Orot Shalhevet - Hilchot Shabbat 2021 | 5782

‫הלכות שבת‬ SHALHEVET HIGH SCHOOL SENIOR JOURNAL OF

RABBI DAVID STEIN

DEAR SHALHEVET COMMUNITY, I grew up singing Uncle Moishy’s famous song about Shabbos (come on, I know you know the tune): “I ain’t gonna work on Saturday, ain’t gonna work on Saturday - double, double, triple pay - ain’t gonna work on Saturdayyyyy!” It’s a song that captures so much about our observance of Shabbos and our commitment to its sanctity - and to this day I can still feel the excitement of belting out that tune as a young kid in summer camp and school.

Yet I’ve also since learned that Uncle Moishy didn’t quite get everything right in that song. Because Shabbos isn’t just about not “working” - it’s about so much more. Shabbos is about creating a feeling, an atmosphere - an avirah - in which we connect to Hashem, to ourselves, to our families, our tradition, and our communities.

But what I think is truly magical about Shabbos is how that connection is created through halakha. In fact, it turns out that in so many ways, Shabbos is the quintessential field of applied halakha - the most common and well-known area of legal discourse in which we apply halakha in order to construct an experience. In setting up the system of laws that we observe on Shabbos, our Sages didn’t just blindly copy and paste directly from the Torah; they interpreted and created a framework of principles and regulations that dictate our behavior and direct our feelings.

And so, as the gemara (Shabbat 49b) explains, it’s not really “work” that is prohibited - what is actually forbidden are a set of creative activities that were needed to construct the mishkan in the desert. Shabbos is the cessation of the thoughtful, purposeful, and creative endeavors - “melekhet machshevet” (see Chagiga 10b) - that define so much of what we strive to do and achieve in this world. In a sense, shabbos is the day that we suspend our creativity so that we can develop our spirituality.

This project is, in so many ways, a celebration of that “melekhet machshevet” - the breathtakingly thoughtful and creative work of Shalhevet’s students. While of course the creativity of Torah learning is not prohibited on shabbos, there is no question that, as Rav Soloveitchik has written, “the study of Torah, by definition, means gleaning new, creative insights.1” As a capstone to our 4-year gemara and halakha curriculum, our seniors spent the year applying the principles and mechanisms of halakha to in-depth study of the laws of Shabbos. With a focus on conceptual understanding and practical rulings, they applied their knowledge of halakhic decision making to the intricacies of contemporary shabbos observance.

I hope you enjoy reading their insights as much as I have - and, much like the experience of Shabbos itself, I hope that this journal enhances your connection to our community and the Torah that we learn and live at Shalhevet High School.

B’virchat HaTorah, Rabbi David Stein Judaic Studies Principal 1 Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik (1983). Halakhic Man. Philadelphia: JPS. p. 99.

TABLE OF CONTENTS SHANI SHAHAM

‫דבר שאינו מתכוין‬

THE LAW OF UNINTENDED OUTCOMES PAGE 3

BARBARA SERUYA

‫פסיק רישיה‬

THE LAW OF UNAVOIDABLE OUTCOMES PAGE 6

JULIET WIENER

‫הוצאה‬

AND THE LAWS OF WEARING CLOTHING ON SHABBAT PAGE 9

JACK SANDERS

COMMUNITIES IN CONTENTION: A HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ERUVIN PAGE 13

NOORIA KERENDIAN

PROTECTING SANCTITY: THE LAWS OF READING ON SHABBAT PAGE 17

MARLEE DRAZIN

BABYSITTERS, RABBIS, AND WAITERS: PAYMENT FOR SERVICES ON SHABBAT PAGE 20

ADINA KURZBAN

“MAKE A FENCE FOR MY COMMANDS:” DERABANAN PROHIBITIONS ON SHABBAT PAGE 23

SHANI SHAHAM

‫דבר שאינו מתכוין‬

THE LAW OF UNINTENDED OUTCOMES On the face of it, the Torah’s discussion of forbidden activities on Shabbat seems quite clear: ‫ ״ויום השביעי שבת ׀ לה‘ אלקיך לא־תעשה כל־מלאכה״‬- “the seventh day is a Sabbath for your God; you shall not do any melakha.” Indeed, at first glance, this Torah prohibition would seem to forbid “any” forms of the creative activities defined by the Rabbis as melakha - including both the 39 avot (primary categories of prohibited activity) as well as toladot (subcategories) defined by Chazal (see Shabbat 73a and Bava Kama 2a). Surprisingly, however, despite the Torah’s apparent blanket prohibition, there are also some actions that may be permitted on Shabbat even if they lead to the performance of a forbidden melakha. These cases are collectively known as situations of davar she’eino mitkaven - permitted actions that may unintentionally result in the performance of a melakha. In this article, we will try explore the concept of davar she’eino mitkaven using an example from the melakha of choresh, plowing. We will then discuss briefly a few practical applications of davar she’eino mitkaven.

Let us begin by giving some background to the melakha of choresh. Plowing is one of the 39 melakhot because - as with all other melakhot - plowing was required for the construction of the Mishkan.1 This melakha is defined as any type of plowing or moving the earth in the ground for the purpose of preparing the earth before planting or sowing. The melakha only applies to plowing that could improve the land for planting purposes. For example, plowing in the desert is not considered a melakha since the earth is unfit for planting. However, activities such as plowing and loosening, leveling, making furrows, removing obstacles, fertilizing, or making holes in the ground are all included in the melakha as Toladot since each one improves the earth for planting purposes.

The Mishnah Berurah summarizes these points in his introduction to the Shulchan Aruch, Siman 337. ‫ חורש הוא אחד מל"ט אבות מלאכות וכיון שכונת‬.‫אקדים לסימן זה הקדמה קצרה והיא‬ ‫החורש לרפויי להשוות הגומות וליפותו כדי שיהיה המקום שוה ולכן החופר בשדה או ארעא‬ ‫כוונתו שהיה שם תל קטן והשפילו או שהיה מקום נמוך והשוה אותו וכן כל המשוה גומות‬ ‫דאז טוב לזריעה וגם שעשה חריץ או במקום בונה שמתקן הבנין עי"ז[ וכן כל מה שעושה‬ ‫הראוי לזריעה חייב משום חורש ]ואם היה זה בבית חייב משום ליפות הקרקע‬ [‫הוא תולדת חורש וחייב בכל שהוא ]רמב"ם פ"א‬ 1 It was necessary to plow the ground before planting the herbs which were used as dyes for the fabrics in the Mishkan. See Shabbat 49b.

3

“I will begin this Siman with a short introduction as follows. Plowing is one of the 39 Avot melakhot. And since the intent of the one who plows is to soften the ground because it is then good for planting, and his intent is also to smooth out the ground and fill the holes so that the ground is level; therefore, someone who is digging in a field, or someone who makes a trench, or if there was a small mound and he flattened it, or if there was a low place and he filled it in to make it level; and so too, anyone who fills in a place that is appropriate for sowing, he is liable due to plowing. And if this is done in his house, he is liable because of the melakha of Boneh (building) as he is thereby fixing his house. And so too, everything that he does to smooth the ground is a Tolada2 of plowing and he is liable.”

In other words, anyone who performs an act on Shabbat that accomplishes the same goal as choresh has violated the melakha.

What is the halacha if one does not intend to do choresh at all, but it occurs as a result of a permitted action? For example, is it permitted to drag a light object along the ground despite the possibility of creating a furrow? This, in fact, is the classic case given of davar she’eino mitkaven. Since one’s intent is not to create a furrow, and it is not certain that a furrow will result from dragging the light object, this action is categorized as davar she’eino mitkaven, an unintended act.

