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Monitor Editor: SIRS Consultancy Ltd. Thanks To Our Contributors: Grace Ayibowu Elicia Bush Ranbir Chandel Vanessa Gregory Paul Johnstone Oliver Krumme Megan Munroe Joshua Shurley

Company Website: This document only refers to the London 2012 Olympic Games, the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games Ltd (LOCOG), the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and any other affiliated entity in a purely factual and editorial manner. It in no way associates itself, deliberately or otherwise, with the London 2012 Olympic Games, including the use of the brand on the cover which is copyrighted to the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Cover image © LOCOG If you wish to contact any contributors, please email Images in this publication may be under copyright. Copyright © SIRS Consultancy Ltd. No part of this publication may be reproduced copied or transmitted in any form or by any means stored in any information storage or retrieval systems without the publishers express permission. Although every effort is made to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the material published. SIRS Consultancy can accept no responsibility.


SIRS Editorial… Dear reader, It is our great pleasure to welcome you to our second issue of Monitor. We are grateful to Paul Johnstone for writing an excellent article on the rise of bodyguards in China and Joshua Shurley for his article on Kony 2012. In our Olympics-themed issue this quarter, we have excellent articles on venue security and on the Atlanta bombing in 1996. Furthermore, we are proud to present ‘The Final 10 Weeks’ - on the key threats facing the Olympics currently. The risks posed to the UK are high. It faces a growing threat of lone wolf terrorists returning from fighting overseas, which could potentially coincide with the Olympic Games. It is understood that MI5 and the police have been contacted by concerned parents of young Muslim men who they suspect of being recruited by Al-Shabaab. Islamist extremists are not the only threat. The Government must now place a much greater emphasis on countering a resurgent far-right threat. Currently, far-right groups are mostly considered in the context of a civil disorder threat rather than one which might directly produce right-wing terrorists, or exacerbate terrorism from Islamist extremists. There has been an extraordinary growth of far-right groups with links to similar organisations in Europe. Civil disorder is an equal threat to that posed by lone wolves. The London 2012 Games will take place in a city still recovering from the August 2011 England Riots. There is still much resentment in a city that has experienced housing benefit and legal aid cuts, large scale unemployment, and which is being asked to contribute towards a huge security operation. The financial burden of the Games may have a continuing impact on the UK’s ability to fund post-Olympics national security programmes. The initial cost of the Games was estimated to be £2.37bn. Now the figure may be as high as £11bn, with the added cost of security spiralling almost on a daily basis. The required number of security staff has increased by 100%, doubling the cost of security from £282m to £553m, with it being more likely to end up on a figure of £1bn like the 2004 Athens Olympics. Funding will continue to be reigned in, at the same time as the emphasis of national security returns from domestic to international, amid concerns about the African Arc of Instability, the growth of Chinese influence around the globe and an increasingly right-wing Europe on the brink of economic collapse. All this could amount to a perfect storm of combined threats and the most serious risks not being reduced during the Olympic Games. Despite recent successful arrests and failed plots, lone wolf terrorists are still very hard to monitor and disrupt. In addition, the planned large scale protests in response to austerity measures mean that the summer of 2012 may be one of discontent rather than of success as originally intended by Olympic organisers.



Contents 6

Seeing the Jungle for the Trees: How Kony 2012 Fits Into the Big Picture of USAfrica Policy

18 The Chinese Bodyguards: Personal Protection in the land of the Dragon Paul Johnstone

Joshua Shurley

12 Boko Haram: Threat To Nigeria's Interests?


Grace Ayibowu

Vanessa Gregory



25 Could Atlanta Happen




aa 42


Summer 2012: The Final Weeks

Jonathan Lautier


Suhel Abo-Hatab


Fear through conspicuous presence? The scale of security for the London Olympics Oliver Krumme


Venue Security: An Olympic Task Megan Munroe

Lone Wolf Terrorism: A Multi-Faceted Threat

Why the West is in desperate need of a comprehensive cybersecurity plan Elicia Bush


The Covert Role of States and State-agencies in Fostering and Perpetuating Terrorism Ranbir Chandel


Monitor | Africa

Seeing the Jungle for the Trees: How Kony 2012 Fits Into the Big Picture of US-Africa Policy

Recent months have seen cyberspace inundated with links to a phenomenon known as Kony 2012 or the Stop Kony movement. It would be safe to assume that anyone with an internet connection has, since March 2012, at least heard the name Kony in some way, shape or form, even if they have not gone on to watch the video associated with it or read up on the matter further. In addition to the viral web video produced by a California-based nongovernmental organisation (NGO) called Invisible Children (IC), there has also been a significant backlash against its makers. Just who is Kony? Why must we stop him and how? And how does this sudden splash of attention that calls for the intervention of the US Military in East Central Africa relate to larger foreign policy focus in the region? Before delving into some of complexities behind the issue, it is


important to first dispel a few myths about the criticism of IC, some of which is unfair, and some of which is appropriate. First, that Invisible Children is a sham charity, receiving less than stellar scoring levels by charity watchdog groups like Charity Navigator. This is mostly due to the fact that IC is not a charity in the traditional sense per se, but rather is an activist organisation aimed at using social media to raise awareness of the plight of abducted children-and obviously a very successful one, if the over 89 million views of their video are any indication. In a rebuttal to their scoring, even Charity Navigator itself asserts that Invisible Children is actually outperforming most charities on transparency and expense allocation. In terms of its goal, IC hopes to make Joseph Kony famous, not to celebrate him, but to raise support for his arrest and set a precedent for international

Monitor | Africa justice, and their efforts have been on mobilising mass support in order to apply pressure on US policymakers to use the necessary means-in this case, military assets-to end Kony’s reign of terror. Another charge levelled at IC is that the thirty minute video oversimplifies a very complex problem, and worse, calls for a solution (US military intervention) that is naive at best and destructive at worst, given the fact that the villain in question is no longer even operating in Uganda, and that inviting in the US Military to intervene is a recipe for disaster.


not motivated by any identifiable political agenda. While Kony claims to be fighting for such causes as the establishment of multiparty democracy and protection of the human rights and dignity of Ugandan civilians, his methods strongly indicate otherwise. Without question, what is most troubling about the LRA has been their tactics.

Unravelling the complexities of Kony, Uganda, and greater regional instability, is no small task, but by first identifying the main actors, their interests, the implications of IC’s proposed solution, this article hopes to shed some light on the matter.

Who is Joseph Kony? Since the mid-1980s, a group calling themselves the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been waging a rebel insurgency movement in northern Uganda. Originating out of the Acholi ethnic group, its charismatic leader is a man called Joseph Kony, a former altar boy and self-described prophet intent on overthrowing the government of Yoweri Museveni. Kony’s ideology has been described as a blend of his interpretation of Biblical commandments and traditional Acholi religious practises seen as very bizarre to outsiders. According to the International Crisis Group, the LRA is

Command structure of the LRA © Invisible Children, Inc.

For over twenty-five years, the LRA has raided remote villages, looting supplies, killing, mutilating, and raping civilians, and abducting children for use as child soldiers. The ensuing conflict has seen


Monitor | Africa

the displacement of over two million Ugandans, the deaths of over 10,000, and the estimated abduction of over 30,000 children. As the Ugandan Government's efforts to find Kony have been stepped up, so have the brutal methods he has employed, including cutting of the lips, ears, and noses of civilian victims as an example of what will happen to those who support government forces. Outside Intervention Since the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Joseph Kony in 2005, there have been numerous attempts to apprehend him, all to no avail. Partly due to effective lobbying by NGOs like Invisible Children and the ENOUGH Project, the United States has increasingly become involved in anti-LRA efforts, providing funding, training, and equipment to Ugandan and other African troops. After peace brokers attempted talks that resulted in several failed negotiations with Kony, followed by a number of military setbacks in northern Uganda by US-backed forces trying to surround the elusive leader, Washington decided to go further. Bipartisan efforts in the US Congress and by both the Bush and Obama administrations have seen the passage of the 2010 LRA Disarmament Bill and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. Since that time, Kony has moved the LRA out of northern Uganda and is believed to be hiding in remote areas in bordering states. This culminated in President Obama’s decision in October 2011 to deploy one hundred American Special Forces advisers-the Green Berets-to the region to assist in the hunt for Kony. Operating in remote areas of northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR), and the newly independent nation of South Sudan, these forces are not engaged in a combat role, but do provide intelligence, training, and

logistical support to these countries’ militaries. There is no shortage of obstacles facing this daunting mission. The area is approximately the size of California, and is one of the most remote in the world, lacking infrastructure and lines of communication. The military forces in the DRC, CAR, and South Sudan are practically non-existent and ill-equipped to handle such a task. Consequently, Ugandan troops have been deployed and are operating in the remote jungle areas of its neighbours to augment the limited role played by these states. Over time, American military assistance to Uganda has increased due not only to its anti-LRA operations, but another mission a thousand miles away that has received little mention in the Kony 2012 media coverage. AMISOM – A quid pro quo? American foreign policy problems in Somalia date back to the early 1990s, and what was seen as a failed mission to save the Somali people from famine and lawlessness that gripped the country after its government's collapse in 1991-culminating in an incident known as Black Hawk Down (taken from a book title and film of the same name).

The crew of a Black Hawk Helicopter a month before the Battle of Mogadishu

Monitor | Africa Since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Washington has set its sights back on Somalia in the hope of rolling back Islamist militants operating there. After a US-backed invasion by Ethiopia to install a Western-supported government in its capital, Mogadishu, peace and stability have continued to elude Somalia, and it remains one of the world’s most dangerous places. Since 2007, a joint United NationsAfrican Union mission known as AMISOM has been providing security for the nascent Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu, and since 2010 has been conducting offensive combat operations against al-Qaedalinked al-Shabaab fighters. The bulk of the troops in the AMISOM mission have been provided by none other than the Republic of Uganda (5,000 to date-with plans for increases of another 3,000), with the US Treasury footing most of the bill. Sceptics of American foreign policy aims charge Washington with funding and equipping Ugandan Army units in order to fight al-Shabaab and carry out an unpleasant task that the American public has no stomach for doing with its own forces in the wake of the last decade of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq.


Some voices in Uganda have expressed outrage the sending of their soldiers into harm's way to fight America’s 'War on Terror', arguing that it is not in their national interest to do so. While true that the mission is a joint UN-African Union endeavour, its significant backing by the United States does not go unnoticed (the US explicitly rejected AU attempts in early 2011 at brokering peace between Qadafi’s Libya and NATO, for example-giving credence to charges that Washington is highly selective in what areas of AU efforts it is willing to condone). The domestic backlash worsened after a terrorist bombing in Uganda’s capital city of Kampala in 2010 by al-Shabaab, killing seventy, in retaliation for its support of AMISOM. The picture painted is thus one where Museveni’s Uganda takes the pressure off of the United States vis-à-vis Somalia in exchange for significant amounts of funding, training, and equipping of his own forces-increasingly used to crack down on his own political opposition, according to numerous African and international media sources. Perhaps worse still are allegations of how Ugandan troops deployed to fight Kony’s LRA have been used not only to abuse civilian populations themselves, but to occupy resource-rich areas in these neighbouring states and loot precious minerals and timber from the region. Stop Kony – Then What?

War flag of al-Shabaab

Now that American Special Forces advisers are closely involved in the manhunt, these alleged abuses may or may not be ameliorated. Only time will tell. Now that the gauntlet has been


Monitor | Africa

thrown, and public pressure on Washington to find Kony is higher than ever as a result of the push by Invisible Children’s Kony 2012 video, the American commitment will very likely be followed through to the end, lest Kony manage to be seen as outwitting the US military-as Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden once aspired to before meeting their ultimate fates. That Kony is a monster and should be eliminated-whether he is in Uganda, DRC, CAR, or South Sudan-is well agreed upon. History and experience suggest that it is only a matter of time and that Kony’s days on Earth are numbered. No doubt this is a good thing.

raising awareness but in mobilising constituencies to apply pressure on policymakers. Traditionally, the US foreign policy establishment focused on more direct threats (like terrorism) to Americans and American interests. Civil unrest and mass atrocities were mainly seen as symptomatic of and ancillary to, concerns of regional stability.

What remains to be seen and is a much thornier issue is the matter of US military aid to Uganda. For the time being, President Museveni’s and the White House’s interests are shared. The troubling increase in repression and autocratic behaviour by Museveni puts Washington into a corner, where it can not afford to upset its ally since they are helping the US with the unpleasant task of securing peace in Somalia. As a result, Ugandan soldiers endure highly dangerous rotations of six month deployments in a conflict that the American public has no will to send its own soldiers to fight. Social Media Game Changer

A poster for the Kony 2012 campaign © Invisible Children, Inc.

This issue no doubt highlights the changing nature of actor-agency in foreign policy decision making. The success of IC’s grassroots lobbying efforts indicates the ‘game changing’ nature of social media. Sites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube have now proven instrumental in not only

The implications of both social media’s impact on policymaking prioritisation and the recent focus on developing strategies to ameliorate atrocities through assisting regional militaries in the conduct of peace operations are in

Monitor | Africa their infancy in terms of rigorous empirical study. The case of Kony 2012 illustrates the promise of the former and the potential for disillusionment with the latter. Most would agree that pursuing Kony to serve the interests of international justice resulting from populist activism in social media is a positive development, as is the will to bring peace to war-torn Somalia. Using African proxies like Uganda to achieve this, possibly at the expense of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law for its citizens however, is much messier.


documentary filmmakers of Invisible Children who seek to raise awareness with the best of intentions. But whether or not the Ugandan army and their American backers are the heroes of this narrative is much more difficult to discern. The world has yet to see the longer-term result of American military intervention in Africa. The situation facing Washington is a daunting one as the quagmire in nearby Somalia has no end in sight.

