Malaysia A Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering The Course

MALAYSIA A MARITIME NATION AGENDA

STEERING THE COURSE

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editors

Capt Ivan Mario Andrew RMN Director General of RMN SPC

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nazli Aziz Coordinator of Centre for Ocean Governance, INOS UMT

Editorial Assistants

Cdr Azrul Nezam Asri RMN

Lt Cdr Hafizan Tarmidi RMN

Lt Cdr Danish Asyraff Abdullah RMN

Published by

ROYAL MALAYSIAN NAVY SEA POWER CENTRE (RMN SPC)

Jalan Sultan Yahya Petra

54100 KUALA LUMPUR

Email: rmnspc@navy.mil.my

Tel: +603 2202 7260

First Published 2023

ISBN 978-967-26093-1-5

Printed by Arif Corporation Sdn. Bhd. 42, Jalan Pengasah 15/13, Seksyen 15, 40200 SHAH ALAM, Selangor

Disclaimer

The views expressed are the author’s own and not necessarily those of the RMN Sea Power Centre. The Government of Malaysia will not be legally responsible in contract, tort or otherwise, for any statement made in this publication.

Copyright of RMN Sea Power Centre (RMN SPC), 2023

© All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means; electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission in writing from the RMN SPC.

PREFACE

This second volume of Malaysia is a Maritime Nation Agenda is compiling various chapters on Malaysia’s past, present and future issues and agendas. It carries the same main title but this volume is focusing on steering the course of the Malaysian maritime agenda. Given the dynamic of maritime agenda at domestic, regional and international levels, the topics addressed in this volume are relevant to understand the strengths, weaknesses, progress, threats, opportunities and challenges that are faced by Malaysia in navigating her direction as a maritime nation.

Surrounded by territorial waters, making sense of Malaysia’s geographical location as a maritime nation is easy. However, steering the course to understand and advance Malaysia’s position as a maritime nation is complicated because of her strategic location. This volume is broad in scope and entails a pluralist-dimensional worldview. It manifests the dynamic and ever-changing perspectives in analysing the nature of different actors interacted at three levels of power authority – domestic, regional and international. The contents in this book has been discussed from historical to current and philosophical to empirical as well as from behavioural to institutional perspectives. The analysis made by the chapter contributors, however, do not necessarily reflect the view of the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN), Universiti Malaysia Terengganu (UMT) and the Malaysian government.

This second volume is organised into six parts. It begins with Part I: Overview and Context, an introductory chapter penned by the editors themselves. Part II contains four chapters that discuss topics on geo strategic and security environment. Consequently, Part III with three chapters addresses topic on Indo-Pacific Strategy and its impacts to Malaysia. As the global agenda has evolved and we are faced the “unconventional” threats, Part IV raises topics related to the border security with four chapters. Meanwhile, Part V comprises two chapters. It touches on blue economy as one of the vital global agenda that intertwined closely with the global development. Finally, Part VI is the epilogue that concludes the topics discussed in this volume.

We would like to extend our gratitude to all chapter contributors. Their valued contributions have enriched our knowledge and permitted this second volume to be published. However, the publication of this book is not intended to exercise ideological and partisan perspectives towards any actors. We also would like to thank everyone who has been involved directly or indirectly in realising this book. Finally, our hope is that the readers of this book would be able to generate new insights related to the efforts in steering Malaysia’s maritime agenda.

Editors, Captain Ivan Mario Andrew RMN Director General, RMN Sea Power Centre (PUSMAS TLDM)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nazli Aziz Coordinator, Centre for Ocean Governance, Institute of Oceanography and Environment, Universiti Malaysia Terengganu

PREFACE

CONTENTS

PART I: OVERVIEW AND CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

Editors

PART II: GEOSTRATEGIC AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER ONE

MALAYSIA A MARITIME NATION: MAINTAINING RESILIENCE IN MANAGING THE CURRENT STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Captain Ivan Mario Andrew RMN

CHAPTER TWO

SHAPING NAVAL POWER: IMPLICATION OF AUKUS TO MALAYSIA’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Captain Ahmad Rashidi Othman RMN

CHAPTER THREE

STRENGTHENING MARITIME SUSTAINABLE AND MARINE ECOSYSTEM PROTECTION THROUGH SECURITY COOPERATION

Commander Azrul Nezam Asri RMN and Lieutenant Mohd Massuoadi Mohd Zukri RMN

CHAPTER FOUR

LABUAN 1846-1963: PORT AND POLITICS OF THE BRITISH MARITIME AGENDA

Nazli Aziz

PART III: INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY

CHAPTER FIVE

MALAYSIA IN THE INDO-PACIFIC ENVELOPE: THE GREAT GAME 2.0

Captain Mohd Yusri Yusoff RMN

CHAPTER SIX

MALAYSIA’S STRATEGIC RESPONSES TOWARDS THE INDO-PACIFIC CONSTRUCT

Tharishini Krishnan

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH: HOW NAVIES CAN SERVE A SHARED INTEREST TO THE INDO-PACIFIC COMMITMENT

Commander Muhamad Zafran Whab RMN

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

PART IV: BORDER SECURITY

CHAPTER EIGHT

MALAYSIA’S MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES DURING COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Captain Tay Yap Leong RMN and Nor Aini Mohd Nordin

CHAPTER NINE

THE ASEAN’S STRATEGIC VALUE IN ENSURING THE MARITIME SECURITY

Captain Mohd Reduan Ayob RMN

CHAPTER TEN

THE EVER-PRESENT OF ABU SAYYAF IN INSULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA:

MITIGATE BUT NEVER DEFEATED

Abdul Razak Ahmad and Ahmad Zikri Rosli

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE UNEXPLORED ROLE OF BORDER COMMUNITIES IN BORDER MANAGEMENT

PART V: BLUE

CHAPTER TWELVE

DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING THE BLUE ECONOMY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: MODEL FOR MALAYSIA

Commander Ang Chin Hup RMN (Retired)

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE ROLES OF THE NATIONAL HYDROGRAPHIC CENTRE IN HARNESSING THE

PART I OVERVIEW AND CONTEXT

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

INTRODUCTION

Captain Ivan Mario Andrew RMN Nazli Aziz

“Malaysia is blessed with all the attributes of a maritime nation with continental roots. Our strategic location, between the Indian Ocean and the Asia Pacific region, makes us the focus of global maritime trade, whereby 90 per cent is via shipping…. The maritime sector’s contributions towards the growth and dynamism of our economy will become more significant as we aspire to become a fully developed nation.”

Dato’ Seri Utama Mohamad, Defence Minister said this in his opening speech when officiating the national Langkawi Maritime Conference 2023 (LMC 2023) on 24 May 2023 in conjunction with the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition (LIMA) 2023. The speech extraction quote above reflects the contents of this book.

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course is the second series of publications by RMN SPC that discusses Malaysia’s past, present and future issues and agendas as a maritime nation. It carries the same main title but this volume is focusing on steering the course of the Malaysian maritime agenda. Given the dynamics of the maritime agenda at domestic, regional and international levels, the topics addressed in this volume are relevant to grasp the strengths, weaknesses, progress, threats, opportunities and challenges that Malaysia has faced in navigating her direction as a maritime nation.

Surrounded by territorial waters, making sense of Malaysia’s geographical location as a maritime nation is easy. However, steering the course to understand and advance Malaysia’s position as a maritime nation is complicated because of the strong “continental roots” in formulating, and making decisions in directing past, present and future nation development. In an attempt to spark the discussion here, this volume is broad in scope and entails a pluralist-dimensional worldview. It manifests the dynamic and ever-changing perspectives in analysing the nature of different actors involved and interacted at three levels of power authority – domestic, regional

Dato’ Seri Utama Mohamad Bin Hj. Hasan Defence Minister, Malaysia, 24 May 2023.

and international in setting the maritime agenda for a nation. The contents in this book have been discussed from historical to current and philosophical to empirical as well as from behavioural to institutional perspectives. The chapter contributors have different backgrounds, from practitioners, academicians, activists and professionals.

This second volume book is organised into six parts. It begins with Part I: Overview and Context, an introductory chapter penned by the editors themselves. Part II contains four chapters that discuss topics on geostrategic and security environment. Consequently, Part III with three chapters addresses the topic of Indo-Pacific Strategy and its impacts on Malaysia. As the global agenda has evolved and we have faced the “unconventional” threats, Part IV raises topics related to border security with four chapters. Meanwhile, Part V comprises two chapters. It touches on blue economy as one of the vital global agenda that is intertwined closely with the global development. Finally, Part VI is the epilogue that concludes the topics discussed in this book.

This book contains 13 chapters. As mentioned above, it addresses four main themes namely Geostrategic and Security Environment (Part II); Indo-Pacific Strategy (Part III); Border Security (Part IV); and Blue Economy (Part V). The arrangement of the chapters as such is to reflect Malaysia’s effort in steering the course in institutionalising a maritime nation. Specifically, there are four chapters in Part II, three chapters in Part III and four chapters in Part IV as well as two chapters in Part V.

In Part II, Captain Ivan Mario Andrew RMN analyses the resilience in managing the current strategic environment of Malaysia as a maritime nation. Since the 21st century is considered as the Asian century, the concerns that perplex the region’s security and progress constitute Malaysia’s resilience in managing the current strategic environment. He argues that the seas are Malaysia’s livelihood, and the security and stability in the South China Sea are critical for Malaysia and Southeast Asian nations. While the territorial dispute in the Southeast Asian region in particular of South China Sea is highly complex, a piecemeal approach would be a pragmatic first step toward a long-term solution. While it is known that practical collaboration, dialogues and trust building are complementary approaches without which effective solutions can be obtained, multilateral cooperation needs to be more steadfast in resolving security concerns.

Captain Ahmad Rashidi RMN discusses the implication of AUKUS to Malaysia’s security environment. In this chapter, he also describes the factors that influence the involvement of Australia and the United States of America (US) with the presence of China as the ‘dragon’ in the region. He highlights that the existence of AUKUS is part of a political and military strategy to balance power in the Indo-Pacific region. Hence, Malaysia needs to be prudent in ensuring that the country’s security and sovereignty are not compromised in the face of the establishment of a military alliance between Australia, the UK, and the US. He adds that in the face of geopolitical challenges involving regional security, it is appropriate that the role of ASEAN through its defence diplomacy be made the focus in the efforts of balancing the influence of major powers.

Commander Azrul Nezam Asri RMN and Lieutenant Mohd Massuoadi Mohd Zukri RMN analyse topics related to strengthening maritime sustainability and marine ecosystem protection through security cooperation. Ocean plays a significant role in aiding a nation to be more prosperous. Through collective efforts, nations are able to manage traditional and non-traditional maritime security and preserve the marine environment effectively. They argue that Malaysia has made noteworthy progress as a maritime nation by investing in personnel and resources while boosting inter-departmental and organizational collaboration. Developing a comprehensive national policy on maritime security and sustainable growth is vital to ensure the issues in the maritime domain are well tackled. This plan should set out the government’s targets and aims for maritime security and sustainable development, as well as the roles and responsibilities of various organizations and stakeholders in achieving these goals. With determination, forward-thinking, and dedicated government entities at all levels, these efforts will be of great worth to the citizens while preserving an area of utmost importance to Malaysia’s future.

The last chapter in Part II is by Nazli Aziz on Labuan Port 1846-1963. Nazli examines the role of a minor port in integrating and consolidating a grand maritime agenda of the British in Southeast Asia with Labuan as a case study. He trances Labuan’s transformation from a natural harbour to a planned port within the regional context. By enlarging the analysis framework of the establishment of Labuan Port from the locality to the region, he illustrates how the port contracting and expanding spheres of influence became part of the larger rhythms of the British political economy. The interaction between ports was often intentional as part of the broader network of markets and trade in order to perpetuate the colonial political-economy powers in the region. There are no such things as “natural” or self-determined ports of the colonials. A port is designed with the purposes and specific features that are pertinent to the area’s interests and the colonial’s needs. As a result, the port interacting under the same ruler has an important impact on the patterns of trade, production and politics which may present new opportunities and setbacks for the development and expansion of particular colonial ports.

Part III deals with Indo-Pacific Strategy. The first chapter in this part is by Captain Mohd Yusri Yussof RMN. He examines the “Indo-Pacific” as an idea that has produced a “mental map” that two traditional oceans i.e., the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean become one ocean. Malaysia is yet to make any official statement on “Indo-Pacific”. This has been generally viewed as “non-action” by certain parties. Even when neighbouring states are seemed to embrace the “Indo-Pacific” geopolitical architecture, Malaysia has remained “inert”. This neutral posture could however be traced through the “set of mechanisms” that Malaysia had used in interpreting the idea. He claims that historically, the history of Malaysia is a history of big power politics and institutionally, Malaysia had seen that being non-aligned is the best policy that it could muster in such situation.

The discussion on Indo-Pacific is further examined by Tharishini Krishnan. She argues that Malaysia must respond to the Indo-Pacific because it is to stay and is shaping the geostrategic discourse and power politics of big powers in the international system. Adopting a hedging position seems to be a logical approach. Malaysia’s strategic response towards the Indo-Pacific construct is one that constitutes neutrality. This approach is driven by the fact that the Indo-Pacific is a systemic rivalry between Washington and Beijing. As a small power, it is illogical and unnecessary for Malaysia to lean towards the Indo-Pacific construct. However, it is not necessarily true that Malaysia is a weak country. Malaysia is bold in proclaiming its position vis-à-vis any rising strategic discourse, for which national interest is prioritised. Malaysia’s decision not to upset China also does not mean that Kuala Lumpur is placating more towards Beijing and less towards Washington. It simply means that Malaysia is smart not to posture against either power because both the US and China are important for its survival, and seeking neutrality provides greater flexibility in its strategic response towards the IP construct.

Chapter by Commander Muhamad Zafran Whab RMN is the last article in Part III. His work provides insight into Malaysia’s unique approach to giving the Indo-Pacific nations’ commitment to common purpose, security, prosperity, and order and how it might help Navies best serve the shared interest. Given the recent escalation of the US-China rivalry and its implications for Southeast Asia’s security landscape. He argues that Malaysia’s current involvement in regional dynamics through the lens of the country’s history of dealing with big power competition may be instructive. By examining Malaysia’s foreign policy in the context of its experience in dealing with various long-term security threats and dominant power hegemony, this chapter reveals how the state mediates its position in light of growing competition between China and the US. This situation focuses on security cooperation and the conflict in the South China Sea. He examines how can Malaysians be understood in terms of the country’s traditional approach to regional security, what is Malaysia’s best course of action today, and how Malaysia has navigated the US-China competition.

Part IV deals with border security with four chapters altogether. The analysis present in this part has the tendency to examine non-traditional security issues. The first chapter in this part is by Captain Tay Yap Leong RMN and Nor Aini Mohd Nordin. They study Malaysia’s maritime security challenges during COVID-19 pandemic. They suggest that a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach is the best strategy for Malaysia moving forward in the future be it during a crisis or in peacetime. They claim that the formation of National Task Force (NTF) has clearly shown its benefit in terms of containing maritime security issues as well as increasing overall enforcement and military capabilities. Domestically, threats such as pandemics and illegal immigrants are detrimental to the nation’s social fabric and economy. Hence, Malaysia must start addressing the current issues of existing illegal immigrants that had made the headlines during the pandemic. A whole-of-society approach is also important in imparting information on the importance of reporting illegal immigrants to law enforcement. However, all of

this requires a strong political will at the district, state, and federal levels. Therefore, Malaysians need to understand the consequence that may occur should the country’s maritime security agencies be without proper strategies and capabilities.

Captain Mohd Reduan Ayob RMN studies the ASEAN’s strategic value in ensuring maritime security. He emphasizes that to gain a win-win approach, ASEAN members took a different strategy in addressing the maritime security to avoid losing to one another, which emphasizes argument through dialogue for later settlement and minimal institutionalisation. This chapter highlights the threat resulted from the competition that arises in the South China Sea. As China’s posture attracted global powers into the theatre, ASEAN seeks necessary balancing in protecting sovereignty. The approach taken was to denote the balancing tendency while proposing several outcomes that suit the internal issues within the ASEAN member state. Unity issues must be addressed and subsequently work towards intraregional balancing towards resolving the territorial disputes, directing a balancing effort as a network of resolving conflicts. Several approaches like collaborations and more frequent engagement are highlighted but no matter how serious the maritime security situation is; ASEAN must resolve internal conflicts without outside intervention and consequently adopt a shared solution to address the regional maritime security issues hence ensuring greater economic height.

Using Abu Sayyaf as a case study, Abdul Razak Ahmad and Ahmad Zikri Rosli’s title evidently suggested that this militant group has been mitigated but never defeated. The chapter sheds light on the nature of the threats posed by Abu Sayyaf to Malaysia’s maritime space and recommends ways to counter them. They argue that the essential measure that needs to be undertaken by Malaysia to safeguard its maritime space is to improve its maritime and naval capabilities. They boldly suggest that to achieve this, it is essential to first address the elephant in the room, i.e., the imbalance in the distribution of budgetary provisions. Besides investing in capabilities, the security forces should capitalise on the locals in Sabah as a source of human intelligence and information. Through cooperation with the locals, the authorities can acquire valuable information, such as the presence of unfamiliar faces or suspicious movements noticed by the locals. This chapter demonstrates that ongoing counterterrorism efforts by Malaysia and its neighbouring countries have been relatively effective. Protecting its waters is vital for Malaysia to realise its aspiration as a maritime nation with continental roots. Eradicating the threats of the Abu Sayyaf Group in its maritime space will ensure Malaysia’s maritime security and preserve the well-being of its people and the flow of maritime activities.

The final chapter of Part IV is by Altaf Deviyati Ismail and Tadzrul Adha. They examine the unexplored role of border communities in border management. This chapter underlines that the border communities by virtue of their relationships with the border are an integral part of border management. Their involvement is crucial especially in problem identification and problem-solving because threats and circumstances existing at the local level are shaped by local context and thus may not necessarily align with national level. Knowledge of the views of key

stakeholder groups and the variation within these groups is vital for those who design border management institutions and processes. The notion of border areas is also an important aspect. The border serves as a hard line or a soft zone or even a mixture of both, where stakeholders who work and often live in crossborder communities face similar challenges such as facilitating trade and tourism while at the same time trying to protect their security and cultures. They argue that in order for Malaysia to be fully prepared for the uncertain future ahead, the government should invest seriously in pushing for “total defence” as a means to preserve our national integrity. The holistic approach in looking at our defence capability must no longer rest on the army’s shoulder or the government alone.

Part V is about the blue economy. There are two chapters in this part. The first chapter is by Commander Ang Chin Hup RMN (Retired). In this chapter, he discusses a model for Malaysia on developing and implementing the blue economy in the Indian Ocean. Malaysia is an active member state of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) on blue economy. He argues that the Malaysian blue economy is a balance between economic development and sustainability comprising all economic activities ranging from traditional industries to waste management and desalination. He suggests that the experience of the IORA through its previous chairs’ initiation, planning and implementation by the Member States could serve as a model for Malaysia in implementing the blue economy.

Meanwhile, Rear Admiral Dato` Hanafiah Hassan highlights the roles of the National Hydrographic Centre in harnessing the Malaysian blue economy. As a coastal nation with a maritime territorial zone, Malaysia has to establish hydrographic services to maintain navigational safety and meet technical requirements for delineating national maritime boundaries. The Royal Malaysian Navy hydrographic service has played a crucial role in upholding Malaysia’s commitments and responsibilities as a member of the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) for decades. He argues that if Malaysia wants to advance its blue economy, Putrajaya must first prioritise the completion of a hydrographic audit and economic evaluation analysis. The economic analysis, according to him, aims to demonstrate that utilising hydrographic services can boost productivity and efficiency while reducing the cost structure of many ocean-related activities.

PART II

GEOSTRATEGIC AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER ONE

MALAYSIA A MARITIME NATION: MAINTAINING RESILIENCE IN MANAGING THE CURRENT STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Captain Ivan Mario Andrew RMN

Introduction

Malaysia is blessed to be in a region experiencing peace and tranquillity with rapid economic growth. Now, the country is not beset with any conflicts. However, geopolitical instability and security concerns in the form of Big Power rivalry and their colliding interest in the region, the mistrust of unresolved territorial disputes and non-conventional security issues are shaping and influencing Malaysia’s economic growth and strategic raison d’être.

With the global and economic centre of gravity shifting to Asia, these concerns that perplex the region’s security and progress constitute Malaysia’s resilience in managing the current strategic environment. Primarily, the government views the defence and security of the country as all-encompassing. The country relinquishes the use of force; however, defending the nation’s maritime interest and territories from domestic and external threats is fundamentally its strategic rationale.

Trends and Challenges to the Current Strategic Environment

The defining feature of the 21st century has been the shift from the global geopolitical centre of gravity to Asia. With a considerable stake in the maritime domain, Malaysia must also be consciously responsible and be the catalyst for peace, security and stability in the region. However, the nature of the following security challenges and the developments in this region over the last few years revolves around questions of whether Malaysia can stay united when national and regional interests diverge and whether it can effectively manage relations with its wealthier, more powerful and influential neighbours which have their particular interest in the region.

Geography

Malaysia must stake its claim for a maritime area twice the size of its landmass. The maritime area covers from the very tip of the Strait of Malacca into the conflictriddled geostrategic South China Sea (SCS) and the Celebes Sea. Furthermore, being in the centre of the busiest waterway linking the east to the west and cognisant of its strategic considerations and interests, the responsibility of safeguarding the country’s maritime geographical area is further divided into three concentric layers (Ministry of Defence, 2020):

a. Core area – Peninsula Malaysia, Sabah, Sarawak and the territorial waters and air space of these land masses.

b. Extended area – Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) and its airspace.

c. Forward area – beyond EEZ, which is of national interest.

Globalisation

Being the process that integrates the world into one comprehensive system, globalisation has impelled inexorable unification of economic, political and cultural activities beyond borders which have profusely brought prosperity to Malaysia. And, thanks to the acceleration of cyberspace technology, these days’ local activities are influenced by transnational incidences at exponential speed, whereby E-Commerce and the unrestricted Internet have disassembled the barriers to the movement of goods and capital augmented political and economic powers (Solomon, 2008). This has allowed Malaysia to delight in the benefits of this world’s increasing prosperity and most advanced technologies.

Besides changing the global political, societal and cultural environment, globalisation has also brought significant opportunities and risks. Most importantly, economic globalisation has amplified the contemporaneous dependence on seaborne trade, which has exposed maritime assets to security vulnerabilities such as piracy, terrorism and other non-conventional threats. These vulnerabilities, to the esoteric defence intellect, hold weighty security implications and a nation’s decision-making process (Dicken, Kelly, Kong, Olds, & Yeung, 1999). Furthermore, maritime trade depends on the secure use of the world’s Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC). This deliberately entails Malaysia comprehensively estimating the associated maritime security risks that demand its ability to exploit the opportunities ambitiously and counteract the risk pragmatically.

The dawn of globalisation’s technological advancements has revealed an even more complex maritime security environment and impacts the development of sea power globally. Today, technology has enhanced capabilities and significantly impacted maritime agencies’ abilities to address a more complex and dynamic environment. For example, while technology supports operational security measures, simple but

Malaysia A Maritime Nation: Maintaining Resilience In Managing The Current Strategic Environment

effective technologies like portable radio communications and speed crafts have also helped law breakers tailor their activities effectively undetected. This, therefore, necessitates security agencies to tailor their operations with newer technologies to manage and enable real-time surveillance and monitoring in enforcing law and order. Furthermore, since maritime security threats are non-traditional and transnational, Malaysia’s maritime organisations must increase their capabilities, revisit their maritime strategies and seek comprehensive adaptable approaches towards this complex maritime environment.

Strategic Rationale

The maritime domain has been and will always be a sphere of influence where divergence and cooperation would be the day’s sound bites. This is because it has attracted numerous issues and challenges that have impacted the security and Malaysia’s economic, social and environmental strata. Hence, with the deepening global crisis, these existing security challenges can increase over time.

Malaysia, which centres on the defence of national interests and territories as its fundamentals to sovereignty and independence (Global Security, 2019), sees the inclusivity of its maritime waters’ security and safety as a local issue. Therefore, the end state for this self-preservation rests on the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) generally and the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) to focus on the need to protect the nation’s interest in the Strait of Malacca, SCS and the Celebes Sea.

Border Delineation

Malaysia’s disputes with its neighbours’ is centred on sovereignty concerns emanating from the apprehensions of insecurity and unresolved maritime borders and boundaries. Contentiously, Malaysia’s serious security challenge can be derived from the complex and multiple territorial disputes in the SCS. However, for the moment, the intensity of the border disputes can be considered low and has remained more at the political and diplomatic level of anger and resentment. The use of force has only been ostentatious, where the presence and role of navies and the employment of the air force have only been tailored to augment the political and diplomatic rhetoric. In short to medium term, an armed conflict seems unlikely, whereby the disputes remain primarily political rather than military. Nonetheless, the risks exist of miscalculations, accidents or unwarranted incidents that can lead to a limited confrontation, which may involve other legitimate forces to a lesser extent.

South China Sea Territorial Disputes

Malaysia’s interest in the area of contention is due to it being strategic and economically within its EEZ. Strategic and economic value makes littorals compete for territory in the SCS. The area of contention has attracted Big Powers’ presents mainly because some of these Lilliputian squabbles over barren lumps of rock lie in

Malaysia A Maritime Nation: Maintaining Resilience In Managing The Current Strategic Environment

the middle of the most import SLOC where trillions of dollars of trade sail from the west to the east and vice-versa. But more importantly, their presence is vindicated because some of these ‘rocks’ have since been strategically turned into military outposts.

Under UNCLOS III, 1982, Malaysian maritime units have a significant right and duty to exert their presence within the authorised EEZ. Nevertheless, these territorial disputes’ primary challenge is avoiding escalation with claimant countries. In these precarious times, the MAF must continue its maritime and aerial activities with caution. Strategically it will not be wise to agitate any of the Big Powers locked in this rivalry as Malaysia depends on both sides economically or geopolitically. End state, Malaysia must position itself unilaterally well within its EEZ and Continental Shelf while continuing to pursue its claims in the SCS.

In this unpredictable and uncertain environment, the destabilising and geostrategic environment due to these territorial disputes will determine to a certain extent, the world’s future with the apparent interest asserted by Big Powers’ presence and assertiveness for a “free and open sea”. Currently, the disputes are at status quo, contained and managed via diplomatic channels and verbal rhetoric. However, the strategic environment can explode into a crisis if mismanaged.

Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)

Now that the COVID-19 pandemic is in its endemic state, the Straits of Malacca, Singapore Strait and SCS are anticipating an increase in traffic density. The high expectations from international users due to the ever-burgeoning traffic in the straits will exert considerable pressure and pose an added security and safety challenge to Malaysia to secure and protect the region’s SLOC. Conflict of any scale concerning the geopolitical complexities within the region’s SLOC will involve various state actors and hamper Malaysia from reaping the benefits of proven and potential riches.

Big Power Rivalry

Intractably the pegboard of Big Power rivalry is due to the unfortunate veracity that one feels besieged by the other increased nationalist sentiments towards challenging each other militarily, politically and economically. The presence of warships and aircraft intruding into the waters and airspace of SCS littorals reflects a more significant global security risk that challenges the democratic values of international law. These irrelevant claims and military bullying only further increase the drift in tensions and turbulence, economic competition, superpower logic and populist nationalism, which threatens the region’s security and prosperity (Hawksley, 2018). The continuous strive in Big Power rivalry where no side wants to provoke a conflict, and none is willing to back away either only propagates the many reasons for conflict to emerge and escalate. End state whatever happens in the SCS due to this Big Power rivalry proliferation will define the world’s and Malaysia’s future

correspondingly.

Alliances

Big Powers establish their regional presence mainly for national interest through concerted collaboration, dialogues and trust-building efforts. Indeed, this increasing interest and forging of security cooperation and alliances under the ‘free and open seas’ rubric only ramps up the presence. These extra-regional navies skirting around each other suspiciously, basically under the pretext of safeguarding their national interest, practically pave the way for more mayhem than good.

There is only collective defence and little inclusive international cooperation between these Big Powers. Under the gambit of curbing the assertiveness within the region’s SLOC, these alliances present a mixed reaction from claimant nations. For the smaller coastal countries, it would be their strategic economic interest to refrain from agitating these Big Powers. Hence, in dealing with this Big Power’s alliances, Malaysia has to play it safe by siding/not objecting against the right alliances simply because it hasn’t the military might’ to go against them.

Conflicts of Concern

The Ukraine crisis has disrupted the world’s economic recovery post-COVID-19 and is likely to persist. Countries directly linked to both countries are the worst affected, with many others feeling the effects of ongoing sanctions, the increase in oil, energy and commodity prices, and the disruption of oil and gas supplies. Significantly this conflict of concern has imported global inflation and disrupted all other related economic transactions and global supply chains. Furthermore, this conflict proves that we are in a situation that depicts the world as unstable and uncertain. Geopolitically, the conflict has also portrayed the division; some are allied with the aggressor, some chose not to side, others are neutral, but many are now shunning the two conflicting countries with blame. Pragmatically, the conflict has placed Malaysia in a position to choose between the competing interest prudently (Bisley, 2022). However, the most intriguing part is that countries are now reassessing their defences, military spending and strategy to not fall into a similar position (The Straits Times, 2022).

Cyber Threats

Today’s maritime environment has expanded from 3-dimensional domains to now include the evolving cyberspace. Cyber-technological innovation and globalisation have proven to be an overwhelming force for good. However, the threat of falling victim to criminal cyber enterprises remains a clear and present danger, making cyber security an increased global concern that must be dealt with seriously. Firm national and regional resolves are needed because the perpetrators could be anyone,

Malaysia A Maritime Nation: Maintaining Resilience In Managing The Current Strategic Environment

from individuals launching attacks from the comfort of their homes to militant groups using social media to recruit members and gain sympathisers (Shahrudin, 2017). Therefore, cyber security is a more significant concern than one may realise, which needs Malaysia’s concerted effort to thwart these perpetrators’ Machiavellian intentions.

Unconventional Threats

The maritime domain has attracted unconventional crime, which by far and large, has been dramatically transformed by the revolution in military affairs due to the consequences of globalisation. Besides the evolving nature of unconventional threats, some of the much-debated issues in the maritime environment in this region are cross-border crimes, illegal migration and the manifestation of illegal unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU). These maritime-related vulnerabilities, which include militancy, maritime terrorism, kidnapping for ransom, robbery at sea, and illegal human and drug trafficking, significantly affect and potentially destabilise the country’s maritime security and safety, which restricts the constructive characteristics of economic globalisation (Ong-Webb, 2006).

Although unconventional crime is seen to be dominant on land or ashore, these unconventional modalities may soon become the most common type of maritime threat in the future. Furthermore, as globalisation has made transit among countries easy and ‘borderless’, the world has become a transit point for the terrorist to launch their atrocities.

Malaysia’s Resilience in Managing the Current Strategic Environment

The changing balance of power dynamics at the regional and global levels has indeed impacted the effective functioning of Malaysia’s ability to secure the country’s maritime interests. The symptomatic fundamental challenges faced, if not curbed, might spiral out of control, become polemic and pit countries against each other. Significantly, more multilateral policies dealing with regional challenges can push Malaysia to look for alternatives in managing the issues with the current and foreseeable deliverables (Rajagopalan, 2021).

Adapting to Globalisation

The expansion of seaborne trade increases the magnitude of challenges Malaysia must encounter to maintain the safety and security for seafarers to ply the SLOC that borders the nation. Besides individual states’ national security measures, a new idea to effect interaction amongst Southeast Asia (SEA) members adapting to globalisation is collectively realising accruing defence cooperation. SEA nations must unite to establish a comprehensive regional or multinational approach towards preserving the freedom of navigation for economic interdependence and for globalisation to carry on incessantly as their national agenda.

Equally, technological valences due to globalisation, which has prominently transformed and radically reduced time and space regarding military applications, must make Malaysia consider radical solutions germane in this evermore insecure and complex maritime environment. Befittingly, the nation’s maritime forces must be outfitted with compatible equipment that enables big data and intelligence information to be networked, which is the sine qua non for success in any maritime operations while operating with the other major forces. The propagation of commercial equipment utilising military hardware must be widely incorporated to improve maritime interoperability in combating potential threats.

Defence White Paper

Malaysia’s inaugural Defence White Paper (DWP), formulated in 2019, set the direction of how Malaysia will remain a secure, sovereign and prosperous Maritime nation. Based on the precepts of Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum (if you want peace, prepare for war), the DWP defines the government’s stance on national defence in line with National Security Policy. Comprehensive consultations with multiple stakeholders within the government agencies, academicians, defence industry players and the public reflect a broad national consensus on the defence force concerning national priorities, policies and resource utilisation.

The DWP outlines three pillars of the National Defence Strategy: interrelated and mutually reinforcing, involving different participants, purposes and processes to help secure Malaysia as a Maritime Nation, which is (Ministry of Defence, 2020):

• Concentric Deterrence, is the principal pillar. It primarily involves the role of the MAF, supported by other national agencies, which serves to preserve our national interests.

• Comprehensive Defence involves the participation of the whole-ofgovernment and the whole-of-society in line with the concept of Total Defence. It is a continuous effort to build internal cohesion, enhance defence preparedness, improve inter-agency coordination, and boost economic capacity and other aspects of national resilience thoroughly and sustainably.

• Credible Partnership refers to bilateral or multilateral defence cooperation with external partners. These partnerships are credible from at least two angles.

• First, Malaysia’s credibility as a dependable partner is the foundation of our defence engagements with countries in the region and the wider world.

• Second, these engagements benefit Malaysia and our partners in terms of defence readiness, security needs and regional stability.

Malaysia A Maritime Nation: Maintaining Resilience In Managing The Current Strategic Environment

Securing SLOC

The mounting challenges maritime crime brings to the SLOC necessitate adequate security means by the nation to combat them and maintain regional stability. Being positioned uniquely at the heart of SEA that borders the shipping artery linking the west to the Asia-Pacific region, the safety and security of this SLOC is thus a national priority. As a coastal state, Malaysia must provide maritime infrastructure and ensure security and navigation safety in these waterways. Therefore, pooling resources for this common cause becomes necessary, a massive geographical task that only some nations can take sole guardianship. Nonetheless, it is one thing to call for cooperation and quite another thing entirely to make it happen, what more with competing for fundamental concepts of mare liberum (freedom of the seas) and mare clausum (a navigable body of water that is under the jurisdiction of one nation and is closed to other nations) that remains it to be the compelling stumbling block to practical cooperation at this present time.

Territorial Disputes

Competing territorial claims emerge as a serious source of tension and remain intractable in the region, especially in the SCS. Most have consolidated claims by occupying islets militarily and building sophisticated military infrastructure to gain geographic advantage to monitor merchant traffic and, more significantly, during hostilities, to serve as a staging point for interdiction.

The abundance of resources in the form of oil, gas and fish stock in the EEZ further amplifies the maritime sphere’s importance to Malaysia’s economy. The fact remains at large, therefore, that we should acclimatise to the maritime demesne as its strategic rationale and stand firm as a maritime nation and not compromise in defending the nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The thinking, working and social culture must place the maritime sector of the utmost importance and preserve our seas in a strategic posture. On the contrary, none of the countries, big or small, in dispute would compromise their claims either. However, rather than resorting to military means, deliberations on a peaceful win-win situation should be sorted out amicably.

Convening International Laws and Codes of Conduct

The importance of international agreements concerning the use of the sea must be addressed and is needed to balance the competing claims and demands of territorial regimes. These agreements will assist in overcoming the capacity shortfalls, establishing a well-balanced cooperative region and realising the full potential of the convention. Legal frameworks in combating maritime crimes and incidences at sea that would prove effective if implemented, among others, include:

• Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DoC). The first step towards legally-binding behaviour and eschewing the use of force in resolving the dispute in SCS is to speed up the negotiations on the Code of Conduct framework agreement (CoC) to replace the 15-year-old DoC of parties.

• United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS III, 1982) provides the overarching legal framework for maritime policy for law and order at sea and managing all coastal states’ security, technology and economic environment. For this reason, nations must ultimately accept subtlety this law as the basis for drawing boundaries and negating disputes over EEZ (although overlapping). However, while UNCLOS exhorts SCS countries to cooperate, the paradox of obtaining maximum benefit from their rights under UNCLOS should not limit the prospects for maritime defence cooperation and regime-building in the region either.

• The adaptation of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES, 2014) will improve communications, thus enabling each other’s actions in close proximity encounters to be understood to avoid causing miscalculations and unprecedented issues while being involved in their myriad activities at sea. Also, when adapted, this code will come in handy when maritime agencies that do not share a common language are called upon to conduct joint operations in conjunction with the existing SOPs and agreements.

• Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention, 1988) is the only code with protocols that relates to terrorism and which closes the gap created by the limited definition of piracy. Ratifying this convention will extend coastal state enforcement jurisdiction beyond the territorial limits and, in particular circumstances, allow the exercise of such jurisdiction in an adjacent state’s territorial sea.

Big Power Presence

Should Malaysia rely on Big Powers as its core allies in SEA to ensure the balance of power in the region? The Big Power’s presence can be seen more as having an enduring utility and an avenue to maintain their defence links to the SEA region as a forward-basing location and gain situational awareness of the SCS and the Indian Ocean. These countries are not obliged to defend the littorals in a war - but presently, they provide the basis for extensive cooperation, shared exercises and communication. Suppose the commitment to a cross-pollination of ideas, practices and experiences in a non-threatening way begins to ebb or be flowed; in that case, Malaysia will still have to rely on regional and local defence solutions to balance and secure itself against the interests of assertiveness in the SCS.

Malaysia A Maritime Nation: Maintaining Resilience In Managing The Current Strategic Environment

While it is essential for Malaysia, it is a concern that alliances with the Big Powers remain the only apparent hedge to ensure the rule-based international order is respected. Nonetheless, choosing sides will be the hardest, and it would be to accept the reality and relevance of the notion and maintain its status as a maritime nation.

ASEAN Way

Since its inception in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has contributed significantly to SEA nations’ stability and prosperity. The ‘ASEAN Way’ incorporates unanimous Agreements and Forums and has worked well to avoid armed conflicts between members. Additionally, ASEAN Centrality via institutional mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), have proven effective as a constructive engagement to manage security issues and economic realities.