The Rambam (Hilkhot Shabbat 1:5) uses the example of dragging a bed, chair, or bench to describe davar she’eino mitkaven and writes that such an action is permitted: ‫דברים המתרים לעשותן בשבת ובשעת עשיתן אפשר שתעשה בגללן מלאכה ואפשר שלא‬ ‫ גורר אדם מטה‬.‫ כיצד‬.‫ אם לא בשבת ובלבד שלא נתכון לאותה מלאכה הרי זה מתר‬.‫תעשה‬ ‫ ולפיכך אם חפרו הקרקע‬.‫וכסא וספסל וכיוצא בהן יתכון לחפר חריץ בקרקע בשעת גרירתן‬ .‫אינו חושש בכך לפי שלא נתכון‬ “Concerning actions that are permissible to do on Shabbat, but it is possible that while doing it, he will do forbidden work3 through them and it is also possible that he will not do so; if he does not have intention to do that particular work, it is permissible.

How is this? A man may drag a bed, a chair or a bench on Shabbat, so long as he does not intend to dig a ditch in the ground at the time that he drags them. Hence, if they dug a ditch into the ground, he need not be concerned, since he did not have intention [for it]. Likewise, a man may walk on top of grass on Shabbat, so long as he does not intend to uproot it. Hence if they are uprooted, he need not be concerned.”

The Shulchan Aruch (siman 337) agrees with the Rambam. However, he points out that it is prohibited to drag a heavy object across the floor if it will certainly result in a furrow. Even though the result is still unintended, the action is prohibited as a “pesik reisha4,” since the result is inevitable. ‫דבר שאין מתכוין מותר והוא שלא יהא פסיק רישיה הילכך גורר אדם מטה כסא וספסל בין‬ ‫גדולים בין קטנים ובלבד שלא יתכוין לעשות חריץ מותר לרבץ הבית כיון שאינו מתכוין‬ :‫להשוות גומות אלא שלא יעלה האבק‬ 2 A Tolada is a subcategory of the Av melakha.

3 ‘Forbidden work’ on Shabbat denotes the 39 melachot, derived from the Gemara, in Shabbat 73a. There are 39 categories of creative activity that are prohibited to do on Shabbat.

4 A Pesik Reisha - which is prohibited on Shabbat - refers to a situation in which one performs a permitted activity that is guaranteed to result in the performance of a melakha - as opposed to a davar she-eino mitkavein, which describes a situation in which one performs a permitted activity that may or may not result in the melakha.

A common modern example of a pesik reisha is walking in front of a motion detector - even though you may “only” be walking around and not intending for a light or door to open, since the outcome is guaranteed, it is as if you did the melakha directly.

4

“A matter that one did not intend to happen is allowed as long as it is not a definite consequence of the specific action (pesik reisha). Therefore, a person may drag a bed, chair, or bench, whether it is big or small, provided he does not intend to make a rut.

One is permitted to sprinkle the floor because he does not intend to level the depressions [of the earth floor], rather he just doesn't want the dust to rise.”

There are a number of practical applications that arise from the discussion of davar she’eino mitkaven. One example is the permissibility of opening a refrigerator on Shabbat.5 When the door is opened, warm air enters the refrigerator, causing inside temperatures to rise. Since the motor is hooked up to a thermostat, the rise in temperature eventually causes the motor to start running. Most of the time, the motor does not start running until after the door stays open for a while. But, if the temperature in the refrigerator was already high, then opening the door will cause the motor to run immediately. In other words, then, opening the refrigerator door is an action that is permitted in of itself, but which may (or may not) lead to the the prohibited activation of the refrigerator’s motor - a davar she’eino mitkaven.

Some Poskim rule that since opening the door of the fridge will eventually cause the motor to run, it is considered equivalent to actually starting the motor, and is therefore forbidden. Such a conclusion would mean that one may never open the door of a refrigerator on Shabbat while the motor is off. Other Poskim, however, hold that it is permissible to open the refrigerator on Shabbat even when the motor is off based on the principle of davar she’eino mitkaven. Although a case of an inevitable consequence (pesik reisha) would still be forbidden, these authorities view the case of the motor with the refrigerator door as a situation which is not inevitable case, since it is entirely possible that the motor will not go on when the door is opened.

Another example is that it is permitted to push a stroller on Shabbat, not only on the street, but also on a dirt path. This is permitted both when pushing it in a straight line as well as turning it to the sides. Even though the wheels make indentations on the ground, this does not constitute making a furrow because the wheels do not remove any earth from the ground, only compressing it (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata, ch.28, based on Beitzah 23b).

As we have seen, the principle of davar she-eino mitkaven is a novel Talmudic rule which requires that when determining liability for violation of Shabbat prohibitions, the halakha consider not only the question of whether a prohibited activity has occurred, but also the context of intentions and actions that led to a given outcome as well. Furthermore, these issues are not merely abstract or esoteric ideas - instead, they directly impact the permissibility of everyday questions that Posekim must deal with in the modern world.

5 In a situation in which a light turns on when opening your refrigerator, this would be forbidden as well due to the light turning on when opening the door due to the principle of pesik reisha discussed above, which is forbidden. The case under discussion is when the light bulb has been disconnected or otherwise rendered inoperable.

5

BARBARA SERUYA

‫פסיק רישיה‬

THE LAW OF UNAVOIDABLE OUTCOMES

The previous article in this volume discussed the principle of davar she-eino mitkaven - the performance of a permitted activity that may lead to a prohibited activity on Shabbat. While such activity is universally permitted, a closely related situation, where the prohibited activity is guaranteed to result, is known as a psik reisha and is forbidden in many circumstances. Thus, while the previous article described the permissibility of dragging a chair across the ground on Shabbat (which may or may not result in creating a furrow in the ground), this article will explore prohibited situations - such as the triggering of a motion sensor - in which a prohibited outcome is unavoidable and inevitable.

While the Mishnah (Shabbat 73a) lists the 39 primary categories of creative activity (melakha) that were done in the Mishkan and are prohibited on Shabbat, elsewhere the gemara (Bava Kamma 2a) intuits the existence of corresponding subcategories (toladot) as well. The gemara there declares that there is no practical difference if one violates a subcategory along with its category, Rabbi Eliezer nevertheless explains that the avot (primary categories) correspond to important work done in the Mishkan while toladot (subcategories) were not part of the essential work of the mishkan.

The distinctions between avot and toladot, as well as the topic of psik reisha, find prominent expression within the melakha of disha, or threshing. Threshing in its most narrow sense refers to removing the kernel from inside a wheat stalk, but it seems that Chazal understood it more broadly as any type of extracting, or removing an object from its encasement. According to the gemara, threshing the amount of a size of a fig is prohibited on Shabbat and violates the melakha of disha. The Gemara elsewhere (Shabbat 75a) also clarifies that disha on a biblical level is only transgressed when one performs it on objects that grow from the ground. A third passage in the Gemara (Shabbat 75b) states that even milking an animal is considered a tolada (subcategory) of disha because this too involves extracting or separating a liquid from its encasement (the udder of the animal). Lastly, the Gemara states (Shabbat 75a) that if one wounds an animal, thereby drawing blood from it, one is liable for disha.

The Rambam codifies this discussion in Hilkhot Shabbat 8:7, which is followed by extensive discussion among the commentators about why one would be liable for milking a cow or wounding an animal if the prohibition of disha only applies to objects that grow from the ground. While some authorities (see Maggid Mishna, par.

7) conclude that animals are considered to grow from the ground (“you are what you eat,” it seems), the Birchat Avraham - written by the Rambam’s son - declares that even 6

though an av and tolada share the same essence and punishments, they have minor differences and are not actually the exact same. Thus, while the av of disha only applies to items grown from the ground, its tolada has no such limitation and can include activities performed with a broad range of objects - including animals.

