Agora 18

COMMUNITY

COMMUNITY

University of Michigan

A. Alfred Taubman College of Architecture and Urban Planning

Agora Journal of Urban Planning and Design Volume 18: 2024

The Agora Journal of Urban Planning and Design in an annual, student-run, peer-reviewed publication of the University of Michigan’s A. Alfred Taubman College of Architecture and Urban Planning

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The views and opinions expressed in this journal reflect only those of the individual authors and not those of the Agora Journal of Urban Planning and Design. Every reasonable attempt has been made to identify owners of copyright. Errors or omissions will be corrected in subsequent editions. All figures are created by authors unless otherwise noted.

Ann Arbor

Christopher Fletcher

Previous Editions

AGORA

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CHANGE

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ENDURANCE AND ADAPTATION

CONNECTION

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ALTERNATIVES

DIVISIONS

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A18 BOARD

EDITORS IN-CHIEF

Revati Thatte

Marisol Mendez

CREATIVE DIRECTORS

Upasana Roy Lawson Schultz

SYMPOSIUM DIRECTORS

Vaidehi Shah sara faraj

BLOG AND WEBSITE MANAGER

Isabella Beshouri

Vanessa Lekaj

DEPUTY EDITORS IN-CHIEF

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Jessie Williams

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A18 STAFF

Andy Larsen Anuriti Singh Celine Shaji

Cleo Randall Kraig Sims Roy Khoury

Yuyang Ma LAYOUT EDITORS

Faculty Advisor’s Letter

DR. SCOTT CAMPBELL

It gives me great pleasure to welcome this year’s volume of Agora. In 2006, a small but ambitious team of master’s students went against the tide of skeptics and launched this journal, navigating from initial inspiration through volunteer recruitment, article solicitation, editing, fund-raising, and publication. This process has unfailingly persisted through heavy course loads, budget cuts, graduate student strikes, blizzards, campus protests, the crunch of winter semester capstone projects, and the Zoomlinked dark days of COVID.

One power of this student-led journal is to hear the voices of the next generation of planners, designers, and urbanists. Unencumbered by historical convention, these authors are freer to explore contemporary challenges beyond the confines of the classroom. They are not afraid to ask hard questions and point out injustices. The themes of these articles are richly varied, though a leitmotif is the unsettling, crisis-filled times we live in.

One author explores the historical burden of racial segregation, displacement, and foreclosure, all in the larger context of racial capitalism. Another author critiques the superficially sensible yet highly detrimental restrictions on where former felons can live in New York City, making homelessness an even greater risk. Yet another author explores community land ownership models

as a promising path towards affordability for manufactured housing. This analysis of structural inequality and marginalization extends into international contexts, including an article on the twin legacies of colonization and modernist architecture in Cameroon.

Sustainability and environmental justice also emerge as powerful themes. One team explores impending climate migration and the need to adapt architectural designs for displaced residents. Another critically examines the legacy of Detroit’s industrial history and the failure of environmental regulations and local planning to protect vulnerable populations. A third author takes on the persistent problem of the automobile’s dominance in Panaji, India, threatening environmental health and crowding out users of public spaces. A final article takes a different view of the city: a poetic narrative of the vibrant sidewalk life in Hanoi.

The faculty and staff offer our wholehearted congratulations to the authors and Agora staff, especially co-editors Revati Thatte and Marisol Mendez, for a job well done. We appreciate your tireless efforts to sustain and nurture this vital platform for new and brave voices for urban innovation and social change.

Scott Campbell Faculty co-adviser

(with Julie Steiff)

Editor’s Letter

REVATI, MARISOL, CALVIN AND REBECCA

Each edition of the Agora Journal of Urban Planning and Design acts as a time capsule that strives to capture the most pressing problems in urban planning. The essence of urban planning is to pursue and faithfully serve the public interest, meaning that while we reenvision our communities, we must also be aware of ideals and factors that endanger their safety and wellbeing. Additionally, in a time when misinformation threatens to upend society as we know it, the need for a strong sense of community becomes ever more urgent. As fundamental planning theories become more mainstream — think walkable neighborhoods with safer streets, climate action plans centered around environmental justice, and collective housing options accessible to all — the underlying question of what it means to build a future that works for everyone still lingers in the air.

Agora’s 18th installment, Community, aims to answer that question. Interpretations of “community” vary widely, as seen in our excellent selection of pieces this year. Student contributors from schools across the University of Michigan detail heritage and history that makes us who we are today. From the modes of transit that make discovering a new city possible to the vibrant street life that characterizes public spaces, our authors not only suggest improvements that can increase social cohesion, but also pay tribute to the natural human tendency to build

community. Students also delve into some of the more thorny and wicked problems of the past that impact communities of tomorrow, including long-standing public health crises and outdated criminal justice policies. Our hope is that this edition of Agora challenges traditional thinking and illuminates a path towards more accessible spaces for everyone.

The book you hold in your hands is a labor of love created by a community of planners, architects, and urban designers. This edition of Agora stands on the shoulders of 18 years of student-led scholarship, nurtured and nourished by the outstanding faculty and student body at Taubman College. We are immensely grateful to our student editorial board for the countless hours spent editing and designing the journal; to faculty and doctoral students who graciously shared their expertise and enhanced our selected pieces; and to our ever-so-supportive faculty advisers, Julie Steiff and Scott Campbell, for their guidance along the way.

We hope you enjoy Agora 18.

Marisol Mendez and Revati Thatte Editors-in-Chief

Calvin Blackburn and Rebecca Griswold Deputy Editors

Setting Up Sex Offenders for Failure: How the intersection of law and city planning exposes sex offenders to longer prison sentences

Trust and Deed: The Communal Ownership of Manufactured Housing

Bed-Stuy is Losing Blackness: A Case Study Exploration of Racial Capitalism, Gentrification, and Foreclosure.

Acknowledgements

The publication of Agora 18 was made possible by the Taubman Endowment Fund.

We would also like to thank the following individuals for their time and expertise in conducting peer reviews for Agora 18:

JONATHAN LEVINE

RICHARD NORTON

MORGAN FETT

LAUREN HOOD

MARÍA ARQUERO DE ALARCÓN

We would also like to give special thanks to our faculty advisors, Dr. Scott Campbell and Dr. Julie Steiff.

WEBSITE + BLOG @ agoragram

The Last Shall be First:

How Colonization Defines the Urban Fabric in Cameroon

PHILIPPE KAME

Master of Architecture

ABSTRACT

The colonial encounter between the indigenous populations of Cameroon and Europeans was a rocky one, fraught with unfairness and horrors that deeply impacted the lives of these populations and radically shifted the course of their histories. Cultural power, as the most conspicuous form of soft power,1 was heavily exploited by the colonial authorities in subjugating the indigenous populations. Their values, beliefs, and worldviews were all supplanted and dominated by European ideologies leading to an acculturation. This cultural genocide has had as many destructive effects as human genocides affecting the formation of modern African societies for years to come. While this essay is primarily focused on uncovering the formation of the urban environment in Cameroon, this research also offered an interesting account and clearer understanding of the urban African experiences under colonial domination. Before the 1980s, rural societies and agrarian studies were believed to offer a more authentic account of Africa than cities,2 as many believed cities were the result of Western machinations on the continent. The growing interest in the lives of Africans under colonial rule brought cities to life as nexus points for a better understanding of colonial rule. Such a research thesis might be problematic on its own but it offers the primary sources on which the author based their findings. Thus, starting with a brief history of colonialism in Cameroon, the paper proceeds with discussions of urban projects and architecture in the main city of Douala under German and French occupation. These discussions will offer a point of departure towards understanding the formation of the urban environment in Douala, before exposing the issues with these urban environments and attempting to trace their origins back to colonialism. This will present ways in which Cameroonians have tried to forge new paths for themselves while navigating their complex urban environments.

Figure 1. On the way to Douala.

Source: Photograph by John Taylor. International Mission Photography Archive, Ca.1860Ca.1960, Bibliothèque Du Défap, University of Southern California

INTRODUCTION

Cameroon can be seen as a unique case due to its colonial history. The country has witnessed the occupation of not one, but three different colonial powers: first Germany, then followed by Great Britain and France after World War I. The impact of these different forms of urbanization, logic, and administration made its cities quite heterogeneous.1 Moreover, it is important to note colonial rule was never full, but always partial and mixed in itself.2 Colonial rule was always rearranged and/ or distorted as it was implemented to adapt and better dominate. Yet in the face of global economic restructuring, particular economic arrangements, cultural inclinations, and forms of external engagement during the post-colonial period, African cities developed differences that made them singular.3

In Cameroon, the city of Douala offers the best account of the colonial history of the country. Its geographical location on the coast of Cameroon led it to be the first point of contact European adventurers had with the rest of the territory, making it the epicenter of all colonial enterprises in Cameroon, be it the European penetration, resistance movements to colonial occupation, and the struggles for independence. Therefore, through social, political, economic, and cultural changes induced by the colonial presence, relations have been forged between the indigenous populations of Douala and the Europeans. The city of Douala today retains much of its colonial footprint as we will see later.

Indeed, most of the urban planning of the city was a colonial invention still in existence. Goerg points out: “If it is obvious that colonization did not import the city in Africa,

Figure 2. “European Hospital.”

Source: International Mission Photography Archive, Ca.1860-Ca.1960, Bibliothèque Du Défap, University of Southern California.

it can, however, be stated that the majority of Africans access the city via the colonial city and that, in the long-term dynamics that mark the continent, the colonial period of the city is a highlight of urbanization.4” Furthermore, urban planning during the colonial era was the result of an architectural legacy.5 Thus, keeping in mind most of these artifacts are still standing today, Zourmba Ousmanou, a Ph.D. researcher at the Università degli Studi di Genova, poses the compelling question if it is worth referring to colonial architecture in Africa as a heritage site. If this architecture were erected in celebration of the former oppressor, to what extent can they become heritage sites? Can the remaining colonial built environment convey cultural or historical significance to the communities in whose territories they are located?

Archives of the German protectorate were destroyed during the First World War and, as such, the colonial-built environment remains the principal witness of a history that impacted the whole nation. Furthermore, as Zourmba Ousmaniu advances, these buildings symbolize collective memories. These structures are tangible traces of the country’s colonial past, and their heritage value must be separated from the ideological rejection of colonial systems. As such, if we are to retain colonialism as a useful concept to

grasp African urban histories, an appreciation is required of the different influences that were brought to bear on urban spaces.6 I wish to make it clear that I am not of that school of thought that claims colonialism brought with it some benefits to African societies—its horrors are too many to see any kind of advantages to it. However, the colonial encounter metamorphosed African societies to the point where its citizens could only learn to adapt and reappropriate their history.

URBANISM AND ARCHITECTURE UNDER GERMAN RULE

The German occupation of Douala, Cameroon translates to an impressive revamping of the landscape to create a “little Berlin” in Douala. Urbanization was heavily promoted by the Germans in an attempt to in the creation of modern European centers was only partially realized as World War I broke out, and the conquest of the Allied Forces in September 19147 ultimately led to the establishment of the French Mandate over Cameroon.

Just as urban planning provided the German colonial government an opportunity to extend its control through public infrastructure, architecture was another tool exploited to mark German presence in the region. It is important to note that in the case of architecture, most of it was experimentation.8 Because architecture was to stand as a symbol of colonial domination, most of the styles and methods in which buildings were constructed were directly imported from Europe. However, colonial authorities would soon realize European models were not necessarily adapted to the local climate and context and would, thus, embark on iterative processes.

Mindful to register their presence in the region in the long-term, Germans would switch their approach to building in Douala using imported

materials from Hamburg such as wood, brick, cement, sheet metal, and tile, just to name a few.9 Plans for administrative buildings were not produced locally, but from Berlin; yet, the historian Jacques Soulilou notes that German architecture from the colonial period, unlike other colonial powers, developed free from any direct design influences that can be explicitly linked to what was happening at the same time in Europe. As mentioned earlier, colonial architecture under the German protectorate was full of experimentation as they adapted imported styles from Europe and adapted them to the local climatic conditions. For example, the Doecker buildings in Cameroon can be seen as Art Deco through their formal qualities but adapted to the local climate through elevated substructures to prevent moisture penetration and double roofs for solar insulation.10

Some examples of other administrative buildings included the headquarters of the first government of colonial Cameroon, constructed similarly to most buildings of German royalty. The building rested on a base one meter high, the walls were laid in bricks, and the floors were made of imported metal planks. The ceilings were made of corrugated iron laid on metal joists and covered with a layer of cement. Finally, the roof was made of wood covered with tarred cardboard11 The main wing had eleven rooms.

The residential facility for the Colonial Governor-General, built in 1901, was a reproduction of the Schloss, a vintage German stately mansion that featured 72 bedrooms.12 Such a structure, in addition to the German police headquarters (Polizeitruppe Kamerun),13 built in 1889, is still standing strong today and serves administrative purposes to the local government. It is also important to note that the diffusion of architectural models takes place in a very restricted population group. As Soulilou explains: “European aristocracy or notable Duala, without forgetting the

numerous religious congregations which show proof of an astonishing uniformity. The vast majority of the Duala people living in the periphery continue to build as their ancestors did, except that there appear roofs covered with corrugated iron (German influence) and that new constraints related to urban development plans have also made their appearance.14”

URBANISM AND ARCHITECTURE UNDER THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE

Just like the Germans, architecture and urban planning for the French represented an opportunity to terrorize the natives and, thus, better dominate them. As such, these projects represented a visible expression of Western concepts of beauty and order. The imposing size of some of these constructions served the main purpose of domination and intimidation by virtue of their direct reference to the inordinate power and resourcefulness of their builders. Germany’s loss during World War I led to the distribution of its former colonies among the Allied powers; Cameroon was placed under the mandated control of France and Britain as a result. For France, the immediate reflex was to erase all traces of German presence in the territory, both intangible and physical. They quickly realized, however, that this might not be the ideal course of action and decided to retain some of Germany’s physical presence in Douala and Yaoundé and build upon them, often changing and redesigning them to suit a French hegemony. France’s infrastructural endeavor in Cameroon could also be seen as experimental as a result, and on the other hand, was more functionalist rather than aesthetics.

The period after the war is marked by a phase that aimed at restarting infrastructural projects left by the Germans, such as the port of Douala, which in 1927 was equipped with

a four-berth dock.15 A 1700m long maritime boulevard was also constructed, which later on would stimulate the establishment of trading houses.16 Concurrently, the French administration engaged in the development of a whole administrative apparatus, like the Germans before them, which included varied sectors like health, law, transportation, and commerce.

Earlier, we talked about the division of the urban space in Douala into two halves comprising a “European city” and an “African city.” Such an urban scheme would also be taken over by the French and developed even further. We see the apparition of “Cités” such as “la Cité des Douanes” in Akwa and la “Cité Chardy” at Bassa for railway executives in 1951.17 These Cité are mostly characterized by an agglomeration of tall buildings, most of which serve social housing purposes, the first of which has been erected on the edge of the cliff of the Joss Plateau. The urban division goes further, and we see the appearance of five zones: A, B, and C partitioning the city of Douala into housing and commercial zones.18

Zone A corresponds to housing and commerce all at once. Geographwically, Zone A is part of the European city on the edge of the Wouri River. Neighborhoods, such as Bali, founded in 1929 are attached to the zone, as well as part of Akwa, founded in 1938.19 In Zone A, the part of Akwa attached to it is its main commercial section, while neighborhoods such as Bali and Bonapriso are residential and Bonanjo administrative, all of which are for and by immigrants from Europe. This progressive expansion of the European city eventually pushed the natives further inland and up north.20

Zone B only serves housing purposes, as well as small commerce by the natives (what the French call “artisanat” (or craft in English). We thus move away from the center and further up north into the African city in

neighborhoods such as Deido and New Bell, as well as on the other side of the river in Bonaberi.21 Infrastructure in this zone mainly served the natives but had to go through authorization by the French authorities beforehand and follow European construction standards.

On the other hand, Zone C is defined as “traditional construction” and cannot be identified by any specific name.22 Geographically, however, it stretches from the extreme borders of the central zone at certain locations to the limit between the city and the rural area. No regulations governed this area and the kind of constructions that could be found follow traditional methods and aesthetics.

Although the architecture under the French mandate remained experimental and functionality was the principal concern, the landscape in Douala became more akin to the history of modern architecture in Europe. By this, I essentially mean architectural forms that appeared in the landscape could be attached to specific European styles, unlike the Germans. This could suggest an unwillingness by the French to develop a completely new architectural language as they tried to import a culture as is.23

Another difference in the architectural landscape under the French mandate is the appearance of large texts on the façade of public buildings. Some spelled “Chamber of Commerce,” “Courthouse,” or even “Native Hospital.” Soulilou reports this new architectural marquee is in line with the part didactic mission of the colonists under the requirement of the League of Nations to presumably prepare the natives for independence24

Ornamentation is featured predominantly in this architecture; art deco style aesthetics mixed with ornaments inspired by the

vegetation appear above the openings on the ground floors; 1930s style balustrades with square or cylindrical balusters would become a noticeable design feature at the windows and along the terraces that border the cliff.25 Additionally, a system of large openings arranged all around the building that allows for free circulation of air becomes predominant. Facades are imposed with repetitive rectangular modules, which the balustrades come to underline. The interior

“THE COLONIAL BUILT ENVIRONMENT TODAY

The interest of the French and German administrations to inscribe their presence in Cameroon over a long period led to considerable investment in architectural and urban projects, giving rise to quality constructions that lasted decades beyond their occupation.26 Moreover, their continuous

The interior distribution includes a vestibule located in the octagonal or square projection, followed by a living-dining room, generally separated from the first room by a low wall. On either side of this central space, doors open giving access to the bedrooms and the bathroom. The kitchen is relegated outside. This plan resumes, after all, the provision traditional, as noted above.”

of these constructions is also worth noting. Soulilou explains: The evolution of architecture in Europe corresponds to the architectural landscape change under the French mandate; hence, in 1955, villas akin to the international style started making their appearance in the neighborhoods of Zone A, such as Bonandjo.36

use by the Cameroonian governments post-independence made them resistant to the vestiges of their time. As AbdouMaliq Simone, Fellow at the Urban Institute of the University of Sheffield, effectively puts it, they are futuristic buildings built with a sharp approach.

Source: Rives Coloniales: Architectures, De Saint-Louis a Douala Edited by Jacques Soulilou

Figure 3. Douala Chamber of Commerce.

Many of these vestiges are still standing today: for example, the Palace of the Prince Manga Ndumbe and the Tsekenis building have been reconfigured into entertainment and administrative spaces, respectively. The German Colonial Bridge, while no longer in use, nevertheless remains a landmark in the nation marking the collective memories as the country’s first bridge constructed in 1902 – it remains a popular tourist attraction in the city of Buea today. Administrative buildings, such as the Chancellor’s Schloss today, have been reconfigured into the governor’s house in Buea, while the stately National Museum of Cameroon in Yaounde previously served as a residence to the French governor in the 1930s.

Colonial urban planning schemes can still be identified today in the city of Douala, notably in its division into zones. Zone A, for example, still serves residential and commercial purposes, and mainly houses European

4.

A fourth zone has been added over time, Zone D, reserved for factories as Douala expanded its manufacturing capacity. These colonial urban schemes have had a deep impact on how the cities of Douala and Yaoundé have attempted to redefine themselves following independence. Nationalism brought a willingness to break free from any form of influence from previous colonial powers, yet the government of Ahidjo, the nation’s first president, just like the French colonial administration seemed to have mostly built upon what was already present. The division of the city of Douala along class and even racial lines today, akin to gentrification in Western countries, traces its origins to the colonial period. Nevertheless, it is commonly argued that African states performed reasonably well in the first decade following their independence.27

Pagoda” because of its architecture. Source: Rives Coloniales: Architectures, De Saint-Louis a Douala Edited by Jacques Soulilou

immigrants today—the neighborhoods of Bonandjo and Bonapriso are still termed as European cities as a result. Moreover, a division can be observed between Zone A and Zone C and B (which mainly houses middleand lower-class citizens of the city). While this division becomes blurry with time, this segregation of sorts happening in the city today can be traced back to colonialism.

The attempt of these states to transform national, political, and administrative apparatuses that were ill-suited for modernization expedited their development. Budgets were pushed beyond their limits to address the costs needed for physical and social infrastructure as well as to configure viable social contracts to provide frameworks for social cohesion, even if they

Figure

The Palace of Prince Auguste Manga Ndumbe, “The

were to be temporary.28 This, unfortunately, led to an erosion of the political capacities of these societies leading to the imposition of regimes that establish enclaves of fiscal administrative capacity distanced from real engagements with either local social processes or institutions. As is particularly the case for Cameroon, many African states no longer make the symbolic efforts to demonstrate concern for the welfare of their

Figure 5. Tropical Modernism as seen in the Hall of Douala.

Source: International Mission Photography Archive, Ca.1860-Ca.1960, Bibliothèque Du Défap, University of Southern California.

populations, and discourses surrounding participatory governance have largely become performances deployed to attract the interests of donors (international lenders such as the IMF, or World Bank mainly).29 This leads to the phenomenon of “laissez faire” where the urban fabric of the city is dictated by its citizen.30

The city of Douala has witnessed impressive growth over the years since its founding. Before World War II, the city reached a population count of 40,000 inhabitants, a number that decreased during the war, then rose again after 1947 to 60,000 inhabitants.31 The city reached a milestone in 1954 and had a population of over 100,000. 7 years later, this number almost doubled, while the European population in the city also experienced a steady rise in parallel. This growth can partly be attributed to the Autonomous Port of Douala which reached a capacity of 1 million The city reached a milestone in 1954 and had

a population of over 100,000. 7 years later, this number almost doubled, while the European population in the city also experienced a steady rise in parallel. This growth can partly be attributed to the Autonomous Port of Douala which reached a capacity of 1 million tons by 1960 and has acted as a demographic attractor throughout the city’s history. The 1970s marked a decade characterized by major housing projects through the central government that promoted social housing and in part funded by the World Bank.34 Various state agencies were, thus, created to this effect to support planned housing areas and the restructuring of neighborhoods such as the Société Immobilière du Cameroun (SIC) in 1952, alongside the Crédit Foncier du Cameroun (CFC) in 1977 and the Mission d’Aménagement et d’Équipement des Terrains Urbains et Ruraux (MAETUR) in 1980.34

This continuous growth attributed Douala (the economic capital of Cameroon) and Yaounde (its capital city) to the roles as poles of complex financial centers at the national and international levels. The urbanization rate in Douala reached 52% in 2010, and the city itself housed 21.3% of the total population and 43.7% of the urban population.35 Eventually, with such fast-increasing urbanization, social infrastructures, accommodations as well as environmental settlements became overwhelmed with environmental degradation as a result. Despite this promising investment in public infrastructure by the new government, the rapid urbanization of the cities of Douala and Yaounde led to a crisis in the management of their urban spaces. Elvis Kah observes that most urban actors in the country are not town planners nor landscapers and the decision-makers have no basic training in the field of town planning. Indeed, if urban planning became formally established in Western countries in the 1930s.36then its application in new urban landscapes might require time to understand how these new cities function. These “urban

planners” in reality were politicians whose decisions went to satisfy politics rather than technical aspects.37 This leads to cities that do not follow specific logic and grow without preconceived plans, master development, and landscape planning. Bessengue represents one of Douala’s quarters where the struggle for remaking urban life has been most marked and often confusing.38 Bessengue is one of the city’s largest market areas, yet most of the markets in the cities of Yaounde and Douala in Cameroon exist with no pre-conceived plans, they are considered areas of insecurity, urban decay, insalubrity, and urban disorder that reflect urban poverty.39

Therefore, as Daniel Immerwhar—Professor of History at Northwestern University and author of The Politics of Architecture and Urbanism in Postcolonial Lagos— explains in the case of Lagos, Douala’s similarly rapidly urbanizing yet low-capital aspect can rightfully be assumed to be a continuation of colonial economic patterns. Such a continuation has also been encouraged by new world economic and political orders in which many African cities were thrown immediately after independence, as they were required to rapidly “modernize,” but not on their terms, but following Western standards and ideals of modernity. Many scholars, such as Immerwhar and AbdouMaliq Simone, have noticed the informal economies that have gained prominence over the years and characterized many African cities such as Douala resulting from rapid urbanization and lack of clear economic infrastructure. Contemporary Douala emerged from the relations of federated but autonomous towns.40 that were only nominally subsumed within the colonial and postcolonial logic of urban development.41 A phenomenon arises whereby the Cameroonian youth, in particular, can perform certain kinds of circulations; intersecting territories (towns) as means of substantiating local places.42 These urban residents are concerned about what kinds of games, languages, sightlines, etc can be

put in play to anticipate new alignments of social initiatives and resources.34 This show of resiliency and ability to strategically engage new forms of urban regulation primarily elaborated elsewhere leads to a kind of urban elasticity, as AbdouMaliq puts it, that provides a multiplicity of ways in and out, while at the same time, leaving cities either excessively fluid or sedentary. Thus, these “informal” economies lead to processes of ‘‘normative’’ urbanization as such activities themselves act as a platform for the creation of a very different kind of sustainable urban configuration for Cameroonian citizens. These informal economies represent how Cameroonians have attempted to negotiate with colonial cities opposed to them on their terms.

ENDNOTES

1. Simone, AbdouMaliq. For the City Yet to Come: Changing African Life in Four Cities. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004.

2. Schler, Lynn. 2002. “The Strangers of New Bell: Immigration, Community and Public Space in Colonial Douala, Cameroon, 1914–1960.” PhD diss., Stanford University.

3. Simone, AbdouMaliq. For the City Yet to Come: Changing African Life in Four Cities. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004.

4. Ibid

5. Ousmanou, Zara. “Meanings and Significance of Colonial Architecture in Douala, Cameroon.” Southampton: W I T Press, 2019.

6. Ibid

7. Ibid Schler, Lynn. 2002. “The Strangers of New Bell: Immigration, Community and Public Space in Colonial Douala, Cameroon, 1914–1960.” PhD diss., Stanford University.

8. Ibid Ousmanou, Zara. “Meanings and Significance of Colonial Architecture in Douala, Cameroon.” Southampton: W I T Press, 2019..

9. Ibid Mark, Peter. “Books -- Rives Coloniales: Architectures, De Saint-Louis a Douala Edited by Jacques Soulilou.” African Arts 28, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 18

10. Osayimwese, Ithohan. “The Colonial Origins of Modernist Prefabrication.” In Colonialism and Modern Architecture in Germany, 187-210, 225-241. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017.

11. Mark, Peter. 1995. “Books -- Rives Coloniales: Architectures, De Saint-Louis a Douala Edited by Jacques Soulilou.” African Arts 28 (2) (Spring): 18

12. Njoh, Ambe J., and Liora Bigon. “Germany and the deployment of urban planning to create, reinforce and maintain power in colonial Cameroon.” Habitat International 49 (2015): 10-20

13. Ousmanou, Zara. “Meanings and Significance of Colonial Architecture in Douala, Cameroon.” Southampton: W I T Press, 2019..

14. Simone, AbdouMaliq. “The Last Shall Be First: African Urbanities and the Larger Urban World.” In Other Cities, Other Worlds: Urban Imaginaries in a Globalizing Age, edited by Andreas Huyssen, 2008.

15. Ibid

16. Mark, Peter. “Books -- Rives Coloniales: Architectures, De Saint-Louis a Douala Edited by Jacques Soulilou.” African Arts 28, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 18

17. Ibid 18. Ibid

19. Ibid

20. Ibid

21. Ibid

22. Ibid

23. Njoh, Ambe J., and Liora Bigon. “Germany and the deployment of urban planning to create, reinforce and maintain power in colonial Cameroon.” Habitat International 49 (2015): 10-20

24. Mark, Peter. “Books -- Rives Coloniales: Architectures, De Saint-Louis a Douala Edited by Jacques Soulilou.” African Arts 28, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 18

25. Ibid

26. Simone, AbdouMaliq. “The Last Shall Be First: African Urbanities and the Larger Urban World.” In Other Cities, Other Worlds: Urban Imaginaries in a Globalizing Age, edited by Andreas Huyssen, 2008.

27. Simone, AbdouMaliq. “The Last Shall Be First: African Urbanities and the Larger Urban World.” In Other Cities, Other Worlds: Urban Imaginaries in a Globalizing Age, edited by Andreas Huyssen, 2008.

28. Simone, AbdouMaliq. “The Last Shall Be First: African Urbanities and the Larger Urban World.” In Other Cities, Other Worlds: Urban Imaginaries in a Globalizing Age, edited by Andreas Huyssen, 2008.

29. Simone, AbdouMaliq. “The Last Shall Be

First: African Urbanities and the Larger Urban World.” In Other Cities, Other Worlds: Urban Imaginaries in a Globalizing Age, edited by Andreas Huyssen, 2008.

30. Simone, AbdouMaliq. “The Last Shall Be First: African Urbanities and the Larger Urban World.” In Other Cities, Other Worlds: Urban Imaginaries in a Globalizing Age, edited by Andreas Huyssen, 2008.

31. Simone, AbdouMaliq. “The Last Shall Be First: African Urbanities and the Larger Urban World.” In Other Cities, Other Worlds: Urban Imaginaries in a Globalizing Age, edited by Andreas Huyssen, 2008.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Philippe Kame is an artist, designer, and fabricator currently pursuing a Master of Architecture degree at Taubman College. Originally from Douala, Cameroon, Philippe’s research and scholarship focuses on decoloniality and the restoration of indigenous African cultures. He is the founder of Culture Lens, a platform that aims at preserving and disseminating the traditional craft and art of Cameroon.

Ann Arbor

Christopher Fletcher

Setting Up Sex Offenders for Failure

How the intersection of law and city planning exposes sex offenders to longer prison sentences

MYLES ZHANG

PhD Candidate in Architecture

ABSTRACT

Our nation’s laws for sex offenders, although designed to protect the public, often have the opposite effect: increasing the chance sex offenders will be re-arrested and re-convicted for new crimes. The core of the problem is not that public safety rules, like Megan’s Law, are too weak. The problem is that these laws are written too strongly and too powerfully that they have the reverse effect: increasing the chances that sex offenders will commit new crimes. There are many problems with sex offender laws: too weak in areas they should be stronger; too strong in areas where they should be more flexible. But today I will examine just one aspect of the sex offender registry (the home address requirement) and how it affects one place (New York City). This analysis of New York City points to concrete and better ways to protect public safety than the current system: ways that reforming Megan’s Law will increase public safety.

New York’s policy requires indefinite incarceration for some indigent people judged to be sex offenders. The within-1,000-feet-of-a-school ban makes residency [...] practically impossible in New York City, where the city’s density guarantees close proximity to schools. R ather t han t ailor its policy to t he geography of New York City or provide shelter options for this group, New York has chosen to imprison people who cannot afford compliant housing past both their conditional release d ate and the expiration of their maximum sentences.

Courts, law enforcement agencies, and scholars all have acknowledged that residency restrictions do not reduce recidivism and may actually increase the risk of reoffending.”

Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor objects to sex offender registration requirements in case of Ortiz v. Breslin, February 22, 2022.1

In August 2020, as the pandemic ripped across prisons and homeless shelters, New York State struggled to find temporary accommodation for inmates being released from prison. In response, the state started renting temporary accommodation in hotels across the city, many left vacant by the pandemic-related temporary decline in tourism. A few inmates—some of them sex offenders—were placed at a hotel in the Upper West Side near Central Park, one of the city’s wealthiest neighborhoods. State law requires sex offenders on parole to live 1,000 feet from the nearest school, but their hotel was just 500 feet from the playground of P.S. 87. In response, The New York Post blasted six of the offenders’ photos across the internet, along with descriptions of their offenses. One neighborhood mom told reporters at the playground of elementary school P.S. 87: “Look, we’re a progressive-minded community, and we tend to be sympathetic to the homeless. [….] But with sex offenders, [we] draw the line.”2

Our nation’s residency laws for sex offenders on parole struggle to balance two conflicting public safety needs: On the one hand, restrictions on residency and employment

keep offenders away from children. On the other hand, these same restrictions limit offenders’ successful rehabilitation as productive members of society. In a nation that has the world’s largest prison population, people incarcerated for all crimes have trouble finding housing after serving their sentences. Inmate re-entry is made even more challenging through the web of laws that restrict their ability to serve on a jury, vote, drive a car, own a home, and travel freely. In turn, housing and job insecurity are usually linked to increased risks of homelessness, mental health issues, and therefore greater chances that new crimes will be committed. In its own way, restricting former prisoners to the spatial margins of our society weakens rather than strengthens the goal of public safety.3

Sex offender laws, like Megan’s Law, are too weak in areas where they should be stronger: They need to better differentiate between violent and nonviolent offenders, and to create a meaningfully scaled parole system that surveils the offender in proportion to the offense. This will require reducing state supervision and parole requirements for sex

offenders deemed non-violent and at low risk of reoffending. Additionally, sex offender laws are too stringent in areas where they should be more flexible: Restrictions on where offenders can live increase the risk that many will become homeless, will need to turn to public welfare, or will be reincarcerated as a result of crimes committed due to housing insecurity. Examining one aspect of the sex offender registry (the home address requirement) in the context of one place (New York City) will aid in identifying the impacts on individuals leaving incarceration. This analysis of the urban form and city plan of New York City points to concrete and better ways to protect public safety than the current system: ways that reforming Megan’s Law will increase public safety.

1. DID THE CRIME, DID THE TIME... BUT STILL DOING TIME?

Jory Smith was supposed to be free. It was August 2020. He had finished his five-year sentence as a sex offender at the Marcy Correctional Facility, a medium-security prison in Upstate New York. But there was one condition for release: He had to give a new home address that met all the state’s requirements. But, because of the web of residency restrictions placed on offenders during parole, no landlord could accept his application and no place met all the requirements. Three years later—three years beyond the date his prison sentence ended— he was still in prison.4 Angel Ortiz was similarly kept locked up for two years longer than the planned date of his release, prompting a lawsuit before the U.S. Supreme Court and Justice Sotomayor. The case claimed that imprisonment beyond the date of planned release violated the constitutional rights of due process and amounted to “cruel and unusual” punishment. As Sotomayor clarified, “New York’s residential prohibition, as applied to New York City, raises serious constitutional

concerns.” She specifically singled out flawed residency requirements that make it impossible for sex offenders to find housing in dense urban areas, as well as a series of no fewer than a dozen studies indicating that residency restrictions had no effect on reducing crimes against children.5

Approximately eight percent of sex offenders are kept locked in prison after the end of their prison sentences because they are required to find housing as a precondition of release, but fail to secure housing due to severe restrictions on where they can live.6 Residency and job requirements are two of the biggest reasons many offenders are locked up for longer than their initial sentence. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (updated in 1995, commonly referred to as Megan’s Law) is a federal law that requires each state to create a public database of sex offenders.7 Their names, birth dates, ages, photos, convictions, home addresses, and all manner of other personal information are public information. The goal of this statute is to inform the public—particularly teachers and concerned parents—of any sex offenders in their neighborhood and to help them identify these people to keep their children away from them. The results are cataloged in a database for every state, including New York State.8 Other commercial websites have further synthesized state data into interactive maps of sex offenders in New York City and other American cities.9

Megan’s Law, a federal statute, only required offenders to give their home addresses and other personal details for purposes of publication. The New York state-level Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), implemented in 1995, additionally barred offenders on parole from living within 1,000 feet of a school or place that children frequent. This law is mirrored in similar language and residency requirements in most other states. For most released inmates (convicted of all

kinds of crimes), the parole period lasts one to four years and rarely more than five years.10 During this time, they must register their address with law enforcement and must check in regularly with a parole officer. However, for sex offenders, the length of time they spend under supervision is longer.11 For level one sex offenders considered at “low” risk of reoffense, the registration period—during which they must share name and home address—is 20 years. For level two offenders at “moderate” risk and level three offenders deemed to have a “high” risk of reoffense, registration with permanent residency restrictions is in place for life. The specific type of crime does not determine the category of whether an offender is deemed to be level one, two, or three, nor does the judge determine this at time of conviction. Instead, a governor-appointed board of examiners determines the risk level, with career-altering and life-altering results depending on the board’s ruling.12

In addition to spatial restrictions, when reviewing applications, landlords and job recruiters can reject an applicant because of their criminal record. For non-violent offenders at low risk of reoffense, making their personal information public likely harms them more and exposes them to employment discrimination than reasonably benefits public safety. For instance, many jobs have zero interaction with minors, such as Amazon warehouse, auto assembly line, construction, finance, and bank teller positions. They are precisely the kinds of jobs where a criminal record as a sex offender is irrelevant to their ability to perform the job. Sex offender laws reason that even after release, offenders pose a continued risk to society and require continued monitoring. For usually more violent level two and three offenders, parole boards might justify their continued supervision and continued, likely lifelong, suspension of certain rights to privacy. But for non-violent level one offenders with low to non-existent recidivism, the case is strong that

posting their details to the registry will expose them to employment discrimination.13

In New York State alone, since the 1990s, dozens of separate amendments to SORA have added additional restrictions and reporting requirements beyond the requirements of Megan’s Law.14 Other more severe amendments have been proposed but failed. One bill proposed doubling parole from 10 to 20 years; another proposed registration for life for all offenders, regardless of the original crime. Another proposed restricting all level three sex offenders from coming within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop.15 Some proposals are unlikely to become reality, but they reflect the degrees of residential exclusion that lawmakers are willing to promote, despite limited studies following up on these laws to measure their effectiveness.

However, New York’s state-level laws are less strict than those of other states. In Florida, sex offenders cannot go to playgrounds, public parks, shopping malls, and – in effect – any place where there might be any number of children. Florida’s registry laws are the strictest in the nation.16 In other states, entire prison psychiatric hospitals have been built to involuntarily detain inmates for months and years beyond the end of their prison sentence.17 The largest of these facilities is the Coalinga State Hospital in California, where up to 1,286 inmates can be detained after their sentences. A quarter reside at the Coalinga hospital because a court and/or doctor has determined they have a mental health disorder that requires constant supervision. The remaining three-fourths are there either as “sexually violent predators,” or because they have not yet met the state’s housing and employment prerequisites to leave prison.18 Most inmates cannot find housing even after finishing treatment, attending therapy, and committing to chemical castration for life – as both requirements of the treatment program and as ways to convince hospital

administrators they are no longer a risk. Other inmates reject participating in the treatment program altogether because even if they successfully complete it, they will not find a job and housing on the outside.19

2. HOW MUCH ARE SEX OFFENDERS ON THE REGISTRY AN ACTUAL RISK TO PUBLIC SAFETY?

What is the recidivism rate among the population formerly incarcerated for all crimes? There are few national studies about the recidivism rate among offenders; one of the most comprehensive is dated 1994, the same year Megan’s Law was implemented.20 This 1994 study had a sample size of 300,000 people from 15 states, convicted for all types of crimes — 67.5 percent of individuals released from prison were rearrested within three years of release. Of this sample, 51.8 percent returned to prison. However, there are many reasons they return to prison. About half of those who return to prison (25.4 percent of those released) do so because they have committed a new crime. The other half of those who return to prison (26.4 percent of those released) return for a nonviolent and technical violation of their parole.21 These types of violations include failing a drug test, missing an appointment with a parole officer, failing to register a change of address, driving without a license, and other questionable reasons to re-incarcerate people. The data also reveals that released prisoners with the lowest rearrest rates were those in prison for homicide (40.7%), rape (46.0%), driving under the influence (51.5%), and sexual crimes not including rape (41.4%).22

What is the recidivism rate among sex offenders? Another 1994 study of approximately 10,000 sex offenders revealed that 3.5 percent were re-convicted for a sex crime within three years—approximately 1

in 25 people.23 Of this same sample size, 24 percent were reconvicted for a crime of any kind during the follow-up period, or about one in four people.24 In comparison, released prisoners with the highest rearrest rates are those originally convicted of robbery (70.2%), burglary (74.0%), larceny (74.6%), motor vehicle theft, (78.8%), having or selling stolen property (77.4%), and having, selling, or using illegal weapons (70.2%). This refutes the claim that sex offenders will inevitably re-offend and must therefore be monitored for life; 3.5 percent is a uniquely low recidivism rate. Both 1994 studies of sex offenders and all released offenders capture a snapshot of the low recidivism rate before Megan’s Law was introduced. If measured by the data on recidivism, Megan’s Law in 1995 and New York’s SORA in 1995 were introduced in a period of low recidivism among sex offenders, despite public assertions at the time that recidivism was rising and that sex offenders would inevitably and unavoidably re-offend.25

The strongest argument in favor of Megan’s Law and SORA is that they provide public information on people who have committed crimes, and who are therefore perceived as likely to commit more crimes in the future. However, if the measured recidivism rate of sex offenders is used to justify the registration requirement, by that logic, other crimes with higher recidivism rates should mandate registration on a public registry. If those convicted for other violent crimes with a higher rate of re-offense are not made to live out the rest of their lives on a public registry, then the utility of the sex offender registry becomes questionable in light of the lower recidivism rate.26

Megan’s Law and a sweep of other “tough on crime” policies emerged during the 1990s War on Drugs and War on Crime amid growing (but largely unfounded) fears of unremorseful juvenile “superpredators.”

Prominent sociologists and criminologists like

John DiLulio claimed a growing population of “superpredators” could murder, rape, and abuse victims without remorse.27 Cases like the 1989 Central Park Five jogger case28 and the 1992 L.A. Riots29 focused national attention on a group of offenders that represented a statistical minority, leading to policy solutions such as the 1995 “three strikes law” in California. Similar to Megan’s Law, the “three strikes law” was driven by media reports of serial offenders; California lawmakers believed that only the harsh sentence of life in prison would be an effective deterrent. Similar to Megan’s Law which provided blanket punishments to violent and non-violent

offenders alike, the “three strikes law” did not distinguish between minor and major felonies, meaning that a three-time serial kidnapper would receive the same life-in-prison sentence as the serial thief caught for stealing from the convenience store. At the same time, the 1990s rise of a “meth epidemic” on urban streets fed into the nationwide perception that highly visible (but statistically minor) events of urban disorder like the 1992 L.A. Riots required sweeping new laws.30 Somewhere between fact and fiction, between a time of declining crime rates and rising media reporting on crimes, these policies emerged amid public pressure for politicians to do something, to do

Figure 1. The area in red represents spaces where sex offenders on parole are restricted from living, a 1,000-foot radius from any school.37

Source: “New York State’s Residency Requirements,” Myles Zhang Digital Portfolio, November 9, 2023

Note: Explore as interactive map at https://www.myleszhang.org/2023/11/09/pedophilia-and-public-space/.

Figure 2. A 1,000-foot radius drawn around the locations of schools in Midtown Manhattan. Sex offenders can live in the non-red areas, which tend to be non-residential areas closer to factories, highways, and sources of pollution.

anything. Thus, fears of an imagined minority of superpredators drove policies that, while written with these predators in mind, affected all classes of offenders and society at large. This resulted in both prison overcrowding and larger-than-predicted prison populations in a carceral state that is now the world’s largest.31

3. HOW MUCH DO RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS RESTRICT HOUSING OPTIONS IN NEW YORK CITY?

The 1,000-foot residency restrictions in New York state law are more actionable in suburban areas than in urban areas. The law thus significantly restricts housing choices for sex offenders in urban areas. NYC Open Data indicates that there are 1,700 public school

facilities in the city, while the census estimates that there are 3,644,000 housing units in the city.32 Downloading the point locations of schools and drawing the 1,000-foot radius around each removes upwards of 95 percent of units from the market. Figure 1 shows the radius around each school and identifies the housing stock where offenders on parole are barred from living. This leaves the areas between red circles as the only places where they can lawfully live in New York City: fewer than 100,000 units. The actual map is likely even more restrictive than is shown below because the database of school locations does not include private schools and daycares.33

When considering the apartment vacancy rate in New York City is just three percent, the actual number of units available at any one time is likely fewer than 3,000. When

considering that half of New York City apartments rent for more than $1,800 per month, the actual number of eligible units at any one time falls to just several hundred. For a city with millions of housing units to exclude offenders from all but several hundred units available to rent at any given time speaks to the serious challenges of societal reintegration.34

The Urban Institute states, additionally, that 90 percent of landlords check for previous evictions, credit history, and criminal background when making their decisions.35 The combination of state laws (that restrict where offenders can live) and private choices from landlords (who can choose their tenants) result in a uniquely difficult housing market for released offenders. The housing shortage is the result of public policies and private choices. In a society that stigmatizes all former inmates—sex offenders and non-

offenders alike—finding housing becomes a uniquely difficult challenge. In its own way, housing insecurity can become a self-fulfilling prophecy for re-offense: People are more likely to be arrested for crimes like loitering, trespassing, and petty theft when experiencing housing insecurity and homelessness. Stigmatizing sex offenders to the degree they become homeless therefore increases the chances they will be rearrested.36

The exact unemployment rate among sex offenders is unclear, but an estimated 60 percent of sex offenders remain unemployed three to five years after leaving prison.38 Data on median income for sex offenders after release is not available, but the jobs they are more likely to hold pay minimum wage with limited benefits. At $16 an hour in 2024, New York City’s minimum wage works out to an annual income of $32,000 a year before taxes.39

Source: Google Maps

Figure 3. A 1,000-foot radius drawn around a single building shows the extent of the surface area covered by a single exclusion zone.

Figure 4. As a comparison, assume the metal block M on the University of Michigan Diag were a single building measuring ten feet square to a side. The exclusion zone would cover almost all of Central Campus. Counting the building perimeter of Central Campus as a single school zone, the exclusion zone would cover most of Downtown Ann Arbor.

Source: Google Maps

This would be well within the minimum income threshold required to be eligible for public housing — however, the New York City Housing Authority states on its rental application FAQ, “A lifetime registration [as a sex offender] results in a lifetime ban from public housing.”40

4. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Current policy means that offenders released from prison have limited options. It would aid offenders in rehabilitation and return to society if current laws were reformed in at least these four ways:

First, reduce the residency requirement from 1,000 feet to 500 feet, or to an amount proportional to population density, in urban

areas. New York state law has historically struggled to balance the needs of low-density rural residents Upstate with the needs of mid-density suburban residents on Long Island and the needs of high-density urban residents in New York City. The 1,000-foot requirement is largely – and reasonably –written with rural and suburban communities in mind. Drawing a 1,000-foot radius around a suburban or rural school excludes offenders from a small number of houses near schools, due to the lower density of the community. For Upstate New York, the 1,000-foot radius excludes an estimated 19 housing units over an area one-ninth of a square mile in size.41 Therefore, there are likely to be fewer neighbors within a 1,000-foot radius of a given property in the suburbs. This suburban form also has high homeownership rates, creating a relatively fixed and less transient community where neighbors watch neighbors. While the

homeownership rate in New York City is just 33 percent, the homeownership rate is 70 percent in the rest of New York State (not counting the city) and 63 percent nationally.42

By contrast, drawing the identical 1,000-foot radius around any New York City property excludes about 1,400 units on average.43 Applying the 1,000-foot radius to Manhattan’s population density of 75,000 people per square mile excludes a still higher 4,300 housing units.44 Given the already highly transient population of New York City renters, the frequently used public transit network, and the millions of commuters passing through urban areas, the public safety benefits of excluding sex offenders from living within a 1,000-foot radius are debatable. For example, knowing from a public database that a sex offender lives five blocks away is of limited public benefit when there are some 10,000 neighbors or 10,000 possible suspects within 1,000 feet. In this way, the harm of this restriction in reducing housing options for offenders is likely much greater than the public benefit of this restriction.

Thousands of prisoners remain behind bars after serving their sentences, for the simple reason that they cannot find housing that meets parole residency restrictions. This is a burden on public funds and is of questionable benefit to public safety. There is no study or estimate of how much the state spends annually on keeping these offenders behind bars. But, for reference, the annual cost of operating the Coalinga State Hospital—effectively a “shadow prison”—was $298 million in 2019, or $218,000 per inmate. A good portion of Coalinga inmates have been involuntarily committed because of an incurable mental illness, but three-fourths are sex offenders unable to find housing and a job on the outside, which is a precondition of their release. In a society where sex offenders have some of the lowest rearrest rates of any group, Coalinga operates a very expensive

form of preventative detention. California’s five prison hospitals like Coalinga cost more to operate annually than the entire budget for all other prisons in the state.45 The per-inmate cost is particularly expensive due to a ratio of approximately one staff member to every inmate, permanent living facilities (including a bedroom and en suite bathroom provided to each inmate), and a range of efforts to make their involuntary commitment feel more like a hospital than a prison. They are not in a prison, by the legal definition; however, they are in a hospital with barred windows, in a rural location in the Central Valley surrounded by barbed wire.46

Second, instead of cost-prohibitive prisons and prison hospitals for sex offenders, there might be more effective and cheaper—but largely untried—programs that allow sex offenders on parole to live in supervised conditions with their parents, relatives, or other legal guardians. Inmates released to their families have lower rates of rearrest, higher rates of employment, and lower rates of homelessness.47 Under the current arrangement, however, if the parents and relatives live less than 1,000 feet from a school, then the offender cannot live with them, even if these relatives have a spare bedroom and will legally vouch that the offender will not be a public safety threat. This was the crux of the issue presented to Justice Sotomayor: Offender Angel Ortiz had already served his sentence, was eligible for release, and had offers from his mother and sister to live with them, but he was unable to because their home was too close to a school. Innovative legislation could be written that makes these family members the legal guarantors of the sex offender and held legally responsible if the offender under their care commits a new crime at the nearest public school.

Third, give parole officers more discretion and freedom to choose where offenders can live. The blanket 1,000-foot requirement

excludes from the housing supply many units that are otherwise entirely safe for offenders to live in. For instance, say that an apartment is 200 feet from a school, but is separated by a river or six-lane highway that requires a half-mile walk to get around. By strict legal interpretation of the law, this apartment is off-limits. But any parole officer and social worker given discretion and the power to interpret laws would approve the offender to live here. Giving more room to these state employees will allow them to interpret the law based on the wealth of factors shaping the built environment. The built environment is more complex than the law alone can legislate and describe in 1,000 feet. Well-written laws are flexible enough that they empower administrators and expert social workers to use their best judgment.

Lastly, we need new, updated, and reformed laws in line with the pace of technological change. In a world that is transitioning from the physical and urban to the digital and virtual, data-driven reforms to Megan’s Law are needed. Megan’s Law and the residency restrictions on sex offenders were largely written in a pre-internet age when the only way to commit crimes was through spatial proximity to victims. Therefore, a law presenting a spatial limit on residence near schools made the most sense for separating offenders from children. Today, there is a virtual world that is not bounded by space; the opportunity for offenders to contact victims extends beyond a physical limit of 1,000 feet and into the virtual world. This points to the need for continued restrictions on how sex offenders use the internet, and a shift in policing resources away from physical and towards digital spaces. Megan’s Law was written for a world without the internet. The proposed reforms are less about leniency toward sex offenders and more about creating more effective restrictions that are driven by data instead of superstition.

Additionally, in a system where inmates are released to society but in which their housing options are limited to certain neighborhoods with a lack of proximity to public schools, the result is the spatial concentration of risk in those neighborhoods—specifically low-income neighborhoods, which are also more likely to have a majority of minority populations. In the current system, majority-Black neighborhoods, which tend to have less spatial mobility and fewer school options, are already more likely to have lower rents compatible with what sex offenders can afford. Spatial racism constitutes the effect of intersecting inequalities in the built environment, where the same risks are concentrated and reconcentrated in neighborhoods that are least able to offer resistance.48 The New York Post complains about sex offenders living on the wealthy Upper West Side and quotes upperclass mothers to support their complaints. Low-income residents and residents in majority-immigrant neighborhoods might also have opposition to living near sex offenders, but rarely are their opinions given the time and visual real estate on the pages of The New York Post

Moral outrages and moral panics at avoidable crimes often motivate overdue legal reforms. Megan’s Law has the valid, noble intention of providing information to protect children from danger. Seven-year-old Megan Kanka was murdered by an offender living next door, with a criminal history unknown to his neighbors. The fortunate reality is that superpredators are exceptionally rare. The concept originated largely from the 1990s public misperception of rising crime rates. The resulting fears motivated multiple public policy reforms, including the 1,000-foot requirement. This realization points to the need for flexibility in punishment: a set of data-driven laws that recognize the large majority of people who become safe and productive members of society after release, with set-asides that allow the judge to impose harsher

sentences on the truly evil. The problem is when highly publicized media reporting on sensational crimes by a few leads to the public perception that freak criminal incidents are commonplace and require a stronger and more punitive police response than is merited.

Activist calls since George Floyd to “defund the police and prisons” suggest that funds now spent on incarceration would be better invested in communities and communitybased health and counseling programs that aid victims of both sex crimes and domestic abuse. There is currently no direct mechanism to take surplus funds from prison budgets and allocate those funds to victim compensation. However, the conversation about the most appropriate allocation of funds starts by chipping away at the cost of running prisons through clemency programs and reforming broken residency restrictions that are not backed by the data on recidivism.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thank you to dissertation advisers Dan O’Flaherty for his research on homelessness and Mary Gallagher for her advice on case law. This essay was originally written for Heather Ann Thompson’s fall 2023 PhD seminar on The American Carceral State. Most of all, thank you to editor Jessie Williams for her patient and insightful line edits.

ENDNOTES

1. Angel Ortiz v. Dennis Breslin, Superintendent, Queensboro Correctional Facility, et al. on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York, 142 S. Ct. 914, 23-29 (2022), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/ courtorders/022222zor_bq7d.pdf.

2. Nolan Hicks, Jennifer Gould, and Laura Italiano, “NYC ‘illegally’ placed pedophiles near Upper West Side playground,” New York Post,

August 7, 2020,

https://nypost.com/2020/08/07/nyc-illegallyhousing-pedophiles-near-upper-west-sideplayground/.

3. Stephanie Robbins, “Homelessness among Sex Offenders: A Case for Restricted Sex Offender Registration and Notification,” Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review 20, 2010.

4. Colin Kalmbacher, “Sotomayor Says ‘Courts Must Step In’ to Protect Constitutional Rights, Urges N.Y. to End Policy of ‘Indefinite Incarceration’ for Sex Offenders Who Served Their Time,” Law & Crime, February 22, 2022

https://lawandcrime.com/supreme-court/ sotomayor-says-courts-must-step-in-to-protectconstitutional-rights-urges-n-y-to-end-policyof-indefinite-incarceration-for-sex-offenderswho-served-their-time/.

5. Angel Ortiz v. Dennis Breslin, Superintendent, Queensboro Correctional Facility, et al. on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York, 142 S. Ct. 914, 23-29 (2022), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/ courtorders/022222zor_bq7d.pdf.

6. Chris Gelardi, “They Were Supposed to Be Free. Why Are They Locked Up? New York has kept hundreds of people convicted of sex offenses in prison long past their release dates,” New York Focus: Who Runs New York?, October 17, 2023, https://nysfocus. com/2023/10/17/sex-offender-sara-prisonparole-new-york.

7. Megan’s Law, Pub.L. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1995).

8. “Sex Offender Registry, New York State Division of Criminal Justices Services, https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/ SomsSUBDirectory/search_index.jsp.

9. “Registered sex offenders in New York, New York [database],” City-Data.com, https://www. city-data.com/so/so-New-York-New-York.html.

10. Sex Offender Registration Act, 1995 N.Y. ALS 192, § 168-1 (2019), https://www.criminaljustice.

ny.gov/nsor/claws.htm#a.

11. Dean G. Skelos, “Strengthening Megan’s Law,” N.Y. State Senate Newsroom, 2006, https://www. nysenate.gov/newsroom/articles/dean-g-skelos/ strengthening-megans-law.

12. What determines the risk assessment as level one, two, or three?

It is less the crime that determines the risk assessment and more the behavior of the individual during the time they are in custody. Two individuals could both be convicted of the identical sex crime, but one would get a level one designation on release and the other a level three, if during the time he was in prison, the latter was poorly behaved and exhibited traits indicating mental illness. The law does not specifically define what behavior amounts to a “sexually violent predator” but instead leaves this choice up to the discretion of the parole board.

13. “Time to Work: Managing the Employment of Sex Offenders Under Community Supervision,” U.S. Department of Justice: Office of Justice Programs, Center for Sex Offender Management, January 2002, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-J-PURLgpo105645/pdf/GOVPUB-J-PURL-gpo105645.pdf.

14. “Nowhere To Go: New York’s Housing Policy for Individuals on the Sex Offender Registry and Recommendations For Change,” The Fortune Society: Building Poeple, Not Prisons, May 2019, https://fortunesociety.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/NowhereToGo.pdf.

15. N.Y. State Senate Codes Committee, “Prohibits certain sex offenders from entering a school bus or within one thousand feet of a school bus stop,” Senate Bill S5433, 202324 Legislative Session, referred to Codes Committee January 3, 2023, https://www. nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2023/S5433.

16. Jill S. Levenson and Leo P. Cotter, “The Impact of Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: 1,000 Feet From Danger or One Step From Absurd?” International Journal

of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 49:2, 2005, 168-178, https://doi. org/10.1177/0306624X04271304.

17. David Feige (director), Rebecca Richman Cohen (producer), and Adam Pogoff (coproducer), Untouchable, released 2016, 1 hour, 45 minutes, http://www.untouchablefilm.com/ about-the-film/.

18. “Department of State Hospitals – Coalinga,” California Department of State Hospitals, November 7, 2016, https://www.dsh.ca.gov/ Coalinga/.

19. Louis Theroux (writer) and Emma Cooper (director), Law and Disorder Series, Season 1, Episode 3, “A Place for Paedophiles,” aired 19 April 2009, British Broadcasting Corporation, https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x6baa33.

20. Patrick A. Langan and David J. Levin, “Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994” Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, June 2002, https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94. pdf.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Roger Przybylski (author) and Luis C.deBaca (editor), “Chapter 5: Adult Sex Offender Recidivism,” in Sex Offender Management Assessment and Planning Initiative, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 2015), https://smart.ojp.gov/somapi/chapter-5adult-sex-offender-recidivism.

25. Hal Arkowitz and Scott O. Lilienfeld, “Once a Sex Offender, Always a Sex Offender? Maybe not: The popular perception of incurable sex criminals may be quite off the mark,” Scientific American, April 1, 2008, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ misunderstood-crimes/.

26. Patrick A. Langan and David J. Levin, “Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994” Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, June 2002, https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.

pdf.

27. John DiLulio, “The Coming of the SuperPredators,” Washington Examiner, November 27, 1995, https://www.washingtonexaminer. com/?p=1558817.

28. The Central Park jogger case was a highprofile criminal case. The night-time assault and rape of Trisha Meili in Central Park led to the wrongful conviction of six teenagers. In a case of racial profiling and media storm, the case fed into public perceptions of New York City’s perceived lawlessness and criminal behavior by superpredator teenagers. Over the next 20 years, all those wrongfully convicted were exonerated based on new evidence and admissions by prosecutors to wrongful conviction. The case, in its time, symbolized the struggles and public hysteria motivating the 1990s War on Crime.

29. The 1992 Los Angeles Riots (also known as the Los Angeles Uprising) were a series of riots and civil unrest in Los Angeles County in April and May of 1992. The acquittal of four police officers for the wrongful arrest and beating of Rodney King caused mass public anger. The response was widespread looting and arson, resulting in 63 deaths and thousands of injuries. The event symbolized, for its time, both racial tension and public perceptions that urban disorder required both a powerful police presence and new “tough on crime” laws.

30. Matthew D. Lassiter, “Introduction,” in The Suburban Crisis: White America and the War on Drugs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2023).

31. Ibid.

32. Department of Education, “School Point Locations,” NYC Open Data, April 24, 2019, https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Education/ School-Point-Locations/jfju-ynrr/about_data.

33. “Nowhere To Go: New York’s Housing Policy for Individuals on the Sex Offender Registry and Recommendations For Change,” The

Fortune Society: Building Poeple, Not Prisons, May 2019, https://fortunesociety.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/NowhereToGo.pdf.

34. Vacancy rate and median rent for New York City in 2023 were calculated from the U.S. Census, as pulled from the database Social Explorer and analyzed in QGIS. Assuming a vacancy rate of three percent, then three percent of 100,000 units is 3,000.

35. Abby Boshart, “How Tenant Screening Services Disproportionately Exclude Renters of Color from Housing,” Housing Matters: An Urban Institute Initiative, December 21, 2022,

https://housingmatters.urban.org/articles/howtenant-screening-services-disproportionatelyexclude-renters-color-housing.

36. Brendan O’Flaherty, “How to Think about Housing Markets,” in Making Room: The Economics of Homelessness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 96-127.

37. Explore as interactive map: “New York State’s Residency Requirements,” Myles Zhang Digital Portfolio, November 9, 2023, https:// www.myleszhang.org/2023/11/09/pedophiliaand-public-space/.

38. James L. Johnson, “Sex Offenders on Federal Community Supervision: Factors that Influence Revocation,” Federal Probation: a journal of correctional philosophy and practice, 70:1, June 2006, https://www.uscourts. gov/federal-probation-journal/2006/06/sexoffenders-federal-community-supervisionfactors-influence.

39. “New York’s Minimum Wage Overview,” New York State: Department of Labor, as of January 1, 2024, https://dol.ny.gov/minimum-wage-0.

40. “Changes to Policies Related to Criminal Justice,” New York City Housing Authority, October 14, 2020 https://www.nyc.gov/assets/ nycha/downloads/pdf/CJ-Policies-For-PublicComment-FINAL.pdf.

41. Data on the number of units is not publicly available and calculated by the author based

on 2021 U.S. census data, using this formula. Census defines a household as the number of people living in a dwelling unit, whether or not they are related by family ties.

( Population density per square mile ÷ 9 ) ÷ Average household size = number of units in exclusion area

Divided by nine because the 1,000-foot school radius covers a surface area 1/9th of a square mile.

For New York State: (427 population density÷9) ÷ 2.5 household size = 19 units, on the low end

42. Census only gives the homeownership rate for New York City (just the city) and New York State (city + state). Homeownership rate for New York State alone (not counting the city) measured by deducting New York City values from the state total in Social Explorer.

43. For New York City: ( 29,076 population density ÷ 9 ) ÷ 2.4 household size = 1,346, round to 1,400 units

44. For Manhattan: (73,667 population density ÷ ) ÷ 1.9 household size = 4,308 round to 4,300 units

45. Miranda Lynch, “Cost of the Shadow Prison in California,” Just Future Project: Bringing shadow prisons into the light, September 26, 2020, https://ajustfuture.org/cost-of-theshadow-prison-in-california/.

