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North Carolina Lawyers Weekly January 17, 2022

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NCLAWYERSWEEKLY.COM Part of the

VOLUME 33 NUMBER 53 ■

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JANUARY 17, 2022 ■ $8.50

Jury should decide if posts were ‘true threats’ ■ BY HEATH HAMACHER hhamacher@nclawyersweekly.com

Looking ahead to 2022: Keep on keeping on ■ BY HEATH HAMACHER hhamacher@nclawyersweekly.com “Welcome back!” Those are the words that many managing partners across North Carolina and elsewhere have been dying to utter since COVID-19 forced lawyers and professional staff to abandon their offices nearly two years ago. Recently, it had appeared as though the number of cases was declining, but tales of its demise

were greatly exaggerated. Thanks to the Delta and Omicron variants—and COVID’s general unpredictability—firms remain compelled to continue contemplating when and how they will get back to a more traditional practice of law, while coming to understand that things may never be the way they used to be. That might not be such a bad thing, however. Reid Phillips, managing partner of Brooks Pierce in

Greensboro, said that the coronavirus has taken a “horrible toll” on humanity but also bolstered firms’ ability to deal with adversity. “We’ve moved from ‘How can we do this?’ to ‘How can we do this better?” Phillips said. “There are lots of things you discover in a crisis about yourself and your organization. If you pay attention and focus on those things, you can make work better See Looking Page 5 ►

The North Carolina Supreme Court has ordered a new trial for a man who allegedly used social media to make drunken death threats against a district attorney, reversing state’s Court of Appeals order to acquit the man because the trial court had failed to instruct the jury on a “true threat” to a court officer. In its Dec. 17 opinion, the Supreme Court found that defendant David Taylor’s speech was protected by the 1st Amendment, and his conviction for knowingly and willfully threatening to kill a court officer had to be vacated because of the improper jury charge. But the high court found that there was enough evidence to withstand Taylor’s motion to dismiss to charges against him, paving the way for a retrial. “Because … the facts presented by the State could have allowed a reasonable jury to conclude defendant uttered a true threat, a properly instructed jury must be allowed to consider this question,” Justice Michael Morgan wrote for the court.

Facebook official When prosecutors declined to charge the parents of a Macon County child who died under unusual circumstances, David Taylor took to Facebook—inebriated, the state says—to criticize the justice system and District Attorney S e e Tr u e t h r e a t s P a g e 6 ►

Biz Court could pick method for valuing shares ■ BY CORREY E. STEPHENSON BridgeTower Media Newswires Business Court judges have considerable discretion in how they determine the “fair value” of a company’s shares in a judicial apparaisal, so long as they consider “customary and current valuation concepts and techniques,” the North Carolina Supreme Court has ruled in a case of first impression involving a merger of two tobacco companies. International tobacco conglomerate British American Tobacco (BAT) entered into an agreement to purchase North Carolina-based Reynolds American Inc. (RAI) in January 2017. At the time, BAT owned roughly 42 percent of RAI’s shares and

controlled several seats on its board of directors. The agreement was negotiated by BAT and a committee comprised of non-BAT-affiliated RAI board members. On the date of the agreement, the consideration was worth $59.64 per RAI share. The transaction was overwhelmingly approved by a majority of RAI’s outstanding shares, including 99 percent of the non-BAT-owned shares which were voted in the merger. A group of dissenting shareholders who believed that the agreed-upon deal price significantly undervalued RAI refused to tender their shares at closing. They filed a complaint for judicial appraisal as permitted under state law.

After trial, post-trial briefing and post-trial oral argument, the Business Court entered a judgment finding that the fair value of RAI stock as of the transaction date was no more than the deal price of $59.64 per share. The dissenters appealed directly to the Supreme Court. In a Dec. 17 opinion, Justice Anita Earls wrote that the Supreme Court had never previously considered an appeal from a Business Court judgment determining the fair value of a dissenting shareholder’s shares, and in this case, the Business Court had been presented with two radically different estimations of the fair value of the shares of RAI held See Shares Page 7 ►

INSIDE VERDICTS & SETTLEMENTS

VERDICTS & SETTLEMENTS

COMMENTARY

Deadly gas leak leads to $5.5 million settlement

$900K awarded to girl hit after exiting school bus

Structure a closing argument to persuade, not just impress

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N O R T H C A R O L I N A L A W Y E R S W E E K LY I Janu ar y 17, 2022

NEWS BRIEFS Berger Sr. backing bill requiring appeals court votes

Berger Jr., Barringer won’t recuse from state voter ID case

RALEIGH (AP) — North Carolina Republican lawmakers could advance legislation soon that would require state appellate judges to disclose publicly how they voted privately on orders issued by their courts, the state Senate’s top leader said. The proposal follows a rapid-fire series of rulings this month involving redistricting litigation that ultimately delayed the March primary until May. Those rulings didn’t detail how court members sided. Senate leader Phil Berger told reporters that colleagues are considering legislation that would mandate orders issued by the state Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to include how each jurist hearing a case came down on the decision. Usually routine orders or those on quick-moving motions issued by the two appeals courts do not disclose how individual judges voted privately. Such Supreme Court decisions are signed “for the court” by the court’s most junior justice. The clerk for the Court of Appeals usually signs similar orders from that court. That’s how it happened three weeks ago when a three-judge Court of Appeals panel blocked candidate filing for U.S. House and legislative seats minutes before the filing period was to begin. Later the same day, a the clerk’s signature was affixed to an order canceling that delay, backed by “a vote of the majority of judges” on the 15-member court. Two days later, the Supreme Court suspended candidate filing and delayed the March 8 primary until May 17 so a panel of trial judges could hear arguments alleging partisan and racial gerrymandering in maps approved by the GOP-controlled General Assembly in November. The Supreme Court order was signed only by Associate Justice Tamara Barringer. Berger a Rockingham County Republican, said a decision like this “just cries out for transparency” and without disclosure creates “suspicion” among the public. Registered Democrats hold a 4-3 seat advantage on the Supreme Court. Republicans hold 10 of the 15 Court of Appeals seats. GOP U.S. Rep. Dan Bishop, who is seeking reelection in 2022, filed a lawsuit in federal court last week against all Court of Appeals and Supreme Court members and other officials. He said he’s been unable to obtain the judges’ votes on the orders. Berger said he hopes legislation could be considered if and when the General Assembly next returns to work, which currently would be no earlier than Jan. 10. Approved legislation would be subject to Gov. Roy Cooper’s signature or veto stamp. Democratic state Sen. Jay Chaudhuri of Wake County said that while the justices were following precedent in how the Dec. 8 order was presented, revisiting that standard is “a discussion that I think that we’re willing to have.” Chaudhuri said it’s likely the impetus for such action comes from the GOP’s unhappiness with the Supreme Court’s order directing that the trial judges rule on the redistricting lawsuits by Jan. 11. That trial begins Monday, with a likely appeal to come. “I think one could say that (Republicans are) also injecting politics into the process,” said Chaudhuri.

RALEIGH (AP) — Two North Carolina Supreme Court justices—the son of a powerful legislator among them—said that they won’t step away from hearing a case that challenges a pair of constitutional amendments, one of which mandates photo voter identification. Associate Justices Phil Berger Jr. and Tamara Barringer wrote separately on Jan. 7 to say that each believes they “can and will be fair and impartial” in hearing the lawsuit brought by the state NAACP. Both justices cited in part the will of the voters who elected them in 2020 to resolve judicial questions. Lawyers for the civil rights group asked last summer that the two justices be disqualified from participating in the deliberations, citing conflicts. The attorneys pointed to Berger as the son of Republican state Senate leader Phil Berger, who is a defendant in the lawsuit that challenges in part the legality of a 2018 statewide referendum that enshrines a voter ID mandate in the North Carolina Constitution. And as a senator, Barringer voted in favor of holding the referendum on the voter ID amendment. The younger Berger wrote that it’s plain that his father is listed as a defendant due to procedure in his official capacity only, and that the lawsuit is truly against the state. “More than 2.7 million North Carolinians, knowing or at least having information available to them concerning my father’s service in the Legislature, elected me to consider and resolve significant constitutional questions like the one here,” Berger wrote in denying the recusal motion. Barringer calculated that of the previous 100 justices on the court before here, slightly over half had first served in the legislature and had fairly and impartially judged state law. “I am following a strong and firmly rooted tradition in reaching the conclusion not to recuse myself due to my prior legislative service,” Barringer wrote. Following the July recusal requests, the seven-member court postponed oral arguments on the substance of the litigation. And in September it asked lawyers to address more than 20 questions related to recusals, including whether justices could require a colleague be removed against their will. It resulted in a flurry of filings by lawyers and academics. as well as fears among some Republicans that a majority of justices could remove Berger or Barringer, both registered Republicans. Democrats hold a 4-3 seat advantage on the court. The Supreme Court released a decision last week that declared in any case an individual justice can either decide on their own or ask the rest of the court to do so. With whatever option is used, the recusal ruling is final, the court wrote. The orders should allow the court to take up arguments in the case soon. The lawsuit challenges another amendment that lowered the cap on a state income tax rate. A trial judge struck down the amendments in 2019, declaring that since many legislators were illegitimately elected from what were previously declared by judges as racially biased districts, they lacked the power to put the questions on the ballot.

LAWYERS IN THE NEWS Lawyers in the News – Jan. 17 Michael Best, a national law firm, announced that it has acquired Forrest Firm in a strategic combination. Michael Best will add 23 lawyers and 13 professionals from Forrest Firm and gains offices in Asheville, Charlotte, Durham, Greensboro, Greenville, Wilmington, and Winston-Salem to join its existing office in Raleigh. Jonathan Y. Ellis, a former Assistant to the U.S. Solicitor General, has joined McGuireWoods as a partner in Raleigh and Washington, D.C., and co-leader of the firm’s appeals and issues team. During his tenure at the Office of the Solicitor General from 2017 to 2021, Ellis argued nine cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. Cranfill Sumner announced that Steven Bader, Stephen Bell, and Charles Hicks have been named partners in the firm. Bader and Hicks are in the firm’s Raleigh office, and Bell is in its Wilmington office. Cranfill Sumner also announced that Deedee Gasch, a partner in the firm’s Raleigh office, has been named the chair of its retail, restau-

rant and hospitality practice group. Robinson Bradshaw announced that Jason S. Kerr, Brian J. Litwak, and Sandra K. Wilburn have been elected new shareholders. Kerr and Litwak practice out of the firm’s Charlotte office, and Wilburn is located in its Research Triangle office. Ellis & Winters in Raleigh announced that Luke Farley, Ginger Hunsucker, and Michelle Liguori have been elected to the firm’s partnership, effective Jan. 1. Alston & Bird announced that Stephen Lareau and Debra Lofano in the firm’s Charlotte office have been elected to the firm’s partnership, effective Jan. 1. Bradley Arant Boult Cummings announced that G. Benjamin Milam and Jonathan Schulz in the firm’s Charlotte office have been elevated to partner, effective Jan. 1. Young Moore announced that Susan “Sue” H. Haberberger has been named a shareholder of the firm, effective Jan. 1. Nelson Mullins announced that Carla Ludwig in the firm’s Raleigh office has been elected to the firm’s partnership, effective Jan. 1.

BAR DISCIPLINE

ROUNDUP Attorney: Christopher D. Lane Location: Clemmons Bar membership: Member since 1993 Disciplinary action: Suspended from the practice of law for two years on Jan. 4. The suspension is stayed for two years so long as Lane complies with certain conditions. Background: In or around February 2011, Lane entered into an “of counsel” agreement with Consumer Legal Services America, an out-of-state corporation that was not licensed to practice law in North Carolina. CLSA attempted to provide legal services to debtors and other “financially distressed consumers” in North Carolina and other states. Through his work on behalf of CLSA, Lane enabled its non-lawyer employees to provide legal advice to his clients and engage in legal negotiations with creditors, assisted the company in its unauthorized practice of law, enabled the company to hold itself out to the public as being authorized to engage in the practice of law, aided its non-lawyer employees as they engaged in the criminal act of debt adjusting, shared legal fees with nonlawyers, collected illegal fees, failed to adequately communicate with clients,

But an appeals court overturned that decision in 2020. The case is one of three pending lawsuits challenging voter ID in North Carolina. A law approved in late 2018 implementing ID details after the successful referendum is currently not enforceable. A federal case was previously set to go to trial later this month before the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments about whether legislative leaders should be permitted to formally defend the law at the trial. (See next story.) And in September, a state judicial panel ruled that the law was unconstitutional.

and failed to supervise the handling of entrusted funds paid by his clients. Separately, Lane also knowingly made a false state of material fact to the state bar in connection with a disciplinary matter in a case where Lane failed to adequately communicate with a client or act with reasonable diligence and promptness on the client’s behalf. Previous discipline: Lane was censured in 2018 for aiding an Illinois corporation engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, reprimanded in 2017 for aiding a California firm in the unauthorized practice of law, censured in 2015 for providing services to North Carolina clients on behalf of a Florida law firm not then authorized to practice law in North Carolina, and reprimanded in 2014 for assisting a different out-of-state firm in the unauthorized practice of law. All of these were subsequent to the failure to supervise and assisting the unauthorized practice of law addressed in the most recent order. All information contained in the Bar Discipline Roundup is compiled and edited by Lawyers Weekly editor-in-chief David Donovan. He can be reached at david.donovan@nclawyersweekly.com.

Federal voter ID trial delayed by U.S. Supreme Court WINSTON-SALEM (AP) — A federal trial on litigation challenging North Carolina’s voter photo identification law has been delayed while the U.S. Supreme Court weighs whether legislative leaders should be permitted to help defend the law in court. The Supreme Court said it would consider the request of House Speaker Tim Moore and Senate leader Phil See Page 7 ►


N O R T H C A R O L I N A L A W Y E R S W E E K LY I Ja nuary 17, 2022

VERDICTS & SETTLEMENTS / 3

Deadly gas leak leads to $5.5M settlement ■ BY DAVID BAUGHER A case involving a deadly explosion prompted by a gas leak at a North Carolina home has been settled for $5.5 million, the plaintiffs’ attorneys report. John Jensen of Jensen Law Group in Chapel Hill and Lee Falls of Falls Law Firm in Charlotte report that the blast destroyed the home, killing both the husband and wife who were residing there. Due to a confidentiality agreement, many of the details of the case, including the location of the blast and the identities of the parties and the counsel for the defendant, were withheld. “The explosion was caused when a gas line and regulator mounted outside the garage broke, which resulted in a gas leak,” Jensen said. “The husband reported the leak and sought defendant’s assistance in turning off the gas supply to his home. Defendant successfully assisted him in

turning off the gas.” But 20 minutes after that phone call with the defendant, the house exploded. The couple’s bodies were John Jensen Lee Falls found later amid the debris. “The husband and wife had no children and were deemed to have died simultaneously under North Carolina’s Simultaneous Death Act,” Jensen said. “As such, the proceeds of the settlement were distributed separately to each of the decedents’ intestate successor beneficiaries.” The settlement was agreed to in January 2021.

SETTLEMENT REPORT – WRONGFUL DEATH

Amount: $5.5 million Injuries alleged: Wrongful deaths and total destruction of a house and its contents Case name: Confidential Venue: Confidential Date of settlement: January 2021 Attorneys for plaintiffs: John Jensen of Jensen Law Group in Chapel Hill and Lee Falls of Falls Law Firm in Charlotte Attorney for defendant: Confidential In addition to the wrongful death recovery, the settlement also covered property loss related to the home and its contents.

$900K awarded to girl hit after exiting school bus ■ BY DAVID BAUGHER A kindergartener who was struck by a vehicle after disembarking from her bus will collect $900,000 from the local school district and the driver of the car that hit her, the attorneys for the girl’s family report. Sam McGee of Tin, Fulton, Walker & Owen in Charlotte and Mark Atkinson of The Atkinson Law Firm in Winston-Salem report five-year-old Pamela Pineda was hit by an oncoming car as she crossed a Wilkes County roadway in 2012. Her mother resuscitated her with CPR, and she was transported to Winston-Salem for treatment of injuries including Sam McGee skull, femur, and pelvis fractures, intracranial hemorrhaging, and a lung contusion. She still suffers cognitive problems and post-traumatic stress disorder. After the car’s driver settled the case for the insurance policy limits of $60,000, the girl’s mother sued the bus driver, contending that her daughter shouldn’t have been allowed to exit the vehicle with a car Mark coming the other way. McGee said that video from inside the bus helped Atkinson establish a timeline of events and indicated that the driver had time to foresee the incident. “Our case, first and foremost, was that the bus driver failed to follow proper procedures when she did this bus stop,” McGee said. “You are supposed to stop,

make sure everything is clear. There are checks you are supposed to do … and only then, do you put out your stop sign and open the door. She started opening the door and putting her stop sign out before the bus was even stopped.” Because the Wilkes County Board of Education was the defendant, the case was heard before the North Carolina Industrial Commission. The board argued that it was insulated from liability by the superseding actions of the driver, who’d driven through the bus’s stop sign. The commission found that this was a foreseeable danger, however, since safety procedures contemplate just such an incident happening. “Although other motorists do not routinely pass stopped school buses, it occasionally occurs, and is a known risk which is incorporated into the training of bus drivers,” deputy commissioner Tyler Younts wrote in an Aug. 27 order, finding that the student didn’t delay or take any other action or inaction to contribute to her own injury, and that being a fiveyear-old, she was incapable as a matter of law of committing contributory negligence anyway. Younts rejected the board’s argument that Pineda could have been waiting to escort her daughter across the street rather than remaining on the opposite side, noting the school district never advised her to do this and couldn’t point to any state or local law, ordinance, rule, guideline, or policy in North Carolina establishing a standard for where parents should wait at bus stops. Atkinson noted that the fact that the student was still technically under the control of the school as she got off the bus was a key point. “The school system had custody of this child and had a duty to make sure that that child was brought to her

VERDICT REPORT – PERSONAL INJURY

Amount: $900,000 Injuries alleged: Skull, femur, and pelvis fractures, intracranial hemorrhaging, lung contusion, traumatic brain injury, PTSD Case name: Blanca Xochitl Zarco-Pineda, as guardian ad litem for Pamela Michelle Pineda v. Wilkes County Board of Education Court: North Carolina Industrial Commission Case Nos.: TA-25372 and TA-25373 Commissioner: Tyler Younts Date of verdict: Aug. 27, 2021 Most helpful expert: Leonard Bernstein (bus safety) Attorneys for plaintiff: Sam McGee of Tin, Fulton, Walker & Owen in Charlotte and Mark Atkinson of The Atkinson Law Firm in WinstonSalem Attorney for defendant: Benjamin Gurlitz of the North Carolina Department of Justice in Raleigh home safely,” he said. “Essentially, they just dropped her off on the side of a 55-mile-per-hour highway and let her fend for herself getting across the street.” The commission awarded the family $900,000, subject to a $60,000 set-off due to the previous settlement.

