The Politics of Shark Attacks: Explaining policy responses following shark bites in Florida, Cape Town, and New South Wales
Christopher L. Neff
A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Government and International Relations
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
University of Sydney February 2014
Statement of originality
This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted previously, either in its entirety or substantially, for a higher degree or qualification at any other university or institute of higher learning. I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged.
Christopher L. Neff
Abstract
This dissertation investigates the policymaking process during emotionally charged periods by comparing responses to shark bites in three locations. It examines the factors that explain policies which followed incidents in the American state of Florida, the South African City of Cape Town, and the Australian state of New South Wales. Each location reacted differently to these events, with Florida banning eco-tourism shark feeding, Cape Town adopting a Shark Spotter program, and New South Wales funding aerial patrols. Shark bite policy responses are emblematic of other emotion-laden and seemingly kneejerk policy responses, yet explaining why one issue or event produces a reaction while another does not remains an elusive question. This study constructs a theoretical framework to analyze the policy process based on the roles of affect, salience, policy entrepreneurship, and causal stories. A high affect-low threshold (HALT) framework is utilized to analyze shark bite policy responses in three ways. First, the HALT framework illustrates the way negative high affect-high salient events can be aggregated into a representative dreaded outcome. Secondly, it demonstrates the way aggregate dreaded outcomes place pressures on key actors to lower policy thresholds. Thirdly, it shows how the pressures from these aversive problem conditions encourage entrepreneurs to select quickly adoptable measures that provide positive affective relief. This framework was utilized in each case study and showed how the speed and direction of policy responses was influenced. In Florida, the governor opened the policy process when faced with the dread of tourism losses and encouraged adoption of a regulatory ban. In Cape Town, community stakeholders lowered the threshold in fear of political involvement and guided the adoption of the Shark Spotter program. In New South Wales, a minister used his office to announce a plan for aerial patrols to interrupt a series of political controversies.
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6.5.2 The governor’s office attached the ban as a solution to the problem of tourists’
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Chapter 7: Case Study #2: South
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9.4 What does the comparison of Florida, Cape Town, and NSW tell us? 252
9.4.1 Negative high affect periods established representative dreaded outcomes in Florida, Cape Town, and NSW 252
9.4.2 High salience turned the events into aggregate dreaded outcomes 253
9.4.3 Policy entrepreneurs in Florida, Cape Town, and NSW played vital roles in lowering policy thresholds to enable policy responses based on dreaded outcomes 254
9.4.4 Entrepreneurs used policy responses to provide affective relief to their dreaded outcome in Florida, Cape Town, and NSW 255
9.4.5 Historical analogies dominated scientific evidence in causal stories in Florida, Cape Town, and NSW 256
9.5 What are the broad applications of the HALT framework? 258
9.5.1 How the HALT framework informs knee-jerk policy and policy overreactions 258
9.5.2 The HALT framework and “policy relief damage” 259
9.5.3 Considering the implications of the affect-threshold framework on other issues 260
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FIGURES
Figure
Figure 4.1: Temporal combining of events, from Linville and Fischer (1991)
Figure 5.1: The presence of entrepreneurs during different policy windows
TABLES
Table
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Table 3.1: Comparing DAL master mean scores and “attack” DAL score
Table 4.1: Comparing boating fatalities, drowning, and canoe and kayak fatalities with annual and world-wide shark bite fatalities
Table 4.2: The closeness of multiple events and the speed of policy responses
Table 4.3: Evaluating the speed of policy responses between shark bite incidents
Table 4.4: Evaluating the speed of policy responses from the last shark bite incident
Table 5.1: Scaling policy entrepreneurship in a matrix to compare central features
Table 6.1: Measuring the speed of political attention to shark bites
Table 6.2: Policy entrepreneurship matrix
Table 7.1: Reviewing the speed of political attention to Cape Town shark bites
Table 7.2: HALT Policy entrepreneurship matrix
Table 8.1: Summary of Muter et al (2013) content analysis of Australia and US shark bite media reports between 2000–2010
Table 8.2: Summary of Neff and Hueter’s (2013) review of NSW Government shark “attack” reporting 2331
Table 8.3: Reviewing the speed of political attention to Sydney shark bites
Table 8.4: HALT Policy entrepreneurship matrix
Table 9.1: HALT Policy entrepreneurship matrix
Table 9.2: Reviewing the speed of political attention in FL, CPT, & NSW 258
CHARTS
Chart 3.1: Ratio of “attack” wording to the total number of words per article 68
Chart 3.2: Attack references per article 69
Chart 3.3: Attack references in headlines 69
Chart 5.1: Likely transitions of policy entrepreneurship based on policy window 136 context
Chart 6.1: Distribution of shark bites in FL between 01 Jan 2001 and 6 Sept 01 169
Chart 6.2: HALT elements for Thaddeus Kuninski’s shark bite in 2000 172
Chart 6.3: HALT elements for Jessie Arbogast’s shark bite in 2001 172
Chart 6.4: HALT elements for shark bites at NSB in April 2001 173
Chart 6.5: HALT elements for shark bites at NSB in August 2001 173
Chart 6.6: Distribution of monthly media stories on “shark attacks” in North America in 2001 178
Chart 6.7: Distribution of media outlets with “shark attack” media stories in 2001 in the U S 179
Chart 7.1: Cumulative shark bites and fatalities in Cape Town (2003-2005) 194
Chart 7.2: HALT elements for the shark bite fatality of David Bornman in 2003 202
Chart 7.3: HALT elements for the shark bite fatality of Tyna Webb in 2004 202
Chart 7.4: HALT elements for the shark bite fatality of Henri Murray in 2005 202
Chart 7.5: Comparison of shark bite media stories in Factiva and Cape Argus 203
Chart 8.1: Comparing reported Bondi beach attendance in 2009 and 2010 228
Chart 8.2: HALT elements for shark bite on Paul de Gelder 230
Chart 8.3: HALT elements for shark bite incident on Glen Orgias 230
Chart 8.4: HALT elements for three shark bite incidents on Andrew Lindop 230
Chart 8.5: Reviewing international and domestic media reports for the three Sydney shark bite incidents in 2009 231
Chart 8.6: Comparing media reports following shark bite incidents in March and November 2009 233
Chart 8.7: Media reports on aerial patrols and the SharkSmart campaign 241
Chart 9.1: Incorporating multiple issues into the (negative) affect-threshold categories 263
PICTURES
Picture 5.1: Illustrations of policy equilibrium
Picture 6.1: Time (2001) Summer of the Shark
Picture 6.2: Florida Panhandle and Pensacola
Picture 6.3: Volusia County
Picture 6.4: New Smyrna Beach in Volusia County
Picture 6.5: Broward County
Picture 7.1: Shark Spotter on the cliffs above Fish Hoek beach
Picture 7.2: False Bay, Fish Hoek beach, and Muizenberg beach
Picture 7.3: Seal Island
Picture 8.1: Newspaper cover of a Bull shark in 2009 in Sydney Harbour
8.4: Sydney Harbour shark bite locations (1942-1963)
Picture 8.5: Bondi beach
Picture 8.6: Avalon beach
Picture 9.1: White shark near a kayaker in Cape Cod in 2012
Abbreviations
Cape Town: CPT
City of Cape Town: Cape Town
Florida: FL
Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission: FWC
New South Wales: NSW
Republic of South Africa: South Africa
United States: US
Acknowledgements
I begin my acknowledgements on a sombre note. While this is a dissertation about public policy, it is more importantly the story of peoples’ lives. The case study incidents discussed in this research involve real people whose lives were lost or altered forever and whose families still struggle. Simply put, shark bites are not data points. They are life and death situations, and I am humbled by the privileges that have allowed me to consider these events in an academic context. I have endeavoured to discuss these events with the care and respect they deserve. I am mindful that the tragic losses of life they represent are truly unimaginable, and my deepest sympathies go to the victims and their families.
