Politik:Perspektive Vl. 7

P E R S P E K T I V E

P E R S P E K T I V E

P E R S P E K T I V E

I V

Lots of Handel, not much Wandel? The changing nature of Sino-German relations

Where does nuclear power fit into Germany's green future?

Decolonising German studies: the perception of German language and identity in 20th-century Britain

How Germany is handling the 2022 Ukraine refugee crisis

Servus Nato / serve us Nato: will Austria ever end its neutrality?

The story of a Jewish immigrant under Austro-Fascism

Electrified mopeds, egg cups and East German Erinnerungskultur: how should we remember the GDR? p.19-20

Neglected history: the politics of memory p.21-23

The Ampel-Koalition's road to cannabis legalisation p.25-24

One year after the federal election - quo wadis, Deutschland?

Angela Merkel: an evolving Legacy

From the Editor

Hallo allerseits,

Herzlich willkommen to the 7th edition of Politik:Perspektive. To any long-time readers out there: it’s a pleasure to have you back! We’re excited to bring you a fresh set of articles from an amazing group of writers. To any first-time readers of the journal: a hearty welcome! Regardless of how you found us, we hope you enjoy flicking through our latest edition and are able to learn something new. You might even feel inspired to write for our next issue…

As the new editor of PP, it’s an honour being able to continue the work of my predecessors and to contribute to an incredible student-led journal that certainly does justice to the diversity and depth of German Studies. The entire process has been a joy to follow, from discussing article ideas and potential improvements with the writers to planning the look and feel of the journal with Maia Barrett, the graphic designer of the issue.

I’d first like to congratulate all of our writers for their fascinating, analytical and insightful work. They have covered so many aspects of politics, society and culture in the German-speaking world without any overlap – gut gemacht! Secondly, I’d like to thank Maia Barrett, our graphic designer and a fellow student at the University of Leeds, for designing such a stylistically exciting issue. Writing and editing the articles is only half the work; Maia turned the incredible contributions of our writers into a fully-fleshed journal. Vielen Dank!

In this edition, you’ll read about the ongoing and arduous process of legalising cannabis in Germany, the life story of Austrian political writer Jura Soyfer, and the state of German current affairs one year after the federal election – to name just a few topics. After reading the issue, you’ll be able to say a thing or two about Austrian neutrality, comment on Germany’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and you’ll even be able to explain the term Vergangenheitsbewältigung within the context of German colonialism. There is one thing we can definitely promise you – every single page of this journal is worth a read!

Viel Spaß beim Lesen!

Liebe Grüße, Katie

CONTRIBUTORS

Katie McCarthy, BA German and History, University of Leeds

Electrified mopeds, egg cups and East German Erinnerungskultur: how should we remember the GDR?

Katie is currently completing her year abroad as an intern at the DDR Museum in Berlin Although she is a born-and-bred Brit, Katie considers herself to be a German at heart and plans to make the permanent move to Berlin after graduation. When she’s not feasting on vegan cake in the office or going to her favourite yoga classes in Prenzlauer Berg, Katie is probably obsessing over Annalena Baerbock or watching the latest German series on Netflix.

Robin Fugmann, BA Political Science and Public Administration, University of Konstanz

One year after the federal election - quo wadis, Deutschland?

Robin Fugmann, 21, is studying Politics and Public Administration in his 3rd year at the University of Konstanz in Germany’s far south. He spent the winter term of 2021 at the University of Leeds In his free time, he likes to play the drums, travel and go out with friends

Holly Perril, BA German and English Literature, University of Leeds

German at Leeds - then and now

Holly is a second-year German and English

Literature student at the University of Leeds. This summer Holly worked in the university archive, curious to discover more about how British-German relations across the 20th century have impacted the teaching of German in Britain in collaboration with her supervisor, Dr Corinne Painter. In her free time, Holly is a Young Goethe Ambassador at the Goethe Institut and visits schools across the UK to encourage students to study German in further education. Her latest adventure is working with the British German Association, helping to edit their podcast Understanding Germany

Hannah Solloway, MA Applied Translation, University of Leeds

How Germany is handling the 2022 Ukraine

refugee crisis

Hannah was born and raised in the United States but moved to Berlin at 18 and now calls the city home. She holds a Bachelor's in Historical Linguistics from the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin and is currently pursuing a Master's in Applied Translation at the University of Leeds When she's not translating or reading long tracts about translation theory, Hannah is an avid reader of science fiction and fantasy books She hopes to have the honour of translating a book into English one day

Neglected History: the Politics of Memory

In her final year at UCL in London, Naomi is still reminiscing about her year abroad in Hamburg which reignited her age-old appreciation for all things Deutschland As a student of History and Politics, Germany occupies a curious intersection of both her academic interests, as well as gastronomic, by being a country full of fellow Kuchen and Kartoffel-lovers Though her plans for the future are uncertain, Naomi hopes that moving back to Germany is part of the equation.

Ottilie Michelson, BA German and Spanish, University of Bristol

The Ampel-Koalition's road to cannabis legalisation

Ottilie is currently studying abroad at the Universitat de València She can often be found drinking coffee or eating jamón in the city's old town and, on occasion, in the library Next year, Ottilie will continue her year abroad in Graz, Austria where she hopes to brush up on her increasingly rusty German and spend weekends exploring Austria & Central Europe

Where does nuclear power fit into Germany's green future?

Holly is a third-year English Literature and German student currently on her year abroad in a quaint little Bavarian town called Regensburg In her spare time, she likes to read novels in English and German. Holly once took comfort in the fact that the real world doesn't contain the same kinds of world-ending existential threats as the dystopia and fantasy that she reads, until she also started reading the news. Recently Holly has picked up climbing as a hobby, in the hope that it will help her when the seas start to rise

Servus Nato / serve us Nato: will Austria ever end its neutrality?

Jack is a native Brit in his final year of a French and German degree. Having spent five months residing in Vienna, he made important pilgrimages to Niki Lauda’s grave and the Spielberg racetrack He is an avid Falco fan, partial to a yodel and will bang on about how truly lässig Austria is. One of Jack’s life ambitions is to hold a conversation with a Vorarlberger one day: failing that, join an Oom-Pah band in the Austrian alps.

Jasmine Sakpoba, BA Politics and German, University of Bristol

Lots of Handel, not much Wandel?

The changing nature of Sino-German relations

Archie is a first-year Politics and German student at the University of Bristol. Following a stint in Austria and the small Bavarian town of Tübingen, Archie is a self-confessed Germanophile, profoundly interested in German foreign policy, international affairs and currywurst. Although he hasn’t started getting out the bread and cheese at lunch yet, he has admitted to hoarding plastic bottles in his room, in the hope that one day the Pfand may work its way over to Britain…

The story of a Jewish immigrant under Austro-Fascism

Jasmine is in her second year at the University of Bristol studying BA Politics and German. She is both Nigerian and German but her German heritage in particular has always been a large part of her cultural interests and upbringing She looks forward to moving to Frankfurt in August 2023 with plans of spending a year working in a boutique firm. Outside of her linguistic pursuits, Jasmine can generally be found on stage, performing with the National Youth Music Theatre or singing along with the university’s Big Band.

Sophie Watkins-Tidley,

BA Philosphy and German, University of Bristol

Angela Merkel: an evolving legacy

Sophie is currently in her first year at Bristol University studying Philosophy and German

She has a great appreciation for German politics and has an interest in current affairs. She hopes to gain experience in this area in the next few years whilst on a placement year in Germany When she isn’t studying, playing music with the University Jazz band or hanging out with friends, she always has her nose in a book!

“The naivety towards China is over” were the words of German finance minister Robert Habeck in his closing speech at the September 2022 G7 Communiqué – a strong statement that reflects a wider shift in western rhetoric towards Beijing.

