Summer 2012 Threats: The Final 10 Weeks by SIRS Consultancy Ltd

Summer 2012 Threats

The Final 10 Weeks www.sirsconsultancy.com info@sirsconsultancy.com @SIRSconsultancy

ÂŠ SIRS Consultancy Ltd

London, UK

Introduction With only 10 weeks left until the Olympic Games begin and last minute security preparations under way, is the United Kingdom prepared for a large scale terrorist attack? With news breaking recently that a worker managed to smuggle a bomb through the Olympic Park’s security defences, and embarrassing revelations emerging in the press almost daily, it is clear that there is still much to be done.

On 15 December 2011 the deployment of up to 13,500 troops to protect the 2012 Olympic Games was 2

announced. Although the extra manpower is definitely needed for Olympic security, it cannot be said that simply filling the gaps will complete the security picture satisfactorily. The United Kingdom needs proactive security measures rather than what has been deemed in some security circles as merely ‘deterrents’. SIRS Consultancy’s report, National Security Risks: Immediate Challenges Before Summer 2012, explained the actual extent of the required security and policing strategy needed in order to successfully implement the largest security operation on British soil since the Second World War. It is an unacceptable 3

error not to deploy extra officers, particularly with 4 billion people watching the Opening Ceremony. It is not merely the Olympics that the UK is showcasing to the world this year, but also Her Majesty the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee. 4

Although military vessels are now docked on the River Thames , what practical use would they have in countering a ‘Mumbai-style’ attack or even a ‘lone wolf’ terrorist operation? The same is true of the potential deployment of surface-to-air missiles to protect key Olympic sites; the possibility of which was announced by Defence Secretary Philip Hammond on 14 November 2011.

There needs to be a better security structure in place to protect the UK from a variety of dangers, such as the significant threat of ‘lone wolves’, who operate independently, and are therefore difficult to detect and 1

Collins, N. (2012). Fake bomb smuggled into Olympic Park. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/olympics/news/9248925/Fake-bomb-smuggled-into-Olympic-Park.html. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 2

Gibson, O. (2011). London Olympics security to be boosted by 13,500 troops. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2011/dec/15/london-olympics-security-boosted-troops. Last accessed 20th Dec 2011. 3

Mower, J. & Hirst, M. (2012). London 2012: Isles of Wonder theme for Olympic ceremony. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16747032. Last accessed 10th May 2012. 4

The Huffington Post (2012). London Olympics 2012: HMS Ocean, Royal Navy's Biggest Ship, Sails Up Thames To Greenwich To Defend Capital During Games. Available: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/05/04/london-olympics2012-royal-navy-hms-ocean-thames-greenwich_n_1476775.html. Last accessed 5th April 2012. 5

BBC News (2011). Ground-to-air missiles 'may protect' London 2012 games. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15724639. Last accessed 14th Nov 2011.

identify as a threat prior to their attack(s). A major threat might be if ‘lone wolf’ terrorists were to carry out simultaneous multiple attacks aimed at causing political, physical or economic damage, utilising the ‘Mumbai-style’ attack model. Anders Breivik has demonstrated a ‘lone wolf’s abilities to carry out 6

simultaneous attacks, in the devastating July 2011 attacks in Norway. Simultaneous attacks aimed at critical national infrastructure (CNI) targets have already occurred in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

In addition, practical measures need to be adopted that reflect real-world changes. These include steps that place a greater emphasis on the real threat from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), as used in the 7/7 bombings, to grenades and firearms. International incidents have demonstrated the lethal impact of this evolution in tactics. For example, we have seen the use of IEDs to breach the perimeter of the InterContinental Hotel in Kabul, which was immediately followed by an assault using firearms and grenades.

The severity of this threat was further demonstrated by the 22/7 terrorist attacks in Norway, when Anders Breivik detonated a car bomb near Regjeringskvartalet (Oslo’s equivalent of Whitehall), which served as a distraction for emergency responders whilst he travelled to the island of Utøya to carry out a separate attack.

The murder of seven people by Mohammed Merah in Toulouse and Montauban during March 2012

demonstrates both the continued threat of Islamist extremism, together with the danger posed by lonewolf terrorists. There is also a significant threat of public disorder with groups setting their sights on the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee to be a day of protest.

As the spike in protests showed in 2010 and 2011, there is a

very real prospect of these legitimate protests being hijacked by individuals intent on causing considerable damage.

BBC News (2011). Norway shooting: Funerals for Breivik victims. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldeurope-14336291. Last accessed 5th Aug 2011. 7

Crisis Consulting (2009). Simultaneous suicide bombings strike Lahore and Nowshera. Available: http://www.netglobers.com/asia/pakistan-simultaneous-suicide-bombings-strike-8942.html. Last accessed 26th July 2011. 8

BBC News (2011). Kabul's Intercontinental Hotel attacked by gunmen. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldsouth-asia-13947169. Last accessed 10th August 2011. 9

BBC News (2011). Norway shooting: Funerals for Breivik victims. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldeurope-14336291. Last accessed 5th Aug 2011. 10

The Telegraph (2012). Toulouse shootings and siege: timeline. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/9160016/Toulouse-shootings-and-siege-timeline.html. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 11

Jubilee Protest (2012). Protest at the Pageant. Available: http://www.jubileeprotest.org.uk/. Last accessed 8th May 2012.

The UK needs proactive security with trained police officers. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary stated that the Army should not be needed during instances of public disorder, but rather, that there should be a radical switch in police tactics. This must be put in place in order to prepare for a likely repeat of last summer’s riots, with training programmes in ‘high risk’ urban areas before the Olympics, including the major cities affected by the riots. Finally, we need to think about increasing the numbers of police that will be available during the Olympic Games, as this is a much-needed investment. As Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer of British counter-terrorism legislation between 2005 and 2011, has warned, there is a concern of deploying too many officers to Olympic venues as it may create shortfalls elsewhere.

Sustainable policing levels have

to be maintained, as an attack or instance of public disorder anywhere in the UK will taint the whole Olympics through media overexposure.

In spite of the UK having close to seven years to plan for the Olympics, it is extraordinarily embarrassing that some fundamental security issues continue. With the world’s eyes on the United Kingdom from now until the Closing Ceremony, it is vital that these Games are as secure as is reasonably possible. This has not yet been achieved.

Bhatt, S. (2012). Is Britain Prepared For The Olympic Games?. Monitor. 1 (1). pp7-8.

Threats A precedent for the simultaneous, ‘multiple-site’ nature of terrorist attacks was set in numerous incidents prior to 7th July 2005 (7/7), most notably on 11th September 2001 (9/11) in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania, and the 11th March 2004 attacks in Madrid. However, once the 7/7 attacks occurred, it was apparent that many systems, policies and operating protocols were insufficient, if not altogether unfit for purpose, despite the preparations made.

Given international trends and precedents, it is clear that the UK currently faces a variety of constantly changing threats including: 

Al-Qa’ida and its regional factions, including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP);



Groups affiliated with al-Qa’ida, such as al-Shabaab;



Irish Dissident Republican extremists;



‘Lone wolf’ terrorists who may not be closely affiliated to a particular group or cell;



Far-right extremists;



Anarchists who take advantage of legitimate protests, resulting from the current global financial climate (as seen in the 2010 student protests);



Extensive civil disorder;



Cyber-terrorism.

International Terrorism Although international terrorist groups frequently state their intention to launch a large scale attack within the UK, it is more likely that attacks will be carried out by UK residents who may be linked to terror facilitation networks, organised criminal groups overseas or have been radicalised. While the overwhelming majority of the UK’s increasingly diverse population live as law abiding citizens within a cohesive society, there is significant public anxiety about the potential exploitation of some ethnic communities that may have strong emotional or family ties to areas of conflict. Moreover, the UK’s national security is to a great extent dependent upon events beyond its own borders. Significant developments in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and East Africa could inspire action on the part of individuals sympathetic to internationally-linked groups.

International terrorist groups continue to research and develop new methods for attacking targets of national interest, and have shown innovation by effectively adapting their techniques to hamper UK law enforcement countermeasures.

We have identified the following methods as highly likely to be utilised by international terrorist groups against the UK: 

Multi-pronged simultaneous attacks utilising low tech and small arms weaponry (such as those which occurred in Mumbai in 2008). Recent al-Qa’ida (AQ) manuals that have been disseminated by al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula outline firearms training, particularly in the use of AK-47s and similar weapons.



IEDs (particularly peroxide

and fertiliser-based

explosives) and Vehicle Borne Improvised

Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) can create confusion, fear and panic, as demonstrated by the twin attacks in Norway on the 22nd July 2011 (22/7). 

Cloned vehicles, including those camouflaged with corporate or charity logos or emergency response markings and equipment that provide the appearance of having legitimate access to restricted areas, provide an opportunity to conduct surveillance or launch an attack;



Use of official uniforms. During the 22/7 attacks in Oslo and on the island of Utøya, the perpetrator, Anders Breivik, demonstrated the effectiveness of wearing a police uniform as a disguise;



‘Softer’ densely populated targets such as trains and shopping centres. Intelligence recovered at Usama bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound in Pakistan after his death indicated an interest in these targets, while he was still at the helm of AQ’s leadership.

Oppenheimer, A. (2009). The evolution of IEDs. Available: http://www.defencemanagement.com/feature_story.asp?id=11993. Last accessed 4th August 2011. 14

Massingham, G. (2010). The Times Square Bomb - Why it Failed. Available: http://www.efilmgroup.com/TheTimes-Square-Bomb-Why-it-Failed.html. Last accessed 3rd August 2011. 15

BBC News (2011). Norway police say 85 killed in island youth camp attack. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14259356. Last accessed 26th July 2011. 16

Al-Shabaab used United Nations-marked cars to attack the African Union's main headquarters in Mogadishu. Sheikh, A. (2009). UN-marked cars used in Somali attack. Available: http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/un-marked-carsused-in-somali-attack-1.458997. Last accessed 26th July 2011. 17

BBC News (2011). Norway police say 85 killed in island youth camp attack. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14259356. Last accessed 26th July 2011. 18

Walker, P. (2011). Osama bin Laden 'closely involved in al-Qaida plots'. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/06/osamabinladen-al-qaida. Last accessed 27th July 2011.

Al-Qa’ida Al-Qa’ida’s (AQ) stated aim is the creation of a single Islamic caliphate. They believe this would end what they view as the oppression of Muslims and the Western occupation of Muslim territory.

AQ also aims to

remove so-called ‘apostate’ regimes, which they perceive to be un-Islamic or too sympathetic to the West, from power in Muslim countries.