For me, I began this dissertation thinking I was the CEO of my PhD, and I have finished it knowing that no one does this alone. There are therefore several key people to thank. I begin, as all things should, with a thank you to my mother. Twice now I have travelled to Australia from the United States with her support and it is only with her backing that this was possible. In fact, this has been a family affair and I am blessed with an extraordinary family that has helped me, including Kristin, Tracey, and Lauren.
At the University of Sydney, the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences and the Department of Government and International Relations has been without fail throughout my study. I thank Dean of Arts and Social Sciences Duncan Ivison, Head of School Simon Tormey, Acting Head of School Allan McConnell, Kate Mayor, David Schlosberg, Megan Mackenzie, Anika Gauja, Fiona Probyn-Rapsey, Adam Kamradt-Scott, Gil Merom, Susan Park, Jane Borton, Graeme Gill, Stewart Jackson, and Ben Moffitt for their tremendous support. I also owe a special debt of gratitude to Dr. Betsi Beem who began this journey with me and encouraged me to work on this topic from the start. In addition, this research simply would not have been completed without assistance from the Sydney Aquarium Conservation Fund and Save Our Seas Foundation.
I am also grateful to the co-authors that I have worked with during this dissertation, including Dr. Jean Yang, with whom we published in Marine Policy (Neff and Yang,
2013), Dr. Robert Hueter in the Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences (Neff and Hueter, 2013), and Luke Edgell in the Journal of Homosexuality (Neff and Edgell, 2013).
Careful attention was paid to ensure that all of the text and contributions used in this dissertation are mine alone. In addition, I appreciate the constructive suggestions of my anonymous examiners and the professional assistance of Meredith Murray in the removal of typos.
In all, this dissertation has been an extraordinary journey, and my final word of thanks goes to those who directly contributed to the final preparation of this document: my associate supervisor Ariadne Vromen, my dear friends Natasha Reurts, Allegra Geller, and Joe Tom Easley, and finally, my supervisor Rodney Smith. There is no substitute for the confidence and support of a great supervisor, and I was fortunate to have all of the above in Rodney. It is not often that I am without words but in this case I hope that a very sincere “thank you” will suffice.
Finally, as with all things, I dedicate this to my brother David.
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Standing atop the watch platform of a scientific research boat, I watched as a 14-foot great white shark breached from the water and flew through the air. The shark was chasing a seal pup just off our anchoring point, Seal Island in False Bay, Cape Town, South Africa. Our boat raced over to watch the final moments of this struggle between the shark and seal. My scientific friends then attempted to place a research tag on the shark. That moment, and the three and a half years of study that are encompassed in this dissertation, have given me great affection for a nickname I received from my fellow doctoral candidates: “the shark guy.” In fact, I find their arguments in favour of the “shark guy” label more convincing than my efforts to convince them otherwise. This dissertation looks at the “politics of shark attacks,” and while this is a study of people and politics, there is simply no removing the central role of sharks from this research.
Moreover, I examine the policymaking processes by starting with a central feature of the issue head-on: the fear of being bitten by a shark. Understanding the causal mechanisms that influence policy responses in these cases provides a valuable study because public policy is often made on the basis of averting dreaded outcomes for politicians (de Mesquita and Smith, 1999) and certain advantaged segments of society (Schneider and Ingram, 1993). Public feelings and attention about an issue, event, or stimuli place pressures on actors so that the dreaded outcomes, which the public seeks to avoid and relieve, become issues that influence the political survival of actors. As a result, understanding the politics of shark “attacks” is about the way actors use the policy process to escape difficult situations for themselves.
This study encompasses a number of important theoretical themes, including the role of emotions in decision-making (Zajonc, 1980; Lodge and Taber, 2005; Slovic, 2004, Sunstein, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2011; and Damasio, 1996), decision-making under stress (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972, 1979; Linville and Fischer, 1991; McDermott et al., 2008;
Druckman and McDermott, 2008), the actions of policy entrepreneurs to champion policies (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Kingon, 1995; Walker, 1974, 1977; Mintrom, 2000; Mintrom and Norman, 2009), and the different types of policy windows (Howlett, 1998). One final theme looks at the role of historical analogies, narratives, causal stories, and problem definitions in framing policy solutions (Brandstrom and Kuipers, 2003; Lodge and Hood, 2002; Stone, 1989, 2002; Rocherfort and Cobb, 1994; Weiss, 1989; t’Hart, 1993, 2003).
Together, these themes and theoretical elements illustrate how the issue is not simply the way shark bites serve as dreaded outcomes, but rather what the emergence of feelings about specific, real or perceived, dreaded outcomes does to the political system during certain contextual periods. I therefore begin with the role of emotion, in this case negative emotion, because policy responses are often influenced by the feelings about the idea of a given outcome rather than the reality of its occurrence. It is here that this study focuses by looking at the way the psychological and emotional dimensions of dreaded outcomes influence the policy process and what other contextual factors accelerate or mitigate social and political attention. Providing a framework for understanding these elements is a key contribution of this thesis. As a result, considering these concepts in an examination of these cases will allow for a broader review of the way emotion and dreaded outcomes are managed within the political system.