Intersection crash leads to $250K settlement

■ BY HEATH HAMACHER hhamacher@nclawyersweekly.com

A 68-year-old woman who was severely injured when her vehicle was struck in middle of an intersection by a driver who’d allegedly failed to yield the right of way has settled her case for $250,000, her attorneys report. Doug Maynard of WinstonDoug Salem and Nicole Scallon of Maynard Henson & Talley in Greensboro represented the woman, who was headed to dinner with her adult son when the crash occurred on Stratford Road in Winston-Salem. At the intersection, a 17-year-old driving a car owned by a family friend had turned left in front of client on a yellow light about to turn red, Nicole Maynard said. Many details, Scallon including the names, were withheld pursuant to a confidentiality agreement. Maynard said that the collision turned the woman’s car on its side and that she spent 16

days in the hospital and underwent four surgeries before being discharged to a skilled nursing facility for approximately three months. The son suffered substantial facial injuries. The teen’s vehicle was insured by State Farm for $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. A GEICO policy provided the teen with $30,000/$60,000 liability, Maynard said. Maynard said State Farm initially accepted responsibility and paid his client’s property damage claim, but later denied her claim, asserting that she’d run the red light at the same time the teen was turning to clear the intersection. Maynard said the case had an unusual procedural twist. The son sued the teenage driver and the vehicle’s owner. They both denied liability and filed a third-party complaint against the mother for contribution and indemnity. Her insurer, Farm Bureau, retained Scallon to represent the mother, who filed an answer and counterclaim against the teen and the car’s owner. Maynard said that the son settled his claim with State Farm for more than $100,000 in late 2020, and the mother’s case had been slated for trial for November 2021 after a demand to State Farm and GEICO expired. But the mother submitted a second demand for State Farm’s limits of $250,000 to allow it to settle

SETTLEMENT REPORT — MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH

Amount: $250,000 Injuries alleged: Blunt force trauma, hemorrhagic shock, disruptive gastrojejunal anastomosis, liver lacerations, and multiple fractures Case name: Withheld Date of settlement: November 2021 Most helpful experts: Dr. Amy Hildreth (trauma surgeon) and Dr. Jason Halvorson (orthopedic surgeon) Insurance carriers: State Farm, GEICO, and North Carolina Farm Bureau Attorneys for plaintiff: Doug Maynard of Winston-Salem and Nicole Scallon of Henson & Talley in Greensboro Attorneys for defendants: Withheld the case without having GEICO involved. “By this point, State Farm had all the necessary information to assess the claim, thus setting up the possibility of State Farm’s responsibility in excess of its coverage should the jury return an excess verdict,” Maynard said.


4 / NEWS

N O R T H C A R O L I N A L A W Y E R S W E E K LY I Janu ar y 17, 2022

The closing argument – a perspective ■ BY PAUL MARK SANDLER BridgeTower Media Newswires The purpose of the closing argument is to incite jurors or a judge to render the decision you request. It is not about impressing listeners with your eloquence. According to the apocryphal tale, when listeners heard Demosthenes, they would remark, “What a pretty speech.” After hearing Cicero, they would remark, “Let us march.” A closing argument should provoke the jury to march into the jury room and render a verdict for your client. The challenge of closing argument is not merely to summarize what you have proved, but also — and this is essential — to unify, to gather together disparate facts and testimony and present a cohesive narrative pointing jurors to one inevitable conclusion. During the trial, evidence often appears disconnected. Facts and documents rarely surface according to the precise chronology and structure you would like because the case must be presented witness by witness. Closing argument is your chance to bind the facts together and tell a story. They don’t teach storytelling in law school, but the skill is essential to courtroom advocacy, particularly closing arguments. It is important in a closing argument to focus on style and delivery. Style means the words to express yourself, including metaphors and similes and rhetorical questions. Delivery includes how you move in the courtroom, gestures, eye contact and other body language. Because jury members remember best what they hear first and last, your closing argument should be presented with an impressive introduction and conclusion, and with a strong grasp of tone, style and delivery.

The structure

When planning your closing, arrangement of your points is key. While there are many ways to structure closing arguments, every closing must have an introduction (assertion of your theme), presentation (development of the facts or law supporting the theme) and a peroration (inspirational conclusion). Bear in mind the concepts of logic and emotion. Sound reasoning — both inductive and deductive —strengthens your argument. Emotion enhances it. Also, consider ethos, the listener’s perception of your character, which includes sincerity, demeanor, knowledge, and even courtesy. Introduction: To begin, you can leap into the main point of your case without a buildup, or you can ask a question or tell a story. The use of humor and suspense can help captivate your audience. You should choose an engaging, personable approach that feels comfortable to you. If you are speaking second, a reference to the previous speaker may be a helpful transition, and you may need to “break the spell” created by the first speaker. A dramatic statement, a compelling question, or an appeal to the listener’s sense of importance can help shift attention to your case. Presentation: This is the time to argue the evidence and law that support your theme, and request a verdict in your favor. Consider dividing each section of your argument into an assertion, presentation, and conclusion. You may repeat this pattern several times within the main body of your argument. Assert the issues or themes of your case, and then speak to the evidence and exhibits that support them. Build upon the claim, weaving together testimony and exhibits in a compelling fashion, until you reach a forceful conclusion for each assertion. When you conclude,

try to engage the jurors by personally requesting that they act in accordance with the evidence you have presented. As you make your points, always take time to refute the evidence marshaled against you by your opponent. Explain why the contrary evidence is unpersuasive. When appropriate, pause to read passages of striking testimony. Visual aids can be very helpful in closing argument, especially in complex cases. This is particularly true with complex subject matters that can be easily understood when mapped out visually. But when using visuals, do not simply read to the judge or jury from the screen, unless you are referring to a transcript or written document. Peroration: The peroration of the closing argument should be a logical, emotional climax of your argument. The art of effective rebuttal argument is in identifying the offending point by the opposition, explaining why it is incorrect based on the evidence, and then stating why your view of the evidence is the proper interpretation. The power of understatement, anecdotes, figurative analogies, other rhetorical techniques, and (again) visual aids can all enhance your emotional appeal as you speak to the jury or judge one last time. Again, people remember best what they hear first and last, so take full advantage of your last words. Although the law provides wide latitude for presentation of the closing argument, limitations apply. Remember to confine your argument to the facts of the case and reasonable inferences from the evidence. Do not misstate the evidence. Never personally attack opposing counsel, and do not directly express your personal belief or opinion during closing argument. Paul Mark Sandler, who is a trial lawyer and author, can be reached at pms@shapirosher.com.

Law firm planning: Get ready for 2022 ■ BY NICOLE BLACK Bridgetower Media Newswires Is your law firm ready for whatever may come now that COVID-19 surges are occurring all around the country, and the Omicron variant is a looming threat? With mask mandates once again in effect in many areas, it’s impossible to predict what the future will look like. That’s why business planning for the upcoming year is more important than ever. You need to ensure that your firm has the necessary procedures and technologies in place to prepare for any eventuality. If you’re not sure where to start, here are four ideas to help you build business resiliency into your firm that will ensure a foundation for success in 2022.

Assess your practice areas

The pandemic’s effects have changed the legal landscape and have created an increased demand for certain types of legal services. By expanding your areas of expertise, you’ll build resiliency into your firm and provide a foundation for success despite the uncertainty of tumultuous change. That’s why it’s important to fully understand how the pandemic has impacted the practice of law and how the specific practice areas that your firm handles will be affected. Then, consider pivoting and taking on practice areas that are more likely to be in demand, including bankruptcy law, employment law, cybersecurity law and M&As.

Take steps to automate your firm

Choose technology that will streamline your law firm’s processes, from the initial client intake to the close of a case. The software you choose should be cloud-based so that everyone in your firm can access it even if your workforce is unexpectedly displaced from your law office. Whether you invest in standalone software or all-in-one programs like law practice management software, put tools in place that will automate 1) billing, invoicing, payment processing, and collections; 2) tasks and deadlines; 3) document assembly; and 4) your firm’s common workflows. Automate those processes, and efficiency — along with increased revenues — will follow.

this standard, which means that moving forward, your firm should establish communication channels that are encrypted whether via encrypted email or the secure online messaging portals built into different types of legal software. Speaking of client portals, they’re also a great way to offer flexible payment options to your firm’s clients. When your firm uses client portals to invoice clients and accept online payments, invoices can be generated by your firm’s staff no matter where they’re located. Upon receipt, your clients can pay immediately, via ACH or credit card. It’s that simple. Not only does this process provide your clients with muchneeded flexibility, but it also ensures that your firm is paid more quickly.

Set up secure communication

Technology

For years, email was the gold standard for law firm communication. But technology advances, pandemic-related cybersecurity issues and recent ethics opinions are changing the security standards applicable to confidential communications. In 2017, the American Bar Association acknowledged the security threat posed by unencrypted email when it issued Opinion 477R. In this opinion, the committee explained that due to “cyber-threats … it is not always reasonable to rely on the use of unencrypted email … (and lawyers should consider) a variety of options to safeguard communications including … (a) secure internet portal.” Since the onset of the pandemic, several other ethics committees have adopted

Last, but not least, as you head into 2022, a top goal should be to incorporate technology learning into your daily routine. These days, technology is changing faster than ever, and as a result, staying current on the latest technology can be a challenge. But if you prioritize technology and set aside a few minutes each day to learn about the latest advances, you’ll be able to build a strong foundation of knowledge that will assist you in making better technology choices for your firm heading into the new year. Nicole Black is a Rochester, New York attorney, author, journalist, and the Legal Technology Evangelist at MyCase legal practice management software.

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NEWS / 5

N O R T H C A R O L I N A L A W Y E R S W E E K LY I Ja nuary 17, 2022

Supreme Court hits brakes on UIM precedent ■ BY CORREY E. STEPHENSON BridgeTower Media Newswires Drivers who’ve been hurt in a car accident may now hit a roadblock to “stacking” the full value of their underinsured motorist policies on top of any recovery they receive from the atfault driver, after the North Carolina Supreme Court declined to follow a rule laid down by the state’s Court of Appeals more than 20 years ago. Pamela and William Dana were hit by a drunk driver in Winston-Salem in 2016. Pamela’s injuries were fatal, and William’s serious. The vehicle that hit them was covered by an insurance policy issued by Integon National Insurance Company which provided bodily injury liability coverage with limits of up to $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. Integon tendered the full $100,000 to the Danas. Pamela had carried UIM coverage with limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. Her insurer, Farm Bureau, offered to pay the full per-person limit, but minus the $100,000 received from Integon. The Danas countered that they were entitled to the full $200,000 policy limits, on top of Integon’s contribution. Farm Bureau sought a declaratory judgment, and in 2018 Forsyth County Superior Court Judge Eric C. Morgan entered summary judgment in favor of the Danas. In 2019, the state’s Court of Appeals affirmed, citing its 2000 decision in N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Gurley, which held that when an at-fault driver’s liability policy is exhausted due to a per-accident cap, the UIM policy limit will be the UIM policy’s per-accident cap. But writing for the Supreme Court’s majority in a Dec. 17 opinion, Justice Samuel Ervin IV reversed, saying that the Danas’ recovery was limited by the per-person limits of the UIM policy. Although the relevant state law is intended to provide protection for innocent victims of motor vehicle negligence, that didn’t require interpreting the statute “to produce the maximum possible recovery for persons injured as a result of motor vehicle negligence regardless of any

other consideration.” “We are unable to conclude that the General Assembly intended N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) to be applied in a manner that fails to take into account the existence of multiple limits of liability and places an injured party in a more favorable position than he or she would have occupied had the tortfeasor been fully insured,” Ervin wrote.

Looking to the statute

The parties agreed that the atfault driver’s vehicle qualified as an “underinsured highway vehicle” under the statute, given that the sum of his limits of liability was less than the limits of the UIM coverage applicable to the Dana’s vehicle and his liability was exhausted by Integon’s distribution. Ervin turned to the statute for guidance, finding “a considerable amount of language that seems to bear upon the proper resolution of the issue that is before us in this case”: the calculation of the amount of coverage that was available to the Danas under the Farm Bureau policy. Ervin paid particular attention to the “repeated references” to the issue of the limitation of liability, which made it “difficult for us to conclude that these expressions have no meaning, a result that, if adopted by the Court, would allow insurers to have a significant degree of flexibility in drafting policies as they see fit.” Attempting to parse the statutory language, Ervin noted the absence of the direct incorporation of per-person and per-accident limits and the use of both singular and plural language with regard to limits. Despite these challenges, he determined the statute incorporated, at least by implication, the traditional use of both per-person and per-accident liability limits rather than a “one size fits all” rule focusing upon a single limit that is applicable in all situations. “We are unable to discern any reason why the General Assembly would have intended to preclude the use of both per-person and per-accident liability limitations in determining the maximum amount of underinsured motorist coverage that is available for

payment to any individual claimant and believe that the most reasonable reading of the relevant statutory language provides for a common sense resolution of the dispute that is before us in this case, which is that, in cases involving multiple claimants, the total amount of underinsured motorist coverage available to those claimants (considering both the available liability coverage and the available underinsured motorist coverage) is limited by the per-accident limit and that the total amount of coverage available to any individual claimant is constrained by the per-person limit,” Ervin wrote.

Gurley in effect overruled

Ervin refused to be limited to making one formula – the per-person limit, the per-accident limit or the Gurley rule – controlling for all purposes. And while Gurley had been on the books for roughly two decades without having been disturbed by the General Assembly, he rejected the canon of legislative acquiescence. “In view of the fact that applying the rule adopted in Gurley to the facts in this case would have exactly the effect that the rule in question was explicitly intended to avoid, it is difficult for us to afford any weight in the interpretive process to the General Assembly’s failure to modify the relevant provisions of N.C.G.S. § 20279.21(b)(4) to account for the likelihood that Gurley would be applied in a mechanical manner to produce a result that Gurley itself appears to have been intended to avoid,” he wrote. The facts of the case demonstrated that Gurley’s application can, in some instances, result in the payment of an amount that exceeds the per-person limit in cases involving multiple claimants. “The relevant statutory language most readily supports the use of an approach that determines the amount to be paid to any particular claimant by treating the per-accident amount of underinsured motorist coverage as the total sum that is available to all of the claimants entitled to a share of the available underinsured motorist coverage, subject to the caveat that the amount of un-

derinsured motorist coverage that is available to any individual claimant is limited to the per-person amount,” Ervin held. Justice Anita Earls wrote a concurrence to provide further explanation as to why she was willing to overrule a settled precedent like Gurley, which she found inconsistent with the applicable statutes. In a separate concurrence, Justice Philip Berger Jr., joined by Chief Justice Paul Newby and Justice Tamara Barringer, argued that the outcome was dictated by the terms of the insurance policy at issue, which stated that the per accident limit was subject to the per person limit. Douglas Maynard of Maynard Law in Winston-Salem, who represented the Danas, said he wasn’t surprised by the outcome. “Since we won at the trial court and the Court of Appeals, 3-0, when the Supreme Court decided to take the case it did cause me some pause,” Maynard said. “It’s interesting that there are two divergent opinions as to why my client officially lost.” William F. Lipscomb of the Lipscomb Law Firm in Wilkesboro represented Farm Bureau and was “extremely pleased” with the decision. “The takeaway for lawyers is that both the per-person and per-accident limits found in almost all motor vehicle insurance policies must be enforced,” Lipscomb said. “Neither limit can be exceeded. That allows multiple claimant UIM claims to be handled consistently with both insurance policy provisions and the North Carolina statutes.” The decision essentially “fixed” the problem of the Gurley decision, Lipscomb said, which allowed the per-person UIM limit to be exceeded in certain claim situations, which was contrary to the insurance policy provisions. “Now all insurance companies can handle these claims consistently with the insurance statutes.” The 35-page decision is North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dana (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-156-21). The full text of the opinion is available online at nclawyersweekly.com.

LOOKING / Ahead to 2022: Keep on keeping on C o nt inu e d f r o m 1 ►

and more enjoyable across the organization. That is our goal.” That said, Phillips said that he believes that for all the benefits of working from home, many Brooks Pierce attorneys are eager to return to the office where they can enjoy the human element of lawyering. For months now, firm leaders across the country have taken an active wait-and-see approach to their anticipated grand reopenings, promoting safety and flexibility while fashioning blueprints for an eventual homecoming.