The implementation of a narrow Takfiri version

the Muslim world is a further AQ objective.

supporters is essential in order to achieve this.

of Islamic law across

They believe that a ‘holy war’ against the West and its

Al-Qa’ida cells are located worldwide, especially in South and Southeast Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East, and are reinforced by their ties to extremist networks.

AQ’s membership, which is

estimated at several thousand individuals worldwide, has attempted to extend its influence through formal affiliations and informal inspirational efforts. Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia and Yemen.

AQ also supports Muslim fighters in Afghanistan, Bosnia,

Possible activities by AQ members or sympathisers within the UK may include fundraising through 27

hawalas (money lenders), the use of charities , front businesses , Internet fraud 30

narcotics sales , as well as the recruitment and radicalisation of individuals.

and possible

House of Commons (2006). Report of the Official Account of the London Bombings on 7th July 2005. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p28. 20

Ibid.

Can be classified as a violent off-shoot of the Salafi movement (Salafism is seen as a form of ‘fundamental Islam’), and condones acts of violence as legitimate methods of achieving religious or political goals; even against other Muslims. 22

House of Commons (2006). Report of the Official Account of the London Bombings on 7th July 2005. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p28. 23

Ibid.

HM Government (2011).CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy For Countering Terrorism. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. pp22-23. 25

Intelligence and Security Committee (2011). Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2010-2011. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p10. 26

Ibid.

Sinai, J. (2011). Tracing Homegrown Jihadists. Available: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/5/tracing-homegrown-jihadists/. Last accessed 26th July 2011. 28

Global Witness (2003).For a Few Dollar$ More: How al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade. Available: http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010304.pdf. Last accessed 28th July 2011. 29

Kellerman, T. (2009).Internet Fraud Finances Terrorism. Available: http://news.discovery.com/tech/internet-fraudfinances-terrorism.html. Last accessed 1st August 2011. 30

Global Witness (2003).For a Few Dollar$ More: How al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade. Available: http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010304.pdf. Last accessed 28th July 2011.

The Intelligence and Security Committee’s (ISC) Annual Report 2010/2011 states that the AQ core in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan continues to pose the most serious strategic threat to the UK and it is assessed that this is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future.

Furthermore, AQ’s

operational activity will continue to pose a direct threat to the West, despite the death of Usama bin Laden, as individuals may be encouraged or inspired to avenge the killing of their leader.

The recently-

foiled ‘underwear bomb’ plot in the Yemen within the last three weeks was widely interpreted by security experts as one to coincide with the first anniversary of bin Laden’s death.

Projections AQ has not launched a ‘successful’ attack in the UK since 7/7, despite numerous attempts. The UK has been relatively lucky since 2005, where plots missed by the intelligence community almost resulted in the following: 34



The detonation of the four 21/7 bombs,



The car bombs in Haymarket and Park Lane in June 2007;



Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s device on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 to Detroit.

35 36

The considerable threat posed by AQ remains consistently high. However, since the death of Usama bin Laden and the onset of the ‘Arab Spring’ movement, the influence of AQ in the Middle East has become increasingly marginalised.

The fact that AQ, under Ayman al-Zawahiri, has so far been unable to mount

a large-scale attack in order to demonstrate its continued relevance, may mean that it is still actively planning to do so.

Security Service: MI5 (2011). International Terrorism. Available: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/internationalterrorism.html. Last accessed 26th July 2011. 32

Intelligence and Security Committee (2011). Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2010-2011. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p9. 33

The Pakistani Taliban ('Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan', or 'TTP') has cited vengeance for bin Laden's death as the main motive for terrorist attacks that killed 80 people in Shabqadar, Pakistan on 13 May 2011. Agence France-Presse (2011).80 killed as Taliban 'avenge bin Laden'. Available: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=70-killed-as-taliban-claim-bin-laden-revenge-2011-05-13. Last accessed 27th July 2011. 34

Press Association (2008). The July 21 failed bombings. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/feb/04/terrorism.world1. Last accessed 23rd August 2011. 35

BBC News (2007). Two car bombs found in West End. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6255960.stm. Last accessed 15th August 2011. 36

Kennedy, D. (2009). Abdulmutallab's bomb plans began with classroom defence of 9/11. Available: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6969075.ece. Last accessed 23rd August 2011. 37

Ibid.

Evidence has shown that there has been an increase in the number of foiled plots linked to AQ. For example, in February 2012, nine men were jailed for plotting to bomb the London Stock Exchange and also planning to establish a terrorist training camp in Pakistan.

Although none of the individuals in

question were members of AQ itself, three of them did belong to an AQ-inspired terrorist group.

During

their trial it was proposed that they had been motivated by online propaganda produced by organisations such as AQ.

According to Piers Arnold, a lawyer for the Crown Prosecution Service, the men had been

“clearly influenced” by AQ’s message.

More recently, in April 2012, four individuals appeared in court accused of planning to attack a Territorial Army base using an IED attached to a remote-control car which would be driven under the gate of the facility in question.

They were charged with discussing methods, materials and targets for a terrorist

attack incorporating IEDs and firearms.

According to the Prosecution, two members of the group were

heard and recorded discussing attacks on a Territorial Army base and several other potential targets, thanks to covert listening devices installed in their cars.

During the initial phase of their trial at Westminster Magistrates Court, it was stated that the four individuals had planned to travel to Pakistan in order to cooperate with AQ in attacking Western forces in Afghanistan.

The men are also alleged to have downloaded six issues of the AQ magazine Inspire,

which contained instructions regarding the manufacture of IEDs.

Therefore there is still a significant risk of an individual or individuals loosely affiliated to AQ carrying out an attack in the United Kingdom.

Current intelligence gaps concerning membership, support activity, or planning operations make it extremely difficult to accurately assess the group’s ability to launch an attack in the UK in the near future. The membership and influence of AQ is likely to increase. However, successful military operations have weakened AQ’s operational capabilities and stemmed the flow of funds to the group. 38

BBC News (2012). Nine jailed over bomb plot and terror camp plan .Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk16968518. Last accessed 16th May 2012. 39 40 41

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

Gardham, D. (2012). Men appear in court charged with plotting to attack Territorial Army with model car . Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/9237329/Men-appear-in-court-charged-with-plotting-toattack-Territorial-Army-with-model-car.html. Last accessed 16th May 2012. 43 44 45 46

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid Ibid.

Despite the obstacles it faces, AQ’s ability to attract and recruit potential followers via the Internet appears 47

to be increasing , due to the pervasive nature of social networking and online communications. AQ will undoubtedly continue to seek influential and multilingual leaders such as the late Anwar al-Awlaki, AQAP’s chief propagandist until his death in September 2011.

Al-Awlaki alone had been linked

personally to the 2009 shooting at Fort Hood in Texas, the stabbing of Stephen Timms MP in 2010, the 2010 Stockholm terrorist attack and the 2010 Times Square car bomb attempt.

Documents retrieved

from bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound following his death, and released to the public in May 2012, indicate that AQ is in itself no longer in direct control of its regional affiliates. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, an affiliate if of AQ, has also been associated with the 2009 Christmas Day bombing attempt on Northwest Flight 253, and the 2010 Cargo Bomb plot. An IED obtained in April 50

2012 by an intelligence asset within AQAP , and subsequently studied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was, according to US officials, similar to devices used by AQAP in the Arabian Peninsula, and appeared to be an upgraded version of the IED employed during the attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253.

The intelligence asset in question, thought to be a British citizen of Saudi origin, 52

was tasked by AQAP with using the aforementioned IED to attack a US-bound aircraft.

These brazen attempts demonstrate the increasing determination of AQAP not only to carry out attacks beyond Yemen’s borders, but to ‘spectacularly’ strike populated hubs in the countries towards which they are most hostile.

In addition, AQ’s members and donors have developed relationships with other Takfiri

Home Office (2011). Prevent Strategy. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p7.

Al-Awlaki was killed in his vehicle in Yemen by a Hellfire missile launched from a CIA drone. Blitz, J & Green, M. (2011) CIA drone kills ‘most dangerous’ al-Qaeda cleric. Available: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/48305e6e-eb42-11e0-adbf-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Zhzj5shV. Last accessed 30th September 2011. 49

BBC News (2010). Profile: Anwar al-Awlaki. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11658920. Last accessed 8th August 2011. 50

MacAskill, E. and Norton-Taylor, R. (2012). Agent in underwear bomb plot 'was British' . Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/11/underwear-bomber-agent-british-al-qaida?INTCMP=SRCH. Last accessed 14th May 2012. 51

Sanchez, R. (2012). Al-Qaeda underwear bomb plot proof of 'perverse' lengths they will go to. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/9251498/Al-Qaeda-underwear-bomb-plot-proof-of-perverselengths-they-will-go-to.html. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 52

BBC News (2010). Profile: Anwar al-Awlaki. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11658920. Last accessed 8th August 2011.

groups, such as al-Shabaab (AS) in the Horn of Africa.

This is further demonstrated by the reduced

proportion of ‘priority’ plots and leads that the Security Service investigates in the UK, where those linked to ‘core’ AQ in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre dropped from 75% in 2008/2009 to 50% in 2011.

A recent strategy of AQ has been to hijack independence movements in states in order to achieve sympathy, and to obtain funding and training facilities as seen in Nigeria and Mali. Additionally, in April 2012, AQ threatened that it would carry out attacks in Britain if the radical cleric Abu Qatada is successfully deported to Jordan. This demonstrates that AQ is still willing to attack the UK.

AQIM Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged in response to the Algerian Government’s effective counter-terrorism efforts following Algeria’s civil war of the 1990s. Following the successful dismantling and reintegration of the Algerian Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the remnants of radical Islamist groups in Algeria sought greater transnational co-operation in the Maghreb, Europe and the Sahara-Sahel Region. This resulted in the resurrection, in January 2007, of the GSPC as AQIM, following the September 2006 announcement that GSPC had joined al-Qa’ida (AQ) to “lead the fight in the Maghreb”. Despite this, AQIM, together with significant presences in Algeria and Mauritania, which are within the Maghreb, also operates in the Sahel states of Mali, Niger and Chad.

In spite of significant Algerian military pressure, AQIM is still based in Algeria’s Tizi Ouzou region. AQIM continues to coordinate its activities through a centralised shura council which includes emirs responsible for matters including military affairs, finance, religious propagation, communications and propaganda. Although estimates vary, it is thought that AQIM’s overall strength is approximately 1,000 personnel.

