) (London: Overseas Publication Interchange Ltd, 1988), 169.

4 “Christ the Savior Cathedral & Romanov Canonization,” Russian Life, last modified August 01, 2001, https://russianlife.com/stories/online/christ-the-savior-cathedral/

5 Haskins, “Russia’s Past,”, 32.

I/ A historically charged cathedral: emergence of a nationalist narrative Introduction

After early 19th century Russia successfully drove Napoleon’s armies out of the country in late 1812, the Tsar decided to honor this historic memory with the advent of an important architectural feat.6 Winning such war was an unhoped-for outcome, as the French armies had victoriously marched over virtually the whole of modern Western Europe. Russia, on the other hand, was an underdeveloped nation that could not tolerate the comparison with its European neighbors, and as such, the victory of 1812 was perceived as a “divine intervention”.7 The newly decided commemorative project shall then be a cathedral, the largest in the whole of the Orthodox world, over which Russia rules. The great Cathedral of Christ the Savior would function as both a honorary shrine to the "grace of Christ the Savior" for the awarded victory of 1812 and a secular temple, in honor of the Emperor, the army commanders, the troops and the people.8 Such rare mixture of secular and sacred elements highlights the close ties that existed between the State and the Church under Tsarist rule.9 Later in fact, the very coronation of the newly induced Tsar Alexander III would merge with the ceremonial sanctification of the Cathedral. The Orthodox Church in reality, has always been a cornerstone of the Russian state, as an effective mean to both ensure people’s apathy and showcase and maintain Russia’s cultural independence, notably with regards to Catholic Europe. There have been two different projects for the Cathedral, under two different Tsars, bringing light to the political project incarnated in the construction. Even though only the latter has been built, both are essential to grasp the essence of the project, and of the regime’s ambitions. The new building shall serve two main purposes: the conflation of religion with secular elements of the Russian state and history, and the praise of the uniqueness of Russian identity. Both these aims take place in the context of mid-19th century, an era witnessing the collapse of many monarchies and the seemingly definitive disengagement of Russia from the European Great Power race, notably in regards with industry and technology in general.

I/ 1) Construction of the Cathedral: conflation of Church and State, praise of Russian distinctiveness

In fact, both projects would combine religious scenes and décor, with the secular exploits of foot soldiers, generals, and especially Tsars. Beyond simply using the comparison with the popular aura of biblical stories to ennoble such actions, the architecture of the two projects reflects a certain vision of the role of religion in Russian history. In fact, the first project would be divided vertically in three sections. The lowest one, would honor the military sacrifice of the war and every soldier, as well as symbolizing the soulless state in which they would allegedly remain without religion. Then, strictly above this base, would lie a separate cross-shaped temple, incarnating the soul supposedly intermediating between the “vulgar” mortal body and the immortal spirit. Ultimately, both Cathedrals would be crowned with a dome, as the embodiment of infinity and "divine pureness".10

6 Katherine Eady, “The Reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior: Public Space and National Identity in Post-Soviet Moscow” (University of Toronto), 5.

7 Andrew Gentes, “The Life, Death and Resurrection of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, Moscow”, history Workshop Journal, no. 46 (Autumn, 1998): 83.

8 Haskins, “Russia’s Past,”, 32.

9 Leon Trotsky, Histoire de la Révolution russe : 1. La révolution de Février (Paris : Points, 1979), 39-52.

10 Haskins, “Russia’s Past,”, 33.

So, beyond simply using a religious building to commemorate war feats, the very project aimed to use people’s sacrifice as a tool to reinforce faith. In fact, this staging of the soul rising to heavens would necessarily imply that a “bodily” sacrifice would not be “noble” enough without the thought elevation of the soul itself. The cathedral thus places religion, by means of this staging and the very call to “Christ the Savior” at the core of an important event for the people in Russian history, in an attempt to reinforce the omnipresent role of Church within everyday life, history and the State itself. Interestingly enough, this disregard for the physical existence of people and such veneration for the religious fact, is implicit in the construction of the Church itself. As a matter of fact, 19th century Russia was not a monarchy like most in Europe, and serfdom bondage was only abolished in 1861. In this manner, one can see the real intentions of the project appear. Beyond the national narrative of a unified story where God, the Tsar and the people would magnificently overcome a common enemy, a sacrifice is always a personal renunciation for a greater good: here, the sacrifice of the people is acknowledged as a blessing in disguise, where the people end up a laughing stock for the powerful and their very own interests.

