This report contains sensitive information about campaign strategy and is intended to be a tool to be used within the LGBTQ movement
Please do not share this report with the media or with individuals not actively involved in leading local, state, or national equality efforts
This report was produced by the Equality Federation Institute with with funding and support from the Gill Foundation
Equality Federation Institute is the strategic partner and movement builder for state-based organizations that are working on the ground to advance policies that improve the lives of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) people Founded in 1997, we are focused on ensuring that all LGBTQ people are protected from discrimination no matter where they live and work; advancing intersectional issues to ensure that the most vulnerable parts of our community experience both legal and lived equality in their daily lives; and developing the strong, resilient, and adaptive leaders we need to lead this work on the ground The greatest opportunities for policy wins are in the states, where the work is hard but the impact is great With our support, statewide LGBTQ advocacy organizations are building a strong movement for equality in the communities we call home .
Visit www.equalityfederation.org for more information.
FRAN HUTCHINS
Fran is the director of organizational development and training for the Equality Federation In this role, Fran works on the ground with state leaders to plan, hire great people, develop leaders, and grow and strengthen our movement organizations and campaigns . Having worked in LGBTQ organizing since 2008, including on California’s Prop 8 and Maine’s 2009 and 2012 marriage votes, she now advises nondiscrimination campaigns on strategy development and execution, data/analytics, and field tactics
IAN PALMQUIST
Ian is director of leadership programs for the Equality Federation . His top priorities are developing strong state leaders and strengthening the movement in the South Ian previously spent twelve years at Equality North Carolina, including five as executive director He led the successful campaign to pass the School Violence Prevention Act, the first LGBTQ-inclusive law in state history and the first statute to include protections for the transgender community in the South .
ANNE STANBACK
Anne is the director of strategic partnerships for the Equality Federation Anne’s primary focus is working with states to develop plans, strategies, and resources to pass laws to protect LGBTQ people from discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations . Anne has spent nearly 30 years working for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights, including her work as the founding executive director of Love Makes a Family, the lead organization that successfully fought for the freedom to marry in Connecticut
ROEY THORPE
Roey is the director of advocacy programs for the Equality Federation In this role, Roey works closely with local and state leaders to create plans and strategies to pass nondiscrimination laws, and trains activists on how to talk about the need for these laws . Roey has worked in the LGBTQ movement for over 25 years, at both the state and national levels, including serving as acting mayor of Ithaca, New York, and as executive director of Basic Rights Oregon . She is a veteran of several candidate and initiative campaigns
Based in Denver, Colorado, the Gill Foundation is one of the nation’s leading funders of efforts to secure full equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people The foundation has invested more than $279 million since its inception in organizations and programs to achieve its mission of equal opportunity for all people, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity and expression . Visit www.gillfoundation.org for more information.
Jenn is a program associate for the Gill Foundation In this role, she leads the foundation’s digital media efforts and assists in strengthening the messaging and communications strategies deployed to achieve state and national policy goals . During her academic years, she contributed to extensive research projects on gender and sexuality studies . Prior to joining the Gill Foundation, Jenn was a program associate at the Equality Federation
In November 2015, voters in Houston, Texas, repealed a municipal nondiscrimination law that had been passed by the City Council earlier in the year . The repeal garnered national media attention and generated a firestorm of criticism within the LGBTQ movement as well as in the mainstream press and social media . The disappointing results of the campaign were significant because it was a loss that occurred at the end of a banner year during which major progress had been made, from the Supreme Court decision declaring a constitutional right to marriage equality to interpretations of Title VII ensuring protections on the basis of sexual orientation . How, then, could we explain the loss of a campaign for such basic protections at a time when momentum seemed to be so firmly on our side? And how could we lose a campaign that had marshaled all of the expertise and resources of the LGBTQ movement, with many of the same leaders and organizations that had brought such stunning wins on marriage?
There are many lessons to be learned from Houston and other recent campaigns, but none more important than this: as the successful movement for marriage has brought LGBTQ people to the forefront in our national dialogue and put our opposition on the defensive, we need to be prepared for an intense wave of anti-LGBTQ attacks, with renewed fervor and new strategies from our opposition . In the past, convincing a city council to pass a law was often the culmination of a municipal campaign; now, it increasingly represents the beginning of a fight to protect the law from repeal This growing use of a repeal strategy has consequences for the movement, since it takes resources to win (much more than our opponents need), and requires that we revisit the strategies we use to pass these laws in the first place . No longer can we pass laws quietly, relying on influential allies and sympathetic council members to get the job done, because this does not bring us the broad base of supporters we will need to defend the laws But the biggest price of the repeals is human: the toll on individuals, particularly in already vulnerable transgender communities and rural areas, can be devastating . The impact of baseless attacks grounded in fear and stereotypes is profound, creating hopelessness and despair and eroding a sense of belonging in hometown communities .
Winning and protecting local nondiscrimination ordinances is no small matter . As documented in Building Momentum for Change,1 a 2013 report from Equality Federation Institute, local policy victories play an important role in advancing protections at higher levels of government By providing opportunities to engage in public education that wins support, establishing facts that make a case for further legislation, demonstrating political momentum, building the capacity of our movement, and, of course, enacting real protections for LGBTQ people, local ordinances are an important tool in our work to win comprehensive nondiscrimination protections nationwide . Fortunately, the LGBTQ movement is nimble and resourceful, and we have always learned from both the wins and losses of the past We believe that we can learn from experience, and we have plenty of it
In this report, we looked at five recent municipal nondiscrimination ballot campaigns to draw out lessons learned and recommendations for success in future campaigns We chose the campaigns for diversity in geography but similarity in other aspects: all were defensive repeal campaigns conducted within the last three years . The campaigns we chose were, in chronological order, Royal Oak, Michigan (November 2013), Pocatello, Idaho (May 2014), Fayetteville, Arkansas (December 2014), Springfield, Missouri (April 2015), and Houston, Texas (November 2015) We lost some of the campaigns and won others, but we did not assume that winning campaigns were strong and losing campaigns were weak; rather, our experience tells us that we can learn best practices and cautionary lessons from both .
First, we briefly tell the story of each campaign . These overviews are not intended to be comprehensive post-mortems, or to evaluate every strategic choice the campaigns made . In each city, the campaigns were run by smart, committed people who were doing the best they could with the information and resources they had This section provides the reader with the overall narrative and key factors that were unique to each campaign (Our colleagues at Freedom for All Americans will be taking a deeper look at the Houston campaign in another report .)
1 http://equalityfederation org/sites/default/files/Building_Momentum_for_Change_Final pdf
Next, we offer recommendations for leaders who are engaged in municipal nondiscrimination efforts, whether they are just getting started, are already working with their elected officials, or are facing a repeal campaign at the ballot . While some of these recommendations may be familiar to people who have extensive campaign experience, we believe this section will be valuable both to local activists taking on an effort like this for the first time and to campaign veterans looking to work even more effectively We offer insight on when and where to go to pursue these protections, planning and leading effective campaigns, executing successful messaging and field strategies, and navigating the aftermath of a campaign, win or lose . Our recommendations draw from experiences across these five campaigns, and we offer selected anecdotes to illustrate our thinking .
Finally, we suggest work for our national movement to help these local campaigns win and create momentum toward statewide and national victory for our nondiscrimination movement .
While we found many important lessons in our research, a few themes rose to the top We urge local advocates, campaign leaders, organizational partners, and funders to take these to heart:
Consider carefully before passing a law that could face a repeal. Find out if the municipality has a repeal mechanism, and if one exists, make sure you have in place what it will take to defend a law if you successfully pass it Failing to do so is costly and potentially damaging
Plan the full campaign at the beginning: public education, then passing the law, then fighting the repeal. Gone are the days when you could pass a law with a strategy that did not engage broad grassroots support; now it is critical that you plan ahead so that you can educate the public as well as mobilize your base in order to defend the laws you pass
Frame the issue before opponents do, with clear, strong, positive messages. If you don’t frame the issue first, our opponents will make the campaign all about fear and misinformation . Make sure you control the narrative from the start .
Transgender leadership and engagement is critical. Transgender people should be included in every level of the campaign, including as spokespeople and in planning and decision-making roles
Engage the community before, during, and after the campaign. In order to make sure that the relationships and the power you build during the campaign continue on, make sure you plan a post-campaign strategy, win or lose, that will set you up for the future
The campaign structure should be clearly defined with roles and responsibilities. Make sure your structure allows for both input from and communication to the broader community, as well as clear roles and lines of authority
Don’t underestimate the opposition. Expect to far outspend our opponents, and that their use of church networks, earned media, and fear-based tactics will render them far stronger than they appear .
We used a combination of sources, including media coverage from both LGBTQ and mainstream press, as well as internal campaign documents We conducted site visits for each campaign, working in teams to interview local activists; organizational leaders from national, state, and local partners; professional campaign staff; and consultants . Altogether, we interviewed more than 50 people involved with the campaigns . All interviewees were promised anonymity to encourage frank and thoughtful reflection on the campaigns they worked on There was no way to interview everyone involved in these campaigns, nor to acknowledge every individual or organization that supported them We enjoyed a high level of cooperation from almost everyone we asked, reflecting what people felt was an urgent need for lessons learned and their own dedication to these campaigns . Campaigns are emotionally charged environments, and naturally there are different and sometimes conflicting perspectives on some points; we took care to get corroboration on sensitive issues and to remind ourselves that our purpose was not to take sides but to give the reader important information about campaign strategy
In March, 2013, the Royal Oak, Michigan City Commission passed a law banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity . Royal Oak is a progressive community of 59,000 people about 15 miles north of Detroit The ordinance was championed by Jim Rasor, an openly LGBTQ City Council member, and Mayor Jim Ellison, with an “inside strategy” that involved little public engagement, and passed with only one opposing vote
Immediately upon passage, opponents launched the unsuccessful effort to repeal the law, which is something that Unity Michigan, a coalition of six pro-LGBTQ equality groups, had feared . They had been attempting to pass similar laws in townships to avoid the repeal mechanism in cities, which would put them in exactly the situation they now faced However, activists had reason for optimism, since they had strong organizational presence with a few coalition organizations headquartered nearby and because Royal Oak is a progressive community The repeal made it to the ballot in November that same year, failing 54–46 percent (6,654–5,670 votes), upholding the law . One reason is that the pro-LGBTQ One Royal Oak campaign raised and spent almost 15 times what the opposition did ($134,000 vs $9,400), and brought both experienced campaign consultants and state and national partners to the effort, while its opponents did not .