46. Louis Theroux (writer) and Emma Cooper (director), Law and Disorder Series, Season 1, Episode 3, “A Place for Paedophiles,” aired 19 April 2009, British Broadcasting Corporation, https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x6baa33.

47. “Family Relationships and the Incarcerated Individual,” Continued Evidence-Based Education Blog, October 12, 2016, https://www.ebpsociety. org/blog/education/221-family-relationshipsincarcerated-individual.

48 Laura Kurgan, Eric Cadora, et al., “Million Dollar Blocks: Using rarely accessible data from the criminal justice system, we have created maps of “million dollar blocks” and of the city-prison-city-prison migration flow for five of the nation’s cities,” Columbia University: Center for Spatial Research, fall 2006, https:// c4sr.columbia.edu/projects/million-dollarblocks.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Myles is interested in the urban and spatial history of the New York metropolitan region, as well as topics in urban history more broadly. He is interested in how ideas about politics, race, and culture are imprinted on the urban form. Through writing, art, digital humanities, and community engagement, he aims to introduce new audiences to history.

Myles is a current Ph.D. candidate in architecture at the University of Michigan, studying 20th-century American urban history. His dissertation examines the “redlining” process, in which state actors and market influences target specific urban neighborhoods and communities and subject them to displacement. Institutional powers created and profited from the “production of decline” in Rust Belt cities. Using the tools of history and archives, this work challenges the populator misconception that particular urban neighborhoods are marginalized as a result of the work ethic of those who occupy and live there.

Mexico City

Deanna Baris

“ TOGETHER, WE ARE A MORE HEALTHY COMMUNITY...

COMMUNITY

SYMPOSIUM 2024

The Symposium section of the journal highlights timely and vital topics central to urban planning, design, and society as a whole. This year’s theme centers on the most foundational element of planning and public service: the community. A community — often centered on a sense of belonging among a group of people — can be formed in myriad ways. This sense of belonging is not just formed through physical proximity but also emotional, intellectual, and social connections rooted in history and shared experiences of people. Additionally, communities define themselves: members consist of a vast array of people, from community activists to families, small businesses, land, and the environmental ecosystems that encompass people. Given the pressing issues of climate change, social inequity, and disinvestment that have plagued many communities, we must consider our relationship with the communities we work with and how to ensure we can best support their flourishing and sustainability.

Urban planners and other public servants work to shape communities and their outcomes but do not always involve community members in the meaningful ways necessary to ensure they thrive. We can see these patterns by looking at the physical and social history of nearly every city in America and the world. These officials charged with community development have also been the source of the loss of community and connection from the many historical and current policies and practices that fragment the social fabric.

Considering this and the clear need for a different path forward, this year’s Symposium theme asks:

Who should design and lead community development efforts in our physical and social landscapes; what could a future look like where communities themselves are planners?

The two Symposium pieces shed light on the complexity and various dynamics of community by exploring what community ownership in traditional planning spaces could look like. “Public Health Ills from Land Use & Urban Planning Neglect: A Need for A Community-Identified Path Forward” investigates legal remedies to redistribute decision-making power to community members through executive order reform. To ensure the necessary environmental justice solution sets are in place to address systemic inequity from land use and urban planning, those most impacted by it should decide the path forward. The piece “Trust and Deed: The Communal Ownership of Manufactured Housing Communities” makes the case for forming community land trusts for the protection of existing mobile parks. This piece highlights the importance of collective land ownership by the community as being crucial to securing existing mobile parks against the threat of corporate investment.

Top-down traditional planning has led to community exclusion and harm for decades, and we must shift to more just and reparative approaches for societal and personal wellbeing to sustain ourselves collectively. We hope these pieces prompt you to think outside the box and reimagine a more livable future for all — one where communities shape their futures.

sara faraj and Vaidehi Shah Symposium Directors

Lauren Jenkins and Jessie Williams Symposium Deputy Directors

Trust and Deed

The Communal Ownership of Manufactured Housing Communities

JESSICA HOBBS

Master of Urban and Regional Planning

ABSTRACT

In Michigan, there are at least one hundred manufactured home communities. The Michigan Manufactured Housing Association boasts that manufactured housing makes “your family’s dream of homeownership… an affordable reality.” Moreover, “a 2023 report from the Manufactured Housing Institute found the average cost per square foot of a manufactured home was $85, roughly half of the cost per square foot of a site-built home.” Manufactured housing offers a promising solution to affordability crises, but securing land ownership for current residents will be the key to its success.

This paper uses the current status of manufactured housing communities and the financial security of their tenants to make a case for the establishment of community land trusts to protect existing mobile home parks. Without these precautions, advances in manufactured home ownership and local legislation to support manufactured housing will not result in the financial security they promise. Communal land ownership offers a secure, flexible, and sustainable solution to manufactured homeowners and renters in the face of rising housing costs, financial instability, and corporate investment.

INTRODUCTION

In Michigan, there are at least one hundred manufactured home communities.1 The Michigan Manufactured Housing Association boasts that manufactured housing makes “your family’s dream of homeownership… an affordable reality.” Moreover, “a 2023 report from the Manufactured Housing Institute found the average cost per square foot of a manufactured home was eighty-five dollars, roughly half of the cost per square foot of a site-built home.”2 Manufactured housing offers a promising solution to affordability crises, but securing land ownership for current residents will be the key to its success.

This paper uses the current status of mobile home parks and the financial security of their tenants to make a case for the establishment of community land trusts to protect existing mobile home parks. Without these precautions, advances in manufactured home ownership and local legislation to support manufactured housing will not result in the financial security they promise. Communal land ownership offers a secure, flexible, and sustainable solution to manufactured home owners and renters in the face of rising housing costs, financial instability, and corporate investment.

DEFINITIONS

MANUFACTURED HOUSING

Manufactured housing, a crucial component of the American housing market, refers to a type of prefabricated housing that is largely assembled in factories and then transported to its residential site or community. This housing style offers a cost-effective, efficient alternative to traditional sitebuilt homes, significantly contributing

to affordable housing solutions. The homes are very likely to have washing machines and dryers, complete kitchens, air conditioning, and piped hot water.3 Manufactured homes, sometimes referred to as “trailers” or “mobile homes,” are constructed adhering to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Code, which was established in 1976 and outlines federal standards for design, construction, and installation. In 2021, there were about 6.7 million mobile or manufactured homes which accounted for about five percent of the total housing stock in the United States.4

MANUFACTURED HOUSING COMMUNITY

A manufactured housing community, also known as a mobile home park, is a residential setting that accommodates mobile homes or manufactured houses. In 2021, over 1.7 million households lived in a group of seven or more mobile homes.5 Usually, these types of communities provide land along with amenities such as utility hookups, communal facilities, and communal spaces. They operate on the model of renting a space or “lot” while the occupants own or rent the structure. These communities are regulated by federal and state rules, which can standardize maintenance, utility provision, lot sizes, and/or rent controls.

COMMUNAL LAND OWNERSHIP

Communal land ownership refers to a system of property rights where land is not owned by an individual or a single entity but is held collectively by a community. Under this arrangement, community members enjoy shared access to, use of, and benefits from the land, often regulated by communal rules

“

MANUFACTURED HOME COMMUNITIES CAN OFFER BETTER CONDITIONS FOR COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS THAN LARGE AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROJECTS.

- Jessica Hobbs

Figure 1. Sign for the old Dreamland mobile-home park in Phoenix, Arizona

Source: Photo by the Library of Congress Prints

and decisions. Communal land ownership is seen in various contexts, including indigenous communities, cooperative housing models, and community land trusts.

COMMUNITY LAND TRUST

A community land trust is an emerging model in urban areas to ensure longterm housing affordability. Under this model, a nonprofit organization holds land in trust and leases it to homeowners, often providing low- to moderate-income families the opportunity to own or rent homes below market price.

HOUSING AFFORDABILITY

Most American households find it increasingly challenging to afford housing. This crisis is precipitated by many factors, the most notable being stagnant real wage growth compared to rising housing costs. The imbalance between income and housing expense, coupled with the scarcity of affordable leases and a significant decrease in governmentsubsidized housing units, significantly intensifies the crisis. Furthermore, gentrification and spatial income inequality exacerbate the inaccessibility of affordable housing options. This intersection of economic trends creates precarity for many households.

Housing affordability issues began to accelerate in the 1990s, as rental prices continued to rise while the incomes of renters remained stagnant. By 2011, the market filtering of existing housing stock to low-income households came to a halt and in some areas, even became negative. This stoppage was, in part, because higher-income households started renting lower standard stock because of the 2008 housing market bubble and the

subsequent recession. It was made worse by financial and policy barriers to the construction of new affordable housing and by many existing, federally subsidized affordable housing units reverting to market-rate rents due to expiring affordability covenants.6

These challenges are compounded by climbing land values. From 2000 to 2016, land pricing in the United States climbed by seventy-six percent—almost twice the rate of inflation.7 These land values were also met with increasing construction costs, rising prices of materials and labor, and soaring development fees. Longer permitting and development timelines, coupled with a complex web of local land use regulations, also significantly inflated construction costs.8 This inflation not only affects market-rate housing but also increases the amount of subsidy needed to construct affordable housing units, especially in high-demand markets.

THE POLICY STATUS OF MANUFACTED HOUSING

Home to about twenty million residents, manufactured housing is the greatest source of affordable low-income housing in the United States.9 Yet, national and local-level regulations create multifaceted challenges for manufactured homeowners.

At the federal level, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) oversees the regulation of manufactured housing. The Office of Policy Development and Research within HUD handles the development of manufactured housing construction and safety standards and oversees the monitoring and enforcement of these standards.10 HUD also affects manufactured home financing through

the management of Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans.11

Challenges arise due to the dichotomy of homeownership and land ownership. While the FHA provides loan insurance for the purchase or refinance of manufactured homes owned as either personal or real property, mortgage financing is traditionally only available for manufactured homes that have been deemed real estate and are attached to land owned by their title-holder. The mobile homes themselves are usually titled as personal property rather than real estate and home buyers often have to resort to chattel loans, which typically have higher interest rates and fewer consumer protections than home mortgages. This reality significantly undermines the promised financial benefits and stability of homeownership.12

Traditional manufactured home communities exist because of these complications in financing. Even though land ownership has been associated with improved housing stability, many manufactured homeowners do not own the land underneath. Credit checks and relatively low caps on borrowing make it difficult for manufactured homeowners to finance both land and the purchase of their homes. Thus, they must rely on manufactured housing community owners to provide at least land if not their manufactured home as well.

Manufactured community owners can abruptly decide to sell the land for redevelopment, quickly throwing mobile homeowners into crisis. Since personal property loans are more common for these homes, moving is rarely a viable option due to potential damages. Also, it is often challenging to find another community willing to accept an older unit. The intricate process and high cost of relocating mobile homes exacerbate this problem. Furthermore, the lack of

landlord-tenant laws protecting tenants also poses a substantial regulatory barrier, often leaving homeowners without longterm rights to the land beneath their homes and very few avenues to fight changes in lease terms or ownership.13

At the local level, planning and zoning boards manage siting regulations for manufactured housing. These local bodies make decisions about land use, including the districts and parcels that allow for manufactured housing. Regulations surrounding aesthetics, foundation requirements, and property line setbacks typically fall under their domain. Local governments also are tasked with permitting and inspecting the development of manufactured home communities.14 States can also set standards for manufactured housing, and state courts create legal precedent for how strict or flexible these local requirements can be.

Several local regulations and policies have been initiated to address these issues. Legislation in Minnesota now allows homeowners of manufactured homes who own their land as part of a co-op to obtain mortgage financing options. A bill has also been introduced in New York to streamline the process of converting manufactured homes into real property for immediate application for mortgages.15 Through legislative improvements and reformed regulations, the landscape for manufactured housing is gradually improving for homeowners, but the escalating investment in manufactured housing communities (MHCs) demands a more rapid response.

WHO OWNS MANUFACTURED HOUSING COMMUNITIES?

For many years, real estate investors have been turning to the affordable housing

Figure 2. The Deseramo Mobile Ranch, one of sevel large mobile-home communities in Mesa, a small Arizona city

Source: Photo by Carol M. Highsmith from the Library of Congress Prints

market for sizable returns, industry dominance, and PR boosts for their firms and development companies. Recently, the scope has widened to include MHCs, as companies recognize their investment potential. This change is primarily due to the unprecedented demand for affordable housing, coupled with the fact that many mobile home parks are owned by retiring Baby Boomers.16 “Institutional investors had accounted for twenty-three percent of manufactured housing park purchases over the previous two years, up from thirteen percent in the two years before that. That has made the investors among the country’s largest landlords.”17

This shift towards mobile home park investment can be understood through stories like that of Sam Zell, Chairman of the Board of Equity LifeStyle Properties, Inc. (ELS), the country’s largest owner of manufactured home parks. Zell “sees tremendous growth potential in both manufactured housing communities and RV resort properties.”18 In December of 2021, the company acquired three new manufactured home park companies for $147,000,000.19

Real estate firms have already found success investing in manufactured home parks in Michigan. In June of 2021, Keel’s Team, a real estate investment firm, purchased a portfolio of three MHCs in Hillsdale, Alma, and Breckenridge, Michigan.20 The median value for a manufactured home in Hillsdale, MI is $49,700.21 In Alma, MI the median value is $20,000.22 In Breckenridge, the median value is $10,000.23 At Keel Team’s first investment refinancing event in 2023, two years after the parks were purchased, investors received a payout of $2,940,000.24 The estimated ROI on this purchase was over twenty-one percent. These returns are largely unprecedented in other affordable housing investments, which offer more modest returns of about

Source: Photo by Lloyd Perkins on Picryl

Figure 3. An aerial view of a trailer park on the post

Source: Photo by UpNorthMemories on Flickr

Figure 4. Trailer Park Camp Trailers Circa 1970 Vintage Travel Trailers at a Michigan State Park Campground and Trourism Card

five to seven percent.25 The Michigan portfolio is one of 16 national case studies listed on the Team’s website which represent a fraction of the company’s total investment portfolio.26

Though investment may bring improved amenities, the increased corporate interest in MHCs isn’t necessarily in the residents’ favor. When the Harmony Communities company bought Golden Hills MHC in Colorado in July 2022, residents faced “50-percent rent increases and…a 12-page single-spaced list of new park rules.”27 This was after two attempts by the residents to purchase the park themselves. These new rules groom communities of personal art, landscaping deemed too high maintenance, and most opportunities for personal or cultural expression. For corporate investors, the goal is not to cultivate sustainable affordability or community but rather to maximize profits through rent increases and resale a few years down the line.

Even for smaller investors, it is easy to acquire multiple parks and make a lucrative return. Lori Lee, the owner of three MHCs in Orlando, says, “Once you’re into it and you’re making money it’s easy to say, ‘One more, one more.’”.28 She was once offered $5,000,000 for one of her parks of about fifty trailers.29 Mobile home parks are also very dependable because residents “stay forever, they have no place to go.”30 Frank Rolfe, who runs “mobile home investing boot camps” nationwide,31 tells students they can increase the rent even at parks charging market rate for two reasons: the high demand for affordable housing and the stringent permitting of MHCs by local authorities.32

Opportunities for corporate profit extend beyond the MHCs themselves; many aspects of the manufactured home supply chain appeal to investors. “In 2003, Berkshire Hathaway purchased Clayton

Homes, currently the largest builder of manufactured housing in the United States.”33 The company’s subsidiaries also include “21st Mortgage (the country’s largest lender for manufactured and mobile homes) and HomeFirst, an insurance agency offering coverage to mobile home owners.”34 In 2020, Clayton Homes earned $1.25 billion before taxes.35 High demand supported by low competition and potential for vertical supply chain control makes investing in manufactured housing communities easy and profits almost limitless.

WHO LIVES IN MANUFACTURED HOMES?

Nationwide, manufactured houses are home to approximately twenty million Americans.36 Manufactured homeowners and residents do not differ greatly from single-family home residents in terms of race, household size, or other social demographics.37 However, there are key statistical differences between the two groups; socioeconomic status, educational attainment, disability status, and age make manufactured home residents more vulnerable to market fluctuations and less autonomous when it comes to housing choices.

Gina, a manufactured homeowner in Wisconsin, has a degree in communications and works as a peer support specialist for Recovery Dane. She professionally supports others and then comes home to her two children. She was hoping that her living situation wouldn’t require more work. Instead, she said she feels like a “second-class citizen.”38 Yet, it would be hard for her to leave. Gina says that “it would cost more to move my trailer than my trailer is even worth,”39and given the current conditions she “would not recommend anybody ever purchase a trailer”40 and move to a mobile home

park. In Gina’s community, even residents who own their trailers need permission to sell them. “It’s almost impossible to leave without simply forfeiting your trailer. You’re better off just living in your car, we’re stuck, and we’re just putting our pennies and dimes together and praying someday to get out of here.”41

Data from the U.S. Census indicates that mobile home residents are more likely to stay put, as only thirteen percent had plans to relocate in the upcoming year. This is considerably lower than the figure for multi-family residents (thirtyone percent) and marginally less than single-family residents (fifteen percent).42 Furthermore, over the last year, only twenty percent of mobile home residents relocated, a stark contrast to the forty-four percent of multi-family residents.43 More than 1.1 million residents of manufactured homes had a mortgage with a median principal of $65,000.44 However, manufactured homeowners face financial challenges including comparatively high interest rates. The average mortgage rate for a manufactured house was 5.2% in 2021, noticeably higher than the 3.7% average of other mortgage rates.45

Over half of the households living in manufactured housing earned below 50% of the National Median Income in 2021.46 Additionally, these residents frequently possess lower educational qualifications, with merely 9.7% of them holding at least a bachelor’s degree and almost a quarter of the household heads having not completed high school. Their relative lack of economic flexibility is further indicated by the fact that in 2022, sixteen percent had refinanced their primary mortgages, compared to forty-three percent of singlefamily homeowners.47

Dorthy Brimingham, 48, has lived at Six-OFive, a manufactured housing community in Virginia, for more than four years. She

shares the trailer with her family and is disabled by “spinal stenosis and eight herniated disks,”48 which she attributes to years of jobs involving heavy manual labor. She relies on government programs for healthcare, income, and food assistance which could be jeopardized if her husband’s income falls above the federally mandated cap. “I’d like to go back and work, but my body won’t let me,”49 she said. After paying for rent and utilities, Birmingham has “$13 a month to live on.”50

Overall, only thirteen percent of American residents identify as having at least one disability.51 But, over one-third of households residing in a manufactured home include a disabled person.52 Households containing a person with a disability would likely face more financial hurdles to land ownership due to potentially high medical costs, interruptions to government subsidies, and challenges finding work. They could also be more vulnerable to negative health outcomes associated with housing instability.

Julie Crites, a resident of a manufactured community park designated for senior living in Clark County, Washington, loves to give back to her community. Crites looked forward to spending her retirement as a community volunteer, on mission trips, or baking for food banks. A substantial rent increase has put many of her plans on hold. The Criteses purchased their manufactured home with cash in 2019. The space rent was $685, which “the couple considered reasonable.”53 When they signed the paperwork for the home, the property manager said their space rent would not increase for at least a year, but eight months later, the Criteses received their first of three rent increases.54 The Criteses are on a fixed income; Julie still works as a nurse and her husband retired last year. After the third round of rent hikes, they considered

delaying Julie’s retirement and adjusting, but they have ultimately decided to try to sell the home and move out.55

The elderly form a considerable portion of manufactured home residents. As of February 2022, about 3.2 million adults, aged sixty and older, lived in manufactured housing.56 This demographic accounts for almost onethird of all adults residing in such homes. Despite the majority being mortgage-free, these older adults bear a similar burden of housing costs to their peers living in conventional housing.57 Moreover, these seniors face disproportionately higher risks of defaulting on their payments, eventually leading to foreclosure or eviction, especially amongst those with incomes below $25,000.58 Because of the highlighted demographic differences between manufactured housing residents and other groups, planners and other policymakers need to support timely and sustainable housing solutions.

COMMUNAL LAND OWNERSHIP

Communal land ownership offers a viable solution in the face of corporate profiteering and the financial and administrative challenges facing individual manufactured homeowners. Community Land Trusts (CLTs) have a long history in the United States and prioritize the development of affordable housing, along with the advancement of social enterprises, agricultural ventures, and cultural activities.59

The concept of CLTs emerged during the late nineteenth century in the US in a convergence of historical precedents. They began as both practical land ownership alternatives and experiments in a counter-collectivist culture. The community focus of these land trusts was heavily informed by the Southern

Peace and Civil Rights movements of the 1950s-1960s, when CLTs as we think of them today took form.60 The organizations of this time, notably New Communities Inc.,61 were created to foster community cooperation and culture while enhancing affordability and individual autonomy. A CLT typically establishes a dualownership structure: homes are usually leased long-term by individuals while land remains communal. The community cooperatively manages the land, creating an environment promoting security and personal attachment to both shelter and food.62

“There are an estimated 225 CLT organizations across the United States, a number set to increase as affordable housing rights activists and advocates in communities… build successful campaigns for long-term investments in affordable housing.”63 Despite the numerous benefits of CLTs — including foreclosure reduction, wealth creation, neighborhood stabilization, and greater racial equity of ownership64 — CLTs represent a small minority of the nation’s landholders. This is due in part to the high land costs and subsequent extensive fundraising requirements in areas facing the highest housing scarcity.

One successful example of how CLTs can work effectively in higher-cost housing markets is the collaboration between T.R.U.S.T. South LA and a nonprofit affordable housing developer in Los Angeles. Through strenuous fundraising efforts, they managed to create affordable housing in a pricey neighborhood.65 “Shared equity schemes like CLTs have the potential to maintain affordability far longer than the 15-40 year requirements of Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) or Section 8 funded developments,”66 even in high-cost areas. However, even community-backed projects must be financially stabilized in the face

of traditional construction costs and timelines. Additionally, construction can result in a temporary, but often long, period of displacement for residents.67 These downsides, combined with the high fundraising and collaboration required, make the TRUST example exemplary but not easily replicable.

COMMUNAL LAND TRUSTS FOR MANUFACTURED HOME RESIDENTS

Manufactured home communities can offer better conditions for CLTs than large affordable housing projects. Many manufactured home residents already own their structures. Therefore, upfront costs for the land trust do not include construction, which can be extensive and costly. This reality leaves more funding available for bargaining over land costs and supporting affordable rents. Additionally, MHCs cultivate a group of related stakeholders.

To create a community land trust for manufactured housing, residents and other community advocates must organize and raise money to support the purchase of the MHC. Then, the trust is established, usually as a 501(c)3, to manage these funds. The trust then negotiates a sale with the current MHC owner. On the chance that an offer is accepted, the trust becomes the permanent owner of the community and is strictly regulated by community trust members to promote housing security for residents who lease the land from the trust at stable, affordable rents.

Land ownership for manufactured home residents is associated with improved housing stability. The Executive Director of the Mississippi Manufactured Housing Association stresses this: “I just see

where our homes have come from and how they’ve completed families. It’s just given them that joy of owning their own home,” she says. “And…whether it’s a couple with four or five kids, whether it’s an elderly couple,... we are making dreams come true.”68 When residents can buy land as a community and operate more cooperatively, “The incentives are no longer to maximize the lot fees and minimize the investment on infrastructure, such as water utilities or green areas, but quite the opposite.”69 Also, on communally owned land, residents are more likely to take part in voluntary community improvements like “helping with gardening in common green areas or doing repair work.”70

The following case studies provide precedent for communal land ownership by manufactured housing residents.

CASE STUDY: DURANGO MOBILE HOME PARK

In early 2022, sixty-three families residing in Westside were under the looming threat of eviction due to the planned sale of their park to Harmony Communities, a park management corporation notorious for raising rents. To avert this situation, the residents decided to make a counter-offer supported by the Elevation Community Land Trust, a Denver-based nonprofit. After an intense period of fundraising, they successfully purchased the park and transformed it into a housing co-operative under a community land trust model. Chavez, who had been a resident in Durango for two decades, was appointed as both the park’s property manager and the co-op’s vice president.71

This shift to cooperative ownership significantly reduced living expenses for residents, with some residents’ rent dropping to less than five-hundred

dollars per month. Additionally, Elevation implemented improvements to amenities such as water meters and utility billing systems, creating additional savings for the residents. These enhancements were funded by a grant from Colorado’s Department of Legal Affairs and a loan from La Plata County and included various infrastructural upgrades like pothole repairs and safer tree trimming in the community.72

Residents of Westside, feeling empowered by their collective home security, now actively participate in decisions that affect their daily lives. The change in ownership has instilled in them a new sense of capability, boosting their plans for future development. Looking forward, they plan to transform their park into a residential neighborhood by gradually replacing trailers with permanent homes. Although this transition is still in the early stages, the co-op and land trust are actively holding resident-led discussions to establish a plan.73

CASE STUDY: SANS SOUCI, BOULDER, CO

In 2018, the Sans Souci mobile home park near Boulder, Colorado was taken over by Strive Communities, a corporate landlord. The change of ownership caught the park residents by surprise because they had no chance to bid for the park themselves. Strive Communities began to transform the park into a more uniformlooking space, intending to resell it later. Rent was raised by twelve percent and park maintenance rules were imposed, forcing the residents, many of them artists, to remove their personal art and decor from the yards. Strive justified the changes by stating they intended to align the rents with the market standard and reinvest almost $1 million back into park improvements.74

Source: Photo by the Library of Congress Prints

Figure 5. Mobile homes

Source: Creative Commons

Figure 6. Old trailer park in Glasgow, Deleware

Desperate to reclaim their space, the residents appealed to their elected officials, urging the need for legislation known as an “opportunity to purchase” requirement. This provision calls for park owners to notify residents of an intended sale, allowing them a chance to bid. Governor Jared Polis ratified this requirement into Colorado State Law in 2020. That same year, Strive Communities put the park up for sale and duly notified the residents as per new regulations.75

Some residents resisted the idea of collectively owning the park due to the projected monthly rent-hike of one-hundred-fifty dollars required for financing. However, the majority felt that owning the park was worth the increase, fearing another corporate buyout if they didn’t make a move.

Despite concerns, the residents placed their bid, and in 2021, they successfully bought the park. Since then, the attitude towards maintaining the park has significantly improved among dwellers, sparking a renewed sense of pride and optimism in the community, with plans for potential communal projects such as developing a garden and setting up a solar grid.76

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

For those with the power to create policy and land use changes, the following recommendations offer active steps towards a more supportive manufactured housing environment:

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FOR MHC-FOCUSED LAND TRUSTS

Local governments should offer financial and logistical support to foster the creation of MHC-focused land trusts.

These initiatives can eliminate economic uncertainties for mobile home residents by ensuring stable, long-term land ownership. Encouraging partnerships with local nonprofits and community organizations can further solidify these trusts as significant contributors to perpetually affordable housing.

CHANGES IN ZONING

Policymakers and local governments should ensure that changes in zoning around MHCs seek community input and are in the best interests of existing residents. This approach can prevent land use changes that escalate property values beyond the financial reach of low- or mid-income community members. This is especially important in instances where residents are organizing to purchase the land beneath their communities or establish community land trusts.

LAND PROTECTION FOR MOBILE HOME COMMUNITIES

Legislation should be enhanced to protect lands occupied by MHCs from unchecked commercial and real estate development. This could involve establishing land protection zones exclusive to MHCs and reducing economic pressures that force community owners to sell. These measures help maintain affordable housing and protect these communities from the risks of displacement and gentrification. Land protection should also include environmental protection from pollution and other contaminants as MHCs are often sited in more blighted areas or close to industrial or other nuisances.

RIGHT TO REFUSAL

As demonstrated in the Sans Souci case, when a park is being sold, residents

should be given the opportunity to place a bid and, at the minimum, a second offer before the land is offered to external buyers. This policy encourages resident control and autonomy over their living environment, safeguards community cohesion, and prevents displacement caused by sales. This also gives communities a more equitable opportunity for negotiation with sellers.

In addition to these local changes, the following proposed Federal policies offer future opportunities:

THE PRESERVATION AND REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE FOR COMMUNITY ENHANCEMENT (PRICE)

PRICE allocates two-hundred-twentyfive million dollars over five years to preserve and modernize manufactured housing. The grants will be distributed competitively to various entities designated by HUD, including states, local governments, resident-owned manufactured housing communities, cooperatives, nonprofits, community development financial institutions, tribes, and other such organizations with the requirement of a fifty percent matching contribution to the federal funds. These funds can be channeled towards infrastructure and planning, resident and community services including eviction prevention and relocation assistance, as well as land and site acquisition. Funds can also be used for resiliency activities, particularly for reconstruction, repair, or replacement, and cater to weatherization and energy efficiency upgrades. The policy expressly states that grants should primarily aid low- to moderate-income residents and ensure long-term housing affordability in manufactured housing communities. Of the total funding, twentyfive million dollars are reserved to assist in the redevelopment of manufactured housing communities into affordable replacement housing, including downpayment assistance for residents, relocation services, or unit buy-outs.77

H.R.7220 - FRANK ADELMANN MANUFACTURED HOUSING COMMUNITY SUSTAINABILITY ACT

H.R.7220 - Frank Adelmann Manufactured Housing Community Sustainability Act, introduced in the House in March of 2022, proposes a business-related tax

Source: Photo by UpNorthMemories on Flickr

Figure 7. Trailer Park Camp Trailers Circa 1930s

credit, amounting to seventy-five percent of the profit garnered from the sale or exchange of real estate to a recognized manufactured home community cooperative or corporation. To qualify for this provision, the property should have been owned by the seller or a related entity for a minimum duration of two years prior to the transaction. Additionally, it must be acquired with the intent to convert it into a manufactured home community and be subject to a commitment ensuring its use as such for at least fifty years or the longest term allowed under the state’s law. The cooperative or nonprofit corporation must be lawfully established within the state where the property is situated and adhere to specific membership and governance standards for their owned communities. The bill also imposes a tax on buyers who violate the covenant to use the property for manufactured housing for at least fifty years or the maximum term permitted under state law. The bill has not yet been passed.78

CONCLUSION

In addition to land policy changes and corporate investment in MHCs, other changes in the home manufacturing industry will have a strong effect on the future of manufactured housing residents and communities. Research on current housing manufacturing trends, especially luxury manufactured housing and improvements in construction technology, can provide insights into how this shift towards quality and innovation might influence buyer preferences, demand dynamics, and the economic sustainability of the current manufactured housing market. Though these trends may result in more manufactured housing design and financing options, they can drive up costs. They may also shift design

and manufacturing away from costsaving choices towards materials and processes that are more luxurious, which could cause disruptions to the current manufacturing supply chain. Conversely, a more positive local perception of manufactured housing may lead to better policy outcomes and siting.

As it stands, the security of those residing in manufactured homes remains in peril if appropriate measures, such as the establishment of community land trusts, are not taken. These measures would not only protect the most abundant naturally occurring affordable housing in the country but also pave the way for future developments in communal land ownership. Investment in and policy to support community land trusts represents an urgent and significant step towards realizing a secure, sustainable, and affordable housing landscape for the benefit of all community residents.

Source: Creative Commons

Figure 8. Mobile homes

ENDNOTES

1. Michigan Manufactured Housing Association. “Find Manufactured Home Communities & Parks | MMHA.” Michigan Manufactured Housing Association.