On the other hand, the cathedral also aimed to praise the distinctiveness of Russian identity. Tsar Nicholas I, initiator of the construction, is remembered for having completely broken with the liberalization policy in place for almost two centuries in Russia, notably banning liberal universities and providing military help to counter revolutions in Europe.11 Before, since late 17th century, Russian leaders were aiming for a freer monarchy, relatively open to liberal ideas concerning religion and economics.12 Such policy would bring the country closer to the West, but Nicholas I decided a strictly conservatist and isolationist policy, in the name of “Russian

11 “Russian Empire: Nicholas Ist” Britannica, accessed May 25, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/place/Russian-Empire/Nicholas-I.

12 “Peter I: the central government of Peter I” Britannica, accessed May 25, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Peter-the-Great/The-central-government

I/ First project for the cathedral, by Aleksandr Vitberg (1816). Source: Wikimedia Commons.

distinctiveness”.13 This distinctiveness, at the core of the Cathedral's project, is the very nationalist idea that Russia has a great path and a great history, greater than any other, and that its strength relies in this traditional culture. This distinctiveness is first and foremost Orthodoxy. The Moscow Patriarchate was of the highest importance in the world, and thus allowed Russia to be a major leader of the Orthodox world. Such position allowed the Tsars to claim heritage to the greatness of the Byzantine empire, a heritage necessarily rooted in the Russian political culture itself as the country indirectly stems from the Byzantine empire. The centralized leadership of the vanished empire, as well as its “religious distinctiveness”, and the striking contrast with a decadent and weakened Europe draws an obvious parallel with Russia, projecting a prestigious aura onto the country.14 This inherently religious narrative is present in the architectural expression itself, through the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. The first project for the cathedral drew inspiration from the Hagia Sophia, in then Constantinople, in an attempt to bring Russia closer to the Balkans, while drifting away from Western European countries. The project, cross-shaped according to Southern Orthodox tradition highlighted this distinctive heritage that sets Russia apart from other Catholic European powers.15 But moreover, there was also a certain call towards traditional Russian vernacular architecture. Whether it’s the war scenes in the cathedral or the traditional Orthodox cupolas, the frescoes commemorating tsars’ coronations or the epic statue representing the Tsar who defeated Napoleon: the cathedral elevated everything that distinguishes Russia, and not just usual victories or prides. The war scenes reminded the visitors that from “the deliverance of ancient Russia from Teutonic hordes (to) the defeat of the French in 1812”16, the country had always been able to preserve its “special path”; that this unique religion, the architecture that it produces, the Tsars that rule over Russia for centuries are endemic to the country, and that this is a greatness worth preserving. Ultimately, this rare layering of the people’s exploits, the greatness of history, the religious narrative and the royal family’s reputation, aimed to come to the regime’s rescue. In fact, as the talks around the Cathedral’s construction advanced in 1830, emerging liberal ideas were starting to develop in contrast with dynastic regimes and religious values.17 The cultural project was, according to the Tsar’s Minister of Education, “orthodoxy-autocracy-nationality”.18 This is what Eric Hobsbawn calls the “invention of tradition”.19 It means the desperate attempt to merge religion, tsarism, and the very idea of nation in people’s mind, for using each of this notions’ power among people to protect each other. Andrew Gentes, American historian focused on 19th century Russia, depicts it as a “hubristic attempt to stem the tide”20 of revolution and aspiration to more equality and freedom in the whole of Europe. In reality, this project can be understood as the first historical emergence in Russia, of a deliberate will to construct an artificial collective memory. One that views history not as an incremental path to the present, but as a deliberate construction to the future. Cemented in traditional values of its time such as autocracy, religion and patriotism, it would root in the country’s politics and culture, producing massive effects up until today.

13 "Russian distinctiveness" is an important concept throughout Russian history. It is the embodiment of a persistent will to emphasize its civilizational uniqueness, as part of a strategy to acquire respect and independence from Europe.

14 David Stoffey, “Byzantine History, Russian Autocracy, and the West,” Charged Affairs, October 30, 2017, https://chargedaffairs.org/byzantine-history-and-russia/

15 Haskins, “Russia’s Past”, 34.

16 Gentes, “Life, Death and Resurrection”, 74.

17 Ibid, 73.

18 Haskins, “Russia’s Past”, 35.

19 Ibid, 35.

20 Gentes, “Life, Death and Resurrection”, 73.

I/ 2) Destruction of a narrative: antagonizing memory, what place for the Old World?