Some analysts argue that it is difficult to accurately assess AQIM’s ideological motivation. However, its propaganda indicates that it intends to rid North Africa and the Sahara of governments that it views as being insufficiently Islamic, together with foreigners, especially French and United States (US) citizens. 54

Hanson, S. (2010). Al-Shabaab. Available: http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650. Last accessed 27th July 2011. 55

Intelligence and Security Committee (2011). Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2010-2011. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p9. 56

Whitehead, T. & Kirkup, J. (2012). Al Qaeda militants warn of terror attack in Britain if Abu Qatada is deported . Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/9216180/Al-Qaeda-militants-warn-of-terrorattack-in-Britain-if-Abu-Qatada-is-deported.html. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 57

Alexander, Y. (2011). 2011 Report Update: The Consequences of Terrorism-An Update on al-Qaeda and other Terrorist Threats in the Sahel & Maghreb. Washington, D.C.: International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. pp2-3. 58

Le Sage, A. (2011). The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. p2.

Individuals held hostage by AQIM and later released have testified that their captors were “wholly committed” to AQIM’s aim of creating an Islamic caliphate encompassing the Muslim lands of Africa and the Middle East.

AQIM utilises several tactics including suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices, kidnapping and assassination. Between February 2003 and April 2011, AQIM and its predecessor the GSPC, executed 31 major operations and caused 253 fatalities. The kidnapping of individuals for ransom is particularly profitable. Estimates indicate this has generated $70 million since 2006.

AQIM’s targets have included African civilians and government officials, together with United Nations (UN) diplomats and Western embassies, together with foreign tourists, aid workers and contractors.

Projections The scope of AQIM’s presence and cross-border activities demonstrates the threat that it constitutes and will continue to pose. For example, although AQIM hostages are usually moved to Mali following their seizure, the kidnapping operations often take place in Tunisia or Niger. Mauritania has experienced several AQIM operations since 2007. The scope of AQIM’s cross-border transnational operations was demonstrated September 2010, when just days after AQIM carried out several kidnappings in Niger, AQIM militants engaged Mauritanian troops 1,200 kilometres west of the location of these events. Mauritanian forces then pursued a mobile AQIM convoy into northern Mali.

More recently, large numbers of AQIM supporters have entered northern Mali in the wake of the spring 2012 Tuareg Rebellion, with the aim of establishing an Islamic state.

AQIM may be willing to attack

targets in Africa outside its usual areas of activity, thus demonstrating a potential expansion in the geographic scope of the threat it poses. This could be especially true of targets thought to be symbolic of

Tisdall, S. (2011). Al-Qaida offshoot hopes to turn Africa's Sahel region into a 'new Somalia'. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/08/al-qaida-maghreb-sahel-new-somalia. Last accessed 8th January 2012. 60

Göita, M. (2011). West Africa's Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM's Sahelian Strategy. Africa Security Brief. 11 (11). p4. 61

Le Sage, A (2011). The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University p1. 62

Göita, M. (2011). West Africa's Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM's Sahelian Strategy. Africa Security Brief. 11 (11). p1. 63

Meo, N. (2012). Triumphant Tuareg rebels fall out over al-Qaeda's jihad in Mali . Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/9191760/Triumphant-Tuareg-rebels-fall-outover-al-Qaedas-jihad-in-Mali.html. Last accessed 8th May 2012.

the US or Western European countries. For example, in April 2010, an AQIM posting on a jihadi website threatened an attack on the US-England football match during the FIFA World Cup in South Africa.

The potential threat that AQIM poses to Europe should also be acknowledged. AQIM continues to threaten attacks on Western countries, especially France and Spain. then-President of France, declared war on AQIM.

In July 2010, Nicolas Sarkozy,

The latter retaliated by declaring war on France, which

supports partner states confronting AQIM in the Maghreb and Sahel. AQIM and AQ’s senior leadership have declared their intention to restore al-Andalus, the historically Muslim area of the Iberian Peninsula.

AQIM may have facilitation networks in Europe, as a number of these were maintained by its predecessor organisation, the GSPC. Therefore, support networks for AQIM operations in Europe might already exist. Although the 2012 Olympic Games are taking place in the UK, whereas AQIM’s main European targets are France and Spain, the possibility of an AQIM attack in the UK during the Olympic period cannot be ruled out. AQIM is thought to have facilitation networks in Europe, and may take this opportunity to gain media exposure. This possibility of an attack on a major sporting event is credible. As already noted, AQIM threatened to attack the US-UK football match during the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa.

Arc of Instability According to a report titled The Consequences of Terrorism - An Update on al-Qaeda and other Terrorist Threats in the Sahel and Maghreb, published by the International Centre for Terrorism Studies in January 2011, an ‘Arc of Instability’ exists across much of the ungoverned space of northern and eastern Africa.

Beginning in the west of the continent, this theoretical arc incorporates parts of Mauritania, Algeria, Mali and Niger, all of which contain AQIM bases, before crossing Chad and Sudan, in which AQIM and AQ are

The Guardian (2010). Al-Qaida threatens to target England-USA match at World Cup. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/apr/10/al-qaida-england-usa-world-cup. Last accessed 15th April 2010. 65

Le Sage, A (2011). The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. p5. 66

France 24 (2010). French PM declares 'war' on al Qaeda after hostage killed. Available: http://www.france24.com/en/20100727-french-pm-fillon-war-al-qaeda-killing-hostage-germaneau-north-africa. Last accessed 1st Aug 2010. 67

The Telegraph (2010). Jonathan Evans' terrorism speech. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8008252/Jonathan-Evans-terrorism-speech.html. Last accessed 18th Sep 2010. 68

Alexander, Y. (2011). 2011 Report Update: The Consequences of Terrorism-An Update on al-Qaeda and other Terrorist Threats in the Sahel & Maghreb. Available: http://www.potomacinstitute.org/attachments/863_2011%20REPORT%20UPDATE%20Maghreb%20%20Sahel%20T errorism.pdf. Last accessed 8th May 2012.

active.

The ‘Arc of Instability’ then crosses Ethiopia before terminating in Somalia, which is the main

operational area for al-Shabaab, another AQ affiliate.

Al-Shabaab Al-Shabaab (AS) is a violent extremist group based in Somalia with a significant number of individual members linked to AQ. Afghanistan.

Many senior AS leaders are believed to have trained and fought with AQ in

Law enforcement and open source intelligence reports suggest that some members of the

Somali community in the UK may be travelling to Somalia

to participate in the Jihad .

The AS movement appears to be using AQ’s Internet recruitment and propaganda tactics to target both Somali and English-speaking members of the Somali community in the UK.

It is also possible that AS

members or sympathisers may be attempting to radicalise individuals in European countries that have large Somali populations.

Even though AS may be locked in conflict with the Somali Government (where the latter has international 76

allies and support from tribes within Somalia) , they have allegedly increased their collaboration with other Jihadist

69 70

groups since the Arab Spring.

Ibid. Ibid.

Hanson, S. (2010). Al-Shabaab. Available: http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650. Last accessed 27th July 2011. 72

Harnisch, C. (2010). The Terror Threat from Somalia: The Internationalization of Al-Shabaab. Available: http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/CTP_Terror_Threat_From_Somalia_Shabaab_Int ernationalization.pdf. Last accessed 28th July 2011. 73

Security Service: MI5 (2011). The trajectory of the threat. Available: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/the-trajectoryof-the-threat.html. Last accessed 27th July 2011. 74

A Jihad is a holy war that is waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty; and, a personal struggle in devotion to Islam especially involving spiritual discipline. Merriam-Webster (2011). Jihad. Available: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jihad. Last accessed 8th August 2011. 75

Goodman, A. (2011). How Al Shabaab Recruited 40 Americans Since 2007. Available: http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/07/27/how-al-shabaab-recruited-40-americans-since-2007/. Last accessed 27th July 2011. 76

International Crisis Group (2010). Somalia's Divided Islamists. Available: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/B74%20Somalias%20Divided%20Islamists.pdf. Last accessed 27th July 2011. 77

A Jihadist is a Muslim who advocates or participates in a Jihad. Merriam-Webster (2011). Jihadist. Available: http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/jihadist?show=0&t=1312794715. Last accessed 8th August 2011.

Recent developments in the region indicate that it may have forged links with al-Qa’ida. The Royal United Services Institute's (RUSI) February 2012 UK Terrorism Analysis Report suggests that a quarter of foreign fighters with the Somali extremist group al-Shabaab are British and could go on to use their experience in the UK or in Europe.

David Cameron has stated that the terror threat emanating from the Horn of Africa was “real” and “substantial”.

MI5 have indicated that as many as 40 young British men, mainly of Somali descent, are

fighting alongside al-Shabaab, and that it is carrying out operations against UN-backed troops in the country.

Furthermore, up to 60 other young British passport holders may have returned to London after

passing through training camps in the south-west of Somalia.

Last year Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, al-Qa’ida's senior commander in East Africa, was killed at a 83

Mogadishu roadblock.

On his laptop were plots to target a famous London hotel and a landmark British

department store. Evidence indicates that Fazul had been recruiting militants with EU passport.

A British fighter with al-Shabaab was also killed in April 2012 during a drone attack in the capital Mogadishu.

The activities of militant groups and pirates operating off the coast of Somalia pose a direct

threat to British interests in the region and to both regional and global security. 78

Quilliam Foundation (2011). Briefing Paper: Somalia and Yemen - Al Shabaab's Widening Ambitions. Available: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/shabaab14july11.pdf. Last accessed 26th July 2011. Available: http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/CTP_Terror_Threat_From_Somalia_Shabaab_Int ernationalization.pdf. Last accessed 28th July 2011. 79

The Royal United Services Institute (2012). Counter-Terrorism in an Olympic Year It Will Get Better Before It Gets Worse. Available: http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/UKTA1.pdf. Last accessed 1st March 2012. 80

McElroy, D. (2012). Britain to spend £20 million on new rapid reaction force for Somalia.Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/9096795/Britain-to-spend-20-million-onnew-rapid-reaction-force-for-Somalia.html. Last accessed 23rd Feb 2012. 81

Hopkins, N. & Norton-Taylor, R. (2012). Al-Shabaab: the Somali militant group recruiting young Britons to its ranks. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/21/al-shabaab-somali-militant-recruiting. Last accessed 23rd Feb 2012. 82

Burleigh, M. & Rainey, S. (2012). The 7/7 widow and a boom in British jihad. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/9118784/The-77-widow-and-a-boom-inBritish-jihad.html. Last accessed 4th March 2012. 83

The Guardian (2011). Fazul Abdullah Mohammed's death celebrated in Kenya and Somalia. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/12/fazul-abdullah-mohammed-death-celebrated. Last accessed 15th June 2011. 84

The Independent (2011). Warning of 'lone terrorist' threat. Available: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/warning-of-lone-terrorist-threat-2302970.html. Last accessed 28th June 2011. 85

Tozer, J. & Gladdis, K. (2012). British links of Al Qaeda chiefs killed by drones on Pakistan border Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2089259/British-al-Qaeda-fighter-killed-drone-missile-strike-Pakistanborder.ht. Available: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2089259/British-al-Qaeda-fighter-killed-drone-missilestrike-Pakistan-border.html. Last accessed 25th Jan 2012.