No other nation has taken greater advantage of Chinese integration than Germany. Chinese citizens and manufacturers value the quality of German products, whilst German companies utilise the scalability of Chinese operations to bring down costs. The result? Last year alone saw 245 billion euros of trade exchanged between the two. However, this phenomenon was in no way natural. Since the early 1970s, one of the tenets of German foreign policy has been a theory known as Wandel durch Handel (change through trade). Scholars insisted that, through the proliferation of trade with authoritarian regimes, they will inevitably become ‘like us’. This was deployed at the indifference of big German business, perfectly placed to exploit the modernisation of Chinese industry whilst also supplying technical know-how and machinery in vast quantities to the rapidly expanding nation.

Profits were growing exponentially, which forced German policymakers to decide whether they could overlook the plethora of problems presented by trading with an authoritarian regime – not only logistically, but also ethically. The latter is one of the primary reasons why the West is attempting to pull out with such haste.

Until 2019, it seemed as though this partnership was in lockstep, described by the German foreign office as a “multi-faceted and intense [...] comprehensive strategic partnership.” Yet following the lead of the US and other western nations, Germany is beginning to become far more critical of the regime it has so closely engaged with. German bureaucrats had been calling for an intense re-evaluation of the relationship for years, but it was not until it became clear that genocide was being committed in Xinjiang in 2019 that Berlin decided to open its eyes. Accompanied by 21 other nations, Germany signed a joint letter to the UN Human Rights Council, fervently condemning the mistreatment of the Uyghur minority and other ethnic groups. Beijing had been labelling these centres as ‘re-education camps’ in a supposed move against terrorism, an expression that Germany in particular would be foolish to ignore. This was one of the first instances of Berlin’s criticism toward Beijing, yet Germany still seems to exhibit restraint when it comes to butting heads with Xi Jinping. 4

n an attempt to limit China's power in the east, Germany has begun to expand its own sphere of influence in the Indo Pacific, sending one of its frigates ‘Bayern’ into the area. Neither Germany’s largest nor newest vessel, the move perplexed the international community, with many commenting it was undoubtedly more emblematic than practical. The secretary of state for defence, Thomas Silberhorn, justified the choice of ship by insisting that the mission wasn’t “aimed at anyone”, yet it didn’t take long for commentators to join the dots. During the ship's scheduled stop in Singapore, frequent mentions of freedom of navigation in the area were made, yet no one would name the oppressor – a clear display of Germany’s reluctance to upset Beijing. Another criticism of the voyage was Germany’s decision to do it alone; a Royal Navy group accompanied by a Dutch frigate had undertaken the same journey just months before. This is both literally and metaphorically telling of Germany’s struggle to form a united European front on China.

Germany is treading a line similar to many other European nations, trying to balance an increase in pressure on Beijing whilst also being able to utilise the prosperous returns of an intense economic partnership. However, it is not an easy game to play. When Merkel was pressed by Beijing in 2019 to allow Huawei to enter the German market and supply 5G infrastructure, it was implied by the Chinese ambassador that Germany’s automobile industry - heavily dependent on China - would be targeted if Huawei were to be excluded. This was a serious wakeup call and has prompted Merkel’s successor, Olaf Scholz, to take a harsher line on China, which the rest of his colleagues in the Ampel-Koalition support. In a recent interview, foreign minister Annalena Baerbock declared that she was “very serious” about ending Germany’s dependence on China

The future looks uncertain and the golden age of Sino-German relations seems to be over. With a stark increase in military spending underway and the revelation that the West is far more entrenched in Chinese trade than it ought to be, China is able to exert its hard and soft power with impunity and efficiency. If the West fails to act, China will continue to expand its sphere of influence in the South China Sea and Hong Kong, making a mockery of the rule of law and the tenets of international cooperation. As one of the principal actors of the European Union, it is vital that Germany takes the helm. Whilst Germany’s domestic relationship with China becomes increasingly one-sided, Berlin must begin the slow and laborious process of diversifying its trade routes. Yet the real test will be Germany’s ability to establish a united European front on China. In the words of Latvian Prime Minister Krisjanis Karins, “China is best dealt with when we are 27, not when we are one.”

WHERE DOES NUCLEAR POWER FIT INTO GERMANY’S GREEN FUTURE?

By Holly Baker

Following the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, Angela Merkel, who (as a physicist herself) had been a firm supporter of nuclear power up until this point, declared Germany’s nuclear phase-out. The plan was simple: immediately shut down the oldest reactors and incrementally remove the remaining nuclear power plants from the supply grid over the course of a decade. By the end of 2022, Germany would no longer have any operational nuclear reactors, eliminating nuclear energy from the country’s internally generated electricity supply. In this way, the German government struck the perfect balance between mitigating the direct risk of a similar nuclear accident occurring on German soil and establishing a realistic time frame to safely replace nuclear energy with more sustainable sources. With 80% of the federal parliament voting in favour of the motion and strong support from the public in the polls, the decision was a flying success for Merkel’s party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Germany was going to lead the way for the rest of the world in eradicating the menacing threat of nuclear catastrophe and the accumulation of toxic nuclear waste.

So, Germany began the long and complicated journey of implementing this plan in the real world. The pair shared a decade-long flirtation with harmonious cooperation. Initially, everything was going smoothly; nuclear power plants were taken off the grid accordingly and Germany’s dependence on nuclear power fell from 25% of the national power supply in 2011 to 6% in the first quarter of 2022. There had certainly been a few bumps along the way, with questions arising about the capability of renewable energy sources to plug the gap in the energy demand left by the nuclear phase-out. Renewable energy sources like wind and solar power alone do not have the capacity for rapid expansion on the scale that would be needed to compensate for the loss of nuclear power. As in any good relationship, however, compromises were sought in the form of increased reliance on energy supplied by gas and coal. This compromise casts a shadow of doubt on the plausibility of Germany reaching its 2038 coal phase-out target and, by extension, its end goal of carbon neutrality by 2045. The plan and its real-world execution looked like they were going to unite in 2022 and get their happyever-after ending after all.

Then, of course, the real world remembered that life is not a fairy tale. At the end of February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a violent declaration of its apathy towards the country’s sovereignty that shocked the world, even though it had been looming on the horizon for many years. From this crisis sprung forth a multitude of problems for Germany, the most pressing being how best to support Ukrainian refugees arriving at its train stations. It was equally important to ensure that Germany did not inadvertently support this criminal invasion via the continued importation of Russian natural gas.

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In the first half of 2021, 14.4% of Germany’s electricity was generated using natural gas, around 55% of which was supplied to Germany by Russia. In the first half of 2022, these figures fell to 11.7% and 35% respectively.

Despite this decrease, Germany remains heavily dependent on Russian gas. Whilst the country is able to rely on a reserve gas stockpile and gas imported from other countries at a high cost to fall back on, a total ban on imports from Russia would compromise the stability of the national grid. Such a scenario could create new problems for Germany, such as prolonged blackouts due to insufficient supply to meet domestic and commercial energy demands. The consequences of this could not only be financially disastrous, but they would also pose a humanitarian threat if citizens, especially seniors, were unable to heat their homes this winter.

Therefore, on 17th October 2022, the German government announced that the three remaining nuclear reactors may legally stay in operation until 15th April 2023. This compromise represents a brief reprieve for nuclear power, conceded only so that dependence on natural gas can be safely reduced first. However, for the Green Party (die Grünen), this new date stands as a hard deadline that they will not deviate from. Starting from April, not only must the remaining 6% share of nuclear energy be rapidly compensated for, but also a large portion of the 11.7% of energy generated in gas power stations. Whilst the amount of energy produced by renewables will most likely continue to climb steadily, the only energy source with the infrastructure to match the pace of a gas and nuclear phase-out is power generated by burning coal.

Coal brings with it its own considerably hefty barrel of problems. Though the risk of immediate death by nuclear disaster is a much more tangible fear than death by air pollution, the effects of mining and burning coal have been calculated to be a slow killer of a much greater magnitude. Cancer, lung complications and other pollution-related illnesses aside, the continued burning of fossil fuels poses a much more existential threat in the form of CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions. Coal produces more emissions than any other energy source, emitting 820 tonnes of CO2 or equivalent for every Gigawatt hour of electricity generated. This is almost twice as much as gas (490 tonnes) and 273 times the emissions from nuclear power (3 tonnes), which were both categorised as environmentally “sustainable” energy sources in a new ruling by the European Union in January 2022. Coal, on the other hand, was not.