This introductory chapter will outline this dissertation by addressing four key points. First, I identify the research question being examined. Secondly, I provide the methodology I used to address this question. Thirdly, I note the hypotheses that underpin this research. Fourthly, I outline the forthcoming chapters.
1.2
What is the research question?
The research question motivating this dissertation asks: What are the factors that explain policy responses to shark bites in the US state of Florida in 2001, the South African City of Cape Town in 2004, and the Australian state of New South Wales (NSW) in 2009?
In addition, a sub-question asks: why did these policy responses differ? The puzzle within these questions addresses two unresolved problems of political analysis regarding why policy responses occur at certain points and not others, and why there are different responses to the same kinds of events. There are multiple interpretations of what influences policy development. John Kingdon (1995) attempts to answer this question through his Multiple Streams Theory by looking at the way problems, politics, and policies converge during policy windows. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988, 1999) put forward the Advocacy Coalition Framework to examine the role of coalitions working on issues around a set of shared beliefs. And True, Jones, and Baumgartner (2007) argue in favour of Punctuated Equilibrium, where attention can bring in new actors to break up policy monopolies. However, there are challenges that remain. For instance, True, Jones, and Baumgartner (2007) note that what is unknown is “what will cause the next big shift in attention” (True, Jones, and Baumgartner, 2007: 179).
1.2.1 Why is this question important?
Understanding the factors that contribute to policy responses is an important question for three reasons. First, this question addresses a theoretical issue, because understanding why some issues produce responses while the same issue at other points does not is a lingering question in political science. Answering even part of this question chips away at the contexts and conditions under which policy responses occur and aids in understanding political behaviour. Secondly, this question is valuable at a governance level because the implications of an increasing number of seemingly ‘knee-jerk’ policy responses impacts long-term governance. This highlights the need to examine their impact within the policymaking process. And thirdly, this research question operates at a practical level. because shark bite policy responses can undermine shark conservation. Thus, this is a difficult question on various levels that can help address multiple dilemmas.
While it is unknown exactly why one policy will occur on an issue, but not another, there appear to be certain pressures, at certain times, that drive these responses. This can be seen outside of expected policy windows (Kingdon, 1995; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003).
Annual budget negotiations are different from policymaking during unexpected policy windows. These are often characterized by short-term, knee-jerk policymaking. Walker (1977: 426) reviews the way U.S. Senators address problem cycles and argues that there are periods when “pressing problems” require that “[a]ction of some kind, even if it is merely symbolic, must be taken as quickly as possible.” Other research has noted these responses, including Lodge and Hood (2002: 1), who provide a valuable critique of kneejerk responses as “forced choice” events. The “forced choice” is defined as, “the condition of having to respond to an immediate or anticipated crisis” (Lodge and Hood, 2002: 1). I refer to these periods as a high affect-low threshold (HALT) periods, in which the relationship between the emotional nature of the issue’s negative outcome can add pressure on actors to open policy windows. This characterization is valuable because it locates the role of degrees of emotion as principle drivers in the policy process while also acknowledging the role of structural and political contexts that establish policy thresholds.
Understanding seemingly knee-jerk policymaking is also a valuable element of policy analysis because this type of short-term issue governance is on the rise. Governing in the 24-hour news cycle is often about governance in constant motion, to stay ahead of the next volatile issue or perceived crisis. However, the speed of government may not be conducive to the public’s expected timeframe for policymaking, and as a result, the speed of politics wins out. For example, former Australian MP John Hewson has noted that “short-term politics is dominating the process” in which the goal of politicians is to “score points” within the media cycle (personal communication, 05 June 2013). Linking the question of why policy responses occur and which pressures create environments for knee-jerk policies is the issue of emotion.
Feelings of dread from a perceived shark “attack” outcome are an influential force in personal decision-making following a shark bite and many other events or issues; however, this role of emotion is underexplored in the policy process. The role of emotion is often relegated to emotionally reflective reactions and overreactions, with the implication that little thought went into what is essentially an autonomic, in this case political, response. Simply hit a certain sensitive emotional point and governments will
kick. Strike a raw nerve and a reaction or overreaction will be produced. This research challenges the assumed nature of these presumptions and seeks to identify a framework that locates the role of emotion in the policy process.
Determining the contexts in which emotion plays a role is important for policy analysis because highly emotional events do not always lead to an increased likelihood of a policy response. In keeping with this, I argue that knee-jerk responses are not simple causal effects from emotional situations. Locating emotion as a feature of the process helps explain the instinctual and cultural dimensions that preference certain issues for political attention and why certain responses are advantaged or resisted. In addition, placing emotion within the policy cycle helps identify the emotional manipulation of the public by actors, in the timing and selection of solutions (Lupia and Menning, 2009). Indeed, references to emotion in public policy are often found in the more developed literature on crises (McConnell, 2003), low probability disasters (Sunstein, 2002), focusing events (Birkland, 1998), and moral panics (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994).
In all, adding emotional analyses into policy analysis improves our understanding of the policy process because it aids in the “causal mechanism that connect cause and effect” (Falleti, 2006: 2). The way in which people and actors feel about a threat or toward a solution are key elements that should be systematically incorporated into policy analysis. Locating emotion within the process also adds to this explicability. The literature has noted that under stress, the public may be seen as more vulnerable. Leith and Baumeister (1996) argue that people have a limited capacity to “think things through” when they get angry or upset and as a result look for the best outcome. Lazarus (1991) argues that under anxiety people do not know what to do or how to respond. Indeed, past schemas (Fiske and Taylor, 1991: 18) can trigger anger from representative events (Cottam et al , 2010: 52). This literature provides a valuable basis for this study and is discussed further in Chapter 2. The next step is to identify how the cases were considered for this analysis.
1.3 How were the cases selected?
Case selection was based on six similarities and two differences across the cases. First, each location experienced multiple shark bites that preceded a policy response. Secondly, each nation had a history of semi-democratic and democratic governmental bodies responding to shark bites. Thirdly, each site has been recognized as a global leader in shark bite policy responses, and its measures have been adopted by other locations Fourthly, all of the policy responses took place within a temporally close period (i.e. 2000-2010). Fifth, each location enacted a policy through semi-democratic or democratic policy processes following a shark bite or series of shark bites. Sixth, each nation led the world in the total number of reported shark bites.
