Politik:Perspektive Vl. 6

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POLITIK PERSPEK TIVE

A COLLABORATIVE STUDENT MAGAzINE ON GERMAN POLItics & SOCIETY

WRITERS

Travis simpson Oliver LaWrie Katie McCarthy Lia Stancheva Emma Delgado Harry Nellis DESIGN

HOWE-YEE LAW @HAL_DESIGNS

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POLITIK

SPECIAL

ELECTION EDITION

CONTENT 05 08

Understanding the German Electoral Landscape: Election Preview

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A ROUND UP OF ELECTION RESULTS IN 2021

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(Baer)Bock auf die Politik?

Why Women Have it Harder in German Politics

Traffic Lights & Jamaican Flags: A Toast To The Underwhelming Reality of the 2021 German Election From Consensus to Conflict : Negotiating The Paradox Of Germany’s Consensus Democracy Following Germany’s Lead: How We Ensure A Successful Handling Of The Impending Afghanistan Refugee CrisiS Football and beer: That’s why we’re here Right-wing extremism in the Austrian mainstream

EDITORs FROM THE

Servus all round & thanks again for ‘picking up’ a copy of Politik:Perspektive!

Corona may have stopped us meeting up, but it hasn’t stopped us providing you with another edition of your favourite University of Leeds German Department journal!

If you’re new to P:P, welcome to our student-led journal on all things relevant in the German-speaking space.

Written by you, for you - it’s been a pleasure reading through this edition’s pieces.

This sixth issue offers another first-class selection of pressing themes. From a wide-reaching and thorough analysis of the recent German election, through to understanding the counter-intuitive prevalence of contemporary nationalism in Austrian politics, this edition is sure to challenge your perspectives of the German-speaking space.

Editing this article was, as ever, a pleasure. We hope you enjoy engaging with these topics as much as we have.

Bis bald, Oli and Harry

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ELECTION 2021 Predicting an election result is a fool’s game, but let’s go for it

- TRAVIS SIMPSON

despite the misogyny that plagues their efforts, women deserve to be in politics.’ -Katie McCarthy

Germany is setting the standard for how democratic systems of election can serve its citizens in a productive manner’ - Oliver Lawrie

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Understanding the German Electoral Landscape: Election Preview

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07 On the 26th of September, Germany will be heading to the polls. The task? Entrust a political party with the responsibility of navigating the country out of the pandemic while dealing with the inordinate number of equally pressing issues facing modern Germany society. For the past 16 years, voters have given this responsibility to the immutable force that has been the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party led by Angela Merkel. Many young voters can’t conceive of a Germany without Merkel at the helm, but like it or not, as Germany gets ready to welcome her successor, the seemingly infinite presence of Merkel is drawing to a close.

Understanding The Electoral System Do Germans Vote for a Person or a Party?

Both. Germans get two votes on election day: one first-past-the-post vote for a local MP and one proportional representation vote for a political party. This second vote is that which will be used to determine the distribution of seats in the Bundestag, otherwise known as the lower house of German parliament, that is comparable to the house of commons in the United Kingdom, or the House of Representatives in the United States.

Do Germans Vote for a Person or a Party?

Why are there always coalition governments in Germany?

There has never been a majority government in the history of the Federal German Republic. The more seats a party has, the more influence they hold in forming the coalition government that will go onto to rule Germany at the federal level, however to have a high enough proportion of the vote share to form your own government simply does not happen.

Why has Angela Merkel been Chancellor if nobody votes for her?

Merkel has only led the conservatives because she was chosen as leader of that party by the party itself. If that party gets the highest vote share in a coalition, their ‘Kanzlerkandidat:in’ (Chancellor candidate) becomes de-facto leader of Germany, even if their party did not get a majority in parliament.

CDU

Greens

Looking at recent opinion polls, we can see there are three main parties who are in contention to win enough seats to lead a coalition government.

Firstly, the CDU and the CSU (the CDU’s sister party based in Bavaria) have led coalition governments since 2005, seeing relatively comfortable victories in the past four elections. With Angela Merkel stepping down, Armin Laschet is leading the party into the election, but with the party’s approval rating slumping, conservatives are scrambling to regain support with just weeks before judgement day.

It appears a primary factor in explaining the CDU’s large drop in support is down to the leadership; namely Armin Laschet himself. In early July, the CDU were enjoying a comfortable 10-point lead above the second most supported party at the time, but after being filmed laughing at an event honouring flood victims, opinion polls show the party falling from around 29% support in July to as low as 19% in some polls. Laschet is desperate to convince voters that the man in the video does not represent the real Armin Laschet. Although he has repeatedly apologised for the incident, voters don’t seem to be as forgiving as he might have hoped, and the CDU look to be set for one of their worst election results in decades.

After a short stint in the lead in May with 25% of the vote, the Greens now find themselves in third place with around 16% of voters poised to minority party in a coalition. Leader Annalena Baerbock was considered a possible chancellor four months ago, but after a series of blunders including exaggerations in her CV and failing to declare money she received from her party, opposition MPs have been able to make her and her party appear unreliable and untrustworthy. Voters also worry about how policies to combat climate change will affect their livelihoods, with many low-income households unable to afford a sudden shift to an environment-first economic model.