Although ASEAN has had successes in bilateral cooperation and dispute resolutions, further and deeper ties hinge upon recognising common and converging interests – the greatest of which is the stability of the international seaborne trade system. Furthermore, complications arising from some non-ASEAN powers preferring to negotiate with ASEAN one-on-one must be relooked. This is because an outsider that successfully engages ASEAN in such a manner prevents the latter from presenting a united front on shared dispute issues but adversely strengthens the relative position of the former.

Alliances/Groupings

Amid territorial disputes and the tensions arising between Big Powers, new terminologies such as the ‘Indo-Pacific’ and multilateral groupings such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and AUKUS by regional authorities to balance the strategic and geopolitical dynamics of the region has some implications to Malaysia and the region in general (Bisley, 2019). Malaysia’s strategic architecture is still dependent on Big Power-based partnerships, primarily bilateral, as a critical element for protecting its national security and sovereignty from external threats.

Regarding economic, security and strategic resilience, states would prefer to resolve and rely on a single (bilaterally) or fragmented regional organisation that provides better options and solutions in dealing with specific challenges. Based on the thicket of such multilateral groupings, it would be more effective to engage bilaterally, which is presumed to be more exclusive, flexible and functional, attributed to the division in choosing sides or interest-based coalitions of the willing (Yadav, 2022). However, these groupings and the territorial integrity and sovereignty issues involving Big Power states have since brought divisions in recognising the value of economic, security and strategic partnership and engagement. These are why states must choose between these hegemonic and self-apexes Big Powers.

Implementing Cyber Security

The expansion of cyber technology and the misuse of it by terrorist organisations warrant individual governments to place more resources, allocation and coherent cyber security strategies to combat these increasingly dangerous cyber-attacks. The more Malaysia engages globally with other regional and international cyber security forces, the better the chances to protect the nation and its people from cybercrimes.

Addressing Unconventional Threats

No nation can address unconventional threats alone in this’ borderless’ world. Hence, tackling unconventional threats from within and externally requires inter-governmental cooperation. Consequently, with each state having different capabilities and ambitions in projecting power, especially in their confined territorial waters, the challenge of who among the littoral states is to initiate or develop this maritime regime that will share intelligence must first be addressed amicably. Enough intelligence must first be attained; how best but none better than establishing appropriate bilateral and multilateral collaboration. The successful maritime collaboration will also require SEA nations to develop unprecedented shipping protection practices, strategies and doctrines and implement joint maritime operations in mainly territorial waters and within the confined routes/ straits of the littoral states.

Conclusion

As a maritime nation, the seas are Malaysia’s livelihood, and the security and stability in the SCS are critical for Malaysia. The significant expansion of economic globalisation has made geo-economics replace geopolitics, transforming Malaysia’s maritime domain into a global strategic environment. Multilateral cooperation needs to be more steadfast in resolving security concerns. Practical collaboration, dialogues and trust building are complementary approaches without which effective solutions can be obtained.

While the territorial dispute in the SCS is highly complex, a piecemeal approach through ASEAN would be a pragmatic first step toward a long-term solution. The inclusive nature of ASEAN’s centrality should decrease the possibilities of a divided association. Fundamentally, having practised respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity as a tenet, members’ deeds must match its action to avoid a calamity experienced in Ukraine. ASEAN must take the cue from the Russia-Ukraine crisis and continue fostering peace, cooperation and economic independence to avoid a similar disaster. Once conflict happens, devastation ensues, and a cure may be challenging.

Malaysia A Maritime Nation: Maintaining Resilience In Managing The Current Strategic Environment

With Big Powers underpinning security in the region, Malaysia’s strategy and economic and political priorities must remain unswervingly in the regional environs. This is because of its economic interest, which lies heavily concentrated within SEA, where decoupling will negatively affect its survivability. The way forward is to share the commonality of purpose with these Big Powers and regional partners. On the other hand, Alliances generally aid in the peace and security of the region. Still, they can serve as a democratic deterrence against unilateral change to the status quo by force. The Russia-Ukraine crisis is a clear example of whether the alliances in this region can collectively stand up to the would-be aggressor (if it happens). Wittingly, Malaysia must be resilient in managing the current strategic environment. Understanding the region’s security challenges will enable Malaysia to attune its actions and policies to be a secure, sovereign and prosperous Maritime Nation.

References

Bisley, Nick, (2019). East Asia Summit buffeted by great power rivalry, 3 November, 2019. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/11/03/will-great-power-rivalryupturn-this-years-east-asia-summit/ (assessed 23 June 2022, 1547H).

Bisley, Nick, (2022). The Ukraine war threatens Asia’s regional architecture, 21 May 2022.

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/05/21/the-ukraine-war-threatensasias-regional-architecture (assessed 23 June 2022, 1642H).

Global Security. (2019, August 13). Malaysia National Defence Policy. Retrieved from Global Security: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/malaysia/ policy.htm.

Goh, T. (2022, May 23). Asia’s current security arrangements better than having one bloc confronting another: PM Lee. Retrieved from The Straits Times: https:// www.straitstimes.com/singapore/asias-current- security-arrangementsbetter-than-having-one-bloc-confronting-another-pm-lee.

Hawksley, Humphrey., Asian Waters – The struggle over the South China Sea & the Strategy of Chinese Expansion. The Overlook Press, New York, (2018), p15.

Ministry of Defence, (2020). Defence White Paper & Key Note Address by Chief of RMN to Malaysia Armed Forces Defence College 2021.

Ministry of Defence. (2020). Defence White Paper. Retrieved from https://www.mod. gov.my/images/mindef/article/kpp/DWP-3rd-Edition-02112020.pdf.

Olds, Kris., Dicken, Peter., Kely, Philip F., Kong, Lily & Yeung, Henry Wai-Chung (1999). Globalization and the Asia-Pacific: Contested Territories. Routledge, London (UK) & New York USA).

Ong-Webb, G. G. (2006). Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS).

Rajeswari Pillai, Rajagopalan, (2021). Explaining the Rise of Minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific,” ORF Issue Brief No. 490, September 2021, Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/research/explaining-the-rise-ofminilaterals-in-the-indo-pacific (assessed 23 June 22, 1429H).

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

Shahrudin, H. S. (2017, January 17). Country’s Cyber Defence Operations Centre up this Sept, says Hishammuddin. Retrieved from New Straits Times: https:// www.nst.com.my/news/2017/01/204974/countrys-cyber-defence-operationscentre-sept-says-hishammuddin.

Soloman, Hussien (2008). Challenges to Global Security: Geopolitics and Power in an Age of Transition. I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, New York & London.

Yadav. Surekha A, (2022). Singapore and Malaysia: Are we really neutral on China? https://malaysia.news.yahoo.com/singapore-malaysia-really-neutralchina-232900929.htm. (assessed Sun, 12 June 2022, 7:29 am).

The Straits Times/ANN, (2022). Lee: NATO-type body not suitable: Asia’s current security arrangements better than one bloc confronting another’. The STAR, Tuesday 24 May 2022.

CHAPTER TWO

SHAPING NAVAL POWER: IMPLICATION OF AUKUS TO MALAYSIA’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Captain Ahmad Rashidi Othman RMN

Introduction

Malaysia has placed nine core security values in its efforts to uphold the state’s Federal Constitution (National Security Council, 2019). The existence of these nine core values that are considered dynamic and complex is aimed at evaluating changes in the current and future security environment. This is important, according to Buzan (1991), who stated that national security involves relatively complex and amorphous entities. According to Waltz (1979), in the structure of the international relations system, security is the primary goal of a state due to the structural pressures and responses to the protection of its security. Every state is exposed to political, economic, environmental, societal and military threats that may create insecurity.

As a sovereign nation, Malaysia defines national security “as a continuous and comprehensive effort in ensuring that Malaysia remains existent, peaceful and prosperous.” The notion is supported by Gariup (2009), who explained that security is a government policy to create peace and protect national interests from enemy threats. It can be described as a state’s responsibility to defend its values of independence and sovereignty and ensure the safety of its people so that they live in harmony and peace (Chandra & Bhonsle, 2015). Therefore, in the face of AUKUS’ establishment, Malaysia must be wise and stand firm in protecting its strategic interests.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss Malaysia’s stance on the establishment of AUKUS and its implications. This essay also touches on the factors influencing the involvement of Australia and the United States (US) in the region. The Chapter will also mention China’s response to the alliance as influenced by China’s Defense White Paper 2019.

Shaping

Shaping Naval Power

The announcement by the US on its withdrawal from the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan was a shock (Bowman, 2021). The conflict is best described as a long war which began with the September 11, 2011 incident and had to date, resulted in the deaths of 2,461 military personnel and an expenditure of more than USD2 trillion (The White House, 2021). Joe Biden’s administration sees the Afghanistan war as not giving returns to US interests. To the current government, the need to address the rise of China, which is now seen as more dominant in the Indo-Pacific region, is critical as it can undermine the US’ priorities globally (Johny, 2021). Therefore, AUKUS’ launch on September 15, 2021, as a tripartite security partnership involving the US, Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) took place shortly after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The move is in line with Biden’s statement, which entails that the era of military operations to rebuild other countries is over. The move is also taken as a response by the US towards China’s maritime strategy, which employs the “Island Chain Strategy” concept, as shown in Figure 1 (Office of Naval Intelligence, 2009).

Under this strategy, China has strengthened its assertiveness in the “first chain, “ consisting of the Kuril Islands, Japan’s central archipelago, Okinawa, and the South China Sea (SCS). Meanwhile, China’s presence in the “second chain”, which extends from Japan to Guam, certainly gives an advantage to Beijing in the middle of the Pacific by allowing both dominant and strategic control (Espena & Bomping, 2020).

Figure 1: China’s Island Chains Strategy Source: (Office of Naval Intelligence, 2009)

Naval Power: Implication Of Aukus To Malaysia’s Security Environment

In the face of this current situation, AUKUS aims to preserve the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region by equipping the Australian Fleet with nuclear-powered submarines (Macias, 2021). The three-nation alliance sees this security partnership as a collective commitment to developing cyber technology, artificial intelligence, and underwater domain capabilities (Southgate, 2021b). To illustrate its gravity, the Prime Minister of Australia emphasised the matter in one of his statements, saying that “our technology, our scientists, our industry, our defence forces are all working together to deliver a safer and more secure region that ultimately benefits all” (Start Insight, 2021). This arrangement has resulted in various reactions from many countries, with those opposing the existence of AUKUS being among them. Among the most prominent opponents in France since the tripartite agreement has caused the cancellation of a submarine contract with Australia at the cost of 66 billion euros (Baron, 2021).

Consequences of the Indo-Pacific Construct for Australia’s Regional Strategy

Although the fundamental goal of AUKUS is to enhance regional cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, it is seen to be more centred on military alliances. Furthermore, Australia’s determination to cancel the project with France invited outrage and was described as a “stab in the back” (Staunton, 2021). The contract, signed in 2016, had promised the supply of 12 conventional diesel-electric submarines, with the first supply expected in 2027 (McGuirk, 2021). Besides, Australia’s agreement on developing nuclear-powered submarine technology with the US and the UK under the auspices of AUKUS is the first in sixty years, as the arrangement was only shared previously between the US and the UK (Holton, 2021). It makes Australia the seventh country in the world to have a submarine powered by a nuclear reactor (Borger & Sabbagh, 2021). The question now is, why did Australia insist on cancelling the submarine manufacturing agreement contract with France and instead accept technical offers from the US and UK to develop nuclear-powered submarines? This issue can be further elaborated on based on the following aspects:

China as a Threat

Australia sees China as capable of posing a threat to the country’s democratic system of administration and sovereignty. It is stated in a statement made by the Prime Minister of Australia, Scott Morrison, who said that “China is not only a major trading partner but also a threat to national sovereignty. The dramatic shift shows how the country struggles with China’s growing power” (Needham, 2020). Among the actions seen as a threat to Australia are China’s attempts to influence the decisions of Australian politicians both at the local council and federal parliamentary levels, alongside Chinese students at local Australian universities. Beijing has also intervened in the administration of Chinese-language media in Australia. The situation became increasingly tense, where Australia, among the countries lobbying world leaders to investigate the origins of COVID-19, discovered that the disease first

appeared in Wuhan, China. The situation made Beijing angry, and it retaliated by imposing trade restrictions, technically suspending beef imports, and restricting a $439 million barley trade by imposing an 80.5 per cent tariff on Australian imports (Packham, 2020). In addition, China also withheld shipments of coal and wine by placing those as technical issues under customs.

Force Projection

Australia sees the ability to own nuclear-powered submarines in addition to longrange missiles using US technology as a benchmark in shaping “force projection” (Mao, 2021). This need is also seen as a response by Prime Minister of Australia Scott Morrison, who mentioned that “China has a very strong nuclear submarine development program” (Reuters, 2021). Thus, Australia’s decision to own nuclearpowered submarines is, in essence, a determination to defend itself against China’s assertiveness and aggressive policy regarding airspace, in addition to the issue of overlapping maritime territorial claims. This capability also allows Australia to mobilise its strategic assets to operate remotely and act as a forward base for tactical and preventive advantage. Shown in Figure 2 is a comparison of capabilities between nuclear-powered and conventional-class submarines. Clearly, being equipped with nuclear-powered submarines afford the Australian Fleet many advantages (Sadler, 2021). This advantage will also translate into the technological development of the country’s defence industry.

Figure 2: Benefits of a Nuclear Submarine Fleet in Australia Source: Sadler, 2021

Shaping Naval Power: Implication Of Aukus To Malaysia’s Security Environment

The US Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region

The US’s determination to strengthen its influence in the Indo-Pacific region through AUKUS is undeniably a deterrent signal to China (Patton, Townshend & Corben, 2021). This retaliatory stance is taken in response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has effectively expanded the nation’s maritime routes across the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, making it easier for the upcoming giant to realise its economic power and strategic ambitions (He & Mingjiang, 2020). Furthermore, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated that China’s actual military expenditure had reached USD240 billion in 2019, nearly 40 per cent higher than the official budget (USD183.5 billion) reported as shown in Figure 3 (Tirpak, 2021). According to SIPRI, China’s defence expenditure for 2019 is much higher than India, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (Funaiole, Hart, Glaser & Chan, 2021). The US Department of Defense had also confirmed this, acknowledging that China’s actual defence spending that year could be higher than USD200 billion. Based on the yearly increases in China’s defence allocation, Biden’s administration has foreseen the need to prioritise the Indo-Pacific region by strengthening deterrence to prevent the growing threat of China’s military capabilities (Townshend, 2021).

Given this data, the US realises it needs to build its capacity to curb China’s advance. Thus, one of the essential steps in doing so is to step up its military presence (Carafano, 2019). On the other hand, the US efforts to strengthen the region’s

Figure 3: China’s Estimated Defense Spending Source: Funaiole, Hart, Glaser and Chan, 2021

defence aspect align with a statement by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who stated, “the Indo-Pacific is crucial to our future” (Scott, 2018). Moreover, the Chinese government has criticised the US over its relationship with Taiwan, which it describes as an autonomous island belonging to China (Tanno, 2021). Therefore, China will likely pursue a more assertive approach by developing its nuclear policy capabilities to threaten the US military capabilities in the region (Gallagher, 2019). This can be proven based on the argument that China’s claim over the SCS is due to three main factors. First, it gives China’s Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) the advantage of carrying out strategic patrols (Ajansi, 2021). This statement was also acknowledged by President Xi Jinping, who mentioned that the need for nuclear submarines is “to manage the SCS” (Gering, 2021). Secondly, the SCS can act as a buffer zone for China if the US carries out a military attack on mainland China. Third, China’s maritime transportation needs sea routes, which matches the SCS’s role of hosting about a third of global maritime trade.

Additionally, the US worries about China’s nuclear strategic development capability as it has developed relatively fast and is now treated as the primary foundation for protecting China’s national sovereignty and security (Vergun, 2021). Deploying China SSBNs is a critical strategic asset in protecting China’s national security. China is also expected to possess 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, a target in line with its ambitions to develop its military capabilities. This effort is evidenced by China’s defence budget for 2021, which has increased by 6.8 per cent (equivalent to USD209 billion) compared to the year before (Xuanzun, 2021).

China’s Stance on AUKUS and the Influence of Its 2019 Defense White Paper

China takes defence cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region seriously, as it deems those in the area irresponsible. China’s Foreign Minister, Zhao Lijian, once voiced that AUKUS can undermine regional peace and stability and intensify the nuclear arms race” (Barber, 2021). This statement was also emphatically acknowledged by Chinese President Xi Jinping, who said that the construction of a U.S.-led alliance would cause a repeat of the Cold War, which took place around the 1970s between the US and Russia (Iwamoto & Yuda, 2021). Also slamming the US’ actions, an international media channel belonging to the Chinese Communist Party mentioned that Washington had lost its mind by gathering its allies to oppose China.

However, it was observed that several Chinese actions were the ones that stimulated the establishment of AUKUS. Primarily, China’s 2019 Defense White Paper stated in detail for the first time the acts of instability by countries such as the US, Russia, EU, the UK, Germany, France, Japan, and India (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2019,). Moreover, the white paper also contained allegations of the US actions as the leading cause of disruption in the international security order. Besides, the white paper also linked Xi Jinping’s desire to achieve the “China Dream” vision as a critical element to the “strong military dream”, as

Shaping Naval Power: Implication Of Aukus To Malaysia’s Security Environment

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

illustrated in Figure 4 (Alsabah, 2016). This was outlined by Xi Jinping in his speech during the 19th Party Congress in 2017, in which he mentioned that he aspires for the Chinese military to become a mechanised force with increased, informative and strategic capabilities by 2020, followed by being fully modernised force by 2035, and a first world-class military by 2049 (US Defence Intelligence Agency, 2019).

Source:

Malaysia’s Stance on AUKUS and Its Implications

Malaysia has clearly stated concerns over the tripartite cooperation. This was voiced by the Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Ismail Sabri Yaakob himself, during the East Asia Summit. He stated that “the development of AUKUS could lead to a nuclear arms race and trigger tensions, resulting in regional instability, especially in the South China Sea” (The Straits Times, 2021). Furthermore, Malaysia remains committed to ensuring the Southeast Asian region as a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) as delineated in the Declaration and Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty. Malaysia’s firm stance on the existence of AUKUS can be highlighted based on two things:

Arms Race

The purchases of nuclear submarines by Australia from the US signal that countries in the ASEAN region and the Asia Pacific will also have to strengthen their military systems. This notion is exemplified by China’s transfer of its former diesel-electric submarines to Myanmar in the first transfer of assets involving the two countries

Figure 4: Xi Jinping’s total overhaul of the Chinese military (2015-2020)

Alsabah, 2016

(Yeo, 2021). The move also shows China’s support for Myanmar’s military government against local protests and opposition. China’s move to supply such strategic assets to Myanmar also raises concerns among ASEAN countries, whose foreign ministers unanimously do not support the Myanmar junta’s actions, as they are seen as linked to human rights abuses and the undermining of the concept of democracy (Wang, CNN & Reuters, 2021). The situation is increasingly challenging as Taiwan, which is currently in conflict with China, is also building eight diesel-electric-powered submarines, which are expected to be handed over to the Taiwan Army in 2025 (Ranhotra, 2021). With the acquisition of diesel-electric-powered submarines, Taiwan may also be able to build and own nuclear-powered submarines. What is more worrying is that this submarine development project involves assistance from seven countries: the US, the UK, India, Australia, South Korea, Canada, and Spain.

Economic Growth is Affected

In addition, if the existence of AUKUS causes a tense situation in the Asia Pacific region, it would undoubtedly be seen as a call for the presence of foreign troops, especially in the SCS. The seas will then effectively be a battleground, a condition that will undoubtedly significantly impact the economic growth of ASEAN countries, as most of their regional and world trade is heavily dependent on the SCS. Additionally, the sea lanes that pass through SCS are the busiest and most important trade routes in the world. In 2016, it recorded the passage of one-third of the world’s maritime trade at an estimated worth of USD 3.4 trillion. It accounts for almost 40 per cent of China’s trade, where 90 per cent is petroleum imports from Japan and South Korea, and 6 per cent is its total US trade (Ott, 2019). In addition, ASEAN is China’s leading investment destination and largest trading partner in manufacturing, agriculture, infrastructure, high technology, digital economy, and green economy. This is proven by strong economic growth in June 2021, where a year-on-year growth of 38.2 per cent was recorded, with investments exceeding USD310 billion and business revenue of Chinese enterprises from project contracts in ASEAN countries approaching USD350 billion (Xinhua, 2021b).

Malaysia’s Approach to Ensuring Security

Malaysia uses its international cooperation, external relations, and political, social, economic, and cultural stance to ensure regional stability and security. As a sovereign nation, Malaysia prioritises the spirit of cooperation and goodwill with all countries regardless of political ideology (Ratnam, 1999), which is in line with Malaysia’s policy of neutrality. However, the current situation calls for the country to ensure the region is free from political disputes between major powers, especially the US and China. Table 1 shows Malaysia’s policy concerning the US and China (Lin et al., 2020). In the aspects of political and diplomatic relations, Malaysia adopts a humane approach with both countries to pursue what it perceives as actions that protect national interests (Finkbeiner, 2013). Malaysia is more dependent on China than the US in terms of economy. In 2020, China was Malaysia’s leading trading partner, with a total trade value of RM329.77 billion.

Shaping Naval Power: Implication Of Aukus To Malaysia’s Security Environment

Additionally, a drastic increase in the trade value of RM454.78 billion (USD108.28 billion) was recorded between both nations from January to August 2021 (Hani, 2021). On the other hand, Malaysia has more dominant ties to the US than China regarding security. From 2018 to 2022, the US allocated security assistance of approximately USD220 million, providing equipment, education, training, and other exchange programs to Malaysia. Meanwhile, approximately USD1 million was earmarked for International Military Education and Training Programs parked under a military agreement to bolster and develop human capital between the two countries (Office of the Spokesperson, 2021).

Source: Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific by Bonny Lin et al., 2020

Furthermore, one of Malaysia’s principles in resolving international issues is negotiation based on international law. Malaysia has, for now, chosen to avoid any debate, more so those involving force or coercion. This cautious approach can be seen through Malaysia’s effort to call the Chinese Ambassador to express Malaysia’s stance and protest against the presence and activities of Chinese ships in Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off the coast of Sabah and Sarawak (Kumar &

Figure 5: Regional Perspectives of Relative US and Chinese Influence (2018)

Nikkei

Shaping Naval Power: Implication Of Aukus To Malaysia’s Security Environment

staff writer, 2021) as the action is contrary to the EEZ Act 1984 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. This firmness of stance demonstrates Malaysia’s commitment to ensuring that every issue of national interest is resolved peacefully and constructively according to international law.

Malaysia can balance the region’s security through its diplomatic ties with China and the US. The relationship between Malaysia and China is generally characterised as a “comprehensive strategic partnership” (Ha, 2021) as it involves close collaboration in various dimensions, enhancement of strategic trust, and sharing of opportunities and joint development plans (Xinhua, 2021a). Meanwhile, the relationship between Malaysia and the US holds a “comprehensive partnership” status as it covers cooperation in politics and diplomacy, economics, education, people-to-people relations, and defence and security (Kuik, 2016). Therefore, Malaysia will continue to enhance and strengthen ties with both countries simultaneously without favouring any country over the other. This approach can indirectly impact Malaysia’s efforts in determining and influencing regional security issues.

Also, Malaysia’s presence in ASEAN influences the region’s stability. As one of the founding nations of ASEAN and a pioneer of the concept of ZOPFAN, which is based on the “principle of peaceful coexistence”, its role in balancing issues related to regional security is huge (Jalil, Perman & Zaaba, 2020). The concept of ZOPFAN, the backbone of ASEAN, was born from Malaysia’s strategy to ensure that Southeast Asia was not involved in major power rivalry during the Cold War (Southgate, 2021a). Thus, Malaysia, which is often seen as the spokesperson for ASEAN, needs to be firm with the AUKUS alliance in asking it to recognise the ZOPFAN concept, which is integral in the regional security structure as a tool that ensures the region is free from nuclear weapons. This stance which explains Malaysia’s determination was voiced by the Senior Minister of Defense, Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein, who said that “Malaysia is in a position to balance the great powers of the region, but at the same time, well respected by both polar powers in the South China Sea” (Azil, 2021).

Conclusion

The existence of AUKUS is part of a political and military strategy to balance power in the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, Malaysia needs to be prudent in ensuring that the country’s security and sovereignty are not compromised in the face of establishing a military alliance between Australia, the UK, and the US. In addition, in the face of geopolitical challenges involving regional security, the role of ASEAN through its defence diplomacy is appropriate to focus on balancing the influence of major powers. The element of mutual trust between Malaysia and the US in security and defence, in particular, can accommodate the need for stability in the region. This can indirectly influence other allied countries to refrain from acting aggressively.

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

On the other hand, the element of mutual trust between Malaysia and China stems from a bilateral economic interest between the two nations. This situation pushes China into needing Malaysia to reach its maximum potential through the peaceful rise. Therefore, Malaysia should maintain its stance on AUKUS to ensure harmony and peace in the Indo-Pacific region.

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Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

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Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

CHAPTER THREE

STRENGTHENING MARITIME SUSTAINABLE AND MARINE ECOSYSTEM PROTECTION THROUGH SECURITY COOPERATION

Introduction

See The Sea! The ocean plays a significant role in aiding nations to become more prosperous. At the present moment, it is supplying many of the necessities for the international community. Utilising the possibilities provided by advances in science and technology and people’s increasing openness to novel ways of using the seas, the ocean is a valuable source of potential. Exploiting marine and coastal resources could lead to more remarkable economic growth and resolve issues such as high unemployment, weak financial growth, food security, destitution, and resilience to climate change (Knol, 2010).

Malaysia is a maritime nation heavily reliant on the ocean for its economic wealth, having a unique position geographically and historically (MIMA, 2022). The primary components of its maritime identity are fishing, maritime transportation and biodiversity, making up the vast majority of its economy. Since the Rio+20 conference, the maritime industry has seen immense development and its impact on the “blue economy” is estimated to be around USD 2.5 trillion. This number will likely increase with new technology, such as autonomous vessels and e-navigation (Consultancy UK, 2015). The development of renewable energy sources, such as offshore wind and tidal energy, has also expanded the “blue economy,” which comprises all economic activity concerning the seas (United Nations, 2012). Malaysia’s maritime sector is a critical component of its gross domestic product (GDP), accounting for 40% of it and carrying more than 90% of its exports. In 2020, this sector alone contributed RM560 million to Malaysia’s GDP (MIDA, 2022).

Commander Azrul Nezam Asri RMN Lieutenant Mohd Massuoadi Mohd Zukri RMN

Strengthening Maritime Sustainable And Marine Ecosystem Protection Through Security Cooperation

The marine environment is intricate to the degree that it can help and hinder legal doings. This complexity can lead to growth and improvement, but it is hard to track and has worsened security problems. Due to this, careful adherence to international law, collaborations with other nations and organisations, and coordinated reactions to unforeseen occurrences beyond the authority of a single entity are essential. As mentioned in the Defence White Paper, this matter is of great importance to the Malaysian government, accentuating the requirement for more prominent maritime security (MINDEF, 2020).

“Seavilisation”

The ocean significantly impacts today’s life, from politics to economy and culture, but it can only be done well with an understanding of the ocean environment (Bateman, 2015). Maritime navigation has been a cornerstone of human history, allowing us to connect continents and develop legally binding rules for oceanic order management (Glissant, 1983). The consequences of this influence are felt in social, economic, political, and military fields. Nevertheless, the maritime environment still faces many threats and issues.

Social Transformation, Shared Values, and Multicultural Engagement

Over the centuries, maritime civilisations have profoundly affected the evolution and development of human civilisation. These civilisations have traded products, people, and ideas over centuries, creating a shared economic system. The Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans were empires that spread their culture, religion and values to other nations. These empires had a complex social structure, a sophisticated legal system, and a lot of art and literature.

Additionally, the Malacca Sultanate, which dominated the Strait of Malacca in the 15th century, significantly impacted Southeast Asia’s marine cultures. Melaka and Penang are socially dynamic because of their ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity (Hall, 2008). The city of Melaka was once the most important port in the region, while Penang was a British trading post. It helped expand Islam, create a prosperous merchant elite, and facilitate trade and the exchange of ideas and cultures between the East and West. Today, both cities are home to a thriving population of ethnic Chinese, Malays, and other minorities.

Besides, maritime civilisations played a central role in developing shipbuilding and navigation technology, which led to more exploration and commerce. These advancements in maritime technology and exploration ultimately helped shape the modern world. Under international law, every coastal state must protect navigational rights and waters, providing trade and safety access. These rights and waters are essential for the life and livelihoods of coastal communities and have been a crucial influence on the advancement of human civilisation. From the Malaysian port cities

of the Malacca Sultanate, these civilisations have shaped our beliefs, practices, and technology, thus making a lasting contribution to the advancement of humanity. Overall, it is clear that maritime civilisations have had a profound impact on developing human civilisation.

Economic Activity

Maritime activities have driven economic growth, especially near coasts. Over 80% of the world’s population lives near coasts to take advantage of transportation and commercial opportunities. Malaysia is no exception to the rule. Its strategic location in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has enabled it to become a regional economic powerhouse. The country’s natural resources, such as natural gas, oil, and skilled labour, help it be a manufacturing and trade hub for Southeast Asia. Its geographical location and well-developed infrastructure make it ideal for shipping goods and providing services to its neighbours (Sekaran, 2022).

The Malaysian economy benefits from maritime activity. The country’s territorial waters are 65,035 km2, and the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) is approximately 500,000 km2 (RMN, 2018). In 2019, fisheries contributed 0.91% of Malaysia’s GDP and 57.80 kg of fish per capita (SEAFDEC, 2020). Regarding shipping and trading, both the Port of Klang and the Port of Tanjung Pelepas are rated among the top 20 ports in the world, with respective container volumes of 13.64 million and 11.2 million TEUs (Zaideen & Ramli, 2023). Additionally, Malaysia is the third-largest exporter of liquefied natural gas and the second-largest oil producer in Southeast Asia (Hutchinson & Bhattacharya, 2022). These factors give the country significant influence over global energy markets.

Consequently, marine activity has played a crucial role in Malaysia’s economic growth and stability. However, it is also important to note that the safety of these endeavours is a primary concern for maritime forces. Protecting the nation’s waters’ security is paramount for its maritime industry’s continued growth and locals’ protection.

Political and Military Expansion

The influence of maritime culture on current politics and the economies of numerous nations has been considerable, providing them with a stronger government and military (Silva, 2017). Malaysia has been granted the benefits of its location at the intersection of significant ocean routes, the Malacca Strait joining the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean (Evers & Darit, 2011). This passageway has been a centre of trade and a strategic point for centuries and has played a significant part in East and West historical events. Aside from fiscal and strategic profits, Malaysia’s control of the Malacca Strait has augmented its armed forces.

Presently, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), Royal Malaysian Police (RMP), and Fisheries Department are working in conjunction with the Royal

Strengthening Maritime Sustainable And Marine Ecosystem Protection Through Security Cooperation

Malaysian Navy (RMN) and Royal Malaysian Air Force (RAF) to strengthen maritime security enforcement. The RMN is currently participating in a 15 to 5 transformation plan which one of the objectives is to raise the number of days their fleet spends at sea by 40%, keeping an average preparedness rate of 85% and increasing their fleet to 55 vessels by 2050 (Vavasseur, 2019). Simultaneously, Malaysia’s intelligent and forward-looking relationship with other nations in the region, such as Singapore and Indonesia, has made the military more effective and able to act in various scenarios. These countries have close military ties and strive to protect ocean sustainability and safeguard the marine ecosystem.

SINK OR SWIM?

Risks, Threats and Challenges

The seas are a worldwide concern, and their protection is essential for the security and equilibrium of the global population. Traditional threats such as piracy, armed robbery, and illicit trafficking have been hazardous; however, more complicated non-traditional threats are escalating (Asghar, 2016). These encompass cyberattacks, illegal trade, and the disruption of maritime borders, which have economic, political, and social effects. To appropriately handle these dangers, states must cooperate in developing solutions that can reduce both deliberate and unintentional risks. Marine hazard has far-reaching and complex impacts, both directly and indirectly. There are immediate impacts, such as the loss of life and property, and long-term impacts, such as the degradation of ecosystems and the loss of species. Furthermore, black market trading of drugs, arms, people, and cyber-assaults can interfere with critical systems and harm the environment. These illegal activities can severely affect society, exacerbating existing social ills and creating new ones.

Maritime issues have long plagued the coasts of Southeast Asia. In the first six months of 2022, Malaysia had the second most maritime accidents worldwide, totalling 113. These incidents included sinking, drifting, and grounding. Malaysia was also in the lead for Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF), with 104 cases, out of the worldwide sum of 278. The country was the preferred destination for most Irregular Human Migration (IHM) occurrences, making up 61% of the reported situations worldwide. The Malacca Straits was one of three significant spots for contraband smuggling, while the Singapore Straits saw the most cases of theft, robbery, and piracy (IFC, 2022). Additionally, a study indicates that Malaysian coasts are littered with 64 to 1930 pieces of plastic waste per square meter, accounting for 30 to 45% of all debris collected (Fauziah et al., 2021).

In addition, unresolved maritime borders are an additional security concern. A volatile situation such as in the South China Sea can arise anytime, and coastal states like Malaysia must be prepared to handle it following their international commitments (Parameswaran, 2016). If Malaysia is not careful, a bold superpower seeking to

expand its claim to natural resources will seize its most valuable natural resources. Thus, it is essential to understand these issues and find ways to mitigate them. Nevertheless, maritime security is a complex problem that requires a specialised approach. Traditional and non-traditional threats must be addressed, and coastal states must work together to find solutions.

World’s Oceanic Epiphany

Given the plethora of dangers and risks that come with the oceans, it is critical to protect maritime safety worldwide. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was established to provide a durable structure for managing the usage of the ocean’s value and protecting global health and wealth. The convention outlines the rights and responsibilities of coastal states in the maritime domain and the laws governing the use of areas beyond the state’s jurisdiction. Similarly, the United Nations (UN) and its specialised body, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), have highlighted the relationship between maritime security and national prosperity. They point out the importance of peaceful usage of maritime areas, trade routes, energy supply, pollution, and the economic benefits of aquaculture. For example, the IMO has created directions for collaboration with other international bodies in the maritime field, such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), to guarantee the safety of vessels and docks (IMO, 2008).

The ocean is fundamental to nations’ economic prosperity and stability, making collaboration and coordination necessary between maritime security countries (Permal, 2022). The UN and its associated entity, the IMO, have taken action to ensure the sea is used peacefully and sustainably so that nations can gain the economic rewards of the ocean while maintaining its ecological balance. The UNCLOS and the IMO have both taken a stand for the conservation of the sea, which includes forbidding harmful activities, controlling pollution, joining forces on an international level, utilising the most up-to-date technology, backing up scientific research and technology transfer, and guarding marine biodiversity (Addis, n.d.). Eventually, it would ensure that the sea remains a safe and secure haven for trade and business worldwide and a valuable resource for everyone. Hence, it is evident that maritime security is of extreme priority for international collaboration and cooperation. With most of the world’s trade passing through the sea, maritime security is critical to the global economy. The safety and security of the sea are a top priority for everyone involved in the trade industry, including carriers, customers, and suppliers.

Diversity Is Strength

Several crises have highlighted that the complexity and interconnectedness of maritime security issues necessitate comprehensive plans based on coordination amongst entities with responsibilities in this domain. Effective maritime security

Strengthening Maritime Sustainable And Marine Ecosystem Protection Through Security Cooperation

governance is achieved through cooperation and collaboration among stakeholders, with states playing a crucial role based on their obligations and capabilities. Simultaneously, Malaysia is adjacent to one of the busiest straits in the world, with an average of 200 vessels passing daily. It requires the assistance of other countries to keep global trade running (Nofandi et al., 2022). Due to the intense concentration of economic activity along the coast and waterways and the high volume of marine traffic along Malaysia’s periphery, its nearly 6,000 kilometres of coastline and neighbouring waters are susceptible to marine pollution. Despite this, Malaysia must oppose piracy and armed robbery against ships traversing the strait (Idris & Harun, 2003). With thousands of ships actively engaged in national maritime activities, Malaysia safeguards human life and ensures safe navigation in an area twice the size of its landmass.

All Hands on Deck!

As a maritime nation, Malaysia faces various security challenges that a single actor cannot tackle. The UNCLOS emphasise the importance of unity of action, where parties and systems must work together. As the scope of maritime security activities is vast, domestic and international collaboration is necessary for Malaysia to establish its position in ocean governance forums. Likewise, various coordinated measures are required to resolve the intricate and interdependent maritime security issues Malaysia and other nations face. A unified national marine security policy ensures the efficient and effective delivery of security measures. This strategy should be developed to support common goals that help Malaysia anticipate, prevent, and react to maritime threats (David, 2022). The principal purpose of this security policy is to allow Malaysia to utilise the ocean to further economic development and prosperity while still abiding by its international commitments and agreements. Unity of action, which requires collaboration, coordination, and harmony between all governmental bodies, private and public organisations, and citizens, is pivotal. The spectrum of actions shall include the following:

Coordination and Cooperation among the Various Agencies. Malaysia must take swift action to ensure the appropriate and productive utilisation of resources by preserving the seas and monitoring maritime entry to Malaysian shores properly. For this goal, something must be done to ensure that all relevant agencies collaborate and that resources are used as efficiently as possible. Adopting the same approach as countries like the Netherlands, France, Greece, India, and Indonesia, by setting up a Ministry of Maritime Affairs would be the most sensible choice. This kind of ministry would unite the numerous agencies and departments, make it simpler for them to cooperate, and prevent redundant services from being provided (BouillonDuparc, 2020).

Moreover, every agency should know its role and obligations and concentrate on what it does best. Utilising procedures such as interoperability, maritime

observation, deterrent presence, and collective action protocols will enable more effective and efficient utilisation of resources. The National Maritime Single Point of Contact (NMSPOC) plan, proposed by the National Security Council (NSC) in 2020, will enable 18 agencies to collaborate and exchange information, knowledge, and intelligence (NST, 2022). Despite the three years without results, this plan should continue. This endeavour will assist in the growth of the Malaysian maritime area and the cooperation between agencies effectively and productively.

