MALAYSIA A MARITIME NATION NAVIGATING THE HORIZON

Editors

EDITORIAL BOARD

Captain Ananthan Tharmalingam RMN

Director General of RMN Sea Power Centre

Prof. Dr. Wan Izatul Asma binti Wan Talaat

Head of Centre for Ocean Governance, Institute of Oceanography and Environment, Universiti Malaysia Terengganu

Editorial Assistants

Commander Wrighton Buan anak Kassy RMN

Lieutenant Commander Norsaydaeaini binti Che Rozubi RMN

LR ETR Tc. Muhamad Asnawi bin Aminuddin

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First Published in 2025

ISBN 978-967-26093-5-3

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The views expressed are the author’s own and not necessarily those of the RMN Sea Power Centre. The Government of Malaysia will not be legally responsible in contract, tort or otherwise, for any statement made in this publication.

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© All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means; electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission in writing from the RMN SPC.

FOREWORD

The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) remains steadfast championing the Malaysian National Agenda as a Maritime Nation. This book journal marks the continuation of a vital discourse, following Malaysia A Maritime Nation Agenda: Charting the Passage (2021) and Malaysia A Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course (2023). Each edition reinforces our collective commitment to strengthening Malaysia’s maritime identity, economy and security in an increasingly complex and dynamic maritime environment.

As a nation strategically positioned along key global maritime trade routes, Malaysia’s economic prosperity, national security and regional influence are intrinsically linked to the seas. Our maritime domain presents both opportunities and challenges, from economic growth through the blue economy to safeguarding our sovereign waters and ensuring regional stability. As a key maritime security institution, the RMN remains committed to protecting Malaysia’s interests while fostering a whole-of-government and wholeof-society approach to maritime strategy.

This journal continues that mission by bringing together perspectives from policymakers, industry leaders and maritime practitioners to shape a forwardlooking and sustainable maritime agenda. It serves not only as a repository of ideas but also as a catalyst for strategic action and policy formulation.

I hope this publication will drive greater national awareness, inter-agency collaboration and long-term investment in Malaysia’s maritime future. By working together, we can navigate evolving challenges and position Malaysia as a strong and resilient maritime nation.

ADMIRAL DATUK (Dr.) ZULHELMY BIN ITHNAIN CHIEF OF NAVY ROYAL MALAYSIAN NAVY

PREFACE

The initiative to publish this book aligns closely with the Malaysia Maritime Conference, first introduced during LIMA ’19 and subsequently continued through LIMA ’23, culminating in this year’s edition coinciding with LIMA ’25. This ongoing effort underscores Malaysia’s unwavering commitment to promote maritime awareness and advancing its status as a progressive maritime nation.

The significance of this book series cannot be overstated. The inaugural publication, Malaysia A Maritime Nation Agenda: Charting the Passage, emerged in 2021, followed by Malaysia A Maritime Nation Agenda: Steering the Course in 2023. Each volume has progressively explored and expanded upon critical maritime themes to promote the national agenda as a maritime nation.

This third edition, aptly titled Malaysia A Maritime Nation Agenda: Navigating the Horizon , builds on the foundation laid by previous editions while venturing deeper into contemporary maritime challenges, emerging opportunities, and strategic possibilities shaping Malaysia’s maritime future. It is organised around three interconnected thematic areas—Geostrategic Dynamics, Non-Traditional Security Threats, and Blue Economy. Within these thematic frameworks, the book comprises eleven chapters, each providing unique insights and expert analyses into various aspects of maritime affairs.

Distinctively, this latest edition represents a collaborative effort, bringing together insightful contributions from local and international experts across diverse maritime fields. Chapters authored by distinguished academics, experienced practitioners, and military strategists offer comprehensive analyses and practical insights. Readers will find particularly intriguing discussions on pivotal topics such as regional stability, emerging security threats, and the transformative economic potential encapsulated within the Blue Economy, providing unique insights and expert analyses that are invaluable to the maritime community.

We extend our heartfelt appreciation to all contributors whose expertise and dedicated research have significantly enriched this publication. Our thanks also go to the editorial assistants and staff at the Royal Malaysian Navy Sea Power Centre, whose meticulous efforts were instrumental in successfully completing this edition.

Ultimately, our aspiration is for readers to find this book enlightening and stimulating. We hope it inspires reflection on Malaysia’s maritime potential, fostering more excellent dialogue, collaboration, and decisive action towards realising our shared maritime ambitions and reinforcing Malaysia’s role within the regional and global maritime landscape.

CAPTAIN ANANTHAN THARMALINGAM RMN PROF. DR. WAN IZATUL ASMA BINTI WAN TALAAT EDITORS

FOREWORD AND PREFACE

CONTENTS

PART I: OVERVIEW AND CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

Captain Ananthan Tharmalingam RMN & Prof. Dr. Wan Izatul Asma binti Wan Talaat

PART II: GEOSTRATEGIC DYNAMICS

CHAPTER ONE

ASEAN’S COOPERATION WITH THE IORA: STRATEGIC ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN THE INDO PACIFIC CONSTRUCT

Brigadier General Dato’ Azudin bin Hassan

CHAPTER TWO

LATERAL LEADERSHIP IN THE INDO-PACIFIC: PRESERVING PEACE THROUGH MIDDLE POWER COOPERATION

Dr. Nell Bennett

CHAPTER THREE

THE MILITARISATION OF FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY

Commander Mohammad Shafiq bin Zainon RMN

CHAPTER FOUR

THE NEED FOR SUBS! ROYAL MALAYSIAN NAVY SUBMARINES DEFENDING MALAYSIA’S MARITIME INTERESTS

Prof. Adam Leong Kok Wey

PART III: NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS

CHAPTER FIVE

MARITIME NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS: SOUTHEAST ASIAN’S PERSPECTIVE

First Admiral Dr. Tay Yap Leong

CHAPTER SIX

HIDDEN LINES OF COMMUNICATION: GEOPOLITICS, CYBER THREATS AND UNDERSEA CABLES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA’S MARITIME SPHERE

E Kin Zane Ryan Seow, Karisma Putera Abd Rahman & Fikry A. Rahman

CHAPTER SEVEN

NAVIGATING CHALLENGES IN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA: THE ROLE OF MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA IN REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY

Commander Syahrum bin Hassim RMN

PART IV: BLUE ECONOMY

CHAPTER EIGHT

HARNESSING THE BLUE ECONOMY FOR MALAYSIA: NAVIGATING OPPORTUNITIES AND GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC Eimaan Intikhab Qureshi

CHAPTER NINE

MARITIME ARCHAEOTOURISM: ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN MALAYSIA

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasrizal Shaari and Dr. Nik Nurhalida Nik Hariry

CHAPTER TEN

TOWARDS BETTER OCEAN GOVERNANCE: THE CASE FOR AN OCEAN POLICY FOR MALAYSIA

Nazery Khalid

CHAPTER ELEVEN

NAVIGATING THE MARITIME NATION AGENDA: MARINE SPATIAL PLANNING AS A CATALYST FOR BLUE ECONOMY DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA

Prof. Dr. Wan Izatul Isma binti Wan Talaat

PART V: EPILOGUE

CONCLUSION

Captain Ananthan Tharmalingam RMN &

Prof. Dr. Wan Izatul Asma binti Wan Talaat

INDEX

PART I

OVERVIEW AND CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

Ananthan Tharmalingam RMN

Prof. Dr. Wan Izatul Asma binti Wan Talaat

Malaysia, endowed with strategic geography and abundant maritime resources, stands at a pivotal juncture, navigating both opportunities and challenges in a rapidly evolving geopolitical seascape. Historically significant maritime routes such as the Malacca Strait, once traversed by ancient traders connecting East and West, continue to highlight Malaysia’s enduring role in global maritime heritage. Navigating the Horizon is the third instalment of the RMN Sea Power Centre’s insightful exploration into Malaysia’s maritime ambitions, following previous books Charting the Passage and Steering the Course . Building upon these foundations, this volume delves deeper, addressing contemporary maritime issues through three distinct yet interconnected themes: Geostrategic Dynamics, Non-Traditional Threats and the transformative potential of Blue Economy.

Malaysia’s maritime domain—dynamic and fluid by nature—remains central to its identity, security, and economic prosperity. Yet, as previous editions have highlighted, steering an effective maritime agenda demands more than geographical advantage; it requires strategic foresight, coordinated institutional effort, and comprehensive governance. Navigating the Horizon gathers perspectives from military strategists, distinguished academics, industry experts, and maritime practitioners, enriching our understanding of Malaysia’s quest for sustained maritime nationhood.

Geostrategic Dynamics

The journey begins with a broad exploration of the geopolitical currents shaping Malaysia’s maritime future. How can Malaysia effectively navigate complex alliances, assert its influence as a middle-power, and manage the intricate dynamics of regional security? Each chapter unfolds critical strategic insights into these vital questions, providing clarity on Malaysia’s evolving role in an increasingly contested geopolitical landscape.

Chapter One by Brigadier General Dato’ Azudin bin Hassan sets the scene by examining ASEAN’s cooperation with the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Through a clear narrative, it outlines both the opportunities for collaboration and significant hurdles presented by political, economic, and geopolitical tensions,

Captain

advocating stronger institutional coordination, trust-building initiatives, and sustained dialogue to strengthen this critical partnership.

Moving from collective diplomacy to individual leadership, Chapter Two by Dr. Nell Bennett introduces lateral leadership within the Indo-Pacific context. Highlighting Malaysia’s potential as a middle power, the chapter vividly demonstrates how creativity, credibility, and strategic diplomacy can preserve peace amid geopolitical rivalry, underpinning Malaysia’s pivotal role in regional stability.

The narrative transitions smoothly into Chapter Three by Commander Mohammad Shafiq bin Zainon RMN, examining the increasing militarisation in the South China Sea. Here, territorial disputes, economic impacts, and environmental concerns are laid bare, underscoring the importance of Malaysia’s strategic naval capabilities and diplomatic interventions to manage regional stability.

Concluding this section, Chapter Four by Professor Adam Leong Kok Wey emphasises the strategic value of submarines in safeguarding Malaysia’s maritime interests. Drawing on historical evidence, it stresses sustained investments and effective operational management of submarine fleets to ensure deterrence and maritime sovereignty.

Non-Traditional Security Threats

The maritime landscape is shaped not only by visible threats but also by unseen challenges requiring innovative strategies and heightened vigilance. These nontraditional threats are often intensified by the geopolitical dynamics discussed earlier, as regional rivalries and strategic competitions exacerbate vulnerabilities and complicate responses. This section highlights these emerging non-traditional security threats, examining their interconnectedness with broader geopolitical currents and their collective impact on regional stability and security.

Chapter Five by First Admiral Dr. Tay Yap Leong initiates this discussion by addressing Southeast Asia’s non-traditional maritime threats, including piracy, human trafficking, and environmental risks. It emphasises Malaysia’s Defence White Paper and UNCLOS, calling for robust regional collaboration and coherent policy frameworks to counteract these effectively.

Continuing this narrative, Chapter Six by E. Kin Zane Ryan Seow, Karisma Putera Abd Rahman, and Fikry A. Rahman focuses on strategic vulnerabilities posed by undersea communication cables, crucial for Southeast Asia’s digital economy. It outlines how geopolitical competition and cyber threats expose these vital infrastructures, urging stronger domestic legislation, enhanced regional frameworks, and improved maritime domain awareness.

Chapter Seven by Commander Syahrum bin Hassim RMN navigates the importance of the Strait of Malacca, showcasing cooperative security measures

implemented by regional states, such as the Malacca Strait Patrols and the “Eyes in the Sky” programme. It advocates deeper regional collaboration and standardised maritime law enforcement to sustainably manage this critical maritime passage.

Blue Economy

The final section delves into promising horizons of Malaysia’s maritime economic potential. Embracing sustainable practices, this segment highlights innovative approaches to responsibly harness maritime resources. By aligning economic growth with ecological preservation, the Blue Economy presents tangible benefits not only for national policy but also for local communities, fostering job creation, enhancing livelihoods, and securing environmental sustainability for future generations.

Chapter Eight by Eimaan Intikhab Qureshi introduces the transformative potential of the Blue Economy for Malaysia, exploring fisheries, shipping, tourism, and offshore energy opportunities. It addresses governance fragmentation, geopolitical tensions, and environmental sustainability, advocating an integrated national ocean policy and regional collaborations.

From economic aspirations, Chapter Nine by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasrizal Shaari and Dr. Nik Nurhalida Nik Hariry transitions to maritime archaeotourism, exploring underwater cultural heritage as a sustainable tourism sector. It confronts challenges such as environmental degradation and public awareness, offering strategic solutions to leverage Malaysia’s maritime archaeological assets fully.

Chapter Ten by Nazery Khalid debates compellingly for comprehensive ocean governance through establishing a unified National Ocean Policy. Drawing lessons from international best practices, it underscores the urgency for integrated management strategies to sustain maritime resources, enhance national security, and foster long-term economic prosperity.

Finally, Chapter Eleven by Prof. Dr. Wan Izatul Isma binti Wan Talaat highlights Marine Spatial Planning as a critical instrument in realising Malaysia’s maritime ambitions, effectively balancing ecological protection, economic development, and social equity through coordinated maritime planning.

Navigating the Horizon involves charting a strategic course, anticipating future tides, and confidently steering towards a sustainable maritime destiny. This book offers thoughtful analyses and actionable insights, reinforcing Malaysia’s commitment to becoming a robust maritime nation thriving in an interconnected world. The strategic insights presented hold broader implications, potentially influencing regional stability, economic development, environmental sustainability, and fostering collaborative international relations across the IndoPacific region.

PART II GEOSTRATEGIC DYNAMICS

CHAPTER ONE

ASEAN’s COOPERATION WITH THE IORA: STRATEGIC ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC CONSTRUCT

Brigadier General Dato’ Azudin bin Hassan Malaysian Army Headquarters

Introduction

In today’s context of Indo-Pacific construct, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) are two prominent regional organisations - the maritime corridor connecting these two entities from the Southeast Asia (SEA) to the Indian Ocean has historically been a conduit for trade, culture, and strategic alliances. The strategic value the sea line of communication (SLOC) hold for global powers is also highly significant. Hence, it has always been aimed for both organisations to ensure regional peace, stability, prosperity and cooperation increasingly important (Acarya, 2009 & ASEAN, 2021). Established in 1967, ASEAN promotes economic integration, political stability, and social progress among its 10 member states, while IORA, established in 1997, comprises 23 member states bordering the Indian Ocean, spanning from Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania (Figure 1).

1:

Indo-Pacific - ASEAN and IORA Member States/Dialogue Partners (Source: Adapted from Agathe, 2017)

This paper argues that both ASEAN and IORA have long understood that collaboration between ASEAN and IORA holds significant potential for improving regional connectivity, trade, and maritime security. Today, within the IP, ASEANIORA cooperation is essential especially in strengthening maritime connectivity (Tharishini, 2023). With extensive coastlines and vital maritime trade routes, these regions recognise the strategic importance of leveraging their collective strengths to address common challenges and opportunities. Both entities appreciate the need for a more meaningful economic development and security cooperation within their respective regions and broader regional integration and stability across the region.

Hence, the rise of the Indo-Pacific construct has created avenue to redefine maritime connections and improve the longstanding ties between ASEAN and IORA in all aspects of economic, geopolitical and strategic terms. However, as much as ASEAN and IORA have undertaken various initiatives to promote mutual understanding, cooperation and development in the past, collaboration has been relatively limited despite shared objectives and geographic proximity (Cordner, 2018). The changing dynamics of the Indo-Pacific present numerous maritime challenges, both traditional and non-traditional, making it imperative for both ASEAN and IORA to pay close attention to one and another and cooperate more effectively.

It is in this context that this paper aims to explore opportunities to strengthen both the institutional mechanisms, foster political consensus, and promote pragmatic cooperation to address common concerns and advance shared interests. Through a comprehensive assessment, the study is expected to contribute valuable insights to regional cooperation in the Indo-Pacific construct and offer actionable policy recommendations. This paper is divided into three sections: (1) The driving

Figure

Map of

factors of cooperation between the ASEAN and IORA, (2) the strategic issues and challenges impeding effective collaboration, and (3) policy recommendations to improve the cooperation.

The Driving Factors for ASEAN-IORA Cooperation

The current cooperation between the ASEAN and the IORA is marked by various initiatives and collaborative efforts to promote regional integration, economic development, and maritime security. While formal institutional linkages between ASEAN and IORA remain limited, member states of both organisations have engaged in practical cooperation and dialogue across multiple domains. Synergizing activities in areas of mutual commitments under IORA and ASEAN would create more comprehensive and inclusive trans- Indo-Pacific arrangements. Figure 2 shows the driving factors that guides ASEAN-IORA current cooperation.

Figure 2: The Driving Factors of ASEAN-IORA Cooperation (Source: Adapted from IORA, 2018; ASEAN.Org, 2023)

Strategic Importance of The Indo-Pacific Construct

Due to economic and geopolitical significance, the Indo-Pacific region has become a focal point of strategic interests for many nations. Spanning from the eastern shores of Africa to the western Pacific Ocean, this maritime space highlights the interconnected nature of sea routes for security and economic growth. When the United States-led Indo-Pacific strategy was introduced, it was aimed to secure Washington a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) - for continuous peace and stability as well as accessibility across major choke points and SLOCs at sea.

This can be observed with all the key sea lanes within the IP Indo-Pacific facilitate about 60% of global maritime trade, 2/3 of global economic growth, with critical chokepoints like the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok being essential for transporting oil and other resources from the Middle East to Asian markets (Storey, 2019) as shown in Figure 3. The security of these passages is vital not only for the United States but for all maritime nations. Besides this, the Indo-Pacific is a realm prosperous in natural resources, including significant offshore oil and gas reserves, and hosts rapidly growing economies such as India and Indonesia. These factors have spurred increased military presence and competition among major powers like the United States, China, and India, each seeking to secure their regional interests.

Figure 3: Indo-Pacific Major Shipping Lan

(Source: Australia Government Department of Defence, 2012 cited in Tharishini, 2019)

The United States’ conscious decision to initiate the Indo-Pacific strategy was largely to realign its policies in responses to its declining influence and the rise of China in the Asia Pacific realm. Emerging and existing stakeholders in the IndoPacific and Indian Ocean regions play crucial roles in shaping foreign policies and expectations (Horimoto, 2020). President Joe Biden during the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Leaders` Summit 2021 has firmly emphasised the future of their nations and world depends on a FOIP enduring and flourishing in the decades ahead. Part of the United States strategic means are modernised alliances and flexible partnerships.

More importantly is strengthening India’s posture as a leading regional power in the Indian Ocean and reliable Quad. Apart from that, the Indian Ocean is a vital hub for international trade and energy security, linking Asia and Africa. It features strategic chokepoints essential for global trade, drawing interest from the United States and China. Despite their interests, geographical challenges prevent any power from dominating the Indian Ocean (Gilson, 2020). This strategy necessitating a more coordinated approach between ASEAN and IORA.

A strong ASEAN is also important for the United States and its allies. Table 1 highlights the importance of ASEAN to the United States. ASEAN with 3rd largest world population is the centre of the Indo-Pacific construct with significant trade and economic relationship with the United States.

Table 1: Why ASEAN Matters for the United States (Source: Adapted from AsiaMattersforAmerica.org/ASEAN, 2023)

The importance of both India and ASEAN along the maritime routes between SEA and the Indian Ocean highlights the strategic shifts the United States adopted to show dominance in the region. As such, it becomes imperative for ASEAN and IORA to play a crucial role in navigating these waters, both literally and figuratively, adapting to the evolving geopolitical landscape to meet emerging challenges and opportunities regionally (Oba, 2019; Koga, 2019; Isa, 2018). In line with this, ASEAN and India have aligned their initiatives more closely with the global strategies to enhance their collective bargaining power and strategic influence.

Shared Regional Security Concerns

Both ASEAN and IORA have many common regional security concerns especially in the context of maritime security given the Indian Ocean’s and SEA’s strategic importance for global trade. Forums like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the IORA Maritime Safety and Security Working Group, for instance, facilitate dialogue and collaborative initiatives to address maritime security threats. Indonesia, a member of both ASEAN and IORA, has actively engaged in maritime security efforts, including hosting the IORA Maritime Safety and Security Workshop in 2018, focusing on enhancing cooperation to combat piracy and transnational crime (Bateman, 2014; IORA, 2024). IORA on the other hand emphasises economic collaboration and quality of life improvements. Its priorities include peace and security, marine science, trade facilitation, disaster management, and promoting good governance (Caballero-Anthony, 2022).

ASEAN and IORA also collaborate on counter-terrorism, recognising the importance of multilateral cooperation in combating terrorism and financial challenges (Ladwig & Mukherjee, 2019). ASEAN’s experience in integrating security through enhancing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) principle in the SEA should be a lesson for IORA’s evolving role and impact on international law of the sea and protection of key regional shipping lanes (Elisabeth, 2022). However, despite efforts to address non-traditional security risks, the overall impact of ASEAN and IORA has been limited, with the ARF Regional Security Model struggling to tackle critical issues effectively (Singh, 2017; Aswani et al., 2022).

Maritime Connectivity and Infrastructure Development

Maritime cooperation is acknowledged as one of the fundamental areas of cooperation between ASEAN and IORA in ensuring the stability of the seas for the economic development of both regions. This cooperation covers maritime transport, blue economy, and maritime security (Sooklal, 2023). For instance, India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for all in the Region) policy, which promotes a secure maritime environment in the Indian Ocean through initiatives like the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) for enhancing regional maritime security cooperation. Duha and Saputro (2022), further explain that, cooperation to boost greater maritime connectivity for trade also includes the development of maritime infrastructure, which is the backbone of economic interaction and connectivity.

Singapore, as a vital member of both organizations, has been active in initiatives promoting port development and maritime connectivity. As a global maritime trade hub, Singapore has championed projects such as the ASEAN Single Shipping Market and the IORA Indian Ocean Maritime Transport Charter to streamline regulatory procedures and improve maritime transport operations efficiency (ASEAN.Org, 2024). Singapore’s involvement in the ASEAN Connectivity Master Plan and the IORA Transport and Connectivity Working Group underscores its commitment in promoting regional connectivity and infrastructure development. ASEAN Connectivity Master Plan 2020’s focus is on the improvement of connectivity in two domains, namely physical and institutional, as well as people’s mobility. An example is Singapore-Kunming Railway Link (SKRL) that aims at linking the South East Asia with China through railways (ASEAN, 2021; IORA, 2021).

On the other hand, there appears to be imbalance in infrastructure development in most IORA member countries, with different levels of development. This situation creates a need for regional cooperation to improve the connectivity of infrastructure among IORA member states and ASEAN member states.

Trade and Economic Cooperation

Trade and economic cooperation between ASEAN and IORA have also made significant strides. as another vital member of both organizations, Malaysia has been at the forefront of promoting economic integration and trade facilitation.

Malaysia’s engagement in initiatives such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the IORA Trade and Investment Facilitation Working Group demonstrates its commitment to enhancing regional economic cooperation. Malaysia’s participation in the IORA Economic Cooperation and Development Working Group has also contributed to initiatives promoting sustainable development and inclusive growth across the Indian Ocean rim (Cordner, 2018).

Since IORA aims to adopt the ASEAN model for engagement in the Eastern Hemisphere, particularly in trade and economy, the complementary interests of significant economies in the Indian Ocean and SEA make cooperation promising. The Indo-Pacific concept has significant implications for Asia, strategically connecting the regions (Pero, 2019; Caballero-Anthony, 2022). ASEAN-IORA trade and economic cooperation present economic opportunities for both regions, essential for ASEAN’s strategic and economic interests. Apart from that, there is an imbalance which exists in the area’s long-term economic development and environmental impact, one which often outpaces the economic and social benefits derive from the oceans. Hence, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IIU) fishing as well as other criminal activities such as piracy can compromise peace and stability as well as hinder global trade and commerce (Chen et al., 2023).

People-to-People Exchanges and Cultural Diplomacy

Promoting people-to-people exchanges and cultural diplomacy is central to ASEAN and IORA’s efforts to foster greater understanding and cooperation. ASEAN is constructive, pragmatic, and result-oriented when raising proposals and initiatives for cooperation. Through cooperation between ASEAN and its external partners, people-to-people exchanges play a significant role in connecting relations and consolidate mutual understanding and trust.

Under the Regional Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-Partner Strategic Partnership (2011-2015), people-to-people contacts are prioritised for the establishment of a community of nations in the region. People-to-people exchanges are also included in several IORA priority areas. Strengthening understanding and mutual trust among people in the Indian Ocean region is an important driver towards better public awareness and an institutional way to manage regional cooperation (Anantasya, 2023).

As an ASEAN dialogue partner and a member of IORA, India has actively promoted cultural exchange and educational cooperation. Initiatives such as the ASEANIndia Youth Summit and the IORA Cultural Affairs Working Group have facilitated youth engagement, intercultural dialogue, and celebration of cultural diversity (RIS, 2023). India’s hosting of cultural festivals and exhibitions showcases the rich cultural heritage of Indian Ocean-rim countries and creating job opportunities. (Durrance-Bagale et al., 2022: Caballero-Anthony, 2022).

Disaster Management and Resilience-Building

Disaster management and resilience-building efforts have gained momentum within both ASEAN and IORA. Statistically, the Asian Development Bank estimated

ASEAN’s risk losing up to 11% of GDP by 2100 if no serious action to address natural disaster and climate change (AsiaMattersforAmerica.org/ASEAN, 2023). On the other hand, IORA member states from South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka’s) has 10%-18% of GDP at risk by 2050. Likewise, Central Asia, Middle East, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa nations face significant losses too (Jones, 2022). As a member of both organisations, Thailand has played an active role in disaster preparedness and response initiatives. It’s engagement in the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) and the IORA Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Working Group has facilitated cooperation in disaster response and recovery efforts. In 2019, Thailand hosted the IORA Workshop on Building Resilience to Disasters, which focused on sharing best practices in disaster management (ASEAN Secretariat, 2024).

Both ASEAN and IORA prioritize maritime security and disaster response. Cooperative efforts, such as those in the Malacca Strait and joint disaster management protocols post-2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, highlight regional interdependence in addressing security threats. The IOGA’s (Indian Ocean Global Alliance) DRM programme concentrates on developing the capacity for DRM in the region including prevention, response and rehabilitation One example is the ORA Workshop on Building Resilience to Disasters involving information sharing through experts and policymakers etc. in line with disaster risk management (IORA, 2021).

Theoretical Frameworks in Understanding ASEAN-IORA in the Indo-Pacific Construct

Theoretical support can be useful in evaluating ASEAN-IORA cooperation due to the complexity and dynamic nature of regional security issues. This cooperation encompasses significant major power competition and a vast maritime security domain, including interests in the IP, IO, and South China Sea (SCS). To thoroughly identify and assess the strategic issues and challenges Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and Neorealism, with a focus on the Balance of Power and Security Dilemma supports the analysis as shown in Figure 4

Figure 4: Theoretical Frameworks for Analysing ASEAN-IORA Cooperation

1. Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

A regional security complex is a group of states with interconnected security concerns, making their national security policies interdependent. Bound by geographical proximity and shared security issues such as political, military and natural disaster threats, these states experience a security threat to one state as a concern for others as well (Buzan & Waever, 2003). They identify various types of security complexes: major power-cantered complexes, standard security complexes, and super complexes formed by overlapping smaller ones. RSCT distinguishes between internal dynamics (interactions within the complex) and external dynamics (interactions with states outside the complex). Changes in global power structures or policies can impact a complex’s stability and character. RSCT emphasizes that global security is the aggregate of these regional complexes, each with unique patterns of amity and enmity, influenced by political, economic, and social factors. Securitization, a key RSCT concept, involves states framing issues as existential threats to justify extraordinary measures. This helps analyse how local security concerns can impact global security (Buzan, 1991 cited in Tharishini, 2015). RSCT is crucial in understanding ASEAN-IORA cooperation and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific where the ASEAN-IORA partnership is notably influenced by regional issues and significant major power rivalries.

2. Neorealism (Structural Realism)

Neorealism, contends that the international system operates in an anarchic state, is lacking a central governing authority. In this context, the distribution of power, primarily military and economic capabilities, dictates state behaviours. Driven by rationality and the imperative of survival, states engage in power balancing to prevent any single state from achieving hegemony (Waltz & Kenneth, 1979). In the context of ASEAN-IORA cooperation, this theory suggests that the partnership can be viewed as a strategic move to balance against the influence of major powers like China. By engaging in these regional forums, the United States and its allies seek to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific construct. These major powers rivalry puts ASEAN-IORA member states in a security dilemma situation. Therefore, the cooperation allows smaller states to pool their capabilities and enhance their collective bargaining power, thereby maintaining a balance of power. The security dilemma refers to the situation where actions taken by a state to increase its security (such as forming alliances or building up military capabilities) can lead to increased insecurity among other states, potentially leading to an arms race. However, ASEAN IORA cooperation may help to reduce the security dilemma among member states by fostering trust and cooperation. By creating a platform for dialogue and collaborative security measures, these regional forums can help alleviate mutual suspicions and reduce the likelihood of conflict, thus enhancing regional stability.

Strategic Issues and Challenges Impending ASEAN-IORA Cooperation

The United States, as a significant Indo-Pacific power, acknowledges the region’s vital importance to its security and prosperity. The evolving nature of warfare and international relations has rendered security issues more intricate. Within the regional context, threats to the security of one state impact all states within the complex, influencing regional cooperation. This dynamic also underscores the growing significance of irregular warfare in achieving strategic objectives. What is “irregular warfare” is defined by the United StatesDepartment of Defense (2007) as,

“A form of warfare in which states and non-state actors aim to influence or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities, either as the main approach or in conjunction with conventional warfare.”

This involves unconventional tactics such as economic dominance, military alliances, influence operations, proxy conflicts and non-state actors to achieve specific political, military, or economic objectives (The United States Department of Defense, 2007; David & Thomas, 2020).

The convergence of state actors, non-state actors, conventional warfare, and IRREGULAR WARFARE presents various strategic challenges that may hinder ASEAN-IORA cooperation. These issues and challenges have been scrutinized from the strategic standpoint of ASEAN-IORA collaboration, and the strategic competition among major powers as depicted in Figure 5

ASEAN-IORA Perspectives

Viewed from the perspectives of ASEAN and IORA, three principal strategic challenges regarding regional cooperation endeavours warrant attention: political disparities among member states, economic disparities within member states, and conflicting regional interests.

Figure 5: Strategic Issues and Challenges of ASEAN-IORA Cooperation

1. Political Differences Among Member States

A significant challenge for ASEAN-IORA cooperation lies in the political differences among the member states. ASEAN members have diverse political systems, ideologies, and foreign policies, complicating consensus on regional issues. Similarly, IORA members display a wide range of political regimes and geopolitical alignments, reflecting the Indian Ocean’s diversity. These differences can lead to divergent priorities, conflicting interests and varying levels of commitment to regional initiatives, posing significant challenges for ASEAN and IORA. ASEAN’s non-interference and consensus decision-making principle can hinder swift collective action, as seen in the varying national responses to China’s maritime claims (Ishikawa, 2019; Saman, 2015). Collective security and strategic autonomy are central to ASEAN, but often conflicting. For instance, the SCS dispute has caused divisions within ASEAN, with countries like Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia engaged in overlapping claims with China. This may have weakened ASEAN’s unity and credibility regarding China’s actions (ASEAN.Org, 2023; Laila et al., 2015). Similarly, geopolitical rivalries, such as between India and Pakistan, can hinder cooperation within IORA. Resolving these political differences requires diplomatic finesse, consensus-building, and a commitment to constructive dialogue. ASEAN’s principle of non-interference and IORA’s emphasis on dialogue and respect for sovereignty help maintain stability but bridging political divides remains an ongoing challenge.

2. Economic Disparities within Member States

Significantly impact ASEAN-IORA cooperation, ASEAN member states show considerable variations in economic development, income inequality, and industrialisation. For example, Singapore and Malaysia are highly developed, while Cambodia and Laos remain underdeveloped with limited economic diversification (ASEAN.Org, 2018; Ravenhill, 2018). These disparities pose challenges in coordinating regional economic initiatives and addressing the needs of less developed states. Similarly, IORA members face economic disparities, with countries like Australia and South Africa having advanced economies, while Comoros and Madagascar face development challenges and rely heavily on agriculture (IORA, 2024; Lee, 2017). These inequalities hinder efforts to promote inclusive growth, sustainable development, and effective disaster management across the Indian Ocean region and SEA. To address these disparities, initiatives such as the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) and the Strategic Action Plan for SMEs aim to support less developed members (ASEAN Secretariat, 2000). Similarly, IORA’s Action Plan and Declaration on Economic Cooperation promote trade, investment, and economic integration.

3. Competing Regional Interests

Posing a significant challenge for ASEAN-IORA cooperation, especially where geopolitical rivalries intersect with regional dynamics. ASEAN members are influenced by external powers like China, the United States, and Japan, each

Major Power Strategic Competitions In The Indo-Pacific Construct

The major power competitions in the Indo-Pacific mainly between US-ChinaIndia as depicted in Figure 6 is seen to impact regional security dynamics and hindering the ASEAN-IORA effective cooperation. Irregular warfare strategy is currently regarded as the most prevalent instrument employed to surpass their respective competitors.

6: US-China-India Strategic Competition and Implications

Geopolitical Competition in the Indo-Pacific

Geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific region is intensifying, marked by the strategic manoeuvres of major global powers and alliances as depicted in Figure 7. seeking to advance its strategic interests in the region (Cordner, 2018). This results in competition for influence, divergent strategic alignments, and conflicting security priorities, complicating consensus and collective action. Similarly, in the Indian Ocean region, major powers such as India, China, and the United States shape geopolitical dynamics and influence regional security architecture. The Indian Ocean’s strategic significance as a maritime trade route and energy corridor has heightened competition for influence, leading to geopolitical rivalries and security tensions. These competing interests undermine regional cooperation efforts on issues like maritime security, environmental protection, and disaster management. Addressing these competing interests requires diplomacy, dialogue and confidence-building measures to mitigate tensions and promote cooperative solutions. ASEAN’s constructive engagement and IORA’s consensus-building and non-alignment approaches help manage competing interests and maintain regional stability, fostering an environment for dialogue, trust-building, and cooperation.

Figure

The Indo-Pacific region holds strategic importance for every continent, driven by geopolitical dynamics and economic interests. The United States, along with NATO and its allies, emphasizes a commitment to a FOIP. Security guarantees to Japan, South Korea, and Australia, along with alliances with non-NATO partners like India and the Philippines, reinforce this stance. The Quad alliance, comprising the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, plays a crucial role in addressing shared security concerns and countering China’s growing influence (The White House, 2022). China, meanwhile, has expanded its strategic reach through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), enhancing global trade routes and securing economic and political leverage. This initiative aligns with BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) objectives to challenge Western dominance. Geopolitical competition is further fuelled by issues like the SCS disputes, India-Pakistan border tensions, and China’s claim on Taiwan, complicating ASEAN-IORA cooperation. Meanwhile, India’s investment in Iran’s Chabahar Port enhances connectivity with Central Asia, countering China’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative (Shambaugh, 2020; Tripathi, 2016).

The IP’s strategic significance is underscored by SEA’s central position and the Indian Ocean’s role as a vital trade hub linking Asia and Africa. The United Statesand its allies focus on upholding international rules and ensuring maritime security, while China’s initiatives aim to reshape regional connectivity and influence. This competition represents a broader struggle for dominance, with alliances and economic strategies shaping the Indo-Pacific’s future. This strategy incorporates economic influence, and other irregular tactics to consolidate power and counterbalance rivals (Syeda Hibba, 2023). The dynamic interplay between these global powers creates strategic issues and challenges for ASEAN-IORA cooperation, highlighting the region’s critical role in international affairs. Economic Dominance and Dependence

Figure 7: Geopolitical Competition in the Indo-Pacific (Source: FES Asia Editorial, 2024)

China has strong economic ties with SEA nations with ASEAN working to improve regional connectivity in response. India is also focusing on connectivity with ASEAN through an Act East policy. The major powers and ASEAN rely on economic leverage and coercion, posing significant challenges for ASEAN and IORA member states, often leading to economic dependency on major powers, notably China (Shambaugh, 2020). As evidenced by the BRI, which, while beneficial, has resulted in debt dependencies, allowing China to exert political and economic pressure. Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, developed with Chinese investment, has been cited as an example of “debt-trap diplomacy,” where financial dependency on China led to a long-term lease of the port to a Chinese company, impacting Sri Lanka’s strategic autonomy.

Likewise, India also leverages its economic influence with ASEAN and IORA through projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, improving regional connectivity. The New Development Bank (NDB) from BRICS supports India’s initiatives, directing funds to bolster its regional sway. However, China’s BRI, exemplified by projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), poses competition, binding countries through extensive infrastructure investments (Tripathi, 2016). Apart from that, the trade war initiation is related to US declining influence on world politics and the weaker-than-predicted threats from the global economy. Disputes between the United States and China disrupt the economic stability of ASEAN and IORA members. US-China trade wars and economic sanctions will impact the global economy as it is the second largest and valued at $300 billion. If the trade war continues, the global trade war is expected to increase to $550 billion, over 10% of world trade (Guo et al., 2023).

For instance, the United States-China trade war disrupted global supply chains, affecting ASEAN and IORA member states economies integrated into these chains and leading to economic uncertainty and trade diversion.

Military Influence and Security Concerns

Maritime security is crucial for the IORA and the Indo-Pacific region. The ASEANIndia partnership emphasises freedom of navigation and peaceful dispute resolution in the SCS. Particularly those involving China, pose significant security threats in the SCS and the Indian Ocean. China’s construction of military installations on artificial islands in the SCS has heightened tensions with several ASEAN members, complicating regional security cooperation (Elisabeth, 2022; Grare & Saman, 2022). Its deployment of fishing fleets, backed by coast guard vessels, to disputed areas like the Spratly Islands, represents a strategic use of irregular maritime forces to establish a presence without triggering outright conflict.

Significant powers like the United States and India create a strategic military alliances and balancing acts for ASEAN and IORA members, making it challenging to maintain a unified security policy. The United States military presence and defence agreements with ASEAN countries like the Philippines and Singapore establish strategic dependencies. Balancing strategic autonomy with collective

security become a challenge to ASEAN-IORA cooperation. It is a significant challenge for ASEAN and IORA due to differing member states’ priorities and dependencies as seen in the varying national responses to China’s maritime claims (Ishikawa, 2019 & Saman, 2015).