Armed with this introduction, we are now ready to examine a case of psik reisha that relates to dosh and understand the meaning of the term and the halakha. The Gemara (Shabbat 75a) presents a machloket concerning the liability for removing the dye of a snail (chilazon) on Shabbat. Extracting dye from and wounding a snail certainly entails a violation of the tolada of disha discussed above, but the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about the extent of the transgression. The gemara explains that the dispute revolves around whether one is liable for both dosh as well as tzad (trapping), but expresses surprise that no authorities seem to also assert liability for killing the snail as well - which should be a violation of the av of shechita! To answer this question, Rava one would not be liable for taking a life because he had no intention of actually killing the snail - an assertion that the gemara challenges by introducing the principle of psik reisha. All authorities agree, concludes the gemara, that in a case where the prohibited outcome is inevitable - such as the case here of wounding and extracting dye from a snail - that even if one didn’t intend for that outcome, he should be held liable for it.

This gemara - along with similar discussion elsewhere - serve as the source for the principle of liability in a situation of psik reisha where a permitted action on Shabbat will lead to a definite violation of a melacha. According to Rav Doniel Schreiber, psik reisha can be defined as “an action the inevitable consequence of which is a Shabbat violation, despite the fact that one does not desire this tangential outgrowth, in the context of a Torah proscription.” For example, washing one’s hands on Shabbat is permitted. But if one washes one’s hands over grass, one would violate the prohibition of watering on Shabbat, thereby creating a psik reisha. Another example would be where you open a door next to a candle and it is certain that the fire will blow out. This action might violate the melacha of extinguishing, even if it was not your intention to do so, because of the principle of psik reisha requires one to have anticipated and prevented this inevitable outcome.

According to the gemara, then, it is clearly forbidden to perform an action on Shabbat involving a standard case of psik reisha. What is the halacha in a case of a psik reisha where one did not derive any benefit whatsoever from the action? Is this still forbidden, or might the prohibition of psik reisha apply only where one actually benefits from the action, even if the performance of the melacha was not one’s intention? The Rishonim (Tosafot Shabbat 103a s.v. lo) dispute this point, with most opinions forbidding such actions, while a minority opinion permits them. A further dispute involves whether leniency is possible where the prohibition transgressed is only rabbinic, rather than biblical. Here, some halachic authorities are stringent, but many more poskim are lenient. Thus, despite the general liability in cases of psik reisha, in a situation where the outcome is not needed and only constitutes the violation of a rabbinic prohibition, there is significant room for leniency.

Let’s now look at two practical cases involving psik reisha. The first is where someone is walking on Shabbat at night and triggers on a motion detector which then turns on a light. Based on our discussion above, the permissibility of this case would seem to

7

hinge on whether turning on the light is a biblical or rabbinic violation, as well as whether one actually benefits from this light. Contemporary poskim debate the halacha in such a case, and some rule leniently that this action is permitted based upon some of the aforementioned considerations (e.g., one did not care whether the light went on or not) and other complicating factors (e.g., one was not even performing an action, but just walking normally). On the other hand, however, many others hold that depending on the type of lightbulb, turning on the light by walking would either a rabbinic or a biblical prohibition, since ultimately he does benefit from the light that was turned on.

Another common example involving psik reisha relates to a hot cup of water or tea where a few droplets were left at the bottom of the cup. If you add more hot water to make it hot again, does this violate the melacha of cooking by reheating the remaining cold droplets of water or tea on the bottom of the cup? Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, O.C. 4:74, Bishul 19) says that one may be lenient in this case because of two factors. The first is that some opinions are lenient on reheating hot liquids that cooled off. Even though many are strict about this (and that is the accepted halacha), Rav Moshe writes that this is also a case of psik reisha delo nicha leh, a psik reisha where one does not specifically desire the results, since one did not intend to heat up those few remaining drop of water and does not derive benefit from them.

We can see from both of these examples that the rules of psik reisha are complex; the answer to whether a case of psik reisha is forbidden is not always a definitive yes or no, and depends on the nature of the outcome as well as the intent of the individual. At the same time, however, this principle is one that is regularly encountered with the increasing use of sensors and computers in the function and operation of every day life. One thing, however, is for sure: like most things in life, the rules of psik reisha highlight that the intention and motivation behind a person’s actions is a key part of the halakhic discourse as well.

8 4

JULIET WIENER

‫הוצאה‬

AND THE LAWS OF WEARING CLOTHING ON SHABBAT One of the 39 categories (melachot) of creative activity prohibited on Shabbat is Hotza’ah, the prohibition of carrying/transferring from one domain to another on Shabbat. The Gemara (Shabbat 49b) states that all of the melachot forbidden on Shabbat were performed in the Mishkan, and that Hotza’ah specifically was performed in the Mishkan when people lifted planks from the public domain (reshut harabim) and placed them into a wagon, a private domain (reshut hayachid), and vice-versa. The Gemara concludes from this example that just as “They lifted the boards from the ground” in the wilderness, so too “you shall not carry objects in from the public domain to the private domain” on Shabbat - thus providing one of the primary sources for the prohibition against transferring objects across domains on Shabbat.

The Mishna and Gemara (Shabbat 93b) also discusses Hotza’ah, providing additional information about the shiur (minimum required amount) for liability on this prohibition. The Mishna explains that while the minimum required amount to trigger a violation of Hotza’ah for food items is a kazayit (the volume of an olive), one would be liable for transferring even k’adasha (the volume of a lentil) of a small insect.

Critically, however, this Mishna also introduces a fundamental component of this prohibition - namely, the position of Rabbi Shimon that one is only liable for Hotza’ah if the transfer is taking place for a useful purpose; one who is simply removing an item from one location while not intending to make use of it at its destination is not liable for Hotza’ah. This concept - known as melakha she-eina tzricha l’gufa (a melakha whose product is not needed) is a wide-ranging leniency that generally provides exemption for one who performs a melakha but does not make creative use of its outcome. While such an action is still Rabbinically prohibited, this protection from liability reflects the creative emphasis and foundation of the 39 melakhot.1 In addition to the transfer of objects across domains, the prohibition of Hotza’ah can also be transgressed by carrying an object for a distance of 4 amot within a reshut haRabim (public domain). On a rabbinic level, Hotza’ah also includes transferring 1 Tosafot (‫ )שמעון ורבי ד״ה תוספות צד שבת‬have a slightly different understanding of the exemption of melakha she-eina tzricha l’gufa, arguing that the exemption only applies to activities whose outcomes are not needed for the same purpose as they were used in the Mishkan. For Tosafot, then, the emphasis here is not on the creative nature of melakha, but rather on their basis in the work that was done in constructing the Mishkan.

9

objects from a public or private domain to a karmelis (an open outdoor area that doesn’t have the full status of a reshut haRabim) or transferring a distance of 4 amot within a karmelis. It should be noted here, however, that the ubiquitous use of eiruvim today in many cities with large Jewish communities serves to create a single halakhic “domain” within the boundaries of the eiruv, thereby removing any potential violation of Hotza’ah on the transfer of objects within that domain. However, the melakha of Hotza’ah remains a very real and relevant prohibition for those observing Shabbat in areas where no eiruv exists.

While Hotza’ah clearly applies to physically carrying objects, it is not as clear whether wearing clothing can ever be defined as an equivalent act of “carrying.” According to the Rambam (Hilchot Shabbat 18:17), one who carries another person wearing clothing while moving from one domain to another is not liable because clothing serves the function of covering oneself and is therefore considered part of the person (one is also not liable for carrying a person either due to the Talmudic principle that “a living person carries himself,” which was actually another corollary of the Mishna discussed above on Shabbat 93b). We can infer from here that wearing most types of normal clothing would not be considered carrying since the clothing is considered part of the person. However, not all types of “wearing” necessarily qualify as “clothing” with respect to Hotza’ah.

