Monitor by SIRS Consultancy Ltd

Monitor Editor: SIRS Consultancy Ltd. info@sirsconsultancy.com Directors: Suhel Abo-Hatab suhel.abo-hatab@sirsconsultancy.com

Shyam Bhatt shyam.bhatt@sirsconsultancy.com

Christian Cullen christian.cullen@sirsconsultancy.com

Jonathan Lautier jonathan.lautier@sirsconsultancy.com

Company Website: www.sirsconsultancy.com

Thanks To Our Contributors:

SIRS Editorial… Dear reader, It is hard to imagine a time when security issues have been more prevalent. This is the year where the United Kingdom will welcome the entire world. We face many challenges on these shores, such as the ‘lone wolf’ threat, emergency communications issues and public disorder. It can be easy to say that this is hyperbole, but it is far more dangerous to sweep these issues under the carpet. Inevitably, with five months left to the Opening Ceremony, concerns are high as we move ever closer to the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. The Queen’s Diamond Jubilee and the London 2012 Olympic Games will undeniably stretch our security capacity to the limit. However, our intelligence and security community has scored some recent successes, with the conviction of four individuals who aimed to carry out a terrorist spree across London. But some of our successes have been due to a sizeable amount of good luck.

Dr Andy Oppenheimer Myron Anagnostakis William Bauer Michael Courtney CET Glassford Edward Hunt Nicole Howard Camille Maubert Mikael Santelli- Bensouda Leah Schmidt Sarada Somaratne If you wish to contact any contributors, please email info@sirsconsultancy.com Cover image © dbgg1979 Images in this publication may be under copyright. Copyright © SIRS Consultancy Ltd. No part of this publication may be reproduced copied or transmitted in any form or by any means stored in any information storage or retrieval systems without the publishers express permission. Although every effort is made to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the material published. SIRS Consultancy can accept no responsibility.

We know that terrorists seek media exposure and with the world watching the United Kingdom, there is hardly a more opportune moment for them to provide maximum media exposure of their cause. Viewing figures of the Opening and Closing Ceremonies are estimated to exceed 4,000,000,000. No one wants Britain in 2012 to provide that showcase, or the London 2012 Olympic Games to be that trophy. The world is seeing changes. It is still reeling from the Arab Spring, the death of Usama Bin Laden subsequently leading to the restructuring of Al-Qaida, and the emergence of new groups and frightening ideology . We are proud to present our bumper first issue of Monitor, and hope that it will be the first of many. This issue contains analysis on the state of security in the United Kingdom. Also, we are privileged to have an excellent article by Dr. Andy Oppenheimer - one of the UK’s foremost experts on IEDs. The China Special feature includes analysis on the Sino-Indian rivalry, its growing influence in Afghanistan and how it is playing a bigger role on the world stage. 2012 could be the year that the sleeping dragon, China, awakens. With significant Chinese investments in Africa typified by the new USD200 million African Union Building, the West needs to carefully consider its actions throughout the world. 2012 will be the year to remember, however we must make sure that it is for the right reasons. It will take more than optimism to mitigate the most serious security risks.

Monitor

Contents 6

Is Britain Prepared For The Olympic Games?

Shyam Bhatt

Emergency Response Communications: Ready For The Olympics? Jonathan Lautier

Exploitation Of The Media By Terrorists

Suhel Abo-Hatab

Lessons That Must Be Learned From The Greek Olympics Myron Anagnostakis

The Psychology Of Rioting: Why Did The London Riots Occur In Contemporary Society? Nicole Howard

International Security And Global Governance For A Secure World Sarada Somaratne

Monitor

Leah Schmidt & William Bauer

2012: Year of the Dragon China Special

Impact Arab Spring: Islamists, Reconstruction & Ethnicity

The Emerging Threat AQIM: An Overview

China in Afghanistan… Valuable Ally Or Emerging Threat? Camille Maubert

Jonathan Lautier

SIRS Book Review: The Al Qaeda Factor

Exploring The Sino-Indian Maritime Rivalry Mikel Santelli-Bensouda

Christian Cullen

Obama: Does His Foreign Policy Match The Rhetoric?

Defence In Austerity

The

Age

Michael Courtney

Edward Hunt

How Could The World Be made More Secure in 2012?

Challenging Extremism In The United Kingdom Shyam Bhatt

CET Glassford

IEDs – Terrorist Weapon Of Choice Dr Andy Oppenheimer

The UK And Scotland In 2015 – National Security Implications Of The “Yes” Vote Christian Cullen

Monitor | United Kingdom

Is Britain Prepared For The Olympic Games? There are now only a few months left until the Opening Ceremony of the London 2012 Olympics Games. This has the United Kingdom prepared itself sufficiently against any major incident? With the recent revelation that the police managed to smuggle a bomb through security, overshadowing David Cameron’s Cabinet meeting at the Olympic Park, questions have been raised as to how safe the Olympic Games will actually be. The England Riots of August 2011, Anders Breivik’s attacks and the change in tactics seen in Afghanistan and Pakistan have demonstrated that British security and policing must revise and adapt in order to confront these dynamic and multi-faceted threats.

what use would they be in countering a ‘Mumbai-style’ attack or even a ‘lone wolf’ terrorist operation? The same is true of the potential deployment of surface-to-air missiles to protect key Olympic sites; the possibility of which was announced by Defence Secretary Philip Hammond. Practical measures that reflect real-world changes must be adopted, which include steps to transfer the emphasis of counter-terrorism investigations from IEDs to grenades and firearms. This evolution of tactics is not limited to the West. During recent attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, militants have used IEDs merely to breach the perimeter, immediately followed by deadly assaults using firearms and grenades.

Evolution of Terrorist Tactics Law enforcement tactics and techniques must be updated and fundamentally revised in order to reflect changes in terrorist-inspired indoctrination and activity. As demonstrated by the Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008 and Breivik’s attacks on 22/7, terrorists are leaning more towards firearms than Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) due to the apparent ease of use of the former. The Mumbai terrorist attacks lasted for several days rather than hours due to the use of firearms. Also, the comparative effectiveness of firearms was demonstrated during Breivik’s attacks in Norway, where the shootings he carried out led to more deaths than all four 7/7 IEDs combined. Although it is fine to say we have military vessels docked on the River Thames,

Anders Breivik demonstrated the ability of a ‘lone wolf’ to carry out a ‘Mumbai-style’ attack

The UK needs a more comprehensive security structure to protect itself from a diverse range of threats. These include ‘lone wolf’ terrorists who are capable of

Monitor | United Kingdom carrying out simultaneous multiple attacks aimed at causing political, physical or economic damage, utilising the ‘Mumbai-style’ attack model. The ‘Lone Wolf’ Threat As with any terrorist group, so-called ‘lone wolf’ actors are motivated by a variety of factors, including adherence to particular social, political or religious causes. The May 2008 bombing attempt in Exeter by Nicky Reilly, an Islamic extremist, highlights the dangers of ‘lone wolf’ terrorism.

Public Disorder and Policing There is also a significant threat of public disorder this year, with groups already setting their sights on the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee. As was seen during 2010/2011, there is a very real fear of these protests being hijacked by individuals wanting to cause damage.

Also in 2010, Terence Gavan, an extreme rightwing ideologue, was jailed for assembling one of the largest arms cachés found in the UK Police must prepare for all areas, including high risk’ urban areas, before the Olympics The UK needs to implement proactive in recent years. These examples security measures with trained police demonstrate the ideological diversity of officers. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the ‘lone wolf’ terrorist threat. Constabulary has stated that the army should not be needed during instances Susceptible individuals may not be of public disorder, but rather, there formally affiliated with radical groups, but should be a radical switch in police can be inspired through the Internet, tactics. particularly via social media websites. ‘Lone wolves’ can be the most difficult to This must be put in place in order to identify and disrupt as they leave a prepare for a repeat of last summer’s smaller ‘digital footprint’. riots with training programmes in ‘high risk’ urban areas before the Olympics. No conspicuous planning or The Olympics Committee must think reconnaissance meetings are arranged, about increasing the number of police and there is a far greater reliance on the officers that will be available during the general public to report the suspicious Games, as this is a much needed behaviour of one individual, rather than a investment. dissenting member of a group doing so. However, there are clear indicators that may be used by law enforcement to detect and disrupt plots. In particular, it is most possible to apprehend ‘lone wolves’ during their acquisition of weapons, or their preparations for the planned attack such as security probing and route mapping.

As Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer of British counter-terrorism legislation has warned, there is a concern of deploying too many officers to Olympic venues as this may create shortfalls elsewhere. Sustainable policing levels must be maintained, as an attack or instance of public disorder

Monitor | United Kingdom

anywhere in the UK will taint the whole Olympics through media over-exposure. Although the extra manpower is definitely needed, the deployment of up to 13,500 troops cannot be used to plug the gaps. Whereas the military can assist the private security firms at Olympic venues themselves, they are not a viable supplement to the police in this instance, where there still remains a shortfall in personnel and resources. The security picture is incomplete. The United Kingdom needs proactive security, including the police, rather than what has been deemed in some security circles as only a deterrent. Collaboration between the military and police has long been known to be difficult, due to their own entrenched command structures and cultures. Hence, the addition of the military’s surprise involvement just seven months before the Opening Ceremony (out of seven potential years of planning) has been an act of sheer folly.

There is extensive inter-agency training (whether in the form of ‘table-top’ or fullscale, live exercises), which takes place at senior organisational management levels, such as ‘Silver’ and ‘Gold’. However, considerably less inter-agency training is provided to ‘front-line’ first responders. Therefore, inter-agency training for first-responders must be radically improved before the 2012 Olympics. Now is the singular opportunity to implement changes and improvements before the Opening Ceremony of the 2012 Olympics, as these Games will require the largest British security operation since the Second World War. The UK Riots of August 2011 and the 22/7 attacks in Norway have demonstrated that law enforcement tactics need to be constantly reviewed and optimised.

Inter-Agency Collaboration Significant improvements need to be made as to how emergency services respond to major incidents, as well as how they share information and intelligence.

We have to make sure that there is not a repeat of last year’s mistakes during 2012

The 2011 Coroner’s Inquest into 7/7 indicates that the extent to which inter-agency collaboration and training must be reviewed. It was only recently that the Government responded to these suggestions and London Resilience partners have agreed to review each individual agency’s current training packages. It is worrying that this is being carried out so close to the Olympic Games.

It is an unacceptable mistake to not recruit extra police officers, especially with four billion people watching the Opening Ceremony. It is not just the Olympics that the UK is showcasing to the world this year; but also Her Majesty the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee. With the world’s eyes on the UK, we need to have proactive security during the Olympic Games, rather than just a ceremonial deterrent.

By Shyam Bhatt

Monitor | United Kingdom

Exploitation Of The Media By Terrorists “…The most advanced of Western communication technology is, paradoxically, what the terror organisations are now using to fight the West…” Gabriel Weimann 2012, Security Expert at the University of Haifa This recent statement by Weimann did not surprise Western security experts. Following the arrest of the four 21/7 bombers in 2005, and the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008, some experts warned Western states to be prepared to counter a similar exploitation of the media and information tools in their country. Mumbai terrorist attacks In November 2008 Lashkar-eTaiba, (LeT) attacked Mumbai. During the attack the LeT terrorists split up into four groups. All group members were equipped with mobile phones, firearms, explosives and grenades. Interestingly, the Indian Government revealed how the terrorists exploited modern technology, especially media coverage. Thus, they were able to maximise acts of terrorism through information obtained via live news broadcasts.

Flames on the roof of The Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai, during the 2008 terrorism attack © Indranil Mukherjee/AFP/Getty Images

Live coverage

Phone updates and tactical advice

During the attack, the four LeT groups were watching live coverage on TV in the besieged hotels as news crews were following the security forces. Therefore, they were broadcasting live from the scenes. Once the Security forces realised this, they cut TV reception to the besieged hotel.

After the live broadcasts had stopped, the terrorists resorted to using their mobile phones in order to stay ahead of the security forces. When necessary, they took phones from their victims. Receiving direct orders from their handlers in Pakistan, the Mumbai attackers acted on live tip-offs from across the border including tactical

Monitor | United Kingdom

advice regarding issues such as police counter-measures, together with motivational messages. In addition, phone protocols recovered by the Indian Security Service have shown that the terrorists spoke to other group members to maximise the number of casualties and to exchange tactical information. At some stage the terrorists called TV stations to claim responsibility and to explain themselves as part of their propaganda measures.

sources, but those from the wider world: Using the wide variety of media aids available to them, the Mumbai terrorists hid from view as security forces neared, and emerged after the security forces had moved elsewhere.

Full potential of the Internet To gather live information about the other LeT groups as well as the security forces’ movements, they also used their mobile phones to access local bloggers, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr and the Internet in general. Just minutes after the first shot of the attacks, both a Google map and a Wikipedia entry were created. The map was updated with information within seconds of many of the incidents that occurred. 70 tweets every five seconds were produced during this incident. The Mumbai 2008 attack is considered by media analysts as one of most welldocumented terrorist attacks of the 21st Century.

“The 2008 Mumbai attacks were one of the most well documented terrorist operations since 9/11, thanks to live media reporting” New York Times The security forces have since found that the Mumbai attackers not only accessed Indian or Pakistani Internet

Indian Security forces try to get an overview of the attacks as well as take cover © Vinukumar Ranganathan

Through the exploitation of modern information technology and the media, these militants were provided with the advantage of being able to ambush the Indian Security forces and to kill the Chief of the Anti-terrorism Squad, as well as 14 other police officers. The danger of live reporting by an eyewitness On 29 July 2005, two of the five suspected terrorists involved in the 21 July 2005 coordinated bomb plot were apprehended by the Metropolitan Police Service’s armed CO19 unit in Notting Hill, West London. While the operation was relayed live on national news channels and around the world, a British TV news channel unwittingly transmitted sensitive operational information that would have been of benefit to the terrorists; hence it could have cost the lives of members of the public and police personnel. As is typical procedure during police operations in the UK, a media blackout

Monitor | United Kingdom was put in place and camera crews from all national news organisations broadcast live pictures from the edge of the police cordon on the street. This took place whilst the CO19 unit organised themselves with the necessary equipment and body armour in preparation to arrest or incapacitate the suspects. During the final stages of their preparations, an eyewitness that occupied the same Peabody Estate flats as the suspected terrorists, began to report live by telephone, from well within the police cordon. The eye witness reported the positions of the CO19 unit throughout much of the siege. The account revealed precise operational details, such as how many officers could be seen and their positions as they moved toward the suspected

planned. The suspects were arrested without incident. Why is it so easy for terrorists to exploit the media? An open and free press is an essential part of democracy. There are many reasons as to why terrorists are able to easily exploit this and the mediaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s practice of reporting in detail during incidents. The main reason why the media reports any of the relevant parts of the incident within minutes after it has occurred, is that the citizens around that area want to know what is going on and whether it is necessary to act. Furthermore, a general access to all necessary information is important for citizens to be able to form their own opinions. Media competition The competition between different media companies also plays an essential role in motivating these individual organisations to obtain a greater amount of information about unfolding incidents than their competitors, and to disseminate it more quickly.