While India’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean aims to counterbalance China’s influence, the Indo-Pacific and the ‘contest for naval influence’ have posed challenges for ASEAN and IORA. This naval power projection has created a security dilemma for their member states in handling significant power influence (Elisabeth, 2022). The Indian and Chinese maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific indicates their clear competition for control over the maritime domain in this region. However, India is somewhat marginalised in this competition, particularly in the Grey Zone areas such as the SCS and the ASEAN nation bloc, as illustrated in Figure 8

Figure 8: Indian and Chinese Maritime Presence in the Indo-Pacific and Grey Zone for India Presence

(Source: Xinhua, 2017; US Department of Defense, 2018 cited in IISS, 2019)

The United States, India, Japan, and Australia have reactivated strategic links with Indo-Pacific states through Quad and AUKUS, which is a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the United States intended to “promote a free and open Indo-Pacific that is secure and stable”. The United States aims to drive global rebirth in the Indo-Pacific where through the IndoPacific Strategy 2022, it recognises India as a like-minded partner and leader in South Asia and the IO, and connected to SEA (The White House, 2022; Heritage & Lee, 2020). Strategic alliances exemplify major powers’ complex interactions in the Indo-Pacific, leaving ASEAN and IORA in a struggle for security cooperation with both China and the United States. Meanwhile, ASEAN is central in promoting peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific by navigating initiatives like joint military exercises and infrastructure projects that impact regional security dynamics.

Political Leverage and Influence Operations

Major powers engage in influence operations to sway political decisions within ASEAN and IORA, exploiting existing political divisions. For example, China’s use of economic incentives and political influence to gain support for its SCS claims has created divisions within ASEAN, undermining collective policy responses. ASEAN believes it can play a leading role in establishing regional rules, but the United States’ intervention is seen as premature complicating the situation (Nye Jr, 2020; Ladwig & Mukherjee, 2019).

Irregular warfare strategies are also used such as proxy conflicts and non-state actors’ involvement. This occurs notably in the National League for Democracy with the Arakan Army in Myanmar. Future state-governance challenges will emerge in states facing non-state actors under peace and cooperation rules, as well as human rights, migration, and terrorism rules (Hashmi et al, 2023). Proxy conflicts and the involvement of non-state actors supported by major powers can destabilise ASEAN and IORA regions. The United States and China’s support for different political factions and armed groups in various SEA countries, such as Myanmar, can exacerbate internal conflicts (Ishikawa, 2019; Grare & Samaan, 2022). Myanmar poses a difficulty for both ASEAN and IORA when huge number of the Rohingya’s people flee to most of the ASEAN and IORA countries causing political unrest, social concern and security instability.

Policy Recommendations and Opportunities For Enhancement

To enhance cooperation between ASEAN and IORA, and address the strategic competition especially involving the United States, China, and India and the associated aspects of irregular warfare, ASEAN-IORA cooperation must adopt comprehensive policies as depicted in Figure 9

Figure 9: Policy Recommendations

Strengthening Institutional Frameworks

To deepen institutional, efficiency and effectiveness of ASEAN and IORA, both institutions have to set out strategic direction by developing strategies, enhance multilateral security architecture externally, and ensure regular security review mechanisms. These frameworks should contain elaborate measures for dealing with traditional and non-traditional security threats. Cooperation could encompass combined military operations, and intelligence exchange to improve the capacity of ASEAN and IORA to respond to security threats. One example is the Malacca Strait Patrols initiated by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand to combat piracy, exhibit successful multilateral engagement.

The ongoing combined exercise and cooperation will help in building defence capability of ASEAN and IORA. They are of a confidence-building nature hence minimizing potential conflicts. For instance, the stepped-up naval cooperation between India and the ASEAN countries has the effect of boosting the security in a given area, and thus, elevating the level of trust. A continuous provision of vulnerability checks and planning for the analysis of the general regional security and cooperation structures is essential. These reviews should encompass the governments, scholars and the civil society so as to guarantee the continued suitability of these frameworks. Strategy review involving stakeholder analyses can tackle emerging issues such as cyber threats. This approach enhances the legitimacy and inclusiveness of policy-making, ensuring diverse perspectives are considered.

To avoid conflicts requires realistic objectives and clear frameworks for collaboration. Clear strategic goals and directive will keep cooperation’s orientation toward results, thus avoiding exploitation by major powers. Setting specific goals helps outline the collaboration process, resource allocation, and achievement metrics, reducing misunderstandings. Mapping out of action plan for disaster response can ensure quick, coordinated efforts during crises. These goals ensure all efforts align with common objectives, enhancing overall effectiveness and value of ASEAN-IORA cooperation.

Building Trust

It is important for ASEAN and IORA members to trust each other. The ASEAN-IORA action plan should promote inclusive dialogue, confidence-building measures, cross-regional partnerships, and people-to-people connectivity. Addressing strategic concerns and confidence-building can be cultivated through inclusive dialogues among ASEAN, IORA members, and major powers. Amplifying venues such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) to embrace IORA members is one way of reducing the security dilemma due to lack of understanding. Confidencebuilding measures, such as joint exercises and information-sharing agreements, can foster trust and stability.

ASEAN and IORA should facilitate cooperation among the member states, universities, research institutes and the think tanks in order to foster cross-

regional cooperation for partnership and exchange programmes. Co-organization of workshops and conferences, common training events addressing interests that include maritime security, environmental protection, disaster response, will enhance knowledge exchange and capacity building. A joint workshop can be organized for member states on the disaster management whereby they exchange the best practices to enhance their disaster management capabilities. Promoting people-to-people connectivity through cultural exchanges, educational programmes, and youth initiatives can foster mutual understanding and solidarity among ASEAN and IORA member states. Programmes like student exchange initiatives between universities in ASEAN and IORA countries can build strong interpersonal and cultural ties, reducing the potential for conflict and promoting a sense of regional community. These soft power initiatives complement hard security measures and contribute to long-term stability.

To further build trust, ASEAN and IORA should establish a regional disaster response mechanism that integrates their efforts. This could include a standing task force and a pooled fund for quick action to natural disasters and humanitarian crises. Given the region’s vulnerability to natural disaster, a well-coordinated response mechanism will ensure a more efficient responses, minimising the human and economic impact. Such cooperation fosters friendly relations and trust among member states, enhancing regional stability.

Encourage Sustainable Development and Economic Cooperation

Concerning the core problems leading to the instability, ASEAN and IORA should focus on integrating sustainability into regional cooperation to improve stability in the Indo-Pacific region. This approach ensures development benefits all member states, creating a more stable and prosperous region. Public policies focusing at blue economy development, sustainable fisheries, and climate change issues can enhance regional resilience. Since socio-economic factors define the long-term security and development, the risk of conflict can be alleviated by addressing socio-economic issues. Blue economy development should be a central theme in ASEAN-IORA cooperation. This includes formulating unified policies to align regional blue economy standards with international benchmarks and encouraging uniform adoption by member states. Capacity building should focus on investing in training and education for marine sectors and establishing R&D centres for blue economy innovations.

To address sustainable fisheries, emphasis should be placed on implementing science-based management plans to prevent overfishing and combat IIU fishing, and establishing regional bodies for enforcement. Strengthening regional cooperation for monitoring and enforcement, engaging local communities in management and decision-making, and educating on sustainable fishing practices are also crucial. Meanwhile, in mitigating climate change impacts, resilience planning is essential. This involves developing climate resilience plans for coastal and marine areas and integrating adaptation and mitigation measures

into development planning. Utilizing renewable energy and establishing regional climate research centres for research and data sharing will effectively address climate change.

Balance Relations with Major Powers

ASEAN and IORA should adopt a balanced approach in engaging with the dominant hegemons like the United States and China. Interacting with the two powers in equal circumstance to prevent domination by one or another promotes a multipolar regional order, which is crucial for stability. This way, they can reduce reliance on any single major power, thereby mitigating security dilemma and the risks of entanglement in major power rivalries. Active participation of ASEAN and IORA warrants for interaction with the major powers while maintaining regional independence and encouraging a multipolar system. Given the geopolitical complexities involving the United States and China, these organisations should strive for strategic autonomy and diversified partnerships. Constant participation in diplomatic forums like the ARF and IORA meetings can foster self-sufficiency and balanced relations. Additionally, supporting regional initiatives that promote economic and security cooperation can help in balancing major power influence and ensure a stable, multipolar region.

Develop Joint Maritime Security Initiatives

ASEAN and IORA should commence unity partnerships gearing towards maritime security initiatives encompassing anti-piracy operations, search and rescue missions, and maritime domain awareness. In this regard, establishing a regional maritime security coordination centre, such as a joint ASEAN-IORA task force, will enhance these efforts. Maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region remains a major concern, and joint initiatives will strengthen regional capabilities, improve coordination, and provide a united front against common threats. A regional coordination centre serves as a strategic operation centre for operational collaboration and hub for information sharing.

A joint ASEAN-IORA task force role is to ensure the two organisations engage in extensive communication, planning and cooperation. It is suggested that this task force should consist of ASEAN and IORA members, dialogue partners, international organisations, and civil society groups. It would identify areas of mutual interest, develop joint initiatives, and monitor progress on collaborative projects. By institutionalising cooperation through a dedicated mechanism, ASEAN and IORA can streamline decision-making and promote synergy between their agendas. Joint maritime security efforts can include coordinated patrols, shared intelligence, and joint exercises among ASEAN and IORA members. These common security strategies lead to more efficiency and effectiveness by enhancing preparedness and enforcement in regional waters, thereby improving overall maritime security.

Conclusion

In summary, the cooperation between ASEAN and IORA holds significant promise for advancing regional integration, economic development, and maritime security within the Indo-Pacific construct. The partnership is driven by shared strategic interests such as enhancing regional security, fostering maritime connectivity, promoting trade and economic cooperation, facilitating peopleto-people exchanges, and strengthening disaster management capabilities. These areas of mutual interest provide a strong base for joint initiatives aimed at fostering stability and prosperity across the region. Comprehensive policies as depicted in Figure 9 above would be able to enhance cooperation between ASEAN and IORA, and address the strategic competition especially involving the United States, China, and India and the associated aspects of irregular warfare.

By focusing on strengthening institutional frameworks, building trust, encouraging sustainable development and economic cooperation, balancing relations with major powers, and develop joint maritime security initiatives, these policies would be able to focus on enhancing economic resilience, security cooperation, and political unity while addressing irregular warfare tactics such as economic dominance, political leverage, balancing acts, proxy conflicts, and influence operations. The proposed establishment of a maritime security coordination centre will enhance coordination and streamline decision-making processes. Prioritising connectivity, infrastructure development, cross-regional partnerships, and sustainable development initiatives will further contribute to the longterm well-being and resilience of the Indo-Pacific construct. Through proactive engagement, strategic coordination of actions, as well as pragmatic cooperation, will allow ASEAN and IORA to achieve their full potential and shape a more interconnected and stable Indo-Pacific region.

Finally, embracing opportunities, flexibility, and inclusivity will enable ASEAN and IORA to navigate regional dynamics and promote peace, stability, and prosperity. Through collective action and collaborative efforts, both organisations can shape the future of the Indo-Pacific and contribute to a more peaceful and prosperous world.

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CHAPTER TWO

LATERAL LEADERSHIP IN THE INDO-PACIFIC: PRESERVING PEACE THROUGH MIDDLE POWER COOPERATION

Dr. Nell Bennett

Sea Power Centre, Royal Australian Navy

Introduction

The Indo-Pacific region currently confronts a greater range of traditional and nontraditional security challenges than any time over the past century. From territorial disputes to climate change, illegal fishing and marine pollution the challenges are diverse and numerous. Furthermore, all these challenges are in the shadow big power competition in the region. Middle powers have traditionally followed the lead of big powers, especially when confronted with serious challenges. However, the issues that the Indo-Pacific region is facing may be more amenable to a different kind of leadership. This chapter argues that the middle powers of the Indo-Pacific are in a unique position to leverage cooperation and collaboration a build a new model of lateral leadership.

Traditional thinking in International Relations assumes that bipolar systems present middle powers with three strategic options: bandwagoning with stronger powers, balancing against perceived threats, or strategic hedging. More recently a fourth has been added. There has been increasing interest in ‘minilateralism’ – or coalitions of states that come together together to advance specific objectives. Yet there is another alternative available for the Indo-Pacific: middle power leadership. Lateral leadership is a concept that is well established in business studies but one that has received little attention in strategic analysis. Middle

powers, much like middle managers, can promote innovative problem-solving and meaningful change in the absence of top-level leadership. Middle power leadership is different from minileralism in two key ways. First, minilateralism is confined to a single, or small, problem set, while middle power leadership provides a mechanism through responding to a broad set of challenges that are long burning or crises that suddenly emerge. Second, as the name implies, middle power leadership empowers actors to lead with others (including great powers) following rather than working through concensus.

This chapter explores the ways that middle powers, such as Malaysia, can ‘lead from the middle’ and promote norms and governance models that will preserve regional stability. The chapter will first discuss the unique challenges facing middle powers in the Indo-Pacific region. It will then discuss the concept of lateral leadership and the ways that this can be applied to the Indo-Pacific. Lateral leadership is distinguished from minilateralism, which is characterised by its single-issue focus and vulnerability to regime change within participating states. Lateral leadership, by comparison, is a sustainable, long-term model for regional governance. This chapter also discusses the importance of regional dispute resolution mechanisms, such as international law of the sea, mediation and arbitration – not to resolve disputes per se, but as a means of promoting a pre-determined system for managing inter-state relations which provides a sense of regional community that transcends specific disagreements. The chapter will close with a discussion of ways that middle powers can adopt a lateral leadership model and the positive impact this can have on Indo-Pacific stability.

Middle Powers in the Indo-Pacific

Interest in the role of middle powers has come in waves since the end of the Cold War. In the late 20th century, scholars and foreign policy practitioners predicted the coming of a ‘Pacific Century’ that would be led by middle powers (Foot & Walter, 1999). The belief was that a new regionalism would emerge, based on economic interests, proximity and cultural values. These hopes were dashed by the Asian Economic Crisis, the Global War Against Terrorism, and finally the remergence of great power politics. Middle power cooperation has gradually fallen out of policy and academic fashion.

As the Pacific Century passed out of mind, the new term ‘Indo-Pacific’ gained popularity. The Indo-Pacific provided new conceptual understanding of the ‘region’ – an alternative to the China-centric ‘Asia-Pacific’. As Rory Medcalf maintains, the redefinition reflects ‘the region’s enduring maritime and multipolar character. It is authentically regional rather than narrowly American. The Indo-Pacific serves not to exclude or contain China but to dilute its influence…’ (Medcalf, 2019, p. 83). The implication being that the inclusion of more middle powers inside the region could temper China’s ascendancy and provide viable alternatives for powers that may otherwise choose to align with China.

Despite the attention paid to middle powers, all too often the term ‘middle power’ is undefined (Gill, Lockyer, Lim & Tan, 2024). This can lead to confusion as to which states fall within this category. Middle powers are typically understood to be ‘non-great powers that can influence international affairs in specific instances, shaping their regional environment in significant ways, and resisting the demands of great powers’ (Brattberg, 2021). While there are competing definitions of middle powers, this chapter relies on three key characteristics of middle power: capabilities, status and impact. Middle powers have medium range capabilities, they are respected in the international hierarchy, and they have significant impact at the regional level (Struye de Swielande, 2019, p. 193.).

According to this understanding, Malaysia, Australia, South Korea and Indonesia would be considered middle powers.

Another characteristic that is often used to identify ‘middlepowerhood’ is a preference for cooperation (Harijanto, 2024). This is because middle powers typically support multilateralism and use diplomacy to promote liberal norms (Spies, 2016). These characteristics can be harnessed to address the challenges facing the Indo-Pacific. Former Australian foreign minister, the Hon Gareth Evans (2019) put it in the following terms,

“Middle power diplomacy, is, in short, the kind of diplomacy which can, and should, be practised by states which are not big or strong enough, either in their own region or the wider world, to impose their policy preferences on anyone else; but who do recognize that that there are international policy taskswhichneedtobeaccomplishediftheworldaroundthemistobesafer, saner, more just and more prosperous… and who have sufficient capacity and credibility to be able to advance those tasks”

Middle powers in the Indo-Pacific are facing issues including threats to maritime security, destabilising territorial claims, food and energy security and the impacts of climate change – to list but a few. In the past, middle powers of the Indo-Pacific have relied on US leadership on key security and economic issues. A self-identified Indo-Pacific state, the US has long viewed itself as part of the region (Scott, 2018) However, the rise of China has led to strategic competition. Sino-American competition has shaped and focussed the US leadership role in Indo-Pacific. As a result, middle powers have an opportunity to exercise lateral leadership to address challenges facing the region.

Leading from the Middle

A key concern for Indo-Pacific middle powers is maintaining regional stability. This goal can be pursued through middle power lateral leadership. Middle power diplomacy is generally normative in nature and tends to promote values including liberal internationalism, multilateralism, good international citizenship, inclusivity and using norms to resolve conflict (Spies, 2016, p. 286). Thus, Indo-Pacific middle powers can work together to preserve and enhance regional governance and dispute resolution structures.

Malaysia, in particular, is well situated to assume a leading role. Malaysia’s middle power leadership credentials rest upon geography, culture, and politics. Malaysia holds a vital geostrategic position in the Indo-Pacific region. Positioned between the Pacific and Indian oceans, Malaysia sits at the centre of two of the world’s most dynamic ocean regions. Not only is Malaysia a point of convergence for these two maritime domains, but it also serves as a link between the Asian continent and the island nations of Southeast Asia (Kuik, 2020, pp. 45-48; Ministry of Defence, 2020, p. 11). Malaysia is uniquely connected to its Southeast Asian neighbours. It shares borders with most Southeast Asian countries and most of the borders are maritime (Ryan, 2023). It is also at the junction of key trade route between the east and west (Ministry of Defence, 2020, p. 23). Culturally, Malaysia is an IndoPacific melting pot. Its people and culture enfuse aspects from Europe, Middle East, India, Southeast Asia and China into a single rich cultural entity. Malaysia’s geography and culture provide the nation with a deep international political network. A member of the British Commonwealth, Malaysia has been a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) since 1971 and has maintained deep and enduring security relationships with Australia and New Zealand. As a key ASEAN member state, Malaysia also has good relations with its neighbours. Further afield, Malaysia is a member of the Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation, which ties it to the wider Islamic world. Few other Indo-Pacific middle powers are able to exercise as much influence over as broad a set of actors as Malaysia.

It is also in Malaysia’s national interest to ensure that regional stability is maintained. China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea are having destabilising effects and are undermining international law. The South China Sea/West Philippine Sea has unique geostrategic significance for Malaysia as it connects the nation’s two landmasses – Peninsular Malaysia and the states of Sabah and Sarawak. In addition, the Straits of Malacca and the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) adjoining the sea are vital to the nation’s security. For this reason, Malaysia’s maritime strategy involves maintaining sovereignty and presence in its territorial seas and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and defending against any external threats or hostility (Permal, 2019).

One of the greatest sources of tension in the South China Sea is the Spratley Islands. These islands are claimed by China, Vietnam and Taiwan in their entirety. Other states, including Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei claim part of the chain (Kwok, 2019, p. 2). Malaysia makes territorial claims over ten Spratley Island atolls near Sabah waters and maintains a military presence in five atolls situated in the southern part of the Spratley Islands (Ryan, 2023). The South China Sea also has economic significance for Malaysia (Lai & Kuik, 2020). The sea’s fish stocks and hydrocarbon deposits make it an important resource for food and energy security (Lai & Kuik, 2020).

China is making aggressive incursions into Malaysia’s EEZ to advance its territorial claims. Over the last decade, the Chinese maritime militia and Coast Guard have conducted operations in two areas that Malaysia considers to be part of

its sovereign territory: James Shoal and Luconia Shoals off the Sarawak coast of Borneo. James Shoal is positioned just above the southernmost tip of China’s nine-dash line, giving rise to the Chinese claim that the shoal is its southernmost territory (Putra, 2024). As a result, China has been deploying its maritime forces just off the coast of Sarawak. China has also aggressively pursued its claim on Luconia Shoals, which have significant strategic value due to their oil and gas deposits. Throughout 2024 the Chinese Coast Guard conducted near-continual patrols of this area (‘A Well-Oiled Machine’, 2024).

Indeed, Malaysia has been the subject of increasingly aggressive incursions into its EEZ. In January 2023 China’s largest coast guard vessel, CCG5901, entered Malaysia’s EEZ, as well as those of several Southeast Asian countries, causing interruptions to Malaysian oil exploration and drilling, (Ryan, 2023; ‘Report: China Coast Guard ‘more robust than ever’’, 2023). CCG5901 is a 12,000-tonne Zhaotou class ship, which is the world’s largest coast guard ship class. CCG5901 is equipped with a 76 mm gun, two 30 mm gun, two anti-aircraft machine guns, two Z-8 helicopters, several unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned underwater vehicles. There is little doubt that the vessel is designed – and used – to intimidate, (‘China’s ‘Monster’ Coast Guard Ship Resumes Patrols in Malaysian EEZ Waters?’, 2024).

China has demonstrated that it has no qualms about using grey zone tactics and constabulary forces to advance its strategic objectives, while keeping just below the threshold for conventional retaliation. China’s use of these tactics has extended to the airspace, including encounters with the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). In 2021 the RMAF intercepted 16 Chinese military aircraft in tactical formation above the Luconia Shoals (Putra, 2024). In order to limit the risk of escalation, Malaysia and other Indo-Pacific nations have tended to respond to Chinese aggression with constabulary forces rather than conventional naval capabilities (Putra, 2024). While this has enabled Indo-Pacific nations to hold their own without risk of escalation, it is short-term response, not a long-term solution. As strategic rivalry between the US and China intensifies, and China seeks to secure its influence over the Indo-Pacific, events like the incursion of the Zhaotou class ‘monster’ ship into Indo-Pacific states’ EEZs can be predicted to become more frequent. China’s territorial ambitions can only be realised at a cost to the other claimant states – and potentially to regional stakeholders concerned with SLOC protection. The Indo-Pacific needs a proportionate plan of action to preserve the status quo. The time is right for the region to adopt a collaborative approach to maintaining stability.

Shaping Outcomes through Middle Power Leadership

Under the traditional realist view of international relations, middle powers are viewed as subordinate to great powers within the international power structures. They must choose to either bandwagon, balance or hedge to survive in an anarchic system. Realists argue that competition is the defining characteristic of international politics. In that respect international politics is much like the

business world. Therefore, insights can be drawn from business studies to enhance leadership in the international sphere.

In 1988 Ikujiro Nonaka elaborated a novel form of leadership called ‘middle-updown management’. This was based on Nonaka’s observations of the way that Honda was conducting product development. Middle managers were given unusual latitude in creative decision making which resulted in a revolutionary new design. This led to a stream of research that found that traditional hierarchical leadership is ineffective at generating creativity, (Nonaka, 1988, p. 9). The topdown approach inhibits interaction between different parties in the system, which in turn prevents the exchange of knowledge and information that can generate new solutions to problems, (Sáenz, Aramburu & Rivera, 2007). In contrast, by empowering middle management to make decisions and solve problems, companies can generate more innovation and creative problem solving (Sáenz, Aramburu & Rivera, 2007).

Middle powers have traditionally been expected to follow the strategic plans set out by the hegemons – just as middle managers have been expected to execute the vision of their senior management (Sherman, 2018). Under the middle-updown model, those in the middle look up for strategic direction, then look down for frontline information to enable them to enact that direction.

Applying the middle-up-down approach to the Indo-Pacific – middle powers can look up to the US for big picture guidance. The US has long been a champion of the liberal order, international law, freedom of navigation and maintaining a free and prosperousIndo-Pacific. Middle powers can then look to their own knowledge and practical tools of statecraft, and look down to smaller states for information and intelligence relevant to regional security issues. By synthesising grand strategy and grassroots perspectives, middle powers can generate new solutions to security challenges.

Middle powers hold unique positions in the Indo-Pacific region – they have access to the great powers, and they have influence over smaller powers. Middle powers also have regional expertise and a more nuanced understanding of the unique dynamics of the Indo-Pacific than big powers which by their very nature are required to maintain a global perspective. Unlike great powers, middle powers are generally more focused on their regions. Middle powers are therefore more alert to opportunities and challenges and have more foreign policy agility, (Struye de Swielande, 2019, pp. 193-194). They can also enact positive change in their region by presenting big powers ‘with unique interpretations of emerging issues and by proposing new initiatives’ (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997) Middle powers can also use their relationships with small states to identify challenges and obstacles and to workshop solutions.

Middle power leadership can be effected through coalition building with states with shared national interests (Evans, 2019). Indo-Pacific states are faced with

the challenge of responding to China’s territorial aspirations and disregard for international law. This provides a common bond that can be leveraged to foster cooperation. The rules and norms that underpin regional order are currently under threat. Middle power leadership can be used to reinforce the structures and institutions that provide stability in the region.

The Middle Path

In a speech on middle power diplomacy, Gareth Evans identified four elements that are necessary for effective middle power leadership: opportunity, capacity, creativity and credibility. In terms of opportunity, the current geopolitical situation provides a valuable opportunity for coalition building based on common interests. The two great powers of the region will not always provide the necessary leadership. The US has a global outlook and domestic considerations that may divert its attention and resources from the Indo-Pacific. China, by contrast, is taking advantage of this fact to engage in the very activities that are destabilising the region. Small powers do not have the resources to enact change, therefore, the responsibility falls to the middle powers to preserve the status quo.

Regarding capacity, middle powers do not have the capabilities to advance global ambitions. A defining characteristic of middle powers is that they have mid-range capabilities. However, these capabilities – when combined with those of other middle powers – are sufficient to effect change at the regional level. A middle power grouping can create sufficient critical mass to influence a region and forestall revisionism. They can use their influence with smaller states to sustain rule of law in the region and encourage adherence to extant dispute resolution structures.

One of the recognised capabilities of middle power diplomacy is norm-promotion. Middle powers can exercise their influence to encourage states to pursue legal avenues for resolving their differences. Even when litigation, arbitration or mediation do not provide a solution that is agreeable to the parties involved, the very process of adhering to a recognised collective dispute resolution mechanism brings states together and creates a sense of community among nations. While it may be intuitive to think that a regional community of nations must be based on common interests, and that these bonds are weakened by internal discord, adherence to international law and norms brings nations together regardless of their positions on discrete issues. By participating in predetermined processes, states demonstrate that they are involved in a collective governance process, (Hakimi, 2017). China’s failure to adhere to international law has a corrosive effect on the institution. Despite participating in the drafting of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea and ratifying the convention, in recent years the Chinese Communist Party has chosen to apply Chinese domestic law to the areas that it considers to be part of its sovereign territory, (Tacujan, 2022). However, if the middle powers of the region continue to use international law to regulate inter-state relations, they can perpetuate the norm of rules-based governance in the region.

Regarding creativity – a key advantage of Nonaka’s model of middle-up-down leadership is that it has been demonstrated to boost creativity and innovation. The region is facing new challenges, such as the effects of climate change and environmental degradation, that require novel approaches. The advantage of middle-up-down leadership over traditionally hierarchical leadership is that it rests on interaction. States can share their information and perspectives to develop new knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 2001, p. 64). The development of shared knowledge should allow the middle powers to adapt to changing conditions, identify and capitalise on news opportunities and respond to challenges as they emerge (Oldham, 2003, p. 244).

Credibility is essential for effective leadership and collaboration. Trust is a precondition for inter-state cooperation and is an essential aspect of lateral leadership (Kydd, 2000). Trust can be built through effective communication. Indeed, by creating channels and forums for free and open communication, states can not only develop confidence and rapport but can provide space for knowledge generation and creative problem solving.

Middle Power Leadership or Minilaterism?

Middle power leadership is different to minilateralism. Minilateralism has been heralded as a way for small and medium powers in the Indo-Pacific to promote norms and protect their interests (Pankaj, 2024). This is not surprising given the number of minilateral institutions in the Indo-Pacific, ranging from the highprofile Quad to less known coalitions such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA), led by Singapore and New Zealand.

Eerishika Pankaj has argued in favour of minilateral leadership on the basis that they can function as regional ‘norm entrepreneurs’. These ad hoc unions may address discrete problems, but they can also tackle broad issues, such as the Quad’s commitment to a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ and the ASEAN South China Sea Code of Conduct (Pankaj, 2024). The proliferation of minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific provides benefits including increased cooperation on issues such as maritime security and climate change.

Minilaterals, however, also have their disadvantages. There is the risk that increases in regional institutions will add additional layers to the already complex institutional landscape of the Indo-Pacific (Parameswaran, 2024). Once a minilateral has been established, it is very difficult to dissolve. Even if the institution becomes ineffectual, formal dissolution would send signals that the participating states no longer value the objectives that the minilateral was established to advance. The result is a proliferation of inefficient institutions that consume resources without providing benefit, (Parameswaran, 2024).

1See the discussion of ‘ba’ in Nonaka, I., Toyama, R., & Konno, N. (2000). SECI, Ba and leadership: a unified model of dynamic knowledge creation. Longrangeplanning , 33(1), 5-34.

Conclusion

Nations of the Indo-Pacific are facing considerable challenges. These include traditional security threats such as revisionism and geopolitical competition, and non-traditional security threats such as climate change, environmental degradation, piracy, terrorism and illegal, unlawful and unregulated fishing. According to orthodox realist theory, leadership is the realm of the hegemons. Middle and small powers must choose between balancing, bandwagoning and hedging. However, this chapter has presented an alternate scenario for the middle powers of the Indo-Pacific – lateral leadership. Rather than following the lead of the great powers, middle powers can form coalitions and use their combined influence to enact change and preserve regional stability. Indo-Pacific middle powers are in a unique position in that they have shared interests in preserving the status quo.

References

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China’s ‘Monster’ Coast Guard Ship Resumes Patrols in Malaysian EEZ Waters? (2024, March 22). Defence Security Asia. https://defencesecurityasia.com/ en/chinas-monster-coast-guard-ship-resumes-patrols-in-malaysian-eezwaters/

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CHAPTER THREE

THE MILITARISATION OF FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY

Mohammad Shafiq bin Zainon RMN Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College, PUSPAHANAS

Introduction

The end of the Cold War initially sparked optimism for a reduction in militarisation since it brought about the hope for global demilitarisation and the widely awaited “peace dividend”. In contrast, there has been no decrease in equipping and organizing states, both major power and small, with military forces, which is occurring globally. This is apparent from the observation that the period following the Cold War has experienced a substantial escalation of militarisation. This growth is exemplified by the prolonged hostilities in nations such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine, and most recently, Palestine. The term “militarisation” is defined by Vocabulary.com (2024) as,

“Theprocessofbecomingreadyforconflictorwarismilitarisation Sometimes, militarisation refers to making a civilian organization resemble the armed forces - with uniforms or weapons, for example. When a country prepares itself for war, that’s militarisation.”

According to the above definition, militarisation is deemed as using the military for a specific purpose. Within the particular context of the South China Sea (SCS), it pertains to the deployment of military forces in this area, and the establishment of artificial or natural islands as strategic military outposts or defensive bases.

Commander

This paper specifically examines the SCS as the scope of study to illustrate the phenomenon of military globalization.

The SCS, located in the middle region of Southeast Asia, is a significant geopolitical theatre where historical claims, territorial disputes, and growing militarisation meet. The oceanic region, rich in valuable resources and important sea routes, has been a focal point for states asserting their authority over islands, reefs, and shoals. In the midst of this climate of contention, the region is experiencing a notable surge in military presence, with crucial components being transformed into strategic bases. This paper presented analysis through combined international relations theories since no single theory may encompass all these aspects, and a combination can provide a comprehensive understanding.

This paper aims to investigate the intricate consequences of the militarisation of characteristics, analysing its profound impact on the delicate balance in the region. Based on the following conceptual framework, specific implications have been analysed as a result of this militarisation process.

This paper is structured by examining the present facts, the prime factor contributing to militarisation, and the contemporary features of militarisation in the SCS. The author conducted an analysis and derived multiple implications. Every impact was concisely expressed. Subsequently, the author performed a “So What” analysis, elucidating the lessons learned from the study regarding the role of Malaysia and the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) in effectively navigating and overcoming these consequences (Mumford, 2018).

The Root of the Militarisation Process

The SCS, a strategically significant region, has been influenced by a historical narrative of states making rival territorial claims. Nations like China, Vietnam,

Figure 1.0: Conceptual Framework

the Philippines, Malaysia, and other littoral states have asserted their historical entitlements to islands, reefs, and shoals, constructing elaborate narratives supporting their sovereignty claims. The historical context establishes the foundation for the intricate and enduring territorial conflicts observed in the SCS. The formation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 introduces a degree of legal intricacy to these arguments (Gonzales , 2020). The UNCLOS, which is an extensive global agreement, delineates the entitlements and obligations of countries with regard to oceanic utilization, encompassing provisions for territorial seas and exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Nevertheless, despite endeavouring to develop a legal framework, the SCS remains a focal friction point (Pradana and Suprayogi, 2021). The region’s early hints of turmoil can be attributed to long-standing territorial assertions and disputes. The SCS has become a significant area of geopolitical tensions due to diplomatic disagreements, naval posturing, and territory claims. The initial conflicts have given rise to an intricate network of conflicting interests and strategic actions. The SCS serves as a vital maritime area where historical claims, legal frameworks, and initial tensions intersect. This convergence of past, present, and future regional dynamics presents challenges to stability and diplomatic resolution in the region. The essence of this historical narrative is that militarisation in this area is predominantly motivated by territorial disputes.

Features in the SCS

In recent years, there has been a troubling development in the SCS - the transformation of previously disputed features into military installations, which were originally sought after for their strategic and economic importance. An essential element of this phenomenon is the creation and advancement of manmade islands. Nations such as China have engaged in major land reclamation initiatives, converting submerged reefs into fortified outposts equipped with airstrips and military infrastructure (Pasandiseh, 2021). These man-made islands function as strategic military bases, allowing a country to expand its influence. Using military assets, such as naval vessels and sophisticated armaments, has intensified tensions. The process of militarisation extends beyond the acquisition of military equipment. There has been a notable emphasis on improving the infrastructure of contested areas, thereby strengthening the logistical capabilities necessary for military activities.

Critical stakeholders in the region, including China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, significantly influence this undertaking. China has been leading the way in pushing its claims through a combination of forceful diplomatic and military expansion (Goldstein, 2020). Vietnam and the Philippines have endeavoured to enhance their positions, resulting in an intricate network of overlapping territorial assertions. The global community has reacted with different levels of apprehension. The United States and its allies have condemned efforts to militarize the SCS while recognizing its strategic importance (Goldenziel, 2020). Despite several calls by international conferences and organizations for peaceful resolutions and compliance with existing maritime regulations, the intricate geopolitical dynamics persistently

influence the process of militarising geographical elements in the SCS, posing a continuous obstacle to regional stability and diplomatic relations.

Geostrategic Implications

Increasing military presence and activities in the SCS has significant geopolitical consequences that impact global events. An essential factor is the mastery of maritime routes and critical bottlenecks. As countries strengthen their positions in the area, the capacity to control crucial sea routes becomes a powerful instrument of geopolitical sway. This control impacts regional dynamics and presents difficulties for international shipping. The SCS serves as a vital channel for international trade, and any interruptions could have significant economic consequences for the countries that depend on these waterways. The increase in military deployment in the region has intensified tensions, affecting the unrestricted movement of ships and causing apprehension regarding the security of vessels sailing through disputed waterways.

The economic consequences from regional trade are substantial and the SCS plays a crucial role in the global supply chain, serving as a pivotal point through which a significant volume of trade flows (Macaraig and Fenton, 2021). The introduction of military presence in the region brings about an element of unpredictability, which has the potential to disrupt the movement of products and influence the economies of the nations concerned. Since the globalized economy heavily relies on international shipping, which faces significant challenges due to escalating geopolitical tensions, escalation of military presence increases the likelihood of maritime incidents that could result in conflicts impeding secure and effective transportation of products.

Moreover, the SCS is also vital in ensuring global energy security as a substantial proportion of the world’s oil and natural gas shipments traverse its maritime territory. The presence of threats or interruptions in this crucial maritime route might have significant implications for global energy markets, emphasizing the geopolitical importance of militarisation in the SCS. This assertion has also been substantiated by the Sea Control operation recently conducted by the Houthis (who are purported to represent Yemen), wherein they have obstructed the passage of humanitarian vessels that are allegedly supporting Israel’s strike against Gaza (Palestine) (Salhani, 2023). This incident has raised global awareness about the significance of controlling cholke points, which are commonly understood as strategic, narrow passages that connect two larger areas to one another. When it comes to maritime trade, these are typically straits or canals that see high volumes of traffic because of their optimal location.

Security Dilemmas and Escalation Risks

Increasing military presence and activity in the SCS has created a complicated network of security challenges for the countries concerned, which has heightened

the likelihood of military escalation. As the littoral states compete for authority over contested regions, the apparent necessity for protective actions frequently intensifies tensions. Security challenges arise when one countries’s efforts to enhance its security are perceived by another as a possible threat, resulting in a reciprocal pattern of military escalation. This potential for military escalation poses significant risks, as miscalculations and unforeseen conflicts may arise in this highly volatile region. Historical instances of regional conflicts, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the dynamics of the Cold War, offer valuable insights into the delicate nature of security challenges and the possibility of catastrophic consequences if diplomatic efforts fail.

External parties have intensified tensions in the SCS as well. The region holds significant geopolitical importance, attracting the attention of major countries such as the United States and its allies (Omar, 2022). These powers frequently undertake activities seen as interventionist by the parties concerned. Sale of weapons, formation of military alliances, and establishment of strategic partnerships create an environment of suspicion, heightening security challenges among regional participants (Abbasi, 2020). The likelihood of unintentional military conflicts increases when other entities become intertwined in the intricate geopolitical climate. In order to circumvent the potential drawbacks of historical events and foster stability, diplomatic endeavours must assume a prominent role, prioritizing the resolution of conflicts and collaboration instead of engaging in military displays. Amidst the complex interplay of geopolitical interests, it is crucial to establish a shared understanding in order to address security challenges and minimize the likelihood of military escalation in the SCS. This implication can be demonstrated by multiple dominant nations currently occupying the SCS, each of them also safeguards their respective interests and ideals by deploying warships, collaborating in military training, and establishing military infrastructure.

Regional Responses and Alliances

In the context of the expanding militarisation in the SCS, the actions and alliances formed by littoral states have played a pivotal role in shaping the current discussions and initiatives to resolve the issue. ASEAN has become a significant participant in tackling the issue by trying to promote diplomatic resolutions through diplomacy and negotiations despite historical internal conflicts. Nations directly involved have engaged in bilateral and multilateral consultations to identify common ground, which has been significant. The current ASEAN-led project, known as the Code of Conduct in the SCS, demonstrates the regional dedication to adopting norms that promote responsible behaviour and prevent conflicts (Mangku and Firdaus, 2022).

Concurrently, alliances and partnerships have been formed in reaction to the perceived threat of militarism. Countries like Vietnam and the Philippines have actively pursued stronger relationships with external actors, such as the United

States, to maintain a balance of power and strengthen their positions in the ares (Capie, 2020). The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) consisting of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, has become increasingly important as a strategic alliance to safeguard a free and open Indo-Pacific region (O’Brien, Gagne and MacDonald , 2022), and indirectly addresses concerns on the SCS.