In order for an item to be considered clothing apparel (and therefore not subject to the restrictions of Hotza’ah), it must meet one of three criteria, which are outlined by Rabbi Simcha Bunim Cohen in “The Shabbos Home,” vol.2 (p.100). The first consists of garments that cover a person for the sake of modesty or for human dignity (kavod habriyot). This includes regular articles of clothing, which are used to cover one's body. The second is a garment that protects one's body from the elements or injury. An example of clothing in this category would be a raincoat worn in the rain. The third category is a garment used to prevent discomfort or shame. This includes sanitary napkins, nursing pads, and feminine products. However, articles in the third category are not fully considered as garments, and therefore can only be worn when being used to relieve discomfort. Apparel that falls into the first two categories are fully considered as clothing, while objects in the third category are only viewed as clothing in a limited sense.

Furthermore, even items worn for protection may not be worn in all cases. According to the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 301:13), only a garment used to directly protect one's body is considered clothing. But any item that only serves the purpose of protecting one’s clothing from dirt or damage is prohibited. Accordingly, Rabbi Cohen writes (ibid., p.105) that it would be forbidden to walk outside (in a location without an eruv that permits carrying) in an apron or bib that only serves the purpose of making sure food does not stain the clothing. However, a raincoat is still permitted to be worn outside because rain seeps through the clothing to the skin without a raincoat, so a raincoat is still defined as protecting the body.

Once an item is defined as a clothing item, it may be worn normally, but it may not be worn in an unusual manner. For example, one is not allowed to wear a tallis folded over one shoulder because this is not the usual way in which it is worn (Shulchan Aruch, O.C. 301:34). Some poskim, such as Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg (Tzitz Eliezer 13:33), do allow wearing a jacket over one shoulder, however, because today this is considered a normal way to wear it. Furthermore, if it is worn normally, it is permitted 10

to wear it even if one only has intent to transport the garment from one location to another. For example, wearing a tallis simply to transport it from your home to a shul is permissible. Essentially, once an article of clothing satisfies one of the three criteria outlined above, it can be worn in any scenario, even when its main purpose is not being fulfilled. Thus, a raincoat may be worn in any weather, even when there is no rain, for the same reason.

In addition to the three requirements discussed above for defining clothing that may be worn across domains on Shabbat to be considered clothing, but it also has to be a garment commonly worn by people in order to be permitted on Shabbat. The rules of defining a garment as “commonly worn” are relatively lenient. Even if a piece of clothing is worn normally only by a minority of people, it becomes “a garment for all,” and anyone may wear it on Shabbat. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 301:21) gives an example of this rule: in the olden days, shepherds (a minority) would normally wear sackcloth as rain protection, therefore making it acceptable for all to wear sackcloth on Shabbat. Nowadays, however, since no one normally uses sackcloth as a rain protectant, it is no longer considered a garment. Rabbi Simcha Bunim Cohen suggests that a white lab coat would be a modern illustration of this principle. Many doctors wear this white coat on a daily basis, and it therefore becomes defined as “a garment for all,” and anyone is allowed to wear a lab coat on Shabbat. There are unusual modes of dress, however, that are prohibited, even if they satisfy one of the three categories. For example, it is forbidden to go out on Shabbat with a box on one’s head or wearing a plastic bag to protect oneself from the rain because these are not items typically worn by a majority or minority group of people (Shulchan Aruch, ibid.). Wearing these items would be considered carrying and in violation of the melacha of Hotza’ah.

If an apparel item does not fit into one of the three categories outlined above, or is not something normally worn by a group of people, it is not clothing and it is forbidden to be carried on one’s body during Shabbat. An example of an item that does not fit into any of these categories would be a name tag - because the name tag does not fit into any of the three functions, it would be prohibited and a violation of Shabbat.

Another potential concern with wearing certain types of clothing on Shabbat is that one might take off an item while walking outside and carry it. Therefore, the Sages prohibited wearing certain types of items outdoors. The first is a loose article of clothing that has a tendency to fall off, such as a loose fitting hat (Shulchan Aruch, O.C. 301:41). Thus, it is only permitted to wear a hat without securing it tightly around one’s head if one is not wearing a kippah underneath because one would not walk around without a head covering. A second type of item that is forbidden is one that a person might take off if they felt it might cause them to be ridiculed. An example of this is going out while wearing only one shoe, which he might remove after being ridiculed for only wearing one (Shulchan Aruch, O.C. 301:7). The third type of clothing one might remove is an item that is frequently removed to show to others.

Items attached to an apparel, like buttons or a tag sewn onto clothing, are permitted and considered a part of the clothing. Items unattached to clothing that help enhance the function of the garment are also permitted, such as a pin to secure a kippah to the head, a belt to hold pants in place, or a safety pin. One may even use a belt that has a key attached to it if the key is serving an essential function for fastening the belt. Some

11

poskim, however, believe a belt should not be worn if it is not fastened because it is not serving a function. A gartel, a religious belt sometimes worn over clothing when davening, is permitted to be worn outside if it is tied over a jacket. If it is worn under the jacket and one already has a normal belt on, then it does not serve a function and would therefore be in violation of carrying on Shabbat (see “The Shabbos Home,” p.112, 117).

Non-clothing articles that are not attached to one’s clothing are usually problematic to wear on Shabbat. But there are three categories of non-clothing articles that are permitted to be worn outdoors: jewelry, medical items, and permanently worn items.

These items, unlike permitted clothing items, may only be worn when serving their intended purpose, as they are not fully considered clothing. Thus, Jewelry can only be worn in a manner that “adorns the wearer,” medical items only when they are fulfilling a medical need, and permanent items may only be worn if they serve the body.

Concerning the first category - jewelry - the Sages originally forbade women from wearing jewelry on Shabbat out of fear that they might remove it to show someone and thereby carry it. However, during the time of the Geonim it became normal practice for women to wear jewelry, so later poskim looked for ways to permit women to wear jewelry on Shabbat. One reason to permit it is that jewelry is now so common that no one will feel compelled to take it off to display to others (Aruch HaShulchan, O.C. 303:22). However, men are not generally permitted to wear jewelry on Shabbat because this is not typical in our society today. Women would also be forbidden to wear jewelry in an unusual manner (i.e., a manner that differs from the way it is worn the rest of the week). For example, if a woman is wearing an expensive piece of jewelry and hides it under her clothing out of fear of being robbed, she is considered to be carrying it and violates Hotza’ah.

The second category of non-clothing items that are permitted to be worn includes medical items. If they are used to help heal the body or prevent injury, they are allowed to be worn on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, O.C. 301:28). For example, band-aids, ace bandages, hearing aids, and slings are not in violation of Hotza’ah. Similarly, one who wears prescription glasses or contact lenses that are needed at all times may wear them on Shabbat. But reading glasses and sunglasses which are not worn daily are forbidden because they are frequently removed and carried (“The Shabbos Home,” pp.139-141).

If one needs sunglasses to protect their eyes, they should consult a Halachic authority.

Items that are worn permanently are allowed on Shabbat. In the olden days, girls’ ears would be pierced when they were young, but they would only be allowed to wear earrings when they were older. Therefore, a piece of wood was placed in the ear so the holes would not close. Such wood would qualify as an item that is considered permanent (Shabbat 65a).

Of course, there are nuances within the question of which clothing does not violate Hotza’ah when worn on Shabbat. The general guidelines provided in this essay, however, lay out the principles upon which the halacha determines what is defined as clothing, and how garments may be worn on Shabbat in a permitted manner that avoids the melacha of Hotza’ah.