Forged in fire

But with COVID lingering like the civil case that just won’t settle, many firms—especially larger ones—are still waiting and seeing. Plans to safely repopulate their office spaces have been developed, proposed, and pushed back until many wonder whether it’s worth it to renew their lease. When the news of COVID broke

in 2020 and attorneys bolted for the gangway, firm leaders were left to figure out how to keep the ship from sinking. Allen Robertson, managing partner of Robinson Bradshaw in Charlotte, said that he never envisioned such a scenario. Yet the firm, like others, found itself scrambling to ensure that it would be able to keep its people safe while continuing to provide the high level of service its clients expect. Today, every attorney, paralegal, and just about every other staff position at the firm has been outfitted with all the essentials—from laptops to dual monitors to Cisco phones—to efficiently operate outside the four walls of their firm. Robertson also looks forward to the day when the firm’s offices are fully and safely populated again and employees can mingle and collaborate like the old days. But even then, some degree of refashioning is in order. While occasional remote work wasn’t out of the ordinary pre-pandemic,

Robertson said that he expects that it will be more commonplace going forward. “We’re never going to go back to exactly the way things were, and we don’t need them to,” Robertson said. “We’re depending on lawyers to basically control their own schedules and act reasonably to support the culture and make a commitment to being together most of the time. Even our most senior lawyers have learned to operate remotely, and that’s going to be a real advantage in the future.” Employees are similarly situated at Sodoma Law, where practice manager Matt Day said that the firm was motivated by COVID and a flu outbreak to fully equip its employees for remote work, necessitating an increased information technology budget to swap out desktops for laptops and upgrade conference rooms to accommodate virtual hearings and office meetings. These necessary processes have led to progress that the firm doesn’t plan

to abandon. “Instead of reducing that budget for 2022, we are taking it a step further and adding new online casemanagement software,” Day said. “This was a long-term firm goal prepandemic that we accelerated … so we could continue to meet the needs of our team members and our clients in a rapidly changing environment.” The changes at firms extend beyond the technology. Phillips said that Brooks Pierce will carry into the new year an invaluable intangible: an opportunity to brainstorm, conceptualize, and fire up some energy and creativity. “Before the pandemic, we had three offices. Now, with practically everyone able to work remotely, we have more than 175 work locations every day,” Phillips said. “There are a lot of new leadership and management challenges that come with that … and we’re actually having fun thinking See Page 6 ►


6 / NEWS

N O R T H C A R O L I N A L A W Y E R S W E E K LY I Janu ar y 17, 2022

Child abuse charges after murder trial weren’t vindictive ■ BY HEATH HAMACHER hhamacher@nclawyersweekly.com Prosecutors may be able to move ahead with child abuse charges that were brought against a Henderson County man after his conviction for attempted murder was overturned on appeal because of a faulty indictment. The North Carolina Supreme Court unanimously overruled a Court of Appeals decision holding that the new charges against Leonard Schalow, who was accused of trying to torture his wife to death, were barred due to prosecutorial vindictiveness and failure to include them in the original indictment. Schalow was tried for attempted murder twice. The first trial ended in a mistrial because of the faulty indictment, and the second trial resulted in a conviction that was overturned in 2016 by the Court of Appeals, which found that it violated Schalow’s rights against double jeopardy. After the Court of Appeals unanimously ruled in 2020 that the third set of charges should also be dismissed, the Supreme Court granted discretionary review. Writing for the court in a Dec. 17 opinion, Justice Robin Hudson said that the issue of prosecutorial vindictiveness hadn’t been preserved—and even if it had, the appeals court went against precedent in requiring a dismissal. Hudson also found that prosecutors weren’t required to join the abuse charges and the murder charge, even though they all stemmed from the same underlying conduct.

If at first (or second)

The appeals court had cited the state’s three attempts at prosecuting Schalow for crimes based on the alleged abuse of his wife that nearly led to her death. After the attempted murder conviction was overturned, then-District Attorney Greg New-

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ahead to how we’ll do things better this year and in the years ahead.”

Not out of the water

A new report by the Center on Ethics and the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and the Thomson Reuters Institute shows that while the legal industry has remained resilient, plenty of challenges lie ahead. According to the report, one potential issue is a noticeably dangerous spike in lawyer attrition, despite increased compensation that is intended to retain talent. The good news is that the perks that many lawyers seek— appreciation, mental well-being, and a better work/life balance—can’t be bought, but can be promoted through remote flexibility. Betty Temple, chair

man told news media that if the ruling was upheld, “then I have a plan in place to address that circumstance and will take additional action to see that [Schalow] is held accountable … I will do everything that I can to see that he remains in custody for as long as possible.” After the Supreme Court declined to review the 2016 ruling, Newman was quoted on Facebook saying that he would prosecute Schalow again and aim to secure a comparable sentence. Newman then brought 20 new charges against Schalow—all stemming from the alleged violence against his wife—that together could generate a prison sentence of more than 50 years, the appeals court noted. Each new set of indictments, the court calculated, could have carried significantly longer prison sentences, which could support a presumption of vindictiveness. The court also found that Newman, who issued all relevant indictments, had a personal stake in the outcome that would also entitle Schalow to a presumption of vindictiveness. The Supreme Court disagreed, however. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. But evidence that repeated prosecution is motivated by the desire to punish the defendant for his offenses doesn’t by itself suffice to warrant a presumption of vindictiveness, Hudson said, and Newman’s comments to the press didn’t suggest that his pursuit of a fresh conviction was retaliatory. “Although the prosecution obtained additional charges, the stated purpose was to ensure defendant was punished for his criminal conduct and to obtain ‘a comparable sentence’ to the original one—not a substantially more severe sentence in

retaliation for the appeal,” Hudson wrote. “Thus, to the extent that the public statements of the prosecutor evidence any discernable motive to the reprosecution attributable to the State, it is to punish defendant for his crimes and not for the successful exercise of his right of appeal.” Hudson said that the Court of Appeals had also erred in calculating the maximum term to which Schalow could be sentenced for the new offenses because it failed to account for a state statute that precludes judges from imposing new sentences which are more severe than the prior sentence, minus time previously served, if a defendant is successful in setting aside a conviction and then convicted for a new offense based on the same conduct.

it must still consider whether there are legitimate prosecutorial reasons for bringing the charges later, Hudson said. Under Warren, the defendant has the burden of showing that prosecutors were trying to evade the statute, because a prosecutor’s charging decision is presumptively lawful, and Schalow had failed to present any evidence that they had done so in his case. “The Court of Appeals also erred by disregarding our rule in Warren and transforming the exception recognized there from one permitting dismissal of the subsequent charges by the trial court to one requiring it,” Hudson wrote. “Accordingly, converting a showing of both Warren circumstances into a mandate requiring dismissal contravenes precedent of this Court.”

Try, try again

Vindictiveness or vindication?

and chief executive officer of Womble Bond Dickinson, said she hopes these can be used as a tool to “recruit and retain top talent.” Not every firm is struggling with attrition, though. In 2021, Sodoma Law opened its fourth office, in Cornelius. This year, the firm is on the hunt for a fifth location. “We realized that COVID didn’t have to stop us from achieving our goals, even if the way we achieved them looked a little differently than we’d originally imagined,” Day said. Similarly, Robertson said that Robinson Bradshaw has had about 30 new lawyers join the firm during the pandemic, plus additional staff members. But some things, like maintaining the unique culture that many firms boast about, can’t be replicated from afar. Robertson said that his firm has been intentional in striving to keep

its people connected, combining virtual firm retreats and affinity group meetings with safe in-person events such as a socially distanced Thanksgiving lunch involving about half of the firm’s Charlotte office dining in a hotel ballroom. He stressed that the formal change in policy will be that lawyers will not be expected to be at their desks five days a week, but that he hopes colleagues will spend more work time together than apart. “We need to be together most of the time, but physically showing up in the office only means something if our lawyers make the further commitment to interact, go see each other, talk things over in person, collaborate, give feedback, provide mentoring,” Robertson said. “All the things we think you get as human beings by seeing each other face to face and interacting.” Minus the standard safety pre-

cautions, Sodoma Law is essentially back to its pre-pandemic operations, its staff and lawyers working in its offices and focused on team building through mechanisms such as its version of Shark Tank, which allows employees to pitch culture-based ideas to the firm’s leadership team. One such pitch resulted in rotating, pet-friendly Doggie Days at the office. Managing principal Nicole Sodoma months ago declared every day at her firm jean day (provided attorneys don’t have to meet with judges or clients). She intends to extend the perk indefinitely, likely ensuring that her employees are among the most comfortable in the profession while practicing law amid a dawdling pandemic. And in the whole scheme of things, what better to take into the new year than comfort? After all, this COVID thing might take a while.

The appeals court had also found that the latest attempt to prosecute Schalow violated the state’s joinder statute, which generally requires all criminal charges related to the same underlying incidents to be brought in one proceeding. (Having found two grounds for dismissal, it declined to address Schalow’s renewed double jeopardy allegations.) Here, too, the Supreme Court disagreed. In its 1985 decision in State v. Warren, the court held that subsequent offenses against a defendant must be dismissed if he shows that the prosecution withheld indictment on them solely in order to circumvent the statutory joinder requirements. A finding that the prosecution already possessed evidence supporting the subsequent charges during the first trial, or that its evidence at the second trial would be the same as that presented at the first, would “support but not compel” a finding that prosecutors were trying to circumvent the statute. But even if a court finds that both Warren circumstances are present,

Because the Court of Appeals declined to address Schalow’s additional argument that double jeopardy barred his latest charges, the Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration of the argument. If the case does ultimately proceed to trial, Newman will no longer be in charge of prosecuting it. He was removed from office last year after a judge issued an order finding that he had engaged in “willful misconduct” in unrelated matters. (Newman was also disciplined by the state bar for making false statements in yet another case.) Assistant Attorney General Joseph Hyde represented the state. Assistant Attorney General Daniel Shatz represented Schalow. Shatz did not respond to a request for comment on the ruling. The 24-page decision is State v. Schalow (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-147-21). The full text of the opinion is available online at nclawyersweekly.com. Follow reporter Heath Hamacher on Twitter @NCLWHamacher.

TRUE THREATS / Jury should decide if posts were C o nt inu e d f r o m 1 ►

Ashley Welch. Taylor worked in the Macon County courthouse and occasionally spoke with Welch, whom he supported in her campaign for election. But when Welch decided against prosecuting the child’s parents after their account of the child’s death from a virus was confirmed,

Taylor made the public posts encouraging the administration of “old time [mountain] justice” by the public and stating that he could easily purchase ammunition and would use his firearms against law enforcement officers if they showed up at his home for communicating threats. Several posts referenced Welch’s death for her lack action. Taylor de-

leted the posts hours later, but not before a detective took screenshots of them and sent them to Welch and the sheriff, who forwarded them to the state’s Bureau of Investigation. Taylor was arrested despite telling investigators that he meant no harm to Welch and asking them to apologize to her on his behalf. At trial, Taylor contended that he hadn’t communicated a “true

threat” to Welch and that the charge violated his constitutional right to free speech. He unsuccessfully moved to dismiss and requested jury instructions distinguishing “true threats” from “political hyperbole.” But Macon County Superior Court Judge Gary Gavenus accepted the state’s position See Page 7 ►


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N O R T H C A R O L I N A L A W Y E R S W E E K LY I Ja nuary 17, 2022

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that it wasn’t required to prove that the threat would cause a reasonable person to believe that it was likely to be carried out, and that any First Amendment arguments would appropriately be raised on appeal. Taylor was convicted and sentenced to two years’ probation and a fine. Taylor appealed the ruling, and in 2018 the Court of Appeals unanimously agreed with him, vacating the verdict and judgment against him and holding that the state needed to prove that Taylor had both general and specific intent to communicate a true threat, and a reasonable person wouldn’t have understood his Facebook posts as a serious intent to kill the district attorney.

Better left unsaid The high court noted that while

the state has an “overwhelming” interest in protecting public officials, its interest in protecting constitutionally protected speech, even if controversial, is greater. Certain speech—including fighting words, obscenity, defamation, and true threats—can be regulated, but neither the state Supreme Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly defined the scope of the true threats exception to the First Amendment. The justices said that the exception shouldn’t sweep too broadly, however, relying on several cases from other jurisdictions to define true threats, including Watts v. United States, a 1969 U.S. Supreme Court decision requiring states to consider the context in which statements are made, the nature of the language, and the reaction of the listeners. More recently, in 2003’s Virginia v. Black, a case involving cross-

burning, a divided U.S. Supreme Court held that the state could single out a “particularly violent form of intimidation,” including true threats, which it defined as “an objectively threatening statement communicated by a party which possesses the subjective intent to threaten a listener or identifiable group,” although the speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Again quoting Black, Morgan wrote that “An individual who communicates a true threat hopes to influence public decision-making not through legitimate means— the painstaking work of convincing fellow citizens or political leaders to change their actions or views— but by “creat[ing] a pervasive fear in victims that they are a target of violence.” Justice Anita Earls concurred in part and dissented in part with the decision. Earls agreed that the

state must prove that a reasonable observer would understand a statement to contain a threat of violence that was communicated with the subjective intent to threaten an individual or identifiable group, but she rejected the idea that the state offered sufficient evidence to withstand Taylor’s motion to dismiss, opining that the Facebook posts didn’t constitute a serious intention to inflict bodily harm. Assistant Solicitor General Nicholas Brod and Deputy Solicitor General Ryan Park represented the state. Assistant Appellate Defender Aaron Johnson represented Taylor. Johnson declined to comment on an ongoing case. The 65-page decision is State v. Taylor (Lawyers Weekly No. 010160-21). The full text of the opinion is available online at nclawyersweekly.com. Follow Heath Hamacher on Twitter @NCLWHamacher

SHARES / Biz Court could pick method for valuing C o nt inu e d f r o m 1 ►

by the dissenters. “To resolve this dispute, the Business Court utilized various ‘customary and current valuation concepts and techniques’ to determine the fair value of the dissenters’ shares, as was required under N.C.G.S. § 5513-01(5),” Earls wrote. “That there may exist some evidence in the record which detracts from the Business Court’s ultimate determination of the fair value of the dissenters’ shares is no cause to disturb its judgment. Instead, we agree with RAI that the Business Court determined the fair value of RAI shares in a manner which comported with the guidelines set forth in North Carolina’s appraisal statutes.”

Business Court discretion

North Carolina’s appraisal statutes vest the Business Court with “significant” discretion to decide how best to determine the fair value of a corporation’s shares given the circumstances of a challenged transaction, Earls said. “The General Assembly chose not to prescribe any specific methodology the court must utilize in an appraisal proceeding,” Earls wrote. “Rather, the General Assembly has provided only that a court must determine fair value ‘using customary and current valuation concepts and techniques generally employed for similar business[es] in the context of the transaction requir-

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Berger to formally step in to the case and defend the 2018 law along with state government attorneys. The lawsuit was previously scheduled to go to trial in Winston-Salem on Jan. 24. In an order issued on Dec. 30, presiding U.S. District Judge Loretta Biggs said it makes sense to delay the start to avoid further confusion over voter ID. Otherwise, a Supreme Court ruling favoring GOP legislators could require a repeal trial. “While the court is mindful that parties have been preparing for trial, there is no reason that such preparation must go to waste,” Biggs wrote. No new starting date was set. Berger and Moore have argued that state attorneys led by Attorney General Josh Stein, a Democrat, have not adequately represented the state to

ing appraisal.’” It is left to the Business Court to determine which valuation concepts and techniques should be utilized to ascertain the fair value of a dissenting shareholder’s shares and the weight to accord the results of any particular concept or technique it selects, Earls added. The dissenters (to the merger, not from the court’s opinion, which was unanimous) argued that the Business Court ignored the statutory requirements and simply deferred to the deal price. But Earls found this argument “inconsistent with a careful reading of the Business Court’s comprehensive judgment.” While the Business Court considered the deal price, it also examined RAI’s competitive positioning and relationship with BAT in the time leading up to the merger, the tobacco industry’s regulatory dynamics, an adjusted unaffected share price analysis, contemporaneous research analyst commentary, valuations produced during the transaction process, an analysis of comparable precedent transactions, a comparative company analysis and other factors. “Rather than choose to value the dissenters’ shares at no more than the deal price of $59.64 per share because that was the deal price, the Business Court utilized a range of acceptable valuation concepts and techniques to arrive at the conclusion that the deal price reflected fair value,” Earls said. defend the law. Biggs and the full U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals have rejected the GOP leaders’ requests. The trial will focus on the underlying voter ID law, the topic of the racebias lawsuit filed by the state NAACP and several local chapters. Other lawsuits are pending over the state’s voter ID mandate, which was approved by voters in November 2018 as a constitutional amendment and then formally written into law by the legislature. It’s currently not being enforced. In September, a state judicial panel ruled that the law was unconstitutional. The North Carolina Supreme Court is hearing a third case challenging how legislators put the constitutional amendment on the ballot — a case that’s been slowed as recusal motions were filed against two state justices, one of whom is Berger’s son. (See previous story.)

Earls rejected the dissenters’ position that the Business Court should have accorded the deal price no probative weight because BAT was a large inside stockholder; nor was she persuaded that the Business Court erred when it declined to adopt the valuation proposed by the dissenters’ expert.

It depends on the case

The dissenters also pushed back on the issue of a “control premium,” arguing that the Business Court erred when it failed to recognize an upward adjustment to the value of the stock because BAT’s block of stock enabled it to control the corporation. Declining to establish a blanket rule, Earls said that a court’s decision to find that a particular market-based method of valuing a corporation does or does not reflect an implicit minority discount—and the separate decision to allow or reject a dissenting shareholder claim to a pro rata portion of a control premium—should be determined on a case-by-case basis. “A dissenting shareholder seeking to challenge the reliability of a market-based valuation technique must present evidence from which the trial court could conclude that a particular market-based valuation methodology undervalues the corporation’s shares,” Earls wrote. “Because the existence and magnitude of any implicit minority discount—and the magnitude and availability to the dissenting shareholders

Supreme Court weighs vaccine rules affecting more than 80 million WASHINGTON (AP) — The Supreme Court heard arguments on Jan. 7 on major Biden administration work rules to bump up the nation’s vaccination rate against COVID-19 at a time of spiking coronavirus cases because of the omicron variant. The justices took up the questions of whether to allow the administration to enforce a vaccine-or-testing requirement that applies to large employers and a separate vaccine mandate for most health care workers. Early in the arguments some members of the court’s conservative majority expressed skepticism for the employer rule. Justice Amy Coney Barrett suggested that a problem

of any control premium—depends on the nature of the transaction, corporation, and market at issue in any given appraisal proceeding, we reject the notion that a court necessarily commits legal error by failing to correct a market-based valuation methodology for an implicit minority discount or by failing to award the dissenting shareholders a control premium.” Finally, Earls held that the Business Court determined the fair value of RAI’s shares on the date the merger closed and that the dissenters were not entitled to additional interest payments, as the text of the statute did not definitively establish how interest should be calculated. The dissenters’ interpretation of the statute—which would require RAI to pay them more than $100 million in interest even though the court found the dissenters were paid fair value— “is absurd,” she said. Cliff Brinson of Smith Anderson in Raleigh, who represented RAI, had no comment on the decision. Attorneys for the dissenters, including Raleigh attorney George F. Sanderson III and Jennifer Randolph of Rolnick Kramer Sadighi in New York City, did not respond to a request for comment. The 56-page decision is Reynolds American Inc. v. Third Motion Equities Master Fund Ltd. (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-163-21). The full text of the opinion is available online at nclawyersweekly.com. with the rule was its broad scope. Justice Neil Gorsuch also suggested officials had overstepped. But the court’s three liberal justices suggested support for the employer rule. Justice Elena Kagan said officials have shown “quite clearly that no other policy will prevent sickness and death to anywhere like the degree that this one will.” And Justice Stephen Breyer said he found it “unbelievable” that it could it be in the “public interest” to put that rule on hold. He said that on Jan. 6 there were some 750,000 new cases in the country and that hospitals are full. Legal challenges to the policies from Republican-led states and business groups are in their early stages, but the outcome at the high court probably will determine the fate of vaccine requirements affecting more than 80 million people.