Furthermore, it is essential to acknowledge the presence of alternative collaboration initiatives that predominantly prioritise economic and security concerns. These include the Indo-Pacific Strategy, involving the Quad countries, and the China Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), which aim to bring together certain countries in the SCS and China (Ryou-Ellison, 2021). Assessing the efficacy of diplomatic endeavours is a multifaceted undertaking. Although there have been ongoing discussions and negotiations, there has been limited real progress in reducing tensions and finding long-term solutions. The intricate geopolitical dynamics, deep-rooted historical resentment and the strategic objectives of key stakeholders contribute to a complex environment that poses difficulties for regional reactions. The efficacy of alliances and partnerships in preventing militarisation will rely on continuous diplomatic endeavours, strict adherence to international law, and a dedication to resolving conflicts peacefully in the SCS.

International Legal Framework

The increased deployment of military forces in the SCS has placed significant emphasis on international law and its framework in the ongoing talks over the geopolitical tensions in the region. The UNCLOS is a fundamental instrument for regulating maritime activities and defining national boundaries (Chandra, 2021). Compliance with UNCLOS has been a highly debated matter, especially with the competing territorial claims in the SCS. Nations, especially China, have claimed their historical entitlements, questioning the relevance of UNCLOS to the conflicts. The international community has utilized international arbitration as a legal means to address and settle disputes. The 2016 verdict by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which dismissed China’s historical claims and supported the Philippines, emphasized the need to abide by international law (Pietrasak, 2020). Nevertheless, legal obstacles still persist. Several governments engaged in the conflicts have voiced concerns regarding arbitration, highlighting the importance of diplomatic resolutions. The intricate interaction between geopolitical interests and legal frameworks underscores the constraints of international law in addressing the complicated problems associated with militarisation. Adhering to international rules and agreements is essential for effectively dealing with the difficulties in the SCS. The efficacy of legal procedures hinges on the dedication of the governments to defend the principles of the rule of law, honour international agreements, and actively participate in constructive conversation to achieve peaceful and fair responses to the region’s intricate territorial and security challenges.

Economic and Environmental Consequences

The process of increasing military presence and activities in the SCS has resulted in a series of significant economic and environmental effects, which have profoundly impacted the fragile equilibrium of the region (Tsionki, 2021). One of the most noticeable consequences is the negative impact on fisheries and marine resources. The significant expansion of military infrastructure and increased naval operations have resulted in conflicts about territorial seas, resulting in overfishing and illicit fishing practices. These activities threaten the area’s biodiverse flora and fauna life and the ability of local communities, who rely on these marine resources for their livelihoods, to sustain themselves.

The increasing militarisation has heightened the pressure on fisheries, worsening pre-existing environmental issues and creating a fragile state for the long-term viability of the maritime ecosystems (Macaraig and Fenton, 2021). Concurrently, the SCS’s militarised operations have resulted in significant ecological deterioration, which is a cause for concern. The creation of artificial islands and the positioning of military resources have led to the destruction of habitats and the disturbance of delicate ecosystems. These activities and the potential for oil spills and other contaminants present a substantial peril to the marine ecosystem. The intricate equilibrium of the ecosystem, meticulously adjusted over generations, is currently experiencing significant pressure, and the enduring ramifications of this environmental deterioration reaching well beyond the realm of geopolitics. The fragile ecosystems of the SCS, which are crucial for the global biodiversity, are being undermined, exacerbating fears about the irreparable harm caused by militarisation.

The economic consequences of militarism are significant, especially for the nations directly engaged in the conflicts. The SCS plays a crucial role as a commercial route, and the increase in tensions has interrupted the smooth movement of products (Zhen, Xiao and Li, 2021). The integrity of shipping routes is jeopardized, and the increased geopolitical concerns pose dangers to the stability of the regional economy. Industries that depend on maritime trade, such as fishing and shipping, have substantial obstacles. Moreover, the SCS’s ambiguity exacerbates investment uncertainties and discourages foreign investors. The predominant militarism in the region undermines the potential for joint economic endeavours and shared wealth, posing a dilemma that necessitates diplomatic solutions and regional cooperation. Given the complex outcomes, governments must strike a cautious equilibrium between their national security concerns and the need for environmentally and economically sustainable practices to ensure the long-term welfare of the SCS and its littoral states.

The Role of Malaysia and the RMN

In dealing with the impact of militarisation in the SCS, Malaysia, despite its small size, should take a diverse approach. First and foremost, Malaysia should recognise

the importance of regional alliances, actively cultivating ties with neighbouring countries to improve regional security collectively. This joint effort includes Malaysia’s membership in regional organisations, where it interacts diplomatically to address common concerns as listed below, thereby contributing to a more stable and secure area.

1. Economic diversification is a significant component of Malaysia’s strategy. The country should minimise its reliance on maritime resources by diversifying its economy. Simultaneously, Malaysia should seek to develop economic linkages with non-regional partners, increasing resilience and lowering vulnerability to maritime sector disruptions.

2. Environmental conservation takes priority as Malaysia should take steps to offset the ecological effects of militarisation. Following this commitment, Malaysia should work with international organisations on marine conservation efforts, actively contributing to preserving the fragile environment of the SCS.

3. Malaysia should also actively participate in humanitarian initiatives, supporting measures to address possible displaced people and pushing for international help during humanitarian crises caused by the effects of militarisation

4. Malaysia should also actively engage in diplomatic measures to de-escalate tensions. Malaysia should substantially contribute to laying the groundwork for peaceful agreements and fostering stability in the SCS by encouraging conversation and confidence-building among regional entities. Through these collaborative activities, Malaysia will demonstrate its commitment to navigating the problems of militarisation while actively advancing regional security, economic resilience, environmental sustainability, and diplomatic stability.

The RMN, as a cornerstone of Malaysia’s maritime security, is critical in countering the impact of militarisation in the SCS through a comprehensive plan. Firstly, strategic alliances are prioritised as the Navy should actively deepen partnerships with like-minded states to foster mutual defence cooperation. Participation in cooperative naval exercises aids in improving interoperability and collective security capabilities. Deterrence tactics are essential, and the RMN should strive to project a credible deterrence posture, discouraging potential assault. This action entails maintaining a visible and capable naval presence in strategically important areas, demonstrating a regional peace and security commitment.

The Navy could also emphasise strategic planning by actively formulating and implementing long-term maritime security plans. Addressing potential worsecase scenarios and contingencies in the SCS ensures a thorough and adaptable approach to addressing the complex problems of militarisation. With investments

in modern maritime surveillance equipment, improved surveillance capabilities are attainable goals. Increased patrols are introduced to monitor and respond to developing security concerns properly and ensure a proactive approach to disruptions. Despite budget constraints, naval capability building is a top priority, with continued efforts to upgrade vessels and equipment for improved operating capabilities. Besides, regular training exercises are conducted to maintain readiness and ensure the Navy’s ability to respond to developing maritime security concerns. Through these diverse operations, the RMN would be able protect Malaysia’s maritime interests and foster SCS stability.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the militarisation of the SCS poses complex difficulties with farreaching effects. Despite the optimism followed the Cold War, the region has seen an increase inmilitarisation, particularly the conversion of disputed features into key military outposts. The roots of this militarisation can be traced back to past territorial claims, perpetuated by the inability of legal frameworks such as the UNCLOS to handle disputes adequately. The significant geostrategic ramifications affect sea routes, global trade, and energy security. Security issues and the possibility of escalation emerge as nations compete for dominance, including major powers like the United States. Regional measures, such as ASEAN and the Quad, aim to counteract militarisation, but progress has been gradual. International law, economic ramifications, and environmental deterioration exacerbate the dilemma.

A diversified approach is recommended for addressing Malaysia’s unique position and the RMN. Malaysia should pursue regional partnerships, economic diversification, environmental protection, humanitarian initiatives, and diplomatic efforts. The RMN, as a critical component of Malaysia’s maritime security, must prioritize strategic relationships, deterrent tactics, long-term planning, surveillance capabilities, and naval capability development. Through these steps, Malaysia and the RMN may actively contribute to negotiating the problems of militarisation, supporting regional stability, and protecting their maritime interests in the SCS.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE NEED FOR SUBS!: ROYAL MALAYSIAN NAVY SUBMARINES DEFENDING

MALAYSIA’S MARITIME INTERESTS

Prof. Adam Leong Kok Wey National Defence University of Malaysia

Introduction

The Kaidai-class submarine was slowly slithering across the calm but misty waters of the Straits of Malacca (SOM) about 7 nautical miles southeast of One Fathom Bank at the break of dawn when suddenly, a violent explosion rocked its stern. The submarine was hit by a torpedo and sank almost immediately, bringing 88 men of her crew down with her. What just happened was a British submarine, HMS Telemachus (a T-class boat) while submerged at periscope depth had spotted the Japanese Kaidai-class submarine, I-166, sailing on the surface and launched a spread of six torpedoes at her (Mason, 2006). One of the torpoedoes hit I-166 which quickly sank her. This submarine action on 17 July 1944 during World War II illustrated the utility of submarines in the SOM despite of some allegations that the Strait is too shallow, and in some places too narrow, for submarine operations, which sets the backdrop for the discussions in this chapter.

The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) had acquired two Scorpène-class submarines in 2002, and the two vessels were delivered in 2009 and 2010 respectively, generating persistent debates on the strategic utility of the RMN operating just two vessels and the costs involved in keeping them running. Meanwhile, in a different but linked development, China has continued its maritime assertion operations in the South China Sea (SCS) and within Malaysia’s vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf claims. China, with its 2023 10-dash line, claims almost 90% of the SCS (Hardy and O’Connor, 2015). Chinese claims

overlap with the EEZs and continental shelf limits of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The SCS debacle may have prompted the claimant states to enhance their naval capabilities and bolster their naval fleets which included the purchase of new submarines.

The Philippines will acquire its first two-to-three-boat squadron soon (reportedly the Scorpène-class submarine is one of those shortlisted) (lerna, 2024). Vietnam has procured and fully deployed six Russian Kilo-class submarines since 2017. Although not claimant littoral states in the SCS, both Singapore (operating six vessels) and Indonesia (building two newer Scorpène-class vessels and operating four other vessels) deploy submarines in their naval operations. Thailand is building one Yuan-class boat which will be operational in the near future. These submarine force developments in the Southeast Asian region validate Malaysia’s decision to procure two submarines in 2002 was spot-on and timely.

The operation of numerous submarines in the Southeast Asian region leads to a few questions for Malaysian defence planners to ponder: What is the strategic utility of submarines? What can a small force of submarines do? Does Malaysia need more submarines in view of ongoing maritime security issues?

This chapter serves to answer these difficult but important questions, and will shed some light on some of the important roles and strategic utility of a submarine force as well as the implications for Malaysia’s strategic context, in order to provide a clearer view on the shadowy business of underwater warfare. It will also provide an analysis of the strategic effects of single submarine actions in naval warfare after World War II to highlight that in the practice of strategy, the strategic yield lies in both the tangible and intangible consequences of tactical actions and not solely on numerical advantage.

The Utility of Submarines

When Malaysia announced in 2002 that she was buying just two Scorpèneclass submarines from France, the news created a series of criticism from some Malaysian politicians and the public on the limited strategic utility of such a small number of submarines as well as the suitability of submarines for Malaysia’s defence (Malaysiakini, 2012). It was understood then that if Malaysia has just two submarines, one can only be used at any time as the other sub will usually need to be serviced and repaired at its home base. This is because submarines, unlike surface ships, require constant regular and intensive servicing and repairs after certain operational time at sea (Andersson, 2016).

To these critics, one submarine is of very limited use. Furthermore, there were claims that the SOM is too shallow for submarine operations. Such criticisms were naïve and strategic-historically blind. The preamble section of this chapter

aSubmarines are referred as boats rather than ships in naval tradition.

disputed the latter claim while lessons from more recent wars had shown that singular combat action by a single submarine still managed to yield significant strategic effects, challenges the former claim. While the ideal number of submarines for Malaysia is said to be between four to six, but based on the limited funds available and the need to train and retain a suitable number of crew members, two submarines, as this article will argue, may just be enough to deter and deny enemy maritime freedom in Malaysian waters for the time being, and serve as a useful stealthy deterrent in contemporary Malaysian naval strategies in the SCS and the SOM.

Submarines have a multitude of functions such as gathering intelligence (especially signal intelligence (SIGINT)), ballistic nuclear missile strike capabilities (for nuclear deterrence), launching land attack cruise missiles, stealthily infiltrating special operations personnel, and traditional combat roles in time of warhunting enemy submarines and sinking enemy surface ships (both merchant and naval). It is in the realm of combat action in sinking enemy ships that have gathered a lot of interest in submarines, especially the famous exploits played by German U-vessels and British submarines during World War I & II, and United States submarines during World War II (WWII) (Clayton, 2012).

Since the end of WWII, submarines had only twice engaged in sinking enemy ships with their roles more focused on intelligence gathering operations, playing cat and mouse games tracking each other under water especially between NATO and Soviet Union submarines during the Cold War, and more importantly carrying nuclear ballistic missiles – providing first and second strike capabilities. A nuclear missile carrying submarine, provides a credible nuclear deterrent.

Submarines are generally classified into two main categories based on their roles, ballistic nuclear missile carriers and hunter-killer submarines (which hunts other submarines, especially nuclear missile carrying submarines), and types of propulsion which are nuclear powered submarines and diesel-electric submarines. Nuclear submarines are able to submerge as long as required without need to surface, only limited by food supplies and human endurance, as it can generate its own power using nuclear reactors and generate its own air supply, but noisier and easier to detect with sophisticated sonar sensors.

Diesel-electric submarines today are quieter than nuclear powered submarines but have limited time submerged, usually between 30-60 days. Some dieselelectric submarines are also powered by an Air-Independent Propulsion unit (AIP) which effectively made the submarine quieter and able to submerge for longer periods (Till, 2013, p.125). In the last decade, Japanese submarine builders have developed lithium-ion battery technology to replace the need of AIP, and was used in the last two Sōryū-class vessels. Lithium-ion propulsion systems will be solely used in the new Taigei-class submarines.

Malaysia’s Scorpènes are hunter-killer submarines and diesel-electric powered, with an option to upgrade to AIP in the future. The first Malaysian submarine was

completed and delivered in 2009 with the second operational in the following year. The first submarine is named KD Tunku Abdul Rahman with the second named KD Tun Abdul Razak, both of them are named after the first and second Prime Ministers of Malaysia, and aptly named as the Perdana-class.

What is Strategic Effect?

Strategy is the study of how means are used to achieve the ends, in this case how military tools and tactics (the means) are used to achieve the political objectives or policy (the ends). Strategy or strategic actions can only be studied based on its consequences. Colin S. Gray (2010) provides a succinct argument about what strategic effect is, “ …the net result of our largely coercive behaviour of any and all kinds upon the behaviour of the enemy.” Gray (2010) sums this up further, “Strategic effect …by definition it can only be in the consequences of what we do.” Both intended and unintended strategic effects, either psychological or material or both, are generated by the strategies we employ.

Strategic effects can only be ‘measured’ based on judgement guided by objective reasoning and logic rather than some mathematical or statistical process (Gra, 1996, p.166). Although strategic effects cannot be measured with mathematical precision, it can be observed in the enemy’s manner of response. The enemy’s response, or non-response, will enable us to understand if the strategy has resulted in its intended or unintended effects. The consequence of strategy is paradoxically different from tactical action.

A tactically-effective operation may not yield the intended strategic effect and paradoxically, an unsuccessful tactical operation may instead still yield handsome strategic effects. Therefore, tactical effects cannot be studied in isolation and must be analysed with the strategic outcome of the operation (Gray, 2014, p.72). Most studies on submarine operations tend to focus on the tactics and drama of submarine attacks. While some studied about the lives of submariners but most of these works lacked analysis of submarine operations’ strategic effects. The next two section-cases will demonstrate cases of singular submarine actions which had produced significant strategic effects.

The Sinking of INS Khukri

The 1971 Indian-Pakistan War started on 3 December 1971, within the backdrop of the Bangladesh Liberation War, when Pakistan launched surprise air strikes on India, leading to another war between these two South Asian powers (Stoessinger, 2011). The geographic location of Western and Eastern Pakistan necessitated the control of maritime sea-lanes of communication, as East and West Pakistan is separated by a 1,000 mile land mass of India. Any supply and transport of troops to East Pakistan from West Pakistan must be conducted by maritime means. India knew this and sought to deny Pakistani navy maritime passage by conducting a retaliatory surprise attack on the Karachi naval base on the night of 4/5 December (Till, 2013, p.171).

The attack code-named Operation Trident, was successful. The Indian navy used missile vessels to conduct the attack and succeeded in destroying a Pakistani destroyer and damaged a few other ships. Following this, the Indian Navy launched a second attack at Karachi on the night of 8/9 December code-named Operation Phyton. This second operation resulted in further destruction at the Karachi port with the main Pakistan navy fuel dump destroyed and three merchant ships sank.

The Pakistani navy knew that they cannot compete with the Indian navy and sought to disrupt the Indian navy’s operations both in East Pakistan (Bay of Bengal) and West Pakistan (Arabian Sea) by sending its small submarine fleet of two submarines. The ageing WWII-era submarine PNS Ghazi was sent to the Bay of Bengal to try to locate and sink the Indian navy’s only aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant operating in the Bay of Bengal. PNS Ghazi managed to sneak into the Bay of Bengal and caused alarm among the Indian navy ships deployed there. A massive anti-submarine search was launched which had diverted valuable naval assets to search for PNS Ghazi. The Pakistani aging submarine, however, was mysteriously lost in the Bay of Bengal (Hiranandani, 2014).

On the Western Pakistan side, PNS Hangor, which was already at sea when the India-Pakistan broke out on 3 December, was redeployed to search and destroy as well as disrupt the Indian navy’s operations in the Arabian Sea. With the surface fleet almost destroyed or disabled by the attacks by India on the nights of 4/5 and 8/9 December, the Pakistani navy had to rely on its sole submarine operating in the Arabian Sea to disrupt Indian operations. PNS Hangor surveyed the coasts of Bombay and made contact with an Indian naval fleet but was unable to position herself for a viable attack. Nonetheless, the Indian fleet detected the presence of a submarine and took evasive actions as well as anti-submarine action. This Indian fleet was heading for another sneak attack at Karachi on the night of 5/6 December. The presence of PNS Hangor had disrupted the operation and dispersed the Indian navy ships resulting in the cancellation of their attack at Karachi. Despite rigorous anti-submarine actions undertaken by the Indian ships, PNS Hangor managed to slip away and continued her combat patrol.

PNS Hangor subsequently made another contact with two Indian navy ships on the morning of 9 December off the Kathiawar coast. She detected the vessels with her sonar and realised they were two Indian navy frigates conducting antisubmarine manoeuvres, most likely looking for her. A game of cat and mouse ensured that the hunted would soon turn out to be the hunter. PNS Hangor took both evasive actions as well as continuosly tracking the Indian navy frigates searching for her. By the evening of 9 December, PNS Hangor managed to position herself on the path of the frigates undetected. PNS Hangor’s captain decided to launch a torpedo attack. At three minutes to 2000H, PNS Hangor fired a homing torpedo but missed. A second torpedo was fired and it found its mark, hitting the Indian frigate INS Khurkri. The second frigate, INS Kirkan closed in on PNS Hangor’s position resulting in PNS Hangor hurrying off the area not before unleashing a Parthian shot, firing a third torpedo at INS Kirkan which managed to evade the torpedo.

Fearing that the Pakistani submarine may be more accurate the next round, INS Kirkan decided to call off her hunt for the submarine and instead turned back to rescue INS Khukri’s crew – tragically just a few were rescued. The INS Khukri, hit at the magazines, sank within 2 minutes with almost its entire complement of 18 officers and 176 men, including the captain. This was the single largest loss of Indian military personnel during the 1971 India-Pakistan War.

A massive submarine hunt was conducted by the Indian navy involving surface ships, aircraft and helicopters. PNS Hangor was attacked by at least 150 depth charges. The sub-hunt managed to disperse and divert the Indian navy ships. A third Indian attack on Karachi port, code-named Operation Triumph, was planned for the night of 10 December but had to be canceled due to the tasking of the Indian navy’s ships for the sub-hunt as well as the risk posed by the lurking submarine on its attacking force. There will be no more naval attacks on Karachi from that night on. The Indian Navy called off its sub-hunt on 13 December and PNS Hangor managing to evade the sub-hunters, successfully returned to Karachi port on 18 December, two days after the end of the India-Pakistan War.

Sink the Belgrano!

The Argentinians who had long demanded the return of the Falkland Islands from the British launched an amphibious landing on 2 April 1982 and captured the Falkland Islands which was lightly defended by a small contingent of Royal Marines. The British decided to recapture the Falkland Islands with military means and quickly assembled a maritime task force for the operation. A British nuclear hunter-submarine, HMS Conqueror was also dispatched to the Falkland Islands on 4 April 1982 to conduct advance reconnaissance and combat patrol (Prebble, 2013, pp. 82-90).

The British had also declared a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) of 200 nautical miles around the Falkland Islands threatening to attack any Argentine warship that entered the MEZ. The Argentinians were aware of the British naval task force heading towards the Falkland Islands. After diplomatic efforts to end the conflict proved futile, the Argentinians sent three naval task forces to intercept the British fleet sailing towards the MEZ (Middlebrok, 2012, p.144). The first task force consisted of the Argentinian navy’s sole aircraft carrier, the ARA Vienticinco de Mayo, two Type 42 destroyers, and three corvettes (West, 2000, p.61). This task force caused considerable alarm for the British, and British submarines including the HMS Conqueror were sent to hunt and attempt to sink this aircraft carrier. The A-4Q Skyhawks, aboard the aircraft carrier, could cause extensive damage to the British fleet and seriously degrade the British’s chances of launching a successful amphibious assault on Falklands Island. The second Argentinian task force consisted of a WW II-era cruiser the ARA General Belgrano, two WW2-era destroyers, and a fuel tanker. The third task force consisted of just three frigates. As the British fleet sailed closer to the Falkland Islands, there was immense pressure to detect and sink the Argentinian ships by the Royal Navy (RN) submarines. The task force led by ARA General Belgrano was detected by the HMS Conqueror on

30 April. At first HMS Conqueror tailed the Argentinian task force from a distance. The WWII-era ships did not have sophisticated sonar equipment and were not able to detect the presence of HMS Conqueror shadowing them. The other Argentinian task force with the aircraft carrier ARA Vienticinco de Mayo was also detected by another RN nuclear submarine, HMS Splendid but due to choppy weather, lost track of the Argentinian aircraft carrier task force.

By now, the British war planners in London were extremely worried about the threat posed by the Argentinian naval task forces on the British fleet. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher knew that the stretched logistics – the Falkland Islands is 8,000 miles from the British Isles - meant that any sinking of British ships – the two aircraft carriers and the vulnerable troop transport ships - would result in huge loss of British lives and combat capabilities, and may turn the public opinion against any continuation of hostilities which may have resulted in the permanent loss of the Falkland Islands to the Argentinians.

The British had also intercepted a message to the Argentinian task forces on 1 May ordering them to advance towards the British fleet and conduct a pincer attack, one from the North East led by ARA Vienticinco de Mayo and the other led by ARA General Belgrano from the South West of the Falkland Islands. HMS Conqueror had been carefully shadowing the task force led by ARA General Belgrano. To avoid detection, HMS Conqueror was moving directly below the ARA General Belgrano. The old cruiser did not have modern or effective antisubmarine sonar systems, and the loud noise generated by its old engines blocked HMS Conqueror’s detection by her escorting destroyers’ sonar.

Based on the new intelligence about the Argentinian’s orders to attack the British fleet, the commander of HMS Conqueror, Commander Chris Wreford-Brown was given the command to attack and sink the ARA General Belgrano, even though it was still sailing outside the MEZ at that time, to pre-empt the chances of the ARA General Belgrano slipping away from HMS Conqueror (not wanting to repeat the loss in the tracking of the Argentinian aircraft carrier by HMS Splendid earlier) and subsequently attacking the British fleet (Middlebrook, 2012, pp.148-151).

HMS Conqueror fired three torpedoes at ARA General Belgrano on the evening of 2 May. Two of the torpedoes hit ARA General Belgrano and the third allegedly hit an escorting destroyer but did not explode. The torpedoes tore two holes into ARA General Belgrano which sunk in a few minutes, killing more than 300 Argentinians out of a complement of slightly more than 1,000 men. The two escorting destroyers did not know that the ARA General Belgrano had been hit and the stricken cruiser was left behind. Only much later did they realise that the ARA General Belgrano had not been following them and returned to search for her only to find the crew of ARA General Belgrano on lifeboats, and scattered on the sea drowning or frozen to death.

The sinking of ARA General Belgrano had rattled the nerves of the Argentinian naval task forces, and realising the dangers and the vulnerabilities of their surface

ships against advanced British nuclear submarines, decided to return to port with the aircraft carrier ARA Vienticinco de Mayo. There would be no more attempts by the Argentinian navy to oppose or threaten the British maritime fleet which subsequently successfully landed on the Falkland Islands on 21 May, unmolested from the sea. The retreat of the Argentinian naval forces inevitably resulted in the termination of resupply by sea for the Argentinian forces based on Falkland Islands, contributing to severe logistic support problems for the Argentinian land forces.

This single submarine action by HMS Conqueror, the first ,and still, only combat torpedo sinking of an enemy ship by a nuclear submarine, and the second successful submarine sinking of an enemy combatant ship after PNS Hangor, had managed to deter and deny the Argentinian navy from posing any problems for the British fleet.

Lessons for Malaysia’s Contemporary Maritime Strategic Context

The strategic effects of the two submarine actions, although not spectacular in terms of the number or tonnage of ships sunk, had managed to garner consequences far above the weight of their torpedoes launched. The sinking of INS Khukri in the 1971 India-Pakistan War forced the Indian navy to cancel a crucial attack on Karachi port as well as diverted and scattered valuable naval assets to search and sink the PNS Hangor. The fact that an enemy submarine had just successfully sunk a frigate, lurking in the Arabian Sea was more than enough to fuel the fear of further losses which led to an intense anti-submarine operation to neutralise the threat.

The sinking of ARA General Belgrano by HMS Conqueror in the early stages of the Falklands War in 1982 had gained immense strategic effect for the British forces sailing to recapture the Falklands Islands – the entire Argentinian navy returned to port and never to venture out again during the Falklands War and not able to threaten the British naval forces (Till, 2013, p.182). British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1993, p.215) later remarked, “The sinking of the Belgrano turned out to be one of the most decisive military actions of the war.”

From these solitary submarine actions, it can be concluded that submarines in modern warfare, even in limited numbers or individually, can still yield valuable strategic effects. The two Malaysian Scorpène submarines armed with Black Shark torpedoes and Exocet missiles together with a silent diesel-electric propulsion, provides Malaysia with underwater warfare capabilities and to conduct strategies of sea-control which are to deter and deny enemy’s naval freedom-of-movement and to secure friendly ships movement in times of conflict.

Submarines are also very useful in laying mines covertly in vulnerable but important maritime areas such as enemy ports and in narrow chokepoints. Mines had served as useful naval weapons and were extensively used in some of the major wars and conflicts such as during World Wars I and II, the Korean War,

the Vietnam War, and the Iran-Iraq war. A significant number of surface warships, submarines and merchant ships had been sunk by mines in these conflicts.

During World War I, the British attempted to force the Dardanelles Strait by using its naval power. However, the sinking of three Royal Navy battleships forcing the Dardanelles Strait by mines had resulted in the failure of its naval plan and the need to conduct an amphibious landing to capture the Dardanelles peninsula led to the disastrous Gallipoli campaign. Mines had also been used to conduct blockades of enemy fleets in harbours. For example, in World War II, thousands of mines were laid in the Baltic Sea (which was instrumental in blockading Russia), in the Atlantic (to blockade Great Britain), and around Japan (successfully blockading the Japanese islands and cut off vital war supplies to the Japanese). Mine clearance operations are costly, difficult, and time-consuming. A modern submarine such as the RMN’s Scorpènes can carry up to 30 mines and covertly manoeuvre into enemy ports or narrow maritime passageways (chokepoints) to lay its mines at selected critical locations.

Malaysia also has extensive sovereign maritime areas to secure which include the SOM and parts of the SCS, effectively making Malaysia responsible for some of the most important and busiest maritime sea lanes and critical ‘choke points’ in the world. The SOM in particular had been perceived to be too shallow and narrow for submarine operations. Nonetheless, the British had successfully, albeit not popularly known, used submarines in the SOM during WWII against Japanese naval ships and merchant shipping. The Japanese used the SOM to send muchneeded supplies by ships and barges to its forces fighting in Burma. The British submarines regularly patrolled the SOM despite its narrow passage with certain patches of shallow waters and vigorous Japanese anti-submarine patrols, and yet still managed to register some significant successes by sinking more than 100 Japanese naval vessels, including the I-166 illustrated in the chapter’s opening section (McCartney, 2006, p.42).

It must also be pointed out that the littoral nature of the SOM provides one of the best maritime waters for submarine operations. The coastal waters, the shallowness, the different salinities and the temperature of the tropical waters, produce lots of ambient ‘noises’ that could make detection by anti-submarine sonar sensors difficult. The RMN’s Scorpène submarines can lie submerged in wait in familiar waters and ambush its targets. The importance of submarines denying enemy freedom of movement through the SOM in time of war is an important facet of Malaysia’s defence strategy.

The British submarines had also both landed and collected Force 136 Special Operations Executive (SOE) agents in Malaya as well as conducted regular reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering missions along the SOM (White, 2009, p.25). These strategic lessons from WWII in the SOM should dispel doubts about the suitability and the strategic value of submarines operating in this narrow and busy waterway. On a supporting note of special operations, the RMN’s special forces unit, PASKAL, is now able to train and operate with its submarines, enabling PASKAL to conduct stealthy maritime infiltration and exfiltration operations.

The RMN vessels are also useful in stealthy intelligence gathering and reconnaissance missions to monitor regional neighbours, extra-regional powers, terrorist groups, and commercial and private shipping maritime movements in Malaysia’s maritime zone to mitigate security risks and potential strategic threats to Malaysia’s national interests.

Conclusion

The two RMN Scorpène submarines, being small, agile and versatile, are wellsuited for operations in the ‘strategic choke points’ of both the SOM as well as in the deeper waters in the SCS. The two submarines had sailed upon completion from France and Spain respectively through parts of the Mediterranean Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean to Malaysia – testimonies of its deeper ocean sailing capabilities. These submarines are essential for Malaysia’s defensive posture which places importance on the practice of limited sea-control and anti-access naval strategies. As a testimony that the RMN has selected the right submarine class, India has bought six Scorpène-class submarines while Indonesia is building two Scorpène-class submarines.

Although Malaysia ideally needs between four to six submarines to provide satisfactory underwater warfare capabilities, the RMN has to cope with two submarines at the moment until budgetary funds are available to purchase more submarines. Both vessels have undergone major refit programmes between 2016 to 2021, enabling the vessels to continue optimal operational capabilities and readiness. Nonetheless, these vessels have reached more than 15 years of service and a Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU) programme is near the horizon to keep the two vessels operating with the latest technology and enhanced modern warfare capabilities for possibly another decade. This will translate to more costs to keep the submarines viable for another decade of service.

More crucially, while one of the vessels is out of commission for the MLU programme, which typically takes anywhere between two to four years, the RMN will be left with just one boat, thus a perilous operational gap. As a temporary stopgap measure, the RMN may need to obtain and operate used-but-refurbishedsubmarines, if there are any, to cover the shortfall in the silent service’s operational tempo. The Republic of Singapore Navy has operated two Challenger-class submarines (formerly Swedish Sjöormen class), and still operates two Archer-class submarines, formerly Swedish Västergötland class submarines, while waiting for the four new Invisible class submarines to be built.

Another critical point to note is that the size of the RMN is small, at around 15,000 men. The relative manpower base to source its submarine personnel is limited and requires substantial efforts and time to recruit, train, maintain and manage its submarine manpower. Attrition rates among submariners are also high –the long time spent underwater within the confines of the size of two buses,

isolation from the outside world, and its related stress and deprivations are some of the reasons why it is hard to recruit, train and retain submarine crews. Hence the sustainment of the silent service’s operational tempo must also account for the retainment of valuable experienced personnel and constant up-to-date skilling of manpower required to sustain its submarine operations. For these to work, the RMN will need to have continued availability of an optimal number of vessels for hands-on operational experience and fine-honing of necessary skills for underwater warfare. It is therefore imperative that Malaysia must continue to plan and explore available options for the sustainment of its submarine fleet as a credible force multiplier and potent deterrent, especially during the decreased availability of vessels due to MLU programme.

In RMN’s Plan 15-to-5 Transformation (Realignment), two more submarines will be procured between 2031 to 2035 to make it a four-boat submarine squadron by 2040. A lengthy time is needed to build a submarine, averaging betwen six to nine years, as well as to set up the infrastructure required to support the submarine, and more importantly, to train capable and experienced submarine crew and maintenance personnel. Hence, the RMN must ensure continued submarine operations during this period.

Furthermore, when the RMN plans to have four operational vessels by 2040, the two older Scorpène-class submarines will be just over 30 years old. Even with updates and upgrades from the MLU programme, there is a limit to how long a submarine can be safely operated, especially in high-risk underwater missions. As a result, the RMN may need to acquire four new vessels in 2031 to ensure that the silent service will have four new operational up-to-date submarines for deployment in 2040 and beyond. The two older Scorpène-class submarines, with the used-and-refurbished stop-gap submarine/s acquired during the Scorpène MLU programme, may then be optimised for training purposes or if too aged, retired.

The RMN submarine fleet may be small in quantity now but as lessons from strategic history have shown that even a single boat, if used astutely, may still be able to produce significant strategic effects well above its tonnage in modern naval warfare. RMN’s submarine experience and capabilities in underwater warfare were not easily gained and must be continued to be retained and expanded to stay relevant in the ever-changing character of naval warfare today and beyond, and as a valuable force-multiplier in mitigating Malaysia’s strategic risks.

References

Andersson, J. J. (2016). Submarine Capabilities and Conventional Deterrence in Southeast Asia.

Contemporary Security Policy, 36(3), 473-97.

Clayton, T. (2012). Sea Wolves: The Extraordinary Story of Britain’s WW2 Submarines. Abacus.

Gray, C. S. (1996). Explorations in Strategy. Greenwood Press. Gray, C. S. (2010). The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. Oxford University Press. Gray, C. S. (2014). Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty. Oxford University Press. Hardy, J. and O’Connor, S. (2015). China completes runway on Fiery Cross Island. Jane’s 360. http://www.janes.com/article/54814/china-completes-runway-on-fiery-cross-reef Hiranandani, G. M. (2014). 1971 War: Sinking of the Khukri’, Indian Defence Review. http://www.indiandefencereview.com/interviews/1971-war-sinking-of-the-khukri/ Lema, K. (2024). Philippines plans to buy submarines to defend sovereignty in South China Sea –senior official. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippinesplans-buy-submarines-defend-sovereignty-south-china-seasenior-2024-02-01/

McCartney, I (2006). British Submarines, 1939-45. Osprey. Malaysiakini (2012). Can our two French-made submarines save M’sia?. Malaysiakini. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/213383 Mason, G. B. (2006). HMS Telemachus - T-class Submarine. Naval-History.net. https://www.navalhistory.net/xGM-Chrono-12SS-07T-Telemachus.htm Middlebrook, M. (2012). The Falklands War. Pen & Sword. Prebble, S. (2013). Secrets of the Conqueror: The Untold Story of Britain’s Most Famous Submarine. Faber and Faber. Stoessinger, J. G. (2011). Why Nations Go to War. Wadsworth. Thatcher, M. (1993). The Downing Street Years. HarperCollins. Till, G. (2013). Seapower: A guide for the Twenty- First Century. Routledge. West, N. (2000). The Secret War for the Falklands. Warner. White, J. F. (2009). The Milk Cows: The U-boat Tankers, 1941-1945. Pen & Sword.

PART III NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS

CHAPTER FIVE

MARITIME NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS: SOUTHEAST ASIAN’S PERSPECTIVE

First Admiral Dr. Tay Yap Leong RMN Diving and Mine Warfare Headquarters

Introduction

Southeast Asia is a region between China, India, Australia, and the Pacific Ocean on the east and the Indian Ocean on the west. Peninsulas and islands can be found across Southeast Asia, with coastline made up of gulfs, bays, inlets, and beaches. The numerous oceans, bays, straits, and gulfs that round the numerous islands and peninsulas contribute to the complicated maritime boundaries of the realm. The tens of thousands of islands that comprise the various nations inside their territorial waters form a network of passages and a distinct physical geography. Southeast Asia is made up of a variety of shapes and sizes due to its political boundaries. From eastern India to China, 11 nations make up Southeast Asia, which is typically separated into “island” and “mainland” regions. The mainland countries consist of Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and the peninsula part of Malaysia. The islands of Southeast Asia’s maritime region consist of Brunei, Indonesia, the Borneo part of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore.

Southeast Asia maritime security landscape is steadily evolving (Bradford and Scott, 2022). The changes can be seen in many forms and some are in the initiatives adopted through the ASEAN Sectoral Bodies and mechanisms namely ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM), ADMM-Plus and ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational

Crime (AMMTC) and their subsidiary bodies. ASEAN member states through the existing ASEAN-led mechanism are increasingly aware of the maritime security interconnectivity and that there is no longer a clear division between security users and providers.

Malaysia Is A Maritime Nation

Historically some of the inhabitants of Borneo Island and the Malaysian Peninsula have been mariners for generations. Adventuresome Malay and Bornean seamen have travelled to far off Pacific Islands, including Australia and New Zealand, as well as the entire archipelago that is now Indonesia. Additionally, they have travelled to Madagascar, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka via the Indian Ocean (Leong, 2021). Its geographical circumstances gave birth to the renowned Malacca Sultanate which has amassed its wealth and power through maritime trade and control of key sea lanes, including portions of the Strait of Malacca, which was and is still a crucial maritime choke point and connecting point for the East-West maritime trading route. The importance of its geographical location has drawn unsolicited attention and exploitation from powerful actors for domination in the Malay Archipelago.

The recurring theme of powerful actors’ exploitation is written in the country’s historical timeline. The Portuguese assault from the sea at the beginning of the 16th century led to the collapse of the Malacca Sultanate. Following the Portuguese colonisation (1511-1641), was the Dutch (1641-1795,1818-1825) and the British (1795-1818,1826-1957), and Japan occupation (December 1941 – August 1941) before it gained its independence from the British on 31 August 1957, forming the Federation of Malaya before the creation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 (Ministry of Defence, 2020). The maritime domain has historically been a key tool for the development of political and economic power, and the Malay states and the big powers have projected their military might beyond the oceans.

Malaysia’s maritime characteristics are further accentuated by the fact that it is a nation surrounded by seas and separated by four main water bodies, with the South China Sea dividing Peninsular Malaysia from Sabah and Sarawak. By virtue of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Malaysia has a twice larger marine area than the land area. In between Peninsular Malaysia and Indonesian Sumatra Island is the Strait of Malacca while on the Borneo Island between Sabah, the Philippines and Indonesia is the Sulu-Celebes Sea. Due to its geographical location, it is a maritime nation with continental roots that are connected to mainland Southeast Asia and Eurasia by land, and the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean on one side, with the Malacca Straits and the Indian Ocean on the other. Hence, as a country surrounded mostly by sea and its national well-being depends on the sea, Malaysia is a maritime nation by all means. All maritime nations, big or small, are generally characterised by three attributes. These three attributes are resources, risks and resolve. Malaysia has all three elements:

1. Resources and Interests: Malaysia’s prosperity is largely derived from its maritime domain. Trade, commerce, fisheries, transportation, people-to people connections, and other modes of wealth creation throughout the nation rely mainly on the seas, seabed, subsoil, waterways, airspace and continental shelf.