SPD The Social Democratic Party (SPD), led by current finance minister Olaf Scholz, are now leading in most polls. Before Laschet was caught in hysterics at flood sites, the SPD were at 16% in the polls, but now find themselves predicted to win 26% of the vote. Unlike the CDU, the SPD have a leader who is widely popular among Germans and has a positive influence on the popularity of the party.

That being said, Scholz has faced his own criticisms and scandals, particularly surrounding accusations of money laundering in the finance ministry (even leading to police raiding the ministry on 9 September) and proposed fiscal policy, but none of them have stuck as much as conservatives will have hoped.

Laschet’s party also warn against the SPD not ruling out a coalition with The Left, a radical-left party which supports the disbandment of NATO. Whether this will affect voters’ opinions remains to be seen, but it doesn’t seem to be having much of an affect present.

Predicting an election result is a fool’s game, but let’s go for it Although support for the party is waning and is at its lowest level for a year, their current predicted share of the vote is significantly higher than the 8.9% they won in 2017. This suggests that climate issues are becoming more important to Germans, but for now not enough to have a Green led coalition this election.

Predicting the Future

ly see eye to eye with an environmental party that seeks to tax the wealthy and increase regulations to protect the environment. Another alternative is a smaller majority coalition between the SPD, the Greens, and the Left Party. Both the SPD and the Greens would be uneasy about working with such a radical-left party, but if there are no alternatives, then they may bite the bullet and make a deal so that they are indeed in government at all.

If all negotiations for a majority government were unsuccessful, a minority government could be formed, though this is undesirable for Germans.

Minority governments can give extremist parties like the Alternative for Germany (AfD) significant influence in the Bundestag, which many find unacceptable. Also, without a working majority, the government would find it difficult to pass legislation, meaning enacting legislation to help Germany recover from the pandemic would be take much longer.

The FDP (and, to a lesser extent, the Left Party) could be kingmaker if they wanted to be, but they would need to work with the Greens to prop up a government led by one of the top two parties. The centre-right FDP would prefer to work with the CDU, but the Greens have more in common with the SPD. The only certainty is that the negotiations will not be cut and dried – a coalition could take months to arrange. During this stage, Angela Merkel will remain as chancellor until a government is formed.

So what kind of coalition could we see? Predicting an election result is a fool’s game, but let’s go for it anyway.

This is democracy in action

Firstly, we are on track for a change. Polling suggests that Scholz and the SPD will be the leaders of a coalition government, the question remains which others parties are part of this. He has made it clear that he does not want to go into another coalition with the CDU, and it’s also unlikely that the CDU would be keen to be the junior partner in any coalition. Therefore, it is fair assume that they won’t work together in a potential coalition, and Germany’s go to government for the 21st century will be no more.

After lots of to-ing and fro-ing, Germany will get a new government of some description. This twisted game of coalitions, while confusing and muddled, is exactly what Germany wants. This is democracy in action; party after party having to sit down and cooperate to have a shot at enacting meaningful, representative change in their country as dictated by the electorate. The benefits of this, and more importantly Germany’s future direction, will become clear once we have the results.

Both the SPD and the CDU could have enough votes to form a three-party-coalition with the FDP and the Greens, but the liberal FDP would not like-

TRAVIs simpson UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

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08 (Baer)Bock auf die Politik?

Why Women Have it Harder in German Politics There is one woman who has dominated German politics in recent months: Annalena Baerbock. The 40-year-old politician and member of the Bundestag was nominated as the Green Party’s candidate for chancellor on 19th April, and, for a while, things seemed to be going well. Baerbock ’s compassionate approach to politics, along with her pledge to tackle the climate crisis as an utmost priority, resulted in her levelling with, if not sometimes exceeding, the governing Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in German polls.

April even saw the Greens reaching 28 percent in the polls, which, for a party that had only received 8.4 percent in the 2017 federal election, was unheard of. For the first time in Germany’s political history, the election of a Green chancellor seemed possible.

However, as is often the case with politics, hopes and dreams about a Green chancellery were quickly shrouded by an overbearing

sense of realism. The political landscape has changed significantly since April, and there is one problem that stands in the way of Baerbock ’s electoral victory.

What is it again? Oh yes, she is a woman.

Whilst many initially celebrated Baerbock ’s nomination, seeing this as an opportunity to break away from Merkel stagnation and re-shape Germany for a younger generation, others were preparing for the wave of hate and disinformation that would inevitably follow. As a female, liberal politician who coleads the Green party, regularly speaks out on climate change and has successfully balanced a demanding career with motherhood, Baerbock is an ideal target for sexist and misogynistic critique. This is especially the

09 case amongst supporters of far-right parties, who are more likely to promote a male-dominated political sphere and traditional family model.

Rolf Pohl, a sociologist and psychologist who specialises in gender studies and recently spoke with Deutsche Welle, has stated that references to Baerbock often focus on her looks, family and private life, as opposed to her political experience and credentials.

Faked pornographic photos of the Green politician have even surfaced on the internet, in an attempt to damage Baerbock ’s reputation and perpetuate this wave of hate and disinformation.

this level of misogyny... ...is disappointing but barely surprising For a country that has been led by a female chancellor for 16 consecutive years, this level of misogyny within the realm of politics is disappointing but barely surprising. A study

by Der Spiegel, published in February of this year, revealed that 69 percent of female members of parliament in Germany had at some point been victims of ‘misogynistic hatred.’ 64 percent admitted to having received hate messages, whilst 34 percent had experienced physical ‘attacks on themselves, their offices or their home.’ For female politicians, entering the German government does not simply mean attending political hearings in the Bundestag and voting on new pieces of legislation. It also means combating the systemic misogyny embedded within this political system and not always feeling trusted or heard by their male peers.