Kony 2012 was a smashing success in terms of accomplishing what its makers set out to do-raise awareness of the atrocities of Joseph Kony’s LRA. It is indeed high time that the plight of conflict-affected victims in Central Africa matters to policymakers. The question is whether or not this concern will extend past the narrow issue of the Kony manhunt. Even providing Kony and his followers are wiped out, other perpetrators of violence against the vulnerable populations in this remote region remain-not the least of which are forces armed and trained by American taxpayers. If the world has now woken up to the horrors of Joseph Kony and are determined to stop him and those like him-good. Let’s hope they stay aware of the bigger picture and demand larger systemic issues are addressedincluding accountability for a worsening human rights situation within Uganda as a direct result of their comparatively powerful military, used as the Ugandan President’s personal regime-protection force, according to critics. No Easy Solution There are no easy solutions. It should be kept in mind that Joseph Kony is the villain in this story, and not the

President of Uganda Yoweri Kaguta Museveni

A recent London conference on Somalia hosted by the UK Government highlighted the fact that too many actors stand to benefit from the current chaotic situation there, making effective reforms problematic. Events in the Central African jungle to the east are no better. So long as Museveni and his allies in Washington benefit from the status quo, it remains unlikely that improvements will occur for the affected peoples of this regional hot spot as it continues to burn. But as one former UN officer put it, ...sometimes the way to put out the fire is simply to stop buying gasoline for the arsonists.

By: Joshua Shurley


Monitor | Africa

Boko Haram: Threat To Nigeria's Interests?

The remains of a car bomb that struck the UN premises in Abuja, Nigeria 2011 Š UNDP

Boko Haram (BH) is an Islamic militant group that seeks the imposition of Sharia law in all the 36 states of the Federation. It was founded in 2002 by Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri. In 2004, it moved to Kanamma in Yobe State, where it set up a base called 'Afghanistan' used to attack nearby police outposts and kill policemen. In July 2009, the Nigerian Police started investigating the group. Several leaders of the group were arrested in Bauchi State, sparking deadly clashes with Nigerian security forces which eventually led to the death of an estimated 700 people. The Christian Association of Nigeria lost 14 Pastors and over 20 Churches in the violence that cut across four Northern States namely: Bauchi, Borno, Kano, and Yobe States.

Attention has been drawn to Nigeria in speculation of possible terrorist activities on Nigerian soil, since the foiled Christmas Day bomb attack on a Detroitbound airliner, carried out by a Nigerian student - Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on 25th December 2009. Prior to that, Nigeria had been a hotbed of violent ethno-religious conflict mostly occurring in the North. It had largely been local and the weapons/tactics used were traditional - machetes, arson, and guns. But, a new dimension emerged as a bomb was used to attack a military barracks on the outskirts of the capital, Abuja on 31st December, 2010. This was the first attack near a military structure since 1999. However, the attack that would gain the group international recognition was the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Abuja on 26th August,

Monitor | Africa 2011. This was the first suicide bombing attack and a car bomb was used which killed at least 21 people and injured 60. This would be the beginning of more daring and devastating attacks carried out by the group. Who are Boko Haram? Loosely based on Afghanistan’s Taliban, Boko Haram mainly use car bombs, gun attacks and a few suicide bombings. The group typically uses AK-47 rifles, but it is thought that they have had access to weapons smuggled into the Sahel region from Libya after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011. These weapons include automatic rifles, grenades, surface-to-air missiles, vehicle mounted anti-aircraft machine guns, grenades, and explosives such as Semtex. It is thought that out of over 100 bank robberies that took place in Nigeria in 2011, 30 were carried out by Boko Haram militants for the purpose of funding their operations. There have also been reports of the group receiving financial support from some members of the ruling political party (PDP – People’s Democratic Party) and from some Northern governors who make monthly payments to the group in return for them not to carry out attacks in their states. Boko Haram also reportedly receives financial support from some active militant groups including alShabaab and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Boko Haram’s members are mostly unemployed and estranged Muslim males. Members also include middleclass university lecturers and students who reject all forms of Western and Christian influences. It is believed that there are over 4,000 active militants in Nigeria who also include non-Nigerians who have crossed Nigeria’s porous borders from Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.


The group’s activities have called into question not only the political stability and future of Nigeria, but also importantly the effects on the rest of the world, particularly in countries with which it shares close ties, both politically and economically. One such country is Britain.

FACT SHEET Official Name: Jama'atu ahlus sunnah lid da'awati wal jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad). Founder: Ustaz Mohammed (deceased in 2009)


Ideology: Islamist, Wahhabi, Salafist, Jihadist Current leadership: Abubakar Shekau, Abu Qaqa (spokesman), Abu Zaid (Spokesman) Operational Base: Northern Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Somalia, Mali, Cameroon. Number of terrorist attacks / Casualties: 21/Over 1000 since 2009 Targets: Mainly located in the North – police stations, military facilities, government building, banks, beer parlours, churches, academic institutions, civilian targets, and more recently, the media Training: al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabaab, other alQaeda training camps in some parts of North Africa such as Niger and militant camps in Mali Group affiliations: al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab Organisational Structure: Cell type structure operating both locally and internationally. The leader commands Regional Leaders who in turn oversee over 26 different operational cells in Nigeria


Monitor | Africa

The British-Nigerian Relationship


Britain and Nigeria have a relationship that pre-dates the colonial era of the 1900s. Both countries are bound by deep historic, cultural, social, economic, and political ties. It was under the British colonial rule that the Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalgamated by Lord Frederick Lugard in 1914. The country gained its independence from Britain in 1960.

When the relationship between Boko Haram and other international terrorist groups such as AQIM and al-Shabaab is considered, one can surmise that the group is a potential threat to the West and will not hesitate to attack Western targets if able to do so. This can be seen in the killing of the kidnapped Briton, Christopher McManus alongside Italian Engineer Franco Lamolinara on 8th March, 2012 by a splinter group of Boko Haram during a failed combined rescue attempt by Nigerian and British forces.

Nigeria is one of the UK’s key international partners and both countries work closely together on a range of domestic and international issues. Nigeria is an increasingly important market for British companies such as PZ Cussons Plc and the UK is one of the largest foreign investors in Nigeria, particularly in sectors such as oil and gas, through companies like Shell. There is also a strong Nigerian presence in the UK, which is home to about 800,000 Nigerians who contribute to the UK’s economy in fields ranging from medicine to entertainment. Nigeria is also home to about 117,000 yearly visitors of British nationality and not less than 16,000 British expatriates who work in sectors ranging from financial services and manufacturing to oil and gas. Thousands of Nigerians attend UK universities every year for both undergraduate and postgraduate programmes, and many more come on holiday or family visits. In light of Boko Haram’s activities vis-avis the relationship highlighted above, a begging question is: what are the implications for the UK? The answers to this can be analysed under three headings – security, political, and economic.

There are numerous flights between London and Abuja and Lagos on a daily basis. According to a December 2011 GDDS (General Data Dissemination System) report, there are about 600,000 passengers travelling between Nigeria and London yearly. This can provide the opportunity for a bomb attempt like the failed Christmas Day bomb attempt in 2009. AQIM is known for carrying out attacks internationally and its relationship with Boko Haram can impact on the group’s ambition for an international reach. The likelihood of this is minimal as BH seems to be more interested in local Nigerian politics than international politics, and as such would not necessarily be interested in carrying out attacks outside Nigeria’s borders. It may seek to assist AQIM and other militant groups in Africa that sympathise with their ideology and objectives, thereby attacking targets in such countries as Mali, Kenya, and Somalia. But this possibility is still low. However, depending on the outcome of proposed negotiations and dialogues between the Federal Government and BH, the group may step up its attacks by targeting Western visitors/expatriates in the country. There are a considerable number of British expats living and working in Abuja, especially in various non-governmental, international, and

Monitor | Africa


multinational organisations. The UN headquarters has been attacked before so it would not be far-fetched to anticipate another such attack from the group in a bid for its demands to be met by the Federal Government.

that since Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the position has been occupied by a Northerner for over 30 years, by the Yorubas for about 12 years, and by the Ibos for a little over two years; this includes both military and civilian rule.

If these attacks should spread down to the South of Nigeria, there is the possibility of a resurgence of the Niger Delta militants as a defensive measure, which could in turn lead to increased kidnappings of foreign workers in the region and destruction of oil pipelines. There is also the potential for the radicalisation and mobilisation of a new set of British youths, possibly with links to Nigeria.

Following President Yar’ Adua’s death in 2009 after a prolonged illness, it was the desire of the Northern party members for another Northerner to become President by virtue of the zoning, even though someone from another ethnic group (Ijaw - Goodluck Jonathan) was VicePresident and constitutionally had the right to remain Acting President until the next general elections. In the early aftermath of Yar’Adua’s demise, Jonathan did not make it clear whether or not he would contest for the Presidency under the umbrella of the PDP until much later. Eventually, the elections were held in 2011 and Jonathan became the winner much to the displeasure of some of the Northern political elite and to the pleasure of the minority groups he seemed to represent. It was the first time in Nigeria’s history that a minority candidate would win presidential elections.

The challenge here is one of a Jihad that is global in nature and which is continually evolving. Boko Haram has shown propensity to adopt al-Qaeda methods and sympathises with the latter’s cause. By providing training and financial support, AQIM is strategically gaining a foothold in Africa. According to a Terrorism-UK Analysis titled Global Jihad Sustained Through Africa by Valentina Soria in April 2012, AQIM’s freedom of movement and operational base will be extended by gaining a foothold in Nigeria and it is gradually doing this by meddling in local affairs. For instance, the group issued a statement in February 2010 condemning the killings of Muslims and urged support for Jihad by Nigerian Muslims. This will have spillover effects that the UK cannot ignore. Political It is believed that the current spate of attacks by BH is more locally and politically motivated than ideologically. There is a zoning system in the ruling political party, PDP when it came to power in 1999. The position of President should be rotated equally among the three major ethnic groups – Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo. Noteworthy is the fact

Goodluck Ebele Jonathan - World Economic Forum on Africa 2012 © World Economic Forum

Boko Haram began violent attacks in 2009 and the attacks have gone unabated till now. There is a strong feeling that this is largely due to the dissatisfaction of the North with the current presidency. It is no longer a secret that a number of Northern governors and politicians fund, support,


Monitor | Africa

or sympathise with the group, therefore sending a signal that once the presidency is returned to the North for a full term of four or eight years, these attacks will stop. Should this assessment be true then it will be particularly worrisome as it poses some possibilities:  Setting a dangerous precedent for other major and minor ethnic groups to follow in order to have their elected representative as President.  A gradual acceptance of militant extremism within the political scene.  A deepening of the ethnic and religious divide in the country which could ultimately lead to its disintegration.

soap maker which gets the greatest share of its sales from Africa has said that sales performance would be very low following the violence in the Northern part of Nigeria. This would inevitably hamper trade and investment in the long run should these attacks go unchallenged.

However, the bulk of this will be felt mostly by the North which is already affected by high levels of poverty and illiteracy. There is a dearth of professionals and skilled artisans as a lot of people now migrate to the South or more secure places in the North. According to a report by Business Day in April 2012, there was strategic mass movement from the North early this In this vein, year. This can Nigeria could cause a become a gradual failed nation restructuring and possibly a of the pariah state, Northern which would economy if affect whatever the violence ties that had continues. been hitherto Development established will be with other tampered with nations. and the gap between the Economic North and the South will There is no deepen doubt that Boko further. Haram has had Also The 12 Nigerian states with Sharia law in green © Bohr a very negative historically, impact on the North has Nigeria’s economy; businesses have always been the food basket of the shut down, employees stay at home in nation as about 78% of Nigeria’s land fear, and sales have reduced. A May mass is located in the North. What the 2011 report by Bloomberg says that the North lacks in terms of a viable Nigerian Breweries has reported a commercial and business environment, reduction in sales, especially in the more it makes up for in agriculture and animal insecure areas. This has also impacted husbandry, while the South provides a on companies owned by foreign viable domestic and international investors of which Britain is an important business terrain. If Boko Haram part. For instance, PZ Cussons, a UK

Monitor | Africa continues its attacks in the North, this balance could be significantly changed. To Sum Up: What Does the Future Hold? In conclusion, the threat posed by Boko Haram may not seem to be an immediate one to the West at the moment. But in the wider scheme of things after having considered its tactics, ideology, and affiliations with other active militant Islamist groups, it is a threat to be wary of and to be curbed. Boko Haram is in its infancy in a global Jihad through Africa. Nigeria being the most populous black nation in the world with over half of that population being Muslims stands the risk of letting an al-Qaeda and Talibansympathetic movement gain a foothold in the country. The borders are porous and there is a weak and corrupt government in place which has caused years of economic, educational, social, judicial, and security neglect; these put together could make the group develop a Hamas style of leadership - provide the basic vital services which the government has neglected to provide these past years, thereby, winning support from the majority of the people. After all, this was how Mohammed Yusuf started. He established a complex which included a mosque and schools where children from poor families in the North and other neighbouring countries were enrolled. That complex soon became a training ground for Jihadists. Solving the Boko Haram menace and curbing it now is not impossible. However, the government must have the will as it has the means to do so. Decisive strategic measures and not military or police heavy handedness will go a long way in dealing with it. The government must be ready to begin to clamp down on all corrupt officials and politicians across all levels of


government. Revenue allocation should be done more strategically and purposefully and steps should be taken to develop new basic amenities and social infrastructure while at the same time reviving old ones. Training in counter-terrorism, intelligence gathering and utilisation, pre-emptive measures, surveillance and detection should be provided for personnel across the security and intelligence agencies. Greater interaction between the populace and their elected representatives should ensue especially at the grassroots. Also, greater responsibility and accountability of the government to the citizens; the adoption of a realistic and functional national security policy; engaging in sustainable dialogue as a means of gathering intelligence and not at the expense of other counter-terrorism efforts; dissemination of relevant information to the public; and ultimately, doing all that can be done to stamp out or reduce to the barest minimum local grievances which are usually exploited by militant groups to gain local support. The bulk of this responsibility lies with the Nigerian government as there is only so much the international community can do. As a key international partner, the UK can help with sustainable intelligencesharing, security partnership, and training in modern counter terrorism efforts. Also, UK companies with a presence in Nigeria should seek to shoulder more corporate social responsibility towards the local environment in which they are situated and create more jobs for the indigenous population. All of these combined alongside the implementation of a holistic and systematic national security policy will help deter further terrorist attacks in the country as well as incursion into it by external militant groups.