2. Jones, Jonathan. 2023. “U.S. States Investing Most in Manufactured Housing [2023 Edition].” Construction Coverage, 1

3. U.S. Census Bureau. 2021. “Manufactured Housing Survey (MHS) Data.” Census Bureau.

4. U.S. Census Bureau. 2021

5. U.S. Census Bureau. 2021

6. Kim, A. M. 2022. “Community land trusts for sustainably affordable rental housing redevelopment: A case study of rRolland Ccurtis Ggardens in Llos Aangeles.” Cityscape 24 (1): 233-256.

7. Pullen, Tyler, Elizabeth Kneebone, and Carol Galante. 2020. “The Cost of Building Housing Series.” Terner Center.

8. Pullen, Kneebone, and Galante 2020

9. Levine, Noah. 2022. “Mobile Home Parks Understudied in Planning.” American Planning Association.

10. Triad Financial Services. 2021. “Can a Manufactured Home Be Real Property?” Triad Financial Services.

11. US Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2011. “Regulatory Barriers to Manufactured Housing Placement in Urban Communities.” HUD User.

12. Triad Financial Services. 2021.

13. Rifkin, Cameron, and Maddie Davis. 2022. “How Manufactured Homes Can Build Housing Stability.” National Conference of State Legislatures.

14. US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2011

15. Rifkin and Davis, 2022

16. Keel, Andrew. n.d. “....” Forbes Business

Council. The Future of Mobile Home Park Investing- Three Big Names. Accessed March 1, 2024.

17. Kasakove, Sophie. 2022. “Investors Are Buying Mobile Home Parks. Residents Are Paying a Price. (Published 2022).” The New York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/2022/03/27/us/mobile-home-parkownership-costs.html.

18. Keel, n.d.

19. Keel, n.d.

20. Keel Team. 2023. “Case Study #13.” Keel Team Real Estate Investments. https:// keelteam.com/case-study-13/.

21. U.S. Census Bureau. 2022. “Median Value (Dollars) for Mobile Homes.” American Community Survey, ACS 5-Year Estimates Detailed Tables, Table B25083. https://data.census.gov/table/ ACSDT5Y2022.B25083?q=mobile%20 homes,%20hillsdale,%20mi.

22. U.S. Census Bureau. 2022. “Median Value (Dollars) for Mobile Homes.” American community Survey, ACS 5-Year Estimates Detailed Tables, Table B25083. https://data.census.gov/table/ ACSDT5Y2022.B25083?q=mobile%20 homes%20alma,%20mi.

23. U.S. Census Bureau. 2022. “Median Value (Dollars) for Mobile Homes.” American Community Survey, ACS 5-Year Estimates Detailed Tables, Table B25083. https://data.census.gov/table/ ACSDT5Y2022.B25083?q=mobile%20 homes,%20breckenridge,%20mi.

24. Keel Team, 2023

25. Bommarito, Scot, and William Maher. 2022. “Affordable Housing: Stable Returns With Positive Social Impact.” Pension Real Estate Association.

26. Keel Team, 2023

27. Kasakove, 2022

28. Neate, Rupert. 2015. “America’s trailer parks: the residents may be poor but the

owners are getting rich.” The Guardian, 1

29. Neate, 2015

30. Neate, 2015

31. Neate, 2015

32. Neate, 2015

33. Keel, n.d.

34. Keel, n.d.

35. Keel, n.d.

36. Fadel, Leila, and Mallika Seshadri. 2023. “Of the Americans living in mobile homes, 3 million of them reside in high flood areas.” NPR.

37. U.S. Census Bureau, 2021

38. HAUGE, RUTHIE, Allison Garfield, and Ali Garfield. 2023. “Mobile homes affordable but problematic, some residents say | Government | captimes. com.” The Cap Times. https://captimes. com/news/government/mobile-homesare-affordable-but-some-residents-findserious-downsides/article_8ea4a290-679711ee-a1de-5f800f18b8ed.html.

39. HAUGE, Garfield, and Garfield, 2023

40. HAUGE, Garfield, and Garfield, 2023

41. HAUGE, Garfield, and Garfield, 2023

42. U.S. Census Bureau, 2021

43. U.S. Census Bureau, 2021

44. U.S. Census Bureau, 2021

45. U.S. Census Bureau, 2021

46. U.S. Census Bureau, 2021

47. U.S. Census Bureau, 2021

48. Min, Daniel S., and Michael Martz. 2023. “With rents rising, mobile home residents have ‘nowhere to go.’” Richmond TimesDispatch. https://richmond.com/news/ state-regional/government-politics/withrents-rising-mobile-home-residents-havenowhere-to-go/article_477178b6-f9a7-11ed841a-4b456a416c9d.html.

49. Min and Martz, 2023

50. Min and Martz, 2023

51. U.S. Census Bureau, “Disability Characteristics,” 2022. American Community Survey, ACS 1-Year Estimates Subject Tables, Table S1810, 2022, accessed on March 1, 2024, https://data.census.gov/ table/ACSST1Y2022.S1810?q=handicap persons.

52. U.S. Census Bureau, 2021

53. Ryder, Mia. 2023. “Rent increases hit residents of Woodland mobile home park.” The Columbian., 1

54. Ryder, Mia. 2023.

55. Ryder, Mia. 2023.

56. CFPB Office for Older Americans. 2022. “Data Spotlight: Profiles of older adults living in mobile homes.” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.

57. CFPB Office for Older Americans, 2022

58. CFPB Office for Older Americans, 2022

59. Thompson, Matthew. 2020. “From Co-Ops to Community Land Trusts: Tracing the Historical Evolution and Policy Mobilities of Collaborative Housing Movements.” Housing, Theory and Society 37 (1): 82-100. DOI: 10.1080/14036096.2018.1517822.

60. Davis, John E. 2014. “Origins and Evolution of the Community Land Trust in the United States.” ROOTS & BRANCHES. https://cltroots.org/wp-content/uploads/ sites/3/2022/06/Origins-Evolution-CLT.pdf.

61. Davis, John E. 2014. “Origins and Evolution of the Community Land Trust in the United States.” ROOTS & BRANCHES. https://cltroots.org/wp-content/uploads/ sites/3/2022/06/Origins-Evolution-CLT.pdf.

62. Turman, Jinny A. 2017. “To Strike A Fair Balance: The Peacemakers and the Community Land Trust Movement in West Virginia, 1970-1982.” West Virginia History 11 (1): 45-71. doi:10.1353/wvh.2017.0002.

63. Green, Jarrid. 2018. “Community Land

Trust.” The Next System Project.

64. Greenstein, Rosalind, and Yesim Sungu. 2005. “Community Land Trusts.” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

65. Kim, 2022

66. Kim, 2022, 1

67. Kim, 2022, 1

68. Rifkin and Davis, 2022

69. Doherty, Iwan. n.d. “A boom in trailer parks converting into community owned cooperatives.” Mutual Interest Media. Accessed March 1, 2024, 1

70. Doherty, Iwan. n.d., 1

71. Bennett, Kirbie, and Jamie Wanzek. 2023. “How a mobile-home park saved its community from a corporate buyout.”

High Country News.

72. Bennett and Wanzek, 2023

73. Bennett and Wanzek, 2023

74. Kasakove, 2022

75. Kasakove, 2022

76. Kasakove, 2022

77. Strauss, Leslie. 2022. “HUD Spending Bill Creates New Manufactured Housing Program and Emphasizes New Construction.” Housing Assistance Council. https://ruralhome.org/hudfunding-fy23/.

78. The US Congress. 2023. “House Bill 7220.” Congress.gov. https://www.congress.

gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/7220/allactions-without-amendments?s=1&r=4.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Jessica Hobbs is a second-year in the Master’s of Urban and Regional Planning. She graduated from the University of Michigan in 2020 with a degree in Colonial History and Sustainability. Her current studies are focused on sustainable alternatives to economic development that further a more circular economy, community ownership, and human health.

Public Health Ills from Land Use & Urban Planning Neglect:

A Need for a Community-Identified Path Forward

Master of Urban and Regional Planning

In memory of Issam Abdul-Nabi Faraj

ABSTRACT

Dozens of neurotoxin-polluting and cancer-causing industrial plants have produced corrosive public health conditions that have plagued communities in Southeast Michigan for decades. This persistent pollution, a product of urban planning neglect and systemic racism, has contaminated the water, air, land, and general living environment. These conditions have not only degraded the local environment – they have also led to higher rates of congenital disabilities, asthma, and cancer, with more advanced stages of cancer occurring within 20 miles of oil refineries. These grave public health conditions are an everyday reality for many Black, Brown, Indigenous, and low-income communities in America, and nominal solutions and paths forward exist as precedents to halt these types of ills. Those charged with public health and environmental protection often have competing interests to attract economic development to respective localities while also experiencing pressures from lobbying interests. There is a need for tangible accountability across levels of government. To this end, this paper proposes that decision-making power is vested with those most impacted by these issues: the communities sharing their backyards with heavy industrial land uses. Other supporting recommendations include exploring judicial and legislative remedies through nuisance law and land use planning. Considering the scale of the environmental justice issues at hand, trusted stakeholders should investigate multiple legal strategies to ensure the most sustainable and tailored solutions to eliminate pollutants, as well as the health implications for the most underserved communities in Detroit, Dearborn, Melvindale, and River Rouge.

SARA FARAJ

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Corrosive public health conditions caused by dozens of neurotoxic, cancer-causing industrial plants plague the cities of Detroit, Dearborn, Melvindale, and River Rouge – urban planners are responsible for these conditions.1 Pollution from these facilities has contaminated the water, air, land, and quality of life for many in the name of economic development and profits that often benefit the already privileged.2 These conditions have caused grave health implications for not only environmental ecosystems, but also the social ecosystems made up of communities living with cancer-causing agents in their backyards.3 The orchestra of hazardous metals, neurotoxins, and carcinogens generated by industrial plants causes congenital disabilities, asthma, and higher cancer rates in the surrounding neighborhoods, with more advanced stages of cancer occurring within 20 miles of oil refineries.4 These public health concerns disproportionately impact Black, Brown, and low-income communities – a trend that is embedded in the fabric of the nation and has burdened the lives of many for decades.5

The affected population surrounding what used to be one of the largest industrial complexes in the world is predominantly Black, Arab, Hispanic, and low-income with lower education levels.6 These circumstances align with historical findings that highlight how pervasive environmental injustice concentrates in and around places with higher numbers of racial minorities and those with lower incomes.7

This paper applies legal frameworks to identify potential strategies to eliminate pollution to foster a healthy environment for the most underserved communities living in proximity. The legal strategies outlined include (1) reform of the Michigan Advisory Council on

Environmental Justice (MAC-EJ) that Governor Gretchen Whitmer created through Executive Order No. 2019-06,8 (2) regulatory action to rezone districts in proximity to heavy industrial and manufacturing districts to create buffer zones, and (3) a tort lawsuit to enjoin toxic operations and force redress. Of the three strategies, this report recommends reforming the Michigan Advisory Council on Environmental Justice through executive order amendment to redistribute decision-making power in the hands of those most impacted by the egregious public health violations and allow them to drive tailored solution sets forward. By allowing those with intimate experience and expertise to design actions that address these public health ills, the impacted community can derive more sustainable and tailored solutions with strong potential to build the foundation for future legislative and judicial action.

Figure 1. An image of illuminated bellowing industrial fumes from the Ford Motor Company Ford River Rouge Complex location in Dearborn, Michigan.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

“ Those most affected are the key subject matter experts who should have the power and authority to direct policy, legal, and reparative efforts forward.

- sara faraj

Figure 2. A photograph of the Ford Motor Company Ford Rouge Complex in Dearborn, MI; colored byproduct lifts into the sky as the United Auto Workers (UAW) union flag, State of Michigan flag, and United States flag overlay the fumes.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This paper also acknowledges that historically, Black, Brown, Indigenous, and other systemically underserved community members and activists have led the way toward environmental justice and better public health through organizing efforts, despite exclusion and limited access to formal decision-making power. For decades, community leaders who are most impacted by harmful public health conditions and structural racism have pushed public policy efforts forward to ensure environmental justice or the “fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”9 Rooted in environmental justice frameworks pioneered by environmental justice giants and scholars such as Robert D. Bullard, these recommendations aim to prevent future risks and public health ills, not to reduce or manage them. Environmental justice also strives for fair and just application of protection promised by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and others charged with monitoring and protecting the environment and health.10

The recommendations and considerations outlined here aim to amplify the grave conditions experienced and highlighted by other activists and local experts for decades while shedding light on possible paths forward. Public agents — such as urban planners, who are responsible for supporting, endorsing, and protecting public health for all — should address the historical and discriminatory harms of the profession that essentially created these spatial conditions and inequities outlined in this paper. Many of the strategies explored in this paper are not novel; activists

and organizers have pursued many already. However, to urban planners and other officials, the idea of placing decision-making power for solution sets in the hands of those with direct lived experience may be novel and even dismissed due to traditional hierarchies in public service.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

II. BACKGROUND

A. BRIEF SUMMARY

For decades, what was once one of the largest industrial complexes in the world has suffocated those nearby — some of whom nearly share their backyard with the polluters.11 The proximity of these polluting plants produced an array of environmental injustices that triggered severe consequences for public health, gravely impacting the well-being of those living nearby. 12 These conditions have

Figure 3. A photograph of two youth community members tossing a ball outside of the Salina Intermediate School in Dearborn, MI; two industrial smokestacks painted red and white loom over the school and mirror the outfits of the children playing outside.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

taken the lives of those who may not have been able to afford to live elsewhere, due to centuries of spatial segregation and racism that have restricted social and physical mobility to live in healthier conditions.13 The architects of these hazardous public health conditions — including dozens of industrial steel, petroleum coke, wastewater treatment, and one of the nation’s largest oil refineries — have contaminated the water, air, and land that populations

Figure 4. An image of a tree-lined road that leads to blue-colored and other industrial substances piled up within the entrance to the Marathon Petroleum (Oil) Refinery in Detroit, MI. A few homes exist in the neighborhood, which appears to have been more populated at one time based on the positioning of the few homes standing today.

from the cities of Detroit, Dearborn, Melvindale, and River Rouge live in.14 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has deemed this area a nonattainment zone, highlighting the violation of air quality standards.15

The culmination of hazardous metals, neurotoxins, and carcinogens from this major industrial epicenter causes health consequences that include but are not limited to congenital disabilities, asthma, liver failure, and higher cancer rates, with more advanced stages of cancer occurring within 20 miles of the oil refinery.16 These public health outcomes disproportionately impact Black, Brown, and Indigenous communities.17 The affected population is predominantly Black, Arab, Hispanic, and low-income. 71% are Black, with 8% of the affected population holding a college degree and 30% of households in poverty.18 These grave public health conditions are not unique to Southeast Michigan; they are part of a racial endemic seen across America due to persistent spatial segregation and systemic discrimination.19

B. RELEVANT LAWS

1. GENERAL LEGAL DUTY & AUTHORITY

The duty and authority to act on public health are vested in federal, state, and local jurisdictions. It is vital to understand which governmental and agency actors are responsible and able to mitigate public health ills in order to outline feasible solution sets and identify the levers or laws and policies each actor can activate to promote welfare, public health, and safety. The State of Michigan Constitution outlines the general legal duty to protect public health within a

particular population or jurisdiction.20 More specifically, the Public Health Code gives the State the power to “promote public health through organized programs,” which includes the “prevention and control of environmental hazards.”21

The State Constitution charges the governor with protecting public health through administrative law; the federal government also exercises administrative law to create agencies to protect welfare.22 Michigan is also a home rule state, meaning that the Constitution vests police powers locally. This governance approach affords some independence to municipalities to codify ordinances or city charters, allowing local land use regulation to promote public health through the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA).23 As it pertains to environmental justice, the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NERPA) within the Constitution of Michigan

Figure 5. A double exposure of a car exiting an alleyway, homes, powerlines, and trees with red, white, and blue smokestacks in the distance. The author made this image in the neighborhood just over the railroad tracks from the industrial epicenter.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

enumerates rulemaking authority to the Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE) to work alongside the EPA and other organizations to ensure environmental protection to safeguard the public health through permitting and regulation.24

Considering the capitalist nature of the public health concern, the impact the industrial epicenter has on interstate commerce may influence outcomes and attempts to reduce burdens from industrial production that disproportionately benefit often white populations and overburden Black, Brown, Indigenous, and low-income populations.25 Congress has broad power to regulate commerce and control goods and merchandise that could impact public health through the Commerce Clause.26 Additionally, through the Taxing Clause and Spending Clause, Congress could also collect and utilize excise

taxes specifically to protect the welfare of people and promote public health by restricting certain harmful goods.27

By understanding where the power to address public health crises exists at the multiple levels of government, one attempting to address the issue can begin to see the vast array of levers in place to prevent grave situations such as this in the future. Given the severity of the public health conditions induced by the industrial complex, levers should be pulled at every level of government to engage various authorities and their duties. Still, it is essential to understand how actors are vesting and putting these powers into action through laws and policies specific to the issue of environmental injustice that corrodes physical and social environments.

2. GOVERNING LAWS

More specifically, the laws and regulations most pertinent to this issue of cancercausing pollution in Southeast Michigan rest at the local and state levels. However, the previously stated federal powers also pertain to this issue due to the unique nature of industrial uses and production, which is the source of the public health crisis. Therefore, the powers of Congress to regulate commerce, taxation, and spending impact these issues of oil and steel production specific to the industrial center.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

The Fifth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution Bill of Rights also applies to these issues. The Takings Clause of Amendment 5 outlines that there must be just compensation for private property taken for public use, which can include economic development.28 When industrial and manufacturing land uses exceed a regulatory mandate or ordinance that protects welfare, they are

Figure 6. An image of fumes lifting from an industrial center smokestack into the clear sky. The image was made in Detroit, MI, near the border of Dearborn, MI, highlighting the municipal borders that divide the industrial center.

a nuisance per se (MCL 125.3407, et seq.). Violating this legal threshold constitutes a governmental taking. It requires the government to award recompense to abate the harm done to the private property owner to maintain the use as a public good for economic use.29 The state, municipalities, and companies have purchased residential assets to avoid nuisance claims and attempt to improve public health conditions for some. An example of this occurred in 2012 and 2020 when the Marathon Oil Refinery in Southeast Michigan purchased assets from locals.30

Additionally, Congress has enacted laws such as the Clean Air Act (CAA), Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or Clean Water Act (CWA) that enables the EPA to regulate to protect public health from pollution, harmful waste, and toxic substances.31 These agencies are responsible for ensuring that pollutants discharged into the air, water, and environment are within reasonable levels that protect public health and welfare while working to improve the quality of the stratospheric ozone layer. Moreover, local municipal zoning ordinances are responsible for promoting conducive public health conditions by separating harmful land uses, such as heavier industrial and manufacturing land uses, from residential districts to protect public health and welfare.32

3. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES OR BARRIERS

Despite federal, state, and local laws and policies in place, high levels of hydrogen cyanide, sulfur dioxide, and chromium persist and kill more than 650 Detroit residents annually.33 Southeast Michigan has experienced population and economic decline since the twentieth

century due to deindustrialization, racism, and federally subsidized exclusionary housing initiatives that led many white residents to flee to the suburbs.34 These conditions have left much of the region vulnerable to development regimes that allow economic interests to triumph over the environment. To this day, the narrative remains that the region cannot fiscally afford to lose its heavy industry sector.35

As a result, constitutional laws such as the Commerce Clause or Taxing and Spending Clauses have done little to limit oil and steel production due to their demand.36

Economic interests have also triumphed heavily over environmental conditions due to lobbying interests following Citizens United v. FEC, 558 US 310.37

Financial lobbying expenditure records for Marathon, the major oil refinery in the industrial complex, highlight their targeted attempts to obstruct the EPA’s oversight and mission by lobbying against

Figure 7. A photograph of an empty brown chair beside a tree surrounded by houses in one of the communities affected by the industrial epicenter in Southeast Michigan and Woodmere Cemetery in Detroit, MI.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

nuclear energy and clear air and water efforts. These lobbying efforts promoting economic interests have compromised the substance of EPA regulations of clean air and water and jeopardized the very tools in place to protect against neurotoxins and other pollutants. On a larger scale, these lobbying impacts have reached U.S. representatives and weakened legislative attempts to reduce toxic outputs from oil and other industries.38 Additionally, without valid nuisance per se claims, the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment will unlikely be enacted to alleviate those who wish to be bought out and relocate to healthier living conditions; the burden to provide proof on the overburdened residents is difficult to overcome.39

Laws such as the CWA, CAA, and TSCA have been insufficient in preventing deadly public health conditions. As heavy manufacturing companies willingly breach compliance and contaminate neighborhoods with carcinogens and toxic waste, the EPA does little to enforce its regulations – leaving many companies busier with settling lawsuits than taking preventative measures to reduce emissions.40 In February 2023, EGLE requested that the EPA remove the region’s nonattainment status under the CAA 2015 National Ambient Air Quality Standards, posing even greater public health conditions for communities already suffering under current air quality conditions.41 The agencies and legislators responsible for protecting public health have requested a reduction in regulations

Figure 8. An image of clouds of byproduct filling the air over the Marathon Petroleum Corporation (MPC) Detroit refinery down the street from a home in Detroit, MI.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

Source: Photo by sara faraj

and monitoring under the CAA, claiming that “exceptional events” of western wildfires were responsible for poor air quality. They have requested that EGLE omit emissions data to bring the region into compliance.42

III. ANALYSIS

A. LEGAL STRATEGY #1: REFORM OF THE MICHIGAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (MAC-EJ)

1. EXPLANATION

One strategy that could address the public health crisis in Southeast Michigan is for the governor to amend Executive Order

No. 2019-06 to redistribute promulgating and other power to the Michigan Advisory Council on Environmental Justice (MACEJ) while expanding representation to those most impacted on the ground. Governor Gretchen Whitmer created the MAC-EJ to give those most affected by environmental injustice a “seat at the table.”43 The MAC-EJ is embedded within and advises the Interagency Environmental Justice Response Team (IEJRT) (“Response Team”), another advisory body created by the Governor’s sixth executive order. The state Environmental Justice Public Advocate, Regina Strong, heads the MAC-EJ. At its inception, she announced that the goal for the council is to address how state departments can better manage public safety challenges.44 The council consists

Figure 9. An image of a beached boat in River Rouge, MI, near Zug Island that reads “POLLUTION CONTROL” on the side of the boat that is clearly out of service.

of 21 members with representation from public health, local government, environmental organizations, tribal nations, community-based organizations, business and industry, labor organizations, and more.45

Since the creation of the MAC-EJ, there has been nominal media coverage and announcement of tangible action to address the pervasive and profuse environmental justice concerns in Southeast Michigan. Given the scale and timeline of these public health ills, building the most effective solution sets may take time; internal bureaucracy may also slow progression. However, the issues at hand are urgent and complex to address regardless of the economic and capitalist nature of the problem. As its name implies, the MAC-EJ is an advisory body, meaning the council has little to no agency to implement concrete efforts to curb environmental danger.

This strategy aims to generate more pathways for those in MAC-EJ to enact action and to ensure greater inclusion from experts on the ground. Having experts from academia, business, and local government on the council can be conducive to sustainable and comprehensive recommendations, but it can also water down the experiences of those who have been most impacted for decades. Formally expanding the goals of the MAC-EJ to address public safety and health issues on the ground as opposed to only within state agencies may expedite addressing urgent issues with targeted solutions.

Reforming Executive Order No. 2019-06 and expanding the decision-making power to ensure that necessary actions for environmental justice issues are in place would have several advantages. It would bolster representation from those most impacted on the ground to ensure

comprehensive recommendations, expand engagement by enlisting trusted community leaders and members with expert knowledge that others on MAC-EJ might not have, and build a foundation for future legislative action. However, this executive approach is relatively impermanent compared to legislative action; legislators and others could prompt judicial action to rescind the executive order, especially with a change in political party leadership.

10. An image of a sign that reads “PRIVATE PROPERTY; NO DUMPING; TRESPASSERS WILL BE PROSECUTED” with the industrial complex as a backdrop, a children’s swing hanging from the tree on the left, and a kid’s toy and parked cars in the distance. The land with the “NO DUMPING SIGN” appears to be vacant; it seems the neighborhood was once more populated based on the placement of the few homes in the area.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

2. APPLICATION

The legal authority for this approach is outlined in the Executive Organization Act of 1965 (Act 380 of 1965), which states, “[t]he governor may establish in the departments of commerce, labor,

Figure

Source:

state police, military affairs, public health, licensing and regulation, and social services, advisory councils.”46 The Emergency Management Act (Act 390 of 1976) also affords the governor the power to enact executive orders when “the governor determines state assistance

is needed to supplement local efforts and capabilities to save lives, protect property and the public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the state.”47

Article 5 Section 8 of the Michigan Constitution also states that the governor

Figure 11. A photo of a manufacturing byproduct lifting into the air from a smokestack in the distance with piles of what appears to be coal acting as a large fence or barrier to the industrial center operations. The author made this image in Dearborn, MI, off Miller Road.

Photo by sara faraj

is charged with supervising state principal departments, such as EGLE and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), and their coordination on and execution of environmental remediation and public health planning.48 Moreover, this course of action might later require the legislative body’s approval to continue the executive order, as seen with COVID-19 executive orders and emergency acts that were previously challenged in Michigan due to the lack of approval from the legislature.49

The executive legal strategy to amend Executive Order No. 2019-06 to bolster decision-making power and expand representation to those most impacted by the Southeast Michigan industrial complex would be signed and enacted through the governor’s executive powers. The advisory body would operate within the EGLE’s Office of the Environmental Justice Public Advocate division, also created by Governor Whitmer’s executive order.50 Expanded council membership would include the addition of five council members within a 0.25-mile radius of one of the major industrial plants that are within and border Detroit, Dearborn, Melvindale, and River Rouge. To be eligible, the additional council members must provide sufficient home address records that show they have been living within the eligibility boundaries for at least five consecutive years. The State of Michigan should also compensate the local council members with just and fair market rates for their work that would include, but not be limited to, (1) conducting discovery, (2) collecting data, (3) producing qualitative research with community members, (4) managing ongoing monitoring and evaluation, and (5) assisting the State Court Administrative Office and others with drafting and implementing protective legislation.51

The central goal of this amendment would be to draft and approve targeted and tailored administrative rules and legislation with counsel support from Earthjustice, a non-profit public interest environmental law organization, or others that already address environmental justice issues. Drafted administrative regulations and laws might eliminate toxic emissions, limit emissions during specific days or times, require industrial companies to conduct substantial and continued remediation, and bolster the community benefits agreements (CBA) process with producers and impacted communities to meet new technological or equipment standards. Governments and agencies should facilitate thirdparty support from trusted community partners, organizations, and institutions to ensure inclusion, equity, and understanding of processes.

Considering that the EPA and others do not equally apply current laws aimed at ensuring public health protection and environmental justice, putting actors in place to ensure equity and adequate regulations is necessary and overdue.52

3. POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES

Without legislative support, the executive action might be challenged, leading to the dissolution of efforts and overall regression of public health protections.53 Because the executive order does not enact a law, there is a greater risk that economic interests may once again overtake health concerns. Support from the Michigan legislature and citizens can ensure that the executive action to create the advisory council is not redacted due to political party shifts.

Furthermore, efforts to reduce emissions or production causing emissions could prompt involvement from federal

actors per the Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the power to regulate economic affairs between states. The commercial nature of this issue involves major industries such as oil and steel; therefore, economic interests to continue production may pose a barrier prompting intervention on a federal level.

B. LEGAL STRATEGY #2: REGULATORY ACTION TO REZONE DISTRICTS IN PROXIMITY TO HEAVY INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING DISTRICTS TO CREATE BUFFER ZONES

1. EXPLANATION

The second recommendation to address the public health crisis in Southeast Michigan is legislative action from the cities of Detroit, Dearborn, Melvindale, and River Rouge. Specifically, this paper suggests rezoning to create buffers

between residential and noxious land uses. Doing so would restrict further residential development in areas of most significant risk to reduce health casualties and explore legal options to provide recompense to those who may choose to relocate.

The Michigan Zoning and Enabling Act (MZEA) outlines the legislative actions and legal authorities that pertain to this strategy.54 The MZEA states, “[a] local unit of government may provide by zoning ordinance for the regulation of land development and the establishment of 1 or more districts within its zoning jurisdiction which regulate the use of land and structures to meet the needs of the state’s citizens….”55 The MZEA vests the power to local units of government, such as cities or townships, to regulate land development through legislation by producing zoning ordinances that map districts according to specified parameters and needs within the governed jurisdiction. Zoning codes further outline the uses permitted by right and conditional uses that may be approved by the legislative bodies that regulate land uses. The jurisdiction may also vest the rights to regulate land use to the Planning Commission, which is often tasked with aligning future land use maps with community objectives.56

This type of legislative strategy can foster more permanent solutions through permitting or outright restricting land uses to facilitate more conducive public health conditions and tailored community solutions. However, this legal strategy might encounter difficulty shifting land uses that have existed for some time. There are also concerns about housing affordability and availability when restricting residential uses to curb negative externalities; displacement is another burden on those who may not be able to afford the cost of living

Figure 12. An image of byproducts rising into the air over the industrial center during dusk in Dearborn, MI.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

in communities that are safe from public health ills. This strategy could also create patchwork policy solutions between jurisdictions, as they are not required to work together to strengthen solutions addressing these public health catastrophes.

2. APPLICATION

As the MZEA states, zoning aims to ensure that planned districts and codes “promote public health, safety, and welfare” by facilitating access to food, energy, and other necessities, while reducing inappropriate overcrowding and use of sewage disposal, water, and other amenities.57 The zoning ordinances between the affected jurisdictions surrounding the industrial complex vary according to their districts, but the general purposes and laws apply broadly.

To apply this legislative, legal solution to the impacted municipalities, the legislative bodies vested with the rights to rezone districts would work in tandem with planning commissions and city planners to ensure proposed rezonings comply with the adopted master plans in their respective jurisdictions.58 Considering the scale and history of municipal and other negligence on these issues, it is likely that master plans do little to eliminate the public health ills generated by the heavy industrial activity bordering neighborhoods.

The focus of this recommendation includes rezoning the surrounding Single-Family Residential, Multi-Family Residential, and other Residential zoning districts in the closest proximity to the industrial complex within the various jurisdictions to heavier and more intensive uses such as Intensive Industrial and General Manufacturing districts. Doing so would eliminate the possibility

of residential districts permitting future residential use and development in hazardous areas; this upzoning would permit more land uses by right in the districts and generate a necessary buffer between residences and harmful land uses.

Various departments — such as the Planning and Development Department in the City of Detroit, the City Planning Commission, and Buildings, Safety Engineering, and Environmental Department — would need to make recommendations to the various City Councils or legislative bodies to trip the rezoning process, which the legislative bodies would ultimately approve. This process would likely constitute a regulatory taking by eminent domain, which would require due process and just compensation of fair market value for the land owners impacted by the rezoning

Figure 13. A photograph of a standalone home framed by the Marathon Petroleum Corporation (MPC) Detroit Oil Refinery in Detroit, MI, as a backdrop. Light blue and white exposed and uncovered substances are piled up in the distance.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

efforts to protect public health per the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.59

Other likely actors involved in this process include attorneys representing individuals and developers impacted by the proposed rezonings and other landowners who are not directly affected but are concerned with depreciating land values.