Annalena Baerbock has consequently been criticised for relatively minor errors and shortcomings. A series of recent scandals have damaged Baerbock ’s image, as well as her position in the polls. It all started with an exaggeration found in Baerbock ’s online CV, in which the chancellor nominee claimed to have been a member of the Ger-

man Marshall Fund. Baerbock was only ever a supporter of the think tank, not a member.

Next was an uncovering of her failure to report a Christmas bonus to officials in the Bundestag. The most recent scandal revolves around Baerbock ’s publication Jetzt: Wie wir unser Land erneuern (Now: How We Renew Our Country). Publicity has mainly focused on her failure to cite information taken from other sources, even though the book is not a scholarly work and thus does not require obligatory citations.

None of these scandals are excusable; politicians should always be held accountable for their misconduct, regardless of gender or party identification. Yet, the significance of Baerbock ’s errors has been blown out of proportion within German media and political circles, especially considering her appropriate response to each incident. The Green politician quickly apologised for a lack of oversight and ‘sloppiness’ in publishing the details of her CV and registered her Christmas bonus immediately after hearing of her failure to correctly report this to the Bundestag administration. Regarding her recent book publication, Baerbock has promised to cite sources correctly in future editions.

Unlike some male politicians, who dispute accusations made against them and try to convince others of their innocence (our own Prime Minister is a shining example), Baerbock has taken full responsibility for her actions in an attempt to regain voters’ trust and promote transparency within politics. ‘I obviously made a mistake, and I am very sorry,’ she told public broadcaster ARD. ‘Because we should be focusing on other more important issues at this point in time.’

politicians should always be held accountable for their misconduct, regardless of gender

Katie McCarthy UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

SPD

ALICE WEidel & TINo CHRUPalla

AFD 92

FDP

196 SEATS

83 SEATS

ARMIN LASCHET

SEATS

Olaf Scholz

Janine Wissler

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THE LEFT

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CHRISTIAN LINDNER

HOW THE GERGREENS MANY ANNALENA BAERBOCK

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SEATS

Whether Germany can make these changes is yet to be seen, but Baerbock ’s resilience in the past few months makes one thing clear: despite the misogyny that plagues their efforts, women deserve to be in politics.

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39 SEATS

Germany currently finds itself at a crossroads, and the results of this year’s federal election could provide the country with a new beginning in more ways than one. Now is not only the time for a new political leader, but also an upgrade of Germany’s political system. It must be altered to cater for the entrance of female politicians into the Bundestag, as well as their rise into higher posts.

Female politicians need to be given the same opportunities as their male counterparts if Germany wishes to boast of a fair and representative democratic system, and gender should never play a role in the assessment of political skill. Perhaps most importantly, female politicians should be made to feel safe in government and measures should be taken to ensure that reports of misogyny and sexism are dealt with seriously.

Now is not only the time for a new political leader, but also an upgrade of Germany’s political system.

Baerbock makes a salient point here, one that female politicians are surely all too familiar with. In discussing the minor errors of a female politician and utilising them to incite gender discrimination, important issues, such as recovery from the pandemic, climate policies and immigration, have been pushed to the wayside. And what is there to gain from such discussions in the first place?

The scandals do not necessarily tell us anything about Baerbock ’s ‘true character’ or lack of credibility, but rather that she is simply human, making mistakes and learning from them. Surely this is something that all politicians can testify to.

CDU/CSU

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*information taken from The Economist

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Traffic Lights & Jamaican Flags: A Toast To The Underwhelming Reality of the 2021 German Election

Grand Coalition - SPD and CDU/CSU Another ‘Grand Coalition’ is not on the cards at present, even if it would offer the most stable government of those on offer. The SPD has made clear it would prefer to build a centre-left government, and enact change in German politics that would leave the conservatives in opposition for the first time in 16 years.

Traffic Light Coalition - SPD, Green, FDP So named because of the colours that represent each party (see title), the Ampel (Traffic Light) coalition seems the most likely government that will form after this election.

The SPD have the first bite of the coalition-forming cherry as they were the largest party, and they see the centre-left politics of the Greens as more than palatable. Issues arise when we throw the FDP into the mix, given the fact their small-state low taxation raison d ’être is the absolute antithesis of the two parent parties seeking their support.

Jamaica Coalition - CDU/CSU, Green, FDP

It’s 18:00 on Sunday 26 September. Years of era-defining Merkel conservatism are drawing to a close, and you can’t bear to look as the exit poll is released; a poll which will dictate the direction of Germany and Europe in the most precarious of times for years to come.

With bated breath you see the predictions, and realise that the Social Democrats (SPD) are victors with 25.7% of the vote, but only by a margin as narrow as well f lattened pork schnitzel. They’re ahead of the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) by a too-close-for comfort 1.6%, and all the while the Greens & the Free Democrats (FPD) are preparing themselves to play kingmaker, lingering in the background on 14.8% and 11.5% respectively.

