AustralianBeachSafetyandthePolitics ofSharkAttacks
CHRISTOPHERNEFF
DepartmentofGovernmentandInternationalRelations,UniversityofSydney, NSW,Australia
Therearenosimplegovernmentsolutionswhensharksbitepeople.Theserareand sometimesfatalincidentsarefraughtwithuncertaintiesand commandadisproportionateamountofpsychologicalspaceinthemindsofthepublic,aswellasalarge degreeofpolicyspaceandfundingfrommanygovernments.Responsestomitigate sharkbiteincidentsinvolvepublicpoliciesthatcontendwiththeneedsofpublicsafety aswellastheresponsibilitytoprotectendangeredpredators.Littlestudytodatehas beendoneexaminingthepoliticsofsharkattacks,yettheseeventsareamongthemost geographicallydispersedhuman–wildlifeconflictsintheworld.Iexaminetheunderlyingconcernsthatdrivethispolicyprocessbyaskinghowproblemdefinitionframing bypolicyentrepreneursaffectsgovernmentresponsesfollowingsharkbiteincidents. ThroughacasestudyofsharkbiteincidentsinSydney,Australiain1929,1934,and 2009,Iidentifythreecompetingproblemdefinitions:behavioral,psychological,and conservation.Thepsychologicaldefinition,buildingconfidenceinthemindsofthepublic,isshowntobethemostsuccessful.Buildingonpreviousresearch,Iarguethatpolicy entrepreneurshipisacentralfeatureinthestrengthofproblemdefinitions.Iconclude bysuggestinglessonsforthebalancedcoastalmanagementofhuman–marinelifeconflictsincludingtheselectionoftrustedspokespeople,prioritizingmeasurestorelieve short-termpublicanxiety,reframingbeachecosystemsas“thewild,”andconnecting publicsafetyeducationtopersonalbehavior.
Keywords beachsafety,human–wildlifeconflict,problemdefinition,sharkattack, sharkconservation
Introduction
Therearenosimplegovernmentsolutionswhensharksbitepeople.Theserareandsometimesfatalincidentsarefraughtwithuncertaintiesregardingwhathappened,whyitoccurred,andhowbesttorespond.Sharkbitesrepresentanunresolvedpuzzleforcoastal managers,scientists,policymakers,andconservationists,whoattempttobalancetheprotectionofendangeredpredatorymarineanimalswiththeharmthepubliccanexperience
Theauthoracknowledgestheexcellentguidancefromhissupervisor,Dr.BetsiBeem,Senior LecturerintheDepartmentofGovernmentandInternationalRelations,SydneyUniversity.Research supportforthisstudywasprovidedbytheSaveOurSeasFoundation,SydneyAquariumConservation Fund,andFacultyofArtsandSocialSciencesattheUniversityofSydney.ProfessorJoeTomEasley andNatashaReurtsaresincerelythankedfortheirinsightful feedbackonpriordraftsandtheauthor alsoacknowledgestheanonymousreviewersfortheirhelpful comments.
AddresscorrespondencetoChristopherNeff,DepartmentofGovernmentandInternational Relations,UniversityofSydney,NSW,Australia.E-mail:christopher.neff@sydney.edu.au
AustralianBeachSafetyandthePoliticsofSharkAttacks89
fromhuman–marinelifeconflicts.Thisdilemmaiscomplicatedbythelowprobabilityand dreadfulconsequencesoftheseevents,thehighdegreeofpublicemotiontheyelicit,and policyresponsesthatcandepleteendangeredspecies’populations.Yet,sharkbiteincidents arereportedannuallyinnationsacrosstheglobe,usuallywithoutpolicychanges.Itiswhen humanbehaviorsorperceptionschange,notsharkbehavior,thatproblemsareobservedand governmentactionisrequested.Balancingtheseissuesrequiresanunderstandingofthe underlyingsocialandpoliticaltensionsoftheseevents,thatis,thepoliticsofsharkattacks. InthisarticleIreviewedresponsestosharkbiteincidentsinSydneyin1929,1934,and 2009.Thequestionbeingaskedishowproblemdefinitionframingbypolicyentrepreneurs affectsgovernmentresponsesfollowingsharkbiteincidents.Iidentifythreecompeting problemdefinitions:behavioral,psychological,andconservation.Thisstudyshowsthat thestrongestandmostdominantproblemdefinitionfollowingsharkbiteincidentsisthe needtorestoreconfidenceinthemindsofthepublic.
A“problemdefinition”frameworkhighlightsthesocialandpoliticalprocessesthat strategicallymanipulateobjectiveconditionsofnatureintoproblemsthatgovernments needtosolve(DeNeufvilleandBarton1987;Stone1989;Bardwell1991;Houstonand Richardson2000).Politicalactorsselectivelychooseelementsthatemphasizethemoralimperativesoftheirproblemtoincreaseitssaliencewiththepublic(Entman1993;Rochefort andCobb1994).Entman(1993)describessalienceas“makingapieceofinformation morenoticeable,memorableormeaningfultoaudiences”(Entman1993,53).Houston andRichardson’s(2000)modelmeasuresthestrengthofadefinitionforachievingpolicy outputsbyreviewingtheroleofpolicyentrepreneurs,includingwhethertheirdefinition attractsaconsensus,providesacompletesolution,andalignswithotherdefinitions(HoustonandRichardson2000,495).Thestrongestproblemdefinitionisexpectedtoproduce theleadingpolicysolutions.
Buildingonpreviousresearch,Iarguethatpolicyentrepreneurshipisacentralfeature ofproblemdefinitionsuccess.Zhu(2008)definespolicyentrepreneursbroadlyas,“those whoarewillingtodevotetheirtime,energy,reputationandmoneytomakepolicychanges” (Zhu,2008,316).Politicians,scientists,researchers,andsurflifesaverseacharticulated differentproblems,narrativesandsolutionsfollowingthesesharkbiteincidents.Theactors whosedefinitionswerejudgedbelievablebythepublic,providedacompleteandworkable solution,andsharedcompatibilitywithotherproblemdefinitions,werethemostlikelyto besuccessful.
Ifindthatin1929,batherbehavioronbeacheswasconsideredtheleadingproblem; however,thiswasnotasuccessfuldefinitionbecauseitlackedaneffectivepolicyentrepreneurandcomprehensivesolutionstoeasetheimmediateconcernsofbeachgoers.In 1935,placementofnetting(ormeshing)offbeachshorelinestocatchsharks,andin2009, aerialpatrolstolookoutoverbeaches,werethesuccessfulpolicyoutputsofentrepreneurs becausethesewereseenaspractical,affordableandvisiblemethodsofboostingbeach morale.Thispsychologicalproblemdefinitionwasdominantduetostrongconfidencebuildingnarrativesthatcamefromtwotrustedandcrediblesources,thepresidentofthe SurfLifesavingAssociationin1935andtheMinisterforPrimaryIndustriesin2009.The combinationofwell-regardedadvocatesandwell-packagedproblemsdirectedtheselectionandsuccessofsolutionsevenasacompetingconservationdefinitionemerges.These conclusionssuggestthatcoastalmanagersofhuman–marinelifeconflictscanbetterbalancetheneedsofbeachcommunitiesandendangeredspeciesbyconsideringthestrongest elementsofproblemdefinitiondevelopment.
FromCapeCodtoCapeTownandSydneytoSharmelSheikh,sharkbiteincidents representthemostgeographicallydispersedhuman–wildlifeconflict.Anyplacethathas
90C.Neff
oceanbeacheshassharksandSydney,Australiaisknownforboth.Threeclustersofshark biteincidentsinSydneyandcorrespondingpolicyresponsesbytheNewSouthWalesState Governmentsstandout:1929,1935,and2009.The1929NewSouthWalesGovernment commissionedaSharkMenaceCommitteeafter“thirteenunluckysurferscametogrief” betweenMarch1918andFebruary1929(SMC1929a,2).Ofthese,sevenwerefatal incidents,thelastofwhichtookplaceinFebruary1929.TheSharkMenaceCommittee beganitsworkinMarch(BrisbaneCourier 1929).Followingfourmoresharkbiteincidents in1934andtwofatalities,theAustralianSurfLifesavingAssociationissuedareportthat calledforgovernmentaction.Inresponse,theGovernmentcommissionedtheNewSouth WalesSharkMenaceAdvisoryCommitteetorestorepubliccalm statingthat,“[t]hethree sharkaccidentsintheearlypartoftheyear1934revivedagitationthatsomethingshouldbe done”(SMAC1935,1326).Lastly,duringtheAustraliansummerof2009,threenon-fatal sharkbiteincidentsoveraspanoftwoweekspromptedtheStateGovernmenttoconduct itsfirstshark-basedreviewofbeachsafetypoliciessince1935(NSW2009a).Themedia dubbed2009Australia’s“SummeroftheShark”(Callinan2009).