If one media outlet decided not to report on an unfolding incident, one of its rivals most likely would. Additionally, in these times of The arrest of these two terrorist suspects being covered live by an widespread Internet access most eyewitness reporter ÂŠ MI5 Website people are able to get news from around the world meaning that terroristsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; address. national as well international media The police were compelled to contact the competition has increased. media outlets directly, bypassing management structures, to request that Journalist vs. journalist the media stop broadcasting eyewitness accounts. A formal request was made by In a time where hundreds of individuals the Metropolitan Police Service. The are seeking work in the field of delay in preventing the live media journalism, individuals already coverage could have resulted in employed as journalists cannot risk operational disruption, or even failure but failing to report on potentially crucial luckily the operation proceeded as

Monitor | United Kingdom

stories. The competition between journalists has, due to the current economic climate, increased dramatically in recent years Cooperation between security forces and the media The Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 as well as the eye witness incident during the 21 July 2005 demonstrate that it is not ideal to attempt to ‘black out’ or to control media coverage. This is especially true as now; it has never been easier to obtain a cheap mobile phone that can access the Internet. But there are other ways of preventing the exploitation of the media during unfolding incidents. Security forces should receive basic training to understand the role of the media in society and to know how to interact with the media to maximize its role during incidents. Additionally, they should be fully aware of what is being shown in real time, so that immediate action can be taken to stop the broadcast of sensitive security-related material. Websites like Twitter should also be monitored during major incidents, so that vital intelligence is not missed or leaked, which is what happened during the August 2011 England Riots. Future developments in social, online and broadcast media have to be considered.

During major incidents there is a clear conflict of interest, between the desire to obtain and disseminate information as quickly as possible, and not to accidentally support terrorism. Therefore security forces need to deal with this issue. The media should be aware that everything they report could be used to create a tactical advantage for the perpetrators of a terrorist attack. In order not to give them the tactical advantage, journalists and media companies should be aware of their responsibility. This should not be enforced by law or through an Independent Watch Board. Instead journalists should agree on basic principles and best-practice guidelines of how and when to report on certain parts of a story. If a journalist does not abide by these rules, then they should be held accountable by the rest of the industry.

A Reporter (front) is reporting about the London Riots in the background as police secure evidence. Both, the Police and the Reporter, are respecting each other’s role

In the case of sensitive information being broadcast, security forces should have numerous emergency contacts. These should be immediately reachable in every media outlet in order to delay the broadcast or to stop parts of it. However, in any case freedom of information must under no circumstances be put at risk.

The media and the security forces should be aware of each other’s purpose in society and their roles during an incident. Both must understand each other reasons for being on the scene. However, the balance of what the general public should know and what the perpetrators could potentially learn about police and security operations must always be kept in mind.

By: Suhel Abo-Hatab

Monitor | United Kingdom

The Psychology Of Rioting: Why Did The London Riots Occur In Contemporary Society? In August 2011, the Metropolitan Police shot and killed Mark Duggan who they suspected had a gun. An investigation proved that there had been no gun, his family and community wanted answers. They believed that Mark’s death represented the antagonistic relationship that the community have with the police. A peaceful protest was organised, where it was later observed that a few individuals from the protest lashed out and began rioting in Tottenham. This escalated into “disorder, looting and the destruction of property” which spread to Peckham, Croydon, Camden and other towns in the UK. This escalation was random.

uncontrollable. The report, “Policing Large Scale Disorder: Lessons from the disturbance of August 2011,” was published detailing the causes of the unrest and the problems which the police had faced. It suggested that the main cause was that the rioters believed the police had lost control and the media had propagated this belief. The police were, commended for their use of the media to communicate to the public in the riot-affected areas which enabled the public to remain safe. The Home Affairs Committee’s report also highlights how rioters used the media to communicate between themselves during the riots, whilst adding that switching off social media would not have been helpful. This opposed criticisms over not shutting down social media to stop rioters communicating with others, for example Blackberry Messenger. There is yet to be a suitable explanation as to why rioting spread. Although psychologists have suggested many theories, no one has considered the economic climate as an explanation as to why the public felt compelled to riot. The report by the Home Affairs Committee has suggested that the Government should examine the evidence to determine the relationship between the rioting areas and areas of high deprivation and of poverty.

A Police Officer gets attacked during the Riots © Tomasz Iwaniec

After the rioting, the government ordered an investigation to be carried out by the Home Affairs Committee, to establish why the rioting had started, and became

It was suggested that an examination of youth unemployment be carried out as it was noted from court statistics that there had been a higher percentage of young people rioting. To understand the riots in London, we must first understand the psychological aspects behind them.

Monitor | United Kingdom

Group psychology: looters hesitated to trespass on their own, but were brazen in numbers

A group behaviour theory that was arguably confirmed by the unrest throughout England is supported by Gustave Le Bon. In his work, Le Bon explains that the crowd “after a period of excitement, will enter upon a purely automatic and unconscious state, in which they are guided by suggestion” from others within the group, usually by the perceived leader. Like most theories put forward in the 1980’s, psychologists argued that as part of the group mentality it’s important for the members of the group to feel as one, so as to enable them to lose their social identity to the group. Le Bon called this merging into the group ‘The Collective Mind’. Therefore, it is clear to summarise that the individuals who participated in the riots acted as ‘The Collective Mind’ as Le Bon suggested. Within this group conformity the individuals change their behaviour to match the attitudes of the group. An individual example of this behaviour can be seen in the case of a grammar school girl who was a ‘respectable’ young lady who got caught up in the group mentality of rioting and looted to the sum of £5,000. Another theory within the field of group

psychology which could explain the rioters’ behaviour against what they deemed to be ‘authority’ is the ‘Social Identity Theory’. This theory attempts to explain an individual’s behaviour within a group and their perceived status, their legitimacy and the inter-group environment. This theory explains why the tension between the rioters and the police turned disorderly and violent. Questions must be asked, is the collective mind or the social identity theory to blame for the London riots? How can the police and governments stop individuals succumbing to a group mentality before it gets out of control? After examining the behaviours and what occurred we can begin to understand how in the future riots can be stopped. This must be done quickly. There is hesitation by the police due to the recent student protests and G20 protest death of Ian Tomlinson and as a result they consulted the Prime Minister David Cameron. Due to the late police intervention rioters realised they could get away with looting and disorder, allowing the mentality of the group to gain momentum and spread to other cities. The most important condition for a riot to form is group identity and the

Monitor | United Kingdom

ability of individuals to identify with the group emotionally and characteristically. Without this the England Riots would not have occurred, as people would have been be too socially conscious to riot on their own.

able to stop the rioting. In contrast it has been suggested that we must consider the social side of the riots, not just the psychological state of the rioters. Therefore the two must be analysed together in order to understand the psychology of rioting. Criminologist Professor John Pitts suggests that “many of the people involved are likely to have been from low-income, highunemployed estates and many if not most do not have much of a legitimate future. There is a social question to be asked about young people with nothing to lose”.

Student protests - Parliament Square, London 2010 © Bob B

While this may be true we do have to consider the statistics from the courts which show that 26% of the rioters were 10-17 male’s 88% and females 12%. While 74% of the rioters were adults, 5% were over 40 and 27% were between 18-20 years of age. Individuals who are employed and have low-incomes or those who have a legitimate future must also be considered.

It could be argued that Le Bon’s theory partly explains the rioters’ behaviour and that if add to the concepts we can explain fully the behaviour. I believe that between the ‘Collective Mind’ theory and Le Bon and Freud’s theories, there is an answer to the group psychology of rioting. Freud’s theory attempts to explain group psychology and the reactions that occur within the group, which he compares to the “herd instinct”. He suggests that there is an innate predisposition to group and thus follow the group’s influence. Although Freud’s work was carried out on non-rioting groups the concept is viable in that it relates to the group’s mental state and behaviour. The theory explains that when individuals enter a group they lose themselves and their inhibitions. In this case it would be the group influencing individuals who create the disorder and chaos of rioting, and thus when challenged or separated from the group individuals are able to regain their individualism. It must be made clear that even though the group’s collective actions as a whole cause destruction and looting of property, this may not represent the behaviour of all members.

In summary, we do not know the exact behavioural trigger that caused a peaceful protest to turn into rioting. Is it as simple as blaming the police’s actions? We do know that the riots could have been stopped before the disorder and destruction got out of hand. However, police and other authorities failed to use the correct level of force necessary to stop the riots from spreading. Furthermore psychoanalytic research should be carried out to explain why the rioters did not consider the police to hold authority. On the other hand, the rioters did not expect any consequences for their actions in August 2011 and must now face the consequences of criminal charges when caught. Furthermore, the economic climate in relation to its impacts on the riots needs to be investigated.

I hereby suggest that if we separated all individuals from the group, we would be

By: Nicole Howard

Monitor | United Kingdom

Emergency Response Communications: Ready For The Olympics? there were “considerable failings in radio and mobile communications”. The May 2011 Report of the Coroner’s Inquest into the events of 7/7, acknowledged that significant progress had been made with regard to emergency communications on the London Underground network since 2005.

Despite the allocation of significant funding towards the improvement of emergency response communications systems in the United Kingdom (UK) since the terrorist attacks of 7th July 2005 (7/7), significant improvements still need to be made. This is especially true of the AIRWAVE radio network, which had reached an advanced state of implementation by 2011. This was designed to offer enhanced levels of emergency radio coverage throughout the UK, especially in areas where previous radio systems experienced limited reception. Despite the scope and ability of the AIRWAVE network, there are indications that it might to an extent, be flawed. These issues must be addressed as soon as possible, ideally before the beginning of the Olympics in July. AIRWAVE on the London Underground It is worth recalling that the emergency services experienced severe communications difficulties following the 7/7 terrorist attacks. For example, according to the Coroner’s Inquest,

The Coroner’s Inquest concluded that the implementation of AIRWAVE on the London Underground network represented a significant improvement over the communications equipment that had been available to emergency services personnel on 7/7. For example, the network functions both above and below ground throughout the Greater London area. Also, the use of AIRWAVE handsets by each of the emergency services allows personnel to utilise the ‘talk-group’ concept to improve interservice liaison and communication following major incidents. However, it is possible that, on the London Underground network at least, AIRWAVE may not prove to be as resilient during a major incident as originally hoped. When the business case for AIRWAVE on the London Underground was published in 2006, it identified 55 ‘high priority’ stations (out of the total 125 sub-surface stations on the London Underground network) where at least two base radio stations would be needed for it to operate as effectively as possible. As of May 2011, fewer than ten of the ‘high priority’ stations had been provided with two base radios. The remainder had

Monitor | United Kingdom only one base radio. Sub-surface Underground stations that are equipped with two base radios can support up to seven simultaneous group calls. However, sub-surface London Underground stations that are equipped with a single base radio can only support up to three simultaneous group calls. Therefore, those ‘high priority’ subsurface Underground stations that are only equipped with a single base radio would be less able to support the emergency services following a major incident within their immediate vicinities. A lack of consistent capacity across the AIRWAVE network would hamper the efforts of the emergency services to simultaneously counter the effects of several concurrent incidents at multiple London Underground stations. Such a shortcoming could prove catastrophic if the emergency services are faced with another multi-site terrorist attack similar to 7/7, or several unrelated and coincidental occurrences. According to the AIRWAVE company website, the rollout of their network on the London Underground was completed in 2009. However, if the Report of the Coroner’s Inquest into the events of 7/7 is accurate, this statement is incorrect. This is due to the fact that the number of base radio stations provided to all but a few of the 55 ‘ high priority’ subsurface Underground stations is lower than recommended by the AIRWAVE business case in 2006. The AIRWAVE network throughout London and the South-East was upgraded during 2011 in preparation for

the 2012 Olympics. However, the conclusions of the Coroner’s Inquest into 7/7 at least cast doubt on whether the network would be able to perform effectively in the event of a single major or several concurrent minor incidents on the London Underground network. AIRWAVE Performance During the England Riots The performance of AIRWAVE during the August 2011 England Riots also arguably demonstrates that it still experiences difficulties in coping with increased radio traffic during major incidents. In late 2011, the Observer newspaper, in an article titled Revealed: how police lost control of the summer riots, reported that, during the England Riots, the AIRWAVE network had “collapsed”. This initial analysis was found to be incorrect, and the Observer confirmed this on 11 December last year.

Telegraph headline © Telegraph Online

Although AIRWAVE did not “collapse” as the Observer originally reported, when rectifying its original error the newspaper acknowledged that a Police Federation report into the policing of the England

Monitor | United Kingdom

Riots concluded that AIRWAVE had experienced “significant local technical difficulties” and that a “significant communications failure” had occurred. According to this report and a further assessment published by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), police personnel within the Greater London area at times had to rely on their own mobile phones due to the difficulties experienced by the AIRWAVE network. It is worth noting that this was not a significant issue for police personnel in other English cities. The HMIC report also highlights the fact that police personnel often relied upon their mobile phones to avoid ‘cramming’ radio space on the AIRWAVE network. This alone indicates that, to an extent at least, AIRWAVE still has difficulty in accommodating increased volumes of radio traffic in the Greater London area. The use of standard mobile phones also means that radio transmissions cannot be recorded, and that evidence of events and decisions may be lost. As AIRWAVE can make and receive calls to and from standard mobile phones and landlines, the use by police personnel of personal mobile phones during periods of limited network capacity seems logical. However, this is not a viable option for three key reasons. Firstly, AIRWAVE was designed as a securely-encrypted digital radio network. It is possible that the use of standard mobile phones in conjunction with network could compromise this as the former would not offer the same degree of security. Also, the operation of standard mobile phones may be adversely affected by increased civilian mobile phone traffic during a period of

prolonged public disorder, or following a major incident. Furthermore, standard mobile phones would become useless if the Mobile Telecommunication Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS), which restricts mobile phone network access in a specific area to emergency services personnel, had been activated. Unless police personnel in the area(s) in question were carrying mobile phones fitted with an MTPAS-compatible SIM card, they would not be able to rely on mobile phones as an alternative to AIRWAVE. The Need for Further Improvements to AIRWAVE According to the AIRWAVE company website, the capacity of the network across London and the South-East was increased during 2011. However, the findings of the Coroner’s Inquest into 7/7, together with the genuine communications difficulties experienced by police during the England Riots, demonstrate that complacency regarding emergency communications failings could prove fatal. AIRWAVE capacity should be increased on the London Underground to enable emergency personnel to adequately respond to incidents. A first step would be to install a second base radio at the ‘high priority’ sub-surface stations which currently only have one such device. Furthermore, AIRWAVE capacity within Greater London must be upgraded to ensure that police personnel are not compelled to rely on their own mobile phones in certain circumstances. Both of these issues need to be addressed to as great an extent as possible before the beginning of the Olympic Games in July.

By: Jonathan Lautier

Monitor | United Kingdom

Lessons That Must Be Learned From The Greek Olympics

Inside the Athens 2004 Olympic Stadium

At the closing ceremony of the 2004 Summer Olympic Games, the President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) Jacque Rogue thanked Greece for organising “a successful and secure Olympic Games”. In the aftermath of 9/11, the ongoing War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq, a small state like Greece had been obliged to organise and secure the most massive sport event in the world. In security terms, the outcome could clearly be characterized as a success. The part that intelligence had to play in this success was vital and quite turbulent. In the new international security context the 2004 Olympic Games were used as a testing ground for the latest antiterrorist superpanoptic technology. The central surveillance integration security system (C4I – command, control, communications, computers and intelligence), planned by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), could not be implemented on time for the games; hence, the security of the Athens Olympics was dependent upon conventional methods. According to a SAIC official “We’re putting together a C4I system to give the Greek Government the tools they need to

manage the security”. However, it would be the Greek public safety and military forces that would provide the actual security and respond to specific calls. It was envisaged that the SAIC system would provide eyes and ears for the local authorities in order for them to be able to use their own assets if any response was needed. SAIC was chosen on the basis of its prior experience of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games and their assets, having created the existing infrastructure of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the US Armed Forces. In addition, a surveillance bio-security system was developed so that public health specialists would be able to detect threats to the community early. The syndromic surveillance and monitoring system, a 1990’s technology pioneered in the USA, and used in Greece by the Hellenic Centre for Infectious Diseases Control, was already in place in August 2002 in eight major hospitals and a major healthcare centre in the greater Athens area. The system was triggered by an outbreak detection algorithm mechanism, which was to give an early

Monitor | United Kingdom

warning to the health authorities of any unexpected outbreak of serious, disease related threats. The system was tested in June 2004 and the Greek Ministry of Health named the test event as successful. Fortunately, there was no need to use the system in real time circumstances. However, the C4I system was not in place on time. The implementation of the project suffered from late planning, increased cost due to the tight timeline and non-specialised personnel. The initial plan included an integrated C4I composed of 30 subsystems which would enhance the collection, analysis and dissemination process. These included a command and decision support system, a communication and information system, a digital trunked radio system, a port security system, and fixed and mobile command centres for the Greek police and fire-fighters, the coast guard, the Athens Olympic Committee Security Division, and the Ministry of Defence.