Despite the decisive margin of the victory, the campaign encountered challenges that made the outcome far from certain One Royal Oak had trouble recruiting volunteers for a couple of key reasons: Royal Oak residents believed that their progressive city would have no trouble defeating the repeal with little effort, and people interested in LGBTQ equality found marriage a more compelling issue than nondiscrimination The opposition, whose most prominent spokesperson was Dr . Fadwa Gillanders, a local pharmacist who started an organization called Just Royal Oak to push the repeal, was passionate though not experienced or well organized Just Royal Oak used some messaging that borrowed from other anti-LGBTQ campaigns, such as one in Anchorage, Alaska, that focused on so-called “bathroom panic .” They went so far as to canvass to distribute a flyer with photos of local transgender people, and also claimed that local blood drives would end if the law was allowed to stand . The opposition’s strategy focused on earned media, phone banking, and robo-calls
POPULATION: 59,000
DATE OF CITY COUNCIL VOTE TO PASS LAW: March 4, 2013
DATE OF BALLOT VOTE: November 5, 2013
DAYS BETWEEN PASSAGE OF LAW AND CAMPAIGN MANAGER START DATE: 76
DAYS BETWEEN CAMPAIGN MANAGER START DATE AND VOTE: 170
OUTCOME: Won
FINAL VOTE: 54% (6,654) against repeal to 46% (5,670) for repeal
CAMPAIGN BUDGET: $134,000
HIGHEST POLLING #: 43% against repeal to 34% for repeal2
KEY PLAYERS: Badlands Strategies/ Jon Hoadley; LA Leadership Lab; The National LGBTQ Task Force; Unity Michigan coalition (ACLU of Michigan, Affirmations, Equality Michigan, KICK, the Michigan Roundtable for Diversity and Inclusion, and the Ruth Ellis Center)
CAMPAIGN MANAGERS: Allison Smith-VanKuiken, Chris Riley
3
One Royal Oak had internal difficulties that were at times so extreme that one campaign leader believes that if the campaign had gone much longer, they likely would not have won . Although eventually successful, the field program struggled to find volunteers, fundraising was slow to get off the ground (not taking off until the end of August), and tensions between campaign leaders resulted in the campaign manager leaving the campaign just a few weeks before election day The original vision of a campaign steering committee who would serve as strong fundraisers with a hands-off approach did not work as well as planned . Some involved believe that this was because the steering committee was the wrong makeup of people, while others think that a lack of experience on the part of the campaign manager kept the campaign from getting a strong start Regardless, people agree that clearer roles and agreements between coalition partners, steering committee, consultants, and campaign manager would have been helpful from the very start
One Royal Oak had significant strengths that contributed toward their win They had experience with similar campaigns, including a high-profile campaign in Kalamazoo in 2009 that resulted in a victory and was led by the same person, Jon Hoadley, who served as general consultant in Royal Oak . The strong coalition of organizations under the Unity Michigan umbrella, including Equality Michigan, Affirmations, and ACLU Michigan, had experience working with each other and also with national partners The support they received from national groups, primarily the National LGBTQ Task Force3 with additional help from the Leadership Lab, allowed them to increase volunteer recruitment and build a skilled team of core volunteers so that they were eventually able to meet their organizing goals And the campaign was able to draw on messaging research from Movement Advancement Project (MAP); previous campaigns in Traverse City and Kalamazoo; and a campaign in Bowling Green, Ohio . They utilized social media to motivate their base, although it was difficult for them to engage journalists to gain earned media .
The campaign was able to afford to do two mailings and a couple of television commercials featuring prominent messengers with deep roots in the community . They printed copies of a handwritten letter from a prominent local Republican with a gay son that they dropped on doors while canvassing, and they stuck to their original messaging plan of emphasizing fairness and equality instead of LGBTQ rights While they wish they had run a more effective program talking to absentee voters, their strategy of using one of their main assets—an identified base of supportive voters—and turning them out to vote was ultimately the right choice and led to their success .
A small town in southeast Idaho, Pocatello is made up of only 54,350 people—many of whom have lived in this predominantly Mormon town all their lives . In 2012, one of its residents, Susie Matsuura, took it upon herself to try and get the City Council to adopt a nondiscrimination ordinance for its LGBTQ residents . The passage of the ordinance didn’t occur until June 7, 2013, in a 4–2 vote by the City Council This victory came after months of public testimony at hearings, adding and removing bathroom exemptions, and even a failed attempt in April when the City Council voted 4–3 not to pass the ordinance .
But the celebration didn’t last long . Although a repeal effort was always a possibility, proponents of the law were caught by surprise when two Pocatello residents (and members of Grace Lutheran Church) secured more than the 1,420 signatures needed by October 2013 to put the repeal question on the ballot . The vote was then set to take place in May 2014 during a Republican primary election known for bringing out conservative voters likely to oppose the ordinance . Local supporters of the ordinance met with state partners at the ACLU of Idaho, Planned Parenthood Votes Northwest, and Add the Words (a statewide group working for nondiscrimination), who had been involved in passing the ordinance . By January, Maria Weeg at Hilltop Public Solutions was hired to run the Fair Pocatello campaign .
The main strategy coalition comprised key partners from Hilltop, ACLU National, and Planned Parenthood Votes Northwest (PPVNW) This coalition would also consult the Human Rights Campaign, the National LGBTQ Task Force, and Equality Utah throughout the campaign, and these groups sent resources and staff to work on the campaign in the final weeks . The Pride Foundation and Add the Words also contributed financially and by engaging their own supporters on the issue .
But it was really the main strategy coalition who worked together to build a plan focused on turning out supporters in Pocatello . PPVNW donated the services of Jonny Carkin in-kind to be the lead organizer and local campaign manager, and he was placed on the ground in Pocatello at the end of March 2014, once the legislative session had ended in Idaho . Locally, Carkin led the Community Advisory Board (CAB), which comprised local residents and supporters who had played a key role in getting the ordinance passed
POPULATION: 54,350
DATE OF CITY COUNCIL
VOTE TO PASS LAW: June 7, 2013
DATE OF BALLOT VOTE: May 20, 2014
DAYS BETWEEN PASSAGE OF LAW AND CAMPAIGN MANAGER START DATE: 238
DAYS BETWEEN CAMPAIGN MANAGER START DATE AND VOTE: 144
OUTCOME: Won
FINAL VOTE: 50 3% (4,933) against repeal to 49 .7% (4,877) for repeal
CAMPAIGN BUDGET: $109,851
HIGHEST POLLING #: 61% opposed to the repeal to 27% in favor of repeal4
KEY PLAYERS: ACLU of Idaho (preballot phase), ACLU National, Hilltop Public Solutions, The National LGBTQ Task Force, Planned Parenthood Votes Northwest
CAMPAIGN MANAGERS: Jonny Carkin, Maria Weeg
The Fair Pocatello campaign was slow to get off the ground Fundraising began in January with a few house parties, but the majority of the $110,000 eventually raised by the end of the campaign was from the state and national coalition members . Financial support came sporadically, but did help pay for a poll conducted by Patinkin Research in February that showed our support at 61 percent With this result, the campaign knew its goal was to identify supporters and turn them out more than our opponents, who would be going to the polls to vote in the hotly contested Republican primary . The poll results and MAP messaging were used to create scripts emphasizing fairness and equality, which were used to talk with voters, identified from a mini-model (a scaled version of the original created by Clarity Campaigns based on specific ballot language), on the phone and at their doors Key strategies included making sure to take advantage of the six-week-long early vote window and conducting an aggressive direct voter contact program .
Weeg and the coalition made strategy decisions from Boise, passing them down to Carkin on the ground in Pocatello to relay to the CAB, who could offer their input, although they rarely challenged the strategy decisions . The CAB was responsible for recruiting volunteers, canvassing, and making phone calls to our supporters with the help of PPVNW and the LA Leadership Lab They wrote letters to the editor, secured business endorsements, did five mailers, phone-banked, and canvassed door to door .
Two local, well-known and respected straight allies served as the public face of Fair Pocatello as a way to show mainstream support for the ordinance . The decision to not place LGBTQ people prominently at the front of this campaign touched a nerve and exacerbated existing personality conflicts within the community Certain national partners were also concerned about this, although there is a lack of agreement about how clearly these concerns were shared with the campaign leadership Hard feelings about this issue still exist to this day within the Pocatello LGBTQ community
Despite this friction, the use of local leaders as messengers was key to beating back the opposition’s claims that this campaign was being run by certain organizations outside of Pocatello, and was a counter to the extremism they displayed . Ralph Lillig was the face of the opposition, using his public access television show and YouTube channel to send out his message of attacks on religious freedom and bathroom panic Luckily for our side, Lillig was too extreme for many, and had only a few resources, raising about $12,000 that was used to create a Facebook page and do one mailer
But even with what appeared to be an elementary campaign, Lillig (and the Republican primary) was able to turn out almost enough supporters to win Initially, the election came down to 80 votes—50 .4 percent (4,943) opposed to the repeal to 49 .6 percent (4,863) in favor . That was close enough that Lillig was able to raise funds for a recount, which brought the margin down to just 56 votes, making the Fair Pocatello campaign an incredibly close win, but a win nonetheless
Home to the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville is the third largest city in the state . It is located in the northwest corner and considers itself the progressive “blue dot” of the state In 1998, Fayetteville made its first attempt to pass a nondiscrimination ordinance
The City Council approved the measure 6–2, the mayor overrode the vote, and the council passed it again . Petitions were collected and the measure lost at the ballot by a wide margin It was a painful episode for the community
In 2014, the community tried again The Human Rights Campaign (HRC)—whose president, Chad Griffin, was born and raised in Arkansas—provided the primary leadership and funding for the campaign from beginning to end HRC staffer Karin Quimby worked early on with James Rector, a young gay man from Fayetteville who had recently headed up the Northwest Arkansas Center for Equality . Together, they identified several key community leaders who served as the steering committee for the City Council portion of the campaign, including Councilman Matthew Petty, who served as the primary strategist for this phase .
A strong steering committee and coalition were created to prepare for the council vote, which resulted in the community feeling engaged and included during this phase of the effort (Unfortunately, this feeling did not hold true for the later phase of the campaign ) Of note, HRC was committed to fully engaging the transgender community from the very start . They worked with Andrea Zekis, an in-state transgender leader, giving her a primary role of connecting the community with the campaign and providing spokesperson training . It worked; 12 transgender people spoke at the council hearing, which was unprecedented .
The coalition leadership strategically waited to encourage a large turnout until the final reading of the bill Very late on August 19, with a packed council chamber, the ordinance passed 6–2 after 10 hours of intense debate . In retrospect, it was the high point of the campaign .