Spanningaperiodof80years,theseincidentspresentauniqueopportunityforgreater understandinginpolicymakingfollowinghuman–marinelifeconflicts.Eachgovernment responsebegantotakeshapefollowingathirdorfourthsharkbiteincident,suggestinga trigger-pointbasedontheperceptionofanon-goinghazard(RochefortandCobb1994, 20;Birkland1998,53).TheyallincludedtheiconiclocationsofBondibeach,Sydney Harbour,orboth,offeringwell-knownproximatethreats(RochefortandCobb1994,21). Mediasensationalizationheightenednegativepublicsentimentstowardsharks,presenting amoralpanic(BurnsandCrawford1999,148).Andeveryincidentfeaturedhighlyvalued membersofsociety,suchassurflifesavers,youngsurfersorNavypersonnel(Schneiderand Ingram1993,345).Butsignificantdifferencesarealsoclear,includingthreedifferentstate governmentsinpower(Nationalistin1929,UnitedAustralian-UnitedCountryin1935,and Labourin2009),varyingaccesstoscientificdataonsharksandcasesthatincludedfataland non-fatalincidents(RochefortandCobb1994,17).Theconstantelementinthisanalysis isthedominanceofaconfidenceandmorale-basedpsychologicalproblemdefinition.
TheoreticalApproachestoPublicPerceptions
Understandingthecognitiveandpoliticalelementsofhuman–marinelifeconflictsrequires conceptsfromanumberofdifferenttheoreticaltraditions.LichbachandZuckerman(2009) describethisasthe“messycenter”approach,leavingtherigidconfinesofonetheoryto recognizethecontributionsofmultipleacademicperspectivesonanissue(Lichbachand Zuckerman2009).Followingsharkbiteincidents,acombinationofframeworksfromrisk theory,socialconstructivism,policydesignandcarnivoreconservationprovidegreater understandingsofsocialattitudesandpolicyoutputs.The“mess”ismade“messier”in thesecasesbecauseapplyinghuman-centeredanalysistoeventsinthewildandtoanimals intheirecosystemsisinescapable.Yetwhiletheseareeachconsidered,policyoutputsare basedonthedecisionshumansmake,notsharks.Asaresult,theroleofpolicyactors, problemmaking,dreadedoutcomesandsharkappealareusedasanchorpointsforthis analysisacrossdisciplines.
PolicyActors
Thecentralroleofentrepreneursandelitesonpolicydevelopmentisacommonthreadacross theoreticalperspectives.Whetheridentifiedas,“politicalactors”(Stone1989;BaumgartnerandJones1991),“moralentrepreneurs”(SchneiderandIngram2005),“worst-case
AustralianBeachSafetyandthePoliticsofSharkAttacks91 entrepreneurs”(Sunstein2007),or“policyentrepreneurs”(HoustonandRichardson2000), thegoaloftheseactorsistostrategicallyshepherdtheirproblemandsolutionintopolicy outputswhenwindowsofopportunityareopen.Whensharksdobitehumans,thesetragic circumstancescantriggerpolicywindowsthatleavetheseincidentsopentointerpretation bysavvyentrepreneurs.
Asskilledtacticians,policyentrepreneursuseanumberofmethodstogivetheir problemsalience,orstickiness,withthepublic.BaumgartnerandJones(1991)suggestthat entrepreneursareabletomaketheirproblemresonatebylookingforthemostreceptive audienceor“venue”toimplementtheirsolutions(BaumgartnerandJones1991,1045). MintromandVergari(1996)arguethatentrepreneurshipinvolvescoalitionbuildingandthat problemsshouldbeframedtobuildadiversenetworkwithalasting“politicalpresence” (MintromandVergari1996).HoustonandRichardson(2000)notethattheeffectivenessof apolicyentrepreneurisimpactedbytheirstatusandposition.Thevisibilityofpolicyactors onanissue,theircredibilityandknowledgeonasubject,aswellastheirpoliticaloffice maketheproblembeingtalkedaboutmoreprominent(HoustonandRichardson2000, 493).Asanentrepreneur,PresidentGeorgeW.Bushusedhis“bullypulpit”andfamiliar imagestopaintapicturethatlinkedhiscurrentprobleminIraqtothe9-11terroristattacks, connectingthesetwoproblemsinthepublicmind(Sunstein2007,535–539).
Sunstein(2007)notesthateffectivepolicyentrepreneursunderstandhowthepublic thinksandusetoolstotheiradvantage.Knowingthatthepublicusesmentalshortcutsto managecomplicatedissues,or“availabilityheuristics,”problemsaredefinedinwaysthatfit intotheseshortcuts(Sunstein2007,535–539).RochefortandCobb(1994)suggestthatthe publicwillpaymoreattentiontoproblemsthatareframedonthebasisoftheirproximity, frequency,severity,andcrisisnature(RochefortandCobb1994,21).Thismethodisgiven addedadvantagewhenscientificuncertaintypersists.Entrepreneursareawareofpublic supportforthe“precautionaryprinciple,”alsoknownas“bettersafethansorry”(Wilson 2010).Theprinciplecallsforsafetymeasures“evenifsomecauseandeffectrelationships arenotfullyestablishedscientifically”(Wilson2010,1301).Sharkbiteincidentpolicy responsesprovideopeningsforentrepreneurstousedoubtsregardingsharkbehaviorto offertheirsolutions,whichmayrequirelittleevidenceandplacetheburdentoprovehonest intentionsonsharks(Wilson2010).
DreadedOutcomes
Thepubliclargelyperceivestheconsequencesfollowingsharkbiteincidentstobedeath. Theseevents,likeplanecrashesandterroristattacks,areconsideredlowprobability–high consequencesincidentswhosevividnatureskewsriskperceptions(Sunstein2002).Public perceptionsofoutcomesfromsharkbiteincidentshavebeensociallyconstructedbycausal storiesinmovies,myths,andmedia.Filmslike Jaws createmisperceptionsinwhich sharksaredepictedasa“rationalenemy”intentonattackingswimmers(Papson1992). Theseimproperconnectionsbetweentheeffectsofanactionwithitsintendedpurposeare describedbyStone(1989)as“teleologicalfallacies”(Stone1989,290).Thisperceived outcomedrivesaprimalrejectionandfearofsharks.Thevividpictureoftheconsequences fromahuman–sharkconflictisembeddedandavailableinthemindofthepublic.Since thepublicoverestimatesrisksbasedonnegativityandavailability,sharkbiteincident imageryisdifficulttoundo(SunsteinandZeckhauser2009).Slovic(2004)arguesthatrisk perceptionsandbehaviorareamplifiedbyemotions,or“affectheuristics”inwhichhumans creatementalshortcutstoeasilyrecallableimages(Slovic2004,971).Theseemotionsare importantbecausepeoplemakedecisionsaboutthingsbasedonmorethanwhattheythink
92C.Neff
aboutsomething,but“howtheyfeel”aboutit(Slovic2004,977).Thecumulativeimpact ofthesecognitiveprocessescanleavethepublicconvincedofanoutcomethatseemsmore realandlikelythanitactuallyisandconnectsnegativefeelingsabouttheseeventstotheir attitudesregardingsharks.