T--------he effects of climate change are ------------undeniable and Germany has already experienced the consequences first-hand. In June of 2021, Germany faced recordbreaking flooding as the world saw a sharp and frightening increase in forest fires These extreme events will only continue to take more lives and devastate more communities if we continue to allow fossil fuels to be burnt on the scale they are currently. Whilst in 2011 a nuclear phaseout was an honourable goal with good intentions, Germany must surely now take a moment to stop and reassess its priorities for clean energy Gas, which would have acted as a slightly more sustainable alternative to coal as a replacement energy source, now comes at too high a moral price.

With advancements in research and development within the nuclear field, the likelihood that an accident like Fukushima will happen again is much lower than it was in the past. Scientists have already proposed a multitude of innovative solutions in response to the challenge of securely disposing of nuclear waste so that it does not harm future generations, but this issue remains just that: a problem for future generations Greenhouse gas emissions and climate change are already affecting us today Germany has the time to phase out its remaining three nuclear plants slowly enough so that it does not have to rush towards its goal of April 2023. Now is the time to take decisive action against climate change and stop a needless increase in the burning of fossil fuels to fulfil an outdated dream.

In the words of J.E. Folley, a British soldier writing from the Second World War, “I am beginning to develop a hatred of these people – all due to the force of circumstance I suppose.” He later writes: “there’s only one good German, when he’s dead.”

Folley’s self-consciousness as he contemplates that his mounting prejudice against the German people is “due to the force of circumstance” is unique, as it presents a tone of cynicism towards the caricatured portrayals of the German character, culture and language within British media during the early stages of the Second World War. This greatly contrasts the violent edge of his outburst that “there’s only one good German, when he’s dead” within his later letters home, demonstrating the loss of his critical eye towards the portrayal of the German character within British propaganda in the latter half of the war. Moreover, this decisive shift in attitude, which no longer questions the politicised presentation of German culture, reduces the German people to a homogeneous mass. This demonstrates a wider issue within our contemporary culture: the loss of criticality towards the Othering of cultures within the British education system.

Focusing specifically on university education, this article is part of the wider project German at Leeds – Then and Now, which analyses how shifting British-German relations across the 20th century have influenced the pedagogy and dissemination of German language learning within further education in Britain.

By Holly Perril

The foundational research for this project has been undertaken by analysing the crossover between two archival collections within the University of Leeds Archive –firstly, the Department of German Collection, which provides a detailed account of the changing pedagogy, curriculum and attitudes towards German learning at the University of Leeds, and secondly, the Liddle Collection, which concerns major crises of the 20th century such as the First and Second World Wars.

This strategy has facilitated a thorough analysis of how global crises and tense British-German relations across this period have directly influenced the pedagogy of German Studies at the University of Leeds. The profound influence of such conflicts and political disputes provides insight into how biases towards other cultures are engrained within the British education system and how such prejudices are mobilised to perform a political function. In our contemporary historical moment, in which Britain is striving to come to terms with its imperial past, this project has presented a case for the decolonisation of language learning as a central tenet of the pursuit to rid the British curriculum of biases which promote prejudice, discrimination and Othering towards foreign cultures.

o---------------of Leeds have been immensely affected by changing BritishGerman relations throughout the 20th century. However, the university’s reaction to global events has dramatically changed, illustrating a clear shift in strategies for academic institutions dealing with moments of international crisis. Throughout the pre-war period from the 1880s to the 1890s, we begin to see a developing fascination with German culture and literature within Britain, which is heavily influenced by the increasing economic and cultural presence of Germany on the global stage.

However, by the 1890s the tone of this fascination becomes more sinister, infiltrated by anti-German conservative rhetoric within the British Foreign Office. This highlights how the intimidation of Britain in the face of a culturally and economically influential Germany led to the Othering of European cultures within British undergraduate education, in aid of stressing the ‘superior’ status of Britain as an economic and cultural power in the global arena. This xenophobic tone intensified upon entry into the 20th century, evidenced by clear attacks on the German character within British media which later disseminated into popular discourse.

Despite this, it was not until the period directly following the First World War that German Studies at Leeds were dramatically shaken by anti-German prejudice. This is evident in the dramatic shift of assessed content in 1919, as the replacement of German literature with epic Greek narratives was manipulated as a means of reviving the memory of British imperial glory. In this way, the emergence of epic in German Studies allowed a celebration of the supposed ‘heroism’ of Britain without directly fetishising the recent conflict with Germany.

Moreover, this troubled relationship within German Studies became increasingly tense in the years leading up to the Second World War, with attitudes towards the study of German being divided into two camps. Firstly, there was the belief that German – the language of the ‘arch enemy’ – should cease to be taught within Britain as it represented the ‘low ideals’ of a backward society. Secondly, there was the belief that the study of German within Britain was imperative to ensuring that Germany’s economic and political progress could be monitored by an insecure Britain desperate to maintain its precedence on the world stage.

Such a conflict can be seen in the divided approach to German learning within Britain during this time. Whilst German became mandatory as a foreign language for young men at the earliest stages of education, it was banished from female education altogether. This gendered divide is very revealing, demonstrating the need to continue the study of German for political purposes. On the one hand, the need for young men to learn the language stresses the need for those in the most influential positions in business and politics to have a firm understanding of German to maintain economic and cultural superiority. On the other hand, the rejection of German in the education of young women conveys a desperate attempt to downplay the cultural importance of Germany in the British psyche.

This divided approach to German Studies from a broader British perspective can be seen in the University of Leeds German Department throughout the Second World War. The complete removal of Old High German texts reveals a desire to eliminate all connections between the roots of Old English and German language and culture, thus illustrating how shifts in the syllabus at the University of Leeds were made to facilitate the Othering of German language and culture.

-----------his portrays how closely the ------------demonisation of German ----

------------identity, such as Churchill -------------describing the ‘vile’ character of the enemy, impacted the representation of Germany and Germanness within British education, leading to seismic shifts in the curriculum and pedagogy of German Studies at the University of Leeds.

Thus, the results of this study have found that the portrayal of Germany and the German language within British education has been constructed by changing international relations between Britain and Germany across the 20th century to perform a political function. This is most notable during the First and Second World Wars, whereby the pedagogy, curriculum and examination of German Studies at the University of Leeds were transformed to promote anti-German sentiment. The portrayal of the German language and its decreasing popularity amongst students within the UK demonstrates how economic tensions between the two countries have engrained biases within the British education system that we continue to use to inform students of the wider world today.

How Germany is handling the 2022 Ukraine refugee crisis

By Hannah Solloway

On 24th February 2022, the Russian government launched an aggressive and unprovoked invasion on the sovereign nation of Ukraine, escalating a war which they began in 2014 with the illegal annexation of Crimea. Between late February and mid-October 2022, over a million refugees arrived in Germany, fleeing the violence and destruction in Ukraine. This makes it the third most popular country for refugees fleeing Ukraine, behind Russia and Poland respectively.

The German government was quick to assist Ukraine. Ministries and public offices scrambled to collect and translate a wealth of needed information into Ukrainian. Germany promptly began to supply Ukraine’s military with ammunition, weaponry and vehicles in regular shipments and has spent over one billion euros so far in 2022 to this effect.

In the first few weeks of the crisis, a special provision was passed to allow Ukrainians to enter Germany and other EU member states and remain there for 90 days without a formal visa. This can be extended by an additional 90 days, but refugees preferably need to register their intent to stay in Germany during this initial period. In March, an EU-wide directive was passed, granting temporary protection to Ukrainians and allowing them to bypass the regular asylum application process. This permit is generally valid for one year but can be extended to up to three years, and often includes permission to work.

Ukrainians who qualify are also able to apply for regular work or study permits. The government has passed an additional law to grant Hartz-IV basic income to Ukrainian refugees from 1st June 2022. This new legislation means that municipal job centres are now the main point of contact to help refugees find employment, language classes and childcare. The aim here is to put Ukrainians on equal footing with unemployed Germans, as well as to grant access to government subsidies like Kindergeld, Elterngeld or Bafög.