HRC and the steering committee expected from the start that the vote would be challenged, but felt confident they could win at the ballot Church-based opponents immediately began collecting signatures, submitting more than 5,000 signatures in September . There was a decision by the steering committee to challenge and attempt to disrupt aspects of the signature collection HRC funded a lawsuit challenging
POPULATION: 80,621
DATE OF CITY COUNCIL VOTE TO PASS LAW: August 19, 2014
DATE OF BALLOT VOTE: December 9, 2014
DAYS BETWEEN PASSAGE OF LAW AND CAMPAIGN MANAGER START DATE: 83
DAYS BETWEEN CAMPAIGN MANAGER START DATE AND VOTE: 29
OUTCOME: Lost
FINAL VOTE: 48% (7,040) against repeal to 52% (7,523) for repeal
CAMPAIGN BUDGET: $186,628
HIGHEST POLLING #: 56% against repeal to 37% for repeal5
KEY PLAYERS: Human Rights Campaign; Markham Group; City Councilman Matthew Petty; local activists Anne Shelley; Patti Williams and David Williams
CAMPAIGN MANAGER: Anne-Garland Barry
the validity of the signatures, but it was unsuccessful They also went back and forth about the wording of the ballot question, but lost that challenge as well .
The original plan was to have the ordinance on the November general election ballot, but they ended up missing a deadline, so the vote was scheduled for a December 9 special election .
Because the leadership team feared having their campaign messaging get lost in the noise of the general November election, and found it extremely difficult to hire qualified campaign staff so close to that election, they waited until after November 4 to bring on a campaign manager and launch the Keep Fayetteville Fair campaign in earnest That gave them little more than four weeks for the bulk of the work
Between the signature collection and the general election, an executive committee made up of HRC and local leaders held weekly calls, which would become daily in the final weeks of the campaign They used this time to figure out who they would hire, and did things such as create mail pieces that would be sent in November, gather data, and write the campaign plan . Although a campaign manager didn’t start until November 10, Rector and other campaign leaders were staffing up, building the public coalition, and preparing for the launch of the field phase of the campaign immediately after the general election
Also during this period, HRC hired a Little Rock political firm, The Markham Group, to oversee the campaign and provide a broad range of services . The Markham Group hired the campaign manager, an organizer named Anne-Garland Barry, who began after the November 4 general election . Barry was not from the state but had been working on Arkansas Senator Mark Pryor’s unsuccessful reelection campaign
Because there had not been regular communication and involvement with the local community between the council win and the launch of the ballot campaign, it was challenging to re-engage volunteers or have them feel the level of ownership they had felt in August The transgender group that had been so engaged for the council vote, for instance, spoke of “broken unity .” Nevertheless, they did continue to participate by training canvassers, organizing a successful Transgender Day of Remembrance event, and holding educational events in the city
The opposition was initially faith-based, and it was the churches who organized the signature collection process However, the Chamber of Commerce became a key opposition player The Chamber president had given verbal assurances of support, but in the final weeks of the campaign, they came out against the ordinance, claiming that it was poorly drafted and vague, and would harm small businesses . All those involved credit the Chamber’s change of position as the reason they lost, in part because their opposition—which was not explicitly anti-LGBTQ—gave conflicted voters cover to vote against the LGBTQ community
Opposition churches may not have seemed sophisticated in their approach, but they still managed to ensure a huge turnout, waiting until the final week to make their push They used the bathroom argument, which likely helped them to turn out their base, but those involved with Keep Fayetteville Fair believe it was not particularly effective in moving undecided voters . Two other pieces to note around the opposition were the involvement of the Duggar family, conservative reality television stars who live in a neighboring community, and the use by opponents of the news of sexual abuse charges (subsequently dropped) filed against Terry Bean, a founder of and major donor to HRC Both issues brought a level of sensationalism into the campaign .
Turnout was high for the December 9 special election . The ordinance was narrowly defeated, with a final tally of 7,523 votes in favor of repealing the ordinance to 7,040 votes against repeal (52 percent to 48 percent) . The missed deadline that forced the question into a special election may have turned out to be a blessing in disguise The November elections brought a huge Republican sweep that our interviewees believe would have resulted in a loss by a much larger margin had the ordinance been on the general election ballot .
In total, Keep Fayetteville Fair raised and spent $186,628, nearly six times more than the opposition This included campaign consultants, legal costs, and field and mail programs; HRC contributed $154,490 of that total, excluding staff time .
Following the loss, the Arkansas legislature passed a statewide preemption law in an attempt to block similar ordinances in the future . However, citing a potential loophole in that law, the Fayetteville City Council passed a new version of the ordinance on June 16, 2015, sending it directly to voters, who approved it 53–47 percent The new ordinance was locally drafted; included a broad religious exemption; and handled discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity differently from other forms of discrimination already protected . Because of this weaker language, HRC—the only national organization that had previously been involved—withdrew its support . At the time of writing this report, the new ordinance is being challenged in state court Because an insufficient number of leaders in this second campaign were willing to speak with us, this report does not attempt to provide more detail or draw conclusions from it .
Springfield, Missouri, is a city of 164,000 people, home to several universities, and the headquarters of Bass Pro Shops and the Assemblies of God (AOG) Church .
A local effort to pass a nondiscrimination ordinance was initiated in 2008 by PROMO, whose staff member Steph Perkins lives in Springfield Local activists spent several years identifying allies on the City Council and in the community, educating the community through debate in the Mayor’s Council on Human Rights, and laying policy groundwork for the eventual ordinance by identifying passage of such an ordinance as a priority in various city planning documents . A 2012 effort to bring the ordinance to a vote provoked so much backlash that the council instead created what came to be known as the SOGI (Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity) Task Force to study the issue The ordinance finally came back to the council October 14, 2014, when it passed 6–3 .
Advocates for the ordinance knew that a repeal ballot measure was likely, and immediately began preparing for a campaign PROMO invited HRC to play a significant role in the campaign, and HRC’s field team was critical in securing initial funding, hiring campaign staff, and making strategic decisions alongside PROMO HRC’s Regional Field Director Lynne Bowman and local PFLAG (Parents, Families and Friends of Lesbians and Gays) chapter leader Kathy Munsinger co-chaired the campaign, with Kellie Freeman, a local activist, serving as campaign manager . The steering committee made broad strategic decisions, with the campaign manager making day-to-day decisions in consultation with Bowman, who served as co-chair .
Other organizations engaged in the No Repeal campaign included local groups GLO Center (Gay and Lesbian Community Center of the Ozarks) and FOCUS; statewide groups Missouri Pro Vote, Planned Parenthood of St Louis Region, and ACLU of Missouri; and national group Gill Action National LGBTQ Task Force and American Unity Fund also provided limited support .
No Repeal knew that winning would be challenging given the conservative, highly religious makeup of the electorate, but chose to move forward The campaign’s strategy prioritized field work and organized a robust persuasion campaign in an effort to inoculate supporters against opposition messaging, with a strong get-out-the-vote push in the final two weeks The
POPULATION: 164,000
DATE OF CITY COUNCIL VOTE TO PASS LAW: October 14, 2014
DATE OF BALLOT VOTE: April 7, 2015
DAYS BETWEEN PASSAGE OF LAW AND CAMPAIGN MANAGER START DATE: 50
DAYS BETWEEN CAMPAIGN MANAGER START DATE AND VOTE: 127
OUTCOME: Lost
FINAL VOTE: 49% (14,510) against repeal to 51% (15,364) for repeal
CAMPAIGN BUDGET: $301,308
HIGHEST POLLING #: 50% against repeal to 40% for repeal6
KEY PLAYERS: ACLU of Missouri; FOCUS; Gill Action; GLO Center; HRC; Missouri Pro Vote; PFLAG Springfield; Planned Parenthood of the St . Louis Region; PROMO; Straight for Equality
CAMPAIGN MANAGER: Kellie Freeman Rohrbaugh
campaign spent $301,000, mainly focused on the field program, with limited direct mail and two TV ads in the final two weeks . Approximately half was in-kind, with $97,000 in staff time and other resources from HRC being the largest donation .
The campaign spent significantly more than the opposition, which raised just $41,000 through the official campaign; activities by individual churches involved were unreported . Much of the opposition organizing was happening through the Assemblies of God Church and other conservative churches, and was not highly visible to the public outside of those venues State and national conservative groups appear not to have been significantly involved It is difficult to overstate the influence of the AOG Church in Springfield; they are among the top employers in the city and own a significant amount of housing and commercial real estate . Some public supporters of the amendment alleged that the church pulled their leases to try to intimidate them
Public opposition messaging focused primarily on bathrooms, promoting fears of “men in the bathroom with little girls,” while messaging in more private settings like congregations talked directly about anti-LGBTQ religious views The No Repeal campaign used messaging based on MAP recommendations that emphasized protecting “all God’s children” from discrimination and harm, treating others as you’d want to be treated, and hard work .
The vote was held on April 7, 2015, in a special election with no early voting . The timing of the election, two days after Easter, was challenging for the No Repeal campaign, as the opposition mobilized churches on one of the highest-attendance Sundays of the year No Repeal couldn’t do voter turnout on the holiday for fear of alienating the high number of very observant people in this community who would be offended by political canvassing on a holy day . The repeal passed by 15,364 (51 percent) to 14,510 (49 percent) .
While disappointed by the loss, the local LGBTQ and progressive community felt a sense of accomplishment in securing such a narrow loss in a community that had overwhelmingly voted for Missouri’s anti-LGBTQ marriage constitutional amendment in 2004 They felt they did better than initial projections and that the Assemblies of God Church was “put on notice” that they were losing power in the community
Houston is the fourth largest city in the United States, the largest city in Texas, and the largest city in the U .S . not to protect LGBTQ people from discrimination . The path to the ballot in Houston started in May 2013, when the ACLU of Texas, HRC, Lambda Legal, Equality Texas, Transgender Education Network of Texas, AntiDefamation League, and Texas Freedom Network came together to discuss the possible passage of an LGBTQinclusive human rights ordinance by the City Council in fall 2015 This timeline would allow the bill to pass while Mayor Annise Parker was still in office, but would be too late for repeal to go on the 2015 ballot, allowing the ordinance to be in effect for two years before going to the ballot
In fall 2013, Mayor Parker determined that 2015 was too long to wait, and convened a meeting of LGBTQ leaders and close advisors . This meeting did not include non-LGBTQ stakeholders who were members of the 15 classes that would have been protected by ordinance, such as veterans and communities of color Texas Freedom Network, Equality Texas, HRC, the Houston GLBT Political Caucus, and the ACLU of Texas led the effort to pass the ordinance, mobilizing speakers to testify at multiple hearings and shepherding the bill through 11 drafts On May 28, 2014, with Mayor Parker’s backing, the Houston City Council voted 11–6 to enact the Houston Equal Rights Ordinance (HERO) .