Primedwithreadilyaccessiblereactionstosharkbites,actualincidentscanignitealack ofpublicconfidenceinbeach-goingaswellasalackofconfidenceingovernment.Governmentsaresensitivetothesesituationsandfeartheconsequencesfrompublicbacklash (SchneiderandIngram1993,338).AchenandBartels’(2004)researchonvotingbehavior andelectoralchangesintheU.S.stateofNewJersey,followingfatalsharkbiteincidents in1916,reinforcestheconcernforpoliticalfall-outfromnaturalcrises.Theyfoundthat “votersregularlypunishgovernmentforactsofGod”andconstituentsindistrictsnear thesharkbiteincidentsvotedagainstthepartyinpower,beyondanyreasonablemeasure followingdisasters(AchenandBartels2004).Overreactionsbythepublicfollowingthese eventsaremetbyoverreactionsbygovernmentsreferredtoas “actionbias”(Sunstein andZeckhauser2009).Fromfencingoffbeachestotakingoffshoesattheairport,these policyoutputsrepresentaspecifickindofvisibleover-reaction,directedatthepublic’s fearofcertainoutcomes.Alternatively,orperhapsconsistently,StringerandRichardson (1979)suggestthat“placebopolicies”areeffectivewhengovernmentsseethemselvesas “‘threatened’bytheemergenceofa‘hostile’issue”(StringerandRichardson1979,29). SunsteinandZeckhauser(2009)reviewedFlorida’sresponsefollowingsharkbiteincidents in2001andnotedpublicdemandsforgovernmentaction(SunsteinandZeckhauser2009). Thesymbolicreactionwasthebanningofallshark-feedingoneco-tourismtripsinthe state.
Negativeoutcomesonendangeredsharkpopulations,asaresultofsharkbiteresponse policies,aregivenlowerpoliticalprioritythanthesocialoutcomesonhumansandthe politicaloutcomesforgovernments.Thereisan“ends–meansorientation”thatfavors improvingpublicperceptionsoverthemeansofgettingtherebecauseriskperception reductionisseenasmoreimportantthanriskreductionitself(RochefortandCobb1994, 165).Thenegativeconsequencesforsharkshaveproventobecatastrophic.Between1950 and2008,16,064animalswerecaughtinthebeachnetsinNewSouthWales,including 577greatwhitesharks(NSW2009a).AlreadyratedbytheIUCNRedListas“vulnerable,” astudybyChappleetal.(2011)estimatedthatthenumberofwhitesharkswas“farlower” thanthenumberofpolarbearsandkillerwhales(Chappleetal.2011,582).
ProblemMaking
AproblemdefinitionapproachhasbeenusedtoexplainpolicymakinginBritishParliament (StringerandRichardson1979),largecarnivoremanagementinNorthAmerica(Clark, Curlee,andReading1996;Nie2001),aswellasair-bagsafetyandclimatechange(Houston andRichardson2000;Pralle2009).Itstatesthateventsarerecognizedtobeapublicproblem by“provid[ing]aframethroughwhichcurrentconditionsareperceivedtobeinconflict withtreasuredsocialvalues”(HoustonandRichardson2000,485).Thisanalysisisshared byFletcher(2009)whonotesthat“policyproblemsemergefromdiscursiveinteractions withinaspecifictimeandplace”(Fletcher2009,802).Therationalesandsolutionsfor problemsarekeycomponentsinpolicydesignanddefinitionsareskillfullyarticulatedby entrepreneurstocompeteagainstotherframes(Stone1989;SchneiderandIngram1993; Dery2000).
Theliteraturemakesclearthatsimplestoriessell.DeNeufvilleandBarton(1987) statethatmythsprovidetherationalesforproblemdefinitionsto“makesenseofeventsand
AustralianBeachSafetyandthePoliticsofSharkAttacks93 providesimplificationsofamorecomplexreality”(182).RochefortandCobb(1994)note thatchoicesinrhetorichelpaproblemstickwiththepublic(152)whileStone(2006)asserts thatdiscourseand“framingservestosimplifythecomplicatedrealityofasocialissueto somethingmoremanageablebythehumanmind”(130).Withinasimplecausalstory, blameisallocatedandthemotivationsofthoseinvolvedareconstrued(Stone1989).The articulationofmotivesisacriticalstrategicelementforentrepreneursbecauseitmakesa problemuniqueandlegitimizestheselectionofasolutionbasedonthenatureofaproblem (RochefortandCobb1994,11;SchneiderandIngram1993,339).Skilledentrepreneurs allocateintentionby“pushingaproblemoutoftherealmofaccidentandintotherealmof purpose”(Stone1989,290).Thiscompletesamoralcomponenttothecausalstorywhere “goodandbad”areidentifiedwithsymbolsandsolutionstoillustratethevaluesofeach (SchneiderandIngram1993,334;DeNeufvilleandBarton1987;Stone1989).
Anentrepreneur’sproblemdefinitioncansucceedininfluencingpolicychangeonly ifthesolutionisperceivedtowork(Zhu2008).Dery(2000)highlightstheimportance of“improving”asituationforaproblemtotakeholdandgainconsensus.Feasibilityisa centralmeasureinHoustonandRichardson’s(2000)modelaswellasKingdon’s(1995) MultipleStreamsModel(Dery2000,40;HoustonandRichardson2000;Kingdon1995). Afeasiblesolutionisseenasonethatfollowsalogicalcausalstory,“getstotheheartofthe problem,”andreflectssharedsocialvalues(HoustonandRichardson2000,486).Solutions thatareperceivedtoworkrepresentsociallyvalidendstoaproblem.Policyresponsesthat protectorkillsharksfollowingsharkbiteincidentsarethereforeviewedasreflectingthe public’ssocialandpoliticalfeelingsaboutsharks.
SharkAppeal
Thestruggletoengenderpublicsupportandprideinsharksisachallengethatanimal advocatesfaceacrossmanyspecies.Researchintohuman–wildlifeconflictsandcarnivore conservationshowthatthelevelofappealthepublicfeelstowardsharks,orotherlarge predatoryspecies,impactsthedegreeofconservationprotectionsprovided(Andersoneand Ozolins2004;Kleiven,Bjerke,andKaltenborn2004;ThompsonandMintzes2002,647). Yet,thefactorsthatmakeanimalsappealingtohumansremain amystery.Ananimal’s size,color,location,andbehaviorareallcontributingfactors(Stokes2007).Meuseretal. (2009)lookedatspecies’attributesandfoundthatendemism,themorelocalaspecies was,producedgreatersupportforconservation.Czech,Krausman,andBorkhataria(1998) reviewedtherelationshipbetweenpublicattitudesofanimalgroupsand“politicalpower” bylookingatthenumberofnongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs)workingontheir behalf(Czech,Krausman,andBorkhataria1998).UsingSchneiderandIngrams’(1993) modelofsocialconstruction,speciesgroupswereplacedintofourvalue-ladentarget populations:“advantaged,contenders,dependentsanddeviants”andcomparedagainstthe kindsofbeneficialorpunitivepoliciesandrationalestheyreceived(Czech,Krausman, andBorkhataria1998,1104).Czech,Krausman,andBorkhataria(1998)foundthatthere isaconnectionbetweenpositiveattitudestowardanimalgroupsandbeneficialpoliciesor organizations,thoughaestheticsisnotalwaystheleadingfactorofsupport.
Theperceptionofanimalbehaviorasathreattohumansimpactspublicattitudes. Czech,Krausman,andBorkhataria(1998)foundthatanimalsconsidered“dangerous” receivemorenegativeattitudes(1110).However,Knight(2008)arguesthat“negativistic attitudesoffearmaybewaning”(95).Scenariospecificdataofhuman–wildlifeconflicts arelikelymostusefulinreconcilingthisanalysis.Zinnetal.(1998)foundthatthecontext oftheconflict,identityofthespeciesandcontrolmeasuresproposedwerethevariablesthat
impactedsupportforresponseactions.Similarly,Kleivan,Bjerke,andKaltenborn’s(2004) surveyofthepublicfoundthatrespondentsproximitytotheanimalandthe“severityof animalbehavior”werekeyinthedegreeofperceivedfear(Kleivan,Bjerke,andKaltenborn 2004,1655–1656).Forsharks,thescenario-specificbehaviorofafewdangerousspecies hasbeenprojectedintopublicfeelingsaboutsharksingeneral.Asaresult,thewayincidents aredefinedforthepublicisanimportantfactorthatcanimpactallsharkpopulations.
Thisarticlemovesforwardwithareviewofmethodology;thepresentationof1929, 1935,and2009cases;andtheresultsofeachcontentanalysis.Iconcludewithadiscussion oflessonsforfuturemanagementresponseplans.