In 1931, only forty-eight years after it was consecrated, the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was blown up

under Stalin’s orders.21 In fact, after the Revolution happened in 1917, the regime had radically changed. It theoretically opposed the autocratic leadership inherent to tsarism, and the bourgeois mechanisms that fueled it and the Church, notably by means of land ownership.22 The Orthodox Church being the biggest landlord at the time in Russia, was necessarily considered as an “enemy of the people” by the newly formed regime, but the antagonism takes root deeper.

In fact, the Soviet regime claims to be heir to Marxism At the core of Marxist philosophy is the emancipation of man, that must “seek his true reality.”23 Though usually reduced to being an emancipation from the oppressive mechanisms of capitalism, Marxism is much more a philosophy than it is just an economy doctrine. It seeks not just for the “abolition” of capitalism but to anything that participates in the freeing of man and in the making of its existence desirable. As such, religion is seen as a “parasite”, because it gets in the way of man’s emancipation. This is why Karl Marx famously refers to it being the opium of the people24 In the exact same way than opium does, religion softens the painly symptoms of the most terrible diseases (in this case capitalism) and by doing so, make the actually curing of the cause at the core of such pains, secondary. Marx’s hope is that in removing the illusion that religion would be, it would call for a real cure: revolution. Considering this original opposition between Communism and the Church, as well as the vehement reaction from the clerks to socialist uprisings in history,25 it appears consistent that both opposed during the Russian Civil War that followed the Bolsheviks taking power in Russia. Capitalists and monarchists, as well as the Church, helped financially and militarily by the Western powers opposed the new communist Party at the head of the State. In fact, the Church sided with them to preserve both its own existence and privileges They participated in actions such as recruiting for the White army, spreading disinformation about the new government, even calling it “antichrist” during collectivization. That behavior during the Civil war, has been a major reason (with the intrinsic Marxist critique) for the treatment of the Christian church in USSR. In short, the Union has had various attitudes towards the Church, but it has mostly been of repression. As early as in 1917, all of the Church’s private properties were expropriated as the Church was the biggest landowner in the country, and many people associated it with oppression, capitalism and tsarism. Lenin and Stalin’s eras were characterized by executions of the main bishops and deportation of clerks, as well as the complete shutdown of all of the 50,000 churches in the country. Only the Great Patriotic War in 1941 put a halt to this inside war, when the State and Church allied against the invader

Still, despite this rooted hatred and the harshness of the cultural and political repression, very few churches have been deliberately destroyed in Russia, only some were desacralized.

21 Ibid, 82.

22 Rosa Luxemburg, “Église et socialisme’’ in Églises et socialisme, (Paris : Les amis de Spartacus, 2006, 6-7.

23 Karl Marx, Contribution à la critique de la philosophie du droit de Hegel (Paris : Allia, 2018), 1.

24 Ibid, 2.

25 Luxemburg, “Église et socialisme,’’ 6-7.

However, the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was blown up under special orders from Joseph Stalin,26 and the grandeur of the public destruction implies it carried a higher meaning to the regime. One can find several reasons to this careful destruction of architectural heritage, notably the need for free space in order to build the newly decided Palace of the Soviets. Reaching heights of 420 meters, this “Palace” would be dedicated to the people, the Revolution and the 3rd Internationale, and it would be crowned by a statue of Lenin three times the size of the Statue of Liberty, visible from anywhere and at any time across Moscow. Still, the truth is this project was meant to be implemented anywhere in the capital but in place of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior ! Below, are shown all of the four favorite locations indicated by the Special Commission for the Palace of the Soviets to be built on. The site ultimately chosen, was the least recommended. It was actually considered too unstable for such a skyscraper and too big at the same time, thus being able to accommodate mass demonstrations that the power did not hope for: such destruction cannot then be understood as a “unfortunate coincidence” As elaborated on earlier, this Cathedral is a symbol: one of Tsarism, of the hegemony of the Church, a symbol of the sacrifice of masses for Tsars that were then disregarded. It is the emblem of the way in which Church and Tsars would use a popular moment of heroism to enforce their oppressive narrative and power.27 Destroying such icon would try to mean the success of the Communist ideology, the unavoidable change of morals coming with the Revolution. Molotov, equivalent of Prime Minister of the USSR in the early 1930’s probably best summarized it in his own words: “It was destroyed on purpose. Objections were raised. I, personally, did not object.... Why preserve a church in the center of the city? It wasn't a rare antiquity, we rationalized. A church at the very center of the city - that wasn't right for Soviet power.” Rebuilding in place of this emblem moreover, would be a strong signifier of the way in which the new regime can work on the ruins of an outdated society.28 The project of the Palace of the Soviets now implemented in place of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior marks the transformation of this central plaza in Moscow as a “urban palimpsest” as evoked by Andreas Huyssen.29 Such places capture the layering of fragments of the past, in a complex struggle to maintain traces of public memory. Both the deliberate political will to layer as a clear antagonism and the sharp contrast between

26 Gentes, “Life, Death and Resurrection”, 82.

27 Ibid, 71.

28 Ibid, 76.

29 Haskins, “Russia’s Past,”, 30.

II/ Boris Iofan’s project for the Palace of the Soviets as of 1933 competition. Source: Russia Treck.

