National Security Risks: Immediate Challenges Before Summer 2012 by SIRS Consultancy Ltd

The following is an excerpt from the handbook:

National Security Risks: Immediate Challenges Before Summer 2012

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Accolades for this Handbook “I have found this SIRS Consultancy handbook on the National Security Risks leading up to the London 2012 Olympic Games to be extraordinarily useful. For the first time the different strands of the threats that are facing this country have been pulled together into one concise document. Having read this I now feel better prepared, better informed and much more ready to understand how threats will develop and how we might deal with them. This is an invaluable piece of work.” Patrick Mercer OBE MP Member of Parliament, UK Shadow Minister for Homeland Security (2003 – 2007)

“This SIRS Consultancy handbook is a must read for anyone who does not want to spend hours of their lives trawling through reports and news pages to get accurate, up-to-date information on the threats the UK faces today. This concise document will help you to understand the issues and develop your plans for the future.” Chris Phillips Managing Director, International Protect and Prepare Security Office (IPPSO) Head of the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (2005 – 2011)

“The Emergency Planning Society believes that the SIRS Consultancy handbook: ‘National Security Risks: Immediate Challenges Before Summer 2012’ to be a timely, thoughtprovoking document that raises a number of valid issues and recommendations, worthy of further investigation and action. We would suggest that all those engaged in the field of resilience read this report.’" Marc Beveridge Chair, Emergency Planning Society

“This handbook should have a place on the reading list for all those who have a role in decision making on security issues - an unrivalled sourcebook of published data.” David Weeks Advisor, Community Resilience UK

“This is a landmark study in the struggle to contain security threats in the UK and elsewhere. Scholars and practitioners in the field and those involved in making the London 2012 Olympic Games safe must read this handbook.” Jonathan Paris, security analyst and Associate Fellow, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, King's College London

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For the sake of consistency, all spellings attributed to sources have been kept in their original state. Every effort has been made to attribute the references used in the report to the correct authors. However, if you notice any inaccuracies, we encourage you to contact us so that future editions of this report may be updated with the necessary corrections.

This document only refers to the London 2012 Olympic Games, the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games Ltd (LOCOG), the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and any other affiliated entity in a purely factual and editorial manner. It in no way associates itself, deliberately or otherwise, with the London 2012 Olympic Games, including through marketing or promotional use. SIRS Consultancy Ltd wishes to take this opportunity to thank the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games Ltd for their kind assistance to ensure that this editorial handbook complies with the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006, Olympic Symbol etc. (Protection) Act 1995 and ‘The Protected Games’ Marks’ guidance (published by LOCOG in August 2010 and accessible via the following URL: http://www.london2012.com/documents/brand-guidelines/guide-to-protected-gamesmarks.pdf).

Threats

A precedent for the simultaneous, ‘multiple site’ nature of terrorist attacks was set in numerous incidents prior to 7th July 2005 (7/7), most notably on 11th September 2001 (9/11) in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania, and the 11th March 2004 attacks in Madrid. Therefore, the United Kingdom’s (UK) emergency responders possessed the necessary skill and expertise for handling multi-site terrorist attacks. However, once the 7/7 attacks occurred, it was apparent that many systems, policies and operating protocols were insufficient, if not altogether unfit for purpose, despite the preparations made 1.

Given international trends and precedents, it is clear that the UK currently faces a variety of threats including: •

Al-Qa’ida and its regional factions, including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 2;

•

Groups affiliated with al-Qa’ida, such as al-Shabaab;

•

Irish Republican extremists 3;

•

‘Lone wolf’ terrorists who may not be closely affiliated to a particular group or cell 4;

Hallett, The Rt. Hon. Lady Justice H. (2011). Coroner’s Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005: Report under Rule 43 of the Coroner’s Rules 1984. Coroner’s Office. pp 64-65. 2 HM Government (2011). CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy For Countering Terrorism. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. pp 26-33. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

•

Far-right extremists 5;

•

Anarchists who take advantage of legitimate protests, resulting from the current global financial climate (as seen in the 2010 student protests) 6;

•

Cyber-terrorism 7;

•

Extensive civil disorder (this is covered in the section entitled: “Cross-Government Strategy for Civil Disorder in the UK”).

International Terrorism Although international terrorist groups frequently state their intention to launch a large scale attack within the UK, it is more likely that attacks will be carried out by British residents who may be linked to terror facilitation networks or organised criminal groups overseas 8.

While the overwhelming majority of the UK’s increasingly diverse population live as law abiding citizens within a cohesive society, there is concern about the potential exploitation of some ethnic communities that may have strong emotional or family ties to areas of conflict 9. Moreover, the UK’s national security is to a great extent dependent upon events beyond its own borders. Significant developments in the Middle East, North Africa10, South Asia 11 and East Africa 12 could inspire action on the part of individuals sympathetic to internationally linked groups.

International terrorist groups continue to research new methods for attacking targets of

HM Government (2011). CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy For Countering Terrorism. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. pp 26-33. 6 Brady, B & Merrick, J. (2011). Fear of anarchist threat grows as countdown to London 2012 begins. Available: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/fear-of-anarchist-threat-grows-as-countdown-to-london-2012th begins-2319565.html. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 7 Ibid. 8 Security Service: MI5 (2011). International Terrorism. Available: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/internationalth terrorism.html. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 9 HM Government (2011). Prevent Strategy. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 7. 10 At the time of writing, it is too soon to deduce with certainty as to the longer-term impacts of the Arab Spring across North Africa and the Middle East. 11 Such as ‘Operation Neptune’s Spear’. This resulted in the death of Usama bin Laden on 2nd May 2011, and led to an increase in anti-Western sentiment due to a perceived undermining of Pakistani sovereignty. BBC News (2011). Pakistan condemns Bin Laden raid and US drone attacks. Available: th http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13398281. Last accessed 6 August 2011. 12 Such as the increasing operations against al-Shabaab, including the first US drone attacks from June 2011, and the tensions that have arisen between the UN and al-Shabaab due to the latter’s refusal to permit the distribution of aid to millions suffering from the 2011 drought and famine. All Africa (2011). Somalia: United States Using Drones to Attack Al-Shabaab. Available: th http://allafrica.com/stories/201106300717.html. Last accessed 6 August 2011.

national interest, and have shown innovation by effectively adapting their techniques to hamper UK law enforcement countermeasures 13.