By: Grace Ayibowu


Monitor | China

The Chinese Bodyguards: Personal Protection in the land of the Dragon

© Brian Carson

On the morning of January 22nd 2003, visitors streamed in and out of the Southern Chinese Shanxi office of Li Haicang. Nothing was out of the ordinary until a lone assassin produced a sawn off rifle and fired a bullet into Li’s body. Until that fateful moment, Li was the Chairman of a multinational company and 27th on the 2002 Forbes list of China’s richest people. Several weeks later on 12th February, a Chinese millionaire from the wealthy enclave on Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province, was stabbed to death by five men outside his home in a pre-planned assassination attack. Lin Jing was a chemicals trader murdered by an employee who taped his eyes shut before garrotting him with a rope. Wu Ruofu was a Chinese movie star who was abducted and Jiang

Yingwu, a regional manager of a popular restaurant chain who was killed by his kidnappers in 2004 even after the ransom was paid. Various media reports indicated that in 2004 alone, around 4,000 people were kidnapped in China. Well-known actor Wu Ruofu was abducted whilst driving his BMW and hidden in the north of Beijing by a notorious Chinese organised crime group who demanded a ransom, but police were able to track them down after several hours and freed Wu. Yun Quanmin was a wealthy entrepreneur involved in a textile business in the Inner Mongolia province. He was abducted whilst driving to his factory. The two kidnappers demanded a ransom of almost US$677,304,

Monitor | China however when the family paid only half of the amount, the kidnappers buried Yun alive. Criminals kidnapped the six-year-old son of a businessman in the northern Chinese province of Henan. They demanded approximately US$541,843 in return for releasing him. The father alerted the police, who quickly discovered the hideout however; sadly, the young boy had choked on his gag. These incidents are just several in part of a growing number of occupational hazards for China’s emerging ultra-rich; assassination and kidnapping are a reason why many of China’s rich are undertaking precautionary measures which are becoming more and more necessary for the emerging class of millionaires and billionaires. With around 30% of China’s millionaires believed to be women and a widening wealth gap making safety an issue for the rich, it’s easy to see that private security and in particular, Baobiao, the Chinese word for bodyguard is taking off as the nation struggles with some of the side effects of its booming growth.


A 2004 media report in the China Daily newspaper stated that in Guangzhou alone, the private security industry employed no fewer than 5,000 personal bodyguards. This is just a small step in the great wall of Chinese security and protection firms opening up throughout the country. There are even Chinese firms now specializing in kidnap insurance and from accounts; business is booming. Australian’s Eddie Wazen and Jason Watson are two industry experts based in Beijing who are leading the way in developing new training programs and services for the Chinese market.

Wazen and Director of Beijing Peoples Police College Eddie Wazen states that when he first visited China Eddie Wazen, who is the Director of back in 1995, international stars rarely Beijing-based Risk Management firm visited and China didn’t have a single Beijing Esoteric Consulting Pty Ltd, has billionaire. He said that China now has been conducting bodyguard training almost 250 individuals with assets worth throughout the People’s Republic of over US$1 Billion and in the past several China for the past decade. He has years China has produced its millionth served as a bodyguard to a Middle millionaire so it’s only reasonable to Eastern Prime Minister, Royalty and foresee the potential risks that are international business executives and associated with this wealth especially understands better than most people when there is a perception among many about the emerging Chinese private Chinese that a large percentage of the security and protection industry. During wealthy made their success through the 1990’s his Australian-based corruption. company was awarded a contract to


Monitor | China

provide security and risk management training for the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games. It was during this time that he was invited to travel to China to conduct training seminars for Chinese Police, Corporate Firms, Hospitality and tourism Industry officials, and private bodyguard firms in Executive Protection, Security Risk Management, Olympic Security, Defensive Tactics and Use of Force Options. During his time in China he has trained officers from the police, law enforcement and the growing number of corporate firms offering bodyguards. He states that a large number of China’s private bodyguards are retired police and/or soldiers from elite units, or former Chinese secret service members, and furthermore, that there has also been a large number of wealthy Chinese who are turning to female bodyguards in a measure of protection.

He says that he has seen bodyguard training programs designed for females advertised at martial arts schools where the training curriculum includes instruction in driving, computer skills, self-defense related laws and “polite conversation�. The teachers at these schools are veteran martial artists, former Special Forces soldiers and operational bodyguards. Female bodyguards are becoming more and more popular as businessmen want them to protect wives, girlfriends and children. Like Australia and the Western world, there are some schools which are professional and understand the complexities of what constitutes the role of a bodyguard whilst there are many other courses that run their course from an outdated training manual without any formal experience or training.

Wazen recalls a local executive, who had received threats that his child would be kidnapped, hired a female bodyguard to escort his child to and from school. He says that employers of bodyguards in Eddie Wazen overseeing training of a Beijing based bodyguard firm 1999 China are successful people like senior He says that there has also been a executives of foreign or private growing demand for private bodyguards businesses, as well as entertainers and being hired by Taiwanese pop singers a growing number of entrepreneurs. and prominent entertainers when visiting mainland China. Wazen states that like anywhere in the world, there are those who are jealous When asked who makes the best of, or simply hate the rich and successful bodyguard he is quick to note that the for their lavish and enjoyable lifestyle. Chinese have long prized Manchurian

Monitor | China bodyguards for their physical size, loyalty and bravery, and female bodyguards have many advantages of their own. Furthermore, many bodyguard training programs place a large emphasis on fitness and physical exercise and often the bodyguard will double as a coach in fitness training for their “bosses”. Many former career military and police officers turned entrepreneur have identified the specialist market of private security and its success in Western society and have now turned their focus on China.


the phrase ‘security consultant’ be used to avoid comparisons with the bodyguard image in America and other Western nations. Many lawyers believe that what is not specifically forbidden by law should be legal however; government officials claim that no firm can legally be registered as a private bodyguard service. There have been a number of occasions where firms have been shut down by the Public Security Bureau.

Just over a decade ago the industry didn’t legally exist. Although there have been several security firms who have Wazen and training team undertaking training for Chinese Olympic Officials received China’s Ministry of State approval to do business Wazen states that as far back as the if their founders have at least five years early 1990’s there was a special course of security experience, the employment in Wuhan, Central China which offered of personal bodyguards in China is still a young women the opportunity to train as grey area as far as the law goes and bodyguards. In 1999, Wazen was invited there are no laws yet in China to teach at the Dalian Peoples Police completely governing the industry. College where he witnessed first-hand a large number of young, fit and attractive Wazen said that the word ‘bodyguard’ females being trained as bodyguards by has had a very negative image in China a specialist unit within the police. These and because of the lack of legal clarity ladies had been trained in all aspects of surrounding the private bodyguards it body guarding including firearms and means that their work is often described Chinese martial arts. It was during this as “personal assistant” or “advisor” and time that Wazen, who is also a senior their multi functions are also reflected in instructor of Street-Edge Defensive the job description. Some firms have Tactics and Jissen Dojos International, also resorted to calling their bodyguard was asked to train these bodyguards in firm a “business etiquette” firm although the defensive tactics and unarmed of late, the Ministry of State insists that


Monitor | China

combat skills of Street-Edge Defensive Tactics and Bujinkan Ninjutsu. An example of the popularity of females attending these programs was highlighted in a Chinese media report which stated that the Wuhan College of Physical Education received 3,000 enquiries when it first announced that it would begin offering a six month training program to teach women how to become bodyguards. The report stated that of that number, over 700 women formally applied and 150 were accepted. It’s a special time in the history of China and the country has been in an economic transition. As such, China is no different to many other countries and crimes towards rich people are inevitable. Furthermore, a widening rich-poor gap, the 2008 Olympic Games and the global market are raising safety concerns among the nation’s elite and leaving many of them vulnerable. This is another reason why private bodyguard services have surfaced and are increasing each year. Like their Western counterparts, many Chinese performers and business executives employ bodyguards as a symbol of their status and prestige. However; aside from prestige, another reason for the increase in popularity of having a bodyguard is the crime rate. Whilst serious crimes such as robbery, theft and murder are still less frequent than in Western society, they are becoming more and more common in China than ever before. Chinese criminal gangs are also now renowned for carrying weapons including firearms, allegedly bought illegally from corrupt police or military personnel. Furthermore, there have been a number of major incidents over the past several years including the countdown to the Summer Olympic

Games in Beijing. Some of these include the March 2008 hijack of a bus in Xian which was carrying Australian passengers and was hijacked by a Chinese man wearing explosives and threatening to blow it up. Furthermore, there was an alleged attempt by Uighur minorities in China to hijack a plane traveling to Beijing in the same year. Many Chinese are rushing to join the ranks of one of China’s newest and best-paid professions and Chinese bodyguards can look forward to salaries of about US$200- 5000 a month depending on their military/police background, formal bodyguard training, education, appearance, knowledge of martial arts and foreign languages. However, whilst many sign up to a world of glamour there are many underlying problems including exploitation of female bodyguards as nothing more than an attractive fashion accessory or for “ornamental reasons”. However; there are those companies that also require a secretary, public relations officer and a bodyguard so in a female they can have all roles put into one role. The director of a firm that Wazen and his team has previously trained stated that he dresses his bodyguards in matching designer suits and long black coats as symbol of status and as far as he is concerned, if people see this in conjunction with his latest European designer car then it means success and that they will want to do business with him. In 2008, security specialist Jason Watson was invited to train students undertaking specialist bodyguard training in the lean up to the Beijing Olympic Games. Watson, who is a Street-Edge Defensive Tactics Instructor is a former Australian paratrooper, veteran of the United Nations mission to Cambodia and who has served as a bodyguard/private security contractor

Monitor | China and advisor to multinational corporate and government organisations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the past eight years is a subject matter expert in the new age of body guarding and high risk security.


Watson says that Chinese law prohibits private security guards from carrying guns, and there are also very strict laws in relation to carrying knives. Therefore, many Chinese bodyguards carry expandable batons and rely on their martial arts or defensive tactics skills including Street-Edge Defensive Tactics and Bujinkan Ninjutsu.

In theory, Chinese bodyguards do not have any special privileges and they have the same rights and responsibilities as civilians including they have no right or entitlement to carry firearms however; it is often Jason Watson training members of a PSD team in Afghanistan the case that many do carry weapons He states that the Chinese bodyguards in complete violation of the law and are rely too much on traditional and often “protected” by corrupt government outdated martial skills which are not officials or because they “know relevant to the modern bodyguard. someone”. Whilst having these skills is an advantage they are not suited to the There are unconfirmed reports that there close quarter and dynamic situations of may be over 20,000 companies the modern era. Instead, systems such throughout China who are involved in as Street-Edge Defensive Tactics and security, body guarding and private Bujinkan Ninjutsu are much more suited investigation work. Although there are to the Bodyguard/High Risk Protection some that are licensed by the state industry. Public Security Bureau (PSB), both In early 2012 prominent media reports throughout China and Asia showed young female students at a bodyguard training school having bottles smashed over their heads to prepare them in the event they may encounter this type of attack when they are a bodyguard. Wazen states that this type of training is more for show then having any real learning outcomes for the students.

Wazen and Watson believes that most of these firms operate underground or in a gray area with little regulation or by paying bribes to local government officials to turn the other way. They both believe that it is only a matter of time before the government opens the door to the private security industry in relation to recognition, accreditation and regulation as they believe that they fill a definite requirement within Chinese


Monitor | China

society. China is a huge country and although there are certain law enforcement officials that would like to see the private security industry controlled by the government it is neither practical nor appropriate. With the increase of crime in China including murder, assassination, kidnapping, corporate and financial crime the government is not in a position to be sending police and troops to provide personal protection to private entrepreneurs, local and foreign business executives and for those that require around the clock safety measures. Furthermore, there are an increasing number of foreign executives, entertainment and corporate businesses conducting business in China and many of these expect the same type of private security found in their native countries.

personal protection is being sought from renowned “subject matter expert� countries such as Australia, Israel and the United States. Watson and Wazen are now offering Chinese Corporations and their personnel specialised training in High Risk Body guarding/PSD and Hostile Environment Awareness Training. Many large corporations are now starting to identify the benefits of putting their personnel through this type of international experience and training. More and more Chinese companies are taking their business to the international community and in many cases to third world countries such as within Africa where the security risks are high. They are also expanding their training programs to offer international students the opportunity to train in China at a number of exclusive training facilities in executive protection, StreetEdge Defensive Tactics, Bujinkan Ninjutsu, Chinese Martial Arts, Israeli defensive tactics, and Counter Terrorism programs.

We have strategic alliances with several prominent Chinese educational and law enforcement institutions and as the opportunities increase where foreign Female bodyguards are becoming more prevalent in China bodyguards may end up in China it’s a great opportunity to train, network and experience a new Over the past several years and since culture whilst learning new skills from China became a member of the World Australian and Chinese experts. Trade Organisation (WTO), Wazen has noticed a trend in Chinese bodyguard firms seeking formal educational By: Paul Johnstone accreditation for their bodyguards and security specialist. As China continues to open up to the modern international world, education and formal qualifications in specialist fields such as

Monitor | America


Could Atlanta Happen Again?

The security issues surrounding the 2012 London Olympics are complex due to the variety and nature of these threats. The attention the Olympics are getting today is in fact leading to discussions that better determine preventive measures and raise awareness. The Olympics are prime terrorist targets for three reasons:   

Visibility Opportunity Varitety of Targets

Visibility plays into two of the 'three Rs' highlighted in What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat, by Louise Richardson: Renown and Reaction. Terrorists want renown in both the world and in their communities, and they want a reaction out of the world. The visibility of the Olympics provides these in spades, with almost every event being televised and the world watching. Opportunity comes from the numerous events, games, and occasions that go along with the

Olympics. The variety of targets includes the variety of countries, prominent figures, athletes, citizens, and governments that attend or host the games, one or all of which a terrorist organisation could be targeting. While there are many factors that may come into play in an attack on the London 2012 Olympics, it is possible to discern the likely type of threat by looking at previous, successful attacks on Olympic Games. The Atlanta Olympics The 1996 Olympics were held in the United States in Atlanta, Georgia. While 9/11 had not yet happened, the U.S. had some experience with terrorist attacks, such as the 1993 failed bomb attack on the World Trade Center and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. As such, the U.S. Government was aware of the security issues surrounding the Atlanta Olympics. There was even a U.S. Senate hearing, The Olympics and the Threat of Terrorism, in June of 1996 “to assure the public that the United States


Monitor | America

[was] doing everything possible to prevent and deter terrorist acts at the Olympic Games”. However, on July 27, 1996, a bomb exploded at a concert being played in the Centennial Olympic Park. Two people died and a hundred and eleven people were injured. Investigations have locked down the timeline of what happened that day:

the attack on July 27th was to confound, anger, and embarrass the Washington government in the eyes of the word for its abominable sanctioning of abortion on demand”.