8 / OPINION DIGESTS

N O R T H C A R O L I N A L A W Y E R S W E E K LY I Janu ar y 17, 2022

Opinions N.C. SUPREME COURT

8

N.C. COURT OF APPEALS

N.C. SUPREME COURT

Criminal Practice Prosecutorial Vindictiveness – Subsequent Prosecution – Insufficient Showing – Failure to Join Charges Defendant’s attempted murder conviction was overturned because of problems with the indictment against him. Defendant has not shown that subsequent indictments charging defendant with crimes arising out of the same facts were the result of prosecutorial vindictiveness, nor that they violate G.S. § 15A-926, which requires the dismissal of subsequent charges if they could have been joined with prior charges. We overturn the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss. We remand for the Court of Appeals to consider defendant’s double-jeopardy arguments.

Background

Defendant was indicted for the attempted murder of his wife. After the jury was impaneled, the trial court noted that the indictment failed to allege malice aforethought. Rather than proceed on attempted voluntary manslaughter, the prosecutor sought and obtained a mistrial. Pursuant to a new indictment, defendant was convicted of attempted murder. Defendant’s conviction was overturned on double jeopardy grounds. Subsequently, defendant was indicted for multiple counts of felony child abuse and assault, all arising out of the same facts that underlay the attempted murder indictment. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, and our Court of Appeals reversed.

Prosecutorial Vindictiveness

After the U.S. Supreme Court found judicial vindictiveness in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), and prosecutorial vindictiveness in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), the General Assembly enacted G.S. § 15A-1335, which provides that when a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or through collateral attack, the trial court may not impose a more severe sentence for the same offense “or for a different offense based on the same conduct.” The filing of additional charges following a defendant’s exercise of a procedural right does not necessarily warrant a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness. A reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness is not shown merely by evidence that the prosecutor sought to punish the defendant for his criminal conduct, as opposed to punishing him for exercising his procedural rights. Here, although the prosecution obtained additional charges, the stated

16

purpose was to ensure defendant was punished for his criminal conduct and to obtain “a comparable sentence” to the original one—not a substantially more severe sentence in retaliation for the appeal. Thus, to the extent that the prosecutor’s public statements evidence any discernable motive to the re-prosecution attributable to the state, it is to punish defendant for his crimes and not for the successful exercise of his right of appeal. Our Court of Appeals erred in calculating the maximum term to which defendant could be sentenced for the current charges because it failed to take into effect § 15A-1335’s limitation on defendant’s sentence. Even if a prosecutor successfully pursues a second prosecution that would otherwise carry a substantially more severe sentence, so long as the charges are “for the same offense, or for a different offense based on the same conduct,” the statute prohibits the trial court from imposing a sentence with a length greater than the sentence which was set aside minus the portion of the prior sentence that the defendant had already served. The Court of Appeals erred in failing to apply § 15A-1335 to its sentencing calculation. As a result, it further erred in holding a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness under Blackledge was shown.

Joinder Violation

G.S. § 15A-926(a) states that two or more offenses may be joined for trial when the offenses “are based on the same act or transaction or on a series of acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.” Once a defendant has been tried for one offense, the defendant’s motion to dismiss a subsequent charge of a joinable offense must be granted. § 15A-926(c)(2). The motion to dismiss must be made before the second trial and must be granted unless “a. A motion for joinder of these offenses was previously denied, or b. The court finds that the right of joinder has been waived, or c. The court finds that because the prosecutor did not have sufficient evidence to warrant trying this offense at the time of the first trial, or because of some other reason, the ends of justice would be defeated if the motion were granted.” § 15A-926(c)(2). Under State v. Warren, 313 N.C. 254 (1985), in assessing a claim the prosecution withheld an indictment to circumvent the statute, the court must assess the justification offered by the state and determine if legitimate prosecutorial reasons supported the conduct. The record reveals no evidence that defendant alleged the state originally held the additional charges in reserve, nor did he allege under Warren that the prosecution withheld indictment on the additional charges in order to circumvent the statute. Under Warren it is the defendant’s burden to make such a showing, because a prosecutor’s charging decision is presumptively lawful.

Reversed and remanded. State v. Schalow (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-147-21, 24 pp.) (Robin Hudson, J.) Appealed from Henderson County Superior Court (Robert Bell, J.) Joseph Hyde for the state; Daniel Shatz for defendant. 2021-NCSC-166

Civil Practice Class Certification – Landlord/Tenant – Statutory Violations Even though the recipients of the collection letters sent by the defendant-landlord could end up with different damages base on individual circumstances, defendant’s uniform procedures establish a sufficiently generalized theory of alleged injury. Accordingly, the trial court could find that “common issues of fact and law are both central for all class members and are susceptible to class-wide proof.” We affirm the trial court’s certification of three plaintiff-classes. The plaintiff-tenants allege the defendant-landlord violated the North Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act (NCRRAA) and the North Carolina Debt Collection Act (NCDCA) when defendant sent plaintiffs collection letters and assessed complaint-filing and eviction fees against them. Defendant appeals the trial court’s certification of three plaintiff classes.

Collection Letter Class

The trial court defined the Collection Letter Class as those tenants who were “sent” the collection letter, as opposed to those who “received” the collection letter. The trial court acted within its broad discretion in inferring that, for the purpose of certifying this class, a letter sent was a letter received. Defendant has not identified any evidence tending to rebut the inference. Moreover, defendant stipulated that “the number of individuals who received the [collection letters] are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the Court.” And one of defendant’s employees testified that collection letters were not delivered by mail, but by direct email or hand delivery to each tenant’s door. Accordingly, drawing this inference was well within the trial court’s discretion. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the injury alleged by the Collection Letter Class is not grounded in an individualized subjective reaction and injury but in a class-wide deprivation of statutory rights under the NCRRAA and NCDCA. As a result, the collection letters need not have caused each class member a personal, factual injury based on their subjective reaction to it, but only an informational injury based on alleged misrepresentations and misleading information contained in the letters, in violation of the statute. Although different members of the class could indeed end up with differ-

ent damages based on individual circumstances, these differences do not undermine the availability of a classwide theory of generalized liability. The uniformity of defendant’s procedures establishes a sufficiently generalized theory of alleged injury. Accordingly, the trial court acted within its broad discretion in finding that “common issues of fact and law are both central for all class members and are susceptible to class-wide proof.”

Eviction Fee Class & Complaint-Filing Fee Class

The trial court’s findings of fact describe defendant’s procedures at issue, not the uniformity of their application, and establish that they were deployed on plaintiffs. We cannot conclude that the facts here are insufficient to support the trial court’s legal determinations that “common issues of fact and law predominate over any individual issues” and that “the common issues of fact and law are both central for all class members and are susceptible to class-wide proof.”

Superiority

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that statutory damages can be measured using objective, class-wide criteria. When a statute creates a cause of action independent from a personal, factual, injury, the relevant questions are only whether the plaintiff has shown a relevant statute confers a cause of action and whether the plaintiff satisfies the requirements to bring a claim under the statute. The NCDCA is one such statute. Accordingly, statutory damages here could be determined based on the generalized theory of alleged classwide informational injuries and deprivation of statutory rights under the NCDCA. The trial court had competent evidence that defendant produced ledgers of tenants that specifically identified those who were charged and paid eviction fees. Further, administrative class-member identification is supported by the precision with which the classes are defined (including use of the applicable date ranges and whether tenants were charged or “actually paid” the applicable fees) and the admitted uniformity with which defendant administered the letters and fees at issue. There is no indication that differences in damages and fees are so inextricably tied to the alleged classwide injury under the NCRRAA and NCDCA as to render the class action form inferior to other methods of adjudication. In fact, the trial court’s superiority determination includes numerous findings to the contrary, including that there were “relatively few evidentiary issues”; that class certification would avoid “the same legal issues [being] relitigated in potentially hundreds of individual cases in different courts throughout North Carolina, which could lead to inconsistent decisions”; and that “the benefits of litigating this case as a class


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10 / OPINION DIGESTS action overrides any drawbacks.” Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in certifying the classes here despite potential collateral differences in damages and fees. Affirmed. McMillan v. Blue Ridge Companies (Lawyers Weekly No. 010148-21, 21 pp.) (Robin Hudson, J.) Appealed from Cumberland County Superior Court (Rebecca Holt, J.) Scott Harris, Patrick Wallace, Edward Maginnis and Karl Gwaltney for plaintiffs; Steven Bader and Richard Boyette for defendant. 2021NCSC-160

Domestic Relations Parent & Child – Termination of Parental Rights – Death of Older Child – Aiding & Abetting Where (1) respondent-mother’s then boyfriend, William Lail, killed her 19-month-old son, “John,” in 2013; (2) prior to John’s death, respondent not only knew that Lail was abusing John and her daughter, “Kate,” but respondent also took part in the abuse, striking John and Kate with a belt and a coat hanger (at least) and took actions to conceal John and Kate’s injuries after they were severely scalded while in Lail’s care; (3) despite Lail’s increasing aggression towards her children and the injuries she knew he had already inflicted, respondent left the children in Lail’s care; and (4) respondent’s actions contributed to Lail’s murder of John, respondent thus aided and abetted Lail’s murder of John. We affirm the trial court’s termination of respondent’s parental rights to “Charlie,” who was born in 2019.

Dissent

(Ervin, J.): The trial court found that respondent “knew or should have known” of the extreme risk posed by Mr. Lail and took no steps to prevent the injury of both children, [Kate] and [John]; and the death of [John].” In order to conclude that respondent aided and abetted Lail’s murder of John, the trial court needed to find that respondent had actual knowledge of the extreme risk posed by Lail. There is evidence in the record to support such a finding, but this court is not a fact-finding body. We should remand to the trial court so that it can decide whether or not respondent acted on the basis of actual knowledge. In re C.B.C.B. (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-149-21, 23 pp.) (Paul Newby, C.J.) (Samuel Ervin, J., joined by

Anita Earls, J., dissenting) Appealed from Catawba County District Court (Burford Cherry, J.) Lauren Vaughan for petitioner; Matthew Wunsche for guardian ad litem; Robert Ewing for respondent. 2021-NCSC-149

Domestic Relations Parent & Child – Termination of Parental Rights – Abandonment – Release from Prison The respondent-father testified that, after his release from prison for killing his wife, his probation officer told him he could have no contact with the victim’s family. The trial court did not believe respondent’s testimony, which respondent said was the reason he did not reach out to his daughter, “Lisa,” who was in the custody of petitioners, the wife’s sister and brother-in-law. The trial court’s credibility ruling did not improperly shift the burden of proof to respondent. Rather, the trial court’s finding demonstrates that respondent’s testimony failed to rebut the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence presented by petitioners that respondent had willfully stopped sending money, cards and gifts for Lisa. We affirm the termination of respondent’s parental rights on the basis of willful abandonment. Initially, petitioners improperly filed their termination petition in Stanly County. The trial court found that due to the improperly filed termination petition in Stanly County, respondent had an additional eight months to make an effort to show his parental concern and care for Lisa. The trial court found that, after respondent was put on notice that petitioners wished to terminate his parental rights in the Stanly County termination case, he “took no action to try to assert his visitation rights with the minor child or to maintain or reestablish a relationship with the minor child aside from sending Christmas gifts and making four child support payments.” Respondent argues that he hired an attorney to assist him in a Mecklenburg County custody case and relied on that attorney until he fired her in December 2018. Respondent’s involvement in the Mecklenburg County custody case was outside the six-month period that is relevant to the question of willful abandonment. Moreover, it is clear that the filing of the Stanly County termination petition put respondent on notice of petitioners’ intentions. Additionally, his argument ignores the fact that he

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took no further action after he fired his attorney in the custody case. The trial court found that respondent “has done close to nothing in this case,” that his actions since his release from incarceration “were very sporadic and inconsistent,” and that his “actions to maintain or reestablish a relationship with the minor child were woefully inadequate.” Respondent last saw and spoke to Lisa in July 2017, he only sent one card and gift in the six months preceding the filing of the termination petition, he did not send any financial support after February 2019, and, although he obtained an attorney in the custody action, he did nothing else in the matter after firing his attorney in December 2018. The evidence supports the trial court’s findings. The trial court’s findings of fact demonstrate that respondent willfully withheld his love, care, and affection from Lisa during the relevant time period. Therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding that respondent’s conduct constituted willful abandonment and that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights under G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Affirmed. In re L.M.M. (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-150-21, 16 pp.) (Paul Newby, C.J.) Appealed from Gaston County District Court (John Greenlee, J.) Ashley Crowder for petitioners; No brief for guardian ad litem; Richard Croutharmel for respondent. 2021NCSC-153

Domestic Relations Parent & Child – Termination of Parental Rights – Relative Placement Two-year-old “Kenneth” was placed with his maternal grandmother, but he was removed from her care due to conflicts with Kenneth’s parents. Even though the grandmother sent the trial court a letter asking to have Kenneth placed with her again, the grandmother did not attend or testify at the hearing on the petition to terminate the respondent-father’s parental rights, and her letter was not entered into evidence. The record shows that the trial court had previously considered and rejected the grandmother as a relative placement. There was no conflict in the evidence which would have required the trial court to make a finding of fact as to the issue of placement with the grandmother. We affirm the termination of respondent’s parental rights. In re K.A.M.A. (Lawyers Weekly

No. 010-151-21, 11 pp.) (Paul Newby, C.J.) Appealed from Henderson County District Court (Kimberly Gasperson-Justice, J.) Susan Davis for petitioner; Patricia Adcroft for guardian ad litem; David Perez for respondent. 2021-NCSC-152

Domestic Relations Parent & Child – Termination of Parental Rights – Paternity Not Established Where (1) respondent was not married to “Zeke’s” mother, (2) he knew about the mother’s pregnancy but provided no support during the pregnancy, (3) he was present for Zeke’s birth but did not sign the birth certificate, (4) the only support he provided was paying $150 to repair the mother’s car after Zeke’s birth, and (5) his paternity has not been determined judicially or by scientific means, the trial court found that respondent did not establish paternity under any of the five prongs in G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5). After a careful review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s termination of respondent’s parental rights. In re Z.J.M. (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-152-21, 4 pp.) (Paul Newby, C.J.) Appealed from Wake County District Court (V.A. Davidian, J.) No brief for petitioner; Mary McCullers Reece for respondent. 2021-NCSC-159

Domestic Relations Parent & Child – Termination of Parental Rights – Substance Abuse The respondent-mother’s reunification case plan included a substance abuse assessment, signing releases for the county Department of Human Services to access her service provider records, random drug screens, a psychological parenting evaluation, obtaining and maintaining housing and income sufficient for herself and the children, and maintaining contact with DHS. Respondent completed a substance abuse assessment on 21 January 2020, which recommended that she attend a 40-hour program with individual counseling. After attending only one session, respondent was discharged from the program for missing several consecutive sessions. Respondent later tested positive for morphine, methadone, and tramadol. Respondent continued to live with her father in the home from which the children were removed, failed to secure steady employment, and stopped participating in meetings with DHS


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12 / OPINION DIGESTS after March 2020. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the termination of respondent’s parental rights. In re T.I.S. (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-153-21, 4 pp.) (Paul Newby, C.J.) Appealed from Cabarrus County District Court (Nathaniel Knust, J.) Garrison White for petitioner; Michael Harrell for guardian ad litem; Richard Croutharmel for respondent. 2021-NCSC-158

er, our review of the record reveals no error in the trial court’s termination of respondent’s parental rights. Affirmed. In re S.G.S. (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-155-21, 10 pp.) (Per Curiam) Appealed from Brunswick County District Court (Calvin Chandler, J.) Jane Thompson for petitioner; Brian Bernhardt for guardian ad litem; Sydney Batch for respondent. 2021-NCSC156

Domestic Relations

Insurance

Parent & Child – Termination of Parental Rights – Inappropriate Housing – Pet Pig

Auto – UIM – Per Person/Per Accident Limits – Gurley Overruled

In her case plan, the respondentmother agreed to maintain safe and appropriate housing; however, respondent’s social worker testified that she never observed respondent’s residence in a condition suitable for “Adam.” In November 2018, the social worker found “animal urine and feces all over the house,” “animal shavings poured in the living room floor,” “molded food on the tables [and] on the stove,” and “piles of trash in the kitchen.” In February 2019, respondent and her boyfriend “had a pig living inside the home,” “a sandbox that appeared that the pig stayed in in the living room floor,” and “buckets of cigarette butts and trash on the living room floor.” Thereafter, the social worker was not able to enter the house. Although respondent testified that her housing conditions had improved, the trial court was free to disbelieve respondent’s testimony. The evidence supports the trial court’s finding that respondent failed to obtain safe and appropriate housing. We affirm the termination of respondent’s parental rights. Though respondent completed parenting classes, mental health and substance abuse assessments, and twenty hours of substance abuse counseling in 2018, she failed to submit to 18 drug screens requested by DSS and tested positive for controlled substances on two occasions. Respondent’s routine noncompliance with the drug testing requirement of her case plan, particularly in light of her diagnoses of methamphetamine use disorder and marijuana use disorder, supports a finding that she had failed to resolve the issue of substance abuse. Further, respondent attended only 28 of the 77 visits she was offered with Adam, demonstrating her inability or unwillingness to properly care for Adam. At the time of the hearing, Adam had spent half of his life in DSS custody. Respondent’s prior neglect of Adam and her circumstances at the time of the termination hearing support the trial court’s conclusion that Adam faced a significant likelihood of future neglect if returned to respondent’s care. Affirmed. In re A.L.A. (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-154-21, 14 pp.) (Paul Newby, C.J.) Appealed from Wilkes County District Court (David Byrd, J.) Daniel Johnson for petitioner; Carolina Mackie for guardian ad litem; Sydney Batch for respondent. 2021-NCSC-148