A longitudinal analysis of every recorded shark bite policy response in the world was reviewed from 1907-2010 to assist in case selection. I gathered this data as part of a research project for the Pew Environmental Group in 2010, which has been updated for this dissertation. The table below (Table 1.1) shows current policy responses at 41 beach locations in 25 countries. The data confirm the leading nature of three case study nations, Australia, South Africa, and the United States, who have influenced nearly all responses globally. These figures demonstrate how all of the leading policy responses have come from these three countries. For example, a “shark-proof” enclosure was first erected in Durban, South Africa, in 1907, and similar efforts extended to Croatia in the 1920s (Dudley and Gribble, 1999), Sydney in 1937, and Hong Kong in 1993. Culling methods were used in Hawaii in the 1960s (Wetherbee et al., 1994) and expanded to New Jersey in 1961 and Brazil in 2008. Each location has experienced a shark bite, and collectively these locations represent 90 percent of all reported shark bite locations in the world.
The differences associated with the case studies include: First, that each location responded with a different policy response to the incidents; and secondly, the decisionmakers in each case location are from varying jurisdictional authorities. In all, case studies were carefully selected and are not identical, by design. In the American state of Florida, the Fish and Wildlife Commission (FWC) voted to enact a statutory state-wide ban on eco-tourism shark feeding in 2001. In the South African city of Cape Town, the
city council adopted an innovative Shark Spotter program through funding in 2004. And in the Australian state of New South Wales (NSW), the Department of Primary Industries adopted aerial patrols along its beaches in a funding scheme in 2009.
Table 1.1 Summary of leading responses to shark bite incidents
Shark Bite Prevention Method Year enacted First Nation/State to develop the method
Current locations using the method Current # of countries using the method
Shark hunts 1916 USA/NJ Egypt (2010), Mexico (2010), Seychelles (2011), Reunion Island (2011), Russia (2011), Western Australia (2000/2011) 6
Beach nets 1937
Australia/NSW New South Wales (1937), Queensland (1962), KZN Natal (1958), Thailand (2012) 4
Drum lines/long lines near beaches 1959 USA/HA Brazil (2004), Queensland (1962)*, KZN Natal (1958)* 1
Beach enclosures 1907 South Africa/Durban Croatia (1920), Hong Kong (1993), New South Wales (1937)* 1
Shark Spotters 2004 South Africa/Cape Town Cape Town (2004) 1
California, Florida, Hawaii, Texas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, Oregon, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Tasmania, Bahamas, Philippines, Ecuador, United Kingdom, Costa Rica, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, New Caledonia, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands, South Korea, New Zealand, South Australia and Italy. 28
While there are a variety of policy responses, a common feature of these issues is their highly emotional nature More specifically, the negative emotions people feel related to
their perceptions about the dreaded consequences from shark bites. This feature narrows broader discussions of emotion down to the characteristics of affect. As a result, I rely on the risk literature regarding the importance of affect in preference shaping (Slovic, 2002). This is distinct from other discussions of mood used in political science (Stimson, 1991) and emotion in sociology (Kemper, 1990). I identify a gap in the research regarding the role of affect in policy development and within theories of the policy process in Chapter 2. Therefore, as a starting point, I raise the question regarding what factor, if any, affective sensibilities about dreaded outcomes play in impacting the selection of particular policy solutions.
Table 1.1 also illustrates an increase in lethal responses across the globe. Historically, both lethal and non-lethal responses have been implemented across the globe over the past 100 years. I note that while “75 percent (31 of 41) of beach locations that have experienced shark bite incidents do not allow the killing of sharks as part of their beach safety program, of the 10 beach locations that do allow killing sharks, 70 percent of these (7 of 10) began doing so since 2004.”
In addition, the research design of these cases looked at defining the starting point for the episodes being studied (Felleti, 2006). In each case, a shark bite incident is noted to initiate each episode and a HALT thermometer tool is used to highlight this period, which ends with the announcement of the policy response. Selection bias is addressed by the different nature of the policy responses being examined. Lastly, it is important to note that the case selection for this dissertation was completed in 2009, before shark hunts in Egypt, Mexico, the Seychelles, Reunion Island, Russia, and Western Australia were announced.
1.4 What are the concepts and hypotheses?
Examining policy responses to shark bites in these three case studies requires locating the role of emotion, specifically affect, within the policy process. I propose a high affect-low threshold (HALT) framework to examine the case study policy responses, which is elaborated in Chapter 2. The concepts that underpin this framework include affect,
salience, policy entrepreneurship, and causal stories. In addition, it is important to identify references to historical analogies, policy thresholds, outcome aggregations, and affective relief. These concepts are briefly defined as follows:
First, emotion in this dissertation is discussed as “affect”, which is defined in the risk literature by Slovic et al (2007: 1333) “as the specific quality of ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ (i) experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) and (ii) demarcating a positive or negative quality of a stimulus.” Affect is distinguished from more traditional discussions of emotion by the speed with which it is felt and the way it can be primed by certain stimuli. High negative affect is referred to as intense negative feelings about an outcome.
Secondly, salience is a key element that is defined in Chapter 4 as “a judgment about the relevance of stimuli compared to other competitive features at a given time.” An important consideration of salience is the way issues attract importance, encounter liabilities to this attention, and occur during salience-prone periods. These features can be readily seen in Khaneman and Tversky’s (1979) work on prospect theory as well as Linville and Fischer (1991).
Thirdly, the standard definition of policy entrepreneurs is challenged in this dissertation, but is summarized by Botterill (2013: 99) as elected or unelected actors who “work to influence debate by framing issues and developing solutions to policy problems which they are ready to promote as soon as an opportunity to do so presents itself.”
Fourthly, causal stories play a leading role in policymaking by defining the terms of the problem and solution. Stone (2006: 129) argues that “policy makers also need a persuasive causal story, because problems come onto the political agenda on the backs of causal stories.”
Fifthly, the role of historical analogies is used as one of the important mental shortcuts people use to connect a previously memorable event with existing stimuli, thereby informing their decision-making. Angstrom (2011: 225) notes that “the power of an
analogy stems from its capability to link an important policy area to a momentous event in the past with the intended outcome. In this way, it makes the issue appear important and the ensuing policy inevitable.”
Sixthly, policy thresholds are noted as the point at which actors and institutions open policy processes to negotiation. This is most obvious in the opening of a policy window and may result from a variety of pressures and stimuli, which will be reviewed in this dissertation. These issues are addressed in greater detail in Chapter 2.