View of the Athens Organising Committee (ATHOC) Technology Operations Centre during the 2004 Olympic Games

High-resolution cameras and a zeppelin would, it was thought, create an electronic fence around the games. Though, SAIC had only 11 months to install, test and ensure that the equipment was operational. Furthermore, they had to train 9,000 Greek technicians, officers and officials

to run the new system. The restrictions imposed by the Greek bureaucracy and the economic limitations of a small state could have been supplemented by the help of the European Union (EU), other states with prior Olympic experience and advanced technology, such as the USA and Australia and primarily by SAIC itself. The EU proved to be very helpful as it allowed Greece to exceed the accepted limits of ‘dataveillance’- electronic surveillance of population in public places - by cross-data matching at network databases such as the black list of the Schengen Information System data bank and that of Europol. The USA sent about 220 CIA and FBI officials to provide extra protection to the US Olympic Team and about 400 to help, inform and train their Greek colleagues, spending approximately USD35 million. They also deployed through NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) surveillance aircraft. On the other hand, the winner of the golden security contract did not stand to its obligations. The security umbrella was activated on 27 July 2004, three weeks before the opening ceremony. By then the widely advertised SAIC system, the ‘gold-metal security achievement’, failed to meet the standards of the ‘biggest security operation in peacetime Europe’, as an ASIS official had put it. The main problem was C4I’s software system. Its complexity and sophistication became a technical nightmare as the 116 operational centres should have operated like the neurons in a brain, which was a central platform, the Command Decision Support System (CDSS). The components could work individually, but when it came to the CDSS, everything led to an operational failure. As a result, the military decided to use

Monitor | United Kingdom its own systems, the police and the firefighters protested and they also used the systems that they were familiar with. The USD225 million C4I, was totally absent during the games. Its main contribution turned out to be political controversy and a bill, which was double that of the Sydney Olympics in 2000. Security and intelligence throughout the games was based on conventional means and interstate cooperation. Nevertheless, nothing happened. The argument though needs clarification. Greece is a small country which has maintained since the 1980’s excellent relations with all Arab countries and Israel. As long as the athletes of the high alert states, such as the USA, the UK, Spain and Australia were given extra protection by their own national authorities, the host state had less to worry about. The British capital is a city three times the size of Athens in a state that proved

to be the most reliable partner of the USA in the War on Terror. Extremists have named the UK as the enemy No3 of the Muslim world, just behind the USA and Israel. Moreover, in London is located the ‘City’, one of the centres of contemporary capitalism. As the anticapitalist movement grows, the Olympic Games could turn out to be an ideal ground for anyone to make their point. Finally, eight years after the Greek Olympics the cyber-security threats are overwhelming, as the experience of Beijing shows. The C4I may not have worked but the security operation protecting the Athens Olympics was still successful. However the UK is a much more prominent target. It is, though, essential to see that experience as another ‘Greek Paradox’ and not as a counter example of the questionable necessity of centralised intelligence systems.

By: Myron Anagnostakis

Athens 2004 Olympic Games closing ceremony © Shizhao

Monitor | World

International Security And Global Governance For A Secure World Todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s threats recognise no national boundaries, and have to be addressed at the global and regional as well as national levels. World politics is characterised by "security interdependence": no state, no matter how powerful, can by its own solo efforts make itself invulnerable to todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s threats. Any event or process that leads to large-scale death or a reduction in life expectancy and that undermines states as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to global security. The modern world requires both states and non-state actors to coordinate their actions through international organisations to address these issues. Security interdependence, in short, requires global governance, and international organisations are a central component of global governance. No single security issue is totally isolated. Nuclear proliferation by states increases the availability of the material and technology necessary for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons. The ability of non-state actors to traffic nuclear material and technology is aided by ineffective state control of borders and the transiting of material through weak states. The prospect of organised criminal groups providing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons to terrorists is particularly worrying. Take, as one example, the threat of nuclear terrorism. Experts estimate that terrorists with 50 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU), an amount that could fit into six one-litre milk cartons, need only smuggle it across borders in order to create an improvised nuclear

device that could level a medium-sized city.

US B61 nuclear bomb being disassembled

There are three clusters of threats with which the world must be concerned: Nuclear weapons and their proliferation Any use of nuclear weapons, by accident or design, risks catastrophic human casualties and economic dislocation. Experts suggest that if a simple nuclear device were detonated in a major city, the number of deaths would range from tens of thousands to more than one million. The shock to international commerce, employment and travel would amount to at least one trillion US dollars. Such an attack would have further, far-reaching implications for international security, democratic governance and civil rights. Regardless of whether more states acquire nuclear weapons, there are also grave risks posed by the existence of large stockpiles of nuclear materials. Today 1,300 kilograms of HEU exist in research reactors in 27 countries. The total volume of HEU stockpiles is far greater, and many HEU storage sites in the world are inadequately secured. States have publicly confirmed 20 cases of nuclear material diversion and more than 200 incidents involving illicit

Monitor | World trafficking in nuclear materials have been documented over the past decade. Terrorism Terrorism flourishes in environments of despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression, extremism and human rights abuse; it also develops in contexts of regional conflict and foreign occupation; and it profits from weak state capacity to maintain law and order. Global economic integration means that a terrorist attack anywhere in the developed world would have devastating consequences for the well-being of millions of people. The World Bank estimates that the 9/11 attacks alone increased the number of people living in poverty by 10 million, the total cost to the world economy probably exceeded $80 billion US dollars. These numbers would be far surpassed by an incident involving nuclear terrorism. Transnational organised crime Transnational organised crime facilitates many of the most serious threats to international security. It is a menace to states and societies, eroding human security and the fundamental obligation of states to provide law and order. Corruption, illicit trade and moneylaundering contribute to state weakness, impede economic growth and undermine democracy. One of the core activities of organised criminal groups - drug trafficking - has major security implications. It is estimated that criminal organisations gain $300 to $500 billion US dollars annually from narcotics trafficking; their single largest source of income. In some regions, the huge profits generated through this activity rivals even the GDP of certain individual countries; thus threatening state security and integrity. There is mounting evidence of a nexus between terrorist groups’ financing and opium profits, especially in Afghanistan.

Global Governance in security issues Professor Mark Duffield argues persuasively in Global Governance and the New Wars that global governance lies in networks that bring together states, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private agencies to accomplish specific regulatory tasks. Since the end of the Cold War, global governance has been marked by a growing emphasis on authority delegation in the form of regional security arrangements, privatisation, subcontracting, and other arrangements that between them share the burden of global management among a wide range of actors. These networks establish durable structures of global governance, yet are fluid and non-territorial, adopting changing security perceptions and risk assessments. They also constitute what Duffield calls 'strategic complexes' of state and nonstate actors, building connections within and between governments, military establishments, IGOs, NGOs and transnational corporations (TNCs). As the face of global society has changed, so too has the nature of global security. Security experts and other commentators have issued dire warnings about the threat posed by cyberterrorism to a global economy increasingly predicted on the smooth functioning of its computer networks. Terrorist ‘cyber-attacks’ on computerised infrastructure contribute a source of deep concern. Such attacks could conceivably wreak havoc on an unprecedented scale, without resorting to ‘violence’ in any ordinary sense of the word. Preventing this possibility must be a priority of the entire international community. Military force can play a role, but the international community needs to develop an alternative, multilateral

Monitor | World

approach to halting terrorism and other organised crime. However, the world institutions of today are bureaucratic and slow to react. They are in need of radical reforms if they are to be more effective and relevant to present realities. The most powerful world leaders and governments are pursuing relentlessly their own agendas to the detriment of the globe. Clearly, our present system of global governance is very poorly equipped to handle the security challenges of the international agenda. National interests dominate to the detriment of global interests in an antiquated system based on national sovereignty. The United Nations and other international organisations reflect a previous world order, which is out of step with todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s challenges and priorities.

Most importantly, the international community has the moral obligation and duty to control and intervene in countries if they descend into chaos, lawlessness or violence, or are unable to protect their citizens from crimes against humanity. Many models of global governance and good governance are advocated by scholars and national leaders through various manifestos with a view to establishing a more secure world. However, a good model for global governance would require the following: Recognition of universal values UN treaties contain universal values and constitute an effective tool for global governance. The UN charter, as the most important UN treaty, empowers the Security Council to maintain international peace and security in the world. Hence, in developing a good model for global governance, it is evident that the UNâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s formulation and implementation of treaties can constitute an effective model for global governance. Dealing effectively with threats, challenges and changes

Council Adopts Resolution on UN-Aftrican Union Cooperation ÂŠ UN Photo / Paulo Filgueiras

Agenda of Global Governance The way forward for global institutions is to tackle new security threats by promoting disarmament, human rights, and building a global rule of law. The implementation and completion of Millennium Development Goals should be a top priority as gross disparities such as poverty and lack of opportunity are fertile grounds for violence and terrorism.

The concept of common security (peace, social justice, environment and human rights) accurately reflects the purpose of the UN Charter, its treaties and conventions. These UN treaties impact on good governance at the international and national levels. Full cooperation with NGOs, CSOs and the private sector In terms of threats relating to corruption, narcotic drugs and organised crime,

Monitor | World alliances are necessary between governments and non-state actors. Some 1,400 NGOs from about 90 countries that form the International Campaign to Ban Landmines were responsible for raising public consciousness and drove the movement that resulted in the Landmine Ban Treaty. Recognition of interreligious and ethical values

certain common codes of conduct. The Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has made major contributions to global security and economic well-being. It has been remarkably successful in achieving its main goals, and, with nearly 190 parties, has become the most widelyadhered to arms control treaty in history. The NPT is an indispensable tool in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The need for international cooperation

In a world where fundamentalism is rife, a balance must be struck between religious and secular values. Respect and tolerance between religious and other groups to ensure that they treat each other with compassion, equality, forgiveness and dignity by developing the culture of the heart, is needed. There by we can avoid a clash of civilization. Recognition of the importance of multilateralism and multilateral diplomacy For the purpose of managing international peace and security, multilateral cooperation has important advantages over unilateralism. As the turbulent history of the 20th century has demonstrated, unilateralism has often been accompanied by domination, fanaticism and violence. By contrast, multilateralism is based on international dialogue, mutual tolerance and respect, consensus building, the accommodation of interests and values, together with mutual understanding. Multilateralism has become increasingly acceptable to non-state actors, which have a growing influence on the international stage. On a positive note, some of the successful examples of global governance can include the newly formed Peace Building Commission, the International Criminal Court, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These examples demonstrate that the governments of the world, NGOs and civil society have agreed upon

Governments and institutions, which are transparent, democratic and accountable, need to cooperate with NGOs and civil society. With all its weaknesses and need of reform, the UN is one of the best world institutions which has the clout, legitimacy and calibre to solve problems effectively on the world stage. All of these are problems that no one country, however powerful, can solve on its own and are the shared responsibility of humankind. The need for international cooperation has grown stronger, even as new rifts have opened up. Solutions to current security concerns lie in policies that strengthen civilians, rather than militaries; policies that are preventive in nature, and which address the root causes of insecurity. The UN cannot expect to survive this century unless ordinary people throughout the world feel that it helped to protect them against threats. These are global governance issues that fall within the jurisdiction of the organisation. The role of the UN and the goal of global governance is to promote peace and disarmament, protect human rights, and the rule of law. If that can be put adequately into action by leaders and global institutions, then we stand a fair chance of solving the huge security problems of the 21st century.

By: Sarada Somaratne

Monitor | World

Impact Arab Spring: Islamists, Reconstruction & Ethnicity 2011 was the most important year for the Middle East in over a generation. The fall of long-term leaders and the advent of mass protest as a vehicle for change, have transformed the political establishments of the Middle East and North African region (MENA).

the main question asked by many observers of MENA is: What are the real results of the Arab Spring for the region? Indeed, as the spring is now effectively turning into winter, with the momentum that has so far propelled the movements fading, it must be asked what the lasting consequences of this period will be. In many ways the term ‘Arab Spring’ implies that there will be a short window of opportunity for change to occur. Recent events indicate several potential outcomes directly related to or indirectly caused by the Arab Spring.

Amongst these: are the need for the reconstruction of strifeThousands of protestors in Tahrir Square © Ramy Raoof torn societies and governmental structures; the Heralded as the Arab Spring, vociferous rise of religious tension in Egypt; the demands for change swept the region, victory at the electoral polls of Islamist ushering in a bold, new era. In both the parties; and the rise of Turkey as a media and popular discourse the Arab regional power. Spring has been, incorrectly, depicted as a mass, pan-regional movement driven Rebuilding and Restructuring: The Road by similar ideas and motivational factors. to Democratisation However, this is not the case. The Arab Spring is a mosaic of varying factors encompassing several movements that are country-focused rather than panregional in origin. But, the term ‘Arab Spring’ is a useful one. It is an accurate label to describe the overall period in which several, long overdue popular movements aligned with one another. Today, over a year on from the fall of Tunisia’s President Zine Abidine Ben-Ali,

One of the major difficulties facing the Middle East and North Africa in 2012 is physical and governmental restructuring following the collapse of regimes. In a region where one of the major complaints of the protesters was the high rates of unemployment and lack of career opportunities, it is of utmost importance that business and industry is resurrected to provide employment.

Monitor | World A notable example of this is in Libya where months of fighting and aerial bombardment by NATO forces have damaged local businesses, as well as oil production. While the oil production with its international interests has bounced back much more rapidly, the small local businesses have not been as quick. In Tripoli alone it is thought that at least half of the buildings in the main commercial centre will have to be demolished, leading to a further delay before business as normal can resume. Furthermore, Libya is still working on how to divide power and reform government institutions. In the rush to celebrate the fall of Ghaddafi, Libya has tried to cover up the years of one-man rule, renaming streets and excluding those with any connection to the former regime from the new government. However, all of this must be done with due caution, avoiding a post-2003 Iraq scenario. Therefore in the case of Libya, with the National Transitional Council (NTC) announcing a new Constitution and forthcoming elections, one must envisage a very slow but deliberate pace of reform and restructuring. Whilst Libya has returned to a certain degree of stability, one of the most troubling aspects remains the lack of a formal military. Indeed, the militias formed during the uprising are still functioning and armed. However, there have been frequent clashes between rival groups, jostling for influence. Until the militias can be taken off the streets and security provision brought back within a formal structure, complete stability cannot be guaranteed. The lack of career options also means that most of the young men who joined these militias do not want to leave them; yet another top priority for an incoming government.

Libyan protester during a demonstration in Benghazi © AP Photo/Kevin Frayer

With great change, comes major work to rebuild countries affected both physically and institutionally by the Arab Spring. Libya remains a case in point of how; despite the media fanfare regarding the ‘end’ of the civil war, the uprisings and overthrow of dictators are only the beginning. The manner and speed with which reconstruction is enacted will most likely determine the speed with which Libya can recover its economy and step towards participatory government. The Rise of Religious and Ethnic Tensions Paradoxically, the Arab Spring has also seen a sharp rise in ethnic and religiousbased tension. The Middle East has always been home to many religions and sects. However, with the Arab Spring and the fall of long-time rulers, the status quo that many people have lived under in the countries affected has vanished. Consequently, the daily lives of many people in the region have been changed. However, the lives of ethnic or religious minorities within these mainly Muslim majority states have also been impacted. In post-Mubarak Egypt, tensions between Muslims and Coptic Christians have risen. Coptic Christians (or ‘Copts’), are the largest Christian community in Egypt constituting around 10% of the total population with 15 million followers.