Projections

Intelligence experts believe the British volunteers form the core of an international force of foreign fighters drawn from the United States, Canada, Europe and East Africa. Government officials now fear that the failed state is rapidly becoming a recruiting ground for British Jihadists in much the same way as Afghanistan was in the 1990s.

MI5 already ranks Somalia as one of the top three countries in the world,

alongside Yemen and Pakistan that pose a potential terrorist threat to Britain.

The Security Service fears that British volunteers who survive the civil war may return home as well trained terrorists eager to launch attacks against the UK.

Also, Al-Shabaab has managed to generate

tens of thousands of pounds in funding through the UK-based Somali population which is estimated at 250,000.

Although experts believe that al-Shabaab currently lacks the capability of launching an attack in the UK, the organisation, whose name means the young men, has a history of attacking sporting events. In 2010, it was blamed for a bomb attack in Uganda that killed 76 people watching a World Cup mounted as revenge for Uganda contributing troops to the African Union force in Somalia.

The Government is particularly concerned about the possibility of terrorism during this summer’s London Olympics, much of which will take place in East End districts where large numbers of Britain’s Somali community are based. It is understood that MI5 and the police have been contacted by concerned parents of young Muslim men who they suspect of being recruited by al-Shabaab.

If AS experiences operational success and receives sufficient financial support; the most likely impact for the UK involves the radicalisation and foreign training of Somali-born British residents for attacks in the Horn of Africa. However, it is also possible that AS could: 

Inspire home-grown threats for attacks against soft, populated targets such as large transport hubs in major cities;

Rayment, S. & Freeman, C. (2012). British Muslims recruited to fight for 'al-Qaeda' in Somalia. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/9090606/British-Muslims-recruited-to-fightfor-al-Qaeda-in-Somalia.html. Last accessed 21st March 2012. 87

Ibid. Ibid.

BBC News (2012). Q&A: Who are Somalia's al-Shabab?. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa15336689. Last accessed 25th Feb 2012.



Ensure that radicalised Britons, having been trained in Somalia, carry out a ‘spectacular’ domestic attack.

Al-Shabaab may be prepared to attack increasingly high-profile locations and individuals, as demonstrated by its April 2012 suicide bombing in Mogadishu which killed the head of the Somalia’s Olympic committee, together with its football chief. Moreover, the fact that AS carried out a suicide bombing against a crowd watching the 2010 World Cup Final on a public viewing screen in the Ugandan capital Kampala, could motivate UK-based AS sympathisers or veterans to attempt an attack against a similar target during the 2012 Olympics.

Domestic Terrorism Irish Dissident Threat Statistics released by the ISC

and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)

indicate a general

increase in activity by Irish Dissidents since between 2008 and 2011, with a reduction in operations during 93

the April 2011-February 2012 period . Despite this apparent decline in activity, the fact that the number of Dissident Republican terrorist incidents is still significantly higher than it was as recently as 2009, indicates that a genuine threat continues to exist.

During the year ending March 2011, according to the Police Service of Northern Ireland, 99 viable IEDs were detonated, or diffused by Army experts.

During the same period, 188 individuals were arrested

under the Terrorism Act, compared with 169 during the previous year, and the number charged under the Act rose from 36 to 40.

Additionally, during the March 2010-March 2011 period, 72 shooting incidents ,

Intelligence and Security Committee (2011). Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2010-2011. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p10. 92

Graham, I . (2011). Bomb attacks double in Northern Ireland . Available: http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombattacks-double-in-northern-ireland/. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 93

Police Service of Northern Ireland. (2012). Security Situation Statistics Monthly Update: Covering the reporting period 1st April 2011-29th February 2012; Statistics by Police District, Area and Region. Available: http://www.psni.police.uk/de/security_situation_statistics_-_by_district_and_area__april_2011_-_february_2012.pdf. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 94

Graham, I . (2011). Bomb attacks double in Northern Ireland . Available: http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombattacks-double-in-northern-ireland/. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 95 96

Ibid. Ibid.

including the terrorism-related use of firearms by security personnel , and 81 paramilitary-style attacks 98

took place . These statistics compare with 22 individual dissident attacks in 2009 and 15 in 2008.

Projections

Taken at face value, statistics released by the PSNI for the period April 2011 to February 2012, indicate that the Irish Dissident threat may be in limited decline. For example, during this period, the number of IEDs deployed by dissident Republicans fell to 53

100

, compared with 99 during the previous year

the number of terrorism and paramilitary-related shooting incidents fell to 60

101

. Also,

102

, compared to 72

103

Despite this, the threat posed by Dissident Irish Republicans remains genuine, as demonstrated by the number of individual incidents during the April 2011-February 2012 period.

The Northern Ireland related threat levels published in May 2012 judged the threat to Northern Ireland itself to be “SEVERE”

104

and highlighted that the threat to the rest of the UK had been raised to

“SUBSTANTIAL”. At the end of April 2012, a fully-primed 600-pound IED, was found in Newry, Northern Ireland.

105

Therefore, the threat has changed from being purely Islamist extremist-based, to one that includes a diverse range of groups and factions. In the ISC Annual Report 2010/2011, the Committee cast doubt on

Police Service of Northern Ireland. (2011). Security Situation Statistics - by District: Financial Year: 1 April 2010-31 March 2011. Available: http://www.psni.police.uk/security_situation_statistics_-_district_breakdown_201011.pdf. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 98

Graham, I . (2011). Bomb attacks double in Northern Ireland . Available: http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombattacks-double-in-northern-ireland/. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 99

Intelligence and Security Committee (2011). Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2010-2011. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p10. 100 Police Service of Northern Ireland (2012). Security Situation Statistics Monthly Update: Covering the reporting period 1st April 2011-29th February 2012; Statistics by Police District, Area and Region. Available: http://www.psni.police.uk/de/security_situation_statistics_-_by_district_and_area__april_2011_-_february_2012.pdf. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 101

Graham, I . (2011). Bomb attacks double in Northern Ireland . Available: http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombattacks-double-in-northern-ireland/. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 102

Graham, I . (2011). Bomb attacks double in Northern Ireland . Available: http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombattacks-double-in-northern-ireland/. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 104

Security Service: MI5 . (2012). Threat Levels. Available: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/threat-levels.html. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 105

BBC News (2012). Newry bomb had 600 pounds of explosives and was fully primed . Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-17877896. Last accessed 8th May 2012.

whether the Security Service would be able to manage the re-emerging threat of terrorism in Northern Ireland without losing cover elsewhere.

106

Threat to the Olympic Torch Relay The main Diamond Jubilee celebrations will take place from Saturday 2 June until Tuesday 5 June, yet from Sunday 3 June onwards

107

the Olympic Torch will be carried around Northern Ireland’s most recently

volatile areas. 

On Sunday 3 June, during the Thames Diamond Jubilee Pageant

108

, the Olympic Torch will be

carried through Belfast, where a bomb attempt was thwarted by police in the city’s busy shopping centre in October 2011. 

109

On Monday 4 June, when the Diamond Jubilee Concert is held and 2,012 Jubilee beacons are lit across the UK

110

, the Torch will pass through Londonderry, where, as recently as January 2012, a

coordinated bomb attack struck two parts of the city (including a tourist centre) within ten minutes. 

111

On Tuesday 5 June, during the Diamond Jubilee Service of Thanksgiving and formal Carriage Procession by the Queen

112

, the Olympic Torch will pass through Omagh, known not only as the

town which suffered the most deadly attack during the Troubles, but one which returned to the headlines when Police Officer Ronan Kerr was killed by a car bomb last April.

113

106

Intelligence and Security Committee (2011). Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2010-2011. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p27. 107

BBC News (2012). The Diamond Jubilee: Events calendar. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16598483. Last accessed 23rd March 2012. 108

Ibid.

109

The Australian (2011). Army defuses bomb in centre of Belfast.Available: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/breaking-news-old/army-defuses-bomb-in-centre-of-belfast/story-fn3dxity1226155323233. Last accessed 25th November 2011. 110

BBC News (2012). The Diamond Jubilee: Events calendar. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16598483. Last accessed 23rd March 2012. 111

UTV (2012). NI leaders condemn Derry bombs. Available: http://www.u.tv/News/Derry-bombscondemned/d5fc18ac-1e8b-4fa8-954a-4b19270fb22a. Last accessed 15TH Feb 2012. 112

BBC News (2012). The Diamond Jubilee: Events calendar. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16598483. Last accessed 23rd March 2012. 113

Daily Mail (2011). Face of the rookie police man killed by Omagh car bomb just weeks after graduating Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1372698/Catholic-police-officer-Ronan-Kerr-killed-Omagh-car-bomb.

Even without the Torch procession passing through Northern Ireland during the Diamond Jubilee, national law enforcement agencies face enormous security challenges as various groups have shown a keen interest in disrupting events. Campaign group Republic has announced details of “the biggest and boldest anti-monarchy protest in modern times” at the Thames Diamond Jubilee Pageant. The protest will be held on the afternoon of Sunday 3 June when a flotilla of up to 1,000 boats, headed by the Queen and senior politicians, is due to travel along the Thames between Putney and Tower Bridge. It is intended that the protest will “greet” the flotilla as it passes through Central London.

114

The Olympic Torch will proceed through areas targeted by terrorists in recent months during three of the four days of the Diamond Jubilee, which we believe to be the result of highly irresponsible planning.

115

The threat by any IRA splinter group could also manifest itself through a ‘lone wolf’ attack.

Home-grown Islamist Extremism Autonomous, home-grown cells that derive their motivation primarily from radical and inaccurate interpretations of Islam have become increasingly prevalent in the UK and the rest of Europe, and have demonstrated that a few committed individuals can inflict large numbers of casualties despite disproportionately minimal resources. The overall cost of carrying out the 7/7 attacks, which included overseas trips, bomb-making equipment, accommodation rent, car hire and UK travel, was estimated to be less than £8,000.