In addition to governmental protections, the outpouring of support for Ukraine by the German people during this crisis has been aweinspiring. An informal infrastructure of aid for incoming refugees sprang up overnight. This infrastructure was later solidified into a formal structure with governmental assistance and bureaucratic procedures, but the very first weeks of the crisis saw a huge grassroots mobilisation effort by ordinary citizens to help refugees.

The first waves of refugees who arrived in Germany were met at train stations by volunteer helpers, who offered them hot food and beverages and helped new arrivals figure out where to go next. Volunteers could and did simply turn up to their nearest Hauptbahnhof and help however they could, with those who had been there a bit longer holding informal training sessions, usually with a megaphone and a crate.

ollection points were set up for donations, which promptly pouredin. Interpreters and anyone who spoke Ukrainian or even Russian ---were highly sought after, with many calls to action from the public and private sector urging them to participate in these refugee resettlement efforts. Even those who couldn’t speak Ukrainian or Russian turned up wherever needed in large numbers and were quickly given basic ad hoc training and assigned shifts. The real desire Germans had to help their European neighbours in Ukraine at this time was palpable, and the level of mobilisation was truly impressive. Storefronts were transformed into collection and distribution centres overnight, providing clothes, food, hygiene products and more to arriving refugees, as well as being crucial points of information. Many people who owned vehicles, particularly those in southern Germany and Austria, collected donations from neighbours and then drove to the border at regular intervals to pass goods to those still in Ukraine.

Many in Germany with room to spare invited Ukrainian families into their homes free of charge, with 300,000 homes being offered by early March. Apps were set up to facilitate this, with new ones such as ‘unterkunft-ukraine.de’ and ‘host4ukraine.com’ springing up specifically to meet this need. Established websites such as Wunderflats, Airbnb and others also created new sections on their websites or ‘pay-itforward’ schemes to facilitate this.

Overall, the clear abundance of support for Ukrainians on both a governmental and societal level has been impressive. However, this is also bittersweet for many, especially for those whose parents or grandparents fled to Germany decades ago as refugees following the Yugoslavian war or were conscripted to rebuild the German economy as Gastarbeiter*innen after the Second World War. As one young woman, a descendant of Gastarbeiter*innen, put it: “Ukrainians get to start university without having finished secondary school – but our parents had to clean toilets when they came to Germany.” She clarified that she is very happy to see Ukrainians being treated so well but is sad and angry that this could not be done for her own parents and countless others who came before. Refugees from warzones like Syria, Afghanistan and Iran have not and most likely will not ever receive an outpouring of support on this scale.

I am thrilled to see how Germany, my adopted home of eight years, has mobilised to help the Ukrainian people who came to this country for safety, and I hope that this sets a precedent of care and compassion for people of any nationality who need refuge going forward.

Servus Nato / serve us Nato: will

Austria ever end its neutrality?

By Jack Elvey

The Republic of Austria has been associated with its neutrality on the global stage for over 60 years. One reason for this is rather obvious amongst budding historians. However, will the nation’s ostensibly neutral ways be tested given the political climate further east?

Landlocked in the centre of Europe and divvied up by the Allies, Austria faced rigorous political uncertainty following the end of the Second World War. Not only had it been on the losing side, but, geographically, it held a pivotal position between East and West too. Tensions over the country’s future grew as the Cold War stand-off between the Soviets and Western Allies meant that the strategically significant Austria could not be lost to either side. Only after Stalin’s death did the political stalemate begin to clear.

Julius Raab, Austrian Chancellor from 1953 to 1961, explored the idea of Austria becoming a neutral country based on the Swiss model, aided by the emergence of Nikita Khrushchev as Soviet leader in 1955 and his aims to improve relations with the West. Austria realised this policy of neutrality on the occasion of the State Treaty, formally signed on 15th May 1955 by the foreign ministers of the Four Powers and Austria. The last Allied troops left Austrian soil on 25th October, and a day later the nation’s parliament enacted the Declaration of Neutrality. This committed Austria to perpetual neutrality, preventing the country from entering military alliances from then on.

The now formally non-aligned Republic of Austria managed to free itself of its immediate past under international legislation and constituted the forming of a new Austrian identity – neutrality.

This neutrality benefited Austria, acting as a bridge between East and West, whilst Vienna became a haven for important summit meetings and a significant entrepôt for the Cold War spy world.

When the Cold War ended, Austria was still yet to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which was originally intended to monitor perceived threats posed by the Soviet Union. Austria, however, joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1995 and NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1999 – a forum for consultation on political and security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Austria has nevertheless retained cosy relations with Russia until recently Following Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Austria was the first Western country to welcome him for a visit. Moreover, the conservative parties Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) and the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) notoriously held consciously purposeful relations with Putin during their coalition between 201719. For example, Austria was the only major EU country not to expel Russian diplomats in the aftermath of the Salisbury poisoning in 2018. Former Chancellor Sebastian Kurz held meetings every 3 months with Putin in 2018 and Austria was the first country that Putin visited officially following his reelection. Ex-foreign minister Karin Kneissl (linked to the FPÖ) even invited Putin to her wedding and they danced together.

urz’s government only fell after a secretly filmed video that revealed --------------Heinz-Christian Strache (Vice -------Chancellor and leader of the FPÖ at the time) seeming to accept a financial offer from a woman pretending to be the niece of a Russian oligarch. Nevertheless, after the political upheaval of Kurz’s ÖVP government, the coalition with the FPÖ was replaced with die Grünen (The Greens).

Throwing Nehammer in the works – the gremlin of the kremlin

In April 2021, Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer became the first Western leader to meet Putin following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and did so with the aim of some good old Austrian diplomacy, demonstrably reminiscent of that during the Cold War. Nevertheless, as Nehammer himself emphasised, “this is not a friendly visit.”

The cracks in the Austrian-Russian relationship had started to appear and even more so since March, when Austria voted in favour of the March 2 General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s invasion. Since these interactions, Russia has declared Austria an enemy of the state.

On 7th March 2021, Nehammer tweeted that Austria’s “neutrality is not up for debate.” The Chancellor stuck to his word, with the country only supporting Ukraine by providing nonlethal weapons and donating humanitarian assistance and protective gear. To Russia, political affairs with Austria seem to be a lot like a Trojan horse, as ties have been reduced to a bare minimum and most of Russian oligarchs’ assets in Austria have been frozen.

Would Van de Bellen be barking up the wrong tree?

Austrian President Alexander Van de Bellen holds the official power in signing the bill to repeal the nation’s neutrality. Doing so, however, would mean changing the Austrian constitution with a two-thirds majority in parliament, which does not currently exist.

Another major factor that dissuades Austria from joining NATO is that its accession to the European Union has managed to broaden its interpretation of neutrality. The nation’s involvement in support of Ukraine, as well as its union with NATO programmes, presents Austria as a country that can rely on external aid in the event of an attack. Unlike Sweden or Finland, whose proximity to Russia catalysed their accession to NATO, Austria is landlocked and surrounded by five NATO members. Despite the war in Ukraine, the country is rather well protected. Entering NATO would equally mean raising its military spending to meet the organisation’s 2% of GDP goal for a member state. However, Austria’s neutral stance in foreign policy has helped the country focus its interests on economic and social resources ever since the end of the Second World War.

The Austrian psyche also plays a role in its refusal to tamper with its neutrality. After the horrific experience of two world wars and the Nazi terror regime, neutrality is deeply rooted in the mindset of the Austrian population. For the past seventy years, Austrians have been working to form their own identity as a nation and neutrality is one aspect that remains close to the bone. In 2022, an opinion poll survey showed that 76% of Austrians wish to remain neutral, whilst 18% favoured joining NATO. Neutrality is clearly anchored in the public mind and there is still no serious public debate over joining the organisation even eight months after the ‘special military operation’ started.

Thus, the chances of Austria ending its neutrality are slim. The political climate further east poses no immediate threat to the republic, and Austria may experience a free ride on NATO’s back should tensions brew further. Alas, in true Austrian spirit, the question of neutrality ist ihnen Wurscht.