MaterialsandMethods
Theuseofrhetoricandsymbolismbypolicyentrepreneurstoframeevents,problems, outcomes,andtargetpopulationshasmadetheproblemdefinitionapproachanappropriate methodtoanalyzeresponsestohuman–sharkconflicts(RochefortandCobb1994).Houston andRichardson’s(2000)modelconnectsthesepointsthroughaqualitativeanalysisto identifytheproblemdefinitions,measuretheirstrengths,andtestthesemeasurements againstpolicyoutputs(HoustonandRichardson2000,495).The1929NewSouthWales SharkMenaceCommitteeReport(SMC1929a),1929SharkMenaceSub-Committee GeneralReport(SMC1929b),1935NewSouthWalesSharkMenaceAdvisoryCommittee Report(SMAC1935),andthe2009DepartmentofPrimaryIndustriesReportintothe NewSouthWalesSharkMeshing(BatherProtection)Program(NSW2009a)serveas foundationaldocuments.Newspaperarticlesarecross-referenced,includingtheNational LibraryofAustraliadigitalarchives,toconfirmpolicyoutputs.Datawerealsogathered fromtheCopplesonArchivesandCurlewisFamilyArchives,theAustralianSurfLifesaving Association,the2006ScientificSharkProtectionSummitinNewSouthWalesandActs oftheNewSouthWalesStateParliamentrelatedtofisheriesmanagementandthebeach meshingprogram.
Thereportsfrom1929,1935,and2009wereexaminedforfivecommoncriteria: statementsofpurposeandjurisdiction;historyofsharkbiteincidents;identificationof solutionstobeconsidered;scientificclaimsregardingsharkbehavior;andfindingsor recommendationsonbeachsafetypolicies.Tooperationalizethetexts,thesixcomponents ofproblemdefinitionsoutlinedbyHoustonandRichardson(2000)areusedtoidentify problems(486).Theseincludenotingthe“societalconditionthatneedstoberemedied;the empiricalevidenceofthecondition;thecausalstory;proposedsolutions;valuesreflective ofselectedsolutions”;andsymbols“thatareendowedwithmeaning”tosimplifythe problem(HoustonandRichardson2000,486).Problemdefinitionsfromthethreeperiods werelabeledandrankedonthebasisoftheir“successcharacteristics,”orlikelihoodof achievingpolicyoutputs(HoustonandRichardson2000,495).
ThePeopleProblemof1929(Table1)
BehavioralDefinition
In1929,theleadingproblemaccordingtotheSharkMenaceCommitteeReportwas batherbehavior.NewSouthWaleshadexperiencedthirteenincidentsandsevenfatalities, includingtwoeachatSydney’sCoogeeandBondibeaches.Accordingtothe1929Report, carelessswimmingatdawnanddusk,whensharkswereknowntohunt,andswimming alonefarfromtheshorelineweretheproblems.Dataonthetimesofdaythatincidents
Table1
Behavioraldefinitioncharacteristics(1929)basedonHoustonandRichardson(2000)
Behavioraldefinition
Societalconditionto remedy Sharkbiteinjuriesandfatalities.
EmpiricalevidenceSharkbiteincidentsinvolveswimmersoutatdawn, dusk,andinisolatedareas.
CausaltheorySharkbitesareaccidents.
Humanbehaviorcanreducehuman–sharkriskand interactions.
SolutionsChangepublicbehaviorthrougheducation,signage, regulation,andfines.
ValuesPublicsafety,personalresponsibility.
SymbolsBeachinspector,finesonbathers.
occurredwasusedtomakethispointandtheReportstatedthat“[m]ostoftheaccidents occurredinthelateafternoon.Inallinstancesexceptonethevictimwasisolatedfromother bathersorentirelyalone”(SMC1929b,3).Asaresult,theReport’srecommendedsolution wastogivebeachinspectors(precursorstolifeguards)additionalauthoritytocontrol humanbehaviorto“preventpeoplebathingatdangeroushoursoroutsuchdistancesasto earnforthemthetitle‘sharkbait’“(SMC1929b,14).
Exceptgettingoutofthewater,nooptionswereadoptedtoaddressimmediatepublic concerns.Localcouncilsweregivenadesignforerectingobservationlook-outtowers,but fundingwaslefttoindividualareasandsurflife-savingclubs.Fisherycontractorswere contactedtoconsidertrawlingforsharks,butfacilitiesdidnotexisttosupportanindustry. Lastly,publicbeachenclosureswereruledoutasimpracticalduetotheheavysurfandcosts involved.TheCommitteefeltthatsincenoenclosurehadyetprovedworkableinAustralia itwasimportantnottocreate“afalsesenseofsecurity”1 (SMC1929a,3).
CausalStoryandPolicyEntrepreneur
Theinfamoushistoryofsharksas“devourers”and“seamonsters”goesbackinWestern culturetothe1550s(Coppleson1959,3).InAustralia,Sturma(1986)suggeststhatitwas theislandnation’sreputationasalandsurroundedbysharksthatmadeitanappealing locationwhenBritishjailerswere“selectingaplacetotransportconvicts”(Sturma1986, 78).The1929Committeefound,however,thatsharkbitebehaviorwasnotabouttryingto eathumans.TestimonyfromfisheriesexpertDavidSteadledtheCommitteetoconclude, “sharksdonotpatrolbeachesontheoff-chanceofoccasionallydevouringhumanprey” (SMC1929a,2).SharkbitesinAustraliadidnotmeansharkattacks.Thiscausalstory providedafoundationforthebehavioralproblemdefinitionbyplacingresponsibilityfor thesharkbitesonswimmers.NewSouthWalesMinisterforLocalGovernment,Michael “TheColonel”Bruxnernotedinthe1929Reportthathehopedchangestothelawwould “haveasalutaryeffectuponfoolhardybathers”(SMC1929a,6).Intwelvereferencesto sharkbitesinthe1929Sub-CommitteeReport,sharkbiteswerelabeledas“accidents”six times;“attacks”fivetimes;andonceas“illresults”(SMC1929b,2–14).
Thebehavioraldefinition’sfailuretoresonatein1929camefromincompletesolutions andthelackofstrong,steadypolicyentrepreneurship.BruxnerlosthispositionasMinister in1930whentheGovernmentwasvotedoutofpower.ThoughhecontinuedinState Parliament,hispoliticalportfoliocenteredontransportationrelatedissues(Aitken1969). DavidStead’sadvocacywaslimitedbyhissupportforbeachenclosuresandnumerous politicalbattles.Hewasleftisolatedandhiscredibilitywasunderminedbyareputation astoo“selfopinionated”(ADB2011).OtherstakeholdersincludedCharlesPaterson, PresidentoftheAustralianSurfLifesavingAssociation.Patersonsupportedtheunworkable enclosuresolutionandwrotethatbadpublicitywasaleadingproblem;however,hediedin 1933.Withoutcontinued,credibleandstrategicleadership,thebehavioraldefinitionwas leftvulnerabletocompetingframes.
PolicyOutputs
InNovember1929,a10-poundfinewasaddedtobathingordinancesonunrulyswimmers inNewSouthWales(BarrierMiner 1929).TheonsetoftheGreatDepressionin1930, however,lefttheotherrecommendedmeasuresundone,includingthelocalfundingfor observationtowersandtrawling.
ThePanicProblemof1935(Table2)
PsychologicalDefinitionI
Publicconfidenceinbeachgoingwasthedominantproblemtobesolvedfollowingshark biteincidentsin1934.Therewerefoursharkbiteincidentsandtwofatalities,includingoneinSydneyHarbour,after1929andtheAustralianSurfLifesavingAssociation calledonthegovernmenttoact.TheGovernmentcommissionedaSharkMenaceAdvisory Committee,whichconductedhearingsandissuedareportthatstated,“thepsychological factor,forinstance,thecommitteerecognizes,isanall-importantone;andthereisevidenceofthenecessityofrestoringthesomewhatshakenpublicconfidence”(SMAC1935, 1327).
Thepsychologicaldefinitioncenteredonwaystocalmthepublic.TheCommitteenoted thatthepublicdemanded“someformofenclosure”asasolution(SMAC1935,1329).2 Asaresult,anexperimentaltwo-yearproposalfor1,000-foot-longgillnets,setalongthe shorelineofSydney’smetropolitanbeaches,wererecommended.Thesenetswouldnot serveasafullenclosure,buttheywouldbesettothebottomoftheseaandbuoyedatthe surfacetocatchandkillsharks(SMAC1935,1345).Thebeachnettingsolutionwasseen asanimmediatewaytoaddressthe“fearcomplex”thathaddeveloped,byreducingthe amountofsharksnearthebeachesandthenumberofsharkalarmsthatwereamplifying publicanxiety.Thereportadded:“[i]fitcouldbeshownthat,underpersistentmeshing, thenumberofsharksweresteadilydiminishingoverthelengthofcoastdealtwith,there wouldbearestorationofpublicconfidenceinsurfbathingasa safeformofrecreation” (SMAC1935,1346).