You’re tired, but rather than head to your Schlafzimmer, content in the knowledge that the leading European powerhouse has its governmental house in order, you are confused. While you are now aware of the make-

up of the Bundestag (German Lower House), you are about as close to understanding what a post-Merkel German government as you were this time last week.

Koalieren oder nicht koalieren, das ist hier die Frage (to form a coalition or to not form a coalition, that is the question) While the previous scenario is (mostly) fictional, it is certainly based in truth. While the result is known, many political commentators in Germany and beyond have been playing games of ‘coalitions‘ in the wake of the election; with 3 outcomes from future coalition negotiations expected.

Koalieren oder nicht koalieren, das ist hier die Frage to form a coalition or to not form a coalition, that is the question

Also names after the colours of the parties making up that of the Jamaican f lag, this coalition presents a mirror image of the traffic light coalition, albeit less likely to form.

Should the SPD fail to form a government, the conservatives can try and form a government as the second largest party. The same issues arise, however. While the CDU and FDP are more similar on the political spectrum, the Greens are not, and will demand the highest of prices for their support.

Democracy In Action While this election will be historic for Angela Merkel’s absence, this acts as a perfect example of why, in many instances, elections in Germany are about as underwhelming as your average Rammstein tribute band.

There were no fireworks on polling night in Germany: No landslide majorities, no electoral collapses, no shock resignations. Underwhelming? Yes. But Germany is setting the standard for how democratic systems of

this election will be historic for Angela Merkel’s absence election can serve its citizens in a productive manner.

Political actors, sometimes with distinctly antithetical political ideologies, will have to take the time to sit down, talk and compromise if they want to govern Germany. That is the price which a German election demands of those who want the privilege of governing their country, and price that is completely justified. It may well be that we don’t see a new German government sworn in until well after spring has sprung, but Germany can afford to wait. A functional representative democracy that produces a representative, progressive government may be a pursuit that takes time, but it is a noble one nonetheless.

OLIVER LAWRIE UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

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From Consensus to Conflict: Negotiating The Paradox Of Germany’s Consensus Democracy

When looking at consensus democracy, perhaps it is unsurprising given their volatile history, that Germany comes directly to mind. It is a textbook example; a government that, on paper at least, can only govern effectively when a broad, representative range of opinions is taken into account, in contrast to using a large majority to marginalise views that diverge from that of the given governing party.

In exploring the reasons behind the relative success of German consensual democracy, it is easier to see it as a point of comparison in a long-standing political debate: at what point do the institutions put in place to inspire consensus hinder efficient political process, and therefore undermine the very foundation of German democracy?

Such is the paradox that exists at the heart of the German political system.

The structure of consensus Germany has taken many steps to ensure their system tends towards consensus, even down to the physical space in which democracy is practiced. The very shape of the internal Bundestag (German Parliament’s lower chamber) is one which serves to inspire consensus. The hemicycle seating arrangement is thought by political theorists to induce consensual parliamentary proceedings.

An innocuous choice, but on closer inspection this has a significant inf luence on how, and the tone in which, democratic debate is run. Rather than be facing each other in a confrontational way, as can be seen in the British Parliament’s House of Commons, German debates are less hostile, and certainly include less jabbering and jeering in the background when discussions are taking place.

Even Winston Churchill recognised the opportunity (or threat, depending on your point of view) of the physical space in which democracy is practiced. When the Houses of Parliament were bombed in the War, Winston Churchill argued for the Chambers to be rebuilt in the same ‘oblong’ shape. In a

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Even the architectural design of the Reichstag (the building in which German parliament sits) inspires consensus. The building itself is topped with a glass dome to represent transparency in politics, a feature which not only allows public viewings of the debating chamber, but quite literally sheds light on the German democratic process.

Secondly, bicameralism and co-legislation aid consensus. With the legislature divided into two elected assemblies, not only are a larger, more diverse range of views included in any decision-making process, but there are more opportunities to critique and amend legislation proposed by the government.

nearly half a year to form another Grand Coalition [is] simply too long to implement a democratic mandate Furthermore, as Germany’s Bundesrat (upper house) is formed of regional governments, elected members simultaneously represent interests of their party in the Bundestag and the territorial interests of their Bundesland (state). To contextualise the consensual nature of this, in the legislative period between 2013 and 2017, 553 out of 555 proposals that had been sent from Bundestag to Bundesrat were passed, while the other two were accepted after re-negotiation in the arbitration committee. This extremely high success rate of passing legislation is down to intense negotiation preceding Bundesrat sessions, rather than governments looking internally, as happens in other countries. This set-up

is even in direct contrast to other bicameral legislatures, such as that of the UK, as the Bundesrat has an equal legitimacy with the electorate and has strong powers, a luxury which the House of Lords does not afford.

On an even more fundamental level, this sense of consensus is premeditated by the German electoral system. Proportional representation makes coalitions almost inevitable, with a very slim possibility of a one-party state. Consequently, decisions are based on compromise and are mutually beneficial for those across the political spectrum, whereas in majoritarian voting systems, such as the UK’s first-past-the-post system, this is rarely the case.

Battling for consensus Ironically, although the very system fosters participation from most actors on the political spectrum, consensus comes full circle, and can result in conf lict. Since the 1980s, the effective number of parties has steadily increased, reaching an all-time high of 4.6 in the federal elections in 2017. This fractionalisation serves to make coalition-building, and therefore government-building, a more complicated, time-consuming and politically draining task.