It didn’t take long for the signature gathering to begin to add a ballot measure to the November 2014 election to repeal the ordinance Opponents of HERO presented about 50,000 petition signatures in July 2014, far more than the 17,500 required . Several advocates pushed Mayor Parker not to challenge the petition, allowing the campaign to start right away, but the city attorney found problems with them that resulted in the petition being invalidated In reaction, these opponents filed a lawsuit against the city, which sparked attorneys representing the City of Houston to issue subpoenas for the sermons of five local pastors to gather evidence on how signature collectors had been trained After a firestorm over what was seen as government intrusion on religion, Mayor Parker eventually dropped the subpoenas in October, but the damage was already done .
Many involved in the campaign said that with the backlash to the subpoenas and the opposition effectively framing the issue for the public with their “no men in the women’s restroom” message, it was around this time, over a year before the actual vote, that the fight was lost .
POPULATION: 2,196,000
DATE OF CITY COUNCIL VOTE TO PASS LAW: May 28, 2014
DATE OF BALLOT VOTE: November 3, 2015
DAYS BETWEEN PASSAGE OF LAW AND CAMPAIGN MANAGER START DATE: 441
DAYS BETWEEN CAMPAIGN MANAGER START DATE AND VOTE: 83
OUTCOME: Lost
FINAL VOTE: 39% (100,582) against repeal to 61% (157,110) for repeal
CAMPAIGN BUDGET: $3,407,007
HIGHEST POLLING #: 56% against repeal to 34% for repeal7
KEY PLAYERS: ACLU of Texas, Equality Texas, Freedom for All Americans, Houston NAACP, Human Rights Campaign, Gill Action, and Texas Freedom Network
CAMPAIGN MANAGER: Richard Carlbom
Over the course of the early months of 2015, hearings and rulings relating to the validity of the signatures took place, ultimately resulting in opponents of the ordinance appealing a lower court’s ruling to the Texas Supreme Court in May . From before the City Council vote to the appeal date, coalition partners discussed conducting a 501(c)(3) issue education campaign to build public support, but were limited by funding constraints and challenges in hiring an appropriate leader for the effort In June 2015, when the timeline for the appeal to make its way through the court was expected to take at least another year, the ACLU of Texas again started making plans for such a campaign . Unfortunately, this plan never got off the ground, because on July 24, 2015, without hearing any arguments on the case, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the Houston City Council must either repeal the ordinance or include it on the November 3, 2015 ballot
While the conservative court’s decision wasn’t a surprise, legal experts expected it would take much longer to issue its ruling; no one expected to go the ballot so quickly Immediately, the coalition leadership went in search of a campaign manager . Because the November ballot would also include 7 candidates running to take the place of Mayor Parker along with a number of district council races, finding a qualified Houston- or Texas-based campaign manager became difficult, and the coalition had to seek out-of-state leadership
On August 12, Richard Carlbom, a Minnesotan who was Freedom to Marry’s director of state campaigns, was hired to lead the campaign, now called Houston Unites Against Discrimination (Houston Unites) He reported to an executive committee made up of an impressive group of experienced leaders from coalition organizations: the ACLU of Texas, Equality Texas, Freedom for All Americans, Gill Action, HRC, NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) Houston Branch, and the Texas Freedom Network Carlbom was in charge of executing the field plan, media buys, and on-the-ground work, and would report back to the executive committee to sign off on decisions and give input . This committee helped hire the rest of the campaign staff, many of whose services were donated in-kind from coalition organizations .
The Houston Unites campaign staff came into the battle in August 2015 with only 10 weeks to fight, and the stage had already been set for them by the opposition . From the council phase and through the court challenges, the opposition Campaign for Houston had already established their framing of the issue with the public They labeled the nondiscrimination ordinance the “bathroom bill” or “Mayor Parker’s bathroom bill,” and penetrated the airwaves and churches with their simple message: “no men in women’s bathrooms .” This message was the opposition’s most effective tactic, so much so that the local television outlets in Texas consistently used language and B-roll that reinforced the opposition’s frame beginning in the council phase and continuing throughout the campaign They moved the bathroom narrative effectively in churches, on social media, and on the radio .
Regardless of the vitriol they were up against, Houston Unites persevered and set out to win with a field strategy focused exclusively on voter ID and turnout, through paid and volunteer phone and canvass efforts . The Equality Federation Institute (EFI) Model was used to identify likely supporters, and MAP messaging helped inform their scripts The door scripts initially brought up the bathroom issue (to connect HERO to the bathroom bill people had heard about) in order to get accurate IDs But this strategy was dropped because bringing up the bathroom issue resulted in a significant loss of support at the doors . The campaign worried that they were pushing voters in the wrong direction and demoralizing canvassers . Unfortunately, the result was less accuracy in identifying solid supporters Canvassers were able to hit the campaign’s field goals, but sadly these goals were not enough to win
Despite a talented and experienced team of local and national staff, the communications arm of the campaign found it very difficult to undo this compelling frame that had already sunk into the electorate . Polls conducted by Goodwin Simon Strategic Research from December 2014 and September 2015 showed the erosion of support throughout the campaign from repeated exposure to the “no men in women’s bathrooms” messaging
From these results, the initial plan was to run a two-track television campaign—one with a positive message about the ordinance and the other as a defense against the opposition’s bathroom attack . Sadly, the budget did not allow them to fully execute both, so they focused on the positive track with only a smaller investment in the defensive track . The communications arm of the campaign then pivoted to a focus on the broad impact of the ordinance beyond LGBTQ people, highlighting race and veteran status as additional protected classes This proved difficult, as it was a challenge to get the “perfect” messenger, and even if they did, many voters did not believe this law addressed nondiscrimination broadly—they only saw it as a bill about bathrooms . Houston Unites was successful in getting some media outlets to fairly report both sides, and print media ran op-eds and stories often favorable to our side Altogether, the campaign ran four television ads, two radio ads, and did a fair amount of direct mail
The ACLU of Texas and the NAACP Houston Branch were the only Houston-based organizations, and with a largely non-local campaign staff, Houston Unites’ work was harder and less connected to local knowledge . This affected field (not knowing where to canvass outside the model’s prediction) and communications (not heavily using radio to counter the opposition), but also affected the way the local activist community in Houston felt toward those from outside who were making the campaign decisions without their input
The Houston Unites campaign ended up spending $3,407,007 compared to $586,664 by the opposition, which was short of the original fundraising goal of even $3,700,000 In the 10 weeks the campaign had, it raised an impressive amount of money, hit its set field goal, and was able to change the way some media outlets were negatively reporting on HERO . Most interviewees who worked on the ballot phase of the campaign believe they made good strategic choices given the short timeline, funding limitations, and the opposition’s head start on framing the issue for the public, but it wasn’t enough to win . In the end, HERO was defeated 61 percent (157,110) to 39 percent (100,582) in a municipal election that saw the highest voter turnout since 2003 .
The most important decision in working toward local nondiscrimination protections comes at the very beginning: whether it is the right time to pursue passage of an ordinance or not Because ballot campaigns require significant local, state, and national resources, and opposition tactics can harm the well-being of LGBTQ people in the local community, advocates should pursue passage of ordinances only when there is a realistic path to victory . Decision makers should consider the following recommendations in assessing whether to move forward immediately; to spend additional time building infrastructure, momentum, and community support first; or to prioritize work in other communities with a greater opportunity for success
Assume that if the council8 passes a nondiscrimination ordinance, you will face a repeal campaign.
If your municipality has a mechanism for a citizen-initiated repeal of ordinances or charter amendments that would preempt an ordinance, it is extremely likely that you will be going to the ballot, and you should plan and operate as though you will With so much attention on LGBTQ issues, the days of quietly passing proequality protections are over . Even in smaller communities that lack organized anti-LGBTQ advocacy groups, it often takes only a few large evangelical churches to gather enough signatures to put a repeal initiative on the ballot In Houston, Fayetteville, Royal Oak, and Springfield, conservative congregations were instrumental in gathering signatures In Pocatello, one conservative couple successfully organized to get the repeal onto the ballot, to the surprise of local organizers . Even in a larger city where gathering enough valid signatures presents a greater challenge for our opponents, unsympathetic judges can allow a repeal to move forward . In Houston, the city found that many signatures had not been validly collected, but the Texas Supreme Court mandated that a repeal go to the ballot without even hearing arguments on the case
Do not trust conventional polling as a metric for assessing whether you can win; look to more sophisticated tools for a clearer assessment of public support.
Polling shows majority support for nondiscrimination protections in nearly every community, sometimes by a wide margin However, painful experience has shown that this support is weak and highly susceptible to erosion in the face of powerful opposition messages (see Chart 1 on page 23) On this issue, polling best reflects people’s aspirational beliefs but does not reflect their fears . To get the most accurate polling, we recommend:
• When conducting initial polling, select a firm with significant experience polling on LGBTQ issues and a proven track record of analyzing what those numbers really mean . Many pollsters, even those who are well respected, simply do not understand the complex dynamics underlying the numbers polls will provide
• Polling not only should assess support, but should look at support after being exposed to strong opposition language, including a fear-based message about public bathrooms and/or locker rooms You and your pollster should get support from the Movement Advancement Project (MAP) team in constructing such a poll, since very few pollsters have experience doing this .
• Assume that undecideds—even those who, when pushed to take a position, say they lean toward our side—are votes against us . The support numbers after being exposed to opposition messaging are a ceiling for us, not a floor, unless extensive (and expensive) inoculation and persuasion work is done (see Chart 2 on page 24)
• Be aware that turnout is highly unpredictable, especially in off-cycle elections, making it difficult for pollsters to design a representative sample
In the available initial polling in these campaigns, the support numbers after being exposed to opposition messaging were close to or above the level of support of the final votes . The one exception was Springfield, the only campaign with the time and resources to do significant persuasion and inoculation work with voters .
8 Throughout our recommendations, we
“council”
This chart compares the initial response when voters are asked about a proposed ordinance without being read any supporting or opposing messages As you can see, across the four campaigns that did quality polling, simply asking voters for their opinion can grossly overrepresent the level of support . A less informed pollster might take these numbers at face value and not dig deeper to assess how this support holds up .