Fostering Partnerships with the Private Sector. The government must collaborate closely with the corporate world to guarantee the successful resolution of maritime issues. The corporate world has the expertise and resources. For instance, PETRONAS’ participation in the Malaysia Continental Shelf Project provides a model for integrating public and private research and development initiatives (Madon, 2017). The project’s objective is to delineate the outer limits of the Malaysian continental shelf if geological and hydrographic evidence indicates that the continental edge extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the coast. The project is significant because it increases Malaysia’s sovereignty over its territory and resources. In order to achieve its objectives, the project team has to draw on the expertise of a wide range of disciplines, including hydrographers, geologists, geophysicists, and oceanographers.

Furthermore, the government should enable private sector involvement in developing innovative technologies and physical infrastructure. By doing this, private industries will have a say in the growth of the maritime sector, and their concerns will be considered. Including corporate leaders in debates and contemplating their suggestions is also imperative. These measures will result in Malaysia’s more dynamic and prosperous marine industry, ultimately contributing to the country’s economic growth.

Optimisation of the Available Resources. Malaysia’s maritime industry has the potential to become a worldwide powerhouse. However, the escalating expenses of maintaining multiple frameworks and resources have emerged as a severe barrier (Hanafiah et al., 2020). The Malaysian government has been working hard to try and address this issue, challenging itself to find a balance between meeting the maritime sector’s needs and maintaining fiscal responsibility. One way to address this issue is to develop a more coordinated and efficient approach to maritime sector development.

For instance, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between local agencies could assist them in obtaining better resources and training while establishing a structure for collaborative decision-making. The agreement could be a model for future government-wide partnerships. By amplifying its resources, the government will have the option to provide best-in-class services, guaranteeing its viability on a worldwide scale and keeping up its standing as an industry pioneer.

Strengthening Maritime Sustainable And Marine Ecosystem Protection Through Security Cooperation

Enhancing Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in the Maritime ecosystem. With contemporary technology such as sensors, radar, and cameras, it is possible to promptly and correctly identify and evaluate potential marine risks. As the significance of ICT is expanding, it is indispensable to take the essential steps to maintain national maritime security regulations. Enhancing ICT can make surveillance and monitor more dependable and efficient, strengthening maritime security.

ICT may also aid communication and collaboration between maritime authorities and other interested parties, including port operators and shipping companies. This will enable them to share required information and coordinate their efforts to respond effectively to potential threats. Moreover, ICT can create a secure communication system, guaranteeing that the data exchanged between maritime stakeholders is encrypted and safeguarded from potential cyber-attacks.

Promoting Global Collaboration. Malaysia should lead ocean governance, cooperating with numerous international entities and organisations to secure the marine environment and myriad activities dependent on the sea. With the help of multilateralism, Malaysia can formulate standard environmental regulations, address the critical factors of environmental destruction, and further the progress of the maritime economy (NST, 2022).

For example, the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) provides a platform for member countries to discuss maritime security, exchange intelligence, and collaborate on security strategies. Exchanging data, knowledge, and best practices will help guarantee the ocean’s protection and sustainability (Singh, 2022). Regional collaboration was advanced with initiatives like the ‘Eyes in the Sky’, part of the Malacca Straits Security Initiative. Other regional partners also contributed, with Japan joining the Regional Agreement on Cooperation Against Armed Piracy in 2006 (Rogers, 2022). It was significant because it would improve the region’s ability to enforce maritime law, increasing public awareness of the maritime domain. In summary, continued engagement on the international stage will ensure Malaysia’s dedication to maritime sustainability and marine ecosystem protection.

Conclusion

Choice Beat Voice! In, it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of maritime security cooperation for sustainable maritime development. Through collective efforts, countries can effectively manage traditional and non-traditional maritime security and preserve the marine environment. Consequently, this creates a more secure regional and global trade atmosphere, leading to economic growth and job opportunities. Malaysia has made noteworthy progress as a maritime nation by investing in personnel and resources while boosting inter-departmental and organisational collaboration.

As previously discussed, developing a comprehensive national policy on maritime security and sustainable growth is vital to ensure that all related participants are in harmony in their endeavour to tackle the issues in the Malaysian maritime domain. This plan should set out the government’s targets and aims for maritime security and sustainable development, as well as various organisations’ and stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities in achieving these goals. Nevertheless, while cooperation in maritime security may be an approach to further sustainable maritime growth and protection, other solutions are accessible. This approach considers our surroundings and defines our marine security needs and weaknesses. It outlines common aspirations and strategies for using all accessible resources to reach ultimate goals in the event of a crisis or anticipation of one. Applying the suggested solution will create an effective national maritime security structure and increase Malaysia’s standing among maritime nations. With determination, forward-thinking, and dedicated government entities at all levels, these efforts will be of great worth to the citizens while preserving an area of utmost importance to Malaysia’s future.

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CHAPTER FOUR

LABUAN 1846-1963: PORT AND POLITICS OF THE BRITISH MARITIME AGENDA

Nazli Aziz

Introduction

This chapter addresses the role of a minor port in consolidating a grand agenda of the British in Southeast Asia with Labuan as a case study. It aims to reconstruct the history of Labuan over a period of 117 years, tracing its transformation from a natural harbour to a planned port within the regional context. The approach to examine locality from the regional lenses is neither new nor extraordinaire in studying Southeast Asian historiography as it has been employed by many scholars such as Reid (2004), Watson-Andaya (1993), Warren (1981) and Kathirithamby-Wells (1992). Although their works are different (on the political economy, society or culture), all linking in their own approach the locality of the case study from the regional perspectives.

The significance of Labuan as a port needs to be reinterpreted in historical research. This paper rejects the researchers’ views that Labuan is irrelevant in the British colonial history of Southeast Asia. Labuan’s functions were changed and had been changed by the British Colonial to tango with the ever-changing regional politics and economy to safeguard the interests of the British. That is to say that the major and minor ports collaborated and competed as part of larger collectivities to ensure the survival and success of the British Empire in this region. By enlarging the analysis framework of the establishment of Labuan Port from the locality to the region, we can illustrate how the port contracting and expanding spheres of influence became part of the larger rhythms of the British maritime agenda.

Labuan 1846-1963: Port And Politics Of The British Maritime Agenda

Searching a site in the Vicinity of South China Sea

The growing interests of the British over Borneo started in the last quarter of the 18th century after the British trade pattern in commodities was changed from spices to the Chinese products. East India Company (EIC) bought tea, silk, porcelains etc. from China and sold their product such as wool in the Chinese markets. However, EIC had difficulty to defray company capital in the Far East as the Chinese did not need the British goods. It became more difficult for the EIC as the company had difficulty in obtaining the Spanish Dollar in order to trade with China after the American War of Independence, 1779 and the Spanish markets were closed at the end of the 18th century (Greeberg, 1955). Therefore, the EIC tried to find another alternative to defray their trading activities in China (Parkinson, 1973).

After the Anglo-Dutch Treaty 1824 was signed, the British paid serious intention to widen their powers in Borneo especially in the west coast of the island. James Brooke was the man behind the lobby as the possession of Labuan would give advantage to Sarawak. The existence of coal deposits in Labuan made the island more attractive to the British. During the Victoria Age of the British Empire, trade was used as a tool to conquer the new territories (Annual Report Straits Settlement, 1923). The possession of Labuan would stimulate the British interests from the Borneo coast to Sulu and New Guinea and thus, would allow them to compete with the Dutch and Spanish. In 1843, Brooke was very concerned about the French activities in the Sulu Sea. If the French were able to obtain territory from the Sultan of Sulu, it would influence the Dutch to strengthen their power on the Borneo coast and consequently, it would limit Brooke’s efforts to broaden his influence in Borneo. The presence of the Dutch on the east coast of Borneo and Celebes made the British lose control over the important trade between Singapore and Bugis. Worse, British almost had no means after Jillolo and its dependencies and New Guinea became new territories of the Dutch (Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, 5 March 1850).

By the mid-19th century, the Brunei Sultanate that controlled half of Sarawak and North Borneo faced political instability. The sovereignty matters became more complicated as the Brunei’s territories were overlapped with the territories of Sulu Sultanate. The British took these opportunities before other European powers intervened. They were afraid that disturbances between these two sultanates would give the Dutch space to maneuver and reasons to intervene. If the Dutch had occupied both the Brunei and Sulu courts, they would monopolize the trade routes to China (Tarling, 1982). The anxiety among the British officers in the east had made London reconsider Brooke’s view on Labuan. Beside the Dutch, the British also worried about the intentions of the French and the Americans in Borneo. The increased interests by Americans over Borneo can be seen from the reports that were always published in their newspapers and finally, caught the attention of the Singapore Free Press. Meanwhile, the determination of the French to establish their base in the Sulu Archipelago worried the British. The British worried that the French

might divert their interests to Borneo instead, if they failed to establish their base in the Sulu Archipelago (Great Britain Colonial Office Labuan, 1844-1906, Memorandum of 1846, Relative to the Occupation of Labuan, June 25, 1846).

The geographical realities of the British ports in the vicinity of the South China Sea had a direct bearing of the strategic and political importance with regard to the physical features of Labuan. Located in the northeast of the Malay Archipelago and southwest of the Philippines Archipelago, Labuan could be the meeting point for merchants using the South China Sea before penetrating the Straits of Malacca and the Sulu and Celebes Seas.

The changes in the cabinet of Great Britain brought new elements into Her Majesty government’s imperialism policies. Labuan began as a naval station under the administration of the navy (Annual Report Straits Settlement, 1920). Navies were needed to safeguard the British merchants in Borneo waters famous for pirate activities. The presence of a naval station had an impact on the trade along the Borneo waters and then Labuan’s role was developed to be a trading center. The British garrison was placed along the island’s coastlines especially in the east coast with an infantry of about 200 persons (Great Britain Colonial Office Labuan, 18441906, Lord Grey to James Brooke, June 1848). The Opium War of 1839 that ended with the Treaty of Nanking 1842 put an end to the controlled trade system in Canton and saw the lease of Hong Kong to the British. Thus, there was an expansion of the British trade in the ports in China namely Shanghai, Ningpo, Fuchow and Amoy. Before Labuan was chosen, the British had surveyed a few areas in Borneo for the purpose of establishing a naval station. For example, in 1824, H.M.S. Semarang suggested that Kuching was not suitable because it was situated 25 miles from the sea and was difficult to sail during the low tide. Meanwhile, Santubong and Muara Tebas did not have the elements to be established as ports (Great Britain Colonial Office Labuan, 1844-1906, Mr. Wise to Sir Robert Peel, March 12, 1844, about Paper Relating to Borneo and the Proceeding for Sarawak of James Brooke, esq., 1848).

In 1844, the motion to occupy Labuan was brought officially before Parliament and an Admiral was asked to take over Labuan. A naval station in Borneo was needed as the EIC was not able to safeguard and protect the ships since the British trade in China had increased (Great Britain Colonial Office Labuan, 1844-1906, Mr. Wise to Sir Robert Peel, March 12, 1844). There were pressures from the merchant associations such as the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, the East India and China Association and the Commercial Association of Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow on the importance of establishing a naval station in the South China Sea which influenced the establishment of a naval station and port in Labuan (Great Britain Colonial Office Labuan, 1844-1906, Chairman of London East India and China Association to the Earl of Aberdeen, June 11, 1846). Two memorandums were sent to the Foreign Office by the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the East India and China Association about the importance of taking Labuan as a naval station or

depot to protect the British merchants that used the South China Sea (Great Britain Colonial Office Labuan, 1844-1906, East India and China Association to FO, June 15, 1846). They believed if the British made Labuan a naval station, it would suppress the pirate activities more effectively.

The first factor was the need for security, a prerequisite for trade. An island with a deep and sheltered anchorage was ideal in the 19th century, when British naval power was supreme in the eastern seas. It was a time of island taking for Britain. After the Nanking Treaty 1842, there was an immediate demand for a naval base for operations and a garrison for troops on the South China Sea to look after British interest along the trade routes from Singapore to Canton (and later Hong Kong). Labuan provided a needed haven for British ships from the elements and enemy warships in the wide stretch of 1,700 miles of waters between Singapore and Hong Kong. The island came to be mentioned when some survivors of an attack on the EIC factory on Balambangan Island in 1775 took refuge on Labuan but their desire was abandoned for decades (Colony of North Borneo Annual Report 1953).

Although Balambangan was considered better and more suitable as a naval station, in the end Labuan was chosen by the British. Balambangan needed a better defence system and involved higher investments to ensure her success as a naval station (Great Britain Colonial Office Labuan, 1844-1906, Secretary of the Admirals to Lords of the Commissioners of the Admiralty, December 12, 1845). Therefore, in the British officers’ eyes, Labuan was better than Balambangan as dredging was not needed. Labuan with natural deep-water harbour was suitable to cater for different types of ships all around the year (Great Britain Colonial Office Labuan, 1844-1906, East India and China Association to FO, June 15, 1846). Situated in between the two most important of British ports in the east, Labuan could play the same role as Ascession Island as a naval station (Great Britain Colonial Office Labuan, 18441906, Memorandum of 1846, Relative to the Occupation of Labuan, June 25, 1846; and Great Britain Colonial Office Labuan, 1844-1906, Hamilton to FO, June 8, 1846). In June 1846, both the Secretary of the Foreign Office and the Secretary of the Colonial Office gave orders to occupy Labuan without further delay for the reason to establish a naval station and harbor of refuge for the protection of legitimate trade and the suppression of piracy (Great Britain Colonial Office Labuan, 1844-1906, Memorandum, June 18, 1846). Labuan had a natural deep-water harbour southeast of the Island which later was known as the Victoria Harbour. The harbour was easy and safe to navigate both from the north and south directions by different types of ships to anchor during the monsoons (Annual Report Straits Settlement, 1929).

Politics and Labuan Port Establishment

The brute logic of rivalry amongst European powers for economy and influence on a regional scale in Southeast Asia, advanced by continuing advancement in science and technology in the western world, pushed Labuan into the political and strategic

limelight. The overwhelming bulk of the seaborne commerce that used the Straits of Malacca to the Far East must use the South China Sea as their sea-lane. It was, therefore, of the supreme intra-Asian trade and strategic interest to the British that depended significantly on trade in the vicinity of Southeast Asian waters to constitute Labuan as a port. The British depended heavily on the South China Sea for its substantial Asian trade as far as from the Persian Gulf that went through the Straits of Malacca before penetrating the Far East markets. From the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca, the vast strategic area of British commercial and imperial interests was well protected but the South China Sea. The presence of the other powers in the South China Sea in the 19th century such as the French in Indo China, the keen interests of Germans and Americans to find settlements within the vicinity of the South China Sea and also the long existence and presence of the Dutch in the east coast of Borneo, would hamper British desire to be more competitive in trade and simultaneously pose a threat to its naval supremacy in the region.

The Nanyang region covering the waters of the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca represented two seminal forces under European imperialism: competitive influence-building by the colonials and the technological revolution in shipping that broadened the gap between the natural harbors and the planned ports. There was a ‘plan’ of colonial ports to predict their rise and fall and to postulate their fortunes, regardless of whether they were under the same empire or rival powers. In the earlier 19th century, the British were interested in gaining control of Borneo because through it, they could exercise surveillance over the route to China. During this period rivalry went on between the Dutch and the British for control of the waters in Southeast Asia which was not clearly defined in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. The Nanyang region possessed a “cross-roads position” of British Empire both in its political-economy and socio-political development as it was accentuated by the existence of a lucrative trade for centuries.

The possibility of the South China Sea turning out to be an arena of European power competition brought a new dimension to the strategic importance of Labuan. Labuan was a suitable location to fulfill a ‘power vacuum’ in the South China Sea. The development of Labuan as a port was linked inextricably with the tensions and rivalries that may develop in the South China Sea in the 19th century. By taking Labuan as a British Crown Colony, the British signaled their sovereignty over the island with the consent of the Brunei court. Thus, this would reduce the apprehension of the impact of great power rivalries on the west coast Borneo and its vicinity and also set up the British inter-regional political systems to perpetuate their interests.

Among the major and minor ports of the British Empire here, there were elements of competition and rivalry. Singapore for example was heavily dependent on international trade and commerce. Singapore enjoyed great economic benefits from commercial navigation via the Straits of Malacca before the ships continued their voyages through the South China Sea. Labuan was not developed as an

alternative port of the British Empire to lure away part of the commerce passing through Singapore before calling on Hong Kong but supported both these ports to ensure their prosperity continued. In fact, the Straits merchants’ argument against the thriving development of Labuan and action taken by the British to stop this was evidently designed to make Singapore “the port” of the British in Southeast Asia. The unity of the British ports in Southeast Asia was meant to champion one port by allowing competition on certain level playing fields only. Thus, the destiny of a port can be patterned if the politics, economic and infrastructure were blended together to inject the activities in the harbor.

As early as the 19th century the British looked ahead to strengthen their positions by every mean available in the region. The British found that there was no British port in the South China Sea. Notwithstanding the dangers raiding and pirates, the South China Sea provided the shortest sea-routes between Singapore and Hong Kong. Furthermore, the British did not have a single port suitable for the collection and distribution of their merchandise and for the supply of the necessary fuel and water for their merchant marine between these two ports. Moreover, Labuan provided a logistical linkage of the utmost significance between Singapore and Hong Kong. Therefore, the British needed to understand the politics of the surrounding seas in order to gain access to the Asian trade and control ‘the smuggling activities’ in the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca. Only with this understanding could the British deploy their vast resources to good effect.

It is interesting to note that Labuan was first not held in high esteem by the British in their search for new ports in Borneo waters. In the early 1840s, however, the British merchants wrote several letters to Madras, impressing upon the Madras government the importance of Labuan. Then, London was warned by Madras that if the British did not take Labuan, the island might be occupied by the other European powers. A few years passed and nothing was done. British authorities in the Straits Settlements also saw Labuan as the means by which their trade in the South China Sea could be extended and be expedited. The influence exercised by colonial powers over the choice of location, human and material resources, including the naval military machinery, was a precursor of the modern-day concept of “sea power”. Labuan was the first British colony on Borneo Island. Its possession was the natural result of British expansion in Southeast Asia and the Far East as well as the imperialistic conflict between the Dutch and the British Empires from 18th to 20th centuries.

The colony of Labuan was uninhabited to start with. Labuan was not the point where sea transport met before it became the British Colony. The harbour merely served as a refuge port for ships during monsoon. However, with the establishment of foreign rule the deep-water shelter of Victoria Harbour acquired new significance, and the port eventually intercepted the trade of the South China Sea ports. Initially, Labuan’s primary task was to be a naval station protecting shipping from Singapore to Hong Kong rather than a major entrepot. It was hoped that Labuan could patrol

the British merchant activities in the South China Sea effectively. The British desired Labuan’s prosperity to revive in her new role as a subordinate port to Singapore. They successfully implemented this plan. The only trade that Singapore freely encouraged in Labuan was the European and local Straits trade in which Singapore was not interested.

Labuan was a Crown Colony from 1846 to 1889. Although, the economic weight of Labuan was of marginal importance, for the success of the British trade in the region, the British needed to remain in Labuan. Labuan as a crown colony was under direct British administration from London. The Governor was the head of the administration; the source of all authority in the colony; and working under and responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. James Brooke was the first Governor. To a great extent the possession of Labuan was significantly influenced by Brooke, an Englishman who had interests and succeeded in gaining control in Sarawak in 1841 and was determined to expand his political sway over the rest of Brunei. The officers were brought from Singapore and the EIC in which one officer was appointed to serve a few posts at the same time. The Governor was responsible for the administration, jurisdiction and internal affairs of Labuan (Great Britain Colonial Office Labuan, 1844-1906, Lord Grey to James Brooke, January 22, 1848). Brooke as Governor of Labuan, Commissioner and General Consul to the Sultan of Brunei and Rajah of Sarawak did not pay much attention to the development of Labuan. In the debate of the Committee of Supply on 14 June 1851, Wilson Patten argued that Brooke “was not practical at all.” (Great Britain Colonial Office Labuan, 1844-1906, Report of the Court of Directors to the Proprietors of EAC, June 30, 1852). Labuan suffered badly under Brooke’s poor administration from the beginning. However, in the 1860s under a new Governor, Sir John Pope Hennessy, Labuan’s potential bloomed as trade and shipping flourished gradually. Under Hennessy, Labuan still lacked officers to govern the island effectively and efficiently.

In 1881, W.H. Treacher was appointed as the third Governor of Labuan. Treacher who had interests in the British North Borneo Company (BNBC) paid more attention to North Borneo instead. He was more concerned about the development of North Borneo as the Company was established for the purpose of business. The dynamism of the BNBC solely depended on the capitalist shares. Treacher as the Governor of BNBC was the first person that suggested Labuan’s administration should be transferred under the BNBC (British North Borneo Herald, 1888). Treacher’s suggestion was supported by a few officers at the Colonial Office. They asked London to revise the status of Labuan as a Crown Colony because the island was considered a burden to the taxpayers in Britain. For example, during Brooke’s tenure as Governor, London spent £9,000 without any projects meant for the economic and social development in Labuan (Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, 1 March 1850).

In 1889, the Colonial Office in London ordered the BNBC to take over the administration of Labuan. The Colonial Office’s reason for transferring Labuan to the Company was the financial situation that Labuan faced. The Colonial Office assumed that expenditures of the island could be reduced if its administration was combined with that of the Company. This was a fundamental part of the strategy of the British Colonials to reduce the costs of direct administration. The strategy of the British Colonials might have served to intensify the centralization of bureaucracy to form a modern state without coterminous. Labuan was officially transferred to BNBC on 1 January 1890. Labuan was administrated by the BNBC for 15 years from 1890 to 1905.

Through the Letters Patent, the Chairman of BNBC was given rights and powers to act as the Governor of Labuan but the island’s status as colony was remained and was subjected to London (British North Borneo Company, 1865-1949, Report on Petroleum on Borneo, 1898). The Common Law of Labuan comprised the Common Law of England except for special provision that was amended in the Law of Local Statute (British North Borneo Company, 1865-1949, Labuan, May 16, 1897). Although Labuan was a Crown Colony, BNBC administered the island like other residencies in North Borneo. As a chartered company, BNBC’s ultimate objective was to make profits and depend directly on its shareholders to expand the Company’s activities. The Company’s main objective was how to manage the company’s finances as low as possible and any activity that was not profitable had no space and was against the Company’s principles.

In the 1890s Labuan was chosen as the most profitable location for a submarine cable station between Singapore and Hong Kong. In 1894 submarine cable was laid linking Labuan to these two most importance British ports in the Eastern seas. By the turn of the 20th century this link, undertaken by the Eastern Extension Company which later merged into Cable & Wireless Limited, had become the most important business in Labuan. Even the island’s coal industry was eclipsed. During the RussiaJapanese struggle that culminated in the 1904-5 war, Labuan came to prominence as a coaling station for British ships attempting to break the Japanese blockade of Vladivostok. Both the island’s coal mines, and submarine cable benefited, and the episode once again proved Labuan’s strategic importance.

Twenty-six years under the BNBC, Labuan was neglected as the Company’s capital was Sandakan. Although Labuan was the second most important port in North Borneo and the most important on the West Cost of Borneo, she was often ignored by the Company. At the close of the 19th century, Labuan did not experience any great physical expansion as a result of a lack of investment. The traders and people of Labuan sent a petition in 1896 urging a change or at least an improvement to the dilapidated condition of their island. They were not satisfied with the increasing tax system, the extravagant administrative expenditures which were the monopoly of the staff of the BNBC and also the jurisdiction system of North Borneo was

implemented in Labuan without the consent of London (British North Borneo Company, 1865-1949, Chairman Court of Directors BNBC to Governor of Labuan, July 4, 1902; Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (Weekly), 11 February 1896). Partly for this reason and partly because of the fear of other imperial powers overcoming and taking over the greatly weakened and reduced Brunei Sultanate, Britain resumed the administration of Labuan in 1906. In 1906, Labuan was transferred and directly administrated from London. London decided to take over Labuan after considering the island’s position as a coal and telegraph station for Borneo which were important for the military.

At the beginning of the 20th century Labuan came to threaten in a small way the economic position of Singapore. Although the establishment of Labuan port did not directly eliminate the economic influences of Singapore in the region, the presence of Labuan made it possible for a rise in its position in Borneo. Labuan became a beneficiary of the indigenous traders of Borneo who called there to load their products. Gradually, the British in Singapore extended their control down to Labuan whose resources could yield such great profits. In 1906 the Colonial Office and the Straits Governor decided to join Labuan as part of the Straits Settlement on the ground that the necessity for continuity and uniformity of administration warranted such a move.

On 1 January 1907, a further step towards complete centralization was taken by attaching Labuan as part of Singapore. This step was justified by the British on the ground that the slow development of the island needed improvement. Through the Letters Patent of 1906, provision was legislated to annexe Labuan as a part of the Straits Settlements. This suggestion was proposed by the Governor of Singapore. In January 1907, Ordinance No.1 of 1907 came into force and Labuan became a dependency of Singapore (Annual Report Straits Settlement, 1920) but financial matters of the island were managed separately from 1907 to 1912. On 1 December 1912, through Ordinance No III of 1911, Labuan was gazetted as a colony of the Straits Settlements. At the same time, a Rural Board was established to control Labuan’s affairs and development (Annual Report Straits Settlement, 1912). Labuan remained under the Straits Settlement until 1946.

World War II brought Labuan’s next change in status. On 3 January 1942, the Japanese military conquered Labuan. Like the British in 1846, the Japanese occupied Labuan for the same reason. Labuan was made a naval station to defend the Japanese interests in the southern part of the South China Sea before reaching Singapore. The Japanese returned the sovereignty of Labuan to the Sultan of Brunei, but the real ruler was the Japanese military (Baker, 1962). Under the Japanese military, Labuan or Maeda Jima was administrated together under the Seikai Shiu or the West Coast and Interior Residency of North Borneo.

In June 1945, North Borneo was liberated from Japanese occupation. Martial Law was declared in British Borneo on 1 September 1945. British Borneo in the context of Martial Law comprised Labuan, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak (Colony of North Borneo Annual Report, 1953). On 10 July 1946, Labuan ceased to be part of the Straits Settlements and became part of the Colony of North Borneo five days later. Labuan lost its status as a free port on 15 July 1946 (Colony of North Borneo Government Gazette, 1946) and it was administrated as Labuan and Interior Residency. Until 30 August 1963, Labuan’s administration was under the provisions of the Letters Patent of North Borneo. On 16 September 1963, Labuan became a part of Malaysia as the Colony of North Borneo (Sabah) joined the federation.

Port Infrastructures and Competitiveness

Although the harbour brought the trade into Labuan and the trade made the port, Labuan could not automatically become a port without a proper plan. That is to say that the establishment of a planned port has made the need for a harbour less significance in the modern history of port development. This is not to deny that in the earlier stages, the location and other geographical factors may have been largely responsible for the development of a port. In other words, the historical influence and the effect of inertia must not be ignored entirely but the modern port must reflect the evolution of the modern ship and other means of transportation. A modern colonial port in Southeast Asia in the early 20th century required a whole group of anchorages, basins, docks and quays that included a wider significance to the port activities such as customs, warehouses, inland transport, and even markets to respond to the ever-changing technology in shipping and modern sea traffic and which Labuan Port lacked. Besides, the ever-changing demand in commodities also required the ability of port to adapt to its ultimate commercial purpose.

Labuan had both similarities and differences in the variables for the establishment of colonial ports in the region in the 19th and 20th centuries. The strategic location of the island itself means that Labuan Port enjoyed geographical advantages with better features of a deep and sheltered harbor. A strategic location with the deep and well sheltered harbor per se, however, would not guarantee the success of the port, as the advantages accruing from these factors have to be weighed vis-à-vis the advantages of other planned ports in the region.

After Labuan was opened as a commercial center in 1848, there was no basic infrastructure of a port such as a commercial wharf. The earlier initiative to provide basic infrastructure was taken by the coal mining company. Ships that anchored at the port used a small wharf that was built in the northwest of Victoria Harbour. The small wharf located at the Beach Streets was built for the navy but also used for loading and unloading imports and exports of Labuan. Besides Victoria Harbour, the supply of coal to the ships was also carried out at the Raffles Port in Tanjong Kubong. Raffles Port did not have a harbour and was not safe for ships during monsoon. In

1854, in order to overcome the obstacle during the monsoons, the EAC suggested building a pier for the ships to berth and get their coal cargo directly from the coal wagon. Besides, the EAC also proposed the construction of a railway for the distance of 8 miles from Tanjung Kubong to Victoria Harbour. This construction was important as coal could be supplied to the ships safely during the monsoons at Victoria Harbour. The road of 8 miles from Tanjung Kubong to the port was upgraded for the increased traffic in coal from the mines. In addition, the Central Borneo Co. Ltd. also built a railway line from Tanjung Kubong to the port in 1891. The construction of the 8 ½ miles railway was completed and opened in 1893.

In the first 20 years of its status as a free port, Labuan offered very limited port facilities to the merchants. Besides a timber wharf and a small godown, there were no navigational aids at all to guide the ships that entered and cleared the port. Ships only entered and cleared the port in the daytime. The strategic significance of Labuan was proven when the island was chosen to be the centre of a telegraph station on Borneo that connected her to Singapore and Hong Kong. This station also connected Labuan to the BNBC, Brunei and Sarawak (The Straits Times, 6 June 1885). The existence of a telegraph service in the 1880s added another dimension to the port development as the Labuan merchants could get information faster.

In 1888, the increasing number of steamships that called at Labuan Port made the authorities propose that tonnage dues should be charged. This suggestion was tabled as the government felt that the shipping activities did not contribute anything to Labuan’s revenues. The government planned to build a lighthouse on Papan Island. The government also planned to install beacons and buoys at the port entrance. Therefore, the ships would be able to enter and to clear anytime (Labuan Blue Book, 1885-1898 in Labuan: Miscellaneous: Blue Book of Statistics, 1848-1906). In the middle of 1890s, a lighthouse was erected on Papan Island, but the light was not functioning well (Annual Report Labuan, 1881-1897 in Labuan: Miscellaneous: Blue Book of Statistics, 1848-1906). In order to improve the capacity of the light house in Papan Island a dioptrie light was installed in 1902 with visibility of 8 miles. However, the existence of Rajah’s Light (Brooketon) at the western entrance of Brunei Bay was underutilized by the ship masters who ran their coastal trade between Labuan and Singapore. In bad weather, the light was only visible after the ships were too close to the shore. Therefore, the ship masters did not rely on Rajah’s Light for guidance.

In the early 1900s, the officers in Labuan paid more serious intention to the development of navigational aids, especially the lighthouse to guide the ships entering and departing from the port. A lighthouse was needed on Kuraman Island as it was considered the most dangerous area for ships calling at Labuan as it had a reef and sand bank on the north and west parts of the entrance to the Brunei Bay (British North Borneo Company, 1865-1949, John K. Webster to A Vanscoline, October 4, 1900). The difficulty of approaching the port at night seriously hindered the trade of the colony. Although the ship masters got their coal cheaper in Labuan

than elsewhere, they made complaints that the delays and anxiety in making a port without lights or landmarks counterbalanced any advantage gained. Therefore, it was better for them to go to Singapore even though the port was usually overcrowded with shipping (Great Britain Colonial Office, 1838-1946, Government House of Penang to CO, February 24, 1900).

In the beginning of the 20th century, the Colonial officers in Singapore admitted that Labuan Port was not Singapore’s competitor but the anxiety among them was obvious. They were afraid that Labuan would take over the role of Singapore especially in bunkering service if proper and complete light houses were erected there (Great Britain Colonial Office, 1838-1946, J.A. Swettenham to Joseph Chamberlain, February 24, 1900). However, the British had no choice but to develop the lighthouses in Labuan. After a few considerations relating to the various schemes for navigation lights at the port, the Slade’s scheme was chosen. This scheme proposed that the best and most economic construction would be to build a lighthouse on Kuraman Island. The site of the lighthouse on Kuraman Island should not be less than 130 feet above sea level with the height of the lighthouse at 100 feet. These combinations would make the lights visible from different approaches. The Labuan government was aware that the erection of a lighthouse on Kuraman Island was of the utmost importance to the prosperity of Labuan’s trade. The lack of navigational aids at the port would seriously postpone the development of Labuan. Therefore, a proposal was also presented to erect lights at the Pelong Rocks (British North Borneo Company, 1865-1949, Secretary the Labuan Coalfields Company Ltd to the Court of Directors BNBC, November 20, 1903).

Although dredging was not required in the harbor, Labuan Port needed dock facilities to make the port more attractive and accommodate bigger and modern ships. To upgrade the efficiency in handling cargo at the port, a new landing pier was built in 1907. In 1920, a coal station was built at the port for bunkering (Annual Report Straits Settlement 1910; Annual Report Straits Settlement 1920). Before that, a new lighthouse on Papan Island was completed in December 1910 with its visible capacity up to 14 miles (Annual Report Straits Settlement, 1911). The lighthouse on Kuraman Island was completed in 1913 (Straits Settlement Blue Book 1913; Great Britain Colonial Office, 1838-1946, Trinity House to Crown Agents, January 28, 1913). In 1924, about 27 acres of agricultural land with 3,000 coconut trees and fruit trees were cleared by the authorities as they blocked the signal from the lighthouse on Kuraman Island. The trees were cut down in order that the lights could be noticed 21 miles from the offshore by the ship masters (Report on Trade, Annual Report Departmental Report of Straits Settlement, 1924).

The period following World War II can be classified as a period of reconstruction for Labuan Port. Restoration and reconstruction of the port infrastructures were given priority as the nerve of Labuan development had been neglected by the British for about one century. The integrated development of infrastructures was recognized as

a catalyst to attract more commercial ships to the port and thus, would stimulate the trade activities. This pattern was different from the previous one as the development of Labuan port was based on an ad-hoc basis that reflected the current situation regarding trade and shipping.

Considering the damage inflicted on the port by war, looting and neglect by the Japanese for more than three years of their occupation, it was a remarkable achievement of the re-occupation personnel, both government and civilian, that the functioning of the port was restored within a year. In 1946, the trade function of Labuan was resumed as soon as the port was reopened to commerce in which the trading conducted could hardly be described as normal. The combined effect of rehabilitation of Southeast Asia and the shortage of raw materials, machines and foodstuffs urged the resumption of trade. Progress in the post-war rehabilitation of port facilities was slow, owing to the world shortage of construction materials. Together with Sandakan, Labuan had been destroyed during the war. Labuan was the worst of all the British colonies were destroyed (Colony of North Borneo Annual Report 1947; Colony of North Borneo Annual Report, 1953).

Its 100th anniversary was marked with destruction to its development. Labuan became the main target for both sides in order to conquer Borneo. Wharves, berths, launches and light crafts sank within the port territory (Report of the War Damage Claims Commission from July 1947 to June 1952). In 1950, the British proposed the integrated development and reconstruction of Labuan Port and Victoria under the Town Planning Scheme and the National Planning Ordinance (Np.14, 1950) (Colony of North Borneo Annual Report, 1950). This agenda was carried on until the 1960s which involved a few phases. For the first time, the development of Labuan Port was not separated from other ports in North Borneo. The significance of the port was translated into new perspectives with the rapid development of the petroleum industry in Brunei and as a trading center for Sarawak and North Borneo. These efforts were translated into the building of the biggest wharf in North Borneo that was able to accommodate and had the capacity to handle cargo and ocean-going ships.

Priority was given to Labuan based on economic opportunities that guaranteed profits to the British in Borneo. The development and reconstruction of Labuan port took into consideration the development in shipping technology and the commodities handled at the port, especially petroleum. If the British did not develop Labuan, another alternative had to be identified. However, any proposal to establish a new port would involve higher costs. For example, Muara in Brunei and north Sarawak could not be approached by ocean going ships. Meanwhile, Jesselton was only a second-class port and needed further dredging works to upgrade its status. Labuan became important in the 1950s as the principal transshipment port for supplies to the Brunei oilfields. The Shell Company built a wharf, a few hundred meters east of the main wharf for the berthing of tankers and supply vessels.

The Development and Reconstruction Plan of North Borneo, 1948-55 was drafted for the main ports in North Borneo. Labuan and Sandakan were the first-class ports in North Borneo and were given priority with the completed and integrated scale of development. The first-class port was referred to as the port that had the capacity to handle ocean going ships of 8,000 tons or more. The second-class port was referred to as the port that had the capacity to handle the ships of Straits Steamship of 2,000 tons. The third-class port was referred to as the port that only had a jetty or lighterage to handle the small coastal ships (Ellison, 1948). Messrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank and Gwyther, a British firm was appointed as consultant for the reconstruction works of Labuan Port. The first phase involved the construction of the main wharf of 600 feet long x 26 feet wide. Each side of the wharf had two dolphins of 80 feet. The wharf was constructed on the waterfront of not less than 26 feet depth at low tide (Messrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank, & Gwyther, 1949; Colony of North Borneo Annual Report, 1950; Colony of North Borneo Annual Report, 1959). Although the wharf was the main structure that was given priority in the development and reconstruction plan of Labuan Port, its construction only began in 1953 (Colony of North Borneo Annual Report, 1953). The proposed plan was altered to suit the approved budget. A consultant from Hong Kong was hired to redesign the wharf especially on the material for the piling works. The construction of the main wharf of 600 feed was completed in 1954 (Colony of North Borneo Annual Report, 1954).

Before reconstruction, Labuan had two wharves. The Liberty Wharf (353 feet long x 45 feet wide) built by the Australian Military had the capacity to handle ships with 24 feet depth to berth by it. However, this wharf was too short to handle the oceangoing ships. Dolphins were needed on each side of wharf for the ocean-going ships to berth (Messrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank, & Gwyther, 1949). The second wharf located on the west of Liberty Wharf was the property of a company. The Small Ship’s Wharf or Victoria Wharf of 5 feet depth was destroyed during the war. The reconstruction started in 1953 by the Australian Military was completed in 1955. The traffic congestion in Labuan Port was reduced as it had the combination of dockyard wharves of 1,025 feet long with the capacity to handle one ocean-going ship of 26 feet depth, a ship of 2,000 tons and 18 feet deep and two coastal ships at the same time. Half the costs for the reconstruction of these wharves were defrayed by the Mutual Security Agency (Colony of North Borneo Annual Report, 1952).

The reconstruction of these wharves was necessary as they could not be maintained economically even if they had not been bombed during the war. The condition of Liberty Wharf was critical as the damage to the pilings was obvious since the wharf was built in a rush within two weeks by using timbers such as casuarinas and sempillor which were non-resistant to the sea waves and marine borers (Messrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank, & Gwyther, 1949; Colony of North Borneo Annual Report, 1950). In 1963, Labuan had three main wharves namely the Liberty Wharf (400 feet long x 30 feet wide) of 25 feet depth, the Victoria Wharf (275 feet long x 30 feet wide) of 20 feet depth and the Shell Oil Installation Jetty (175 feet long x 25 feet wide) of 31 feet depth (Annual Report Marine Department of Sabah, 1964).