The story of a Jewish immigrant under AustroFascism

By Jasmine Sakpoba

Following the collapse of the Habsburg empire in 1918 and the end of the First World War, the Republic of Austria was established. The new state was shaped by political and economic unrest, as well as the effects of the Treaty of St Germain in a world ravaged by war. At the same time, the Bolshevist Revolution from 1917 to 1923 had left thousands displaced and fleeing the Russian Empire, forced to become refugees.

During this period, the province of Vienna was dominated by the Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei (Austria’s Social Democratic party) and had only just emerged from the economic turmoil of the 1921 hyperinflation crisis. Despite international loans of 650 million gold crowns through the Geneva Protocols of 1922 and the Treaty of Lana in 1921, the Austrian Republic was in a state of total disrepute, subject to high unemployment, stringent budget cuts and unstable government. Vienna, known colloquially as ‘Red Vienna’, was dominated by the anti-clerical Social Democrats seeking to create a new, socialist alternative form of society. Tensions naturally arose with the conservative political right, the Christlichsoziale Partei (the Christian Social Party), which sought a return to a Catholic and conservative Austria, and with the political right in wider Europe, consisting of figures such as Benito Mussolini in Italy, Miklos Horthy in Hungary and Adolf Hitler in Germany.

Amongst the many political refugees fleeing to Austria was Jura Soyfer. Born on 8th December 1912, he and his family were forced to flee their home in Kharkiv in Ukraine to Baden in Germany, eventually settling in Vienna in 1923.

Son to Lyubov Soyfer and the Jewish industrialist Vladimir Soyfer, Soyfer grew up immersed in the political turbulence of Austria in the 1920s and 30s, becoming one of the most consistently political Austrian writers of his day.

In 1927 and against the backdrop of political civil war in Vienna, Soyfer, aged 15, discovered socialist literature through his friend Mitja Rapoport. Fascinated and inspired by socialist ideas of ambitious plans for infrastructure and diplomacy, he soon became politically active. Soyfer joined the Verband Sozialistischer Mittelschüler (the socialist youth organisation of the Social Democrats), through which he could further explore social democracy in Austria and begin writing deeply political poems and critical texts. Socialism essentially became the catalyst for Soyfer’s introduction and integration into Viennese society With the disadvantage of being a Ukrainian-Jewish immigrant moving in almost exclusively Jewish circles, political activism and socialist interests prevented him from developing narrowly Jewish concerns in political, cultural or literary matters at the time.

The civil war of 1927 left 89 demonstrators and 5 police officers dead, an ultimate defeat for the Social Democrats, who became characterised as a ‘red menace’ within the political sphere. Throughout this period, Soyfer focused on his poems and writing. In 1929, he began his work for the Politisches Kabarett der Sozialistischen Veranstaltungsgruppe, aged 17. The Wall Street Crash, instigating yet more political chaos and throwing Austria into a new state of economic crisis, fuelled Soyfer’s inspiration for his political publications.

his crisis, however, also highlighted the failure of the ChristianSocials to revive Austria’s economy and increased demand for a more ---radical socialist government. From 1930, Soyfer began regularly publishing poems and articles in the Arbeiter-Zeitung The publication was the central organ of the Austrian Social Democrats, criticising the failures of the Christian Socials and highlighting the necessity for a shift towards the political left. At the time, Soyfer’s poems and commentaries on daily and weekly political events were being read by 85,000 people every week.

With the turn of the decade came a steady rise in support for fascism in Austria, spurred on by questions surrounding the annexation of Austria by Germany, economic failure under the republic, and the rise of fascist chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss, in government. Austria’s ability to sustain itself as an independent economic unit was called into question and many Austrians turned to more radical politics, having lost faith in their own. This provided Soyfer with the opportunity to promote his own growing belief in socialism by ridiculing the gradual collapse of capitalism. Drawing “revolutionary conclusions from his satiric exposure of the enemy, [he] incited his readers to fight fascism in Austria, and he clearly foresaw that Hitler’s politics, if not stopped, would inevitably lead to war” (Jarka, 1987).

However, the rise of fascism in Austria and the growing popularity of the NSDAP in Germany under Adolf Hitler led to an increase in anti-Semitism. The growing class-specific anti-Semitism of the Social Democratic party went hand in hand with the image of the ‘rich Jew’ as the class enemy, primarily associated with Fascism in the 1930s. This image rejected people like Soyfer and decisively influenced the reception of his work.

Parallel to political dynamics, Soyfer’s works turned aggressively activist, contributing more to the verbal revolutionism of Austro-Marxism than that of social democracy and leading him to join the Communist Party after the February Uprising in Austria in 1934. This four-day conflict between the Austrian government and socialist forces increased the population’s drive towards radical politics and split political dynamics ever further.

Working as an active Communist in the underground scene and heavily monitored by Austrian police, Soyfer began one of his most famous works, his novel ‘So starb eine Partei’ (It’s Up To Us!). It is now regarded as one of the most perceptive political novels of all time, despite never having been completed. Soyfer tried with great effort to capture the political events of the period in this novel. He analysed problems such as bureaucratisation in Austria, the government’s incapability to reconcile the younger and older generations in a new post-war republic, and the loss of the vision that the Social Democrats, and Soyfer himself, once held. Moreover, he analyses the fatal dilemma of Austro-Marxism within Austria, condemning the Social Democrats for not being radical enough in the face of the catastrophe brought on by fascism. Up until 1937, Soyfer was supported by the left whilst writing works as a Jew under fascist threat. However, the more he sought to ask ‘the Jewish Question’ in his poems, plays and writing, the more he also found it invariably led to an anti-Semitic answer.

M------------------istaken for Franz Marek, the Austrian ------------------communist politician and editor of -------------------the-party journal Weg und Ziel, -----------------------Soyfer-was arrested by Austrian police and found guilty of writing incriminatory pieces for the communist party in 1937. After 26 days of freedom following 3-months of imprisonment for his-crimes, Soyfer was arrested again in an attempt to cross the border into Switzerland in 1938 and was transported to Dachau concentration camp It was here that Soyfer met Herbert Zipper, an internationally renowned composer. Together they wrote and composed the famous Dachaulied, a song acting as a cynical and ironic response to the Nazi phrase Arbeit macht frei (work will set you free). The song could neither be written down nor recorded, so was passed on by word of mouth to other prisoners, as well as by Zipper upon his release from the camp in 1939. In the autumn of the same year, Soyfer was transported to Buchenwald concentration camp, where he died of typhoid fever on 16th February 1939. He was 26 years old.

Throughout his life, Jura Soyfer’s vision was not to present solutions or conclusions to his readers, but rather to rally a desire for protest in real life. The plays he wrote for small theatres in later life break down political illusions and call upon society to create change in its present form, not just theoretically or hypothetically. His works were a form of propaganda, directly connected to the time he lived in and to ideas of what it meant to be a Jewish writer under Austro-Fascism in the republic. To this day, he calls on us through his published works to be critical of the world around us and to always question our present society.

At the time of writing, I have spent the past two months working at the DDR Museum in Berlin. Throughout Germany, but especially in a city like Berlin, it is nearly impossible to escape the pervasive presence of the country’s past, out of which has grown its so-called Erinnerungskultur or culture of remembrance. Every day at the museum is defined by curiosity – new facts to be learned, new objects to be discovered and new discussions to be had. Arguably, the most fascinating of these discussions is the one I have been having in my head ever since I arrived here: how exactly should we remember the GDR?

In the first two weeks of my internship, I spent some time working in the DDR Museum’s gift shop. My days consisted of restocking fridge magnets, dusting the Trabant toy cars on display, and selling pieces of the Wall to both German and international tourists in little paper bags. As I completed my hourly checks around the shop, I noticed T-shirts with the words Held der Arbeit (Hero of Labour) printed on the front, pink miniature rubbers of Karl Marx’s ‘Capital: Critique of Political Economy’, and infinite rows of the famous GDR egg cup, fittingly designed in the shape of a chicken and available in a variety of colours. Nevertheless, there is another side to the gift shop that aims to establish greater historical depth and understanding for the museum’s visitors. For example, we sell comprehensive information guides in six different languages, as well as a selection of historical books, accounts and biographies written by academics on the subject – directly underneath the egg cups, to be precise.