Monitor | World

They had long suffered from unofficial discrimination, in terms of governmental jobs and housing; but post-Revolution, the life of an Egyptian Copt has become considerably harder. There have been attacks on Churches and Cathedrals by Islamic fundamentalists, increased tension with Muslim neighbours and a marked increase in Coptic emigration, with 100,000 people leaving for foreign countries. This upsurge in sectarian tension, has led US Commission on International Religious Freedom to request that the State Department puts Egypt on its list of ‘countries of particular concern’, owing to increasing violations of religious freedoms for the Coptic Christians. Matters came to a head in October when the army clashed with Coptic protestors, leaving 24 dead and over 200 injured; a signal that the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces was willing to use violence to suppress dissent from this religious minority. This is cause for concern, for under Mubarak the Copts may have suffered petty discrimination, but they were never subjected to live fire from armed forces.

now hoping that they will have a place of their own in the new Libya. During Ghaddafi's rule, the Amazigh were not allowed to speak their own Tamazight language, nor could they use any traditional Amazigh names for their children. This is now changing, with the reappearance of the Amazigh flag and a radio station playing formerly banned Tamazighet music. Despite these small victories, there is still no formal recognition of a people who make up between 5 and 10% of the Libyan population. How the Libyan TNC will respond to the Amazigh as they continue to rebuild Libya in 2012 will be a real test to see if they guarantee them an equal place in the new Libya. To deliberately leave them out would be a repeat of the policies of the past, failing to create a truly unified Libyan state. In a region plagued by religious and ethnic discord, it is highly important to ensure that the Arab Spring does not herald a new era of persecution for minority groups in Egypt and Libya. This is a key indirect effect of the Arab Spring and must be monitored effectively. Changing Relations: The Impact of Islamist Electoral Victories For many observers it was evident that Islamist parties would undoubtedly greatly benefit in postArab Spring elections. However, with the fall of long-time dictators, the opportunity has arisen for Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Tunisian Ennahada party or in Libya, a redefining of the country’s constitution along non-secular lines, with Sha’riah to be constitutionally enshrined as the source of law.

Protestors in Cairo © Ramy Raoof

However, in post-Revolution Libya, Berbers who were deliberately marginalised under Ghaddafi’s rule, are

Tunisia experienced the early effects of the Arab Spring. The flight of Ben Ali opened up the political scene, discrediting former regime members and

Monitor | World supporters to the extent that, during the consequent elections, Tunisians turned to the Ennahada (Islamic Renaissance) political party, often viewed as moderate Islamists. In the Tunisian elections of last October, Ennahada secured over 40% of the vote, gaining 90 seats in the country’s parliament. Ennahada have promised to uphold Tunisian secularism, thereby hoping to reassure many Tunisians and critical foreign investors. In Egypt the post-Mubarak picture is different. Although the Muslim Brotherhood, committed to guarding Egypt’s secularism, won the majority of the vote with 36%, the runner up was a hard-line Salafist party called Al-Nour with 24%. Although the vote is a threestage process, it is already evident that the Egyptian electorate is split on where to turn, with a majority favouring Islamist parties.

influences the electoral process and makes them appealing to many mainstream voters. Libya is another very interesting case. Following the overthrow of Muammar Ghaddafi, the NTC has started drafting a new constitution for the country, one to be based largely on Sha’riah law. Article One of the Libyan Interim Constitutional Declaration, states that Sha’riah will be the principal source of legislation. In the context of Libya this is entirely expected; Libya has a 99% Sunni-Muslim population, hence after four decades of brutal autocracy the use of familiar and codified Sha’riah law makes sense. For many states, the Arab Spring has brought about a return to the familiar, in some ways ‘safe’ form of legislation, one that has stood the test of time and is not a throwback to a discredited dictator. Therefore, one real consequence of the Arab Spring has been the rise of Islamist parties that may seem alien to the West, where the latter has been used to dealing with largely secular despots. Most people outside the Middle East associate Islamist parties with restriction and religious dogma, but parties such as Ennahada are marrying ideas of a secular tolerance with a progressive Islamist agenda, which in turn appeals to voters. There is no reason why the Arab Spring cannot yield the same idea of an Islamist element in a democracy, as practiced by Turkey’s AK Party. The Rise of Turkey as the New Regional Power

Protesters gathering in Egypt, Libya and Syria © Soerfm

This is not altogether surprising, as Egyptian Islamist parties have a strong grassroots organisational structure, and often provide the closest thing most Egyptians have to a welfare state. This

Throughout the Arab Spring, Turkey stood out for its ongoing leadership within the region and place as invaluable powerbroker. It was engaged as a NATO member during the Libyan campaign and was a vociferous critic of the Mubarak regime during the Egyptian Revolution. During the Syrian uprising, Turkey has consistently led the way both in

Monitor | World

condemnation of the regime in Damascus and in its use of economic sanctions to force the regime into making concessions towards ending the bloodshed. Its contribution to the Arab Spring has been critical, making it possibly the most influential MENA nation during 2011. Turkey has arguably found its voice when faced with the Arab Spring, calling for Mubarak to “satisfy demands for change” during the Egyptian Revolution; a very bold diplomatic move. It also hosts the Syrian National Council, the opposition in exile, hinting that Turkey is investing deeply in the fall in the Assad regime. Indeed, the Syrian case is an excellent example of how the Turkish Government is projecting its power into neighbouring countries; in this instance, it closed off trade with Syria in order to facilitate change. By doing this it adds a moral dimension to its foreign policy to balance an otherwise controversial domestic policy trend, while in the process making it appear very strong externally. Equally, Turkey’s relationship with Israel has changed considerably. In the first instance the withdrawal of its ambassador from Tel Aviv over the Gaza Flotilla incident, sends a clear signal that it intends to be able to follow through with clear action to issues such as this. Turkey will therefore steer a more independent course away from its traditionally US-aligned path. Equally, as Iran increasingly grows in regional importance, Turkey will try and carve out its own regional sphere of influence, especially in the Levantine region of Syria and Lebanon. Therefore, when set against this backdrop, Turkey’s reactions to the Syrian Uprising are entirely logical. Effectively, the Arab Spring has seen Turkey emerge fully from its shell and seeks to make a significant and unique

mark upon the Middle East. Turkey is now the rising Middle Eastern power. It is fair to argue that the Arab Spring has facilitated its rise as a regional power, becoming both an invaluable NATO member and a country that is able to implement and organise its own agenda. This, more than anything, is probably the strongest indication of the lasting, panregional effects of the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring: A Lasting Legacy? In one of the most dramatic years that the Arab world has seen, rulers have been toppled and the people have taken control of the streets, thereby changing the face of the region. Profound change, however, brings about profound consequences. New governments are still in their infancy and those that have had elections are creating new national balances of power as they have been mostly Islamist, and not the generally secular leaders of prior regimes. Sha’riah law is also increasingly seen as the law source of choice, perhaps heralding a return to what is safe and familiar, instead of the dictatorial rule that dominated for so many years. Turkey, though not a participant per se in the Arab Spring, is also one to watch as it is on the rise as a new regional power; even more so because of the uprisings. None of the challenges that face the Middle East post-Arab Spring are insurmountable, but they are critical. Now that the heady days of protest are finished, those who protested in their thousands must turn their energy towards making sure the demands they fought for are met, and that the participatory governments they asked for are created in a way that does not marginalise sections of the population. Their unity brought the Arab Spring to where it is now.

By: Leah Schmidt & William Bauer

Monitor | World

The Emerging Threat Of AQIM: An Overview Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged in response to the Algerian Government’s effective counterterrorism efforts following Algeria’s civil war of the 1990s. Following the successful dismantling and reintegration of the Algerian Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the remnants of radical Islamist groups in Algeria sought greater transnational cooperation in the Maghreb, Europe and the Sahara-Sahel Region.

However, its propaganda indicates that it intends to rid North Africa and the Sahara of governments that it views as being insufficiently Islamic, together with foreigners, especially French and United States (US) citizens. Individuals held hostage by AQIM and later released have testified that their captors were “wholly committed” to AQIM’s aim of creating an Islamic caliphate encompassing the Muslim lands of Africa and the Middle East.

This resulted in the resurrection, in January 2007, of the GSPC as AQIM, following the September 2006 announcement that GSPC had joined alQaida (AQ) to “lead the fight in the Maghreb”. Despite this, AQIM, together with significant presences in Algeria and Mauritania, which are within the Maghreb, also operates in the Sahel states of Mali, Niger and Chad. Security forces have clashed with terrorists numerous times in the North of Niger © Magharebia

In spite of significant Algerian military pressure, AQIM is still based in Algeria’s Tizi Ouzou region. AQIM continues to coordinate its activities through a centralised shura council which includes emirs responsible for matters including military affairs, finance, religious propagation, communications and propaganda. Although estimates vary, it is thought that AQIM’s overall strength is approximately 1,000 personnel. Some analysts argue that it is difficult to accurately assess AQIM’s ideological motivation.

AQIM Tactics and the Scope of the Threat it Poses AQIM utilises several tactics including suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices, kidnapping and assassination. Between February 2003 and April 2011, AQIM and its predecessor the GSPC, executed 31 major operations and caused 253 fatalities. The kidnapping of individuals for ransom is particularly profitable. Estimates indicate this has generated $70 million since 2006. AQIM’s targets have included African

Monitor | World

civilians and government officials, together with United Nations (UN) diplomats and Western embassies, together with foreign tourists, aid workers and private contractors. The scope of AQIM’s presence and cross-border activities in and potentially beyond the Sahel and Maghreb demonstrate the threat that it constitutes. For example, in 2010 indications that AQIM aimed to kidnap a Western national in northern Burkina Faso prompted the evacuation of US Peace Corps volunteers. Also, although AQIM hostages are usually moved to Mali following their seizure, the kidnapping operations often take place in Tunisia or Niger. Mauritania has experienced several AQIM operations since 2007.

The potential threat that AQIM poses to Europe should also be acknowledged. AQIM continues to threaten attacks on Western countries, especially France and Spain. In July 2010 French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared war on AQIM. It reciprocated by declaring war on France, which supports partner states confronting AQIM in the Maghreb and Sahel. AQIM and AQ’s senior leadership have declared their intention to restore al-Andalus, the historically Muslim area of the Iberian Peninsula. AQIM may have facilitation networks in Europe, as a number of these were maintained by its predecessor organisation, the GSPC. Therefore, support networks for AQIM operations in Europe might already exist.

The scope of AQIM’s cross-border transnational operations was demonstrated September 2010, when just days after AQIM carried out several kidnappings in Niger, AQIM militants engaged Mauritanian troops 1,200 kilometres west of the location of these Mauritanian army repels al-Qaida attack © Magharebia events. Mauritanian AQIM and Other Islamist Terrorist forces then pursued a mobile AQIM Groups: Potential Expansion convoy into northern Mali. Furthermore, AQIM may be willing to attack African targets outside its usual area of activity, thus demonstrating a potential expansion in the geographic scope of the threat it poses. This could be especially true of targets thought to be symbolic of the US or Western European countries. For example, in April 2010, an AQIM posting on a jihadi website threatened an attack on the USEngland football match during the FIFA World Cup in South Africa.

Despite an increase in the frequency of its operations, AQIM has arguably failed to become a trans-Sahara ‘umbrella’ organisation for Islamist terrorist groups. However, AQIM’s aim to continue expanding its operations and influence across the Maghreb and Sahel would, if successful, allow it to recruit former members of earlier Islamist terrorist groups.

Monitor | World

often indirect, and restricted to levying taxes on smuggling operations which cross AQIM territory, this link could give AQIM access to the smuggling routes that transit Mauritania, Mali and Algeria. These could then be used to covertly move personnel and material in order to support either newly-formed AQIM groups in Morocco, or a resurgent Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group. Morocco breaks up al-Qaida cell © Magharebia

These now-defunct organisations include the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, the Tunisian Islamic Front and the Mauritanian Group for Preaching and Jihad. Although these groups have been largely suppressed by North African governments, the drivers of radicalization that attracted individuals to them, such as poverty and political marginalisation have never been satisfactorily addressed. AQIM could, if the scope of its activities continually increases, absorb the remnants of these groups and become an ‘umbrella’ terrorist organisation in their former operational areas. AQIM’s current access to drug trafficking routes in north-west Africa may prove logistically useful to it in working with the remnants of the aforementioned Islamist terrorist groups, particularly the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, whether to resurrect these groups as local partners or to absorb their remaining personnel. The ‘Cocaine For Arms’ smuggling route, beginning in South America and entering Africa through Guinea Bissau, transits Mauritania, Mali and Algeria, which all contain significant AQIM elements, before entering Europe via Morocco and Algeria. Although AQIM’s links with drug trafficking syndicates are

The increasing unemployment and rising prices of basic commodities in Morocco could aid recruitment to such organisations, as poverty is a recognised driver of radicalisation. At least one attempt by the Moroccan ‘Al Battar’ network to join AQIM in order to receive terrorist training and access to weapons, thus providing the former with the ability to carry out terrorist attacks in Morocco has already been disrupted, in September 2011. AQIM and Drug Trafficking Despite its sometimes tenuous links with drug trafficking syndicates, AQIM could potentially generate significant revenue from the illegal drug trade in north-west and North Africa. For example Moroccan authorities recently arrested 34 individuals attempting to smuggle 600 kilograms of cocaine destined for Europe from Algeria and Mauritania. These individuals included AQIM members based in northern Mali, which has become a storage point for much of the cocaine transiting the region. Estimates indicate that had this cocaine been sold at wholesale prices in Europe, it would have generated $60 million profit. This demonstrates that AQIM, through its links with drug trafficking syndicates, can acquire significant

Monitor | World

operational funding, thereby maintaining the threat that it poses. Additionally, networks which could support AQIM operations in Europe may already be in place, as a number of these were known to have been maintained by its predecessor, the GSPC. Therefore, if, as the available evidence indicates, AQIM has access to drug trafficking routes which terminate in Europe, it could use these to provide covert support to and maintain links with its European networks.

original objective, concerns persist that AQIM, an affiliate of AQ, may still be able to provide training, operational, and recruitment support to the remnants of LIFG. The provision of such support would almost certainly extend AQIM’s influence into Libya. The original decision by LIFG to join AQ was taken without the agreement of the majority of LIFG’s ruling council. Therefore, a minority of LIFG’s members may still be willing to receive AQIM support and to help facilitate the latter’s activities in Libya. As of March 2011, 500-600 of LIFG’s members had been released from prison. Even if only a tiny percentage of these individuals are willing to cooperate with AQIM, they could still provide the organisation with the basis for future Libyan operations. The fact that Libya borders Algeria, which houses a key AQIM base, could only aid such operations.

Libyan NTC fighters claim Bani Walid © Magharebia

AQIM and Libya Although it is too early to assess the effect of the 2011 overthrow of the Gaddafi Regime on AQIM, it is likely that its influence in Libya will increase during the foreseeable future. During the Libyan Uprising, the African media reported that links between the Libyan insurgents and AQIM were developing. AQ’s former links with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG; renamed as the Libyan Islamic Movement in 2011) could also benefit AQIM. In November 2007 it was announced that the LIFG, which originally emerged in 1995 with the objective of overthrowing the government of Colonel Gaddafi, had joined AQ. LIFG officially severed this link in July 2009. Despite the formal separation of LIFG from AQ, and the redundancy of its

Additionally, weapons acquired by AQIM in Libya during the unrest which preceded the overthrow of the Gaddafi Regime could allow it to mount larger and more destructive operations than it has previously carried out. According to Robert Fowler, a former UN special envoy to Niger and AQIM captive for four months during 2008-2009, AQIM has acquired 20,000 shoulder-launched SA-24 missiles, heavy mortars, artillery, and thousands of anti-tank mines. AQIM’s Community Links AQIM has been increasing its influence by forming close links with remote Sahelian communities. Marriage between AQIM members and locals has often proved effective in ensuring strong AQIM links to such communities. The marriage of Mokthar Belmokhtar, an Algerian AQIM leader, to the daughter of one of the chiefs of the Arab Barabicha tribe in northern Mali, consolidated

Monitor | World Belmokhtar’s growing ties with nomadic tribes that run local smuggling routes. Links such as this could allow AQIM to utilise pre-existing smuggling networks to move personnel and material both within and beyond Mali’s borders, thereby maintaining physical links between individual AQIM groups. This would increase AQIM’s ability to act as a genuinely cross-border and transnational terrorist organisation, thus increasing the scope of the threat that it poses.

due to “economic under-development and the absence of meaningful administration, the resentment of the local population is getting stronger and stronger” in north-western Chad. Although AQIM does not have a base of operations or a significant presence in Chad, the fact that it is active in the west of the country and that it utilises economic stagnation to increase the scope of its influence, should definitely be cause for alarm.