Domestic Relations Parent & Child – Termination of Parental Rights – Substance Abuse In a case involving intractable substance abuse by the respondent-moth-

After a multi-vehicle accident, the at-fault driver’s insurer divided its per-accident liability coverage limit among several victims. Contrary to the ruling that would be required by N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Gurley, 139 N.C. App. 178 (2000), we hold that an injured party and his decedent’s estate are entitled to benefits from the decedent’s underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage on a per-person basis, despite the fact that the liability insurer made its payment on a per-accident basis. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision, which upheld summary judgment for the defendant-victims. Following its two-decade-old ruling in Gurley, the Court of Appeals held that “when the negligent driver’s liability policy was exhausted pursuant to the per-person cap, the [underinsured motorist] policy’s per-person cap will be the applicable limit. However, when the liability policy was exhausted pursuant to the per-accident cap, the applicable [underinsured motorist] limit will be the [underinsured motorist] policy’s per-accident cap.” However, the most reasonable reading of G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) provides for a common-sense resolution of the dispute before us: in cases involving multiple claimants, the total amount of uninsured motorist coverage available to those claimants (considering both the available liability coverage and the available UIM coverage) is limited by the per-accident limit and that the total amount of coverage available to any individual claimant is constrained by the perperson limit. Admittedly, Gurley, upon which the Court of Appeals and defendants have relied in this case, has been on the books for almost two decades without having been disturbed by the General Assembly. In ordinary circumstances, we would be inclined to give the General Assembly’s acquiescence in that decision near-controlling effect. However, we cannot agree that the canon of legislative acquiescence, should be deemed controlling here, given that the Court of Appeals described the rule that it adopted in Gurley as having the effect of avoiding an “[interpretation] of the statute that ... would result in defendants receiving more compensation than if [the tortfeasor] had been either fully insured or uninsured altogether.” Since applying the Gurley rule in this case would have exactly the effect that the rule was explicitly intended to avoid, it is difficult for us to afford any weight in the interpretive process to the General Assembly’s failure to modify the relevant provisions of § 20-279.21(b)(4) to account for the likelihood that Gurley would be applied in a mechanical manner to produce a result that Gurley itself appears to have been intended to avoid. The relevant statutory language

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most readily supports the use of an approach that determines the amount to be paid to any particular claimant by treating the per-accident amount of underinsured motorist coverage as the total sum that is available to all of the claimants entitled to a share of the available UIM coverage, subject to the caveat that the amount of UIM coverage that is available to any individual claimant is limited to the per-person amount. As a result, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and this case is remanded to the superior court for the entry of a judgment declaring that the total amount of UIM coverage made available to defendants collectively is to be set at the per-accident limit, with no individual claimant to receive more than the per-person limit. Reversed and remanded.

Concurrence

(Earls, J.): The effect of this court’s decision is to overrule a settled precedent of the Court of Appeals, N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gurley, 139 N.C. App. 178 (2000). Doing so is justified, notwithstanding the parties’ potential reliance interests which are implicated in departing from the rule endorsed in that case. When the plaintiff-insurer and the decedent entered into a contract for automobile insurance, the terms of their contract necessarily incorporated G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4), which until today meant what the Court of Appeals said it meant in Gurley. Nevertheless, whatever reliance interests may have existed are outweighed by the unmistakable fact that the Gurley rule is irreconcilable with the text, structure, and purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act generally and § 20-279.21(b)(4) specifically, as the majority has persuasively explained.

Concurrence

(Berger, J.): As the majority acknowledges, the plain language of § 20-279.21(b)(4) does not address whether the UIM per accident limit is subject to the UIM per person limit. There is, therefore, no conflict, and we must turn to the language of the policy to determine whether the UIM per accident limit is subject to the UIM per person limit. The policy plainly states that the UIM per accident limit was subject to the UIM per person limit, and that the proper amount of UIM coverage available was subject to the per person limit. Thus, the amount of UIM coverage available to defendants was subject to the per person limit. North Carolina Farm Bureau

Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dana (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-156-21, 35 pp.) (Samuel Ervin, J.) (Anita Earls, J., concurring) (Philip Berger, J., joined by Paul Newby, C.J. & Tamara Barringer, J., concurring in result only) Appealed from Forsyth County Superior Court (Eric Morgan, J.) On discretionary review from the Court of Appeals. William Lipscomb for plaintiff; Douglas Maynard for defendant; J.T. Crook, Philip Collins and David Coats for amicus curiae. 2021NCSC-161

Domestic Relations Parent & Child – Termination of Parental Rights – Undated Notary The Yadkin County Human Services Agency’s director signed a verification of the petition to terminate respondents’ parental rights, and the signature was notarized. However, the notary public failed to date the verification. This technical defect in the notarial certificate is accorded a “presumption of regularity” by G.S. § 10B-99. The director’s signing of the verification before the notary constituted “substantial compliance” for purposes of § 10B-99(a), giving the district court subject matter jurisdiction over this action. We affirm the termination of respondents’ parental rights. The verification page refers to “this ___ day of May, 2020” despite the fact that HSA’s attorney signed the motion on 30 June 2020. We find it likely that the person who prepared the verification simply failed to update that document to correspond with the date shown upon the signature page associated with the termination motion and we are unwilling to infer from what might well have been a clerical oversight or some similar omission by the notary a finding that the director swore to the accuracy of a non-existent or inchoate pleading in light of the well-established presumption of regularity that applies to a trial court’s decision to exercise its jurisdiction and the presumption of regularity afforded to notarial acts pursuant to § 10B-99(a). The significant date for purposes of a termination proceeding is the date upon which the motion or petition was filed rather than the date upon which the petition or motion was signed or verified. We cannot conclude that either N.C. R. Civ. P. 11(b), or G.S. § 1-148 requires that the verification of a termination of parental rights petition or motion occur contemporaneously with or subsequent to the


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signing of any such pleading. Affirmed. In re C.N.R. (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-157-21, 19 pp.) (Samuel Ervin, J.) Appealed from Yadkin County District Court (Robert Crumpton, J.) James Freeman for petitioner; Paul Freeman for guardian ad litem; Richard Croutharmel and Thomas Diepenbrock for respondents. 2021NCSC-150

Real Property Beach House Sale – Water Damage – Tort/Negligence – Agents’ Duties Given his knowledge of the house’s history of water intrusion, there is a jury question as to whether the seller’s real estate agent had a duty to disclose such history, even after a painter said he hoped he had fixed the leak. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ reversal of summary judgment for plaintiffs’ agents on the claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Otherwise, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ reversal of summary judgment for defendants. After they bought a house on Oak Island, plaintiffs discovered extensive water intrusion and a termite infestation. According to the general contractor hired by plaintiffs, cosmetic repairs had prevented plaintiffs’ inspector from finding the damage. Plaintiffs sued the seller and its owner, the seller’s real estate agent and agency (the seller’s agent), and plaintiffs’ own real estate agents and their agency (plaintiffs’ agent).

Negligence

The record disclosed the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning the extent to which the seller’s agent had a duty to disclose the history of water intrusion into the house given the equivocal nature of statements made by a painter about the extent to which he had repaired the leak that he had been hired to address. The seller’s agent had a duty to disclose any fact of which they were aware that might reasonably have impacted plaintiffs’ decision to purchase the house. The record contains evidence tending to show that the agent knew of previous water-intrusion issues at the house and that he had hired a painter to, among other things, attempt to locate and repair the source of a leak in the living room. After completing the required work, the painter sent a text message to the agent informing the agent that he

“may have found that leak” and that he “[hoped] that was it.” Despite the agent’s characterization of the painter as an “experienced professional,” he was a painter and pressure washer rather than a licensed contractor. Moreover, even if one were to accept the painter’s qualifications as sufficient, the equivocal nature of the statements made in the text messages raises a genuine issue of material fact concerning the extent to which the agent reasonably relied upon those statements in failing to disclose to plaintiffs the existence of water intrusion into the house. A rational juror could properly conclude that the seller’s agent acted unreasonably in relying upon the adequacy of the painter’s performance in rectifying the problems evidenced by the water intrusion into the house. The home inspection does not shield the seller’s agent from liability here given the longstanding and extensive nature of the damage to the house and apparent attempts to conceal the damage.

Fraud

As the Court of Appeals correctly determined, the record discloses the existence of genuine issues of material fact concerning (1) the reasonableness of any reliance that the seller and its agent may have placed upon the repair work performed by the painter and (2) whether plaintiffs reasonably relied upon the inspection report prepared by their inspector.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The Court of Appeals determined that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether plaintiffs’ agents breached a fiduciary duty to plaintiffs by (1) failing to procure the property manager’s maintenance records and (2) hiring the inspector, given his failure to conduct intrusive moisture testing. In their contract with plaintiffs, plaintiffs’ agents attempted to limit their duties to plaintiffs. However, plaintiffs’ agents have failed to cite any authority for the proposition that a real estate agent may limit or “define” his or her fiduciary duties by contract, and we know of none. We decline to hold that the duties plaintiffs’ agents owed to plaintiffs hinged upon the language of the contract rather than upon general principles of North Carolina agency law. Nevertheless, plaintiffs failed to forecast evidence that their agents had an independent duty to obtain the house’s maintenance records. Plaintiffs’ agents are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to this is-

sue. Further, since plaintiffs did not successfully impeach the inspector’s qualifications or demonstrate that plaintiffs’ agents had any reason to conclude that the inspector had failed to act appropriately, the record contains no basis for concluding that plaintiffs’ agents failed to exercise reasonable diligence in recommending that plaintiffs employ the inspector or in relying upon his expertise. Plaintiffs’ agents were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims of breach of fiduciary duty. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Dissent

(Berger, J.): The record evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, demonstrates that the seller’s agent hired a handyman to repair a leak, the handyman conducted repairs, and four months later, a licensed home inspector found no evidence of an existing leak even after it had recently rained. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the seller’s agent to believe that the leak had been remedied. As such, the fact that there had previously been a leak was no longer material. Thus, the agent was under no duty to disclose this information to plaintiffs. Under the circumstances of this case, the sellers’ agents were not negligent, nor did they commit fraud. Moreover, the majority opinion seems to suggest a seller’s real estate broker is now a guarantor of the condition of the subject property and faces potential liability for failure to disclose any potential deficiency mentioned by the seller. This expansion of the responsibilities of a seller’s agent will lead to uncertainty. Cummings v. Carroll (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-158-21, 58 pp.) (Samuel Ervin, J.) (Philip Berger, J., joined by Paul Newby, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) Appealed from Brunswick County Superior Court (Alma Hinton, J.) On appeal and discretionary review from the Court of Appeals. Christopher Chleborowicz and Elijah Huston for plaintiffs; Stuart Stroud, Kimberly Connor Benton, Alexander Dale, Ryal Tayloe and Clay Allen Collier for defendants.

Schools & School Boards Charter School – Sovereign Immunity – False Claims Act Since the General Assembly has

classified charter schools as entities that “operate independently of existing schools” and that are run by “private non-profit corporations,” charter schools are not agencies of the state and are not entitled to sovereign immunity. We affirm in part and reverse in part the ruling of the Court of Appeals. The state sued the defendant-charter school (the Academy) and the individual defendants—the Academy’s principal/CEO and his wife, the chairperson of the Academy’s board—after the State Auditor found that the Academy had “overstated enrollment,” that it had employed unqualified relatives of the individual defendants “at a cost to the school [of] $92,500 in the final year,” and that the individual defendants “accepted over $11,000 in questionable payments despite owing more than $370,000 in payroll obligations” to the Academy’s employees.

Sovereign Immunity

The General Assembly has not chosen to categorize charter schools as state agencies or instrumentalities and has, instead, classified charter schools as entities that “operate independently of existing schools” that are run by “private non-profit corporations.” As a result, we hold that the General Assembly did not intend for charter schools to be deemed to be agencies or instrumentalities of the state. Furthermore, G.S. § 115C218.20(b) ensures that the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the State Board of Education, and their agents cannot be held liable for the acts or omissions of a charter school. Such a provision would be unnecessary if charter schools were afforded the benefits of sovereign immunity. In addition, charter schools are local rather than statewide in character. Such locally oriented entities are typically protected by governmental, rather than sovereign, immunity.

False Claims Act

Because a non-profit corporation of the type that is statutorily required to operate a charter school is clearly a “corporate” body, a charter school is necessarily encompassed within the statutory definition of “person” set out in G.S. § 12-3(6). As a result, § 12-3(6) indicates that a charter school is a “person” subject to liability for purposes of the False Claims Act unless that result would be “inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly” or “repugnant to the context of the same statute.” The obvious purpose of the False

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14 / OPINION DIGESTS Claims Act is to ensure that public funds are spent in the manner for which they were intended instead of being misappropriated, misspent, or misused. Since a nonprofit corporation is perfectly capable of using public funds in a manner that is inconsistent with the prohibitions set out in G.S. § 1-607(a), the use of a definition of “person” that sweeps in such entities would not be inconsistent with the purposes that the General Assembly sought to achieve by enacting the False Claims Act. Thus, the use of a definition of a “person” that includes a charter school for purposes of the False Claims Act seems perfectly consistent with the legislative intent as expressed in § 12-3(6). According to the Academy, the average daily membership estimate of 366 students that it reported for the 2013–14 school year was nothing more than a “projection” that the Academy was statutorily authorized to make rather than an objective falsehood. However, the state clearly satisfied the requirements of N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(b) by alleging that the defendantprincipal stated in a phone call that occurred on 26 April 2013 that there would be 366 students enrolled at the Academy for the 2013–14 school year, that $344,340.44 in excess funds had been allotted to the Academy as a result of this allegedly false representation, and that the state was seeking to recoup this amount from defendants, a group that included the Academy. Thus, the state satisfied Rule 9(b) in pleading its False Claims Act claim against the Academy. In addition, we reject the Academy’s contention that the state failed to plead the making of an “objective falsehood” and that the state was on notice that the enrollment estimate upon which its False Claims Act claim relied might be lacking in substantive support. Although the Academy vigorously argues that a projected enrollment figure cannot be the sort of objective falsehood necessary to support liability under the False Claims Act and that the state should have known the nature and extent of the Academy’s financial situation at the time that the Academy submitted the enrollment estimate upon which the state’s False Claims Act relies, we do not find either of these arguments to be persuasive. Assuming, without deciding, that knowledge of the falsity of the relevant representation might be sufficient to prevent a finding of liability for the making of that statement under the False Claims Act, any such argument would lack sufficient support given the record in this case.

Principal’s Liability

Assuming, without deciding, that a “CEO/Principal” is a public official rather than a public employee and that such a person exercises discretionary authority, we agree with the Court of Appeals that, in light of the state’s allegation that the defendantprincipal knowingly made “false or fraudulent statements in connection with receiving state funds,” the state’s complaint contained sufficient allegations to preclude dismissal of the False Claims Act claim that it asserted against the principal. The Court of Appeals did not err by denying the principal’s motion to dismiss the False Claims Act claim against him in his individual capacity. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. State ex rel. Stein v. Kinston Charter Academy (Lawyers Weekly

No 010-159-21, 47 pp.) (Samuel Ervin, J.) Appealed from Wake County Superior Court (Graham Shirley, J.) On discretionary review from the Court of Appeals (Matthew Liles, Kevin Anderson and Daniel Mosteller for the state; Amie Sivon, Mary Webb, Edward Coleman and Demyra McDonald-Hall for defendant Kinston Charter Academy; Ozie Hall, pro se; Daniel Gibson, Paul Stam and Matthew Tilley for amici curiae. 2021NCSC-163

Criminal Practice Constitutional – Free Speech – Threat to Court Officer – Facebook Posts In order to prove a violation of G.S. § 14-16.7, the state must prove a defendant’s speech constituted a “true threat” to a court officer. In this case arising from defendant’s angry Facebook posts, even though the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on “true threat,” the state presented sufficient evidence to survive defendant’s motion to dismiss. We affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision to vacate defendant’s conviction, but we reverse the Court of Appeals opinion that remands for entry of a judgment of acquittal. Instead, we remand the case to the trial court for a new trial. When the district attorney declined to prosecute the parents of a dead child, defendant posted several Facebook rants, threatening the DA with “death.” Certain categories of expression can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content. These “constitutionally proscribable” categories of expression include true threats. A speaker’s subjective intent to threaten is the pivotal feature separating constitutionally protected speech from constitutionally proscribable true threats. We define a true threat as an objectively threatening statement communicated by a party which possesses the subjective intent to threaten a listener or identifiable group. A true threat reflects an individual’s effort to settle political disputes by violence rather than deliberation. The First Amendment interest in fostering speech is particularly substantial when, as in the present case, the speech in question is a message critiquing the manner in which an elected official has chosen to carry out the position’s public duties. The First Amendment’s protection of the right to criticize public officials safeguards our democracy by keeping elected representatives accountable to the people whom they serve. To ensure that this right can be vigorously and unreservedly exercised, the First Amendment constrains us to reject any interpretation of G.S. § 14-16.7(a) which would chill constitutionally protected political speech because of the possibility that the state will prosecute—and potentially convict—somebody engaging only in lawful political speech at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect. When viewed in the light most favorable to the state, defendant’s statements would potentially be reasonably regarded by a jury as constituting a true threat to inflict serious bodily injury upon or to kill the elected district attorney. Defendant’s multiple uses of the word “death” in direct reference to the elected district attorney and the judicial system in which she was serving, defendant’s favor-

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able reception to the exercise of “vigilante justice” and “old time mountain justice” for those individuals who are a part of the court system, defendant’s numerous representations of his willingness to use firearms to accomplish his manifesto, defendant’s several expressions of bravado concerning his commitment to employ firearms against any representative of the criminal justice system, and defendant’s repeated expression of the hope that the elected district attorney would become aware of defendant’s social media posts all combine to warrant consideration by a jury as to whether defendant issued a true threat to inflict serious bodily injury upon or to kill the elected district attorney. Since there was no dispute that defendant created the social media posts at issue, and since these messages of defendant constitute substantial evidence of a threat against the elected district attorney when this evidence is viewed in the context of the state’s entitlement to every reasonable intendment and inference to be taken from it, defendant’s motion to dismiss was correctly denied. Because the facts presented by the state could have allowed a reasonable jury to conclude defendant uttered a true threat, a properly instructed jury must be allowed to consider this question. Reversed and remanded.