Labuan 1846-1963: Port And Politics Of The British Maritime Agenda

All the lighthouses were destroyed during the war. In 1946, the lighthouses on Kuraman Island and Papan Island were repaired with a visibility of 7 miles first. The second stage of the restoration of the lighthouses was done in 1948 with a visibility of 15 miles. Then in 1951, the full power visibility of 21 miles on Kuraman Island and 17 miles on Papan Island were installed. Until 1948 Labuan Port did not have light beacons and pier lights to pilot the ships entering the port. In order to overcome the problem, mark beacons were installed temporarily. Since 1948 almost all buoys were installed except at the west bank. In addition, the lights were also needed at the Jahal Shoals to pilot the ships entering the port from the east channel at night. Since 1950, 17,000 candle power electric lights were installed on Papan Island to pilot ships entering Labuan Port with additional navigational aids such as three light beacons installed at the Harbour Shoals (Colony of North Borneo Annual Report, 1950).

When the military left the island, they handed over a few ships, a tug, slipway and lighter and workshop to the civil authority for their use or to be destroyed. A tug of 300 horse powers was used to tow, four lighters to load and unload the commodities and a slipway was used to handle ships of 300 tons. The slipway and the workshop were used by the port authority to repair ships. Labuan Port provided repair services for ships in Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak (Colony of North Borneo Annual Report, 1963). Apart from that, the port authority also built a new transit godown of 10,000 square feet in 1957. It increased the capacity of the godown for storage to 28,000 square feet (Colony of North Borneo Annual Report, 1957). The Colonials also reclaimed land on the east side of Liberty pier in 1958 in order to build a new godown (Colony of North Borneo Annual Report, 1958). To improve trade activities, merchants in Labuan were guided by the Free Port Guild of Labuan. The guild tried to attract the international shipping lines to use Labuan as an entrepot. Free storage was provided for 14 days at Labuan port with the introduction of bills of lading at the end of 1957 (Colony of North Borneo Annual Report, 1957).

Conclusion

The modern history of Labuan is the history of its port’s development. Labuan Port was a foreign creation. Foreign trade determined the need for an economic base and the considerations of defense brought out the advantages of Labuan as a port. No comprehensive study of the growth of the colony can fail to point out the dependence of Labuan on the port. From 1846-1963 Labuan Port’s development corresponded with major changes in the internal and external influences on the port. Political and economic progress in the area it served, the rise and fall of rival ports and the development of world shipping were important factors to which Labuan Port readily responded. The first century of Labuan’s development under the British was basically characterized by a “control of the territory” based on the geostrategic assessment of a seaport and its influence over the environment in terms of “keys” to control the colonial interests. Thus, a rigid port system was designed that prevented the development and potential of the port. Aftermath of War II,

Labuan 1846-1963: Port And Politics Of The British Maritime Agenda

the port was injected with a new dimension of integrated development. Labuan Port, however, was never provided with complete installations to compete with other major ports in this region. It is obvious that within 117 years, the institutional framework, economic, social and technical factors conditioning port development and expansion depended heavily on the colonial decisions. The strategic location of Labuan meant that the island came to play an important intermediary role within the political economy of the British colonies. The emergence, survival and success of Labuan, however, depended heavily on its ability to maintain the intermediary role that the island played between the internal and external networks of the ports. Central and periphery ports of the British colonies in the region were the creation and combination of both short-term and long-term power relations. In order to establish a core port for colony in the region, a prerequisite was the consolidation of a political center and economic core.

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Kathirithamby-Wells, J. (1992). The Politics of Commerce in Southeast Asia: An Historical Perspective. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya.

Labuan Blue Book: 1885-1898.

Labuan: Miscellaneous: Blue Book of Statistics, Series 146: Public Record Office, Great Britain, 1848-1906.

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

Merssrs. Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank & Gwyther. (1949). Report on the reconstruction of the Wharves at Labuan, Jesselton, Sandakan, Kudat and Tawau, North Borneo, July 28, 1949.

Parkinson, C.N. (1973). Trade in the Eastern Sea 1793-1813. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Reid, A. (2004). Global and Local in Southeast Asian History, International Journal of Asian Studies 1: 5-21.

Report of the War Damage Claims Commission from July 1947 to June 1952, Colony of Sarawak, Colony of North Borneo, State of Brunei.

Report on Trade, Annual Report Departmental Report of Straits Settlement, 1924.

Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1850, March 1). Retrieved from https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Page/singfreepressa18500301-1.1.1. [Accessed on 15/5/2023].

Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1850, March 5). Retrieved from https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Page/singfreepressa18500305-1.1.1. [Accessed on 15/5/2023].

Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (Weekly) (1896, February 11). Retrieved from https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Page/ singfreepresswk18960211-1.1.1. [Accessed on 15/5/2023].

Straits Settlement Blue Book, 1913

Tarling, N. (1982). The Burthen, the Risk and the Glory. Kuala Lumpur. Oxford University Press.

The Straits Times (1885, June 6). Retrieved from https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/ newspapers/Digitised/Page/straitstimes18850606-1.1.1. [Accessed on 15/5/2023].

Treacher, W.H. (1889). British Borneo: Sketches of Brunei, Sarawak, Labuan and North Borneo, Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 20: 13-74.

Warren, J.F. (1981). The Sulu Zone 1768-1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asia Maritime State.

Singapore: Singapore University Press.

Watson-Andaya, B. (1993). To Live as Brothers: Southeast Sumatra in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

PART III

INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY

CHAPTER FIVE

MALAYSIA IN THE INDO-PACIFIC ENVELOPE: THE GREAT GAME 2.0

Introduction

Everything starts with an idea. Most of the time, ideational construct takes precedence over material construct. For example, a television starts with the notion of better communication; a plate starts with the idea of not getting one’s food filthy; and a traffic signal starts with the idea of better traffic management. Without an idea, certain things we know in our life may cease to exist. An idea, therefore, is also the most powerful thing in the world; if it can be pursued, materialized and implemented. Victor Hugo, a well-known French writer, gently articulated this viewpoint in one of his renowned quotes, “On résiste à l’invasion des armées; on ne résiste pas à l’invasion des idées” (Hugo, 1907). Literally translated as “One resists the invasion of armies; one does not resist the invasion of ideas”, it basically means that once the intangible has festered on a capable mind, the physical is no match for it. Tyrion Lannister, a once-despised character in the popular television series Game of Thrones, eloquently emphasized this idea further with his monologue, “What unites people? Armies? Flag? Gold? There is nothing more powerful than a good story. Nothing can stop it. No enemy can defeat it”. Not even time can stop an idea. An idea, without a doubt, is the most prevailing thing in the world.

Earth has existed for approximately 4.5 billion years (Dalrymple, 2001). Hence, the material construct of it is nothing “new”. Even if changes during the Ice Age resulted in the emergence of the “new continents”, it is still not something “new”. It has remained relatively unchanged for thousands of years. What changes, however, are the ideas behind how we view (and subsequently segregate and/or merge the material construct of) the world. The earth’s physical structure remains unchanged

Captain Mohd Yusri Yusoff RMN

after the treaty, but the world’s map has changed. Before The Treaty of Westphalia, almost all the states we know of nowadays did not exist (Rae, 2007). Malaysia, for example, did not exist before 1957, and as a result, neither did its territory nor sovereignty. Hitherto, the world was primarily divided into colonies, empires and kingdoms. States had taken over these empires. “Central to the globalisation of the sovereign state were the processes of imperial collapse and decolonisation” (ibid). The actual collapse, however, was not really in terms of the material constructs of the empires or kingdoms, as some of the buildings of former empires and kingdoms are still standing now. What was collapsing and disintegrating then were essentially the ideas of empires and kingdoms, overtaken by new ones, the idea of a Westphalian state system. No one can resist the invasion of an idea, not even the great armies of the empires.

Conversely, ever since the earth existed, there were already oceans. When we compare the age of the world to the time any name was given to each of the oceans surrounding it, we can all agree that the latter is relatively young compared to the former as the latter is also based on an idea, which was later turned into “reality” based by consensus view; a consensus reality. Indian and Pacific oceans henceforth could be viewed from the same perspective. The present name of “Indian Ocean” has only been known since at least 1515, when the Latin form Oceanus Orientalis Indicus (“Indian Eastern Ocean”) is attested, named for the kingdom of India, which projects into it (Hui, 2010). It was earlier also known as the Eastern Ocean, Hind Mahasagar, Indic Ocean and Erythraean Sea (Vincent, 1800).

Meanwhile, the present name of the “Pacific Ocean” was only given by the Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan in 1521, denoting the “peaceful ocean” he encountered during his voyage (Hartig, 1910). It is thus innocuous to say that the said ocean has also been known by many other local names beforehand, primarily by people living on the fringes of it. This also remains true in the matter of all the oceans’ names around the globe. Consequently, instead of the earth having only one whole ocean, the names given to parts of the ocean (mainly depending on its localities and vicinities) had divided this one ocean into many oceans, as we know it, creating imaginary separation lines on the ocean, based initially on ideas that grown afterwards into consensus reality.

Accordingly, the concept or idea behind the notion of “Indo-Pacific” could thus be easily comprehended. Instead of two “separate” entities of water, the idea is to frame both the oceans (read: regions) together. Why? Brewster (2014) argued that the idea behind it is to change the popular “mental maps” of how the world is understood strategically, creating a new consensus reality. He gave an example of the Imperial Japanese Army, which stopped short of invading India in 1942 after conquering Burma, as their leaders did not “see” the Bay of Bengal to be a single strategic entity in the Asia region. There was a dividing line between their “mental map” of what constituted Asia and the Indian subcontinent beyond (ibid). Why

Malaysia In The Indo-Pacific Envelope: The Great Game 2.0

have certain powers viewed it as important to change this “mental map”? The Copenhagen School had famously argued about the so-called “ regional security dynamics/complex” (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998). They contested that any regional security dynamics should be primarily understood within what is called a “security complex” or a “set of states whose security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (ibid). The answer thus is simple. The idea is to conveniently group the states surrounding the littoral “Indo-Pacific” together, tantamounting to generalizing the security complex of both regions as having the same security perceptions and concerns. Hence, the start of the problem, as perceptions could not be easily generalized.

The Problem

Since perception could be referred to as the “set of mechanisms” we utilise to make sense of the many sensory inputs we are faced (Carbon, 2014), it could therefore be of infinite varieties, as the set could be a mixture of anything and everything someone had experienced in life. These mechanisms are developed mainly from that someone’s unique background; for example, by “language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people”(Huntington, 1993). In short, it is usually referred to as an “identity”. Therefore, the identities that we have in each of us are different, as not all of us were brought up in the same way. We have our view of the world. Someone’s “6” could be someone else’s “9”, depending on their point of view (perception). One could, however, persuade another to have the same perspective as theirs if they could “frame” the same ideas you have in you on them, putting them in your shoes. Once one achieves this, one will have them seeing it from their point of view, seeing the same “6” instead of the “9”. For example, instead of perceiving the Bay of Bengal as a separator in one’s “mental map” between East Asia (including Southeast Asia) and South Asia, it could also be oppositely perceived as a connector. It all came down to education, or in this case, re-education. If one could re-convince the masses with their new framing narrative, a new consensus reality will emerge, replacing the old one. Convincing a large number of people is difficult, to say the least.

This comes down to what Huntington (ibid) argued that the dominating source of future conflict would be culture. Even when the regional masses could accept the new framing on the surface, culture (or civilisation in Huntington’s terms) will still play a dominant part in the undercurrents. This would usually mean hesitation or even rejection of accepting the idea. As the idea of “Indo-Pacific” is to “unify” the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions under one “mental map”, these civilization undercurrents will surely bring some resistants’ to the idea, especially in Asia. Acharya (2010) argued well on this when he said there is no such thing as “one” Asia and no single concept of Asia. Multiple (though not always mutually exclusive) interpretations of Asia exist, some based on material constructs like economic growth, interdependence,

Malaysia In The Indo-Pacific Envelope: The Great Game 2.0

and physical might. In contrast, others are based on ideational underpinnings like civilizational ties and normative ideals (ibid). Based on the eight main civilizations that Huntington (1993) had argued on (Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization” (ibid)), Asia consists of at least half of the principal civilizations of the world. Bay of Bengal therefore in this view, is not just a separator or connector to someone’s “mental map”, it is also a “cultural fault line”; a line that ideologically could not be crossed.

The Posture

It, therefore, came as no surprise when Malaysia has yet to officially state its view on the topic (let alone have any posture), even when other surrounding countries seem to embrace the “Indo-Pacific” geopolitical architecture. Baffling as it may appear, the neutral posture (that could be misinterpreted as “non-action”) by Malaysia in “reacting” to “Indo-Pacific” could be definitely explained. Subtlety, Malaysia’s Defence White Paper 2020 (DWP2020) promulgated Malaysia’s perspective on this. Throughout the DWP2020, Malaysia had used the term “Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions” instead of “Indo-Pacific”. It denotes the same area (material constructs) but not with the same perspective (ideational construct). There are 13 mentions of the term “Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions” in this official document, and the term “Indo-Pacific” had only been exclusively used to denote the strategies announced by countries of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad; Australia, India, Japan and the United States of America (the US)). Malaysia had not any view of the “IndoPacific” notion. However, it had a view and even a posture to this traditional region of Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean, which is to be its “bridging linchpin” (Malaysia MINDEF, 2020). The idea behind Malaysia’s perspective could always be traced back to Huntington’s (1993) “language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people” standpoint, i.e. identity, especially in terms of history and organization.

“Malaysia’s history is, in many ways, a history of big power politics”(Malaysia MINDEF, 2020). Malaysia’s history is always about how the hitherto major powers influenced the country’s fate and fortune. Malaysia has known this well since it has been a recurring theme for as long as time can remember. While its location provided opportunities for commercial and civilizational growth, it also had unfortunately attracted unwelcome attention and exploitation by powerful entities seeking to dominate the Malay Archipelago. DWP 2020 simplified these influences through the timeline:

From the rise and fall of the Malacca Sultanate, the successive colonial rule by the Portuguese (1511-1641), the Dutch (1641-1795, 1818-1825) and then the British (1795-1818, 1826-1957), the changing shape of colonial Malaya after the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty, the Japanese occupation (December 1941- August 1945), the birth of the Federation of Malaya as a sovereign state (31 August 1957), followed by the creation of a larger federation when Malaya (Tanah

Melayu) merged with other former British colonies of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak formed an independent Malaysia (16 September 1963) at the height of the Cold War (Malaysia MINDEF, 2020, p. 13).

The “history” reason Malaysia has no open perspective on the current notion could be fully understood. As this idea of “Indo-Pacific” is principally attached to the dynamic of the US-China strategic competition (He & Li, 2020; Khurana, 2018; Medcalf, 2019; Scobell, 2020), the historical identity of Malaysia had recognised as a great powers competition’s ambiguities that could lead to both opportunities and challenges, or either, or none at all. As long as its “set of mechanisms” cannot make sense of the inputs (whether it is an opportunity or a threat), Malaysia will be precautious with its perception of the idea and, subsequently, its view (read: policy). The contradiction in China’s South China Sea Policy, where China gave a mixed signal of maritime assertiveness and economic-diplomatic inducement to its littoral states (Kuik, 2017), or contradictive values promoted by the US, where it is promoting the ideas of liberal democracy, human rights, and open markets while curtailing the import of Malaysian palm oil to protect the US soybean industry (Kuik & Abdul Razak, 2021), have had an impact on Malaysia’s perception. A traditional Malay proverb, “gajah sama gajah berjuang, pelanduk mati di tengah-tengah”, could be roughly translated to “when two elephants are brawling, “ the mouse-deer would die in the middle” would culturally come into every Malaysian’s mind given this. Moreover, as a mouse-deer is a revered clever animal in the Malay Annals, Malaysia wants to avoid getting stuck in the middle as smartly as possible.

Institutionally, in its international relations principles and strategies, Malaysia has always been neutral and non-aligned. Both its foreign and defence policies have to a large extent, on multiple occasions, highlighted this fact. Its current Foreign Policy Framework of the New Malaysia: Change in Continuity and DWP2020 have stressed this point home even more. While the former emphasises the principle that “Malaysians want a Malaysia that is a friend to all and enemy of none” and “…a Malaysia that remains neutral and non-aligned” (Malaysia MOFA, 2019, p. 6), the latter sees “non-alignment and shared security as the basis of Malaysia’s Credible Partnerships” strategy (Malaysia MINDEF, 2020, p. 4). Non-alignment and multilateralism have been institutionalised in Malaysia since its infancy, from the late 1960s until the early 1970s. With the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, which Malaysia is one of its founding members (ASEAN.ORG, 2020), Malaysia then embraced non-alignment by joining the Non-Aligned Movement countries and replacing the alliance-centric Anglo-Malayan Defence Arrangement (AMDA) with Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) in 1971(Malaysia MINDEF, 2020). This external outlook has been continued, strengthened and indoctrinated by the ensuing governments, institutionalising it into the psyche of the population. Even when Malaysia’s 61 years-old government of Barisan National fell in 2018 to the new government of Pakatan Harapan (Nadzri, 2019), the institutionalisation of the non-aligned principle is still apparent in the existing foreign policy.

This “institution” reason subsequently barred Malaysia from making any official external statement about the concept of “Indo-Pacific”. The key to understanding this lies in viewing the concept not as an idea of integrating the two regions but in building a common front against China, and it is hard for countries not to do this, especially in light of the current Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States produced by the White House on February 2022. In this new document, the US had underlined that:

“This intensifying American focus (in the region) is because the Indo-Pacific is partly facing mounting challenges, particularly from the People’s Republic of China. The PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power. The PRC’s coercion and aggression span the globe but are most acute in the Indo-Pacific. From the economic coercion of Australia to the conflict along the Line of Actual Control with India to the growing pressure on Taiwan and bullying of neighbours in the East and South China Seas, our allies and partners in the region bear much of the cost of the PRC’s harmful behaviour. In the process, the PRC is also undermining human rights and international law, including freedom of navigation, as well as other principles that have brought stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific.” (The White House, 2022, p. 5)

The institutionalisation of non-alignment and multilateralism, in the perception’s “set of mechanisms”, has made Malaysia neutral in its stance on the “Indo-Pacific”. Hence, to make any statement that seemed to be on the bandwagon or balancing against the concept would contradict this institutionalised non-alignment principle of Malaysia. Malaysia wants to avoid being seen as taking sides, as it perceives the concept is more attached to power polarisation than it does to the idea of regional cooperation. Accordingly, Malaysia refused to see it from a zero-sum game perspective. Like any other pragmatic small state, it is trying to limit the risks while reaping the benefits that it could from this great powers competition. Malaysia, like other Southeast Asian countries, has instinctively hedged by keeping to its equidistance policy, diversifying strategic ties, and adopting slightly ambiguous tactics in its cooperation with these competing powers (Kuik & Abdul Razak, 2021).

The Conclusion

An idea is the most powerful thing in the world if it can be pursued, materialised and implemented, and “Indo-Pacific” is such an idea. The fundamental concept behind the notion is to merge the two old ideas of the “Indian Ocean” and “Pacific Ocean” into one. It is to produce a “mental map” that the two traditional oceans are now one ocean. Subsequently, this “mental map” would also include the littoral states of the oceans. The objective is to neatly combine the governments around the littoral “Indo-Pacific” together, implying that both regions’ security complexes share

similar security perceptions and concerns. Ultimately, if the idea is being bought, this notion will be materialised into what we know as “reality”; a consensus reality. The old reality as we know it would end, replaced by this new reality.

An idea, nonetheless, would only produce such consensus (in order for it to be materialised) if the masses perceive that the idea benefits them. As perception is argued to be a “set of mechanisms” that we use to interpret the inputs of the surroundings, we would have a different set of it, mainly developed from our experience or background. Huntington (1993) nonetheless argued that this perception primarily originates from “language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people”. It creates what is known as culture, and the highest culture that we could attest to is what he argued as a “civilisation”. He also argued that this cultural divide would be the fault line of our future crisis; the clash of civilisations (ibid). The geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, such as the assertion of this “Indo-Pacific” notion and the reactions of its regional powers, could be viewed partly through the lens.

Malaysia is yet to make any official statement on “Indo-Pacific”. This has been generally viewed as “non-action” by certain parties. Even when neighbouring states seemed to embrace the “Indo-Pacific” geopolitical architecture, Malaysia has remained “inert”. However, this neutral posture could be traced through the “set of mechanisms” Malaysia had used in interpreting the idea. Subtlety, Malaysia had officially stated its view of the notion in its strategic DWP2020 when it avoided using the term by replacing it with a more traditional “Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions” term instead. The expression could be easily replaced with the muchhype “Indo-Pacific”, but the document had stuck to the conventional referential throughout, proving it was intentional. Historically, Malaysia has a history of big power politics and institutionally had seen that being non-aligned is the best policy it could muster in such a situation. Hence, Malaysia’s neutral stance. It was due to Malaysia needing to be more knowledgeable and active on the idea. It was intentional, especially when “doing nothing” could also be an option.

A linchpin is a pin that passes through the end of an axle to keep a wheel in position; it does not support the wheel, but it ensures that the wheel is kept in place when it turns. A “bridging linchpin” is, in a way, an oxymoron. However, even then, this strategic idea of “ensuring security through connectivity/cooperation” was lost in those who view international relations as a zero-sum game. This great game of geopolitics is not a coin toss; it is only limited to head and tail. Perhaps, even the Nash Equilibrium in game theory could only be used to model some of the possible scenarios in finding the strategy for this game. Welcome to the Great Game 2.0.

“One of the mistakes some political analysts make is to think that their enemies should be our enemies.” - Nelson Mandela.

Malaysia In The Indo-Pacific Envelope: The Great Game 2.0

References

Acharya, A. (2010). Asia is not one. The Journal of Asian Studies, 69 (4), 1001– 1013.

Brewster, D. (2014). Dividing Lines: Evolving Mental Maps of the Bay of Bengal. Asian Security, 10 (2), 151–167.

Buzan, B., Waever, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Carbon, C.-C. (2014, Jul 31). Frontiersin.org. Retrieved Jan 20, 2022, from Frontier In Human Neuroscience: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/

Dalrymple, G. B. (2001). The Age of the Earth in the Twentieth Century: A Problem (mostly) Solved. London: Geological Society of London.

Hartig, O. (1910). The Catholic Encyclopedia. Retrieved Jan 15, 2022, from Ferdinand Magellan: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/

He, K., & Li, M. (2020). Understanding the Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific: US-China Strategic Competition, Regional Actors, and Beyond. International Affairs, 96 (1), 1-7.

Hugo, V. (1907). The History of A Crime. Nottingham Society.

Hui, C. H. (2010). Huangming Zuxun and Zheng He’s Voyages to the Western Oceans. Journal of Chinese Studies (51), pp. 67–85.

Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilisation? Foreign Affairs, pp. 22–49.

Khurana, G. (2018, Jan). The Origin of ‘Indo-Pacific ‘ as Geopolitical Construct. The Diplomat.

ASEAN.ORG. (2020). The Founding of ASEAN. Retrieved Feb 2, 2022, from Association of Southeast Asian Nations: https://asean.org/about-asean/the-founding-ofasean/

Kuik, C.-C. (2017). Explaining the Contradiction in China’s South China Sea Policy: Structural Drivers and Domestic Imperatives. China: An International Journal, 15 (1), 163–186.

Kuik, C.-C., & Abdul Razak, A. (2021). Malaysia’s Resilient (but Ambiguous) Partnership with the United States: e Dilemmas of Smaller States in the Indo-Pacific Era. Asia Policy, 16 (4), 86-95.

Malaysia MINDEF. (2020). Malaysia Defence White Paper 2020. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Defence.

Malaysia MOFA. (2019). Foreign Policy Framework Of The New Malaysia: Change in Continuity. Putrajaya: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia.

Medcalf, R. (2019). Indo-Pacific Vision. Asia Policy, 14 (3), 79–96.

Nadzri, M. (2019). The 14th General Election, the Fall of Barisan Nasional, and Political Development in Malaysia, 1957-2018. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 37 (3), 139–171.

Rae, H. (2007). Theories of State Formation. In M. Griffiths, International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge.

Scobell, A. (2020, May 15). Constructing a U.S.-China Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific and Beyond. Journal of Contemporary China, 69-84.

The White House. (2022). Indo-Pacific Strategy of The United States. Washington. Vincent, W. (1800). The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea. Cadell & Davies.

CHAPTER SIX

MALAYSIA’S STRATEGIC RESPONSES TOWARDS THE INDO-PACIFIC CONSTRUCT

Tharishini Krishnan

Introduction

History has shown that ocean space has experienced high levels of human interactions, developing an interactive high-sea trade between many different regions and connecting religions, societies and civilisations. This character has driven states to constantly focus on the maritime domain regarding state interactions. Today, when one looks at the shaping of the Indo-Pacific (IP), it represents an essential maritime dynamic contouring the interaction between countries. It has become a crucial platform for sea lanes of communication (SLOC), maritime connectivity and economic growth.

However, the significant contribution of the sea to human civilisation, economic growth and maritime connectivity has also led to states frequently using the maritime domain as a reason for competition; in the past, the rise and fall of great powers have been used frequently to determine a state’s power at sea. Sir Julian Corbett, one of the forefathers of maritime studies, states that the ocean is a thoroughfare, an element critical to national life (Corbett, 2004). On the other hand, Alfred Thayer Mahan states that the sea is a “great common”, a medium through which commerce and military force could flow freely (Mahan, 1987). Therefore, the role of the maritime domain in shaping regional and global security architecture has been widely discussed by scholars of contemporary world politics. In this regard, the IP, which focuses on the maritime aspect, will likely invite maritime competition between states.

As such, Kuala Lumpur has no choice but to respond to strategic discourse within the IP because Malaysia is a maritime nation. With this status, the ocean plays a crucial role in contributing towards the country’s well-being, both politically and

Malaysia’s Strategic Responses Towards The Indo-Pacific Construct

economically. Furthermore, geographical proximity has significant implications for Malaysia in the IP context. During the 15th century, Malacca rose to an established maritime port designated to support long-distance trade covering the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and eastwards from Malacca (Arasaratnam, 1994). This port was clearly at a linchpin between the Indonesian, Indian and Muslim worlds and was dominant like no other trading place in the Indian Ocean (IO) region. The immense strategic importance of the Straits of Malacca has not changed in the 21st century; being the shortest sea route between the Gulf and the critical Asian markets and between India, the South China Sea (SCS) and the Pacific Ocean (PO), thus, makes it imperative for Malaysia to respond to the IP construct strategically.

China’s power assertion lately has challenged Washington’s hegemonic role in the international system, a power position led by the US since the end of the Cold War. In response to this power competition, the IP was a geographical and strategic construct by the United States (US) to act and balance Beijing’s ambition to rise as a global and dominant power. Peace and stability are also key reasons for Malaysia to focus on the strategic changes within the IP construct. As a central country between the IO and the PO, Malaysia will potentially be sandwiched between the US and China’s power struggle and be directly impacted by any changing security in the true realm of dynamics.

The first section of this chapter provides an overview of the IP construct since its inception in 2007. The central argument of this chapter is that because the IP has direct implications for Malaysia, it must draw its line of strategy in responding to it. However, as a small maritime nation, Malaysia must be strategically intelligent in strategising its policy vis-à-vis the IP construct. It has been argued that Malaysia will see the IP as a theatre of opportunity and leverage its position as an essential maritime link between the east and the west. However, the country will remain vigilant to ensure it is not affected by the geostrategic competition between the US and China. In this regard, Malaysia will embrace neutrality in responding to the IP construct and this chapter seeks to provide insight into why Malaysia has adopted this posture. The chapter then discusses Malaysia’s issues and challenges regarding the IP construct to explain its neutrality vis-à-vis the IP.

The Indo-Pacific Construct

Several factors drive the IP construct. Firstly, the IP has strong, constructive geostrategic intentions. When the Cold War ended, the US was the only state with hegemonic status. Other powers could not challenge the US’ status; with no possibility of power transition, Washington was the dominant power in the international system. However, driven by power status like any other state in realpolitik, China rose to challenge the US’s position. This scenario was observed when Beijing marked history as a modernised nation during the 2008 Olympics. The success in executing such a prestigious event reflected China’s economic

strength. China’s economic power and leverage were further observed around 2010 when it became the most prominent Asian and second-largest national economy globally. The economic power provided a solid foundation to introduce Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. In 2021, approximately 133 to 140 countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China to become part of the BRI, projecting China’s wealth over the years. With its economic status, China soon began turning this capability into other forms of power leverage. Politically, China was more assertive in condemning the US’ extra-regional presence in Asia, particularly President Obama’s “strategic pivot” in 2011. Militarily, China turned its economic capacity into military capabilities and military dominance was evident in the SCS.

Beijing’s economic and military development altered the distribution of power between the US and China, and threatened the primary interests of Washington. As a result, the US introduced the IP construct as a counter-strategy to balance China’s rising power. However, to implement this strategy, the IO and New Delhi were a strategic rebalance in realising this objective. From a geographical perspective, the combination of the IO and the PO covers almost half of the globe and represents approximately 60 per cent of the world’s population, covering nearly 35 diverse nations. This area is a terrestrial alteration from the previously known “Asia Pacific” canton a decade ago. The shift from “Asia Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific”, which now focuses on the IO and a rising India, has a deep-rooted historical significance. One of the most telling statements, made by a great American naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, was perhaps fundamental in shaping the current focus on the IO. This statement suggests that whoever controls the IO dominates Asia. The ocean is the key to the seven seas. In the twenty-first century, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters (Mahan, 1987), which lie at the centre stage of the communication and significant transportation route for maritime countries between the east and the west; it boundaries major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca.

From an economic perspective, the IO provides the world with enormous marine resources. Approximately 90 per cent of world trade and two-thirds of all petroleum supplies travel by sea and the IO runs half of the world’s container traffic (Kaplan, 2010). Approximately 40 per cent of crude oil is transported by sea through the Strait of Hormuz and 50 per cent of the world’s merchant fleet capacity runs through the Strait of Malacca (Kaplan, 2010). The IO is a transit route for 70 per cent of all oil trade and 50 per cent of all international shipping (Desai & Mavani, 2012) and home to 40 per cent of the world’s oil and gas reserves, 60 per cent of uranium, 40 per cent of gold and 80 per cent of diamonds (Desai & Mavani, 2012). However, only onefifth of total trade is conducted between its littoral states and the remaining 80 per cent is extra-regional, projecting global interest in the IO. With China’s rising power, the US sees the strategic composition of India to balance this power. On the other hand, India, an adjacent neighbour to China, sees Beijing as a strategic competitor,

thus seeing the US’s strategic policies vis-à-vis China to its advantage. As such, the shaping of the IP was a construct and grand strategy led by the US to shrink a rising China by engaging with strategic partners.

The IP’s essence as a geopolitical framework began during the 2004 tsunami when a Tsunami Core Group was formed in 2005. This formation set the base for establishing the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which brought in vital regional partners such as India, Japan, and Australia. In 2006, India and Japan shared a strategic assessment of China and its strategic vulnerability, in which its energy lifelines transit the IO (Kuo, 2018). This weak link provided India with strategic leverage, and the term IP was coined in 2007. By 2010, the idea gained more weight, with India seen to be playing a more vital role and value chain of strategic relationships with neighbouring and other countries within the IP span.

Further support for the idea of the IP was observed, with Prime Minister Abe of Japan terming the IP as the “Confluence of Two Seas” to the “diamonds of democracy” (Lee & Lee, 2016). Australia, however, provided a more general statement, nevertheless expressing its support of the Quad and the IP as one new development between likeminded states in shaping the mutual dialogue of common issues and challenges. One of the early initiatives under the IP was the US-India Malabar exercise held in 2007 with Japan. In 2013, the Australia Defence White Paper identified the IP as a new theatre. When Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office, he rejuvenated the Look East Policy to Act East Policy as a bridge to promulgate its maritime strategy extending to the western and southwestern of the PO. 2015 was a significant year for the US, India, and Japan. The US-India Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean and the first Joint India-Japan Statement on the IP and world were announced. In October of the same year, the Indian Navy released its Maritime strategy, focusing on a shift to the IP.

However, between 2007 and the end of 2016, the IP was conceived to be more of a geopolitical amalgamation, including coping with the rise of China (Kuo, 2018). Furthermore, considering the early stages of the conception, there were reservations towards its true intention and the purpose of the IP construct, especially with the exclusion of China. As such, the IP was considered “an attention-grabbing idea that will soon dissipate like sea foam” (Rudd, 2021). However, the intensity of the IP to encircle China was increasing, which was observed during the Presidency of Donald Trump. In 2017, the US identified the IP as a new theatre in its security strategy. In April 2017, Japan released its report on the “Free and Open” IP strategy, and the most significant shift in US policy was renamed the Pacific Command the IP Command. The IP and its intentions were seen as more forceful when President Biden took office. During Biden’s trip to Europe in June 2021, China began to view the IP more seriously as an attempt to create a sphere of influence with the involvement of India and Australia in the G7, which eventually became the D10 grouping. With this development, Beijing called the IP a notion representing a continuation of the Cold

Malaysia’s Strategic Responses Towards The Indo-Pacific Construct

War mentality and bloc politics. Beijing further argued that China did not pose any systemic challenges to anyone and that the US’s IP is an attempt to hinder China’s peaceful rise and fulfil its national interest as an independent country, showing an indication of increasing tension between the US and China.

Issues and Challenges for Malaysia

Malaysia must respond to the IP. The IP is to stay and is shaping the geostrategic discourse and power politics of big powers in the international system. Hence, Malaysia must take a constructive position vis-à-vis the IP. Therefore, adopting a hedging position seems logical; as a small nation, taking a middle position will mean that Kuala Lumpur defends its maritime interests and the integrity of its waters but keeps a relatively low profile in doing so (Krishnan, 2022). Furthermore, Malaysia seeks to preserve its national interests by strengthening its bilateral relationships with strategic partners and fostering multilateral diplomacy through the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). The reasons to adopt neutrality vis-à-vis the IP may be understood by analysing three significant aspects, namely Malaysia’s interest in pursuing economic advancement, optimising security leverage, and ensuring the peace and stability of Southeast Asia (SEA).

Pursuing Economic Advancement

Since its interception, the IP has been viewed as a strategy to reduce China’s growing power. Though this use is accurate in the case of the US wanting to maintain its hegemonic power since the end of the Cold War, as a big brother to most nations and a major responsible power, Washington cannot afford to project the IP solely as a grand strategy to compete with China. This behaviour will cause a loss in popularity across the international community. The US understands the consequences of focusing only on China and is aware that it also must provide policy alternatives and progressive value in the IP to reduce the power gap with Beijing.

Hence, the IP has gradually built upon a solid progressive foundation and become a geostrategic framework that any state cannot exclude. The IP has not only expanded its role covering peace and security issues that could be used as a tool to balance against China but also provided other progressive elements such as maritime connectivity, economic development, digital connectivity, cyber security partnership, infrastructure and technology development, assistance for good governance and civil society, and health security. For a small nation such as Malaysia, such policy packages will benefit its development. As such, Kuala Lumpur cannot exclude itself from the IP but instead learn to manoeuvre within the agenda.

For instance, when the BRI was introduced in 2013, many countries were caught in a debt trap. According to an Aid Data report, China’s oversea lending was worth USD 843 billion, including USD 385 billion of “un - and under-reported debt” (Wooley,

2021). Like many other countries, Malaysia signed a huge project that amounted to billions of dollars, creating a dilemma for the government. Among the continued BRI projects is the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), but even this USD11.9 billion project underwent multiple realignments when Tun Dr Mahathir took office in 2018. The remaining two pipeline projects in Sabah and the third, which would link to Malacca, were scrapped due to the loss that Malaysia would have to absorb. Although it is unclear whether this move has upset China, it has undoubtedly created some unease between Kuala Lumpur and Beijing. However, when the Build Back Better World (B3W) was introduced under the IP initiative, it created more space and opportunity for Malaysia to realign its economic policies without upsetting China because Malaysia’s long-standing relationship with the US provided a smooth path to seeking Washington as an alternative, one that cannot be constituted as directed against China, but merely an attempt by Malaysia to expand its economic partnership with strategic partners. The IP had similar policies on the digital economy, cybersecurity, energy, and infrastructure development, and Malaysia could slowly reduce its dependency on China. Trump introduced initiatives such as the Three Seas Initiative (consisting of the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Sea initiatives), the Blue Dot Network, and the Digital Silk Road, which were alternatives to China’s “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” concepts.

Another example is the US support for economic growth in Asia, which seeks to improve the policy environment of eligible developing member economies to advance regional cooperation and a possible free and open trade and investment in the region. The policy includes introducing mechanisms to engage in economic reforms and promote interventions and best practices, policy studies, dialogues, workshops, and a trade-facilitation and business-enabling environment. The IndoPacific Business Forum with ASEAN Business Council is one instance of the US’s progressive initiatives under the IP framework. During the 6th US-ASEAN Summit, a new US-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership was announced to help municipal governments advance the digital transformation of urban systems and increase USASEAN commercial engagement in the digital economy (Mori, 2019). The need for digital connectivity has increased since the Covid-19 pandemic; this inventiveness attracts developing countries such as Malaysia to engage with the US.

As a developed and advanced country, the core pillar of the US vision in the IP is to develop an open, transparent, and inclusive regional architecture. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative seeks to enhance the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, combat corruption, and strengthen autonomy from foreign coercion (Office of the Spokesperson, 2018). The IP initiatives have also developed the Indo-Pacific Development Fund and the Indo-Pacific Development Bank to provide financial and technical support for infrastructure and technology development in developing countries. This assistance allows small nations to learn from the best practices offered by advanced countries in improving their policies in the country. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the Quad Vaccine Partnership addressed

Malaysia’s Strategic Responses Towards The Indo-Pacific Construct

financing and logistical demands for producing, procuring, and delivering safe and effective vaccines. There was close coordination with the World Health Organisation, the Export-Import Bank of the US, and the US Healthcare Alliance to respond to the pandemic, which was helpful in Malaysia during the health crisis.