- 12:58 a.m.: A part-time security guard named Richard Jewell spotted a suspicious, unattended knapsack in the park and alerted officials, who soon began to clear the area. - 1:07 a.m.: A 911 caller from a phone booth down the street methodically uttered the words that would soon be replayed around the globe. “There is a bomb in Centennial Park. You have 30 minutes.”

FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitives photo of Eric Rudolph

Higher Number of Casualties Averted - 1:20 a.m.: The bag exploded, spraying shrapnel around a corner of the park, injuring more than 100 people, and killing Alice Hawthorne, who had brought her daughter to the Olympics as an early birthday present. Who Was Responsible? The person responsible for the attack, Eric Robert Rudolph, was not the first suspect nor was he immediately apprehended. Another person was originally suspected, the security guard Richard Jewell. First hailed as a hero, he quickly became the prime suspect, only to later be exonerated. After that Eric Rudolph was identified as the bomber, but he was not caught until 2003. However, when he was found, he revealed during questioning that he committed the attacks to strike a blow at the U.S. Government and choose the Olympic Games because they promoted socialism. He said that, “the purpose of

The terrorist attack was largely mitigated, partly due to accident and partly due to security measures. The bomb itself was accidentally shifted so the explosion and blast radius were not as large as they were meant to be, meaning less people were killed and injured than intended. More important were the security measures that were in place. First was the presence and awareness of the security guard. The second was the speed and competency with which the police were able to evacuate the area. The success of recognizing the threat and taking immediate action significantly decreased the number of casualties. The failure of the security measures surrounding the Atlanta Olympics is hard to pinpoint. There was just not enough time to evacuate the park completely, thus causing the casualties. However, that was hardly a failure since security did as much as possible in the time they

Monitor | America had. It’s also hard to say the failure was in not recognizing Eric Rudolph as a potential terrorist because he was not on a watch list nor was he affiliated with any groups. Like some other terrorists he had a relatively clean background and had not popped up on the FBI’s radar. What is important is to learn as much as we can from Atlanta bombing in the hopes of preventing other attacks. Lessons for Future Olympic Games One lesson that can be taken away from the Atlanta bombings is that security measures must be in place for all events, no matter what the size or location. If they are connected to the Olympics they could be seen as targets. These include games, events for the athletes, and public events. Second, that awareness of surroundings and suspicious individuals and objects should be at the top of the security measures for security guards, CCTVs, and the public. Third, we can learn that security plans must be made, practiced, and swiftly carried out in the case of an emergency. The Atlanta Olympics also provide an additional lesson on what kind of terrorist may succeed in a similar attack. Eric Rudolph was considered a ‘lone wolf’ terrorist. The fact that there was no terrorist cell meant there was little to no traffic or chatter that would have alerted the authorities. From Atlanta 1996 to London 2012 The security at the London Olympics is already high. The bill for security at the Olympics is estimated to be £1 billion and there are 23,700 guards. It has been theorized that terror cells may use ‘cleanskins’ - people with no criminal or extremist links. This similarity presents the same problem that occurred at the Atlanta Olympics, if a person with no known terrorist connections, who is not


seen as a threat by authorities, decides to build a bomb and plant it at the Olympics then it would be hard to detect and stop them. The construction worker who brought a fake bomb to the Olympic site in May 2012 and took pictures with it proves that there is a real problem and possible way terrorists may attack the 2012 Olympics. The measures taken before the 2012 Olympics to stop threats and foil plots are necessary and important for the safety of the Olympics. However, the U.S. Government prepared for and sought out threats to the 1996 Olympics and the attack still occurred. While new technologies, better investigations, and more security measures are in place, the threats are still not completely eliminated. Atlanta taught us that actions taken in the heat of the moment can directly affect the outcome of an attack. Thus, the lessons learned from the Atlanta bombing are as follows: practicing simulated terrorist attacks, having everyone on the lookout for suspicious activities, and ensuring that emergency preparedness plans in place are essential. In the end, the 1996 Olympic bombing showed that in the situations where preventive measures fail, our level of preparedness can mitigate terrorist attempts. Law enforcement and the public are able to recognize threats and they can take actions to improve safety and lessen the effect of any incident. If the worst were to occur, Atlanta at least shows us that vigilance and plans make a difference in reducing loss of life. It may not be a solution or a way of circumventing attacks but it shows our readiness and capabilities in facing whatever may come.

By: Vanessa Gregory


Monitor | Olympics

Brand purely used for editorial purposes only © London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games

Summer 2012: The Final Weeks With only a few weeks left until the Olympic Games begin and last minute security preparations underway, is the United Kingdom prepared for a largescale terrorist attack? With news breaking recently that a worker managed to smuggle a bomb through the Olympic Park’s security defences, and embarrassing revelations emerging in the press almost daily, it is clear that there is still much to be done. On 15th December 2011 the deployment of up to 13,500 troops to protect the 2012 Olympic Games was announced. Although the extra manpower is definitely needed for Olympic security, it cannot be said that simply filling the gaps will complete the security picture satisfactorily. The United Kingdom needs proactive security measures rather than what has been deemed in some security circles as merely ‘deterrents’. SIRS Consultancy’s report, National Security Risks: Immediate Challenges Before Summer 2012, published in November 2011, explained the actual

extent of the required security and policing strategy needed in order to successfully implement the largest security operation on British soil since the Second World War. It is an unacceptable error not to deploy extra officers, particularly with 4 billion people watching the Opening Ceremony. It is not merely the Olympics that the UK is showcasing to the world this year, but also Her Majesty the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee. Proactive Security Measures Although military vessels are now docked on the River Thames, what practical use would they have in countering a ‘Mumbai-style’ attack or even a ‘lone wolf’ terrorist operation? The same is true of the deployment of surface-to-air missiles to protect key Olympic sites, which was announced by Defence Secretary Philip Hammond on 14th November 2011. There needs to be a better security structure in place to protect the UK and

Monitor | Olympics the 2012 Olympic Games from a variety of dangers, such as the significant threat of ‘lone wolves’, who operate independently, and are therefore difficult to detect and identify as a threat prior to their attack(s). A major threat might be if ‘lone wolf’ terrorists were to carry out simultaneous multiple attacks aimed at causing political, physical or economic damage, utilising the ‘Mumbai-style’ attack model. Simultaneous attacks aimed at critical national infrastructure targets have already occurred in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In addition, practical measures need to be adopted that reflect real-world changes. These include steps that place a greater emphasis on the real threat from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), as used in the 7/7 bombings, to grenades and firearms. International incidents have demonstrated the lethal impact of this evolution in tactics. For example, we have seen the use of IEDs to breach the perimeter of the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul, which was immediately followed by an assault using firearms and grenades.


Merah is also clearly quite distinct from some others who have been called ‘lone wolf’ Islamist terrorists recently. He is different from British student Roshonara Choudhry, who tried to stab a Member of Parliament for supporting the Iraq War. This event does demonstrate that intelligence services need to be more aware of people who they may have considered peripheral figures within terrorist networks. The 2012 attacks by Mohammed Merah in Toulouse and Montauban, together with the strikes carried out by Anders Breivik in July 2011, have demonstrated how imminent the threat from these micro-actors is. However, due to the cellular nature of extremists, there may be an increasing number of failed attacks resulting from a lack of skill or faulty equipment as demonstrated by the 21st July 2005 (21/7) London bombing attempts.

The severity of this threat was further demonstrated by the 22/7 terrorist attacks in Norway, when Anders Breivik detonated a car bomb near Regjeringskvartalet (Oslo’s equivalent of Whitehall), which served as a distraction for Anders Behring Breivik has demonstrated how effective and dangerous 'Lone Wolf' attacks can be in Europe emergency responders, including security forces, whilst Evidence has shown that there has been he travelled to the island of Utøya to an increase in the number of foiled plots carry out a separate attack. linked to al-Qa'ida (AQ). For example, in February 2012, nine men were jailed for 'Lone Wolf' Threat plotting to bomb the London Stock Exchange and also planning to establish The murder of seven people by a terrorist training camp in Pakistan. Mohammed Merah in Toulouse and Although none of the individuals in Montauban during March 2012 question were members of AQ itself, demonstrates both the continued threat three of them did belong to an AQof Islamist extremism, together with the inspired terrorist group. During their trial danger posed by lone wolf terrorists.


Monitor | Olympics

it was proposed that they had been motivated by online propaganda produced by organisations such as AQ. More recently, in April 2012, four individuals appeared in court accused of planning to attack a Territorial Army base using an IED attached to a remotecontrol car which would be driven under the gate of the facility in question. They were charged with discussing methods, materials and targets for a terrorist attack incorporating IEDs and firearms.

The threat of civil disorder is not just posed by far-right affiliated groups, it could also manifest itself through loosely-affiliated groups or individuals. Furthermore, as a result of the current economic climate and the difficulty that many individuals have in finding employment, isolated cases of extreme protest may become more frequent. For example, on 27th April 2012, Mark White, who had failed to obtain a Heavy Goods Vehicle licence, stormed the offices of the training company in question on Tottenham Court Road in London. He demanded a refund and threatened to ignite the contents of a number of gas canisters if his wishes were not met.

According to the Prosecution, two members of the group were heard and recorded discussing attacks on a Territorial Army base and several other potential targets, thanks to covert listening devices installed in their cars. The men are also alleged to have downloaded six issues of the AQ magazine Inspire, which contained instructions regarding the manufacture of IEDs. Therefore there is still a significant risk of an individual or individuals loosely affiliated to AQ A repeat of the 2011 riots would be devastating if it occurred during the Olympics carrying out an attack in the UK. Europol has This incident was later resolved also raised awareness that AQ could peacefully but indicates the desperation use the Games as a possible way to felt by some individuals regarding the reinstate their ability to attack the West current economic climate. As a result of in a most media-effective way. the incident, hundreds of people were evacuated from surrounding buildings Public Disorder and the Goodge Street and Warren Street Underground stations were There is also a significant threat of closed. public disorder with groups setting their sights on the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee Such a protest during the Olympic to be a day of protest. As the spike in Games would cause severe disruption protests in 2010 and 2011 showed, and uncertainty. Individuals considering there is a very real prospect of these mounting a similar protest may attempt legitimate protests being hijacked by to take advantage of the national and individuals intent on causing global media’s focus on the UK during considerable damage. the Olympic period.

Monitor | Olympics Irish Dissident Threat


there is a concern regarding the deployment of too many officers to Olympic venues as it may create shortfalls elsewhere.

The threat from the IRA and other Irish Dissident groups is also still very much apparent. The fact that the number of Dissident Republican terrorist incidents is still significantly higher than it was as recently as 2009, indicates that a genuine threat continues to exist. During the year ending March 2011, according to the Police Service of Northern Ireland, 99 viable IEDs were detonated, or diffused by Army experts. During the same period, 188 individuals were arrested under the Terrorism Act, compared with 169 during the previous year, A Republican poster in support of the (Provisional) Irish Republican Army (IRA). The poster contains a quotation from Bobby Sands who died while on and the number charged hunger strike in 1981. under the Act rose from 36 to 40. Additionally, during the March 2010Practical Security vs a Ceremonial March 2011 period, 72 shooting Deterrent incidents, including the terrorism-related use of firearms by security personnel, Sustainable policing levels have to be and 81 paramilitary-style attacks took maintained, as an attack or instance of place. These statistics compare with 22 public disorder anywhere in the UK will individual dissident attacks in 2009 and taint the whole Olympics through media 15 in 2008. overexposure. The UK needs proactive security with In spite of the UK having had close to trained police officers. Her Majesty’s seven years to plan for the Olympics, it Inspectorate of Constabulary stated that is extraordinarily embarrassing and the Army should not be needed during intolerable that some fundamental instances of public disorder, but rather, security issues continue. With the that there should be a radical switch in world’s eyes on the United Kingdom police tactics. This must be put in place from now until the Closing Ceremony in in order to prepare for a likely repeat of September, it is vital that these Games last summer’s riots, with training are as secure as is reasonably possible. programmes in “high risk” urban areas This has not yet been achieved. It is before the Olympics, including the major imperative that the United Kingdom has cities affected by the riots. proactive security during the Olympic Games, rather than just a ceremonial Finally, we need to think about deterrent. increasing the numbers of police that will be available during the Olympic Games, By: Suhel Abo-Hatab as this is a much-needed investment. As Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer of British counter-terrorism legislation between 2005 and 2011, has warned,


Monitor | Olympics

Fear through conspicuous presence? The scale of security for the London Olympics

Sports fans all over the world are counting down the days: the 27th of July 2012 will mark the launch of the Games of the XXX Olympiad. London will be the first city to hold the games for the third time in its history, after 1908 and 1948. Even before the official opening ceremony in the London Olympic Stadium at Marshgate Lane on the 27th of July, a certain group will also be back. Hundreds and thousands of uniformed security personnel: police, army, and private security companies. Uniforms all over the place, with guns and tear gas at their disposal, ready to use them, if necessary. Because they know very well: where masses of people gather for a global event, the security risk will significantly increase, so does the threat of potential terrorist attacks. Once again, a global sports event has to be guarded to ensure safe competition and to ensure the safe course of the entire event. Some say that we have gotten used to it, specifically since the

2005 terrorist attacks, just one day after London had been awarded with the 2012 Olympic Games by the International Olympic Committee. This was the very first signal for London security forces to implement the highest possible level of security for the Games. Combined with a broad network of CCTV (Closed-Circuit Television) cameras throughout the city, monitoring almost every single square inch and movement, observing and detecting potential threats to the Games and the participants’ security, every potential suspect should be identified in time, before they are able to potentially carry out an attack. Last summer, London was attacked again. Not by terrorists this time, but by its own inhabitants. The 2011 England Riots tested the security forces once again. But now it was not limited to a selected single target. This time, various London districts degenerated into warzone like battlefields. Another dead giveaway for London Olympic security to

Monitor | Olympics express its determination to show its presence in public and to ensure adequate security for the 30th Olympic Games. After the terrorist attacks during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, where Israeli athletes were attacked by the Black September terrorist group, inside the Olympic village, it became evident that even sports competitions with a global message for peace are highly vulnerable to acts of violence. While the German security forces back then proved themselves to be overwhelmed by the situation, the incident ended in a disaster– with all captured Israeli hostages being killed. Nowadays, it appears that security prevails over sports, competition, and the feeling of a global society of sport enthusiasts.