2. Risks and Challenges: While Malaysia’s sovereignty and sovereign rights over Malaysia Maritime Zone (MMZ) and strategic waterways, airspace and critical communication lines are challenged within the maritime areas, they are also a source of external threats.

3. Resolve and Action: Malaysia shows its commitment to national interests, influence, and contribution to the region through its maritime domain. Maritime domains enable Malaysia to transform national resolve into an array of regional cooperative mechanisms for protecting its resources and mitigating risks from the sea. As a result of a series of initiatives with ASEAN member states, Malaysia has been able to turn ideas into concrete cooperation agreements in the fields of defence, development, and diplomacy.

Although geographically Malaysia’s maritime domain is between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. It remains connected to its continental root via Peninsular Malaysia. Hence in this aspect, although consisting of critical resources and assets, land-based resources can pose risks, but they are also a source of solutions. External threats and challenges historically, presently and in the future derive from their continental, maritime and airspace origins. Thus, the determination to promote regional integration and pursue national interests not only extends northward to mainland Southeast Asia but also through and along our continental roots, to potential ties with various parts of Eurasia. It is also expressed by connections or connectivity. Among Malaysia’s notable efforts were the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link (SKRL) and the ASEAN-Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC) in 1995, and the joint Malaysian-Vietnam submission on the Extended Continental Shelf in 2009. However, as noted by Leong (2021), despite its continental roots, Malaysia’s immersion in the maritime domain appears to concur with geopolitical thinker Nicholas Spykman’s dictum, “Geography does not argue. It simply is.”.

Economic Importance of The Sea

An important centre of trade and knowledge between the 7th and 13th centuries was the Buddhist maritime commercial kingdom of Srivijaya, which encompassed parts of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula and Western Java. At that time, Srivijaya controlled merchant shipping through the Straits of Malacca. From the end of the 13th century, the state was torn apart by war and two important centres of power emerged. First, Malacca in the 15th century, then Aceh (North Sumatra) and Johor (now Malaysia) in the early 16th century. While Aceh was primarily an important Muslim trading centre, Johor gained importance due to the tin mines in its hinterland and the homegrown precious pepper. The port city of

Malacca was used primarily by Muslim merchants as an important transhipment port on route between India and China. In the years that followed, western colonisation occurred and they occupied Malacca as well as other ports in the region, including Aceh, sporadically reducing the influence of Islamic merchants (Schröder, 2017). The last colonial power that had gained a foothold in Peninsular Malaya was Britain with Malacca, Penang (Georgetown) and Singapore as major trading hubs. Although today Malacca is no longer a major trading hub due to its shallow water, Malaysia’s maritime economic activities in Malaysia are expected to gradually increase over time. The contribution of the maritime sector towards the growth of the Malaysian economy will be more significant as Malaysia aspires to become a fully developed nation. This is obvious due to the following reasons:

1. Malaysia shares maritime boundaries with six other Southeast Asia countries and three land borders with neighbouring states (One World - Nation Online, 2023). The six maritime border countries are Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam while the three land border countries are Brunei, Indonesia and Thailand. The waters of the Strait of Malacca have a length of 550 nautical miles.

2. The extremely busy narrow lane of the Strait of Malacca, with about 90 thousand ships per year or about nearly 200 ships every day passing through it (Nofandi, 2022).

3. The recognition that Malaysia was ranked 25 in the world’s most competitive economy in 2021 as declared by Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA, 2021), where 90% of its trade is seaborne (Sekaran, 2022).

4. The emergence of 22 ports throughout the country. Currently, there are seven major ports in Malaysia with Port Klang and Port of Tanjung Pelepas (PTP) making significant contribution in terms of container volume. Records show that these two leading ports posted a combined throughput of 24.9 million 20-foot equivalent units (TEUs) in 2021, with Port Klang at 13.7 million TEUs and PTP at 11.2 million TEUs, their highest achievements to date (Lim, 2022).

The sea is an essential lifeline and as a nation surrounded by seas, Malaysia’s maritime sector is a key contributor to the country’s socio-economic wellbeing. Therefore, with so many natural resources coming from the sea, and many strategic marine spaces to safeguard in a progressively complex security environment, maritime economic activities have also increased tremendously. There is a pressing need for governments worldwide to diversify their economies, particularly in the oceans, where shipping, minerals, oil, and renewable energy are all major industries. The concept of “blue economy” is not a new one (Ridzuan et al., 2022). SDG14 (Life below Water) was incorporated into the 11th Malaysia Plan for the 2016–2020 period as a sign of Malaysia’s commitment to having a sustainable ocean by the year 2030. The 10 goals of SDG14 are primarily concerned with marine life and its resources. To maintain the health and productivity of the ecosystems, Malaysia has agreed to all of the goals for ocean conservation and sustainable development. Malaysia will benefit from the blue economy in

terms of new jobs and economic expansion. One-third of the overall value of ocean-based industries comes from offshore oil and gas, with the other twothirds coming from marine and coastal tourism, marine equipment, and port facilities (MIDA, 2021). Shipping, shipbuilding, ship repair, port services, oil and gas, fisheries, naval defence, and other law enforcement agencies are the most economically significant maritime industries. Currently, the Malaysian maritime industries contribute approximately 40% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Sekaran, 2022).

Oil and Gas (O&G) Sector

The booming O&G sector in Malaysia offers a clear edge and wide range of market prospects. Contributing 20% of Malaysia’s annual GDP, it is a significant sector of the country’s economy (MIDA, 2021). By 2020, this sector was targeted to raise total gross national income (GNI) contribution to RM241 billion (USD79 billion) from RM117.7 billion (USD39 billion) in 2011 (Arend, 2013). According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Malaysia’s total reserves amounted to 6.7 billion (BOE) across the three regions, Sarawak having 2.8 billion BOE, followed by Peninsular Malaysia at 2.2 billion BOE and Sabah at 1.7 billion BOE (Third World Network, 2020).

Apart from oil, natural gas is also abundant in Malaysia with deposits having been discovered in all the three regions. Gas has been driving Malaysia’s socioeconomic growth for several decades, where in 1998, natural gas surpassed oil as the country’s single largest fuel source until today, contributing 42% of the national primary energy supply in 2017. The country’s total natural gas reserves were 2.48 trillion cubic meters in 2017 (Malaysian Gas Associate, 2017). However, as of the end of 2020, Peninsular Malaysia had approximately 0.57 trillion cubic meters of non-associated and associated natural gas reserves left, a decrease compared to 0.61 trillion cubic meters in the previous year (Statista Research Department, 2023). These figures indicated that at present, the bulk of the natural gas reserve is mostly in Sarawak and Sabah. Nevertheless, in 2021, Malaysia produced approximately 74.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas, an increase from 68.7 billion cubic meters the year before. This makes Malaysia produced around 73 billion cubic meters of natural gas on average annually (Statista Research Department, 2022).

Fisheries

Marine fisheries are an important industry in Malaysia’s fisheries sector, which supports considerable growth in the economy and national food security. In 2021, the fishing industry contributed 0.8% to the Malaysian GDP (Statista Research Department, 2023). The fisheries subsector generated RM14.88 billion in revenue in 2021 from the production of 1.75 million M.T. of edible fish, 242.5 million ornamental fish pieces, and 24.4 million bunches of aquatic plants. Production of edible fish fell by 2.1%, from 1.79 million MT (in 2020) to 1.75 million MT (in 2021). The fisheries industry production value increased by 7.5%, from RM13.84 billion (in 2020) to RM14.88 billion (in 2021). Figure 1 below illustrates Malaysia’s fisheries production achievement in 2021 (Department of Fisheries Malaysia, 2022).

Figure 1: Malaysia’s Fisheries Production 2021 (Source: Department of Fisheries Malaysia, 2022)

Unfortunately, the demersal fish population, which are species that reside and eat on or near the bottom of the ocean, has decreased by 88% for the entire nation since the 1960s. This finding was based on the data from the Fisheries Department’s trawling surveys, which were conducted in 2016 (Selan, 2021). The national wild fish catch has decreased in Malaysia due to overfishing, pollution, climate change, and foreign vessels encroaching into Malaysian waters as well as including local fishing vessels entering restricted areas (Fathi, Harun, Rambat, & Tukiran, 2018). In Malaysia, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing cost us RM6 billion in 2016, and even after stricter enforcement and surveillance, we lost RM4.2 billion in 2019. Once more, the depletion of our fish stocks has been largely caused by overfishing and poaching, which also includes the employment of dangerous fishing methods like fish bombing, the use of dragon traps and push nets, bottom trawling, etc., as well as intrusions by foreign fishermen (Loh & Malik, 2022).

Tourism

A total of 26,100,784 tourists visited Malaysia in 2019, a 1.0% increase from the previous year. Malaysia saw a gain of 2.4% in tourism receipts, or RM 86.1 billion, as compared to the same period in 2018. Notwithstanding the increase in revenues brought on by the 1.3% increase in per capita spending, tourists continue to view Malaysia as a destination with good value (Malaysia Tourism Promotion Board, 2021). Maritime tourism, often referred to as marine tourism or coastal tourism, refers to leisure activities that take place in the marine environment, such as cruising, beach activities, scuba diving, snorkelling, fishing, and other sports. Furthermore, in terms of maritime tourism, Sabah Tourism reported there were 3.88 million tourists who have spent RM8.342 billion in Sabah based on tourism receipt recorded.

Geostrategic Environment

One of the greatest challenges faced by Malaysia today is the complex global security dynamics. Most nations are currently struggling to fight economic

recession, religious and political differences, unresolved territorial claims, and most recently the Covid-19 pandemic. As these geostrategic challenges change rapidly, Malaysia also faces new security challenges such as the major power politics, increasing importance of regional maritime concerns, such as overlapping claims, and the emergence of non-traditional security threats. As Malaysia opens a new chapter under the premiership of Anwar Ibrahim, this new chapter also allows the country to redefine its stance on foreign policy. In his maiden press conference, Anwar highlighted the importance of China and called for enhanced bilateral relations with this regional power. At the same time, Anwar also did not leave out other key partners such as the United States, Europe, India as well as ASEAN and emphasized that relations with these countries are equally crucial (Chong, 2022).

There are five megatrends of the future identified by countless analysts. These megatrends are anticipated to continue, even though certain important trends will have short-term headwinds and others will experience tailwinds due to events like the Covid19 epidemic. The epidemic is more evidence of Malaysia’s swift technological adoption, as we responded to the problem by immediately implementing new technologies in healthcare, education, and other fields. The megatrends’ effects on the world go beyond only business operations and commercial relationships. Instead, they have a significant impact that will potentially disrupt the military and security contexts in which these businesses, their clients, and countries must function. Reducing risk will necessitate more responsive and responsible government structures as well as increased societal cooperation. The ability to foresee and respond to megatrends will be crucial for the survival of some nations. The Global Government Defense and Security Network (2016) put forth five megatrends i.e., the shift in global economy power, demographic and social change, rapid urbanisation, climate change and the rise of technology (IR 4.0) as discussed below.

Shift in Global Economy Power

The emphasis on world growth has changed. Global economic power domination by the West is relatively declining. Therefore, the development we are seeing is fundamentally a rebalancing of the world economies. It is crucial to recognise the interconnectedness of the trade and investment flows between developing markets, which are expanding considerably faster than the conventional routes from developed to emerging and developed to developed countries. This is in addition to the expansion and size of emerging markets.

Along with resource investments in Africa and the North Sea, China is also increasing its economic influence in the West. International trade will continue to expand unabatedly even though the East and the South are now the main regions of global growth. As a result, national economies in various regions will become stronger, with more resources to protect and to invest in security and defence. The change may also lead to an increase in burden sharing to ensure that commercial trade routes and freedom of navigation are secured from hostile

actors, as well as reduction in some countries’ reliance on traditional power projectors like the United States for security. During this transformation, extensive and complex supply chains that aim to optimise national economic advantages may become more susceptible to disruption by cybercriminals engaging in disruptive activities like industrial espionage, theft, or terrorism.

Demographic and Social Change

National priorities for government spending are determined by national demographics. As the populations age, the demand for social services and healthcare will place tremendous pressure on budget priorities, perhaps competing with or even displacing spending on defence and security. Instead, there may be a larger risk of radicalization and civil unrest as a result of the concurrent growth in the adolescent populations of developing markets and least developed countries, as well as a higher possibility that disruptive transnational forces will succeed in establishing themselves in these countries. This could lead to problems with internal and external security that would require more funding and creative approaches to resolve.

Rapid Urbanisation

Less than 30% of the world’s population resided in cities in the 1950s. The UN predicts that by 2030, 4.9 billion people will live in urban areas, bringing the percentage to 50%. It was estimated that by 2015, there would be 22 megacities with minimal populations of 10 million, with 17 being in developing nations. The global urban population is expected to increase to 68% by 2050 (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018). Law enforcement, intelligence, internal security institutions as well as conventional defence groups will face enormous challenges as a result of the boom of urbanisation. Urban population growth may exceed governments’ capacity to provide basic services, which could lead to a rise in radicalization and the emergence of alternative governance systems dominated by organised crime and non-state terrorist organisations that will illegitimately force/subjugate urban dwellers. It will be expensive and necessitate greater interagency cooperation to provide enough police and security for these locations.

Defence sectors will also have to deal with internal instability and keep an eye on outside influences that aim to polarise these people for political reasons. The mega-cities that result from this tendency will also be a more favourable environment for nonstate actors like terrorists and revolutionaries, hiding in plain sight while wreaking havoc and destruction. Because of the greater population density in these cities, both natural and man-made disasters will have a greater impact, necessitating a huge, whole-of-government approach to address the humanitarian, defence, and security concerns that come with them.

Climate Change

Resource depletion and the effects of climate change are causing significant economic concern. By 2030, it is anticipated that energy consumption would

rise by up to 50% while the rise in water demand at around 19% by 2050 (“Water for Life” Decade, 2014). Rising sea levels and harsher weather are two potential climate change impacts that could make conventional farming, hunting, and fishing methods difficult or impossible in some regions. The demand for resources to support population expansion and food security may conflict with the need for sustainable solutions. Natural resource disputes have long caused tensions between nations. These conflicts will only get worse and more important to national survival as the world’s population keeps expanding, especially when it comes to the most essential resources like food, water, and energy supplies.

Undoubtedly, this will result in conflicts over the rights to water, oil, wind, fishing, hunting, and other mineral resources on a regional and possibly global scale. This issue is made worse by the the world’s population growth towards urban areas and strains the chain of producers of natural resources to meet considerably greater demand levels. Although it increases the efficiency of these supply chains, it also makes them more vulnerable to disruptions that might have severely affected the larger populations concentrated in metropolitan areas. This vulnerability will be impacted by global climate change’s effects on sea levels, water scarcity, and arable land. Natural disasters will exert pressure on traditional security and defence forces to retain order and provide non-traditional defence services during a humanitarian crisis.

Rise of Technology (IR 4.0)

Innovations in fields like artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, and other research and development frontiers are raising the potential for productivity and creating new investment opportunities. The size and structure of the global manufacturing and high-tech sectors, as well as the businesses that operate within them, are changing as whole new industries are created. Our world will continue to change as a result of the internet, network-capable mobile devices, data analytics, cloud computing, and machine and deep learning capabilities. While advancements in the fields of nanotechnology and other frontiers of research and development increase the productive potential for businesses, they also give malicious actors more tools to increase their capacity for disruption and devastation. With each new technological development that encourages even more automation, analytics, and communications, new vulnerabilities will be generated that will present a unique challenge to the security, defence, and law enforcement industries.

The internet, mobile devices, data analytics, drones, artificial intelligence, and cloud computing will give defence and security firms step-function improvements in their ability to assess and respond to threats employing the same, readily available instruments to cause harm. Vendors will also make all devices “secure to the user,” preventing intelligence and law enforcement organisations from monitoring users and gathering evidence. Defence and security organisations will face difficulty in creating and modifying these tools at the pace of industry rather than the usual pace of government.

Regional Maritime Concern

The Asia Pacific region is also witnessing realignment and restructuring of middle powers’ foreign and security policies. Notwithstanding the global geostrategic concerns, the defence and security focus is from the regional perspective. The issues surrounding the Southeast Asian region are directly associated with the maritime domain areas. For instance, the maritime disputes in the South China Sea involving six countries from the Southeast Asia region. There were many verbal exchanges between government vessels from various claimant countries. Nevertheless, the highlight here is that this kind of incident has been handled professionally and more importantly, there has not been any untoward incident reported involving Malaysia in the contested waters. Additionally, the rise of China and the United States competition in the South China Sea possess additional pressure and challenges to the littoral states. Hence, Malaysia has narrowed down to seven challenges namely maritime border disputes, maritime border encroachment, China-US competition, extreme ideologies, ASEAN effectiveness, Asia-Pacific shifting to Indo-Pacific; and illegal immigrants.

Non-Traditional Security Threats

Facing these seven challenges, in order to move forward the defence community must evolve to maintain a stable maritime regime that promotes our national prosperity and global maritime connectivity. Therefore ‘non-military’ issues, also known as non-traditional security threats, should also be a concern to the socioeconomic well-being of the country. Being the nation’s most capable maritime force, it is only natural that the role of the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) and other maritime enforcement agencies such Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and Marine Police be expanded to include managing these domestic or non-traditional security threats. This concept is not new, as it is being practised worldwide, and is also known as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), which means the use of military capabilities across a range of nonmilitary operations.

Accordingly, the Non-Traditional Security Threats that have been recognised are: (i) marine pollution; (ii) human trafficking/Illegal immigrants; (iii) vessel hijacking; (iv) terrorism; (v) IUU Fishing; (vi) smuggling of drugs and contraband; (vii) sea robbery; and (viii) kidnap for ransom. To handle issues on these nontraditional security threats during the pandemic, a National Task Force (NTF) was established to address the spike of the Covid-19 pandemic in early May 2020. The NTF’s operation took place from 6 May 2020 until 31 Dec 2022. During the operation, there were cases of apprehension, seizure of goods without a master, and expulsion reports.

Challenges to Maritime Security

The maritime security issues that arise pose challenges including biodiversity loss, environmental degradation, human rights infringements and regulation to

manage maritime economic resources. The issues of climate change and new technologies are some of the emerging issues which were not factored in during the negotiation of UNCLOS. The use of maritime grey zone tactics is designed to avoid conflict escalation and militarisation of maritime disputes. The tactics pose maritime competition and undermine UNCLOS and freedom of navigation. Based on the regional geostrategic environment, regional maritime concerns and non-traditional security threats Malaysia’s maritime security challenges can be further narrowed down as below: -

i. There is no definition of maritime security, biodiversity loss and environmental degradation, human rights and labour protections, and the regulation of access to economic resources, including on the seabed and in the water column.

ii. Some issues were not a factor at the time of UNCLOS’s negotiation, including climate change and the use of new technologies such as autonomous maritime vehicles.

iii. Tackling the impacts of climate change on maritime security poses both legal and political challenges under UNCLOS due to overlapping jurisdictions, contested sovereignties, and competing economic interests.

iv. While the advent of maritime autonomous vehicles provides a direct challenge to UNCLOS, which assumes vessels are crewed and cannot be operated remotely.

v. Exclusive flag state jurisdiction is an important principle of the law of the sea. However, the widespread use of flags of convenience poses a particular challenge to maritime security and the enforcement of laws on the high seas.

vi. The use of maritime grey zone tactics is a new and dangerous trend in international affairs. States have traditionally projected naval power to defend their maritime interests. Today however, China and Iran conduct covert operations and deploy civilians or irregular forces to claim territory in the South China Sea or harass shipping traffic in the Persian Gulf respectively. Grey zone operations are designed to avoid conflict escalation and the militarisation of maritime disputes. Yet they fuel maritime competition and undermine UNCLOS and freedom of navigation.

Way Forward

To overcome the challenges posed by maritime security, several actions and changes of attitude should be considered Some of the suggestions that can be taken are listed below:

i. There is an urgent need to define maritime security, new technology and other undefined challenges under UNCLOS. Hence governments might

consider working together at defining the undefined clauses or terms within UNCLOS.

ii. The government may wish to consider monitoring new autonomous maritime vehicles carefully and advocate for a clarification of the existing rules if there is an increase in the use of autonomous vehicles for piratical acts.

iii. The government might wish to consider taking a leadership role and working with others to ensure the link between vessels and the state in which they are registered is genuine and substantial.

iv. There is no mechanism to manage grey zone tactics, and the leading states have so far refused to discuss these issues. Hence, the government should advocate for a mechanism to manage grey zone tactics. Otherwise, grey zone operations will remain a continuing threat to maritime stability and international security, as well as to the global maritime governance regime centred on UNCLOS.

v. The government should continue working with its partners and allies to protect and preserve the principles of freedom of navigation not only in the South China Sea but in every regional sea.

Malaysia understanding the importance of addressing maritime issues adopted the Whole-of-Government and the Whole-of-Society (WoGoS) approaches to address the maritime non-traditional challenges as stated in its Defence White Paper. For instance, in the context of the Whole-of-Government approaches, the formation of a National Task Force, that consists of 19 other government enforcement agencies in tackling the challenges including the maritime nontraditional threats. In the context of the Whole-of-Society approaches, it focuses on Malaysia’s defence workforce which covers five main groups, namely the Regular Forces and Reservists, Volunteer Forces, Veterans, Civil Servants in Defence, and the People (Rakyat).

Conclusion

Malaysia by all accounts and features is truly a Maritime Nation, therefore protecting its maritime interests is paramount to protecting its national interests. Malaysia’s action is very much influenced by the dynamics of the global geostrategic environment and maritime non-traditional threats. Existing maritime nontraditional threats will remain a major concern for many years to come. Malaysia has outlined a robust and adaptive strategy to address its maritime security challenges in its Defence White Paper with robust strategies that is adaptable to the ever-changing internal and external influences.

With the Defence White Paper in place, Malaysia is seeking to have stable defence funding from the government which allows long-term planning with a

predictable budget in which secure and stable funding will allow us to develop procurement planning that is affordable and sustainable for years to come.

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CHAPTER SIX

HIDDEN LINES OF COMMUNICATION: GEOPOLITICS, CYBER THREATS, AND UNDERSEA CABLES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA’S MARITIME SPHERE

Introduction

Bait Al-Amanah

In a globalised world where human interaction is deeply embedded by digital connectivity, we rely heavily on the undersea cable infrastructure, which possesses the ability to transmit vast amounts of essential data for economic activities, financial activities and even defence communications. Given this consideration, the undersea cable is invariably considered as critical infrastructure and its security has been one of the priorities for governments. As the Southeast Asian region is currently hosting two strategic maritime lanes, the Strait of Malacca (SOM) and the South China Sea (SOS), the safety of undersea cable infrastructure could not have been more imperative. The SOM for one, is one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes (Evers & Gerke, 2006) and a crucial passage for economic purposes, or military activities, due to its strategic geography. Similarly, owing to the strategic location, the SCS is considered as a chokepoint area which is often associated with geopolitical rivalries, which adds to the layers of the already complex maritime security in the region (Kaplan, 2014). Indeed, the deep concentration of undersea cables in the Southeast Asian region only underscores the need for robust security measures.

Against the backdrop of security concerns, especially in the maritime realm, Malaysia has a pivotal role to play in safeguarding maritime infrastructure, including the protection of undersea cables. Given the rising threats to the infrastructure,

E Kin Zane Ryan Seow, Karisma Putera Abd Rahman and Fikry A. Rahman

Malaysia’s maritime governance and security primary responsibilities in ensuring the security of Malaysia’s maritime borders may extend beyond conventional naval defence as to protect critical and sensitive information infrastructure. Indeed, this development serves as a reflection of the ever-evolving nature of security challenges in the digital era today. According to Noor (2024), at present, Malaysia’s maritime policy framework still lacks a comprehensive approach in protecting undersea cable infrastructure. Given the consideration that Malaysia’s ambitions as a maritime nation through its vast interest in the maritime domain either in the SCS and the SOM, it is imperative that Malaysia navigates this conundrum while at the same time fortifying its digital infrastructure as means of protection from any potential threats.

This chapter focuses on cybersecurity and non-traditional security threats to submarine cables, with emphasis given to the physical sabotage and cyberattacks. Given that undersea cables have become one of the potential targets by state and non-state actors alike, any disruption would not only deteriorate the physical infrastructure alone, but its far-reaching consequences may affect Malaysia’s overall economic stability, military and national security. Therefore, this chapter aims to assess the vulnerabilities of Malaysia’s maritime domain and propose pragmatic policy recommendations to enhance protection mechanisms. This chapter also adopts a multi-faceted approach that includes policy analysis, case studies and recommended strategies. By assessing existing best practices and regional security cooperation, this chapter seeks to identify relevant actionable measures which could be replicated to bolster Malaysia’s undersea cable resilience. These exercises would shed insights on the opportunities and challenges, while at the same time providing pragmatic policy recommendations. Ultimately, this chapter aims to contribute to the broader efforts to secure and ensure the resilience of digital infrastructure in Malaysia amidst an evolving security landscape.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Undersea cable infrastructure in Southeast Asia will be examined in the next section by identifying key players in undersea cable projects, its geopolitical and economic importance, and the regional points of contestation such as the SOM and the SCS. Subsequently, the chapter describes the non-traditional security threats to undersea cables and at the same time examining the implications to Malaysia’s national defence and gaps in current undersea cable treaties, policies, and laws. The following section then examines the geopolitical rivalries between the United States and China and ASEAN’s response to aforementioned rivalries to safeguard its undersea cable infrastructure. This is then followed by an overview of relevant undersea cable objectives in the ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025, and case studies of undersea cable policies of countries within the region. Finally, the article prescribes strategies and recommendations to mitigate non-traditional threats to undersea cables and provide a brief future outlook of Southeast Asia’s digital infrastructure.

Undersea Cable Infrastructure in Southeast Asia

Key Players and Projects

Southeast Asia’s submarine cable infrastructure represents a critical dimension of global digital connectivity, with Malaysia emerging as a pivotal node within this evolving network. The SEA-ME-WE 6 system - spanning 19,200 kilometres from Southeast Asia to Europe - exemplifies the geopolitical complexities inherent in digital infrastructure development, as evidenced by the transition from Huawei Marine to U.S.-based SubCom following security concerns that prompted Chinese stakeholders’ withdrawal (Brock, 2023). Concurrently, the India-Asia-Xpress (IAX), backed by Reliance Jio (Rao, 2024), establishes complementary connectivity between the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asian digital economies, adding substantial capacity while subtly reshaping regional digital alignments.

For Malaysia, these developments transcend mere technical significance, reinforcing its strategic position as a digital hub within the ASEAN framework. Malaysia’s MyDigital goals of having the highest number of submarine cable landings in Southeast Asia (Ministry of Economy, 2021) represents a timely desire of enhancing network redundancy while positioning Malaysia as a preferred transit point for global internet traffic. Increasing the number of cable landings in Malaysia serves dual imperatives — distributing economic benefits beyond established centres while addressing network resilience. Yet this enviable position carries inherent vulnerabilities - as Malaysia’s centrality in regional data architecture increases, so too does its profile as a potential target for those seeking to exploit digital infrastructure.

Geopolitical and Economic Importance

With these submerged networks carrying an overwhelming 95% of transnational data flows (Tan, 2023), they form the critical foundation upon which the region’s expected $2 trillion digital economy by 2030 depends on (ASEAN Secretariat, 2023). These cables have moved beyond their infrastructural purposes to become mediums of economic leverage and geopolitical contestation. Malaysia’s strategic vision as a maritime nation based on the 2020 Defence White Paper status finds powerful expression in its approach to submarine cables. The Malaysian maritime apparatus requirement to safeguard these cable networks highlights the evolving nature of maritime security itself — no longer confined to traditional naval operations, but encompassing the protection of digital infrastructure upon which modern state power increasingly depends on. Even as military establishments maintain dedicated secure channels, their operational ecosystems remain tethered to commercial cable networks for non-classified communications (Wall & Morcos, 2021).

The Ministry of Transport’s 2024 decision (Free Malaysia Today, 2024) to liberalise cabotage restrictions for foreign cable repair vessels demonstrates a pragmatic strategy: sacrificing certain elements of regulatory control to ensure system

resilience and minimise network disruptions. This policy recalibration reflects an understanding that in the digital domain, accessibility and redundancy can constitute an equally meaningful expression of sovereignty as rigid territorial control. Perhaps most significantly, these submarine networks have emerged as contested spaces in the broader Sino-American strategic competition. Washington’s campaign to exclude Chinese telecommunications infrastructure from international networks, juxtaposed against Beijing’s ambitious Digital Silk Road initiative, transforms these cables into manifestations of great power influence.

Regional Focus: Straits of Malacca & South China Sea

The SOM and SCS represent two key areas in Southeast Asia’s maritime spaces where commercial movements, security considerations, and national ambitions converge with particular intensity. The SOM, channelling almost one-third of global commerce (Feingold & Willige, 2024) and serving as a critical passage for submarine cables, embodies the vulnerability of concentrated maritime activity. The density that highlights its economic significance simultaneously heightens its susceptibility to disruption. The establishment of no-anchoring zones reflects growing recognition among littoral states that infrastructural protection requires new governance mechanisms, though the sheer volume of maritime traffic renders comprehensive enforcement a persistent challenge.

The SCS presents a more overt theatre of contestation where overlapping territorial claims, particularly Beijing’s expansive claims, directly impede digital infrastructure development, such as the case with the Singapore-Japan Cable 2 (SJC2) (Clark, 2023). The bureaucratic friction surrounding cable deployment in contested waters introduces operational complexities that frequently necessitate costly route alterations through uncontested territories. Should these factors remain unresolved, it could result in Malaysia being shunned from future submarine cable infrastructure especially after the missed Apricot, Bifrost and Echo cable opportunities (Hazim, 2021), directly impacting the objectives of the MyDigital blueprint.

Non-Traditional Security Threats to Undersea Cables

The vulnerability of undersea cables towards physical and cyberspace threats is exacerbated by its sheer length complicating monitoring, enforcement and repair operations. Most cable damage incidents are accidental in nature, often stemming from fishing activities, anchoring, and natural disasters (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity [ENISA], 2023). These incidents are more frequent in high-traffic bottlenecks such as the Red Sea or the SOM, where cables situated across sea lines of communication (SLOC) are more prone to damage, whether accidental or deliberate. The impact of severed undersea cables can range from a minor slowdown in internet connectivity to a major disruption as seen in the collateral damage of four undersea cables during the 2023 Red Sea Crisis, which

saw a disruption affecting 25% of Asia-Europe data traffic resulting from sunk anchors in Houthi-led cargo ship attacks (Gritten, 2024). Incidents involving severed cables have become frequent, with two to four undersea cables being severed every week on average (Burdette, 2024).

The often-accidental nature of cable damage has led to state-sponsored actors to conduct grey-zone tactics by carrying out dredge fishing activities or anchoring in known undersea cable lines, providing a layer of plausible deniability for states on sabotage operations, presenting a dimension of non-traditional threats to undersea cable security. Recent incidents of undersea cable sabotage involving the TPMK-3 undersea cable in Taiwan’s outlying island of Matsu and the Estlink 2 undersea cable in Finland by tankers have demonstrated the willingness and capacity of state actors in employing dark fleets to masquerade and conduct grey-zone sabotage to achieve strategic objectives (Chang & McCarthy, 2025; Bockmann, 2024).

In addition to physical damage, undersea cable infrastructure is also vulnerable to hacking and espionage at cable landing stations, with notable examples being the tapping of fibre-optic cables by the UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in international cable landing stations within British coasts, and the collaboration between Denmark and the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct domestic surveillance in submarine cable landing stations (MacAskill et. al, 2013; Moss, 2020). Concerns of landing station espionage are similarly extended to the concern over direct tapping of undersea cables by ships parked on top of undersea cables. However, industry experts have deemed direct tapping to be unlikely, as it requires a dry environment for insertion alone, with tremendous logistics to facilitate the cutting of optic fibres, powering the tapping device, and the storage and transmission of acquired data — through another large cable (ENISA, 2023). Hacking and eavesdropping attempts through cable network management systems or cable-tapping at landing points is simply much more economical and feasible for malicious actors.

Why It Matters to Malaysia’s Broader National Defence

Malaysia’s connectivity relies on its 23 submarine cable networks and 15 landing stations. This includes diplomatic cables and military communications, which often contain classified information. The implications of unprotected undersea cables to the military includes the potential for classified leaks, transmission of critical military intelligence, and delayed response time in a crisis event from sabotaged communications.

Our response to threats toward undersea cables are further compounded by the globally privatised nature of the industry, whose supply chain from planning to production and deployment to maintenance are almost exclusively handled by private companies (Wall & Marcos, 2021). This complicates efforts in the implementation of national security policies that are often time and resource consuming, coupled with the fact that cable consortiums do not necessarily

support or agree with policies proposed by governments. The experience of the United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has demonstrated difficulties to achieve consensus in data-sharing standards and private-sector buy-in to share cyber-threat information with the US Federal Government (Frazier, 2023). The difficult experience of securing information exchange on cyber-threats alone implies further obstacles to secure the support of undersea cable and consortiums to implement government policies meant to secure our undersea cable systems.

Serious implications of undersea cable threats and difficulties in securing privatesector consensus on undersea protection initiatives requires dedicated blueprints to undersea cable protection. The absence of tailor-made security policies and rigorous undersea cable protection standards collectively open the door for various malicious activities, from hacking into network management systems of undersea cable operators that are often not up-to-date to latest cybersecurity standards to commit sabotage and espionage (Wall & Morcos, 2021). The lack of public-private sector exchanges also complicates the enforcement efforts of our overstretched coast guard and navies, who are already facing operational challenges in monitoring extensive maritime areas and responding swiftly to grey-zone aggression especially in Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

In Europe, threats towards undersea cables have become prevalent as Russia is suspected of employing grey-zone tactics to sabotage European cables, which the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have already pre-empted with redundancy practices by financing projects to reroute internet via satellite communications in the event of sabotaged undersea connectivity (Voce et. al, 2025; Manson, 2024). This can be a point of reference for Malaysia, where upscaling satellite communications infrastructure, despite its cost, may prove strategically sound for the East Malaysia region, which is close to our overlapping maritime territorial claims and yet serviced by only five undersea cables across five landing stations.

Governance Gaps

The main governance gap in undersea cable protection points to the limited international legal frameworks guiding cable protection, especially in contested waters and EEZ. There had been three international treaties governing the protection of undersea cables:

1. International Convention for the Protection of Subsea Cables (1884).

2. Geneva Conventions of the Continental Shelf and High Seas (1958).

3. United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982), which overruled the previous two conventions.

These treaties establish universal norms from the operations of laying, maintaining and repairing cables, to the obligations of enforcement and legislation against intentional or accidental damage to undersea cables (ENISA, 2023). However, these treaties fall short in addressing criminal jurisdiction over intentional damage to cables, especially in contested waters.

Under international law, the ‘principle of territoriality’ is applied by states to impose the right to exercise ‘prescriptive jurisdiction’ and ‘enforcement jurisdiction’ in their maritime territories. The former refers to the authority of the State to prescribe and apply laws, while the latter refers to the authority of the state to enforce said laws (e.g., to arrest, detain, prosecute, convict, sentence, and punish) (Beckman, 2014). While UNCLOS recognises prescriptive jurisdiction of coastal states to pass national legislation to create offences and implementing rights outside their maritime boundaries such as EEZ and high seas, enforcement jurisdiction has been unclear particularly on the jurisdiction of vessels.

Outside reasonable doubt of piracy, illegal fishing, human trafficking, and unauthorised broadcasting, enforcement units have to seek the ‘right to visit’ under UNCLOS from corresponding flag states or the master (Beckman, 2014). This in turn complicates efforts to control incidents of undersea cable damage, where the enforcement jurisdiction by States is complicated under UNCLOS. State actors employing grey-zone tactics often masquerade their ships with unrelated flag states, such as the Shun Xing vessel allegedly involved in Taiwan’s undersea cable sabotage bearing a Cameroon flag, while Eagle S bears the flag of Cook Islands while severing Estlink 2 in the Finnish Baltic (Xiao et. al, 2025; Bockmann, 2024).

Meanwhile on the domestic end, efficient undersea cable protection requires addressing several policy gaps. For starters, Malaysia needs to continue its commitment to increase the defence budget amidst aging equipment and procurement scandals to modernise its navy to be capable of fully protecting especially the vast maritime borders of East of Malaysia and its EEZ. The recent 8% increase in defence spending to RM21.2 billion is a positive start, although the maintenance and repair costs up to RM5.8 billion will continue to restrict the fiscal space to procure new naval assets (Daniel, 2024). At the same time, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) must begin planning ahead for undersea cable sabotage and espionage by enhancing cross-agency intelligence sharing and patrol drills near undersea cables.

At the same time, Malaysia lacks specific legislation to address undersea cable incidents, if left unchecked, might complicate enforcement and telecommunications repair operations especially in its EEZ and adjacent high seas (Raha & K.D., 2021). In the event of undersea cable damage, its downtime

1The five undersea cables are: BaSICS , SKR1M , East-WestSubmarineCableSystem , SEA-H2X , and the Labuan-Brunei Submarine Cable

and impact will highly depend on its proximity to the nearest spare cable storage, and the availability of cable repair ships to carry out repair works (ENISA, 2023). Currently, Malaysia is still lacking the domestic capability to carry out undersea cable repair works, with most cable maintenance and repair works carried out by Singapore as of 2020 (Zainul, 2020). Dependence on foreign contractors to maintain critical assets such as undersea cables have prompted concerns of potential reconnaissance on military communication links and precise mapping of undersea cable by malicious actors to carry out swift grey-zone operations (Runde et. al, 2024).

Geopolitical Rivalries and Regional Responses

US-China Strategic Competition

The U.S.-China strategic competition significantly impacts global and regional landscapes, especially with the advent of the new Trump administration. Digital technology is no exception to this rivalry. The competition between these major powers substantially influences undersea cable investments and technology standards, among other areas. As digital technology becomes an increasingly crucial element of economic and national security, both the United States and China have sought to expand their influence over submarine cable networks.

The United States has consistently pushed initiatives to secure global digital supply chains and has advocated for limiting reliance on Chinese technology. One of the key concerns raised is the risk of cyber espionage associated with Chinese telecommunications firms such as Huawei Marine Networks, which is involved in undersea cable construction (Segal, 2020). In response, the United States has pursued alternative routes, partnering with allies such as Japan and Australia to finance and construct submarine cables that bypass China.

Meanwhile, China, as an emerging global player, is expanding its presence in undersea cable investments through its Digital Silk Road Initiative (Zhao, 2021). Under this flagship initiative, Beijing finances cable projects in Asia, Africa and the Pacific, aiming to cement its role as a dominant player in global digital infrastructure. The intensifying competition between the United States and China has led to the fragmentation of global digital governance, often forcing other countries into difficult positions and increasing pressure to align their undersea cable policies with one of the two major powers.