Additionally, the maintenance by AQIM of strong links with local communities could be utilised to provide ’safe havens’ for equipment and personnel, thereby allowing AQIM to maintain an operational presence in the relevant areas. Economic factors are also aiding the geographic expansion of AQIM’s influence. AQIM’s illegal activities generate income and job opportunities for individuals and communities in the Sahel. Representatives of numerous Sahelian Tuareg communities have admitted that declining economic and employment opportunities are “driving some into the arms of AQIM”. The fact that “small numbers” of Tuareg and other Sahelian tribal militants have joined AQIM confirms this. The worsening economic situation in the Sahel has largely, according to some analysts, been created by AQIM’s lowlevel terrorist attacks and criminal activities in the region. For example, AQIM kidnappings have prompted a decline in Sahelian tourism. Within the last year, concerns have been expressed that north-western Chad will become the next Sahelian area in which criminal and terrorist influence will increase due to limited economic opportunities. Saad Adoum, the International Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for Central Africa, has noted that

Celebrations may be short-lived if AQIM grabs a foothold in the region © Magharebia

The Reality of the Threat The available evidence indicates that AQIM constitutes a genuine threat. AQIM is able to operate across national boundaries throughout the Sahel and Maghreb regions, and is constantly expanding and entrenching its influence in these areas. Under current conditions, it could potentially extend its reach still further, into Morocco, Chad, and possibly Libya. AQIM’s intent and probable ability to attack Europe cannot be ignored. The probability that links will develop between AQIM, al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and Boko Haram in Nigeria must also be taken seriously.

By: Jonathan Lautier

Monitor | Book Review

SIRS Book Review: The Al Qaeda Factor Finally, something we have needed for over a decade: an effective template to empirically compare one major terrorist plot to another. For academics or students of intelligence, security or war studies, this is a core text that will surely be an asset to any essay or dissertation. Within the next year, this book will feature on shortlists of compulsory purchases when starting any relevant courses.

By Mitchell D. Silber – Director of Intelligence Analysis, New York Police Department ISBN 978-0-8122-4402-1 In case you haven’t yet heard, the NYPD’s Director of Intelligence Analysis, Mitchell D. Silber, has written a tour-de-force on al-Qaeda’s evolution over the past two decades. In this landmark work, he demonstrates that the core of Al Qaeda does not centrally control the current threat, and proves (with abundant primary evidence) therefore that the death of Usama bin Laden has limited impact on the day-to-day threat faced by the West. He does this in the most practically effective way possible: by painstakingly analysing the operational cycle of 16 key Al Qaeda-associated plots and attacks against the West. Specifically, he considered the following criteria: target selection, casing, logistics, communications and weaponisation.

For practitioners, this is even more an essential purchase. Silber’s assessments may be applied to other terrorist organisations or subversive groups such as Anonymous, who are made up of individuals who participate in action under a single brand. Silber set the parameters of his work perfectly, without falling into the temptation of ‘mission creep’ through covering the many additional angles or tangents of other terrorist groups. The Al Qaeda Factor deals a knockout blow to any stereotypical assertion that America misunderstands the terrorist threat. This is the single most practically useful point of reference on Al Qaeda to date. Given the fresh objective rigour that Silber has applied in this work, we can only impatiently hope that this will not be his last. In particular, we believe he might be the best possible author of a future analysis on the ‘lone wolf’ threat and their case study plots… and so we begin waiting.

By: Christian Cullen

Monitor | World

Obama: Does His Foreign Policy Match The Rhetoric? ‘If other states were to claim the broad-based authority that the United States does-to kill people anywhere, anytime-the result would be chaos." Philip Alston, former UN special rapporteur The incumbent Obama is up for reelection soon, and what better time to assess his foreign policy contributions. When Obama took over from Bush in 2009 popular opinion held that significant policy changes would be implemented. But have Obama’s policies on issues such as civil liberties and the ‘War on Terror’ lived up to his initial rhetoric?

this threat and signed the act. This act is a reaffirmation of the original 2001 authorisation for the Use of Military Force, which was hurriedly signed off by Bush shortly after the 9/11 attacks. The new act extends the United States’ right to the ‘indefinite detention in military custody of US citizens who are suspected of having "substantially supported" al-Qaida, the Taliban or "associated forces" – and makes such detention mandatory for foreign nationals who are accused of having links to al-Qaida.’ Opponents of this new act – of which there are many – argue that this is an even worse attack on civil liberties than the original Patriot Act. This new act was a response to growing concerns over the legality of America’s targeted killings. As the original 2001 act stated that the US could peruse, detain and kill - without due process – those linked to 9/11, the wording of the legislation was in need of changes.

President Obama has only recently acknowledged precision drone strikes

When elected, Obama promised an end to what he described as Bush’s attack on civil liberties, both at home and abroad. However, many would argue that Obama has not only preserved the status quo regarding issues such as Guantanamo bay (the detention centre for terror suspects that he failed to close down) but has advanced policies that he himself stood against - including the use of detention centres and drone attacks. Indeed, such issues are of timely significance, as in December last year Obama signed the ‘National Defence Authorisation Act of 2012’ – a piece of legislation he initially threatened with his veto: However, Obama later rescinded

The original understanding was that alQaida was a large, centrally-controlled organisation. After the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, it became clear that the US had drastically over emphasised the power and scope of Bin Laden’s ‘alQaida.’ Academics have highlighted the growing threat of homegrown terrorism – a much more tangible threat to national security in the West, particularly in Britain – for the true threat is the ideology itself.

Monitor | World

Islamist terrorism is spread, not from ‘the base,’ (the literal translation of al Qaida) but, rather, the radical Islamist message filters through networks loosely connected by the global media – particularly the internet. Part of Obama’s allure was his apparent moderation, but this has not permeated his foreign policy. Nor has it dented the misconceptions in the US regarding the nature of the Islamist threat. The al Qaida message, Bin Laden’s myth was based on the idea that the US was a demonic power. Surely by advocating the use of drone attacks and targeted killings Obama is simply supporting this myth. Regardless of this, the new 2012 act has distanced itself with al-Qaida and the 9/11 plot, not in response to growing concerns over domestic terrorism, but to legalise their wider ambitions in the Middle East. It seems that, indeed, US foreign activities have strayed significantly over the past ten years. And by classifying all terrorist activities or affiliations with terrorists as an act of war, the new legislation has allowed the US to continue pursuing and detaining US civilians or foreign nationals, even legislating the contentious use of drone strikes inside foreign states – a policy which Obama has backed. Even overlooking the deaths of many innocents, one would argue that such actions are counterproductive and damaging to international relations. When Obama took office, the world expected a more moderate foreign

policy, based on diplomacy and dialogue. Recently, commentators and analysts have predicted that an invasion of Iran is likely, with relations between the US and Tehran at an all-time low. The Iranian plan to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the US, and the spate of car bombings that have killed Iran’s nuclear physicists have added to the hostilities. Indeed, while many have been arguing the case for and against the US attacking Iran’s nuclear programme, it seems that a covert war may have already begun in Iran. Many have stated that the US is surely involved, as is Israel, in the recent assassinations of Iran’s scientists. This new chapter is another example of the breadth of America’s ‘War on Terror’.

President Obama addressing Congress

As many in the intelligence arena particularly the Central Intelligence Agency - stated before and after 9/11, the threat from radical fundamental Islamic terrorism in the West is minute. The US Government, it seems, has begun to believe its own myths, leading the country further in this direction, and even Obama looks powerless to resist the trend.

By: Edward Hunt

Monitor | World

How Could The World Be Made More Secure in 2012? ‘…the six major categories of threats the world will confront in the decades ahead: [will be] war within states; war between states; weapons proliferation; terrorism; organised crime; and…the human security threats posed by poverty, disease and environmental crisis.’ Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group Weapons of Mass Destruction overshadow the entire globe as a short term threat, and their removal is needed. With a few states “allowed” them, and others desiring to produce them, there needs to be proper control and limitation. This is due to the fact that the threat of their use, or even their falling into undesirable hands, will continue to rise and make the world less secure. Poverty and hunger also cause long term issues for global security. Both elements can cause large-scale migration to neighbouring states and further afield causing destabilisation. Trying to alleviate poverty will help reduce some of its long term effects and make countries more stable, thereby improving regional and global security. As early economists believed, allowing trade links to open will create friendlier links between nations and prevent clashes. This in turn could prevent mass migration, and also limit the chances of extremist groups growing in collapsed states.

as the most important entity and not the individual. Poverty and hunger affects the individual. However poverty and hunger on an individual basis has other repercussions that can make the world less secure. A scarcity of jobs can lead to large-scale migration as individuals relocate in order to find work. Such migration can cause a destabilisation of regions and countries surrounding the migrants’ homeland. It is often the skilled workers who leave the country. In the developed world immigrants, often illegal, can cause problems due to exploitation and crime. These may not be as obvious a threat to security as nuclear weapons as they are more long term than constituting an immediate or short term threat.

Poverty and Hunger Poverty and hunger are not issues that cause serious problems in the Refugee children in Sam Ouandja next to their temporary shelter © Nicolas Rost developed world and are often overlooked by realist thinkers. During the famine in Ethiopia ‘…the This is due to realism seeing the state grain was sold to those who could afford

Monitor | World

it and those with greater political clout – people in the cities, and the army.’ (Jackson 1994) This lead to mass starvation as those with money could afford the food.

some of the food produced can be kept aside to feed the population – reducing the issue of hunger whilst also generating capital. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The current options for dealing with the issue of poverty and hunger need to change. Funds given by the likes of the World Bank need to be done so far more carefully. Often pouring in money to a government does not reach those who need it the most. To counter poverty growth is needed; therefore free trade should be a practise states adopt universally. Johan Norberg states ‘it is in places where prosperity has grown fastest that poverty has been most effectively combated.’ Norberg attributes this to ‘…continuing, preferably faster, economic growth.’

‘Conflicts in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East seem to indicate that mankind is quite capable of perpetuating conventional warfare without allowing it to escalate into self-defeating nuclear exchange.’(Pitt 1970) Nuclear weapons rely on the Mutually Assured Destruction theorem which has prevented their use in war. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat to global security.

The heavy subsidies given to EU farmers put farmers in the developing world completely out of the market. They cannot afford to sell their produce, even though it would be far cheaper to produce. The mercantilist view adopted by many realists has to change if poverty is going to be dealt with. A liberalist view is required for Africa. Individuals need money and food, a comparative advantage is required. When agriculture is heavily subsidised, this is not a comparative advantage. Frances Moore Lappé and Joseph Collins, however, do not agree with this idea. Because developing countries may have a comparative advantage in food production ‘fruits, vegetables, coffee, feed grain, sugar, meat, and so on are shipped out of the third world…’ This is where funding and trade liberalisation are needed most. It is true that more food may be exported, as that is where the comparative advantage lies, however giving an initial funding boost to get things rolling will mean

Peacekeeper Intercontinental Balistic Missle

The realist paradigm can be used to explain the rationale for producing and holding such weapons. Realists believe in power and security to maintain their country’s position. Lantis states that ‘there are two primary reasons why countries build weapons of mass destruction: security and prestige.’

Monitor | World Today seven countries admit to having nuclear weapons, and at least one other is presumed to have them. The countries in question are all dominant in world politics, five of them sitting as the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Having nuclear weapons certainly makes them seem more powerful.

nuclear powers. This treaty has clearly failed in its main objective. Survival is the key. Nuclear weapons assure such survival. States often termed as rogue by those who have issues with them, feel they need protection. The best way to obtain such protection is to become a nuclear power. This gives them the security and prestige Lantis spoke of. Realism is not the paradigm to reach a conclusion with. Realist countries need to understand that other states have the same idea of power and security. If they can see this, then removing potential clashes between the two would result in a more secure environment for them to operate in. Also, realists need to stop thinking on the state level, and more on the individual level. Rather than sticking to set guidelines on how to help, individual responses are needed for each country.

Iran’s President Ahmadinejad has come under increasing scrutiny © Parmida Rahimi

Realism the Right Paradigm? States such as Iran and North Korea are still accused of trying to acquire nuclear capabilities. Both countries have received widespread criticism. Yet this criticism is not entirely deserved. Those criticising are nuclear powers themselves. They have nuclear weapons, and clearly feel some security in this. As the Canberra Commission put it ‘…states that possess them [nuclear weapons] become themselves targets of nuclear weapons.’ The Non-proliferation Treaty was an attempt to stop nuclear weapons spreading beyond the five original

Each country that is suffering with poverty needs its own plan to address the issue. This will require more time and thinking, and perhaps money, however doing it properly would mean less issues in the future and, for African nations in particular, not having to rely on food and financial aid. Free trade is an option for pulling countries out from poverty, thus enabling them to become more secure as each state would be capable of helping its populace and work of functioning as a state should. Importantly, where financial assistance is needed, this should be tailored to each country. Dealing with poverty will help reduce dissatisfaction, destabilisation and migration, and therefore the security threats linked to these issues.

By: CET Glassford

Monitor | World

IEDs - Terrorist Weapon Of Choice “The greatest producer of casualties on the battlefield in the 20th century was artillery, and my assessment is the IED is the artillery of the 21st century." Lt. Gen Michael Barbero, Director of US JIEDDO The improvised explosive device (IED) continues as the main weapon of terrorism, in both civilian and military arenas. The IED or homemade bomb – any explosive device that is not manufactured according to a military specification – has a longer history than the media would have us believe. The Irish Fenians used dynamite after its invention by Alfred Nobel in 1863 as the first stable explosive for homemade devices. In World War I, T.E. Lawrence used railway and roadside bombs to disrupt Turkish supply routes and create "an uncertain terror for the enemy". In World War II the IED came into its own: resistance movements and Britain’s Special Operations Executive used command-wire, grenades, shaped charges and mines to derail German trains and sabotage bridges and facilities.

today’s groups, which utilise the IRA’s methods. In the 21st century, security, intelligence and armed forces around the world are facing increasingly unpredictable threats and varied levels of expertise and capability in IED deployment by terrorist and insurgency groups. Supply chains for explosives and components stretch beyond borders and sometimes whole continents, with increasing avoidance of detection of materials and emplacement.

Troops need to be ‘situationally’ aware of the IED threat as well as well as skilled in the use of their gear © US ARMY

In the Vietnam War IEDs caused a third of all US casualties. From 1970 the Provisional IRA provided a 30-year master class on IEDs and their TTPs (techniques, tactics and procedures) became the textbook template for

Nation states, most notably Iran and Pakistan, support and provide succour for insurgents as well as the means to build and deploy IEDs. Despite the elimination of several Al Qaeda (AQ) leaders their affiliates and other jihadiinspired groups remain high on the threat list in several unstable countries undergoing uprisings and tumultuous change. Additionally, other extremist

Monitor | World groups and individuals, as well as criminal elements, are increasingly turning to IEDs in multiple forms to cause mayhem and threaten and destroy their enemies.

from Pakistan – mainly from the Pakarab factory in Multan, Punjab, which makes 350,000 metric tons a year - over unpoliced border areas. Three-quarters of Taliban IEDs are made from CAN. The Taliban have extensive local and transnational supply chains, using informal money transfers for locally available commercial chemicals and components from legitimate suppliers. But as the AQ connection has been largely broken by US drone attacks, the explosives supply shortfall is being filled by supplies of new, more powerful militarygrade explosive manufactured in Pakistan.