HMS Bulwark will be based in Weymouth. Both vessels will carry Puma or Lynx helicopters, together with Apache assault helicopters equipped with Hellfire missile launchers. Typhoon fighter jets are being moved to RAF Northolt in order to intercept any suspicious aircraft flying over the city and on its outskirts, surface-to-air missiles will be on standby to intercept potential attacks from the air. The estimated costs for these security measures will be around £ 1 billion.

However, although HMS Ocean will be stationed on the River Thames during the Games there were limited © Defence Images casualties and damage after the From an outside spectator’s point of bombing attack during the 1996 Summer view, these huge security efforts seem Olympics in Atlanta, the threat of to be largely excessive. Does someone targeted attacks on the Olympic Games really feel safe when hundreds of was renewed one more time. security personnel – police and the army – stand at the entry gates to the For the London Games around 10,000 stadiums, alongside the marathon track, officials will be available, according to or helicopters and fighter jets flying over the Ministry of Defence website, backed London city at low altitude? How safe up by 13,500 members of the British can someone feel when security guards armed forces (more than the entire hold their guns in their arms, ready to British commitment in Afghanistan with use them in case of imminent danger? 9,500 soldiers). These forces include How annoying is it to pass through land, air, and naval assets; with ships security barriers at the entrances of and gunboats stationed alongside the sport facilities, to be thoroughly River Thames – including the Royal examined and screened, to have your Navy’s biggest ship, HMS Ocean. bags searched for potentially dangerous Additionally, the amphibious assault ship objects?


Monitor | Olympics

These measures are not only limited to London, but will also affect all traffic routes into the capital, including railway routes from all over the UK and from the Eurotunnel, and all London-bound airports. Security for the Olympic Games covers a massive logistical challenge for everyone involved in the organization of pre-emptive action against any potential threat, coming to London on any possible route on land, on the water, or by air. Looking at it from a Western perspective, this massive amount of security in terms of personnel and equipment implies a perception of imminent danger. While a regular and 'normal' day in a European city communicates a feeling of security by the simple absence of obvious security forces, a massive presence of security displays the exact opposite. More visible security means in short, an increased feeling of imminent potential threat, more insecurity, and therefore more fear in general public. This reversed security impression is closely linked to the apprehension of the loss of personal freedom, personal security - physically and psychologically, and concerns about further development for civil rights in society. In the end, civil rights groups and individuals claim the erosion of the stability of Western democratic principles through individual and collective freedom. To paraphrase from a novel written by Robert Harris: “London City would just look like in one of those rubbish science fiction movies set in the near future, after the security forces have completely taken over all governmental and administrative control of the state.� But let us see the harsh reality. The Olympic Games are being regarded as a contemporary Western Mecca for the promotion for all possible forms of

capitalist strategies, marketing, and sales. As such, the Olympic Games became a potential target for any kind of terrorist attacks, through any kind and method of attack. Attacking the Olympic Games means to attack Western society as a whole. Post-Englands Riots During the England Riots of 2011, the enormous presence of police, security, and locked up shops, bars, and restaurants implemented a feeling of uncertainty and an impression of helplessness. Knowing that something might occur or even go terribly wrong, spectators and fans will probably consider not going to the competitions at all. So, will this mean that all the grandstands in the stadiums will remain empty and that people will stick to the TV and internet coverage? Blaming the security forces for scaring spectators off just by their conspicuous presence is certainly not what the organizers, police, and army have in mind. Looking at any other event in sports, visits by high-ranking politicians or high society, security measures are a matter of course in contemporary event management. Since the Olympic Games are not only a popular sports event, but also a prestige project and a vital economic factor for every city organizing them, it is understandable that any possible measure has to be taken into consideration when planning and executing such a full scale international event. Everyone will have to ask themselves: In our modern society where terrorism seems to be an imminent threat on any occasion at any time, and both, host country and the international community have to respond to it in any possible way to prevent attacks, What do you want security for the Olympics to look like?

Monitor | Olympics


Imagine two possible scenarios:

Risk Awareness

Scenario number one: The Olympic Games will be held without any security measures. No police, no CCTV surveillance, no emergency plans, nothing. There will be no individual screenings at the gates, no bags will be researched, no vehicles examined for possible explosives. There will be neither naval assets patrolling alongside the River Thames, nor RAF jets flying over the city.

A worst-case scenario does not mean it is likely to happen, and no one wants it to happen; but there is a reasonable risk of it. As a result, the London Games security organizations, forces, and everyone responsible for security during these seventeen Olympic days will have to be prepared for this eventuality. This risk awareness is a sign of 24/7 readiness, a sign to the public, that the whole situation is very well under control. When the Olympic Games end on the 12th of August 2012, and the security representatives can report that there have been no serious incidents whatsoever during the entire duration of the Games, critics will claim that the entire efforts were unnecessary, and that a big chunk of public funds have been utterly wasted. It should be pointed out, however, that any Olympic competition, any public meeting in the realm of the attendees’ activities, and any other happening that remains free of any unplanned and sudden incident can be regarded as a full success, and that every single penny was well spent for security measures, no matter how intense, vast, and maybe excessive it might look like at a first glance.

RAF Typhoon fighter jets will safeguard the air space above London City Š Smudge 9000

Scenario number two: The organizers of the Olympic Games will take any possible measure necessary to ensure the safety of visitors, athletes, officials, high-ranking guests, journalists, and everyone involved in the course of the Olympic competitions, in media coverage and in sponsorship activities. Everything at the disposal of the security forces will come into action; put on standby for any eventuality. Any possible scenario will be examined and trained, any feasible strategy outlined and drilled for the worst-case scenario, to prevent the unthinkable and the unimaginable.

By: Oliver Krumme


Monitor | Olympics

Venue Security: An Olympic Task According to US News and World Report, there were 168 separate, significant terrorist attacks that occurred at sports-related events from 1972-2004.

The Aquatics Centre (left), ArcelorMittal Orbit (centre), Olympic Stadium (background, right) and Water Polo Arena (foreground, right) in the London Olympic Park © CM Glee

The issue of terrorism has been a major concern for Olympic Games’ planners since the terrorist attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics, and sporting events have increasingly become worthwhile and popular targets for terrorists. The terrorist bombing at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics and 9/11 have served to further amplify concerns of terrorism at these events and have increased pressures on hosts to ensure security. With the high levels of terrorist threat present at an Olympic Games, hosts maintain the primary objective of staging the event safely and securely, and protecting the event venues is a core component in every host’s security strategy. Securing the main stadium is critical as it ranks high on the list of advantageous targets for terrorists. Its appeal is derived from two chief incentives. First, the main stadium is consistently the site for Games’ Opening and Closing ceremonies, the two events that generally bring in the most television viewership and global notoriety; thus making it a desirable target for spreading a terrorist’s message via an attack. Second, for many Olympic Games, the main stadium is built specifically for the event and,

accordingly, becomes an icon of the nation’s pride in hosting the Games. Games-time preparations are routinely measured by the progress of construction or improvements to the main stadium. In the run-up to the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, the news media was constantly airing reports on China’s progress on the building of the massive ‘Bird’s Nest’ stadium, the magnum opus of China’s efforts to portray its modern image to the world. Consequently, an assault on an Olympic Games’ main stadium would be a stain on the host’s reputation, and could yield a global loss of confidence in the host’s ability to successfully manage the event. ‘Venue Security’ as a general principle covers all venues utilised for an event, both indoor and outdoor, which can include dozens of sites. The London 2012 Olympics, for example, will make use of over 30 event sites as well as dozens of other ‘parallel-event’ and ‘live site’ areas. Venue Security Preparations During the planning phase, two main types of security challenges come into

Monitor | Olympics play when planning for an event. First are the venues that are built specialy for the event, such as the main stadium, aquatics center, Athletes’ Village, velodrome, etc. These venues are generally specific to the event, and are often venues that the host city does not already possess, and thus need to be built particularly for the event. Purposebuilt sites, while expensive and timeconsuming to construct, give event organizers more control over the security tactics in operation for the event. A principle that London 2012 has used in the construction of the Olympic Park is a concept called Secured by Design; a UK Police initiative supporting the principles of 'designing out crime'. This means that during every phase of the venue’s construction, from the initial architectural blueprints through to the final days of completion, the security strategy for the venue, along with the particular methods and systems that will be employed during the event are taken into account.


security technology to bring them up to the standard of the purpose-built sites. For London 2012, venues such as Old Trafford in Manchester, which will host several football matches, need to be considered. Security for the stadium is already high, simply based on its function as home to the Premier League’s Manchester United Football Club. With a capacity near 76,000, the stadium hosts numerous large-scale, high-profile football matches and other events every year and thus is well prepared to meet the security requirements set out by the 2012 organizers. Other venues, however, may not be so well-versed in security matters or equipped with the latest in security technology, and are thus retro-fitted to bring their security levels up to the standard required by the Olympic bid contract.

According to Margaret Gilmore writing in the RUSI Journal, strategies included in the Secured by Design concept include tactics such as the use of more secure building materials (e.g. bomb-proof glass ) and the “Void Certification” process (wherein all voids and cavities, such A photo of Horse Guards Parade in London © Chris O. as above ceilings and beneath floors, are inspected for foreign objects and Challenges to securing a venue can confirmed clear before being sealed). include: transport routes or residential The Secured by Design concept has areas directly adjacent to the venue or been employed extensively throughout site, making it impossible to fully lock the Olympic Park development areas. down any buffer-zone to the venue; underground parking lots situated The second category of venues in the directly below the venue or site (such as security planning phase consists of prethe Melbourne cricket ground used for existing structures. These structures the 2006 Commonwealth Games); need to be retro-fitted with the latest


Monitor | Olympics

copious access points; a lack of updated CCTV system/network; etc. Event organizers take the necessary measures to secure these venues, whether it is closing roads to traffic or limiting entry points for spectators. Outdoor venues pose even more significant challenges and can include areas such as the beach volleyball matches to be held at the Horse Guards Parade in Central London, or The Sydney Opera House and Sydney Harbour, which hosted the Triathlon for the 2000 Olympics. In an acknowledgment of these challenges, the Sydney 2000 organizers rated their outdoor venues with a higher risk than their indoor venues. Some outdoor event areas present hosts with a myriad of security challenges, such as the Marathon or cross country skiing routes, given the vast expanse of ground the events cover and the characteristics of each (either in extremely densely populated areas, such as with the Marathon routes, or in remote and isolated vicinities, such as with the biathlon and cross-country skiing routes). Marine environments like Weymouth Bay and Portland Harbour, which will be used for the 2012 sailing competitions, bring with them a specific set of security challenges. The UK is planning for twenty-one ‘Live Sites’ across the country where fans can gather to watch events unfold on large projection screens. Some of these sites are expected to draw crowds of up to 80,000 spectators. Live Sites and other event-related public sites are difficult to secure given the amount of access points and large numbers of people. Parallel events (titled because of their event-related nature) can include a plethora of event types, such as concerts, parties, rallies, etc., and can occur at all hours of the day, with many of the concerts and such taking place after dark. The Centennial Park bombing at the Atlanta 1996 Olympics

occurred in such a setting: a public open-space gathering area, after midnight, as people were leaving a concert in a nearby outdoor venue.

The triathlon will be held at Hyde Park © B Boris

One of the most commonly used security techniques for these events is to set up a secure perimeter that fully contains the site (such as with the London 2012 site in Hyde Park). This tactic is further enhanced by restricting access points, and setting up ‘Mag and Bag’ searches (hand-held magnetometer-wand sweeps and hand-searching of bags) at all entry points, and stationing static and patrolling guards throughout the site. However, several issues emerge with the use of this technique. Secure perimeters are not always fully impenetrable and event organizers have at times found it difficult to obtain the high number of security staff needed to patrol actual event venues, let alone to staff parallel and live-sites. Moreover, under the cover of darkness and in the midst of the large crowds that gather at these events, terrorists may find it easier to manoeuvre, which, simply because of their timing, may make events held at night more difficult to secure. Likewise, the recent rise of flash-mobs, organized in very short timeframes via social media Internet sites, can bring large crowds together very quickly and can occur in virtually any

Monitor | Olympics location. This can pose a significant challenge to law enforcement authorities in providing security for these areas since they cannot plan for these events in advance. Law enforcement and security officials are prepared to meet these challenges, however. Threat and risk assessments are performed on each venue independently, alongside those produced for the overall Games and regular national assessments. These assessments are taken into account when devising the level of security set for each venue. Aspects considered when setting particular security arrangements can include: site vulnerability surveys, spectator profiles, national terrorist threat levels for the country, region, and particular sporting events, and the sites’ specific characteristics (location, structural dynamics, public access, etc.).


Organizers also take into consideration precedents set at previous events; for example, after the 1996 Centennial Park bombing the necessity to strengthen security at parallel-sites became apparent. Venue Security Operations One of the most significant Venue Security operational policies utilized for Olympic events is the use of the principle of ‘Island-Site Security.’ As the name implies, the overall objective of this principle is to make the main site similar to that of an island in terms of security: the main venue is secure, and there is an identified border surrounding the site inside which authorities are confident of the venue’s security. Island-Site Security can be similarly compared to the ‘Ring of Steel’ security concept utilized in central London, where concentric rings expand from a central location towards an outer perimeter, providing incrementally decreasing levels of security the farther one gets from the epicenter the epicenters being the main event stadium or event sites.