The growing tensions in this critical maritime route, coupled with overlapping territorial claims, are likely to intensify disputes over submarine cable routes and maintenance operations. China, for one, has expansive maritime claims in the region, with its coast guard and naval vessels increasingly patrolling areas where cables may be laid, leading to confrontations with neighbouring states (Bateman, 2021). Any attempt to lay or repair undersea cables in contested waters risks escalating regional conflicts. Additionally, China’s artificial islands and military installations in the SCS raise concerns about its ability to exert control over critical infrastructure (Poling, 2020).

ASEAN’s Position and Response

Given the strategic importance of submarine cables in Southeast Asia, coupled with the region’s crucial maritime routes such as the SOM and the SCS, ASEAN member states (AMS) inevitably find themselves at the crossroads of great power rivalry. The region’s collective response to external forces has largely been characterised as a careful balancing act, prioritising regional stability while avoiding overt alignment with either the United States or China.

To date, ASEAN’s approach to submarine cable security has been largely pragmatic. The AMS recognise the need to safeguard critical digital infrastructure from potential threats, including cyberattacks, sabotage, and geopolitical disruptions. While the ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025 emphasises the importance of digital connectivity and infrastructure resilience, policy divergences among AMS have hindered the development of a unified regional strategy for undersea cable security (Seah, 2021).

Maritime Enforcement Cooperation

Given the potential risks associated with undersea cables, the AMS could explore enhancing naval cooperation to safeguard these critical assets. One potential policy option includes conducting joint patrols in high-risk maritime zones, particularly in the SCS and the SOM, as a deterrent against sabotage or unlawful interference with undersea cables.

Additionally, ASEAN member states could establish an agreement on informationsharing among their naval forces (Collin, 2020). Such an agreement could facilitate cooperation in joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) efforts, improving early threat detection for submarine cable infrastructure. The framework of the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) could potentially serve as a model for this initiative.

Another mechanism worth considering is the establishment of a dedicated ASEAN task force for undersea cable security, integrating both enforcement and civilian stakeholders. This task force could enhance rapid response capabilities in the event of cable disruptions and could be incorporated as a subset of the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) through a robust regional coast guard cooperation.

ASEAN and Its Member States: ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025 and Regional Undersea Cable Harmonisation

Part of the ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025 (ADM 2025) includes the desired outcomes (DO) to improve the quality and coverage of fixed and mobile broadband infrastructure (as listed in DO2), with enabling actions (EAS) to “Move towards best practice permission and access rights for local and national infrastructure including submarine cable repair” (as listed in EAS 2.2), which is marked as ‘high priority’ in the ADM 2025.

EAS 2.2 recognises the difficulties in gaining access rights to deploy and repair undersea cable infrastructure as the most pressing problem to deploy high quality and vast coverage broadband services across ASEAN. This builds on earlier efforts such as the nonbinding “ASEAN Guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair of Submarine Cables” published in 2019 to address submarine cable resilience by focusing on simplifying permit applications but lacking in enforcement mechanisms.

To achieve the objectives of moving towards best practice permission and access rights for regional undersea cable repairs, the ADM 2025 needs to provide more robust initiatives for regional policy harmonisation that includes standardising regulations and technical guidelines across ASEAN states. For starters, efforts must continue to build on the progress made in the 2016-2020 ASEAN Information and Communications Technologies Master Plan (AIM 2020), whose action points for undersea cables include convening dialogue with relevant stakeholders to identify submarine cable repairs in ASEAN. Malaysia can build on this by having the RMN and MMEA to step up engagements with civil and private stakeholders under the ASEAN umbrella. Similarly, Malaysia can coordinate with regional state actors to establish an ASEAN rapid response team to address incidents relating to undersea cables. Inter-governmental coordination can be built through regular joint maritime patrols on undersea cable lines and cyber-threat intelligence sharing.

The Case of Singapore

Singapore’s network of 26 international submarine cable landings represents not just physical assets but the benefits of deliberate policy choices and whole-ofgovernment coordination that have positioned it as the region’s digital nexus. Singapore’s regulatory approach demonstrates a practical understanding of how legal frameworks support infrastructure resilience. Through its Telecommunications Act (Attorney-General’s Chambers of Singapore, 2020), violators face steep SGD20,000 fines with daily SGD2,000 penalties (China Shipowners Mutual Assurance Association, 2019) for damages to telecommunications cables, creating genuine deterrence through financial consequences and thorough enforcement. Malaysia’s approach unfortunately, even when spread across five separate laws i.e. the Continental Shelf Act, the EEZ Act, the Penal Code, the Merchant Shipping Ordinance and the Communications and Multimedia Ac, still does not fulfil the need for a comprehensive legislation on submarine cables (Su & Mohd Rusli, 2021).

Singapore also leads in terms of emergency response capabilities, although Malaysia is on the right path. When cables fail, Singapore’s streamlined repair permitting gets crews working within days, which is a critical advantage in an era where connectivity disruptions trigger cascading economic impacts. Malaysia’s continued cabotage policy exemption for repair vessels acknowledges this reality, showing a growing recognition that administrative speed matters as much as regulatory thoroughness.

The 2024 policy review by RSIS (Beckman et al., 2024) highlighting Singapore’s multi-agency approach offers Malaysia a possible roadmap. By recognising cables as critical infrastructure, Singapore can frame these assets not as mere commercial utilities but as foundational elements of national security. While Singapore is yet to accept these recommendations, it is an important step that Malaysia should consider, especially as these cables have a paramount role in maintaining its national security and prosperity.

The Case of Indonesia

Indonesia’s vast maritime domain presents a fascinating counterpoint to Singapore’s concentrated digital efficiency. With its 17,000 islands straddling the equator, Indonesia functions simultaneously as an internal market for regional submarine cable networks and as a critical junction where international cables traverse between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The sheer scale of Indonesia’s submarine cable architecture, 217 distinct segments as of 2022, reflects both necessity and aspiration (Wijaya, 2023). Projects like the East Palapa Ring reveal a state grappling with its geographical reality (Dinarto, 2021), attempting to improve digital connectivity across dispersed territories through strategic infrastructure investment. Yet this ambition confronts challenging geographic and regulatory obstacles that outline complex governance challenges.

The vulnerability of Indonesia’s submarine cables emerges from an unfortunate convergence of risk factors: seismic instability along the Pacific Ring of Fire (Yuen Yee, 2024), intensive maritime traffic in confined waterways, and perhaps most significantly, one of the world’s largest fishing fleets—approximately 719,000 vessels (OECD, 2023) whose activities pose persistent threats to submerged cables. This combination of natural and human-induced hazards creates a particularly challenging operational environment. Perhaps most revealing is Indonesia’s repair timeline metrics, exceeding 30 days on average compared to Vietnam’s remarkably efficient 12-day standard (Hussain, 2020). This striking disparity reflects not merely logistical complications but deeper institutional fragmentation. The absence of consolidated legislative frameworks specifically addressing submarine cable protection has created regulatory gaps where overlapping jurisdictions between shipping, telecommunications, and marine spatial planning authorities impede rapid response capabilities (Centre for International Law, 2024).

The Case of Malaysia

Across Southeast Asia, common roadblocks include regulatory fragmentation with Malaysia’s five separate laws contrasting Singapore’s consolidated Telecommunications Act, bureaucratic delays in repair permitting as seen in Indonesia’s 30-and-above day repair timeline compared to Vietnam’s 12-day standard, and insufficient recognition of these assets’ strategic significance. Practical approaches to overcoming these challenges include targeted regulatory consolidation, cabotage exemptions for repair vessels as Malaysia

has implemented, and whole-of-government coordination mechanisms that compress response times. The contrasting case studies of Singapore and Indonesia demonstrate that effective submarine cable governance in Malaysia requires not just robust legislation but institutional alignment.

Although Malaysia isn’t fundamentally outclassed , the gaps reflect the challenges of implementing coherent regulation across a more complex geographic and administrative landscape. With targeted regulatory consolidation and better inter-agency coordination through a whole-of-government approach, Malaysia has the building blocks to match Singapore’s regional digital influence. For Malaysia, Indonesia’s experience offers a valuable testing ground to observe which approaches to maritime digital infrastructure succeed and which fall short. The Indonesian case demonstrates how regulatory cohesion and institutional coordination function as prerequisites for infrastructure resilience, particularly in complex maritime environments not unlike Malaysia’s. The challenges facing Indonesia’s submarine cable networks remind us that digital connectivity, for all its virtual benefits, remains fundamentally anchored in physical infrastructure that requires sophisticated governance frameworks adapted to specific geographic contexts.

Mitigating Non-Traditional Security Threats: Strategies and Recommendations

Strengthening Legal and Regulatory Frameworks

To mitigate non-traditional security threats, a robust legal and regulatory framework is undeniably essential. Given the critical role of submarine cables in global communication, clearer guidelines are warranted to protect this vital infrastructure. While UNCLOS provide a foundation for cable protection, gaps remain in addressing emerging threats such as cyberattacks, sabotage, and espionage targeting undersea cables (Davenport, 2020).

Cross-Sectorial Collaboration

The complexity of non-traditional security threats necessitates a coordinated approach involving multiple stakeholders, including both public and private sector entities. Relying solely on naval forces for the security and protection of undersea cables is insufficient. Instead, robust partnerships between government agencies, navies, technology firms, and telecom operators are required.

A Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model plays a crucial role in bolstering submarine cable security (Levinson, 2020). Governments could collaborate with telecommunications companies and tech giants to develop comprehensive risk assessments and security protocols (Brewster, 2019). According to Tully (2021), real-time intelligence sharing among key stakeholders would substantially enhance situational awareness, enabling faster responses to potential threats. Joint exercises between navies and industry players could also improve crisis response capabilities, ensuring that all parties are prepared for scenarios such as

cable damage due to sabotage or cyber intrusions. Additionally, closer regional collaboration within the ASEAN framework could enhance collective security efforts. Since submarine cables often span multiple jurisdictions, establishing an ASEAN-wide framework for cable protection would strengthen overall resilience (Severino, 2020). Joint maritime patrols, shared threat intelligence, and synchronised response strategies could help mitigate risks posed by both state and non-state actors (Caballero-Anthony, 2021).

Technological Advancements

New solutions for the protection of undersea cables against security threats may be resolved through advancements in technology. For instance, AI-powered maritime surveillance systems could track and monitor vessels operating near sensitive cable locations. When combined with satellite monitoring, these technologies provide early warnings about potential suspicious activities, enabling the enforcement and defence forces to respond swiftly and effectively (Johnson, 2021).

Furthermore, modern cable monitoring systems equipped with sensor technology can detect unusual activities, such as tampering or changes in pressure, before significant damage occurs (Lin & Singer, 2020). This approach allows authorities to respond promptly, thereby reducing the risk of major disruptions to the infrastructure.

Conclusion and Future Outlook

Malaysia’s position at the centre of two critical maritime chokepoints, the SOM and the SCS, renders its submarine cable infrastructure simultaneously invaluable and vulnerable. As the digital backbone carrying 95% of transnational data flows, these global submerged networks have transcended mere commercial utility to become foundational elements of national security and economic prosperity. Malaysia’s ambition to achieve the highest number of submarine cable landings in Southeast Asia through the MyDigital blueprint represents not just technological aspiration but strategic necessity in an increasingly contested digital domain.

The vulnerabilities confronting Malaysia’s 23 submarine cable networks and 15 landing stations are multifaceted — ranging from commercial maritime accidents to sophisticated grey-zone operations and cyber-espionage. The regulatory fragmentation across five separate laws, compared to Singapore’s consolidated approach, creates legal gaps that malicious actors can exploit. Most concerning is the emergence of plausibly deniable sabotage operations, as demonstrated by incidents in Taiwan and Finland, which expose the limitations of conventional maritime security frameworks when confronting hybrid threats. The future security of Southeast Asia’s digital infrastructure demands a paradigm shift from siloed national approaches to collective regional resilience. ASEAN’s Digital Masterplan 2025 provides a preliminary framework, but requires substantial strengthening through standardised regulations, streamlined repair protocols,

and joint enforcement mechanisms. The establishment of an ASEAN-wide submarine cable rapid response team would compress repair timelines from Indonesia’s problematic 30-day standard toward Vietnam’s more efficient 12-day benchmark.

The RMN stands poised to play a greater role to defend our maritime infrastructure. With its recent 8% budget increase, the RMN could pioneer joint patrols targeting grey-zone threats while establishing intelligence-sharing protocols across regional navies. Such leadership would provide Malaysia greater influence in regional digital governance while advancing its Maritime Nation aspirations. The securitisation of Malaysia’s submarine cable infrastructure requires transcending conventional civil-military divides. Given the inherently privatised nature of the industry, future security frameworks must integrate telecommunications firms, cable operators, naval, enforcement, and regulatory agencies through institutionalised publicprivate partnerships.

Further research is urgently needed to quantify the strategic relationship between maritime territorial disputes and digital infrastructure security, particularly as USChina strategic competition intensifies under a second Trump administration. Meanwhile, Malaysia should pursue technological innovation through AIenhanced maritime surveillance systems and distributed sensor networks capable of detecting tampering or pressure changes before major disruption occurs. As Southeast Asia’s $2 trillion digital economy by 2030 depends on these submarine cable networks, the evolution of Malaysia’s maritime security apparatus from traditional naval defence to comprehensive digital infrastructure protection will determine not merely its technological future, but its sovereign capacity in an era where power flows through fibre-optic cables as surely as through territorial waters.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

NAVIGATING CHALLENGES IN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA: THE ROLE OF MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA IN REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY

KD JEBAT

Introduction

The Strait of Malacca is an essential maritime route, significantly contributing to global commerce by facilitating almost one-third of the world’s commercial shipping. Extending roughly 480 nautical miles between Peninsular Malaysia and Sumatra, Indonesia, it constitutes the most direct connection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This narrow Strait has enabled trade contacts between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia for ages. The strategic significance is clear, since over 90,000 vessels traverse the waterways each year, including significant oil shipments bound for East Asia (Bateman & Chan, 2022; National Bureau of Asian Research, 2023). Approximately 15 million barrels of oil traverse the Strait daily, highlighting its importance in the global energy supply network (Rahman & Singh, 2022; The Insurer, 2021).

Notwithstanding its economic and strategic significance, the Strait of Malacca encounters various security issues, including piracy, armed robbery, illegal fishing, human trafficking, and smuggling. In 2022, the waterway experienced a 41% increase in pirate incidents relative to the prior year, with 38 occurrences reported in the first half of the year (ReCAAP ISC, 2023; National Bureau of Asian Research, 2023). These concerns jeopardise both commercial shipping and national security, hence complicating marine administration in the region. The geopolitical environment of the region is intricate, with key powers like China, the

Commander Syahrum bin Hassim RMN

United States, and India striving to augment their influence, hence intensifying security concerns (Yusof & Karim, 2023; National Bureau of Asian Research, 2023). To address these challenges, Malaysia and Indonesia have strengthened their collaborative security initiatives to safeguard the Strait. Efforts such as the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols and the “Eyes in the Sky” aerial surveillance programme reflect their dedication to maintaining maritime security. These joint measures include coordinated naval patrols, intelligence sharing, and synchronized enforcement operations to deter piracy and other illicit activities (Chan & Rahman, 2023; The Gulf Observer, 2023). Additionally, Malaysia has enhanced its maritime security by deploying high-speed intercept vessels and improving surveillance capabilities through the Malaysian Maritime Sea Surveillance System (SWASLA), which covers vast maritime zones (Tan, 2022; The Gulf Observer, 2023). This study delves into the Strait’s strategic importance, the security threats it faces, ongoing collaborative measures, and subsequently provides strategic recommendations to bolster maritime security and regional stability.

The Strategic Importance of the Strait of Malacca

The Strait of Malacca is vital for global energy security, especially in the transit of crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG). Approximately 15.2 million barrels of oil daily pass across the Strait, primarily serving China, Japan, South Korea, and India. The passage functions as a vital route for oil transportation from the Middle East to Asia, rendering any disruption a significant economic and geopolitical issue. A blockade or crisis in the Strait could dramatically increase global oil prices, disrupt energy supply networks, and result in significant economic consequences, especially for oil-dependent economies in Asia (Zhang, 2024).

Beyond its role in energy trade, the Strait of Malacca is a critical conduit for transporting manufactured goods, raw materials, and agricultural products, facilitating global commerce. South East Asian nations like Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam heavily depend on the Strait to export palm oil, rubber, textiles, and electronic products, while major economies like China, Japan, and South Korea rely on it for importing machinery, minerals, and industrial components. According the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR, 2023), the region’s economic interdependence with global markets makes it highly vulnerable to disruptions such as piracy, blockades, or geopolitical conflicts, which could cripple supply chains, increase costs, and destabilize international trade.

The Strait of Malacca possess considerable geopolitical significance, drawing the interest of major nations including China, the United States, Japan, and India. Due to its strategic position, nations vying for supremacy in the Indo-Pacific area regard control of the Strait as a vital element in their marine strategies. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its investments in regional infrastructure, like Kuantan Port (Malaysia) and Kuala Tanjung Port (Indonesia), have elicited apprehensions regarding Beijing’s expanding influence. Simultaneously, the United States naval deployments and India’s strategic presence highlight the Strait’s significance in regional power dynamics (Nguyen, 2024).

The Strait of Malacca confront a variety of security threats, such as piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, and potential terrorist activities, despite their economic and geopolitical significance. The Strait were historically one of the most perilous waterways in the world due to the high number of piracy incidents, which led to international and regional collaboration to combat maritime crime. Smuggling of contraband products, weapons, and illegal drugs continues to be a persistent problem. The Strait is also exploited by human trafficking networks to transport unlawful migrants, with a particular emphasis on Rohingya refugees and economic migrants from South Asia. In order to mitigate these security threats, littoral states must implement robust maritime enforcement and continuous surveillance (Rahman, 2023).

With thousands of vessels passing through the Strait of Malacca daily, environmental hazards such as oil spills and other forms of marine pollution leading to ecological deterioration are becoming more prevalent. Large oil tankers transiting the small channel increase the risk of accidents and accidental oil spills, endangering marine wildlife and coastal communities. Overfishing and illegal fishing activities further threatens fish stocks, affecting the local economy. Climate change and rising sea level events collectively pose long-term difficulties to coastal populations and marine infrastructure. Thus, as noted by Tan & Abdullah (2023), to protect the Strait’s ecological health, Malaysia and Indonesia must implement stringent environmental legislation, pollution control measures, and marine conservation initiatives.

The Strait of Malacca, with its high traffic volume, is prone to navigational risks such as ship collisions, vessel congestion, and shallow water mishaps. Malaysia and Indonesia have invested in modern Vessel Traffic Management Systems (VTMS) to improve monitoring, navigation, and emergency response coordination. The Strait of Malacca Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), administered by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), reduces the danger of marine accidents by controlling ship movement patterns. Continued investment in port facilities, navigation aids, and rescue operations is critical to ensuring seamless and secure transit through the Strait (Yusof, 2023).

As global trade volumes increase, the Strait of Malacca presents both obstacles and potentials. While improved security cooperation between Malaysia and Indonesia has reduced piracy and smuggling, emerging threats like as cyber-attacks on marine infrastructure, geopolitical conflicts, and environmental problems necessitate more vigorous responses. At the same time, advances in marine technology, digital navigation, and green shipping practices present potentials to improve efficiency, security, and sustainability in the Strait. Keeping the Strait secure, open, and well-managed would necessitate ongoing coordination among regional and international partners, confirming its standing as a critical artery of world trade (Liew & Hassan, 2024).

Malaysia and Indonesia’s Joint Maritime Security Efforts

The Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP), which was established in 2004 by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, is one of the most significant collaborative endeavours to protect the Strait of Malacca. The Strait had become a piracy stronghold due to the escalating piracy incidents in the early 2000s, for which this initiative was a direct response. The MSP is designed to prevent criminal activities by incorporating rapid response mechanisms, intelligence exchange, and coordinated maritime patrols. The region’s maritime security has been significantly enhanced as a result of the concerted efforts of these nations, which have resulted in a significant decrease in piracy cases (Ho, 2021; ReCAAP ISC, 2023). The MSP has received financial and technological support from external stakeholders, such as the United States and Japan, in order to advance its objectives, as a result of its success (Bateman & Chan, 2022).

The “Eyes-in-the-Sky” (EiS) programme was initiated as a critical element of the MSP to improve aerial surveillance over the Strait. This initiative allows Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand to conduct coordinated aerial patrols in real time using maritime patrol aircraft, thereby providing real-time intelligence on vessel movements and potential hazards. The deployment of these aircraft has considerably enhanced monitoring capabilities, enabling authorities to promptly address suspicious activities (Sazlan et al., 2022). The EiS programme is designed to enhance maritime domain awareness in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore, thereby contributing to the overall security and safety of this critical maritime corridor (ReCAAP ISC, 2023; Ho, 2021).

Both Malaysia and Indonesia engage proactively in the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), a framework that facilitates international cooperation in fighting against maritime crime. ReCAAP promotes the exchange of information among regional law enforcement agencies, thereby fostering coordinated responses to the challenges posed by piracy threats. The accord additionally provides technical support, programmes for capacity enhancement, and mechanisms for intelligence sharing to improve the efficacy of measures against piracy (Chan & Rahman, 2023). Through ReCAAP, Malaysia and Indonesia engage in collaboration with various regional partners to scrutinise piracy trends and maritime crime patterns in real-time, resulting in more effective countermeasures and enhanced maritime domain awareness (ReCAAP ISC, 2023; Liow, 2021).

Beyond coordinated patrols, Malaysia and Indonesia engage in joint naval exercises and law enforcement operations to strengthen maritime security. The Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) frequently cooperate on operations targeting smuggling, illegal fishing, and human trafficking. These joint efforts ensure that law enforcement personnel from both countries can operate seamlessly within their respective maritime zones (Tan, 2022). These drills also improve search and rescue efforts and help both nations respond swiftly to maritime threats. More

than just a strategy, this cooperation builds trust and stronger ties, reinforcing security in the region (ReCAAP ISC, 2023; Bateman & Chan, 2022). Protecting this waterway is a shared priority between the two neighbouring nations.

Both Malaysia and Indonesia have increased their security engagements to include external parties including the United States, Japan, China, and Australia in recognition of the Strait of Malacca’s global significance. Japan provides financial support and technological transfers to improve port security and marine domain awareness, and the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) frequently holds collaborative maritime security training exercises with both nations (Singh & Lee, 2022). Furthermore, by supporting joint capacity-building initiatives, marine policing, and counterterrorism initiatives, Australia and India have been aggressively enhancing their security alliances with Malaysia and Indonesia. The Indo-Pacific region’s stability is further strengthened by these cooperative initiatives (ReCAAP ISC, 2023; Liow, 2021).

Due to the significant marine traffic in the Strait, Malaysia and Indonesia have prioritised the improvement of port security and vessel traffic management systems (VTMS). The Strait of Malacca Vessel Traffic Management System (SOMVTMS) is essential for monitoring and regulating maritime traffic, maintaining safe navigation, and mitigating the hazards of ship collisions, smuggling, and other illegal activities (Chan & Rahman, 2023). Port authorities in significant sites, such Port Klang in Malaysia and Belawan Port in Indonesia, have instituted sophisticated security screening protocols. These measures encompass the implementation of automatic identification systems (AIS), X-ray cargo scanners, and biometric access controls to enhance port security and deter unauthorised actions within maritime infrastructure (Tan, 2022; Singh & Lee, 2022).

Both Malaysia and Indonesia acknowledge that continuous training and capacitybuilding are essential for maintaining robust maritime security. The two countries regularly organize joint maritime security workshops, leadership training programmes for naval officers, and crisis response drills to enhance operational efficiency. Initiatives such as the Malindo Jaya exercise provide platforms for maritime forces to train in realistic threat scenarios, including hijackings, search and rescue operations, and emergency disaster responses (Yusof & Karim, 2023). Expanding these training programmes to address emerging security challenges, such as cyber threats targeting maritime infrastructure, will further strengthen the resilience of Malaysia and Indonesia’s maritime enforcement agencies in safeguarding the Strait of Malacca (Chen, 2021; Ho, 2021).

Strengthening Maritime Security Cooperation

Improving real-time intelligence sharing between Malaysia and Indonesia is one of the main developments required to protect the Strait of Malacca. Although current arrangements as the MSP and the ReCAAP help to organise cooperation, intelligence integration can still be improved. Collective Security Theory (Kupchan, 1998) holds that nations under shared dangers have to cooperate to handle security issues. In line with this theory, Rahman and Singh (2022) proposed that

both countries should set up a specific Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centre to collaboratively examine real-time data from naval forces, coast guards, and surveillance systems Furthermore, this centre might combine intelligence from foreign partners including Australia, the United States, and Japan to create a multi-tiered early-warning system enhancing marine domain awareness and danger identification (Chen, 2021). According to the Constructivist Approach to Security (Wendt, 1999), intelligence sharing depends critically on trust-building, hence, adopting these approaches will help grow Malaysia and Indonesia’s relationship with regional allies. Both nations can guarantee speedier response times and strengthen maritime security over the entire region by enhancing intelligence coordination.

To effectively counter maritime crimes of piracy, illegal fishing, and smuggling, Malaysia and Indonesia must invest in cutting-edge surveillance technology. Expanding on satellite-based monitoring systems’ deployment, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and artificial-intelligence-based analysis would significantly improve ships’ movement tracking in real-time (Huang et al., 2023). The Technological Determinism Theory (McLuhan, 1964) asserts that technological advancements are the driving force behind the evolution of security approaches. The Network-Centric Warfare theory (NCW) (Cebrowski, 1998) also suggests that the integration of surveillance networks and communications networks improves situation awareness, which explains the use of smart vessels with radar sensors and automatic alert features in high-risk maritime areas. Both countries must take into account drone-based maritime patrols that would not only be costeffective but provide quick-response capacity in cases of breaches in security, further enhancing maritime situation awareness in Malacca Strait (Jones & Tan, 2020). Deploying these technology measures would make Malaysia and Indonesia remain at the forefront of future maritime challenges while streamlining resources and operating efficiency.

The discrepancies within Indonesian and Malaysian maritime laws have historically posed significant obstacles to the enforcement of security measures against criminal activities in the Malacca Strait. The necessity for cohesive maritime legislations is evident to guarantee that individuals apprehended in the waters of Indonesia or Malaysia are prosecuted within their own jurisdictions (Othman & Karim, 2021).

The Regime Theory by Krasner (1982) substantiates the necessity of a bilateral extradition pact and harmonised maritime laws to eradicate legal loopholes that enable criminals to evade prosecution. Furthermore, international maritime legal framework emphasises the idea of freedom of the seas, necessitating collaborative systems that strike a balance between national sovereignty and shared security. To enhance maritime law enforcement, standardised operating procedures (SOPs) for coordinated naval responses should be established, ensuring both countries adopt synchronised strategies in tackling maritime security threats efficiently (Chong, 2022). Strengthening legal cooperation will lead to a more unified approach to maritime law enforcement, enabling both nations to effectively address transnational maritime crime with consistency and coordination.

To maintain their effectiveness, maritime security operations require sustainable financial resources. National security funds should be directed towards maritime surveillance, collaborative patrols, and navy upgrade initiatives in both Malaysia and Indonesia (Rahman & Singh, 2022). The Economic Security Theory (Dunning, 1998) posits that a stable marine commerce environment is crucial for economic development, hence warranting long-term investments in security infrastructure. Moreover, the funding of advanced marine security efforts can be enhanced by obtaining financial support from international institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank. The Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Theory (Carbonnier, 2013) underscores the capacity of significant shipping corporations benefiting from the Strait to participate in security initiatives via voluntary contributions or maritime security taxes. The ongoing improvement of maritime security initiatives will be supported by the establishment of sustainable financing mechanisms, ensuring that economic interests correspond with security goals. This will promote sustained investment in regional stability and defence capabilities.

Conclusion

The Strait of Malacca continues to be one of the globe’s most strategic maritime corridors, acting as a lifeline for international commerce and energy transport. At the same time, its economic and geopolitical significance makes it a hotspot for potential security risks in the form of piracy, smuggling, and geopolitical rivalry between global powers. Malaysia and Indonesia have appreciated the need to preserve peace in this strategic Strait by instituting several joint-security measures like the MSP, the EIS programme, and greater maritime cooperation through their navies. All these have helped to see substantial decrease in piracy attacks as well as improved maritime awareness of the region. New challenges in the form of cyber-attacks on maritime infrastructure, environmental risks, and changes in geopolitical dynamics require that measures to secure the Strait must constantly evolve to maintain long-term peace and efficiency in protecting the Strait.

Malaysia and Indonesia have gone far in maritime security cooperation but must improve further in sharing of intelligence, harmonizing laws, and adoption of cutting-edge technology for maritime surveillance. Having a specific Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centre would enable the two countries to consolidate in realtime their maritime agencies’ as well as their global counterparts’ data to improve early warnings for potential attacks as well as quick reaction to new dangers. Additionally, harmonizing maritime laws as well as having in place a bilateral extradition pact for maritime crime would address legal loopholes to prevent criminals from taking advantage. Investments in satellite-based monitoring technology, UAVs, and AI-based analytical capabilities would further improve the efficiency of Strait of Malacca security operations in countering threat from illicit maritime activity.

Ultimately, sustaining the long-term security and sustainability of the Strait of Malacca requires multi-faceted approaches that include regional and global

cooperation, public-private partnership, and capacity-building measures that take place on a continual basis. Malaysia and Indonesia must extend their multilateral dialogue on security to include members of ASEAN as well as other crucial players like Australia, Japan, and India to consolidate regional maritime security mechanisms in place. Sustainable financing arrangements involving financing from global finance organizations as well as from maritime industry players must further be explored to finance ongoing as well as future maritime security measures. By advocating for a comprehensive cooperative approach, Malaysia and Indonesia would make the Strait of Malacca secure, stable, and robust maritime route that reinforces its status as a vital global gateway for global trade and economic.

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PART IV BLUE ECONOMY

CHAPTER EIGHT

HARNESSING THE BLUE ECONOMY FOR MALAYSIA: NAVIGATING OPPORTUNITIES AND GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

Eimaan Intikhab Qureshi National Institute of Maritime Affairs (NIMA), Pakistan

Introduction

The concept of Blue Economy is one that recognizes the ocean as one of the most important sources for economic growth while preserving the environment (Maza, 2025). With the aim to split environmental degradation with economic growth, it promotes responsible resource management and the use of innovative technologies. With oceans taking up 70% of Earth’s surface, the Blue Economy helps with not only sustaining livelihoods for more than 3 billion people but also provides options for dealing with issues such as climate change, food insecurity and energy shortages (Kamboyo, 2024). The concept of Blue Economy matches closely with several UN Sustainable Development Goals, like 14 (Life Below Water) as it promotes ocean stewardship and responsible marine resource management, however, it has horizontal linkage with all SDGs. The SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) is supported by sustainable fisheries management by improving nutrition and ensuring food security. The sector of coastal tourism can contribute to SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) by creating opportunities for livelihoods (Chaturvedi, 2023).

The Indo-Pacific is one of the important oceanic zones in the world, which contributes immensely to global trade, economic interconnectivity, and geopolitical interaction between states. The Indo-Pacific Region includes some

of the most populous countries such as Pakistan, China, India, Japan, Australia and Malaysia and accounts for around two-thirds of economic output globally (Drishti, 2023). It is an important hub for trade, consisting of critical maritime routes, including the Strait of Malacca. This chokepoint is important for linking the economies of East Asia, Middle East, South Asia and Europe, making it a linchpin of international trade.

Malaysia plays a vital role in the Indo-Pacific Region because of its economic potential and strategic location. It navigates a delicate balance between major powers especially the United States and China by using the policy of ‘pulling sideways’, which means maintaining economic ties with China while engaging in security cooperation with the US (Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2024). The geopolitical location of Malaysia is important as it seeks to preserve its maritime interests. Malaysia’s long coastline and marine resources offer many opportunities for sustainable development. Sitting astride strait of Malacca is hallmark of their geostrategic location. The contribution of its Blue Economy are expected to increase from 21% to 31% (Akademi Sains, 2022).

Blue Economy Versus Ocean Economy

The terms Blue Economy and Ocean Economy are used to describe economic activities related to the ocean. While both terms describe the same thing, there are distinctions that make them stand out from one another. The ocean economy deals with economic activities in the marine environment like fishing and shipping but does not prioritize sustainability. The Blue Economy, however, carries a more holistic approach; it focuses on all the economic activities related to oceans but most importantly it focuses on the sustainable use of marine resources for economic growth and conservation of biodiversity and preservation of environment.

The World Bank defines it as “the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods, and jobs while preserving the health of the ocean ecosystem” (World Bank Group, 2017) The European Commission describes it as encompassing “all economic activities related to oceans, seas, and coasts,” covering a wide range of interlinked established and emerging sectors (European Commission, 2021).

The Blue Economy serves as a framework and policy for sustainable marine economic activities. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) projects that the ocean economy, which includes all industries with a direct or indirect connection to the ocean, such as marine energy, ports, shipping, coastal protection, and seafood production, could outperform global economic growth by 2030, which indicates the importance of marine sectors in economic development (CMEMS, 2017).

Strategic Importance of the Indo-Pacific Region

The strategic location of the Indo-Pacific Region has a vital importance for global trade which makes it a focal point for geopolitical competition. The presence of important sea routes is also a reason for competition between major states. An example is the dispute over maritime boundary in the South China Sea, involving a number of countries like Vietnam, China and Philippines, which highlights the possibility of conflict (Ziętek, 2018). Different countries competing for influence in the region led to the militarisation of the Indo-Pacific. QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), which involves United States, India, Japan and Australia, is one of the examples (Smith, 2021). US has issued Indo- Pacific Strategy (replacing Asia-Pacific Strategy) in 2022, which recognizes India’s dominant role in Indo Pacific region and termed as Net Security Provider and termed China as the aggressor. US Pacific Command and CENTCOM jurisdictions and areas of responsibilities have also been redefined.

The Indo-Pacific Region is also home to many territorial disputes and potential flashpoints which further complicate the security dynamic of the region. Hence the Indo-Pacific Region has become a theatre of security concerns in the 21st century which have implications for stability on a global level (Ziętek, 2018). The increasing militarisation of the Indo-Pacific region implies the risk of a potential security dilemma which increases the possibility of conflict in the region.

Major chokepoints in the Indo-Pacific region include the Strait of Malacca. Since it connects the Indian with the Pacific Ocean, it plays a major role in energy security, as it carries oil and gas from the Middle East and enables trade to Asia. The strategic competition between great powers such as China and the US has a major influence on this region’s maritime security paradigm. In the scenario of a conflict, the Strait of Malacca can be exploited by the US to stop trade for China which can have serious implications as major energy trade is done through this passageway.

Figure 1: Indo Pacific Region (Source: Ahmad & Lockard, 2025)

Economic Importance of the Indo-Pacific Region

The Indo-Pacific Region is home to major economies like India, Australia and Japan, and is the driver of global economic trade. A significant portion of the world’s energy supplies pass from the Strait of Malacca which highlight its importance for energy security (Energy Information Administration , 2024). Approximately 60% of global maritime trade passes through the Indo-Pacific Region (Anadi, 2024). The Indo-Pacific is also a hub for manufacturing; countries like Vietnam and Bangladesh play important roles in global supply chains and technological innovations.

The global fisheries production in the Indo-Pacific Region has been stabilized at 90 million tons per year since 1990s (Holt, 2024). The sector of aquaculture is also becoming important in its role in curbing the issue of food insecurity. Indonesia produces 6 million tons annually, with its aquaculture sector valued at 30 billion dollars (Holt, 2024). The shipping sector is also important for the countries of this region; around 90% of India’s trade passes through these waters. Maritime trade volume reached 12.292 million tonnes in 2023, which was 2.4% more than the last year (UNCTAD, 2023).

Regional Organizations in the Indo-Pacific Region

A number of different regional organizations play important roles in promoting economic cooperation and development in the Indo-Pacific Region. Each organization has a certain focus and aim. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has Malaysia as a founding member, is focused on promoting regional integration with the help of initiatives like ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), which aims to create a single market and production base. The AEC Blueprint 2025 created a framework of strategies for better economic integration, including trade facilitation and investment liberalization (ASEAN, 2023). The Blue Economy framework adopted in 2023, serves as a guide for the member states to integrate sustainable use of marine resources (ASEAN, 2023).

The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) aims to promote sustainable economic development and collaboration within Indian Ocean rim countries which include maritime cooperation and facilitating trading goods. IORA’s work on Blue Economy is focused on unlocking the potential of ocean resources for economic development (IORA , 2024). The IORA, to promote Blue Economy, focuses on areas like, Fisheries and Aquaculture, renewable ocean energy, tourism etc. It has established the Indian Ocean Blue Carbon Hub to protect and restore blue carbon ecosystems throughout Indian Ocean Region (IORA, 2024). Pakistan is not a member of IORA due to Indian influence. The absence of Pakistan from IORA leaves a void for an important member. With Pakistan, this organization can be more successful, as it will comprise of all the nations in the Indian Ocean Region.

Malaysia’s Maritime Identity and Strategic Role in the Blue Economy

Malaysia’s historical evolution as a maritime nation can be traced to its geographical location next to the Strait of Malacca. From the early Malay kingdoms, the region evolved as a vital center for trade, attracting people from all regions (Hanafiah et al., 2020). In today’s world, Malaysia is involved in different regional and international collaborations focused on maritime security. It collaborates with neighboring countries to combat issues like piracy, illegal smuggling and transnational crimes (Putrajaya, 2023).

Recognizing its potential, Malaysia has embraced the Blue Economy as a cornerstone of its sustainable development agenda. Malaysia’s focus on increasing the utilization of its ocean resources can be seen in its attempt to develop a comprehensive National Ocean Policy which promotes sustainable use of marine resources and is focused on enhancing maritime security. The National Ocean Policy of Malaysia has not been implemented, however the draft was completed in 2011 (Reef Check Malaysia, 2021).

Malaysia’s input to ASEAN’s cooperation frameworks highlights its commitment to enhancing the utilization of ocean resources while also preserving marine biodiversity (Rahman, 2023). Fisheries, offshore energy, coastal tourism and aquaculture highlight Malaysia’s approach to incorporating economic development and environmental sustainability. In this way, Malaysia not only promotes its national economy but also contributes to regional stability.

Figure 2: Map of Malaysia (Source: Ahmad & Lockard, 2025)

Malaysia’s Position: Policies, Initiatives and Governance

Malaysia recognizes the potential of Blue Economy as key area of development, as it contributes 23% to the nation’s GDP. The Blue Economy has been incorporated into the 12th Malaysia Plan, which was developed by consulting with the relevant ministries and organizations (Azam et al., 2023).