We have identified the following methods as highly likely to be utilised by international terrorist groups against the UK: • Multi-pronged simultaneous attacks

utilising low tech and small arms weaponry (such as

those which occurred in Mumbai in 2008 15). Recent al-Qa’ida (AQ) manuals 16 that have been disseminated by al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) outline firearms training, particularly in the use of AK-47s and similar weapons. • Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs, particularly peroxide

and fertiliser 18 based

explosives) and Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) can create confusion, fear and panic, as demonstrated by the twin attacks in Norway on the 22nd July 2011 (22/7). • Cloned vehicles, including those camouflaged with corporate or charitable logos or

emergency response markings and equipment that provide the appearance of having legitimate access to restricted areas, provide an opportunity to conduct surveillance or launch an attack 19; 20

• Use of official uniforms . During the 22/7 attacks in Oslo and on the island of Utøya, the

perpetrator, Anders Breivik, demonstrated the effectiveness of wearing a police uniform as a disguise 21;

Security Service: MI5 (2011). International Terrorism. Available: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/internationalth terrorism.html. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 14 A ‘Mumbai-style attack’, a term coined in the aftermath of the coordinated attacks by terrorists in Mumbai, India, is one that involves firearms and grenades, possibly in addition to IEDs. These protracted attacks took place from th th 26 until 29 November, 2008. Bowcott, O & Norton-Taylor, R. (2010). 'Mumbai-style' terror attack on UK, France and Germany foiled. Available: st http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/29/terror-attack-plot-europe-foiled. Last accessed 31 July 2011. 15 Leppard, D. (2009). Police expect Mumbai-style terror attack on City of London. Available: st http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article6962867.ece. Last accessed 31 July 2011. 16 Bream, S. (2008). New Al Qaeda Manual Reflects Changing Faces of Terror. Available: th http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,403902,00.html. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 17 Oppenheimer, A. (2009). The evolution of IEDs. Available: th http://www.defencemanagement.com/feature_story.asp?id=11993. Last accessed 4 August 2011. 18 Massingham, G. (2010). The Times Square Bomb - Why it Failed. Available: http://www.efilmgroup.com/Therd Times-Square-Bomb-Why-it-Failed.html. Last accessed 3 August 2011. 19 Al-Shabaab used United Nations-marked cars to attack the African Union's main headquarters in Mogadishu. Sheikh, A. (2009). UN-marked cars used in Somali attack. Available: http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/un-markedth cars-used-in-somali-attack-1.458997. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 20 BBC News (2011). Norway police say 85 killed in island youth camp attack. Available: th http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14259356. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 21 Ibid.

• ‘Softer’ densely populated targets such as trains and shopping centres. The latest

intelligence recovered at Usama bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound in Pakistan indicated a recent interest in these targets, while he was still at the helm of AQ’s leadership 22.

Al-Qa’ida

Al-Qai’da’s (AQ) stated aim is the creation of a single Islamic caliphate. They believe this would end what they view as the oppression of Muslims and the Western occupation of Muslim territory 23. AQ also aims to remove so-called ‘apostate’ regimes, which they perceive to be un-Islamic or too sympathetic to the West 24, from power in Muslim countries. The implementation of a narrow Takfiri version 25 of Islamic law across the Muslim world is a further AQ objective 26. They believe that a ‘holy war’ against the West and its supporters is essential in order to achieve this 27.

Al-Qa’ida cells are located worldwide, especially in South and Southeast Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East, and are reinforced by their ties to extremist networks 28. AQ’s membership, which is estimated at several thousand individuals worldwide, has attempted to extend its influence through formal affiliations and informal inspirational efforts 29. AQ also supports Muslim fighters in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia and Yemen 30.

Possible activities by AQ members or sympathisers within the UK may include fundraising through hawalas (money lenders), the use of charities 31, front businesses 32, Internet fraud 33 and possible narcotics sales 34, as well as the recruitment and radicalisation of individuals 35. 22

Walker, P. (2011). Osama bin Laden 'closely involved in al-Qaida plots'. Available: th http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/06/osamabinladen-al-qaida. Last accessed 27 July 2011. 23 th House of Commons (2006). Report of the Official Account of the London Bombings on 7 July 2005. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 28. 24 Ibid. 25 Can be classified as a violent off-shoot of the Salafi movement (Salafism is seen as a form of ‘fundamental Islam’), and condones acts of violence as legitimate methods of achieving religious or political goals; even against other Muslims. Keppel, G. (2002). Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam. London: I.B. Tauris. p 31. 26 th House of Commons (2006). Report of the Official Account of the London Bombings on 7 July 2005. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 28. 27 Ibid. 28 HM Government (2011). CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy For Countering Terrorism. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. pp 22-23. 29 Intelligence and Security Committee (2011). Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2010-2011. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 10. 30 Sinai, J. (2011). Tracing Homegrown Jihadists. Available: th http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/5/tracing-homegrown-jihadists/. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 31 Financial Action Task Force (2008). FATF Report on Terrorist Financing – Use of Charities and Non-Profit th Organisations. Available: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf. Last accessed 7 August 2011.