Dissent

(Earls, J.): I concur in the portion of the majority opinion holding that, to convict a defendant under § 14-16.7(a), the First Amendment requires the state to prove both that the defendant communicated a message that a reasonable observer would understand to contain a threat of violence and that the defendant communicated the message with the subjective intent to threaten an individual or identifiable group. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the state’s evidence in this case was sufficient to withstand defendant’s motion to dismiss. An objectively reasonable observer viewing defendant’s Facebook posts in their full context could not understand his messages to contain a serious intention to inflict bodily harm on the district attorney. State v. Taylor (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-160-21, 65 pp.) (Michael Morgan, J.) (Anita Earls, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) Appealed from Macon County Superior Court (Gary Gavenus, J.) Nicholas Brod and Ryan Park for the state; Aaron Thomas Johnson for defendant. 2021NCSC-164

Domestic Relations Parent & Child – Termination of Parental Rights – Neglect – Substance Abuse Although some permanency planning orders said “Robert” was initially removed “due to the actions of his mother,” the record shows that both parents contributed to Robert’s removal and subsequent adjudication as neglected. In fact, the first child protective services report alleged improper supervision, injurious environment, and substance abuse after three-year-old Robert wandered from the home alone while the respondentfather was asleep. We affirm the termination of respondent’s parental rights. The trial court found the “activities of the parents and/or conditions in the

home of the parents [that] led to or contributed to the adjudication, and led to the Court’s decision to remove custody from the parents,” included a CPS report that was accepted for improper supervision, injurious environment, and substance abuse on 14 May 2018 after Robert left the house while respondent was sleeping and a neighbor called 911; respondent’s admission that household members had a history of cocaine use; respondent’s positive test for prescribed and unprescribed controlled substances on 15 May 2018 and his admission to use exceeding the prescribed amount of his medications; and, after a second CPS report was accepted on 27 August 2018 following the mother’s being charged with a DWI while Robert was in the car, a DSS home visit on 28 August 2018 which found the home to be in disarray. The record evidence supports finding of fact 13: “The parents failed to properly supervise their child” and “the parents[’] excessive and continued usage of controlled substances contributed to their lack of proper care and supervision of the child.” The evidence and findings that respondent failed to correct the issues that contributed to Robert’s prior adjudication as a neglected juvenile support the trial court’s determination that there was a likelihood of repetition of neglect. In re R.G.L. (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-161-21, 31 pp.) (Anita Earls, J.) Appealed from the District Court in Person County (Benjamin Hunter, J.) Thomas Fitzgerald for petitioner; Matthew Wunsche for guardian ad litem; Lee Gilliam for respondent. 2021-NCSC-155

Domestic Relations Parent & Child – Termination of Parental Rights – Substance Abuse & Domestic Violence Given the respondent-father’s ongoing substance abuse and the recurring domestic violence in the home, the trial court could find that there was a likelihood of future neglect if the father’s five children were returned to his care. We affirm the termination of respondent’s parental rights. All five of respondent’s children had previously been adjudicated to be neglected juveniles. In the years following this adjudication, respondent was again arrested for driving while intoxicated with his children in the vehicle. In 2018 alone, he was charged with driving while intoxicated on four occasions. Respondent was provided the opportunity to care for his children during a “trial home placement” by order of the trial court on 27 June 2019. However, on 11 September 2019 DSS received a referral alleging ongoing substance abuse and domestic violence issues involving both parents. Respondent admitted to DSS that he was still smoking marijuana. He subsequently tested positive for marijuana and gabapentin, an anticonvulsant prescription medication. This evidence supports the trial court’s finding that there existed “a high likelihood that the neglect would continue” if the children were returned to respondent’s care. The trial court’s findings regarding past neglect and the likelihood of future neglect are sufficient to support its conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights on the basis of neglect. In re S.J. (Lawyers Weekly No.


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010-162-21, 7 pp.) (Anita Earls, J.) Appealed from the District Court in Robeson County (Angelica McIntyre, J.) Sydney Batch for respondent; Edward Yeager for petitioner; Carrie Hanger for guardian ad litem. 2021-NCSC-157

Corporate Merger Dissenters – Stock Purchase – Fair Value – First Impression

This case arises from the merger of Reynolds American Inc. (RAI) and British American Tobacco (BAT) and certain shareholders’ (dissenters’) claim that the price paid to RAI shareholders as a result of the merger was unfair. In our first consideration of an appeal from a Business Court judgment determining the fair value of a dissenting shareholder’s shares pursuant to G.S. § 55-13-01 et seq., we hold that the Business Court’s use of various “customary and current valu-

LAWYER TO LAWYER / Directory

OPINION DIGESTS / 15 ation concepts and techniques” to determine the fair value of the dissenters’ shares was appropriate under our statutory framework. We affirm the Business Court’s conclusion that the dissenters were paid fair value for their shares. The merger consideration included 0.5260 shares of BAT plus $29.44 in cash. On the date of the merger agreement, this consideration was worth $59.64 per RAI share. The transaction ultimately closed on 25 July 2017. On

this date, the merger consideration was worth $65.87 per RAI share. The transaction was “overwhelmingly approved” by a majority of RAI’s outstanding shares, including 99 percent of the non-BAT-owned shares which were voted in the merger. RAI paid the dissenters “the amount the corporation estimates to be the fair value of their shares,” $59.64, “plus interest.” §§ 55-13-22, 55- 13-25(a). The dissenters refused to accept this offer and conveyed their be-


16 / OPINION DIGESTS lief that the fair value of their shares was between $81.21 and $94.33 per share. The Business Court conducted a thorough analysis and concluded that “under the circumstances present here … the resulting deal price is reliable evidence of RAI’s fair value.” This approach represents an appropriate exercise of the Business Court’s discretion to select valuation methodologies under § 55-13-01(5). The Business Court plainly utilized many “customary and current valuation concepts and techniques” in addition to considering the deal price when determining fair value.

Market Check

When the directors of a corporation being sold have completed a market check, there is typically reason to believe that the deal price reflects fair value. However, we disagree with the dissenters that a court necessarily abuses its discretion when it credits the deal price resulting from a transaction during which a formal market check was not completed.

DCF

While a court may choose to rely upon a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis to determine fair value, nothing in North Carolina’s appraisal statutes demands that the Business Court do so in every case. The valuation resulting from Dr. Mark Zmijewski’s DCF analysis “far exceeds any other evidence of value in the record and suggests that RAI’s management, RAI’s Board, RAI’s Financial Advisors, RAI’s shareholders, stock market analysts, and the market itself mispriced RAI by as much as $50 billion.” Although a court might appropriately choose to credit the outlier results of a DCF analysis when there are reasons to distrust other proposed valuation methodologies, such a dramatic divergence as exhibited here— attributable almost entirely to the modeler’s choice of value on a single input—reasonably gave the Business Court cause to doubt the reliability of Dr. Zmijewski’s analysis. The Business Court did not abuse its discretion in choosing not to credit the results of Dr. Zmijewski’s DCF analysis.

Missing Witness Rule

The missing witness rule allows the fact-finder to draw an inference regarding a disputed factual issue that is adverse to a party who fails to call an available witness with peculiar knowledge of the fact to be established.” This court has not formally adopted the missing witness rule. Even assuming that the missing witness rule is recognized in North Carolina, nothing compels the factfinder to ultimately draw the requested inference. Here, RAI’s expert, Paul Gompers, relied on an expert report by Anil Shivdasani, but Shivdasani did not testify. Since the dissenters could have introduced Shivdasani’s deposition testimony but chose not to, the Business Court was entitled to presume that the substance of his testimony would not have bolstered the dissenters’ argument.

Market Efficiency

We decline to adopt a bright-line rule which would prohibit a court from finding that the market for a corporation’s shares is semi-strong efficient in the absence of direct expert-witness testimony. In its determination that the mar-

ket for RAI’s shares was semi-strong efficient—and which, by extension, supported its decision to credit Gompers’s adjusted unaffected stock price analysis in its fair value determination—the Business Court considered factors set out in Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989), which was a “fraud on the market” case. However, the Business Court also relied upon other cases in which courts considered many of the same factors examined by the Business Court when assessing market efficiency for the purposes of conducting a judicial appraisal. Moreover, Delaware courts have explicitly relied upon the Cammer factors in this same context. We find these cases persuasive. Accordingly, the Business Court did not err when it examined these factors in assessing market efficiency.

Control Premium

The dissenters argue that Gompers’s adjusted unaffected share price analysis did not reflect the fair value of their shares because the analysis “did not reflect a control premium.” A control premium is an upward adjustment to the value of stock when the block of stock being valued enables the holder to control the corporation. A court’s decision to find that a particular market-based method of valuing a corporation does or does not reflect an implicit minority discount— and a court’s separate decision to allow or reject a dissenting shareholder’s claim to their pro rata portion of a control premium—should be based on the record before the court in each particular case. Here, the dissenters have not identified record evidence supporting their assertion that RAI’s share price reflected an implicit minority discount. Accordingly, the Business Court did not err in crediting Gompers’s adjusted unaffected stock price analysis without accounting for an implicit minority discount. Affirmed. Reynolds American Inc. v. Third Motion Equities Master Fund Ltd. (Lawyers Weekly No. 010163-21, 56 pp.) (Anita Earls, J.) Appealed from Forsyth County Superior Court (Louis Bledsoe, C.J.) Donald Tucker, Christopher Capel, Clifton Brinson and Gary Bornstein for plaintiff-appellee; Jessica Thaller-Moran, Jennifer Van Zant, Lawrence Rolnick, Sheila Sadighi, Jennifer Randolph, George Sanderson, Kevin Abrams, Peter Shindel, Kieran Shanahan, Brandon Neuman and Christopher Battles for defendant-appellants; no brief for defendant-appellees. 2021-NCSC-162

Domestic Relations Parent & Child – Termination of Parental Rights – Fast-Tracked Case After being ordered not to, the respondent-mother continued to allow contact between her daughter, “Nancy,” and her boyfriend, Todd, despite Nancy’s reports of abuse by Todd, and despite Todd’s extensive criminal history and his statement that he wanted to “kill children.” Although respondent was required to submit negative drug screens in order to visit with Nancy, respondent continued to test positive for various drugs; moreover, a hair follicle test showed dangerously high levels of methamphetamine and amphetamines in Nancy. Finally, Nancy admitted to suicidal ideation and planning. The trial court determined in its initial disposition and permanency-

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planning order that the case fit within the aggravated circumstances of G.S. § 7B-901(c)(1)(b) and (c)(1)(e). Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court was not required to delay its best-interests determination. We affirm the termination of respondent’s parental rights. There was no evidence presented by any party regarding how long it might take before respondent and Nancy made sufficient progress such that visitation could resume or regarding how long it might further take to allow respondent sufficient visitation to improve her bond with Nancy. Respondent’s argument that as a matter of law she was entitled to a delay in order to potentially improve her bond with Nancy is not supported by case law, by the evidence presented at the termination hearing, or by the Juvenile Code. The trial court did not err by moving forward with its best-interests determination after it concluded that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s rights. In re N.B. (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-164-21, 17 pp.) (Anita Earls, J.) Appealed from Madison County District Court (Hal Harrison, J.) Jamie Stokes for petitioner; Sophie Goodman for guardian ad litem; Peter Wood for respondent. 2021-NCSC-154

Criminal Practice Constitutional – Continuance Denied – Harmless Error – General Intent Crime The prosecutor had assured defense counsel that the state would not use recordings of defendant’s jailhouse phone calls at trial, so counsel and his investigator focused on other elements of the defense. But the evening before jury selection started, the prosecutor told defense counsel that the state would use 23 of the more than 800 calls. The trial court erred when it denied defense counsel’s motion to continue so that counsel could review the calls. However, this was harmless error with respect to defendant’s felony murder because the calls were admitted as rebuttal evidence to defendant’s evidence of lack of specific intent. The felony underlying defendant’s felony murder conviction was the general intent crime of assault with a firearm on a government official. We affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision to uphold defendant’s felony murder conviction. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding defendant’s conviction for the specific intent crime of armed robbery. We remand for a new trial on the charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon. State v. Johnson (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-165-21, 17 pp.) (Tamara Barringer, J.) (Philip Berger, J., not participating) Appealed from Durham County Superior Court (Rebecca Holt, J.) On appeal from the Court of Appeals. Zachary Dunn for the state; Marilyn Ozer for defendant. 2021NCSC-165

Domestic Relations Parent & Child – Termination of Parental Rights – Abandonment & Failure to Pay Child Support According to the trial court’s findings of fact, since the end of the parties’ relationship near the end of 2012, when “Joe” was seven months old, the respondent-father’s only contacts with Joe were (1) at Joe’s second birthday

party and (2) an hour at a park when Joe was two years old. Moreover, respondent has not paid child support as ordered. Our review of the record reveals no error in the trial court’s termination of respondent’s parental rights. In re J.I.T. (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-166-21, 5 pp.) (Philip Berger, J.) Appealed from the District Court in Rutherford County (Ellen Shelley, J.) Martin Jarrad for petitioner; Edward Eldred for respondent. 2021-NCSC151

N.C. COURT OF APPEALS

Municipal Subdivision Approval – Water & Sewer Capacity Fees – Developer’s Contract The defendant-town asserts that it charged the plaintiff-developer future water and sewer capacity fees pursuant to the parties’ contract and not pursuant to an ordinance that is unlawful under Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town of Carthage, 369 N.C. 15, 789 S.E.2d 454 (2016). However, on the town’s motion to dismiss pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we must accept as true the developer’s allegation that the town assessed the fees pursuant to the ordinance. We reverse the trial court’s grant of the town’s motion to dismiss. The town also argues that, assuming the fees were unlawful capacity fees, the developer’s claim is time-barred under former G.S. § 160A-393.1 because the claim was brought more than one year after the regulation was applied to plaintiff. However, as in Quality Built Homes, the essence of the developer’s claims is that the town acted unlawfully by assessing a water and sewer impact fee not authorized by the Public Enterprise Statutes. These claims are thus resting upon an alleged statutory violation that resulted in the exaction of an unlawful payment which the developer has an inherent right to recoup. Bill Clark Homes of Raleigh, LLC v. Town of Fuquay-Varina (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-249-21, 13 pp.) (Valerie Zachary, J.) Appealed from Wake County Superior Court (Vince Rozier, J.) Christopher Edwards, Ryal Tayloe and Jordan Spanner for plaintiff; Dan Hartzog and Katherine Barber-Jones for defendant. 2021-NCCOA-688

Tort/Negligence STCA – Administrative – Agency Negligence – Public Duty Doctrine – Adult Care Home Where the plaintiff-adult care home alleges the defendant-agency harmed plaintiffs by negligently suspending admissions to the home and issuing statements of deficiencies, the State Tort Claims Act waives the agency’s sovereign immunity. We affirm the Industrial Commission’s denial of the agency’s motion to dismiss. Although defendant contends the STCA only applies to situations where a private person may also be liable, the STCA will be construed so as to effectuate its purpose of waiving sovereign immunity so that a person injured by the negligence of a state employee may sue the state as he


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would any other person. The “private person” language within the STCA pertains to the nature of the proceedings but does not operate to bar waiver of sovereign immunity. Defendant’s argument fails to acknowledge that many cases presented to the Commission and to this court on appeal involve regulatory action. Defendant also contends the STCA does not apply because “the statutes regulating adult care homes expressly provide for challenges of penalties and suspensions under the Administrative Procedure Act.” Defendant argues that allowing this claim amounts to an impermissible “end-run around” the process the General Assembly established for challenges to regulatory action. The availability of an administrative remedy does not preclude plaintiff from seeking a remedy under the STCA. This court recently held that an entity regulated by defendant had an adequate state remedy under the STCA. Nanny’s Korner Day Care Ctr., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 264 N.C. App. 71, 825 S.E.2d 34, appeal dismissed, review denied sub nom., Nanny’s Korner Day Care Ctr., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Div. of Child Dev. & Early Educ., 831 S.E.2d 89 (N.C. 2019). The issue in this case—whether a regulated entity has a state remedy under the STCA—has already been decided by this court in Nanny’s Korner, and that decision has not been overturned by a higher court. Accordingly, we are bound by this precedent and hold that plaintiffs were not barred from bringing a claim under the STCA. Furthermore, plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by the public duty doctrine. Under G.S. § 143-299.1A, the public duty doctrine is a defense only if the injury alleged is the result of (1) a law enforcement officer’s negligent failure to protect the plaintiff from actions of others or an act of God, or (2) a state officer’s, employee’s, involuntary servant’s, or agent’s negligent failure to perform a health or safety inspection required by statute. In all other cases the public duty doctrine is unavailable to the state as a defense. Plaintiffs’ claim is based on allegedly negligent licensure actions taken after a series of inspections. Plaintiffs’ claim is not for the alleged negligent failure to perform a health or safety inspection. Accordingly, by applying the plain language of the statute and our Supreme Court’s holding in Ray v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 366 N.C. 1, 727 S.E.2d 675 (2012), we hold that plaintiffs’ claim is not barred by the public duty doctrine. The dissent expresses concern that defendant and other state regulatory agencies will be held “in an impossible standard” liable for both enforcing and failing to enforce statutory mandates. The dissent cites in comparison our recent opinion in Tang v. N.C. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 2021-NCCOA-611 (unpublished). In Tang, it was established that the conditions actually posed a serious risk of harm to adult care facility residents, that defendant knew or should have known of the conditions, and that defendant failed to take appropriate regulatory action (i.e., assessing a Type A violation). In this case, taking the factual allegations in plaintiff’s affidavit as true, the home’s conditions did not actually pose a serious risk of harm, but defendant took the most extreme regulatory action available (i.e., multiple Type A violations and a suspension

of admissions). Although the dissent characterizes this as an impossible predicament where defendant will always be liable, these cases simply present examples where defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in fulfilling its statutory duties. Affirmed.