Despite this, Malaysia faces several challenges in exploiting the Blue Economy to its full potential. These challenges include the consolidation of comprehensive national ocean policy and marine spatial plan, upgradation of integrated governance mechanisms and also an overlap of jurisdiction among the government agencies. Other than this, Malaysia’s perilous maritime security challenges include the dispute over the maritime boundary, assertiveness from neighboring countries and non-traditional security threats which further complicate the maritime governance capacity (Yusof & Zaideen, 2024).

Key Sectors Contributing to Malaysia’s Blue Economy

The Blue Economy of Malaysia possesses a few sectors that utilize the country’s numerous marine resources that contribute majorly to its economic growth. These sectors include;

Fisheries and Aquaculture

Fisheries and aquaculture sector plays an important role in Malaysia’s Blue Economy that contributes almost 0.8% to the national GDP of the country. Malaysia produced 1.3 million metric tons of fish in 2024 (Malay Mail, 2024). The Malaysian government started a number of policies to promote sustainable fishing practices to ensure food security and increased livelihoods (Azam, 2023).

Shipping and Ports

The sector of Shipping and ports is crucial for Malaysia’s Blue Economy as it contributes around 39% of its total output in this sector. Malaysia’s strategic geographical location next to the major shipping routes increased its role as a maritime logistics hub in the Southeast Asia. The government of Malaysia invested in the development of port infrastructure and in improving shipping services to facilitate trade and increased economic activities related to maritime (MIDA, 2023).

Malaysia has 8 federal administrated ports, which are Port Klang, Port of Tanjung Pelepas, Johor Port, Penang Port, Bintulu Port, Malacca Port, Kuantan Port and Kemaman Port. The Port Klang and Port of Tanjung Pelepas are the two main container ports of Malaysia, handling around 64% of the cargo (Port Development In Malaysia, 2022).

Offshore Energy

Offshore energy is another meaningful player for the Blue Economy. This sector contributes to the Blue Economy through substantial revenue generation, and it creates opportunity for livelihood in industries such as oil and gas, renewable energy, environmental management and others. Lately, considerably more attention has been directed toward renewable energy sources such as solar, wind and tidal power, adjusting substantially with Sustainable Development Goals. The Malaysian government is actively pursuing several important investments in renewable energy projects. This effort aims to expand its energy portfolio and substantially reduce its reliance on fossil fuels. (Johnstone & Vaghefi, 2019)

Coastal and Maritime Tourism

Coastal tourism is a major component of Malaysia’s Blue Economy and maritime tourism. The nation boasts a meaningful amount of biodiversity and features many strikingly picturesque coastal landscapes. Around 38 million tourists visited Malaysia in 2024 (Mehboob, 2025). Ecotourism offers potential for conservation. The government now recognizes this potential for economic growth as well. These initiatives develop marine protected areas for tourism while lessening the effect of unsustainable tourism practices (Johnstone & Vaghefi, 2019). The contribution of coastal and maritime tourism to Malaysia’s economy was predicted to increase up to 198.7BN Malaysian Ringgit, reaching 10.5% of national GDP (Breaking Travel News, 2024).

Regional Collaborations and Partnerships

Malaysia, for the promotion of Blue Economy, is involved in a number of different collaborations.

ASEAN

Malaysia actively participates in the ASEAN framework which is focused on promoting sustainable practices to other member states. It aims to encourage cooperation in areas like marine ecosystem protection and sustainable fisheries management (ASEAN, 2023).

Bilateral Agreements

Malaysia has signed bilateral agreements with its neighboring countries to increase maritime security, follow best practices in fisheries management and to collaborate on research initiatives related to marine biodiversity.

Public-Private Partnerships

The government of Malaysia is nurturing public-private partnerships to bring in investments in the Blue Economy sectors. This includes collaborations in

renewable energy projects, marine biotechnology and sustainable aquaculture. One example of PPPs is the development of Port Klang, where the Malaysian government partnered with private companies to manage and operate container terminals (Verougstraete et al., 2015).

Policies for Sustainable Maritime Development

Malaysia has worked on a framework of policies and initiatives that are focused at sustainable maritime development. Twelfth Malaysia Plan, a key initiative that covers the Malaysian government’s plan for Blue Economy, is key to economic growth while sustainably using ocean resources. There have been several initiatives and policies that make sustainability the center of their focus. The National Agrofood Policy 2021-2030 focuses on the improvement of Malaysia’s food security. This policy is a continuation of the NAP 2011-2020, through which the GDP increased by 6.8% annually from 2011 (Azam, 2023).

National Blue Ocean Strategy was launched by the Malaysian government in 2009; it aims to promote and develop sustainable growth and use of fisheries and aquaculture industries. The National Eco Tourism Plan 2016-2025 is one of the strategies that is repositioning the marine protected areas in Malaysia as ecotourism destinations that promote the conservation and management of marine and terrestrial resources. This helps reduce the pressure on marine resources, especially on coral reefs, due to unsustainable tourism development and irresponsible tourist behaviour during activities like diving and snorkeling (Azam, 2023).

The Malaysian government initiated the National Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing to address the challenge posed by IUU fishing in its waters. This plan aligns with the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) International Plan of Action that was adopted in 2001, focused on establishing elaborate measures for sustainable fisheries management.

Integrated Coastal Zone Management is a comprehensive approach that is focused on managing coastal resources in a sustainable manner while keeping a balance in economic, ecological and social interests. This framework is important as it addresses the challenges that are faced by coastal areas of Malaysia due to human activities (Azam, 2023).

Alignment with UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Malaysia’s policies on maritime are closely linked with a number of United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) demonstrating its commitment to the global efforts towards sustainable practices:

The Sustainable Development Goal 14, which is focused on Life Below Water, works to conserve and sustainably use ocean and marine resources. The SDG 14 highlights the importance of oceans in helping with food insecurity and

regulating climate change. It is also focused on dealing with marine pollution, habitat destruction and overfishing (Tereza, 2022).

Malaysia recognizes the importance of incorporating SDG 14 into its policies, an example of this is the National Policy on Marine Fisheries. The policy is designed to guarantee the sustainable management of Malaysia’s marine resources. It guarantees sustainable practices to avoid overfishing and protects the marine environment from the adverse effects of unplanned development. This policy is guided by the Fisheries Act 1985, which provides a legal map for regulating fishing activities in the country’s waters.

Malaysia has designated Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) which conserve marine ecosystems and biodiversity. These areas play a key role in aiding the achievement of SDG 14 by protecting important habitats like mangroves and coral reefs. Tunku Abdul Rahman Park, Pulau Redang Marine Park and Sipadan Island are a few examples of the MPAs in Malaysia. These MPAs directly contribute to achieving the SDG 14 by ensuring the protection of marine environments (Rahman et al., 2019)

Impact on Sustainable Maritime Practices

There is significant impact on Malaysia’s overall economy due to aligning its policies with the Sustainable Development Goal 14 (Life Below Water). The implementation of these policies has led to advancements in promoting sustainable maritime practices and has contributed significantly in the economic growth of the country.

The development of a comprehensive framework that are aligned with the standards of the International Maritime Organization and the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals. These frameworks are designed to put stricter regulations on emissions and pollution control, which are a necessity for protecting marine ecosystems. The National Transportation Policy 2019-2030 is an example of such policy that focuses on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from maritime activities, which aligns with SDGs 13 and 14 (Chong, 2023).

There has been an increase in job creation for the coastal communities due to promotion of sustainable practices in fisheries and eco-tourism sectors; the initiatives have been aligned with SDGs. Malaysia is addressing poverty, by fostering an inclusive Blue Economy, and ensuring that local communities can benefit from marine resource management (Berniere, 2024). Other than this the National Plan of Action on Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing has helped observance of fishing regulations which has led to a healthier fish stock and more resilient ecosystem. Policies that have involved local communities in decisionmaking process have fostered a sense of ownership over marine resources which has led to better stewardship and sustainable practices (Azam, 2023).

Challenges Facing Malaysia’s Blue Economy

Despite there being progress on sustainable practices, there are still challenges facing Malaysia’s Blue Economy.

Geopolitical Tensions and Regional Competition

The strategic location of Malaysia in the South China Sea, makes it the center of attention of the geopolitical tensions around the maritime boundaries and claiming of resources. Concerns over the issue of fishing can complicate collaborative management efforts. An example of this is the dispute between Vietnam and Philippines regarding fishing zones have led to issues that complicate working on joint initiatives that are aimed at sustainable resource management (Azam, 2023). Tensions over resources have increased due to the presence of important shipping lanes and oil reserves. These disputes can lead to issues that hamper cooperation and collaboration in shared waters (Azam, 2023).

Environmental Degradation and Climate Change Impacts

Environmental degradation is a significant threat to Malaysia’s marine ecosystems. Pollution from land-based sources, habitat destruction from development at coastal areas, and overfishing are issues that have led to the declining fish stocks and loss of biodiversity. Malaysia generates more than one million tonnes of plastic waste, a majority of which ends up in the oceans. This pollution effects marine life which leads to a declined fish stock and damages the ocean life. The Ellen McArthur Foundation has warned that if these practices are not changed, the ocean will end up having more plastic by weight than fish by 2050 (Yusof & Zaideen, 2024).

Development of the coastal areas for tourism purposes often ends up destroying the habitat. This makes mangroves and coral reefs particularly vulnerable to destruction caused by human interference. Approximately 50% of Malaysia’s mangrove forests have been destroyed due to development in coastal areas (Azam, 2023).

The factor of climate change further increased these challenges because of rising sea levels, ocean acidification and increased frequency of extreme weather events. It threatens marine life but also the livelihoods of the coastal communities that are dependent on these resources. The effects of climate change can lead to reduced number of fish population and altered marine habitats which affects food security and the nation’s economy (Azam, 2023).

Policy Gaps and Institutional Inefficiencies

There is an absence of a comprehensive national ocean policy in Malaysia that results in division in governance among different agencies that are responsible

for maritime affairs. This division leads to an inefficient decision-making process and weak enforcement of regulations. An example is the lack of coordination between federal and state governments leads to uncertainty in implementing the marine environmental laws (Azam, 2023).

Australia, in 1998, introduced its National Ocean Policy which was aimed at managing and protecting Australia’s marine resources. It emphasizes integrated eco-system-based planning, sustainable economic activities, i.e. fisheries and tourism and conservation of biological diversity. Malaysia can take this policy as a sample and adopt similar strategies according to its own interests. This includes strong conservation efforts through more MPAs, enhancing international cooperation on maritime issues, promoting sustainable economic activities like eco-tourism etc (Australia’s Oceans Policy, 1999).

There is a shortage of labor and resources that are essential for effective enforcement of the existing regulations. This insufficiency of workforce hinders the efforts put in to conserve the Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) which cover around 5.56% of Malaysia’s marine territory (Yusof & Zaideen, 2024).

Opportunities for Malaysia’s Blue Economy

While faced with multiple challenges, the Blue Economy of Malaysia has immense potential for growth through different avenues. By integrating emerging technologies to enhance sustainability in the maritime sectors.

By using GPS tracking system Malaysia can improve navigating the fishing routes and reduce bycatch. For example, the implementation of the Electronic Monitoring Systems can lead to real-time data collection on fishing activities and improve obedience to the fishing regulations to promote sustainable practices.

Advanced data analytics can help with better decision-making in the matter of resource allocation and management strategies. Department of Fisheries, Malaysia uses data analytics to assess different fish populations and the conditions of habitat, which enables targeted interventions to sustain marine biodiversity.

The development of public-private partnerships can play an important role in bringing in innovations in the Blue Economy. Collaborations between government agencies and the private companies can bring in significant investments in sustainable aquaculture practices or any project on renewable energy like offshore wind farms. The partnership between Malakoff Corporation Berhad and MMC Group is an example of a public-private partnership which is aimed at developing solar energy project to contribute to reducing carbon emissions while supporting Malaysia’s energy needs (Bernier , 2024).

Joint ventures that combine academicians, stakeholders and the government can bring forward innovative plans for the improvement of Blue Economy of

Malaysia. The collaboration between Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia with the private sector will work on marine biotechnology research to develop sustainable products from marine resources (Othman et al., 2023).

Other than this there are a number of opportunities for growth in different sectors of Blue Economy of Malaysia. As there is a rising global demand for seafood, there is potential for more development in the aquaculture sector through better practices that make sustainability a priority in its functioning while also meeting market needs. The National Aquaculture Policy promotes sustainable practices such as integrated multi-trophic aquaculture (IMTA), which also tries to maintain the ecological equilibrium whereby the waste of one species is used to feed the other (Bernier, 2024). These highlight Malaysia’s commitment towards using its resources in a sustainable manner. This commitment extends beyond aquaculture, Malaysia is looking to invest in its energy sector as well.

There is therefore immeasurable potential in Malaysia to develop its renewable energy resources like tidal energy or offshore wind farms. Thus, the government has pioneered several projects to promote investments in the renewable energy sector such as Sustainable Energy Development Authority (SEDA) initiatives.

Lessons for Pakistan

Pakistan, a country with a vast coastline, can learn from Malaysia on how to develop its Blue Economy, especially in development of industrial area and bringing in foreign investment. Malaysia’s Port Klang is an important example from which Pakistan can learn operations and management to improve Pakistan’s port facilities. Pakistan can also take points from Malaysia’s coastal management system to combat pollution and coastal erosion. Malaysia is working on preservation of coral reefs and other marine protected areas; Pakistan can learn how to establish and manage marine parks and sanctuaries. Pakistan can learn from Malaysia’s Fisheries and Aquaculture policies and increase its production to achieve $60 billion export by 2030.

Pakistan can export seafood to Malaysia adding to its aquaculture production. The two countries can also explore joint ventures in fishing and marine equipment manufacturing. Pakistan can also contribute to Malaysia by establishing partnerships between Pakistani and Malaysian distributors.

Recommendations and Way Forward

Malaysia has devoted itself to sustainable practice, reflected even in the alignment of its policies with the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly SDG-14 (Life Below Water). The establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) is Malaysia’s way towards conserving marine biodiversity while pursuing sustainability in the fisheries industry. The engagement of local communities in sustainable practices and resource management increases compliance with regulations and promotes stewardship over marine resources. Initiatives such as the coral reef restoration

project, have the power to motivate local populations to take ownership of the marine environment.

Way Forward

(a) A comprehensive national ocean policy needs to be formulated that focus on all the aspects ocean management, including fisheries and aquaculture, shipping, and environmental protection. Australia’s National Ocean Policy can be taken as a sample, as it effectively integrated various stakeholders to manage its vast marine resources.

(b) Innovative ideas in emerging technologies that help promote sustainable practices should be promoted in all sectors of Blue Economy. Satellite monitoring systems to keep an eye on illegal fishing activities is a technology where investment would prove to be fruitful.

(c) Furthermore, digitalization in the maritime industry can enhance efficiency within shipping logistics and fisheries management. The issue of Illegal Unregulated and Unreported Fishing can be addressed by bringing in block chain technology Kumar et al., 2020).

(d) It is important to understand that maritime security and economic stability go hand in hand. Security issues in the maritime sector can impact economic growth, hence it is important to have policies that are aimed at balancing both sectors simultaneously.

Conclusion

Malaysia, a truly maritime nation which is driven by its rich marine resources and strategic location in the South China Sea, its Blue Economy has significant opportunities in the field of sustainable development and growth. National policies aligned to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), establish Malaysia’s commitment to responsible management of its marine resources and environmental conservation. Initiatives such as the National Plan of Action on IUU Fishing and setting up Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) indicate ways Malaysia is taking proactive measures for illegal fishing and marine biodiversity preservation.

However, issues like environmental degradation, geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea region and inefficiencies of governmental institutions threaten the sustainability of Blue Economy. These issues need to be addressed and for that purpose Malaysia may commit to engaging in regional cooperation with its neighboring countries and streamline government structures through formulation of national policies, invest in technologies and promote sustainable practices across maritime industries.

Engaging the communities in decision-making will ensure compliance and build a culture of stewardship over marine resources. By prioritizing these strategies, Malaysia will be in a position to reap full benefits of the Blue Economy towards

enhancing long-term economic resilience while positively impacting regional stability and ecological health. On this path, collaboration among all stakeholders will lead to the creation of a sustainable maritime future for Malaysia, the region and the world as well.

The writer is associated with the National Institute of Maritime Affairs; views expressed are his own. The writer can be reached at eimaan.nima@bahria.edu.pk

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CHAPTER NINE

MARITIME ARCHAEOTOURISM: ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN MALAYSIA

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasrizal Shaari and Dr. Nik Nurhalida Nik Hariry

Universiti Malaysia Terenggganu

Introduction

The development of maritime archaeotourism in Malaysia is the primary focus of this chapter. This new tourism segment is intriguing due to its huge potential, extending beyond only diving activities at archaeological sites. Maritime archaeotourism is intricately linked to the nation’s marine historical endeavours. Malaysia, with its rich maritime heritage and strategic location along historic trade routes, holds immense potential for the development of maritime archaeotourism, which integrates sustainable tourism practices with the investigation of underwater cultural heritage, providing visitors with a distinctive opportunity to establish a connection with the nation’s maritime history. Malaysia’s territorial waters holds a veritable treasure trove of historical and cultural significance, encompassing ancient shipwrecks, submerged artefacts, and the narratives of ancient seafaring communities.

Malaysia, a maritime nation encompassing a sea area of 574,000 km², has a rich history that traces back to the ancient kingdoms in Nusantara, such as Kedah Tua, and the subsequent emergence of the Malay Kingdoms of Malacca and the Johor-Riau Sultanates (Jacq-Hergoualc’h, 2002). The evolution of ancient kingdoms in Malaysia progressed from an agrarian society dependent on agriculture to a maritime kingdom focused on trade, utilizing waterways as channels for communication and commerce. Peninsular Malaysia’s strategic location in between the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea has significantly facilitated ancient commercial operations in the region (Flecker, 2007). Thus, it is conceivable that the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca have become a graveyard for numerous shipwrecks, given the rapid progression of archaic trade in this region.

Internationally, the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage, seek to protect submerged cultural sites (Nik Hariry, 2024). Unauthorized salvaging violates the protections accorded under the convention, resulting in international conflicts and legal actions. Malaysia’s underwater cultural heritage includes several submerged relics, shipwrecks, and historical sites that provide unique insights into the country’s maritime history. The National Heritage Act of 2005 (NHA 2005) or Act 645 serves as the primary legal framework for conserving and administrating cultural assets. However, the implementation of this legislation confronts several obstacles that require investigation and future change.

The NHA 2005 defines “underwater cultural heritage” as any remnant of human existence with a cultural, historical, or archaeological character partially or

Figure 1: An underwater archaeology diver is exploring and documenting shipwreck artefacts on the seabed off Bidong Island, Terengganu. The discovery is evidence of Malaysia’s rich maritime heritage that is still hidden on the seabed.

completely submerged. This comprises sites, structures, buildings, artefacts, and human remain, as well as their archaeological and natural contexts timber (Brown & Sjostrand, 2002). The Act allows the Commissioner of Heritage to designate, register, and manage heritage sites and objects, including those found underwater. It also created the National Heritage Register, which details out all recognized heritage sites and artefacts in Malaysia.

As a maritime nation possessing a rich maritime heritage and coastal sites, Malaysia is strategically positioned to capitalize on maritime archaeotourism. The nation possesses numerous undiscovered shipwreck sites, old trading ports, and artefacts that illustrate its crucial position along past trade routes (Lockard, 2010). Maritime archaeotourism in Malaysia possesses significant potential due to the nation’s abundant marine heritage, encompassing shipwrecks, old ports, and submerged artefacts.

However, some issues must first be resolved to guarantee the sustained development of this emerging tourism. Challenges like environmental degradation, inadequate public awareness, insufficient funds for research and conservation, and regulatory deficiency provide substantial obstacles. Concurrently, these problems offer prospects for innovation, collaboration, and sustainable development. By resolving these difficulties, Malaysia may be established as a premier destination for maritime archaeotourism, promoting blue economic development, cultural conservation, and environmental responsibility.

Key Features of Maritime Archaeotourism

Five features of maritime archaeotourism can potentially be explored for this new tourism segment in Malaysia. These segments collectively contribute to a comprehensive and enriching experience for tourists interested in maritime archaeology, blending education, recreation, and cultural appreciation are as discussed below.

Underwater Exploration

The opportunity for underwater exploration can be fostered for specialized tourism aimed atmdivers seeking unique experiences in diving. Individuals participating in scuba diving activities typically seek new challenges, such as exploring shipwrecks, submerged cities, or ancient structures. In this context, Malaysia is home to two major categories of underwater cultural heritage sites:

i. Ancient Shipwrecks: Visiting sites where ancient ships have sunk, often with guided tours explaining the historical context and significance (Sukkham, 2015). In general, the primary structure of the discovered ancient shipwrecks in Malaysian waters is no longer identifiable due to the active sediment deposition process that takes place in nearshore areas, which

has resulted in their burial in the seabed. Between 1984 and 2002, over 10 shipwrecks were discovered in Malaysian waters, including in Sabah and Sarawak. Government-appointed consultants have successfully.

ii. World War Wrecks: Exploring wrecks from World War II, which often have rich histories and are popular among divers. Malaysia holds the sites of numerous significant World War II shipwrecks that are submerged beneath its coastal waters. These wrecks are popular dive sites, drawing the attention of maritime archaeologists, military historians, and adventure seeking divers. Their presence contributes to maritime archaeotourism by emphasizing Malaysia’s role in international naval history and providing opportunities for sustainable tourism and heritage conservation. Among the famous World War II wreck sites are HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales (Pahang), Japanese Wrecks (Labuan, Sabah), and Japanese Wrecks (Terengganu).

Museums and Exhibitions

Artefacts recovered from maritime archaeological sites are displayed in museums, offering non-divers a chance to learn about underwater heritage.

i. Museum Exhibits: Indoor displays of artefacts recovered from maritime archaeological sites, often accompanied by historical narratives and multimedia presentations.

ii. Live Demonstrations: Interactive exhibits and demonstrations of ancient maritime technologies and practices.

Figure 2: A diver was exploring the artefacts on the seabed of the Bidong Shipwreck, Terengganu.

Education and Research

Visitors are often provided with insights into the history, culture, and significance of maritime sites, sometimes even participating in archaeological projects.

i. Academic courses offered by universities, research institutions, and related government agencies focusing on maritime archaeology and conservation provide added value and awareness to the main players and stakeholders in the maritime archaeotourism industry.

Figure 3: Maritime Heritage Exhibition at Bujang Valley Museum, Kedah, Showing the Historical Artefacts and Ancient Shipwreck Location

Figure 4: An exhibition of a collection of pottery and ceramic artefacts from ancient shipwrecks in Malaysian waters, demonstrating maritime trade links and cultural influences between past civilizations

ii. Short-term educational programmes like workshops and seminars for enthusiasts and professionals, often including hands-on activities.

iii. Events like archaeological fairs showcasing recent discoveries, conservation efforts, and public lectures by experts can attract public interest to participate in understanding and deepening the concept of maritime archaeotourism.

Figure 5: Training and knowledge sharing session at Universiti Malaysia Terengganu (UMT) between research teams, maritime archaeologists, and Army Museum, Royal Malaysian Army in efforts to preserve and rescue shipwreck heritage in Malaysian waters

Figure 6: Underwater Artefacts Conservation Workshop at Universiti Malaysia Terengganu

Artefacts Conservation

Maritime archaeotourism emphasizes the conservation and preservation of underwater cultural heritage and marine environments. Preserving artefacts in maritime archaeotourism is essential for safeguarding submerged cultural heritage while facilitating sustainable tourism practices. Artefacts, including shipwrecks, ceramics, anchors, cannons, and human remains, provide significant historical insights but are susceptible to decay upon exposure. Effective conservation guarantees their durability and improves the tourist experience via ethical tourism. The preservation of artefacts in marine archaeotourism reconciles heritage conservation with public involvement. By employing in-situ preservation, ex-situ treatments, responsible tourism, and international collaboration, we can guarantee the integrity of these historical riches for future generations.

Cultural Connectivity

It highlights the historical connections between communities and maritime trade routes, fostering a deeper appreciation of shared cultural heritage (Kanumoyoso, 2018). Cultural connectedness in maritime archaeotourism underscores the historical role of oceans and seas as conduits between civilizations. Studying and protecting maritime historical places enhances our understanding of interrelated histories and collective human experiences. Maritime archaeotourism not only revitalises historical narratives but also promotes cultural appreciation, international solidarity, and sustainable tourism practices.

Figure 7: Conservation and Management Workshop of Underwater Cultural Heritage Artefacts

Opportunities in Maritime Archaeotourism

Maritime archaeotourism provide for multiple opportunities and has huge potentials for sustainable tourism, education, heritage preservation, and economic development as discussed in detail below.

Economic Benefits

Maritime archaeotourism promotes the local economy through increased tourism activities and job creation. It can attract both recreational divers and cultural tourists, contributing to both local and national economy. Tourists visiting underwater sites related to museums or participating in guided archaeological experiences create demand for services like accommodations, transportation, dining, and equipment rentals. Regions with established underwater heritage sites can introduce entry fees, permits, or guided tour packages, creating direct revenue streams.

Developing and maintaining maritime archaeotourism infrastructure creates employment opportunities for the local communities, including dive operators, guides, boat crews, and conservationists. Indirectly, it supports businesses like dive shops, restaurants, and local crafts. Integrating maritime archaeotourism with existing tourism hubs increases the overall destination appeal, attracting diverse visitors. High-profile discoveries or exhibitions of artefacts can enhance international visibility and attract repeat visitors. For example, the fascination of exploring ancient, submerged regions has elevated underwater cultural heritage to the forefront of the maritime tourist industry, attracting fans from all over the world. A survey of organizations that recruit maritime archaeologists revealed a strong demand for specialists in state and federal agencies, private corporations, non-profits, and museums, highlighting the sector’s potential for job development.

Figure 8: A maritime archaeotourism expedition begins when divers leap into the sea, exploring underwater cultural heritage while the support team on the boat ensures a safe and responsible dive.

Cultural Preservation

Maritime archaeotourism encourages the documentation and preservation of maritime history (Bekić & Ferenčić, 2014). Promoting underwater cultural heritage tourism educates both locals and visitors about historical trade routes, shipwrecks, and cultural exchanges, fostering appreciation for the past. Cultural information centres, guided dives, and interactive museums allow people to connect with history, creating a sense of pride and identity. Income from entry fees and tourism can be reinvested in preserving and protecting underwater heritage sites, promoting their sustainable management. Partnerships with private entities or international organizations for tourism development can bring financial resources for documentation and restoration. By making maritime heritage sites accessible and monitored, archaeotourism may reduce the risk of illegal salvage or damage caused by uninformed divers. Public interest in these sites can encourage stricter enforcement of heritage protection laws.

Adventure Tourism

Maritime archaeotourism Offers unique experiences, such as diving into historical shipwrecks by catering to travellers seeking unique, experiential, and adventurous activities. Scuba diving or snorkelling around historic shipwrecks offers a thrilling mix of exploration and discovery, attracting adventure enthusiasts and history buffs alike. Underwater heritage sites offer varied experiences, from exploring ancient wooden wrecks to submerged temples and modern warships, each with its own story (Chik., 1998). Tourists can combine diving with complementary activities, such as trekking to coastal landmarks or participating in cultural festivals, enhancing the adventure. Investment in diving schools, boat tours, and safety equipment tailored to archaeotourism supports adventure tourism and builds local capacity for broader marine tourism opportunities.

Figure 9: Divers explore ancient maritime artefacts, showcasing the beauty of underwater cultural heritage and the importance of conservation in maritime archaeotourism

International Collaboration

Maritime archaeotourism fosters international collaboration in the conservation and examination of submerged cultural treasures to investigate and advocate for collective undersea history. Collaborative archaeological expeditions and training initiatives can augment expertise and competencies for sustainable tourist administration. Collaborative initiatives, such as the establishment of regional maritime tourism routes, can link underwater historical sites across neighbouring nations (e.g., within the ASEAN region), enhancing international tourism. Collaborative marketing initiatives and travel offerings can enhance exposure and accessibility for travellers. Partnerships with international organisations such as UNESCO promote compliance with international standards for the conservation of underwater cultural treasures, thereby guaranteeing responsible tourism practices. Collaborations with international diving organizations and NGOs foster sustainable practices and certification initiatives for operators. By emphasizing the interrelated histories uncovered through maritime archaeology, Malaysia and its collaborators may underscore the international importance of these sites, increasing cross cultural appreciation and discourse.

Figure 10: Engagement Program with ASEAN Underwater Archaeologist in Underwater Archaeology Training at Mount Dutton Bay, Australia

Challenges in Maritime Archaeotourism

Despite the available opportunities and comprehensive legal framework provided by the NHA 2005, there are several challenges impeding the effective preservation of underwater cultural heritage in Malaysia as discussed below.

Environmental Concerns

Environmental degradation is one of the main concerns for introducing maritime archaeotourism, specifically involving underwater cultural heritage sites. The influx of tourists may damage fragile underwater ecosystems and artefacts. Without proper management, tourism activities can lead to serious ecological damage, affecting marine biodiversity, archaeological integrity, and the sustainability of these sites. Disclosing the site of a shipwreck may facilitate prospects for treasure hunters and metal salvagers. Illegal salvage operations off World War II-era shipwrecks endangering the environment with probable oil spills from disturbed wrecks. Researchers have cautioned that the search for metals within these shipwrecks may result in vast oil spills. Underwater cultural heritage faces considerable dangers from both environmental forces (corrosion, biological growth) and human activity (looting, unregulated tourism, damaging industrial practices). The tight balance between economic interests and ocean protection, as typified by arguments over seabed mining in the Pacific, demonstrates the intricate interaction of pressures threatening these unique cultural riches

Legal and Ethical

Challenges Issues of ownership, looting, and illegal salvage of underwater cultural heritage remain prevalent. Some maritime archaeological sites do not have

Figure 11: Engagement Program with a researcher from Flinders University, Australia

adequate legal protection, making them vulnerable to illegal exploitation, lack of supervision of artifact theft, and other illegal activities at maritime sites (Nik Hariry, 2024). Illegal salvage operations targeting underwater locations, particularly sunken World War II vessels, have resulted in the loss of priceless artefacts, causing substantial problems to marine heritage preservation. Unauthorized entities are deconstructing shipwrecks to remove valuable metals such as steel, aluminum, and brass, often destroying historical monuments and war graves. In recent years, various cases have exposed the seriousness of unauthorized salvage operations. Legal complications, such as fragmented jurisdictional frameworks and insufficient adherence to international accords like the 2001 UNESCO Convention, lead to enforcement gaps, particularly in international waterways.

Access and Infrastructure

Many maritime archaeological sites are in remote or difficult-to-access locations, requiring significant investment in infrastructure (Abdullah, 2017). Facilities such as information centres, diving equipment, and accommodation are not sufficient to attract tourists. The breadth of maritime zones, particularly in isolated locations such as high-latitude oceans, makes constant monitoring extremely difficult and costly. This logistical problem is exacerbated by a lack of finance, which impedes critical tasks such as archaeological surveys, preservation initiatives, and regulatory compliance. Without enough financial backing, many programs fail, leaving vulnerable underwater places exposed to neglect and exploitation. The lack of trained professionals, especially underwater archaeologists and preservation specialists, further reduces the ability to successfully manage and safeguard these sites.

Awareness and Education

A lack of public awareness about the value and fragility of underwater cultural heritage can hinder conservation efforts. Many are unaware of the historical and cultural values of maritime sites (Sjostrand, 2006). There are also limited formal and informal education or training programmes to produce experts in the field of maritime archaeology. Protecting underwater cultural heritage presents multiple interconnected issues. The need for creative research and increased awareness of underwater cultural heritage remains high.

Funding and Investment

The government and private sector have not fully supported funding for exploration, preservation, and development of sites. Opportunities for collaboration with foreign institutions for research and preservation have not been maximized. Several interconnected difficulties impede the preservation of underwater cultural heritage. Limited resources, such as finance and skilled personnel, make efficient monitoring of large maritime areas difficult (Nik Hariry et al., 2024). Another barrier is technological restrictions, as advanced underwater research and recording tools are frequently expensive and necessitate specialist

knowledge, which may be absent in many areas. The sheer size and remoteness of these areas, particularly the high-latitude waters, make constant surveillance difficult and costly. Insufficient financing further inhibits research, equipment deployment, and enforcement, preventing many conservation measures from being implemented. A scarcity of professionals skilled in both diving and archaeology exacerbates the problem, restricting the ability to manage and maintain these sites.

Conservation and Preservation Issues

Underwater artefacts such as shipwrecks and ceramics are easily damaged by human activities, ecosystem changes, and time. Illegal salvagers have targeted numerous shipwrecks from World War II in Southeast Asian waterways (Kanumoyoso, 2018). Malaysia still lacks the facilities and technology to manage and preserve maritime heritage. In 2023, the Malaysian authorities detained the Chinese vessel Chuan Hong 68, suspected of illegally salvaging parts from British World War II shipwrecks. HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse were found with scrap metal believed to be from the wrecks, both designated as war graves. These wrecks, which often contain the bones of sailors, are deconstructed for metals like copper, bronze, and steel, resulting in the devastation of historical places and disdain for war cemeteries.

Strategies in Implementing Maritime Archaeotourism

To address the challenges and issues that are currently present in the emerging new tourism segment of maritime archaeotourism, a variety of strategies can be suggested as follows:

Conservation and Management

Conservation and management are essential for ensuring that underwater cultural heritage, such as shipwrecks and coastal archaeological sites, remains preserved while allowing sustainable tourism activities. Designation of marine protected areas (MPA) to protect important underwater cultural heritage sites together with marine diversity is an option. To successfully protect underwater cultural heritage, comprehensive solutions addressing financial constraints, capacity building, regulatory frameworks, and technical improvements are required.

Increased Awareness and Education

Awareness and education play a crucial role in maritime archaeotourism by promoting the protection and appreciation of underwater cultural heritage. By educating tourists, local communities, and stakeholders, we can ensure that historical shipwrecks, submerged cities, and coastal archaeological sites

are preserved for future generations. Awareness and education in maritime archaeotourism ensure that underwater cultural heritage is not only explored but also respected and preserved. By using museums, guided tours, digital tools, and community involvement, a sustainable future for maritime archaeology can be created while enriching the experience for tourists and locals alike.

Reinforcement of Laws and Regulation

Laws and regulations play a vital role in the strategic planning of maritime archaeotourism since maritime archaeological sites are threatened by looting, unregulated tourism, and environmental degradation. Reinforcing existing laws related to maritime heritage preservation will increase the monitoring of illegal activities at maritime archaeological sites. Adequate legal framework may help protect underwater cultural heritage while ensuring sustainable tourism development.

Develop Infrastructure

Since infrastructure plays a crucial role in the success and sustainability of maritime archaeotourism, which involves exploring underwater cultural heritage sites, developing environmentally friendly tourism facilities may improve access to maritime sites. Well-developed infrastructure ensures safety, accessibility, conservation, and an enhanced visitor experience while protecting these fragile sites from damage.

Promote Sustainable Community-based Tourism

Promote community-based tourism management and develop educational tour packages through enhance collaboration between government, academia, the local community and the private sector.

Bidong Shipwreck: A Case Study in Introducing Maritime Archaeotourism in Malaysia

The Bidong Shipwreck is an exemplary prospect for a maritime archaeotourism program in Malaysia, owing to its historical importance, underwater accessibility, and capacity to draw both researchers and recreational divers. The shipwreck in Pulau Bidong is said to represent a vestige of maritime trade, either originating from the colonial era or previous commercial times. Pulau Bidong possesses historical significance as a previous settlement for Vietnamese Boat People, enriching cultural narratives that can be incorporated into tourism initiatives.

Malaysia is already a popular destination for shipwreck diving, with sites like the WWII-era Prince of Wales wreck. The Bidong Shipwreck can be marketed as an accessible site for beginner and advanced divers, boosting ecotourism. The wreck offers insights into Malaysia’s maritime history, trade routes, and shipbuilding techniques. Artefacts such as ceramics, ship structures, and cargo remains can provide educational opportunities for researchers and visitors. The shipwreck

(Source: Baharim et al., 2023)

Figure 12: Vietnamese Boat Peoples’ monument on Bidong Island, Terengganu

Figure 13: The Klein 4900 sonar device captured the Bidong shipwreck. The sonar-processed image depicts two divers, their bubbles (blue circles), and the artefacts. The red dashed line represents the estimated shape of the Bidong Shipwreck.

has now transformed into an artificial reef, attracting diverse marine life, which enhances the underwater experience for divers. A sustainable archaeotourism program can promote marine conservation and responsible tourism. Collaboration with local universities (e.g., Universiti Malaysia Terengganu) has turned the site into a marine archaeology research hub. Local communities can be involved in tourism activities, benefiting economically while promoting heritage conservation.

(Source: Baharim et al., 2023)

With proper heritage protection laws and tourism guidelines, the site can be developed in line with Malaysia’s cultural tourism goals. Sustainable tourism practices, such as controlled diving permits and educational tours, can protect the site from damage. By combining history, marine ecology, and adventure tourism, the Bidong Shipwreck has the potential to become a model site for maritime archaeotourism in Malaysia. A well-structured programme can attract historians, divers, conservationists, and tourists while ensuring the long-term preservation of the site.

Figure 14: Map showing the location of Bidong Shipwreck in the gazetted National Heritage Zone in Bidong Island waters.

Conclusion

Maritime archaeotourism in Malaysia presents significant potential due to the nation’s rich underwater cultural heritage, including shipwrecks and submerged archaeological sites. It offers huge potentials for sustainable tourism, education, heritage preservation, and economic development. Malaysia, a nation with a rich maritime heritage, can cultivate this niche tourism sector while guaranteeing longterm conservation via responsible tourism strategies, community involvement, and international collaboration.

Nevertheless, as an emerging tourism segment, maritime archaeotourism faces several challenges that must be addressed to realize the opportunities fully. Underwater archaeological research in Malaysia has progressed less aggressively as compared to neighbouring countries like Indonesia and Thailand. Financial constraints and heavy reliance on commercial salvage experts in the past have hindered comprehensive development. The enforcement of maritime archaeology regulations must be strengthened to ensure the protection and preservation of underwater cultural heritage.

To harness the full potential of maritime archaeotourism in Malaysia, it is essential to address existing challenges through strategic planning, investment in research and conservation, and the development of sustainable tourism practices. This allows Malaysia to improve its cultural heritage tourism while helping to preserve its submerged cultural riches. The excavation of the Bidong Shipwreck in 2013 revealed that local professionals could conduct scientific underwater digs, indicating a promising avenue for future study and tourism. Implementing comprehensive capacity-building frameworks that focus on cognitiveinformational, political-institutional, and economic-technological factors can lay

Figure 15: The underwater technical team installed the main-axis line at the target point of multiple prefabricated steel joints.

a solid foundation for marine archaeology and its integration into the tourism industry.

To surmise, maritime archaeotourism in Malaysia has immense potential but requires strategic planning, conservation efforts, and community engagement. By addressing existing challenges and leveraging opportunities, Malaysia can become a leading destination for maritime heritage tourism while preserving its rich underwater history for future generations.