Additionally, urban planners and government officials can work with polluters who are willing to develop the necessary buffers. For example, the Marathon Petroleum Corporation (MPC) announced in 2020 that it would spend $5 million on home buyouts to build a buffer and improve community conditions for

Figure 14. A photograph of a children’s playground with red, white, and blue smokestacks in the distance that blend in with the playground frames in Dearborn, MI.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

3. POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES

those living in Michigan’s most polluted zip code. The MPC has failed multiple EPA inspections and received nine environmental violations in 2018 alone. This program is like the 2012 buyouts offered by the company; 266 homeowners of the 294 eligible properties elected to relocate during this time, highlighting the demand. In 2017, residents in other surrounding neighborhoods posted signs that read “Buy more homes,” but MPC declined.60 Potential legal challenges to legislative rezoning include navigating tensions over private property rights, the difficulty of creating cohesive and uniform plans across jurisdictions without the help of regional planning agencies, and the cost of utilizing eminent domain to acquire residential property for public use and benefit. Because fundamental rights might be questioned under due process, there may be significant pushback from landowners concerning the rezoning. These actions would also trip the need for just compensation for the takings, considering that the land would be taken for public use and economic production. Local jurisdictions may not be able to afford the cost of providing just compensation legally required to all the potentially impacted landowners, despite financially benefiting from the current land use conditions. Renters who likely enjoy reduced housing costs next to the industrial area might be pushed into a tight housing market and face barriers to finding another residence. Additionally, it may be difficult for the surrounding cities to unite on these plans, leading to rezoning in some cities but not others. Because these issues occur at the municipal level, other actors, such as state officials or federal agencies, do not have the vested power to act on these issues.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

C. LEGAL STRATEGY #3: TORT LAWSUIT TO ENJOIN TOXIC OPERATIONS AND FORCE REDRESS

1. EXPLANATION

The third legal strategy to address the public health crisis in Southeast Michigan would be for impacted private parties and supporters, such as environmental justice organizations, to enact a judicial remedy through a tort lawsuit that forces monetary redress or property buyouts. Through this strategy, impacted locals could relocate to healthier conditions.

The State of Michigan or a local jurisdiction can also bring a lawsuit against industrial companies under the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, which protects public health and welfare for the populace by safeguarding minors and those who are unable to protect

Figure 15. An image of a single cloud reflected in a puddle below with Zug Island, a heavily industrialized island, in the distance. This image was made at the intersection of Fort Street and a residential neighborhood in the Delray neighborhood in Detroit, MI.

themselves from sanitation, air, and water pollution or other harmful public health conditions or concerns.61 Parens Patriae affords the power for sovereign states to act on behalf of their citizens, often when private parties are publicly invading “publicly held rights to health, safety and welfare” through nuisance, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and other means.62 A judicial remedy through the governmental use of parens patriae could lessen the burden on individual citizens to organize and carry out costly litigation, while allowing the State of Michigan or municipalities to join together in a tort lawsuit.63 Case law can also set broader legal standards for polluting industries. However, there is some difficulty in proving harm within the reasonableness test and a high cost of litigation among the dozens of industrial companies within the complex. Those bringing the suit must also prove that the private defendant was at fault and that there were losses or damages from the defendant’s negligence.64

Municipalities and urban planners are responsible for creating these conditions; they permitted these incompatible land uses. Therefore, they should be held accountable in attempts to eliminate future harm by aligning with the goals outlined in the MZEA to promote public health. The argument for maintaining industrial activity rooted in economic welfare for some does not consider the infringement on the general welfare. Predominantly Black, Brown, and Indigenous communities have endured the exchange of general welfare for commercial gains for decades. The grave risks and outcomes of living in close proximity to these noxious land uses are clear, yet urban planners and others neglect to address the matter despite public protest.

2. APPLICATION

The legislature has the power to order appropriate parties to act per the MZEA, which affords the ability to enforce zoning ordinances that should not permit an “unreasonable interference” of public health. In this case, the legal classification for this type of action pertains to both public and private nuisance law.65 The nuisance can trip a penalty for the violation, impose a civil infraction or fine, and designate a blight violation or other sanction authorized by law.66

The legal application of the strategy would include data collection and the gathering of records for the EPA, EGLE, and others to make a case for public health violations in the air, water, and environment. The strategy might involve legal firms, such as Earthjustice or the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, in formulating valid claims and proof of violations according to the rules promulgated by state administrators

Figure 16. An image of snow-covered shrubs and grass with Zug Island and a home in the background. This image was made in Detroit, MI.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

and others. Trusted researchers and organizations could collect testimonies and health testing to further substantiate the case with firsthand experiences and health conditions of those most impacted by environmental injustice. The State of Michigan, local municipalities,

environmental organizations, and impacted community members surrounding the industrial complex would then work together to bring forth the tort claim of public nuisance as public plaintiffs to the varying companies (private defendants) in the industrial

Figure 17. A photo of red, white, and blue smokestacks in the distance with the Islamic Market Village off Dix Ave on the right side of the frame. There are several Arab cultural markers in the surrounding neighborhoods of the major industrial center, such as mosques and markets offering halal products.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

complex according to their type of emissions and amount of pollution or violations.

3. POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES

The potential legal challenges to this judicial strategy include the difficulty of withstanding the reasonableness test, meeting the heavy burden of proof, and gaining authorization to use private health data to prove substantial harm occurred on a public scale. Moreover, the tests the courts may use to find substantial harm committed on a public scale or valid tort claims may pose significant barriers for those with limited resources and access to support. Additionally, the size of the industries and economic input will be challenging to overcome. Public nuisance tort lawsuits that aim to reduce commercial production of this caliber may cause concern for interstate commerce and Congress per the Commerce Clause.67

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommended legal strategy for the environmental justice and public health crises in Southeast Michigan is for the governor to amend Executive Order No. 2019-06 to reform the MAC-EJ with the necessary power to participate in promulgating rules. The governor should also expand MAC-EJ membership to include more impacted community members. An executive order presents the legal strategy needed to build a foundation for a sustainable solution set because it allows those most impacted to develop a tailored solution set. These efforts can also expand beyond the initial executive order into more permanent legislation and greater transparency and accountability in processes. Government officials and other stakeholders should

work with the Michigan legislature to ensure the continuation of the executive order and advisory council.68 To bolster these efforts, legislators can and should also pass legislation that positions the MAC-EJ within NERPA to ensure the permeance of the advisory council and recommendations and actions to reach goals the governor and council set to eliminate neurotoxic pollution. Moreover, the MAC-EJ can facilitate and guide participatory action research and planning to direct local jurisdictions on how rezonings to eliminate the mixing of noxious land uses with community space; it could help guide the process with findings in litigation processes.

A suite of legal strategies is necessary to address the scale of these environmental injustices and public health ills that urban planners have facilitated for decades. Environmental organizations and localities should support impacted community members in seeking redress for harm caused by polluters through judicial remedies. Legislators should revisit environmental regulations that have historically bypassed environmental justice frameworks to ensure fair application of law and livable community conditions. Current regulations are insufficient, and accountability measures are lacking in ensuring equal protection for the Black, Brown, and Indigenous communities disproportionately plagued by environmental injustice.69

CONCLUSION

The public health crisis in Southeast Michigan is a wicked problem that will require activating an array of policy and legal levers that engage actors across public, private, and non-profit sectors. It will require subject matter experts and data, but most importantly, the local knowledge and narratives of those whom

these issues have impacted for decades, many of whom have lost relatives and friends to cancer and other health implications.70 Those most affected are the key subject matter experts who should have the power and authority to direct policy, legal, and reparative efforts forward. Formally realizing this requires a redistribution of power that goes beyond traditional, often tokenistic engagement. Sustainable restoration can only occur through this participatory citizen control; those experiencing public health firsthand best understand what they need to mitigate further corrosive conditions and should have the authority and decision-making power to decide the path forward.

Together, these legal strategies have the potential to set the foundation and build precedents for lawsuits and other legal strategies that can lead to more permanent solutions, such as case law

or legislation that expands beyond Southeast Michigan. Efforts to eliminate these public health ills rooted in racism can also reshape the path forward for urban planning. Municipalities, government officials, and urban planners have been complacent in cultivating these harmful conditions and have benefited financially from the unsustainable and inequitable land use decisions that drive them.71

The grim outcomes have been clear for those who have lost loved ones or battled cancer, asthma, and other illnesses from sharing their backyards with negligent polluters who are often in favor of commercial gain over consequences that do not reflect the true cost of environmental and personal costs. Legislators and other government officials must hold industrial and manufacturing agents to standards rooted in environmental justice; doing so will require more stringent oversight and a strengthening of regulations.

The question is: should urban planners be liable for permitting these noxious community conditions through land use and other permits? The answer is yes.

Figure 18. An image of a street light turning red in front of a heavy industrial plant in Dearborn, MI, near a steel manufacturing plant.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

Figure 19. A photo of the Marathon Petroleum Corporation (MPC) Detroit refinery at night, where the Marathon Oil logo is lit up on a sign.

Source: Photo by sara faraj

ENDNOTES

1. Brush, M. (2011, August 15). A settlement reached for part of River Rouge cleanup. Michigan Radio. Retrieved from https:// www.michiganradio.org/environmentscience/2011-08-15/a-settlement-reachedfor-part-of-river-rouge cleanup

2. Bullard, R. D., & Johnson, G. S. (2000). Environmentalism and public policy: Environmental justice: Grassroots activism and its impact on public policy decision making. Journal of Social Issues, 56(3), 555–578. https://doi.org/10.1111/00224537.00184

Neavling, S. (2021, January 8). Struggling to breathe in 48217, Michigan’s most toxic ZIP code. Detroit Metro Times. Retrieved from https://www.metrotimes.com/news/ struggling-to-breathe-in-48217-michigansmost-toxic zip-code-23542211

3. Cleary, E., Asher, M., Olawoyin, R., & Zhang, K. (2017). Assessment of indoor air quality exposures and impacts on respiratory outcomes in River Rouge and Dearborn, Michigan. Chemosphere, 187, 320–329. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. chemosphere.2017.08.091

4. Williams, S. B., Shan, Y., Jazzar, U., Kerr, P. S., Okereke, I., Klimberg, V. S., Tyler, D. S., Putluri, N., Lopez, D. S., Prochaska, J. D., Elferink, C., Baillargeon, J. G., Kuo, Y.-F., & Mehta, H. B. (2020). Proximity to oil refineries and risk of cancer: A population-based analysis. JNCI Cancer Spectrum, 4(6). https://doi.org/10.1093/ jncics/pkaa088

5. Neavling, S. (2021, January 8). Struggling to breathe in 48217, Michigan’s most toxic ZIP code. Detroit Metro Times. Retrieved from https://www.metrotimes.com/news/ struggling-to-breathe-in-48217-michigansmost-toxic zip-code-23542211

Disparities in the impact of Air Pollution. American Lung Association. (2022, November 17). Retrieved from https:// www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/who-isat-risk/disparities

Fleischman, L., & Franklin, M. (2017, November). Fumes across the fence-line: The health impacts of air pollution from oil & gas facilities on African American communities. Clean Air Task Force. Retrieved from https://www.catf.us/ resource/fumes-across-the-fence-line/

Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG). (2023).

Community profiles: City of Detroit, City of Dearborn, City of Melvindale, City of River Rouge. Community profiles. Retrieved from https://semcog.org/ data and-maps/community-profiles/ communities=5,1025,1125,1155

6. Cleary, E., Asher, M., Olawoyin, R., & Zhang, K. (2017). Assessment of indoor air quality exposures and impacts on respiratory outcomes in River Rouge and Dearborn, Michigan. Chemosphere, 187, 320–329. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. chemosphere.2017.08.091

Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG). (2023).

Community profiles: City of Detroit, City of Dearborn, City of Melvindale, City of River Rouge. Community profiles. Retrieved from https://semcog.org/ data and-maps/community-profiles/ communities=5,1025,1125,1155

7. Bullard, R. D., & Johnson, G. S. (2000). Environmentalism and public policy: Environmental justice: Grassroots activism and its impact on public policy decision making. Journal of Social Issues, 56(3), 555–578. https://doi.org/10.1111/00224537.00184

Mohai, P., & Saha, R. (2015). Which came first, people or pollution? assessing the disparate siting and post-siting demographic change hypotheses of environmental injustice. Environmental Research Letters, 10(11), 115008. https://doi. org/10.1088/1748-9326/10/11/115008

8. SOM - State of Michigan. (2020, January 23). Twenty-one Michiganders selected for the state’s first Environmental Justice Advisory Council. SOM - State of Michigan. https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/news/ press-releases/2020/01/23/twenty-onemichiganders-selected-for-the-states-firstenvironmental-justice-advisory-council

9. Bullard, R. D., & Johnson, G. S. (2000). Environmentalism and public policy: Environmental justice: Grassroots activism and its impact on public policy decision making. Journal of Social Issues, 56(3), 555–578, 558. https://doi. org/10.1111/0022-4537.00184

10. Bullard, R. D., & Johnson, G. S. (2000). Environmentalism and public policy: Environmental justice: Grassroots activism and its impact on public policy decision making. Journal of Social Issues, 56(3), 555–578, 558-559. https://doi. org/10.1111/0022-4537.00184

11. Brush, M. (2011, August 15). A settlement reached for part of River Rouge cleanup. Michigan Radio. Retrieved from https:// www.michiganpublic.org/environmentscience/2011-08-15/a-settlement-reachedfor-part-of-river-rouge-cleanup

12. Fleischman, L., & Franklin, M. (2017, November). Fumes across the fence-line: The health impacts of air pollution from oil & gas facilities on African American communities. Clean Air Task Force. Retrieved from https://www.catf.us/ resource/fumes-across-the-fence-line/

The United States Department of Justice. (2015, May 19). U.S. settles with Marathon Petroleum Corporation to cut harmful air emissions at facilities in Indiana, Kentucky and Ohio. The United States Department of Justice. Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-settlesmarathon-petroleum-corporation-cutharmful-air emissions-facilities-indiana

13. Neavling, S. (2021, January 8). Struggling to breathe in 48217, Michigan’s most toxic ZIP code. Detroit Metro Times. Retrieved from https://www.metrotimes.com/news/ struggling-to-breathe-in-48217-michigansmost-toxic zip-code-23542211

Rushing, K., & Ali, M. (2021, February 18). Meet the community that stopped an environmental power grab by the Trump administration. Earthjustice. Retrieved from https://earthjustice.org/features/dteriver-rouge-toxic-legacy

14. Neavling, S. (2021, January 8). Struggling to breathe in 48217, Michigan’s most toxic ZIP code. Detroit Metro Times. Retrieved from https://www.metrotimes.com/news/ struggling-to-breathe-in-48217-michigansmost-toxic zip-code-23542211

Brush, M. (2011, August 15). A settlement reached for part of River Rouge cleanup. Michigan Radio. Retrieved from https:// www.michiganpublic.org/environmentscience/2011-08-15/a-settlement-reachedfor-part-of-river-rouge-cleanup

15. Environmental Protection Agency. (2023). Nonattainment Areas for Criteria Pollutants (Green Book). EPA. Retrieved from https://www.epa.gov/green-book

16. Disparities in the impact of Air Pollution. American Lung Association. (2022, November 17). Retrieved from https://www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/ who-is-at-risk/disparities

Neavling, S. (2021, January 8). Struggling to breathe in 48217, Michigan’s most toxic ZIP code. Detroit Metro Times. Retrieved from https://www.metrotimes.com/news/ struggling-to-breathe-in-48217-michigansmost-toxic zip-code-23542211

Williams, S. B., Shan, Y., Jazzar, U., Kerr, P. S., Okereke, I., Klimberg, V. S., Tyler, D. S., Putluri, N., Lopez, D. S., Prochaska, J. D., Elferink, C., Baillargeon, J. G., Kuo, Y.-F., & Mehta, H. B. (2020). Proximity to oil refineries and risk of cancer: A population-based analysis. JNCI Cancer Spectrum, 4(6). https://doi.org/10.1093/ jncics/pkaa088

17. Fleischman, L., & Franklin, M. (2017, November). Fumes across the fence-line: The health impacts of air pollution from oil & gas facilities on African American communities. Clean Air Task Force. Retrieved from https://www.catf.us/ resource/fumes-across-the-fence-line/

Gostin, L. O., & Wiley, L. F. (2016). Public health law: Power, duty, restraint. University of California Press.

18. Neavling, S. (2021, January 8). Struggling to breathe in 48217, Michigan’s most toxic ZIP code. Detroit Metro Times. Retrieved from https://www.metrotimes.com/news/ struggling-to-breathe-in-48217-michigansmost-toxic zip-code-23542211

Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG). (2023). Community profiles: City of Detroit, City of Dearborn, City of Melvindale, City of River Rouge. Community profiles. Retrieved from https://semcog.org/ data and-maps/community-profiles/ communities=5,1025,1125,1155

19. Fleischman, L., & Franklin, M. (2017, November). Fumes across the fence-line: The health impacts of air pollution from oil & gas facilities on African American communities. Clean Air Task Force. Retrieved from https://www.catf.us/ resource/fumes-across-the-fence-line/

Mohai, P., & Saha, R. (2015). Which came first, people or pollution? assessing the disparate siting and post-siting demographic change hypotheses of environmental injustice. Environmental Research Letters, 10(11), 115008. https://doi. org/10.1088/1748-9326/10/11/115008

20. Michigan legislature. (1978, September 30). Public Health Code (Excerpt) Act 368 of 1978. Michigan Legislature - Section 333.2221. Retrieved from https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/ MCL?objectName=MCL-333-2221

21. Michigan legislature. (1978, September 30). Public Health Code (Excerpt) Act 368 of 1978. Michigan Legislature - Section 333.2221. Retrieved from https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/ MCL?objectName=MCL-333-2221

22. State of Michigan Legislature. (2023). Michigan legislature. Michigan Legislature - Article V § 2. Retrieved from https://www.legislature.mi.gov/ (S(2ppxt4pe5mbxlzazbtkhpdog))/mileg. aspx?page=getObject&objectName=mcl Article-V-2

23. State of Michigan Legislature. (2006). 2006, Act 110, EFF. July 1, 2006. - michigan legislature. State of Michigan Legislature. Retrieved 2023, from https://www.legislature.mi.gov/ (x3eqqx2ix0ez34nsk1zysl45)/documents/ mcl/pdf/mcl-Act-110-of-2006.pdf

24. State of Michigan Legislature. (2023). NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT -- Act 451 of 1994. Michigan Legislature - Act 451 of 1994. Retrieved from http://www.legislature.mi.gov/ (S(2qpnyqlaigpqrzkvizsuwxz0))/mileg.asp x?page=GetObject&objectname=mcl-Act451-of-1994

Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE). (2023). About EGLE. SOM - State of Michigan. Retrieved from https://www.michigan.gov/ egle/about

25. Bullard, R. D., & Johnson, G. S. (2000). Environmentalism and public policy: Environmental justice: Grassroots activism and its impact on public policy decision making. Journal of Social Issues, 56(3), 555–578. https://doi.org/10.1111/00224537.00184

26. Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation (CONAN). (2023). ArtI.S8.C3.1 overview of commerce clause - constitution.congress. gov. Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation. Retrieved from https://constitution. congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C3-1/ ALDE_00013403/

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

sara m. faraj (she/her) is a first-generation Arab American participatory action researcher, environmentalist, and photojournalist in Southeast Michigan. She is a Master of Urban and Regional Planning student and alumna of Wayne State University’s Urban Studies and Planning program, where she minored in Urban Sustainability. Her work aims to support social infrastructure in the built environment through preserving culture in place, cultivating accessible food systems, and facilitating emancipatory processes that aim to recenter community visions and voices in planning. faraj is also passionate about understanding how non-traditional planning processes can amplify and promote growth for creators and culture makers; Black-, Brown-, and Indigenousowned small businesses; and community leaders who strengthen the foundation and scaffolding of communities.

Toledo Christopher Fletcher

Sidewalk as a Threshold: Hanoi, Vietnam

NGOC MINH DANG

Master of Architecture

ABSTRACT

This essay explores the dynamic interplay of tradition and modernity in Hanoi’s urban landscape via sidewalks which serves as hubs of social interaction and cultural exchange. The author delves into the distinct street culture of Hanoi, epitomized by the iconic trà đá vỉa hè (iced tea stands), which offer more than refreshments but a glimpse into the city’s social fabric. The role of street vendors in the spiritual life of the city is also examined, particularly their presence around temples and pagodas, blending commerce and spirituality. The contemporary urban challenges in Hanoi, especially the city’s approach to managing a vast fleet of motorbikes and enhancing pedestrian-friendliness is also addressed. The introduction of Hanoi’s metro system signifies a shift towards sustainable urban development, aiming to balance modern transportation demands with pedestrian convenience and the preservation of cultural heritage. This transition is seen as a step towards creating more livable, vibrant, and sustainable urban spaces in Hanoi, underlining the city’s commitment to evolving while retaining its unique character. The essay concludes by emphasizing the importance of sidewalks as living narratives that encapsulate Hanoi’s history, culture, and ongoing urban transformation.

In the heart of Hanoi, the city streets are a living gallery of Vietnam’s storied past punctuated by a keen spirit of innovation. The cityscape is accented by architectural gems from every epoch of Vietnamese history – dynastic, colonial, revolutionary – each contributes towards the landscape and lore of the city. Most notable are the stately French colonial-era buildings, adorned with distinctly Parisian designs. They stand as living relics of Vietnam’s enduring colonial memory. Their ornate facades, graceful arched windows, and wrought-iron balconies create a striking contrast with the backdrop of traditional Vietnamese architecture, resulting in a unique fusion of past and present that is the hallmark of contemporary Vietnamese style.

The streets of Hanoi truly come alive with vibrant street markets that beckon with a sensory symphony. Vendors and stalls line the main streets, presenting their products on the sidewalks. The atmosphere resonates with the harmonious cacophony of spirited bargaining, the sizzling sounds of street food being prepared, and the kaleidoscope of colors from the fresh produce on display. These street markets are not just retail spaces; they serve as epicenters of social interaction, where locals and visitors converge to partake in the city’s heartbeat and spirit.

The vibrant street market experience in Hanoi transcends the boundaries of the market stalls themselves, spilling onto the very streets that bear witness to the city’s bustling commerce. Amidst the urban tapestry, vendors ride their trade to the streets, utilizing ingenious means to peddle their products. With their mobile setups perched on their vehicles, these vendors become a dynamic part of Hanoi’s street culture. As they navigate through the labyrinthine alleys and thoroughfares, their distinctive calls and melodic yodeling resonate through the cityscape, creating an auditory signature that is quintessentially Vietnamese. These melodic refrains are more than just

catchy jingles; they are a storied tradition, a rhythmic ode that encapsulates the essence of what they sell. Whether the tantalizing aroma of steaming pho, the sizzle of bún cha, the colorful array of fresh produce, or the myriad of goods and curiosities, each vendor’s song is a harmonious embodiment of their offerings, inviting passersby to attend in the sensory feast that unfolds on the vibrant streets of Hanoi.

The presence of trà đá via hè, or iced tea stands on the sidewalk, is also an iconic and unmistakable facet of Hanoi’s street culture. These humble establishments offer more than just a beverage; they provide a unique window into the daily rhythms and social fabric of the city. Typically, these stands are located at the doorstep of the vendor’s residence, easily identifiable by the small plastic stools in colorful shades of vibrant red and blue. The setup itself is simple yet effective in catching the eye of passersby. Either a makeshift desk or a repurposed table, sometimes adorned with an umbrella to shield patrons from the tropical weather conditions, serves as the central hub of activity. A warm teapot, nestled within a tea warmer, awaits on the table, emitting fragrant steam that mingles with the surrounding street scents. The pièce de résistance, often seen leaning against the table, is the đieu cày, or farmer’s pipe, a distinctive and culturally significant accessory that adds an extra layer of character to these sidewalk tea stalls. These elements create an inviting and welcoming atmosphere that appeals to weary office employees, fatigued construction laborers, and inquisitive tourists who huddle in for a conversation. The intersection of daily life and tradition on the sidewalks of Hanoi extends into the realms of spirituality and commerce, as seen in the city’s temple areas.

Where religion and belief are woven deeply into the Vietnamese spiritual fabric, street vendors play a unique and meaningful role, extending their businesses to include the

Figure 1. Photo of a vendor selling durians on bike

Source: Original photo by Dave Weatherall

hallowed precincts of ancient temples and pagodas that grace the cityscape. These architectural marvels, adorned with rich history and cultural significance, transcend mere structures; they are revered spiritual landmarks and cultural keystones, etching their significance onto the urban canvas. To inquire about the whereabouts of these enterprising vendors amid the intricate designs, resplendent hues, and the redolent aroma of incense that converge to form a sensory mosaic, one needs to look no further than the city’s sidewalks. At the very thresholds of these sacred sites, one frequently encounters these welcoming vendors, offering essential items such as incense and complete ceremonial sets known as “mâm ngũ qua.” These thoughtful offerings are meticulously curated to streamline the spiritual experience for temple-goers, enabling them to approach

these revered spaces with open hearts and tranquil minds, devoid of the burdensome need for extensive preparation. In this harmonious confluence of commerce and spirituality, these vendors assume a vital role in enriching the cultural and spiritual vibrancy of the city, where the sacred and the secular coexist in perfect harmony, seamlessly merging tradition with contemporary urban life. This blend of tradition and modernity in Hanoi is also mirrored in how the city tackles contemporary urban challenges.

According to Vietnam Registar, as of September 2022, Hanoi boasted an impressive fleet of nearly 6.5 million motorbikes, and this figure does not even encompass those brought into the city by visitors from other regions, as reported by the city’s Transport Department. This significant number of motorbikes

Source: Collage created by author with found images taken by Kenh14/Mai Lân, VnExpress/Ngoc Thanh, Asia Imag- es/Shutterstock

Figure 2. People casually conversing over trà dá via hè

raises a pertinent question: How does a relatively compact city with an area spanning 3,359.82 square kilometers (1,297.2 square miles) manage to provide adequate parking infrastructure for such a vast and diverse array of approximately 6.5 million vehicles? The key to that question may rely on the organic humanism of Vietnamese residential architecture design and urban planning. Venturing through Hanoi’s labyrinthine alleys reveals the enduring presence of tube houses, adding as a distinction to Vietnamese urban design for centuries. Tube houses, with their distinctive narrow frontages and extended depths, exemplify optimized space usage in heavily populated urban areas. These structures typically feature long, slender designs that efficiently maximize limited land in bustling cities. A key aspect of these buildings is the preservation of internal courtyards, which serve multiple purposes: to enhance the aesthetic appeal, to invite natural light and facilitate air circulation, and

to create a refreshing and airy atmosphere within the confines of the compact space. These architectural gems reflect the ingenuity of Vietnamese architects, who have skillfully navigated the challenges of urban density. Their designs demonstrate their ability to optimize space while maintaining functionality and comfort, making tube houses emblematic of intelligent urban planning and design in areas where space is at a premium.

The focus on efficient use of space and adaptability in design is not limited to residential architecture but extends to the very streets of Hanoi, particularly visible during the weekends. On weekends, when the central areas of Hanoi transform into pedestrianonly zones, a fascinating shift in the city’s dynamics takes place. During this time, not only do Hanoi’s residents but also local and global visitors find themselves navigating the intricate web of authorized parking spaces integrated along the city’s sidewalks. This transformation reflects a dynamic fusion of urban planning and communal engagement, turning sidewalks into multifunctional spaces that cater to the diverse needs of the city’s denizens and guests. These authorized parking spaces, positioned along the sidewalks, serve as essential hubs for accommodating the city’s ever-present motorbike population. They embody a practical approach to managing urban mobility and offer an improvisational area around the walking street border designated for motorbike parking that minimizes congestion while optimizing accessibility to the city’s vibrant central districts.

This approach to urban design and mobility management, aimed at creating harmonious public spaces, epitomizes urban inclusivity. They are not solely for the convenience of Hanoi’s residents but encourage both local and global visitors who choose to explore the city’s charms on foot. By providing designated parking facilities along the sidewalks, Hanoi

Source: Photographed by author at an intersection in Hanoi

Figure 3. Hanoi during rush hour

embraces the diverse needs of its visitors, ensuring that they can experience the city’s unique culture, history, and cuisine with ease and convenience. As the motorbikes gracefully line up in these authorized spaces, a sense of order and harmony emerges on the otherwise bustling sidewalks. This careful integration of parking facilities into the urban landscape underscores the city’s commitment to balancing the demands of modern transportation with the preservation of its cultural heritage and the well-being of its pedestrians.

In the winding streets of Hanoi, the pedestrian experience may not always be ideal. The meandering lanes, while discouraging fast vehicular traffic, underscore a paradox that characterizes urban mobility in Vietnam. In a nation where motorbikes reign supreme as

the primary mode of transportation, speed and efficiency often prevail over pedestrian convenience. Vietnam’s major urban cities, Hanoi included, lean heavily on motorbikes due to their agility in navigating the intricate urban landscape. This dependence on motorized two-wheelers occasionally leads to a delicate overlap between pedestrians and motorbike riders, particularly during peak hours. In their pursuit of swift and efficient travel, motorbike riders may occasionally resort to utilizing sidewalks, a practice that represents a pragmatic solution amidst congested streets and gridlock despite being a traffic violation. It is vital to recognize that the sidewalk maneuvering is not merely a disregard for traffic regulations but also an expression of a profound longing to reunite with loved ones and find solace within the comfort of home.

Source: Graphic site analysis created by author with use of background image by Josh Stuart

Figure 4. Visualization of Weekend Walking Street in the Old Quarter, Hanoi

However, this narrative of urban mobility is undergoing a significant transformation. It is crucial not to overlook the ever-evolving landscape of walkability in Hanoi. In 2021, the Hanoi Department of Transportation finally inaugurated the metro system after over 10 years of construction, ushering in a new era of urban mobility and pedestrian-friendliness. The metro system has cast a shift in the way people traverse Hanoi. By strategizing metro stations at every node of the city, residents are to enjoy convenient access to key destinations, reducing their reliance on motorbikes and private vehicles. This transition is evaluated not only to alleviate traffic congestion but also to prioritize the safety and comfort of pedestrians while potentially mitigating the city’s carbon footprint.

Hanoi’s new metro system embodies a commitment to sustainable urban development, aligning with global initiatives to create eco-conscious urban spaces. Transitoriented developments around metro stations will not only enhance walkability but also give back the vibrant, pedestrian-oriented zones where people can leisurely stroll, shop, and dine. Safety and comfort for pedestrians have been paramount in this new era of walkability. Dedicated pedestrian pathways, well-placed crosswalks leading to metro stations, improved lighting, clear signage, and heightened security measures to ensure that walking in Hanoi is a secure and pleasant experience, even during nighttime hours are yet to be discussed. This commitment to pedestrian infrastructure

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

also mirrors the broader tapestry of the city’s streets, where each sidewalk narrates a story of its own as a threshold.

Sidewalks are not static entities but dynamic reflections of Hanoi’s history, culture, and urban evolution. They encapsulate architectural legacies, cultural vibrancy, and the enduring spirit of its residents. From the colonial-era facades to the meandering alleys and bustling markets, from spiritual sanctuaries to the integration of nature, these streets weave a rich narrative of Hanoi’s past and present. While challenges persist in pedestrian-friendliness, the advent of the metro system marks the beginning of an era characterized by improved walkability, sustainability, and enhanced community engagement, ensuring that Hanoi’s streets continue to evolve as vibrant, livable, and thriving urban spaces.