The ISC Annual Report 2010/2011 states that the AQ core in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan continues to pose the most serious strategic threat to the UK and it is assessed that this is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future 36. Furthermore, AQ’s operational activity will continue to pose a direct threat to the West, despite the death of its leader, as individuals may be encouraged or inspired to avenge the killing of Usama bin Laden 37.

Projections AQ has not launched a ‘successful’ attack in the UK since 7/7, despite numerous attempts. The UK has been relatively lucky since 2005, where plots missed by the intelligence community almost resulted in the following: • The detonation of the four 21/7 bombs 38; • The car bombs in Haymarket and Park Lane in June 2007 39; • Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s device on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 to Detroit 40. The considerable threat posed by AQ remains consistently high. However, since the death of Usama bin Laden and the onset of the ‘Arab Spring’ movement, the influence of AQ in the Middle East has become increasingly marginalised 41.

Global Witness (2003). For a Few Dollar$ More: How al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade. Available: th http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010304.pdf. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 33 Kellerman, T. (2009). Internet Fraud Finances Terrorism. Available: http://news.discovery.com/tech/internetst fraud-finances-terrorism.html. Last accessed 1 August 2011. 34 Global Witness (2003). For a Few Dollar$ More: How al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade. Available: th http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010304.pdf. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 35 Security Service: MI5 (2011). International Terrorism. Available: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/internationalth terrorism.html. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 36 Intelligence and Security Committee (2011). Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2010-2011. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 9. 37 The Pakistani Taliban ('Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan', or 'TTP') has cited vengeance for bin Laden's death as the main motive for terrorist attacks that killed 80 people in Shabqadar, Pakistan on 13 May 2011. Agence France-Presse (2011). 80 killed as Taliban 'avenge bin Laden'. Available: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=70-killed-as-taliban-claim-bin-laden-revenge-2011-05-13. Last th accessed 27 July 2011. 38 Press Association (2008). The July 21 failed bombings. Available: rd http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/feb/04/terrorism.world1. Last accessed 23 August 2011. 39 BBC News (2007). Two car bombs found in West End. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6255960.stm. Last th accessed 15 August 2011. 40 Kennedy, D. (2009). Abdulmutallab's bomb plans began with classroom defence of 9/11. Available: rd http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6969075.ece. Last accessed 23 August 2011. 41 Ibid.

Current intelligence gaps concerning membership, support activity, or planning operations make it impossible to accurately assess the group’s ability to launch an attack in the UK in the near future 42. The membership and influence of AQ is likely to increase. However, successful military operations have weakened AQ’s operational capabilities and stemmed the flow of funds to the group 43.

Despite the obstacles it faces, AQ’s ability to attract and recruit potential followers via the Internet appears to be increasing 44, due to the pervasive nature of social networking and online communications. AQ will undoubtedly continue to seek influential 45 and multilingual leaders such as Anwar al-Awlaki, AQAP’s chief propagandist until September 2011 46. AlAwlaki alone had been linked personally to the 2009 shooting at Fort Hood in Texas, the stabbing of Stephen Timms MP in 2010, the 2010 Stockholm terrorist attack and the 2010 Times Square car bomb attempt 47.

AQAP, a part of AQ, has also been associated with the 2009 Christmas Day bombing attempt on Northwest Flight 253, and the 2010 Cargo Bomb plot. These brazen attempts show their increasing determination not only to carry out attacks beyond Yemen’s borders, but to ‘spectacularly’ strike populated hubs in the countries towards which they are most hostile 48. In addition, AQ’s members and donors have developed relationships with other Takfiri groups, such as al-Shabaab (AS) in the Horn of Africa 49. This is further demonstrated by the reduced proportion of ‘priority’ plots and leads that the Security Service investigates in the UK, where those linked to ‘core’ AQ in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre have dropped from 75% in 2008/2009 to 50% in 2011 50.

BBC News (2011). Osama Bin Laden diary 'planned attacks' - US officials. Available: th http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13370524. Last accessed 27 July 2011. 43 AQ raises funds by operating front businesses, illegal gold trading, currency smuggling, drug smuggling, and the siphoning of funds from donations to fraudulent charitable organisations. Global Witness (2003). For a Few Dollar$ More: How al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade. Available: th http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010304.pdf. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 44 Home Office (2011). Prevent Strategy. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 7. 45 CBS News (2011). Yemen terror targets kids with jihad cartoon. Available: th http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/07/20/501364/main20081309.shtml. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 46 Al-Awlaki was killed in his vehicle in Yemen by a Hellfire missile launched from a CIA drone. Blitz, J & Green, M. (2011) CIA drone kills ‘most dangerous’ al-Qaeda cleric. Available: th http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/48305e6e-eb42-11e0-adbf-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Zhzj5shV. Last accessed 30 September 2011. 47 BBC News (2010). Profile: Anwar al-Awlaki. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-eastth 11658920. Last accessed 8 August 2011. 48 Ibid. 49 th Hanson, S. (2010). Al-Shabaab. Available: http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650. Last accessed 27 July 2011. 50 Intelligence and Security Committee (2011). Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2010-2011. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 9.

Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab is a violent extremist group based in Somalia with a significant number of individual members linked to AQ 51. Many senior AS leaders are believed to have trained and fought with AQ in Afghanistan 52. Law enforcement and open source intelligence reports suggest that some members of the Somali community in the UK may be travelling to Somalia to participate in the Jihad 53

The AS movement appears to be using AQâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Internet tactics to target both Somali- and English- speaking members of the Somali community in the UK 55. Furthermore, it is possible that AS members or sympathisers may be attempting to radicalise individuals in areas that have large Somali populations.