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CHAPTER TEN

TOWARDS BETTER OCEAN GOVERNANCE: THE CASE FOR AN OCEAN POLICY FOR MALAYSIA

Nazery Khalid

Universiti Malaysia Terengganu

Introduction

The seas and oceans, which cover approximately 75% of the earth surface are the elixir of life. Their importance cannot be overemphasized as they encompass many key areas of life, including food security, sovereignty, national security, trade transportation, marine tourism, resources exploitation, energy generation, culture and heritage, socio-economic development, scientific advancement and climate regulation. Without seas and oceans, there would be no life on this planet.

For coastal states, their socio-economic and strategic interests are directly and indirectly influenced by the surrounding seas. The livelihood of many people would be affected, maritime trade would be impeded, navigation safety would be disrupted, coastal communities and beyond would bear the brunt of pollution to the marine environment and national security would be threatened. This most certainly applies to Malaysia as well where its history, fortunes and destiny are intertwined with the seas. As a maritime nation, by virtue of its extended Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Malaysia boasts a maritime zone of 556.285 km2 which is larger than its land size of 329,960 km2 (MyGovernment, 2016). With a unique geography of two land masses separated by the South China Sea, namely Peninsular Malaysia, and Sabah and Sarawak on Borneo Island.

Malaysia has a coastline of 4,675 km (2,068 km in Peninsular Malaysia and 2,607 km in Sabah and Sarawak), the 29th longest coastline in the world (SeaAroundUs, u.d.). It claims an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 331,674 km, 200 nautical miles

or 374 km from its shores. An estimated 70% of its population live along coastlines (Ehsan, 2019) where most of the largest cities in the country, most industrialised areas, best public infrastructures and most vibrant economic regions are located. Given this and the fact that all of Malaysia’s states are coastal states, with a sizeable number living on islands, it is little wonder that the majority of the population is highly dependent on the seas, whether directly or indirectly, for their livelihood and socio-economic needs. Those living in coastal communities have a physical affinity and emotional attachment to the seas.

In addition to its unique maritime geographical features, Malaysia boasts other impressive credentials. It has a long, colourful maritime history and tradition, culminating in the emergence of Malacca Port as a busy and prosperous entreport in the 15th century that facilitated maritime trade between the Malay Peninsular and its regional neighbours and with the Western world. The port, the centre for spice trading during its heyday, was the crown jewel of the Malacca Sultanate which ruled much of the Malay Peninsular and parts of Sumatra in Indonesia in the 15th century and whose influence extended throughout the Malay Archipelago. The Strait of Malacca and the South China Seas have also acted as a conduit for the movement of people and cross-cultural exchanges between the Malay Peninsular and other countries and regions from ancient times, which sowed the seeds for its present-day multicultural, multireligious population.

Malaysia A Maritime Nation

Malaysia’s location along strategic sea lanes and East-West trade makes it a maritime nation of great global significance and importance (Khalid & Basiron, 2008). The Strait of Malacca facilitates the seaborne transportation of an estimated a quarter of global container trade and a vital conduit of international oil shipment by sea (Evers & Gerke, 2006), and hosts an estimated 100,000 vessels annually, making it one of the world’s busiest and most crucial maritime trade passages (Nautical Institute, 2023). From a strategic standpoint, the importance of the seas to Malaysia cannot be overaccentuated. They provide passage to commercial ships which carry cargos that feed the nation and its ports and facilitates its economy. Hence, it is a matter of national interest for Malaysia to ensure the surrounding seas are safe for navigation. Without safe and secure seas, it would be impossible for seaborne trade, which facilitates 90% the country’s trade, to flourish.

Should passage in the sea lanes of Straits of Malacca and South China Sea be blocked or impeded by hostile forces or through acts of terrorism targeting ships, like in the Red Sea where Houthi rebels have wrought havoc on commercial shipping, Malaysia’s fishermen, ports, trade and by extension its economy would be severely affected. In the absence of protection from the threats of hostile military forces and non-conventional sources such as terrorists, pirates, smugglers, pollution, refugees, illegal aliens, illegal sandmining, illegal unreported and unregulated (IIU) fishing and, increasingly, climate change, the country’s seas, strategic interests and even sovereignty could be threatened. Beyond Malaysia’s interests, international trade which navigates through the Straits which provides

the shortest routes between Indian Ocean and the South East Asian and Asia Pacific regions would also be adversely affected if the threats are not overcome. The seas also provide living and non-living marine resources which are pivotal to Malaysia’s economy, food security and energy security. South China Sea contains rich hydrocarbon, namely oil and gas, which are the backbone of our economy. The national oil company Petronas, Malaysia’s only Fortune 500 company, undertakes extensive exploration and production activities offshore in the sea. Malaysia’s offshore hydrocarbon reserves rank it fourth in Asia Pacific with the biggest oil reserves (with 2.7 billion barrels of proven reserves in 2023) and the largest in South East Asia, in addition to being a major natural gas producer. In 2023, Malaysia was the second highest producer of petroleum in Southeast Asia and the fifth highest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) globally. In the same year, Malaysia had oil reserves of 2.7 billion barrels—the second-largest oil reserve in the Southeast Asia (US Energy Information Administration, 2024).

Malaysia has world class seaports such as Port Klang and Port of Tanjung Pelepas (PTP), ranked 12thand 14th in the list of the world’s busiest container ports based on throughput volumes handled (Lim & Hazim, 2025). Penang Port is a key gateway to trade in the northern region of Peninsular Malaysia, facilitating the export of the multinational companies especially in the electronics and electrical sector, which contributes 5.8 percent to the country’s GDP in 2023 (MIDA, 2024). Bintulu Port is the world’s largest LNG export terminal, while the Johor Port stands as the world’s largest palm oil export terminal. The country’s biggest shipping line, MISC that is owned by Petronas, is a major player in global energy shipping and is the world’s largest owner-operator of Aframax tankers. Major shipyards in the country can build high quality vessels for local and foreign markets and are known for their high quality, durable and competitive products. Meanwhile, marine tourism and sea-based recreational activities are growing in Malaysia boasting many stunning beaches, islands and diving sites. These activities are supported by an ecosystem of ancillary service providers including marine surveyors and engineers, bunker oil suppliers, ship crewing and chandlering companies, classification societies, maritime training and education institutions, maritime research institutes, marine consultants and many others.

The socio-economic importance of the seas is also underscored by the dependence of Malaysians on fish, which provides a key source of protein to the population. Malaysia has the highest fish consumption per capita in South East Asia and one of the highest in the Asia Pacific at 52.7 kg, relying highly on the surrounding seas for its primary source of protein (Birruntha, 2024). Fishery provides employment to around 112,000 people in 2023 (Statista, u.d.) and plays a vital role the social fabric of coastal communities and fishing villages dotting the coastlines. Despite fishing only contributing 0.8 percent to its GDP in 2023 (DOFM, u.d.) and clear signs of alarming and dramatically falling fish catch in local waters, fishery remains very important to Malaysia’s economy and food security. From an environmental point of view, the importance of the seas to Malaysia cannot be overemphasized. The country sits in a region of rich marine biodiversity and is a member of Coral Triangle Initiative, an inter-Governmental grouping which

counts six nations in the Asia Pacific region that sets to protect the corals from environmental damage and human activities. The coastal and marine ecosystem play a pivotal role in ensuring fisheries habitat and the socio-economic fabric of coastal communities. Given that an estimated 80 percent of marine pollution comes from land-based resources (Badrun, Ariffin & Salleh, u.d.), it is therefore crucial for Malaysia to have in place measures to curb land-based affluents and wastes from being dumped or discharged into the seas to keep them free from pollution and ensure their sustainability.

National Ocean Policy Experience of Selected Countries

Several nations have formulated and implemented their National Ocean Policy (NOP), many of which notably act as an integrated, ecosystem-centric strategic roadmaps addressing the seas and maritime spaces under their jurisdiction (Cicin-Sain, Vanderzwag a& Balgos, 2015). Their NOPs typically encompass socio-economic targets and action plans articulated to promote harmonization between existing strategic plans and national laws towards fostering sustainable development of the seas surrounding them, protect biodiversity and safeguard vulnerable marine resources and ecosystems.

The NOP usually acts as reference points to promote, and strengthen cooperation, collaboration and coordination of government agencies involved in oceans affairs, whether directly or indirectly. Some of the NOPs also identify various stakeholders such as coastal communities, marine industry players, NGOs, research and learning institutions and society in general to work together with those agencies to realize the objectives of the policy. The NOP have been formulated in acknowledgment of not only the enormous importance of the seas to those countries but also of the threats faced by their maritime spaces and the huge challenges to ensure they are safe, secure, clean and sustainable.

A glance of selected NOPs (see Table 1) reveals the awareness of governments of the need to urgently protect and judiciously manage marine resources to balance current socio-economic needs with the preservation of environmentally sensitive marine environment. The policies accentuate the need for all stakeholders to share the responsibility of ensuring the sustainability of the seas and their resources and their long-term health.

Country Policy

Australia

Australia’s Oceans Policy

Fiji

2020–2030

National Ocean Policy

Indonesia Indonesian Ocean Policy

Solomon Islands

National Ocean Policy

Key focus

To sustainably manage 100% of the ocean area under Australia’s national jurisdiction by 2025, guided by a Sustainable Ocean Plan that focuses on maintaining a healthy and productive ocean ecosystem while addressing climate change impacts and pressures from land and sea-based sources.

To protect Fiji’s marine environment and to sustain the country's people. The policy includes a commitment to 100% sustainable management of the ocean and 30% marine protected areas by 2030.

To ensure sustainable management of Indonesia’s ocean resources; promote development of quality of human resources and marine technologies; boost maritime defence and security; enforce sovereignty, law and safety at sea; adopt good ocean governance; safeguard welfare of coastal communities; and enhance competitiveness of marine economic and industry.

To provide an enabling environment for the socio-economic development of the Solomon Islands through sustainable use of natural resources, provision of meteorological services, reduction of risks and impacts of climate change and other hazards to communities, and disaster preparedness.

Vanuatu

National Ocean Policy

Timor Leste

National Oceans Policy

To achieve an ocean governance framework that supports traditional marine resource management practices and knowledge and manages all line agencies with responsibility for maritime and ocean affairs, and harmonizes national actions in relation to the marine resources of Vanuatu.

To develop Timor Leste’s coastal and ocean territory and address overarching ocean, under the vision of

‘Ahealthyandsecureoceanthatsustainsthe livelihoods, prosperity and social and cultural values of the people of Timor-Leste in a fair and equitable manner’

Table 1: Key features of the National Ocean Policy of selected countries

Ocean Governance State of Play in Malaysia

For a country which has outstanding maritime features and impressive maritime credentials like Malaysia, it is a conundrum that it has yet to establish a national policy that provides a governance framework for its oceans and marine resources. The absence of an integrated and whole-government approach in the management of its oceans is even more glaring against the backdrop of intensifying use of the seas, rising threats to their environment and increasing demand for living and non-marine marine resources to meet its growing population. It is observed that one reason why the Malaysian maritime scene is dogged with age-old issues and problems: many of the issues and challenges are partly a result of conflicting PESTEL (political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal) systems which are under the jurisdiction of multiple agencies and cut across various acts, rules, regulations and stakeholders.

Amid this state of play and increasing environmental challenges such as marine pollution and climate change, the pressure is growing for Malaysia to put in place a policy that will enable government agencies from working in silos mode and cut across ministerial confines. The fluid nature of the seas and the asymmetrical, nonlinear features of the threats faced demands intra-agency cooperation, and close collaboration with other stakeholders such as fishermen, coastal communities, marine industry players, and NGOs. Being a member of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which adheres to UNCLOS 1982, Malaysia has ratified a number of international conventions and enacted legislations to give effect to its obligations to them. These conventions are international commitments and form part of the legal framework of the national ocean governance.

The management of the multiple aspects of the seas and coastal-based resources in the country is carried out in a sectoral manner by multiple ministries and Government authorities. They are guided by several strategic policies, institutional arrangements and legal instruments in the form of international conventions ratified by Malaysia and legislations. This ‘arrangement’ gives rise to overlaps in jurisdiction, authorities and functions. It is hereby estimated that there are approximately 50 government ministries and agencies, each with its own objectives and coordination mechanisms, enforce around 60 legislations related to ocean governance at the Federal and State levels in the following areas:

Maritime Security and Enforcement

a. The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN, which is governed by Armed Forces Act 1972, safeguards Malaysia’s maritime security and sovereignty. It also enforces the Environmental Quality Act 1974, Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984 and Fisheries Act 1985.

b. The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), a constabulary security agency under the Prime Minister’s Department enforces the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Act 2002. MMEA was established to

enforce law and order for the preservation of peace, safety and security in the Malaysian Maritime Zone (MMZ) and to coordinate search and rescue operations in the Malaysian Maritime Search and Rescue Region. The MMEA Act 2002 defines its jurisdiction and power to perform enforcement functions for ensuring the safety and security of the Malaysian Maritime Zone.

c. The National Security Council, an agency under Prime Minister’s Department, is tasked to primarily formulate and implement national maritime security through the National Security Policy aimed at safeguarding the country’s maritime borders and security. It oversees issues related to the national security of Malaysia’s waters, especially the South China Sea, and manages maritime threats through coordination with relevant agencies such as MMEA, the RMN and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

d. Marine Police, a division of the Royal Malaysian Police, is tasked with maintaining law and order and execute national security operations at sea.

e. The Royal Malaysian Customs Department which enforces the Customs Act 1967and Excise Act 1976.

Ports and Shipping

Ministry of Transport (MOT) which oversees the regulation of ships and shipping activities through Merchant Shipping Ordnance 1952 (through its agency, the Marine Department Malaysia), Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1994/2005, Merchant Shipping (Near Coastal Trade) Voyage Limit Rules 1994, Federation Light Dues Act 1953 and Langkawi International Yacht Registry Act 2003. MOT also oversees the regulation, development and activities of ports in Malaysia through various Acts namely Port Authority Act 1967, Penang Port Commission Act 1995 and Port Privatization Act 1990.

Marine Environment

The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Sustainability, through its agency Department of Environment, regulates vessel-based pollution in Malaysian waters through the Environmental Quality Act 1974 and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984. These are implemented along with international conventions on marine pollution and marine environmental protection which Malaysia has ratified including MARPOL Convention 1973, OPRC 1990 and Basel Convention 1989.

Maritime Heritage and Tourism

a. The Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture which regulates marine tourism activities through enforcing the Tourism Industry Act 1992.

b. The Department of National Heritage under Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture acts as the main agency for the protection and preservation of underwater cultural heritage through enforcing the National Heritage Act 2005.

Maritime Training and Education

Ministry of Higher Education which oversees the regulation, development, management and conduct of structured training and education for maritime personnel and professional.

Coastal Development

Local Governments in charge of coastal community development through enforcing Local Government Act 1976 and Town and Country Planning Act 1976.

Marine Resources

a. Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security oversees regulation and management of the marine living resources through the Department of Fisheries, the lead agency for the implementation of the Fisheries Act 1985 and National Fisheries Licensing Policy. Besides regulating the local fishing industry, it also handles illegal encroachment of foreign fishing vessels into Malaysian waters under the Fisheries Act 1985 implemented in tandem with the EEZ Act 1984. The Department also oversees Malaysia’s marine parks under the Marine Parks and Marine Reserves Order 1994.

b. Ministry of Environment and National Resources enforces marine wildlife under the Wildlife Conservation Act 2010 and regulations related thereto.

c. The national oil company, Petronas, undertakes exploration and production of oil and gas in Malaysian waters under the Petroleum Development Act 1974.

Maritime Safety and Maritime Search and Rescue

The Marine Department under Ministry of Transport MMEA is the focal agency for navigation safety while MMEA is responsible for search and rescue in Malaysian waters.

Marine Research

National Security Council oversees marine scientific research in the EEZ through the Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984, while research funding is mainly through Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, Ministry of

Higher Education. The Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA), a think tank under the Ministry of Transport, carries out maritime policy research along with universities and research institutes, which also conduct research on various aspects of the seas.

A National Ocean Policy for Malaysia?

As the global landscape becomes more complex, the use of the seas intensifies and as our maritime zone and oceans around us come under various threats that could underline or socio-economic and national interests and maritime sovereignty, the need to have in place a comprehensive policy to oversee the management of its seas has become even more pronounced. Despite the sectoral, non-centralized and at times convoluted nature of ocean management and governance in the country, Malaysia can never be accused of not caring about its waters. Its adherence to international maritime conventions, rules, regulations, protocols and standards, and its efforts at the national level to care and protect the seas through various legislation and initiatives underscore its commitment and deserve praise.

Given the supreme importance of the seas to Malaysia, it warrants considering having in place a NOP to oversee the planning, coordination, management and activities related to the use of the seas. The main arguments in favour of having such a policy are:

i. Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Manage the Many Aspects Related to Maritime Space and Resources: Having an ocean governance framework and policy in place would go a long way towards addressing weaknesses, gaps and problems, some of them decades-old and could become worse if not quickly resolved, can be attended to in an effective way. Such a policy could lead the way to a transformative, anticipative and more dynamic manner of ocean governance that befits the feature of the seas and the growing importance, dependence and complexity of the seas to the country.

ii. Shedding The ‘Working in Silos’ Mindset: Necessary to enable agencies involved in matters related to the seas to cooperate and collaborate across their defined jurisdictions. This ensures quick, effective response to matters requiring inter-agency intervention and cooperation.

iii. Optimizing The Allocation of Financial Resources: In these times of challenging economic conditions, the Government is adamant to ensure financial resources allocated to Ministries and agencies are used judiciously. This is underlined by the Outcome Based Budgeting approach to prevent wastage of public funds. Given that multiple agencies are involved in the management of sea-based activities, it makes sense to have a policy with clearly spelled-out objectives to ensure the seas are managed well for the benefit of the nation. This can lead to targeted spending for infrastructure development, assets, solutions, technologies and human capital, and avoid unproductive competition for and duplication of expenditure among the various agencies.

iv. Improving Effectiveness of and Response Time to Maritime Security

Threats: Amid growing threats to Malaysia’s maritime security coming from non-conventional, asymmetrical sources and non-state actors such as pirates, illegal fishermen, terrorists and illegal immigrants, the need to have in place adequate assets, personnel and processes to quell the threats has become more pronounced. With a NOP in place can improve coordination among agencies involved in patrolling and enforcement at seas, resulting in faster and more effective response to threats at sea. It will also eliminate competition for funds among agencies, overlapping objectives and jurisdictional confusion and conflict.

v. Enabling Marine Industries to Flourish: Malaysia has done fairly well in sectors such as commercial shipping, port operations, shipbuilding / ship repair and offshore oil and gas exploration and production. Several agencies are involved in the planning, regulation, management and enforcement of various Acts and regulations. However, there is a notable lack coordination among them which has resulted in the inefficient management of certain activities and the failure to realize specific strategies and master plans formulated for specific sectors. An example is the Malaysian Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Master Plan 2020 (SBSR 2020) launched in 2011 which set the targets of capturing 80% and 2% of the local and global newbuilding market respectively and capturing 3% of the ship repair market of vessels plying the Strait of Malacca and 80% of the offshore support vessels (OSV) in the South China Sea, all by 2020. The failure to meet those targets of SBSR 2020, which some industry players felt were unrealistic to begin with, could be attributed to, among others, the absence of close coordination among various agencies involved in the shipbuilding and ship repair industry and their failure to work together with the shipyards.

vi. Realizing Emissions and Energy Transition Targets Malaysia is committed to targets set by IMO. As 2030, the targeted year to attain net zero, looms, the country still has a long way to go to overcome the challenges of becoming a carbon-neutral economy. Being a member of IMO and being a party to Paris Agreement and Kyoto Protocol, Malaysia is committed to attaining carbon neutrality. This is underscored by the introduction of several roadmaps such as National Policy on Climate Change, National Energy Transition Roadmap, 12th Malaysia Plan 2021-2025 articulating its commitment to reduce carbon intensity by 45% by 2030 and achieve net-zero GHG emissions by. 2050. The maritime sector is also expected to step up to the plate to help realize the target of this important national agenda. A coordinated push by the various Ministries and agencies involved in the maritime sector can help reduce emissions from activities in the marine industry, ease energy transition to cleaner fuels and renewable energy, curb GHG emissions and protect the marine environment and ensure its sustainability.

Having a NOP can help harness the talent and competency of various Ministries and agencies related to ocean governance which are no doubt good at what they do and enhance coordination amongst them in addressing the issues and threats and capitalize on opportunities presented by the seas. A cogent, comprehensive policy, which can be developed from the draft NOP formulated by National Oceanography Directorate in 2011. The key areas or clusters under their jurisdictions - namely marine environmental protection, marine resources (living and non-living), maritime security and enforcement, maritime safety, maritime transport and industries, marine tourism and heritage protection, and coastal development – can be managed more effectively under a single policy, as opposed to in the current sectoral manner under a plethora of Acts and regulations.

Implementation of action plans and enforcement of laws can also be carried out in a swift, coordinated manner, which would enhance the possibility of fruitful outcomes. Gaps caused by the working in silo can be addressed under the ambit of a single, unifying policy to enable ocean governance in Malaysia to be carried out strategically led by an agency under the Prime Minister’s Department. The structure of this agency can be modelled after the then Economic Planning Unit (EPU), Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU) or Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit (MAMPU). The agency, which may be called Seas and Maritime Space Management and Development Unit (SAMUDERA), can be put in charge of planning, coordination, implementation and management of Malaysia’s waters. Being an agency of the Prime Minister’s Department would give it the clout needed to carry out its functions and the authority to cut across ministries and agencies and deal with the highest levels, including with other stakeholders of the seas, to formulate, implement and evaluate strategies related to ocean governance. Being the focal agency on maritime matters and backed by a national policy to safeguard Malaysia’s multiple interests at sea, SAMUDERA would have the authority to make recommendations to the Prime Minister or even the Parliament on matters pertaining to the seas.

Conclusion: The Way Forward

In conclusion, it is clear that ocean governance in Malaysia can be improved by leaps and bounds with a NOP that can provide an urgently-needed framework to manage the seas in a more efficient way. With the benefit of well-studied strategies, action plans and realistic targets, the policy can be translated into a roadmap under which the stakeholders of the seas and the entire nation can unite towards ensuring that our seas are safe, secure, clean and sustainable to meet our needs and safeguard our interests. With unbridled commitment and cooperation of parties to implement the policy, Malaysia will boost its capability to protect, secure and sustainably manage its seas and their resources, and to address the multiple challenges in ocean governance.

The introduction of a NOP could not come any sooner. Such a policy is urgently needed to balance the multiple interests, attain better coordination among the Ministries and agencies involved in ocean governance, protect the seas from threats, conserve the nation’s maritime heritage, grow the Blue Economy sustainably and safeguard the marine environment and resources. The policy will set the country in the right course towards strengthening its ocean governance in the key areas and at various levels and across sectors. An efficient ocean governance framework can help Malaysia to achieve national, regional and global ocean-related sustainable development goals on various areas such as socioeconomic development, food security, climate change resilience and adaptation, environmental protection and conservation of biodiversity, while safeguarding its own strategic interests.

With a cogent, integrated and coordinated approach to manage the huge challenges in keeping the seas safe, secure, healthy, resilient, secure and productive, Malaysia would go a long way towards ensuring that its seas can be sustainable for the benefit of the current and future generation.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

NAVIGATING THE MARITIME NATION AGENDA: MARINE SPATIAL PLANNING AS A CATALYST FOR BLUE ECONOMY DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA

Prof. Dr. Wan Izatul Isma bin Wan Talaat Universiti Malaysia Terengganu

Introduction

Since human activities in many areas of the coastal and marine areas will increase significantly in the near future, uncoordinated expansion of existing uses of the ocean and the addition of emerging uses, along with a rapidly growing coastal human population, are likely to exacerbate the decline of marine ecosystem health. Maintaining the well-being of ocean ecosystems and their ability to provide essential ecosystem services for human populations will therefore require a comprehensive, integrated management of marine uses and activities can be achieved in part through ecosystem-based Marine Spatial Planning (MSP). This would be invaluable in replacing the current patchwork of complex, uncoordinated, and often disjointed rules and regulations governing use of coastal and ocean waters around the world. Likewise, this complication must also be addressed at the national level. This chapter dwells on MSP as a management tool towards sustainable ocean economy or blue economy development in Malaysia while looking at the existing national governance framework to its implementation. While Malaysia has yet to launch its Blue Economy Blueprint, the discussion on blue economy in this chapter is therefore guided by the ASEAB Blue Economy Framework.

Navigating The Maritime Nation Agenda: Marine Spatial Planning As a Catalyst For

On 23rd October 2024, the National Physical Planning Council (MPFN) chaired by the Prime Minister has approved the Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) framework for Malaysia and declared that MSP will be implemented in Malaysia to drive the Blue Economy and enhance national ocean governance. Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, who chaired the 46th meeting of the National Physical Planning Council (MPFN), said the initiative would increase the potential of the country’s marine resources and proclaimed that,

“The government is confident that creating this clear policy will optimise the potential of our marine resources as an economic asset for the nation while boosting investor confidence in Malaysia’s investment prospects.” (NST, 2024)

The MPFN paper on MSP Framework was prepared by the Regional Planning Division of the Department of Town and County Planning, or better known as PLANMalaysia, upon a study made by a technical working group for the National Marine Spatial Planning Policy Framework (TWGMSP) formed by the department.

Human activities in many areas of the coastal and marine areas will increase significantly in the near future. Uncoordinated expansion of existing uses of the ocean and the addition of emerging uses, along with a rapidly growing coastal human population, are likely to exacerbate the decline of marine ecosystem health. Maintaining the well-being of ocean ecosystems and their ability to provide essential ecosystem services for human populations will therefore require a comprehensive, integrated management of marine uses and activities can be achieved in part through ecosystem-based MSP, which was first raised during the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development UNCED (1992) through its Agenda 21 approaches. The Rio Ocean Declaration, an outcome of the 2012 World Ocean Day event at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) also urged States to continue developing integrated and ecosystem-based approaches. Although the Future We Want outcome document signed by the UN Member States in 2012 omits to mention ‘integration’, it remains a key feature of ecosystem-based approaches linked to MSP, which is emerging as a salient tool for implementing these approaches in oceans governance (Young et al, 2007; Douvere, 2008; Foley, 2013).

MSP is basically about planning when and where human activities take place at sea to ensure these activities are as efficient and sustainable as possible. IOCUNESCO provides a clearer definition to MSP as a public process of analysing and allocating the spatial and temporal distribution of human activities in marine areas to achieve ecological, economic, and social objectives that usually have been specified through a political process. Urgent calls to intensify ocean governance in national jurisdictions as well as in regions especially where small island developing States are located and on the high seas have been reiterated in multiple international forums (Vince, 2014).

As noted by Underdal almost half a decade ago in 1980, solution to the marine environmental crisis has been based on integrated as well as ecosystem-based

approaches. According to Mackelworth (2012), MSP is not merely focusing on the environmental conservation, yet, comprise of a broader objective to balance the distribution of activities in selected coastal and ocean areas to serve ecological, economic, and social purposes including cooperative between states to overcome common threats or promoting peaceful relations. His view was also shared by Hu (2012).

MSP For Better Ocean Governance

As has been numerously called for in international forums, integrated and ecosystem-based approaches to ocean governance is the best solution to safeguard the sustainability of the oceans and their natural resources and MSP is, as proven worldwide, the management tool that bridge the science and policy, which is the first step in governance. The Convention of Biological Diversity 1992 (CBD) was the first international forum that highlighted the importance of having good governance framework by warranting it member States to develop national strategies, plans and programmes by taking legislative, administrative and policy measures (which collectively form governance framework) for the conservation and sustainable use of biological resources and diversity.

The main elements of MSP include an interlinked system of plans, policies and regulations comprising of the components of environmental management systems and some of the many tools that are already used for land use planning (Talaat, 2024). The necessary consideration is that they need to work across sectors and give a geographic context in which to make decisions about the use of resources, development, conservation and the management of activities in the marine environment (Aziz et. al., 2020; Che Din et. al., 2022)

MSP is currently being acknowledged worldwide as a planning and management tool that enables integrated, forward-looking and consistent decision-making on the use of the sea, where numerous countries are now embracing this tool to combat crowded usage of their territorial waters (Kaur & Talaat, 2019). Since MSP is not merely a planning tool, which is not an end in itself, but rather a management tool that involves many parties, from decision-makers to multiple users of the sea and coastal areas, and takes into account all the environmental parameters measured through scientific studies, it is definitely an integral part of ocean governance (Talaat, 2024).

The main elements of MSP include an interlinked system of plans, policies and regulations; the components of environmental management systems (e.g. setting objectives, initial assessment, implementation, monitoring, audit and review); and some of the many tools that are already used for land use planning. The necessary consideration is that they need to work across sectors and give a geographic context in which to make decisions about the use of resources, development, conservation and the management of activities in the marine environment (Talaat, 2024).

Navigating The Maritime Nation Agenda: Marine Spatial Planning As a Catalyst For Blue Economy Development

Through the planning and mapping process of a marine ecosystem, decision makers and the authorities can take into consideration the cumulative effects of maritime industries on our seas and subsequently seek to make industries more sustainable and proactively minimize conflicts between industries seeking to utilise the same sea area. The intended result of MSP is a more coordinated and sustainable approach to how our oceans are used ensuring that marine resources and services are utilised, but within clear environmental limits to ensure marine ecosystems remain healthy and biodiversity is conserved (Talaat, 2024).

The MSP process should result in a spatial vision and a comprehensive management plan for a marine area. MSP is a management tool, where zoning plans and regulations are one of a set of management actions for implementing the MSP. The zoning plans can guide the approval of individual permits for the use of marine space. As noted by Ehler (2008), “Integrated marine planning is recognizedasaneffectiveapproachforbalancingmultipleobjectives,managing development and conflicting uses…”

Coastal and marine ecosystems are impacted constantly by a multitude of different stressors. Coastal and marine areas worldwide represent ever increasing concentration of human activities (for example: recreation and tourism, energy, commerce and trade, fisheries and aquaculture). The increasing pressure from activities and limited space on coastal areas and at sea demands that society anticipate how the sea can be used in a more sustainable manner. These development pressures and their associated impacts often lead to the detriment of the ecological integrity of marine environment.

It is also important to acknowledge the fact that one can only plan and manage human activities in coastal and marine areas, but not the marine ecosystems or components of ecosystems (Ehler & Douvere, 2009). Thus, a sound planning and management framework is therefore imperative to ensuring that impacts associated with coastal and marine activities accrue socio-economic and environmental benefits (Talaat, 2024).

As an ecosystem-based management tool (the characteristics of MSP are as shown in Figure 16 above), MSP is potentially the best solution to sustainably manage a marine and coastal space, where allocation of human activities in specific marine areas can be made according to objectives (e.g., either for the development or preservation of an area) or specific uses (Ehler & Douvere, 2009). As noted earlier by Douvere (2008) Since conflicts among users and activities will directly influence of the health of marine environment, MSP will be able to resolve issues relating to limited space and marine resources impacted by tremendous economic expansion, collectively causing has caused several maritime threats including overfishing, pollution, and destruction of habitat (Talaat, 2024). MSP is more about making transformation through strong commitment, financially and behaviourally. For a MSP plan to work, it requires financial support from the authority as well as behavioural change, knowledge, skills and commitment, of both the institutions and the community.

The Legislative Basis of MSP

In general, limitations deriving from the UNCLOS are to be considered in MSP (Papageorgiou, 2015) where the Convention sets no serious limitations to the coastal state for zoning and MSP within the EEZ limits. This gives the rights of a coastal State to carry out spatial planning (Kaur & Talaat, 2020; Talaat, 2024) and develop its own framework according to the following maritime zones: -

1. Internal Waters limit: As provided by Article 8 of the UNCLOS, these waters on the landward side of the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured are not affected at all by international law. Thus, coastal States are free to plan and regulate the use of these waters.

Figure 1: The 6 characteristics of MSP (Source: Talaat, 2024 – as adopted from Ehler & Douvere, 2009)

2. The Territorial Waters limit (12 nm from the baseline): According to Article 3, there is no limitations for a coastal state in exploiting waters and resources at all vertical levels of the sea (surface, water column, seabed, sub‐soil) in its territorial waters and the coastal state has full jurisdiction for zoning and MSP, and is only limited by the innocent passage of ships. Thus, clear rights are granted to coastal states to have spatially considerable influence on how innocent passage is exercised.

3. The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) limit (up to 200nm from the baseline): According to Article 57, sovereign rights of coastal states are expanded in the EEZ, so as to include exploring and exploiting, conserving and management of natural resources of the seabed and the sub‐soil, as well as of the waters super‐adjacent to the seabed. Spatial planning is consistent with the UNCLOS regime - as long as only matters of the sovereign and functional rights are regulated and rights and freedoms of other States are given due regard. Functional rights of a coastal State in the EEZ are the rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage marine natural resources (both biological and abiotic) in the water column, on the seabed and subsoil, and the rights to carry out activities like energy production from the water, current and wind.

4. Continental Shelf limit: Within which sovereign rights of coastal states are limited to the exploitation of mineral and non‐living resources of the seabed and sub‐soil, to correspond with the EEZ.

Domestic Governance Framework

The Federal Constitution is a document defining the rights and responsibilities of federal government, state governments, citizens and also interrelationship between them. Under the constitution, the Parliament has the exclusive power to make laws over matters falling under the Federal List (such as citizenship, defence, internal security, civil and criminal law, finance, trade, commerce and industry, education, labour, and tourism) whereas each State, through its Legislative Assembly, has legislative power over matters under the State List (such as land, local government, Syariah law and Syariah courts, State holidays and State public works). Parliament and State legislatures share the power to make laws over matters under the Concurrent List (such as water supplies and housing) but Article 75 provides that in the event of conflict, Federal law will prevail over State laws. These lists are set out in Schedule 9 of the Constitution, where:

i. the Federal List is set out in List I,

ii. the State List in List II, and

iii. the Concurrent List in List III.

There are supplements to the State List (List IIA) and the Concurrent List (List IIIA) that apply only to Sabah and Sarawak. These give the two states legislative

powers over matters such as native law and customs, ports and harbours (other than those declared to be federal), hydroelectricity and personal law.

While Article 77 allows States the residual power to make laws on any matter not listed in any of the above three lists, the Parliament is allowed to make laws on matters falling under the State List in certain limited cases, such as for the purposes of implementing an international treaty entered into by Malaysia or for the creation of uniform State laws. However, before any such law can be effective in a State, it must be ratified by law by its State Legislature. The only exception is where the law passed by Parliament relates to land law (such as the registration of land titles and compulsory acquisition of land) and local government (Article 76).

As shown earlier, the relationship between Federal and State government in managing environment are very complex. State seems to have a wider authority in managing environment because it is closer with natural resources. The responsibility needs to be divided carefully and fairly because one party might accuse the other in intruding their right. In the other hand, Federal government has responsibility in integrating and standardizing environmental standards among the states to ensure the enforcement can be done effectively. However, the standard acceptance is solely depending on the state government. Conflict will occur when there is rejection on behalf of the state government.

However, among 183 Articles and 13 Schedules provided in Federal Constitutions of Malaysia, they are no word of ‘environment’. It is because, environment covers a wide area and the responsibilities were laid in all of the three lists; Federal, State and Concurrent List. It means that both Federal and State Government are responsible in passing legislations based on their authority provided in the list. The distributions of powers in general are as in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Distribution of Powers under the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution

Navigating The Maritime Nation Agenda: Marine Spatial Planning As a Catalyst For Blue Economy Development In Malaysia

The Laws

There are a plethora of federal laws relating to environment, planning and development that are both segmented and sectorial as listed in Table 2.3 below.

Legislations

Environmental Quality Act 1974 (amended in 1996 and 2001) -

Environmental Quality (Clean Air) Regulations 1978-

Environmental Quality (Sewage and Industrial Effluents) Regulations - (1979 (amended in 1997)

Environmental Quality (Environmental Impact Assessment) - 1987

Fisheries Act 1963 (amended 1985)

National Forestry Act 1984

National Parks Act 1980

Mineral Development Act 1994

Protection of Wild Life Act (1972 amended in 1976 and 1991)

Land Conservation Act 1960

Local Government Act 1976

Functions/Role

Provides the basis for the coordination of all activities related to the environment throughout the country

Regulates pollution standards

Regulates sewage and industrial effluents

Infrastructure activities for state works

Responsible for conservation of fisheries and established marine parks and marine reserves

Established the administration, management and conservation of forests

Governs creation and the maintenance of national parks. Created during the controversy surrounding the protection of Endau Rompin Forest

Responsible for mineral extraction regulation

Mineral Development Act 1994

Conserves hill lands to prevent soil erosion, and control salutation

An act to revise and consolidate the laws relating to local government whereas it is expedient for the purpose only of ensuring uniformity of law and policy to make a law with respect to local government

Sewerage Service Act 1993

Water Act 1920 (Revised 1979)

An Act to amend and consolidate the laws relating to sewerage systems and sewerage services throughout Malaysia for the purpose of improving sanitation and the environment and promoting public health; and to provide for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto.

An Act to provide for the control of rivers and streams.

Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974

Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1994

Biosafety Act 2007

Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984

Continental Shelf Act 1966

Town and Country Planning Act 1976 (Act 172)

International Trade in Endangered Species Act 2007

Pesticides Act 1974

Plant Quarantine Act 1976

National Parks Act 1980

An Act to amend and consolidate the laws relating to street, drainage and building in local authority areas in Peninsular Malaysia, and for purposes connected therewith.

An Act to make provisions with respect to civil liability for oil pollution by merchant ships and for matters connected therewith.

An Act to establish the National Biosafety Board; to regulate the release, importation, exportation and contained use of living modified organisms, and the release of products of such organisms, with the objectives of protecting human, plant and animal health, the environment and biological diversity.

An Act pertaining to the exclusive economic zone and certain aspects of the continental shelf of Malaysia and to provide for the regulations of activities in the zone and on the continental shelf and for matters connected therewith.

An Act relating to continental shelf of Malaysia, the exploration thereof and the exploitation of its natural resources and for matters connected therewith.

An Act for the proper control and regulation of town and country planning in Peninsular Malaysia and for purposes connected therewith or ancillary thereto.

An Act to implement the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and to provide for other matters connected therewith.

An Act to control pesticides

An Act to amend and consolidate the laws relating to the control, prevention and eradication of agricultural pests, noxious plants and plant diseases and to extend co-operation in the control of the movement of pests in international trade for matters connected therewith.

An Act to provide for the establishment and control of National Parks and for matters connected therewith

Table 2: Federal legislations relating to environment, planning and development

Navigating The Maritime Nation Agenda: Marine Spatial Planning As a Catalyst For

Town and Country Planning Act 1976 (Act 172): The Spatial Planning Legislation

As the most relevant federal legislation relating to MSP, Act 172 was formulated following Article 76 (4) of the Federal Constitution where Parliament may do so for the purpose only of ensuring uniformity of law and policy. It is therefore enforced in the states of Peninsular Malaysia under the jurisdiction of the Department of Town and Country Planning (DCTP). Originally, Act 172 contains 9 sections and 59 subsections but later amended 3 times between the years 1993 to 2001 as follows: -

i. The amendment in the year 1993 (known as Act A866) where this Act was amended with an added provision relating to sewerage activity so that it conforms to the Sewerage Services Act 1993 (Act 508) created in the same year.

ii. In the year 1995, Town and Country Planning Act 1976 (Act 172) was amended (known as Act A933) to handle the weaknesses that existed due to developments that disregard environment conservation especially that relating to tree preservation. The whole provision relating to tree preservation can be seen in Section 5A beginning Subsection 35A to 35H Act 172.

iii. This Act was amended in 2001 (known as Act A1129) was again amended to handle the problem that arise especially in the real estate sector and realize the federal government’s role in matters pertaining to Town and Country Planning in tandem with the spirit of mutual responsibility provided for in the Federal Constitution.