TheReportfurtherrecognizedtheimportanceofobservationtowers,asavisible confidence-buildingmeasure,notingthat“theknowledgethatacarefulwatchisbeingkept forsharksisknowntobeanimportantfactorintheimprovementofthemoraleofbathers” (SMAC1935,1342).
Thebehavioraldefinitionin1935complemented,morethancompeted,withthepsychologicaldefinition.Itsnarrativehadchangedandbatherswerenotblamedforsharkbite
Table2
Behavioralandpsychologicaldefinitions(1935)basedonHoustonandRichardson(2000)
BehavioraldefinitionPsychologicaldefinition
Societalconditionto remedy Sharkbiteinjuriesand fatalities.
EmpiricalevidenceSharkbiteincidentsinvolve swimmersoutatdawn, dusk,andinisolatedareas.
CausaltheorySharkbitesareattacks,with humanoperationsincluding fishingandsewagenear swimmingareasincreasing thepresenceofsharksnear bathers.
SolutionsBanfishingnearbeachesand changesewageoutfall flows.
ValuesPublicsafety,personal responsibility.
Beachgoersarescaredandlosing confidenceingoingtothebeach.
Adropinbeachattendanceand surfing.Bondirecordsdropof 872,000in1933.
Sharkbitesareattacks.
Visibilitymeasures:showingshark populationculling/feweralarms, towersandbeachnetswill restorepublicconfidencein beachgoing.
Restoreconfidencethrough visibilityofbeachmeshing, observationtowers,andalarm.
Publicsafety,publicconfidence, protecttourism,economic efficiency,government accountability.
SymbolsSewageoutfalls,fishermen.Deadsharkphotos,beachnets, towers,flags. incidents.TheReportconsideredpeople’sactions,suchasfishingfromthebeachandthe constructionofsewageoutfallsnearbeaches,tohaveaninadvertentroleinbringingsharks closertoshore.TheReportrecommendedchangestobeachfishingandre-directingsewage outfalls(SMAC1935,1348).
Table3
BondiBeachattendancerecords(1929–1937)(CopplesonArchives1964,Box11.p.19)
Bondi
Beach/YearAttendance
Differencefrom previousyear SharkbiteincidentinNew SouthWales
19293,582,0313fatalincidents
19304,363,908 +781,877
19313,584,310 779,598
19323,502,770 81,5401incident
19332,630,043 872,727(24.9%)
19342,674,686 +44,6433incidents/2fatal
19352,768,530 +93,8442fatalincidents
19362,772,870 +4,3401fatalincident
19373,856,150 +1,083,280
CausalStoryandPolicyEntrepreneur
Thechangingrhetoricandcausalstoryaboutshark“attacks”drovepublicpanicin1935 andservedasthebasisforthepsychologicaldefinition.Dr.VictorCoppleson,adoctor, veteran,andadvisortotheSurfLifesavingAssociationofAustralialedtheadvocacyfor thisnewnarrative.Copplesonbelievedthatswimmerswerebeingmisledbyresearchthat saidsharksdonotbitehumans.3 Inresponse,hepublished“SharkAttacksinAustralian Waters”inthe1933 AustralianMedicalJournal.Undertheheading“Theevidenceof theresponsibilityoftheshark,”hearguedthat,“theevidencethatsharkswillattackman iscomplete”(Coppleson1933,466).By1935,theSharkMenaceAdvisoryCommittee Reportreferredtoshark“attacks”in77percentofsharkbitereferencesand“accident”in ninepercent.
Takingcontroloftheopenpolicywindowcreatedbythesharkbiteincidents,Adrian Curlewisbuiltthecaseforsolvingtheproblemofpublicpanic.Asurfer,barrister,founderof thePalmBeachSurfClubandnewPresidentoftheAustralianSurfLifesavingAssociation, Curlewisarguedthatthedeclineinbathingandsurfingparticipation,asaresultofsharkbite incidents,wasdetrimentaltothehealthandwellbeingoftheStateandtheNation,adanger toallAustralians(CanberraTimes 1934).Recordsshowa25percentdropinattendanceat Bondibeachbetween1933and1934(Table3)(CopplesonArchives1964).Togetpeople backinthewater,Curlewistookanactiverole.In1935,heopenedthesmallbeach-netted enclosureatNielsenParkinSydney,otherwiseknownas“SharkBeach”(SMH 1935).He publiclydefendedtheReportinnumerousnewspaperarticlesandLetterstotheEditorand ledtheeffortforStatefundingofbeachnettingin1937.Aftercontractualdisputesand foot-draggingfortwoyears,hestated,“itwillbetragicifwehavetowaitforanother sharkattacktorousethepublic”(SMH 1937).Curlewisadvocatedforpublicationofbeach netshark-catchdataandnewspaperaccountsinitiallyrecordedweeklysharknumbers. Hewouldremainanadvocateofbeachnets,laterserveasaNSWSupremeCourtJudge andcontinueasPresidentoftheSurfLifesavingAssociationforatotalof44years.The entrepreneurshipofCurlewisandthescientificnarrativefromCopplesonpaintedapicture ofacrisiswithnation-wideimplicationsandasolutionthatwasaffordable,workable, defendable,andvisible.
PolicyOutputs
Theprinciplerecommendationofbeachnetsinthe1935Reportreceivedfullfundingin 1937.Apaymentoftwenty-thousandpoundsbytheGovernmentbegantheworkoffisheries contractorsfornetsfromCronullatoPalmbeach(TheMercury 1937).TheCommittee’s ReportalsoledtheStateWaterBoardtocommissionadifferentrouteandtreatmentfor theBondisewageoutfallin1936.Observationtowersremainedtheresponsibilityofsurf clubs;however,morebeganbeingbuiltafter1935includingtheiconiceighty-foottower atManlybeachin1938.
ThePanderingProblemof2009(Table4)
PsychologicalDefinitionII
Theleadingproblemfollowingsharkbiteincidentsin2009wastheperceptionofadecline inpublicconfidenceintheGovernment’sbeachsafetyprogram.Incidentsattwonetted beacheswithinthreeweeksatBondibeachandAvalonbeachonNewSouthWales’Central
Table4
PsychologicalandconservationdefinitionsbasedonHoustonandRichardson(2000)
PsychologicaldefinitionConservationdefinition
Societalcondition toremedy
Mediareportingonsharkbite incidentsisleadingtocriticism ofGovernmentbeachsafety programs.
EmpiricalevidenceSharkbiteincidentsatnetted beachesandmediareports.
CausaltheorySharkbitesareattacks.Sharksare toblameforswimmingnear beachandbeingcaughtinnets.
Thevisibilityofnets,aerial surveillanceandtowerswill showGovt.actionandsupport existingprogram.
SolutionsFundaerialpatrol,issueReporton successofprogramsandkeep sharknetstoplacatecritics,the publicandscientists.
ValuesPublicsafety,publicconfidence, protecttourism,Australian excellence,government accountability.
SymbolsHelicopters,beachnets,towers, flags,SharkSmartbrochure.
Beachessafetymeasuresthat killendangeredsharks.
Internationalcriticismandshark catchdata.
Beachnetsareworkingand by-catchmitigationmeasures areinplace.
Knowingmoreaboutshark behaviorwillreduce human–sharkinteractions.
Checknetsmoreregularly, increaseresearchandmove managementtoEnv.Dept.
Protectionofendangered sharks;internationalnorms. Publicsafety,shark conservation.
Sharkcatchdata,beachnets
Coast,aswellasSydneyHarbourledtoanannouncementbytheGovernmentthatitwould conductitsfirstreviewofthebeachmeshingprogramsince1971.NewSouthWalesPrimary IndustriesMinisterIanMacdonaldstated,“[t]herecentsharkattacksintheSydneyarea havecausedcommunityconcernanditshouldbeknownthegovernmentistakingaction” (ManlyDaily 2009).