Hanson, S. (2010). Al-Shabaab. Available: http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650. Last accessed 27 July 2011. 52 Harnisch, C. (2010). The Terror Threat from Somalia: The Internationalization of Al-Shabaab. Available: http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/CTP_Terror_Threat_From_Somalia_Shabaab th _Internationalization.pdf. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 53 A Jihad is a holy war that is waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty; and, a personal struggle in devotion to Islam especially involving spiritual discipline. th Merriam-Webster (2011). Jihad. Available: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jihad. Last accessed 8 August 2011. 54 Security Service: MI5 (2011). The trajectory of the threat. Available: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/theth trajectory-of-the-threat.html. Last accessed 27 July 2011. 55 Goodman, A. (2011). How Al Shabaab Recruited 40 Americans Since 2007. Available: http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/07/27/how-al-shabaab-recruited-40-americans-since-2007/. Last th accessed 27 July 2011.

Al- Shabaab administration flag Even though AS may be locked in conflict with the Somali Government (where the latter has international allies and support from tribes within Somalia 56), they have allegedly increased their collaboration with other Jihadist 57 groups since the start of the Arab Spring 58. Evidence suggests that it may have sought to build links with al-Qaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and with nascent Jihadist groups in Libya 59. Moreover, it may be increasingly co-operating with militants in Yemen. This could be an example of how it will seek to work with other Jihadist groups in the future.

Projections If AS experiences operational success and receives sufficient financial support; the most

International Crisis Group (2010). Somalia's Divided Islamists. Available: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-ofth africa/somalia/B74%20Somalias%20Divided%20Islamists.pdf. Last accessed 27 July 2011. 57 A Jihadist is a Muslim who advocates or participates in a Jihad. Merriam-Webster (2011). Jihadist. Available: http://www.merriamth webster.com/dictionary/jihadist?show=0&t=1312794715. Last accessed 8 August 2011. 58 Quilliam Foundation (2011). Briefing Paper: Somalia and Yemen - Al Shabaab's Widening Ambitions. th Available: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/shabaab14july11.pdf. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 59 Ibid.

likely impact for the UK involves the radicalisation and foreign training of Somali-born British residents for attacks in the Horn of Africa. However, it is also possible that AS could: • Inspire home-grown threats for attacks against soft, populated targets such as large transport hubs in major cities; • Ensure that radicalised Britons, having been trained in Somalia, carry out a ‘spectacular’ domestic attack 60.

Domestic Terrorism Irish Dissident Threat

Recent developments relating to Irish Republican-based terrorism, such as the bomb that killed Constable Ronan Kerr of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) 61, have demonstrated a general increase in activity by Irish Dissidents. This indicates that an attack on the UK mainland could be more likely 62. This threat has increased significantly over the past two years, as demonstrated by the murder of Ronan Kerr in April 2011, which was the sixth attack against security targets in Northern Ireland this year and followed 40 attacks in 2010. This compares with 22 attacks in 2009 and 15 in 2008 63. The Northern Ireland related threat levels published on 24th September 2010 judged the threat to Northern Ireland itself to be “SEVERE” 64 and highlighted that the threat to the rest of the UK had been raised to “SUBSTANTIAL” 65. Therefore, the threat has changed from being purely Islamist extremist-based, to one that includes a diverse range of groups and factions. In the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) Annual Report 2010/2011, the Committee

Security Service: MI5 (2011). International Terrorism. Available: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/internationalth terrorism.html. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 61 BBC News (2011). Ronan Kerr murder 'brutal and grotesque'. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukth northern-ireland-12962723. Last accessed 27 July 2011. 62 BBC News (2010). Irish terror attack a 'strong possibility'. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11408758. th Last accessed 27 July 2011. 63 Intelligence and Security Committee (2011). Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2010-2011. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 10. 64 “SEVERE” indicates that an attack is highly likely and “SUBSTANTIAL” that an attack is a strong possibility. Home Office (2011). Current threat level. Available: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/currentth threat-level. Last accessed 5 August 2011. 65 BBC News (2010). Irish terror attack a 'strong possibility'. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11408758. th Last accessed 27 July 2011.

cast doubt on whether the Security Service would be able to manage the re-emerging threat of terrorism in Northern Ireland without losing cover elsewhere 66.

Home-grown Islamist Extremism

Autonomous, home-grown cells that derive their motivation primarily from radical and inaccurate interpretations of Islam have become increasingly prevalent in the UK 67, and have demonstrated that a few committed individuals can inflict large numbers of casualties despite disproportionately minimal resources. The overall cost of carrying out the 7/7 attacks, which included overseas trips, bomb-making equipment, accommodation rent, car hire and UK travel, was estimated to be less than £8,000 68.

‘Lone Wolf’

As with the members of any given terrorist group, so-called ‘lone wolf’ perpetrators are motivated by a variety of reasons, including their adherence to particular social, political or religious causes. Susceptible individuals may not be formally affiliated with radical groups, but can be inspired through the Internet, particularly via social media websites. ‘Lone wolves’ can exist in interconnected groups, even if they are only virtual networks. However, ‘lone wolves’ can be the most difficult to identify and disrupt as they may choose to leave a less conspicuous ‘digital footprint’. No suspicious planning or reconnaissance meetings are arranged, and there is a far greater reliance on the general public to report the suspicious behaviour of one individual. The May 2008 bombing attempt in Exeter by Nicky Reilly 69 has underscored the fact that ‘lone wolf’ attackers are becoming more indiscriminate in their targeting 70. The revised Prevent Strategy further highlights the dangers of ‘lone wolf’ terrorism 71. In 2010, Terence

Intelligence and Security Committee (2011). Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2010-2011. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 27. 67 Home Office (2011). Prevent Strategy. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. pp 44-47. 68 th House of Commons (2006).Report of the Official Account of the London Bombings on 7 July 2005. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 23. 69 Nicky Reilly was a vulnerable Muslim convert with Asperger’s syndrome. He was directed online to build nail bombs, which he attempted to detonate at the Giraffe restaurant in Exeter in May 2009. Fresco, A. (2009). Nicky Reilly, Muslim convert, jailed for 18 years for Exeter bomb attack. Available: th http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article5619151.ece. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 70 Ibid. 71 HM Government (2011). Prevent Strategy. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p15.