116

‘Lone Wolf’ Threat As with the members of any given terrorist group, so-called ‘lone wolf’ perpetrators are motivated by a variety of reasons, including their adherence to particular social, political or religious causes. Susceptible individuals may not be formally affiliated with radical groups, but can be inspired through the Internet, particularly via social media websites. ‘Lone wolves’ can exist in interconnected groups, even if they are only virtual networks. However, ‘lone wolves’ can be the most difficult terrorists to identify and disrupt as

Available: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1372698/Catholic-police-officer-Ronan-Kerr-killed-Omagh-carbomb-weeks-graduating.html. Last accessed 15th June 2011. 114

Davies, C. (2012). Queen launches diamond jubilee tour in multicultural Leicester . Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/mar/08/queen-diamond-jubilee-tour-leicester1. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 115

Pogatchnik, S. (2012). Experts: IRA dissidents could crash Olympics party. Available: http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-04/D9U625K01.htm. Last accessed 20th April 2012. 116 House of Commons (2006).Report of the Official Account of the London Bombings on 7th July 2005. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 23

they may leave a less conspicuous ‘digital footprint’. No suspicious planning or reconnaissance meetings are arranged, and there is a far greater reliance on the general public to report the suspicious behaviour of one individual.

The May 2008 bombing attempt in Exeter by Nicky Reilly

117

underscored the fact that, to an extent at

least, ‘lone wolf’ attackers are becoming more indiscriminate in their targeting. Strategy further highlights the dangers of ‘lone wolf’ terrorism.

119

118

The revised Prevent

In 2010, Terence Gavan, an extreme

right-wing ideologue, was jailed for assembling one of the largest arms cachés found in the UK in recent years.

120

In March 2012, a series of three gun attacks targeted French soldiers as well as civilians with Jewish religious beliefs, in Montauban and Toulouse. In total, seven people were murdered, and five others were injured. These attacks led to severe unease among the population of South-West France. The perpetrator, Mohammed Merah, who was self-radicalised, was shot and killed in a gunfight with police.

121

Merah’s motivation was to attack the French Army for its involvement in the war in Afghanistan and to avenge the recent deaths of Palestinian children killed by Israeli forces in Gaza and the West Bank.

122

His

actions arguably differed from those of other recent ‘lone wolf’ terrorists such as Anders Breivik, in that they took the form of a protracted campaign, rather than a single or limited number of attacks carried out during a single day. Mohammed Merah’s modus operandi of using a scooter to rapidly arrive at and leave the scenes of his crimes unchallenged by security forces

123

, could prove attractive to certain attackers, due the anticipated

traffic congestion in Greater London during the Olympic period. The use of a scooter by a ‘lone wolf’ terrorist in these circumstances would aid their mobility as well as making them more difficult to pursue, stop and apprehend. As this could be a vehicle of choice, the police must consider how its emergency response would work amongst Olympics-related traffic and gridlock. 117

Nicky Reilly was a vulnerable Muslim convert with Asperger’s syndrome. He was directed online to build nail bombs, which he attempted to detonate at the Giraffe restaurant in Exeter in May 2009. Fresco, A. (2009).Nicky Reilly, Muslim convert, jailed for 18 years for Exeter bomb attack. Available: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article5619151.ece. Last accessed 26th July 2011. 118 119

Ibid. HM Government (2011).Prevent Strategy. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p15.

120

Roberts, L. (2010). 'Lone wolf' BNP member jailed for 11 years for building up explosives arsenal. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/bnp/6996980/Lone-wolf-BNP-member-jailed-for-11-years-for-building-upexplosives-arsenal.html. Last accessed 26th July 2011. 121

BBC News (2012). Obituary: Toulouse gunman Mohamed Merah.Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldeurope-17456541. Last accessed 23rd March 2012. 122 123

Ibid. Ibid.

Merah is also clearly quite distinct from some others who have been recently referred to as ‘lone wolf’ Islamist terrorists. He is different from British student Roshonara Choudhry, who tried to stab a member of Parliament for supporting the Iraq War.

124

He is also different from Arid Uka, the 21-year-

old Kosovar living in Germany who shot two American servicemen as they waited at Frankfurt Airport in revenge for what he believed American soldiers were doing in Afghanistan.

125

In both of those

cases, the individuals involved were not particularly connected to any radical group (except through the Internet), but chose to carry out their acts of political violence by themselves, aiming at targets they thought would be justified. Merah’s attacks demonstrate that intelligence services must do all they can to optimise their abilities to investigate figures of potential interest at the periphery of terrorist networks. Previously, they would have been able to focus on the core, and leave the more fragmentary elements of the network on a longer leash. But with the growing instance of individuals like Merah, and their increasing lethality, it will have to be reconsidered which individuals are of concern. This year’s attacks by Mohammed Merah in Toulouse and Montauban, together with the strikes carried out by Anders Breivik in July 2011, have demonstrated how imminent the threat from these microactors is. They work as small, autonomous cells and may utilise advanced technology including the Internet and satellite communications. However, there may be an increasing number of failed attacks resulting from a lack of skill or faulty equipment as demonstrated by the 21st July 2005 (21/7) London bombing attempts.

126

Projections The threat from ‘lone wolf’ extremists is more difficult to assess, given their spontaneous nature. Just as the 2006 ISC report into 7/7 suggested that all Government departments and law enforcement agencies need to have a common understanding of radicalisation, the 22/7 attacks in Norway have demonstrated that this must be a priority in relation to ‘lone wolf’ threats.

127

124

Dodd, V. (2010). Profile: Roshonara Choudhry. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/nov/02/profileroshonara-choudhry-stephen-timms. Last accessed 20th March 2012. 125

MSNBC (2012). US airmen's killer gets life sentence in Germany.Available: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46340478/ns/world_news-europe/t/us-airmens-killer-gets-life-sentencegermany/#.T6ksnOjSp5Y. Last accessed 15th March 2012. 126

Borland, S. (2008). July 21 bombers launch appeal . Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1580766/July-21-bombers-launch-appeal.html. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 127

Intelligence and Security Committee (2006).Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 30. Government Communications Headquarters (2009). GCHQ to host UK Cyber Security Operations Centre. Available: http://www.gchq.gov.uk/press/csoc_newsitem.html. Last accessed 27th July 2011.

We assess that the threat from small terrorist groups or ‘lone wolf’ terrorists will increase in frequency due to the decentralised nature of the radical Islamist movement.

128

US President Barack Obama has stated

that a ‘lone wolf’ terror attack in the USA is more likely than a major coordinated effort like the September 129

11 attacks.

Therefore, there may be an increase in the likelihood of attacks, whether indiscriminately

against members of the public or upon prominent individuals, such as the stabbing of Stephen Timms MP.

130

However, one of the more vulnerable areas for a ‘lone wolf’ and a possible opportunity for law enforcement detection and intervention is during the acquisition of training and skills necessary for successful attacks. In the light of 22/7, other extremists might have considered the difference in fatality numbers between the two types of weaponry utilised by Anders Breivik, and therefore might opt for firearms instead of IEDs. Moreover, firearms are easier to operate than IEDs, and are less likely to malfunction.

131

As a result, future terrorist attacks are likely to involve more use of firearms than has been

seen previously.

Far-Right Extremism Although far-right extremists can be found in different groups across the UK, such as the English Defence League (EDL)

132

, there is little to distinguish between them.

English Defence League

The English Defence League (EDL) has staged a series of street demonstrations since it was formed in 2009, many of which have led to violence and disorder. However, the EDL publicly maintains that it is a

128

Critical Threats (2011). Pakistan Security Brief - July 27, 2011. Available: http://www.criticalthreats.org/pakistansecurity-brief/pakistan-security-brief-july-27-2011. Last accessed 27th July 2011. 129

MacInnis, L. (2011). Obama says "lone wolf terrorist" biggest U.S. threat. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/16/us-usa-obama-security-idUSTRE77F6XI20110816. Last accessed 22nd August 2011. 130

BBC News (2010). Student guilty of attempted murder of MP Stephen Timms. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-11673616. Last accessed 28th July 2011. 131

BBC News (2011). Timeline: How Norway's terror attacks unfolded. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldeurope-14260297. Last accessed 29th July 2011. 132

Taylor, M. (2010). English Defence League: new wave of extremists plotting summer of unrest. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/may/28/english-defence-league-protest-bnp.

peaceful protest group which only opposes ‘militant Islam’. 25,000.

133

EDL membership is estimated to be around

134

In spite of its name, the influence of the EDL extends beyond England itself. Far-right activists from across Europe (including France, Sweden and Denmark) joined thousands of EDL supporters to demonstrate in Luton, in February 2011.

135

The EDL also has a pragmatic strategy to reach out to any demographic

group, including the Sikh and Jewish communities, who may share an historical animosity towards Muslims.

136

During the August 2011 England Riots, this organisation attempted to portray itself as the protector of local communities principally in Eltham and Enfield, in order to generate support. Instead, during their demonstrations, riot police were hit with missiles, and over 1,000 officers were embroiled in the disorder.

137

Projections

At present, the threat posed by right-wing extremism in the UK is more likely to manifest itself through civil disorder, as opposed to direct terrorist acts. However, the possibility of terrorist actions by far-right extremists represents a genuine threat which should not be ignored.

Anarchist Extremists Anarchist Extremists (AE) adhere to the anti-government movement which rejects the rule of authority and advocates violent means to overthrow established social, political and economic hierarchies.

138

The AE

133

English Defence League (2011). Mission Statement. Available:http://englishdefenceleague.org/about-us/missionstatement/. Last accessed 16th August 2011. 134

RT (2012). Breeding Breiviks? Europe, US ‘at risk’ of anti-Islam massacre. Available: http://rt.com/news/breiviktrial-england-extremist-920/. Last accessed 26th April 2012. 135 Taylor, M & Davis, R. (2011). EDL protest attracts European far-right activists. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/feb/04/edl-rally-european-far-right. Last accessed 16th August 2011. 136

Copsey, N. (2010). The English Defence League: Challenging Our Country and Our Values of Social Inclusion, Fairness and Equality. Available: http://faith-matters.org/images/stories/fm-reports/english-defense-league-report.pdf. Last accessed 16th August 2011. 137

Hough, A. et al (2011). London riots: vigilantes hurl bottles at police in Eltham. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8694472/London-riots-vigilantes-hurl-bottles-at-police-in-Eltham.html. Last accessed 16th August 2011. 138

Federal Bureau of Investigation (2010). Domestic Terrorism Anarchist Extremism: A Primer. Available: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/november/anarchist_111610/anarchist_111610. Last accessed 28th July 2011.

threat was exposed by successful police operations during the Royal Wedding of April 2011 with the attack on Prince Charles’ car during the student protests of December 2010

139

140

, together

and other

separate incidents.