Born and raised in Hanoi, Vietnam, Ngoc Minh Dang has been captivated by the intricate blend of historical elegance and modern dynamism in architecture. She is now dedicated to merging classic architectural motifs with modern, sustainable methods, aiming to create eco-friendly urban spaces that honors cultural heritage. Ngoc Minh is currently a Master of Architecture candidate at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, where her path aims to highlight the profound impact of intercultural learning and seamlessly integrating historical traditions with innovative architectural concepts.

Newark, DE

Lawson Schultz

How Bed-Stuy is Losing Blackness:

A Case Study Exploration of Racial Capitalism, Gentrification, and Foreclosure.

SANYA BERY & LAWSON SCHULTZ

Master of Urban and Regional Planning

ABSTRACT

Bedford-Stuyvesant, commonly known as Bed-Stuy, has undergone significant transformation over recent decades, marked by shifts in race, class, and social dynamics. Most notably, despite being historically one of New York City’s densest Black communities, Bed-Stuy experienced an intense decline in its Black population, coupled with rising housing costs and foreclosures. This study delves into the factors behind this displacement, including redlining, white flight, and predatory lending practices like subprime mortgage loans. It argues that the displacement of Black residents in Bed-Stuy is not simply a consequence of standard urban development narratives but rather a result of interconnected racial dynamics within highly racialized capitalist urban settings. Viewing these issues through the lens of racial urban capitalism reveals the systemic exploitation of Black individuals embedded within urban planning and housing structures, which disproportionately displaces Black communities. By challenging prevailing narratives and acknowledging the intersection of race and capitalism, this study underscores the urgent need for a more equitable approach to urban development in Bed-Stuy and beyond.

INTRODUCTION

Bedford-Stuyvesant, a Central Brooklyn neighborhood colloquially referred to as BedStuy, rose to prominence in the 1920s as one of New York City’s renowned densely populated Black communities. Amidst Brooklyn’s evolving municipal landscape, Bed-Stuy experienced a profound transformation in the past few decades characterized by shifts in race, economics, and social dynamics. In this case study we argue that the displacement of Black individuals, or the forced relocation of existing residents, within Bedford-Stuyvesant, was not a natural result of the standard urban development narrative, but rather an occurrence fueled by mutually reinforcing racial social processes occurring within highly racialized capitalistic urban development.

In 2007, Bed-Stuy recorded the highest rate of foreclosure filings among residential properties compared to all other neighborhoods in New York City.1 Still, the cost of housing rose, with Bed-Stuy’s gross median rent increasing by 42.3% between 2010 and 2015.2 3 This trend of escalating costs made it challenging for longtime residents to continue to live in the neighborhood. At one point the largest Black neighborhood in New York City, only 30.5% of Bed-Stuy residents were Black in 2022.4 In Bedford’s older section,, Black residents have officially become a minority for the first time in fifty years.5 The white population surged, increasing by 633% from 2000 to 2010, marking the most significant increase observed among any significant racial or ethnic group in any neighborhood within New York City within that time frame.6

Why did such intense displacement of the Black population in Bed-Stuy occur? Kingsley argues that displacement began during foreclosure incidents of 2007 and 2008, as residents of these properties had no choice but to leave the area, and new residents in search of lower-priced houses moved in.7

On the other hand, some researchers look beyond the foreclosure incidents and point more broadly to gentrification, when a low-income area is transformed into a highincome area through changes in the racial and ethnic makeup, as the cause of Bed-Stuy’s displacement. According to the Furman Center at New York University, gentrification occurs when the median rent in low-income neighborhoods—those falling within the bottom 40% of average household income in 1990—surpasses the median rent of New York City as a whole over the past two decades. By this measure, Bed-Stuy is among the 17 neighborhoods in New York City classified as gentrified.8

However, both foreclosure and gentrification are simply examples of displacement processes, and they alone do not explain why the majority of Black residents were displaced in Bed-Stuy. Likewise, foreclosure and gentrification are not exclusive to the Bed-Stuy neighborhood; rather, they are symptomatic of broader systemic issues prevalent across municipalities in the United States.

Driven by capitalism’s pursuit of profit, U.S. cities prioritize new development at the expense of current residents. David Harvey, an influential urban theorist, describes this cycle of growth, devaluation, regrowth, and revaluation within urban structures as indicative of capitalism’s relentless expansion.9 Informed by Harvey’s theories, one may be tempted to shrug off displacement as an inevitable result of capitalist urban development and a city’s life cycle. However, this conventional narrative of capitalist urban development neglects the importance of race in where and how intensely displacement will occur.10 So, we refute it as an adequate means to properly understand the ‘why’ in the case of the displacement of Black residents in BedStuy.

Instead, we adopt Dantzler’s framework of racial capitalism, which highlights the existence of a wider pattern of antiBlack sentiment. Illustrating not only the interdependency of capitalism and racism but also how their interactions influence development and broader societal change, racial capitalism—which notes that capitalism requires racial segregation and exploitation to operate—provides a more truthful lens to analyze the displacement of BedfordStuyvesant. We argue that mass displacement in this context is not merely an inevitable economic outcome of traditional urban development narratives. Instead, it arises from the interconnected and mutually reinforcing racial dynamics within highly racialized capitalist urban environments.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BEDFORD-STUYVESANT

Before the 1920s, Bed-Stuy was two separate ethnically diverse villages: Bedford and Stuyvesant Heights. Bedford was notoriously home to ‘old money’ New England and New York families, while Stuyvesant Heights was home to ‘new money’ families11. When the Brooklyn Bridge opened in 1883, white upperclass families from Manhattan flocked to brownstones in both Bedford and Stuyvesant Heights. In 1907, following the opening of the Williamsburg Bridge, working-class Irish, Italian, and German Jewish immigrants who were originally living in the Lower East Side of Manhattan began to settle in Brooklyn, which drove many of the wealthy residents to move out. This left even more of Bedford and Stuyvesant Heights inhabited by working-class immigrants.12

Beginning in the early 1900s, New York City saw a dramatic rise in its population of Black residents—particularly in Harlem—as a result of the Great Migrations from the rural South. Over time, Harlem became overcrowded, and

residents sought out better living conditions in other neighborhoods. In 1936, the Independent Subway System extended its ‘A-line’ by eight stations, five in Bedford and Stuyvesant Heights.13 Harlem’s Black residents utilized the A train expansion to move to Bedford and Stuyvesant Heights, drawn to the excess space and proximity to the Brooklyn Navy Yard, which offered well-paying wartime jobs. The two neighborhoods were then recognized as one large Black community, earning Bed-Stuy the nickname ‘Little Harlem.’ Black immigrants from the Caribbean, primarily Guyana, Jamaica, and Barbados—and to a lesser extent, Trinidad and Tobago—and Haiti moved to Bed-Stuy in large numbers in the 1980s during the Second Great Migration. By the late 20th century, Bedford-Stuyvesant had surpassed Harlem as the largest Black neighborhood in New York City.14

REDLINING AND OTHER ACTIONS OF EXCLUSION WITHIN BEDFORD-STUYVESANT

In Bedford-Stuyvesant, exclusion manifested its most destructive and enduring consequences through redlining, a systematic practice of evaluating neighborhoods without considering residents’ qualifications or creditworthiness. This practice involved denying or restricting financial services to specific neighborhoods based on their racial or ethnic makeup.

Redlining as a term derives from the government homeownership programs— specifically, the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and the Home Owners Loan Corporation—that were part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal attempts to revive the housing market post-Great Depression. The government employed color-coded maps to assess the loan eligibility of neighborhoods. These maps visually represented the assigned grades, ranging from

“A” to “D,” indicating the least risky to the most risky areas respectively. The “D” areas were marked in red, or ‘redlined’, signifying that the neighborhoods were not worthy of inclusion in homeownership and lending programs.15

The Home Owners Loan Corporation characterized Black people, immigrants, and racial integration as ‘detrimental influences’ on real estate values, neighborhood stability, and quality of life.16 Such a framing emphasizes the basis of racial capitalism: people and places are racialized through subjective valuation based on their proximity to whiteness.17 Thus, as seen in Bed-Stuy, no neighborhood with people of color could obtain high enough ratings to qualify for FHA-insured mortgages. Even if a Black neighborhood scored well on nonracial criteria, FHA officials directed appraisers to manipulate the calculations to guarantee a rating of “D.”

Anti-Black exclusion, however, had begun long before redlining. Often regarded as benign entities focused on neighborhood maintenance, homeowners associations have a dark historical background, as they emerged from a deep-seated desire to exclude Black individuals from newly developed suburban neighborhoods.18 HOAs are private organizations established within a residential community to manage and regulate the community and enforce rules and covenants that govern individual property use and maintenance. During the first Great Migration, there was a strong effort among white residents to maintain Bedford-Stuyvesant as an affluent, predominantly white oasis. The best example of this is the creation and influence of both the Midtown Civic League and the Bedford Homeowners’ Association, two white supremacist groups that joined forces to limit the number of Black residents in Bed-Stuy.19

In June of 1937, both groups voted to demand heightened police presence in Bed-Stuy to

address what they perceived as increased crime attributed to the Black newcomers20 This further solidified the subconscious association between Black migration and criminality, leading to a rise in unjust arrests and a decline in the Black population within the neighborhood. During this period, instances of police brutality and unjust arrests against Black Americans in New York City were on the rise.

Concurrently, the Midtown Civic League announced that it would assist residents in Bed-Stuy who wished to sell or rent their properties in finding ‘desirable’ tenants or buyers. This announcement was referred to as an intense and brave effort to preserve the Bedford and Stuyvesant sections as upscale residential neighborhoods. The Midtown League was widely praised for its efforts to preserve the area.21 In reality, this ‘preservation’ amounted to clear exclusionary tactics, effectively making it nearly impossible for Black newcomers to purchase homes from white residents or for white residents to rent to Black tenants. Shortly thereafter, BedStuy received a ‘D’ rating regarding its credit investment risk, solidifying its status as a ‘redlined’ community.. When explaining why Bed-Stuy was redlined, the appraiser noted that the presence of people of color has a clear negative impact on the attractiveness of the neighborhood.22

An essential component of racial capitalism is recognizing that racism persists through the continual reproduction of social, economic, and political systems, particularly those ingrained within the housing sector. The Midtown Civic League and Bedford Homeowners’ Association weaponized exclusion to first strengthen and spread the narrative of ‘Black Evilness’ socially, then to actively segregate access to housing. This combination of variation in housing evaluation methods depending on identity and the racialized perceptions of neighborhoods

perpetuated neighborhood racial disparities until this falsified portrayal was solidified in the political and economic system under the name of redlining.23

The redlining of Bed-Stuy was a self-fulfilling prophecy.24 Since the neighborhood was starved of investment, Black homebuyers living in Bed-Stuy were unable to obtain conventional loans or mortgages to buy or improve homes, regardless of their creditworthiness. Thus, redlining gave birth to a cycle of exclusion: The denial of basic city services and long-term disinvestment in BedStuy reduced the number of job opportunities,

“discussion of exclusion. During the period from 1940 to 1970, white flight was widespread across the nation. For every Black resident who relocated to a northern or western city during this time, two white residents departed for the suburb.26 When thinking of this mass exodus, it’s important to ask ourselves who has the economic and social mobility to be able to move and leave a devalued neighborhood behind? Who has the racial privilege to have access to a less hazardous place to live?

While starving neighborhoods of color, the FHA simultaneously subsidized the mass production of suburbs with a clause that

The redlining of Bed-Stuy was a self-fulfilling prophecy. Since the neighborhood was starved of investment, Black homebuyers living in Bed-Stuy were unable to obtain conventional loans or mortgages to buy or improve homes, regardless of their creditworthiness.”

quality and access to proper education and health care, and created a much lower quality of life.

The cumulative impact of housing discrimination contributed significantly to Bed-Stuy’s transformation into one of New York City’s most impoverished neighborhoods by the mid-1960s, earning it the reputation as America’s ‘largest ghetto.’25 During this time, wealthy white families were incentivized to move to the suburbs so they could obtain government-guaranteed mortgages in neighborhoods with increasing property value, and they fled from Bed-Stuy and other redlined areas in Brooklyn.

White flight, or the phenomenon of white people moving out of urban areas with significant minority populations and into suburban areas, is pivotal within the large

prohibited resale to Black people. The FHA justified this clause by stating that if Black people bought homes in these suburbs, or even if they settled near the suburbs, the property values of the white homes that were being insured would decline and the loans would be at risk.27 Similar to how the presence of people of color automatically reduced a neighborhood’s score, there was no factual basis for this claim on the part of the FHA. Instead, the rationale was both created and fueled by racism and masked as a legal, economic housing strategy. The very creation of a white oasis suburbia is imperative to the understanding of racial capitalism: that affluent, white-majority communities are symbolic of the racial violence enacted upon Black communities, representing the marginalization of Black spaces and Black people as a second-class status.28

A dangerous path to go down is to view these acts of exclusion as prior, isolated actions with little relevance to the happenings of Bed-Stuy today. Despite the 1968 Fair Housing Act outlawing racially motivated redlining29, the policy fueled a cycle where Black individuals were systematically denied access to financial opportunities associated with homeownership, hindering the accumulation of generational wealth. While it may be tempting to view these actions as distinct examples of institutional racism confined to a specific era, the persistence of presentday economic disadvantage due to redlining can still be seen in the original residents of Bed-Stuy. This includes higher poverty rates, increased vacancy rates, greater risk of loan denials, prevalence of subprime lending, and limited economic mobility.30

Similar to redlining, the creation of whiteonly suburbs also had a snowball effect of exclusion, where employment and lending discrimination perpetuated poverty and substandard housing in Black neighborhoods.31 White families utilized home equities to finance various opportunities such as higher education, eldercare, financial independence, and the creation of generational wealth. Conversely, racially restrictive practices obstructed Black individuals’ ability to purchase homes in desirable areas, while simultaneously devaluing any neighborhoods they inhabited—further impeding the accumulation of generational wealth. The connection between housing and education policies is evident: Underfunded and inadequate school systems hinder multigenerational educational and professional achievements. Black residents of Bed-Stuy were constrained to remain in a rapidly devalued neighborhood, devoid of the advantages and privileges afforded to white families.32

SUBPRIME LOANS AND THE EFFECT OF PREDATORY INCLUSION

Predatory inclusion, also known as reverse redlining, is the practice of offering credit under unfair terms to communities that have historically been deprived of access to credit, primarily due to race.

In Bed-Stuy specifically, predatory inclusion took form in subprime mortgage loans. Subprime mortgage loans have higher interest rates and unfavorable terms, such as adjustable rates or prepayment penalties, and are meant to be offered to prospective borrowers with impaired credit records.33 Black borrowers in Bed-Stuy had similar rates of impaired credit records, but the area lacked lending institutions, and thus made Bed-Stuy ideal for bankers that wanted to target, exploit, and profit off of residents.34 Subprime loans were very profitable for the banks due to their higher fees and interest rates. Most lenders made significant profit at the inception of a loan. Often, the lender would pass the default risk on to others by transferring the loan. Before the crash of 2008, a lender who foreclosed on a property was likely to make a profit through resale.35 Compared to white applicants with similar credit, Black residents were 2.8 times more likely to be denied a loan entirely and 2.4 times more likely to receive a subprime loan.

Black borrowers often received subprime loans if they were turned away by conventional lenders and sent to subprime subsidiaries, or if received unjustifiably expensive loans from non-traditional lenders.36 In both of these circumstances, the borrowers were experiencing discrimination. This highlights the concept, ‘reverse redlining’, the practice of targeting select communities for credit on unfair terms.37 Instead of excluding BedStuy from normal mortgages, as they once did, lenders now targeted this lower-income,

urban Black neighborhood for mortgage loans with deeply unfavorable terms for overpriced homes of inferior quality. Bed-Stuy and the Black residents who inhabited it were incorporated into urban real estate simply to have wealth further extracted from them, and again transferred to white society.

When discussing Black homeownership, it is imperative to mention the American Dream: often grounded on the basis of homeownership as a means to achieve socioeconomic mobility. Within urban areas, such a concept is further evident through the evolution of housing policy that defines social relations by prioritizing owners over renters.38 In false promises of homeownership that were once out of reach due to redlining and suburban exclusion, subprime loans seemed to dangle the idea of the American Dream in the faces of Black borrowers. But, in actuality, urban homeownership incentives seen in BedStuy between the 1960s and 1970s exploited the dream of homeownership, rather than supporting and creating a legitimate pathway to upward socioeconomic mobility.39 Both the real estate industry and the federal government came together to create what was often referred to as state-sponsored, market-based solutions that were supposed to address housing needs but instead resulted in predatory inclusion through profit-motivated racialized actions made possible by the enduring legacy of segregation.40

In 2007, Bedford-Stuyvesant had the highest foreclosure rate for subprime mortgages in the entire nation. More than one in four people with subprime loans, or 25.2 percent, lost their homes to foreclosure– almost four times the national average of 6.9 percent.41 In New York City, among Bed-Stuy and the nine other community districts with the highest rates of foreclosure in 2007, the population was at least 86% percent non-white.42 Just as seen with the mutually reinforcing relationship of

exclusion-driven action, redlining, and overall neighborhood devaluation, the foreclosures due to subprime mutual loans further emphasize the cyclical, highly interconnected nature of racist and capitalistic economic action. In Bed-Stuy, the initial dependence of Black borrowers on risky subprime loans is a result of the historic denial of credit based on segregation. Subprime loans, then, led to the loss of wealth through foreclosures. Residents who managed to retain their homes despite foreclosure experienced recurring income losses due to unnecessarily high-cost loans.43

FINAL THOUGHTS

Our analysis of Bed-Stuy through the lens of racial urban capitalism highlights two key points. First, it underscores the fact that while capitalism is inherently exploitative, not all identities face exploitation equally. Second, it brings to light that the widespread displacement of Black communities in Bed-Stuy largely stems from this unequal exploitation of Black individuals—revealing how anti-Black sentiments are deeply entrenched within our capitalistic urban planning and housing structures. Given this understanding, it’s crucial to question established narratives like the standard urban narrative, which portrays displacement as an inevitable part of municipal development. While displacement may be a common occurrence in urban areas, it’s essential to acknowledge that these structures have been intentionally arranged in a manner that leads to the displacement of Black communities specifically, ultimately to facilitate the growth and advancement of white populations.

ENDNOTES

1 “Foreclosure Filings New York City, 2007.” New York City, New York: New York University School of Law, n.d.

2 U.S. Census Bureau. “MEDIAN GROSS RENT (DOLLARS),” 2010. American Community Survey, ACS 5-Year Estimates Selected Population Detailed Tables, Table B25064, 2010, accessed on March 19, 2024.

3 U.S. Census Bureau. “MEDIAN GROSS RENT (DOLLARS),” 2015. American Community Survey, ACS 5-Year Estimates Detailed Tables, Table B25064, 2015, accessed on March 19, 2024.

4 U.S. Census Bureau. “ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates,” 2022. American Community Survey, ACS 5-Year Estimates Data Profiles, Table DP05, 2022, accessed on March 19, 2024.

5 Fratello, Joseph. “The Rise of Bedford Stuyvesant: A Gentrification Case Study”. “Eckardt Scholars Projects.” (2018)

6 Santora, Marc. “In Bedford-Stuyvesant, a Black Stronghold, a Growing Pool of Whites.” “The New York Times.” (2011).

7 Kingsley, G. Thomas, et al. “Broadening Ownership of Capital: Strengthening Democracy Through Employee Ownership.” “Community-Wealth.org.” (2018).

8 Furman Center. “New Report Analyzes New York City’s Gentrifying Neighborhoods and Finds Dramatic Changes in Rent and Population.” “The Stoop (Furman Center).” (2016).

9 Harvey, David. “Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction.” “The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science” 610 (2007): 22–44.

10 Squires, Gregory D., and Kubrin, Charis E. “Privileged places: Race, uneven development and the geography of opportunity in urban America.” “Urban Studies” 42, no. 1 (2005): 47–68.

11 Santora 2011.

12 Charles, Mario A. “Bedford Stuyvesant.” “The

Encyclopedia of New York City,” 2nd ed., 2010, pp. 109–110.

13 Botein, Hilary. “From Redlining to Subprime Lending: How Neighborhood Narratives Mask Financial Distress in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn.” “Housing Policy Debate” 23, no. 4 (2013): 714-737.

14 Charles 2010.

15 Wilder, Craig Steven. “A Covenant With Color: Race And Social Power In Brooklyn.” New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

16 Wilder 2000.

17 Dantzler, Prentiss. “The Urban Process under Racial Capitalism: Race, AntiBlackness, and Capital Accumulation.” “Journal of Race, Ethnicity and the City” (2021).

18 Gotham, Kevin Fox. “Urban Space, Restrictive Covenants and the Origins of Racial Residential Segregation in a US City.” “International Journal of Urban and Regional Research” (2000), Chapter 3.

19 Brooks, Emily. “A War Within a War”: Policing Gender and Race in New York City During World War II. PhD diss., The Graduate Center, City University of New York, 2019.

20 “Bedford Area Called Copless City ‘Stepchild”’, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, June 4, 1937.

21 “Midtown League to Preserve Area”, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, June 16, 1937.

22 Wilder 2000.

23 Howell, Joshua, and Korver-Glenn, Elizabeth. “The increasing effect of neighborhood racial composition on housing values, 1980–2015.” “Social Problems” (2020).

24 Badger, Emily. “How Redlining’s Racist Effects Lasted for Decades.” “The New York Times,” 2017.

25 Museum of the City of New York (2020). Elsie Richardson: Investing in BedStuy. https:// www.mcny.org/story/elsierichardson-investingbed-stuy.

26 Boustan, Leah. “The Culprits Behind White Flight.” “The New York Times,” 2017.

27 Rothstein, Richard. “The Color of Law: A forgotten history of how our government segregated America”. Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2018.

28 Dantzler 2021.

29 “The Fair Housing Act.” Civil Rights Division, June 22, 2023. https://www. justice.gov/crt/fairhousing-act-1.

30 Rothstein 2018.

31 Rothstein 2018.

32 Rothstein 2018.

33 Rothstein 2018.

34 Mansfield, Cathay. “Reverse Redlining in the Subprime Mortgage Market: Comments on Moving Toward Integration: The Past and Future of Fair Housing.” (2020).

35 Mansfield 2020.

36 Mansfield 2020.

37 Newton v. United Companies Fin. Corp. 1998.

38 Dantzler 2021.

39 Taylor, Keeanga-Yamahtta. “Race for profit: How banks and the real estate industry undermined black homeownership.” UNC Press, 2019.

40 Dantzler 2021.

41 Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Okah, Ebiere, and James Orr. “Subprime Mortgage Lending in New York City: Prevalence and Performance.” Staff Report no. 432, 2010.

42 Furman Center 2016.

43 Mansfield 2020.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Sanya Bery is a Dual master’s candidate at the Taubman College of Architecture and Urban Planning and the School of Environment and Sustainability. She is interested in how environmental action and re-planning can be utilized as tools to address structural inequity and racism, specifically in the urban landscape.

Lawson C. Schultz aims to collaborate with communities as a planner and researcher to empower visions of sustainability, safety, and joy. Lawson is an urban planning student focusing on land use, environmental justice, and the relationship between community development and mass incarceration. They research prison planning in Michigan with the Carceral State Project, and facilitate art workshops with the Prison Creative Arts Project.

Chicagoland’s Regional Approach to Expanding Affordable Housing

ALAYNA BRASCH

Master of Public Policy

ABSTRACT

For a considerable time, the Metro Chicago area has faced difficulties finding affordable housing, especially for low-income families and the black community. Established in 2002, the Regional Housing Initiative (RHI) seeks to solve this problem by offering incentives to developers for the construction of affordable homes in high-opportunity locations. In order to promote integration based on race and income in affluent communities, ten of Chicago’s fourteen housing authorities work to create affordable housing. Affordable housing options have been more widely available thanks to the RHI, which has also improved minority and low-income households’ access to quality employment and educational opportunities. The RHI has demonstrated effectiveness in tackling affordable housing concerns, while more effort is to be done to eliminate the NIMBY mindset and to further integrate low-income and minority households.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the past several decades, a lack of affordable housing has plagued the metro Chicago area. Between developers not being able to profit off affordable units, suburban NIMBYism preventing the construction of affordable units, and a lack of regional cooperation amongst Chicago’s more than 280 municipalities, low-income families have experienced a history of struggles when it comes to finding affordable, decent housing.1 This is especially true for Chicago’s black population, many of whom spent decades living in substandard public housing towers. To address this issue, the Regional Housing Initiative (RHI), created in 2002, has provided some hope for a change in the right direction through the use of project-based vouchers. The RHI started as an agreement between the Chicago Housing Authority and the Housing Authorities of Lake and Cook counties to provide incentives to developers to offer more affordable housing in areas of high opportunity. Today, 8 of the 14 housing authorities in the Chicago area, including Joliet, McHenry County, Oak Park, Chicago, Kendall, and DuPage, participate in creating affordable housing under the RHI.2 While the RHI has its share of limitations, its regional approach to affordable housing enables a pathway for some of Chicago’s minority residents to access better neighborhoods at more affordable prices.

BRIEF HISTORY OF METRO CHICAGO’S HOUSING AND SPRAWL

Planning housing at the regional scale is especially important for the Chicago region due to its oppressive housing history. During World War I, incoming Black residents were pushed out to Chicago’s South Side, also known as the Black Belt, which consisted of small homes and apartments that could

barely accommodate their tenants; most of them were without electricity or plumbing. As privileged households became wealthier, they sprawled farther out from the city.3

Low-income and minority households lived near the factories in the city, the middle class located in neighborhoods outside the city, and the upper class in neighborhoods farther out. Between 1915 and 1920, the number of Black Americans traveling to Chicago to escape racial violence in the South increased dramatically, coinciding with the movement of white families to the suburbs. World War II brought another wave of Black migrants to the city, further straining the already dwindling availability of Black Belt homes.4 The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), established in 1937, was responsible for maintaining public housing and thus was the only agency that could fix this housing crisis. Unfortunately, the CHA quickly became a segregating tool for white, conservative politicians. In an effort to “clear out” the slums, the CHA decided to simply “rebuild them in the form of high-rise public housing developments, the ‘second ghetto.’”5

During the process of site selection for these high-rise housing developments, any genuine effort to construct them in predominantly white neighborhoods was crushed with major resentment from city councilmen and white residents. As a result, most of the CHA’s projects were built on vacant land in predominantly Black neighborhoods, and others were built on “slum-cleared land,” displacing thousands of families. By design, these displaced households were left to rely on the CHA’s segregated housing. The growing density of these projects left a strain on public services. The public schools in these areas were overcrowded, police enforcement was practically nonexistent, and there was no access to recreational community centers.6 Consequently, the second ghetto remained much like Chicago’s original Black Belt homes, run-down and isolated from opportunities.

HISTORY OF THE RHI

Unsurprisingly, in the 1990s, thousands of the public housing units under the CHA were at risk of being demolished due to the extremity of their hazardous conditions. The residents of these homes were to receive Section 8 vouchers for private-market rental housing. At the same time, there was an increase in population and job opportunities in the suburbs. To assess whether or not the private market could accommodate the rising need for housing, the Illinois Housing Development Authority (IHDA), the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the CHA, and other public and private sector entities together funded a regional market study. They were shocked to find that although the job market and population were booming, the rental housing stock was extremely limited. Available units were often very expensive, particularly those located in the opportunity areas that have better access to schools, jobs, and transportation.7 The results indicated that Section 8 voucher holders and other lowincome families were clearly segregated from the rest of the metropolitan region.8

To address this issue and others identified in the study, all 14 housing authorities in the Chicago area came together in a meeting. After going over the results from the regional market study, several initiatives related to affordable housing were formed, including the Regional Housing Initiative. Because RHI originated as an intergovernmental agreement and the housing authorities were able to choose whether to opt in, there was essentially no political opposition regarding the adoption of RHI.9 The CHA and the housing authorities of Lake and Cook counties were the first members to join in 2002. As these regions began to diversify both their housing stock and communities, some of the other housing authorities also began to adopt RHI. Upon joining the RHI, housing authorities had to contribute 10 percent of their vouchers to

the combined regional pool. After the initial commitment, the proportion they contributed could be changed but not exceed 20 percent.10 Operating and management agreements along with an addendum were adopted to allow subsidies to cross jurisdictions, and to ensure efficiency and coordination among the participating housing authorities.11

Unlike the CHA’s site-selection process in the 1940s and 1950s to specifically segregate Black households, now, the purpose of the RHI is to select sites that offer opportunities to those who have been restricted from the Chicago region’s nicer neighborhoods. Originally, RHI members and stakeholders defined these areas using HUD data to generate a map of the region. They also developed an ‘Opportunity Index,’ which equally weighs certain indicators of poverty, housing stability, job access, labor market engagement, school performance, and transit access of each area within the Chicago metro region.12 The index gives every area a score of one to ten. Areas receiving a six to ten rating are labeled ‘opportunity areas,’ while non-opportunity areas are those with ratings from one to five. These non-opportunity areas are also called revitalization areas, where public and private sectors plan and invest to create an opportunity area.13 By specifically defining the opportunity areas within the region, RHI members can guarantee that lowincome people are moving to neighborhoods where they will have improved access to better jobs, public services, transportation, and schools.14

UNDERSTANDING SECTION 8 VOUCHERS

The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program was passed by Congress in 1974 to provide households living in impoverished neighborhoods the choice to move into better ones. Once a family makes it off an extensive waitlist, they can look for an apartment priced within a certain range determined by

HUD every year for each metro area. When the family finds an apartment in the area of their liking, they will pay around 30 percent of their income towards rent, while the voucher covers the rest.15 However, one of the major issues with Section 8 vouchers is that the types of units that are within the price range set by HUD are rarely located in neighborhoods nicer than the ones voucher holders are trying to leave. On the rare occasion that voucher holders do find apartments that meet the price range in a decent neighborhood, landlords often refuse to rent to them because of the common misconception that Section 8 voucher holders are negligent tenants who could scare off market tenants.16 This makes it extremely difficult for voucher holders to find decent housing and improve their access to opportunities. Thus, the original purpose of Section 8 was not achieved; voucher holders continue to be isolated and concentrated in areas of poverty. However, through projectbased vouchers, the RHI provides a more effective way for low-income households to find affordable housing in better communities.

HOW RHI WORKS

The key to RHI is that it is a regional, collaborative effort of members committing their resources. The participating public housing authorities pool together portions of their voucher funds to support the development of affordable housing in opportunity areas: areas with greater access to jobs, more reliable public transit, good schools, high homeownership rates, and low poverty rates. Rather than the vouchers being awarded to tenants, these vouchers are awarded to developers. According to the RHI application, “Up to 25 percent of the total units in multifamily proposals may receive RHI voucher assistance,” and “For developments limited to disabled residents, up to 100 percent of units may receive voucher assistance.” The vouchers awarded to developers come from

the joint pool of the participating housing authorities. In order to receive any voucher assistance, developers have to submit proposals to the Chicago Metro Agency for Planning.17 The chances of a proposal being approved increase if the proposed development is located in opportunity areas with access to jobs, transportation, and good schools.