These examples showcase that Malaysia’s hedging position has provided the freedom to choose the most effective policy aligning with its national interest. However, it is also important to realise that Malaysia’s relationship with China in terms of the economy is closer than the US and Malaysia’s attempt to completely incline towards the IP will not be practical. The policy should maintain a balance among China, the US, and other advanced countries that can provide similar economic packages.

Optimising Security Leverage

From a security perspective, Malaysia should observe the IP closely to avert the negative implication it might inflict on the peace and stability of Malaysia and its surrounding waters. Geographically, Malaysia is situated between the IO and the PO, two critical oceans that shape the IP. One of the intentions of the US to give stronger gravity to India is to leverage its geographical position at the Straits of Malacca, an area in which China’s maritime vulnerability lies. Hence, as a significant watchdog of the Malacca Strait, there is the possibility of conflict or tension occurring in this strait which has direct implications for Malaysia. In addition, the IP covers the SCS. The SCS is a territorial dispute where Malaysia and China are significant claimants along with Vietnam, the Philippines, and, to some extent, Indonesia in the case of Natuna Island. China’s ambition to rise as a dominant maritime power in this area has led to increased maritime activities in the SCS, such as extensive island-building and base construction activities. Grey Zone Operation (GZO), in particular, has increased and impacted Malaysia. 89 People’s Liberation Army Navy incursions occurred near Luconia Shoals from 2016-2020, in which The Chinese coastguard intruded 72 times. The regular GZO of China has led the Foreign Minister of Malaysia frequently carry out diplomatic protests against China.

One of China’s recent attempts that took the spotlight was the April 2020 incursion by the Haiyang Dizhi 8, which entered waters near Malaysia’s state oil drillship, the West Capella, amid the Covid-19 pandemic. Malaysia did not comment on this incident, claiming any explicit confirmation that China was conducting improper activities near the outer edge of Malaysia’s 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In June 2021, vessels from the Chinese coastguard patrolled around a Malaysian drilling operation in the Kasawari gas field off Sarawak. This event was further complicated by Chinese military planes entering Malaysian airspace. In September 2021, China challenged Malaysia by conducting a seabed survey on Malaysia’s continental shelf. This scenario promoted the US-led Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). The principle of freedom of the seas subsequently provides an appetite for claimant states to support Washington in shrinking China’s dominance in the SCS. Though the FOIP

Malaysia’s Strategic Responses Towards The Indo-Pacific Construct

may loosen up the tension in SCS with another Big Power providing the balance, claimant states are careful not to make the SCS an ocean space for conflict. On February 2021, the first freedom of navigation was conducted adjacent to the Paracel Islands to challenge China’s 1996’s declaration of straight baselines around the islands. Washington has also transited the Taiwan Strait to demonstrate its presence around the area. More of this kind of drilling was conducted with the presence of USS John S. McCain and US Curtis and the recent US IP Command exercise with Britain, Australia, and Japan, which coincides with Chinese military training drills in SCS. The crowding of other powers in the SCS may trigger unnecessary tension with China.

The expansion of the IP to dilute the strength of Beijing in the SEA and its dominance at SCS will place Malaysia in a difficult position. As stated by Tun Mahathir, who argues that warships would lead to tension in the SCS, Washington’s continuous increase in presence in this area will cause China to continue to claim rights with military development. These military tensions have meant Malaysia has been caught between responding and reacting attentively to the scenario. As such, it may be wise for developing countries such as Malaysia to avoid becoming involved in the power politics of superpowers in its region (Krishnan, 2020).

Washington may achieve an effective balance and a control mechanism, which signals to Beijing that claimant states have the alternative of engaging with other powers to increase their relative power vis-à-vis China. However, Kuala Lumpur must remain vigilant that the IP is big power agenda. Small countries should remain below the threshold of great power competition and ensure they do not drag themselves into big power rivalry. The exclusion of China in the IP equation is a possible entrapment between the US and China, which Malaysia seeks to evade. Against this backdrop, Malaysia has adopted neutrality in responding to the IP construct. It seeks not to reject or accept fully but pursue a middle position by engaging the IP and policies led by the US but not going against China. The US and China are equal partners in optimising its security leverage for Malaysia. Therefore, taking a side is not an option.

Ensuring Peace and Stability in Southeast Asia

Regionalism has been the main action of Malaysia’s foreign policy. Despite some anxiety in the earlier stages, the spirit of regional cooperation was the pillar of the early establishment of ASEAN and focused on working towards common interests and values. Whilst the shaping of ASEAN initially contained the spread of communism, today, the common interest has evolved significantly. The signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1976, which stamped mutual respect and non-interference in other countries affairs, created confidence in the region. Soon, the membership expanded, and other members of the region were seen to be joining ASEAN: Brunei (1984); Vietnam (1995); Laos and Myanmar (1997); and Cambodia (1999). With the establishment of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, ASEAN was furnished with a strong

structure and sense of direction. The Charter provided three solid pillars for the regional organisation to flourish: the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN PoliticalSecurity Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Today, the ASEAN has evolved to stable regionalism; as an intergovernmental organisation, it seeks to promote economic, political, and security cooperation in the region.

The success story of ASEAN, almost five decades since its establishment, reflects the ‘unity’, ‘amity’ and “long-term vision” that it has for the region. Thus far, ASEAN has kept its members together. Despite the diversity, the achievement of ASEAN is envied by other regions – the members have never experienced severe conflict. The various sentiments under the ASEAN flag, such as “ASEAN community”, “ASEAN way”, and “ASEAN centrality”, have kept members intact for decades. This particular characteristic of ASEAN has gained much attention in the US Asia policy.

SEA’s geographical location has attracted major powers, making it a battleground for power competition. In addition, the abundant natural resources that the SEA possesses make a significant strategic contribution to US’ investment opportunities, with ASEAN representing the world’s third-largest population and fifth-largest economy. Furthermore, the ASEAN is a substantial security connector in the SEA due to its inevitable geostrategic location in the IP confluence, which is especially prominent in the maritime realm, where the SEA connects critical SLOCs, including the Straits of Malacca, the Sulu Sea, and the SCS.

The IP will no doubt provide a certain level of leverage for the SEA members. China’s dominance in the SCS has led both claimant and non-claimant states to seek a power balance. The IP could create room to develop a more effective regional power equilibrium vis-à-vis any power that seeks to show dominance in the region, particularly leveraging the FOIP against China. However, the FOIP is the centrepiece that will also test the unity of the ASEAN. As tension increases between the US and China, most ASEAN members must be cautious in positioning themselves to avoid entanglement in the big power rivalry between Washington and Beijing. The IP construct and FOIP present some opportunities, but the exclusion of China is not well-received by ASEAN. As small nations, members of the region should not support any form of containment against any power because this attempt would trigger China to isolate the region. The non-involvement of Beijing in a grand strategy such as the IP continues to create regional suspicions amongst the region, one that contradicts the US’ official definition, where it continues to argue that the FOIP is a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach.

ASEAN has been united in the economic and social sectors of the region; however, in the case of defence and security, most ASEAN countries have struggled to reach a consensus. The US strategically countering China and its power in Asia will lead to a possible entrapment between big powers, specifically regarding security engagements. Big powers can marginalise this scenario to their advantage, and the

IP is a classic example of the possibility. Major power rivalries and the possibility of proxies’ war, one that was experienced during the Cold War, is a lesson for the SEA to avoid entrapment. Therefore, SEA countries need to ensure that it upholds mutual respect and non-interference policy to the core. To this end, Malaysia, like any other SEA member, understands this situation, the impact on its foreign relations, and its close economic relationship. Even Quad members continue to enjoy economic benefits with China. Malaysia’s support of the IP construct and the US’ idea of shrinking China’s power in the Asian region does not suggest intelligent behaviour. Peace and stability remain a core interest of Malaysia.

Conclusion

As a small power, it is illogical and unnecessary for Malaysia to lean towards the IP construct. Malaysia’s strategic response towards the IP construct constitutes neutrality. This approach is driven by the fact that the IP is a systemic rivalry between Washington and Beijing. The rise of China has systematically challenged the US’s long-standing global position, and the IP is a strategic response by the US to contain China. That said, this scenario means that the US-led new strategy against China is a big power competition. Furthermore, the US’ technique of engaging solid regional powers such as India in South Asia, Japan in Northeast Asia, and Australia in the Pacific has created a security dilemma reflecting the extent to which the US securitises its efforts to counter China’s global rise as a power.

The China factor is also vital in Malaysia’s decision to opt for a middle position. In the early stages of IP development, Beijing did not comment and saw the IP as a strategy that would dissipate at the same speed it was formed. The exclusion of Beijing seemed like it needed to be more logical; China is a big rising power, and it should have a significant role to play in the IP construct as it focuses on maritime connectivity, freedom of navigation, and economic development. However, the idea of excluding China remained a central agenda. The US further accelerated its strategy, and this expansion in policy demonstrates the seriousness of Washington to challenge and shrink China’s power, which has significantly increased the tension between the US and China; for Malaysia, it would not be wise to be in the middle of these powers.

However, it is not necessarily true that Malaysia is a weak country. Malaysia boldly proclaims its position vis-à-vis any rising strategic discourse prioritising national interest. Malaysia’s decision not to upset China also does not mean that Kuala Lumpur is placating more towards Beijing and less towards Washington; it simply means that Malaysia is wise not to posture against either power because both the US and China are essential for its survival, and seeking neutrality provides greater flexibility in its strategic response towards the IP construct.

Malaysia’s Strategic Responses Towards The Indo-Pacific Construct

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

References

Arasaratnam, S. (1994). Maritime India in the Seventeenth Century. Delhi: Oxford University.

Corbett, J. S. (2004). Principles of Maritime Strategy. New York: Dover Publication, Inc.

Desai, D., Mavani, M. D. (2012, June 13). Safeguarding Prosperity In The Indian Ocean: Exploring India-US Cooperation. Observer Research Foundation. https:// www.orfonline.org/research/safeguarding-prosperity-in-the-indian-oceanexploring-india-us-cooperation/

Kaplan, R. D. (2010). Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. Random House.

Krishnan, T. (2020). Malaysia’s Posture in the Indo-Pacific Construct. Journal of Asian Economic Integration, 2(2), 180-191.

Krishnan, T. (2022). Malaysia’s View and Responses to Grey Zone Conflict in the South China Sea. Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, (42). https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/

Kuo, M. A. (2018, January 25). The Origin of ‘Indo-Pacific’ as Geopolitical Construct. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/the-origin-of-indo-pacificas-geopolitical-construct/Lee, J. (2018). The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and Implications for ASEAN. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

Lee, L. & Lee, J. (2016). Japan-India Cooperation and Abe’s Democratic Security Diamond: Possibilities, Limitations and the View from Southeast Asia. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 38(2), 284-308. http://www.jstor.org/stable/

Mahan, A. T. (1987). The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783. New York: Dover Publications.

Mori, S. (2019). US Technological Competition with China: The Military, Industrial and Digital Network Dimensions. Asia Pacific Review, 26(1), 77-120.

Office Of the Spokesperson. (2018, November 18). Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region. US Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/ advancing-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-region/index.html

Rudd, K. (2021, August 6). Why the Quad Alarms China. Retrieved from Foreign Affair: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-06/why-quadalarms-china

Wooley, A. (2021, September 29). AidData’s new dataset of 13,427 Chinese development projects worth $843 billion reveals a major increase in ‘hidden debt’ and Belt and Road Initiative implementation problems. AidData. https://www. aiddata.org/blog/aiddatas-new-dataset-of-13-427-chinese- developmentprojects-worth-843-billion-reveals-major-increase-in-hidden-debt-and-beltand-road-initiative-implementation-problems

THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH: HOW NAVIES CAN SERVE A SHARED INTEREST TO THE INDO-PACIFIC COMMITMENT

Commander Muhamad Zafran Whab RMN

Introduction

In recent years, the term Indo-Pacific (IP) has become more prevalent in global strategic and geopolitical discourse. Strategic analysts and high-level government/military leadership in Australia, Japan and the United States (US) have used the term to refer to the region regularly since 2011 (Ghoshal, 2019). The IP includes the tropical waters of the Indian Ocean, the western and central Pacific Oceans, and the seas connecting them in the general area of Indonesia. Additionally, from an Indian perspective, the IP region encompasses the maritime space extending from East Africa and West Asia’s littorals, across the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific Ocean, to East Asia’s littorals. In an August 2007 speech to the Indian Parliament, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe referred to the confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as the dynamic coupling of seas of liberty and prosperity in broader Asia.

The IP concept has changed common paradigms of how the world operates strategically. The US initially used Indo-Asia Pacific to maintain its geographic inclusiveness within the emerging IP concept. However, it has since begun to use the term referring to a convenient region to recognise India’s rise as a significant player in the region’s expanding geopolitics. However, the term was officially articulated in Australia’s 2013 defence White Paper (Bergmann, 2013).

Securing the global commons and freedom of navigation has taken on greater significance than ever in globalisation due to increasing competition for access to offshore resources. It is no secret that India is a maritime nation with Japan, Indonesia,

The Conceptual Approach: How Navies Can Serve A Shared Interest To The Indo-Pacific Commitment

Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines. The Indian and Pacific Oceans’ freedom of navigation is therefore essential to them. Following international law and norms, these countries must promote an international framework and a code of conduct for freedom of navigation (Sakhuja, 2011). A mechanism based on international law to safeguard nations’ rights in global commons is even more critical considering China’s recent assertive claim to nearly all of the South China Sea (SCS), as well as its unilateral declaration of laws requiring Beijing’s permission in China’s, claimed territorial waters and air space (Buzan, 2003).

Aim

This chapter provides insight into Malaysia’s unique approach to preserving the IP nations’ commitment to a common purpose, security, prosperity and order and how it may assist Navies in serving the shared interest more effectively. Based on the current intensification of the US-China rivalry and its consequences for the security environment of Southeast Asia (SEA), it may be beneficial to examine Malaysia’s current role in regional dynamics through the country’s history of coping with great power competition. Looking at Malaysia’s foreign policy in the context of its experience in dealing with various long-term security concerns and hegemonic power, this chapter illustrates how a tiny nation like Malaysia can mediate its position in light of intensifying competition between China and the United States. This circumstance focuses on security cooperation and the SCS conflict. Thus, this is accomplished by posing the following questions: how can Malaysians be understood in terms of the country’s traditional approach to regional security? What is Malaysia’s best course of action today, and how has Malaysia navigated the US-China competition?

Security and Prosperity in Malaysian Perspective

As a maritime nation, Malaysia has been influenced by this convergence. Three reasons make examining a country’s position in the IP construct critical.

First, Malaysia is a coastal state located at the meeting point of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. As a result, Malaysia has become a challenger to the connectivity of the IP concept. This situation is due to Malaysia’s pivotal role in the Malacca Strait, the world’s busiest global trade route.

Second, even though the quadrilateral security dialogues, colloquially referred to as the Quad, are comprised of significant powers such as the US and prominent regional players such as Australia, India, and Japan, the Quad wields considerable impact in the global system (Lee, 2016). Because of their proximity, the Quad members rely on small nations like Malaysia to help them achieve their economic development, partnership, and leadership objectives in Southeast Asia (SEA).

Third, under the Indo-Pacific framework, the ASEAN incorporates between the states and sub-regions across a vast swath of geography. Consequently, ASEAN serves as a

main critical focus for the Quad’s regional strategic interests, and member reactions are essential in order to ensure the Quad’s consistency and significance.

Furthermore, Shearer and Gale (2018) argue that the central argument of the Quad is that it lacks clearness. This perception is understandable, considering the ASEAN’s ongoing debate over terminology. However, it seeks to address various critical issues, such as regulations order in Asia, rights of navigation and overflight in the seaborne commons, promote protection, interoperability enhancement, global security and terrorism. This assessment is critical to comprehend Malaysia’s position. Apart from that, ASEAN welcomes IP because it adds another layer of regional power dynamics. This equilibrium, it is hoped, will lead to SEA’s prosperity.

ASEAN

The ASEAN outlook on the IP has made significant progress towards integrating SEA into the IP framework. Since the framework is not legally binding, ASEAN cannot play a significant role and the IP issue has thus far been left off the organisation’s agenda. The view appears to re-emphasise the ASEAN’s centrality and inclusiveness of IP, implying that it does not accept China’s isolation, thereby demonstrating the ASEAN members’ concern about being marginalised (Kliem, 2019). Thus, while it is a welcome initiative, it is also viewed as a threat to ASEAN’s primacy. Against this backdrop, Malaysia has taken a cautious stance to avoid becoming entangled in the US-China power struggle. Malaysia’s position on the IP can be described as neutralist (Krishnan, 2020). While Indonesia, Malaysia’s neighbour and ASEAN have pledged to maintain regional peace and security. Indonesia recommended the ASEAN perspective, which emphasises collaborative efforts and peace. Some might argue that Indonesia attempts to address its desires and places reasonable expectations in the ASEAN outlook on the IP before the international community (Mu, 2021).

US-China Rivalry

The US-China competition in the SCS strategically impacts Malaysia and has significant implications for Malaysia’s security. Malaysian observed that China will continue to claim its sovereignty in the SCS through military expansion and presence, whereas the US will do so through its allies. The US has increased the leverage of the Seventh Fleet to conduct Freedom of Manoeuvre in the SCS, which the government has strongly disagreed with and argued that warships would exacerbate regional tensions in the region as Malaysia’s territorial integrity is at risk. China’s expansion of the Great Wall of Sand near the Spratly Islands, through which the US freely navigates, will also be confrontational. Because of these military tensions, Malaysia has been forced to choose between responding and reacting attentively to the scene. The power politics of the region’s superpowers may put undue strain on a developing country like Malaysia.

The Conceptual Approach: How Navies Can Serve A Shared Interest To The Indo-Pacific Commitment

South China Sea

The SCS waters have become increasingly militarised over the last two decades, with regional and international actors attempting to secure their respective claims to maritime resources. While China and the US have completely controlled the situation, other nations have imposed on parts of the disputed areas at various points through military and civilian operations. The conflicts primarily revolve around jurisdictional issues and the associated legitimacy of economic and military interests in the maritime region. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants states the right to exploit sea resources within 200 nautical miles of their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The situation in the SCS is complicated by overlapping territorial claims and Beijing’s self-serving interpretation of its maritime rights and interests in the region. Tensions have increased significantly over the last five years between 2016 and 2021. The United States has responded to China’s aggression and its strategic partners’ fend-off policy by increasing its naval force in the region and reaching out to smaller states.

Moreover, the US has routinely conducted freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) to establish its right (Meijer, 2021). However, Beijing has warranted its intentional military build-up in the SCS by asserting past sovereignty over the nine-dashed area, a nebulous part of the maritime territory. On several occasions, China’s claims and linked actions have violated the activities of other SEA claimant countries, including Malaysia. So far, the latter has gotten out of this bind by relying on an illustrious history of non-confrontational postures.

On this basis, Malaysia’s contemporary hedging direction is contextualised within a continuum of appropriate measures that are distinctive to Malaysia’s foreign policy trajectory. More precisely, Malaysia has initiated a three-pronged strategy.

• First, participating in ASEAN and other international initiatives is part of a broader strategy of non-alignment ambiguity while leaving room for bilateral strategic cooperation with regional and external powers.

• Second, improving cooperation for the strengthening of the military but also maritime management instruments.

• Lastly, promoting stability and security narratives as a discourse justification for the preceding policy.

Conceptual Model

The conceptual model was developed to derive an approach that best serves the maritime nation or the Navies’ shared interest in regaining IP region properties. This model was built around the concept of maritime security. Maritime security is a new

subfield of global security studies. In the early 2000s, academics and professionals began debating maritime security following the emergence of acts of terrorism. Fear of terrorism on land and sea increased in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, attacks on the US. This situation was exacerbated further between 2008 and 2011, when piracy in the Somalia Sea increased, jeopardising the global trade process. Thus, with the demise of state-centric security concerns, these issues have gained traction and become a topic of discussion (Bueger & Edmunds, 2017). The concept of maritime security continues to evolve, with various actors in fields such as maritime policy, ocean management and global security defining it differently. As a result, Bueger (2015) offers a concept of maritime security that considers all maritime stakeholders’ aspirations and perspectives.

This framework demonstrates the IP nations’ commitment to a shared purpose, security, prosperity and order and how Navies can best serve the shared interest from the Malaysian perspective. The chapter attempts to construct a maritime security concept using semiotics to demonstrate the interrelation of various maritime security concepts. The following section will discuss the recommended action in greater detail.

Based on Figure 1, Bueger’s idea of maritime security contains four good-purpose dimensions. The sea has historically been a significant economic resource. Most international trade occurs via sea, where fishing is an important global industry and massive mining in the sea has great tourism potential. However, the sea is also connected to long-term economic growth. In other ways, naval operation, maintaining sea control and the notion of sea power is linked to maritime security.

Figure 1: Commitment of Indo-Pacific Nations Model Toward Prosperity Source: Author work

The Conceptual Approach: How Navies Can Serve A Shared Interest To The Indo-Pacific Commitment

Moreover, the concept of sea power elevates the Navy’s role in maritime sovereignty. Ideally, maritime security is also linked to human security. Since the 1990s, human security has been proposed as an alternative to national security. Initially proposed by the UNDP, the idea seeks to refocus security concerns on people rather than states. Human Security is a post-Cold War non-traditional security issue. Human Security becomes a critical issue at sea due to threats like piracy, illegal immigrant, human trafficking, unreported fishing (IUU Fishing), etc. Maritime security is also defined as ensuring the safety of ships and maritime installations, including the marine environment. Other topics covered included preventing collisions and accidents and the environmental disasters they may cause. As a result, this model was used to determine or illustrate the best approach for the Navy or military forces when confronted with IP challenges. This approach is predicated on the premise that tensions in the SCS pose new security challenges and Malaysia’s foreign policy practice must constantly adapt (Morton, 2016). The study provides insight into the sustainability of Malaysia’s way forward based on recent developments that can be used as a first step toward ensuring the IP region’s prosperity.

The Best Way for Navies to Serve a Common Interest

Concerning the best way for navies to serve a common interest, the chapter will explain how the Malaysian government’s recommended actions. This plan is based on prior experience and will be suggested as a best practice by other states in mitigating a common interest in the IP Region. The discussion is based on Figure 1, illustrating how the model explains the best approach method.

Mutual objectives and interests in securing territorial waters and EEZ sovereignty include the maritime nations’ responsibility under UNCLOS Article 55. Protecting territorial challenges in maritime nations has always placed a premium on the frontlines of national defence, namely the Navy and Air Force. Additionally, it encompasses other law enforcement agencies operating in territorial waters, for instance, marine police, coast guard, immigration, customs and related agencies. It is possible to initiate and establish a recognised and coordinated system for all parties managing security, control, and updating information. These concerted efforts should foster cooperation in enforcing international law-based security in territorial waters.

The vessel business operator’s perspective is that the right time and place are always critical. Thus, the maritime nation states’ EEZ or territorial waters must always be well-protected to avoid damaging problems. Similarly, if the collaborative effort successfully formalises it, both maritime and nation-states in SEA and IP Region will benefit from strategic economic and security benefits in the long run.

Furthermore, the issues of piracy, smuggling, illegal immigration, and pollution are all common potential hazards in territorial waters, as is safe navigation. The

enforcement strength and tasking capability dimensions must be emphasised to foster a more favourable joint operating environment. Each unwarranted incident is prone to misunderstanding and can escalate into a more significant conflict. As a result, it is critical to establish a mechanism for resolving highly perplexing maritime issues and challenges. Any maritime nation that signed the UNCLOS treaty must follow the rule that foreign ships or planes can conduct navy operations, hydrographic surveys, or intelligence gathering in the EEZ area if the maritime nation-states have permission.

These maritime nations in the SCS, or IP region, particularly those with extensive coastlines adjacent to the sea, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia, India, Japan, Vietnam, and others, have a significant interest in protecting their EEZ area from external and internal threats. To mitigate and resolve these challenges, maritime nations require collaborative efforts and interdisciplinary approaches involving numerous agencies from diverse sectors and jurisdictions. The navies that lead the pack in maritime circumference have made obligatory commendable efforts to keep sovereignty and border integrity intact and uninfringed. Visible navies’ actions on a national and international level demonstrated a critical commitment to maritime security and challenges, primarily in EEZ territorial waters.

Due to territorial challenges in most maritime nations, naval powers are accountable for a broad range of maritime territorial security tasks. Apart from the traditional military defence mission, the navies also perform tasks related to sovereignty exercise, security, law enforcement, environmental protection and resource management. As a result, navies are implicated in any extraterritorial movement within maritime nations’ jurisdiction areas. Any breach or violation of territorial waters must be addressed immediately and firmly because, in international law, inaction signals are a tacit acceptance of the legitimacy of an action (Zulkifli & Zahari, 2021). This situation will establish a precedent which may jeopardise maritime nations’ interests in the future; thus, navies’ responsibilities are unquestionable to prioritise their nation’s security agenda at all costs.

The other consequence of the excellent order for a maritime nation, particularly in the SEA and IP Region, is the need for navies to strengthen their partnerships and alliances. Partnerships and alliances were developed at a higher political level, such as when the SEA states formed ASEAN in 1967. (Irvine, 1982). International relations between maritime states, particularly in SEA, are conducted by resolving disputes involving state members through diplomacy. Since then, no military action has been considered to resolve any dispute in this region. Thus, the primary implied security policies are through diplomatic resolutions, and military action is likely to be the last resort in resolving disputes. The political leaders of these ASEAN nations advocate for strong allegiances on bilateral and multilateral agreements on national, regional, and international relations to achieve a mutually beneficial security environment (Mahbubani, 2017).

The Conceptual Approach: How Navies Can Serve A Shared Interest To The Indo-Pacific Commitment

This regional strategic partnership and alliance cooperation has evolved into a policy of neighbourly prosperity to achieve regional resilience. Navies have frequently used these tactics in this region for an extended period. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that the partnership and alliance strategy enhances regional and global cooperation and mitigates territorial challenges. Through joint exercises and pieces of training, courtesy visits, and defence conferences and exhibitions, the partnership and alliances will foster interaction between ‘Navy to Navy’ among maritime nations. This strategic partnership and alliances are not limited to ASEAN navies but extended to the perimeter of the Five Powers Defence Arrangement (Sari, 2019) frameworks and powerful world power nations such as the US, China, India and Japan. This strategy entails using a non-military measure to address a security condition. This type of ‘Navy to Navy’ collaboration will increase transparency and openness in implementing Confidence and Security Building Measures (Cossa, 2019).

The cooperation strategy for bilateral or multilateral relationships and alliances entails confidence-building measures such as ‘Navy to Navy’ talks, defence cooperation programs, coordinated patrols, joint training and exchange programs. The initiatives of affiliated partnerships and alliances will improve mutual parties’ trust, tolerance, understanding, sense of belonging and communication. These beneficial defence diplomacy and policy approaches are adopted and adapted to extend diplomatic influence among alliances and partners.

This strategic concept is consistent with SEA’s pragmatic maritime nations’ international policy of becoming friends to all and enemies to none. Strengthening partnership and alliance strategies can also serve as a guide for responding to unanticipated crises and emergencies during peacetime involving Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), Search and Rescue (SAR), Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR), Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIOPS) and NonCombatant Evacuation Operations (NCEO) (Lin-Greenberg, 2018). There have been numerous disasters involving MOOTW, the most notable being the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 in March 2014, which involved 25 nations in search and rescue operations (Thayer, 2014). Additionally, it demonstrated how regional navies could strengthen partnerships and alliances through multilateral coordination of SAR operations. The wise implication for navies is that cooperation among alliances today is a virtue tomorrow.

Alliances

Engagement through shared security narratives was also suggested. Indeed, Malaysia’s regional activism is founded on promoting ASEAN diplomatic and security culture (Lai, De Silva, & Wang, 2021). This approach has highlighted Malaysia’s strategy to engage regional and external actors, both bilaterally and multilaterally. This chapter demonstrated its importance in shaping regional security issues and

bolstering Malaysia’s well-known and recognised regional foreign policy positionality. Since Malaysia’s non-confrontational moves are evidenced by its past and current risk-management strategies, they have helped shape regional discourses and modes of interaction, mainly when expressed as a member of multilateral organisations.

The significance of multilateral opportunities, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the well-known AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) trilateral partnership, is growing. As a result, the international and regional powers have an expanding preference for less formal and more constrained settings for discussing ad hoc issues rather than larger and more institutionalised ones. Malaysia has criticised the US and its allies for what it deems to be dangerous actions that could spark a regional arms race to contain China’s hegemony. Hedging states like Malaysia have taken advantage of the lack of formal structure and decisionmaking mechanisms of ASEAN’s security narratives while maintaining open and visible communication channels with China (Mangiarotti, 2021).

As a result of the IP rivalry between the US and China, Malaysia has pursued risk management strategies based on multilateral opportunities and international organisations while also focusing on bilateral ties and condemning Major power muscle-flexing exercises. As well as strengthening maritime governance, Malaysia has engaged in strategic security partnerships and military cooperation.

Conclusion

The concept of IP opens a slew of possibilities. When a large expanse of maritime interconnectivity links two major trading spheres, it has the potential to improve security and economic stability. People have always relied on the ocean to connect and interact with each other regardless of national interests and handle traditional and non-traditional maritime-related issues. Malaysia is one of the many countries that could benefit from the IP strategic approach. The IP-defined pattern Malaysia strengthens its relationships with its most important partners. It also allows Malaysia to establish connections and collaborate better with the global community. An entirely new approach to maritime reorganisation and decision-making will be taken under the IP concept.

However, the scope of IP poses a challenge to Malaysia. The IP concept relies on geopolitical factors, not geographical ones, and needs a clear framework. Because Malaysia is a small country, a stable region is vital. Hence, Malaysia needs more confidence in the Quad due to its lack of supremacy. While all these countries are important allies, Malaysia must choose between the US and China. Intense policy responses will directly impact the region, putting Malaysia at risk of marginalisation and entrapment. To win Malaysia’s favour, the US-led IP must be more precise. Defining the goal is critical, especially if the strategy is to attract SEA countries and Malaysia’s IP posture is to remain neutral.

The Conceptual Approach: How Navies Can Serve A Shared Interest To The Indo-Pacific Commitment

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Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

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PART IV BORDER SECURITY

MALAYSIA’S MARITIME

SECURITY

CHALLENGES DURING COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Captain Tay Yap Leong RMN Nor Aini Mohd Nordin

Introduction

The new Novel Coronavirus, or COVID-19, was discovered on 31 December 2019 in Wuhan, China. The outbreak peaked at the end of February 2020 in China with around 80,000 cases and its government imposed a lockdown in the affected region. While the situation had developed in China, the world only confirmed the presence of the virus between the end of February and the middle of March 2020. There were calls for control measures to be implemented to contain the spread of the virus in every country due to the chaotic outbreak experienced by China, but the spread was quicker than most might have expected. It was not until the number of cases globally reached an alarming 118,000 involving 144 countries that the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared the COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic on 11 March 2020.

COVID-19 has been considered the worst outbreak in the world since 1990. It has a higher magnitude than the Ebola outbreak in 2014, which was mostly confined to West Africa (Bowles et al., 2016). Several measures were taken to contain the virus, including lockdowns, movement control orders, and closing borders. Malaysia, as a maritime nation, was also severely affected due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This chapter will focus on the impact of COVID-19 on Malaysia’s maritime security. In addition, it will also look at the initiatives and cooperation born from this pandemic.

COVID-19 in Malaysia

Looking back, COVID-19 is a pneumonia of unknown aetiology. It was diagnosed on 31 December 2019 in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China, and notified to the WHO China office. Later, 44 unexplained pneumonia cases with no identified causative agent

were reported in China from 31 December 2019 to 3 January 2020. On 7 January 2020, the Chinese authorities identified it as a Novel Coronavirus. China shared the Novel Coronavirus gene sequence with other countries on 12 January 2020 to develop specific diagnostic kits. WHO subsequently received more detailed information from China’s National Health Commission on 11 to 12 January 2020 that the outbreak was linked to an exposure at a fish market in Wuhan. WHO only declared it as a public health emergency of international concern on 30 January 2020 after a total of 282 confirmed cases of 2019-nCoV were reported in China (278 cases), Thailand (2 cases), Japan (1 case) and South Korea (1 case). Of the 278 confirmed cases in China, 258 were reported from Hubei, 14 from Guangdong, five from Beijing and one from Shanghai (World Health Organization, 2020). Cases from Thailand, Japan and South Korea were exported from Wuhan, China.

The first COVID-19 outbreak in Southeast Asia was detected in Thailand on 10 January 2020. It was followed by Singapore and Malaysia detecting their first confirmed case on 23 January 2020 and 25 January 2020, respectively. Following that, there were numerous waves and clusters of COVID-19 across Malaysia. The first detected case was reported to be a male with a history of travelling to Singapore and attending a meeting involving an international delegation, including those from China. Subsequently, other cases of COVID-19 were brought into Malaysia by Chinese tourists from Wuhan via Singapore and Malaysian citizens who travelled to severely affected countries such as Italy and Indonesia.

To contain the disease, the Ministry of Health (MOH) was at the forefront of national outbreak control during this pandemic. In the early stages of the global spread of COVID-19, even before the first case was reported in Malaysia, the MOH had developed a comprehensive preparedness plan. The plan included several key elements, such as enhanced screening at points of entry (airports, seaports, border checkpoints) and interagency cooperation, strengthened sampling in clinics and hospitals, designation of hospitals and laboratories across the country as “treatment” and “sampling” centres respectively, strengthen public health surveillance systems through aggressive case detection and robust contact tracing and adequate stockpiling of personal protective equipment (PPE) and necessary medicines (DG of Health, 2020).

In terms of mitigation, Malaysia took a similar approach to what was implemented by China by introducing the Movement Control Order (MCO). MCO was introduced as COVID-19 cases escalated during the second wave. Phase 1 MCO started for two weeks, from 18 to 31 March 2020. This was extended for another two weeks into the Phase 2 MCO on April 1-14, followed by a further two weeks into the Phase 3 MCO on April 15-28, followed by another two weeks into the Phase 4 MCO on 29 April 2020. It was extended for two weeks until 12 May 2020. The entire MCO or lockdown period was scheduled for eight weeks. However, given the partial opening of the economic sector, as announced by the Prime Minister in his special address on Labour Day (1

May 2020), from 4 May 2020, the MCO was changed to conditionally MCO (CMCO). The CMCO lasted until 9 June 2020, after which the Recovery MCO (RMCO) was activated from 10 June to 31 March 2021. During RMCO, business, education, religion, hospitality and tourism sectors reopened, but with strict Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), which included restrictions during conferences, exhibitions and weddings. However, the Malaysian borders remained closed except for permitted travel.

The mitigation effort was only successful because of Malaysia’s proactive National COVID-19 Immunisation Programme. It was and still is currently being implemented by the Malaysian government to curb the spread of COVID-19 and to end the pandemic in Malaysia by successfully achieving the highest immunisation rate among its citizens and non-citizens residing in Malaysia (Malaysia Prime Minister Office, 2021). To date, it is the most extensive immunisation programme that has ever been carried out in Malaysia. However, the programme was plagued by numerous controversies and issues, despite it generally running smoothly. These included a slow vaccine rollout rate due to a lack of vaccine supplies despite the Malaysian government’s efforts to purchase more than enough for the population, poor allocation and prioritisation of the vaccines, logistical issues with the digital vaccination appointment and certificate system via the MySejahtera’s app, false information about vaccines, outbreaks and overcrowding at vaccination centres.

Following approval by the Malaysian Cabinet, Malaysia’s Minister of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI) was named the coordinating minister for the National COVID-19 Immunisation Programme until his resignation on 16 August 2021 (Azman, 2021). According to Malaysia’s annual report by Price Waterhouse Coopers, as of mid-February 2022, over 98% of the adult population in Malaysia were fully vaccinated. This included 89% of adolescents (aged 12 to 17) that were fully vaccinated and over 55% of the adult population received booster shots (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2021). Hence, to ensure that the programme met its goal, a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach was adopted, involving many Ministries and Government Agencies, State Governments, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the private sector and members of the community.

Throughout 2021 and early 2022, some places had to go into MCO or CMCO and it was only on 1 April 2022 that Malaysia moved on to the endemic phase. The change towards the endemic phase also came with an announcement of Malaysia’s international borders opening. Fully vaccinated travellers were allowed to enter the country without quarantine. Although the international borders were opened, strict SOP remained, especially concerning the maritime sector vis-a-vis maritime security. Issues on maritime security were most evident by the entry of illegal migrants via the sea.

Malaysia’s Maritime Security Challenges During COVID-19 Pandemic

Maritime Security Challenges Amidst COVID-19

Malaysia is located at the centre of Southeast Asia’s major trade and transportation routes and relies heavily on the sea for its economic activity. According to the report by the World Bank, in 2021, a significant portion of Malaysia’s trade was 131% and Malaysia’s gross domestic product came from maritime trade (The World Bank, 2023). According to these well-cited figures, around 80-95% of Malaysia’s total annual trade relies on sea routes at some point. Surrounded by the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, the Andaman Sea, the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea and the Indian Ocean, Malaysia faces many challenges in protecting its waters. Malaysia’s waters include its Inland Waters, Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the airspace above these waters. Malaysia’s economy is heavily dependent on offshore natural oil and gas resources, and its maritime sector is characterised by these busy Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs). The SLOC straddle the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, which serve as the country’s trade gateways, connecting Europe, West Asia and South Asia to East Asia.

As the country braced itself to battle against the spread of COVID-19, security issues remained in the maritime domain. Although Malaysian authorities have not yet developed an official definition of maritime security, “security” refers to being safe and unaffected by danger or threat. As a result, anything that threatens Malaysia in the maritime realm might be classified as a national interest. Various departments and policies are responsible for protecting the maritime area. Maritime security has a broad but all-encompassing application in Malaysia, spanning all government

Source: Capt. Dr. Tay Yap Leong, RMN

portfolios depending on how a stakeholder securitises and interprets a specific maritime issue. The procedure of safeguarding any particular interest depends on how each ministry or government agency views the vulnerability of that interest and the risk of not managing that vulnerability. The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in increased international crimes like smuggling (at first, pandemic-related medical supplies, subsequently food), illegal drug trafficking and human trafficking, and illegal migrants. Piracy and violent robbery against ships, which have long been an issue in Southeast Asia’s maritime security, continue to be a problem. The figure below surmises the non-traditional issues on maritime security.