The aftermath of an IED © US Army

Afghanistan – simple, crude, plentiful In 2010 and 2011 over half of all fatalities in Afghanistan were from IEDs, and suicide attacks against civilians are growing. The Taliban and Al-Haqqani network continue to deploy around 1,000 a month, despite aerial surveillance and other countermeasures. Simple, crude booby trapped bombs with pressure plates are made of wood and easily disguised materials; and plastic rather than metal components, which are difficult to detect in minesweeping operations. Clearing routes, villages and other areas of hidden IEDs takes many hours with a constant ongoing need for bomb disposal skills, and attacks on convoys threaten supplies. Potassium chlorate (from fireworks suppliers) and ammonium nitrate (AN) also combined with diesel fuel (ANFO) are the main explosives used. CAN (calcium ammonium nitrate) is trucked in

This may have powered a vehicle-borne IED attack on Rhino in Kabul in October 2011 in which 12 US soldiers, a Canadian soldier and four Afghans died. Some 3 kg is said to be as powerful as 20 kg of more conventional explosives.

ANNUAL IED BLASTS TOP

16,000 

The number of makeshift bombs that were cleared or detonated in Afghanistan increased by 9% from 15,225 in 2010 to 16,554 in 2011



There were 9,304 IED events in 2009



Afghans killed or wounded by such bombs increased 10% in 2011 over the previous year.



More than 4,000 civilians were killed or injured in IED blasts during 2011

Monitor | World

Two soldiers hand search for IEDs - arguably the most dangerous and intensive aspect of EOD tours of duty © US Army

The Taliban now have access to legacy munitions as mortar shells or old mines. Big IEDs are increasing – over 500kg set off by trip wire or pressure plate can tip over protected armoured vehicles. A massive truck bombing in September 2011 injured 80 US soldiers and killed five Afghans at an outpost 60 km from Kabul followed by co-ordinated strikes two days later on NATO HQ and the US Embassy. Iran is supplying the Taliban with explosives, detonators, and advanced shaped IEDs such as explosively formed projectiles or penetrators (EFPs), and rockets disguised as old Soviet rockets, with Iranian-made fuses. Weapons intelligence units and intelligence services are tasked with interdicting the supply and apprehending the suppliers to close them down and disrupt the flow. This involves international multi-agency cooperation as the networks straddle borders and involve front companies and third-party shipments across countries and, sometimes, continents.

Taliban TTPs The Taliban and Haqqani networks vary their TTPs to counter ISAF measures. Troops are watched and IEDs planted accordingly. Not only are roadside IEDs heavily disguised, but person-borne IEDs (PBIEDs) – suicide bombs – are being hidden in turbans. Such a device killed former Afghan President Rabbani on 20 October 2011. As US night raids drive insurgent leaders further into border areas, retreating Taliban are planting booby-trapped IEDs in villages, which are demolished by ISAF troops. Many PBIED attacks are by infiltrators into the Afghan Army and Security forces. On 5 April 2011 a Taliban suicide bomber in police uniform entered Kandahar Police HQ, waited until the police chief appeared then detonated himself killing the chief and two others. There are more attacks in cities, making it difficult for NATO air response, such as a rocket attack by Haqqanis on the US Embassy in Kabul last September.

Monitor | World

The Pakistan connection

Iraq and the RCIED

Sectarian civilian PBIED attacks by Pakistani Taliban have increased, and the Haqqani network operating out of North Waziristan Pakistan is targeting troops, Afghan civilians and police officers, using intelligence gained on their targets. The Pakistani ISI (InterServices Intelligence) is known to be sheltering insurgents. In Pakistan, IEDs have killed 2,000 people, including at least 1,000 soldiers, since August 2010.

Having been perfected by the IRA, radio-controlled IEDs (RCIEDs) emerged in the Iraqi post-invasion insurgency. By transmitting a radio signal to a modified receiver within the IED, a terrorist can detonate it either instantly from a distance – with the bomber well out of the way and unseen – or as a timed device. In Iraq hundreds of legacy 155-mm artillery shells could be set off by a signal from cheap, openly sold household gadgets: key-fob car alarm switches, garage door openers, wireless doorbell buzzers – anything which sends a signal to a receiver within the IED to initiate the explosion.

In Dec 2011 in Karachi four blasts were from remotely detonated unidirectional roadside IEDs, in which the direction of the blast is controlled to enhance damage to the target area. The technology is imported from the Taliban, using the same explosives – so a kind of ‘revolving door’ of attack M.O. exists between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Then came the most ubiquitous initiator of all - the mobile phone - in every local cell network. Mobiles are also used as timing devices, as in the Madrid 2004 bombings. Electronic countermeasures (ECM) - jamming systems - have to be constantly updated, as bombers quickly learn how to circumvent the ECM. The US Joint IED Defeat Organisation (JIEDDO) has spent upwards of $6 billion on ECM. Then the insurgents used bandwidths beyond the jamming range. ECM systems must also counter very low signals and detecting devices against a lot of background noise, especially in urban areas.

U.S. and Iraqi soldiers display ‘sticky IEDs’- magnetic bombs that militants attach to vehicles - found during a raid at a checkpoint near the Iraq-Iran border © NPR

Some attacks have targeted nuclear weapons storage facilities, as when Pakistani Taliban suicide bombers blew up entry points to the main armament complex at a nuclear components facility in the Wah Cantonment Ordnance Complex, in August 2008.

Passive infrared (PIR) triggers also pioneered by the IRA (and used by their current dissident offshoots) have been widely deployed in Iraq t trigger roadside IEDs when a convoy passes by and breaks the infrared beam. The PIR signal cannot be jammed electronically as it does not use radio frequencies as a trigger.

Monitor | World

The catch-up game of insurgents vs. countermeasures is exemplified by the USA’s attempts to counter PIR initiation. When they introduced heat decoys to trigger the PIR without damaging passing vehicles, insurgents adjusted the firing angle to make the explosive slug hit 2-3m behind the heat decoy. And in early 2010 Afghan insurgents brought in a new PIR - dubbed the ‘Black Cat’, which incorporated a motion detector adapted to detect the passing ECM sweep ‘bubble’ and to detonate only at that moment. Emerging conflict areas Global terrorist IED incidents outside Iraq and Afghanistan are reaching around 300 per month, including detonations and discovery of intact devices. According to the US Department of Defense, from 2008 to 2011 IED numbers outside Afghanistan and Iraq more than doubled. From January to Sept 2011 there were 367 attacks in the US and 608 a month in 99 other countries.

P.I.E.S

using improvised explosives in suicide car and motorcycle bombs. In only one week in January 185 people were killed in bomb attacks, and in two days in January Nigerian police recovered more than 100 IEDs in Kano, including eight in an abandoned car. Boko Haram has advanced its TTPs from throwing dynamite sticks on a simple time fuse at police stations to deploying a suicide VBIED which destroyed as many as 40 vehicles in a car park. This rapid increase in expertise indicates collaboration with other jihadi groups. Amidst a worsening situation in Syria, with over 3,000 killed as of mid-January, the first IED attacks were described by Western officials as professional operations employing military highexplosives used by jihadi groups in Iraq and elsewhere. Syrian officials blame AQ for the attacks, such as two huge explosions in Damascus on 23 December, which killed 40 and injured 100. But the opposition Syrian National Council questioned the provenance of the attacks because they occurred in heavily secured areas.

Power - Initiator - Explosive - Switch

 Initiator, switch, main charge, power source, and a container  Additional “enhancements” – shrapnel: nails, glass, ball bearings Uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa mean legacy explosives, weapons and ammunition are becoming available to all-comers (as they did in Iraq), including stocks of weapons-grade chemicals, most notably mustard and nerve agent at five facilities in Syria. In Nigeria – already a violent country the campaign by the Islamist sect Boko Haram intensified throughout 2011,

In every unstable or insurgent arena, the IED will make its blood-soaked mark. In all its hydra-headed form it will likely continue to be the weapon of choice for terrorists planning civilian-based attacks as well as by insurgents and revolutionaries. Apart from political solutions to terrorism and the unbelievably courageous acts of the many brave men and women who dismantle the devices, efforts to prevent loss of life and limb of troops and civilians depend on breaking the networks which feed the terrorists the means by which they build and emplace the tools of their deadly trade.

By: Dr Andy Oppenheimer

Monitor | China Special

China in Afghanistan... Valuable Ally Or Emerging Threat? Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s attempt to build an Afghanistan with American democratic characteristics and Chinese economic dynamism highlights the delicate positioning at play, whereby Afghanistan is subjected to different and sometimes contradictory foreign influences. Indeed, while the US is the biggest player in Afghanistan, China is also preparing to assume a long-term role in the country. In fact, the Chinese Metallurgical Corporation’s successful bid on the Anyak copper mine in Logar province, worth USD4 billion, made China the largest single foreign investor in the Afghanistan’s history. This made the West shudder by reminding it how powerful - and potentially threatening – a neighbour the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is.

Since 2001, China’s involvement in the country shifted from disinterest to evergrowing investments in Afghanistan’s infrastructures, mineral wealth and agriculture. However, its expanding commercial interests are deeply controversial because of their political reach. Indeed, China, which has gained control of strategic assets without firing a single bullet, has been accused of free-riding on the stability provided by the American troops in order to secure access to natural resources. In fact, American troops not only bring general security to the Logar province, but they have also trained the 1,500 Afghan National Police soldiers who are directly protecting the local infrastructure. This behaviour is perceived as unacceptable because of China’s refusal to share the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’s burden.

Monitor | China Special

U.S. Army soldiers and a platoon of the Afghan National Army prepare for a mission in the Pole-Elam district, Logar province, Afghanistan © Sgt. Russell Gilchrest

Indeed, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Mr Gang, made it clear that it is “out of the question to send Chinese troops (...) in Afghanistan” and discounted NATO’s request to use the Wakhan corridor for logistical supplies. This is interpreted as an indirect confrontation with US interests and goals in the region; and viewed with suspicion by the West. Arguably, it is assumed that there is a correlation between increased economic power and amplified political weight; that is to say that because China expands its economic assets in Afghanistan, it will inevitably also increase its political influence. Some indeed fear that China’s business activities in Afghanistan and Central Asia could alter the balance of power in areas vital to the US’s strategic interests. By shunning away from any major security role and distancing itself from ISAF, China conveys the image of a profit-focussed actor who utilises its powerful national companies to expand influence in Afghanistan and who doesn’t balk at dealing with rogue actors.

While China benefits from the US tackling transnational Islamic terrorism, it also adopts a very cautious and balanced diplomacy with both the United States and the Taliban. Being a direct target of terrorist activities because of its policy on Xinjiang’s Muslim minority, and Anyak being located in a potentially Talibancontrolled area, China is in effect willing to compromise with all regional actors to maintain stability. However, the depiction of China’s involvement in Afghanistan and the wider region as a threat to Western interests is biased by the widespread “China Threat theory” which impregnates Western analysis. Because Western interpretations of China’s role in Afghanistan derives from the way the West sees China –as a threat – and the way it sees itself – as liberal and benevolent – it is fair to assume that an examination of the Chinese discourse is needed in order to grasp the other side of the story.

Monitor | China Special

Afghanistan and the Direct Investment Model – The Chinese narrative

appealing because it allows them to prioritize economic development.

What distinguishes China from other actors in the Afghan reconstruction is its outstanding ability to project funds into unstable and high-risk areas. Indeed, its national companies have the capability to deal with risks associated with investing in remote and insecure regions into which Western companies cannot – as yet penetrate. The China Metallurgical Group, by accepting the risks associated with such investment and adding incentives like the building of infrastructures – power plant, hospital, Mosque – outbid the West.

This strategy has been criticized in the West because it is seen as providing support for authoritarian regimes; but, so far, it seems more successful in bringing stability to war-torn countries than Western humanitarian and counterinsurgency missions. Based on successful results in Africa, this macrolevel system will have a positive impact on Afghan stability in that it will promote a virtuous circle of economic development in the wider region – Central Asia, Xinjiang, Afghanistan – and will reduce Afghanistan’s dependence on international aid, therefore advancing the wider American goal of stability.

The comparative advantage of China over American and European investors is rooted in its Direct Investment model, which offers loans below market rates and have the attractive feature of not associating economic development with political reforms. Indeed, while Western donors and investors condition aid on democratic and human rights improvements, for developing countries like Afghanistan, China’s policy of nonintervention in internal affairs is

The reason for and implication of such a strategy resides in China’s primary security interest in its Western province of Xinjiang. The PRC is indeed most concerned about cross-border terrorism coming from its Western and Southern neighbours’. Despite the militarization of its borders and the increased security cooperation with the Shanghai

Monitor | China Special

Cooperation Organization, China is very vulnerable to Islamic militancy spill-overs from Afghanistan and the Pakistani safe havens. Hence the implementation of a cautious policy of economic development and support to Afghanistan’s reconstruction which enforces stability while at the same time remaining distant from the US initiatives to avoid being associated with the controversial War on Terror. By providing training to the Afghan police and anti-drug factions, investing in local resources and promoting cooperation between Central Asian governments on the “three evils” – fundamentalism, terrorism and separatism – China aims to maintain dialogue and cooperation and consolidate its long-term presence. This calculation is based on the assumption that by developing a Central Asian economic sphere – in which the opening of the Wakhan corridor would play a crucial role in reviving the Silk Road - China will securely reinforce its economic rise while avoiding becoming the target of Islamic extremism. “We do the heavy lifting and they pick up the fruits” – the American narrative One could safely assume from its involvement in Afghanistan that China is pursuing a narrow interpretation of its interests. Although the PRC officially adheres to the shared principles of the War on Terror such as anti-terrorism – from which it profits to legitimize its Xinjiang policy – or anti-narcotics, it also rejects the all-encompassing US strategy instead prioritises domestic security and development. Indeed, China claims that far from seeking regional hegemony, it wishes to

preserve the international order and pursue its national interest within it. Afghanistan at the cross-roads of the US-China agendas What stems from those two conflicting narratives is that the stereotypical distinction between a disinterested West and a voracious China is not relevant in the sense that it stems from ideological perceptions rather than rational observation. Consequently, the idea of China as a threat doesn’t stem from the reality of it as an expanding power but rather from “perceptions, especially those regarding the potential that Beijing will become an example, source or model that contradicts Western liberalism as the reigning paradigm” (Stephen Chan 1999). Indeed, because China, by making profits in Afghanistan, doesn’t fit in the normative expectations of the US on how it should act, it is displayed as a threat to global peace. This means that the idea of China as a threat to the regional status quo is more a selffulfilling prophecy than an actual reality in the sense that, by framing China as a menace, the US may not only push it towards brinkmanship but also lose its attractiveness to the Afghan government and people, and therefore get bogged down even more. Afghanistan is the place where two narratives and strategic cultures met the West’s fear of losing its hegemony and China’s confident economic expansion. Because China’s domestic and economic concerns shape its approach to foreign policy, it is engaging with Afghanistan in its own terms, which is understood as a threat by the West but also as an unmatched opportunity by Afghanistan.