Aerial view of the main Olympic stadium © B Boris

The Island-Site approach includes an array of security tactics: access to the site is based on an accreditation system; all persons and companies working for, or at, the venue undergo an accreditation process and must show their accreditation pass on entering the


Monitor | Olympics

venue. This applies during the construction, pre-Games and Gamestime phases. The accreditation process, according to Pete Fussey, Jon Coaffee, Gary Armstrong and Dick Hobbs, is a significant undertaking as hundreds of thousands of people generally require accreditation (for the London 2012 Games, the Home Office expects that nearly 450,000 people will need to be accredited). A CCTV network operates within the venue for additional security. Beijing installed over 300,000 CCTV cameras across the city, including a significant number within the main stadium. Camera feed is typically sent to a closely-located CCTV operations center, such as the purpose-built operational center for the Manchester 2002 Commonwealth Games located near the main Sportcity venue. During the event, all spectator entry points are manned by security personnel who conduct ‘Mag and Bag’ searches, oversee spectators’ movements through magnetometer gates, and conduct random personal searches when necessitated. At the Manchester 2002 Commonwealth Games, for example, roughly seventy percent of spectators were in possession of a bag that required searching and security personnel uncovered over 7,000 prohibited items (mostly Swiss Army knives and alcoholic beverages). Similarly, approximately one out of every five spectators entering the main venue required a person search. Additional invenue patrolling guards, event stewards and crowd control personnel are also utilized to strengthen security. For the majority of mega-events, entry and access tasks are routinely carried out by private security personnel hired by the Organizing Committee. The main venue is enclosed by a perimeter fence that further enhances security, and vehicle access is monitored

and restricted to those individuals holding appropriate accreditation. While the actual venue structure’s access points constitute the first perimeter in the site’s ‘rings of concentric security’ IslandSite strategy, the first set of perimeter fencing constitutes the second. This perimeter fencing is accompanied by CCTV cameras linked to the CCTV operations center and is reinforced by patrolling guards. Security between these first and second rings is at its highest, with access limited to accredited persons and ticket holders, and severely restricted vehicle access is enforced. An added security measure sometimes applied at these sites is the installation of vehicle arresting bollards. Depending on the geography of the site, a second perimeter fence is sometimes constructed, constituting the third ‘concentric ring’ of security. Beijing 2008 is an excellent example of this approach: The entire site had an outer communal area surrounded by a perimeter fence that could be accessed by the public after undergoing simple security checks at monitored access points, while another fence inside this communal area encircled the main stadium and could only be accessed by event ticket holders. An essential component of the IslandSite concept is the implementation of the ‘Lockdown’ phase. In the days prior to the event, security officials and law enforcement specialists conduct a thorough sweep of the facility and entire Island-Site area to ensure the site is free of hazardous material, such as explosives. Specialist explosives materials search teams and explosivesdetection dogs are brought in to verify that the site is sterile. All corners and niches of the site are checked, including items such as rubbish bins and openings to underground services, such as sewer and water manholes. Internal cavities of purposebuilt facilities are checked and cleared

Monitor | Olympics during the build phase as part of the Secured by Design principle. Once all areas of the site are cleared, the site goes into a ‘Lockdown’ stage which increases the level of site security to that employed during the Games. At the start of this phase, the site thus becomes an ‘island’, fully sealed off from the outside and completely clear of harmful materials on the inside. Many Olympics hosts have utilized the IslandSite strategy, though the applications of specific Island-Site security components vary at each Games. The overall size of the Island-Site and its ‘concentric rings of security’ fluctuate considerably from one event to another based on each event’s specific geography. The Salt Lake 2002 organizers established a set of five concentric rings of security while Athens established three. Similarly, the durations of the implemented Lockdown phases have varied significantly from one Olympics to the next. The Athens 2004 main site was cleared and locked-down forty days prior to the start of the Games, while the Torino 2006 venue was locked-down only nine days prior. For Salt Lake 2002, some sites entered the Lockdown


phase only one day prior to the Opening Ceremony. With the high levels of threat and risk associated with hosting an Olympics, the use of the venue security policies discussed above is an imperative element in a host’s overall security strategy. With the exception of incidents occurring before Games’ opening, minor security breaches taking place during events, and terrorist threats directed at the Games, we have not witnessed a physical terrorist attack during an Olympics that caused injuries or fatalities since the attack at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. Correspondingly, all hosts since the 1996 Games have employed these venue security principles to some degree or another. Thus, while it is impossible to fully know the reason for the lack of attacks on Olympics events in recent years, it is reasonable to postulate that the security policies in place have acted as a deterrent, at least in part.

By: Megan Munroe

Any crowded place in the UK will be at a heightened risk during the summer of 2012


Monitor | Current Threats

Lone Wolf Terrorism: A Multi-Faceted Threat In August 2011, during a speech focussing on the then-upcoming tenth anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Barack Obama stated that ‘lone wolf’ terrorism now posed a greater threat to the United States than a large-scale operation of the type carried out in September 2001.

shooting spree that killed a further 69 people attending a summer youth camp organised by the Norwegian Labour Party. Breivik’s modus operandi was therefore a combined attack utilising both firearms and IEDs.

In an interview with the US media, he argued that “The most likely scenario that we have to guard against right now ends up being more of a lone wolf operation than a large well-coordinated terrorist attack. A lone wolf terrorist has been defined as “a person who acts on his or her own without orders from-or even connections to-an organisation”. Although this definition is largely, although not entirely, accurate, it is also vague. Lone wolf terrorism is a tactically and ideologically diverse phenomenon. The modus operandi of lone wolf terrorists, together with their specific motivations and the process by which they became radicalised are often unique to the individual in question. Modus Operandi The modus operandi of individual lone wolf terrorists is perhaps the most visible indication of the multi-faceted nature of the overall lone wolf threat. Several examples confirm this. For example during the 22/7 terrorist attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011, the perpetrator, Anders Breivik, utilised a combination of firearms and an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) to carry out two separate attacks at different locations. Following the detonation of an IED located in a car near Regjeringskvartalet, Oslo’s equivalent of Whitehall, which killed eight individuals, Breivik travelled to the island of Utøya, where he carried out a

Breivik demonstrated the tenacity of a ‘Lone Wolf’ attacker

The combined use of firearms and an IED by Breivik contrasts with the modus operandi of US Army officer Nidal Malik Hasan who, in a report published before the 22/7 attacks, was described as “The most successful case of a Lone Wolf so far”. On 5 November 2009, at Fort Hood, Texas, Major Hasan used firearms to kill twelve fellow soldiers together with one civilian. A further 30 people were wounded. Hasan was eventually shot and wounded, thus allowing him to be apprehended. Hasan’s trial is currently scheduled to begin on 20 August 2012. Despite the differing modi operandi of Breivik and Hasan, their respective attacks both demonstrate the

Monitor | Current Threats effectiveness of firearms as amodus operandi for lone wolf terrorists. The case of Roshonara Choudhry, who was convicted of attempting to murder Labour MP Stephen Timms in May 2010, further confirms the diversity of the lone wolf terrorist threat, with regard to the modus operandi of individual perpetrators. Instead of trying to kill large numbers of people as Hasan had done and Breivik would subsequently do, Choudhry attempted to assassinate Stephen Timms in revenge for his support for the Iraq War. Choudhry stabbed Stephen Timms, the MP for East Ham, twice in the stomach, whilst he was holding a surgery in his constituency on 14 May 2010. This lone wolf action, an attempt to assassinate a prominent individual by stabbing them, could not be more different from the operations of Breivik and Hasan, both of which featured the use of firearms, and in the case of Breivik an IED, and which were designed to inflict large numbers of casualties. During March 2012, Mohammed Merah, a 23-year-old French citizen of Algerian origin, carried out a series of three firearms attacks which targeted French soldiers, as well as civilians with Jewish religious beliefs, in Montauban and Toulouse, killing seven people. Five other individuals were injured. Following a siege by security personnel of Merah’s flat in Toulouse, Merah was shot and killed on 22 March 2012 after jumping out of a window whilst firing a weapon. Merah’s modus operandi had been to use a scooter to arrive rapidly at and leave the scenes of his crimes unchallenged by security forces. This differs from the modi operandi of the lone wolves who have been examined so far, as Merah had clearly planned how to escape following his attacks. During his trial, Breivik stated


that he had been “very surprised” to have survived both of his attacks, and that he had considered that he only had a five per cent chance of surviving the Oslo bombing. Therefore, it is unlikely that he formulated an escape plan prior to the 22/7 attacks. Also, Hasan continued his shooting spree until he was wounded and apprehended, thereby making escape impossible. Similarly, Roshonara Choudhry attempted to kill Stephen Timms despite the nearby presence of a security guard who rapidly seized her following the attack. Although she was unable to carry it out, Choudhry’s modus operandi was, to a limited extent, similar to that of Mohammed Merah, in that she had planned a protracted campaign, in her case, to target and kill MPs who had supported the Iraq War, based on research that she had carried out into the voting records of individual Members of Parliament. Despite being apprehended before being able to carry out an attack, the planned modus operandi of the far-right extremist Ian Davision demonstrates that lone wolf terrorists are not limited to conventional weapons such as firearms and IEDs. In 2010 Davison was jailed under the Chemical Weapons Act 1996 for preparing around one dozen lethal doses of ricin. This demonstrates that lone wolf terrorism incorporating weapons of mass destruction could soon become a reality. Beliefs, Motivations, and Targets It is usually the case that lone wolf terrorists adhere, to varying degrees, to a belief or beliefs which both motivate them to commit acts of terrorism, and guide them in the selection of their targets. However, despite ideological similarities between individual lone wolves, clear differences exist between specific individuals, and it is these that


Monitor | Current Threats

reinforce the notion that lone wolf terrorism is a multi-faceted threat. During his trail in the spring of 2012, Anders Breivik openly stated that he carried out his attacks in July 2011 in order to act “in defence of Norway against multiculturalism”. Breivik then elaborated on this theme by arguing that the aim of his attacks was to end “multicultural drift” in Norway, and proposing that Norwegians “...risk being a minority in their own capital in their own country in the future”. According to a profile of Breivik compiled for the BBC during the period of his trial, from his late twenties onwards Breivik became increasingly paranoid concerning what he viewed as the “Islamisation of Europe”. This profile also noted that, following his arrest, Breivik described the 22/7 attacks as “atrocious but necessary” in order to defeat immigration. Breivik’s beliefs definitely influenced his choice of targets. His decision to detonate an IED in an area of Oslo which contained prominent government buildings was influenced by his belief that the current Norwegian Government, which is a coalition of the Labour, Socialist Left and Centre parties led by Labour Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, has been responsible for an increase in the number of Muslim immigrants entering Norway. Breivik has also claimed that he carried out his second attack, against members of the Labour Party’s youth wing, the AUF, on the island of Utøya in order to “wipe out” the next generation of a the political party that he blamed for encouraging a multicultural Norway. Although he carried out his attacks as long ago as 1999, David Copeland, dubbed the ‘London nailbomber’, is still worth examining with regard to the similarities and differences between individual lone wolves. This is due to the

fact that he adhered to beliefs similar although not identical to those of Anders Breivik, but also followed a targeting strategy different to that which Breivik employed. Ideologically, David Copeland was undeniably similar to Anders Breivik in his opposition to what is broadly referred to as ‘multiculturalism’. Following his arrest Copeland stated in relation to the issue of ethnic minorities that “I don’t like them. I want them out of this country. I’m a national socialist. Nazi whatever you want to call me. You know what I mean I believe in a really master race...” Copeland elaborated on this by arguing that ethnic minority communities were “...inferior... in everything...” In addition to this, Copeland also expressed hatred for homosexuals. Copeland’s beliefs directly influenced his choice of target, as did Breivik’s. David Copeland planted IEDs outside a supermarket in Brixton, which is known for its large black and ethnic minority community, and also in Brick Lane, East London, which has a significant South Asian community. A further device was planted and detonated in the Admiral Duncan pub in Soho, due to it being a focal point for London’s gay community. Despite certain clear ideological similarities, Breivik and Copeland differ in terms of their targeting strategies. For example, Breivik chose to target the political party and establishment that he blamed for increased ‘multiculturalism’ in Norway, whereas David Copeland attacked ethnic minorities themselves. However, it is worth noting the Breivik’s target selection was also influenced by his belief that “random violence” against Muslims would only serve to generate increased sympathy for Islam. Copeland and Breivik also differed in key elements of their respective beliefs. At the opening of Breivik’s trial, a short self-produced film which outlined his

Monitor | Current Threats view that ‘Cultural Marxists’ were attempting to Western civilisation through the imposition of multiculturalism, was screened. According to an allegedly widespread extreme right-wing belief, ‘Cultural Marxism’ originated within the Frankfurt School of critical theory, elements of which plotted to destroy Western civilisation by encouraging multiculturalism, homosexuality and collectivist economics. Despite Breivik’s opposition to ‘Cultural Marxism’, it is clear that he chose his targets due to his opposition to ‘multiculturalism’ rather than any significant homophobia on his part. This contrasts with David Copeland’s ideology and the way in which it influenced his targeting strategy. According to Nick Lowles, director of Hope Not Hate, which monitors rightwing extremist activity, Breivik’s views represent an evolution within the modern far-right, which now sees Muslims, rather than a variety of different ethnic or religious groups, as the main internal minority enemy. Therefore, a comparison of Copeland and Breivik’s guiding beliefs also demonstrates that the lone wolf threat has the ability to evolve significantly in a relatively short period of time. There are also both clear differences and similarities between Islamist lone wolves both in terms of their personal motivations and beliefs, and how these influenced their choice of targets. For example, prior to his shooting spree, Major Nidal Hasan expressed “deep opposition” to the US-led conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to a former colleague of Hasan’s who worked alongside him at Fort Hood, Hasan had stated that Muslims “...had the right to rise up and attack Americans”, and that the United


States should “...should not be in the war in the first place”. It has been suggested that Hasan, a US Army psychiatrist, may have been more specifically motivated by testimony regarding civilian casualties that he received from military personnel during sessions following their return from operational theatres. Based on what he heard from patients during these sessions, Hasan made a number of unsuccessful requests that certain personnel be prosecuted for war crimes. Therefore, Hasan was possibly motivated by a desire for revenge against what he viewed as war crimes by US military personnel against the Muslim populations of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Major Nidal Malik Hasan, Fort Hood shooter

Roshonara Choudhry’s views were, to an extent, similar to those of Hasan, in that she believed that the West, and especially the US and UK, were pursuing a policy of aggression towards Muslim countries, and that it was the duty of Muslims to respond to this. During a police interview following her arrest, Choudhry stated that “when a Muslim land is attacked it become obligatory on every man, woman and child and even slave to out and fight”.