To incentivize developers to use RHI, the IHDA has created an application in which developers can simultaneously apply for RHI vouchers and low-income tax credits to help with funding.18 In deciding which proposals should be approved, a selection panel, made up of representatives from participating housing authorities and the IHDA, assigns each proposal a score from one to ten to distinguish the level of opportunity in the location of the proposal.19 A score of one represents the weakest link to opportunity while a score of ten represents the strongest link. The housing authority with jurisdiction over the area identified in the proposal is the lead housing authority for the proposal and makes the final decision of approval. RHI vouchers are awarded only when the lead authority approves the proposal.20

HOW THE RHI IS FUNDED

The RHI was funded solely through philanthropic grants between 2002 and 2011. In 2011, HUD awarded RHI $1 million to go towards developing the metrics used to identify opportunity areas. In 2015, HUD provided another $125,500 to continue operations, update the regional waitlist, and pursue other technical changes. More recently, RHI has been in pursuit of a more sustainable financial model, as finding funding for its third-party partners becomes a growing concern.21 For each housing option created with RH1 subsidies, staffing costs are $886, while staffing costs for other mobility programs are about $3,000 per household.22 This further displays the fact that RHI, and regional coordination in

general, is more efficient than individual local governments approaching regional problems on their own.

WHO LIVES IN RHI HOUSING?

Tenants for RHI voucher units are chosen from a regional waitlist, provided and managed by BRicK Partners, an external member of the RHI, along with the lead housing authority. The RHI application states: “BRicK will refer at least three times as many potential tenants as there are units available.” People on the waitlist are required to pick a regional preference. To ensure that potential tenants will genuinely make use of living in an opportunity area, priority is given to people who have attended job training or vocational training, work within 12 miles of the RHI development, or are unemployed due to disability or age.23

RHI PARTNERS

In addition to the eight participating housing authorities, other members have also helped create and manage the RHI. Without these other partners and stakeholders, the housing authorities involved in the RHI would not have had the community acceptance, degree of leverage, and political support that they continue to receive to this day (Housing Mobility). As previously stated, one of these partners is the IHDA, the state’s housing finance agency. The Metropolitan Planning Council (MPC), a nonpartisan policy and advocacy organization, assisted in developing the selection criteria for voucher proposals and managed all aspects of RHI operations. CMAP, the region’s metropolitan planning organization, has assumed leadership of RHI since 2015 and took over the majority of the tasks once completed by the MPC. Collaboration among these various actors is what enables coordinated efforts in expanding and improving access to inclusive developments.24 The RHI demonstrates that

separate entities are capable of addressing regional issues through regional cooperation.

BARRIERS TO RHI

As previously mentioned, RHI is a policy designed to work against some of the stereotypes of voucher-holding tenants. One way it attempts to do this is by distributing vouchers to developers rather than to tenants. As long as landlords follow all antidiscrimination laws, they can only choose from people who would normally be voucher holders to live in the RHI voucher units, and thus cannot deny low-income tenants a unit. Although the vouchers being tied to the units eliminates stereotypical landlord discrimination, low-income tenants searching for RHI voucher units still face barriers.

One particular example of this involves a proposal for a development in Jefferson Park. The developer, Full Circle Communities, proposed the construction of a 100-unit building, 30 of which are voucher units. The development would replace a former food distribution facility, doubling the number of affordable units in Jefferson Park. Once word got out about the proposal, backlash immediately followed. Even though the tenants would not exclusively be voucher holders, the backlash was wholly related to false stereotypes of voucher tenants. In the Chicago Reader’s coverage of one protest event, a resident is described as expressing concern over the tenant screening process, saying it “wouldn’t prevent future residents from bringing in every miscreant cousin, nephew, brother and son.” Protestors also spoke of fears of increasing crime rates and decreasing property values if the development were to be approved.25

These concerns were eerily similar to the protests made several decades ago by white residents about Black households attempting to move into the suburbs. The stigma attached to affordable housing assistance, and the clear

lack of understanding of the economically and racially segregated region, displays the fact that metro Chicago has a long way to go before the historical consequences of racially triggered sprawl can be effectively changed by policies such as the RHI. As of now, construction for this development has not begun because Full Circle Communities was not able to get approval for low-income housing tax credits, for reasons unrelated to the protests. However, community pushback has successfully halted other affordable housing proposals, particularly one of Full Circle’s other developments in Portage Park.26 Not all the residents in these suburban neighborhoods resent affordable housing developments in their communities. Even in Jefferson Park, community pushback has spurred the creation of the group Neighbors for Affordable Housing in Jefferson Park. This counter-protest is part of the YIMBY (yes in my backyard) movement, as it aims to show city council members and future residents that not all of Jefferson Park is against affordable developments.27 In towns such as Crystal Lake and Glenview, for example, residents expressed some initial concern about the affordable housing resembling the CHA’s earlier public housing projects, but they were eventually impressed with how nice the townhomes and apartments were; some were not even aware that they were specifically for low-income tenants. Several people who got off the waitlist and moved into apartments in Glenview reported to The Atlantic that, overall, they were much happier being in a safer place with nicer stores and better schools.28

RHI OUTCOMES

Since 2002, the RHI has successfully provided affordable housing in opportunity areas. As of 2003, the RHI has committed over 600 subsidies to 40 mixed-income and supportive developments around the region, supporting approximately 2,200 apartments.29 Individual local jurisdictions would not have been

able to support nearly as many low-income development proposals without the pooling and transferring of subsidies under the RHI.30 It has also had some positive, unintentional outcomes as well. According to Julie Claussen, head of the McHenry County Housing Authority: “While desegregating public and subsidized housing isn’t the RHI’s intent, it can, coincidentally, have that effect.”31 This demonstrates an incredible turnaround in how Metropolitan Chicago has dealt with providing affordable housing. Some low-income people who would have otherwise never had the opportunity to move to a better neighborhood for an affordable price are now able to do so.

For example, in 2013, despite neighborhood opposition, developers of the Grove

Apartments in Oak Park were able to take a boarded-up commercial space and turn it into a thriving affordable apartment community. Oak Park faces much less opposition to affordable housing now that neighbors realize the benefits.32

Over time, the RHI has evolved to further incentivize its usage. In 2008, RHI property owners became eligible for the Housing Opportunity Area Tax Abatement Program. Administered by the housing authorities, this program reduces the property taxes for landlords who rent RHI units in opportunity areas.33 Due to the incentives offered to developers and property owners, the RHI has started influencing other metropolitan areas. Baltimore, for example, has gathered up its Metropolitan Council, housing authorities, and the State Housing Finance Agency to create applications for developers to participate in creating regional affordable housing.34 That program is now fully operational with six participating housing authorities.35 Moreover, there is some hope that regional strategies for creating more affordable housing in opportunity areas could become more popular throughout the nation.

Although the RHI has been beneficial for the Chicago region and the few other metropolitan regions that have adopted similar policies, it

will not solve the lack of affordable housing everywhere because not every region has the same housing disparities or resources. In this particular case, Chicago was in the midst of a crisis in which the amount of housing did not meet the growth in population and jobs. Thanks to the cooperation between housing authorities, the redistribution of funds, and the financial support from other partners, the RHI works in this region.

The RHI is not perfect; to this day, the lack of affordable housing in the Chicago region is still a crisis for low- to medium-income and minority residents.36 A nonprofit organization called Housing Choice Partners published a report on RHI results. They found that the wait list is not updated annually, meaning much of that information is outdated. Additionally, even though RHI vouchers are intended for developments in opportunity areas, this is technically not required. As a result, some developments are completed in non-opportunity areas, which are much harder to fill with regional residents in need of affordable housing close to good jobs and schools. To address this, the Baltimore program only gives vouchers to participants in opportunity areas.37 Adding to the challenges of RHI is the fact that the country’s housing supply and housing costs are the worst they have been in decades, leaving voucher recipients stuck in traditional areas (without opportunity) for much longer periods of time.38 To improve some of these issues, RHI partners stopped accepting applications in 2021.39 Although the RHI is not perfect and may not be specifically applicable to all other metro regions, Chicago’s experience suggests that tackling the issue of affordable housing is done best at the regional level; a non-regional approach typically only further exacerbates racial and economic inequalities.40

CONCLUSION

Through regional strategies, the Regional Housing Initiative has essentially designed a way to help desegregate Chicago’s racially and economically sprawled region by expanding access to more affordable housing in some of the region’s nicest communities. By prioritizing regional equity, households have better access to good schools and good jobs. Furthermore, the RHI has effectively contributed to desegregating the Chicago area, offering more low-income and minority households a chance to live in neighborhoods they would not have access to otherwise. The regional waitlist increases the chances of people finding affordable units. The pooling and transferring of vouchers has allowed housing authorities that normally would have had very few project-based vouchers available to support more proposals for affordable housing. Although there is still much more work to do in integrating the region’s low-income and minority households into opportunity areas and overcoming the NIMBY mindset, the RHI has demonstrated that tackling the lack of affordable housing from the regional level can produce some success.

ENDNOTES

1. Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning. 2021. “Regional Housing Initiative.” CMAP. https://www.cmap.illinois.gov/programs/ housing/rhi.

2. Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning. 2023. “2023 Community Data SnapshotsCMAP.” Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning. https://www.cmap.illinois.gov/data/ community-snapshots.

3. Bruegmann, Robert. 2005. “Early Sprawl, an excerpt from Sprawl: A Compact History by Robert Bruegmann.” The University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/Misc/ Chicago/076903.html.

4. “Housing and Race in Chicago.” 2003. Chicago Public Library. https://www.chipublib. org/housing/.

5. Greetham, David T. 2013. “Chicago’s Wall: Race, Segregation and the Chicago Housing Authority.” The College of Wooster. https:// openworks.wooster.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=4800&context=independentstudy.

6. Greetham, David T. 2013. “Chicago’s Wall: Race, Segregation and the Chicago Housing Authority.” The College of Wooster. https:// openworks.wooster.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=4800&context=independentstudy.

7. Snyderman, Robin, and Antonio R. Riley. 2016. “Embracing Odd Bedfellows in Odd Times.” Case Western Reserve University. https://case.edu/socialwork/nimc/sites/default/ files/2020-05/Snyderman.Riley_.%20WWV. Embracing%20Odd%20Bedfellows.2020.pdf.

8. Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning, Chicago-area Housing Authorities, RAND Corporation, and Metropolitan Planning Council. 2016. “Project Profiles in Regional Housing Mobility Chicago and Rockford.” US Department of Housing and Urban Development. https://www.hud.gov/sites/ documents/CHI_ROCK_PROJ_PROFILES.PDF.

9. Snyderman, Robin, and Antonio R. Riley.

2016. “Embracing Odd Bedfellows in Odd Times.” Case Western Reserve University. https://case.edu/socialwork/nimc/sites/default/ files/2020-05/Snyderman.Riley_.%20WWV. Embracing%20Odd%20Bedfellows.2020.pdf.

10. US Department of Housing and Urban Development. n.d. “Project Based Vouchers.” | HUD.gov / U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. https://www.hud.gov/ program_offices/public_indian_housing/ programs/hcv/project.

11. Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning, Chicago-area Housing Authorities, RAND Corporation, and Metropolitan Planning Council. 2016. “Project Profiles in Regional Housing Mobility Chicago and Rockford.” US Department of Housing and Urban Development. https://www.hud.gov/sites/ documents/CHI_ROCK_PROJ_PROFILES.PDF.

12. Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning, Chicago-area Housing Authorities, RAND Corporation, and Metropolitan Planning Council. 2016. “Project Profiles in Regional Housing Mobility Chicago and Rockford.” US Department of Housing and Urban Development. https://www.hud.gov/sites/ documents/CHI_ROCK_PROJ_PROFILES.PDF.

13. Snyderman, Robin, and Antonio R. Riley. 2016. “Embracing Odd Bedfellows in Odd Times.” Case Western Reserve University. https://case.edu/socialwork/nimc/sites/default/ files/2020-05/Snyderman.Riley_.%20WWV. Embracing%20Odd%20Bedfellows.2020.pdf.

14. Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning, Chicago-area Housing Authorities, RAND Corporation, and Metropolitan Planning Council. 2016. “Project Profiles in Regional Housing Mobility Chicago and Rockford.” US Department of Housing and Urban Development. https://www.hud.gov/sites/ documents/CHI_ROCK_PROJ_PROFILES.PDF.

15. Semuels, Alana. 2015. “Chicago’s Regional Housing Initiative.” The Atlantic. https://www. theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/

chicago-regional-housing-sectioneight/398798/.

16. Semuels, Alana. 2015. “Section 8 Is Failing Poor Americans.” The Atlantic. https://www. theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/ section-8-is-failing/396650/.

17. Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning. 2020. “Regional Housing Initiative Developers Application.” Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning. https://www.cmap.illinois.gov/ programs/housing/rhi/developers.

18. Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning. 2020. “Regional Housing Initiative Developers Application.” Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning. https://www.cmap.illinois.gov/ programs/housing/rhi/developers.

19. Turner, Margery. n.d. “The Chicago Regional Housing Choice Initiative.” PRRAC. https:// www.prrac.org/pdf/HCP_Narrative_final_ report_CRHCI.pdf.

20. Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning, Chicago-area Housing Authorities, RAND Corporation, and Metropolitan Planning Council. 2016. “Project Profiles in Regional Housing Mobility Chicago and Rockford.” US Department of Housing and Urban Development. https://www.hud.gov/sites/ documents/CHI_ROCK_PROJ_PROFILES.PDF.

21. Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning, Chicago-area Housing Authorities, RAND Corporation, and Metropolitan Planning Council. 2016. “Project Profiles in Regional Housing Mobility Chicago and Rockford.” US Department of Housing and Urban Development. https://www.hud.gov/sites/ documents/CHI_ROCK_PROJ_PROFILES.PDF.

22. Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning, Chicago-area Housing Authorities, RAND Corporation, and Metropolitan Planning Council. 2016. “Project Profiles in Regional Housing Mobility Chicago and Rockford.”

US Department of Housing and Urban Development. https://www.hud.gov/sites/ documents/CHI_ROCK_PROJ_PROFILES.PDF.

23. Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning. 2020. “Regional Housing Initiative Developers Application.” Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning. https://www.cmap.illinois.gov/ programs/housing/rhi/developers.

24. Local Housing Solutions. n.d. “Regional collaboration to support the development of affordable housing in resource-rich areas.” Local Housing Solutions. https:// localhousingsolutions.org/housing-policylibrary/regional-collaboration-to-supportthe-development-of-affordable-housing-inresource-rich-areas/.

25. Dukmasova, Maya. 2017. “Opposition to Affordable Housing in Jefferson Park Is Nothing New for Chicago.” Chicago Reader. https://chicagoreader.com/blogs/oppositionto-affordable-housing-in-jefferson-park-isnothing-new-for-chicago/.

26. Nitkin, Alex, and Heather Cherone. 2017. “Jeff Park Housing Activists Vow To Escalate Fight Amid Setbacks.” DNAinfo Chicago. https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20171011/ jefferson-park/5150-jefferson-park-mixedincome-neighbors-for-affordable-housing-injefferson-park-northwest-side-unite/.

27. Robertson, Derek. 2017. “Say ‘Yes In My Backyard’ to Affordable Housing.” Waging Nonviolence. https://wagingnonviolence. org/2017/07/chicago-fight-affordable-housing/.

28. Semuels, Alana. 2015. “Chicago’s Regional Housing Initiative.” The Atlantic. https://www. theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/ chicago-regional-housing-sectioneight/398798/.

29. Snyderman, Robin, and Antonio R. Riley. 2016. “Embracing Odd Bedfellows in Odd Times.” Case Western Reserve University. https://case.edu/socialwork/nimc/sites/default/ files/2020-05/Snyderman.Riley_.%20WWV. Embracing%20Odd%20Bedfellows.2020.pdf.

30. Snyderman, Robin, and Antonio R. Riley. 2016. “Embracing Odd Bedfellows in Odd Times.” Case Western Reserve University.

https://case.edu/socialwork/nimc/sites/default/ files/2020-05/Snyderman.Riley_.%20WWV. Embracing%20Odd%20Bedfellows.2020.pdf.

31. Taylor, Charles. 2015. “Housing Authorities Push Regional Approach to Affordable Housing.” National Association of Counties. https://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/ documents/CNSSA09072015_LO_v4.pdf.

32. Vietti, Perry. 2016. “Grove Apartments: The skeptics had it wrong.” Wednesday Journal. https://www.oakpark.com/2016/12/13/groveapartments-the-skeptics-had-it-wrong/.

33. Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning, Chicago-area Housing Authorities, RAND Corporation, and Metropolitan Planning Council. 2016. “Project Profiles in Regional Housing Mobility Chicago and Rockford.” US Department of Housing and Urban Development. https://www.hud.gov/sites/ documents/CHI_ROCK_PROJ_PROFILES.PDF.

34. Snyderman, Robin, and Antonio R. Riley. 2016. “Embracing Odd Bedfellows in Odd Times.” Case Western Reserve University. https://case.edu/socialwork/nimc/sites/default/ files/2020-05/Snyderman.Riley_.%20WWV. Embracing%20Odd%20Bedfellows.2020.pdf.

35. Snyderman, Robin, and Antonio R. Riley. 2016. “Embracing Odd Bedfellows in Odd Times.” Case Western Reserve University. https://case.edu/socialwork/nimc/sites/default/

files/2020-05/Snyderman.Riley_.%20WWV. Embracing%20Odd%20Bedfellows.2020.pdf.

36. Walker, Leon. 2024. “How to tackle Chicago’s affordable housing crisis: Opinion.” Crain’s Chicago Business. https://www. chicagobusiness.com/equity/how-tacklechicagos-affordable-housing-crisis-opinion.

37. Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning, Chicago-area Housing Authorities, RAND Corporation, and Metropolitan Planning Council. 2016. “Project Profiles in Regional Housing Mobility Chicago and Rockford.” US Department of Housing and Urban Development. https://www.hud.gov/sites/ documents/CHI_ROCK_PROJ_PROFILES.PDF.

38. Bahney, Anna. 2023. “Home affordability is the worst it has been since 1984.” CNN. https:// www.cnn.com/2023/08/24/homes/homeaffordability-worst-since-1984/index.html.

39. Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning. 2021. “Regional Housing Initiative.” CMAP. https://www.cmap.illinois.gov/programs/ housing/rhi.

40. Sturtevant, Lisa A. 2015. “The Importance of a Regional Affordable Housing Strategy: “Small Steps” Towards Regionalism.” Housing Association of Nonprofit Developers (HAND). https://www.handhousing.org/the-importanceof-a-regional-affordable-housing-strategysmall-steps-towards-regionalism/.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Alayna Brasch is a graduate of the University of Michigan’s Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy (MPP’23) and also holds a bachelor’s degree in political science and environmental science from U of M. She was nominated for U of M’s 2019 Granader Family Excellence in Upper-Level Writing in science prize. Now working in the city manager’s office for the City of Royal Oak, urban planning and innovative policy solutions to housing affordability crises remain a prominent focus of her work today.

Perrysburg,Ohio

Christopher Fletcher

The Rural(bridge) House(s)

MICHAEL THUT, QILMEG DOUDACTZ & TIM JOCKERS

Master of Urban and Regional Planning

ABSTRACT

In response to the changing climate over the past several decades, it has become clear that the role humans play in relation to their environment needs to change. The increase of observed migration across the country has revealed that moderate-climate windows, or “climate havens,” are becoming increasingly scarce, forcing many to relocate into the Great Lake Region. With models predicting a shift in climate zones over the next 50 to 100 years, we anticipate migration patterns will accelerate, straining both urban and suburban environments, as populations resettle in these “havens’’.

As these global conditions spur change and resettlement, the Rural(bridge) House(s) envisions development outside of traditional urban centers, by re-envisioning the value of our countryside. The proposal’s high-density design promotes sustainable practices and embodies a connection to the surrounding community, thanks to the implementation of selected strategies borrowed from New Urbanism. The form of collective living presented in this proposal encourages younger generations to invest into their community by reinstituting Connection, applying Density, and embodying Sustainable Living.

INTRODUCTION

In response to the changing climate over the past several decades, it has become clear that the role humans play in relation to their environment needs to change. Today, we see the effects of this through gentle migration patterns that reveal the abandoning of traditionally popular regions due to growing intensities of global temperatures and natural disasters.1 This phenomenon shows that moderate-climate windows, or “climate havens,” are shifting northward, and that by 2075, the Great Lakes Region will become one of few climate havens left in the United States.2 With climate models predicting this shift over the next 50 to 100 years, we believe migration patterns will accelerate, straining both urban and suburban environments. Due to these concerns, our team was asked to speculate on the design and development of communities outside of traditional urban centers to better disperse populations throughout the region.3 We found rural environments appealing and well positioned to take on such growth, as they have been reporting steady decreases in population since the turn of the century4 due to issues exacerbated by the lack of economic development, job availability, and access to education.5 Using this as a backdrop for our work, our team set out to design a speculative proposal that envisions an architectural development for new rural communities, set in response to reported climate projections.

When searching for a site to help ground the work we looked to Port Austin, a rural town actively experiencing its own concerns of growth and future stability. Originally developed by fishing and agriculture industries, the town has been slowly receding, closing many of its once fruitful resources.6 While a few local farms are still in operation, the small,7 aging population8 is looking for a new, more sustainable means to make a living.9 Capitalizing on its position in relation to Lake Huron, the town has been able to rebrand itself

as a tourist destination, drawing visitors to attractions like Turnip Rock and the Art Barn Installations during warmer months; however, this seasonal fluctuation stretches the town’s resources and fails to provide consistent support for businesses throughout the offseason.10 In speaking with local business owner and community organizer Chris Boyle, we found that the town lacks young, steady residents to support businesses throughout the year.11 Chris commented that he spent a lot of time in Port Austin when he was growing up, and he wants it to still be going strong for his kids and future grand-kids. Chris’ father, Terry, has been a long-time resident and shared an equal excitement in seeing the town reestablish a sense of stability and growth.12

This sentiment prompted us to ask, “who are we intending to attract with this proposal,” in order to rejuvenate the community and appropriately address the interests of longevity. To inspire a target audience for the proposal, we looked two hours south, to Detroit, the city with the highest percentage of “single-parent households” in the United States.13 We felt this demographic would be ideal for fostering a community of shared ownership, reshaping what it means to be a neighbor by supporting each other’s families through joint living.14 This seed would ideally flourish, encouraging the youth to invest in the town’s future success. The proposal of the Rural(bridge) House(s), imagines a new model for collective living by re-envisioning residual space within Port Austin’s townscape, utilizing strategies borrowed from theories of New Urbanism15 to promote Connection, Densification, and Sustainable Living.

SPECIFICATIONS

Due to the effects of climate change,16 it is becoming more important for designers to be responsible when proposing potential futures. Given the climate context of the project and the agricultural history of Port Austin, we decided to promote the idea of living with the land, as opposed to on it.17 Our site for this proposal made use of an eight and a half acre lot positioned two blocks off of the main drag. This location provided the proposal with high visibility and opportunity, as an example for future development within the town and other potential landscapes. With this ambition in mind, we looked to more modern planning strategies to help guide our work. Our early iterations used principles from New Urbanism18 to rescale the concept of the rural neighborhood, so as to promote Connection, Densification, and Sustainable Living within the project.

To start, we analyzed the site: its adjacencies, histories, natural features, and biological presences – all of which constructed a holistic understanding of the location in today’s context. Through this analysis, we noticed that the lot used to be split into two separate blocks, with State Street and Arthur Street extending through the site,19 bridging the town’s eastern residential district to the town’s centralized business district.20 However, today, we found these districts atrophying, linked only through a busy, non-pedestrian friendly E Spring Street.21 As in many — if not most — rural towns, the automobile dominates as the primary mode of transportation, supporting existing configurations of widegaited townscaping that limit the community’s capacity for passive interaction.

Interested in using the site to address these concerns, we looked to combine the desired density and need for connection. Thus, our site design proposes strips of walk-ways and plazas that allow for residents, and the broader

community, to freely move through the site without disturbing the ecosystem (Figure 02: Axonometric Drawing). This design intention naturally narrows the site’s scale — resizing it to the human — encouraging slower and more intimate interactions.22 These tactics foster cohabitation between humans and the environment, while also promoting healthier habits, like walking or biking, around town.23

The walk-ways in the proposal stretch across the site, intercepted only by the housing community (Figure 18: Site Plan Drawing). To optimize and reduce the overall footprint, the Rural(bridge) House(s) approaches the question of rural development and climate refuge through the exploration of “collective living,” challenging typical delineations of private and public space within a domestic setting. This proposal maximizes the living space by encouraging the “messiness of life” to spill onto a centralized deck, linking all housing units to each other (Figure 17: Second Floor Plan Drawing). Using this deck as a way to not only to traverse the project but more importantly to invite neighbors into each other's daily routines, we were able to reduce the usual square footage expected within the modern home and encourage neighbor-toneighbor interaction through the design. This results in an active space that accommodates the family, but also a wider community, (Figure 04: Exterior Perspective Render 01) by condensing traditionally separate living programs into collective space supported by fire pits, barbeque grills, clotheslines, play areas, picnic tables, and sunning chairs. While all of this living is elevated off the ground, the public-focused programming, situated on the first floor, helps to attract the wider community into the proposal.

The high-density design optimizes the human footprint, providing more space and resources for other environmental relationships around the site. Our building proposal only covers 14% of the lot, making the Floor Area Ratio (FAR) of the project an astounding 0.279. For reference,

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

This image identifies the boundaries of the 8.5 acre plot that the proposal intends to fill. Annotated on the image are key businesses, topographical information, and lighting diagrams to show off the site’s relation to the larger, contextual environment.

Figure 2. Exterior Perspective 01

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This drawing is an illustrated render of the ground floor “market space”. This is the street front view of the project as someone approaches from the town center. Here, the drawing experiments with visualizing the 4 seasons, so as to help capture the essence of the proposal, as it adapts throughout the year.

Figure 1. Site Analysis Image

Note: This drawing is an illustrated render of the second floor deck that runs the length of the proposal. This space is intended to allow for the messiness of life to spill out on the boards of the deck, in hopes of fostering an active community.

in urban development projects of the same or similar typology, it is very common to have 1.0+ FAR. In other words, while the building design is dense, placing it on this size lot results in a relatively low percentage of building footprint to land ratio.24 The remaining site is dedicated to the reforesting of the naturally biodiverse wooded area currently fringing the lot. By planting and nurturing a mixture of local tree species like Cherry, Oak, Maple, and Pine, our proposal will foster an environment of young, growing collaborations between humans and the surrounding landscape.

Taking these concepts a step further, our team looked to integrate a system of passive design strategies that combine high-quality efficiency with low-cost construction. In keeping with these intentions, the proposal uses reclaimed wood as its exterior cladding, adding a rustic/worn aesthetic to the lake-side construction. As for the interior, we optimized

our design to host environmental systems, like Photovoltaic Panels (PV Panels), Air-Water Heat Pumps, and Energy Recovery Ventilators (ERVs), to condition and ensure user comfort and environmental care. Additionally, we

3. Program Diagram 01

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This diagram shows off the commercial programming around the proposal’s main plaza. The “Market Core” hosts facilities for Vertical Farming, as well as fixed pavilions intended for use by the Port Austin farmer’s market.

Figure

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Figure 4. Exterior Perspective 02

5. Axonometric Drawing

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This axonometric drawing shows the proposal integrated with the site. Here, the gray striations are illustrated pathways running through the site, allowing residents and the broader community, access to and through the project. The connections fostered on site joins the east side of Port Austin to the business district, so as to draw more foot traffic from the residential district into the town’s center.

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This diagram looks at the east face of the project, so as to better reveal the programmatic relationships between the Vertical Farming facility and the housing grafted to, on, around the commercial program.

7. Program Diagram 03

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This diagram looks at the second chunk of programs in the proposal, and is affectionately called the “Education Core”. In this core, a wide array of public programming is fixed to the first floor (labeled as Classroom Space, Theatre Space, Interactive Chicken Coup, Cafe) and the housing is stacked on top of that programming.

Figure

Figure 6. Program Diagram 02

Figure

8. Program Diagram 04

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This diagram reveals the programmatic relationships in the third chunk of program, called the “Public Core”. Here a makerspace/woodshop holds the ground floor as a commercial program, while larger, more collective residential units. Here the deck widens into a series of micro-plazas littered with community focused objects like fire pits, clotheslines, hammock netting, slides, and picnic tables, and lawn chairs. This core is intended to be the large outdoor living room for the whole community.

Figure 9. Program Diagram 05

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This diagram reveals the final chunk of programming, which is dedicated strictly to housing. The “Housing Core” offers more intimate layers of interaction between units and their neighbors, as each unit is neatly tucked into the other. Following the “Public Core” this final core is meant to be slower, supporting more day-to-day family life.

Figure 10. Exterior Perspective 03

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This drawing is an illustrated render that captures the second floor deck spanning between two chunks of programming. These “bridging” moments happen several times throughout the proposal and have become a staple of the project.

Figure

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This comprehensive site plan reveals, with more clarity, the guiding logics to our design organization and landscape design. Here, the exterior pathways and plazas in and through our site take center stage as they work to allow movement through and around the site.

Figure 11. Site Plan Drawing

Figure 13. Relational Section 01

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This section drawing is slicing through an edge condition seen in our Public Core, showing off the relationship of the makerspace (ground floor) to the residential units above. This drawing helps to reveal the detailed relationships between programs, their function, and their construction.

Figure 12. Relational Section 03

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This longitudinal section drawing reveals the complex set of relationships between all adjacent programming. This drawing follows the second floor deck, stretching the length of the proposal, and highlights the program linkages through the shared physical space.

14. Interior Perspective

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This drawing is an illustrated render showing off the living space inside one of the proposed units. The design intentionally sought to separate private spaces from more communal ones, and so this two story unit tucks bedrooms and bathrooms on the first floor, and leaves its second floor open for the kitchen, living, and dining spaces.

Figure 15. Relational Section 02

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This transverse section drawing reveals the broader contextual relationships between the building’s programs and the site. Following the drawing from left to right, the street leads into a highly permeable plaza with fixed pavilions holding footprints for the farmer’s market. In the center of the drawing, the proposal’s density intensifies, as programs of Vertical Farming capture the ground floor and housing stacks atop. Just to the right of the project, the density immediately dissipates, intentionally allowing for the forested area to grow into the site, and claim the majority of the space remaining.

Figure

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This first floor plan drawing displays the entire ground floor of the proposal. Here, the public programming is intermixed with housing units, and the striations through the site better reveal the underlying logics that guided site development.

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This overall elevation drawing reveals the public face of the building as it presents itself to Bridge Street. This drawing reveals the entirety of the project and all of its relationships on site.

Figure 16. First Floor Plan Drawing

Figure 17. West Elevation Drawing

Figure 18. Second Floor Plan Drawing

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Note: This second floor plan drawing shows the second level of the proposal. This plan shows the density of activity that can happen on the share deck. This deck links all of the proposal’s residents and programming together, creating a tightly bound community using methods of connection, densification, and sustainable practices.

designed a user-controlled cross-ventilation system to enhance the natural circulation and ventilation of air within the units. All of this, along with the use of Structurally Insulated Panels (SIPs), produces a building with low energy needs to support our daily lifestyles. Overall, this project models an energy-efficient and sustainable solution for the building’s heating, cooling, and ventilation needs, promoting low-waste lifestyles in both commercial and residential settings.