Projections

Due to the continued economic crisis and the high number of unemployed youth, the tendency for disaffected individuals to join such illicit groups may increase. Links between British AE groups and affiliated organisations in Europe could strengthen (as demonstrated by protests at economic summits, notably those in Athens 2011

141

) as governments implement tighter austerity measures. The expansion

and development of such groups would lead to increased social unrest as demonstrated by the 2010 student protests in Central London.

142

There is a danger that peaceful protests may be hijacked more frequently by Anarchist Extremists, such as during the 2010 student protests and as demonstrated by ‘black bloc’ actions, Trades Union Congress’ peaceful anti-cuts protest of March 2011.

143

which undermined the

144

Cyber-Terrorism Cyber-terrorism can be defined as extremist indoctrination, violence, destruction, or disruption of online services through the use of Information Technology (IT) systems. The intended purpose of this is to create

139

Hughes, M. (2011). Royal wedding: masked anarchists thwarted by police. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/royal-wedding/8483761/Royal-wedding-masked-anarchists-thwarted-bypolice.html. Last accessed 28th July 2011. 140

BBC News (2010). When aggression overtakes the rhetoric. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/london/hi/people_and_places/newsid_9277000/9277389.stm. Last accessed 28th July 2011. 141

Mail Online (2011). Streets of fire: Protesters set policeman alight as riots erupt in Athens. Available: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1359891/Athens-riots-erupts-Greek-protesters-set-policemen-fire.html#ixzz1. Last accessed 28th July 2011. 142

Coughlan, S. (2011).Student tuition fee protest ends with 153 arrests. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-11877034. Last accessed 26th July 2011. 143

The ‘black bloc’ is not the name of an organisation, but a tactic whereby individual anonymity is maintained with scarves, hoods etcetera whilst aiming to display a show of unity by carrying out their anonymous actions en masse. Young, D. (2001). Autonomia and the Origin of the Black Bloc. Available: http://www.ainfos.ca/01/jun/ainfos00170.html. Last accessed 2nd September 2011. 144

LibCom (2011). Black Bloc interview: 'Only actions count now'. Available: http://libcom.org/forums/news/blackbloc-only-actions-count-now-31032011. Last accessed 8th August 2011.

fear, by causing confusion and uncertainty within a given nation state, with the goal of influencing a government or population to conform to a particular political, social or ideological agenda. Examples of cyber-terrorism include hacking into computer systems 147

networks

, website defacing ‘denial of service’ attacks

communication

145

146

, introducing viruses to vulnerable

148

, or terrorist threats made via electronic

149

The ISC Annual Report 2010/2011 stated that the Internet is an ideal environment for ideological and political extremists and has been described as a “virtual extremist madrassa”.

150

The Dutch General

Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) has described the Internet as the “turbocharger of radicalisation”

151

since it offers an efficient means of disseminating extremist propaganda and technical

knowledge.

The revised CONTEST Strategy

152

(released in July 2011) has indicated that the trend of increased

reliance on cloud computing and greater usage of social networks presents an altogether changed landscape, to which law enforcement agencies must quickly adapt, in order to effectively monitor and disrupt the dissemination of terrorist material.

153

Hostile attacks upon UK cyber-space can be carried out

by governments, non-state actors, criminals or terrorists.

154

145

Baranetsky, V. (2009). What is cyberterrorism? Even experts can't agree. Available: http://www.hlrecord.org/news/what-is-cyberterrorism-even-experts-can-t-agree-1.861186. Last accessed 26th July 2011. 146

Almeida, A. (2011). Pakistan Cyber Army Hacks into BSNL. Available: http://tech2.in.com/news/general/pakistancyber-army-hacks-into-bsnl/232572. Last accessed 27th July 2011. 147

HM Government (2011). CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy For Countering Terrorism. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p34. 148

Almeida, A. (2011). Pakistan Cyber Army Hacks into BSNL. Available: http://tech2.in.com/news/general/pakistancyber-army-hacks-into-bsnl/232572. Last accessed 27th July 2011. 149

Gavin, R. (2011). Terror threat brings prison time. Available: http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Terror-threatbrings-prison-time-1615542.php. Last accessed 28th July 2011. 150

Intelligence and Security Committee (2011). Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2010-2011. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p54. 151

Ibid.

152

The ‘CONTEST’ counter-terrorism strategy is based upon four key work streams, known as the ‘four Ps’: Prevent stops individuals from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism in the first place; Pursue acts to frustrate terrorist attacks within the short term through apprehending suspects; Protect involves the physical strengthening of potential terrorist targets; and, Prepare aims to mitigate the effects of any attacks that do occur. Omand, D. (2010). Securing the State. London: Hurst & Company. pp64-65. 153

HM Government (2011). CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy For Countering Terrorism. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p34. 154

Intelligence and Security Committee (2011). Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2010-2011. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p53.

The world's most widespread cyber-attack to date, carried out between 2006 and 2011, successfully targeted approximately 72 organisations

155

including:



22 government agencies;



13 defence contractors;



Six financial firms;



International institutions, such as the International Olympic Committee.

156

Younes Tsouli (also known as “Irhabi 007”), a hacker from the UK, served as an AQ conduit for two years. He not only hacked American university computers and put out propaganda for the al-Zarqawi-led insurgents in Iraq

157

, but also taught other online Jihadists how to commit cyber-terrorism

158

Cyber-crime techniques are sometimes employed to conduct denial of service attacks linked to economic offences that generate funds to benefit terrorist or extremist groups

159

160

, but are also

. The proportion

of cyber-crime directly or indirectly attributable to terrorists is difficult to determine. However, links have been identified between terrorist groups and criminals that allow terror networks to operate through the use of computer resources

161

to share money laundering techniques

162

and transit routes

163

The extent to which the Government takes the cyber-terrorism threat seriously is demonstrated by the opening of the Cyber-Security Operations Centre in 2009, which is located within Government Communications Headquarters’ (GCHQ) Cheltenham site.

164

155

Alperovitch, D. (2011). Revealed: Operation Shady RAT. Available: http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/whitepapers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf. Last accessed 4th August 2011. 156

Emery, D. (2011). Governments, IOC and UN hit by massive cyber attack. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-14387559. Last accessed 4th August 2011. 157

Corera, G. (2008). The world's most wanted cyber-jihadist. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7191248.stm. Last accessed 26th July 2011. 158

Ibid.

159

Keteyian, A. (2011). "Anonymous" hacker: We can shut your website. Available: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/07/19/eveningnews/main20080814.shtml. Last accessed 28th July 2011. 160

Global Witness (2003). For a Few Dollar$ More: How al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade. Available: http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010304.pdf. Last accessed 28th July 2011. 161

Chargualaf, J. (2008). Terrorism and Cyber-Crime. Available: https://w ww.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-70c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_032db98f-3811-4c77-9048602188f3d947e/display.aspx?rs=enginespage. Last accessed 26th July 2011. 162 163

Ibid. Ibid.

164

Government Communications Headquarters (2009).GCHQ to host UK Cyber Security Operations Centre. Available: http://www.gchq.gov.uk/press/csoc_newsitem.html. Last accessed 27th July 2011.

FBI Director Robert Mueller has cautioned a group of information security professionals that cyber attacks will soon become one of the biggest threats to America’s safety, possibly surpassing the threat level 165

posed by terrorism.

When addressing the cyber threat looming over America’s security establishment, Mueller mentioned the growing technical expertise of groups like al-Qa’ida and Somalia’s al-Shabaab as part of an online threat against the United States. Other parts of that threat include acts of digital espionage by foreign powers as well as “organized criminal syndicates.”

166

Cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism remain a constant threat. In April 2012, the hacking group ‘Anonymous’ carried out a denial of service attack that blocked access to the Home Office website for at least one hour.

167

The attack may have been carried out in protest at a variety of issues including the potential

extradition of alleged hacker Gary McKinnon to the United States.

168

A similar attack has recently been

carried out by an unknown group against the Serious Organised Crime Agency’s website.

169

A leading member of Anonymous also took part in the Occupy Wall Street protests in New York in late 2011.

170

This link potentially raises the spectre of combined cyber attacks and targeted civil disobedience.

The hacking group, ‘Team Poison’, has claimed that one of its members was able to eavesdrop on and record conversations by police counter-terrorism officers staffing the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) anti-terrorist hotline, as a result of being able to bypass obsolete security technology.

171

This followed a

‘phone denial of service’ attack by Team Poison against the MPS anti-terrorism hotline, which resulted in the hotline being ‘bombarded’ with around 700 individual phone calls. The attack was carried out using customised software installed on an overseas server.

172

165

Boone, J. (2012). FBI warns threat of cyber attacks on par with terrorism. Available: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/the-grid/anonymous-fbi-al-qaeda-cyber-war-attacks. Last accessed 3rd March 2012. 166

Ibid.

167

Lusher, A. (2012). Hackers 'shut down' Home Office website . Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/9192699/Hackers-shut-down-Home-Office-website.html. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 168

Ibid.

169

Liebowitz, M. (2012). Hackers Attack UK's SOCA Website. Available: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/47281120/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/hackers-attack-uks-socawebsite/#.T6kfZejfqfU. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 170

eSecurity Planet (2011). Leading Anonymous Hacker Joins Occupy Wall Street Protests . Available: http://www.esecurityplanet.com/hackers/leading-anonymous-hacker-joins-occupy-wall-street-protests.html. Last accessed 15th May 2012. 171

Williams R. (2012). Team Poison hackers claim to have recorded anti-terrorist hotline calls . Available: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/team-poison-hackers-claim-to-have-recorded-antiterrorist-hotline-calls7640090.html. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 172

Ibid.

During the 2008 Olympics, Beijing experienced about 12 million cyber attacks per day.

173

This

demonstrates that events such as the Olympic Games represent high-profile targets for hackers. With the emergence of hacking groups such as Anonymous and Team Poison, the possibility of targeted and destructive cyber-attacks during the 2012 Olympics cannot be ruled out.

173

The Guardian (2012). London Olympic Games at risk of cyber-attack, claims Maude. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/government-computing-network/2012/may/03/london-olympics-maude-cybercrime. Last accessed 8th May 2012.

Civil Disorder The England Riots in August 2011 were not a “one-off” event, as it has been claimed. In the twelve months leading up to those events alone, there were numerous riots involving criminal damage which required a substantial police presence with riot equipment. Lessons should have been learned from these incidents, but were not. A wide range of groups have already announced that they intend to use the Olympics as their stage to raise awareness of their cause. Given the Home Office’s announcement that 20,000 media representative from around the world are expected to attend the Olympic Games

174

, this

would be a opportunity upon which any extreme political group may hope to capitalize.

During the 158th boat race between Oxford and Cambridge University, protester Trenton Oldfield jumped into the water. This was the first occasion on which the race has been disrupted by a swimmer.