Monitor | Current Threats

As with Hasan, it is clear that Choudhry’s personal beliefs regarding perceived Western aggression led her to select Stephen Timms MP as a target, because, in her words, he “very strongly agreed with the invasion of Iraq”.

targeting strategy, it also highlights that differences in beliefs and motivational factors exist between individual Islamist lone wolves, as neither Hasan or Choudhry seem to have been motivated by Israeli actions.

However, a key difference between Hasan and Choudhry’s target selections is that Hasan targeted military personnel in revenge for civilian casualties in operational theatres, whereas Choudhry attempted to murder an individual who had been part of the political decisionmaking process that made the Iraq War itself, possible. A further negligible difference is that whereas Hasan appears to have been motivated by US military activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Choudhry was more specifically concerned with avenging the invasion of Iraq.

Processes of Radicalisation

The beliefs that led Mohammed Merah to carry out his attacks in Toulouse and Montauban during March 2012 are similar to those of Nidal Malik Hasan, in that two of the attacks were carried out in revenge for Western military operations in Afghanistan. During the first two attacks by Merah, carried out on 11 March in Toulouse and 15 March in Montauban, a total of three French paratroopers were killed and one seriously wounded. Following Merah’s death, Francois Molins, France’s anti-terrorist prosecutor, confirmed that during the siege of his flat, Merah had told police that he had in part acted to avenge the presence of French troops in Afghanistan. However, Merah’s killing of three children and a rabbi at the Ozer Hatorah Jewish school in Toulouse on 19 March was, according to Francois Molins, motivated by the deaths of Palestinian children during Israeli military operations. Whilst this demonstrates how Merah’s personal beliefs contributed to his

Regardless of their guiding beliefs or other motivations, the process by which an individual becomes radicalised to the extent that they are willing to carry out terrorist acts, is vital in understanding the threat that lone wolf terrorism poses. However, the fact that the process of radicalisation varies between individuals confirms that the lone wolf terrorist threat is genuinely multi-faceted. Anders Breivik appears to have become radicalised through both personal experiences, and exposure to mainstream media and other sources which both corroborated and helped to further shape his opinions. Breivik has claimed that he first became aware of the threat of ‘multiculturalism’ when he immersed himself in Oslo’s hip-hop scene, and the fact that, during this period, he was attacked by a gang of Muslims who broke his nose. Also, it has been claimed that Breivik was influenced by a February 2010 article in The Times, which reported that a survey had indicated that 60 percent of Englishmen believed that society was becoming dysfunctional due to multiculturalism. Furthermore it has been suggested that Breivik’s membership of the right-wing Progress Party, the FrP, and prior to that its youth wing, may also have shaped his outlook, although this is still uncertain. Breivik may also have been ‘selfradicalised’ by the fact that he studied recent history, and was “disgusted” by the reaction of the EU, which condemned the entry of Jörg Haider’s far-right Freedom Party into government

Monitor | Current Threats in Austria in 2000, and which also expressed disquiet at the views of Hungary’s right-wing coalition government, which he claimed was pressurised by the EU intro changing its policies. He might also have considered that his views on multiculturalism had been vindicated by the fact that, in his own words, “Sarkozy, Merkel and Cameron have all said that multiculturalism have failed”. Whereas Breivik appears to have been largely self-radicalised and, as he has claimed, by personal experiences, Nicky Reilly, an Islamic convert with an unstable family life and “social issues”, seems to have been radicalised online by individuals in Pakistan with whom he communicated via the Internet.


by his experiences. Prior to his attack, Hasan claimed that he had been the victim of harassment due to Arab background and his religious faith, and that he had been subject to “name calling” during arguments with fellow officers. However, it is more likely that the bulk of Hasan’s radicalisation was the result of personal contact, both face-to-face and later online, with Anwar al-Awlaki, who was the chief propagandist for al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula until his death in September 2011. Hasan and alAwlaki originally met when the former attended al-Awlaki’s sermons at the Dar al-Hijrah mosque in Falls Church, Virginia, between 2000 and 2002. Hasan was subsequently in regular email contact with al-Awlaki.

Roshonara Choudhry was also clearly radicalised by the influence of Anwar alAwlaki, although in her case, it was via online videos of his speeches. She also spent significant amounts of time browsing jihadi websites. Therefore, she was probably selfradicalised, as she would have most likely searched for this material herself. This contrasts with the largely personal radicalisation of CCTV image of Nicky Reilly in Exeter's Giraffe restaurant Reilly and Hasan by other individuals both over the Internet, and in the case of Hasan, via After Reilly had been in communication initial face-to-face contact. with these individuals, who had found him via his YouTube channel, they The fact that Choudhry was also an began to push him towards carrying out academic high-achiever with a stable life an IED attack, and advised him on how means that her background differs to construct a bomb. As a result of this significantly from Islamist lone wolves process, Reilly attempted to detonate an such as Nick Reilly ,and demonstrates IED at the Giraffe restaurant, Exeter, in that an individual’s personal May 2008. circumstances are no guarantee of Like Breivik, Nidal Malik Hasan may, to a limited extent, have been radicalised

whether or not they will turn to terrorism.


Monitor | Current Threats

As with Nicky Reilly, Mohammed Merah was from an ‘unstable’ background, and in his case had been considered a juvenile delinquent. As a minor, Merah was reported at least 15 times for acts of violence. He was first arrested in 2005 and served two short prison terms in 2007 and 2009. His convictions reportedly included thefts and driving offences.

later during formal terrorist training contrasts with the other examples examined, which also in themselves differ from each other, demonstrates that lone wolf terrorists become radicalised via a number of different processes, strengthening the idea that lone wolf terrorism is a genuinely diverse phenomenon. Summing Up: The Multi-Faceted Nature of Lone Wolf Terrorism The available evidence indicates that the lone wolf threat is genuinely diverse and should not be seen as a single phenomenon, which is how it is sometimes defined. This is confirmed by the different modi operandi of lone wolves, together with their varying beliefs and targeting strategies, and the often unique processes by which they became radicalised.

‘Religious & political entrepreneurs’ will continue to play a role © Muhammad ud-Deen.

According to the French magazine Le Point, Merah first became radicalised whilst he was in prison. Merah also travelled to Pakistan in 2010 and 2011, and told police whilst under siege that he had received al-Qa’ida training on the Afghan border. According to Claude Guéant, French Interior minister at the time of Merah’s attacks, Merah’s level of radicalisation seems to have been increased by these trips. The fact that Merah’s radicalisation, which took place initially in prison and

Furthermore, the examples of Copeland and Breivik demonstrate that the lone wolf threat has the ability to significantly evolve in a relatively short period of time. Also, Nidal Malik Hasan and Mohammed Merah were both, to an extent, radicalised through their links with Islamist terror groups, which contradicts the accepted view that lone wolves do not have connections with larger terrorist cells or organisations. Treating lone wolf terrorism as a monolithic phenomenon will only hinder efforts to counter it.

By Jonathan Lautier

Monitor | Current Threats


Why the West is in desperate need of a comprehensive cybersecurity plan

Cyber-security is the term on the tip of everyone’s tongues these days, closely followed by cyber-warfare and cyberjust about everything else. The Internet and the computer truly have changed the game as we know it, much for the better; what we didn’t prepare for, however, was its meteoric rise and haphazard construction along the way. The Internet wasn’t built with security in mind and certainly no one could have fathomed the sheer amount of data that would suddenly need to be protected yet shared with selected people, without being intercepted or looked at. Defense was an afterthought. Network connections were an afterthought. Now we pay the price in cyber attacks unless we can coordinate on a comprehensive cyber plan to effectively thwart these negative

activities, and pursue perpetrate them.



Almost overnight we have been forced to come to grips with the fact that our traditional notions of state power do not carry the weight they used to. Assuredly, much power still rests in sheer physical might, yet now we must consider how useful that force is against a virus in the systems that control it. Take, for example, the Stuxnet worm that buries itself deep in computer systems. In 2009, this selfreplicating virus likely disrupted uranium enrichment at an Iranian facility in Natanz. It is unknown what activates the worm’s destructive phase, but it was programmed to shut itself away if Siemens industrial software or equipment is undetected on an infected computer.


Monitor | Current Threats

The construction of Stuxnet is masterful, to say the least. The way it slips in as a flawless masquerade of a legitimate program, the way it exploits multiple Microsoft zero days (security gaps system creators are unaware of), the way it was programmed to erase itself come June 24, 2012. Though it’s widely thought the United States and Israel (both industrialized nations) are behind Stuxnet due to its sophisticated construction, this has not been confirmed by the governments of either nation. The truth is Stuxnet technically could have come from anywhere and been crafted by anyone-that’s the beauty of cybercrime. Often the perpetrator is untraceable and their motives are unknown. Further complicating this issue is the wide variety of attacks that often hit unsuspecting users and can spread to critical systems.

on a national level are not a new issue, however: McAfee says, “In 2007, McAfee’s annual virtual criminology report concluded that 120 countries had, or were developing, cyber espionage or cyber war capabilities”. Computers and the Internet have leveled the playing field. No matter who does it, untold billions of dollars of damage is done every year in the West, bringing down the earnings and reputations of companies and governments alike. The daily attacks vary in size, type, and intensity with an arsenal ranging from the ever-popular DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attack, which overwhelms servers, to a virus or malware infection. At this point, it is no longer an option for government and industry not to work together.

Certainly, a lone hacker can cause substantial damage to a system, but cyber groups on a national scale are of much greater concern. Briefly consider Estonia and Georgia in 2007 and 2008 respectively: the Internet of both nations was crippled by a barrage of cyber attacks on such a large scale that it was either condoned by a government or at least tacitly approved of by a government (due to the involvement of telecoms). Indeed, governments such as China’s have publicly confirmed the existence of cyber units within their militaries whose purpose is ostensibly to fortify China’s network security and defend against attacks. Many nations doubt the purity of this mission considering the high number of attacks on Western companies and governments from Chinese sources. Cyber attacks organized

A diagram of a Distributed Denial of Service Attack © Everaldo Coelho

Monitor | Current Threats


As they say in American football, “the best defense is a good offense”. This is not to suggest that countries or companies should start launching cyber offensives willy-nilly but rather to argue it is better to discover your vulnerabilities and fortify them before someone malicious does it for you. Furthermore, instead of merely attempting to fend off attacks as they occur, a more active strategy that involves retaliation against the attacker Air Botswana website, having been attacked by the Pakistan Cyber Army should be undertaken. Tech A nation’s economy, after all, is tied up companies are working overtime to fill in industry (not to mention much of its this gap to provide trustworthy innovation). Undoubtedly in most experience to fight back against industrialized nations in the West, the attackers, yet the West should strive military relies on industry for a great for more coordination and fewer kneedeal of its technical expertise and jerk reactions. It needs to be made involves private contractors in an evereasier to share information regarding increasing number of its activities. On cyber-security attacks amongst the other hand, they are almost never business and government without the able to get the whole intelligence fear of losing one’s reputation; when picture that a government has with cyber attacks are only handled intheir piecemeal clearance and house and the results go unshared, information. Both actors are in this other companies or governments may together and must present a united be completely unaware of the threat front against cyber attacks-both will and exposing themselves to harm. surely benefit in the long run with the sharing of intelligence and expertise. It only takes one computer to spread a The United States, for one, is making strides in this arena: once a year, CEOs of major companies are gathered and given the highest clearance while the National Security Agency (NSA) details new attacks and how to prevent them. Furthermore, the US Department of Defense is expanding a pilot program to more cleared companies within the Defense Industrial Base that aims to increase voluntary sharing of information as well as providing actionable data to these companies on malicious cyber threats.

virus or to be hacked. As such, everyday users, especially in critical organizations and in government positions, need to fully understand why certain IT protocols exist. They are essential in countering a variety of threats, including cyber-terrorism.

By: Elicia Bush


Monitor | SIRS Opinion

The Covert Role of States and Stateagencies in Fostering and Perpetuating Terrorism Aristotle wrote critically of terror employed by tyrants against their subjects. In recent times, state terrorism as a form of foreign policy was shaped by the presence and use of violence, and the legitimizing of such violent behaviour led to increasing acceptance when it was employed by states. For many years, terrorism was perceived as a contest between two sides: on the one hand, a group of people or an organization, and on the other, a sovereign state. However, during the course of the second half of the twentieth century, various countries began to use, and expanded their use of terrorist organizations to promote state interests in the international domain. If terrorism alone did not come with its own threat and repercussions, it being fostered by states and state-sponsored agencies adds to the danger and the consequences for modern civilisation. What started as movements within countries in the past, have over the centuries been spreading their tentacles beyond international borders. State-sponsored terrorism literally implies a state’s use or support of terrorism against another state or against its own people. The expression ‘state-sponsored terrorism’ is now commonly used to describe a state’s support of international terrorism. Any country that intentionally and/or strategically employs terrorism or aids and abets terrorist groups as an instrument of its foreign policy against another country is categorized as a state sponsor of terrorism. State terrorism can be defined as a government’s direct or indirect support

to official or non-official groups to commit violence and is the “direct or indirect instigation, by a government, of official and nonofficial groups to exercise psychological or physical violence against political opponents, another government, or other entities for purposes of coercion and widespread intimidation to bring about a desired political or strategic objective.” One of the main reasons for states sponsoring terrorism is that state support for terrorist groups allows them to use violence without overtly pressuring other governments towards certain political ends or finding themselves in the international 'communal soup'. State sponsorship of terrorism tries to promote domestic and foreign policy through clandestine, secret, and often violent means. State Sponsoring Terrorism Countries take to sponsoring terrorism because direct confrontation can lead to severe consequences, the most paramount being direct retaliation from the country being attacked. Additionally, and perhaps in the long run with more dire consequences, such an action involves the international community, which may impose sanctions and take other measures which will cripple the economy of the state. Moreover, warfare is way too expensive and most of the time it’s countries which are not too economically stable and powerful that initiate terrorist activities across borders. Though funding terrorism does not come cheaper, it nonetheless imposes lesser strain on the economy than would direct warfare.