Gavan, an extreme right-wing ideologue, was jailed for assembling one of the largest arms cachés found in the UK in recent years 72. Evidence suggests that the threat from these micro-actors will increase 73. They exist as small, autonomous cells which utilise advanced technology including the Internet, satellite communications and international commerce 74. However, due to the cellular nature of extremists, there may be an increasing number of failed attacks resulting from a lack of skill or faulty equipment as demonstrated by the 21st July 2005 (21/7) London bombing attempts 75.

A major threat might be if ‘lone wolf’ terrorists were to carry out simultaneous multiple attacks aimed at causing political, physical or economic damage, utilising the ‘Mumbai-style’ attack model 76. Simultaneous attacks aimed at critical national infrastructure (CNI) targets have already occurred in Pakistan 77. The seriousness of this threat was further demonstrated by the 22/7 terrorist attacks in Norway, when Anders Breivik detonated a car bomb near Regjeringskvartalet (Oslo’s equivalent of Whitehall) in Oslo before methodically gunning down victims, killing 69 people on the island of Utøya 78.

Roberts, L. (2010). 'Lone wolf' BNP member jailed for 11 years for building up explosives arsenal. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/bnp/6996980/Lone-wolf-BNP-member-jailed-for-11-years-for-buildingth up-explosives-arsenal.html. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 73 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (2006). Country Reports on Terrorism 2006. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. p 11. 74 Ibid. 75 Henry, E. (2008). 'Fifth bomber' admits planning 21/7 attack. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1568833/Fifth-bomber-admits-planning-217-attacks.html. Last accessed th 28 July 2011. 76 Cowell, A. (2011). Britain Raises Terror Alert Level. Available: th http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/world/europe/08britain.html?_r=1. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 77 Crisis Consulting (2009). Simultaneous suicide bombings strike Lahore and Nowshera. Available: th http://www.netglobers.com/asia/pakistan-simultaneous-suicide-bombings-strike-8942.html. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 78 BBC News (2011). Norway shooting: Funerals for Breivik victims. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldth europe-14336291. Last accessed 5 Aug 2011.

Projections The threat from ‘lone wolf’ extremists is more difficult to assess, given their largely solitary modi operandi. Just as the 2006 ISC report into 7/7 suggested that all Government departments and law enforcement agencies need to have a common understanding of radicalisation, the 22/7 attacks in Norway have demonstrated that this must be a priority in relation to ‘lone wolf’ threats 79.

We assess that the threat from small terrorist groups or ‘lone wolf’ terrorists will increase in frequency due to the decentralised nature of the radical Islamist movement 80. The US President Barack Obama has also stated that a ‘lone wolf’ terror attack in the USA is more

Intelligence and Security Committee (2006). Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 30. 80 Critical Threats (2011). Pakistan Security Brief - July 27, 2011. Available: th http://www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan-security-brief/pakistan-security-brief-july-27-2011. Last accessed 27 July 2011.

likely than a major coordinated effort like the September 11 attacks 81. Therefore, there may be an increase in the likelihood of attacks, whether indiscriminately against members of the public or upon prominent individuals, such as the stabbing of Stephen Timms MP 82.

However, one of the more vulnerable areas for a ‘lone wolf’ and a possible opportunity for law enforcement detection and intervention is during the acquisition of training and skills necessary for successful attacks.

In the light of 22/7, other extremists might have considered the difference in fatality numbers between the two types of weaponry utilised by Anders Breivik, and therefore might opt for firearms instead of IEDs. Moreover, firearms are easier to operate than IEDs, and are less likely to malfunction 83. As a result, future terrorist attacks are likely to involve more use of firearms than has been seen previously.

Far-Right Extremism

Although far-right extremists can be found in different groups across the UK, such as the English Defence League (EDL) 84, the distinctions between them are often minimal.

English Defence League The English Defence League (EDL) has staged a series of street demonstrations since it was formed in 2009, many of which have led to violence and disorder 85. However, the EDL publicly maintains that it is a peaceful protest group which only opposes ‘militant Islam’86.

In spite of its name, the influence of the EDL extends beyond England itself. Far-right 81

MacInnis, L. (2011). Obama says "lone wolf terrorist" biggest U.S. threat. Available: nd http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/16/us-usa-obama-security-idUSTRE77F6XI20110816. Last accessed 22 August 2011. 82 BBC News (2010). Student guilty of attempted murder of MP Stephen Timms. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-11673616. Last accessed 28th July 2011. 83 BBC News (2011). Timeline: How Norway's terror attacks unfolded. Available: th http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14260297. Last accessed 29 July 2011. 84 Taylor, M. (2010). English Defence League: new wave of extremists plotting summer of unrest. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/may/28/english-defence-league-protest-bnp. 85 Britton, P. (2010). Religious leaders call for EDL rally ban. Available:http://menmedia.co.uk/manchestereveningnews/news/s/1194317_religious_leaders_call_for_edl_rally_ th ban. Last accessed 14 August 2011. 86 English Defence League (2011). Mission Statement. Available:http://englishdefenceleague.org/aboutth us/mission-statement/. Last accessed 16 August 2011.

activists from across Europe (including France, Sweden and Denmark) joined thousands of EDL supporters to demonstrate in Luton, in February 2011 87. The EDL also has a pragmatic strategy to reach out to any demographic group, including the Sikh and Jewish communities, who may share an historical animosity towards Muslims 88.

