Manifested Psychological Problems Not Enough to Stick ADA Claim to City
By Jerry L. Pigsley and Kelly M. Ekeler, Harding & Shultz, P.C., L.L.O.
In a case involving a series of psychological evaluations, discharge proceedings, and lawsuits, a court of appeals upheld the termination of a Chicago police officer. See Brumfield v. City of Chicago, Nos. 11-2265 and 11-3836 (7th Cir. Nov. 6, 2013). Linda Brumfield was a Chicago police officer from 1999 until she was fired in 2010. According to Brumfield, in 2006 she began to experience psychological problems, and the City began to require periodic psychological evaluations to determine if she was fit to continue to perform her job.
In 2008, Brumfield sued the City alleging that the City was discriminating against her based upon her race, sex, and sexual orientation by subjecting her to the psychological evaluations. While the 2008 lawsuit was pending, the City initiated discharge proceedings against Brumfield relating to an incident in which Brumfield shoved a towing company employee during a dispute over towing truck fees. The Police Board did not discharge Brumfield but suspended her without pay for 180 days.
While the 2008 lawsuit was still pending, the City again initiated discharge proceedings against Brumfield relating to an incident where Brumfield told her captain that she was going to be injured on duty and then fell to the ground, feigning injury. This time the Police Board upheld the City’s decision to terminate Brumfield. Following her termination, Brumfield filed two more lawsuits against the City, alleging, in part, that the City violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) when it suspended her and later terminated her employment.
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The three lawsuits against the City were eventually concluded in the City’s favor. Brumfield appealed the lower courts’ decisions, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions and made two significant holdings of law.
First, the Court considered Brumfield’s argument that her conduct during the feigned-injury incident was merely a manifestation of her psychological problems and that she was therefore discharged because of her disability. The Court rejected Brumfield’s argument and explained that an employer may fire an employee for engaging in unacceptable workplace behavior without violating the ADA even if the behavior is precipitated by a mental illness. The ADA does not require an employer to accommodate disabilities that have no bearing on an employee’s ability to perform the essential functions of her job. Brumfield did not allege that her psychological problems prevented her from performing the essential functions of her job. Quite the opposite, Brumfield’s psychological evaluations determined she was fit for duty as a police officer. Second, the Court held that Title II of the ADA does not cover disability-based employment discrimination. Title I of the ADA specifically prohibits employment discrimination because of disability, while Title II prohibits the exclusion from the benefits, services, programs or activities because of disability. But, because Brumfield was procedurally estopped from bringing her claims under Title I of the ADA, she sought to revive her claims under Title II of the ADA. In rejecting Brumfield’s claims under Title II, the Court reasoned that getting and keeping a job were not
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