During the first four weeks of my internship, I helped out at one of the museum’s regularly held Veranstaltungen.

By Katie McCarthy

My job for the evening was to welcome and sell drinks to the attendees, some of whom lived in the GDR and utilise these events as a form of reminiscence – depending on the subject matter, of course. The Germans have a perfect word for this: Ostalgie The term is a rather catchy combination of the words Ost (East) and Nostalgie (nostalgia). These attendees will gladly talk to me for hours about their experiences growing up in the East. However, they also acknowledge the aspects of their childhood that are perhaps best kept in the past. I am standing on the other side of the table, Sprudelwasser in hand, listening intently and trying to decipher their thick East German accents.

In the sixth week of my internship, I began writing posts for the museum’s Facebook page. Every month, we collate articles that are related to the GDR and share them with our followers. They can find out which galleries are housing the paintings of East German artists, what the best walking routes are for tracing the remnants of the Berlin Wall, or even how a new Berlin start-up is modernising old GDR mopeds and making them more environmentally friendly. All you have to do is click on one of these posts and scroll down to the comments to see that the GDR remains both a divisive and controversial topic.

ne person reminisces about their yearly holidays to the Baltic coast with their parents, whilst another writes that “WE NEED TO STOP LIVING IN THE PAST AND UNITE AS ONE GERMANY!!!!!” (exclamation marks and all). Interestingly, one follower even complains that the museum is ruining its reputation by gendering, whereas another follower supports it.

The eighth week of my internship saw me write a blog post about the Green Party in the GDR – a topic that, despite fascinating me deeply, I knew nearly nothing about prior to writing. Even though the German Green Party today is called Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (a combination of both its Eastern and Western progenitor), focus mainly seems to be placed on the founding history of the latter. The story of the East German Green Party is one of perseverance, risk, failure and, ultimately, triumph. The party emerged from a large network of oppositional environmental groups and sought to uncover the GDR’s dangerous reliance on brown coal and its motives behind keeping environmental data private. Writing the blog post left me wondering: why has the eastern side of this story been brushed under the carpet and the western part pushed to the foreground?

The easiest place to identify the difficulties involved in remembering the GDR is on the internet, where visitors from across the world leave their reviews of the museum. Some describe the museum as educational and informative, praising its interactive elements and broad coverage of themes such as free time, politics, fashion and daily life. The recreation of a typical Plattenbau flat is always a favourite among tourists, as well as the blue Trabant car that stands proudly in the museum’s display window. Others would say that the museum’s approach is offensive and mocks the very real struggles that defined this period. These visitors argue that, instead of selling ice cream and fridge magnets, the museum should be focusing on the content and quality of its exhibition.

My time in Berlin so far has allowed me to consider how the GDR can and should fit into German society, politics and culture today. The bygone state I have been studying at university for the past two years has now taken on a new form in my head, as I observe how the DDR Museum attempts to find its place and purpose in a country that is still very much shaped by its socialist past.

The question I posed at the beginning of this article is one that I still do not have an answer to and perhaps never will. However, if I have learned anything during my time at the museum so far, it is that the way the GDR is remembered inevitably varies from person to person. The older East Germans I speak to at the museum’s events bring a very different perspective to the school pupils who run around the gift shop with their friends, as well as to the British intern who is writing this article right now.

The reviews I discussed above make clear that, whilst the museum is doing many things right for its visitors, it also seems to be doing many things wrong. This will always be the case when recounting a part of history that continues to have a considerable impact on the present. Regardless of its successes and failures, the most important thing is that the museum exists at all. With its neon blue sign lighting up the Spree river and beckoning Berlin’s tourists to its entrance, the DDR Museum acts as a constant reminder of the defunct state that shaped – and continues to shape – multiple generations. It is an ideal starting point for those who know nothing about the GDR and a suitable form of remembrance for those who perhaps know it too well.

Regardless of their approach and reception, institutions like the DDR Museum play an integral role in carrying the historical legacy of the GDR – even if it does come in the form of a chicken-shaped egg cup.

By Naomi Hattam

Despite Germany’s linguistic pragmatism, Germans seem to have a knack for inventing words that we wish we had made up first in English: Sehnsucht, Schadenfreude and Schnapsidee are a few personal favourites. But a more politically charged and, arguably, more ‘German’ example is Vergangenheitsbewältigung – the process of coming to terms with the past. What this looks like in practice varies, but it generally involves the acknowledgement of and atonement for culpable national history.

It is perhaps unsurprising that the Germans coined a word for a process that has dominated public life since reunification. With twelve years of National Socialism to look back on, no other country has confronted its past like Germany. In September 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz pledged 1.2 billion euros for the care of elderly Holocaust survivors and further Holocaust education. At a time when purse strings are tightening, this promise demonstrates the government’s ongoing commitment to Vergangenheitsbewältigung

Germany leads by example in its atonement for the Holocaust, which in its depravity led to the coining of the word genocide – the crime of crimes. But it seems that German Vergangenheitsbewältigung begins and ends with Nazi atrocities, even though the Holocaust was not the first genocide to be committed by the Germans in the twentieth century.

Comparatively short-lived to those of France and Great Britain, the German Empire (18711918) was nevertheless brutal in its oppression of native populations.

Their violent suppression of the Ovaherero and Nama uprisings in German Southwest Africa (1904-1908) escalated into the first genocide of the 1900s, with the death of around eighty percent of the total Ovaherero population and significant losses to the Nama. Likewise, the use of famine as a weapon in German East Africa killed hundreds of thousands of natives during the Maji Maji Uprising (1905-1907).

Though debate continues, many scholars agree on a connection between these colonial tactics of subjugation and annihilation and the Nazis’ methods to exclude and eliminate groups on racial grounds. In 1985, the UN classified the Herero massacre as a genocide, but it was not until 2015 that the Bundesregierung informally acknowledged it. This fostered some reconciliation between Germany and the Herero population, but, frankly, the first genocide of the twentieth century still receives little attention outside of Namibia.

The explanation for this is complex but two overarching factors have influenced successive governments. Firstly, there is the significance of the Holocaust. The sheer horror of the Nazis’ systemic murder on racist and eugenicist grounds created a new barometer for human evil and caused seismic changes around the world. It is, therefore, neither wrong nor unexpected that it carries such weight in public memory discourse. Rather, it raises the question of why Vergangenheitsbewältigung, for all the good it has done, is absent in other cases of state-inflicted barbarity.

ood relations with Britain and France are influential and some German ---------------officials fear the frosty reception of raising colonial culpability. More so, however, politicians and scholars are concerned that they would be treading dangerous territory by discussing ‘another genocide’ that could be perceived as comparative to, even reductive of, the Holocaust. The subject no doubt requires sensitivity and their trepidation is understandable. But this argument assumes that Vergangenheitsbewältigung is a zero-sum game, that acknowledging one atrocity will come at the cost of the other. Investing in Holocaust Vergangenheitsbewältigung is important and should continue. But it also feels wrong to neglect aspects of history which have devastated and traumatised other populations, based on the perception that it could devalue another barbarity. Should memory be so insecure? It doesn’t need to be. Atonement for both doesn’t equate to their comparison or equalisation. Far from a zero-sum game, processing the past appeals to all of history’s lessons.

Practicality is the Bundesregierung’s second and more predictable prerequisite for colonial Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Specifically: money. Legal advisors to the government have admitted that German-Namibian settlements regarding the Herero genocide have intentionally avoided the word ‘reparations’, preferring ‘investment’ instead. This is because the legal and financial onus on reparations is greater, and the Bundesregierung fears that conceding to Namibia would embolden others to make claims against Germany, as Greece and Italy have already attempted. The reparative payments towards Holocaust survivors are admirable in their enormity and instrumental in the education of millions worldwide. But because of its magnitude, conservative politicians, especially those in the far-right Alternative für Deutschland party, worry this would have to be replicated, which they argue is financially unviable.