Concurrence

(Dietz, J.): My dissenting colleague strains to avoid Nanny’s Korner’s holding by asserting that this court’s “dismissal was the ratio decidendi and the end of our appellate mandate,” leaving the rest of the court’s analysis as unbinding “obiter dicta.” This is nonsense. It is this court’s holding that binds us, not merely the mandate or disposition, and we held in Nanny’s Korner that the plaintiff’s constitutional claim was barred because the plaintiff “had an adequate state remedy in the form of the Industrial Commission through the Torts Claim Act.”

Dissent

(Tyson, J.): The STCA only permits parties to sue the state “where the State of North Carolina, if a private person, would be liable…” G.S. § 143-291(a). Plaintiff’s allegations are wholly based on regulatory actions and sanctions defendant cited plaintiff for violating and which it has not denied. No “private person” has any right or authority to perform these exclusively state regulatory actions or to inspect or sanction a licensee for violations of laws and regulations. G.S. § 131D-2.4. Presuming defendant or its employee-agent did not act professionally or reasonably during the scope of their investigation or in preparing its 400-page “Statement of Deficiencies,” the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act provides an adequate and exclusive state remedy for allegedly improper or unjustified regulatory action by a state agency or employees. The General Assembly provided clear, but limited, internal and external remedies for parties who claim injury by unjustified regulatory agency action. If aggrieved, plaintiff possessed adequate state remedies under the NCAPA and failed to exhaust them. Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed. Cedarbrook Residential Center, Inc. v. N.C. Department of Health & Human Services (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-250-21, 33 pp.) (John Arrowood, J.) (Richard Dietz, J., concurring) (John Tyson, J., dissenting) Appealed from the Industrial Commission. Joseph Ponzi and Howard Williams for plaintiffs; Adam Doerr, Demi Lorant Bostian and Amar Majmundar for defendant. 2021-NCCOA-689

Domestic Relations Parent & Child – Support – Modification Motion – Depressed Income – Cancer – Extraordinary Expenses Where the plaintiff-father has developed cancer, as well as a host of physical ailments that make it difficult for him to tolerate the extensive physical strains required to perform his work as an instructor for the Department of Defense, but where he nevertheless continued to work until right before the start of his classes at Columbia Law School and was still willing to provide support for the parties’ children, the defendant-mother

did not show that plaintiff had reduced his income in bad faith. We affirm the trial court’s order reducing plaintiff’s child support obligation and denying defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees. Defendant sought an increase in child support to pay for the children’s new activities—music lessons, fencing and acting classes—as extraordinary expenses. No evidence showed any of the children possessed any special needs or significant talent which would require such activities. The trial court acted within its discretion when it chose not to hear evidence of the children’s activities. Defendant admitted that she had paid her attorney fees in full. Defendant also admitted, “After gross, my net is only $2,800 to $2,900, and over half of that has gone to pay my attorney fees. This was evidence that she has sufficient funds to defray the expenses and that she has funds left over after paying her household expenses. Finally, no evidence showed plaintiff had failed to pay the ordered child support or did not intend to pay his child support obligations. Defendant did not meet her burden of proving she was entitled to an attorney’s fee award. Affirmed. Mendez v. Mendez (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-251-21, 13 pp.) (John Tyson, J.) Appealed from Mecklenburg County District Court (Christine Mann, J.) Keith Metz for plaintiff; Melissa Clark-Ford for defendant. 2021-NCCOA-691

Constitutional Right to Farm Act – Limitation on Nuisance Actions The Right to Farm Act, G.S. § 106-700, as amended in 2019, limits nuisance actions against farms. Although plaintiffs contend that the recent amendments to the statute violate the Law of the Land Clause, the amendments fall within the state’s police power and promotes the state’s goal of protecting agricultural activities in North Carolina. We affirm the superior court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint. The state’s long-asserted interest in promoting and preserving agriculture, forestry, horticulture, livestock, and animal husbandry activities and production within North Carolina clearly rests within the scope of the state’s police power. The statute and its amendments are intended to promote agricultural and forestry activities and production in North Carolina by defining and limiting nuisance claims against agricultural, forestry and related operations. Limiting the potential nuisance liability of agricultural, forestry and related operations helps ensure the state’s goal of protecting agricultural activities in North Carolina and encouraging the availability and continued “production of food, fiber, and other products.” § 106-700. Plaintiffs argue the amendments are private or special laws “relating to health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances” in violation of N.C. Const. art. II, § 23. The amendments are statewide laws of general applicability to “agricultural and forestry operation[s].” The distinction between agricultural “production of food, fiber, and other products” and forestry and all other industries is germane to the amendments’ stated purpose to preserve and protect the agricultural and forestry

activities and production. The amendments seek to define and ameliorate the consequences that nuisance suits by remote parties pose prospectively to established and essential agricultural and forestry operations. Finally, all members of the classifications of agricultural and forestry operations, subject to the amendments’ general terms and applicability, may invoke their protections against suit. Affirmed. Rural Empowerment Association for Community Help v. State (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-252-21, 19 pp.) (John Tyson, J.) Appealed from Wake County Superior Court. Elizabeth Haddix, Mark Dorosin, Burton Craige, Narendra Ghosh and Christopher Brook for plaintiffs; Matthew Tulchin, Kenzie Rakes, Nathan Huff, Jared Burtner, Thomas Siler, Nicholas Mirisani, Christopher Smith, David Ortiz and Phillip Jacob Parker for defendants; Blakely Hildebrand, Alex Hardee, Chandra Taylor, Matthew Ballew, Tien Cheng and Christopher McLennan for amici curiae. 2021-NCCOA-693

Tort/Negligence Negligent Misrepresentation & Fraud – Banks & Banking – Loan Officer’s Representation Where (1) plaintiff was an experienced real estate investor; (2) he had never done business with the defendant-bank before; (3) after a loan officer assured him that his application for a home equity line of credit (HELOC) would go through, plaintiff withdrew $670,000 from his IRA to buy a new property, intending to replace the IRA funds within the 60day grace period with money from the HELOC; (4) the bank later informed plaintiff that the bank did not make HELOCs in excess of $250,000 and offered him a conventional loan instead, which plaintiff declined; and (5) plaintiff acknowledges that the bank rectified any confusion, plaintiff has not alleged facts that would support a claim for negligent misrepresentation. We affirm the trial court’s grant of the bank’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Although plaintiff alleges that the bank assured him on “repeated occasions” that his loan “would go through,” he fails to allege when and where those assurances were made. Moreover, the bank’s purported assurances that a “loan would go through” relate to prospective events and are insufficient to state a claim for fraud. The promise to lend was not based on any false statement of an existing fact. Plaintiff fails to allege the materiality of a HELOC. There is no allegation of why he required a HELOC to repay funds into his IRA. Plaintiff fails to allege any substantive basis for his rejection of the conventional loan he was offered. He alleges he was given only seven hours to decide whether to accept the bank’s offer and asserts the proposed loan was subject to onerous conditions. Given his past conversations and negotiations with the bank, plaintiff fails to allege why he reasonably could not review and commit within seven hours, or what other “onerous conditions” were attached to the loan. Plaintiff is an experienced real estate professional, who has bought, sold, owned, and financed several properties. Plaintiff owned assets worth several millions of dollars. Plaintiff allegedly relied upon conver-


18 / OPINION DIGESTS sations with a lender, with whom he had no previous relationship to make a significant financial decision, before applying for a loan. Plaintiff could not conceivably place reasonable reliance upon a loan officer’s forecasts that his “loan would go through” or that it would close by a certain date. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for fraud. Affirmed. Roberson v. TruPoint Bank (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-253-21, 11 pp.) (John Tyson, J.) Appealed from Buncombe County Superior Court (Marvin Pope, J.) Annabelle Chambers, Jake Snider and Brent Helms for plaintiff; Joseph McGuire for defendant. 2021-NCCOA-692

Domestic Relations Alimony & Child Support – ‘Security’ – Life Insurance – Equitable Distribution – Attorney’s Fees The trial court ordered the defendant-husband to maintain a $550,000 life insurance policy to secure his child support arrearage and his alimony obligation. Not only did the trial court’s order over-collateralize defendant’s obligations, but it also could have the effect of awarding the plaintiff-wife a second alimony award, payable after defendant’s death. An alimony obligation ends upon the payor’s death. We vacate and remand the parts of the trial court’s order requiring defendant to maintain life insurance and awarding plaintiff attorney’s fees. Otherwise, we affirm. G.S. § 50-16.7(b) provides in relevant part that a court ordering the payment of alimony may “require the supporting spouse to secure the payment of alimony ... by means of a bond, mortgage, or deed of trust, or any other means ordinarily used to secure an obligation to pay money or transfer property[.]”We hold that the life insurance the trial court ordered defendant to maintain did not qualify as “security” within the meaning of § 50- 16.7(b), and therefore do not reach the issue of whether life insurance can qualify as a “means ordinarily used to secure an obligation to pay money” under § 50-16.7(b). Alimony and other payments made to support a dependent spouse terminate on the death of either party unless they are part of a complete settlement of all property and marital rights between the parties for which there is reciprocal consideration, such that the entire agreement would be destroyed by a modification of the support provision. The requirement in the trial court’s order that defendant “secure his child support arrears and alimony by maintaining life insurance on his life with a death benefit of $550,000.00,” was, in effect, a second award of alimony rather than security for his alimony obligation of $1,900 per month and unsatisfied child support arrears. The obligations purportedly secured by the policy were the net, unsatisfied child support arrears that accrued between 1 February 2020 and 30 June 2020 of $18,026.75 and a total potential alimony obligation of $456,000 in nominal terms (i.e., without any adjustment for inflation or other discounts), assuming (1) defendant survived the entire 20 years he was ordered to pay $1,900 per month in alimony; (2) the parties never reconciled; and (3) plaintiff never remarried. That is, setting aside the validity of this purported security, if the requirement that defendant maintain

life insurance with a death benefit of $550,000 was, in fact, security for his unsatisfied, net child support arrears and his total potential alimony exposure, the life insurance over-collateralized the obligations secured, which equaled at most $474,026.75. The obligations purportedly secured equaled $75,973.25 less than the $550,000 of “security.” More fundamentally, the order was, in effect, a second award of alimony. Were defendant to pay his net, unsatisfied child support arrears on or before 5 July 2020 and the $1,900 per month, as ordered, but pass away on 31 July 2040, the day before his final $1,900 monthly alimony payment was due, assuming the parties never reconciled and plaintiff never remarried, plaintiff would receive a windfall, more than a double recovery of the amounts purportedly “secured” by the life insurance. Accordingly, we hold that the life insurance the trial court ordered defendant to maintain did not qualify as “security” within the meaning of § 50-16.7(b). Finally, “alimony shall terminate upon the death of either the supporting or the dependent spouse.” G.S. § 50-16.9(b). The death benefit of the life insurance defendant was ordered to maintain would constitute alimony plaintiff received after defendant’s death—upon the occurrence of which any obligation of defendant to pay plaintiff alimony would have been extinguished. Section 50-16.7(b) does not create an exception from the rule that an alimony obligation terminates upon the death of either the supporting or dependent spouse. We therefore vacate the portion of the trial court’s order requiring defendant to maintain life insurance with a death benefit of $550,000 naming plaintiff as beneficiary. Finally, our review of the record shows that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to plaintiff included fees attributable to the equitable distribution portions of the case, which was improper. We vacate and remand for entry of an attorney’s fee award that does not include fees for equitable distribution. Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded. Wadsworth v. Wadsworth (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-254-21, 20 pp.) (Darren Jackson, J.) Appealed from Johnston County District Court (Jim Love, J.) Mary McCullers Reece for plaintiff; Tiffanie Meyers for defendant. 2021-NCCOA-703

Criminal Practice Second-Degree Murder – ‘Accident’ – Sentencing – Malice A witness who had been incarcerated with defendant testified that defendant said both defendant and the victim had their hands on the gun when it went off, killing the victim. Nevertheless, defendant testified that he was not in the room and did not fire the gun; furthermore, defendant extensively impeached the inmate’s testimony. Defendant may not now rely on the inmate’s testimony to contend he was entitled to an instruction on accident, a theory he personally disclaimed at trial. We find no error in defendant’s conviction of second-degree murder. Defendant argues that he is permitted to rely on inconsistent defenses. This argument is without merit. Defendant cannot simultaneously deny that he committed the shooting

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and claim that he accidentally committed the shooting. The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, does not suggest that defendant committed acts which brought about the death of the victim. Because there was not sufficient evidence to entitle defendant to an instruction on the defense of accident, the trial court did not err by omitting an instruction on that defense.

Sentencing

Malice may be shown in at least three different ways: (1) actual malice, meaning hatred, ill-will or spite; (2) an inherently dangerous act done so recklessly and wantonly as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty and deliberately bent on mischief; or (3) that condition of mind which prompts a person to take the life of another intentionally without just cause, excuse, or justification. The second type of malice is commonly referred to as “depraved-heart” malice. The crime of second-degree murder has two potential classifications, B1 and B2, depending on the facts of the murder. While second-degree murder is generally classified as a B1 offense, it is classified as a B2 offense where depraved heart malice is used prove the offense. G.S. § 14-17(b). A general verdict would be ambiguous for sentencing purposes where the jury is charged on second-degree murder and presented with evidence that might allow them to find that either B2 depraved-heart malice or another B1 malice theory existed. Here however, the jury’s verdict was not ambiguous because there was no evidence in support of depraved-heart malice. The evidence tending to show defendant’s guilt supported only B1 theories of malice, and the jury was instructed only on those theories. Although the jury returned a general verdict convicting defendant of second-degree murder, it is apparent from the evidence presented and instructions given that the jury, by their verdict, found defendant guilty of B1 second-degree murder. The trial court did not err by sentencing defendant as a Class B1 felon. No error. State v. Crisp (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-255-21, 16 pp.) (Allegra Collins, J.) Appealed from Swain County Superior Court (Alan Thornburg, J.) Marissa Jensen for the state; Candace Washington for defendant. 2021-NCCOA-697

Criminal Practice MAR – Prisons & Jails – Pandemic – Risk of Serious Illness or Death Defendant’s sentence was lawful when imposed. While we do not dispute the gravity of defendant’s predicament—being incarcerated during a pandemic while also suffering from health conditions that make him more susceptible to the disease—and while the state may have a duty to modify the conditions under which it holds individuals who are incarcerated, the mere fact that one is held in prison does not give rise to a claim of cruel and unusual punishment or make that imprisonment invalid as a matter of law. We affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for appropriate relief and relief under habeas corpus. Defendant failed to fulfill the procedural requirements to properly seek

habeas relief. Our affirmation of the denial of such relief is without prejudice to defendant’s right to seek habeas relief with a properly supported petition. State v. Thorpe (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-256-21, 7 pp) (John Arrowood, J.) Appealed from Wake County Superior Court (Paul Ridgeway, J.) Zachary Dunn for the state; Heidi Reiner for defendant. 2021-NCCOA-701

Criminal Practice Human Trafficking – Multiple Counts – Sentencing – Prior Record Level G.S. § 14-43.11 defines human trafficking such that defendant could be guilty of multiple counts as to each victim. We find no error in defendant’s convictions of 12 counts of human trafficking, 11 counts of promoting prostitution, four counts of conspiracy to promote prostitution and attaining habitual felon status. Defendant capitalized on six women’s addictions to heroin and dire economic circumstances to manipulate them to engage in prostitution arranged via online advertisements set up by defendant and his wife, Samantha Rivard. The women gave money paid and received from engaging in sexual acts to Defendant in exchange for heroin, food, transportation, and a place to live.

Competency & Proceeding Pro Se

A defendant who is competent to stand trial may also waive his right to counsel and represent himself. The record and the substantial interaction between the court and defendant shows the court undertook a thorough and realistic account of defendant’s mental capacities and competence before concluding defendant was competent to waive counsel and to proceed pro se. Separate trial judges held two competency hearings regarding defendant’s mental capacity. Even were we to agree the trial court erred in allowing defendant to represent himself, defendant has made no showing he was prejudiced by his lack of counsel. Stand-by counsel was available to assist and was consulted to assist defendant in navigating the proceedings. Further, given the overwhelming evidence against defendant, any asserted error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Indictments

The indictments allege every element of the offense (human trafficking in violation of G.S. § 14-43.11(a) (i)) within a specific timeframe for each separate victim. The indictments clearly allege the crimes for which defendant was being charged and gave him notice to prepare and assert his defense.

Human Trafficking

G.S. § 14-43.11 states, “(a) A person commits the offense of human trafficking when that person (i) knowingly or in reckless disregard of the consequences of the action recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means another person with the intent that the other person be held in involuntary servitude or sexual servitude or (ii) willfully or in reckless disregard of the consequences of the action causes a minor to be held in involuntary servitude or sexual servitude… “(c) Each violation of this section constitutes a separate offense and shall not merge with any other of-


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fense.” Defendant argues the General Assembly did not intend to punish an offender multiple times for what he asserts is the same continuing crime by allowing a prosecutor to charge countless offenses for each separate act an offender took in order to hold a victim in sexual servitude. Defendant’s and the dissent’s interpretation of the statute disregards the words “entice” and “harbor” and would result in perpetrators exploiting victims for multiple acts, in multiple times and places, regardless of the length of the timeframe over which the crimes occurred as long as the defendant’s illegal actions and control over the victim were “continuous.” Whether defendant’s actions violate the elements of the statute is ultimately a matter of fact for the jury to determine. The jury acquitted defendant on five counts of human trafficking of victims J.O. and E.C. Sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to enable it to unanimously reach its verdicts with care and discernment as between the evidence presented of various charges and multiple victims. The statute and intent of the General Assembly are clear. Defendant’s arguments asserting human trafficking is a continual offense and may only be charged as one crime for each victim is without merit and overruled.