During the August 2011 England Riots, this organisation attempted to portray itself as the protector of local communities principally in Eltham and Enfield, in order to generate support. Instead, during their demonstrations, riot police were hit with missiles, and over 1,000 officers were embroiled in the disorder 89.

At the time of writing, Scotland Yard is investigating possible links between Anders Breivik and British far-right and anti-Islamic groups 90. Breivik’s manifesto, 2083: A European Declaration of Independence 91 claimed that more than 600 of his Facebook friends were EDL members. It also indicated that he had been in contact with EDL leaders. The manifesto, signed "Andrew Berwick” and dated “London 2011", contains numerous references to his links with the EDL and the UK, and suggests that he was introduced to extreme right-wing politics in London in 2002 92. In spite of the EDL’s claims that there has never been any official contact between Breivik and their organisation 93, there have been reports that Breivik attended at least one EDL demonstration in the UK during 2010 94.

Projections At present, the threat posed by right-wing extremism in the UK is more likely to manifest itself through civil disorder, as opposed to direct terrorist acts. Despite this, the possibility of

Taylor, M & Davis, R. (2011). EDL protest attracts European far-right activists. Available: th http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/feb/04/edl-rally-european-far-right. Last accessed 16 August 2011. 88 Copsey, N. (2010). The English Defence League: Challenging Our Country and Our Values of Social Inclusion, Fairness and Equality. Available: http://faith-matters.org/images/stories/fm-reports/english-defense-leagueth report.pdf. Last accessed 16 August 2011. 89 Hough, A. et al (2011). London riots: vigilantes hurl bottles at police in Eltham. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8694472/London-riots-vigilantes-hurl-bottles-at-police-inth Eltham.html. Last accessed 16 August 2011. 90 BBC News (2011). UK links to Norway killer probed. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politicsth 14284763. Last accessed 15 August 2011. 91 BBC News (2011). 'Breivik manifesto' details chilling attack preparation. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14267007. Last accessed 16th August 2011. 92 Taylor, M & Townsend, M. (2011). Norway gunman claims a London connection and links to the EDL. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/24/norway-gunman-london-connection-edl. Last accessed th 15 August 2011. 93 Ibid. 94 Daily Mail (2011). Police probe claim Norwegian gunman marched with English Defence League. Available: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2018865/Norway-shooting-Anders-Behring-Breivik-marched-Englishth Defence-League.html. Last accessed 16 August 2011.

terrorist actions by far-right extremists represents a genuine threat which should not be ignored.

Anarchist Extremists

Anarchist Extremists (AE) adhere to the anti-government movement which rejects the rule of authority and advocates violent means to overthrow established social, political and economic hierarchies 95. The AE threat was exposed by successful police operations during the Royal Wedding 96 of April 2011, together with the attack on Prince Charles’ car during the student protests of December 2010 97 and other separate incidents.

Projections Due to the continued economic crisis, the tendency for disaffected individuals to join such illicit groups may have increased. Links between British AE groups and affiliated entities in Europe could strengthen (as demonstrated by protests at economic summits, notably those in Athens 2011 98) as governments implement tighter austerity measures. The expansion development of such groups would lead to increased social unrest as demonstrated by the 2010 student protests in Central London 99.

There is a danger that peaceful protests may be hijacked more frequently by Anarchist Extremists, such as during the 2010 student protests and as demonstrated by ‘black bloc’ actions 100, which undermined the Trades Union Congress’ peaceful anti-cuts protests 101.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (2010). Domestic Terrorism Anarchist Extremism: A Primer. Available: th http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/november/anarchist_111610/anarchist_111610. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 96 Hughes, M. (2011). Royal wedding: masked anarchists thwarted by police. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/royal-wedding/8483761/Royal-wedding-masked-anarchists-thwarted-byth police.html. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 97 BBC News (2010). When aggression overtakes the rhetoric. Available: th http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/london/hi/people_and_places/newsid_9277000/9277389.stm. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 98 Mail Online (2011). Streets of fire: Protesters set policeman alight as riots erupt in Athens. Available: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1359891/Athens-riots-erupts-Greek-protesters-set-policementh fire.html#ixzz1. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 99 Coughlan, S. (2011). Student tuition fee protest ends with 153 arrests. Available: th http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-11877034. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 100 The ‘black bloc’ is not the name of an organisation, but a tactic whereby individual anonymity is maintained with scarves, hoods etcetera whilst aiming to display a show of unity by carrying out their anonymous actions en masse. Young, D. (2001). Autonomia and the Origin of the Black Bloc. Available: nd http://www.ainfos.ca/01/jun/ainfos00170.html. Last accessed 2 September 2011.

Cyber-Terrorism

Cyber-terrorism can be defined as indoctrination, violence, destruction, or disruption of online services through the use of Information Technology (IT) systems. The intended purpose of this is to create fear, by causing confusion and uncertainty within a given nation state, with the goal of influencing a government or population to conform to a particular political, social or ideological agenda 102.

101

LibCom (2011). Black Bloc interview: 'Only actions count now'. Available: http://libcom.org/forums/news/blackth bloc-only-actions-count-now-31032011. Last accessed 8 August 2011. 102 Baranetsky, V. (2009). What is cyberterrorism? Even experts can't agree. Available: th http://www.hlrecord.org/news/what-is-cyberterrorism-even-experts-can-t-agree-1.861186. Last accessed 26 July 2011.

Components of cyber-terrorism may include: 103 Examples of cyber-terrorism include hacking into computer systems 104, introducing viruses to vulnerable networks 105, website defacing 106 (see screenshot overleaf), ‘denial of service’ attacks 107, or terrorist threats made via electronic communication 108.