For all the politics, it must be acknowledged that Germany is still streets ahead of its allies by even pursuing Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Like in Great Britain and France, the past decade has witnessed increased public and scholarly engagement in postcolonial debates, particularly over the restitution of stolen artefacts. The controversy of Berlin’s Humboldt Forum, which celebrates the Prussian Empire by displaying looted art and objects, perfectly exhibits growing tensions in postcolonial Germany through its opening in 2021 and the disapproval that followed.

In 2021, the Bundesregierung formally recognised the genocide as part of an agreement with Namibia, which committed Germany to annual funds over a period of thirty years for construction and development within former Herero territory. This was contentious amongst Namibians, but it was nonetheless unprecedented for a former imperial power. In many ways, however, this highlights the absence of colonial crimes on the European agenda, indicating that racism continues to rear its ugly head.

There is still a long way to go for imperial Vergangenheitsbewältigung to be both accepted and fully implemented in Germany. In part, the Bundesregierung’s caution is understandable and its sensitivity to the Holocaust is not misplaced. At the same time, Germany exemplifies the advantages of Vergangenheitsbewältigung and the potential that championing justice can have in healing relations and rebuilding for the better. Humility in governance is power: Germany is widely considered to be a trusting pair of hands internationally, seen as the de facto leader of Europe and even of the “Free World”, according to the New York Times (2015).

It is debated whether this is because of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, but Germany’s position as Europe’s “moral compass” during the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 and Merkel’s use of the past to justify her generous asylum policy allude to its significance.

By beginning to process its imperial history, Germany has already achieved levels of progress in former colonial relations that are unseen elsewhere. Taking up the mantel of moral authority, the Bundesregierung should not shy away from further colonial Vergangenheitsbewältigung, but should rather press others to follow the precedent it has established.

Despite committing one of the worst evils in history, coming to terms with its Nazi past has strengthened Germany, painful and slow though it has been. When will governments understand that it is not weak to confront their own injustice? Maybe money makes the world go round, but the pursuit of justice and integrity pays off eventually. There’s only so long that former colonial powers can ignore the colossal elephant in the room.

By Otti Michelson

The Ampel-Koalition, formed following Germany’s 2021 federal election, has set out to legalise the recreational consumption of cannabis or Freizeitskonsum. Whilst currently not top of the agenda, with events in Eastern Europe and the possibility of a global economic recession requiring a little more urgency, it nevertheless appears that the Ampel-Koalition is keen to deliver on their Koalitionsvertrag (coalition agreement). It would make Germany the second EU country after Malta to legalise the recreational use of cannabis.

“Only second?!”, or perhaps “Malta?!”, you may say to yourself, thoughts leaping to the coffee shops of Amsterdam which draw in thousands of tourists each year. Many European nations, the Netherlands being the foremost example, have decriminalised or shown a certain level of tolerance to possession of the drug. Nevertheless, they are yet to legalise cannabis.

Germany has relaxed its attitude towards personal cannabis consumption in recent decades; a 1992 reform means that those possessing a ‘small amount’ are not prosecuted. Each of the 16 Bundersländer exercises its own judgement on what is considered a ‘small amount’, with most permitting possession of up to six grams. Berlin, perhaps unsurprisingly, stands out. The city-state, often viewed by young people as a bastion of European party culture and social liberalism, does not prosecute those possessing up to 15 grams of the drug.

Given such a liberal attitude towards personal use, the need for complete legalisation may seem unclear. However, the decriminalisation model, which an increasing number of European states have implemented (Switzerland in 2013 and Austria in 2016, for example), has serious flaws. Decriminalising only the end stage of the cannabis supply chain does little to protect consumers and nothing to regulate quality or strength. This has the potential to fuel the black market, strengthening organised crime gangs that bring the drug into the country.

In 2018, the Greens and FDP, belonging to the government’s three-way coalition, announced their plan to legalise Freizeitskonsum if elected. Their reasoning appeared to lie primarily in the weaknesses of the decriminalisation model; a bill drafted by the Greens in 2018 proposed regulation of the entire supply chain from the plant’s cultivation to the consumer. It is a move which would safeguard the growing number of young users whose brains are particularly vulnerable to the adverse neurological effects of the strongest strains of cannabis. Tax revenue also plays a role. The University of Düsseldorf estimates that the economic benefits of legalisation equate to up to 4.71 billion euros, calculated using the saved costs in policing and healthcare combined with expected tax revenue.

Despite the logical reasoning and public support behind the plans, legal obstacles threaten to stall the AmpelKoalition’s progress on the issue.

oncerns are focused on the cccccccccccccompatibility of Germany’s lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllproposed legalisation and lllllllllllllllllllll regulation of the market with EU law and UN drug control conventions. As a member of the Schengen Area, it remains Germany’s responsibility, according to an agreement signed in 1985, “to prevent and punish by administrative and penal measures the illegal export of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, including cannabis.” Although Malta, also an EU member and signatory of the Schengen Agreement, successfully legalised the personal use of up to seven grams of cannabis and cultivation of up to four plants in 2021, it faced fewer barriers as it did not legalise the entire distribution network as Germany is attempting to.

Last month, the German government published an Eckpunktepapier (key issues paper), in which it outlined its plans to legalise and regulate the recreational cannabis market. The German government has established that the most straightforward way to ensure that German legalisation complies with EU law is through what it calls an Interpretationslösung (interpretative solution), a declaration that the government’s plans fulfil Germany’s international legal obligations. Such interpretive solutions have previously only been used to justify tolerance and decriminalisation rather than the legalisation proposed, making this a bold and unprecedented move. If the Interpretationslösung is rejected by the European Commission, the Eckpunktepapier acknowledges that amendments to EU and international law would be necessary for the government’s plans to be realised. This further hurdle would push back any potential legalisation far beyond the government’s current 2024 target and likely beyond their term of office entirely.

Though evidently not the most pressing concern the German government currently faces, success in overcoming the hurdles of cannabis legalisation would have significant domestic and international impact. Domestically, it is believed that the nation would become the world’s largest legal cannabis market, stimulating economic growth and job creation. If taxed appropriately, the black market could be quashed and the 4 million Germans who regularly use cannabis assured of the quality and safety of their chosen products. Internationally, Germany would set a precedent for other governments within and beyond the EU, likely finding themselves under increasing public pressure to follow suit.

The 26th September 2021 marked the end of an era in Germany. For the first time since 2005, Angela Merkel did not lead the Conservatives into a federal election. For the first time since the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949, no incumbent Chancellor was running in an election – excluding the first election, of course. And for the first time since 2002, the Social Democrats were the strongest party in a federal election, which had seemed impossible only three months before. The election brought about a type of change that can barely be considered disruptive. Germans love continuity, and it seemed very ‘continuous’ when Merkel’s deputy Olaf Scholz became Federal Chancellor in December. Since then, however, Germany has changed considerably since September 2021. What exactly happened during this period?

When Scholz’s government – the first coalition consisting of Social Democrats, Greens and Liberals – began its work, it aimed to pass some reforms which had previously been blocked by the Conservatives: a higher minimum wage, a lower minimum age for suffrage, fewer restrictions on abortion, and more publicly financed flats. The first challenge began when tension in Eastern Ukraine began rising and German politicians debated about whether to deliver weapons or not. Putin’s attack on Ukraine on 24th February showed that the Schonfrist (grace period) for the new coalition was suddenly over and that the government had to start making difficult decisions independent of ideological premises. The Greens, formerly aligned with radical pacifism, had to agree to military support for Ukraine, and some of them have even become the loudest advocates for weapons.

By Robin Fugmann

The cleavage between the parties in the political centre and those on its peripheries today is striking. Whilst the SPD, CDU/CSU, Greens and FDP mostly agree on military support for Ukraine and imposing sanctions on Russia, the nationalist Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Left Party refuse to support these policies.