Most piracy and sea robbery incidents in Southeast Asia are actual attacks or attempted attacks that generally occur within the 12 nautical miles’ territorial boundary of littoral states. Regional coast guards and other law enforcement agencies have increased security at ports and anchorages to address this issue. This has significantly reduced sea robberies in Southeast Asia’s most important ports. Malaysia has been particularly successful with its multilateral initiatives with neighbouring countries, such as the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) in the Malacca Straits and the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement (TCA) in the Sulu Sea. During the pandemic, the IMB-PRC and ReCAAP-ISC reported only one minor incident in the Strait of Malacca in 2021. In the Sulu and Celebes Seas – two large bodies of water connecting Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia in 2020, one kidnappingfor-ransom occurred in the area. However, not a single incident was reported in 2021. However, regionally over the period 2019-2021, the statistics of the four centres were different, sometimes significantly different, but the overall trends were the same. In 2020, the first year of the pandemic, there was a 15% to 20% increase in Piracy and Sea Robbery (PSR) incidents in Southeast Asia. It dropped in 2021 to roughly the same level as in 2019 (see Table 1) (Onn, 2022).

The number of PSR incidents dropped globally and regionally in the second year of the pandemic. The IMB-PRC recorded 132 global incidents in 2021, down from 194 in 2020 and the lowest recorded number since 1994 (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2022). ReCAAP-ISC reported 82 attacks across Asia in 2021, down from 97 in 2020, a drop of 15% and the second-lowest number of incidents since it started collecting data in 2007 (ReCAAP, 2021). Unlike previous economic shocks, there was no dramatic increase in attacks except in the Singapore Strait. This is likely due to the existing mechanism in place by littoral states such as the MSP and the TCA, which has effectively contained the issues over the years.

Note:

In addition to the issues at sea, various forms of illegal cross-border entry were observed during the pandemic. Two activities have brought the attention of the government. These included the smuggling and trafficking of persons and the seizure and smuggling of illegal goods such as drugs, tobacco and wildlife.

a. The influx of illegal immigrants Malaysia accepts refugees, asylum seekers and migrants for humanitarian reasons. However, Malaysia’s resolve was tested due to the influx of these groups into the country during the pandemic. There were about 200 Rohingyas who tried to land in Langkawi via sea, but Malaysia rejected them over the fear of coronavirus in 2020. The government established the Immigration Act 1959/63 (Act 155) and then the Passport Act 1966 (Act 150) and later the Immigration Regulations 1963 to cut back the increasing speed of illegal immigrants into the country (Mahmood, 2020). The difficulty of entering Illegal Immigrants or Pendatang Asing Tanpa Izin (PATI) into the country is not new to Malaysians (Popova & Özel, 2018). The influx of illegal immigrants into the country has been ongoing for a long time and has been increasing since the 1980s (Ahmad, Ajis & Awang, 2014). Among the factors that encourage the entry of illegal immigrants into the country is because of high employment opportunities. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the entry of illegal immigrants into Malaysia is not only because of employment opportunities but also to save themselves from the spread of the COVID-19 virus in their country of origin (Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, 2020).

Widespread instances of illegal cross-border entry are of concern because they undermine the country’s socioeconomic, health and political standing and challenge national border controls on multiple fronts. The pandemic challenges Malaysia’s ability to draw a clear line between providing humanitarian assistance and maintaining security. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International condemned the decision to deny access to the country. Malaysia has been a major host country for the Rohingya community since the 1970s, with approximately 102,960 Rohingyas

Table 1: Reports of PSR Incidents in Southeast Asia, 2019-2021 (Onn, 2022)

1. International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB-PRC) is in Kuala Lumpur.

2. Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia’s Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP-ISC) located in Singapore.

3. Information Fusion Centre (IFC) located in Singapore.

4. Maritime Information Cooperation and Awareness Center (MICA) located in France.

Malaysia’s Maritime Security Challenges During COVID-19 Pandemic

as of the end of July 2021. About 158,500 are from Myanmar, 23,370 are from China and 29,880 are from conflict areas and other ethnic groups fleeing persecution in Myanmar (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2022). However, Malaysia has not signed the 1951 UN Convention on Human Rights nor the 1967 Protocol. This demonstrates that Malaysia has the right to its sovereignty and national viability by taking precautionary measures against the spread of COVID-19. A single refusal to protect its people appears to have tarnished Malaysia’s international reputation for its role as a sympathetic and flexible humanitarian aid provider. This further required the Home Office to develop a long-term strategy to deal with illegal entry into the country. Allowing illegal immigrants into the country could expose local citizens to the pandemic and threaten human security. According to reports, undocumented immigrants have poor residency and living conditions. Hence, this group will likely bring COVID-19 and other transmittable diseases into the country (Bedi, 2020).

b. Criminals Profiting from the Pandemic. The Malaysian Department of Statistics has reported that 33% of workers in the fisheries subsector have reported unemployment due to the COVID-19 epidemic, with the agriculture and services sectors having the highest unemployment rates in 2020. This is affecting Malaysia’s fisheries through the rise of illegal fishing. There is the likelihood that criminals try to take advantage of these and other communities, especially those staying in coastal areas, such as fishermen who have lost their job during the MCO. Unemployed fishermen who still live near the sea may be tempted by these criminals to engage in illegal activities. Because drug smuggling can be lucrative, the activity can escalate during a pandemic. In the long run, people will become addicted to drugs and are drawn back into business for more financial gain. The government will then face a new health crisis, drug addiction. State-allocated funds will run low because of increased spending on rehabilitation.

c. The Heightening of COVID-19 Cases will overwhelm the Healthcare System

The immigration detention centre has exceeded its capacity. Unemployment depletes government resources that need to allocate funds to help illegal immigrants. The country’s priority remains business continuity, but more money is spent on dealing with security issues than health services. Left unchecked, the rise in illegal immigration will result in more energy and resources spent on border control instead of healthcare. This means governments will have ineffective health care during the pandemic. Moreover, Malaysia’s international image would also be tarnished.

During the second wave of COVID-19 in the country, thousands of inmates were infected, namely in the case of Cluster Benteng LD in Lahad Datu, Sabah and Cluster Tembok in Alor Setar, Kedah (Yew, 2020). Most infections were due to illegal immigrants in some detention facilities such as prisons, Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) prisons, temporary detention centres and special detention centres, with rates ranging from 2.0% to 38.8%. In addition, the Director General for the Malaysia

Ministry of Health also voiced his concern about illegal migrants spreading the virus, as in the case of Cluster Benteng LD (Rahim, 2020). Although on 18 March 2020, the government began implementing the MCO, a measure to prevent the spread of the coronavirus (COVID-19) (New Straits Times, 2020), nevertheless, many foreigners, especially those with refugee status, did not care about the laws enforced by the government, which included cross-border actions (Sukumaran & Jaipragas, 2020).

Maritime Security – Overcoming Pandemic Challenges

The threat of the pandemic made it critical for cooperation to curb illegal crossborder activities such as human smuggling, drug trafficking, maritime robbery and kidnapping for ransom. During the pandemic, the government implemented Ops Benteng to restrict illegal immigrants and secure the country’s borders to manage the COVID-19 pandemic successfully. Following the increase of cases involving illegal migrants in Sabah and the incident in the Selayang Wholesale and the northern maritime border of Peninsular Malaysia, the government decided that there is a need for a whole-of-government approach in executing Ops Benteng more effectively. Eliminating these threats did not rely solely on any one agency. Therefore, it was important for the government to consolidate all relevant security agencies under one unified force to counter the threats. The goal was to bring together 19 major security agencies and was presented to the National Security Council (NSC) by the Chief of Defence Force. As a result, on 7 May 2020, the National Task Force (NTF) was formed under the command of the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF). The 19 agencies had been ordered to join forces under the NTF to prevent illegal border crossings from getting out of hand. The NTF assumed the mission and purpose of coordinating operations with other security agencies to address border security threats that arose during the pandemic war. The NTF and Ops Benteng were based on policies issued at the national strategic level. The Defence White Paper (DWP) and Security and Public Order Policy (Dasar Keselamatan dan Ketenteraman Negara – DKKA) were among the national strategic policy documents used as primary references.

NTF allowed for more effective and optimal use of existing capabilities belonging to various government agencies and civilians, such as fishermen, to be part of its information-sharing arm. The agency’s capabilities include using radar, K3M application, boats, ships, aircraft and drones. Combining multiple agencies under the Ops Benteng meant capabilities were deployed more effectively and efficiently. The presence of many national assets in the air and sea was a means to deter illegal migrants and other cross-border offences. NTF allowed for the optimisation of surveillance and tracking system and information networks to identify illegal immigrants and other offenders (Mohd Ali, 2020). It coordinated operations with other security agencies and assisted in curbing the entry of illegal immigrants. Following that, it made it easier for agencies to detour and overshadow illegal immigrant boats from Malaysian waters (Nurulhuda, 2021).

Through Ops Benteng, NTF managed to determine three main maritime security issues, which were illegal immigration, smuggling of drugs/contraband, animal, cigarettes and ketum leaves, as well as illegal fishing. Based on frequent reports of arrests of illegal immigrants and seizures made by Ops Benteng, the NTF demonstrated its effectiveness in integrating various law enforcement agencies for integrated patrol and surveillance of the country’s borders and checkpoints. As of 9 August 2022, NTF apprehended 1,392 skippers (tekong), 21,866 illegal immigrants and 1,248 smugglers. In terms of assets, NTF succeeded in seizing 803 ships and boats. In addition, they also succeeded in chasing away 3,259 illegal immigrants and 981 ships/boats. The total value of goods seized by NTF accumulated to RM971.09 million. The summary of NTF achievement is shown in Table 2 (Kementerian Pertahanan Malaysia, 2022).

Establishing the NTF amid the COVID-19 pandemic was a timely and comprehensive effort to strengthen governance and fortify existing law enforcement agencies to ensure land and maritime border security. “Good governance” can be defined as “responsibility and accountability for the overall operations” of an organisation. Better integration in cooperation and prudent planning among law enforcement agencies under the NTF reduced a range of illegal activities and successfully curbed the spread of COVID-19.

Table 2: Ops Benteng Success Statistic until 9 August 2022

Malaysia’s Maritime Security Challenges During COVID-19 Pandemic

When the government introduced its MCO to curb the transmission of COVID-19, many foreign fishermen took advantage of the situation and entered Malaysian waters. As a result, Malaysian law enforcement agencies under the NTF government stepped up efforts to crack down on illegal fishing. Joint operations by the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), the Department of Fisheries, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN), the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) and the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) under the NTF reportedly seized several foreign fishing vessels and their crews. As reported by the Department of Fisheries, illegal fishing costs up to RM4.25 billion annually (Ramli, 2022).

Procurement of strategic assets should continue to further improve agencies and military capabilities in defending and securing the country from any form of external threats. According to a report made in Air Times, RMN received 11 units of Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIB) from the Ops Benteng Procurement Programme. In addition, the MMEA also received seven fast interceptor craft (FIC) ordered for the ongoing Ops Benteng (Abas, 2020).

In addition to the non-traditional security issues, Malaysia faced maritime border encroachment and big power competition in the region. Regarding maritime border encroachment, there were numerous sightings of foreign vessels even during the pandemic (Malay Mail, 2021). The encroachment was mainly done via grey tactics making it more difficult for Malaysia to determine the number of times the incident occurred. The most common grey tactic is when a ship is registered in a state where the owner is not a citizen of that state. This situation is known as the flag of convenience. Such situations made it more difficult for law enforcement since UNCLOS does not have a clear definition of maritime security, giving leeway for using grey tactics. Nevertheless, as a sovereign nation, Malaysia lodged several diplomatic notes of protest against the vessels’ state government over their encroachment into Malaysia’s EEZ off the coasts of Sabah and Sarawak (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2021).

Conclusion

Fundamentally, no government is prepared to face a health crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic. Only a coordinated response from all levels of government can minimise crisis management failures. Moreover, given the scale of the COVID-19 situation, there is a call for stronger partnerships at all levels of government. Therefore, transparent and accurate communication based on mutual trust and respect between all authorities is fundamental. In addition, by bringing different levels of government together to define goals and develop strategies, containment and recovery efforts can be more effective.

A whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach is the best strategy for Malaysia to move forward in the future, during a crisis or in peacetime. The formation of NTF has clearly shown its benefit in terms of containing maritime security issues and increasing overall enforcement and military capabilities.

Domestically, threats such as pandemics and illegal immigrants harm the nation’s social fabric and economy. Hence, Malaysia must start addressing the current issues of existing illegal immigrants that had made the headlines during the pandemic. Malaysia needs to have specific guidelines for each category of illegal immigrants. As observed in Ops Benteng, there is a critical need for a whole government approach. A whole-of-society approach is also essential in imparting information on reporting illegal immigrants to law enforcement. Furthermore, information on registering marriage between a citizen and a foreigner and childbirth must also be imparted to all Malaysians to avoid future statelessness issues.

Internationally, there is an inherent need for a clear definition of maritime security in the existing UNCLOS. It is from defining maritime security that other matters on maritime security can be further incorporated in ensuring safe passage across the blue ocean. In addition, with the ever-changing technology, there is also a need for further dialogue and discussion addressing the use of unmanned vehicles in crimes such as sea robberies and piracy.

However, this requires a strong political will at the district, state and federal levels. Therefore, Malaysians need to understand the consequence that may occur should the country’s maritime security agencies need proper strategies and capabilities.

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Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

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Malaysia’s Maritime Security Challenges During COVID-19 Pandemic

CHAPTER NINE

THE ASEAN’S STRATEGIC VALUE IN ENSURING THE MARITIME SECURITY

Captain Mohd Reduan Ayob RMN

Introduction

ASEAN was established in 1967 in Bangkok by the five original countries and today, it has 11 members. ASEAN’s pride and credibility as the most successful regional organisation with its unique approach towards handling affairs with the complex strategic nature of Southeast Asia (SEA) have always caught regional and global powers’ attention.

The threat to the SEA region ranges from conventional to unconventional, with maritime importance contributing to the security paradigm. China’s expanding economic and military presence in the region has eventually harmed regional stability (Menla Ali & Dimitraki, 2014), resulting in more outsider intervention. Scholars have been locked in debates on whether the re-emergence of China would be peaceful or perilous. China’s involvement, together with the multiple internal actors in the scenarios of the territorial disputes, increases the critical stakes for the United States (US), putting the security dynamic into complex variables that influence each other. Yet to find a win-win approach, ASEAN members have taken different strategies in addressing maritime security to avoid losing to one another, hooked within the ‘ASEAN Way’, which emphasises argument through dialogue for later settlement and minimal institutionalisation (Majumdar, 2015).

The essay is organised into 4 parts. The first section discusses the background of ASEAN and its relation to the major powers. The second section will discuss maritime security within the region. The third section analyses differing balancing behaviour within the region and approaches deemed by the ASEAN. The final part will discuss the issues, challenges and ways to ensure regional security before concluding the essay.

Asean’s Strategic Value In Ensuring The Maritime Security

ASEAN

ASEAN sits at the convergence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Land masses and oceans are resource-abundant and support a combined consumption market for more than 620 million people, with significant SLOCs aiding global trade (Khurana, 2019). Separately, SEA countries’ nationhood milestones had varied degrees of violence given ideological contestation vis-à-vis external power interventions. China had to some degree, influenced communist ideals, while Westerners had also managed to influence capitalism. Amidst the geopolitical tussle, SEA established ASEAN as a Security Regime in 1967 to promote regional peace and stability (Thayer, 2013), comprising Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam and Timor Leste. ASEAN abides by its fundamental principles: mutual respect amongst member states and noninterference in other internal affairs (Seah, 2009). Although the non-intervention policy seemed ‘despicable’, the recent 2021 Myanmar coup portrays its firm policy where none of the ASEAN members states ‘intervened’. Nevertheless, diversity of interests is still at stake.

Maritime Security Threat

Security concerns exist across different levels and domains. This section elucidated strategic issues with a ‘macro lens’ across different domains. For instance, maritime security issues can be liminal where unresolved issues such as the diversity of ASEAN, territorial disputes and inclination towards superpowers impact relations. For the past decades, regional stability and security within SCS have been affected by maritime disputes (Ott, 2001) and migrant issues. The presence of additional powers exacerbated the problem by compelling ASEAN with diverging interests (Koda, 2014) to act as their will, thus aggravating the SCS dispute and proving to be a vexing obstacle in achieving unity. ASEAN has yet to be able to pursue its centrality concept to handle China’s aggressiveness (Thayer, 2020) shift of global focus due to affected regional security forging a different response by member states. ASEAN division was marred due to additional security threats (Ministry of Defence, 2020) in this region. Both conventional and non-conventional threats undeniably become an attracting factor for outsiders, notably from middle-power nations seeking to assert regional influence (O’Rourke, 2021), as well as being part of the balancing strategy from the superpowers.

Approach by ASEAN

a. Balancing Behaviour

With multiple approaches by the ASEAN due to differing inclinations, the discussion will be centred on the Balance of Power (BOP) Theory. BOP theory revolves around the power relationship with other states. It is a mechanism that compels nations

The

to join the weak against the strong, in equalising the power distribution among states (Andersen, 2018). BOP can be empirically seen as early as in Westphalia 1648, a power theory emphasised by Morgenthau (1948) and further elaborated by Waltz (1979). Waltz (1979) identifies that BOP occurs when “two coalitions” are formed in the international system. If given the option, secondary states will side with the weaker coalitions to avoid being threatened by the stronger side. Decades after the Cold War, the global shift towards ASEAN was visible when China began to gear up on all fronts as a strategic ‘balancer’, disrupting US’s hegemony and having greater leverage containing the SEA region (Kong, 2021). US pursuits for alliances amidst its distance from the SEA region have resulted in strategic competition (Keukeleire & Schunz, 2008). Graham Allison terms “Thucydides Trap”, a dangerous dynamic that arises when rising power attempts to oust a ruling power (Alden, 2006), which relates to the US-China rivalry.

SEA is Asia’s geographically south-eastern region, encompassing the SCS that bridges the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. It is highly diversified, characterised by variations in traditions, faiths, politics and economic and strategic orientations. The division is amplified due to the colonial legacy that divides areas according to their conveniences, power-sharing treaties and agreements (Kizeková, 2016). They endorsed border separation by splitting seas and oceans formerly free for use and established artificial borders in the region, resulting in several disputes (Gerstl & Strašáková, 2016). After independence, SEA countries’ national borders overlapped and posed territorial disputes (Gerstl & Strašáková, 2016) that later intersected with China’s 9-Dash Line. The overlapping claims in the SEA region began with contestation for territorial rights because of colonial rulers who drew sovereign limits using a different version of measurements via agreements. SEA’s strategic location along the busiest maritime trade route and its natural resources value make disputes more complex regarding power and interest. To date, ASEAN has not resolved the disputes.

b. Complex Hedging Strategy.

This approach is analysed as the ASEAN’s overarching BOP practises (by all), structured by these circumstances which include: Firstly, China’s coercive approach and geopolitical strings attached to the wealthy economic initiatives will impact sovereignty (Kim et al., 2020). Secondly, US’s balancing act is welcomed, but TransPacific Partnership (TPP) withdrawal (Mui, 2017) doubted its regional sustainability. Thirdly, US-China’s SEA-oriented trade could force ASEAN to choose sides, as emphasised by Singapore’s PM in 2018, “US-China trade war would force ASEAN to become or remain friends with both” (Cheong, 2018). Finally, ASEAN’s diversifications coupled with complex interests may drive them to align or uncertainly reinforce capabilities against one another.

c. Bandwagon China

China’s antagonism significantly contributes since bandwagon denotes a willingness to align with a direct threat. Cambodia is probably the only SEA country that is bandwagon with China. Cambodia was utilised as a counterweight to Vietnam’s dominancy, dating back to the 1975 war in which China invaded Vietnam through Cambodia’s alliance (Raymond, 2020). Viewing ASEAN as an ineffective mechanism, Cambodia sought China’s military and political aid to counter threats from Thailand and Vietnam, thus wielding China’s considerable influence. Nevertheless, there is also a risk that SEA countries will align with China within a dynamic realist term; China is rising and close, while the US is declining and distant (Denmark, 2018). Numerous nations have improved relations with China, influencing China’s territorial posture that would lead SEA countries to favour China. Although this strategy is economically advantageous, China’s ignorance of domestic issues and the string attached is too risky, hence not adopted by the ASEAN majority.

d. Balancing with the US

ASEAN primarily views the US as a comfortable saviour in counter-balancing China’s act, with several already analysed aligning to the US. The Philippines and Thailand are firmly having a treaty alliance with the US (Vaughn, 2007), but evidence shows that Vietnam and Singapore are also balancing with the US. (2020) survey, 54% chose the US, while 46% chose China if forced to choose between both (Iwamoto, 2020). Despite its strong relationship with China (it receives Chinese tourists, FDI and joined the BRI), Thailand is grouped under the US camp. Although having a treaty alliance with the US, it maintains cordial military relations with China but is impacted by China’s indiscriminate growth in the Upper Mekong River (Mière, 2013). China’s hydropower dams and diversions are disrupting Thailand’s associated ecosystems, forcing Thailand to ally with the US in the fight against Communism to exert China’s pressure.

The Philippines benefited from a limited historical Chinese influence. The SinoPhilippines’ tense relations sparked after the “9-Dash Line” and subsequent incidents in the SCS. Duterte appearance as anti-US (Grossman, 2019) was probably only rhetoric because he utilised US presence to highlight the support of its territorial issues with China. Despite having a war with the US and great assistance from China (during the French Independence war), Vietnam opposes China intruding on its internal affairs (Thayer, 2016). Previously ruled by China, Vietnam’s normalised relationship with China was further marred by the “9-Dash Line” proclamation, causing Vietnam to partner with the US and seek Western military deals to oppose China’s pressure. Vietnam signed a comprehensive US partnership deal in 2013, but is cautious of China’s economic relations, owing to China’s control over the Mekong Rivers, which act as strategic buffers between the countries. Singapore is a peculiar SEA country trying to preserve ties with both. Despite claiming neutrality with

substantial China influences, Singapore is comfortably externally balancing with the US, presumably the strongest connection with the US among ASEAN states (O’Rourke, 2021). Singapore only has tiny areas of disputes and is mostly unaffected by territorial disputes.

e. Intra-Regional Balancing

There are two approaches to this strategy. First is the “alliancing” between ASEAN against identical threats, though not a “hard balancing” but is also part of alliance theory. Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand, for example, formed the Malacca Straits Patrol initiative, which consists of Malacca Straits Sea Patrol (MSSP), Eyes in the Sky (EIS) and Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG) (Hutabarat et al., 2020) to ensure merchant ships’ safety when traversing the Strait of Malacca. The same goes for Trilateral Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines in combating border issues like piracy, contrabands and Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR). The balancing act established a stronger ASEAN in the face of the NSA but had little effect on China’s territorial demands. Secondly, the strategic location of SEA has attracted large numbers of external powers involved.

The UK, France, Japan and Australia are increasing the regularity of sending warships to the region, thus connecting with ASEAN in pursuit of a better security paradigm. This second approach has little influence on internal conflicts but significantly affects China’s deterrence. For example, Malaysia and Singapore have military ties with the UK and Australia via the FPDA, which conducts its exercise in the SCS at least twice a year, portraying their willingness to assist ASEAN in territorial dispute claims with exterior forces. Through analysis, it produces triple outcomes. Firstly, ASEAN will appear more assertive in its territorial disputes with China, but China will respond by strengthening its forces closer to the theatre. Secondly, while this balancing would help multilateral collaboration, it would exacerbate SEA’s relations with China. Thirdly, middle power balancing would complicate the BOP dynamic by further establishing a sub-balancing of ASEAN’s personal interests.

f. Internal Balancing

As ASEAN’s unity cannot unite them in dispute management, the SEA nation views the rise of the other state’s military capability as a threat, necessitating a modernisation of the country’s capability, thus creating security dilemmas (Collins, 2000). Related to the insecurity feelings, an internal balancing strategy is taken by all countries to protect sovereignty. This strategy has several outcomes. Firstly, ASEAN’s ties will worsen as members turn cold-blooded towards one another. Secondly, when internal ties deteriorate, unity erodes, weakening ASEAN’s cohesiveness. Finally, this would attract further outsider interference and China would enjoy ASEAN’s divisiveness. On the bright side, the internal balance may be good, given ASEAN’s reliance on complex hedging strategies. As a single significant association, ASEAN’s

The Asean’s Strategic Value In Ensuring The Maritime Security

capabilities will strengthen due to healthy competitiveness among member states. Thus, they may assist one another in developing a more robust capability to counter the same threat.

Issues, Challenges and Way Forward

Diversification of ASEAN is the main challenge in resolving territorial disputes. ASEAN complicacy appears cohesive in the world but diverse in posture when resolving territorial conflicts. The ‘ASEAN Way’ is merely just security rhetoric once China gets involved in territorial disputes (Majumdar, 2015). The issue will remain unresolved if each nation maintains its unilateral claim without attempting to settle it through a common objective and language. However, it is impossible to resolve the issue through dialogue. No Chairman would issue such a collective statement or Joint Communiqué considering the territorial disputes are no longer a bilateral issue and has riddled between the games of China. Intensified strategic competition between both causes a terrible influence in the region. US-China’s interactions in the region have far-reaching strategic implications on a worldwide scale of maritime order, posing a significant threat to territorial and maritime security. The strategic competition brings challenges in the BOP towards more considerable heights, inviting other countries to form alliances to prevent one another.

Cohesiveness and the ‘ASEAN Way’ of responses are limited to addressing the maritime security challenge. ASEAN states will continue to emphasise their territorial claims, strengthening their military capabilities as the top priority in deterring their neighbours. The insecurity feelings of ASEAN modernising its militaries, which could result in territorial aggression, have created a security dilemma. Although ASEAN always pursues diplomacy, military spending has never been reduced to remain competitive. Crucial to highlight is that “outside intervention does little too territorial disputes”. Resolving territorial disputes will necessitate an increasing amount of external engagement. China is advocating for an approach in the COC towards its favourable conditions rather than towards SEA’s advantage. Although more power would likely join the arena, the interest is inclined towards emphasising the battle of strategic competition rather than resolving internal territorial conflicts. Contested areas will create a security vacuum due to overlapping national jurisdiction. They could be exploited by criminals, such as through piracy or KFR, who will use the area as an escape sanctuary. The criminal increase is cascading towards more outside intervention, thus tarnishing global trust towards ASEAN in managing its security.

Opportunities & Recommendations

After all, the deliberation, intervention and territorial conflicts in the SEA region may not always result in a bitter world. It is a chance to strengthen relations between SEA countries. Like a push-pull game, the US’s desire for ASEAN to join its anti-China bandwagon will benefit in a way ASEAN will re-evaluate China relations. However, on

the other hand, China would risk ASEAN getting muted by the Chinese and creating a troublesome US relationship. This first argument may not be a popular opinion or approach, but addressing the BOP strategy seems valid and crucial in achieving the dream security state. This is due to internal and external battles required to be handled by all ASEAN member states, against other member states, or even against non-ASEAN. As the BOP strategy diversifies following each interest and there is little that outsiders can do to resolve internal territorial conflicts, having a resolute BOP strategy is the best approach. The most productive BOP to ensure the security of ASEAN would be Intraregional balancing for territorial disputes and more likely minimise the complex hedging approach that does not show ASEAN’s true colours. External balancing with benefits to ASEAN must also be welcomed and improved cooperation mechanisms must prevail. Nevertheless, ASEAN must view internal balancing as a healthy rivalry towards better dispute management.

Resolving territorial disputes without outside intervention is essential. Marginal errors due to the colonial agreement must be sorted in a win-win and lose-lose situation. Subsequently, a combined US and China cooperation via ASEAN-led platforms may confront further territorial disputes progressively, not by resolving problems but by managing mistrust among ASEAN members. This would contribute to a more stabilised situation, decreasing the potential for foreign intervention. It would also create a healthy environment between member states, thus opening the door to forging a healthy security alliance.

ASEAN must enhance internal interoperability to secure regional security further while balancing China’s assertiveness. Advanced regional security collaboration could become a critical strategic advantage. A more frequent exercise within ASEAN will create an asymmetric advantage against adversaries, and would be the best way of responding to any security issues with the ‘ASEAN Way’. Exercises like the ASEAN Maritime Naval Exercise should be carried out more frequently. This kind of effort would mean nothing to Major Powers but will surely achieve strategic effects. Outsiders will see ASEAN as a strong body that must not be played around, nor can be bullied. Knowing that when the increasing power poses the capacity to integrate and efficiently govern occupied areas (Wohlforth et al., 2007), stronger ASEAN shall unite into the intraregional balancing against China and cover the loophole vacuumed by the discrepancy. Assuming a tactical talk, “collective sea control” by ASEAN littoral state in the SCS would be a perfect start to disrupt outside interference.

International collaboration is vital. ASEAN must boost international collaboration as ‘one team’, joining both US-led and China-led initiatives to demonstrate neutrality and serve as a network for resolving conflicts. International partnerships uphold international norms within the region. No new Major Power may appear in the region when the boundary issues in SEA remain stable. Hence, ASEAN must smartly hedge within the intraregional balancing by avoiding aligning on one large state over

another and safely navigate amongst superpowers, be more flexible in diplomacy tools, thus retaliate firmly when necessary. This would successfully manage the conflict and crisis, thus proving again that the ‘ASEAN Way’ does the talk on the ‘pitch’, not only through dialogue.

ASEAN still needs to catch up in defence industries where over-reliance on the outside manufacturer affected all member states. Internally, several countries have proved the ability to develop their own weaponry or defence sector with relatively high-tech arms, with minimal involvement of outsiders. Advancing the internal defence industry and development would elevate ASEAN to the next level, where the impact would also benefit the economy significantly. This will promote trust and cohesion between members, thus forging stronger collaborations. This collectively would also bring ASEAN into a Self-Reliance regime, thus reducing the outside role in the region whilst reducing dependency on outsiders, maximising legitimacy and becoming the economic catalyst.

Finally, means managing conflict within ASEAN must be centralised towards the ‘ASEAN Way’. Not only to manage relations among member states but it will also be able to serve as a platform for dampening external pressures and moderating outsiders’ behaviour in the region. Preventing Major Powers to avoid resorting to military options could be a mountainous task, but seeking a cooperative mode with ASEAN military diplomacy will ensure regional sanctuary is secured. No matter how big the issue, member states must manage any affairs by promoting the ASEAN-Way and ASEAN-Centrality of resolving conflicts (Grausová, 2020), investing in collective ASEAN-led initiatives such as the COC and East Asia Summit to intensify efforts to resolve outstanding conflicts (Bi, 2021), and to offer possibilities for regional and Major Powers to reconcile. Every conflict within ASEAN territory must be followed with a Joint Communiqué indicating the collective response by ASEAN.

Conclusion

The chapter highlights the threat resulting from the competition that exists in the SCS. As China’s posture attracts global powers into the theatre, ASEAN seeks necessary balancing in protecting sovereignty. The approach was to denote the balancing tendency while proposing several outcomes that suit the internal issues within ASEAN member states. Unity issues must be addressed and, subsequently, work towards intraregional balancing on resolving the territorial disputes, directing a balancing effort as a network of resolving conflicts. Several approaches, like collaborations and more frequent engagement, are highlighted. However, no matter how severe the maritime security situation is, ASEAN must resolve internal conflicts without outside intervention and adopt a shared solution to address the regional maritime security issues, ensuring greater economic height.

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The Asean’s Strategic Value In Ensuring The Maritime Security

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

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THE EVER-PRESENT OF ABU SAYYAF IN INSULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA: MITIGATE BUT NEVER DEFEATED

Abdul Razak Ahmad Ahmad Zikri Rosli

Introduction

Since 2014, selected districts of Sabah, Malaysia, have received perennial security threats from the sea despite restrictive measures. Because of that, the authorities have been warned of possible attacks and criminal activities such as kidnapping for ransom by the Islamic militant group Abu Sayyaf. This chapter will shed light on the nature of the threats posed by Abu Sayyaf to Malaysia’s maritime space and recommend ways to counter them.

The Threat

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was founded in the early 1990s by Abdurajak Janjalani, a veteran of the Afghan-Soviet war. The group first laid down their roots on Basilan Island. They have since extended their influence over the southern Philippines, particularly the chain of islands between the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea, such as Jolo, Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga City. Influenced by the radical Islamist ideology of Al-Qaeda, the group’s mission is to establish an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines. Along the way, the ASG has committed numerous terror attacks involving bombing, kidnapping for ransom and beheading. However, several victories of the Philippines government against the ASG and other Islamic militant groups, such as the recapture of the city of Marawi in 2017 and the subsequent military and police operations to capture influential figures in these groups, have significantly weakened them and put them on the defensive.

Despite the Philippines government’s success in weakening the group, nothing definite can be said about the demise of the ASG and their threats. Observers have argued that with the pressure they face onshore, the group will turn to the sea to

The Ever-Present Of Abu Sayyaf In Insular Southeast Asia: Mitigate But Never Defeated

conduct malignant activities such as kidnapping for ransom, smuggling drugs and weapons, and recruiting foreign fighters to maintain the financial capacity of the group and their operations (Benson, 2020; Curran, 2019). The group’s shift to maritime space poses a serious concern to the Malaysian. Due to the proximity of the eastern coast of Sabah with the Sulu-Celebes Sea, the state and its surrounding waters cannot avoid being the ASG’s areas of operation. As early as 2000, Sabah had already become the target location of the group’s criminal activities when 21 hostages were abducted from a resort on Sipadan Island (Malay Mail, 2016). More than two decades later, the threats from the ASG remain, with the authorities imposing curfews in the districts of eastern Sabah due to fears of infiltration and encroachment from the group (Abdullah, 2022).

With the abovementioned considerations, this chapter argues that the ASG remains a significant security threat, particularly to Malaysia’s maritime space. Therefore, Malaysia should bolster its capabilities to counter the threat and safeguard its maritime space. Some recommendations that can be taken up include investing in the country’s maritime and naval capabilities, cooperating with locals for information, strengthening collaboration with neighbouring countries through existing frameworks, i.e., the Trilateral Cooperative Agreement (TCA), and undertaking nonmilitary approaches. Protecting its maritime space is crucial for Malaysia to realise its aspiration as a maritime nation, espoused in its 2020 Defence White Paper.

The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section will focus on the ASG’s maritime operations and threats to Malaysia’s maritime space. The subsequent section will discuss the ongoing efforts by Malaysia and neighbouring countries to counter the threats. Accordingly, recommendations will be laid down to enhance the effectiveness in countering the threat and, finally, the conclusion.

ASG’s Threat to Maritime Space

Although terrorist groups are known for their land-based operations, the sea also serves as a vital geographic space for some groups, such as the ASG. The ASG has already used the sea to conduct their terror attacks in their early years; for instance, in 1991, they bombed a Christian missionary ship, MV Doulous, in Zamboanga City, killing two missionaries (Banlaoi, 2005). This section will deliberate on the ASG’s maritime operations and their threats to Malaysia.

A study conducted by Stable Seas (Stableseas, 2021) analysed the maritime activities of 43 prominent armed groups worldwide and found that the ASG is “widely recognised as one of the groups most adept globally at exploiting the maritime space” (Benson, 2021). The study argued that other armed groups in the Philippines, such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), the Maute Group and the New People’s Army (NPA), “have not demonstrated the ability to exploit the maritime space to the same degree as ASG, but have done so more selectively, and,

given the opportunity, may seek to replicate ASG’s tactics” (Benson, 2021). (Banlaoi 2005 p. 71) attributes the ASG militants’ mastery of the sea to many of their families’ tradition as seafarers, as well as their possession of the necessary equipment to conduct maritime operations, such as “night-vision devices, thermal imagers, sniper scopes, various types of commercial radio, satellites, cellular phones, and high-speed watercraft”.

While the group have committed criminal activities and terror attacks by sea since the early years of its formation, it was not until the 2000s that the ASG truly shifted their focus to the vast maritime space. Among the reasons behind this shift was the disruption in the group’s financial links with its primary funder, Al-Qaeda. This was due to the response to the 9/11 attack and the global context of the ‘war on terror’, which also led to increasing military pressure from the Philippines’ forces (Curran, 2019). Writing in 2005, a Filipino expert on terrorism studies, Rommel Banlaoi, opined that “Abu Sayyaf, once a predominantly land-based terrorist organisation, is becoming more and more maritime in its operations, to escape the predominantly land-based Philippine military responses to internal security threats” (Banlaoi, 2005, p. 72). To maintain the group’s coffer, they turned to the sea to conduct operations that would bring financial rewards, such as kidnapping for ransom and smuggling drugs and weapons.

In analysing the maritime activities of the violent armed groups, Stable Seas has developed five types of activities engaged by these groups: tactical support; target; take; traffic and trade; and tax and extort (Benson, 2021). Tactical support refers to activities supporting the group’s operations on land, such as smuggling recruits, fighters, weapons and supplies and launching land-based raids via maritime routes. Secondly, target refers to targeting and attacking civilians, security personnel and infrastructures at sea. Take comprises any act that seizes resources and properties (human or otherwise) in the sea, such as armed robbery and kidnapping for ransom. The fourth item, traffic and trade, refers to the group’s involvement in a trade that uses maritime routes, such as smuggling drugs and weapons and human trafficking. Fifth is tax and extort, whereby the group will impose informal taxes or ask for protection money from those involved in maritime trading activities. The 1991 bombing of MV Doulous and the tragic explosion of Superferry 14 in 2004, which claimed 116 lives and was also committed by the ASG that claimed 116 lives, are some examples.

Out of the activities stated above, the ASG is well-known for kidnapping for ransom and smuggling foreign fighters into the Philippines (Benson, 2021). These two activities are why the ASG remains a significant security threat to Malaysia’s maritime space. As mentioned earlier, Sabah has been one of the target locations for abduction activities by the group since 2000 and has targeted tourists, tourism industry workers and fishermen (Malay Mail, 2016). It has continued for over two decades and peaked in 2016 with 17 incidents, although the rate has declined over

The Ever-Present Of Abu Sayyaf In Insular Southeast Asia: Mitigate But Never Defeated

the past few years (Joubert, 2020; Storey, 2022). Despite the declining rate, the threat of abduction still lingers, leading authorities in Sabah to extend the duskto-dawn curfew in selected eastern districts and the surrounding waters (The Star, 2023a). Furthermore, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia’s Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAPISC), which facilitates information-sharing and safety guidelines, has continuously cautioned master ships to exercise extra vigilance and adopted precautionary measures laid down by the Centre (Safety4Sea, 2023).