With the latest amendment, 2 new sections have been included and a few approaches have been introduced, in particular, in the development planning system and also planning control in Act 172. Section 16B (1)(2)(3) was inserted to include Special Area Plan (SAP), which is a proposed plan in more detail composition compared with Local Plan. Since SAP is more akin to the “action area plan”, where its function is for detailed guidance in the planning and development control of designated areas, this provision on SAP would be the most suitable option for MSP. Section 16A (1) has provided that a proposal for a designation of special area may be submitted to the State Planning Committee for the any one or combination of the following purposes: -

i. Special and detailed treatment by development;

ii. Redevelopment;

iii. Improvement;

iv. Conservation or management practice, or partly by one and partly by another method of the whole or part of such special area; and

v. The nature of the treatment proposed

The Policies

Policy is generally understood as a “principle adopted or proposed by the Government” . There are several national policies on environment and planning as listed in Table 3 below. These policies have distinct and sectoral scope and their contents were mostly adopted from international conventions like CBD, UNFCCC and CCD.

Policies

National Forestry Policy 1978, (revised 1992)

National Energy Policy 1979

National Policy on Biological Diversity 1998

Functions/Role

To conserve and manage the nation’s forest based on the principles of sustainable management and to protect the environment, to conserve biological diversity, genetic resources and to enhance research and education.

To ensure adequacy, security and cost effectiveness of energy supply, to promote efficient utilization of energy and to minimize negative environmental impacts in the energy supply chain.

To conserve Malaysia’s biological diversity and to ensure that its components are utilised in a sustainable manner for the continued progress and socio-economic development of the nation.

Malaysia Policy on the Environment 2002

National Agri Food Policy 2011-2020

National Wetlands Policy 2004

To address continuous economic, social and cultural progress and enhancement of the quality of life of Malaysians, through environmentally sound and sustainable development.

To address food security and safety to ensure sustainability, affordability and accessibility among others.

To sustainably manage wetlands for their environmental and socio-economic functions to ensure the continual progress and well-being of the nation. This policy, however, was never published nor distributed to the public upon its launching. It is currently being reviewed and expected to be launched as the new National Wetlands Policy 2018.

Navigating The Maritime Nation Agenda: Marine Spatial Planning As a Catalyst

National Urbanisation Policy 2006

National Physical Plans

To guide and coordinate the planning and urban development to be more efficient and systematic in particular to manage the increasing number of urban residents in 2020 with emphasis on the balance between the social, economic and physical development in the city.

To strengthen the country’s planning through dimensional spaces in national economy policy by coordinating sectorial agency through preparation of allocation spaces in sectorial policy, to form framework for planning at state level and local; and to form physical planning policy.

Table 3: National Policies relating to environment and development

National Physical Plans (NPP): The Main Policy in Spatial Planning

As the highest spatial planning within the national development planning framework, NPP summarises on strategic policies to determine direction for physical development and conservation for all Peninsular Malaysia. The functions of the NPP are as follows: -

1. Formation of the country’s spatial framework;

2. Increase in the national economy competitiveness;

3. Modernization of the agriculture sector;

4. Strengthening tourism development;

5. Management of human settlement;

6. Conservation of natural resources and environment;

7. Integration of the nation’s transportation network; and

8. Suitable provision on infrastructure.

National spatial planning is a complex process. It necessarily involves a wide range of cross-sectoral policies relating to many diverse participants and stakeholders, both horizontally and vertically, such as utility service providers and private sector. The Town and Country Planning Act 1976 (Act 172) provides the legal basis for the preparation of the National Physical Plan. To ensure its relevance in the fastchanging environment, Section 6B (4) of Act 172 obliges that the NPP be reviewed every five years in tandem with the review of the Five-Year Development Plan, or as and when directed by the National Physical Planning Council (NPPC). We are currently at the NPP-4, which has put forth

MSP in the National Policies

Although MSP is relatively an emerging subject matter in Malaysia (Aziz et al., 2019; George et al., 2016), reflected from the fact that its MSP initiative has yet to be listed in MSPglobal as at 2024. This is about to change with the strengthening

of development planning policies with embedded land-sea interaction via the Fourth National Physical Plan (NPP4) and the Second National Coastal Zones Physical Plan (NCZPP-2), which were launched in 2022 by PLANMalaysia (Talaat, 2024). From policy purview, the policy focussing on development core through concept of ‘Comprehensive Spatial Ecosystem’. As the main document for national planning under Section 6B of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1976 (Act 172), the NPP4 emphasises on the significance of MSP under the Comprehensive Development of Coastal Land Use Actions. The NCZPP-2, through Action 1.3, further introduces MSP within the Strategy of Resilient Development Against Disaster Risk, which aims to strengthen conservation of coastal and marine areas by formulating and implementing MSP framework.

Under the NCZPP-2, MSP has been put as one of the key features and been made as Strategic Action AE 1.3 (as shown in Figure 2 below) under Thrust 2 on Sustainable Ecological Assets and Ecosystem Services.

Figure 2: Strategic Actions under Thrust 2 of the NCZPP-2 - Sustainable Ecological Assets and Ecosystem Services

Navigating The Maritime Nation Agenda: Marine Spatial Planning As a Catalyst For Blue Economy Development In Malaysia

Institutional/Administrative Framework

Without taking into account states’ jurisdictions, the management of various affairs of the sea and marine and coastal resources at the federal level is carried out sectorally by various ministries and government agencies as illustrated in Table 1 below. This fragmentation or distribution of jurisdictions is guided by varied strategic policies, institutional arrangements and existing legal instruments in the form of either or both international conventions ratified by Malaysia and domestic laws. This ‘arrangement’ inadvertently creates overlap in jurisdiction, powers and functions.

Ministry/Department

Department of Environment

Department of Wildlife and National Parks

Forestry Department of Peninsular Malaysia

Malaysian Meteorological Department

Department of Agriculture

Department of Fisheries

Department of Irrigation and Drainage

Functions/Role

Placed under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment to handle all pollution issues.

Manages the nation’s conservation program and sustainable management of the nation’s biodiversity.

Responsible for the management, planning, protection and development of the Permanent Reversed Forests (PRF) in accordance with the National Forestry Policy and the National Forestry Act.

Monitors atmospheric composition in Malaysia and provides information and advice on the meteorological aspects of air pollution.

Provides development services especially to farmers and protect the country’s agriculture industry to ensure food and environmental safety.

Manage the national fishery resources in an efficient, innovative and environmentally friendly manner based on scientific information and good governance.

Provides engineering expertise services and water resources management including river management, coastal and manage flood and drought in holistic way to improve citizens life in the context of water security and environment sustainability in river management, coastal management, water resources management and hydrology, flood management as well as stormwater management.

Department of Marine Parks Malaysia

PLANMalaysia

Establish management zones for the conservation of aquatic flora and fauna also conserve and protect the biological diversity of the marine community and its habitats.

Implements and monitors comprehensive, systematic and innovative development planning for the well-being of society by planning, controlling and coordinating development, land use and land conservation through effective implementation of the Town and Country Planning Act (Act172) and related acts, and formulating and implementing planning regulations, policies, plans and guidelines and ensuring effective adoption by all agencies at the implementation stage.

Table 4: Government Agencies with Primary Environmental Protection Responsibilities, Planning and Development

As the main administrative agency in spatial planning, PLANMalaysia plays its role to ensure the ideal use, development, and conservation of land through its functions at three levels of government: federal, state and local as illustrated in Table 5 below.

Federal Level State Level Local Level

To advise the Federal Government on all planning matters related to the use and development of land;

To act as the Secretariat to the National Physical Planning Council formed under the Town and Country Planning Act 1976 (Act 172);

To encourage comprehensive, effective and efficient planning through planning laws, methodology, research, standards, procedures and planning rules;

Main advisor to the state government in all planning matters, including the use and development of land;

Secretary to the State Planning Committees formed under the Town & Country Planning Act 1976 (Act 172);

To plan, coordinate and control the use and development of land and buildings in the local authorities’ areas;

To facilitate, assist and encourage the collection, upkeep and publication of statistics, bulletins, monographs and other publications related to town and country planning and its rules; and,

To advise local authorities regarding the policies and control of land use and buildings;

To perform other related tasks entrusted by the State Authority or the State Planning Committee.

Navigating The Maritime Nation Agenda: Marine Spatial Planning As a Catalyst For Blue Economy Development

To translate national socioeconomic policies into physical and spatial strategies/forms based on land use formulae and settlement programmes;

To assist state governments, local authorities and government agencies in preparing Development Plans, such as State Structure Plans, District Local Plans and Special Area Plans; and,

To monitor, update and publish statistics, bulletins and rules related to town and country planning.

To regulate development in the states, including approvals and monitoring of development-plan implementation;

To assist state governments in preparing layout plans for special state projects; and,

To conduct research and studies on land use and development.

Table 5: Functions of the PLANMalaysia according to the Levels of Government

MSP as Catalyst for Blue Economy Development in Malaysia

MSP is the most suitable management tool to utilise in order to achieve Blue Economy. According to IOC-UNESCO’s Policy Brief (u.d.), which was developed in the framework of the MSP Global initiative, in developing a sustainable Blue Economy, the increasing demand for maritime space for various uses, along with the multiple pressures on marine and coastal resources, requires an integrated approach to ocean management. This calls for the ecosystem-based approach to ocean management in MSP, which promotes development of maritime and coastal economies through sustainable use of resources. According to the world Bank (2022), MSP provides a comprehensive and integrated investment framework and financial and social rational for the Blue Economy by reducing investment risk and improving investors’ certainty to access marine resources. Specifically, MSP addresses upstream environmental and social issues and allocates the spatial and temporal distribution of marine activities.

Since at this point of time, Malaysia has yet to have its MSP Framework nor a national blueprint for Blue Economy, reference can be first made to the ASEAN Blue Economy Framework (ABEF), which has streamlined eight main blue economy sectors namely: (i) sustainable fishery; (ii) sustainable aquaculture; (iii) marine and coastal tourism and cultural natural heritage conservation; (iv) maritime transport and green ports; (v) marine renewable and non-renewable energy; (v) mineral extraction industries (vii) desalination; and (viii) marine biotechnology and bioprospecting.

The ABEF intends to guide ASEAN blue economy initiatives while encouraging regional integration and cooperation and strengthening the capacity of ASEAN

Member States (AMS) to maximise the sustainable use of aquatic spaces. The ABEF was drafted in accordance with international laws, which include the UN Charter, 1982 UNCLOS, other relevant UN treaties and conventions including those of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the ASEAN Charter, relevant ASEAN treaties and agreements, as well as ASEAN shared values, norms, and principles. There are three main objectives set by the ABEF as shown in Figure 3 below.

1. To ensure a cross-sectoral and cross-stakeholder approach, creating a value chain, supporting inclusiveness, and ensuring sustainability to make the blue economy a new engine for ASEAN future economic growth.

2. To develop a common understanding on the blue economy, provide a foundation for regional actions relevant to the blue economy to maximise the economic potential of ASEAN’s ocean and inland water resources, and foster collaborative actions and/or cooperation in areas* with a view to supporting sustainable economic growth and prosperity.

3. To serve as a non-binding reference document for continuous engagement and conversations on the blue economy amongst AMS and between ASEAN and its partners.

The areas mentioned in Objective 2 include marine and coastal ecosystem protection, combatting IUU fishing, sustainable aquaculture and fishing practices, marine industrial development, food, water, and energy security, trade and connectivity, security and safety of navigation, marine and freshwater science, aquatic based energy, blue governance and management, biotechnology, data statistics and data analytics, livelihood, adaptation to and mitigation of climate change, and innovation.

To achieve the objectives outlined in Section 3, the framework is structured around three areas i.e. the guiding principles for implementation of a blue economy in ASEAN, blue strategies on which AMS should focus, and enablers that accelerate blue economy development and growth. Principle 1 of the guiding principles for implementation of the ABEF (Value Creation), which emphasises the need to generate economic value while responsibly utilising ocean and inland water resources. Principle 1 mentions how MSP can assist the AMS to retain this value while efficiently and effectively using ocean and inland water resources. The ABEF is based on three strategies namely: -

Figure 3: The Objectives of the ASEAN Blue Economy Framework

1. Blue Strategy 1: Blue Conservation Management

2. Blue Strategy 2: Blue Science, Technology, and Innovation

3. Blue Strategy 3: Blue Priority Sectors

Blue Strategy 3: Blue Priority Sectors is centred on six key areas (where MSP is put as the third key area) as follows: -

1. Defining the blue economy’s fields of application and key areas, and providing a coherent definition: Helps resolve recurring and one-off problems, improves existing scenarios, and develops new ways to value blue potential.

2. Increasing the knowledge of blue potential and associated constraints: For example, national blue accounting of natural resources will facilitate opportunities for development as well as the optimal use of blue assets. Further knowledge will help refine the transition of value chains to circular economy principles, improving the efficiency of value chains cross-sectorally and ensuring the simultaneous development of sectors across ASEAN.

3. Supporting MSP: Will facilitate improved management of resources and cross-sector collaboration.

4. Ensuring Communication: Key amongst AMS, sector stakeholders, and governance structures, as it will benefit ASEAN by encouraging dialogue, the recognition of blue development projects (and their progress), and the dissemination of knowledge and best practices, which will facilitate blue growth cross-sectorally.

5. Developing and encouraging sustainable blue financing mechanisms: Will contribute to blue growth by accelerating the development of blue economy projects, stimulating investment into integrated and holistic blue approaches, and incentivising sustainable resource use and a transition to a more sustainable and inclusive economy with wider economic benefits.

6. Stimulating traditional and emerging sectoral growth: The specific potential actions for the blue economy sectors are presented in Annex IV in Figure 4 below.

SUSTAINABLE FISHERY

1. Develop small-scale fisheries while minimising the negative impacts on the environment.

2. Promote conservation and sustainable management of aquatic resources by better informing and involving fishers in decision-making processes.

3. Promote an inclusive blue value chain with a strong focus on quality improvement and achieving responsible and equitable fish trade and marketing.

4. Ensure security on board for fishing embarkations, and create safe working conditions and security.

5. Strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change.

6. Pursue the prevention of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in line with ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on the Blue Economy.

SUSTAINABLE AQUACULTURE

1. Attract and promote private–public partnership (PPP) investment for aquaculture to realise the full potential of fish farming.

2. Engage in the production of endemic species.

3. Develop hydronic aquaculture systems.

4. Accelerate the development of aquaculture fish processing capacities.

5. Empower women and youth in aquaculture.

6. Promote sustainable aquaculture practices by developing guidelines for environmentally friendly and socially responsible aquaculture practices.

MARINE AND COASTAL TOURISM AND CULTURAL NATURAL HERITAGE CONSERVATION

1. Enhance access to finance and business support services for micro, small and medium-scale operators, and facilitate the entrance of new, local entrepreneurs in the tourism sector.

2. Assess the environmental and social impact of the tourism sector, and establish initiatives to address 21 potential negative impacts, including on the preservation of cultural natural heritage.

3. Strengthen the marketing of coastal, freshwater, and marine tourism sectors in countries where terrestrial, wildlife-based tourism currently dominates.

MARITIME TRANSPORT AND GREEN PORTS

1. Adopt best practices of ASEAN Member States (AMS) where possible for the development of green ports.

2. Ensure fair sea freight rates and other transport costs.

3. Develop transport corridors.

4. Promote good governance of the sector.

5. Develop shipbuilding industry aiming for job creation, with compliance to ESG standards.

6. Use of more efficient technology and less reliance on fossil fuel.

7. Ensure security and safety in the maritime and lake areas.

Navigating The Maritime Nation Agenda: Marine Spatial Planning As a Catalyst For Blue Economy Development In Malaysia

RENEWABLE AND NON-RENEWABLE ENERGY

1. Consider exploring the possibility of conducting technical studies to assess areas of high potential for renewable blue energy.

2. Increase access to financing and promote investment in renewable blue energy.

3. Strengthen national and regional energy resiliency planning and coordination, such as oil spill contingency plans.

MINERAL EXTRACTION INDUSTRIES

1. Map the seabed and lake beds.

2. Reform unsustainable financial mechanisms, and create a conducive financing environment to help industries’ transition to a blue economy.

3. Increase knowledge of deep seabed, coastal, and seawater mineral resources.

4. Develop policy frameworks to accelerate the transfer and application of blue economy technologies.

5. Develop environmental impact assessment gu5. idelines.

6. Promote the application of innovative industries.

7. Create innovative industry databases and support tools.

DESALINATION

1. Promote PPPs for the development of reverse osmosis desalination.

2. Develop integrated desalination–salt production systems.

3. Build small desalination plants in remote coastal areas.

MARINE BIOTECHNOLOGY AND BIOPROSPECTING

1. Develop a policy framework to accelerate the transfer and application of blue biotechnologies.

2. Promote the application of innovative industries.

3. Create innovative industry databases and support tools.

4. Ensure the establishment of PPPs to run bioprospecting surveys and missions..

Conclusion

The complications to implement MSP in a federated nation like Malaysia is irrefutable. The facts that there is distribution of powers, as provided under the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution, in making laws as well as in implementing the laws, which can be inferred from the multiple agencies involved may have created certain impediments to such efforts. Thus, resolving the governance issues is of utmost importance before embarking on our MSP journey. There must be sufficient legal framework with a designated institution to implement MSP.

Figure 4: Annex IV of the ASEAN Blue Economy Framework - The specific potential actions for the blue economy sectors

In benchmarking for good practices, we can learn from the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority’s experience, which took about 13 years to develop and implement its first zoning plans. Another instance whereas the Yellowstone National Park established by the US Congress in 1872 took almost 35 years before extractive activities were fully banned in the park. Likewise, the Xiamen Integrated Coastal Management in China which utilised MSP as a management tool in creating its MFZ could have been more interesting because of the success of transforming the city to what it is today (Talaat, 2024). Closer to home is Indonesia, where MSP has recently been acknowledged as a key component in managing its marine space and resources through the elevation of its MSP Directorate to the Directorate General of the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries.

MSP has been mentioned in the ABEF as the tool to achieve Blue Economy. This calls for a national MSP Framework under Initiative AE1.3A under the NCZPP-2 and subsequently implement MSP for five key zones under Initiative AE1.3B. Despite Malaysia being quite lagging behind in adopting and implementing MSP, as compared with the other ASEAN countries, it is better late than never. The decision made by the MPFN chaired by the Premier on 23 October 2024 may serve as a wakeup call that in navigating the maritime nation agenda, Malaysia must promptly start looking into MSP as an enabler, i.e., as the catalyst, to further its blue economy development. Therefore, as a maritime nation with marine space more than double its terrestrial space, Malaysia must no longer take the backseat in pursuing its blue economy potentials through MSP.

Reference

ASEAN Blue Economy Framework

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Aziz, N., Muhammad, Z., Ghazali, F., Talaat, W. I. a. W., & Saputra, J. (2019). Marine Spatial Planning: The Way forward for Sustainable development of Central Terengganu, Malaysia. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University, 54(4). https://doi.org/10.35741/issn.0258-2724.54.4.9

Aziz, N., Muhammad, Z., Saputra, J., Ghazali, F., & Talaat, W. I. a. W. (2020). A study of the socioeconomic development trends in Central Terengganu, Malaysia: Potentials of marine spatial planning. Journal of Advanced Research in Dynamic and Control Systems, 12(6), 776–785. https://doi.org/10.5373/ jardcs/v12i6/s20201093

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Navigating The Maritime Nation Agenda: Marine Spatial Planning As a Catalyst For Blue Economy Development In Malaysia

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PART V

EPILOGUE

CONCLUSION

Malaysia has begun to chart its passage as a maritime nation hundreds of years ago. The first edition of the Maritime Nation books dwells into charting the passage of a maritime nation, while the second edition revolves around steering the course towards the maritime nation agenda. As a culmination to the preceding editions, this Maritime Nation edition aligns towards navigating the horizon where the discussion in this book is divided into three main themes –Geostrategic Dynamics, Non-Traditional Security Threats and Blue Economy.

Under the first theme – Geostrategic Dynamics comprising four chapters - the narration started with ASEAN’s cooperation with the IORA and the strategic issues and challenges in the Indo-Pacific construct. Noting of the current context of geopolitical landscape, the author described on how the rise of the IndoPacific construct reshaped many new prospects for regional collaboration, with the strategic collaboration between the ASEAN and the IORA as the example. The chapter further described on how both ASEAN and IORA shared regional security concerns highlighting the need for a collaborative security approach where improved maritime connectivity and infrastructure are also crucial for economic integration and trade facilitation. The author also argued that while fostering people-to-people exchanges strengthens cultural ties and effective disaster management is essential for regional resilience, ASEAN-IORA cooperation still faces considerable challenges. Significant obstacles noted include political differences among member states, varying levels of economic development, and competing regional interests present, compounded by competition between major powers, particularly the United States, China and India.

The author subsequently proposed five recommendations: (i) strengthening institutional frameworks for better coordination among ASEAN and IORA members; (ii) building trust through enhancing capacity-building initiatives for more effective implementation of joint projects; (iii) promoting sustainable development and inclusive economic policies to bridge developmental gaps among member states; (iv) fostering continuous dialogue and diplomatic

Captain Ananthan Tharmalingam RMN

Prof. Dr. Wan Izatul Asma binti Wan Talaat

engagement to mitigate the adverse effects of major power competition; and (v) developing joint maritime initiatives such as a joint ASEAN-IORA task force to mitigate maritime security issues. By adopting these measures, ASEAN and IORA can enhance their cooperative efforts, fostering greater regional stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. This study used secondary data analysis also utilizes the RSCT and Neorealism Theory, particularly the concepts of balance of power and security dilemma, to examine the issues and challenges hindering ASEAN-IORA effectiveness.

The narration on Geostrategic Dynamics continues with the discussion on lateral leadership in the Indo-Pacific and preserving peace through middle power cooperation. The author started by discussing the challenges faced by middle powers in the Indo-pacific Malaysia are facing. The chapter discussed Malaysia’s geopolitical position and the current challenges to its sovereignty and economic security before proceeded to examine the concept of middle-up-down leadership and the ways that this business principle can be applied to international politics. The chapter subsequently deliberated on the ways that middle powers can lead in either with or without big power guidance, which requires four key elements: opportunity, capability, creativity and credibility.

In the end, the chapter addressed the importance of maintaining international law and agreed rules and norms to ensure that nations in the region adhere to pre-determined systems for dispute resolution and thereby consider themselves to be part of a community of like-minded nations. The chapter concluded by noting that while the challenges facing the region are significant, it is not insurmountable, where lateral leadership can provide the Indo-Pacific with creative and responsive solutions to resolve problems and preserve stability.

The third chapter under the Geostrategic Dynamics theme dwells on the militarization of features in the South China Sea (SCS) and the implications for regional stability. The author started by noting that despite post-Cold War expectations for demilitarization, the SCS has witnessed intensified militarization driven by territorial disputes and competing sovereignty claims among regional actors, notably China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Establishment of artificial islands, fortified military installations, and strategic bases designed to assert national power and secure critical maritime resources and trade routes are central to this phenomenon where this militarization generates significant geostrategic tensions, threatening the free navigation essential to global commerce and energy supply chains.

The author further discussed on how the escalation in military presence has severe economic impacts, disrupting regional trade and posing threats to global supply chains. Likewise, environmental implications are equally severe, endangering marine biodiversity, exacerbating illegal fishing activities, and threatening fragile marine ecosystems. Noting that the evolving security dynamics also risk military escalation, the chapter argued that external powers are drawn into a geopolitical confrontation, which calls for Malaysia to strategically engage through regional diplomacy, economic diversification, environmental protection, and robust naval

preparedness. The author further described how the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) emerges as a pivotal actor, tasked with maintaining deterrence, strengthening international collaborations, and proactively managing security threats. This paper subsequently highlighted the urgency of comprehensive, peaceful, and cooperative approaches to sustain regional stability amidst escalating militarization in the SCS.

The final chapter under the Geostrategic Dynamics theme proposed for the the need for the RMN’s submarines to defend Malaysia’s maritime interests. Noting that despite ongoing debates over their operational utility in shallow and narrow waterways like the Strait of Malacca (SoM), the author argued that the strategic value of submarines remains significant within contemporary maritime security contexts. The chapter further noted that Malaysia’s acquisition of two Scorpèneclass submarines reflects an insightful strategy amidst rising maritime tensions, notably in the SCS, where overlapping territorial claims involving China, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Brunei necessitate enhanced naval deterrence. Citing the the sinking of INS Khukri during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and the ARA General Belgrano during the Falklands War in 1982, the author contended that these incidents demonstrate submarines’ ability to alter adversary behaviours significantly beyond their tactical engagements.

The author further suggested that for Malaysia, submarines provide critical capabilities including intelligence gathering, sea-denial operations, mine-laying, and special forces support, essential for safeguarding national interests and controlling strategic maritime chokepoints. Noting that operational challenges such as limited fleet size, maintenance demands, financial constraints, and personnel sustainability pose considerable hurdles, the chapter concluded that the RMN must strategically manage submarine force sustainment, including future procurement, mid-life upgrades, manpower training, and regional maritime collaboration, to ensure Malaysia’s submarines continue to serve effectively as vital deterrents and multipliers of maritime power.

The second theme Non-Traditional Security Threats started with a chapter describing these threats from the Southeast Asian’s perspective. Noting that the Southeast Asian region is surrounded by some of the busiest straits in the world, its connectivity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans allows for trade, and social interaction within the region will eventually pose security and stability concerns to many. Since all nation-states either have maritime or land boundaries connected to them, the author argued that it has created many non-traditional threats in the maritime sector.

The chapter further contended that as an ASEAN member state (AMS), Malaysia views the sea as an economically important interest because 23% of its GDP is related to the maritime sector. Therefore, the major maritime security and stability concerns are subjected to geostrategic environments in the regions such as great power politics issues, maritime security and defence and non-traditional threats issues. The author further argued that in order to address the identified

challenges, there is a need for ASEAN member states to define the great power politics issues, maritime security and defence and non-traditional threats issues by using the context of UNCLOS as a guide. The Defence White Paper published in 2020 serves as a principal guideline for Malaysia to address the identified challenges posed by the discussed maritime non-traditional threats, which may also be adopted by other AMS.

The Non-Traditional Security Threats theme continues with a chapter on the hidden lines of communication revolving around geopolitics, cyber threats, and undersea cables in Southeast Asia’s maritime sphere. The authors started by noting that undersea communication cables carry over 95% of transnational data flows, making them both an economic lifeline and a strategic security concern, particularly for Southeast Asia’s crucial digital economy. However, these cables, once thought relatively resistant to power politics, now face intensified global rivalry, overlapping maritime claims, and national policy pressures. They further noted that the region’s rapid digital expansion, which was marked by investments from tech giants and large-scale projects like SEA-ME-WE 6, coincides with the deepening US–China competition and rising “grey-zone” threats. Drawing on incidents of sabotage, cyberattacks, and espionage, this chapter illustrated on how physical and political risks erode cable resilience and necessitate updates to international treaties such as UNCLOS. This chapter emphasised on Malaysia’s strategic maritime ambitions, revealing how the fragmented domestic laws and governance bureaucracy leave the country vulnerable to disruptions.

This chapter further provided comparative insights from Singapore’s streamlined regulatory regime and Indonesia’s vast archipelagic challenges, which collectively highlight the importance of coherent legislation, cross-sector collaboration, and robust maritime domain awareness. The chapter proceeded to discuss on ASEAN’s evolving frameworks, including high-level summits and the ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025, highlighting how regional partnerships can help mitigate geopolitical and non-traditional security risks. Finally, in order to safeguard Southeast Asia’s critical undersea cable infrastructure and future-proof the region’s digital connectivity, the chapter proposed for a multi-layered approach, stronger national laws and regulations paired with ASEAN-led initiatives.

The third chapter on Non-Traditional Security Threats discussed on the roles of Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s regional maritime security to navigate challenges in the SoM, which is a critical maritime chokepoint, facilitating nearly one-third of global maritime trade. The author noted that nonetheless, the Strait faces considerable maritime security threats, including piracy, armed robbery, illegal fishing, human trafficking, smuggling, and environmental degradation. Increasing pirate activities, geopolitical rivalries among major powers such as China, the United States, and India. The chapter highlighted the strategic significance of the Strait, existing threats, and collaborative security measures between Malaysia and Indonesia, including initiatives like the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) and the “Eyes in the Sky” (EiS) aerial surveillance program.

The chapter further explored Malaysia’s independent efforts through technological advancements like the Malaysian Maritime Sea Surveillance System (SWASLA). Given evolving threats, including cyber-attacks and geopolitical tensions, this author advocated for strengthened maritime collaboration, intelligence fusion, enhanced surveillance capabilities, and standardized maritime laws. In order to ensure long-term stability and security of the Straits, the chapter subsequently proposed for sustainable financing mechanisms, public-private partnerships, harmonized maritime legal frameworks, and enhanced capacity-building initiatives.

The third theme - Blue Economy – commenced with highlighting the transformative potential of harnessing the blue economy in Malaysia. This chapter underscored the opportunities within fisheries, shipping, tourism, and offshore energy, while addressing critical governance fragmentation and geopolitical challenges. It concluded by advocating for an integrated national ocean policy and regional collaborations to sustainably maximize maritime economic opportunities. The second chapter discussed issues and opportunities in maritime archaeotourism in Malaysia as a rich country in maritime heritage with significant historical artifacts submerged in its waters. The authors contended that maritime archaeotourism encompasses more than just diving and it offers opportunities for sustainable tourism linked to the exploration of underwater cultural heritage, including ancient shipwrecks and submerged artifacts. Nonetheless, several challenges hinder the growth of this tourism segment, such as environmental degradation, lack of public awareness, inadequate funding for conservation, and regulatory deficiencies. The chapter advocated for strategic planning, investment in research, and community engagement to address these concerns and enhance the sector. Finally, the chapter highlighted the need for collaboration among stakeholders to harness the full potential of Malaysia’s maritime archaeological assets while preserving them for future generations.

The subsequent chapter on Blue Economy promoted for an ocean policy for Malaysia in order to have better ocean governance. Noting that the oceans are indispensable for Malaysia, and despite having a larger maritime zone than land area and significant reliance on the oceans for trade, food security, energy resources, and tourism, Malaysia still lacks a comprehensive National Ocean Policy (NOP) for coordinated ocean governance. The chapter further contended that the existing ocean management in Malaysia is fragmented across numerous ministries and agencies, resulting in overlapping jurisdictions, inefficiencies, and gaps in managing maritime affairs.

The chapter further contended that international experiences demonstrate how a structured and integrated NOP can significantly improve ocean governance by fostering inter-agency cooperation, aligning strategic objectives, and mobilizing stakeholder participation. Drawing lessons from countries like Australia, Fiji, and Indonesia, this chapter highlighted the urgent need for Malaysia to establish a robust, integrated NOP to address existing management inefficiencies, strengthen national maritime security, protect vulnerable marine ecosystems, sustainably

exploit marine resources, and facilitate the nation’s transition toward achieving climate resilience. Finally, the chapter contended that adopting a unified and comprehensive NOP will facilitate Malaysia to sustainably manage its maritime spaces while enhancing national maritime sovereignty, environmental integrity, and economic prosperity.

The final chapter on Blue Economy discussed on how marine spatial planning (MSP) can act as a catalyst for blue economy development in Malaysia. Since human activities in many areas of the coastal and marine areas will increase significantly in the near future, the chapter argued that uncoordinated expansion of existing uses of the ocean and the addition of emerging uses, along with a rapidly growing coastal human population, are likely to exacerbate the decline of marine ecosystem health. Thus, in order to maintain the well-being of ocean ecosystems and their ability to provide essential ecosystem services for human populations, the chapter contended that a comprehensive, integrated management of marine uses and activities can be achieved through ecosystem-based MSP.

The chapter further contended that this would be invaluable in replacing the current patchwork of complex, uncoordinated, and often disjointed rules and regulations governing use of coastal and ocean waters around the world. This chapter dwelled on MSP as a management tool towards sustainable ocean economy or blue economy development in Malaysia while looking at the existing national governance framework to its implementation. Since Malaysia has yet to launch its Blue Economy Blueprint, the discussion on blue economy in this chapter was therefore guided by the ASEAN Blue Economy Framework.

While the debate on “Malaysia a Maritime Nation” agenda persists, this edition of Maritime Nation book reiterates the importance of reinforcing maritime security to address traditional and non-traditional threats. While countries around the globe is proposing for blue economy development, Malaysia’s decision to embark on MSP as a catalyst to its blue economy development must be taken seriously. As a maritime nation with more than double marine space than its territorial space, there is an urgent need for Malaysia to buckle up on its MSP framework, in line with its upcoming Blue Economy Blueprint. Concerted efforts from all stakeholders, across-board, are needed to ensure our national maritime interests are safeguarded and continue to flourish.

A

artificial islands

ASEAN

ASEAN-IORA

INDEX

18,45,88

1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 32, 36, 38, 43, 47, 48, 65, 66, 67, 71, 74, 82, 83, 89, 90, 93, 94, 95, 106, 107, 108, 114, 115, 117, 124, 138, 161, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192

7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 187, 188

B

Blue Economy

3, 22, 26, 69, 79, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 160, 163, 164, 166, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 185, 191, 192

G

geopolitical tensions

1, 3, 41, 42, 44, 107, 120, 123, 191 geopolitics 37, 45, 81, 96, 97, 106, 124, 190 governance framework 92, 153, 154, 157, 160, 163, 165, 168, 192 green shipping

101

I

Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific region

2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 44, 48, 74, 96, 100, 103, 107, 111, 112, 113, 114, 124, 125, 126, 187, 188

7, 17, 23, 29, 34, 44, 111, 112, 113, 114 international cooperation 102, 121

Llateral leadership

M

Malacca Strait Patrols

2, 29, 30, 31, 36, 37, 188

3, 21, 90

Malaysia 1, 3, 10, 15, 21, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 38, 40, 41, 45, 46, 47, 52, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 74, 76, 77, 78, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 141, 152, 154, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178, 182 ,183, 184, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192

Malaysia Maritime Zone

marine resources

67

45, 112, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 151, 154, 159, 164, 166, 167, 178, 192

marine spatial planning 91, 183, 184, 185, 192

maritime connectivity

maritime governance

maritime grey zone tactics

maritime nation

maritime security

maritime surveillance

6, 10, 24, 74, 187

76, 82, 116

75

3, 66, 82, 83, 123, 130, 131, 149, 150, 160, 161, 183, 187, 192

6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 31, 36, 46, 47, 52, 65, 66, 74, 75, 76, 81, 83, 93, 94, 96, 97, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 113, 115, 116, 117, 123, 154, 155, 158, 159, 161, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192

47, 93, 94, 105

maritime transport 10, 159, 178

middle powers

29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 188

militarisation 2, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 75, 113

Minilateralism

36 N

non-traditional threats

76, 82, 85, 189, 190, 192

O

ocean governance

P

piracy

R

regional cooperation

regional security

Regional Security Complex Theory

regional stability

Royal Malaysian Navy

S

Scorpène-class submarines

3, 153, 154, 157, 159, 160, 164, 165, 184, 191

2, 9, 11, 21, 23, 37, 87, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 115, 190

6, 10, 11, 14, 16, 22, 45, 108, 123

1, 9, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 21, 24, 34, 46, 82, 97, 187

12, 13

37, 38, 42, 47, 89, 100, 105, 107, 115, 124, 188, 189

40, 51, 74, 87, 154, 160, 189

51, 60, 61 shipwreck

South China Sea

Southeast Asia

Strait of Malacca

Submarine Cables

130, 131, 134, 139, 142, 143, 146

2, 12, 26, 27, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 48, 49, 51, 62, 66, 74, 75, 76, 81, 84, 94, 96, 97, 113, 120, 123, 124, 126, 130, 146, 149, 150, 151, 155, 158, 160, 188

65, 66, 67, 68, 74, 83, 89, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 106, 107, 108, 116, 146, 151

2, 66, 68, 81, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 112, 113, 114, 115, 150, 158, 189

90, 94, 97 sustainability

3, 22, 46, 105, 107, 112, 115, 118, 121, 122, 123, 139, 142, 152, 158, 165, 173, 176, 189

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 118

U

UNCLOS

underwater cultural heritage

2, 41, 44, 47, 49, 75, 76, 86, 87, 92, 154, 161, 167, 168, 179, 190

3, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 145, 156, 191

EDITORIAL BOARD

EDITORS

CAPTAIN ANANTHAN THARMALINGAM RMN

Director General

ROYAL MALAYSIAN NAVY

SEA POWER CENTRE

COMMANDER WRIGHTON BUAN

ANAK KASSY RMN

Head of Maritime Department

ROYAL MALAYSIAN NAVY

SEA POWER CENTRE

PROF. DR. WAN IZATUL ASMA BINTI

WAN TALAAT

Head of Centre for Ocean Governance Institute of Oceanography and Environment

UNIVERSITI MALAYSIA TERENGGANU

EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER

NORSAYDAEAINI BINTI CHE

ROZUBI RMN

Maritime Staff Officer (Strategy)

ROYAL MALAYSIAN NAVY

SEA POWER CENTRE

LR ETR TC. MUHAMAD ASNAWI BIN

AMINUDDIN

Information Technology Staff

ROYAL MALAYSIAN NAVY

SEA POWER CENTRE

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

BRIGADIER GENERAL DATO’ AZUDIN

BIN HASSAN

Director General of Planning

MALAYSIAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS

COMMANDER MOHAMMAD SHAFIQ

BIN ZAINON RMN

Directing Staff

MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

FIRST ADMIRAL DR. TAY YAP LEONG

Commander of Naval Diving and Mine Warfare

NAVAL DIVING AND MINE WARFARE HEADQUARTERS

ROYAL MALAYSIAN NAVY

DR. NELL BENNETT Researcher

SEA POWER CENTRE

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

PROF. ADAM LEONG KOK WEY

Director of Centre for Defence and International Security Studies NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY OF MALAYSIA

E KIN ZANE RYAN SEOW Analyst BAIT AL-AMANAH

COMMANDER SYAHRUM BIN

HASSIM RMN

Commanding Officer

KD JEBAT

ROYAL MALAYSIAN NAVY

ASSOC. PROF. DR. HASRIZAL SHAARI Director of Research and Field Service Center

UNIVERSITI MALAYSIA TERENGGANU

EIMAAN INTIKHAB QURESHI Research Associate

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MARITIME AFFAIRS (NIMA), PAKISTAN

NAZERY KHALID Adjunct Professor

UNIVERSITI MALAYSIA TERENGGANU