In the 2017 election, it took nearly half a year to form another Grand Coalition. In a politically volatile world, there are very convincing arguments that such a length of time is simply too long to implement a democratic mandate. In the most recent elections, for example, the last thing voters decided was for Angela Merkel to have another 6 months in office.

It is clear too that there is a limit on consensus in Germany, and who qualifies to be a part of this consensual process. In the latest election, the far-right Alternative für Deutschland ’s (Af D) gained 10.3% of votes for the Bundestag (a 2.3% decline on the 2017 election), yet parties continually refuse to cooperate with the party, which is viewed as ‘too extreme’ for German politics. In the most recent elections, parties refused to even countenance entering into a coalition with

the Af D, citing their desire to only work with democratic parties.

The future of consensual democracy There are, therefore, big questions to answer about what lies ahead for consensus politics in Germany, especially in a post-Merkel world. Many believe that Merkel has been the driver of this traditional consensus-driven political approach. Yet, CDU party insiders fear the defeat in September could throw the once-dominant force of German postwar politics into an existential crisis, fracturing a consensus that could even lead to a split between centrists and conservative hardliners.

There are even some, such as Wolfgang Merkel, director of the democracy and democratization unit of the Berlin Social Science Center, who believe this dwindling of consensus is a sign of maturity and a restoration of debate. Some voters are saying that ‘Grand Coalitions’ are causing centrist parties to become so indistinguishable that it is preventing healthy debate, and eroding the fundamentals of democracy. In this respect, this friction may be removing consensus, but actually creating a healthier democratic process.

There are even more fundamental questions about whether trying to keep a consensus is damaging democracy. Can a Parliament that ignores the 5th biggest party be truly democratic? After all, the point of democracy is to fulfil the will of the people. In an age of populism, it is clear you either need to share government with people whom you are ideologically opposed to, or you have no government at all. It is unclear whether future leaders of Germany will be ready to embrace this, and if they are not, where does that leave those whose opinions aren’t palatable to the German establishment? As is the way in politics, we can make an educated guess, but only with time will the answers become clear. What is becoming evident is that with the rise of populism, the fundamental mechanisms put in place to ensure consensus, may not be enough.

there are big questions to answer about what lies ahead for consensus politics in Germany

famous speech in 1943, Churchill noted that to keep parties strong and distinct, opposing benches were essential in making “crossing the [physical and political] f loor” more difficult. He was acutely aware of the fact that “we shape our buildings and then our buildings shape us”.

EMMA DELGADO UNIVERSITY OF Nottingham

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Following Germany’s Lead:

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How We Ensure A Successful Handling Of The Impending Afghanistan Refugee Crisis

The escalation of refugee crises in Europe has been recognised by the European Commission (EC) as one of the most serious problems after World War II; something that has been keenly felt by Germany and its Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF).

Having been recognised as the second-largest destination for migrants according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Germany has put an emphasis on ensuring a symbiosis exists between welcoming migrants and understanding their needs, whilst also balancing the demographic change and social mobility within the country.

Nowadays, immigrating for a period of time to seek better opportunities in life is commonplace; whether it would be leaving your home country for better education or to find ways to support your family financially. Looking to the past, many historical events prove the theory that migration is a continuous process whose echo reverberates throughout the world still to this day. To start to understand this process, the related terminology and the factors which drive this phenomenon is essential when reliably analysing these topics, and I shall aim to do so in this article.

The escalation of refugee crises in Europe has been recognised by the European Commission as one of the most serious problems after World War II What Is Migration?

As stated by the International Organisation for Migration in 2015, the word “migration” means “movement of an individual or group of people across an international border or

within one country”. In a historical context this process started when the nomadic tribes wandered across various territories in search of new pastures and better places for hunting and fishing. Scroll forward to the modern day and the situation has not changed as drastically as you might think when looking at the reasons why people decide to leave behind their families to start a new life elsewhere. Religious conf licts, political grievances, lack of prospects, climate change, poverty – these all lead to the search of better living conditions away from home, where people would receive better education, opportunities for development and a safe living environment. According to the German Documentation Centre for Migration, the total population from a migrant background has risen to almost 16 million in the period between 2005 and 2011. Why Germany? After the unification in 1990, the country has been seen as an appealing destination – high employment rates, stable economy, and most importantly welcoming policies to settle in faster and secure a job abroad.

Germany’s Unique Relationship To Migration Germany has been at both ends of the proverbial migration spectrum. In the first half of the 19th century the country lost a significant portion of its population as millions of people emigrated to the USA. Soon after however, rapid industrialisation and the foundation of the German Customs Union counteracted this process, laying the foundations for Germany to become the largest industrial economy in Europe and the fourth in the world. While migration has played an integral role in building Germany to what it is today, it has also deepened the question of the national identity in the country.

On the one hand, there are many positive sides that come from cultural exchange brought about by migration. A society made up of people who live a more diverse range culture is enriching and aid better intercultural understanding between the divergent cultures, something that Germany has embraced. The government has introduced new migration laws and regulations to aid the

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Just because they speak a different language or live a different culture is no reason to forget that they are human just like the rest of us.