By: Camille Maubert

Monitor | China Special

Exploring The Sino-Indian Maritime Rivalry In the dying embers of 2011 the sentiment between China and India regarding maritime activities became increasingly antagonistic. China explicitly warned India against any interference in the South China Sea, India demonstrated its increasing naval capability with the introduction of its second aircraft carrier - two years ahead of schedule - and China beefed up its physical presence across the Indian Ocean. Emboldened by a sense of strength and necessity both nations are expanding their capability and presence beyond their immediate periphery, directly into the others’ ‘backyard’. What is the naval security state of affairs between Asia’s rising powers?

exclusively, from energy security, as China’s energy import dependency leaves her vulnerable across volatile transport routes. To this extent, the Malacca Dilemma constitutes a potent threat perception. In the event of heightened Sino-Indian tension, India (due to its proximity to the Malacca Strait, of which 85% of China’s energy needs pass through) could physically blockade China’s energy supplies. This narrative is used to justify the Middle Kingdom’s proactive presence expansion into the Indian Ocean.

Competing claims to Asia’s waterways As emerging Asian powers, both China and India’s vital security interests have dilated towards regional concerns. Their interests lie especially in the Indian Ocean. The strategic focus on the region is predominantly due to its proximity to the energy rich Persian Gulf, a vital transport route for Asia’s energy and commercial interaction with the world market. Specifically, it is the desire to ensure security over vital shipments that has dictated the growing Chinese naval presence in the region. This, in turn, stimulates India’s proactive response of increasing its naval capability whilst projecting its presence in the South China Sea. These parallel policies signal an overlap in their strategic spheres, as both nations aim to expand their strategic footprint across coastal Asia. Beijing’s rationale derives largely, but not

Marines of China’s People's Liberation Army

However, Beijing’s expansion also serves to stifle Indian attempts at exercising domain dominance. India, by a coincidence of geography, is the dominant maritime power in the Indian Ocean. Accordingly, the region constitutes India’s sphere of influence wherein New Delhi widely sees that its task is to be the steward of the waterways, safeguarding transit vessels. It is this vital responsibility that many consider to be India’s breakthrough into the global elite of nations. As both nations aim to ensure their national interests, they are increasingly drawn into a competition for supremacy.

Monitor | China Special

The China Threat: String of Pearls Beijing’s interests in establishing a quasi-permanent presence in the Indian Ocean are contextualised through the narrative of energy insecurity. The desire to express self-determination is an essential characteristic in China’s ‘peaceful development’. Accordingly, China has employed mutually enforcing tactics to facilitate its policies. Firstly, to strengthen its presence, it is taking tempered measures, which consist of diplomatic, economic and military engagement across the ocean’s littoral. Described as the ‘String of Pearls’. Secondly, Beijing is continuing a traditional naval build-up to fully utilise and protect its growing interests. The String of Pearls strategy has been used to describe the physical manifestations of China’s interests within the Indian Ocean. These ‘pearls’ consist of: the building of container ports and deep-sea facilities in Chittagong, Bangladesh; assistance in constructing Pakistan’s deepwater port of Gwadar; support for the projected construction of a twelve-hundred-mile oil and gas pipeline from a port near Sittwe in Myanmar; and the controversial investment in the construction of Asia’s own Suez Canal that would cut across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand, subsequently bypassing the Malacca Strait. Supplementing this is a methodical and patient naval build-up. In August 2011 Beijing’s naval ambitions were significantly boosted as China’s first aircraft carrier, the Varyag, completed its maiden voyage. This is noteworthy as aircraft carriers denote strategic importance and the commissioning and deployment of the Varyag also improves

China’s maritime deterrence and combat capability. This significant moment is a watershed in the process of developing a capable navy, one that will be able of projecting and defending the Middle Kingdom’s interests. Such advancement has not gone unnoticed by India, as with any augmentation of military strength and presence expansion comes greater suspicion and acts of counter-balancing. Despite official Chinese rhetoric professing that its actions serve only to safeguard its national security, it does little to alleviate New Delhi’s perceived threat. China’s actions are viewed with suspicion and are widely described within Indian military circles as being antagonistic and provocative.

Indian Aircraft carrier INS Viraat during an exercise

However, from the Chinese perspective the advent of the String of Pearls strategy is itself misleading as it attempts to construct a narrative of the China threat to justify retaliatory and often aggressive means. Beijing claims that it is not in search of any permanent presence in the region and that it wants to ensure security of its energy supplies. Nonetheless, China’s geopolitical intentions cannot be naively overlooked. Beijing may be attempting to exercise power through ensuring its presence across the Indian Ocean. Supplementing this is also the desire to curtail the naval reach and capability of India, suggesting

Monitor | China Special that China deems India a long-term adversary. In essence, Beijing may be exercising a policy of ‘nipping India’s navy in the bud’. India’s manifest destiny China’s encroaching presence in the Indian Ocean is cause for Indian ire. India’s interests in Asia’s waterways are a manifestation of its geographical reality; it is the central territorial feature of the Indian Ocean. This feeds India’s inherent desire to exercise naval dominance and hegemony over the Ocean. In an attempt to achieve this, India is consistently upgrading its naval fleet, which last month witnessed the advent of its second aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and is soon to be followed by the third. This demonstrates how seriously India takes it perceived role by not limiting the military options available to it. Furthermore, India’s augmentation of its naval capability is not pursued exclusively unilaterally. Recently, New Delhi has actively participated and hosted naval exercises with Singapore, Australia, Japan and the US, tentatively signalling the formation of a democratic bloc alliance. Not only does this energise India’s aspirations but it is also intended to act as deterrent to the ever-watchful China. Certainly, a substantial part of India’s naval surge is undoubtedly responding to the perceived reality of the China threat. The spectre of the China threat was first raised in The Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2004. The explicitly claimed that China poses a maritime challenge to India. It highlighted China’s “determined drive to build a powerful blue water maritime force” and the “imperative for India, therefore, [was] to retain a strong maritime capability in order to maintain the balance of maritime power in the Indian Ocean, as well as the larger AsiaPacific region”.

This indicates that not only has the China question has been an active defence consideration for some time but also effective measures have been and are being taken, to address the concern. Additionally, India has moved to balance China’s creeping influence with its own strategically targeted maritime presence in the South China Sea. This firmly locks them both into an intense zero-sum relationship, or put rudimentarily, a titfor-tat encounter. New Delhi’s Look East Policy, a similar strategy to that of Beijing’s, is becoming critical for strategic deterrence against China and a sustained presence in the South China Sea is a crucial national security imperative. The establishment of closer ties with Japan, Taiwan and Vietnam ensure that India holds some power of deterrence whilst enabling its military to project presence into the heavily disputed Sea. Whilst China is frustrated with India’s newfound strategic relationship with all these nations, the most troublesome of late has been Vietnam. This is largely due to the increasing tenacity with which China is pursuing its disputed territorial claims, an issue it vehemently warns New Delhi to steer clear of. As both nations aim to outmanoeuvre their rival in order to secure national interests by manipulating Asia’s waterways, it is clear that both are jostling for strategic space across Asia’s littoral. The active-reactive nature of the maritime rivalry between China and India dictates that the emergence of interests in opposing strategic zones increases the likelihood of confrontation. The wider implication of this rivalry is that it severely effects the fragile security situation across the continent, by engendering fractious responses to any future incidents.

By: Mikael Santelli-Bensouda

Monitor | China Special

Defence In The Age Of Austerity In 2012, the fiscal realities in Europe and the US will drive shifts in the military doctrines of Western countries. US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta has noted that austerity programmes have struck at the most inopportune moment, exposing endemic weaknesses in the world’s most successful collective security alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The dichotomy that is presented by capability gaps and a rapidly shrinking desire for the US to continue to fill them leaves the Alliance at a cross-road; evolve into a leaner, modern Organization that can shoulder its burdens, or become a relic of the past. A 2009 Goldman Sachs report noted that the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), are a mere two decades away from becoming the economic powerhouses of the world. Booming whilst the US and Europe are experiencing economic stagnation. The BRIC countries are expanding and modernising their militaries to ensure they can pursue distinct foreign policies. One may argue that this is a natural progression that comes with economic prosperity. While the militaries of India and Brazil in particular are behind the curve relative to Western armed forces, their ambitious goals are sustainable.

great Western militaries strategic turning point.

towards

The recent US announcement of a leaner military also identified the AsiaPacific as a region of geo-strategic interest. With decades-old territorial disputes, proven energy reserves and monumental commercial shipping operations, the stability of and access to the South China Sea is and will continue to be of prime importance to many nations. This is further exemplified by the substantial naval build-up occurring in many of its coastal states, largely as a response to recent Chinese aggression. While this shift in US defence policy marks a “moment of transition”, it should also be interpreted as a warning to NATO Members: America, the engine and wheels of the Organization, is now looking outside of the Alliance’s traditional region of interest. Furthermore, fiscal realities make the “overstretched” role of the US within NATO impossible to sustain.

At a time when sleeping giants are rising, when A Chinese fleet vessel before the construction of Hangchow Bay Bridge competition for resources This leaves the Alliance to its own is growing and when fiscal realities are devices to determine whether it will sink forcing NATO’s Membership to or swim. Mr. Panetta has previously forensically examine contributions, discussed how the Organization and the austerity programmes are propelling the

Monitor | China Special trans-Atlantic relationship are of prime importance to global security but they must be maintained under a clear, multilateral unity of purpose.

Alliance will head into a deep recession. What emerges can only be a fundamentally leaner Organization as many Allies struggle to realize their domestic budgets, let alone a luxury such as NATO. Nations that cannot meet agreed-upon contributions should rightly be left out of the process, for they jeopardize Members that do. If this structure is sustainable without the historic level of commitment from the US, then the Alliance may survive.

Some commentators have suggested pooling or sharing resources as one Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta speaks to pilots during flight operations option Europe may pursue © Scott Pittman to decrease defence While Afghanistan and Libya have spending while maintaining a minimum demonstrated some of the achievements level of security. Indeed, NATO’s 2010 that are possible through collective Strategic Concept discussed such a action, they have also revealed crippling possibility. This could involve states capability gaps that the US has been jointly acquiring and operating forced to fill in the eleventh hour. If the equipment and capabilities. US can no longer play the “protector of Europe,” will the Alliance survive? This concept is not new; in 2010 the UK Unequivocally, modern threats will and France signed a cooperative require coordinated, multilateral declaration over a maritime carrier responses, which will need to be group. However, experiences with implemented robustly and effectively. NATO have demonstrated that there are almost no consequences to a Member Unfortunately, NATO’s history has that does not live up to its commitments, shown that collective endeavours are reneges on agreed-upon contributions or plagued with political, social and completely halts them mid-way through financial hurdles that ultimately put the a campaign. lives of the troops on the ground in danger. At present, many states may no While such assertions appear costlonger have the power to overcome effective on paper, they are likely to be them due to budget restrictions. viewed as thrifty if and when troops are reliant on or stranded by equipment they This poses the question of whether it is are missing. possible for NATO to survive. It can be argued that the value of the organisation Additionally, a non-interventionist foreign has been greatly inflated since its policy, while virtuous and economically inception by its chief investor, the US. sound, ignores the realities of As a result of this and in combination globalization. Not only are vital national with the effects of the economic realities interests now global in scope, but that all Members presently face, the Western states are no longer in a

Monitor | China Special

position to hypothetically, occurs.

stand another

idly-by if, Srebrenica

non-traditional problems yet economic realities appear to be stifling their chances.

The EU stands at the precipice of some of the most financially challenging years it has ever faced. The US confronts the possibility of a USD1 trillion cut to its defence budget over the next decade. Indeed, Lawrence Korb accurately observes that the national debt is a threat to national security.

It is unquestionable that defence departments writ-large are lightning rods for excess flab. However, while the US maintains more members of military marching bands than Foreign Service personnel, defence must look out of its historic region of interest, prepare for non-traditional threats including cyber and space, transnational terror and international crime on a tight budget. Austerity should not discount the risks and threats that may require a defence response.

Some NATO Members may be relinquished to securing their own borders and being wholly incapable of meeting the financial contributions required by the organisation. In working to prevent a collapse of the European Monetary Union, France and Germany may experience a similar fate.

In sum, the fundamental rethink of defence strategy that is beginning to take shape in 2012 will lead to a new revolution in military affairs. Whilst Americaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ten-year plan could embolden the military strength of China, it has also identified its backyard as a region of geo-strategic importance.

In doing so, the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s pre-eminent collective defence organization will be forced to remedy its Individual Partnership Action Plans were launched at the NATO Summit in Prague shortcomings or fall on its sword. If NATO The Alliance may find it impossible to founders, what could appear in its wake overcome the capability gaps that have are contextually based coalitions of the been exposed by Afghanistan and Libya willing. Western Governments face the that can no longer be filled by the US. If dilemma of costs of security versus risk this occurs, Europe may witness the management. disintegration of NATO in the near term. The real dilemma is that geo-politics is evolving into an era where collective security and multilateral responses are most required to adequately address

Ultimately, any evolution should produce a defence department modelled on the common soldier: lean, agile, highly skilled and constantly scanning a 360degree horizon.

By: Michael Courtney

Monitor | Opinion

Challenging Extremism In The United Kingdom

In 2003, the Government created a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy called CONTEST to â&#x20AC;&#x153;reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.â&#x20AC;? CONTEST is comprised of four divisions, which are Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. Prevent focuses on stopping people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism.

vulnerable is vital in combating terrorism. Individuals are suggested to be vulnerable to extremist messaging for a range of reasons, many relating to issues of identity, faith, frustrated ambition, migration and displacement. Lastly, Prevent identifies support for violent extremism to be as a result of real or perceived grievances. In particular, there is a growing belief that British foreign policy in the Muslim world is hostile to Islam.

The revised Prevent strategy summarises that the support of extremist groups is the result of a combination of factors. The interpretation of religion, via a persuasive ideology, is crucial in extremists legitimising their own behaviour. Furthermore, media and social networks are extensively being used to help support extremism, with perpetrators often operating openly in institutions promoting that ideology. One key aspect surmised by Prevent, states that support of individuals who are

Prevent lists five main objectives for 2012. Firstly, it aims to challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices. Secondly, to disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate. Furthermore, Prevent has an objective to support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment or have already been recruited by violent extremists. In addition, the Prevent scheme aims to increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism and address the grievances, which

Monitor | Opinion

ideologues are exploiting. The strategy intends to accomplish these objectives via developing intelligence, analysis, information and improving strategic communications. Challenging the Ideology

how schools in England can use the curriculum to provide children with knowledge on how to challenge extremism. In conclusion, much has been undertaken by the Prevent scheme in order to challenge the violent extremist ideology.

Challenging the ideology behind violent extremism and supporting mainstream voices is crucial to the Prevent scheme. Working alongside Muslim scholars, faith groups and other influential voices in the Government is challenging the extremist ideology. However, although An example of a PREVENT Toolkit, which has been sent to some schools different alternatives However, the implementation of these are being discussed by working schemes requires liaisons outside of the alongside different groups, there is room Government, which can prove for improvement in sponsoring the wider challenging. The reluctance among teaching of Islam and developing British Muslims to volunteer for Prevent citizenship education in Mosque and co-operate on a larger basis may schools. In addition, the Foreign and result in Prevent officials depending Commonwealth Office is working on a largely on those who do. Consequently, project to ensure that clear and credible those selected as representatives of the counter-radicalising theological advice is Muslim communities could potentially prominent and accessible on the Internet have a disproportionate amount of in a variety of languages. power. Furthermore, a problem arises that a few members who have However, many individuals are volunteered to co-operate may not potentially being radicalised on social account for the majority of the views in networking websites and other Islamic the community. forums, over which the Foreign Commonwealth Office does not have Subsequently, in order to challenge the that much control. In addition, a British ideology and support mainstream government agency being prominent in voices, it is reportedly difficult to find promoting a different cultureâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s religion reliable liaisons. Due to financial and causes grievance with many Muslim other incentives, there may be many self communities and could further alienate â&#x20AC;&#x201C;elected spokespersons. This could them. The Prevent scheme has further further alienate communities by lending challenged the ideology behind violent government sponsored endorsements to extremism by publishing toolkits for unpopular groups, or can even damage schools. These give practical advice on

Monitor | Opinion

the credibility of the scheme in itself by not actually focussing on the real problem. Although there are some incentives, allegedly there are few motivations for the right individuals, such as schoolteachers or moderate Muslim leaders, to work alongside the Prevent scheme.

universities about extremism on campus. However, universities are only a small fraction of the picture when it comes to combating radicalisation. Compared with the old Prevent strategy, the revised scheme has many more departments and a significantly larger budget.