Thepsychologicalproblemwashighlightedbycriticismofthebeachnettingprogram andlackofsufficientaerialpatrols.TheOpposition,Liberalparty,statedthatMinister Macdonald“hasn’tdoneeverythingpossibletomitigatethepossibilityofsharkattacks” (ABC2009a).CallsforadditionalaerialpatrolsalsocameinfromthelocalMayornear BondiandabusinessthatrunshelicopterservicesplacedblameontheGovernmentforthe incidents(Robinson2009;ABC2009b).
TheGovernment’ssolutiontothecriticismofaerialpatrolswastoreverseitsposition (NSW2009a,14;Hansard2009b,19237).InNovember2009,MinisterMacdonaldannouncedfundingforanexperimentaltrialofhelicopterpatrolsatthe51meshedbeaches. Therationaleforthischangeincludedthat“theshark,andfearofsharkattack,hasaspecial placeintheAustralianpsyche”(Hansard2009b,19237).Headdedthatthetrialprogram wouldaidinscientificdatacollectionaddingbenefittotheexistingsharkmeshingprogram (SMP).However,theMinisteralsocommentedtoalocalnewspaperthat,“[h]elicopter
Table5
AustralianSurfLifesavingAssociationdata(2008–2010)
Bondibeach/DifferencefromSharkbiteincident YearAttendancepreviousyearinNewSouthWales 2008650,496i 2009847,668 +197,172(23%)3non-fatalincidents 2010683,410 164,258(19%)
iDataofweekendbeachattendanceprovidedbytheAustralianSurfLifesavingAssociation, personalcorrespondence,July21,2011.
trialswillhaveaminimalbeneficialeffectbuttheGovernmenthasadutytodoallwecan toprotectbeachgoers”(Holland2009a).
Strategicchoicesweremadetoreinforcetheexistingbeachnettingprogram,and supportthepsychologicaldefinition.Havingconcludedin2006thatbeachnetting“helped easepublicconcernabouttheriskofsharkattackatpopularbeaches”(NSW2006,4) MinisterMacdonaldstatedin2009,“themeshingprogramisheretostay”(Holland2009b). Withoutthenets,the2009Reportfoundthatthereweregreaterchancesof“interactions betweenbathersandgreatwhitesharks”(NSW2009a,16).Infact,theoptiontoexpandthe coverageofbeachnetswaskeptonthetableif“aperformanceindicatorrelatingtohuman fatalitiesorseriousinjuriesweretriggered,suchasthese recentattacks”(NSW2009a,105).
Lastly,theReportrecommendedanincreaseincommunityeducationregardingtheroleit canplayinriskreductionandabrochurewasdevelopedto“supplementtheGovernment’s highlysuccessfulannualsharkmeshingprogram”(NSW2009a,41;NSW2009b).
Thesolutiontoapotentialdropinpublicconfidencewastoplacateitscriticsandthe public.TheGovernmentreverseditspositions,reinforceddreadedoutcomesfromsharks, expandedconfidence-buildingmeasuresandattemptedtoreassurethepublicaboutthe strengthsofthecurrentprogram.Yetthereappearstobelittleevidenceofalackinpublic confidence.BeachrecordsofweekendattendanceatBondiin2009showanincreaseof 23percentoverall,asnotedinTable5.Areviewofweekendaveragesduringthisperiod showsadropinattendanceimmediatelyfollowingtheThursday,February12sharkbiteat Bondi;however,thisappearstoreboundto7,810attendeesbyFebruary22,andmorethan 23,000onMarch7.
Thecompetingconservationdefinitionproposedin2009suggestedaconflictbetween beachnettingmeasuresthatkillendangeredsharksandrequirementstoconservesharks. ThistensionwasillustratedintheReport’sexecutivesummarywhichnotedthat,“although theSMPhasbeeneffectiveinreducingtheriskofsharkattack,itisalsolistedasaKey ThreateningProcessunderboththe FisheriesManagementActof1994 and Threatened SpeciesConservationAct1995”(NSW2009a,v).4 TheSMPisanexceptiontothe1996 Statelawprotectingwhitesharksandwasupdatedfrom1937in1971tolimitnettingto AprilthroughSeptember,reducethesizeofthenetsandexpandthenumberofbeaches covered.In2009,netsprovidedcoverageatbeachesfromWollongongtoNewcastle(NSW 2009a,1).
Thesolutiontotheconservationproblemdefinitionattemptedtochallengethepsychologicaldefinition.TheReportstatedthatwhiletheSMPprogramwouldcontinue,attempts wouldbemadetominimizesharkdeathsandthedeathsofotherspecies.Recommendations includedestablishing“triggerpoints”toalertmanagersinsidegovernmentdepartmentsof
AustralianBeachSafetyandthePoliticsofSharkAttacks101 increasedcatchesofendangeredspecies.Italsorecommendedreducingtheamountoftime betweencheckingthenetsforentangledanimals,andincreasingresearchtoinformtherisk ofattack(NSW2009a,39,41).
CausalStoryandPolicyEntrepreneur
MinisterMacdonald’scausalstoryprovidedafoundationfortheGovernment’spositions byblamingsharks.Hearguedthatthebeachnetswereworkinganddidnotconflictwith conservationvaluesbecausesharksweretoblameforswimmingnearthebeachandfor runningintothenets.TheMinisterexplainedthat“thesharkssensorysystemdetectsthe netandthisencouragestheshark,ratherrapidly,toleavethearea”;headded,“essentially, thenetsarethereasapsychologicalbarriertothesharks”(Hansard2009a,17822).This argumentcontinuedevenafterDr.JohnPaxtonoftheAustralianMuseumarguedin2006 thatthistheorywas“unfounded”sincethenetsaremovedeveryfewdays(Paxton2006).The institutionalpower,however,oftheMinister’spoliticalpositionallowedthepsychological definitiontoprevailandoverrulesciencebecausetherationalesprovidedweresalientwith thepublicandprovidedimmediatereliefofperceivedconcerns.
Theevidenceofinternalbureaucraticsuccessrestsinthetriggersestablishedinthe eventofbothpublicpanicfromasharkbiteincidentaswellas fromhighnumberofsharks caughtinthenets.Bymatchingthetacticsforhumanprotectionwithsharkprotection theyhavecreatedthefirstwaythatnetscouldbereduced.Whilepoliticaldominancerests withMinisterMacdonald,the2009policyoutputsillustrateanon-goingbattlebetweenthe psychologicalandconservationproblemdefinitions.
PolicyOutputs
Fundingforthepsychologicaldefinitionwasswift,withfundingallocatedforthehelicopter programandfor“100,000sharkeducationbrochures”aspartofanew“SharkSmart” program(Hansard2009b).Theconservationdefinition’spolicyoutputsincludedmoving theSMPfromtheDepartmentofFisheriestoanewJointManagementAgreementunder NewSouthWales’threatenedspecieslegislation.Thebeachmeshingprogramtransferred operationstotheIndustry&InvestmentNSWandtheDepartmentofEnvironment,Climate ChangeandWater.Thetransferindepartmentalmanagementofbeachnettingrepresents thefirstsignificantconnectionbetweenconservationeffortsandtheapplicationofthebeach safetyprogramsinAustralia.Inaddition,morefrequentcheckingofbeachnetsforanimals caughtupinthenetsandDNAcollectionwasenactedtodeterminesharkpopulations andmovements.Fundingforthetaggingofbullsharks,totracktheirbehaviorinSydney Harbour,wasalsoapprovedprovidingadditionalscientificresearchontherecord(NSW 2009a).
Results(Table6),Discussion,andConclusion
Inthepoliticsofsharkattacks,itisthesurvivalofthefittestproblemdefinition.Houston andRichardson’s(2000)modelillustrateshowcompleteproblemdefinitionsofferedby strategicpolicyentrepreneurscanresultinpolicyoutputsbasedontheirsolutions.The advocacyanddefensebyAdrianCurlewisandMinisterMacdonaldwerecentraltothe successofthepsychologicaldefinitionsin1935and2009.Curlewisledtheeffortstofund beachnetsanddefendedthemfordecades.MinisterMacdonaldusedexistingdoubtsabout sharkscienceandhispoliticalpositiontomitigateconservationconcernsandovercomethe
Table6
Characteristicsofsuccessfulbeachsafetyproblemdefinitions
BehavioraldefinitionConfidencedefinitionConservationdefinition
Effectiveentrepreneur(Low)M.F.BruxnerandDavid Stead (High)AdrianCurlewis,Ian Macdonald (Medium)DeptofFisheries
Consensusamong proponents (High)Agreementthateducation andawarenessarekey.