12

JACK SANDERS

COMMUNITIES IN CONTENTION: A HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ERUVIN Could you imagine a Shabbat where you can’t carry a tallit or siddur to shul? Where your toddler couldn’t ride in a stroller? Where you leave your keys at home? In the comforts of many large cities with well-established Jewish communities, such as Los Angeles and New York, Jews need no longer worry about these concerns - but plenty of other Jewish communities around the world (many of them with smaller Jewish populations), are yet to (or cannot) establish an eruv. This article aims to inform the reader of the eruv’s halakhic origins, explore the history behind it, and examine the process and politics of establishing an eruv in communities.

The last of the thirty-nine melakhot (creative activities forbidden on Shabbat) listed in the Mishna on Shabbat 73a is ‫( הוצאה‬hotza’ah) – the transferring of items between private and public domains. While this prohibition is discussed extensively within the gemara (see, for example, the opening Mishna of Masechet Shabbat), the gemara (Shabbat 49b) provides a source for this prohibition that is rooted in the transferring of the kerashim (planks) used for the construction of the Mishkan in the desert from the public domain into the wagons, which were private domains. What, however, is the definition of a private domain? How do we determine the boundaries across which one cannot transfer objects on Shabbat? Interestingly, these boundaries are not defined by ownership, but rather on the physical enclosure of a space. In order to be defined as a private domain on a Torah level, an enclosure with at least three walls is necessary (Shabbat 6a). This is especially important for the construction of an eruv.

The most common private domain is a house or apartment, as opposed to a busy road, or park, which is public. The difference between these two types of areas is not that one owns their house but not the park, but instead is based on the fact that one’s home is enclosed and, in the physical sense, private.

As far back as the early middle ages, historical and halakhic sources attest to attempts by various communities to devise ways to allow the transfer of objects on Shabbat over large areas that were not otherwhile enclosed by any physical boundary. To do so, residents of these towns and cities began using a network of strings and poles to enclose a large area and thereby render it a halakhically private domain by relying on the Talmudic concept of tzurat ha-petach - the idea that a boundary could consist of the form or outline of an enclosure even if it did not constitute a entirely physical separation.

13

Manhattan, New York A consistent theme through the twentieth century eruvin was turmoil and supervisional conflicts. One good example is the attempts to construct an eruv in Manhattan. The first Manhattan eruv was established in 1905 by the Polish scholar, Rabbi Yehoshua Seigel, whose eruv only encompassed the Lower East Side. Some rabbis opposed Rabbi Seigel’s eruv, however. Rabbi Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, for example, wrote in his book Edut Le-Yisrael that “there are many observant Jews and especially Hasidim from Poland who carry here on the street on Shabbat relying on the permission of Rabbi Yehoshua Seigel of Sherps.1” Rabbi Henkin then critiques Rabbi Seigel, stating that the permits for the eruv had long since expired. Eventually, Seigel’s eruv was no longer respected, and by the late 1940’s, most of the orthodox communities had migrated north to the Upper West and East sides of Manhattan.

In 1962, aspirations for an eruv came to life with Rabbi Menachem Mendel Kasher spearheading the operation, despite delays in the construction of the eruv resulting from disagreements within the Jewish community in New York. At the time, there were very few eruvin in North America, prompting hesitancy and caution. One notable opponent of the Manhattan eruv was Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who raised several halakhic concerns about eruv the comforts of 20th-century life rendered the eruv unnecessary. He held the position that some still do today: “I do not object, but I do not participate.”2 Following the eruv’s completion, tensions grew as eruv-contenders responded harshly; the Agudath HaRabbanim wrote in a letter that “Whoever relies on the Manhattan eruv is considered a Shabbat violator.”3 Nevertheless, the plans for the eruv proceeded, and one year prior to the eruv’s completion, proponents met to finalize the project. Rabbi Henkin, who previously criticized Seigel’s eruv, emphasized three situations in which their proto-eruv may be used (at this point, it had been constructed but not accredited) in cases of “great need”.

Those cases included: “1. For the sake of women and children who want to go outside, especially in the summer months. 2. For the sake of doctors who need to carry on behalf of patients who are not in life threatening situations. 3. For the sake of those who need to carry on the Shabbat of Succot to the succah.”4 Despite this limited support however, a consistent theme through the twentieth century eruvin was halakhic turmoil and supervisional conflicts.

The Manhattan Eruv was never entirely accepted by much of the orthodox population in the city, who refrained from carrying outside on Shabbat. In response to this situation, an official eruv was erected in 1999 in the Upper West Side alone, supervised by the Beis Din of Mechon L'horoa5. This eruv now encloses most of the borough.

Consistent with the city it resides in, the Manhattan eruv is the most expensive to maintain in the world. Shuls and local organizations donate money to support the price tag of at least $125,000 a year.6 Every Thursday, rabbis drive along the perimeter of the eruv, examining it for any damage. Even if just one portion of the eruv is down, it must be repaired before Shabbat or the entire eruv will be invalid, and the majority 1 Rabbi Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, Edut Le-Yisrael (NY, 1949), p. 151 2 Letter published in Hapardes 33:9 (June, 1959) 3 Hapardes 40:8 4 http://www.rabbimintz.com/2007/02/articles-and-books/the-manhattan-eruv/ 5 http://eruv.nyc/ 6 https://www.npr.org/2019/05/13/721551785/a-fishing-line-encircles-manhattan-protecting-sanctity-of-sa bbath#:~:text=The%20concept%20of%20the%20eruv,the%20public%20zone%20on%20Saturday.

14

of the upkeep cost comes from repairs.7 Some still do not accept even the current eruv, but its thorough supervision and funding from at least 29 institutions indicate a more favorable view.8 Los Angeles, California Prior to the existence of the greater Los Angeles eruv, a smaller one surrounded the Pico-Robertson area. Howard Witkin and Elliot Katzovitz, members of Anshe Emes and Aish HaTorah, saw the city’s freeway system - which makes extensive use of protective walls and fences - as a means to expand the eruv.9 Especially in Los Angeles, a large city, both in terms of population and distance between Jews (the Westwood and La Brea Jewish communities are around six miles apart, about three times the width of Manhattan island), the construction of an eruv that would encompass the Jewish community was an expensive proposition. The Pico-Robertson eruv cost approximately $35,000 to erect, a sum that was far overshadowed by Witkin and Katzovitz’s ambitious project, which cost around $250,000 to construct.10 The expanded eruv of Los Angeles was completed in 2002, taking about seven years to actualize. The boundaries cover 80 square miles, utilizing the walls of the 10 Freeway to the south, the 405 Freeway on the west, the 101 (Ventura and Hollywood freeways) on the north, and then connecting back to the 10 Freeway via Western Avenue, making it significantly larger than the Manhattan eruv.11 The halachic debate surrounding the Los Angeles eruv was different than that of New York due to the nature of its construction – as mentioned, rabbis of Los Angeles utilized the freeway walls (as opposed to string and light poles) to encompass the boundaries, reducing the need to rely upon the use of tzurat hapetach among other issues. Fortunately for the local rabbis, a hundred years of precedent from New York was readily available, and likely aided in the streamlining and construction of the eruv.

Yet this project would also experience its share of challenges: on September 9th, 2016, the Los Angeles Community Eruv board announced a possible suspension by the end of the month due to a lack of funding. The article wrote: “The LA ERUV has exhausted its funds for operation of the citywide eruv. We are planning to shut the eruv down at the end of this month until we solidify ongoing funding and replenish our reserve accounts.”12 In response to community members who accused the board of using the eruv to threaten (or what they called “blackmail”), the board published another article that same day with additional information on the management of the eruv: “Our annual budget runs at about $120,000 per year. We have a crew of three rabbinical inspectors with drivers that check the eruv every week. We also have a crew with our own dedicated lift truck that spend hours every Thursday night and often Friday making repairs. Then we have insurance, special insurance for CalTrans, D&O, liability insurance, auto insurance, etc. We also spend several thousand dollars each year on truck maintenance and repairs to keep it safe and usable.”13 Letters were sent all across 7 Ibid.