Disrupting Extremism

However, there are challenges with extra departments and more finance. Co-operation is key in order to combat terrorism from different fronts and to stop individuals of interest from slipping through safeguards. In addition, it is recommended that extra finance be used with extra scrutiny, especially in this current economic climate.

Another key feature of the Prevent scheme is to disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate. The scheme identifies evidence suggesting that the ideology of extremism gains influence through individuals who actively promote it. Furthermore, it surmises that the â&#x20AC;&#x153;radicalisersâ&#x20AC;? exploit open spaces in communities such as mosques, schools, prisons, youth clubs and a host of private venues. As a consequence, the government now works with communities to disrupt these individuals with a range of legislative powers. There have been key achievements accomplished by the Prevent scheme; however the extent of these in the long term must be evaluated.

There are further challenges; such as there may be a perception that Prevent is instructing Muslims about their own faith at the expense of the remainder of the British public. As well as angering some communities, this is potentially having a converse effect on the integration of the new generation of British Muslims with the rest of the population.

In addition, by Prevent publicly There has been much work undertaken disrupting some forms of Islam and in order to build resilient communities promoting another strand of it could and to strengthen relations between potentially alienate some communities different faiths. Furthermore, the as it raise concerns that the British importance of understanding the true Government is taking part in religious definition of Islam is vital to the Prevent proselytising. scheme. As a consequence, the UK has been promoted as a centre for the excellence for Islamic studies outside of the Muslim world. In addition, standards have been strengthened in Mosques and working with Imams. The issue is to delegitimise the rhetoric and imagery propagated by violent extremist groups. As a consequence, the Prevent strategy has been successful Although the police take lead responsibility for gathering evidence and obtaining in giving guidance to arrests, MI5 retain the lead for collecting, assessing and exploiting intelligence

Monitor | Opinion Supporting Individuals

Supporting individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists plays a crucial role in Prevent strategy. The Prevent strategy construes that vulnerability is not simply a result of actual or perceived grievances but rather it may be the result of family or peer pressure in the absence of mentors or role models. Therefore, the Government has put into place programs that will support those who are believed to be vulnerable to radicalisation with more intensive interventions focussing on people who have already been drawn into violent extremist networks.

some individuals may not take any finance in order to not be associated with violent extremism. Additionally, there is much confusion over the term â&#x20AC;&#x153;community cohesion.â&#x20AC;? Despite this aspect being at the heart of Prevent and targeting vulnerable individuals and communities, some of the finance for it has been used for activities other than counter-terrorism activities. Although stopping individuals is at the heart of the Prevent strategy, if one looks at many of the terrorists been found guilty in the United Kingdom, nearly every Muslim has been seen to be integrated and contributing to society.

Furthermore, the Government will continue to prosecute those who commit criminal offences as well as providing support to those who are drawn into offending. In addition, increasing resilience of communities to violent extremism plays a vital role in supporting individuals. Improvements are needed to ensure that another 7/7 does not happen

However, supporting vulnerable individuals and communities, whilst trying to derive intelligence from them, could potentially cause confusion and tension. The Muslim community could also be suspicious with government involvement, and even possibly reluctant to be involved. Furthermore, allegations of spying could potentially arise with the involvement of the police, with the Muslim community feeling suspicious about the investigations conducted. In addition, the term Preventing Violent Extremism may make some Muslim individuals feel monitored, branded or targeted. As a consequence, despite there being allocated Prevent funds,

Challenges The scheme is still new to this government; hence there could be a shortage of proven practice and results, notably in programs to identify and support vulnerable individuals. However, there have been drawbacks and failings. This strategy may have been effective in foiling the terrorist plots after 7/7, but it has been unable to identify the socioeconomic causes that could trigger the planning of terrorist attacks in the UK. It has been counter-effective, as it does not tackle all the issues.

By: Shyam Bhatt

Monitor | Opinion

The UK And Scotland In 2015 – National Security Implications Of The “Yes” Vote “Britain may be a 300-year-old union that once ruled the waves and half the known world, but on home soil, the country is closer than ever to a messy divorce” Russia Today, January 2012 allowing greater flexibility and more control over their affairs, whilst not ‘going the whole hog’ in complete separation from the UK. At the time of writing, wrangling between Whitehall and the Scottish National Party (SNP) on the referendum’s parameters ensues, such as its timing, wording and implications. A later referendum could mean a more unpopular Coalition Government that has taken difficult economic decisions, a greater sense of Scottish nationalism in terms of the 700th year since the battle of Bannockburn, and more simply, a longer time for the SNP to make their case to the Scottish electorate. On an as-yet-undisclosed date in the autumn of 2014, Scottish residents will participate in a historic referendum to decide whether Scotland remains part of the United Kingdom, or enters a new era as an independent nation-state.

However pivotal these factors may be, the possibility for the more ‘historic’ outcome is not an insignificant one, for the following reasons: UK Foreign Policy

For the time being, polls have been reported in the media to suggest that Scottish residents want to have more powers devolved to their country,

Recently, Alex Salmond has claimed that England would also reap net benefits without Scotland being part

Monitor | Opinion

of the Union, calling for a “positive relationship of equals”, and that Scotland, England, Northern Ireland and Wales would still share a monarch, a currency and a social union. He suggested that Members of Parliament on both sides of the border would stick only to the issues in their respective countries, without the current arrangement of MPs voting on policies on either side. A poll conducted by the Institute for Public Policy Research suggested that the English believed that they would be worse off as a result of Scotland’s absence. The SNP’s success in the election of May 2011 can in part be attributed to their staunch opposition to the Iraq War, which officially ended only last December when the USA withdrew their forces. Alex Salmond underscored the Iraq War as the principal example of foreign policy that was compulsorily forced upon the Scottish electorate by Westminster politicians.

source of great diplomatic tension between the UK and USA.. As the convicted terrorist, who was directly involved in the bombing of Pan AM flight 103 over the skies of Lockerbie (killing 270 people in the UK’s most deadly terrorist attack in its history), was allowed to leave. Energy Security Supporters of the referendum are pushing for over 90 per cent of natural resources extracted from the North Sea to be kept by Scotland. Scottish Finance Minister, John Swinney has suggested that if Scotland takes its share of “marine resources”, Scotland would become the sixth wealthiest country in the world, comparing starkly to his prized statistic that currently, “Great Britain holds only the 16th place”.

As justice and policing is already a matter entirely devolved to Oil platform in the North Sea – how will this be regulated if Scotland achieves Scotland, independence? © Dave Conner independence would For the remaining UK, this could be end the currently confounding yet another difficulty; any tension situation where the UK’s Prime with Russia within the next few Minister is apparently constitutionally decades that could impact UK unable to veto any controversial energy security could leave the UK decision taken by the former significantly vulnerable, with no say country’s devolved Government. The on how North Sea oil and gas is universally condemned release of utilised. Abdelbaset al-Megrahi by the Scottish Justice Secretary was a

Monitor | Opinion

Scotland would be expected to be at least partially financially liable for the multi-billion pound project that would involve relocating the submarines from Faslane, in the Clyde. However, the timescale for this possible relocation is unknown. There remains the sobering risk for the UK Government, that in spite of the annual cost of Trident that runs into billions of pounds, the deterrent will not have a base and therefore, at least be rendered inoperable until a suitable port can be built. This issue presents itself at possibly the most testing and unpredictable time since the Second World War, particularly when Trident submarines are normally in constant deployment. There exists the very real possibility that Iran may itself become the nuclear A Trident submarine leaving its base in Scotland © JohnED76 club’s newest member precisely around the time Nuclear Deterrent the UK momentarily loses its nuclear capability. Currently, the four submarines that house the UK’s nuclear capability is In austere times, with the forces of based at the Faslane naval base, NATO allies already stretched within Scotland. Currently, Faslane is (possibly in Syria by this point), after the only port in the UK capable of the toughest of cuts in the defence housing Trident. However, the SNP budget and in conventional military has made it clear that they wish to assets, and the UK suffers from its ensure that Scotland no longer military partnership with France due participates in the nuclear club. Alex to its economic ‘disobedience’ with Salmond’s acute disdain for these the rest of the EU; could this be a “weapons of mass destruction” – as time when the UK is left truly he is keen to describe them – vulnerable? represents perhaps the most significant issue for Scottish The issue of relocating the nuclear independence. deterrent is potentially a grave one. UK Defence Secretary Philip Faslane was built specifically as its Hammond has suggested that location was relatively secluded,

Monitor | Opinion

meaning that the key advantage of unpredictability was maximised. If moved to a less secluded area, it would be easy for enemy states to know where submarines are located in real time. A loss of maintaining the advantage of ambiguity could be potentially catastrophic. Could the change in ratio of nuclear weapons per square mile of territory affect the calculus of nuclear necessity? Taking Israel for example: one principle reason for its feeling particularly vulnerable is, as Netanyahu was keen to remind the UN’s General Assembly in his retort to Abbas’ push for full Palestinian statehood, that a jet airliner can fly from Israel’s west to east territory in three minutes. Israel’s (undeclared yet widely-known) possession of nuclear weapons may in part due to its feeling of insecurity based on its diminutive size.

International Relations Alex Salmond has made assertions that he would be keen for Scotland to leave NATO on the basis that it is a nuclear alliance. In practice, this might have little impact for the people of Scotland as, presumably, if any direct threat to Scotland would still be considered by neighbouring countries as a threat to them, and natural alliances would be created in order to combat such a threat. However, such a shift may be more serious for NATO itself, during a time when supranational institutions are being tested by unilateral decisions; whether in the form of David Cameron’s recent veto against the EU’s austerity measures, or the frequent impasse experienced by the permanent members of the UN Security Council when voting whether or not to condemn or place sanctions on certain Middle Eastern regimes. Then comes the question: why give up ‘national interests’ for the sake of ‘voluntary agreements’ which are arbitrarily set by others with competing interests?

Vetoes one day may become ‘opt-outs’ the next. Governments in Various versions of the Union Jack were proposed in 1603 – what could the such times feel new design look like if Scotland achieves independence? empowered and As Scotland’s secession from the UK popular with their electorates. would result in a decrease one third Isolation sets in, then international in the geographical size of the UK, it security suffers in an otherwise is feasible that future governments of technologically and socially the latter country would consider globalised world. bolstering the number of warheads by a commensurate amount to Could the separation of St. Andrew’s maintain this reverse ratio. cross prompt an exodus from the Commonwealth? For example, the

Monitor | Opinion Australian flag – designed so that its royal blue merged seamlessly with the Saltire of the Union Jack in its upper left corner – would be left looking considerably different, if the Australian Government were to opt to update their Union flag to match that of the UK. Whilst the majority of Australians are currently in favour of keeping the same head of state as the UK, a flag refresh might prompt an identity crisis and raise the question Australian independence. Any other country or principality may follow suit. Intelligence When asked about how UK intelligence and security would be operate in the aftermath of a split by Scotland, a Home Office spokesperson said: “Public protection is our number one priority and that will not change. However, he declined to comment more specifically on what the implications would be for UK intelligence, suggesting that it was too early to speculate. Presumably, as Scotland’s police operated independently, and since Scotland would have its own independent military, it can be assumed that the same would be true for Scotland’s intelligence and diplomatic communities. The Security Service, for example, would no longer operate in Scotland; and neither GCHQ nor the Secret Intelligence Service would serve it. New, Scottish equivalents of these entities would inevitably have to be created within its borders. It is likely, however, that of the three aforementioned agencies, the Security Service’s personnel numbers would be reduced. Where would Scotland’s equivalent staff have originated? If from the current

Security Service, would that be a potential conflict of interest? However, all three are likely to need to address the following quandary: what would happen to Scottish personnel operating south of the border? In particular, could SC or DV Cleared personnel - who may have faithfully worked for decades in the ‘Old UK’ but mostly north of the border - be identified as a potential security concern having developed a primary loyalty to Scotland? Or will a special, pragmatic arrangement be put in place, such as treatment as having dual nationalities? Could there be a ‘cut-off’ date for future Scottish citizens to be able to be SC or DV Cleared in British terms? Borders In terms of Scottish passports, the SNP-led government stresses that border controls would not be brought into force between their country and the future UK. All modes of transport would operate as they do at present, with border security already strong at all UK international and domestic airports, and ports. Moreover, no identity documents will need to be provided when travelling between the two countries by land. However, the impact on immigration and the vetting of foreign nationals is less clear. Policing On the issue of the impact full Scottish independence would have for policing in the UK or Scotland, a Home Office spokesperson said simply that “policing is already a devolved matter for Scotland.” Although this is currently also the same for justice, health and education, there is the possibility that mutual aid would be more complex

Monitor | Opinion

between police forces across an international border.

due to their prohibitive associated costs. When comparing Scotland to Ireland and Norway, he believed that an independent Scotland’s forces would merely consist of 8,500 soldiers, three maritime reconnaissance aircraft, eight offshore patrol vessels and a few helicopters. UK Secretary of Defence Philip Hammond was more direct when claiming that an independent Scottish military would be unworkable: "The idea that you could break off a little bit like a square on a chocolate bar - and that would be the bit that went north of the border - is frankly laughable".

However, Alex Salmond has suggested that whilst HM Naval Base Clyde, Scotland – Will this be taken over by an Lord West’s and Philip independent Scottish Government? Hammond’s case could perhaps have been more Military Forces easily made before the recession, he envisages that the Scottish defence Lord West of Spithead questioned force would look almost precisely the the financial and bureaucratic costs same as the remaining allocated of a new Scottish air force, naval forces to be based in Scotland after base and mobile army brigade. As the defence review has been fully widely reported in the Scottish press implemented. in January, he suggested that if the future Scottish defence force were to be ‘allocated’ 20 Typhoon jets, submarines or hi-tech warships, they would be unable to maintain them

In summary, the national security implications of the “yes” vote are colossal and are yet to be fully addressed, let alone resolved.

By: Christian Cullen

Monitor

National Security Risks: Immediate Challenges Before Summer 2012 Special discounted price for Monitor readers:

£20.00 Contact info@sirsconsultancy.com Title: National Security Risks: Immediate Challenges Before Summer 2012 Author: SIRS Consultancy Ltd ISBN 978-1-908684-02-8

This handbook presents policymakers with a final opportunity to make critical changes in order to optimise national security, months before the Opening Ceremony of the biggest peacetime event to take place in the UK: It is comprehensive in scope and is the first document to encompass all five official inquiries into the 7 July 2005 London Bombings. This handbook also offers its own analysis of the Anders Breivik ‘lone wolf’ attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011 and the August 2011 England Riots. All key threats are covered. Whilst emphasising key conclusions made by the 7 July Inquiries, this handbook makes many original recommendations that must be urgently addressed before Summer 2012.

This security handbook has received numerous accolades including…. “I have found this SIRS Consultancy handbook on the National Security Risks leading up to the London 2012 Olympic Games to be extraordinarily useful. For the first time the different strands of the threats that are facing this country have been pulled together into one concise document. Having read this I now feel better prepared, better informed and much more ready to understand how threats will develop and how we might deal with them. This is an invaluable piece of work.” Patrick Mercer OBE MP “This SIRS Consultancy handbook is a must read for anyone who does not want to spend hours of their lives trawling through reports and news pages to get accurate, up-to-date information on the threats the UK faces today. This concise document will help you to understand the issues and develop your plans for the future.” Chris Phillips - Head of the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (2005 – 2011)

For more information, please contact info@sirsconsultancy.com

www.sirsconsultancy.com info@sirsconsultancy.com Twitter速: @sirsconsultancy