Seventh, the aggregation of negative high affect outcomes is the psychological condition of “temporally combining” (Linville and Fischer, 1991:8) the perceived consequences from multiple events. Lastly, the term affective relief also builds off the work of Linville and Fischer (1991). It refers to the way in which a policy response is perceived to address a dreaded outcome or aggregation by disaggregating the events and interrupting the negative emotions as a way to relieve social or individual distress. Linville and Fischer (1991) refer to this within psychology as the “renewable resources model,” in which positive feedback is introduced to provide support to individuals or groups who are experiencing temporally combined negative feedback.
There are four hypotheses that emerge from considering these factors as a way to explain different shark bites policy responses in Florida, Cape Town, and New South Wales:
Hypothesis#1: Shark bites in Florida, Cape Town, and New South Wales are perceived by the public to be negative high affect events. This is based on fear of the dreaded outcome from stimuli of the event. The foundation for this hypothesis is outlined in the affect literature, which includes Zajonc (1980), Slovic (2002), Damasio (1996), and Lodge and Taber (2005), among others discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Importantly, this hypothesis locates affect at the start of the policy process.
Hypothesis #2: Policy actors in Florida, Cape Town, and New South Wales open the policy process quickly following multiple negative high affect-high salience events that are aggregated together. This window of opportunity is indicative of a policy threshold
that can be seen through the announcement or implementation of policy responses. The basis for this analysis relies on salience literature and prospect theory noted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1982), Linville and Fischer (1991), and McDermott et al. (2008), which is addressed in Chapter 4.
Hypothesis #3: The speed and direction of policy responses in Florida, Cape Town, and New South Wales are selected by political actors following negative high affect-high salience aggregations based on their perceptions of positive affect relative to the negative dreaded outcome and access to quickly implementable resources. This analysis builds on the “renewal resources” model proposed by Linville and Fischer (1991) noted in Chapter 4, as well as the literature on policy entrepreneurship by Mintrom (2000), Mackenzie (2004), and Neff and Edgell (2013), discussed in Chapter 5.
Hypothesis #4: Previously aggregated events in Florida, Cape Town, and New South Wales will stimulate lower policy thresholds in the future because of the availability of dreaded aggregate outcomes. This analysis most directly relates to the power of historical analogies from Brandstom, Bynander, and t’Hart, (2004), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), and Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003). Here, I build on these analyses to suggest how events commonly appear to be overreactions since seemingly minor stimuli may trigger responses relative to aggregate problem conditions.
1.5 Methodology: How have I attempted to answer this question?
I approach this research as a theory building and “process tracing” (George and McKewon, 1985) exercise to explain the factors that contribute to policymaking in each case study George and McKewon (1985:35) define process tracing as an “approach [that] attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behaviour that then occurs; the effects of various in institutional arrangements on attention and, processing and behaviour.” This process identifies the “causal mechanisms” that influence policy responses. Yee (1996:
77) notes that “process tracing is a plausible procedure for establishing an explanatory link between ideas, beliefs, etc. and policies.”
I used a mixed-methods qualitative analysis to examine each case and evaluate evidence. Answering this research question requires “in-depth knowledge of phenomena” (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig, 2007). In turn, I employed a multiple case study analysis of policy responses in Florida, Cape Town, and New South Wales based on Yin (2009). Yin (2009: 17) cites Schramm (1971) who stated, “the central tendency among all types of case study is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result.”
Causal mechanisms are described by George and Bennett (2005: 137) as “ultimately unobservable physical, social or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions.” The causal nature of this analysis is important because this technique moves beyond causal effects. Collier (2011: 823) notes that “these methods can add inferential leverage that is often lacking in quantitative analysis.”
I focus on explaining these different policy responses by developing a theory that identifies the causal mechanism at work. The HALT framework provides the theoretical elements and is applied to the cases to evaluate the presence of evidence to support the theory. This approach builds on that of Sabatier (2007), who compares an array of policy design concepts. He suggests that the continued development of these frameworks and theories is essential to public policy analysis and that there are guiding principles in their advancement. These include: being “logically coherent”; having “causal drivers”; being falsifiable; being broad in scope; and that they stimulate counterintuitive thinking (Sabatier, 2007). I suggest the proposed HALT framework is consistent with these recommendations. The implications from this combined analysis asks whether knee-jerk policy reactions and overreactions are really automatic and disproportionate as presumed, or whether considerations of affect and emotion offer additional data to interpret these responses.
1.5.1
Operationalizing the research question
This study offers an exploratory investigation into the applicability of a high affect-low threshold (HALT) framework for understanding the policy processes in these cases. The concepts to be operationalized for the theoretical framework have been described. These include: 1.) affect (and shark bites as negative high affect events), 2.) salience and aggregations 3.) policy entrepreneurship, 4.) affective relief and, 5.) policy thresholds.
The evidence needed to support the presence of each concept is noted below, followed by a discussion of the appropriate way to collect that data and the methods being applied in this dissertation. In addition, Table 1.2 below provides a summary of the operationalization of the HALT framework, including the independent variables and dependent variable as well as the indicators for these variables and the sources of evidence that are used to lend support to the hypotheses.
Identifying measurements for people’s feelings toward shark bite outcomes requires multiple sources of data. Evidence to support shark “attacks” as negative high affect events was gathered from: 1.) a quantitative empirical analysis regarding the negative high affect nature of the discourse for the key words “shark attack,” 2.) a measure of the quantitative frequency of that discourse in newspapers, and 3.) a review of narratives in newspapers and government documents that portray sharks negatively. Several methods were used in gathering and analyzing this data (see Chapter 3). First, Whissell’s Dictionary of Affect (DAF) was used to empirically measure the affective level of the discourse toward the key word “shark attack.” Secondly, a review of leading newspapers in each case study location was conducted to determine the frequency of “shark attack” usage. Thirdly, historical and contemporary narratives that portray sharks negatively were reviewed.
The methods for gaining this evidence of affect include the DAF, a content analysis of media reports for each case study, namely the Associated Press, Cape Town Times, and Sydney Morning Herald. The discourse analysis of historic newspaper reports included
reviews using TROVE media archives in Australia, government documents, and archival research. In addition, previous surveys on public attitudes toward sharks from the Baltimore Aquarium in 2002 and a survey of Cape Town residents by Neff and Yang (2013) provided data that confirmed other data sources regarding the negative high affect nature of shark bites.