Another major security threat posed by the ASG to East Malaysia is the movement of foreign fighters into the southern Philippines via Sabah. It must be noted that militant groups in the southern Philippines have managed to attract foreign fighters from neighbouring countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, but also from Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Middle East to fight alongside them (Curran, 2019). The battle of Marawi, for instance, saw an influx of foreign fighters. Experts claim that the militants used Sabah as the standard route and transit point, particularly for fighters from Indonesia (Yusa, 2020). Sandakan and Semporna are the two most common points of departure due to their proximity to the islands in the southern Philippines. In the case of the 2019 Jolo cathedral bombing by an Indonesian couple, it is reported that the couple and their family stayed for two months in Keningau, a city located in the middle of Sabah, before going to Sandakan and eventually arriving in Jolo to carry out the suicide mission (Vanar & Golingai, 2021). Other than being a favourable transit point, some foreign fighters temporarily stay and take up jobs in Sabah, primarily in construction or agriculture, before travelling to their targeted destination. This is because Sabah has more economic opportunities than the impoverished islands in the southern Philippines. The money gained from these opportunities is later used to fund their terrorist activities (The Straits Times, 2021).

In short, ransom kidnappings, the movement of foreign fighters, and other criminal activities by the ASG show that Malaysia’s maritime space remains highly vulnerable –particularly along Sabah’s eastern coast. Necessary measures must be strengthened or undertaken to safeguard these areas of concern.

Ongoing Efforts and Development by Malaysia and its Neighbours

It is vital to scrutinise the ASG’s strategic evolutions due to developments by neighbouring countries like Malaysia and the Philippines. Throughout the years, the ongoing efforts and measures taken by Malaysia and the Philippines have placed pressure on the ASG to reinvent itself to suit the changing dynamics of the 21st century in order to conduct their illegal maritime operations. It is believed that the ASG will continue using maritime space to focus on piracy, ransom kidnappings and the movement of fighters and supplies, which can be deemed tactical support.

To combat the ASG’s growing influence across Southeast Asia, minilateralism must be utilised more effectively and as a targeted approach. Moisés Naím writes on minilateralism, ‘We should bring the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem’ (Naím, 2009). In this case, that particular problem defeats the growing influence of the ASG in Southeast Asia.

Observers look to countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia in forging the strategy of minilateralism, given their geographical location and power intensity. Though minilateralism has its defects, these pale in comparison with the stalemate caused by many partners in foreign affairs in bilateralism. Indeed, minilateralism is not a magic solution to any dispute, but it is an alternative worth considering rather than the status quo of bilateralism. The prospects for expansion may seem small, but this is a crucial step in addressing the ongoing developments in the subregion.

The three countries, all signatories to the TCA, recognise that the threat in these maritime areas constitutes piracy (Parameswaran, 2022). These acts, such as ship hijacking and ransom kidnapping, threaten their national security interests and sovereignty at sea. Therefore, to overcome maritime piracy, the three countries have implemented the initiatives agreed upon in the TCA (Ariani, 2018). The TCA’s operating mechanism highlights key measures from government initiatives, such as annual ministerial meetings, exchange of ideas between chiefs of defence forces, and expanding patrols along the coast, all of which will reinforce maritime security in the face of the threat from the ASG. Membership in the TCA in the initial stages can set a precedent for other countries in the Southeast Asian region and ultimately become the driving force in intensifying defence cooperation.

In the Philippines in May 2017, an alliance of disgruntled ex-guerrillas, impoverished farmers and disaffected youth attacked government installations in Marawi. These included members of the ASG from the Sulu archipelago and the Maute Group from Lanao del Sur. This conglomerate was joined by foreign fighters forming an ISISinspired band that seized parts of the city. To defeat the militants, the President declared martial law throughout Mindanao. After vicious combat that devastated large parts of Marawi, the Army took the city back in October, killing more than 900 militants, according to government sources (Fonbuena, 2020). After a brief moment of quietness, the militants relaunched attacks on the Army, leading to a counter-insurgency campaign. While military operations have weakened the militants, the armed forces have not defeated them. In central Mindanao, factions of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and remnants of the Maute Group continue to operate. At the same time, the ASG took coverage in the Sulu archipelago (Crisis Group, 2022).

Following heavy battles between ASG fighters and the military in 2016, provincial officials stepped in to combat the insurgency. They outsourced some security tasks

The Ever-Present Of Abu Sayyaf In Insular Southeast Asia: Mitigate But Never Defeated

to village militias, who blocked new members from joining ASG and worked closely with the Philippine Army (Crisis Group Interview, 2019). The campaign gained even more ground after government forces killed its leader and dozens of his men in Marawi. Local bureaucrats also used this momentum to push forward development projects and improve public services (Douglas, 2018).

Based on a country report (US Department of State, 2021), in the year 2018, Malaysian police arrested at least 20 suspects in Sabah for involvement in terrorism-related activities, including smuggling militants into the southern Philippines, “enabling kidnapping-for-ransom operations, recruiting children as militants and human shields, and participation in ASG-led beheadings” (U.S. Department of State, 2021). On the other hand, Malaysia has monitored, arrested, deported and tried suspected supporters of terrorist groups, including the ASG. It has also cooperated with the United States and others to increase border security capacity at airports and in the Sulu Sea to counter terrorist messaging on social media because the country is used as a transit point for these militants’ movements.

Among the Malaysian anti-terrorism measures was Bank Negara’s “Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism Policy Digital Currencies” directive. The country’s ongoing counterterrorism efforts to work with international organisations, like the United Nations agencies and ASEAN, have included hosting workshops on combating extreme online messaging. The United States government’s report on terrorism in 2018 also noted Malaysia’s efforts in combating terrorism through legal prosecution, border patrol and social media monitoring. “The report also recorded how the Pakatan Harapan government, which assumed office in 2018, had pledged to review terrorism-related laws, including the Prevention of Crime Act 2012 (Poca), Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA) and the Sedition Act 1948” (Malaysiakini, 2019).

Besides that, the Malaysian government purchased six new light-attack helicopters under a US $76 million contract inked in 2016. These were stationed in Sabah as part of the government’s move to bolster state security, reinforce anti-crime efforts in coastal areas, and deployed in the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZONE). This area covers 1,400 kilometres of coastline in Malaysia’s easternmost state of Sabah, between Kudat and Tawau. The newly acquired assets enable attack, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and security missions supporting the Malaysian Army’s operations. In 2020, Malaysia confirmed receiving the first of six MD 530G helicopters and the military personnel operating them were sent for training in the United States (Yeo, 2022).

Recommendations

The essential measure that needs to be undertaken by Malaysia to safeguard its maritime space is to improve its maritime and naval capabilities. This entails

equipping the forces with advanced and sophisticated assets ranging from vessels to surveillance systems. However, to achieve this, it is essential to first address the elephant in the room, i.e., the imbalance in the distribution of budgetary provisions. Within the ESSCOM, which comprises the Royal Malaysian Armed Forces (RMAF), the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), budgetary allocations tend to favour the Army over the marine police or the MMEA. This is “despite the fact that most of the country’s security threats are maritime in nature” (Abuza, 2019). However, it is also important to note that since 2020, the budget for the Navy and the MMEA has experienced a gradual increase. Still, in the recent budget Belanjawan 2023, the MMEA was allocated only RM718 million while the Army, the Navy, and the air force received more than RM1 billion each (Abas, 2023). Speaking in a forum in 2022, the former deputy defence minister, Liew Chin Tong, echoed the same concerns that “Malaysia too often acts as if jungle warfare is still the main form of conflict” and “yet the challenges are now coming from the sea, no longer the jungle” (as quoted in Chew, 2022). Unless this imbalance is corrected, the entities responsible for safeguarding Malaysia’s maritime space, such as the MMEA, will remain underfunded and jeopardise the effort to ensure maritime security.

However, considering that the newly elected government has focused on the agenda of economic development, institutional reform and social justice, any dramatic changes in the defence provision are highly unlikely. With such constraints, the least that can be done is to relocate some of the assets from Peninsular Malaysia to Sabah, as suggested by local analysts (Rahman & Rahman, 2022). Nevertheless, the incoming of two offshore patrol vessels (OPV) for the MMEA and the addition of 42 border control posts announced in the latest budget should be a positive move (Bernama, 2023; The Star, 2023b).

Besides investing in capabilities, the security forces should capitalise on the locals in Sabah as a source of human intelligence and information. Through cooperation with the locals, the authorities can acquire valuable information, such as the presence of unfamiliar faces or suspicious movements noticed by the locals. The efficacy of this approach is illuminated by the operation conducted by the Philippines armed forces in November 2020, wherein they managed to intercept an ASG vessel and kill seven of their fighters. The success of this interception mission was due to the information supplied by the local fishermen to the authorities prior (Benson, 2020). However, to ensure cooperation by the locals, Benson (2020) observes that authorities must play their role in cultivating close relations with the local community and developing appropriate reporting mechanisms for the locals so that they can confidently share information without fearing retribution from the armed groups. In brief, other than gathering information and intelligence through conventional means such as patrolling and aerial surveillance, cooperating with the locals can serve as a low-cost yet effective addition.

The Ever-Present Of Abu Sayyaf In Insular Southeast Asia: Mitigate But Never Defeated

After being halted due to the pandemic, the TCA was said to undergo revival when the three defence ministers of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines met in March 2022 in Malaysia. Among the actions discussed to be taken is implementing trilateral maritime exercises in addition to the trilateral maritime and air patrols conducted since 2017. It would also involve strengthening intelligence-sharing and deploying maritime patrol liaison officers to the maritime command centres in Tawau, Sabah; Tawi-Tawi, the Philippines; and Tarakan, Indonesia, for greater coordination. Furthermore, the three countries should further institutionalise the TCA through annual meetings at the ministerial level and increase the timing of patrols to include 24-hour coverage (Parameswaran, 2022). All these initiatives will significantly contribute to the maritime security of the concerned areas. However, since the change of government in the Philippines and Malaysia in May and December 2022, the momentum seems to be waning. With the upcoming general election in Indonesia in 2024, it is high time for the participating countries to expedite the expansion process and translate it into concrete actions without risking any further postponement, given the urgency of the maritime security threats.

Thus far, this chapter has discussed the military and traditional security-related approaches and what is equally important is the non-military measures. The conventional military approaches might be impactful in short to medium-term. However, to comprehensively eliminate the threats posed by the ASG and other similar groups, the government should implement the non-military approaches concurrently. Some of the approaches include curbing corruption and radicalisation among security personnel, educating the local community and building rapport to instil a relationship of mutual trust with the authorities, and improving the lives of the community through economic reforms and programs (International Crisis Group, 2022; Rahman & Rahman, 2022; Sukhani, 2021).

Conclusion

The initial analysis showed that although the ASG’s operations have been declining in recent years, the group continues to be a significant security threat to Malaysia’s maritime space due to the group’s proven adaptability and resilience; therefore, the Malaysian government should undertake the necessary measures to improve its capabilities in countering the threat.

Also, this chapter has demonstrated ongoing counterterrorism efforts by Malaysia and its neighbouring countries, such as the establishment of ESSCOM and the TCA, both of which have been relatively effective. However, there are some recommendations for Malaysia to heighten further its preparedness in facing threats from the group. These recommendations are to invest in the country’s maritime and naval capabilities, cooperate with locals for intelligence information and strengthen existing mechanisms with neighbouring countries alongside other non-military measures.

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

Protecting its waters is vital for Malaysia to realise its aspiration as “a maritime nation with continental roots”, espoused in its 2020 Defence White Paper (Ministry of Defence, 2020, p. 11). As a maritime nation, Malaysia recognises that its maritime space is a crucial source of prosperity and prestige, as well as risks and threats. Therefore, eradicating the threats of the ASG in its maritime space will not only ensure Malaysia’s maritime security, particularly in eastern Sabah, but also preserve the well-being of its people and the flow of maritime activities such as transportation, fishing, and trade, all of which are central to its economic development.

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Chew, A. (2022, January 24). Malaysia must shift from ‘jungle warfare’ to keep eye on Chinese boats in South China Sea, militants, as maritime threats rise. South China Morning Post. scmp.com/print/week-asia/politics/article/3164457/ malaysia-must-shift-jungle-warfare-keep-eye-chinese-boats

Crisis Group Interview, Journalist, Cotabato City, 27 November 2019.

Crisis Group Interview, Local MILF Leader, Zamboanga City, 21 December 2019.

The Ever-Present Of Abu Sayyaf In Insular Southeast Asia: Mitigate But Never Defeated

Curran, M. (2019). The Deadly Evolution of Abu Sayyaf and the Sea. The Maritime Executive. https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/the-deadly-evolutionof-abu-sayyaf-and-the-sea

Fonbuena, C. S. (2020). Marawi Siege: Stories from the Front Lines. Journalism for Nation Building Foundation

International Crisis Group. (2022). Addressing Islamist Militancy in the Southern Philippines (No. 323; Asia Report, pp. 1–37).

Joubert, L. (2020, April 30). Abu Sayyaf: The Chameleon in the World of Terror. Stable Seas. stableseas.org/post/abu-sayyaf-the-chameleon-in-the-world-of-terror

Malay Mail. (2016, September 19). Sabah abductions since 2000: A timeline. https:// www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2016/09/19/sabah-abductions-since2000-a-timeline/1208663

Malaysiakini. (2019, November 2). M’sia remains source and transit point for IS, Abu Sayyaf militants - US Gov’t report. Retrieved April 5, 2023, from https://www. malaysiakini.com/news/498317

Ministry of Defence. (2020). Defence White Paper: A Secure, Sovereign, and Prosperous Malaysia. Ministry of Defence.

Naím, M. (2009, June 21). Minilateralism. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy. com/2009/06/21/minilateralism/

Parameswaran, P. (2022, April 19). Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines Consider Expanding Sulu Sea Trilateral Patrols. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat. com/2022/04/indonesia-malaysia-philippines-consider-expanding-sulusea-trilateral-patrols/

Rahman, K. P. A., & Rahman, F. A. (2022, July 7). Reexamining East Malaysian Security in an Age of Growing Threats. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/ reexamining-east-malaysian-security-in-an-age-of-growing-threats/ Safety4Sea. (2023, March 23). ReCAAP ISC: One incident of armed robbery 14 – 20 Mar. https://safety4sea.com/recaap-isc-one-incident-of-armed-robbery-1420-mar/

Stable Seas (2021) A Transnational Non-Profit Initiative for Actionable Maritime Security and Governance Research organisation focusing on issues of maritime security and governance, https://www.stableseas.org/aboutstable-seas

Storey, I. (2022). Piracy and the Pandemic: Maritime Crime in Southeast Asia, 202022. ISEAS Perspective, 76(2022), 1–9.

Sukhani, P. R. (2021, July 10). Countering terrorism on Malaysia’s borders. East Asia Forum. eastasiaforum.org/2021/07/10/countering-terrorism-on-malaysiasborders/

The Star. (2023a, February 19). Sea curfew extended with threats still present. https:// www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2023/02/19/sea-curfew-extended-withthreats---still-present

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

The Star. (2023b, February 24). Budget 2023: RM36.2bil for Home, Defence Ministries to beef up national security. https://www.thestar.com.my/ news/nation/2023/02/24/budget-2023-rm362bil-for-home- defenceministries-to-beef-up-national-security

The Straits Times. (2021, September 5). Malaysia’s Sabah is South-east Asian terrorists’ preferred transit point: Experts. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/ malaysias-sabah-is-south-east-asian-terrorists-preferred-transit-pointexperts

US. Department of State. (2021, May 10). Country Reports on Terrorism 2018 - United States Department Of State. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved April 7, 2023, from https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2018/ Vanar, M., & Golingai, P. (2021, September 5). The Sabah connection. The Star. https:// www.thestar.com.my/news/focus/2021/09/05/the-sabah-connection

Yeo, M. (2022, August 19). Malaysia Confirms Delivery, Training Schedule For Light Attack Helicopters. Defense News. Retrieved April 7, 2023, from https:// www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/03/02/malaysia-confirmsdelivery-training-schedule-for-light-attack-helicopters/

Yusa, Z. (2020, July). Dangerous Waters: Maritime Crime in the Sulu Sea. The Diplomat, 68

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE UNEXPLORED ROLE OF BORDER COMMUNITIES IN BORDER MANAGEMENT

Altaf Deviyati Tadzrul Adha

Introduction

The Southeast Asian region is one of the most diverse areas and the world’s largest island group, with a dozen distinct seas, numerous archipelagic waterways, and tens of thousands of islands. This expanse is divided by several sovereign countries and recognized autonomous areas that spread from Aceh, on the north-western tip of Sumatra, to the archipelago’s south-eastern extreme in Papua New Guinea (Amling, Bell, Benson, & Duncan, 2019). This area also includes the world’s busiest shipping lanes, its most biodiverse marine environment, and many of the global leaders in fisheries production. No other maritime region combines the geographic and political complexity of this area. These characteristics are what makes the Southeast Asian archipelago one of the world’s most challenging maritime security environments.  Malaysia, a country of 32 million population, is strategically located within the Southeast Asia region and has maritime boundaries with almost all ASEAN countries. The Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea that surrounds Malaysia are strategic waterways of high international interest as these waterways are primary international maritime routes between ports, used for trade, logistics and naval forces.  Malaysia’s land border length of 3,147.3 km is shared with three countries, Brunei, Indonesia and Thailand, while our maritime borders are with Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and Singapore. Due to the vastness of the border area in both Peninsular as well as Borneo island, policing and monitoring Malaysian borders is deeply challenging.

Policing Malaysian Borders

Malaysian border management and security is managed by agencies under several Ministries. These agencies include the Royal Malaysian Police, Royal Malaysian

Customs Department, Malaysian Department of Immigration, Malaysian Border Control Agency, Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency and of course the Malaysian Armed Forces. The legal crossing points along the Malaysian borders in general can be divided into three catagories; land, air and sea which consiste of various checkpoints co-managed by several agencies. In total the number of authorized checkpoints all over the country totals 138 (Zainol, Jusop, Ridzuan, & Kamaruddin, 2019). However, even with the high number of authorised checkpoints all over the country, it is unable to fully cover the borders. This is because Malaysina border are so porous. Hence, illegal crossing points ae equally numerous and perhaps may even be higher.

Due to the porousness of the borders, Malaysia is vulnerable to a number of challenges; illegal activities such irregular migration, refugees and asylum seekers interlinked with human trafficking and cross border militancy and terrorism.

Irregular Migration

Malaysia’s industrialization and her subsequent need for continuous cheap labour as well as a diverse multi-ethnic population makes it an attractive destination for migrant workers both legal and illegal. Today, Malaysia has become one of the main ‘destination’ countries for intraregional migration, both forced and economic migrants in the Southeast Asian region, second only to Thailand. It is estimated that the country hosts two million documented and an even greater number of undocumented migrant workers, with foreign workers constituting upwards of 30 per cent of the workforce (IOM, 2021). The majority of migrants originate from Southeast Asian countries with comparatively less robust economies. It is not possible to determine the exact number of migrants in Malaysia at any one time, though unofficial estimates range from 1.4 to 3 million (IOM, 2021). This is partly due to the fact that a large proportion of migration occurs irregularly, outside Malaysia’s migration laws and regulations.

Sabah state is among the states which relies heavily on cheap labour for its tourism industry but more so for its palm oil industry. As the demand for palm oil extractions increased globally, the need for vast expansion and the use of manual labourers in the workforce increased too. The Malaysian palm oil industry relies heavily on migrants from the Philippines and Indonesia albeit many of the workers are not legally documented or recognized under any labour regulations. The continuous demand for the workforce overwhelmed the need to securitize Sabah’s internal and external wellbeing.

Sabah borders two countries, to the south she borders with Indonesia’s North Kalimantan province, and the Sulu, Celebes and South China seas to the north, northeast and northwest, and with Philippines, she shares a maritime border northeast of the island. Before the formation of Federation of Malaysia in 1963

(through the Malaysia Agreement), Sabah’s status with Malaysia was contentious, due to the earlier historical account that stated the North Borneo state as under the prerogative of the Sulu Sultanate which by the virtue of the Philippines Constitution, a part of the republic, based on the agreement signed in 1878 and the 1898 Paris Treaty between the Spain and the United States of America regarding the Spanish’s relinquishing of its former territories (Tregonning, 1970).

The east coast of Sabah is home to over a million stateless communities that flow between Mindanao proper, the Sulu Islands, and Sabah, as a result of long civil conflict and for the lack of economic and commercial activities in the Southern Philippines (Ghani, 2022). It also has a large inland indigenous population and non-citizens including a significant number of undocumented and stateless communities who have been in Sabah since the 1980’s. Although the Malaysian government did eventually recognize these immigrants under the IMM13 program, it is important to note that Sabah also has undocumented indigenous people who are living in the interior and rural areas especially at the border region, cut off from significant developments accorded by the Federal government to the Sabahan populace.

The east coast region of Sabah is prone to trafficking, extremist militant activities like kidnapping for ransom, smuggling, gender-based violence, and other kinds of criminal activities linked to the deep poverty and vulnerability of much of its population. It was not until a few years ago that Sabah was equipped with more permanent military bases and assets to counter the militancy and piracy at the Sulu Sea (BorneoToday, 2021). Therefore, among the most challenging issues faced by Malaysia and Sabah in particular is that human trafficking/cross border crimes and militancy movement are intertwined with the high number and movement and presence of a very big population of irregular/illegal migrants and refugees that remained unresolved and politicised. There was also no effort to integrate and reach out to the migrant communities who are left to deal with their own affairs in silo and subject to all forms of exploitation ranging from forced labour and political mobilisation.

The under-managed cross-border movement is a persistent problem for Sabah due to the porousness of borders as well as a long history of migration with the wider Southeast Asian region, specifically southern Philippines and Indonesia. The other contributing factor is also lack of engagement and participation of the migrant communities especially the undocumented who make up a significant population at the border regions. The southern part of the Philippines which has produced a plethora of civil conflicts due to ongoing territorial claims by various political groups since the 1950’s resulted in a push factor for people to seek economic livelihoods across the border, to Malaysia. The presence of Filipinos, mostly illegal in cities such as Kota Kinabalu, Sandakan and Semporna working within the service and tourism industries is not only a common sight but shows the magnitude of how the economic sectors rely on them for cheap labour.

The Unexplored Role Of Border Communities In Border Management

Migrants from Kalimantan and Sulawesi can mostly be found in Sabah territories such as Lahad Datu, Sandakan and Tawau, areas which happen to have the most palm oil plantations in the state, which is a key reason why more than 80 percent of palm oil plantation labourers are from Indonesia. However, anecdotal evidence that IMAN has collected suggests that the pattern of hiring Indonesian workers in plantations is changing, especially with the opening of Nusantara, the new administrative capital of Indonesia in Kalimantan which is pulling in workers for infrastructure projects. Alternatively, independent palm oil plantations are seeking Filipinos to fill in the short fall, but this has encouraged trafficking and exploitation as middle persons seek to exploit from the demand.

Unofficial guestimate puts the number of undocumented migrants in Sabah as more than one million with the majority residing in the east coast of Sabah (Miwil, 2020). Many have been here for decades, resulting in third and fourth generation labourers - the children of earlier migrants who were born and raised in Sabah but have no documentation and neither do they have access to proper school/education or healthcare. The current situation of undocumented migrant workers and their families in Sabah is no longer attainable. They have lived and resided in Sabah for generations and formed as a backbone of the state’s labour force in key economic sectors yet many work in Sabah with no documents and every little to no protection making them vulnerable to risks and abuse such as exploitation, slavery, trafficking and detention by authorities.

Undocumented migrants and their families tend to live in precarious conditions and be exposed to an accumulation of adverse determinants of health. Only scarce evidence exists on the social, economic and living conditions-related factors influencing their health status and wellbeing. To date, the authorities response towards the rising problem has been very conservative and focussed on deportation which, frankly speaking, is not working and there is no regularisation process in sight for the Filipinos. Many within the high number of returnees, were born and raised in Sabah and know of no other place. So many will risk their lives via smuggling routes to return to Sabah after being deported.

Another rising aspect is the role of China and Chinese investment within the Sulu seas, particularly the opening of resorts within the islands near to Semporna which has resulted in the forced relocation of local communities, mostly Bajau Laut (sea gypsies) to either the mainland or other islands, out of the sight of aid provisions. This is an aspect that is under studied. China’s ambitious southwards expansion of its maritime Silk Road not only has pushed communities out of its primary domain, but the rapid developments of the region does undermine the sovereignty of individual countries who have long standing diplomatic and territorial issues with China.

Refugees and Asylum Seekers and Human Trafficking

Malaysia has also attracted asylum seekers and refugees as far as from the Middle East, but the majority are still from within the region. Today, Malaysia is a recipient of large refugee groups from Myanmar (HRW, 2022). In the peninsula, most refugees are from Myanmar, the civil unrest in Myanmar as well as the genocide that took place in Rakhine state has led to mass expulsion of Myanmar people in particular the Rohingya community to Malaysia, while in Sabah, most are from Southern Philippines. The Wang Kelian incident is a perfect example of how they become prey and victim with vicious and deadly consequences. In 2015,  mass graves and suspected human trafficking camps were discovered in the jungles near the border with Southern Thailand.

The dense jungles of southern Thailand and northern Malaysia have become a major stop-off point for smugglers bringing people to Southeast Asia by boat from Myanmar, most of them Rohingya Muslims fleeing persecution. Despite the increase of border patrol and deployment of personnel, for the most part, the line that separates the two countries remained unattended (Sinnappan, 2022). In April 2019 a Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) was established and according to initial findings, these camps located near Wang Kelian, Kedah, were known by the local community as the movement of smuggled people through the villages, via intricate jalan tikus. There have also been reports of bribery and coordination between the traffickers and the authority, but this was downplayed, while investigation continues. IMAN Research’s own interviews have provided clues as to why many refugees are stationed on these borders. Despite the pogrom in Myanmar, there has been an active match-making business between trafficked Rohingya women waiting to be taken as wife (many are child groomed as bride-to-be) with prospective Rohingya “husband” within the large community in Malaysia (Wahab, 2018).

In July 2021, the US State Department, in its annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report downgraded Malaysia’s standing from middle Tier-2 to lowest Tier-3 watchlist due to its failure in addressing the severity of human trafficking and on the lack of improvement to mitigate the crisis (2021 trafficking in persons report, 2021). The report specifically mentioned “the authorities continued to conflate human trafficking and migrant smuggling crimes, and did not adequately address or criminally pursue credible allegations on labour trafficking”. Under heavy scrutiny, the US government also banned imports from the world’s largest glove maker, Top Glove, saying it has found reasonable evidence of forced labour practices at the company’s production facilities in Malaysia (Strangio, 2022).

Responding to the report, the Work Minister stated that “the government will study the cost imposed by agencies that recruit migrant workers for the rubber and palm oil industries, in order to ensure there are no hidden charges that could lead to worker exploitation and debt bondage.” And despite the findings, it is unlikely that the US

The Unexplored Role Of Border Communities In Border Management

would impose any sanctions on Malaysia as the former is rallying support among Southeast Asian countries to curb China’s growing power and influence in the region. It may be true that what’s happening at the border vis-a-vis human trafficking is only the tip of the iceberg, as many other illegal activities goes unreported.

Militantcy and Terrorism

Another side-effect of armed conflict and instability within the region is the rise of militancy and terrorism. Cross-border militancy movement is a persistent problem for Sabah due to a long history of migration with the wider Southeast Asian region, specifically southern Philippines, which is known as a hotbed for militant movements such as the Abu Sayyaf Groups (ASG). The southern part of the Philippines have also produced a plethora of civil conflicts due to ongoing territorial claims by various political groups since the 50’s. The geographical proximity between southern Philippines and Sabah territories such as Lahad Datu, Sandakan, Tawau and Sipadan island has created a spillover effect of groups like ASG, which has members in these territories who are ready to carry out lucrative kidnap-for-ransom activities. Sipadan, which lies on the “geopolitical fault line” between the borders of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines has been described as a place where “smugglers, pirates and separatist groups thrive” (Fuller, 2000).

Besides major kidnappings, which the state of Sabah experienced for the first time in April 2000 when ASG militants stormed the resort island of Sipadan and kidnapped 21 tourists and resort workers, the state have also experienced other criminal and terror acts, such as the Lahad Datu invasion in February 2013 that resulted in the deaths of nine soldiers, six civilians, and 56 militants. As a militant group, the ASG in numerous times have professed allegiance towards terrorist organizations like the al-Qaeda and the Daesh in the last two decades.

The porous border of Sabah has allowed the groups to operate in a small clandestine manner, with a network of sympathizers among the Sabahan migrants to help them with information and shelter. As recent as August 2022, a key ASG militant, wanted for series of bombing by both the Malaysian and Philippines authorities have been captured in a town of Beaufort (Michael, 2022). The militant group also saw a dwindling future of piracy when leaders of the group were killed in increasingly successful security operations in the Southern Philippines, while some less known members surrendered to the authority.

Border Management and Security

The Malaysian government acknowldeges the challenges it faces in border management. In a recent statement, the Minister of Home Affairs announced that it plans to consolidate all agencies involved in border management into one single agency for better efficiency since currently there are around 20 agencies from

different Minsitries involved (Shah, 2023). This single agency is expected to unify all current functions and utilising the latest technology without compromising security. However, there has not been any discussion on the enhancing the role of border communities in manageing border security.

Most governments, not just Malaysia views border security from national sovereignty angle and still relies on rather traditional views of management and security. Border regions are the periphery, far from the centre of power, as a result of this geographical isolation, it results in border peoples being marginalised – an unequal distribution of power both in the economy and society (Sofield, 2006). The border area is more than just a line on a map, that differentiates countries and separates communities. They are not barren places devoid of people, it has long been inhabited by communities who fluidly move within the bigger regional area. It is an area that has its own economic life and culture.

Traditionally, borders whether physical or conceptual has been a demarcation of ‘us’ and ‘them’, of delineating difference, of civilized from barbarian, of one field of endeavour (e.g. the arts) from another (the art of war), as either ‘open’ or ‘closed’, and of dividing friend from foe (Sofield, 2006). The term border not only defines a legal demarcation between States but it also signifies where differences begin, where one culture or politics ends and another begins (Hortsman, 2006).

Border management, unfortunately has always been from a more central perspective, broad top-down strategies, more responsive to the agendas of national interest. These strategies formulated by national authorities may not meet the needs of border stakeholders and authorities who face unique circumstances in the border areas. Among these stakeholers are the local communities who are deeply affected by policies made by the central authorities. The challenges faced on border management, the threats are multi-faceted and require all stakeholders involved and one key stakeholder that is absent from Malaysia’s border security management is the communities role.

Border Communities as Stakeholders

Border communities by virtue of their relationships with the border are an integral part of of border management. Their involvement is crucial especially in problem identification and problem-solving because threats and circumstances existing at the local level are shaped by local context and thus may not necessarily align with national level. Knowledge of the views of key stakeholder groups and the variation within these groups is vital for those who design border management institutions and processes. The notion of border areas is also important aspect, the border serves as a hard line or a soft zone or even a mixture of both, where stakeholders who work and often live in cross-border communities face similar challenges such as facilitating trade and tourism while at the same time trying to protect their security and cultures

(Alper, 2011). Engaging border communities, as well as other local stakeholders on how border management should function based on their lived experiences give rise to understandings of how the border works, its impacts and how it can change for the better. This would also mean, authorities need to view border security less narrowly, it should also be about facilitating the numerous stakeholders who rely on the borders for their livelihood. It also means viewing daily transborder migration as a lived reality and not necessarily a threat. Of course this will require a cross-border migration framework that benefits both countries and particularly facilitates local communities to move without fear of punishment.

The border economy is different from the hinterland markets because their existence is not owed to traditional aspects of economy such as labour pool, their wealth is drawn from the presence of the border and what is provides that does not exist anywhere else. Border markets experience is tied to among others exchange rates between currencies, taxes between countries, and bans of imports and exports. They are dependent on the business opportunities offered by their peripheral location. Hence, cross-border entrepreneurship activity plays an important role in the community’s economic development programs. The emergence of business groups and trade activities will generate employment, create wealth, contribute to tax revenue and stimulate the construction of infrastructures such as transportation. Indirectly, this will improve the standard of living in the border communities. Therefore, it is not suprising that Malaysia invests on the border economy.

In August 2022, the Malaysian government had announced that they will continue to develop the special border economic zone (SBEZ) to boost investment and economic activities and as of date has signed three property strategic investment agreements amounting to RM7.2 billion with Thailand. Based on the trajectory, the border trade between Malaysia and Thailand would see an increase of up to 30.26% to RM 79 billion in 2021 following the reopening of all nine checkpoints along the borders of both countries that have boosted economic activities (Khoo, 2022). The shifting of Indonesia’s capital to Kalimantan, is also of great potetntail for neighbouring Sabah and Sarawak. It will require both regions to prepare themselves, especially in the development of borders. The government intends to improve border infrstrutcure by upgrading the Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) complexes along the main border between Sabah, Sarawak and Kalimantan (Bernama, 2023). This will also result in new townships across the borders.

Hence, as more and more development is being done at the border regions, their role in strengthening security would be more needed than ever especially since the security challenges will only increase and not decrease.

Strengthening Cross Border Community Collaboration

Through the ASEAN framework, Southeast Asian nations have been able to improve cross-border collaboration at the institutional level, particularly on investment and trade which is critical and have helped address border communities tremendously (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009). The numerous Special Border Economic Zones (SBEZ) are examples of these collaborations (Jusoh & Razak, 2022). However, this collaboration at the border level has to transcend economics. In order to bring in communities to also be a part of security, we need a community-driven approach that empowers communities. A community-driven development approach is an important component of a cross- border program to improve not only their living condition but promote people-to-people contacts allowing people residing on both sides of the border to find solutions to common problems.

When Nusantara the new capital of Indonesia fully operationalizes, the community living within the greater region of the area would be impacted by continuous development programs, including the people in Sabah and Sarawak. It is inevitable that many labour forces in Malaysia, working in plantations, tourisms and commercial sectors would seek better wages and working conditions in east Kalimantan as there would be better job opportunities with attractive pay. Nusantara is set to open in 2025, and infrastructures to accommodate the function of the government, including military bases would mean that security around the region is an utmost priority.

Malaysia in this case must also prepare itself to deal with an increased flow of activities both on the land and on the waters of east coast Sabah, a potential security concern from piracy if the route between Celebes and Sulu Sea to the South China Sea becomes major shipping lanes and more areas are opened for more oil and gas exploration plans. Multi-agency cooperation between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines is necessary to promote holistic security coordination, information sharing that in the long-term would benefit everyone, especially the local communities (LoC, 2017). This would also mean, engagement with local communities living within this cross-border area will also have to be strengthened, local communities would provide much needed information and assistance in patrolling and monitoring this vast area.

Conclusion

Malaysia to be fully prepared for the uncertain future ahead, should invest seriously in pushing for “total defense” as a means to preserve our national integrity. The holistic approach in looking at our defense capability must no longer rest on the army’s shoulder or the government alone. It is a matter of national security and therefore, the citizens, academicians, professionals should also be brought into the fold to discuss how we can promote patriotism in the full meaning of “pertahanan menyeluruh”.

The Unexplored Role Of Border Communities In Border Management

Most developed countries have streamlined civil-military relationships through democratic engagement, legislations and policies, vis-a-vis total defense. In many examples, this has proven to be effective and improved the overall understanding about militarism. A need for fiscal increment in materializing the goal of total defense must be made clear to the public and with utmost transparency. Malaysia’s navy capabilities should be ready for anything that is going through our waters, not only through the Malacca Strait or the South China Sea, but also through the soon-to-be crowded Sulu and Celebes Sea in Sabah due to our neighbor’s newly established capital city.

The discussion about our nation’s defense should be made available for the general public to understand how important it is for all of us to embrace the spirit of patriotism as we wade through an uncertain future. We should not abandon the idea of ‘total defense’ because of political maneuvering. We may have other things that are less sensitive to compromise, certainly not our status as an independent country and with the rule of law.

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Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

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Strangio, S. (5 Jan, 2022). Malaysian Glove Maker Vows Reforms Following US Import Ban. Retrieved from The Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/ malaysian-glove-maker-vows-reforms-following-us-import-ban/

Tregonning, K. (1970). The Philippine Claim to Sabah. The Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 161-170.

Wahab, A. (21 Feb, 2018). The Colours of Exploitation: Smuggling of Rohingyas from Myanmar to Malaysia. Akademika 88, 5-16. Retrieved from ForitfyRights: https://www.fortifyrights.org/mly-inv-jnr-2019-02-21/

Zainol, Jusop, Ridzuan, & Kamaruddin. (2019). MANAGING MALAYSIAN BORDER: THE CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS IN MAINTAINING SECURITY. International Journal of Politics, Public Policy and Social Work, 01-13.

PART V BLUE ECONOMY

DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING THE BLUE ECONOMY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: MODEL FOR MALAYSIA

Commander Ang Chin Hup RMN (Retired)

Introduction

In coping with resource scarcity in the 21st century, the oceans allow nations to yield economic and social benefits from a wide range of resources such as fisheries, oil and gas, minerals and renewable energy. Following this, the ocean economy in the Indian Ocean is gaining increasing importance in the Coastal Nations, Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small-Island Developing States (SIDS) in the region.

The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) comprises 23 Member States bordering the world’s third-largest ocean. Presently, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the current chair of IORA. To promote the Blue Economy, IORA outlined four focus areas: fisheries and aquaculture, port and shipping, renewable ocean energy and offshore hydrocarbon, and seabed minerals. Though states may differ according to geographical and political circumstances, human expertise and technological advancement, the Indian Ocean Member States are committed to these focus areas by implementing the IORA Action Plans through their national Blue Economy strategies.

Since its adoption as a particular focus area in the IORA Charter, two declarations were made, leading the IORA Member States to commit to sustainably harnessing ocean resources. The Blue Economy has also been formulated into IORA’s Action Plan 2017-2021. The IORA has two specialised agencies to promote research and development in various fields: The Fisheries Support Unit (FSU) and the Regional Centre for Science and Technology Transfer (RCSTT).

As a maritime nation, Malaysia is an active member state of the IORA on Blue Economy. Its Blue Economy is a balance between economic development and sustainability

Developing And Implementing The Blue Economy In The Indian Ocean: Model For Malaysia

comprising all economic activities ranging from traditional industries like fisheries and aquaculture to waste management and desalination for freshwater. Recently, a position paper on the Blue Economy was formulated to provide a constructive framework for developing a sustainable economy for the marine and maritime sectors in the country.