The ISC Annual Report 2010/2011 stated that the Internet is an ideal environment for ideological and political extremists and has been described as a “virtual extremist madrassa” 109. The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) has described the Internet as the “turbocharger of radicalisation” 110 since it offers an efficient means of disseminating extremist propaganda and technical knowledge. The revised CONTEST Strategy 111 (released in July 2011) has indicated that the trend of increased reliance on cloud computing and greater usage of social networks presents an altogether changed landscape, to which law enforcement agencies must quickly adapt, in order to effectively monitor and disrupt the dissemination of terrorist material 112. Hostile attacks upon UK cyber-space can be carried out by governments, non-state actors, criminals or terrorists 113.

103

Snow, G. (2011). Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, Washington, D.C.). Available: http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/cybersecurity-responding-to-the-threat-of-cyberth crime-and-terrorism. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 104 Almeida, A. (2011). Pakistan Cyber Army Hacks into BSNL. Available: th http://tech2.in.com/news/general/pakistan-cyber-army-hacks-into-bsnl/232572. Last accessed 27 July 2011. 105 HM Government (2011). CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy For Countering Terrorism. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 34. 106 Almeida, A. (2011). Pakistan Cyber Army Hacks into BSNL. Available: th http://tech2.in.com/news/general/pakistan-cyber-army-hacks-into-bsnl/232572. Last accessed 27 July 2011. 107 Keteyian, A. (2011). "Anonymous" hacker: We can shut your website. Available: th http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/07/19/eveningnews/main20080814.shtml. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 108 Gavin, R. (2011). Terror threat brings prison time. Available: http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Terrorth threat-brings-prison-time-1615542.php. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 109 Intelligence and Security Committee (2011). Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2010-2011. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 54. 110 Ibid. 111 The ‘CONTEST’ counter-terrorism strategy is based upon four key workstreams, known as the ‘four Ps’: Prevent stops individuals from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism in the first place; Pursue acts to frustrate terrorist attacks within the short term through apprehending suspects; Protect involves the physical strengthening of potential terrorist targets; and, Prepare aims to mitigate the effects of any attacks that do occur. Omand, D. (2010). Securing the State. London: Hurst & Company. pp 64-65. 112 HM Government (2011). CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy For Countering Terrorism. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 34. 113 Intelligence and Security Committee (2011). Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2010-2011. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 53.

At the time of writing, the world's most widespread cyber-attack has recently been uncovered, which has, over the past five years, been known to have infiltrated approximately 72 organisations including 114: • 22 government agencies; • 13 defence contractors; • Six financial firms; • International institutions, such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) 115.

Air Botswana website, having been attacked by the ‘Pakistan Cyber Army’

114

Alperovitch, D. (2011). Revealed: Operation Shady RAT. Available: th http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf. Last accessed 4 August 2011. 115 Emery, D. (2011). Governments, IOC and UN hit by massive cyber attack. Available: th http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-14387559. Last accessed 4 August 2011.

Younes Tsouli (also known as “Irhabi 007”), a hacker from the UK, served as an AQ conduit for two years. He not only hacked American university computers and put out propaganda for the al-Zarqawi-led insurgents in Iraq 116, but also taught other online Jihadists how to commit cyber-terrorism 117. Cyber-crime techniques are sometimes employed to conduct denial of services attacks 118, but are also linked to economic offences that generate funds to benefit terrorist or extremist groups 119. The proportion of cyber-crime directly or indirectly attributable to terrorists is difficult to determine. However, links have been identified between terrorist groups and criminals that allow terror networks to operate by utilising computer resources 120 to share money laundering techniques 121 and transit routes 122.

The seriousness with which the Government takes the cyber-terrorism threat seriously is demonstrated by the opening of the Cyber-Security Operations Centre in 2009, which is located within Government Communications Headquarters’ (GCHQ) Cheltenham site 123.

116

Corera, G. (2008). The world's most wanted cyber-jihadist. Available: th http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7191248.stm. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 117 Ibid. 118 Keteyian, A. (2011). "Anonymous" hacker: We can shut your website. Available: th http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/07/19/eveningnews/main20080814.shtml. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 119 Global Witness (2003). For a Few Dollar$ More: How al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade. Available: th http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010304.pdf. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 120 Chargualaf, J. (2008). Terrorism and Cyber-Crime. Available: https://w ww.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-70c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_032db98f-3811-4c77-9048th 602188f3d947e/display.aspx?rs=enginespage. Last accessed 26 July 2011. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 Government Communications Headquarters (2009). GCHQ to host UK Cyber Security Operations Centre. th Available: http://www.gchq.gov.uk/press/csoc_newsitem.html. Last accessed 27 July 2011.

Projections Figure 1: Types and Likelihood of Cyber-Attacks 124

The following table describes the type of cyber-attacks, ranging from the ‘least likely’ to ‘most likely’:

Least Likely

Physical Attacks to Facilitate Cyber-Attacks Requires an extremely high degree of co-ordination and resources Could be a physical attack in order to commit cyber-crime or cyber-terrorism

Physical Attacks to Exacerbate Cyber-Attacks Could be executed by any group capable of cyber-operations This type of attack could aim to disable infrastructure assets, which are needed to recover effectively from a cyber- attack

Cyber-Attacks to Facilitate Physical Attacks Requires more organisation and technological sophistication This attack could be intended to defeat security systems, gain accesses to restricted areas in order to mount a physical attack

Cyber-Attacks to Exacerbate Physical Attacks Requires the least amount of resources and knowledge Terrorists could use the cyber-component of an attack to increase chaos caused by a ‘main physical attack

Most Likely

Terrorist Financing International terrorist organisations employ a variety of mechanisms to procure, transfer and store financial assets. Terrorists and criminals attempt to conduct these activities without

124

Commonwealth of Virginia: Department of State Police Virginia Fusion Center (2009). 2009 Virginia Threat Assessment. Virginia: Virginia Fusion Center. p 82.

attracting the attention of law enforcement agencies by utilising closed networks and systems with limited regulation.