175

His

protest demonstrated how difficult it is for security forces to protect widely spread sports events with many spectators. Moreover, his actions guaranteed him extensive national and international media exposure for several days. As a result of his actions, Trenton Oldfield was banned from approaching nearer than 100 metres to the Olympic Torch Relay route until 28 May 2012.

176

This demonstrates that the Olympic Torch

Relay is seen as a potential target for protesters, or other groups seeking media exposure.

The threat of civil disorder is not just posed by far-right affiliated groups, it could also manifest itself through loosely-affiliated groups or individuals. Furthermore, as a result of the current economic climate and the difficulty that many individuals have in finding employment, isolated cases of extreme protest may become more frequent. For example, on 27 April 2012, Mark White, who had failed to obtain a Heavy Goods Vehicle licence, stormed the offices of the training company in question in Tottenham Court Road, London, demanding a refund and threatening to ignite the contents of a number of gas canisters if his wishes were not met.

177

This incident was later resolved peacefully but indicates the desperation felt by

some individuals amid the current economic climate.

174

Association of Chief Police Officers (2011). Policing the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games .Available: http://www.acpo.police.uk/ACPOBusinessAreas/OLYMPICS/Policing%20the%202012%20Olympic%20Games.aspx. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 175

BBC News (2012). Man in court over University Boat Race disruption .Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukengland-london-17812166. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 176

Blake, M. (2012). Boat race swimmer is banned from going within 100m of Olympic torch route by court Available: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2134014/Boat-race-swimmer-banned-going-100m-Olympic-torch-routecourt.html. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 177

Sky News (2012). Central London Siege: Police Arrest Man . Available: http://news.sky.com/home/uknews/article/16217431. Last accessed 8th May 2012.

As a result of this incident, hundreds of people were evacuated from surrounding buildings and the Goodge Street and Warren Street Underground stations were closed.

178

Such a protest during the

Olympic Games would cause severe disruption and uncertainty. Individuals considering mounting a similar protest may attempt to take advantage of the national and global media’s focus on the UK during the Olympic period.

2011 HMIC Reports on Public Disorder Following the student protests which took place during November and December 2010, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) released a report entitled ‘Policing Public Order: An overview and review of progress against the recommendations of Adapting to Protest and Nurturing the British Model of Policing’, in February 2011. This report warned that large numbers of protesters can be rapidly and unpredictably organised and relocate through the use of social media and mobile telephones. Moreover it stated how, “...those responsible for commanding events must plan with this adaptability in mind”.

179

The police response to the August 2011 England Riots demonstrated that the recommendations of the HMIC report had not yet been implemented to an adequate extent. In particular, the February 2011 HMIC report advised the police to consider effectively utilising and monitoring social media in order to prevent any public disorder which may be incited and orchestrated via this media.

Although police forces did utilise social media sites such as Twitter

181

180

182

and Flickr

to distribute the photos

of rioters, it was not used optimally during the riots. Social media could have been used to gauge the mood during the first night of rioting in Tottenham, thereby helping to prevent further public disorder. Instead, rioting subsequently spread across England. Despite HMIC’s original advice in February 2011, social media was not initially utilised effectively by the police in order to pinpoint areas in which rioting or further disorder could be determined as being likely.

178

Ibid. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2011). Policing Public Order: An overview and review of progress against the recommendations of Adapting to Protest and Nurturing the British Model of Policing.London: HMIC. p4. 180 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2011). Policing Public Order: An overview and review of progress against the recommendations of Adapting to Protest and Nurturing the British Model of Policing. London: HMIC. p6. 179

181

Williams, C. (2011). Facebook and Twitter to help police track riots.Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/social-media/8723038/Facebook-and-Twitter-to-help-police-track-riots.html. Last accessed 29th August 2011. 182

Howie, M. (2011). Police release fresh images of riot suspects. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8713624/Police-release-fresh-images-of-riot-suspects.html. Last accessed 29th August 2011.

A second HMIC report, The Rules of Engagement: A Review of the August 2011 Disorders, published in December 2011, recommended the introduction and use of an “all-source” hub where information from local and national sources, together with all types of social media, could be collated and assessed.

183

avoid an overwhelming data input, the introduction of advanced software to analyse trends that could fuel community tensions, together with efficient data management, are essential.

184

The second HMIC report also highlighted the inconsistent nature of police public order training, including unclear definitions regarding the use of force and tactical differences between individual police forces.

185

This report indicated that much of the equipment available to the police during the England Riots was substandard. For example, some vehicles did not have reinforced glass, steel grilles, or ‘run-flat’ tyres that would have allowed them to be driven over broken glass. personnel existed even within individual police forces.

187

186

Variations in protective equipment for police

According to the latter HMIC report, variations in

public order equipment between individual police forces still persist.

188

Despite the first HMIC report, the police were not prepared to prevent crime and destruction of property through early interventions to disrupt those demonstrating clear criminal intent. Furthermore, the ‘human shield’ tactic employed by officers was shown to be woefully ineffective. The HMIC report stated that the police must physically protect and harden potential targets within a protest environment, in order to reduce the opportunities for rioters to attack or damage the sites in question.

189

Police efforts to counter overt criminality during the August 2011 England Riots were initially ineffective. The present command model was demonstrated to be inadequate in responding to fast-moving and complex situations, despite the HMIC, in February 2011, asking whether a more devolved command

183

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2011). The Rules of Engagement: A review of the August 2011 disorders. London: HMIC. pp6-7. 184

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2011). The Rules of Engagement: A review of the August 2011 disorders. London: HMIC. p10. 185

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2011). The Rules of Engagement: A review of the August 2011 disorders. London: HMIC. p63. 186

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2011). The Rules of Engagement: A review of the August 2011 disorders. London: HMIC. p7. 187

Ibid.

188

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2011). The Rules of Engagement: A review of the August 2011 disorders. London: HMIC. p44. 189

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2011). Policing Public Order: An overview and review of progress against the recommendations of Adapting to Protest and Nurturing the British Model of Policing. London: HMIC. p9.

structure might allow officers to act with greater speed.

190

In addition, an HMIC review of 45 police forces

carried out in September 2009 indicated that fewer than 60% had tested their mobilisation plans during exercises. This figure remained unchanged as late as December 2010.

191

Public order training courses for Bronze and Silver commanders have taken longer to implement than was practical. The Bronze course was first piloted in September 2009, and the Silver course during the following December. The time taken to establish these new courses for commanders resulted in long periods during which some training centres did not deliver any command training. Other training centres continued to accredit commanders under the old course content.

192

The response to the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) August 2010 request to chief constables that more than 400 existing public order commanders should receive additional training in order to improve their skill-sets has been inadequate. Several of the training courses initiated in response to this request have been cancelled due to limited interest. In addition, less than a third of applicable commanders have so far been reassessed in order to ascertain whether they are still sufficiently able to oversee a police response to public disorder.

193

To successfully counter the ongoing threat of terrorism and effectively coordinate the inter-agency response to terrorist attacks, significant improvements have to be made to the capabilities of UK police forces during and beyond the Olympic Games.

190

Ibid.

Police Strategy Mohammed Merah’s shooting campaign in Toulouse and Montauban suggests that terrorist acts are increasingly being undertaken by ‘micro-actors’ and could therefore be an indication of an evolution in terrorist tactics. These ‘micro-actors’ are a considerable challenge to the law enforcement and intelligence communities. As a result, UK law enforcement and security agencies must be as interconnected as possible, especially during the Olympics when the eyes of the world will be on the UK.

Police engagement with local communities must be commended; however, there are areas which could be improved. There have been some extraordinary instances where the police have been severely criticised in the media. One recent infamous case arose in Birmingham when 150 Automatic Number Plate Recognition surveillance cameras were installed in two of the city's predominantly Muslim areas.

194

However, the initial cause of local concern was the source of funding, which originated from the Prevent counter-terrorism budget.

Operation OVERT highlighted the danger of radicalised extremist elements to the Muslim community. As a direct result, Muslim communities began to actively engage with the police and take ownership of the issue of extremism, which persists in some of these areas.

195

Law enforcement tactics and techniques must be updated to reflect changes in extremist indoctrination and activity. The Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008 demonstrated the effectiveness of an assault using firearms and grenades over the use of IEDs. These guerrilla tactics drew out the attack over several days rather than hours. This comparative effectiveness was clear during the 22/7 attacks in Norway, when Anders Breivik detonated a car bomb near Regjeringskvartalet in Oslo before methodically gunning down and killing 69 people on the island of Utøya.

196

Breivik’s massacre using firearms alone led to over eight

times the number of fatalities than his bomb, which claimed eight victims, and more deaths than all four 7/7 IEDs combined.

This change in terrorist tactics is not limited to attacks in the West. For example, during a recent attack, Taliban militants used IEDs merely breach the fortified perimeter of the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul,

194

Lewis, P. (2010). Surveillance cameras spring up in Muslim areas - the targets? Terrorists. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jun/04/birmingham-surveillance-cameras-muslim-community. Last accessed 29th July 2011. 195

Thornton, S. & Mason, L. (2007). Community Cohesion in High Wycombe: a Case Study of Operation OVERT. Available: http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/57.full. Last accessed 27th July 2011. 196

BBC News (2011). Norway shooting: Funerals for Breivik victims. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldeurope-14336291. Last accessed 5th August 2011.

which was immediately followed by a deadly assault using firearms and grenades.

197

The Taliban’s attack

on the British Council in Kabul also encompassed distinct phases, which were similar to those that formed the strike against the fortified Inter-Continental Hotel in June 2011.

198

This Taliban operation began with a suicide bomber attacking a nearby checkpoint using an IED. Minutes later, the British Council’s perimeter was breached with a VBIED. Lastly, four attackers stormed the building with firearms and rocket-propelled grenades, killing at least nine people.

199

The strategy of using a combination of suicide bombers, firearms, and heavier weapons including rocketpropelled grenades and mortars, although in an a less-coordinated manner against a wider variety of targets, was also apparent during a series of Taliban attacks in Kabul on 15-16 April 2012.

200

The targets

of these attacks included the British, Russian, US and German embassies, the headquarters of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force, and the Afghan Parliament.

201

The Taliban attacks in Kabul,

combined with operations in two other Afghan provinces, killed a total of 11 security personnel and four civilians and wounded a further 32 and 42 respectively.

202

One potential tactical innovation that emerged during these attacks was the offensive use of firearms by individuals who were also equipped to carry out suicide bombings. For example, one would-be suicide bomber attacked the Kabul Military Training Centre using firearms.