Angela Merkel’s decision from 2015 to open the German borders and invest €21 billion towards the needs of migrants has been under the spotlight in many controversial political debates even in her own party. At worst, this was even described as an “unprecedented political mistake”. That being said, each working migrant facilitated by Merkel’s policy contributes to economic prosperity brought about by a new work force which takes most of the low paid and skilled jobs, alleviating pressure on the job market and combating a declining birth rate.

However, this is not to the detriment of German people. Studies illustrate that in the last years there was a still a healthy balance between the qualification level of the newly welcomed and those deemed as German nationals. The Federal Government has also made a statement that the declining birth rate in Germany and the consequent inf lated average age can be inf luenced positively by young immigrants who contribute to closing this demographic gap.

On the other hand, questions still remain about the ‘ethnic’ German population’s pro-migrant stance, especially given incidences such as mass antisemitic demonstrations following Merkel’s “open-door” refugee policy. Hate crimes in the country started escalating and inequalities were deepened in

the second half of the 20th century after the arrival of the so-called Gastarbeiter - “labor migrants from the countries of the Mediterranean littoral” (Roggenkamp, 1982). Although foreign worker presence was initially presumed to be temporary, it turned out to play a key role in shaping modern European politics (Schmid, 1983). In various interviews people have shared their stories about being ignored and feeling as if they were in Germany, but were not a real part of its community.

The perceived loss of national identity and culture in combination with the language barrier and the pressure on the social infrastructure are some of the most common arguments against having a welcoming migrant policy.

“Those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it“ Identifying the mistakes from the past is an essential tool in dealing with similar crises in the future in a more successful manner, such as the ‚2015 resembling crisis‘ emerging from Afghanistan (Politico, 2021). There is a fundamental question here that must be answered – what can (or must) we learn from the past, so that we can deal with the situation arising in Afghanistan in the best possible way? The impact of COVID-19 has deepened the critical situation with new refugees entering Europe and there is no doubt that only diplomatic and conscientious actions can lead to a workable long-term solution to this issue. Although the situation escalated this summer with the Taliban usurping the Afghan government, the crisis itself has been going on for more than 40 years now. Filippo Grandi – the UN High Commissioner for Refugees – has commented that “Afghanistan’s displacement crisis is one of the largest and most protracted in the history of the UN’s Refugee Agency (UNHCR, 2021). European officers are intent on taking a proactive approach, indicating that all solutions must be implemented in advance to avoid extreme ramifications should all not go to plan. Irregular immigrant f lows should be avoided,

and all member states should work together with other host countries (e.g., Iran and Pakistan) to guarantee the burden is shared fairly on all sides.

What Can You Do? As a member of a society that will most likely play its part in aiding Afghanistan, there are things you can do to help ensure a success is made of this mass migration. Take the time to educate yourself with relevant information on Afghan culture, in the hope that no baseless prejudices will obscure any interactions you may have with those coming to your country. Sympathising with their plight can lead to providing better support and more comprehensive integration to those looking for a new life abroad. To be forced to leave your home in such unprecedented times could be not only challenging, but also very emotionally draining.

Just because they speak a different language or live a different culture is no reason to forget that they are human just like the rest of us. So remember the countless benefits they bring, and restore some much needed faith in humanity if your paths do at some point cross in the future.

Lia Stancheva UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

The impact of COVID-19 has deepened the critical situation with new refugees entering Europe

processes involved with migrants. An example of this is the Anerkennungsgesetz (Recognition Act) which allows migrants to have their qualifications fully recognised in Germany and hence practice their professions to the betterment of the German economy.

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FOOTBALL AND BEER,

THAT‘s Why we‘re here

It was a quiet Saturday morning in Stuttgart, the state capital of Baden-Württemberg, as I f licked through the Futbology app in a somewhat desperate attempt to find something to do with my day. The sun was shining, apparently not too uncommon here in October, and after a few weeks of getting to know the city, I decided it was about time that I went out and experienced some of the local football culture. With any trip to Vf B Stuttgart ruled out due to the pandemic, I sought out a lower-league fixture, hoping not to have to travel too far from my f lat. A 25-minute train journey ensued until I reached my destination for the day: Backnang, home of TSG Backnang 1919, newly-promoted to the Oberliga Baden-Württemberg. What a decision it turned out to be!

The walk from the train station down to the Etzwiesen Stadion was gorgeous, crossing the Murr River and meandering through the town’s quiet outer streets. It was then

that the matchday feeling finally returned.

As I neared the stadium, the imposing Murr Valley Viaduct seemed to arise from nothing, providing a stellar entrance, and later backdrop, to my first game in over 7 months.

A friendly welcome to the ground followed, with a Helles beer and Bratwurst mit Senf from the oddly-named ‘Bienenstand ’ not far behind. As for the ground itself, well, it’s simply breath-taking. The imposing viaduct stands tall on one side, with the forest on the other, resulting in a stunning setting for football. 6 rows of terracing are to be found behind the goal, remaining mostly empty, with away fans instead choosing to populate the rows of terracing adjacent to the pitch.

The wooden main stand and clubhouse crown the ground and provide more refreshment facilities for the fans, and I decided to sit with a good number of them, paying the €2 entry for the 270-capacity main stand.