III/ Rank of proposed implementation sites, all preferred to the location of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. Source: personal document using information from the Provisional Technical Soviet in charge's report.

all of the narratives that share this urban space, make it particularly relevant to use the term of "urban palimpsest". They do not just cohabit; they collide as they intentionally oppose each other theoretically. Such places are “memory knots”30 in which eclectic elements come to clash and materialize a nation’s debate about its own identity, about its prides and shames.

II/ What role for memory in a society: how has the change in the very concept of memory enable a political misuse of heritage?

In times of instability or economic crisis, the disbelief in tomorrow prompts a withdrawal into the past, notably with the interest in symbols such as the Cathedral of Christ the Savior . 31After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disenchantment is massive: a once rousing ideology failed after seventy years of bureaucratic and violent gesticulations, and has led the country into a deep economic crisis.32 The call for rapid liberal reforms towards a freer market and freedom of speech is large, but they again strongly disappoint, as the crisis deepens and the regimes fail to apply the democratic transition they promised (see Annex 1 for elections' details about political aspirations in the nineties) Corruption damages the country; public services break apart: the liberal promises have failed completely. It is in such times of repeated disappointment and disbelief, Lowenthal says, that people look back to their past: “nostalgia for things old and outworn supplants dreams of progress and development.”33 In a throwaway society where everything is ephemeral, people begin to look for something more lasting. The problem of modernity though, is that it has alienated us from our past, there is no such thing as “memory” left, Pierre Nora says34 . While past and present used to merge into an everyday perpetuation of traditions and gestures (memory), the characteristics of modern time have cut-off this uninterrupted link between past and present. Many reasons can be found that are essential to the understanding of the Cathedral's complexity. Firstly, the architectural "heritage mania", while canonizing the most common of all monuments, creates a picturesque image of the past, alienated from us as modernity moves forward and proclaimed “heritage” ages. Societal changes as well, have turned “memory” obsolete, by making transmission, its very constituent, impossible. Ultimately, according to Penelope Lively, the spatial and temporal detachment from objects of memory, impact its construction. Memory has a certain physicality, and if one cannot revisit their own origins, they are then somehow forever "untethered". This is particularly relevant in terms of what is unfolding in Russia, through the precise example of religion and the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. Even though very few Churches were destroyed after the Revolution, many closures have led to the unavoidable decay of Orthodox faith in Russia, and particularly a kind of “biblical illiteracy”.35 The Orthodox believers have lost touch with their past because they have lost touch with its everyday revival. Still, while such interruption of the traditional course of everyday memory might cut people from their roots, it actually also implies a strong resurgence of a “historicized memory”. This term embodies Nora’s essential critique: that what we are used to calling memory has been “historicized”. It is

30 Ibid, 31.

31 David Lowenthal, ‘Excerpt,’ in The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of history (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 1.

32 Kathleen E. Smith, Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory during the Yeltsin Era (London: Cornell University Press, 2003), 41.

33 Lowenthal, ‘Excerpt,’ 1.

34 Pierre Nora, ‘Entre Mémoire et Histoire. La problématique des lieux,’ in Les Lieux de Mémoire, tome I : La République, ed. Pierre Nora (Paris : Gallimard, 1984), XXV.

35 Kathy Rousselet, ‘Introduction : l’orthodoxie russe aujourd’hui,’ Archives de sciences sociales des religions, no. 162 (July 2013) : 4.

just a really specific, folkloric, type of history, far from what memory is, that is to say the perpetual reactivation of habits and customs. This historicized memory is a modern interpretation of memory in a way that allows the constitution of an identity in spite of the breach between present and past. Pierre Nora calls that a “preservative religion”,36 by means of “archival productivism”. The loss of our “living memory” implies a necessary change of point of view, one that limits memory to its "colder" historical meaning In that way, historicized memory has changed from an evolving concept to a holy conservative religion, that by essence can no longer change. Where memory was spontaneous gestures, habits and skills, it is now a duty centered on individuality rather than on social life and commons. Thus, one could say that the reconstruction of the Cathedral is then somehow an abdication from the national government, in the way that this folkloric elation of history admits the death of the very Russia it refers to. Memory and history have merged.37 The key outcome of this blurred line between the two is the ability it provides for manipulation. Memory is intended to be a certain perception of the course of events from a man’s perspective, while history takes a step back from both personal implication and time. Thereby, while “memory” appears to be a partial take on the passage of time, “history” is considered to be objective, almost as a neutral account of the course of history. Merging both, implies that you can force a biased point of view into being considered objective. This is the manipulation at stake in the reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior.