CONCLUSION

The world is changing. Each passing day solidifies this fact and underscores the junction a new generation of designers must face. As global conditions spur change and resettlement for climate refugees, the Rural(bridge) House(s) re-envisions the value of the countryside by exploring new typologies and strategies for collective living in rural communities. The proposal's high-density design promotes sustainable practices and embodies a connection to the surrounding community, thanks to selected strategies borrowed from New Urbanism. This project, being speculative, did not review plans for phasing integration to the town; however, we want to acknowledge that this is a necessary task should a project of this scale be attempted in practice.

The form of collective living presented by the Rural(bridge) House(s) encourages younger generations not only to come to but also to stay in Port Austin by reinstituting Connection, applying Density, and embodying Sustainable Living. But this should not be the end, as the work presented here is not and should not be the last word in efforts to redefine the realm of domesticity and community. It is our hope that this proposal has created a platform for addressing concerns of both climate and community in order to promote a discourse of change in our profession.

Note: This drawing is an illustrated render that captures the second floor deck spanning between two chunks of programming. These “bridging” moments happen several times throughout the proposal and have become a staple of the project.

Source: Photo by Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers

Figure 19. Exterior Perspective 04

END NOTES

1 Freedman, Eric. “A Safer Haven? How the Midwest Can Be a Refuge amid Climate Change - If We Prepare.” Crain’s Forum, June 23, 2022.

2 Xu, Chi, Marten Scheffer, Jens-Christian Svenning, Timothy Lenton, and Timothy Kohler. “Human Climate Niche - 2020 and 2070.” Science On a Sphere - Human Climate Niche 2020 and 2070, July 21, 2020.

3 Velikov, Kathy, and Jonathon Rule. “Countryside Collectives.” Ann Arbor: Taubman College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan, January 5, 2023

4 “Report: Challenges Facing Rural Communities.” National Conference of State Legislatures, January 21, 2020.

5 Velikov, Kathy, Jonathon Rule, Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, Timothy Jockers, Chris Boyle, and Terry Boyle. Countryside Collectives Site Visit. Personal, January 27, 2023.

6 Ibid

7 Bureau, US Census. “Port Austin, MI .” Census. gov, January 21, 2024.

8 “Port Austin.” Port Austin - Demographics, 2022.

9 Velikov, Kathy, Jonathon Rule, Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, Timothy Jockers, Chris Boyle, and Terry Boyle. Countryside Collectives Site Visit. Personal, January 27, 2023.

10 Ibid

11 Velikov, Kathy, and Jonathon Rule. “Countryside Collectives.” Ann Arbor: Taubman College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan, January 5, 2023.

12 Ibid

13 Witsil, Frank. “Massive Layoffs Hurt SingleParent Households More; Detroit Tops List.” Detroit Free Press, December 3, 2018.

14 “Safca, Antoanela. “Building a Village: Meet

the Single Parents Finding Stability through Cohabitation.” The Guardian, November 21, 2019.

15 “What Is New Urbanism?” Congress for the New Urbanism, May 15, 2023.

16 Freedman, Eric. “A Safer Haven? How the Midwest Can Be a Refuge amid Climate Change - If We Prepare.” Crain’s Forum, June 23, 2022.

17 Velikov, Kathy, and Jonathon Rule. “Countryside Collectives.” Ann Arbor: Taubman College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan, January 5, 2023.

18 “What Is New Urbanism?” Congress for the New Urbanism, May 15, 2023.

19 “Port Austin” Google Earth

20 “Zoning Ordinance_Village of Port Austin.” Village of Port Austin, October 10, 2016.

21 “Port Austin” Google Earth

22 “What Is New Urbanism?” Congress for the New Urbanism, May 15, 2023.

23 Ibid

24 Hargrave, Marshall. “Floor Area Ratio: Definition, Formula to Calculate, Example.” Investopedia, August 21, 2020.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Designers Michael Thut, Qilmeg Doudactz, and Tim Jockers developed Studio MQT as an interdisciplinary design team that sought to tackle questions of densifying rural landscapes. The studio formed at the University of Michigan, as part of an architecture studio, focused on the issues of housing. Together, they have produced a small collection of work that has been recognized for excellence in the field of design that confronts both speculative and built environments. Studio MQT’s commitment to finding creative, sustainable, and equitable solutions to complex problems has underscored much of their work, and continued research. Their latest project, The Rural(bridge) House(s), was submitted to the 2023 ASCA National Conference for an AIA Housing Education Award, and was invited to submit their work to an online publication, sponsored by Taubman College of Architecture and Urban Planning. Studio MQT looks to continue their efforts through continued interest and research opportunities.

Taipei, Taiwan

Chinchieh Chen

Transportation and Tourist Towns:

Analyzing Panaji’s parking policy

TAHIR NORONHA & AMAR KULKARNI

Master of Urban and Regional Planning Urban Planner, Corporation of the City of Panaji

ABSTRACT

This paper scrutinizes the intricate relationship between transportation planning and the unique challenges posed by tourism in Panaji, Goa, India. Focused on Panaji’s 2013 parking policy, the study employs a multi-faceted methodology, combining ground surveys, Right to Information applications, interviews, and literature review. In the context of limited, compartmentalized data access in India, the research attempts to present decentralized, participatory data to supplement its core analysis of the policy. Panaji has exceptionally high per-capita car ownership, a historical layout ill-equipped for current vehicular volumes, and a concerning trend of escalating vehicle registrations. Public policy execution hurdles are also numerous, encompassing weak traffic enforcement, inaccurate, inaccurate parking space counts, and inadequately priced parking fees. In response to these challenges, the paper proposes progressive solutions tailored to Panaji’s context. Recommendations span dynamic data collection, congestion pricing inspired by successful international models, surge pricing in parking, and the municipalization of traffic management. Framed as a ‘wicked problem,’ the paper advocates for timely, radical solutions, urging the integration of transport planning into land-use considerations. Finally, emphasizing the importance of financial prudence, the paper suggesting that revenue reinvestment into non-motorized transportation is imperative for a revised policy to be sustainable going forward.

In the 1990s, the advent of the affordable private automobile in India changed the landscape of transportation and development planning.1 Tourist towns—popular vacation destinations where seasonal visitors outnumber residents—are particularly impacted by this phenomenon, causing conflict between community interests, tourism development, and transportation planning. Studies indicate that tourism potential increases with transportation coverage at a regional level, as tourists prefer easily accessible destinations.2 However, tourists are often compelled to bring their own vehicles out of a desire for freedom of movement while on vacation.3,4 Tourist movement is seldom captured in municipal and even state-level data and is hard to inject into travel demand models.5 As a result, transportation planning in tourist towns becomes a delicate balancing act. The dynamism of tourist towns demands a nuanced approach that not only caters to the needs of the local population but also accommodates the influx of visitors seeking both convenience and the freedom to explore at their own pace.

The challenges posed by tourism often result in plans with weaker fact bases and visions that conflict with the community’s aspirations and demand from non-residents for tourism.6 There is growing scholarship on tourismtransportation planning7 and a pressing need to develop place-specific,8 data-driven plans addressing the concerns stated earlier.9

By evaluating a 2013 parking policy in Panaji, a prominent tourist town in Goa, India, this paper highlights the hurdles of transportation planning in touristic areas. The paper will also offer suggestions that planners can adopt in formulating policies that are specifically tailored to the context of tourist towns like Panaji.

METHODS

In attempting to aggregate and present objective data on transportation in Goa, this paper draws from ground surveys and trip research carried out by Kulkarni, numerous Right to Information applications filed by Noronha, interviews with officials in both the city of Panaji and the state transportation department, and a literature review of reports prepared by numerous consultants for the national, state and local government. Our findings are supplemented by urban photography clicked by Kulkarni, highlighting the traffic congestion in Panaji (Figure 1). We intend to place important transportation data in a single window through this article –documenting the condition of tourist towns to this aspect of planning, while reporting information that has never been public before.

Data in India is exceptionally hard to come across,10 since it is confidential and siloed in different departments. This poses serious governance issues,11 with non-profit organizations and activists often being forced to connect the dots and bring information to planners and policymakers. Researchers in India increasingly advocate for decentralized and participatory data collection.12 By getting on the ground and sourcing data ourselves, we attempt to emulate this model forming the framework for our review of Panaji’s policy and our recommendations.

Source: Amar Kulkarni

BACKGROUND

Goa has the highest per-capita car ownership among all states of India.13 The state’s AMRUT (Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation) plan indicates that the current public transport modal share in the city of Panaji is just 2%. This means that 98% of Panaji’s residents prefer using other modes of transport such as personal four- and two-wheelers.14 Table 1 compares the vehicle ownership details of Panaji with those of two comparable cities which are not tourist towns, Panvel in Maharashtra and Karwar in Karnataka. Both cities have similar median income and are roughly the same size as Panaji. Further, all three cities have a significant share of the population which is Konkani-speaking. Yet, despite the socioeconomic and cultural similarities, residents of Panaji have so many more vehicles than residents of the other two cities.

Figure 1. Aerial image of congestion in Panaji

Figure 2. Map of India, with inlay of the Konkan Region, showing three cities of Panaji, Panvel, and Karwar.

Source: Census 2011

Note: Across all three cities, houses which were deemed “vacant” by census officers were not surveyed.

PANAJI’S PROBLEM WITH CARS

The city of Panaji is already well beyond the population for which it was designed. Panaji was planned in 1774. City streets were designed for a total population of around 15,000.15 The primary mode of commute was by foot and by boat, though a minority would travel by horse or cart. Panaji now has a resident population of at least 40,000 with an estimated 60,000 - 70,000 additional daily population.16 This floating population consists of people who come for jobs, including 18,000 state government employees17 as well as those who carry out other commercial, institutional, and economic activities, which tend to be mutually interdependent. For example, the presence of tourists, commercial activities, government departments, and services in the capital benefit local grocery stores, restaurants, and related small-scale businesses. Undeniably,

this leads to a major demand. The daytime population increase brings a significant volume of vehicular traffic into the core city’s narrow lanes. This poses a pivotal challenge to Panaji, which must accommodate these vehicles on the road and in parking areas. It results in traffic congestion, extended travel times, and degrading air quality. Table 2 illustrates how the number of vehicles in the region is steadily increasing. It is interesting to note that one of the fastest-growing modes is the rental two-wheeler sector. It is likely that the unavailability of parking and lack of public transport in touristic areas has led visitors to opt for this mode of transport.

While vehicle ownership has increased, parking supply has not. Most buildings in this historic city do not contain on-site parking,

Table 2: Vehicle registrations by year for the entire state of GOA

Source: Department of Transport, Government of GOA (2021)

Note: Granular data for panaj was not available, but it is estimated that 80% of vehicles registered in the Panaji RTO move around Panaji city.

forcing visitors and residents to park on the street. Amendments to the building construction regulations18 now require limited on-site parking for city buildings. However, in the last decade, there has been negligible construction of new structures within city limits. “Congestion” has thus become a major issue to residents and visitors of Panaji, and successive strategic, investment and development plans have prioritized the issue over the last decade and a half.

PANAJI’S PARKING PLANS

Setting out to address the issue of “congestion,” Panaji attempted to increase its parking supply. The development plan of 200519 put in a proposal for the reclamation of the Manshem wetlands to develop a business hub called Patto. One of the key factors in the Patto plan was developing additional parking and bus connectivity, to support commuters who work and visit Panaji. This project arguably failed. The lack of last-mile connectivity from Patto to the historic core city has resulted in parking being available in the area, while congestion still reigns supreme in the core city.

Subsequent plans such as the State Government’s “Imagine Panaji” masterplan20 (2011) and the Charles Correa Foundation’s (CCF) “Decongestion Model for Panaji City Core”21 (2014) also put the combating of congestion front and center. Contrary to the parking-centric 2005 plan, these plans advocated for increased pedestrianization and public transport and did not address parking supply. More recently, the Imagine Panaji Smart City Corporation paid consultants Urban Mass Transit Company (UMTC) a sum of INR 28 million (USD $330,000) to prepare a comprehensive mobility plan and a parking master plan for the city.22 Similarly, the German Ministry for Environment funded ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI) to prepare a plan called “Eco-Logistics: Low

Carbon Freight for Panaji” in 2019.

Although not all of these plans were implemented, the CCF plan pushed the Corporation of the City of Panaji (CCP) to prepare estimates for paid parking. The CCP estimated that annual expenses would be INR 360 million (USD 4.35 million), while projected revenue from parking fees would be at least INR 450 million (USD 5.43 million).23 Thus, in 2014, CCP released a tender seeking a suitable contractor to take up the work at a fee of INR 63 million (USD 760,000) per year. City staff believed this would give the contractor a profit margin of over 25%, making it a lucrative business prospect.24 Several bids were received, but all of them were less than onethird of the estimated fee.25 The tender was withdrawn and re-issued in 2019. At that time, a bid of INR 33 million (USD 397,500) per year was accepted from a private contractor.

HURDLES ENFORCING PARKING POLICY

Local officials never assumed that so many people would own private vehicles after the introduction of affordable models in 1990.26 Today all lanes of the core city, including corners, are perpetually occupied by cars. There is negligible space for any other activity, such as walking or bicycling. Non-motorized activities become an obstacle to vehicular movement, particularly private cars. Despite a notification issued by the District Magistrate, North Goa to enforce parking prohibitions on designated corners in Panaji,27 no action has been taken against offenders (Figure 4).

Simply put, the enforcement of traffic regulations has been relatively weak in the city, partly due to police staffing issues. The traffic division of the Panaji police has a staff of just 59 officers, with a jurisdiction of 193 square kilometers (48,000 acres). As of November 2022, 650 policemen handled a

Figure 3. Parking on the sidewalk, February 2020.

Source: Amar Kulkarni

minimum of 1.54 million vehicles in the state — a ratio of 2,300 cars for every officer in the traffic cell.28 Panaji is also a city of events and festivals, and at the time of writing, traffic police are occupied with the management of the International Film Festival of India. It is no wonder that city officials complain about the limited number of personnel to handle traffic violations.29

Panaji voters continue to believe that the lack of parking supply is the core issue – evidenced by the fact that both parties contesting the 2021 city elections promised to build multilevel parking structures in their manifestos.30,31

The opposition party, “We Ponjekar,” went further, promising to scrap pay-parking in the city if elected to power.32

The grounds for this belief are uncertain, as data is lacking. At the time of writing, the city of Panaji has no count of the number of parking spots in its jurisdiction. There is speculation that the city officials undercounted parking spots when preparing approximations.33 Vehicle sample surveys conducted by ICLEI34 and CCF35 indicate that there are approximately five times as many cars entering the core city as the number of available parking slots noted in the CCP approximations.

INCREASE SUPPLY OR REDUCE DEMAND?

Panaji is at a crossroads, as vehicle ownership is rapidly increasing. The city is struggling to enforce traffic management, and the primary solution touted by politicians and resonating with residents is increasing roadway widths and parking supply. We argue that this approach may appear to work in other cities, but it is a short-term solution. Mobility is a demand derived from the need to access destinations.36 This is particularly true in Indian cities, where case studies have already indicated that increasing the width of carriageways leads to increased commutes by private vehicles,37 as the literature indicates. Additional restrictions imposed by Panaji’s position as a tourist town make it even harder to plan for supply increases.

CONCLUSION

SOLUTIONS TO PARKING REFORM

Transportation and connected parking issues must be understood as issues of accessibility and not mobility. Limitations imposed by data collection, available space, and the failure of supply-based decongestion models prompt demand-based policy solutions.38 Panaji’s land uses are a major obstacle in transportation planning. The prevalence of state departments in the city brings a large number of commuters on a daily basis, imposing significant demand on the city’s streets. Yet the city cannot “zone out” these land uses. Land use plans are made by the State Town and Country Planning Department, preempting Panaji. The city attempts to make transportation plans but faces issues in implementation and enforcement.39 An example of these mismatches is the building amendments mandating parking minimums. Even if Panaji attempts to impose demand solutions like pay parking, these regulations are outside

Source: Amar Kulkarni the city’s jurisdiction. Finally, there are major environmental and social costs of congestion that must be considered when planning in the public interest.40 Evidently, transportation planning must be integrated into land-use plans, and land use planning should be municipalized, especially in a city like Panaji.

Finally, the objective of transport plans must focus on enhancing accessibility, not easing mobility.41 Therefore, if Panaji is to make concrete efforts towards a progressive parking policy, the following recommendations can be examined:

1.LAYING A FOUNDATION: DATA COLLECTION

The first step the CCP needs to take is simple: data collection. The city gravely lacks urban information. Although this is a problem throughout India, Panaji’s lack of technical capacity leaves it especially vulnerable. Although despite hiring paid consultants have carried out transportation planning, critical data, including numbers of vehicles, details of existing infrastructure, and identification of alternatives, is not included in plans and reports. For example, the 2018 Parking Master Plan prepared by UMTC missed the task of enumerating existing parking slots.42 The last vehicular mode surveys for Panaji were carried out in 2013 as a part of the CCF plan. Without recent data, it is impossible to accurately plan for efficient transportation in Panaji. The CCP could immediately coordinate with the Pay and Park contractor and institute some on-ground data collection to get a better understanding of the mode share and intensity of traffic within the city. A state legislator, Cruz Silva, is attempting to bring laws that could compel the CCP (and other municipalities) to collect this information.43

2) DEVELOPING A SYSTEM: CONGESTION PRICING

Moving beyond a robust monitoring system, one way to control congestion is charging fees to users who prefer private modes of transport, disincentivizing the trips and congestion.44 Places like London have successfully implemented congestion pricing mechanisms for several decades. London introduced congestion pricing in 2003. On the first day,

Figure 4. Parking on corners, November 2022.

London added 300 extra buses to the Central London Bus Network, boosting alternative modes of transport. This combined model proved very successful.45 In London, vehicles have to pay a congestion charge of GBP 15 (USD 19) on a daily basis to enter the 21-squarekilometer congestion zone between 7 am andto 6 pm from Monday –through Friday and 12.00 pm to 6 pm on weekends. Consequently, the congestion zone experienced 39% fewer private cars between 2002 to 2014. The price has increased from GBP 5 (USD 6.36) to GBP 15 (USD 19) from 2003 till today.46

In theory, this policy should be easy to implement in Panaji, with the city’s six entry points becoming thresholds into a potential congestion pricing zone. However, significant political will is required to push this through, which has not yet materialized. Should Panaji cross this threshold, “Gravitational Attraction” best practices47 should be used. This principle plugs well into the uncertainty of tourist movement and behavior in Panaji because it features time-determined variable congestion charges. This will ensure that commuters are not overly inconvenienced while simultaneously urging casual visitors to make their own considerations when deciding to drive into Panaji.

3) INTEGRATING WITH CURRENT POLICIES: SURGE PRICING IN PARKING

Similarly, a surge or dynamic pricing mechanism could be piloted for parking fees. In this case, land use becomes an important determinant that can also influence the parking demand.48 We suggest a model that changes based on land use and time of day. In the current scenario, the uniform INR 20 (USD 0.25) charge/hour for four-wheelers does not segregate peak (high demand) and non-peak hours (low demand). Two-wheeler commuters pay an even smaller fee of INR 4 (USD 0.05) per hour. India’s latest Household Consumption

Expenditure Survey estimates that Urban Goans spend INR 8,734 (USD 105) per capita on average every month on consumption.49 The cost of living in Panaji, or owning a private four-wheeler automobile is far higher than the average per capita spend. INR 20, or even 100, per day on parking is a negligible fee for most commuters and residents, and the data shows no substantial reduction of private vehicle use or congestion. We posit that this conflict between high demand for parking, available capital, limited space availability, and low fees is the root cause of traffic overflow and congestion. To improve the situation, it is important to focus on the mechanisms and tools that can help to decongest the traffic in Panaji. Critical to this effort is reducing the number of on-street vehicles and discouraging vehicle users from parking in congested areas. To achieve the desired results, the city can experiment with the concept of surge parking fees on specific streets in the core city as a pilot project to help determine what challenges there may be when scaling the concept to the city or ward level.

4) FOLLOW-THROUGH: MUNICIPALIZING NON-POLICE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

The above supply and demand adjustments would be effective only if CCP could enforce transportation in the city. One of the biggest issues in the city is double-parking. Panaji experiences it on all primary and secondary roads, obstructing the flow of traffic and associated activities. Surge pricing or induced demand policy will not work in the absence of an integrated enforcement mechanism. The police are currently struggling to manage the traffic that enters the city. There is a growing movement to replace police in traffic management. Proponents argue that this is especially useful in jurisdictions where the police are known to be exploitative or corrupt.50 A municipal traffic force will also have a narrower mandate and quicker response time. Central government officials

appear to concur that the Goa police are an exceptionally corrupt body,51 especially targeting tourists and motorists.

There is a precedent for non-police traffic officers. In the US, the city of Philadelphia made headlines by deciding to replace some police officers with civilians handling issues of traffic enforcement.52 Activists in the city of Washington DC recently held a public meeting to advocate for similar reforms along the lines of Germany's Ordnungsamt. The Ordnungsamt are an unarmed police force used to enforce social order regulations. They have proven to be exceptionally effective at traffic management and parking enforcement.53 There is a statutory provision for Panaji to municipalize traffic functions under the Corporation. As per the CCP Act 2002, the city is empowered to draft by-laws to organize “Street traffic: street traffic and the reduction of noise caused by such traffic.”54 The Goa Motor Vehicles Act may need to be amended to allow this, but it should not pose too much of a hurdle.

FINAL THOUGHTS

Because of the complex networks of actors, politics, and tourism aspirations in the city, Panaji’s transport issue is a “wicked problem”55 and will require radical solutions to amend. Pilot projects and trial-and-error approaches risk postponing action and reducing public support for long-term solutions. The city needs to act now, integrating transport into land use planning before it is too late.

These actions must be financially progressive. Panaji’s public transport infrastructure is grossly lacking: a revamped pay-and-park and congestion pricing policy could bring significant revenue to the city. It is important that this revenue be placed into a special fund that gets reinvested into non-motorized transportation. The current policy of giving

profits to contractors has led to several issues, including the collection of extra-jurisdictional fees56 leading to public discontent. If the revenue werewas reinvested in CCP, the city would benefit and it could possibly hire an urban planner to carry out a more dynamic, specific, and data-driven parking policy.

ENDNOTES

1. Kenneth Bo Nielsen and Harold Wilhite, “The Rise and Fall of the ‘People’s Car’: Middle-Class Aspirations, Status and Mobile Symbolism in ‘New India,’” Contemporary South Asia 23, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 371

2. Eden Sorupia, “Rethinking the Role of Transportation in Tourism,” Proceedings of the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies 5 (January 1, 2005).

3. Tan Yigitcanlar, Lawrence Fabian, and Eddo Coiacetto, “Challenges to Urban Transport Sustainability and Smart Transport in a Tourist City: The Gold Coast, Australia,” Open Transportation Journal 2 (2008): 29–46.

4. Diem-Trinh Le-Klähn and C. Michael Hall, “Tourist Use of Public Transport at Destinations – a Review,” Current Issues in Tourism 18, no. 8 (August 3, 2015): 785–803, https://doi.org/10.1080/13683500.2014.948812.

5. Yigitcanlar et al, 2008

6. Yigitcanlar et al, 2008

7. Le-Klähn, 2018

8. Huy Quan Vu et al., “Tourist Activity Analysis by Leveraging Mobile Social Media Data,” Journal of Travel Research 57, no. 7 (September 1, 2018): 883–98, https://doi. org/10.1177/0047287517722232.

9. Janet E. Dickinson and Derek Robbins, “Representations of Tourism Transport Problems in a Rural Destination,” Tourism Management 29, no. 6 (December 1, 2008): 1110–21, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2008.02.003.

10. Henk Ritzema et al., “Using Participatory Modelling to Compensate for Data Scarcity in Environmental Planning: A Case Study from India,” Environmental Modelling & Software, Thematic Issue - Modelling with Stakeholders, 25, no. 11 (November 1, 2010): 1450–58, https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2010.03.010.

11. Pramod Kumar Singh, “Spatial Data Infrastructure in India: Status, Governance

Challenges, and Strategies for Effective Functioning,” International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research 4, no. 4 (April 17, 2009): 359–88, https://doi.org/10.2902/ijsdir. v4i4.138.

12. Ritzema, 2010

13. Census of India 2011

14. CCP Goa. “AMRUT Service Level Improvement Plan for Urban Transport in Goa” Imagine Panaji Smart City Corporation, January 2016.

15. Pinto, Celsa (2014) Panaji, Anatomy of a Cultural Capital. Goa 1556 Publishing, Saligao.

16. Census of India, 2011

17. Silva, Cruz, (2024) “Legislative Assemby unstarred Question #36, “Details of Government Servants”. February 8, 2024

18. Goa Land Development and Building Construction Regulations (GLDBCR) Amendment of 2017.

19. “Outline Development Plan for Panaji 2011” North Goa Planning and Development Authority, 2005

20. Mendizibal, Maria. (2011) “Imagine Panjim” Goa State Infrastructure Development Corporation & LKS http://grupolks.com/C/PC/Noticias/tabid/87/ articleType/ArticleView/articleId/967/language/ es-ES/Inaugurada-la-exposicion-publica-delMasterplan-de-Panaji-India.aspx

21. Correa, Charles. Parikh, Ruturaj. DSouza, Rhea. Pereira, Golda. & Hameed, Bhavana. (2014) “Decongestion Model for Panaji City Core” Charles Correa Foundation.

22. Navhind Times Network. “IPSCDL’s Consultant Asked to ‘Complement’ Comprehensive Mobility Plan Report | The Navhind Times.” The Navhind Times. July 14, 2018. Retrieved on December 16, 2022 from https://www.navhindtimes.in/2018/07/14/ goanews/ipscdls-consultant-asked-tocomplement-comprehensive-mobility-plan-

23. Corporation of the City of Panaji (2013) “Approximations for Pay-Parking, Phase-I in Panaji City”

24. CCP Engineer, Interview (November 2023)

25. Times News Network “CCP’s Pay-Parking Tender Comes up -Cropper Again” The Times of India, Goa September 17, 2017. Retrieved on November 15, 2022 https:// timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/goa/ccpspay-parking-tender-comes-a-cropper-again/ articleshow/48992561.cms

26. Kenneth Bo Nielsen and Harold Wilhite, “The Rise and Fall of the ‘People’s Car’: Middle-Class Aspirations, Status and Mobile Symbolism in ‘New India,’” Contemporary South Asia 23, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 371–87, https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2015.1090951.

27. North Goa District Magistrate, Notification 23/6/2022/MAG/TIS/2408, 10 August 2022.

28. Team Herald “Acute Staff Crunch hits Goa Traffic Police” oHeraldo November 06, 2022 accessed on November 27, 2022 from https:// www.heraldgoa.in/Goa/Acute-staff-crunch-hitsGoa-Traffic-Police-/196279

29. Anonymous CCP employee, personal interview November 2022.

30. Bharatiya Janata Party (Monserrate Panel): “BJP4Panaji Manifesto”. 2021

31. Furtado, S. “We Ponjekar Manifesto”. 2021

32. Furtado, “We Ponjekar Manifesto” 2021

33. Anonymous CCP Employee, Interview.

34. Kulkarni, Ghorpade, Saini & Kumar, “LowCarbon Action Plan for Urban Freight, Panaji” Eco Logistics, ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability, 2022

35. Charles Correa Foundation, “Decongestion Model for Panaji City Core”, 2014.

36. Levine, J, Grengs, J.. & Merlin, L.A. (2019) ‘From Mobility to Accessibility’ Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 2019

1 report/.

37. Talat Munshi, “Built Environment and Mode Choice Relationship for Commute Travel in the City of Rajkot, India,” Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment 44 (2016): 239–53.

38. Levine, J, Grengs, J.. & Merlin, L.A. (2019) ‘From Mobility to Accessibility’

39. Anonymous CCP employee, Interview (Nov 2023)

40. United States. Federal Highway Administration. Office of Transportation Management. “Congestion Pricing : A Primer : Overview,” October 1, 2008. https://rosap.ntl.bts. gov/view/dot/748.

41. Levine, J, Grengs, J.. & Merlin, L.A. (2019) ‘From Mobility to Accessibility’

42. UMTC "Parking Master Plan for Panaji City" Imagine Panaji Smart City Development Corporation"

43. Author #1 is working with Mr Silva to introduce a private member bill seeking to amend the Corporation of the City of Panaji Act (2002) to compel the city to do vehicular studies. This amendment is slated to be placed before the house in July 2024.

44. André de Palma and Robin Lindsey, “Traffic Congestion Pricing Methodologies and Technologies,” Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies 19, no. 6 (December 1, 2011): 1377–99, https://doi.org/10.1016/j. trc.2011.02.010.

45. Todd Litman, “London Congestion Pricing–Implications for Other Cities” (CES-DICE 2005).

46. United States. Federal Highway Administration. Office of Transportation Management. “Congestion Pricing : A Primer : Overview,” October 1, 2008. https://rosap.ntl.bts. gov/view/dot/748.

47. De Palma and Lindsey, 2011.

48. Jonathan Levine, Zoned out: Regulation, Markets, and Choices in Transportation and Metropolitan Land Use (Routledge, 2010).

49. National Sample Survey Organisation. “Household Consumption Expenditure Survey 2022-23: Fact Sheet” Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Program Evaluation. March 2023

50. Anna Orso "Philadelphia can replace some police officers with civilians, arbitration panel rules" The Philadelphia Inquirer November 15, 2022. Accessed November 27, 2022.

51. Gauree Malkarnekar, “Sitting Idle in Goa, Tolerance to Corruption High: CBI,” Times of India, November 2, 2022, https:// timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/goa/sittingidle-in-goa-tolerance-to-corruption-high-cbi/ articleshow/95256293.cms.

52. Orso, 2022

53. Jelle Heidstra et al., “Traffic Law Enforcement by Non-Police Bodies” (Helsinki, Finland: The Escape Project, 2000).

54. Corporation of the City of Panaji Act, 2002

55. Rittel and Webber (1973) "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning" Policy Sciences 4, 1973,

155–169

56. Rohan Shrivastava, “No Contract to Charge Parking Fees, but Pay to Park in Panaji,” Times of India, October 4, 2023, https://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/city/goa/no-contract-tocharge-parking-fees-but-pay-to-park-in-panaji/ articleshow/104148266.cms.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Tahir is an architect and urban planner, he is currently a graduate student at the University of Michigan researching comparative governance, farmland and environmental protection, and participatory planning. His work experience includes four years as convener of the Charles Correa Foundation, where he led a team of fellows, working on urban design projects and architectural research. Tahir currently works part-time as a planner at the City of Detroit, assisting the government in formulating regulations and bylaws. He is a member of several historic preservation advocacy groups in India, and indigenous rights and environmental grassroots orgs in Goa.

Amar is an urbanist with a background in environmental planning and law. He is working for ICLEI South Asia in Shimla, where he provides assistance to the Himachal State Government, planning electric vehicle infrastructure. With over 8 years of experience in local governments and international nonprofits, his work centers on climate action, decarbonization, sustainable transportation, land use and urban public space. Collaborating with local governments, Amar believes interdisciplinary approaches are necessary for integrating sustainability into the built environment.

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