The next measurement reviewed salience in these cases and included indicators for media and political salience. First, data regarding the quantitative frequency of media coverage of the shark bite incident was analyzed. Secondly, data regarding the relative nature of media attention to a given shark bite versus other shark bite incidents and other competitive news events were compared to identify the salience-prone nature of the media cycle. Thirdly, the data for political attention or salience required identifying the actions of political actors in response to the shark bite incident. I used qualitative analysis to examine which actors were involved, their position, and how quickly they engaged in a response. Higher levels of salience were categorized based on the speed of actions by senior figures. The measure of speed is a particularly important data point throughout this study, given that identifying aggregations of multiple events together is evidenced by the increased speed of policy responses relative to the frequency of negative high affect-high salience events.
The methods used to collect this salience data included media content analyses using Factiva to review the number of new stories for each event, media analysis of newspapers, government documents, and reports from each case study to identify comments from political actors, and an empirical review of the speed of policy responses relative to the events. In addition, informal interviews provided crucial data regarding the role of the relative frequency of local shark bites in aggregating dreaded outcomes.
The role of actors is central to the HALT model. Measuring policy entrepreneurship in this study includes three indicators: first, first-hand public or private statements from the actors who identify themselves as entrepreneurs; secondly, private statements from experts associated with the issue who identify the entrepreneurs; and thirdly, email
communications that can reasonably be perceived to confirm entrepreneurial activity. Sources of evidence for policy entrepreneurship data include statements and emails from multiple sources in all three locations. The methods for collecting this data include inperson interviews and fieldwork, government document analysis of parliamentary statements, and archival research of departmental emails from the jurisdictional offices, provided under transparency laws.
Fieldwork was conducted in each of the three locations with approval from the Human Ethics department at the University of Sydney. An interview schedule is included in Appendix A. I conducted 21 in-person, “key informant” interviews (Schrank, 2006: 169) and one Skype interview between 2010 and 2012. The informal interview process was followed Seidman (2006). In Florida, 10 people were interviewed, in Cape Town 10 people were interviewed, and in New South Wales two government officials were interviewed. Each interviewee was provided questions in advance, and each session was recorded in agreement with the interviewee. Notes were taken and summarized following each interview, and verbatim quotations were later taken from the recordings.
Importantly, the sensitive nature of internal political operations meant that interviewees for all three case studies were anonymous. This limitation meant that statements that elaborated on their individual roles and gave away their identities were restricted. Yet, the need for anonymity also allowed for greater accessibility, which was an important feature of this study and offered access to insider operatives that included departmental staff and key community stakeholders. Access to this data helped illustrate the ways in which entrepreneurs in each location used causal stories to advance their solutions and locate themselves in the policymaking process.
Table 1.2 Summarizing the operationalization of the HALT framework
Variables:
Dependent Variable
Policy responses
Independent/Explanatory Variables
Affect (negative)
Salience
Policy entrepreneurship and causal stories
Indicators and values of variables:
a.) Public statements
b.) Government funding announcements
c.) Commission votes
Sources of evidence:
a.) Government reports
b.) Government press releases
c.) HANSARD parliamentary records
d.) Inter-departmental emails
e.) Stakeholder interviews
f.) Media reports
Policy threshold
Affective relief
a.) Quantitative valuation of key “shark attack” discourse
b.) Media use of shark “attack” discourse
c.) Media use of intent-based or shark criminalization discourse
d.) Beach attendance
e.) Survey data on public attitudes toward sharks
a.) Media attention toward shark bites
b.) Political attention toward shark bites
c.) Salience-prone periods relative to other news following shark bites
a.) Statement from actor
b.) Statement from stakeholders
c.) Email communication
a.) Public statement
b.) Government funding
c.) Issue hearing/meeting
a.)Support from political actors, the public, or community organizations
a.) Whisell’s Dictionary of Affect (DAF)
b.) Stakeholder interviews
c.) Media reports
d.) HANSARD parliamentary records,
e.) Australian Surf Lifesaving Association
f.) Archival research
g.) Polling data
a.) Factiva media content analysis and coverage
b.) Public statements,
c) Document analysis
a.) In-person interviews
b.) Document analysis
c.) Public statements
d.) Archival research
a.) HANSARD parliamentary statements
b.) Media reports
c.) Document analysis
a.) Media reports
b.) Archival research
The last two concepts involve policy thresholds and affective relief. The indicator for policy thresholds was based on statements from jurisdictional actors about the issue that opened the policy process. Sources for this included public statements and parliamentary speeches, media reports, and government reports. The methods for gathering this data were consistent with those noted above and included archival research, document analysis, and content analysis of media reports. Archival research was gathered from the University of Cape Town, NSW State Library, and Mote Marine Laboratory. Firsthand information was obtained through emails from the Governor’s office and FWC through requests with the FWC, under Florida’s transparency laws known as ‘sunshine’ laws. Primary documents were also obtained in the form of beach utilization data in Sydney. Secondary documents from each location included the Florida Sea Grant presentation in 2002, Cape Town’s “Finding a Balance” Report in 2006, and the 2009 Report on the NSW Shark Meshing Program.
Finally, the indicator for affective relief was based on supportive statements in favour of the measure from the public, political leaders or community organizations. This data was available through public statements, media reports and archival research. The method of analyzing this evidence included discourse analysis that looked at the role of causal stories and historical analogies in building or reflecting public support. Together, the evidence was used to lend support to the hypotheses and serve as a foundation for this examination. However, a number of qualitative tools needed to be developed to facilitate this analysis.
1.5.2 Qualitative analysis
As noted, this research question was examined through a comparative case study using qualitative process-tracing methods. In addition to expert assessments, public statements, media reports and government documents, I evaluated these independent variables by creating three instruments. First, a HALT ‘thermometer’ was developed to compare shark bite incidents within each case study using the features of the framework. This is discussed in Chapter 6. Secondly, I measured the speed of political attention and policy
responses from the dates of the events to the announcement of the response. This process begins in Chapter 4. Thirdly, a policy entrepreneurship matrix was developed in Chapter 6 and used to review and compare core entrepreneurial variables between actors.
This dissertation has had two main limitations. First, this study was limited to the three case studies, based on time and available resources. Additional case studies and quantitative analysis, both of which were beyond the limits of this thesis, would be useful future tests of the model. Second, it is important to note that within these cases, other causal relationships that are not noted may be contributing factors. This dissertation is not providing a theoretical framework that should be seen as the sole path to understanding the policy outcome. Indeed, there may be multiple ways in which these responses can be analyzed (Bennett, 2003: 3). This analysis attempts to apply an original framework to policy analysis. As a result, demonstrating the applicability and promise of the theory were the primary objectives. The next section briefly outlines how each of the forthcoming chapters contributes to these objectives.