III/ The Cathedral of Christ the Savior: an obvious memory tool in the wake of massive changes

III/ 1) Context

On the 19th August 2000, the newly built Cathedral of Christ the Savior was consecrated in Moscow,38 118 years after it was originally consecrated. The whole of the highest State and Church society attended this historical event. It was a key moment in the wake of ten years of political turmoil as well as identity and morale vagueness: the consecration of the memorial policy of the new conservative regime in place. At that point in time, the reconstruction of the Cathedral proclaims the canonization of history, of the nation’s legacy, but is however suffused with a profound clash of memories. Because the project does not actually carry the intention to put Russian history on a pedestal, but rather to project the aura of "Great Russia" onto contemporary matters and regimes, thus erasing the parts that wouldn’t fit in this narrative. It is a story of filiation, the denial of seventy years considered to be a sidestep in the natural path of Russian history.39 Here lies the paradox of this reconstruction, the one that historicized memory brings: the confusion of history and memory. The way the project is described and mediatized appears neutral, avoiding clear comments or intentions on communism or the Church's role. It appears the Cathedral has to be rebuilt matter-of-factly, as part of an alleged objective take on Russian history. But in this way, it implements a subversive biased memory in the ambivalent national narrative. Memory becomes a tool to modify history.

Just ten years earlier, in late December 1991, the USSR collapsed in several entities including Russia and former independent republics. With the administrative bureaucracy also fell a

36 Nora, ‘Entre Mémoire et Histoire’, XXVI.

37 Ibid, XXXIV.

38 Henri Tincq, ‘La ligne dure s’impose lors du « concile » de l’Eglise orthodoxe de Russie,’ Le Monde, August 23, 2000, https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/2000/08/23/la-ligne-dure-s-impose-lors-du-concile-de-leglise-orthodoxe-de-russie_3636581_1819218.html

39 Eady, “The Reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior,” 4.

certain set of morale. In fact, the country long rid of the religion dominance instilled a different morality: the leader, the group, the Soviets, were as many institutions that would command behaviors in society in place of the typical pious morale law. Moreover, there was no such thing as pursuing profit so Russian existences couldn’t be shaped by a desire of accumulation nor by the fear of the afterworld: there was a specific Soviet morale. The collapse of the Union leaves a huge gap in this regard, and the post-communist changes involve the redefinition of virtually everything, from social relations to basic meanings.40 In addition, it left a political field of ruins. First, the direct aftermath of the collapse saw the rise of three main ideological blocks: liberals, anti-perestroika communists and tsarist nationalists, that could not seem to find any meeting points, thus paralyzing the country administration. Still, making the most out of America's aura, the liberal party eventually succeeded to access presidency in 1991, and newly enforced liberal laws faced massive discontent. In fact, despite suffering from the lightning implementation of private market and free-enterprise, people faced huge inflation amounts and saw the GDP continuously decrease. Beyond simply revealing itself in highly charged events such as the 1993 constitutional crisis, this violent blighted hope establishes the “end of tomorrow”, the definitive collapse of the belief that future holds something greater.

III/ 2) Project: embodiment of the emerging narrative

Thus, was left an ideological, almost philosophical void. There began the rise of nationalist discourses, looking backward with nostalgia, to times of greatness and pride (see figure V: decay of liberal ideas and rise of nationalism in legislative elections between 1993 and 2003) The political aim is to cement this rootless nation by creating a shared experience. On top of it, calling upon the Greatness of history aims to introduce the idea that there is a Russian nature, recipe for success and resilience. But this alleged “nature” in fact, serves the very purposes of those in power. Indeed, the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was originally built as a way to enforce the cultural doctrine of “autocracy –orthodoxy – nationality”;41 this idea that for a nation to be, it needs a religion and the grace of God, and that this religion implies despotism. This artificial vision of what binds a nation together, is useful to call upon as the establishment or reinforcement of one of the three pillars, allows the others to develop again. Thereby, the reconstruction of the Cathedral, somehow making a parallel between the victory against the French and the one against Communism, allows to summon the Tsarist memory as well as reinstating a religious narrative, in close ties with political power. Monuments are in fact,