In Houston, Fayetteville, and Pocatello—campaigns that didn’t do significant persuasion work and focused on turning out supporters—polls overestimated support by 6–17 percent . Only the Springfield campaign came close to its initial polling numbers, perhaps due to significant persuasion work to shore up weak supporters (Royal Oak is not included as there was not comparable polling available for that campaign )
9 Patinkin Research Strategies, February 2014 The initial support and oppose numbers for Pocatello include yes/no, strongly and yes/no, not strongly numbers
10Anzalone Liszt Grove Research, October 2014 The initial support and oppose numbers for Fayetteville include strongly for/against, somewhat for/against, and unsure/lean for/against numbers
11Anzalone Liszt Grove Research, January 2015 The initial support and oppose numbers for Springfield include yes/no, strongly and yes/no, somewhat, and lean yes/no numbers
12Goodwin Simon Strategic Research, September 2015 The initial support and oppose numbers for Houston include definitely yes/no, probably yes/no, and unsure/lean yes/no numbers
This chart compares the level of support after pollsters have exposed voters to opposition messaging . While the exact language used varied, all of the messages tested included language about sexual predators in bathrooms Since not all of the polls asked respondents who said they were undecided which way they leaned, the undecided numbers include everyone who indicated they were undecided, including those who indicated leaning one way or the other . The data suggest that all or nearly all of the Undecided/Refused voters went to the opposition, except in Springfield
According to Goodwin Simon Strategic Research, the pollster for Houston Unites, “It appears that similar to the polling on marriage ballot measures, the more important predictor of the final vote is the percent ‘Not Yes’ vote—meaning No, Unsure, and Refused combined—rather than the percent Yes vote The level of opposition vote on Election Day in 2008, 2009, and 2012 mirrored the ‘Not Yes’ vote in most reliable polls conducted close to Election Day . That appears to be a similar dynamic at play with this topic . ”
In addition to polling, the EFI Nondiscrimination Model Core Support score has proven to be an effective tool for predicting public support It can be used in the absence of a municipal-specific poll, or before polling has taken place, to estimate support levels and to help advocates decide whether and/or when to mount a campaign . See The EFI Nondiscrimination Models below for more .
Before asking elected officials to move an ordinance, develop a plan for what it would take to win in both the advocacy and ballot phases.
Map out a full campaign plan that includes an initial public education phase, a council advocacy phase, and a ballot campaign phase to assess what it will take to successfully pass and defend an ordinance in your community .
Assess whether your community, along with committed external partners, has the capacity to execute a realistic plan.
Executing a winning campaign is no small task If you don’t have the necessary components in place (or a reasonable expectation of how they’ll be developed in time to be used), consider spending time securing and building that capacity and reassessing in six months or a year .
Do not let the council pass an ordinance until you have a path to victory at the ballot. Sometimes, allies on a council will, with the best of intentions, want to move forward quickly . Work to develop strong and transparent partnerships with decision makers, educate them about the importance of having the needed infrastructure in place, and time the council vote for the best ballot opportunity This level of influence requires a strong working relationship with council members, which should help to influence their strategy
While advocates had originally hoped to have the Houston ordinance on the 2016 presidential ballot, with a more favorable electorate, and to do more public education ahead of the council vote, the mayor and council pushed the ordinance forward on their own timeline, making the campaign’s work during the ballot phase more challenging .
The Equality Federation Institute (EFI) nondiscrimination models are a set of tools that can help you understand how likely people in your city, county, or state are to support nondiscrimination protections for LGBTQ people .
Like polling, modeling predicts how voters will act based on how a sample of people respond to surveys Modeling takes an extra step, creating intricate demographic profiles of survey respondents and then cross-referencing profiles with actual voters’ demographic information . The EFI tools are particularly helpful because they predict how likely individuals are to be supportive of nondiscrimination protections even after hearing opposition messaging . They also can predict how likely people are to be movable on this issue—to be torn or pulled in either direction, meaning that they could be swayed by our stories of why fairness matters or by the opposition’s attempts to activate their fears .
The EFI models can be used in two important ways in campaigns . During a campaign, the models can be used to create target lists of people to canvass, call,
and mail But before you even mount a campaign, the models can assist with planning . In any situation in which you would consult or commission a poll, the models can provide similar and often more nuanced information No model or poll can perfectly predict the outcome of a vote, but on this issue, we have found that the EFI models work well . In Houston, the campaign used the models to plan the field campaign, and later found that the model came very close to actual election results
For example, the Core Supporter model can give you a good idea of how many individuals there are in your municipality who are likely to stay with our side no matter what . If you then use a turnout model to predict which of these individuals are likely to vote, you have a target universe for get-out-the-vote work and a good understanding of how close you are to your win number . For example, if the model puts you 100,000 votes short and you have a choice over whether to go to the ballot, you may decide to wait, knowing that 100,000 is too big a gap to bridge with the time and resources you have .
Think twice about pursuing an ordinance in a community with little or no LGBTQ infrastructure.
The value of local infrastructure and the participation of local leadership are significant . For example, Springfield had an active LGBTQ center and several community organizations, allowing them to have significant local engagement in leading, funding, and volunteering for the campaign, including the running of an effective persuasion and inoculation field effort . In contrast, Fayetteville lacked strong local LGBTQ institutions, and the fledgling LGBTQ center wasn’t actively involved in the campaign While there were wonderful individual activists involved, without existing infrastructure to tap into, the campaign struggled to get the level of sustained volunteer participation it needed .
Having local infrastructure in place ahead of a campaign allows the community to emerge from the campaign even stronger, win or lose Higher-infrastructure Springfield came out stronger and more active, while lower-infrastructure Pocatello and Fayetteville were fractured . While Houston has thriving local LGBTQ institutions, they weren’t fully engaged in the ballot phase of the campaign, leaving some division and frustration behind
Once the decision has been made to move forward with a campaign to pass a local ordinance, it is important to think through and develop a plan for the entirety of the effort before the campaign begins Plans should always include the possibility of a repeal effort as well as a postcampaign plan .
You can’t start too early thinking about what your campaign coalition will look like Spend time with your leadership team brainstorming both likely supporters and those who might not initially come to mind . Make sure the leadership group is as diverse as possible from the start to ensure that your list of potential allies is equally diverse Likely supporters will include the range of LGBTQ organizations and individual leaders, as well as people of color, women’s organizations, civil rights groups, labor, social workers, education and child welfare advocates, and progressive faith leaders/ communities Because attacks based on gender identity are guaranteed, it is especially important to identify as many transgender organizations and individuals as you can at the start of the campaign . Less likely—but critically important— supporters should include the business community, clergy and people of faith who don’t come from the more progressive faiths/denominations, and Republicans
Because the public debate around passing nondiscrimination laws inevitably focuses on transgender people and their lives, transgender people should be included at every level of the campaign Research shows that transgender people and their coworkers and families are important campaign messengers, but you should not rely on transgender people to step into these roles if they have not been meaningfully included in other parts of the work . We recommend that transgender people, whether through an organizational seat at the table or via roles for local activists, be included in initial planning and decision making . It is important to note that due to structural inequity and historic lack of funding, not every community will have a transgender advocacy organization that can afford to buy into the coalition This should not preclude the inclusion of transgender people in the decision making process Not only is making their inclusion a priority the right thing to do, it can make for a stronger campaign with deeper connections to potential messengers and spokespeople . Campaigns can provide excellent opportunities to build local leadership, especially the leadership of transgender people . When staffing the campaign, consider hiring local transgender leaders One Royal Oak had a transgender campaign manager, Allison Smith-VanKuiken, for most of the campaign . Her leadership sent a clear message that the campaign would not downplay the impact of the law on the transgender community
For transgender people who do not yet have the experience needed to be on staff, make it a priority to raise them into volunteer leadership roles, such as volunteer trainer, action lead, or event coordinator . As the campaign progresses and needs to hire additional organizers, as is usually the case, these transgender leaders will be prepared to step up .
If your organization is responsible for drafting the ordinance and additional categories beyond sexual orientation and gender identity are to be included, it is essential to engage key coalition members from the beginning . This way you can ensure that other groups’ needs are being met by the ordinance, and you will have guaranteed support throughout the council and potential ballot campaign phases . In Houston, city officials left key non-LGBTQ stakeholders out of the conversation during the ordinance drafting phase, which meant that many of their needs were not met in drafting the law It then became hard to ask these groups to join the coalition and publicly support the law during the ballot campaign phase, because they were neglected in the beginning .
Relationships are the key to success in every campaign . For the council phase of the campaign, it is essential to develop good working relationships with city officials, both elected officials like the council members and nonelected officials like the city attorney Equally important is to begin conversations with LGBTQ elected officials before any campaign planning begins
Passing nondiscrimination protections will often be very personal for LGBTQ officials These individuals can be some of the best advocates or, conversely, can move forward on their own without coordinating with community leaders . They frequently don’t want to believe that their own locality could vote to repeal these protections; you must educate them very early on about what it will take to succeed . You may even want to share this report with your out officials and strongest allies on the council Ask them about their own political and electoral considerations around timing and content up front, so you understand their interests beyond the ordinance itself
As stated above, activists should assume that a success at the council will trigger an effort to repeal the new law . For that reason, seek assistance from one of the national LGBTQ legal organizations . They can advise on how best to write the ordinance from the beginning to make a repeal more difficult later on . There could be language included, for example, that makes countering the bathroom argument easier Every law and community is different, but asking this question up front may help you use language that will better withstand a repeal
Some municipalities have added more categories of protected classes, hoping to bring in additional allies and broaden the positive effect of the ordinance, thereby blunting the attack on the transgender community Experience shows that including additional classes in an ordinance polls well but does not get significant traction in the public debate, and does not inoculate against bathroom attacks . Messaging that focuses on protecting veterans, people of color, and other classes is appealing, but ultimately voters seem to make their decisions based on their opinion on sexual orientation and gender identity protections, and the opposition’s harmful misrepresentations of what those protections mean . However, including classes that aren’t already protected is often the right thing to do . It builds alliances with other causes and doesn’t cost support for the ordinance . Seek input from other communities that could be covered to determine whether they should be included
Public education should be at the heart of any nondiscrimination campaign Not only does it increase your chances of winning, if done well, but it has the ability to leave a community more open and accepting of LGBTQ people once the campaign ends . The impact of education happens over time, however, and the earlier you begin and the more diverse your efforts, the more effective your campaign will be . We know that framing the issue early in the public’s mind and inoculating them against opposition messages is critical There are many aspects of a campaign that cannot be done with 501(c)(3) money, but public education is often an ideal way to maximize your 501(c)(3) dollars in a way that can build toward a policy win
Look closely at the rules for a repeal campaign to go to the ballot and try to time passage of the ordinance through council to face a repeal ballot measure at the most favorable election possible . Progressive voters are more likely to turn out for national general elections and much less likely for special elections
You’ll also want to time passage to give you the time you need to build a campaign ahead of your preferred election date . Because Fayetteville’s ordinance qualified for the ballot just five weeks ahead of a general election, most skilled campaign workers already had jobs and were unavailable until after the general election— just four weeks before the vote on the ordinance . Houston’s short timeline, driven by an unexpectedly quick court decision, also made hiring local expertise challenging Neither had enough time to do the persuasion and inoculation work that Springfield’s longer timeline allowed
The five campaigns evaluated varied significantly in how much time was spent in each phase of the campaign
Don’t wait for a legal challenge to conclude to start building your ballot campaign. Too many campaigns have been doomed because they waited too long to begin organizing . See Chart 3 on page 28 to see how Fayetteville and Houston waiting for a court decision before launching their ballot campaigns left them with less time than they needed While legal challenges to the validity of petition signatures are worthwhile, they must not be undertaken at the expense of building the infrastructure needed to fight at the ballot . Be aware that, in many states, judges look at the intent of the voter even if there are technical legal problems with signatures, so don’t count on success even if the city attorney or others are optimistic . While it’s important not to take the council vote phase for granted, time spent thinking about staffing and strategies while legal challenges are still active can only benefit the campaign if a repeal effort does happen
Start raising money as soon as you decide to move forward with your campaign. Don’t wait to start raising money! Yes, it will be harder to raise funds before there is a clear repeal effort, but that can’t be an excuse not to do it . Pro-LGBTQ campaigns need to raise far more money than our opponents to be successful . Don’t ignore fundraising appeals to and events for your base . These efforts serve as a way to raise smaller dollars, as well as to educate supporters about what lies ahead But large amounts will need to come from more personalized major donor solicitations Begin identifying potential donors and training your team to make those important asks
Prepare the community for the challenge ahead.