Prior Record Level

While defendant may not have “stipulated” to the sentencing worksheet itself in writing, defendant failed to object to the classification of his prior felony firearm possession conviction as a Class G felony each time he was presented an opportunity. Defendant reviewed and understood the prior record worksheet, and he objected to portions of it. Because of his silence, defendant cannot now contest the remaining convictions to calculate his prior record level. Defendant argues because the timeframe the crimes against A.B. and M.F. occurred is after 1 December 2014, when G.S. § 90-113.22A went into effect, the state is required to prove defendant’s possession of drug paraphernalia conviction was related to a controlled substance other than marijuana. At trial, however, defendant acknowledged “possession of drug paraphernalia ... [is] a misdemeanor.” The trial court indicated the paraphernalia conviction “is noted as a misdemeanor on the worksheet,” to which defendant responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” By not objecting to the inclusion of the paraphernalia conviction when given an opportunity, and by not presenting any evidence to support his contention, defendant left the trial court without a means to determine the validity of his contention. Defendant has failed to show any error in the trial court’s determination of his prior record level. No error.

Dissent

(Arrowood, J.): Where a criminal statute does not define a unit of prosecution, a violation thereof should be treated as a continuing offense. The state has failed to show defendant should be convicted on multiple counts of human trafficking per victim, as opposed to a single, continuing count per victim. Statutes creating criminal offenses must be strictly construed against the State.” Our human trafficking statute is clear in its use of the word “another”

in subsection (a) as it pertains to the victim: the law intends to protect individual victims from human trafficking, and, read in conjunction with subsection (c), anyone in violation thereof will, at a minimum, face charges for each victim affected. Common sense dictates that the offense of human trafficking should encompass the entire period of a victim’s being held in involuntary or sexual servitude from the time of the initial act of” recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining begins until the victim’s free will is regained. State v. Applewhite (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-257-21, 49 pp.) (John Tyson, J.) (John Arrowood, J., dissenting) Appealed from Cumberland County Superior Court (Thomas Lock, J.) Mercedes Restucha-Klem for the state; Michael Casterline for defendant. 2021-NCCOA-694

Criminal Practice Constitutional – Free Speech – General Assembly Hallway – Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Statement of Charges Since the General Assembly’s visitor rules are content-neutral and are reasonable “time, place, and manner” restrictions, defendant’s First Amendment rights were not violated when he was charged with seconddegree trespass after he and his fellow protestors refused to lower their noise level in halls of the General Assembly. We find no error in defendant’s conviction for second-degree trespass.

Jurisdiction

Our superior courts do not have original jurisdiction to try a misdemeanor charged in a statement of charges. However, in this case, a grand jury made a presentment to the district attorney, which was followed by an indictment. Nevertheless, prior to defendant’s trial in superior court, the prosecutor substituted a statement of charges for the indictment. Under State v. Capps, 374 N.C. 621, 843 S.E.2d 167 (2020), the statement of charges can be treated as an amendment to the indictment. Since the only difference between the indictment and the statement of charges was that the former described the premises in question as those “of the North Carolina General Assembly” while the latter described the premises as those “of the State of North Carolina,” the amendment was permissible.

First Amendment

Contrary to defendant’s argument, this is not a case about free speech— it is a case about loud speech. While protesting health care policy, defendant led protesters through the halls of the General Assembly, chanting loudly. After complaints from legislative staff, the General Assembly’s police chief told protesters to lower their noise level or face arrest. The protesters did not quiet down, and they were arrested. The General Assembly’s visitor rules are content-neutral. Even if defendant’s First Amendment rights were implicated, they were not violated. The visitor rules are reasonable “time, place, and manner” restrictions. The interior of the General Assembly is not an unlimited public forum. While citizens are free to visit the General Assembly and communicate with members and staff, the govern-

ment may prohibit loud, boisterous conduct on a content-neutral basis that would affect the ability of members and staff to carry on legislative functions. The legislative rules serve a significant interest of limiting loud disruptions, and defendant has various other channels to make his concerns known and to otherwise engage in protests of legislative policies. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s First Amendment rights were not violated by the application of the legislative rules that support his conviction. No error.

Concurrence

(Inman, J.): I concur in the result of the majority’s First Amendment ruling. A law or regulation that principally concerns itself with conduct may also burden speech and be subject to First Amendment protections. The General Assembly’s visitor rule places at least an incidental burden on speech, as it explicitly includes “singing, clapping, shouting, [and] playing instruments” as “nonexclusive examples of behaviors that may disturb the General Assembly.” If a city noise ordinance that forbids deliberately noisy or diversionary activity that disrupts or is about to disrupt normal school activities, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), is subject to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny as a time, place, and manner restriction on expression, it is hard to discern how the visitor rule is not also a time, place, and manner restriction subject to the same level of First Amendment review. The General Assembly allows any and all speech that falls within a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction. As a result, the hallway where defendant was arrested qualifies as a designated public forum. Nevertheless, the visitor rule is a reasonable time, place and manner restriction that survives intermediate judicial review. I also conclude that defendant’s prosecution did not violate his rights under N.C. Const. art. I, § 12 “to instruct [his] representatives, and to apply to the General Assembly for redress of grievances.” To the extent that this argument is encompassed by defendant’s underlying First Amendment challenge, it fails alongside that as-applied claim. State v. Barber (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-258-21, 27 pp.) (Chris Dillon, J.) (Lucy Inman, J., concurring in part & concurring in result in part) Appealed from Wake County Superior Court (Stephen Futrell, J.) Matthew Tulchin for the state; Scott Holmes, Irving Joyner and Malcolm Ray Hunter for defendant. 2021-NCCOA-695

Criminal Practice Probation Revocation – Mismatched Oral & Written Findings The transcript shows that the trial court checked the wrong boxes on the judgments revoking defendant’s probation. Since the judgments do not allow us to determine whether the trial court would have revoked defendant’s probation on any appropriate grounds, we must vacate the judgments and remand. The trial court marked boxes on the form judgments indicating defendant had waived his hearing and admitted to all eight of the violations

in the violation report. The trial court did not mark the box indicating each of those violations alone would support revoking defendant’s probation. Moreover, the trial court marked the boxes making separate findings that revocation was appropriate because defendant committed a new crime or absconded, and the box indicating defendant had served two prior Confinement in Response to Violation (CRV) terms. As evidenced by the transcript itself, however, defendant did not waive his revocation hearing. Defendant expressly denied all eight of the allegations, and the trial court stated it would only find that defendant had violated the eighth violation—not complying with his Security Risk Group (SRG) Agreement. Nothing in the record indicates the trial court ordered a second CRV term in case number 17 CRS 86913. Therefore, the judgments do not provide this court with aa basis to determine whether the trial court would have decided to revoke defendant’s probation on any appropriate grounds. We note that the SRG Agreement was an express condition of defendant’s probation only in case number 18 CRS 338. Therefore, the trial court could not have properly found that defendant violated the SRG Agreement in case number 17 CRS 86913. Moreover, even assuming the trial court did not err in finding that defendant violated a valid condition by not complying with the SRG Agreement, in order to revoke probation, the trial court would have also had to find that defendant committed a new crime, absconded, or served two prior terms of CRV in this matter. Because the record does not indicate that defendant served two prior CRV periods in 17 CRS 86913, this would not be a proper basis for revoking his probation in that case. Vacated and remanded. State v. Whatley (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-259-21, 11 pp.) (Toby Hampson, J.) Appealed from Buncombe County Superior Court (Steve Warren, J.) Amar Majmundar and Grace Linthicum for the state; Kerri Sigler for defendant. 2021-NCCOA-702

Criminal Practice Constitutional – Ineffective Assistance Claim – Opening Statement Admissions– Harbison Inquiry Even if it would have been ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel to admit to elements of the charged crime, and also to a lesser-included offense, during his opening statement, the trial court conducted a sufficient inquiry under State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175, 337 S.E.2d 504 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123 (1986), to ensure that defendant had consented to counsel’s admissions. We find no error in defendant’s convictions of sale of heroin, possession with intent to sell or distribute (PWISD) heroin, possession of drug paraphernalia, and attaining habitual felon status. During his opening statement, defense counsel admitted that the state would show the jury a video of defendant delivering a substance to an informant and that the substance turned out to be heroin. However, counsel said defendant did not realize the substance was heroin. At the urging of the prosecutor, the trial court thereafter engaged in


20 / OPINION DIGESTS a colloquy with defendant to ensure that defendant understood and had consented to counsel’s admissions. Admission by defense counsel of an element of a crime charged, while still maintaining the defendant’s innocence, does not necessarily amount to a Harbison error. Defendant testified at trial that he, in fact, did take the baggie containing heroin to the informant as a favor to suspected drug dealer Daniel Cox, but he did not know the substance in the baggie was heroin, and he never intended to sell heroin during that exchange. Thus, defendant maintained although he may have committed the acts in question, he did not have the requisite intent to convict on these charges. Therefore, as to the sale of heroin and PWISD heroin charges, defense counsel did not admit defendant’s guilt because defense counsel did not admit defendant intended to sell or deliver the heroin. Harbison also encompasses defense counsel’s implied concession to his client’s guilt without prior authorization. Here, defense counsel’s statements could have been admissions to defendant possessing drug paraphernalia. Defendant testified that he exchanged the baggie for money and that he thought the substance may have been “hash.” Thus, defendant testified to other incriminating circumstances that may have been sufficient to satisfy the intent requirement for possession of drug paraphernalia. Moreover, counsel’s admission of a lesser-included charge also triggers Harbison. Possession of narcotics is an element, and therefore a lesser included offense, of possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver narcotics. Although defense counsel may not have expressly admitted to defendant knowingly possessing heroin, counsel’s statements implicated a lesser-included offense possibly triggering Harbison. However, even assuming these statements were, in fact, admissions of possession of drug paraphernalia and lesserincluded drug possession offenses under Harbison, the trial court’s inquiry into defendant’s prior consent was adequate. During its colloquy with defendant, the trial court did not discuss the state’s burden in the possession of drug paraphernalia charge. Although the trial court did not specifically address the elements of possession of drug paraphernalia and the state’s burden in proving this charge, the trial court did go into detail with respect to the other charges. Moreover, the trial court asked defendant whether he was aware defense counsel admitted “at least some of the things that the State would need to prove to convict” defendant. Defendant acknowledged that he did understand. The trial court also asked whether defendant had discussed these statements before trial and whether defense counsel had defendant’s “permission to make those admissions[.]” Defendant answered in the affirmative. Therefore, although the better practice may have been for defense counsel to make a record of defendant’s consent prior to making these opening statements, the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry after the fact under Harbison to establish a record of defendant’s consent to these admissions.

No error. State v. Bryant (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-260-21, 17 pp.) (Toby Hampson, J.) Appealed from Craven County Superior Court (Joshua Willey, J.) Forrest Fallanca for the state; Brennan Aberle for defendant. 2021-NCCOA-696

Criminal Practice Sex Offender – Failure to Register – False Address Where defendant falsely reported that his address was 1010 Foxcroft Lane, Building 604, Apartment A6 in Statesville, but where defendant was actually staying in 1010 Foxcroft Lane, Building 602, Apartment A6, a jury could find that defendant submitted the address information under false pretenses. We find no error in defendant’s convictions of failing to register as a sex offender and attaining the status of a habitual felon. Although Buildings 602 and 604 are separate buildings, they are adjoined by a breezeway. The evidence before the trial court included (1) on 25 June 2019, defendant represented both that he resided at 1010 Foxcroft Lane, Building 604, Apartment A6, and that he was homeless—two things that could not both be true; (2) that very same day, defendant was seen at Building 602, Apartment A6, not Building 604, Apartment A6, where he represented to the sheriff’s office he resided, suggesting that he did not, in fact, reside in Building 604 despite representing that he did (but which could also tend to show that he resided in neither place, and was homeless on 25 June 2019); and (3) on 26 June 2019, an occupant of the apartment where defendant claimed he lived informed a deputy that defendant did not live there. A reasonable juror could have inferred from the evidence that defendant willfully misrepresented to the sheriff’s office that he lived in Apartment A6 of Building 604 on 25 June 2019. When a person is required to register as a sex offender, providing an incorrect address on the forms used by the sheriff’s office to record and monitor compliance with the requirement to register is a misrepresentation that constitutes circumstantial evidence of deceptive intent, as well as the mental state of willfulness. While this evidence of defendant’s willful state of mind and deceptive intent was circumstantial, deceptive intent is seldom proven by direct evidence, and willfulness too often must be inferred from the surrounding circumstances rather than proven through direct evidence. Altogether, a reasonable inference of defendant’s guilt may be drawn from these circumstances. The jury also heard from Deputy Cody James that she believed defendant was trying to trick her and avoid supervision by providing an incorrect address. The jury also heard of a potential motive that by providing an address on 25 June 2019, this gave defendant an excuse from signing the homeless log on 21 June 2019 and 24 June 2019. Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, and giving the state the benefit of every reasonable inference arising from the evidence, we hold that the evidence that defendant was guilty of violating G.S. § 14-208.11(a) (4) by submitting false information about his whereabouts to the Iredell

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County Sheriff’s Office on 25 June 2019 was sufficient to go to the jury. No error.

Dissent

(Dillon, J.): It is not enough for the state to produce evidence showing that defendant registered a false address or even that he did so knowingly. Rather, it is the state’s burden to produce evidence that raises at least a reasonable inference that defendant acted willfully, under false pretenses, that is, evidence from which the illicit purpose motivating defendant to misreport can be reasonably inferred. While the state put on evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that defendant, in fact, did not live in Building 604 (but rather in Building 602), I cannot understand how one could reasonably infer from that evidence that defendant misreported for some illicit purpose or, otherwise, in an attempt to deceive the sheriff’s office. The state’s main theory regarding defendant’s willfulness/false pretense motive was that defendant misreported his address for the purpose of avoiding supervision by the sheriff’s office. The state explains that defendant—knowing that the sheriff’s office would be aware that the occupants of Building 602, Apt. A6 were being evicted, as it was that office’s duty to execute on the eviction—lied about his address (by reporting Building 604 as his address) to avoid having to report every other day as a homeless offender. However, the state’s own evidence offered at trial conclusively belies the state’s theory. Specifically, the state’s evidence showed that defendant informed the sheriff’s office that he no longer lived in any apartment unit by signing the homeless log. Defendant made his misreport timely (within three business days of moving into the apartment). He signed the homeless log timely (as soon as he was again homeless). Though he misreported the building number, this misreport could not have been made to avoid supervision, as he had already moved out and had already accurately reported that he was again homeless. The majority suggests that the two reports, being made on the same day, were inconsistent. However, the state’s own evidence shows that defendant was simply following the rules in making the two reports. It is true that the sheriff’s office did not know where defendant was living over that weekend. But the office’s reporting rules did not require defendant to report that he had been living in the apartment until the day he was kicked out. One could suspect that defendant moved into the apartment after Friday June 21, residing there for less than five days, but that he reported Friday as his move-in date to hide his failure to sign the homeless log that Friday, as he would have been required to do. Indeed, one may have a suspicion that defendant lied for this very purpose. But the state did not meet its burden of presenting evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that defendant was, in fact, homeless on Friday June 21. Our law does not allow a defendant to be convicted on mere suspicion. State v. Lamp (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-261-21, 17 pp.) (Darren Jackson, J.) (Chris Dillon, J., dissenting) Appealed from Iredell County Superior Court (Joseph Crosswhite, J.) Deborah Greene for the state; Mark Hayes for defendant. 2021-NCCOA-698

Criminal Practice Murder – Relatives’ Testimony – Grief – Alleged Coordination Evidence that the victim’s brother grieved by withdrawing from communicating with others was relevant to rebut defendant’s theory that the brother influenced another witness to speak to the police. We find no error in defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder. The jury heard testimony and evidence to support the facts that (1) defendant was in the home when the victim was murdered; (2) the victim had not been awoken by an intruder or the couple’s dog barking; (3) there were no signs of forcible entry and nothing appeared displaced; (4) the murder weapon was usually stored in the kitchen drawer among other miscellaneous items; and (5) the weapon was later found discarded outside right next to the home. Defendant’s fingerprints were not found on the gun. A DNA mixture was found on the gun, but the major contributor was the victim. No determination could be made about the two minor contributors. No blood was found on defendant’s clothing. No gunshot residue was found on defendant’s hands, pants, or underwear, but her shirt contained one small particle, characteristic of gunshot residue, but with the origin inconclusive. Family friend Roxanne Whittington visited defendant about a week later and found defendant’s demeanor to be “very cold.” Whittington told police about the visit. The following month, Whittington initiated a second interview with police. Sabrina Adams, who worked in the victim’s medical practice, testified that defendant, who was the office manager, had failed to pay withholding taxes from employee paychecks for four years. The state theorized that defendant had killed the victim to keep him from learning about the withholding tax deficit. On appeal, defendant challenges the admission of testimony from the victim’s brother, Richard, and Richard’s wife that, after the victim’s death, Richard had locked himself in his room and not communicated much with family members. First, defendant did not object to such evidence, and she elicited similar evidence on cross-examination of these witnesses. Second, the evidence was relevant to rebut evidence suggesting that Richard had spoken with Whittington shortly after the victim’s death, supplied her with incriminating information that she had told the police, and had influenced Whittington’s decision to initiate the second police interview, wherein she said she believed defendant had murdered the victim. In any event, overwhelming circumstantial evidence links defendant to the murder, that is wholly unrelated to evidence about Richard’s grief dealing with the unexpected death of his brother. No reasonable probability is shown that, had the challenged statements been excluded, the jury would have acquitted defendant of first-degree murder. No error. State v. McCutcheon (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-262-21, 15 pp.) (John Tyson, J.) (John Arrowood, J., concurring in result only without separate opinion) Appealed from Buncombe County Superior Court (Peter Knight, J.) Robert Ennis for the state; Emily Holmes Davis for defendant. 2021-NCCOA-699


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North Carolina Lawyers Weekly January 17, 2022 by SC Biz News - Issuu