8 http://eruv.nyc/#readmore 9 https://jewishjournal.com/community/6241/ 10 Ibid.

11 https://laeruv.com/ 12 https://laeruv.com/planned-eruv-shutdown-at-end-of-september-2016/ 13 https://laeruv.com/eruv-guide/building-an-eruv-a-picture-history/ 15

Los Angeles, to homes and shuls spreading awareness and fundraising for the efforts.

To the relief of most Los Angeles Jews, the eruv survived and remained standing, and to date the eruv has only been down twice in almost 20 years. Nevertheless, however, many in the Los Angeles community are hesitant to utilize the eruv. Doniel Berry, a Hasidic Jew, said in an interview with KCRW that he does not use the eruv: “There is a practical concern that it might fall down over Shabbat and that possibility doesn’t make it not kosher or not usable, but it does make it a possibility that it might not be kosher. So for that extra precaution I am not alone in the community that we choose not to use it, basically just out of an extra layer of protection that in the event it should go down, we won’t accidentally be transgressing the prohibition of carrying on the Sabbath.”14 It seems that communal, financial, and halakhic challenges inevitably plague the efforts of eruvin supporters. Indeed, as we have seen, this is true of both the Los Angeles and New York eruvin, despite differences in costs, structure, and history. At the same time, however, both of these expansive eruvin have dedicated management and financial resources - and ultimately, the halakhic efforts to enclose each community have allowed these two prominent centers of American Jewish life to largely unite their diverse and distinct Jewry.

14 https://www.kcrw.com/culture/shows/design-and-architecture/west-las-eruv-the-hidden-wall-built-and-maintained-by-orthodox-jews#:~:text=The%20eruv%20dates%20b ack%203%2C000,covers%20about%20100 %20square%20miles.

16

NOORIA KERENDIAN

PROTECTING SANCTITY: THE LAWS OF READING ON SHABBAT The Torah states in multiple places that we are commanded to observe Shabbat by not performing any ‫מלאכה‬, or “creative work.” What this “work” entails is not clearly listed or defined; however, and the Sages in the Gemara (Shabbat 49b) infer from the usage of the term ‫ מלאכה‬in other areas of the Torah, such as the construction of Mishkan, that it includes a list of thirty nine categories of work.

Yet prohibited activity on Shabbat does not only include these categories of Biblically forbidden work or even their subcategories (toladot). Even one who refrains from these activities may still fail to capture the essence of this weekly holiday: the obligation to rest that is described in Shemot 23:12: ‫”ששת ימים תעשה מעשיך וביום השביעי תשבת למען ינוח ינוח שורך וחמרך וינפש‬ “‫בן־אמתך והגר׃‬ “Six days you shall do your work, but on the seventh day you shall cease from labor, in order that your ox and your donkey may rest, and that your home-born slave and the stranger may be refreshed.”

In order to preserve this element of Shabbat, the Sages instituted certain gezeirot (Rabbinic prohibitions) to protect its sanctity and holiness. One of these gezeirot includes the prohibition of reading certain materials whose content is unrelated to Shabbat.

Before analyzing this rabbinic prohibition, it is important to understand the nature of gezeirot and the biblical authority granted to the Sages to enact them. The Torah states in Sefer Devarim (17:11) that the Jewish people should not stray from the words of the Sages, a source the the gemara (Shabbat 23a) identifies as the foundation of Rabbinic legislative authority. Similarly, the gemara (Yevamot 21a) bases the Rabbi’s ability to enact prohibitions on the pasuk in Vayikra 18:30, which commands ‫”ושמרתם‬ “‫ את־משמרתי‬- “You shall guard my prohibitions.” Taken together , these sources serve as the source for the authority given to the Sages to institute enactments that will safeguard the Torah laws along with the spirit behind those laws.

The process by which the Rabbis exercise this authority was carefully articulated throughout the Talmud, and defined the Rabbinic mechanisms and prerequisites for enacting takanot/gezerot, including the use of majority rule (Bava Metzia 59b), the reliance upon precedent when rendering decisions (Mishna Eduyot 1:5), the 17

understanding that there can be multiple correct answers within halakhic debate (Eiruvin 13b), and the role of the community in the creation and acceptance of halakhic norms (Pesachim 50b). Guided by these principles, the Rabbis of our tradition set out to create laws that would complement and support the letter and spirit of the Torah’s commandments.

In specific, the sages of the Talmud recognized that two fundamental principles of Shabbat could be at a risk without specific gezeirot and takanot to protect them: The spiritual distinctions between the seventh day and the rest of the week (hamavdil bein kodesh lechol) and promotion of the joyful/festive element of Shabbat. The first element is clearly evident from the Torah’s discussion of the celebration of Shabbat (Shemot 20:7): ‘‫ ויום השביעי שבת ׀ לה‬:‫ ששת ימים תעבד ועשית כל־מאכתך‬:‫זכור את־יום השבת לקדשו‬ ‫אלקיך לא־תעשה כל־מלאכה‬ Remember the sabbath day and keep it holy: Six days you shall labor and do all your work, but the seventh day is a sabbath of your God: you shall not do any work As clearly mentioned in the text, Shabbat must be different from the rest of the week.

But even while observing all the Torah-based melakhot of Shabbat, there is still a possibility that Shabbat may feel as mundane a day as any other. This concern, as well as a pasuk in Yeshayahu 58:13 that refers to avoiding “mimetzo cheftzecha” - “pursuing your affairs” - served as the basis for the enactments not to engage in certain activities on Shabbat including one’s business. This concept of avoiding mundane affairs on Shabbat is known as “hefzei hol,” and included the prohibition against reading secular or business information. According to some Rishonim, such as the Rosh (cited in Mishna Berura, 307:51), the reason for the prohibition against reading is because it is also an activity that the Sages felt would transform Shabbat into a day like the rest of the week; they thus enacted the prohibition to preserve its sanctity.

Which types of materials are included in the enactment against reading? The Gemara (Shabbat 149a) refers to not reading shtarei hedyotot, which literally means “regular documents,” but it is unclear what types of material this includes and the scope of the prohibition. The Rambam claims (Perush HaMishnayot, Shabbat 23:2) that one should only read sacred texts and materials on Shabbat. Other reading material, such as financial documents, contracts, and even letters, would be engaging in the everyday business activities of the week and should be avoided. The Rambam goes on to say that even science materials should be banned because they may lead to the performance of weekday activities, but Rashi limits the prohibition exclusively to financial documents.

The Shulchan Aruch (307:1) rules that even letters are usually forbidden to read, though he quotes both opinions concerning science materials and other secular wisdom (307:17). More recent Poskim have ruled as a compromise approach that one may read secular reading material on Shabbat provided it has value. This approach, however is often difficult to apply since the notion of “value” is subjective and may differ for each individual.

Furthermore, advertisements in newspapers and other magazines may also pose a problem because they are considered business documents, which are forbidden as discussed above (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata, ch.29). While many poskim do not allow reading newspapers on Shabbat since they too are similar to business documents, some permit if reading them gives a person great enjoyment.