V/ Evolution of main parties’ number of seats in the Parliament in the ten years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Source: Personal document using information from Politika.su

40 Smith, Mythmaking in the New Russia, 4. 41 Haskins, “Russia’s Past,”, 35.

“intertextual fragments” reanimated in various discourses of memory,42 and the very destruction of the Cathedral had frozen its original memory project in time. This notion of “intertextual fragments” is key to understanding the stakes that the Cathedral holds in the (re)construction of Russia’s identity: in this country with a complex culture, wrestling with fragments of identity and history, such monuments produce and preserve immaterial concise snapshots that capture events, ambitions and ideologies. The object itself becomes a catalyst (ultimately virtual) that outlives its very physicality. It becomes a physical memory onto which various memories and discourses can bind. This is what ultimately lies in the destruction of the Cathedral: the destruction and the violence itself, as well as the site and scale of the building, create a stronger memory of the Cathedral, and with this very memory remain memories of things it was related to. The objects become “intertextual”, because they allow massive narratives and discourses to exist between the lines, without any actual phrasing. These martyr objects crystallize the causes they associate with: where the presence could have been anecdotal, the absence becomes visible, perhaps more than it has ever been. Understanding the “theoretical” value of “empirical” objects allows to explore the ways in which they can be used, beyond their very destruction, to manipulate or organize specific narratives and political projects. The Cathedral of Christ the Savior then, by means of its reconstruction, is desacralized once again, as it becomes a vulgar repository for various ambitions. But on the contrary, and this is somehow the main entanglement regarding the complexity of this very topic, such buildings, though allowing manipulation also enable a certain resiliency to maneuvering, due to the fact that they precisely exist beyond discourses, and beyond their own physicality.

In the troubled Russia we described, the first step towards binding the nation together, that the Cathedral allows, is opposing the widely recognized crimes that have affected the people. Because beyond mechanically opposing the Soviet regime as a way to affirm the filiation with the tsarist regime, modern Russia also sees a common enemy in the Communist rule. Both democrats and liberal Christians (the strongest political ideologies in the direct aftermath of the collapse) see the destruction of the Cathedral as a symbol of collective suffering,43 being a constant reminder of the many other crimes of Stalin against the people. Thus, rebuilding the cathedral is an effective act of erasure and of repentance, trying to act as a strong symbol of collective healing. It erases the “mistakes” of the past, considering Soviet history apart from Russian history, and reconnecting with the direct line of legacy: pre-1917 The USSR era becomes a side-step. Then, because building collective memory only on negative affects and traumas cannot be sustainable, the Cathedral also tries to bring positive feelings into the reconstruction of memory. It calls to the three pillars of "autocracy-orthodoxy-nationality" in order to create feelings of pride and national unity.

Nationality first, by calling upon the tsarist narrative of “Russian distinctiveness” though also notably claimed by Stalinism. In fact, the very object of the Cathedral is the embodiment of this concept: from the neo-byzantine architecture to the patriotic war it recalls, it proudly stands for the uniqueness of Russian culture and history. The reconstruction uses this narrative as such, as well as building an interesting parallel with the “Great Patriotic War” of 1945, with names of fallen soldiers updated within the Cathedral.44 It can also be seen as a sign that Russia has not lost touch with its past, its skills and aesthetics, in a kind of critique of the dematerialization of Western culture and heritage. In fact, it would appear as an emblem of strength and unity of modern Russia, not yet weakened by Western modernity, even after the liberal reforms were

42 Ibid, 38.

43 Gentes, “Life, Death and Resurrection”, 86.

44 Haskins, “Russia’s Past,”, 43.

put in place.45 Thereby, “great craftsmanship” and strong historical connection reinforce the nationalist narrative of “Russian distinctiveness”.

Then, the Cathedral binds the people and the nation, with religion, by means of “Christ the Savior” and religious iconography. Has the Christ saved Russia once again? According to official discourses, it might be, as Boris Yeltsin put it “we all need repentance” after the Soviet era,46 and the people should go back under the heel of religion. While appearing as the easiest way to reinstate morals and rules, this religious resurgence characterized by the incredible spending of 300 million dollars for the reconstruction,47 serves a precise political agenda. As elaborated on Marxism, religious resurgence can be seen as a willing project to form an apathetic mass after the turbulent event of the early 1990’s. But moreover, it serves a despotic project.