Developing the Blue Economy in the Indian Ocean

The development of the Blue Economy in the IORA can be traced to the efforts of three previous IORA Chairs, namely Australia (2013-2015), Indonesia (2015-2017) and South Africa (2017-2019). Australia pioneered the introduction of the Blue Economy to the IORA during its chairmanship from 2014 to 2015. At the first IORA Ministerial Blue Economy Conference held in Mauritius in September 2015, Member States committed to sustainably harnessing ocean resources. Following that, the IORA Secretariat, in consultation with the Member States, adopted the Blue Economy as a focus area. The consensus known as the Mauritius Declaration on the Blue Economy recognises four essential areas, namely Fisheries and Aquaculture, Renewable Ocean Energy, Port and Shipping and Offshore Hydrocarbons and Seabed Minerals.

If Australia is recognised as a pioneer, Indonesia is better known as the planner. Taking over from Australia as the IORA Chair from 2015-2017, Indonesia hosted several ad hoc Committee Meetings in Bali to formulate the Blue Economy into the IORA Action Plan 2017-2021. Malaysia contributed to the discussions through the involvement of its diplomates and the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA), representee. Member States later adopted a consensus known as the Jakarta Declaration on the Blue Economy to implement the action plan. The Second IORA

Figure 1: The Second IORA Blue Economy Core Group Workshop on Maritime Connectivity and Financing for Development in the Indian Ocean

Ministerial Blue Economy Conference was held during the 2017 IORA Summit, which took place from 8 to 10 May 2017 in Jakarta, Indonesia. The Jakarta Declaration and action plan highlighted several actionable Blue Economy projects, such as the Financing of the Ocean Economy, Research and Development, Technology Transfer, Information Sharing, Exchange Programmes and Expertise.

Implementing the Blue Economy in the Indian Ocean

As chair to the IORA from 2018 to 2019, South Africa played a leading role in driving IORA Member States to implement Blue Economy projects. However, Member States realised that implementation was complex as they faced many obstacles. As discussed in the 17th Meeting of the Council of Ministers in Durban in 2017, Member States faced challenges choosing between economic growth and environmental sustainability. At the meeting in Durban, it was discovered that the Member States faced several challenges in implementing the Blue Economy as categorised into four areas below:

Port and Shipping

The Indian Ocean is strategically located between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. It is surrounded by three main continents: Asia, Africa and Australia. The ocean is a vital Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) between the resource-rich Middle East and the emerging economy of China. Thus, the Indian Ocean is significant in the global economy, particularly in ports and shipping. However, as the port sector in the Indian Ocean region continues to expand to serve the growing international shipping, some member states are struggling to keep pace with rapid development in financing their infrastructure.

Fisheries and Aquaculture

Fisheries are one of the critical resources of the Indian Ocean as it contributes to the livelihood of the coastal population, besides being a food source to hundreds of millions in the region. However, areas in the Indian Ocean are either fully exploited or over-exploited and fish stock is rapidly depleting. While the aquaculture sector also contributes to the fishery economy in the Indian Ocean region, the sector’s resources and technological capability remain lacking.

Renewable Ocean Energy

The world depends on fossil fuels as its primary energy source for the ever-growing population. However, the rising combustion of fossil fuels releases carbon, which contributes to increased levels of greenhouse gases, subsequently causing global warming and climate change. This pollutes the environment and threatens ecological stability and food security. In the Indian Ocean, IORA Member States are

Developing And Implementing The Blue Economy In The Indian Ocean: Model For Malaysia

highly dependent on imported fossil fuel; thus, they may need to look for alternative sustainable and renewable ocean energy such as wave energy, tidal range, tidal currents, ocean currents and Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC).

Offshore Hydrocarbons and Seabed Minerals

The Indian Ocean’s Blue Economy includes offshore hydrocarbons and seabed minerals, which have a high potential for development unilaterally and bilaterally with neighbouring countries. However, research and development in the seabed and mining sectors still need to be developed. The IORA held a workshop on the Exploration and Development of Seabed Minerals and Hydrocarbons in Bali, Indonesia, in 2015.

Challenges in Implementing the Blue Economy in the Indian Ocean

During the 20th IORA Council of Ministers’ Meeting on 17 December 2019, Foreign Ministers of Member States discussed through webinar issues faced by their countries, including the Blue Economy. Two main challenges arose from the IORA implementation of the Blue Economy, which could also be lessons learnt for its Member States, including Malaysia, concerning economic growth and environmental sustainability. On the economic front, the vast ocean presents excellent opportunities for fisheries, aquaculture, seaports and shipping. It also possesses an abundance of marine resources for renewable ocean energy. Yet, offshore carbon and seabed minerals remain untapped. While the Blue Economy may bring tremendous opportunities for economic growth to the Member States, over-exploration and abuse of fisheries and shipping activities negatively impact the environment, thus raising the issue of sustainability.

Blue Economy in Malaysia

In Malaysia, a position paper on Blue Economy was recently published by the Academy of Sciences Malaysia (ASM) for government agencies, academia and industry based on science-based inputs. The paper provides a constructive framework for developing a sustainable, lucrative, inclusive and future-proofed economy for the marine and maritime sectors in the country. It comprises all economic activities related to marine and ocean resources ranging from traditional industries like fisheries and aquaculture, coastal and marine tourism, marine transport, shipping, ports and related activities, to extractive industries, renewable energy, marine bioprospecting and biotechnology, waste management and desalination for freshwater.

Conclusion

The IORA and its Member States have demonstrated their commitment to the Declarations of the Blue Economy and the IORA Action Plan 2017-2021 for the Indian

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

Ocean. The experience of the IORA through its previous chairs’ initiation, planning, and implementation by its Member States could serve as a model for Malaysia in implementing the Blue Economy.

The IORA Member States recognise the importance of the Blue Economy to their national economy and prioritise its implementation in four focus areas: fisheries and aquaculture, port and shipping, renewable ocean energy, and offshore hydrocarbon and seabed minerals. However, they face challenges balancing economic growth and environmental sustainability when implementing the Blue Economy. Though the Blue Economy provides a great opportunity, it also presents challenges in the over-development of ports and shipping, abuse of fisheries, and negative environmental impacts. In Malaysia, its Blue Economy, as recommended by the ASM, strikes a balance between economic growth and environmental sustainability, covering all economic activities ranging from traditional industries like fisheries and aquaculture to waste management and desalination for freshwater.

References

Ang, CH 2019, Striking a Balance Between Economic Growth and Environmental Sustainability of the Blue Economy in IORA, MIMA Bulletin Volume 26 (2). Position Paper on Blue Economy, (2022) Unlocking the Values of the Oceans, Academy of Sciences Malaysia.

Vishua, N.A. & N. Bohler-Muller, (2018) The Blue Economy Handbook of the Indian Ocean Region.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE ROLES OF THE NATIONAL HYDROGRAPHIC CENTRE IN HARNESSING THE NATION’S BLUE ECONOMY

Introduction

“Hydro” is derived from the Greek word for water, and “graph” is the Greek word for “picture.” In other words, hydrography uses charts to study water depth, submerged obstructions, and water movement’s true form and characteristics. The objective of this applied field is to correctly identify the physical characteristics of coastlines and the bottoms of oceans, rivers and other bodies of water. Numerous procedures are required for the gathering of hydrographic data. Data on tidal currents and water levels, temperatures, density, salinity and other qualities are collected in addition to bathymetry. These data are utilised in the development of hydrographic models and nautical charts. Nevertheless, its applications extend beyond navigational purposes. Hydrography has a unique relationship with all aspects of oceanography and meteorology, including studying and exploiting ocean biodiversity, protecting and conserving the environment, coastal development, hazard or disaster simulation, the marine tourism industry and military defence (IHO S-32, 2019)

Globally, the need for hydrography for safe navigation has long been recognised. Hydrographic organisations, academic institutions, industry players and technical experts have collaborated and worked tirelessly for this need and to develop a deeper understanding of the ocean (FIG, 2006). In this age of globalisation, the practice of hydrography has become worldwide and is not restricted to a particular region or nation. As a coastal nation with a maritime territorial zone, Malaysia has to establish hydrographic services to maintain navigational safety and meet technical requirements for delineating national maritime boundaries (IHO M-2, 2018). This duty was thus entrusted to the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) by Decision No. 443/887/72 of the Council of Ministers dated 31 October 1972. This decision established the RMN as the qualified organisation performing hydrographic activities in Malaysian waters.

Rear Admiral Dato` Hanafiah Hassan

The Roles Of The National Hydrographic Centre In Harnessing The Nation’s Blue Economy

The Hydrographic Branch TLDM (CHTLDM), which was formed then, assumed responsibility for these tasks and duties as of that date. However, in 2005, CHTLDM was renamed the National Hydrographic Centre (NHC) due to an extension of its tasks and responsibilities.

The (RMN) hydrographic service has since played a crucial role in upholding Malaysia’s commitments and responsibilities as a member of the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) for the past 58 years. In addition, the RMN dutifully advises the Malaysian government on hydrography-related issues, fulfilling obligations under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

The National Hydrographic Framework

The function of the RMN through the NHC in hydrographic affairs and charting is not limited to defence requirements alone; it also entails the publication of nautical publications and services for the national and international maritime community. As administered by the Director General of Hydrography, widely termed as Chief Hydrographer, the functions of the NHC are as follows:

a. Advisor to government on hydrographic concerns, marine geospatial data and national maritime mapping.

Figure 1: Illustration of KD PERANTAU Conducting Hydrographic Survey Operation Source: National Hydrographic Centre

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

b. Supervise and monitor hydrographic survey operations in Malaysian waters.

c. Establish a technical resource for internal hydrographic consultancy services.

d. Manage and coordinate maritime geospatial data collection, storage and maintenance for public and military use.

e. Represent the nation at international conferences and gatherings on hydrography and charting.

f. Publish nautical publications and services for the use of the maritime community (locally or internationally) that is compliant with the United Nations (UN), IMO and IHO, like the Malaysian Electronic Navigational Chart (MyENC) to ensure the safety of navigation in national waters.

g. Publish and distribute custom charts, tidal and associated information to support operations, exercises or training for Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF).

Initially, NHC’s physical assets consisted of two survey ships: KD MUTIARA (1977) and KD PERANTAU (1998) were the region’s most technologically advanced survey ships then. These two physical assets, which were located in Lumut Naval Base, were furnished with cutting-edge seaborne instrumentation for bathymetry, high-precision positioning, tidal monitoring and the equipment for obtaining miscellaneous oceanographic data. Through this cutting-edge technology, the processed data obtained were also generated for commercial and security applications for the maritime industry, besides being used by the RMN. In addition to these two assets, NHC was supported by two survey vessels introduced to the fleet in 2007. The two survey vessels, Hydro Boat 1, which was placed in Pulau Indah, Port Klang and Hydro Boat 2 in the Naval Region 2 Headquarters in Sandakan, Sabah, together with the two ships, were responsible for hydrographic surveys in Malaysia’s 569,845 km2 of waterways, including components of the country’s Internal Waters, Territorial Sea, EEZ and Continental Shelf (RMN, 2018).

The Roles Of The National Hydrographic Centre In Harnessing The Nation’s Blue Economy

Today, NHC has the most advanced hardware and software available. These user-friendly features used for data analysis are incorporated better to meet the requirements of the system’s end users. Nonetheless, KD MUTIARA was decommissioned in 2018 owing to ageing and obsolete machinery (NST, 2018).

Unlocking the Potential

According to the World Bank, the blue economy is the “sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods and jobs while preserving the health of ocean ecosystem.” The European Commission defines it as “All economic activities related to oceans, seas and coasts”. Due to this fact, global marine commerce and trade activities are estimated to be worth USD 2.5 trillion. Technological advancements such as autonomous vessels and e-Navigation will likely cause this number to increase. Elsewhere, the extraction and utilisation of ocean resources for renewable energy, such as offshore wind and tidal energy, are also witnessing substantial expansion, boosting the blue economy (United Nations, 2012).

In recent years, maritime navigation has been driven by innovative technological advancements transforming the maritime industry and contributing to the marine or blue economy’s growth. For that reason, the maritime industry has become one of the most crucial contributors to Malaysia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

According to the Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA), the maritime sector generates forty per cent of Malaysia’s GDP. In comparison, more than ninety per cent of Malaysia’s exports are transported by sea (MIDA, 2022). Therein 2020,

Figure 2: A Maritime Nation: Area of Responsibility Source: National Hydrographic Centre

Malaysia’s GDP yield from the maritime industry was roughly RM560 million. Hence, to meet the growing needs of seafarers, NHC maintains its inventory of nautical charts in a data-driven and more efficient manner.

NHC has demonstrated an enormous commitment to utilising Malaysian water safely and sustainably, considering the increasing limits placed on them to meet the world’s demand. Access to massive, current marine geospatial data, or “blue data,” is essential and NHC stores an abundance of this blue data. In addition to the navigational data provided for our chart inventory, NHC maintains a wide variety of data sets, ranging from over one million tidal constants to terabytes of bathymetric data describing the nature of the seafloor. This information is vital, allowing for a much more extensive range of decisions that can unleash the full potential of the blue economy. NHC is concurrently expanding the channels through which this information is conveyed to the public to empower users to make crucial decisions in a marine environment undergoing massive change.

Marine Transportation and Safety of Navigation

The Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention administered by IMO sets explicit guidelines for navigational safety and other connected aspects to the oceans. The primary objective is to ensure safe navigation under the IHO principles and decisions as much as possible. At the national level, NHC works closely with Malaysia Marine Department to ensure and enhance the safety of navigation in Malaysian waters. Through coordination amongst hydrographic offices, the IHO seeks to guarantee that hydrographic and nautical information is accessible globally in the timeliest, accurate and unambiguous manner possible (IHO S-4, 2021). Due to these international rules, the relationship between hydrography and navigational safety is inevitably more pronounced than with other activities.

Figure 3: MyMarine Geohub Portal

Source: National Hydrographic Centre

The Roles Of The National Hydrographic Centre In Harnessing The Nation’s Blue Economy

Hydrographic activities’ most apparent civil benefit is the economic value derived from the increased shipping efficiency (Connon & Nairn, 2010). Undoubtedly, routes that are shorter and deeper save time and money. Since time is money, commercial ships need accurate and current nautical information, such as paper charts and Electronic Navigational Charts (ENC) (NOAA, 2020). They also increase capital efficiency when it is feasible to use larger ships or load ships more densely, thereby achieving economies of scale.

Since the inception of hydrographic services in the RMN, NHC has released 126 charts of Malaysian waters. It is separated into four folios, two for commercial and two for defence. It comprises several schemes, such as overview, coastline, approach, harbour and ports, which offer safe travel and pertinent information for seafarers. Following this and with the nation’s commitment to ensure the safety of navigation in its waters, NHC has accordingly issued 119 cells of ENC covering Malaysian waters. In 2022 with the advancement of NHC’s digital technology, the sales of these products generated up to RM20 million for the Malaysian economy. This figure might double since the global maritime commerce’s estimated annual growth rate three decades ago was 3.1%. However, at this rate, global maritime commerce did increase by 44% in 2020 and could double by 2031, reaching 11.5 and 16.04 billion tonnes, respectively. (UNCTAD, 2005).

Source: National Hydrographic Centre

Development of Maritime Interest

In November 1994, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 came into effect. UNCLOS 1982 outlines numerous circumstances in which signatory nations may submit claims for an extended Continental Shelf beyond the

Figure 4: Publication Chart Sales 2012 - 2022

200 nautical mile limit. These claims must be based on the seafloor’s established hydrographic and geologic characteristics, typically derived from hydrographic surveys and other relevant surveys. This, in turn, can lead to a nation’s ability to exploit and produce offshore resources. As a technical advisor in hydrography and charting, NHC has been directly involved in submitting to the Commission on The Limits of Continental Shelf (CLCS). Thus far, two documents have been submitted: the Malaysian Continental Shelf Project Phases I and II. The first submission was a Joint Submission with Vietnam on 6 May 2009. The second submission for the remaining portion of the Malaysian Continental Shelf was successfully submitted to CLCS on 12 December 2019 as a Unilateral Submission (CLCS, 2022).

Even though NHS’s primary purpose is to support maritime safety, the extensive databases and various products and services it has amassed over the years have a significant economic value in aiding the management and exploitation of natural marine resources. NHC provides cartography and bathymetry for decision-making in port facility construction, coastal zone management, tourism development, seabed exploitation and fishing. Annually, NHC typically issues several official authorisations to conduct bathymetric surveys, inspections of precision soundings, revisions of Technical Reports for Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and approvals of Technical Reports for tourism, port development and aquaculture projects.

National Spatial Data Infrastructures

The information needed (Marine Geospatial Data) to construct a chart includes not only the depth of the water but also navigational aids, wrecks, obstructions, shipping lanes, tidal data, port information, oil and gas infrastructure, pipelines, underwater cables, maritime borders and a lot of other vital details. This Marine Geospatial Data is a component of the National Spatial Data Infrastructure. It refers to any data relating to or carrying information about a specific location and features on the Earth’s surface (IHO C-17, 2017). It is frequently referred to as the geographic location information of physical items (latitude and longitude). Consequently, it necessitates collecting data from numerous agencies across multiple spectrums. NHC has classified thirteen categories of Maritime Geospatial Data in Malaysia, including hydrography, among other related fields (Figure 5). NHC serves as administrator and is responsible for managing marine data provided by other authorities, while the National Geospatial Agency (NGC), the lead agency, is in charge of the national management of all geospatial data.

The US National Research Council came up with the term “Spatial Data Infrastructure” (SDI) in 1993 to describe a set of technologies, policies and institutional arrangements that make it easier for people in an information-sharing community to create, share, and use geospatial data and related information resources (ESRI, 2010). Following this, the NGC created Malaysia’s SDI, Malaysia Geospatial Data Infrastructure (MyGDI). MyGDI is a government-initiated national programme that provides and facilitates

The Roles Of The National Hydrographic Centre In Harnessing The Nation’s Blue Economy

infrastructure for the exchange of geospatial information. The development of the marine economy, the expansion of maritime business and the preservation of the environment depend on the availability of high-quality, correctly maintained Marine SDI data. Consequently, MyGDI established a Marine Technical Committee, of which NHC oversees the Marine SDI.

Maritime Boundaries

Accurate hydrographic data is a necessary and fundamental prerequisite for delimiting the marine boundaries outlined in the UNCLOS 1982 (Hydro International, 2008). Such boundaries must be shown on nautical charts, so that mariners, fishers, security personnel and others know their location (Monahan & Susan, 2002). Regardless of how much diplomats, attorneys and judges debate the legal principles of maritime boundary delimitation, the hydrographers and the data used to create nautical charts identify the exact geographical position of a boundary based on the recognised legal standards. To this effect, the ministry has appointed NHC to be in Malaysia’s Maritime Delimitation Technical team. This team is tasked with settling maritime demarcation issues with two neighbouring countries, namely Singapore and Indonesia. Besides being in this technical team, the NHC also participates in the hydrographic survey activities with neighbouring states as part of its Joint Verification Work (JVW) to establish the low water line for maritime boundary delimitation.

Figure 5: Malaysia’s Marine Geospatial Data Categories

Source: National Hydrographic Centre

Law Enforcement and Defence

The RMN relies heavily on hydrographic data and information provided by NHC, which support various naval operations-related solutions. These nautical products, environment awareness and chart coverage, which significantly impact maritime dominance, must be comprehensive and accurate to permit warships freedom of manoeuvre. With this knowledge, the navy thus can plan its operations and, more significantly, anticipate where the enemy could strike.

Simultaneously, keeping an eye on what is happening at sea and conducting patrols and other law enforcement, including defence actions within the territorial seas and EEZ, is essential. Illegal activities at or from the sea, such as drug trafficking, arms smuggling, piracy, and illegal fishing, may devastate a country’s economy. Piracy, maritime terrorism, illicit trafficking of people, weapons, or drugs and unchecked marine pollution can all result in monetary losses. Accurate maps provide law enforcement in this nation with more manoeuvrability, which is a tactical advantage when dealing with the abovementioned risks (Groff & Mcewen, 2006). Therefore, hydrographic surveys have enormous and incomprehensible strategic value. By allowing the most efficient routes and cutting down on transportation expenses, trade liberalisation helps the economy expand and prevents other economic losses. It is difficult to underestimate the economic importance of a hydrographic service’s data in facilitating “Maritime Power” as this ensures “good order at sea,” which promotes unhindered maritime commerce.

Posturing For the Future

Assessing a national hydrographic programme’s full economic and business advantages is challenging because the amount of foreign trade transported by water continues to increase. IHO Member State studies indicate that the cost-tobenefit ratio is at least 10:1 for nations that rely heavily on marine commerce or interests (IHO Secretariat, 2014). In the future, exploitation and sustainable growth of national marine zones will be paramount to governments and enterprises. Therefore, the national transportation and geographic data infrastructure’s reliance on hydrographic data is a significant and indispensable component.

Figure 6: High Resolution of Hydrographic Product at Layang-Layang Island Source: National Hydrographic Centre

The Roles Of The National Hydrographic Centre In Harnessing The Nation’s Blue Economy

Additionally, the RMN is unwavering in its pursuit of a deeper understanding of the world’s seas for safer navigation, the maritime industry and the future of our planet (Ministry of Defence, 2020). This need is in conjunction with the nation’s maritime sector’s rising growth and development, which mandates the usage of sustainable marine geospatial data embracing all Malaysian waterways, for a scalable spatial data infrastructure can operate at the organisational, national and international levels. This requirement, therefore, empowers more efficient development planning, implementation and control while retaining national sovereignty. In lieu, the NHC has prepared to fulfil this goal by executing measures under the Marine Geospatial 2050 project, which integrates with the RMN 15to5 Transformation Programme to deliver comprehensive, highly accurate and current marine geospatial information.

SEABED 2050

NHC’s ambitious target is to achieve 100 per cent coverage of all national waterways with multi-beam hydrographic data by the year 2050. Theoretically, this is possible, but achieving this goal will take a significant amount of time which does not consider any new needs or re-measuring that might be needed to update the present data.

The RMN has only one hydrographic ship, KD PERANTAU, and two hydrographic boats. The NHC has also developed a plan to collect hydrographic and bathymetry data to ensure long-term viability. The plan is based on four essential factors:

• Strengthening the nation’s sovereignty

• Meeting the requirements of security and defence

• Ensuring the safety of navigation

• Expanding the nation’s maritime economy

Figure 7: Roadmap of Marine Geospatial 2050 Source: National Hydrographic Centre

Consequently, the reliability of the data collection process needs to be enhanced, and the plan to acquire two Survey Motor Launches (SML) has been elevated to one of its eleven initiatives and a component of the SEABED 2050 sub-programme. The acquisition of these assets can assist the government in preserving the value of long-term hydrography data collection.

Map Once, Use Many Times

The digital revolution that has unfolded in recent years has seen one of the most radical transformations in the depth and breadth of the marine geospatial data at our disposal. We have seen a transformation in how it has been gathered, giving it an unprecedented scale and range. Moreover, new capabilities emerge as we immerse ourselves in this data-the possibilities for achieving what can be extraordinary (Hydro International, 2014).

With this in mind, NHC believes that making data findable, accessible, interoperable, and reusable will ensure that, where permissible, it is available to anyone who needs it. MSDI is not an end state but can only be easily implemented with technology. However, MSDI is a constantly evolving ecosystem of the nine pathways, including governance, data and partnerships, which can only be achieved when each is developed equally and iteratively.

Disaster Resilience

Approximately three billion people worldwide rely on seafood as their primary protein source (Forbes, 2020). The sea and ocean economies also sustain the livelihoods of those who live on or near the coasts through tourism, fishing and aquaculture. Sadly, over the past seven decades, over 500 natural catastrophes

Figure 8: Roles and Function of NHC Marine Geospatial Department Source: National Hydrographic Centre

have struck nations with emerging economies worldwide (Mead, 2022). Hurricanes and other forms of severe weather climate have also caused significant damage to communities located along the shore. Additionally, over forty per cent of the world’s seas have been severely impacted by human activities, such as pollution and IUU fishing, which contribute to a decrease in fish stocks and the destruction of the coastal ecosystems. However, more consideration is needed to ensure the oceans’ sustenance growth for a balanced or equitable ecosystem.

Knowingly or otherwise, hydrographic services can be optimised to strengthen the resilience of the blue economy and government infrastructure to natural disasters. NHC has access to terabytes of data and detailed bathymetric data of the waters around Malaysia, which have been obtained by one of our industry partners or NHC. Millions of grabbed samples from the seabed, temperature and salinity profiles, and a large number of additional datasets significantly play an essential part in facilitating long-term economic expansion and in assisting the nation in mitigating the dangers linked to an ever-increasing natural occurrences.

Ocean Economy

As the economic frontier, the ocean promises an ample supply of wealth and excessive potential for increasing economic development and employment. Therefore, realising the ocean’s prospects demands accountable and ecological approaches to its economic development. Currently, the present constraint concerning the ocean economy’s development is its health deterioration. However, the rise of anthropogenic carbon emissions has caused the ocean to absorb much of it, leading to ocean acidification. Additionally, rising sea temperatures, sea levels, and shifting ocean currents have resulted in biodiversity and habitat loss, changes in fish stock composition and migration patterns, and a higher frequency of severe ocean weather events (OECD, 2016).

Figure 9: Roles and Function of NHC Meteorology and Oceanography (METOC) Department

Source: National Hydrographic Centre

The Roles Of The National Hydrographic Centre In Harnessing The Nation’s Blue Economy

As technology improves our understanding of the deeper world’s oceans and our capacity to access them, numerous new prospects for future ocean development have emerged and are gradually materialising. Among these is the recent interest in the minerals of the ocean floor and the production of energy from the water. In conjunction with other environmental datasets, this information can produce habitat maps that will help us track how rising ocean temperatures harm critical marine habitats and concentrate conservation efforts.

Using satellite data to monitor environmental change is another practical application of hydrographic products. This is demonstrated by creating an innovative method for monitoring the evolution of mangrove tree species in coastal regions (Purwar, 2022). In addition to having a large capacity for absorbing greenhouse gases, these trees are crucial in mitigating the effects of tidal surges generated by extreme weather by serving as a natural barrier. The more we learn about the importance of coastal wetland carbon sinks and natural sea defences, the more crucial it is to map, monitor, and manage these resources.

Opportunities

Hydrographic data growth must be a big emphasis if we so desire the oceans to be a place for people to feel safe, secure and prosper. As there is a great deal of untapped blue economic potential out there (Hydro International, 2010), undoubtedly, there is adequate space for innovation in applying hydrographic products to mitigate the effects of natural disasters and enhance the blue economy. Combining these data with tidal and bathymetric data makes it possible to assess the impact of storm surges and other extreme weather events on coastal communities and infrastructure. Then, after thoroughly examining the risks and mitigation strategies, decisions can be made regarding how to safeguard the residents of these areas.

The National Charting Plan is a programme in which we engage with other partner organisations to aid state governments in their efforts to promote and defend shipping and marine environments.

The NHC Marine Data Portal is a reliable site to assist the government in making better-informed judgements on the ocean floor. Information such as on bathymetry brings together disparate elements, including AIS traffic, wrecks and obstructions, maritime limitations, data on the seabed composition, and much more, which benefit all seafarers. This portal will make it possible to design port expansion based on a highly improved comprehension of the seabed bottom and the ocean conditions; as a result, significantly larger cruise ships will be able to dock. In addition, the most susceptible areas to erosion can be identified, which will facilitate in identifying suitable locations for new coastal infrastructure, such as hotels or coastal towns, and thus supports the development of coastal infrastructure. Since tourism is also a significant contributor to the nation’s economy, this will also be a piece of encouraging information for the local community (Saad, Beltagy, & Mahmoud, 2000).

The Roles Of The National Hydrographic Centre In Harnessing The Nation’s Blue Economy

There are also an infinite number of other viable options. Marine archaeologists could also utilise various data, such as bathymetry, wrecks and obstructions, seabed composition, and tidal data while conducting seabed archaeology research at potential sites for renewable energy sources such as wind farms (Infoceans, 2016). The future growth of ocean-based industries, which is expanding rapidly, can outperform the growth of the global economy. The opportunities to integrate this with hydrographic data are paramount and cannot be emphasised more. Hydrography helps to add to our knowledge about the sea floor by establishing detailed bathymetry and identifying any obstacles or other objects resting for safe navigation.

Recommendation

For the government to seriously consider participating in the so-called “blue economy,” it must first prioritise the completion of a hydrographic audit and an economic evaluation analysis. The economic analysis aims to demonstrate that utilising hydrographic services can boost productivity and efficiency while reducing the cost structure of many ocean-related activities. This includes direct economic benefits, such as more outstanding product sales and indirect economic benefits.

This analysis also aims to identify the hydrographic program’s components that need improvement and create deadlines and priorities for completing unfinished tasks. Aside from that, the audit’s findings are supposed to determine the optimal level of investment and the spending plan for NHC.

The cost-benefit auditor needs to investigate the operating procedures of NHC to establish the extent to which there is potential for greater cost-saving efficiency. In addition, the NHC is responsible for ensuring that national plans for surveying and charting are in place and that the hydrographic system’s crucial development is considered in national or ministerial development plans. This includes the development of human, material and financial resources and administrative systems related to national surveying and charting goals.

Conclusion

Malaysia’s economic growth depends on maritime trade. As a maritime nation, NHC, as Malaysia’s leading maritime hydrographic surveying agency, has to strive to preserve the nation’s waters diligently are navigable, especially when 94% of all international trade passes through the Malacca Straits. Hence, to maximise finite resources and preserve safe navigation in Malaysian waters, NHC must strengthen cooperation and coordination between the country’s hydrographic agencies and marine users.

In addition to ensuring safe navigation, hydrographic data contributes significantly to protecting the marine environment and the nation’s defence. Consequently, hydrographic survey data is required to locate offshore mineral reserves, grow the agricultural, fisheries, environmental and maritime sectors, and develop ecofriendly and sustainable methods for productivity gains. With hydrography, the blue economy can realise its full potential.

Furthermore, the NHC can establish maritime boundaries with neighbouring nations. This will intensify efforts in future exploration and exploitation of marine resources. As a direct result, the demand for hydrographic surveys will increase over the next few years. The ever-evaluating developments in hydrographic services have led to the discovery of more information about the oceans than previously thought. However, there is significantly more data to comprehend, and NHC endeavours to be at the forefront of this ambition to help expand new markets sustainably. By expanding the network of data providers and making a broader range of data sets available to consumers, NHC will aspire to provide real value to its clients and contribute to the future growth and sustainability of the blue economy.

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PART VI EPILOGUE

CONCLUSION

Captain Ivan Mario Andrew RMN Assoc Prof. Dr Nazli Aziz

This book reemphasises the first series of Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Charting the Passage that “Malaysia is, without doubt, a coastal state under the law and a maritime nation in geography and identity” (Andrew & Talaat, 2021, 181). Surrounded by bodies of water, the notion of Malaysia as a maritime nation is easy to envisage. Fundamentally, it may be straightforward to explain what constitutes a maritime nation. Still, more needs to be understood as to how a maritime nation that has employed continental roots in governing the state for decades to re-establish its maritime roots. Several maritime nations may demonstrate similarities in their maritime affairs if we merely examine them from international relations. However, they may respond ambiguously to the same issues because of the different nature of the political discourse and norms in any given society.

The sovereignty of Malaysia’s territorial waters is demarcated by the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, the Andaman Sea, the Gulf of Thailand, the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea. With these waters, Malaysia’s maritime boundaries are shared with two major archipelagic states perceived as maritime nations - Indonesia and the Philippines, and four others perceived as “continental roots” states - Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore and Brunei. Evidently and Undoubtedly, the two water bodies, the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea are among the major global trade and shipping routes linking the East to the West and vice versa.

These bodies of water have intertwined significantly with the past, present and future of Malaysia’s home and foreign affairs that have shaped her development. In retrospect, contemporary Malaysia was inherited and established from the rise and fall of pre-colonial sea powers and maritime empires of the Nusantara (Malay Archipelago) period. Then, the colonial period of Tanah Melayu (Malay Peninsula), especially during British imperialism, changed the local worldview. Under the British, Tanah Melayu was divided into three different administrative and governance systems - the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States and the Unfederated Malay States. The orientation of Tanah Melayu’s strategic posture, as well as the development character and outlook, has detoured gradually from water to continental roots, and the post-independence 20th century Malaysia witnessed a rapid and well-planned development of new settlements of socio-economic growth and urbanisation that were in the “landlocked districts”. However, the notion of Malaysia as a maritime nation has been revitalised since the beginning of the 21st century. Even so, to this day, the continental roots are still ingrained and dominant in Malaysia’s maritime affairs decision-making.

The interest to revitalise this notion is understood if one can forecast the emergence of China as a military superpower and global economy house. The South China Sea becomes a focal point when we discuss the bodies of water surrounding Malaysia as it draws interest from China. The South China Sea can be regarded as the “Mediterranean Sea” of Southeast Asia, small but vital for the global economy and dynamic in shaping foreign affairs of the states in the vicinity. The rapid emergence of China in the past two decades has altered Malaysia and ASEAN members’ behaviour concerning their maritime affairs. With overlapping claims among the ASEAN members in the South China Sea and from China and Taiwan, maritime security and naval presence have become vital in designing strategic management and conflict resolution.

Considering the re-emerging interest in consolidating the notion of Malaysia as a maritime nation, it is surprising that the subject has not received much academic and practical attention within the field of Malaysian studies. There needs to be more discussion on maritime affairs beyond traditional security threats, territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Only a little is known about other aspects, such as the nontraditional threats, non-state actors, security compatibility with the local political culture, etc.

The paucity to date needs to be re-addressed to re-establish the knowledge of what Malaysia would gain and lose as a maritime nation. To address this gap, six chapters in this book examine various issues and challenges as well as prospects and opportunities for Malaysia as a maritime nation through different lenses and dimensions. In an attempt to strengthen the understanding of Malaysia as a maritime nation, the scope of discussions in this book covers both traditional and non-traditional security issues and geostrategic and socio-economic issues.

, the chapters are addressed from various perspectives from domestic, regional and global lenses to avoid the primordial impulse of “over-glorifying” Malaysia’s maritime agenda from a parochial outlook. The book focuses on the geostrategic and security environment, Indo-Pacific strategy, border security and blue economy. This book highlights the importance of understanding the traditional and non-traditional threats to a maritime nation, the progress and transformation of the agenda, and the trouble and dilemma in steering it forward. Specific case studies are used in certain chapters to examine security and the strategic environment.

Today’s geopolitics and strategic management significantly link with the economic agenda. The maritime-based economic sectors have stimulated Malaysian economic growth for decades. Achieving prosperous and greater peace through sustainable blue economy development and a win-win situation should be promoted and preserved to prevent any escalation of the militarisation of the water bodies surrounding Malaysia.

The strategic location of Malaysia means that she can play an essential intermediary role within the political economy of the trade and commerce between the West and the East. The geostrategic position of Malaysia has allowed her to remain in the same role from the Malacca Sultanate to the European colonisation of contemporary Malaysia. However, Malaysia’s emergence, survival and success depended heavily on her ability to maintain the intermediary role that the nation has been playing within ASEAN and external powers without jeopardising her neutrality principle. Any inclination to align towards any political and economic blocks should be counterbalanced with the impact of the conventional and unconventional maritime importance, both in short and long-term power relations, in balancing the superpowers’ interests.

Emphasising maritime affairs’ security and strategic agenda from international relations, political economy and community development is vital to strengthening Malaysia’s maritime nation position. Current and future discussions should enhance and revitalise the interests of young and future generations in the importance of protecting Malaysia’s sovereignty. Unfortunately, the puzzle that has been raised in discussing the issues and challenges is the mechanism to steer the course in strengthening the national maritime agenda since the potentials and opportunities of the Malaysian maritime domain have been addressed from the continental rather than maritime nation perspectives. Hence, it has created a vague posture that Malaysia is not a maritime nation.

For Malaysia to maintain as a maritime nation, an efficient ocean governance framework that embodies a comprehensive national ocean policy must be established. The national ocean policy shall overarch the maritime affairs that include other vital elements such as security, safety, environment, economic development, culture and people. Obviously, for any maritime nation, the institutional framework, economic, social and technical factors conditioning the maritime development depends heavily on the government’s decisions.

The Malaysian ocean governance needs to be changed to tango with the everchanging maritime strategy, politics and economy to safeguard the nation’s interests. A comprehensive ocean governance is needed to steer the course in ensuring the survival and success of Malaysia as a maritime nation. The existence and the survival of a maritime nation can only be understood by analysing the purpose of developing and expanding maritime activities, i.e., how they interact economically and politically. By enlarging the analysis framework of steering the course of a maritime nation from the local to the regional, this book illustrates how a maritime nation contracting and expanding spheres of influence becomes part of the larger rhythms of global maritime issues.

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Captain Ivan Mario Andrew RMN Director General RMN Sea Power Centre

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nazli Aziz Coordinator of Centre for Ocean Governance, INOS, UMT

Captain Ahmad Rashidi Othman RMN Commanding Officer KD SELANGOR

Lieutenant Mohd Massuoadi Mohd Zukri RMN Staff Officer National Hydrographic Centre

Captain Mohd Yusri Yusoff RMN RMN Submarine Command

Commander Azrul Nezam Asri RMN Head of Maritime Affairs RMN Sea Power Centre

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

Dr. Tharishini Krishnan Senior Lecturer Department of Strategic Studies Faculty of Defence Studies and Management National Defence University Malaysia

Commander Ts. Dr. Muhamad Zafran Whab @ Hassan Basari RMN Head of Research and Development PUSTAKMAR

Captain Mohd Reduan Ayob RMN Commanding Officer KD LEKIU

Captain Dr.Tay Yap Leong RMN Director of Maritime Security MiDAS

Nor Aini Mohd Nordin Assistant Director of Maritime Security MiDAS

Dr. Abdul Razak Ahmad Abdul Razak Founding Director Bait Al Amanah

Malaysia a Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course

Ahmad Zikri Rosli Associate Analyst Bait Al Amanah

Altaf Deviyati Ismail Managing Director Iman Research

Tadzrul Adha Fieldwork Specialist Iman Research

Commander Ang Chin Hup RMN (Retired) National Consultant to United Nations (UN)

Rear Admiral Dato’ Hanafiah Hassan Director General National Hydrographic Centre