18

In addition to the reading materials discussed above, materials that may be disturbing or sad should also not be read on Shabbat (Piskei Teshuvot 307:24, 26). The reason for this is similarly rooted in the pasuk mentioned above from Yeshayahu 58:13: “‫ענג‬ ‫ ”וקראת לשבת‬- “you shall call the sabbath a ‘delight.’” Shabbat, in other words, is supposed to be marked by happiness, and one must not disturb the tranquility of Shabbat through reading material that may cause sadness or displeasure. One is exempt from this prohibition of reading disturbing materials, however, if he/she is reading about Jewish historical events or Rabbinical biographies since it is contributing to Torah learning which is not only allowed but encouraged on Shabbat.

Reading on Shabbat has the potential to be beautiful and to add to the day’s extra element of spirituality, and the Rabbinic prohibitions related to reading materials discussed here are not intended to completely get rid of reading and all it has to offer but rather to enhance one’s experience of Shabbat. Personally, reading is a key component of my own Shabbat observance and my habit of delving into a new book every week has given me valuable perspective on these prohibitions. Reading can be an emotional investment, and a well written book has the power to lift or lower your spirits tremendously, and so the gezeirot regarding this activity are crucial elements of preserving and enhancing the sanctity of Shabbat.

19

MARLEE DRAZIN

BABYSITTERS, RABBIS, AND WAITERS: PAYMENT FOR SERVICES ON SHABBAT We know that there are 39 categories of melakha, which we can translate as “forbidden creative activities” that are prohibited on Shabbat. But beyond the 39 melakhot, there are also many other activities that Chazal forbade due to various gezeirot, or rabbinic decrees. One such decree mentioned in the Gemara (Nedarim 37a) is known as sechar Shabbat, earning money on Shabbat. One might wonder: What is the reason for this decree? How can we even earn money if we are not allowed to work on Shabbat? Can I get paid for being a waiter on Shabbat? Am I not allowed to get paid for working at shul? In this essay, we will address some of these issues and hopefully explain the basis for the halacha and some of the practical applications.

The Sages enacted a gezeira forbidding any type of business transaction on Shabbat because it may lead to writing (see Rashi and Tosafot, Beitzah 37a). The prohibition of sechar Shabbat is included within this decree and was forbidden as well to prevent one from engaging in other transactions (see Rashi, Ketubot 64a; Mishna Berurah 306:16).

Although working on Shabbat is normally forbidden anyway, this prohibition of sechar Shabbat includes receiving compensation even for a permitted Shabbat activity, such as serving food. The prohibition of sechar Shabbat also renders receiving compensation after Shabbat is over forbidden if the work was done on Shabbat.

According to this, one would think that it is never permitted to be compensated for permitted work done on Shabbat. However, there are a number of exceptions where one may be allowed to receive compensation. One such exception is havla’ah, which literally means that one is paid for something that is “mixed in.” If the payment for Shabbat is lumped together with payment for a weekday activity/work, one may get paid for the work done on Shabbat. This applies even if most of the work is done on Shabbat, so long as some work is done before or after Shabbat.

The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 306:4) records the prohibition of sechar Shabbat together with the allowance of receiving sechar Shabbat in the case of havla’ah using the example of someone who is hired to watch over seeds. ‫השוכר את הפועל לשמור זרעים או דבר אחר אינו נותן לו שכר שבת לפיכך אין אחריות שבת‬ ‫עליו היה שכיר שבת שכיר חודש שכיר שנה שכיר שבוע נותן לו שכר שבת לפיכך אחריות שבת‬ ‫ ולא יאמר לו תן לי של שבת אלא יאמר לו תן לי שכר השבוע או החדש )ואם שכרו לחדש‬.‫עליו‬ .‫ או יאמר לו תן לי שכר עשרה ימים‬,(‫והתנה עמו לשלם לו כל יום כך וכך מקרי שכיר יום‬ A worker who is hired to watch over seeds or anything else may not be paid for Shabbat and therefore he is not liable for any losses incurred on Shabbat. If he is hired 20

for the week, the month, the year, or for a seven-year stretch, he may be paid for the Shabbos and thus he is liable for losses incurred on Shabbat. “He must not say ‘pay me for Shabbat’; rather, he must say “pay me for the week or for the month” (and if he was hired for a month but the agreement was that he will be paid per day’s work, he is called a day worker) (Ran); or he should say “pay me for ten days work.”

Some Poskim hold that the leniency of havla’ah applies not only if one is paid together for two different jobs, one performed before Shabbat and one on Shabbat, but it applies also if one is paid for a service provided on Shabbat if the service required preparatory work (Aruch HaShulchan 306:12). In this case, the payment for the service done on Shabbat is added to the payment for the preparation, making it part of the weekday payment. For example, it is certainly permitted to tutor another student on Shabbat in Torah-related subjects. The teacher may not receive compensation for the tutoring on Shabbat alone, but if they needed to prepare for the session before Shabbat or bought special materials for it, some poskim allow the teachers to receive one large payment.

The second leniency for sechar Shabbat is suggested by the Mordechai Ben Hillel haCohen, known commonly as “the Mordechai” (1250-1298). He says that because sechar Shabbat is a prohibition that is not explicitly stated in the Torah but formulated by the Rabbis, payment is permitted if the service is done in order to fulfill a mitzvah.

The Mordechai views work for the purpose of the mitzvah as not included in the sechar Shabbat decree (see also Pesachim 66b for a Talmudic discussion of this leniency).

For example, the Mordechai would allow compensating a chazan who leads the prayer service on Shabbat or someone who blows the shofar on Rosh Hashana, since both of these are mitzvah acts. Other poskim, though, forbid sechar Shabbat even when it is received for mitzvah activities.

The Shulchan Aruch (306:5) records both sides of this dispute, and the Rema adds that all would agree it is permitted if one is paid together for an entire month or year, due to the principle of havla’ah. ‫ הגה ואם שכרו לשנה או לחדש לכולי‬:‫אסור להשכיר חזנים להתפלל בשבת ויש מי שמתיר‬ .(‫עלמא שרי )ד"ע‬ It is prohibited to hire Chazanim to pray on Shabbos, but there are those who permit it. Rama: If he is hired for the year or for the month everyone permits it.

However, even those poskim who permit receiving compensation concede that “no blessing will come from the money earned on Shabbat” (Mishna Berura 306:23). Thus, all would agree that it is preferable to utilize the first leniency of havla’ah and try to receive compensation for work performed on Shabbat and during the week together.

A third leniency involves offering compensation through a service such as guarding something on a person’s behalf. The reason is that guarding is not considered compensation; it does not guarantee any material benefit, but rather prevents someone from suffering a loss. Thus watching someone else’s object, or babysitting in return for babysitting or other work, would be permitted (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata, ch.28).

A fourth potential leniency is offering voluntary compensation. One is allowed to give

21

a gift to someone for performing a service on Shabbat (see Mishna Berura 306:24).

Thus, giving someone a present to express thanks for work they have done is permitted, provided it is clear that offering the present is not obligatory, but voluntary -- an employee may not demand a gift for work performed on Shabbat.

Let us now look at some practical applications related to compensation on Shabbat, all of which are discussed by Rabbi Simcha Bunim Cohen in “The Shabbos Home” (pp.35-38).

Waiter – As discussed above, a Jewish waiter/helper should not be paid for work on Shabbat. If he works as a waiter during the week or if he had to do work for his job before or after Shabbat, it would be permitted.

Babysitter – One may not be paid for babysitting on Shabbat, but one may request babysitting services in return because this is equivalent to the case of guarding as compensation discussed above.

Renting – One may not rent any possessions for Shabbat, such as an apartment, room, or car. One may also not derive any benefit from that income. If the rental includes a period before or after Shabbat period and one payment is made, it would be permitted. In addition, one may rent out property exclusively for Shabbat as well if some preparatory work is required before Shabbat (such as getting the house ready).