(High)Agreementthatpublic confidenceneededtoberestored. (High)Agreementthat conservationrequirementsapply.
Feasibilityofsolutions(High)Economicallyand politicallyworkable. (High)Economicallyandpolitically workable. (Low)Lackpoliticalsupport.
Comprehensiveness(Low)Lacksshortterm solution.
Compatibilitywithother definitions
(Med)Conflictswithconfidence definition.
(High)Answerspublic concerns. (Medium)Doesnotfullyanswer problemcondition.
(Medium)Conflictswith conservationdefinition.
(Medium)Conflictswith confidence.
Policyoutputs1929:Beachordinance1929:N/A1929:N/A 1935:Signsonbeaches1935:Beachnetting,towers1935:N/A 2009:Beachnetting,aerial surveillance,SharkSmart Campaign. 2009:Netskeptbutcheckedmore andDept.changed.Shark taggingintheHarbour.
AustralianBeachSafetyandthePoliticsofSharkAttacks103
conservationdefinition.Theabsenceofthisleadershipforthebehavioraldefinitionandits incompletesolutionleftitvulnerabletocompetingconcerns.
Problemdefinitionanalysisprovidesapictureoftheunderlyingissuesintheseshark bitecases.IconcludethatNewSouthWales’beachsafetypolicesin1929,1935,and2009 werenotdirectlyabouthurtingsharksbutinsteadaboutregulating,calming,andplacating thepublic.Thesefindingshighlighttheneedtomanagepublicperceptionsandlimit governmentoverreactions,afocusonsolutionsaimedathumanbehaviorratherthanshark control.Thesecasestudiesalsoreveala“predatorpolicyparadox”wherepoliticianssee fewpoliticalincentivesinsupportingpoliciesthatprotectendangeredspeciesthatmay harmthepublic.Asaresult,beachnettingpoliciesvalidatekillingendangeredsharksto easepublicfears,evenasscienceaffirmsthedirestateofthesharkpopulationcrisis.Further studyisneededinthisarea.
Forcoastalmanagers,thereareanumberoflessonsforrespondingtohuman–marine lifeconflicts.Thefirstlessonisthattherearerealchoicesabouthowtodiscussthese events.DiscourseisastrategicchoiceandAustraliahasahistoricrecordofcommonsense rhetorictosharkbites.Second,theselectionofsavvyandlong-termpolicyentrepreneurs isessential.Third,theinclusionofmeasurestorelieveshort-termpublicanxietyaddto asolution’scomprehensiveness.Fourth,educationisneeded toconnectlong-termpublicsafetytopersonalbehavior.Ifthepubliccanplayanewroledeterminingitspersonallevelofrisk,thenabalancebetweenconservationandbeachsafetybecomesmore likely.
Finally,thetacticsthataregoodformakingentrepreneurs’problemdefinitionsstick withthepublicarebadforsharks.Highlyemotionalstoriesthatpresentvividimagesof familiar,local,severe,andon-goingthreatsprovideopeningsforentrepreneurialsolutions. Thesestrategies,however,reinforcenegativepublicperceptionsofsharkbiterisksandconsequencesthatareusuallyfalse.Meetingthischallengerequiresre-definingtheperceived outcomesheldbythepublicregardingsharkbehavioratbeachesandthenegativeresultsof publicpanicthatconcerngovernments.Freshresearchintobeachecosystemactivity,more vocalrespectforsharedmarinespacesandnewattentiontopersonalresponsibilityinthe oceanbyvaluedsourcesallofferopportunitiestore-shapethewaypeopleandpoliticians managethemselvesandbalancepolicydecisions.Inshort,theunconsideredelementsof thebeachprovideanopportunitytoreconsidertheknown,butmisperceived,aspectsof sharks.
Notes
1.ApreviousbeachenclosureatCoogeebeachinSydneyin1922 failed,withthenetwashing awayjustbeforetheceremonytoopenittothepublic.
2.AsteelmeshenclosureplacedatCoogeebeachbythelocalCouncilin1929wasseenas evidenceofa“veryeffective”approach(SMAC1935,1331).
3.Copplesonlabeledas“baloney”theassertionbytheU.SNavybrochurethatsharksdonot biteswimmers.Healsotookissuewitha1905claimthatsharkswillnotbiteabovetheCaribbean.
4.Thefirstprotectionsforanysharkspeciesintheworldtookplacein1984whentheNew SouthWalesStateGovernmentdeclaredthegreynurseshark(Carchariastaurus)aprotectedspecies (Environment2011).Whitesharks(Carcharodoncarcharias) alsoreceivedprotectioninthestate (1996).
References
Achen,C.,andL.Bartels.2004.Blindretrospectionelectoralresponsestodrought,fluandshark attacks. Estudio(WorkingPaper/199):1–40.
Aitkin,D.1969. Thecolonel:ApoliticalbiographyofSirMichaelBruxner.Canberra:Australian NationalUniversityPress.
Andersone,Z.,andJ.Ozolins.2004.PublicperceptionoflargecarnivoresinLatvia. Ursus 15(2): 181–187.
AustralianBroadcastingCorporation(ABC).2009a.TheWorldToday—Newsharkattack sparkspoliticalfrenzy.http://www.abc.net.au/cgibin/common/printfriendly.pl?http://www.abc. net.au/worldtoday/content/2008/s2504985.htm(accessedAugust1,2011).
AustralianBroadcastingCorporation(ABC).2009b.MoreprotectionurgedafterBondisharkattack.http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-02-13/more-protection-urged-after-bondi-shark-attack/ 294640(accessedJuly29,2011).
AustralianDictionaryofBiography(ADB).2011.Stead,DavidGeorge(1877–1957).http:// adb.anu.edu.au/biography/stead-david-george-8634(accessedJuly12,2011).
Bardwell,L.1991.Problem-framing:Aperspectiveonenvironmentalproblemsolving. EnvironmentalManagement 15(5):603–612.
BarrierMiner.1929.Foolhardybathers:Finesmaybeinflicted.November26,1929.NationalLibrary ofAustraliawebsite,http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article46576977(accessedMay10,2011).
Baumgartner,F.,andB.Jones.1991.Agendadynamicsandpolicysubsystems. TheJournalofPolitics 53(4):1044–1074.
Birkland,T.1998.Focusingevents,mobilization,andagendasetting. JournalofPublicPolicy 18(1):53–74.
BrisbaneCourier.1929.SharkMenace:Committeetoreport.28March1929.http://nla.gov.au/ nla.news-article21390210(accessedApril1,2010).
Burns,R.,andC.Crawford.1999.Schoolshootings,themediaandpublicfear:Ingredientsfora moralpanic. CrimeLawandSocialChange 32:147–168.
Callinan,R.2009.SharksrampageinAustralia.January12,2009. Time magazine.http://www. time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1871007,00.html(accessedJuly5,2011).
CanberraTimes.1934.Sharkmenace:Campaigntocombat.August23,1934.NationalLibraryof Australiawebsite,http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article2368047(accessedJune18,2011).
Chapple,T.,S.Jorgensen,S.Anderson,P.Kanive,A.P.Kimley,L.Botsford,andB.Block.2011.A firstestimateofwhiteshark, Carcharodoncarcharias,abundanceoffCentralCalifornia. Biology Letter 7:581–583.
Clark,T.,A.Curlee,andR.Reading.1996.Craftingeffectivesolutionstothelargecarnivoreconservationproblem. ConservationBiology 10(4):940–948.
Coppleson,V.1933.SharkattacksinAustralianwaters. TheMedicalJournalofAustralia 1(15): 449–466.
Coppleson,V.1959. Sharkattack.Sydney:AngusandRobertson. CopplesonArchives.1964.CopplesonLetters.NewSouthWalesStateLibrary. Czech,B.,P.Krausman,andR.Borkhataria.1998.Socialconstruction,politicalpower,and theallocationofbenefitstoendangeredspecies. ConservationBiology 12(5):1103–1112.
Dery,D.2000.Agendasettingandproblemdefinition. PolicyStudies 21(1):37–47. DeNeufville,J.andS.Barton.1987.Mythsandthedefinitionofpolicyproblems. PolicySciences 20:181–206.
Entman,R.1993.Framing:Towardclarificationofafracturedparadigm. JournalofCommunication 43(4):51–58.