It is also important to prepare the community for the emotional effect of the campaign ahead . While those who have worked on campaigns before are likely prepared for the vicious messaging from the opposition, those in the community may be experiencing it for the first time It could benefit the campaign and the community’s relationship to hold a community event at the start of the campaign that introduces residents to the types of harmful messages they will likely encounter, and offers them support
Having a strong state or local group is key to taking care of the community during and after Because local leadership, in the form of Steph Perkins from PROMO, the GLO Center, and a PFLAG chapter, were involved in all phases of the Springfield campaign, they were attuned to the emotional needs of the community in a way that outside organizers couldn’t be . This attention kept volunteers going through tough times and helped leave organizations and the community as a whole stronger despite a loss
Winning is the most obvious and consistent goal that all of our campaigns share But we encourage you to set goals for your campaign that go beyond winning at any cost . Along with metrics for voters contacted and media hits earned, set goals for local leaders developed . When the campaign closes up shop after election day, and national partners and professional campaign operatives leave town, having a strong local organization and leaders to support it can be key to making sure the law is implemented (or in the case of a loss, that the fight continues) A campaign can provide an opportunity for local activists to learn how to run a phone bank, use the VAN (Voter Activation Network), recruit volunteers, talk to the press, tell their stories, and other skills that will improve their work post-campaign .
It is important to layer tactics and understand how different kinds of work will start and peak at various points in the campaign . It is also important to plan for growth in budget, staff, and volunteer programs . For instance, community organizing and lobbying intensify in the lead up to the Council vote, while voter identification, persuasion, and get out the vote efforts peak in succession through the ballot campaign phase
As in any organization, establishing strong leadership with clear roles is essential From the drafting of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) to the hiring of staff, clarity and accountability are key And because local campaigns are building toward an eventual passage of nondiscrimination at a state level, we must build campaigns that do more than just achieve this one policy win . By focusing on coalition building, community engagement, and local leadership development, we can create campaigns that set us up for the work ahead and leave the community in a stronger place even in case of a loss
In every campaign there will likely be multiple players and organizations that come together to achieve a common goal . Roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined at the beginning to avoid pitfalls and tensions between players . If an organization is donating in-kind staff, it needs to be determined who that staff member will report to during the campaign: will it be the campaign manager, the executive committee, or the staff member’s current supervisor? On several campaigns, in-kind staff reported to both their organizational supervisors and campaign management—which led to confusion . Determining the reporting structure at the start of the campaign helps to avoid duplicate levels of communication, and keeps campaign staff from feeling disempowered . The roles of hired staff, in-kind staff, consultants, and the executive or other committees should be determined at the onset and agreed upon in the MOU
Note that leadership may change from the council phase to the campaign phase as more organizations and individuals become involved, but you should strive to find a role for those who were involved since the beginning, as they add valuable local knowledge and expertise In Houston, key players in the council phase, like the Houston GLBT Caucus, were unable to afford the buy-in for the Houston Unites steering committee and therefore weren’t integrated into decision-making; although individuals from the Caucus were active in the campaign, several interviewees felt the campaign didn’t adequately tap into this base of local knowledge In Fayetteville, key leaders from the council phase felt left out of communication loops and decision making once the ballot phase began, in part because their roles and responsibilities were not clearly articulated at the start of each phase .
Whether your campaign will be made up of local partners or a combination of local organizations and national partners, it is important to draft and require all organizations to sign an MOU that outlines key elements of the campaign, such as decision making structure, steering or executive committee responsibilities, financial commitments, list sharing guidelines, etc . See MOUs for Effective Coalitions on page 32 for issues to consider in creating one .
Keep in mind that completing a signed MOU can be a long process because the legal teams for each organization will need to review and sign off on it, so start on this as soon as possible after deciding to move forward State and national partners will have examples from past campaigns that can be a good starting point
As our movement grows more sophisticated in the ways that national organizations work together on local campaigns, the same cadre of national players are increasingly working together on multiple campaigns They have developed practices that can be easily adapted from one campaign to the next, so that campaigns can be built up quickly with national organizations understanding how things will work and how they can best contribute resources and expertise
But this campaign structure, while nimble and familiar to those involved, can be difficult for locals to connect with It can be overwhelming for even the most experienced local activists to understand how they can contribute important ideas and feedback In addition, these campaigns are often “pay to play,” requiring large financial contributions in exchange for a seat on the steering committee, which approves the campaign plan, hires the campaign manager, and makes major strategy and financial decisions . Pay to play brings critical early funds to local campaigns, but it can also put membership out of the reach of local leaders
Municipal ballot campaigns increasingly involve formal agreements between state and national partners Creating and agreeing to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) ensures that the interests of all organizations involved are protected, both during the term of the agreement and afterward . It is an opportunity to discuss important issues, including finances, staffing, and decision making, up front so that everyone is clear about expectations and accountability Each entity should have the MOU reviewed by its attorney, as it can constitute a contract The following list of questions provides a starting place for creating an MOU
• Is there a required buy-in for the coalition? If so, how much is it? Does it need to be paid up front, or can you make installments? Are different levels required for local, state, and national participants?
• Do in-kind contributions, such as staff time, count toward this buy-in? If so, how will the value of those contributions be determined?
• Who can join the coalition, and how are membership decisions made?
• What are the process and timeline for leaving the coalition if you choose to? Will all or part of your contribution be refunded?
DATA
• What happens to contact information generated through the campaign (e g , identified voters, volunteers, and donors)? Who has access to that data at the end of the campaign and how may they use it?
• Will coalition organizations be fundraising for individual organizations using campaign data during the campaign? After the campaign? What are the restrictions, if any, on this activity?
• What happens to polling data and other research affiliated with the campaign? Who can access this data and how can it be used?
• Is VAN (Voter Activation Network) access a part of the agreement for all members? If so, is there an additional charge for that? What if your organization has separate access to the VAN—can you use your existing account?
• What is the leadership structure of the coalition? How is leadership decided? If there is a formal steering committee, who is on it? (You also want to consider whether or not it is an advantage to be in a leadership position in the coalition—it might or might not, depending on the time commitment, concern over other issues your organization is taking a position on, or political endorsements you are considering )
• What decisions are made by the steering committee? Do these decisions require a quorum, a majority/ plurality/consensus vote?
• Are there other formal entities with which the campaign will be interacting? For instance, is there a broader coalition of community groups with whom information will be shared, but who have different decision making authority?
• Will staff be hired by the coalition? If so, how will hiring decisions be made and who will supervise this staff? What will be the relationship between coalition staff and staff of coalition organizations? How will staff who are donated in-kind handle reporting?
• Will all information pertinent to the campaign be shared with everyone in the coalition? Is there any information that is kept to a smaller group?
• How often are updates provided and how will this happen? Email, phone, in person?
• How can the parties amend the MOU? What is required to dissolve the MOU? Will it expire on a preestablished date? How will parties divide assets, if any, at the termination of the MOU?
In order for a campaign to incorporate both national and local leaders, we suggest that pay to play steering committees can choose to count in-kind resources from local organizations (such as member contact information, office space, or staff time); offer a lower contribution level for local organizations (as the Springfield campaign did); or waive the requirement altogether for a couple of local leaders so that they are both learning from locals with valuable perspectives, and also building those leaders for the future Steering committees can, at their discretion, also decide to add at-large members in order to represent specific communities, for example, the transgender community .
Engage the key local organizations’ leaders with a campaign advisory board. With many campaigns, organizations and individuals outside the town or city are involved, sometimes more so than the local people . It can be tempting to keep the strategy and communications within the campaign team, but this can be a detriment to the campaign, as excluding residents who want to be involved can leave them feeling resentful and unwilling to help It is important to communicate with the community throughout the campaign, providing them with updates on progress and high-level strategy decisions .
In addition to the steering committee, we recommend setting up a broader campaign advisory board (CAB) with local leaders and organizations who want to play a role . While a steering committee might have six to eight members, a CAB could have twenty or more, and instead of a financial contribution, organizations can support the campaign with resources and expertise specific to their strengths The campaign manager or another senior staff member would meet regularly with the CAB to keep them informed about strategy decisions, and solicit help with various activities of the campaign . This allows for local activists to stay engaged and invested, as they are the frontline stakeholders, and for the campaign to benefit from their knowledge, resources, and enthusiasm In Pocatello, a CAB comprising local activists and those involved in the city council phase worked with the campaign manager to canvass, recruit volunteers, and write letters to the editor While they didn’t make the larger strategy decisions, they were able to give feedback on messaging and field, remain engaged, and provide local knowledge .
Staffing campaigns can be a challenge for several reasons First, it can be difficult to find local campaign and organizing talent that has experience working with the LGBTQ movement Resist the assumption that all campaigns are mostly the same and LGBTQ experience is not required . Nondiscrimination campaigns are unique, as are the tactics and messaging that the movement has worked hard to develop and test . When hiring local consultants or organizers, look for those who are open to learning from LGBTQ movement professionals All staff will need to be trained on the most up-to-date MAP nondiscrimination messaging and persuasion tactics
Although hiring people from the national movement with experience on LGBTQ campaigns is key, so is hiring locals who have relationships with on-the-ground leaders and knowledge of the culture, geography, and demographics of the municipality . The decision not to hire local leaders can result in resentment that can damage coalition efforts and hurt volunteer recruitment . And hiring locals can create continuity after a campaign, when people living in the community will continue to leverage their relationships for good causes
Because of the tension between needing to have LGBTQ movement experience and local leadership, we recommend that when possible, campaign staff be paired off according to experience In Springfield, this model worked well, with the local campaign manager, Kellie Freeman Rohrbaugh, getting significant advice and support from HRC’s Lynne Bowman, who served as campaign co-chair .