In fact, making God the highest judge of mankind’s actions sets a certain frame for autocracy. Yeltsin famously said “Only the Lord can command me to resign

I serve the Lord and the people”.48 But God’s affinities are artificially built, notably by entities such as the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, and they are easily influenced. What the Cathedral did in 1883, it does in 2000 as well: institute the idea that there is a natural Russian appeal to autocracy, and that it is part of its history, from 1812 to 1945 and beyond. This is what the systematic connection artificially built between “autocracy-orthodoxy-nationality” serves, a habituation to these regimes that yet have nothing inherent to any culture. This appeal towards autocratic legacy is significant in the history of the Cathedral as well as modern Russia. In fact, recently, the city of Moscow installed a statue of Tsar Alexander II, during whose reign the cathedral was initially built, on the very site of the reconstruction.49 In doing so, as well as canonizing the Romanov family within the rebuilt cathedral in August 2000,50 the regime clearly ties the meaning of this reconstruction with the idea of a strong state and leadership, based on the old tsarist regime

III/ 3) Limits: criticism of the aims and means

Still, some criticism arises, as a response to this deliberate misuse and manipulation of history, as well as to the underlying despotic ambitions. In fact, many experts, clergypersons and political groups criticize the obvious political will behind this reconstruction, in spite of all common sense. The project does not make sense from an administrative perspective as it implies huge spendings in times of deep economic crisis, “in a country with millions of homeless”.51 It does not make any sense from an architect’s perspective either, as it testifies “historical arrogance”52 regarding the definitive disappearance of skills and splendors. In fact, the Cathedral proves this criticism was justified, as it was built with a concrete structure and historically marble statues were made in bronze, for the sculpting craftmanship had disappeared. The reconstruction does not make any sense either from a historical perspective, as it instills historical contempt, stating that one can destroy and rebuild as they please. Ultimately, and more ironically maybe, it does not make sense “religiously”: the

45 Ibid, 42.

46 Parks, “Yeltsin Sheds Atheism.”

47 Gentes, “Life, Death and Resurrection”, 86.

48 Parks, “Yeltsin Sheds Atheism.”

49 Haskins, “Russia’s Past,”, 49.

50 Ian Traynor, “Russian makes Saints of its Imperial Martyrs,” The Guardian, August 15, 2000. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/aug/15/russia.iantraynor

51 Eady, “The Reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior,” 14.

52 Haskins, “Russia’s Past,”, 45.

gigantism of the project and the spendings instill “some proud thoughts; God forbid” a Moscow priest says.53

Finally, this project does not radiate from a popular request nor from any obvious arbitration: it is a very clear deliberate political project stemming only from the highest political leaders. The artificiality of this decision, of the politicians’ beliefs, and the cathedral itself draw a parallel with the artificiality of the memory policy in place. All leaders in charge from Yeltsin to Mayor Luzkhov went from searing agnostics to fervent believers, even getting baptized at the age of 61 for Yeltsin’s case:54 their faith was a tool at the service of their careers. The cathedral was rebuilt in outrageous manners, on top of a completely new conference room and with completely anachronistic construction materials. As the State and the Church show discontent for the people, they try to react. After many years of confusion between political and religious, attacking one is attacking both. As of recently, the international proposal for Moscow’s patriarch to be sanctioned, as part of a plan to weaken the government, is significant of the superposition of both these powers.55 But more directly related to the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, is the performance by Pussy Riot, that took place in the Cathedral on February 21, 2012. The feminist punk band performed a specifically anti-Putin ‘punk Te Deum’. The conflation between the secular and the sacred has reached such extents that blasphemy has become lese majesty and vice versa. But what the performance underlines particularly to me, is the power of what lives intertextually within the Cathedral. Eliot

Borenstein, journalist,

summons a haunted fantasy, that I believe is very appropriate.56 The repeated stamping of sacred objects on this site, whether religious or ideological, has turned it into a ghost house where all these images of the past cohabit silently. Each time though, they are in fact kept under silence by a more recent layer of “sacredness” that veils the whole site. If, though, this ultimate

53 Parks, “Yeltsin Sheds Atheism.”

54 Haskins, “Russia’s Past,”, 45.

55 “Ukraine: Bruxelles propose de sanctionner le chef de l’Eglise orthodoxe Russe,“ Europe 1, May 4, 2022, https://www.europe1.fr/international/ukraine-bruxelles-propose-de-sanctionner-le-chef-de-leglise-orthodoxerusse-4109474

56 Eliot Borenstein, “Holy appropriate: why Pussy Riot and the Cathedral of Christ the Savior are a match made in heaven,” The Calvert Journal, January 22, 2014, https://www.calvertjournal.com/articles/show/1983/christthe-saviour-moscow-pussy-riot