1.6 Dissertation chapter structure
This dissertation contains nine chapters, which are outlined below. In Chapter 2, I lay the foundation for the dissertation by establishing the elements that are used to build the HALT framework as a model of policy analysis. I introduce the affect-threshold framework and briefly review how these elements are seen to work together. I note how the proposed framework is distinguished from current literature in other areas, including focusing events and moral panics.
In Chapter 3, I address the political dimensions of affect. This focuses on the qualitative measurements of affect and how shark bites represent negative high affect events. A review of public attitudes toward shark bites and shark bite stimuli in each case study location is used to highlight negative perceptions of shark bites in the United States, South Africa, and Australia.
In Chapter 4, I build on the discussion of affect and examine the implications of salient characteristics on policy responses. I review the benefits and costs of salience and the cognitive tools that are used to provide speed in diagnosing situations. An analysis of the speed of shark policy responses is used to illustrate the aggregation of multiple events into a more intense dreaded outcome.
In Chapter 5, I look at the role of policy entrepreneurs and the way they use causal stories as political instruments to advantage their solution. Here, a narrow definition of policy entrepreneurship is applied as are categorizes of measurement. In addition, causal narratives are given typologies to aid in this analysis. The relationship between certain entrepreneurs and policy windows is also reviewed to identify advantaged situations based on the affective and salient characteristics. This completes the establishment of the HALT framework.
In Chapter 6, the first case study is applied to the HALT framework. The FWC’s ban on shark feeding in Florida is examined. I identify the policy being examined and the location and shark bite details. I review the evidence to support the case as a negative high affect event as well as salience in leading to the response. I note other similar cases where no response occurred. I also review the role of Governor Jeb Bush as a policy entrepreneur regarding the enactment of this policy and his use of causal stories.
In Chapter 7, the adoption of the Shark Spotters program by the city of Cape Town is reviewed as the second case study. I identify the political and geographic contexts and apply the HALT framework again to the nature of the incidents. Standout issues in this chapter include the salience-prone nature of tabloid reporting in Cape Town and the impact of adopting an innovative program on the speed of the policy process.
In Chapter 8, I review NSW’s adoption of aerial patrols as the third and final case study. I investigate a change in policy made by the then Minister for Primary Industries, Ian Macdonald, regarding these patrols. The HALT framework is applied to this policy
response and examines the way negative high affect-high salience conditions presented a dreaded outcome in the minister’s political life.
In Chapter 9, I conclude the dissertation and compare findings from the three cases. I note the implications from these findings on broader understandings of public policy and indicate that policy responses to HALT events can have both positive and negative impacts.
In all, this research question illustrates the way in which political science can help solve difficult problems. The aim of this research is to explain why shark bite responses occurred in these three locations and why they differed. The proposed HALT framework focuses on the emotional nature of these incidents and analyzes empirical data regarding affect, salience, policy entrepreneurship, and causal stories to indicate the applicability of this as an interpretive public policy tool. It also reviews the level of policy thresholds during these situations and the way responses provide affective relief. These elements will be seen as successful because they are able to provide evidence for one theory regarding why the shark bite responses happened, why they occurred at one point rather than another, and why responses differed across locations. In addition, this process-tracing and theory-building research attempts to make progress in analyzing a broader range of seemingly knee-jerk policy responses which often follow emotional public events. In sum, I hope to provide an original contribution of knowledge that aids in examining broad areas of the policymaking process.
Chapter 2. Building a Model of Analysis
“[T]he methods of politics, as of social sciences in general, are constantly in need of scrutiny and revision in order to avoid falling into a category that is neither scientific science nor practical politics ” Charles Merriam (1921: 178)
2.1 Introduction
This research focuses on two of the most fundamental questions of policy research. The first is, what are the factors that influence policy responses? Harold Lasswell (1950) put this best in his foundational writing by defining politics as “who gets what, when, and how” (Lasswell, 1950). Since then, significant contributions have been made to the study of policy design; however, questions remain. For instance, there are circumstances when one event may result in little or no response, yet the same event occurring (or appearing to occur) a second or third time results in a dramatic escalation of policy responses. Often, these situations move from “normal” conditions to “crisis” events on the basis of their frequency or severity (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994). However, even then, the factors that influence policy responses are not assured. Nohrstedt (2008: 258) identifies a lingering gap in the literature when he notes that there is an insufficient framework for determining, “why some crises result in major policy changes while others do not.”
A second question is, what factors influence different responses to the same kinds of events across varying locations? This is often a practical issue of how we explain diverse responses to political scandals, economic crises, climate change, or “killer bees.” At issue is the degree to which political institutions or social factors, the collective group or the individual, are the leading or subsequent players in the development of policies.
This chapter looks to answer these two questions by outlining a theoretical model and policy response framework that connects emotions and perceived fears to issue thresholds. The model is based on four elements: affect, salience, policy entrepreneurship, and causal stories. The chapter challenges the starting point of political
behaviour as issue emergence, proposes a model for examining the causal relationships that lead to policy responses to low-threshold events. It locates this framework within the broader threshold literature and distinguishes the model from other policy design theories that deal with similar issues
The use of threshold models provides a valuable theoretical framework for understanding public policy. They have been used to indicate the importance of issue-attention (Peters and Hogwood, 1985), the temporary nature of policy equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009), and the waves of issue acceptance that influence policy responses (Wood and Doan, 2003). In this research, I am using a threshold analysis to illustrate how feelings about outcomes can raise or lower the crucial point at which policy responses are expected.
2.2 The unrecognized role of affect in political behaviour
This analysis begins by contesting the point at which political behaviour is argued to begin. Robert Dahl notes that political behaviour is like “the monster at Loch Ness,” obvious to all but difficult to find (Dahl, 1961: 763). The search for the ontology and typology of political behaviour remains debatable; however, the emphasis on a systematic approach to policy research as “the science of democracy” (Lasswell, 1941) has pushed the discipline toward approaches and methodologies deemed more “scientific.” Within this context, there are three factors that should be noted. First, there continues to be criticism toward theories of political behaviour that embrace the “scientific study of politics” (Storing, 1962), suggesting limitation in its approach (Strauss, 1962). Secondly, there has been a longstanding rejection of emotion as a central component of political behaviour due to its “unscientific” nature. And thirdly, new scientific evidence and social science data have affirmed the central role of affect and emotion in human behaviour (De Martino et al., 2006). This confluence of elements suggests that it is time for a review of the unrecognized role of affect in political behaviour.