203

This contrasts with the Taliban’s

operations against the Inter-Continental Hotel and British Council building, during which IEDs were used merely to breach secure perimeters in order to facilitate firearms attacks by other individuals.

204

197

BBC News (2011). Kabul's Intercontinental Hotel attacked by gunmen. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13947169. Last accessed 10th August 2011. 198

Harooni, M. (2011). Nine dead in Taliban assault on British Council in Kabul. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/19/us-afghanistan-blasts-idUSTRE77I0FX20110819. Last accessed 22nd August 2011. 199

Ibid.

200

Farmer, B. (2012). Kabul attacks show Nato intelligence failure says Hamid Karzai . Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9206881/Kabul-attacks-show-Nato-intelligence-failuresays-Hamid-Karzai.html. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 201

Georgy, M. & Chalmers, J. (2012). Embassies targeted in Kabul attacks, Taliban claims 'spring offensive' . Available: http://www.brantfordexpositor.ca/2012/04/15/embassies-targeted-in-kabul-attacks-taliban-claims-springoffensive. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 202

AP (2012). Taliban launch multiple suicide attacks in Kabul . Available: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/04/16/2003530446. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 204

BBC News (2011). Kabul's Intercontinental Hotel attacked by gunmen. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13947169. Last accessed 10th August 2011.

Therefore, the Taliban is becoming increasingly innovative and flexible in the tactics that it employs during its attacks.

UK police forces and Government agencies must collaborate with their international counterparts to the fullest extent. For example, a specialist team of 15 experts from the FBI has recently visited the Mumbai police force to learn lessons from the 2008 attacks. From this, the FBI intends to develop a counterterrorism model to be included in the syllabus at their training academy.

205

Such an approach would

certainly benefit UK police forces and law enforcement organisations. It is expected that UK policing and security personnel will have access to the Europol intelligence database during the Olympics.

Protecting Potential Terrorist Targets The revised CONTEST Strategy highlights that the Government will take a wider focus on strengthening protective security for power stations and sites involving hazardous materials. Furthermore, high quality advice on protective security will be given to those responsible for crowded places. However, more must be done to protect iconic institutions around London and Great Britain during and beyond the Olympics.

Terrorists may be deterred by the idea of striking highly secure Olympic sites and may opt for softer targets in less prominent locations, such as public viewing places, pubs as well as public transport hubs. Should such an attack occur far away from Olympic venues, its impact would be as high. Also, due to high levels of security at Olympic sites, the likelihood of an attack in a less-well protected location is possibly greater.

Security also needs to be increased at sites and facilities which provide material support to retail outlets within the Olympic Park. For example, a number of high profile firms, including Waitrose and Marks & Spencer, have been told to increase security at their warehouses, in order to stop terrorists planting explosive devices in lorries delivering goods to the Olympic Park.

206

In response to this request, Waitrose

has increased the number of CCTV cameras at its depot in Aylesford, Kent, by more than a third.

207

205

Panigrahi, D. (2011). FBI team in Mumbai to study counter-terrorism techniques. Available: http://www.hindustantimes.com/FBI-team-in-Mumbai-to-study-counter-terrorism-techniques/Article1-729168.aspx. Last accessed 4th August 2011. 206

Myers, R. (2012). Waitrose and M&S told to boost security ahead of Olympics over fears of bombs in delivery lorries . Available: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2129926/London-2012-Olympics-Waitrose-M-S-told-boostsecurity-fears-bombs-delivery-lorries.html. Last accessed 8th May 2012. 207

Ibid.

Firms based throughout the UK are carrying out, in line with instructions from the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG), extra checks on vehicles making deliveries to the Westfield Stratford City mall, which is situated on the east side of the Olympic Park, close to both the main Olympic stadium and the basketball and aquatics centre.

208

According to a LOCOG source, “The

threat of someone planting a bomb on a lorry headed for the Olympic Park is very real.”

209

The threat of a ‘Mumbai-style’ terrorist attack also remains significant. If such a plot is uncovered, there is a danger that this could overwhelm the investigative capacity of the police and prevent potential spectators from attending the Games.

Regional Fusion Centres According to the revised CONTEST Strategy, Prevent must not be used as a means of systematically gathering intelligence on people or communities.

210

Instead, it is designed to allow the relevant authorities

to work with and help the community to deal with threats and other issues. However, it is essential that accurate and relevant information about the terrorist threat is shared by the police with local Prevent partners. Since 2009 Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLPs) have been developed for this purpose.

211

The regional ‘fusion centre’ concept could be an invaluable tool to improve information-sharing during future counter-terrorism and other investigations. In addition, this concept could result in greater interorganisational coordination during the preparation of CTLPs. However, if implemented, legal and ethical constraints governing inter-agency information exchanges would need to be considered.

The use of regional fusion centres could also support Operation HINDSIGHT. This exercise model is designed to raise awareness of identification and referral processes regarding individuals deemed vulnerable to radicalisation, within local authorities.

212

It is based on real examples of radicalisation and

provides key stakeholders with the tools to identify vulnerable individuals, and offer appropriate intervention measures and support mechanisms.

213

It has been developed by ACPO’s Prevent Delivery

Unit and the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism.

208 209 210 211 212 213

214

Ibid. Ibid. HM Government (2011). Prevent Strategy. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p32. Ibid. HM Government (2011). Prevent Strategy. London:The Stationery Office Ltd. p58. Ibid.

214

Skills For Justice (2011). Operation Hindsight. Available: http://www.skillsforjustice.com/NewsEvents/News/Operation-Hindsight. Last accessed 12th August 2011.

Regional ‘fusion centres’ could house exercises such as Operation HINDSIGHT, as a single session could then cater for representatives of local authorities, key stakeholders and the police. If implemented, this arrangement would be cost effective and increase inter-agency consultation and understanding.

This concept could also significantly improve intelligence-sharing between the Security Service, regional police forces and Central Government in order to: 

Deploy personnel;



Provide training;



Give technical assistance;



Vet security clearances.

215

In order to be more efficient and financially viable, existing infrastructure could be used to establish a network of UK regional ‘fusion centres’. For example, pre-existing facilities for organisations such as the Counter-Terrorism Units, Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units, local police forces and the regional offices of the Security Service could employed.

Regional fusion centres could also play a major role in helping to identify community tensions, thereby potentially allowing police and local authorities to prevent future outbreaks of rioting and civil disorder. The National Community Tension Team (NCTT), which is situated within the Prevent Delivery Unit monitors and analyses community tensions across the UK. individuals

216

The NCTT, which has a core staff of four

217

, coordinates the monitoring of community tensions by collating information from local police

forces, local authorities, and Government departments, in order to assess current or emerging issues within local communities. community tensions.

218

The NCTT’s assessments are used to produce monthly reports on possible

219

Utilising regional fusion centres in order to gather intelligence on potential or actual community tensions could significantly support the work of the NCTT. Regional fusion centres could provide a secure forum for the collation and assessment of relevant information provided by, principally, local police forces, local authorities, and also Key Individual Networks (KINs), comprised of prominent and influential figures from

215

Department of Homeland Security (2011). National Network of Fusion Centers Fact Sheet. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1296484657738.shtm. Last accessed 29th July 2011. 216

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2011). The Rules of Engagement: A review of the August 2011 disorders. London: HMIC. p33. 217 218

Ibid. Ibid.

219

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary(HMIC) (2011). The Rules of Engagement: A review of the August 2011 disorders. London: HMIC. p34.

within the local community.

220

Each of these stakeholders would need to be represented if regional fusion

centres were to successfully assess tensions within local communities.

The in-house assessment of community tensions by regional fusion centres and the submission of their findings to the NCTT could serve to reduce the latter’s workload. This may well prove beneficial, especially when the limited number of core personnel available to the NTCC is taken into consideration.

221

The use of regional fusion centres could also prove beneficial in alleviating the effects of projected UK Government cuts to policing and security budgets. According to RUSI’s February 2012 UK Terrorism Analysis report, it is envisaged that central Government funding for police forces in England and Wales will be cut by 20 per cent over a five year period.

222

ACPO has estimated that these cuts in funding will

result in 28,000 police job losses between 2012 and 2016. front-line officers and 16,000 civilian staff.

224

223

These estimated losses encompass 12,000

RUSI’s February 2012 report suggests these reductions in

spending have already had an affect on counter-terrorism operations.

225

In the event that the projected reductions in police personnel numbers had a negative impact on the operations of Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs), regional fusion centres, through the presence of both KINs and police personnel, would still be able to discuss and assess the concerns of the local population, and to decide, in partnership with the community, what action could be taken in response. These are two of the functions of NPTs that could potentially be hindered by the projected reductions in personnel numbers.

220

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary(HMIC) (2011). The Rules of Engagement: A review of the August 2011 disorders. London: HMIC. p29. 221

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary(HMIC) (2011). The Rules of Engagement: A review of the August 2011 disorders. London: HMIC. p33. 222

Royal United Services Institute (2012). The Post Olympic Challenge. UK Terrorism Analysis. No.1 (February 2012), p11. 223 224 225

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

SIRS Consultancy Ltd SIRS Consultancy Ltd is a UK-based specialist intelligence, security and geo-political risk consultancy. The company has significant experience in both corporate and government security environments, and have launched their security handbook in Parliament alongside members of the All Party Parliamentary Group On Specialist Security. The company has also carried out specific research projects for Patrick Mercer MP, and have given evidence for the Riots Inquiry held by the Rt Hon Keith Vaz MP. Recently, their threat assessment on the Olympic Torch Route has been published in Bloomberg Businessweek and other publications worldwide.

About the Authors: Suhel Abo-Hatab: Suhel is a subject matter expert on German and UK national Security Issues. He specialises on the exploitation of the Media by terrorists as a recruitment, propaganda and radicalisation tool. Contact: suhel.abo-hatab@sirsconsultancy.com Shyam Bhatt: Shyam has written several articles on the state of security in the UK before the Olympic Games next year. He is an expert in the psychology of terrorist activity and the rise of globalisation, guerrilla and asymmetric warfare. Contact: shyam.bhatt@sirsconsultancy.com Christian Cullen: Christian has wide and rich experience, ranging across the Civil Service, the private sector and Parliament. Before founding SIRS Consultancy, he was a project manager within the Home Office. Contact: christian.cullen@sirsconsultancy.com Jonathan Lautier: Jonathan has written or contributed towards several articles on subjects as diverse as cyber-security, the August 2011 England Riots, and the erroneous dissemination of terrorism-related propaganda and training material by mainstream media outlets. Prior to working for SIRS Consultancy, he was employed as a Civil Servant by the Ministry of Defence. Contact: jonathan.lautier@sirsconsultancy.com

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