With about 10 minutes gone in a game that

23 was to become extremely one-sided, I noticed two fans to the right of the main stand putting on a raucous, non-stop show of support for the home side. It’s safe to say that I was encapsulated from the get-go. TSG’s performance was not their best, and after about 20 minutes, the game became somewhat irrelevant for me. I spent the rest of the match soaking up the atmosphere, with the football as a kind of distraction.

The away side, 1. Cf R Pforzheim, were 0-2 up by half-time. By this point, I had a nagging feeling that I recognised one of the Ultras, and after trying for most of the half to figure out why, it finally clicked. During lockdown I’d watched a Copa 90 video on the ‘Team with One Ultra’ and whilst deciding where to go that morning, I just happened to choose the game where the so-called ‘12th man’ was in residence. That video now has over 455,000 views, which is testament to the respect felt towards the club’s only Ultra.

Although the popularity and high quality of the documentary cannot be denied, there was a glaring issue with the production: the video honed in on the idea of TSG only having one hardcore fan, despite there actually being three!

I spent the rest of the match soaking up the atmosphere, with the football as a kind of distraction.

Just before the second-half commenced, I moved out of the main-stand and towards the two Ultras who were there that day, noticing the bottles of beer and of course, the half-empty (or full?!) bottle of Pfeffi liqueur alongside. It took until the 70th minute before I plucked up the courage to approach them, cordially asking “how long’s left, lads?” in my best Swabian. The rest was history.

Nico and Timothi introduced themselves soon after, naturally offering me a beer too.

They seemed happy to have another person supporting the side, in spite of my initial shyness and Neanderthal-like grunting in absence of knowing the actual words to their chants. Once I gained in confidence, it was truly liberating to be chanting, clapping and generally having a good time with such a small group. There was something beautiful in out-singing the 40 odd Pforzheim away core with just the three of us. It was football stripped back to its bare roots; perfectly imperfect, passionate, slightly mental and propped up by a lot of beer. The whole experience was summed up rather well by the chant “Fußball und Bier, darum sind wir hier”. There was nothing but the truth in this – we were indeed only there for the football and the beer. Despite the 0-4 loss, the atmosphere was great, and the free booze after the game on account of Nico’s presence in the clubhouse was even better. I felt so warmly welcomed and taken in by everyone at the club – all for just showing a genuine interest in their side that day. It’s safe to say that I don’t remember the train journey home on that sunny October afternoon…

The core of hardcore supporters consists of Nico, Timothi and Alex. They make up TSG’s Ultra section, supporting the side faithfully, with pre-match f lag waving, Tifos, banners, constant chanting & drumming. On a good day, there may even be some celebrating!

I’ve already been told hilarious stories by the group, my favourite referencing Nico as the lone away fan against Karlsruher SC’s 2nd team, where he stood in the away ‘cage’, urged by stewards to enter the prison-like away sector despite literally being the only fan. Or the time when rival ultras from SSV Reutlingen threatened to steal their banners.

It’s all part and parcel of being an Ultra in the 5th tier of German football.

I was hooked. When I returned later that month, the side’s performance was a total reversal of that 0-4 loss. The result was an emphatic 5-2 win in the derby match against FSV 08 Bissingen, and the strong performance was met with pride and raucous support throughout. Aside from the three

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25 of us, all you could really hear on that cold Wednesday night was the kick of the ball, the referee blowing his whistle and the occasional shout from players or fans. Yet there was a constant noise from the left-hand corner throughout: Nico’s drum beat, Timothi’s voice booming out or myself bellowing ‘TSGGGGGG’. The players here feed off the support and it was clear to see how much it was galvanising them that evening. It’s not just a one-way thing though – Nico, Timothi and Alex’s relationship with the team, manager and staff is incredible. They are TSG Backnang’s heroes. As we got the team going, the players responded with fiery challenges, that extra bit of pace or last-ditch blocks. It would probably be more apt to say that both the Ultras and the players feed off one other – there’s no give or take relationship here.

This was best summed up by the scenes after the game, as the players celebrated to our chanting and then proceeded to say cheers with a fist-bump, handshake or pitch side conversation.

The Ultras and the players feed off one another - there‘s no give or take relationship here It’s the best of what we all love football for, especially here in Germany: our clubs, the camaraderie, the people. The idea of having a few beers, watching the footy, having a laugh, singing some songs and enjoying a few more after. It’s simply brilliant, football romanticism at its finest. More often than not, you don’t need to go looking that far for your football fix. TSG and the people involved are the perfect example of that.

HARRY NELLIS UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

25 Right-wing extremism in the Austrian mainstream

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27 Anti-immigration, nationalist and anti-establishment sentiment lies at the heart of the modern-day Austrian Freedom Party’s (FPÖ) political identity. Where other parties with similar ideologies struggle to threaten mainstream political entities in other Western European democracies, the FPÖ has continually enjoyed political success for the past 30 years. How is it then that a self-proclaimed patriotic, populistic political party is consistently the third largest party in the Austrian political establishment, and has formed a part of three separate governments since 1999?

Firstly, it is important to note that there is no single factor that can explain the FPÖ’s political success; explaining their success poses a significant challenge for political scientists. As Karner notes, conventional political models cannot explain the sustained political success of the FPÖ. Muis et al. Observe that political success for far-right parties like the FPÖ is typically associated with factors such as perceived cultural losses and economic disadvantage. Such conditions, however, have not been associated with Austria in the timeframe in which the FPÖ have enjoyed significant political successes.