Doctors – If one must see a Jewish doctor on Shabbat, the Steipler Gaon says that one must do their utmost to compensate him or her. Although they may not take compensation for that visit alone, if a follow-up visit is required after Shabbat, payment for the entire treatment may be made all together. Furthermore, if the doctor provides medicine or a bandage, payment for the service may be combined with reimbursement for the expense. Another option is to offer payment in the form of a gift. Although this is the approach of most poskim that in principle a doctor may not take payment for services rendered on Shabbat, some poskim consider giving medical services to be a mitzvah and therefore permit compensation (see Mishna Berura 306:24 concerning a midwife).

22

ADINA KURZBAN

“MAKE A FENCE FOR MY COMMANDS:” DERABANAN PROHIBITIONS ON SHABBAT The 39 melachot are 39 different categories of creative activity prohibited on Shabbat.

Each melacha consists of an av melacha, the primary category of the prohibition, and sub-categories, or toledot, that expand the primary prohibition. For example, the prohibition against lighting a fire extends to a heating up metal to weld it (Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 9:1). There are also other activities that are not included in the melakhot, however, and were prohibited on Shabbat by the Rabbis. These activities are known as derabanan prohibitions, and were generally created under the authority granted to the Rabbis by the pasuk (Vayikra 18:30) of “‫ ”ושמרתם את־משמרתי‬- “You shall guard my prohibitions” (see Yevamot 21a).

According to the Rambam (Hilchot Shabbat 21:1), the Rabbis created two types of derabanan prohibitions on Shabbat. The first includes activities that are similar to a melacha. The second includes activities that could lead to performing a melachA. This is called a gezeira, or preventative decree, which ensures that one does not come to violate a melacha. For example, playing music on Shabbat is not allowed because repairing an instrument is forbidden due to the melacha of makeh bepatish (the melacha that prohibits completing an object), and playing may lead to tuning, which is a form of repair.1 What is the status of electricity and electrical appliances on Shabbat? These are, of course, not discussed by Chazal since such technology did not exist in earlier times.

Nevertheless, all contemporary halachic authorities agree that using electricity and turning on appliances is forbidden on Shabbat. However, they disagree on why this is the case. With the advent of electricity, numerous halakhic authorities in the 19th and early 20th centuries endeavored to define the nature of this prohibition, and suggested several possible reasons as to why using electricity would be forbidden. These opinions included the prohibition of molid (the rabbinic prohibition against creating something new on Shabbat), makeh bepatish, boneh (the melacha against building something on Shabbat), bishul, (based on the suggestion that heating metal or other resistors in an electric circuit would be included under the prohibition of cooking on 1 Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 338:1); Yehuda Shurpin, “Why can't we connect to G-d through music on the shabbat?”

Chabad.org, accessed 4/1/2022, https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/965540/jewish/Why-no-music-on Shabbat.htm#:~:text=Nevertheless%2C%20at%20some%20point%20%28most%20likely%20during%20t he,instrument%E2%80%94an%20act%20which%20is%20biblically%20prohibited%20on%20Shabbat.? msclkid=25b085c6b20b11ec8b42a16cc7888f05 23

Shabbat), as well as the prohibition of mav’ir (kindling a fire, referring to both causing fuel consumption and the potential of lighting sparks when plugging in electrical appliances2). As some of these reasons do not apply to all forms of electricity use, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach posits that it is not ever permitted to use electricity on Shabbat because the average population would have a difficult time discerning between electricity that the Torah forbids and electricity that it does not forbid. He also notes that even in situations where no clear prohibition exists, in our day and age there is clear halakhic and communal precedent prohibiting electricity use (Michat Shlomo 9:3 par. 7).

Let us now illustrate how these reasons are applied practically by providing some examples of electrical appliances one encounters on a typical Shabbat day.

The first object is a refrigerator. There are three possible reasons as to why a fridge may be prohibited to use, all of which revolve around the act of opening the fridge door.

When the fridge door opens, it lets in air that is warmer than the inside temperature.

This causes the motor of the fridge to run, cooling the temperature inside. Some halachic authorities rule that causing the motor to begin running violates Shabbat and opening the fridge is therefore forbidden. A second opinion holds that opening the fridge is permitted because although this will cause the motor to run, the motor does not begin to run immediately after the door is opened and is thus only an indirect result.3 The third opinion is similar to the second one but focuses on the intent. Since it is not certain that the motor will be activated while the fridge is open and it is an unintended consequence, or a davar she-eyno mitkavein4, and the intent of the person opening the fridge is not to start the motor, using the fridge is permitted.

Another common application of the rabbinic prohibitions related to electricity relates to use of telephones on Shabbat.5 According to the Chazon Ish, lifting the phone out of the receiver violates the melacha of boneh (building) by completing a circuit, while according to the Beit Yitzchak, this violates the prohibition against molid (creating something new). Similarly, placing the phone back into the receiver also violates the prohibition against building. Dialing a phone is prohibited as it creates an electrical connection between the two users and because it violates the rabbinic prohibition against hashma’at kol, or creating a sound. Speaking on the phone also violates this prohibition. Using a cellphone, while functionally different, would similarly involve a violation of these prohibitions, as myriad electric circuits are continuously opened and closed throughout the operation of such devices.

Microphones, intercoms, and hearing aids are all subject to similar rulings. Although most of these devices do not involve causing lights to be turned on, the other reasons for forbidding electricity still apply. Therefore, none of these devices can be switched on during Shabbat, as that creates an electrical connection, but turning them on before Shabbat is permitted.6 In terms of the intercom and microphones, however, one can leave it on but one may not speak into it, as that violates the rule of hashma’at kol and likely involves the completion of internal circuits as well. In terms of automatic doors, 2 Rabbi Simcha Bunim Cohen, “The Shabbos Home,” ArtScroll Halacha Series, 476-480.

3 Rabbi Cohen, 481 4 This idea is rooted in the gemara Chagigah 10a, which states that only melachot machshevet, or melachot done with intention, are prohibited by the Torah. For more on this, see the article on davar she-eino mitkaven in this volume.

5 Rabbi Cohen, 484-485 6 This also applies to items such as fans and lights.

24

one can follow a non-Jew through the door once it has been opened, but it is forbidden to cause the automatic doors to open or close because this would similarly cause an electrical circuit to be completed. This ruling can be extended to elevators as well; a non-Jew may open the door and press the buttons, but a Jew cannot. Likewise, a Jew may walk into an elevator and ride it (according to some authorities) if a non-Jew caused the door to open, but the Jew may not cause it to open or close himself.

Doorbells and security cameras also pose an issue on shabbat. Doorbells cannot be rung, as it involves both using electricity as well as causing a sound to be emitted. If the security system being used has a motion sensor, it should be turned off before Shabbat. Other opinions disagree and allow one to walk past the sensor even if it activates the light, since this was not one’s intent and the person does not necessarily desire the benefit obtained.7 Alarms that need to be manually turned off should be deactivated as well, and if one forgets to do so, they cannot press the buttons to deactivate it on Shabbat.

These rules are all subject to leniency, however, under certain circumstances. The gemara discusses several leniencies that generally apply to Rabbinic prohibitions: to prevent monentary loss or if someone is sick (Ketubot 60a), to do a mitzvah (Pesachim 66b) to protect human dignity (Brachot 19b), and for communal needs, and as such each situation of need may allow for leniency in consultation with a halakhic authority.

As exemplified through all these examples of activities forbidden on Shabbat, there are many aspects to each prohibition, and significant debate behind each example and technology under consideration. Today, electrical appliances surround us in every aspect of modern life, and these examples are just some of the ways that halakha has engaged in the modern application of Talmudic principles to the world around us.

7 For further discussion, see the article in this volume about pesik reisha.

25

WWW.SHALHEVET.ORG