Funds are often generated through the trafficking of profitable commodities such as contraband cigarettes 125, counterfeit goods 126, and illicit drugs 127. Terrorists may also generate funds through fraudulent charitable organisations that collect large sums in donations from both witting and unwitting donors 128. Terrorist organisations are often creative in generating new ways of receiving and hiding funds 129 from law enforcement organisations 130. A recent example is the sending of video clips, which include requests for financial support, to the mobile telephones of potential donors 131.

Illicit assets could be moved, concealed or laundered through less transparent trade or financial mechanisms that can make tracking more difficult, including: • Charities; • Informal banking systems • Bulk cash

132

;

133

;

• Commodities (such as precious stones and metals)

134

Funds may be stored in the form of commodities because they are an easy means by which to trade outside formal banking systems.

125

Noble, R. (2003). The link between intellectual property crime and terrorist financing. Available: th http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/BASCAP/Pages/links.pdf. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 126 Ibid. 127 Indian Express (2011). 4 charged for trying to sell drugs to fund terror. Available: th http://www.indianexpress.com/news/4-charged-for-trying-to-sell-drugs-to-fund-terror/823335/. Last accessed 27 July 2011. 128 BBC News (2010). Pakistani charity is blacklisted by US State Department. Available: th http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11833725. Last accessed 27 July 2011. 129 Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (2011). Money laundering/terrorist financing activities. Available: http://www.jmlsg.org/other-helpful-material/article/money-laundering-terrorist-financing-activities. Last accessed th 27 July 2011. 130 BBC News (2010). Pakistani charity is blacklisted by US State Department. Available: th http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11833725. Last accessed 27 July 2011. 131 European Police Office (2011). TE-SAT 2011. Available: th https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/te-sat2011.pdf. Last accessed 5 August 2011. 132 Global Witness (2003). For a Few Dollar$ More: How al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade. Available: th http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010304.pdf. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 133 Noble, R. (2003). The link between intellectual property crime and terrorist financing. Available: th http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/BASCAP/Pages/links.pdf. Last accessed 28 July 2011. 134 Global Witness (2003). For a Few Dollar$ More: How al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade. Available: th http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010304.pdf. Last accessed 28 July 2011.

Figure 2: Generating, Moving and Storing Illicit Funds (Commonwealth of Virginia Police Virginia Fusion Center) 135

The following table shows how fraudulent funds could be earned, transferred and stored; internally and externally:

Generating Internal

Moving

Storing

- Front businesses

- Bulk cash smuggling

- Conflict gems and precious

- Fraudulent charities

- Unregistered informal

metals

- Donations through

transfer systems (hawala)

- Sympathetic banking

religious institutions

- Over/Under invoicing

institutions

- Drug trade

between front businesses

- Counterfeit goods - Fraud

External - Individual donations - Contributions from

- Wire transfers

- Fraudulent bank accounts

- Business transactions

charities

The revised Prevent Strategy (2011) stated that charities can be formed to raise funds under false pretences for terrorist groups, either domestically or overseas. More specifically, charities can also raise and move funds for the wider purposes of enabling radicalisation and recruitment activity. Of the Charity Commissionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s total caseload of 180 investigations in 2009/2010, 11 investigations followed allegations or suspicions of terrorist-related activities 136.

The Charity Commission has its own asset-freezing powers, and where charities are suspected of criminal activity (including terrorism), they will be referred to law enforcement agencies. However, both the raising of public awareness of illegitimate charities and the methods used to report suspicions could be improved 137.

135

Commonwealth of Virginia: Department of State Police Virginia Fusion Center (2009). 2009 Virginia Threat Assessment. Virginia: Virginia Fusion Center. p 96. 136 Home Office (2011). Prevent Strategy. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. p 93. 137 Charity Commission (2008). Charity Commission Counter-terrorism strategy. Available: http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/our_regulatory_activity/counter_terrorism_work/ctstrategy.aspx. Last th accessed 27 July 2011.

Further Support and Advice Police and Government SIRS Consultancy can provide bespoke advice to individual police forces, law enforcement agencies and Government departments to help mitigate the serious risks that remain in the final months leading up to the Olympic Games to be held in London and across the UK. Business and Academia SIRS consultancy can carry out bespoke research and analysis for business or academic purposes in the areas of security, intelligence, resilience and defence.

Media In addition to meeting ongoing demand for interviews in relation to this report and UK security, SIRS Consultancy provides the media with analysis on all areas of security, intelligence, resilience and defence around the world. The Authors of this Report: SIRS Consultancy Ltd Suhel Abo-Hatab: Suhel is a subject matter expert on German and UK national Security Issues. He specialises on the exploitation of the Media by terrorists as a recruitment, propaganda and radicalisation tool. Contact: suhel.abo-hatab@sirsconsultancy.com

Shyam Bhatt: Shyam has written several articles on the state of security in the UK before the Olympic Games next year. He is an expert in the psychology of terrorist activity and the rise of globalisation, guerrilla and asymmetric warfare. Contact: shyam.bhatt@sirsconsultancy.com Christian Cullen: Christian has wide and rich experience, ranging across the Civil Service, the private sector and Parliament. Before founding SIRS Consultancy, he was a project manager within the Home Office's Mass Fatalities Team. Contact: christian.cullen@sirsconsultancy.com Jonathan Lautier: Jonathan has written or contributed towards several articles on subjects as diverse as cybersecurity, the August 2011 England Riots, and the erroneous dissemination of terrorismrelated propaganda and training material by mainstream media outlets. Prior to working for SIRS Consultancy, he was employed as a Civil Servant by the Ministry of Defence. Contact: jonathan.lautier@sirsconsultancy.com