By creating local/national staff partnerships at all levels, from campaign management to field staff, campaigns can maximize their individual strengths .
Frame the issue before opponents do, with clear, strong, positive messages.
As noted before, insider campaigns for pro-LGBTQ protections aren’t working anymore It will no longer be just supporters and opposition who hear about these protections, but the larger public—on their televisions, on the radio, and on their doorsteps . It is imperative to frame the narrative the public hears first, and that you frame it in strong, compelling ways, long before it goes to the ballot
If you are considering passing a nondiscrimination ordinance, it is critical that you begin with a public education campaign prior to the council phase The Movement Advancement Project (MAP) has conducted extensive research on talking about nondiscrimination protections, and this tested research should serve as a starting point to influence the messaging you create that is unique to your municipality . MAP continues to update and adapt messaging based on what we’re learning in state and local campaigns . Using this messaging research to educate the public prior to any passage of legislation will allow you to frame the narrative and begin to build familiarity with LGB and especially transgender people before the opposition begins their onslaught of antitransgender attacks . If you do not get your message out before the opposition, your ability to defeat a repeal at the ballot becomes much harder .
Our opposition has discovered their most effective tool: the bathroom attack . From here on out, the LGBTQ movement must always assume the opposition will use this message frame, and we must discover a way to combat it While MAP messaging has proven effective in a longer-term public education setting, it was insufficient to bring voters back to our side once they had been exposed to an extreme attack using frightening graphic images .
In Houston, many involved with the campaign would say they lost 18 months prior to the actual vote, during the city council advocacy phase . It is at this time that the opposition began framing the narrative, calling the bill the “bathroom bill” and using the narrative “no men in women’s bathrooms ” Not only was the campaign unable to frame the message first, they were then unable to defend against the opposition’s message effectively That message only became stronger, to the point where many voters believed the equal rights bill and the bathroom bill were two separate ordinances .
It’s important to have a strategy that anticipates these attacks before they happen, and to do inoculation in advance through public education, as well as planning for a strategic response to such attacks . MAP and others are working to develop stronger, tested messaging to combat these attacks . Local campaigns should work with them to field-test and improve these messages
In all five campaigns, our side outspent the opposition While this is essential across all aspects of the campaign, it is especially important to outspend the opposition in paid media, and to out-organize them in communications efforts .
Prior to Houston, the opposition and the bathroom message, although still present, were less organized . In Royal Oak and Pocatello, the opposition remained local; spent very little money; didn’t do many, if any, television or radio ads; and did one or two direct mailers While the bathroom message was a part of each opposition’s campaign, it was intensified in Houston through the use of extreme images, the refrain of “no men in women’s bathrooms,” and the early consistent organized attack . Someone who worked closely on the Pocatello campaign even said that it could not have weathered opposition ads like those in Houston .
The lack of strong, well-funded opposition was one contributing factor to the wins in Royal Oak and Pocatello, but campaigns cannot count on this in the future . You must have multiple television and radio ads for every one of theirs; you must place op-eds and letters to the editor; you must do multiple direct mailings—whatever the opposition is doing, you must do substantially more
Each campaign will need strong spokespeople, but waiting until the last minute to find them can be a detriment to your campaign . Start during the council phase with those people who came to the city council meetings and testified If you will need a specific spokesperson, such as the mayor or the chief of police, gauge that person’s support during the pre-council phase Starting early not only guarantees effective spokespeople, but builds relationships that are necessary to do this work effectively .
When you have found your spokespeople, make sure you vet and train them An emotional story of discrimination may have been effective testimony during the council hearings, but during a campaign that same spokesperson will likely need training to be able to talk effectively to the media . You are not going to find the perfect spokespeople an hour before you need them on camera, so make sure you start vetting and training those you will need long before you need them One campaign had fully produced a television spot only to find out the subject had an arrest record Be sure to do a full background check on the most visible messengers This protects your campaign and your spokespeople from potentially damaging exposure, because both the media and your opposition may dig for personal background information .
While some campaigns have utilized LGBTQ, and specifically transgender, spokespeople, others have chosen not to do so, preferring to use local, respected straight allies While this strategy may have been a part of a win in some places (such as Pocatello), it was to the detriment of the broader community’s education about LGBTQ people in that city . When you exclude LGBTQ people from being spokespeople in the campaign, you fail to humanize them and build familiarity with voters . You also risk alienating the local LGBTQ community, fostering resentment toward the decision makers of the campaign MAP offers guidance on how to effectively use LGBTQ spokespeople It is important for all concerned to have LGBTQ individuals at the front and center of the campaign, alongside allies .
Pollsters and messaging consultants will sometimes recommend emphasizing other harms of repealing the law besides the impact on LGBTQ people . While every campaign will decide appropriate messaging based on its locality and the specifics of the ordinance in question, be very careful about downplaying LGBTQ people and issues The opposition will be putting fear of and misinformation about LGBTQ people front and center, and when you avoid facing the issues head on, you are missing the opportunity to educate voters in ways that allow you to hold onto their support . This advice can sometimes come from a lack of experience with LGBTQ-specific campaigns, and if you encounter it, consulting movement organizations for support can be a valuable strategy .
Train the media.
The media can be a campaign’s worst enemy . In Royal Oak and Houston the television media gave the majority of airtime to the opposition, often falsely reporting and leaving it up to the audience to fact check Houston Unites met with reporters during the ballot campaign to coach them on how to report fairly Unfortunately, by that time it was too late: their bad habits, like using B-roll of bathroom signs, were already ingrained, and few improved . Educating the media on accurate and fair reporting prior to the council phase will pay off in both the short and long term, and early conversations lay the groundwork for follow-up meetings to deliver feedback The media can deeply impact voters, so you must make intentional and early efforts to educate them about our issues and perspectives
All five campaigns that we researched used field organizing and voter contact as key tactics, which we would recommend to any campaign
Include field as part of the public education campaign.
Recent research has shown that persuasion canvassing—one-on-one conversations averaging around 10 minutes— can be effective in reducing prejudice toward transgender people and increasing support for nondiscrimination laws . This tactic proved successful in marriage campaigns and appears to have had an impact on the Springfield campaign However, no campaign has run a program such as this in a longer-term public education context
As mentioned elsewhere in this report, campaigns should build in a longer public education phase before a council vote and between the council and repeal phases An important component of a public education campaign is a field program, with a paid canvass, a volunteer team, or a combination of the two A field program accomplishes many important public education goals that later electoral campaigns can build on . First and foremost, a longer field program ensures that there are experienced leaders trained in the campaign’s messages and methods in place as the campaign ramps up A successful volunteer component can activate the base, creating momentum, skilled leaders, and community buy-in for the campaign Finally, more testing and experimentation on persuasion tactics is needed, and these longer public education campaigns can be an important place for this testing to take place .
Use modeling for field planning and targeting.
Another suggestion for field programs is to use the EFI Nondiscrimination Models, created by Clarity Campaign Labs and available on VAN, at all phases of your campaign As mentioned in The EFI Nondiscrimination Models on page 25, when crossed with a turnout model, the EFI model can be invaluable for determining if there is enough core support to run a campaign in the first place . The model should also be used to create a field plan that outlines the size of each voter contact universe: ID, persuasion, get-out-the-vote, etc . This will help field directors budget for staffing, paid vendors, and volunteer goals The campaign should also use the activist score to augment its volunteer recruitment lists
As useful as the model is for targeting, it does not replace local knowledge In most (but not all) ordinance efforts, local and state leaders drive the council phase, with national partners becoming more engaged in some capacity during the ballot phase . In other sections of this report, we address ways to make this tactic work well, but field is a special case At least a portion of the leadership of the field campaign should be local, whether is it the field director or a deputy field director Locals with field experience can provide valuable knowledge about geographic targeting, grasstops organizing, and local culture .
The usual dynamics around this issue consistently lead to much higher turnout than past elections in the same municipality would suggest . Local campaign leaders in Fayetteville thought just 4,000 people would vote based on past special elections in the city, but HRC pushed to plan for significantly more They were right to do so because on Election Day 14,563 people turned out to vote Based on Fayetteville’s experience, Springfield’s team boosted their estimate for turnout in their special election even further, but still came in low . Based on both of those experiences, Houston’s campaign estimated a boost in turnout for their election, held in conjunction with citywide races, and still underestimated Consult with experienced field operatives like those at Equality Federation, Freedom for All Americans, HRC, and ACLU to get help making a good turnout estimate, but know that these predictions are very difficult to get right
Having nondiscrimination on the ballot can increase turnout on both sides, so in very large municipalities, such as Houston, our campaigns’ ability to win simply by affecting turnout is limited . In smaller cities, such as Pocatello, a strong turnout strategy can make a difference .
Make sure there’s a turnout strategy for early voting.
Especially if your vote takes place in a special or municipal election rather than a general election, use an early or absentee voting push as part of your field strategy . Because voters who are more supportive of our cause, especially younger voters, are less likely to turn out on election day, promoting alternative voting strategies can boost your support numbers In addition, because our support tends to be higher before the opposition message penetrates, getting supporters to the polls early can decrease the chance that they will be misled by radio and television ads .
Research whether your municipality allows for:
• Vote by mail
• In-person absentee
• Early vote periods
• No-excuse absentee voting
• Same-day voter registration
Understand and plan around the rules of these voting alternatives For example, if your locality allows (and you should carefully check the legal requirements about this), you can bring no-excuse absentee voting applications to the door during a canvass and sign up supporters right away . Then your phone get-out-thevote operation can follow up to make sure supporters send in their ballots . You can schedule a day of action around early voting, asking all of your supporters to vote on that day and having them post about it on social media In-person early vote and same-day voter registration are also good tactics to use for college campuses Arrange for vans to drive students to the town office to register and vote, and spend a week or two beforehand recruiting students to vote early at specific days and times, giving them “tickets” for the vans and a list of items they need to bring .