Monitor | SIRS Opinion The practice of state-sponsored terrorism is a reasonably safe and lowcost alternative to direct conflict. Given the reasons, some regimes will continue this practice. States using terrorism as part of a foreign policy may well manage to accomplish with a small number of men and limited weapons what is otherwise the domain of large armed forces and an outright frontal attack. Not only could such a small number help in conquest of rival states, but if the missions are carried out properly and in a covert manner, the state sponsor might even escape identification, and therefore international military response and economic sanctions. State-sponsored terrorism comes in different guises; a government may use its state intelligence and security resources to covertly commit terrorism in another country or it may choose to provide a safe haven for terrorists, allowing them unrestricted movement and


Tools of State Sponsorship State sponsorship increases the ‘reach’ and danger of terrorism because it provides the terrorist group with far greater resources than they would otherwise be able to. Secondly, the availability of arms also adds to the danger; in the absence of a state sponsor the terrorists would be unable to just as easily have access to firepower. The relationship between the patron state and the terrorist organization is generally reciprocal and mutually beneficial. Terrorist organizations use state sponsorship to spread their network of terror and to expand their reach while the state uses terrorism as effective weapon against its enemies. Terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda and Hizbulla which have conducted long terrorist campaigns have had multiple sources of support ranging from

activity. Also sponsoring states Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, have been known to covertly sponsor terrorism governments fund to charitable terrorist organizations to organisations directly or indirectly private individuals. through various channels, like social, cultural or charitable associations. In During the course of the second half of most cases these organisations or the twentieth century, various countries associations are mere fronts for groups began to use, and expand their use of that engage in terrorist activities. Usually terrorist organizations to promote state states and terrorist organisations share interests in the international arena. mutual interests too. Since then terrorism has become a tool of states and even of superpowers. Many nations under the garb of sincere international co-operation use covert methods to encourage and guide


Monitor | SIRS Opinion

terrorist acts to suit their needs and to accomplish their objectives. Iran supports other regimes in fostering terrorism and using or threatening to use extreme means of violence against other nations as has been observed during the ‘Arab Spring’. Iran is not the only country which supports and executes terrorist activities through its official agencies. There has been direct Libyan involvement in terrorist activities too. Even terrorists caught in India and the US, Kasab, David Headley and Rana have testified that the Pakistani Army and the intelligence unit, ISI, are vigorously involved in supporting terrorist acts across its borders.

passive sponsorship of states in encouraging terrorism by indirect and covert means. As terrorism is mostly self-funded through local means, passive sponsorship is an increasingly strategic category of state support. As the international arms market has seen a proliferation of small arms many terrorist outfits find support one way or the other through government involvement, no matter how indirect or passive. Policies of State Sponsorship More worrying is how some governments make policies which lead to deliberate noninterference with a terrorist group that is raising money, recruiting, or otherwise exploiting the state's resources or territory. Boiled down, the regime supports the agendas of the terrorist organisations and wants the group/s to flourish and believes that by not acting it can help it achieve its objectives.

Where state terrorism is concerned, the world at large generally assumes that attacks are committed by terrorist 9/11 has led to more focus on state-sponsored organisations, that is terrorism Š Dennis S true but not the entire picture; some attacks are directly carried out by official The United States, taking measures to state institutions or their agents like counter terrorism in different ways, has security forces, intelligence services, assembled an international coalition and others. In some cases there is a against the threat of terrorism. Many direct state or support from a sub-state countries in that coalition however fail to agency where support through all the contribute significantly to the fight. Even stages of planning, preparation and/or worse, the willingness of some members operation is provided. of the coalition to actually combat terrorism is doubtful. Saudi Arabia, It is not the blatant involvement of a Pakistan, and for a long time Iran, are state that is a worry, what is more the countries mostly supported by the alarming and difficult to tackle is the West, as allies and economic, trade and

Monitor | SIRS Opinion commerce partners. Unfortunately these very countries seem to be double-edged swords since there have been far too many incidents where these very countries have been known to be involved in covert help to terrorist outfits. Saudi Arabia enlisted in the fight against terrorism only after intense pressure from the United States following the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Even then, its cooperation has been minimal and rather dubious. For example, Riyadh resisted Washington's requests to use its bases in Saudi Arabia for military operations against Osama bin Laden's terrorist facilities in Afghanistan. The Saudi government has been the principal financial backer of Afghanistan's Taliban movement since at least 1996. It has also channelled funds to Hamas and other groups that have committed terrorist acts in Israel and other portions of the Middle East. Many independent donors have been known to offer financial aid to terrorist organisations. When Bin Laden was killed in Pakistan it came to light that three Saudi Arabian nationals were involved in offering financial support to Bin Laden and his 'cause'.


To add to the injury, the Saudi monarchy has funded dubious schools and "charities" throughout the Islamic world and even in the West. The Saudis fund money to many ‘madrassas’ around the world, which often are the breeding grounds for recruiting terrorists. Recent revelations in the UK exposed the 'teachings' offered in Saudi Arabian run Islamic schools in various parts of the UK. These schools and organizations have been hotbeds of anti-Western indoctrination. The schools not only indoctrinate students in an extreme form of Islam, but also teach them to hate secular Western values. Pakistan is even more blatant and 'unapologetic' in its support to terrorist groups. If it were not for the active support of the government in Islamabad, the Taliban could never have come to power in Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities helped fund the militia and equip it with military hardware during the mid-1990s when the Taliban was merely one of several competing factions in Afghanistan's civil war. Even when the United States exerted pressure after the September 11 attacks, Islamabad still did not sever its political and financial ties with the Taliban. That Bin Laden was found to be hiding in Pakistan has not come as too much of a surprise to many.

A soldier guards the roadside checkpoint outside Srinagar International Airport Š Jrap Czak

Pakistan has also assisted terrorist factions in Kashmir, groups which have committed violent acts against civilians. It has also been established that Pakistan offers aid and training to extremist groups to commit terrorist attacks in India/Kashmir. Additionally many of the extremist 'madrassas' funded by


Monitor | SIRS Opinion

the Saudis operate in Pakistan. Iran still remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism. It has been providing increasing support to numerous terrorist groups, including the Lebanese Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ). This support and involvement keeps undermining the Middle East peace negotiations. Iraq provided safe-haven and support to a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups, as well as bases, weapons, and protection to terrorist groups. Syria has continued to provide safe-haven and support to several terrorist groups, some of which oppose the Middle East peace negotiations. North Korea harboured several hijackers of a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in the 1970s and maintained links to other terrorist groups. Sudan has continued to serve as a safe haven for members many terrorist outfits including al-Qaida, the Lebanese Hizballah, alGama'a al-Islamiyya, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the PIJ, and HAMAS.

terrorism in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Poland has also alleged that terrorists have "friends in Pakistani government structures�. In July 2009, President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari admitted that the Pakistani government had "created and nurtured" terrorist groups to achieve its short-term foreign policy goals. According to an analysis published by Saban Center for Middle East Policy in 2008 Pakistan was the worlds 'most active' state sponsor of terrorism including aiding groups which were considered a direct threat to USA. According to some reports published by the Council of Foreign Relations, the Pakistan military and the ISI have provided covert support to terrorist groups active in Kashmir, including the al-Qaeda affiliate Jaishe-e-Mohammed.

Pakistan has categorically denied any involvement in terrorist activities in Kashmir, arguing that it only provides political and moral support to the groups which wish to escape Indian rule. Many Kashmiri militant groups also maintain their headquarters in Pakistan administered Kashmir. Many of the terrorist organisations operating there are banned by the UN, but continue to operate under different names. The United Nations Organisation has pointed out Pakistan’s inability in controlling the activities of these banned groups The fact that Bin Laden was able to stay undetected in Pakistan has led many to question whether he received any support from factions of the ISI along its Afghanistan border and not Pakistan has been accused by India, restricting the activities of Taliban Afghanistan, the United States, the leaders who have been designated by United Kingdom of involvement in the UN as terrorists.

Monitor | SIRS Opinion Pakistan is perhaps the world’s most active sponsor of terrorist groups; its involvement does not just stop at sponsoring terrorism but also includes aiding groups that pose a direct threat to international peace. Pakistan supports terrorism and terrorism groups in a variety of ways that range from actively backing some groups, maintaining contacts with others, turning a blind eye to some groups, and in some cases lacking the capacity to shut down radicalism it opposes. In addition, support for terrorism in Pakistan is almost all encompassing and involves both government and non-state actors. Islamabad has long worked with many different groups linked to terrorists in its fight to wrest Kashmir from India. To this end, Pakistan has worked with groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaishe-Muhammad and Harkat ul-Mujahideen to train terrorists to fight in Kashmir. So to be able to deal with states sponsoring terrorism, first it needs to be understood what its level of involvement of is. That way the international community can arrive at certain strategic steps to tackle the states which sponsor terrorism and perpetrate covert means of violence. When such states are properly dealt with and ‘punished’ it will result in other states wishing to adopt such means to reconsider their involvement and re-evaluate the loss and benefit of such involvement. It is not justified nor wise to tar all the nations with the same proverbial brush, each strategy should be based on the degree and the length of involvement and to what degree the state’s actions have led to unrest, violence and the number of terrorist attacks. So the states


whose involvement is limited to just supporting terrorism a cultural and diplomatic boycott may be enough while those states which initiate attacks and execute them through organisations thriving on their soil, an economic boycott and perhaps a legal action is justified. States which execute terrorist attacks through their own intelligence and security services and their agents should face the possibility of offensive measures. The international community and international organisations like the UN should have clear, defined and consistent ways of taking action against states sponsoring terrorism. It is only when the state sponsoring terrorism is aware of the surety and of the degree of retaliation if it continues to be involved and that the international community will definitely take measures against adopting such an approach will these deterrents succeed. The state wanting to engage in such activities should realise that the price for such involvement will be far higher than the benefits it may accrue by sponsoring terrorism. Dealing With The Situation First and foremost it needs to be established what drives states to sponsor terrorism. What are their ambitions and ideologies and political leanings and policies? What needs to be asked is that why is there so much of a lack of proper action and retaliation and to seek the right kind of information so a carefully planned strategy and counter moves could be formulated. Once we have adequate information we will able to formulate strategies to deal with this worldwide threat.


Monitor | SIRS Opinion

Then we need to look at the way the its economic and other needs. In world deals with this situation. The real addition the resolutions passed by the problem lies in the hypocritical way the United Nations and those by the international community chooses to Security Council are at best useless combat state-sponsored terrorism. The since most member countries have world at large is differences amongst ready to themselves and so a condemn stateunanimous decision is sponsored rarely, if ever, reached. terrorism but when it comes to Unless the international doing something community takes a about it is not unified stand against ready to take states sponsoring action against terrorism to punish states countries such as responsible for Iran and Syria perpetuating and aiding which are terrorism it will be a blatantly active difficult task to tackle this sponsors of danger. Countries need international to both individually and terrorism. There as a community develop has to be a strategies and implement collective and foreign policies and consensual adopt measures against diplomatic states that sponsor retaliation to terrorism. The terrorist attack in Mumbai raised concerns of instances of possible links to Pakistan’s security agencies © Indranil state-sponsored Lastly, what we also Mukherjee/AFP/Getty Images terrorism by the have to do is to ask international community. Also, imposing ourselves honest questions; do we sanctions against a state sponsor of prefer life over profits, is oil more terrorism is all but meaningless, since important or blood, is safety important or only very few countries normally impose gains accrued under the shade of the these sanctions. sword? It would be more effective if the whole international community were to also join in and impose sanctions. Economic and political sanctions imposed against a state sponsor of terrorism would naturally affect the social and political and economic condition of the state against which such sanctions are imposed. This is likely to work because it would involve the international community, otherwise such states have only the US and a few other countries imposing the sanctions and the state may easily look to other countries to fulfil

As long as countries and world leaders look to fulfil immediate needs, they will have to accede to certain ‘expectations’ from trading countries that are involved directly or indirectly with terrorism. Oil may be a very important constituent in daily life, but is it worth the blood staining our hands after the handshake; to all intents and purposes the deal may well have been signed in blood.

By: Ranbir Chandel



National Security Risks: Immediate Challenges Before Summer 2012 Special discounted price for Monitor readers:

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This handbook presents policymakers with a final opportunity to make critical changes in order to optimise national security, months before the Opening Ceremony of the biggest peacetime event to take place in the UK: It is comprehensive in scope and is the first document to encompass all five official inquiries into the 7 July 2005 London Bombings. This handbook also offers its own analysis of the Anders Breivik ‘lone wolf’ attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011 and the August 2011 England Riots. All key threats are covered. Whilst emphasising key conclusions made by the 7 July Inquiries, this handbook makes many original recommendations that must be urgently addressed before Summer 2012.

This security handbook has received numerous accolades including…. “I have found this SIRS Consultancy handbook on the National Security Risks leading up to the London 2012 Olympic Games to be extraordinarily useful. For the first time the different strands of the threats that are facing this country have been pulled together into one concise document. Having read this I now feel better prepared, better informed and much more ready to understand how threats will develop and how we might deal with them. This is an invaluable piece of work.” Patrick Mercer OBE MP “This SIRS Consultancy handbook is a must read for anyone who does not want to spend hours of their lives trawling through reports and news pages to get accurate, up-to-date information on the threats the UK faces today. This concise document will help you to understand the issues and develop your plans for the future.” Chris Phillips - Head of the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (2005 – 2011)

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Monitor Issue 2  

The second-ever issue of Monitor – a security, intelligence and geo-political magazine. Contributors are practitioners, academics or experts...

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