On the contrary, Austria is eighteenth on the United Nations Human Development Index, an index classifies countries based upon life expectancy, quality of life and educational opportunity. Further, Plasser notes that Austria has long been marked for its political stability. Given these factors, political theory suggests a far-right party such as the FPÖ should struggle to find its electoral niche in the Austrian political system, yet their enduring success indicates that modern day Austria is indeed a politically fertile environment for populist parties.

The FPÖ would not have commanded political power without being able to both conceive and implement a reliable strategy that allowed for its sustained success, regardless of the aforementioned socio-economic factors typically associated with the rise of parties with similar ideologies. As such, this piece proposes that in the absence of, and in contrast with, the previously noted indicators of success for right-wing populist

political movements, the manipulation and exploitation of Austrian identity by the FPÖ plays an overarching role in explaining the FPÖs successes to date.

These factors safeguard the loyalty of the FPÖ’s voter base and thus preserve its sustained electoral success.

The FPÖ has both recognised and exploited the potential identity politics it holds to mobilise voters and, consequently, forms an essential part of their political strategy. An example is their intent to manipulate the memory of Austrian history, and therefore shape the identity that voters build based on these memories. As Ager mentions, through historical revisionist statements that directly contradict official historiography, ‘various forms of [alternative] discourse become “mainstream” in the public sphere [...] whereby National Socialist crimes are permanently and repeatedly trivialised ’. Through this, the FPÖ normalises a contradictory narrative to the one propagated by the Austrian political establishment regardless of factual validity.

This mainstream political deviation enables the FPÖ to legitimise accusations against the political establishment that would not previously have been salient in the minds of the electorate. Consequently, its supporters are empowered to hold an extreme and divergent political identity that they perceive to be legitimate within the construct of modern Austrian society.

Stoegner consolidates this fact by noting that this strategy is not only linked to historical memories. The author remarks that the FPÖ wants to shape societal narratives to suit their political direction; they appear anti-elitist in public, yet their actions indicate that they do not actually want to develop a solution to elitism. Instead, they aim to further expand and reinforce the “us and them” narrative between themselves and the

perceived political establishment. By manipulating and, in some instances, reconstructing Austrian identity, it is not only easier for the FPÖ to ensure supporters will identify with its chosen values, but also make sure it is socially destructive for its supporters to accept criticism from divergent political perspectives. These factors safeguard the loyalty of the FPÖ’s voter base and thus preserve its sustained electoral success.

The FPÖ’s manipulation of Austrian identity is not only prevalent on a domestic level. The FPÖ recognises that questions of identity also emerge, and are politically expedient, on an international level. Austria is part of the European Union (EU), where sovereignty is exchanged for economic and social benefits; a vulnerability of the EU that is exploited by the FPÖ. As has been noted by scholars such as Karner, international unions largely find it difficult to connect with the lived identities and histories of many citizens, thereby highlighting the areas that the FPÖ can exploit to connect with voters.

This dependence on identity for engineering political success is further demonstrated by the FPÖ’s performance as a governing party. As a partner of a governing coalition, the FPÖ found it significantly more difficult to respond to political sentiment in a timely and effective manner, as they became the party “responsible“ for problems in the political arena. As Ellinas states, as a member of former governments, the FPÖ has had to both implement its policies and have its policy critically scrutinised at both an international and domestic level. This newfound scrutiny meant that the hypocrisy associated with both propagating anti-establishment rhetoric and being a part of that very same establishment is more easily exposed. Further, Stoegner notes that the FPÖ does not want to offer solutions to issues such as social inequality. Its express purpose is to provoke outrage and use it to mobilise voters at elections, despite anti-establishment politics being a fundamental aspect of their political existence. This exposition of the FPÖ serves to damage both its reputation and, as a result, its chances of electoral success.

To substantiate this argument in with a real-world example, it is worth noting the events of the so-called Ibiza affair in 2019, where two leading FPÖ politicians, including former Austrian Vice-Chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache, helped a Russian oligarch be awarded with state contracts.

This a concrete example of the inherent hypocrisy of the FPÖ’s electoral strategy; the counter-elitist rhetoric is juxtaposed with the elitist actions of the FPÖ whilst in government. The consequences of being in government as a populist party were also visible: The FPÖ lost a total of 20 seats in the federal election that followed in the aftermath of the scandal.

Despite identity politics playing a central role in the success of the FPÖ, it is worth noting the party has equally made use of more conventional methods to generate support. As Ellinas explains, they controlled the rhetoric around migration before established parties could formulate effective policy to ease the concerns of the Austrian population. Another tool for political success is the FPÖ’s relationship with the mass media.

Ellinas notes that their ‘easy access [...] to the mainstream media’ helps them connect with potential voters and therefore maintain electoral success.

The ability of leading FPÖ politicians to manipulate and exploit perceived national identity and its related narratives creates a space in which the party can, and will, thrive for as long as their voter base remains politically insulated from divergent political ideologies.

In the absence of the usual indicators of a fertile political environment in which farright parties like the FPÖ can succeed, Austrian national identity must be recognised as one of the cornerstones of their enduring success in the contemporary Austrian political space.

OLIVER LAWRIE UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

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