Environment.2011.AustralianGovernment,DepartmentofSustainability,EnvironmentWater, PopulationsandCommunities,SharksinAustralianWaters.http://www.environment.gov. au/coasts/species/sharks/greynurse/index.html(accessedAugust1,2011).
Fletcher,A.2009.Clearingtheair:Thecontributionofframeanalysistounderstandingclimate changepolicyintheU.S. EnvironmentalPolitics 18(5):800–816.
AustralianBeachSafetyandthePoliticsofSharkAttacks105
Hansard.2009a.Sharkmeshingprogram.September22,2009.ParliamentofNewSouthWales website,http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/hansart.nsf/V3Key/LC20090922012 (accessedJune10,2011).
Hansard.2009b.BeachSafety.November11,2009.ParliamentofNewSouthWaleswebsite,http:// 143.119.255.92/prod/parlment/hansart.nsf/V3Key/LC20091111021?open&refNavID=HA8 1 (accessedJune10,2011).
Holland,M.2009a.Governmentbackflipsoversharkairpatrol.November11,2009. DailyTelegraph [online].http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/government-backflips-over-shark-airpatrol/story-e6freuy9-1225796271393(accessedJune17,2011).
Holland,M.2009b.Thisiswhyweareouttobaitsharks.March27,2009. DailyTelegraph [online].http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/indepth/this-is-why-were-out-to-baitsharks/story-e6frewr9-1225691725558(accessedJune17,2011).
Houston,D.,andL.Richardson.2000.Thepoliticsofairbagsafety:Acompetitionamongproblem definitions. PolicyStudiesJournal 28(3):485–501.
Kingdon,J.1995. Agendas,alternatives,andpublicpolicies (2ndedition).NewYork:HarperCollins College.
Kleivan,J.,T.Bjerke,andB.Kaltenborn.2004.Factorsinfluencingthesocialacceptabilityoflarge carnivorebehaviours. BiodiversityandConservation 13:1647–1658.
Knight,A.2008.“Bats,snakes,andspiders,Ohmy!”Howaestheticandnegativisticattitudes,and otherconceptspredictsupportforspeciesprotection. JournalofEnvironmentalPsychology 28:94–103.
Lichbach,M.,andA.Zuckerman.2009. Comparativepolitics:Rationality,culture,andstructure. NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.
ManlyDaily.2009.Sharkhotspots.March3,2009. ManlyDaily,RebeccaWoolleyreporting.[online]. http://manly-daily.whereilive.com.au/news/story/shark-hotspots/(accessedApril19,2010).
Mercury.1937.Sharkmeshing:Governmentallots20,000.November1,1937. TheMercury.National LibraryofAustraliawebsite,http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/29210902(accessedMay10, 2011).
Meuser,E.,H.Harshaw,andA.Mooers.2009.Publicpreferenceforendemismoverother conservation-relatedspeciesattributes. ConservationBiology 23(4):1041–1046.
Mintrom,M.,andS.Vergari.1996.Advocacycoalitions,policyentrepreneursandpolicychange. PolicyStudiesJournal 24(3):420–434.
Nie,M.2001.ThesociopoliticaldimensionsofwolfmanagementandrestorationintheUnitedStates. HumanEcologyReview 8(1):1–12.
NSW.2006.ScientificSharkProtectionSummitReport.NewSouthWalesDepartmentofPrimary Industrieswebsite,http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/ data/assets/pdf file/0008/137294/Report-fromthe-Scientific-Shark-Protection-Summit.pdf(accessedMarch10,2010).
NSW.2009a.ReportintotheNSWsharkmeshing(batherprotection)program[publicconsultation document].NewSouthWalesDepartmentofPrimaryIndustrieswebsite,http://www.dpi. nsw.gov.au/ data/assets/pdf file/0008/276029/Report-into-the-NSW-Shark-Meshing-Program. pdf(accessedMarch10,2010).
NSW.2009b.NewmeasurestomakeswimmersSharkSmart.September1,2009.Departmentof PrimaryIndustrieswebsite,www.lia.nsw.gov.au/news and media/news/2009 news/?a=135443 (accessedJune1,2010).
Paxton,J.2006.MisconceptionsaboutsharkattacksandN.S.W.sharkmeshing.[online]. http://nccnsw.org.au/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=1428&Itemid=711(accessedMarch11,2010).
Papson,S.1992.Crossthefinlineofterror:SharkWeekontheDiscoveryChannel. Journalofthe AmericanCulture 15(4):67–81.
Pralle,S.2009.Agenda-settingandclimatechange. EnvironmentalPolitics 18(5):781–799. Robinson,G.2009.Blamelaidoversharkattacks.March2,2009. BrisbaneTimes [online].http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/news/national/blame-laid-over-shark-attacks/2009/03/ 02/1235842313258.html(accessedJuly27,2011).
106C.Neff
Rochefort,D.,andR.Cobb.1994. Thepoliticsofproblemdefinition:Shapingthepolicyagenda Lawrence,KS:UniversityPressofKansas.
Schneider,A.,andH.Ingram.1993.Socialconstructionoftargetpopulationsforpoliticsandpolicy. TheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview 87(2):334–347.
Schneider,A.,andH.Ingram.2005. Deservingandentitled:Socialconstructionsandpublicpolicy. Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.
Slovic,P.2004.What’sfeargottodowithit?It’saffectweneedtoworryabout. MissouriLawReview 69:971–990.
SMAC.1935.ReportoftheSharkMenaceAdvisoryCommitteeonSuggestedMethodsofProtecting BathersfromSharkAttack.Report58107244-a.NewSouthWales,Australia.
SMC.1929a.SummaryofNewSouthWalesSharkMenaceCommittee’sReport.Report86206-a. NewSouthWales,Australia.
SMC.1929b.GeneralReportofSub-CommitteeforPresentationtotheMeetingofGeneralCommittee.NewSouthWalesSharkMenaceCommittee.NewSouthWales,Australia.
SMH.1935.Sharkenclosure:Manlyleaserecommended.October7. SydneyMorningHerald.NationalLibraryofAustraliawebsite,http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article172071166(accessedJune 18,2011).
SMH.1937.Sharkmenace:Governmentaidsought,meshingscheme.July8,1937. SydneyMorningHerald.NationalLibraryofAustraliawebsite,http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article173921146 (accessedJune18,2011).
Stokes,D.2007.Thingswelike:Humanpreferencesamongsimilarorganismsandimplicationsfor conservation. HumanEcology 35:361–369.
Stone,D.1989.Causalstoriesandtheformationofpolicyagendas. PoliticalScienceQuarterly 104 (2):281–300.
Stone,D.2006.Reframingtheracialdisparitiesissueforstategovernments. JournalofHealthPolitics PolicyandLaw 31(1):127–152.
Stringer,J.,andJ.Richardson.1979.Managingthepoliticalagenda:ProblemdefinitionandpolicymakinginBritain. ParliamentaryAffairs 33(1):23–29.
Sturma,M.1986.ThegreatAustralianbite:EarlysharkattacksandtheAustralianpsyche. Journal oftheAustralianAssociationforMaritimeHistory 8(2):78–81.
Sunstein,C.2002.Probabilityneglect:Emotions,worstcasescenarios,andlaw. TheYaleLaw Journal,112(1):61–107.
Sunstein,C.2007.OnthedivergentAmericanreactionstoterrorismandclimatechange. Columbia LawReview 107:503–558.
Sunstein,C.andR.Zeckhauser.2009.Overreactiontofearsomerisks.WorkingPaperSerieswp08079,HarvardUniversity,JohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernment.
Thompson,T.L.,andJ.J.Mintzes.2002.Cognitivestructureandtheaffectivedomain:Onknowing andfeelinginbiology. InternationalJournalofScienceEducation 24(6):645–660. Wilson,M.2010.Adaptiveresponsestoriskandtheirrationallyemotionalpublic. SaintLouis UniversityLawJournal 54:1297–1312.
Zhu,X.2008.StrategyofChinesepolicyentrepreneursinthethirdsector:Challengesof“technical infeasibility.” PolicySciences 41(4):315–334.
Zinn,H.,M.Manfredo,J.Vaske,andK.Wittmann.1998.Usingnormativebeliefstodeterminethe acceptabilityofwildlifemanagementactions. SocietyandNaturalResources 11:649–662.