Use community organizing and field to build momentum, identify and train messengers and volunteers, and increase visibility during the council phase of the campaign. We have discussed elsewhere in this report the importance of identifying and training messengers early in a campaign . A robust field effort can be extremely helpful in doing this . Whether it is in grasstops meetings or community events such as phone banks or canvasses, organizers are key staff who can find messengers for the communications and messaging teams to train In addition, holding volunteer events, such as phone banks or hearing attendance, can increase the visibility of the campaign, provide important earned media opportunities, and build a base of volunteer leaders for the ballot phase of the campaign
Even if your campaign is using paid vendors to drive quantity contacts, volunteers are an important supplement to this work . In addition, a robust volunteer program builds the capacity of leaders on the ground, preparing them for future campaigns We found that throughout the campaign it is important to provide a welcoming culture for volunteers Not doing so risks alienating influential community leaders and creates missed opportunities for leadership development, especially of transgender community members, who have the potential to be important leaders and spokespeople for the campaign . In Houston, one important element of a welcoming culture was making space for transgender and gender-nonconforming people to express their identities, including through the sharing of pronouns on nametags In Springfield, the campaign manager and field director specifically prioritized a “customer service” culture of treating volunteers with gratitude and respect that helped keep people engaged .
Making phone calls and knocking on doors to talk to voters about nondiscrimination, especially in light of our opposition’s attacks on transgender people, is a different experience than doing so for other issues or for a candidate . Therefore, it is important to provide volunteers with full trainings and coaching, and not just to hand them a phone list or walk packet Training should allow people the opportunity to practice the scripts In addition, it is important to set aside time to share people’s experiences after each phone bank or canvass
Canvassers and phone-bankers will inevitably be asked about transgender issues, but many of them may never have talked with a transgender person or thought a lot about what transgender people experience Transgender leaders can play a key role in educating volunteers and helping them feel personally connected to the issue .
In Springfield, a dedicated transgender community leader named Wendy took on a big role in volunteer training and really connected with volunteers . A wonderful result was that canvassers who had no other personal connection to the transgender community started talking about what they wanted for their friend Wendy at the doors, putting a personal perspective on the issue for voters
Be aware, however, that because of the ways that transgender people are targeted by our opposition, and the high level of prejudice they face every day, extra care and support is sometimes needed Some transgender volunteers may find canvassing too daunting or dangerous, and the campaign should work with them to find other meaningful roles .
After all the hard work and emotion that goes into a campaign, election day can too often become the end of the effort instead of the beginning of a final and critical post-campaign phase From solidifying (or restoring) personal relationships to cementing policy and ensuring proper implementation, there are important reasons to think beyond election day, whether that day ends in victory or defeat .
Include a post-campaign section in
In order for effective post-campaign activities to happen, they must be written into the campaign plan . Taking the time to envision how to close out what has often been months—and sometimes years—of intensive planning and organizing and education is best done before leaders get into the hectic pace of a campaign When this step is left off, communities lose the opportunity to maximize success and minimize divisiveness . The steering committee should discuss and decide post-campaign plans as election day approaches .
Shutting down a campaign in an effective way takes time and money If not explicitly budgeted for ahead of time, chances are good that there won’t be the human or financial resources to ensure that this happens Things to budget for include paying bills (knowing that some may not come immediately), cleaning the offices, list management and thank-yous .
Taking the time to debrief a campaign is essential . Make sure that the people around the table represent all the critical constituencies That includes not just all the major organizational players but key representatives from the volunteer base as well Holding the debrief as soon after election day as possible will ensure that the most reliable narrative of what went right and what went wrong will be captured . And be sure that the campaign’s weaknesses as well as its strengths are discussed, especially for winning campaigns where criticism may not seem as relevant .
Share lessons learned with the national movement.
Don’t let the results of a thorough debrief sit on a shelf Whether the campaign results in a win or a loss, important lessons learned should be shared with the national movement to improve chances of success in the next campaign . Advocacy organizations and funders alike can make wiser decisions going forward if they know which tactics and strategies to replicate and which to avoid .
The local community feels the impact of a municipal campaign in a much more personal and intense way than it does a statewide or national effort . Campaigns should build in time post–election day to bring the community together in appropriate ways Certainly with a loss and even with a win, relationships may have been strained or broken After their ballot loss in 2015, the City of Springfield held a large rally in a prominent downtown square The rally gave supporters an opportunity to come together in their disappointment, but also allowed them to re-energize themselves for the work ahead .
volunteers and the community what’s next and how to stay engaged.
While it doesn’t need to happen through a big public event, it is critical that leaders communicate with supporters and the broader community about next steps Again, this is true whether activists are coming off an exciting win or a dispiriting loss There is no better way to lose momentum for future efforts than to go silent at the end of a campaign . Holding community meetings, taking advantage of having the attention of mainstream media, creative use of social media, and one-on-one conversations with key stakeholders are all effective ways to encourage supporters to stay engaged
As we know from policy wins in both the LGBTQ movement and those of other equality struggles, passing a law does not mean that discrimination will end, nor does it mean that the laws will be properly implemented Be sure to build in a plan for how the new law will be implemented and who will have primary responsibility to ensure that the work of implementation happens .
Although most of the lessons learned concern individual municipal campaigns, the following suggestions should be considered, because if implemented, they would allow us to win repeal campaigns more consistently .
Find more effective messages to combat scare tactics around public accommodations.
Our opponents have increasingly employed messaging that focuses on public accommodations, especially public restrooms and locker rooms . The latest round of attacks, used in the Houston campaign, were both more extreme (depicting predators entering bathroom stalls to harm young girls) and more refined (not explicitly showing transgender people but rather suggesting that allowing transgender people to use appropriate facilities gives leeway to predators of all kinds) Reducing the argument to “no men in women’s bathrooms,” a trope that was repeated over and over until it completely overwhelmed any factual discussion of the content of the law, was highly effective for opposition in Houston . Since that time, MAP has begun testing new and sharperedged rebuttals to these types of attacks, and that research must continue as our opposition’s messaging evolves Individual campaigns will still need to make their own messaging decisions based on region, content of the ordinance, and other considerations, but national research to find strategic approaches, as MAP and a coalition of transgender advocacy groups are doing, is critical .
Test persuasion and inoculation tactics.
The best messaging alone may not be enough to win . We also need to hone our tactics and find out how we can win over undecided voters and inoculate weak supporters against opposition messaging to keep them through election day
The Springfield No Repeal campaign is the only campaign of the five studied that did significant persuasion and inoculation work in their field program, and they appear to be the only campaign that won the support of a significant portion of the undecided voters, according to their initial polling . However, because there was no rigorous evaluation designed for this campaign, we can’t say definitively that their canvassing tactics are the reason for that outcome
Their story, along with the proven success of “deep canvassing” tactics on nondiscrimination conducted by SAVE in Miami and documented by Stanford researcher David Brookman, suggest that this tactic deserves further experimentation and study
Particularly needed is research to determine if persuasion canvassing is effective in the heat of a ballot campaign, what particular aspects of these longer conversations at the doors make a difference, how to best target these tactics, and whether the significant investment of money and volunteer time it takes to execute this tactic is the most effective use of resources . Funders and national organizations should partner with upcoming local campaigns and researchers to make sure we are learning as much as possible and improving our work with upcoming campaigns
One reason that opposition attacks exploit public accommodations and transgender people is that while the needle has moved significantly on the issue of marriage equality, the same cannot be said for the understanding of transgender people’s lives and the need for nondiscrimination laws that protect LGBTQ people more generally Study after study shows that increased familiarity with LGBTQ people leads to greater acceptance In addition, because the vast majority of people either believe LGBTQ people are already protected from discrimination nationwide or that discrimination no longer occurs, we have an uphill battle when it comes to making a case for nondiscrimination laws .
Rather than treating each campaign as an individual event, it would benefit all municipal efforts, as well as the effort to pass a federal nondiscrimination law, to launch a national public education campaign . This strategy worked for the marriage equality movement (Freedom to Marry’s “Why Marriage Matters” campaign), with an overall campaign look and wording that was adapted geographically and also used for national purposes . The same strategy can be used for nondiscrimination, particularly, for introducing the public to transgender people and making a case for legal protections Focusing on social and earned media will keep costs down, and the ability to educate via compelling pieces spread through social media engages our base and starts conversations within families and friends, with the ability to reach a wide audience quickly .
Part of the excitement and significance of the Houston campaign was that the city itself was so large and nationally symbolic But the campaign was expensive, many times more than the other campaigns in this study While the dynamics of large municipalities mean that some of the concerns are different, there are many lessons, particularly about public education messaging, that can be learned from smaller campaigns with less political risk and less money raised and spent . They also offer ideal opportunities for testing and experimenting with field tactics such as persuasion canvassing; building the capacity of advocacy organizations that can work in other municipalities and eventually on statewide campaigns; and training up-and-coming movement leaders In addition, smaller municipalities offer the opportunity to narrow the scope of what we hope to learn and focus on one or two issues (for instance, messaging to a predominantly Mormon population in Pocatello) in the hopes that we can add up what we learn into a very specific and comprehensive picture . With large campaigns, there are so many moving pieces that it can be difficult to focus on specific lessons we need to learn
In addition to specific messaging lessons, we recommend the practice of planning, funding, and running robust public education campaigns in selected municipalities prior to the passage—and possibly even before the introduction—of the laws This strategy means that we are effectively beginning the campaign to beat the repeal before the law is passed . For our movement, learning to plan and fund these efforts early requires a new approach, not relying on the emergency of a repeal to capture attention . Small municipalities offer us the ability to learn how to do this most effectively with the greatest cost efficiency; how to gauge when we are ready to move forward; and how to find compelling ways to engage our supporters in this work without a pending repeal as the catalyst . Freedom for All Americans and other national organizations are gathering information that can be used to select the municipalities for these efforts, and national campaign organizations should work together to select municipalities accordingly .
Each new phase of the LGBTQ movement has required innovative strategies and a period of learning through both winning and losing, and the current post-Obergefell moment is no different Right now, municipal repeal campaigns with their damaging fear-based messages are among the key strategies our opponents are using, hoping to slow our momentum and regain political ground . If we are to continue to build toward the goal of nationwide discrimination protections for LGBTQ people, we need to extract lessons learned from recent experiences and use them to build for a stronger future . Repeal campaigns will continue to be a serious threat as long as the movement is unable to consistently defeat them .
Fortunately, we have demonstrated our ability to analyze our work in each political context and come up with new and creative strategies for the future . Organizations have developed productive means of working together, with strong leadership and issue expertise And the movement itself has never been stronger as we use everything we are learning to continue to tip the scale of public opinion toward fairness and equality We offer this analysis and set of recommendations as one piece of that work, and are optimistic that using this report as a guide will set us up for more success in the future .
Equality Federation Institute has many additional resources to help with campaigns like the ones described in this report . Contact our staff or visit www .equalityfederation .org for more information .