And what about the moderate opposition party? The CDU – led by Merkel’s former rival Friedrich Merz – has found its role in harshly criticising the government. Perhaps it was Merz’s fate to be an opposition leader, having gained experience in this role as chairman of the party’s parliamentary group between 2000 and 2002.

And now, as the Western World tries to do as much as possible to isolate Putin’s regime, it is obvious that Germany’s dependence on Russia is the result of cardinal errors made in the last 20 years. Putin does not even need to explicitly blackmail Germany when it comes to gas –we know that ourselves. This is why Germany’s foreign policy towards Russia often appears discouraged. Heating bills are currently the number one issue among the population, and the more Russian gas you use, the more you help Putin finance his horrific war. Many people are now promising to use their heaters less, even calling it Frieren für den Frieden (freezing for peace).

ealistically speaking, I predict many ----------- people will give up on this attitude in -the coldest weeks of winter. The elderly especially are less willing to abstain from heating, but nobody can predict what would happen if imports of Russian gas stopped immediately. This scenario is far from straightforward and its outcome would depend solely on the population’s behaviour. I have strong concerns that a significant and emotional cleavage between supporters and opponents of the government’s policies may once again arise. In a broader context, it seems to be that a new political milieu has emerged during the last few years: apolitical, dissatisfied people who always complain about the government no matter what course of action it takes. It will be the task of the moderate, democratic parties to integrate these voices into the policy-making process. Otherwise, the share of protest parties in German parliaments will rise.

The public’s focus is obviously on these crises, but what about other political events? In February, Frank-Walter Steinmeier was reelected as Federal President with a large majority. In April, Anne Spiegel became the first minister from the new federal government to resign because of mistakes she had previously made as a minister in Rhineland-Palatinate. One of the most undignified processes in German politics I have ever seen also happened in April when the Bundestag voted on whether to make Covid vaccinations compulsory for all citizens. It was not clear how a majority of members of the Bundestag (MdBs) would be organised for this, so the result was very chaotic. Whilst a vast majority of MdBs from the SPD and the Greens voted in favour of compulsory vaccination, the majority within the other parliamentary groups did not. Health Minister Karl Lauterbach knew that nearly everyone from the FDP was strictly against it, but he hoped that the Conservatives – generally in favour of compulsory vaccination – would support him.

Instead, the Conservatives made the Bundestag decide on their own bill that would introduce a vaccination register first and make compulsory vaccination possible later. The order in which the Bundestag decided over the bill was relevant to the parties’ tactics of blaming one another for not consenting to a productive proposal. No matter what you think about compulsory vaccination, the whole process was the result of parties trying to trick each other instead of cooperating and finding a solution.

Additionally, a ticket which can be used for local public transport all over Germany was temporarily introduced between June and August due to rising inflation. Costing only 9 euros per month, the ticket was very popular and, thus, led to crowded trains This case shows how much more is possible once you invest in infrastructure. At the moment, the government is working on the introduction of a similar ticket for the future. This could be a starting point for a new era in Germany where public transportation is finally recognised as an essential part of an environmentally friendly lifestyle.

I conclude that uncertainty and worries about Germany’s political future are on the rise. The government is facing complicated tasks and often lacks a clear position due to the parties’ varying ideologies. What we call the ‘collective action problem’ in political science – the difficulty to make the population cooperate for a general aim like saving gas – becomes apparent. Nevertheless, I assume that most people will recognise the impact of their individual behaviour and respect that it is indeed harder to govern in times of crisis than in ‘normal times’. The current situation is worse than it was one year ago but it will surely improve after the winter. Deutschland, keep calm, save gas and carry on!

Angela Merkel, the ‘Crisis Chancellor’ and ‘Mutti’ of Germany, has left behind a legacy which has been both praised and criticised across the globe. There were numerous successes during her chancellorship, demonstrating her unwavering morals and ability to handle tense situations with vigilance and practicality. Examples include her response to the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 and her political strategies during the 2008 financial crisis. Her legacy in the area of foreign policy, however, may be questioned in light of recent political events. Following the end of her chancellorship in 2021 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, some may wish to analyse Merkel's legacy on a closer level.

It is first important to acknowledge the positive aspects of Merkel’s leadership, particularly her controversial yet largely successful handling of the 2015 refugee crisis, which saw more than one million refugees flee to Germany. Although a controversial act at the time, Merkel stood by her steadfast morals and defended the right of refugees to enter Germany through its borders, welcoming those who desperately sought safety and shelter. One of Merkel’s priorities was to look beyond the mere arrival of the refugee population, also ensuring their integration into and understanding of German culture and society. Her promotion of work programmes and language and cultural integration courses is an important example, as it highlighted her understanding that the crisis was far from being a short-term political issue.

Merkel's integration initiative and her insistence on keeping borders open were somewhat successful, with many refugees now having attained an impressive level of German language proficiency and having successfully integrated themselves into society through work and education.

By Sophie Watkins-Tidley

Despite opposition from the far-right party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and some members of her own party, such as the CDU's Wolfgang Bosbach who blamed Merkel for the increase in AfD popularity, Merkel insisted on helping others whilst risking her own reputation. That is not to say, however, that she simply dismissed the opinions of others in her party; in one of her final interviews as Chancellor, she acknowledged and accepted that not all politicians agreed with her agenda and course of action. Nonetheless, Merkel remained steadfast in her humanitarian convictions.

Thus, one of Merkel’s greatest markers of success was her embrace of controversial politics in the face of these political events, understanding that great actions inevitably come with criticism. This can also be seen through her leadership during the 2008 financial crisis. Although Merkel was criticised by foreign leaders for her harsh economic policies on European nations such as Greece, she continued to act with patience and the intent of finding a sustainable solution to the recession. It was her independence and ability to remain calm under international criticism which adds to the validity of her legacy.

ert Rürup, a German economist and former chairman of the German ------------Council of Economic Experts, ------argues that Merkel had to stimulate the economy in order to prevent its collapse, whilst also introducing strict austerity measures on certain countries including Greece. Merkel insisted that, unlike in countries such as France and the United Kingdom, there would be no short-term plan implemented in Germany. At the time, Merkel was heavily criticised for her economic policies as many individuals did not agree with certain sanctions. Despite this, she continued to shed some lighthearted humour throughout the crisis, as evidenced in a Frankfurter Allgemeine interview, whereby she was questioned on the impact the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers Firm would have on the German economy. Merkel responded that they should have asked a “Schwabische Hausfrau” – a housewife who is stereotypically good with money. This sense of humour acts as a testament to Merkel’s success, able to spread laughter through a worrying time whilst still remaining headstrong in her pursuit of political solutions.

The 2022 Afghanistan crisis can also be seen as one of Merkel’s successes, continuing her practical and patient style of politics in order to move as many German citizens as possible out of the country. Merkel admitted that she had made a mistake in her failure to anticipate an authoritarian takeover of Afghanistan. Although this made her vulnerable to criticism, it may also be viewed as another positive aspect of her legacy: the ability to admit one's mistakes. Such honesty is difficult to find in today’s political landscape, yet Merkel thought it better to present herself as an honest leader as opposed to a perfect one.

The limitations and criticisms of Merkel’s legacy were also affected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine this year. Before the invasion, Germany was importing 55% of its gas from Russia, which had steadily increased since the beginning of Merkel’s chancellorship and support of Nord Stream 2. Whilst Germany’s reliance on Russian gas made Merkel vulnerable to criticism, she continued to defend her actions, arguing that her politics were always based on what was the best solution at the time. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is not surprising, but this does not necessarily mean that it was expected or easily anticipated prior to February of 2022. Thus, it is clear that Merkel was acting in Germany’s best interests at the time of her decision to strengthen political ties with Russia.

Angela Merkel has undoubtedly left behind a positive legacy, regardless of the role that recent political events have played in attempting to distort her political image. She should be remembered as the chancellor who showed the world that crisis and hardship can be met with compassion and kindness, despite the difficult positions a politician may find themselves in. She willingly opposed members of her party in pursuit of morality, as expressed in her famous statement “wir schaffen das”. This is Merkel's true legacy – her understanding of the concept of freedom and her ability to embody hope and kindness in the midst of political instability.