VI/ Performance of the Pussy Riot in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior on February 21, 2012. Source: Consequence.net.

layer peels off, perhaps all others can resurface and become powerful political tools, as testifies the violence of the political repression against Pussy Riot. This performance sums up what I have tried to bring to light concerning the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. That, beyond the very object itself, lies a rooted narrative of iconoclasm. That the history of this palimpsest-building as well as the physical shape it allows ideologies to take, creates a certain call to iconoclasm. The icon in fact, creates a catalyst (as Haskins says) that can certainly allow official narratives to set in, but also -and perhaps mainly- allows ideological contradiction and political violence to become tangible and physical. And it also brings to light the very contemporary contradictions of the building, beyond the historical ones that have shaped the site. In fact, when Pussy Riot do use a satirical religious (sacred) piece such as the Te Deum to draw a risible parallel with Putin’s rule, it is considered offensive and blasphemous. It is considered iconoclast and thus reprehensible But when the Church and State do use an almost just as much inviolable figure as Peter the Great57, to underline the greatness of the reconstruction and the officials behind the project, it is not in any way considered blameworthy anymore. Yet, such cheap and cardboard-cut-out treatment of the almost sacred figure that is Peter the Great in Russia, could be clearly considered iconoclast. The argument thus ultimately comes back to this idea that the objects and the icons bear certain things in essence (acquired through history and discourses) but that they can also be twisted in many ways. And that if their aura can be used as a political tool by those that claim their heritage, it can also be used by their opponents. The memorial architectural objects, though tangible and deeply rooted in history, are extremely malleable. Here, without attacking the sacred objects themselves, uses the charged history and narrative of the Cathedral to acquire the same power. This has been recurrent in the history of this building This cathedral, its aura of sacredness and of various ideological discourses, remains (beyond any criticism that we can hear of regarding the artificialness of the reconstruction) an iconic political stage, most contemporary and most subversive. As surprising as it might be for a neo-byzantine cathedral to be contemporary and subversive, it appears the official manipulation has called for a popular, punk one: the vacuity of the official ideological narrative around this object, has left room for another reappropriation. A reappropriation that uses the inherent historical background of the building as a tool of empowerment, as well as the norms of religious practices, to have a strong and relatively safe stage for the band's ideas, for opposing to artificiality of the official construction. Where is in fact, beyond speeches and discourses, the great Orthodoxy of the 19th century, the incorruptible ties between Church and State? Where is traditional RussianOrthodox craftsmanship? Nowhere, all of these have vanished and the reconstruction is the clear proof of that: the world we refer to does not exist anymore, but we wish to act as if, for its aura blesses us, they would appear to say. The object has been desacralized by those who expressly refer to its sacredness, and it thus calls for new icons and a new set of morals and political views to use its inherent political power. The repression of Pussy Riot performance shows, as well as the indignation among Russians regarding their harsh treatments and sentences,58 that the values and the narrative they have attacked by means of the Cathedral do not tangibly exist in the country anymore, and their action reveals such hypocrisy. The building is deliberately used politically to project a vision of Russia, of its culture, of its identity, that does not refer to anything practical in contemporary Russia.

57 A 100 meters high kitschy statue of Peter the Great has been erected in 1997 to commemorate his rule. Similarly, a proud and aggressive statue of Alexander II has been erected on the site of the Cathedral in 2005. 58 Nathalie Ouvaroff-Blime, “Condamnation des Pussy Riot: la Russie se divise,” Huffington Post, August 20, 2012, https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/nathalie-ouvaroffblime/proces-pussy-riot-retombees_b_1809102.html.

This is the inherent paradox of the Cathedral’s reconstruction: while claiming such works to be made in respect for history, it rejects its evident spontaneous course. The reconstruction projects a subjective point of view on events onto the allegedly objective course of history. It highlights the very political project of those in power: while calling themselves “nationalists”, they indeed have very few respects for the nation. The nation they worship is not the one boisterous people that springs onto the course of events, nor the fascinating organic development of a culture; but rather a never-changing picturesque vision, a snapshot of a long-gone civilization. The cathedral is the ultimate gesticulation of a corrupted interpretation of history, stained with corruption, over-zealousness and sin of pride; very long way from a certain orthodoxy-imbued aristocracy.

Annex 1: results of the presidential elections in 1991 and 1996. Source: data from Wikipedia and personal document. The juxtaposed results show a wave of hope in liberal reforms in the direct aftermath of the collapse, followed by a strong backlash.

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