For nearly twenty years, homo economicus or the “normative standard of rationality” (Grusczynski et al., 2012) has served as a dominant political science model drawn from rational-choice theory or public choice theory. Bobrow and Dryzek (1987: 49), note that this theory “applies deductive reasoning based on individual rational maximizing behaviour in order to determine the collective consequences under different situations.” Political behaviour is therefore seen to be driven by logical cognitive judgments, the availability of information, and structures or rules. Within public policy literature, the way in which issues emerge for consideration is a starting point in measuring this behaviour.
Some public policy research has explicitly or implicitly challenged the commonly assumed link between rational human behaviour and policy outputs. This includes research into the identification of policy problems (Stone, 1989; Kingdon, 1995), mobilizations of policy communities (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009), and responses to sudden focusing events (Birkland, 1998), which are key elements in agenda setting and the policy process. For example, Baumgartner and Jones’s (2009) model of punctuated equilibrium addresses the instability of issue domains by analyzing the ability of the public to act by “cognitive friction” (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). This relies on bounded rationality (Simon, 1955), which Baumgartner and Jones (2009) define as the “failure of people to tally up costs and benefits from a potential decision and then to choose the best course of action.”
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979, 1982) work on “probability neglect” utilizes bounded rationality and challenges rational choice theory by shifting its emphasis from utility maximization toward relative points in which “those faced with gains tend to be risk averse, while those confronting losses become more risk-seeking” (McDermott, Fowler, and Smirnov, 2008: 335). These contestations have led to questions about the nature of policy design (e g., from incremental and episodic to “disjointed”), biases inherent in a “rational” model in which “reason is indeed male” (Lloyd, 1993: xix), and the elements impacting human behaviour.
A more comprehensive understanding of the fundamentals underlying policymaking is needed. Bozeman (1986: 527) states that, “it is increasingly clear that policy analysis is not sufficiently attentive to the psychology of decision-making.” However, affect and emotion have yet to find their place in this dialogue. Theodore Lowi (1992: 6) asks political scientists to consider, “improving the prospect of rationality in human behaviour.” Smith and Ingram (1997: 2) follow suit, highlighting “[t]he inadequacy of public policy analysis as a producer of useful, important, and influential knowledge for policymaking and implementation is more universally agreed upon.” McGovern and Yacobucci build on these arguments by suggesting that an “augmentation” is needed to predominant theories because, “[t]he reliance on varying forms of instrumental rationality and behavioural individualism, even within newer institutional models, will continue to hamper efforts to implement policy solutions” (McGovern and Yacobucci, 1999). Thus, political behaviour based on rational individual actors is being contested; however, the role of emotion and affect have not yet been centrally located within policy design theory. The model proposed later in this chapter gives proper emphasis to the role of affect in policymaking.
Affect, which is defined by risk theorist Paul Slovic (2004) as the “faint whisper of emotion” to an outcome, word, or target, is commonly viewed as a liability to ideal policy processes. Rejection of affect and emotion in politics is often based on the argument that valences are simply tools for manipulating the masses. Marcus (2002) notes that the “sentimental citizen” is seen to come at the expense of rational decision-making and political society (Marcus, 2002). Grusczynski et al., (2012) note that the American Founding Fathers feared that the public would be easily manipulated and “argued for building institutions capable of protecting political society against the foibles of an emotional citizenry” (Gruscznski et al , 2012). Central to the demotion of emotion and affect is the belief that they are “unscientific” in nature because testing for emotional stimuli is difficult when compared with more objective and deliberative cognitive logic. Yet, David Hume famously wrote in the 18th Century that “reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions” (in Lewis, Jones, Barrett, 2010). He was joined by Hegel, Bacon, Brooks, Rousseau, and James, who all challenged the negative depictions of emotion.
Helvetius stated, “only a passion can triumph over a passion” (Helvetius, 1758: 159-160).
William James (1890) wrote that “the brain is a feeling machine for thinking.”
More recently, the link between affect and risk in decision-making has played an increasing role in the disciplines of economics, psychology, philosophy, and sociology (Solomon, 1998; Zinn, 2006). David Houghton (2009: 133-134) describes affect within political psychology to include discussions of moods and “evaluations.” Yet discussions of emotion remain uncertain as researchers appear to dance between inferred and explicit demonstrations of acceptance regarding the role of emotion in political behaviour. As Marcus (2000: 222) notes, “a consensus on the effects of emotion in politics remains to be achieved.”
Perhaps the best example of emotion being seen to play an informal role in political behaviour is Schattschneider’s (1961) discussion of the value in “expanding a conflict” to make it more appealing to allies. Attracting more actors occurs by increasing the number of voices, expanding an issue’s scope and highlighting its severity, which makes the issue more emotionally salient. Indeed, emotionality is inferred throughout policy literature.
From the positive connotations of the “benefited” social constructions of Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) target populations and measuring the tone of newspaper articles or the “mood” of the public (Kingdon, 1984/1995), through to the importance of “dramatic” focusing events that touch the public (Birkland, 1998), many authors implicitly note the key role of affect.
Reviews of affect have taken place formally in public policy and science to answer the question of how strong an impact affect can play in decision-making, and why and how this relates to cognitive decision-making. And while this question, first asked by Aristotle, remains contentious, there are conclusions that can be drawn to move forward in this analysis. Kuklinski et al studied political judgment responses testing for affect and deliberative decision-making and found that deliberations alone did not produce more tolerant results (Kuklinski et al., 1991). Kenneth Craig’s (1997: 114) research on understanding infant and child pain suggests that “sensory and emotional qualities of pain must dominate” early in life because there is no other bearing. His research is aided by
studies that show that when infants experience traumatic events these are held as emotional memories rather than descriptive memories (Craig, 1997: 114). Marcus (2000: 221) traces the study of emotion in politics through studies of leaders and the way the public evaluates circumstances. Brown and Michael (2002) looked at the role of affect in the discourse around suffering and found that seeing the suffering of others gives actors greater authenticity, suggesting that the public may be more open if affect reflects particular sensibilities. Lodge and Taber (2005: 455) reviewed the concept of “hot cognition,” and their experiments found that feelings toward political leaders, groups, and issues can be triggered “automatically” (italics in the original) if there is “congruence” between the concepts (e.g., cockroach as “disgusting”). This research was joined by the landmark work in neuroscience by De Martino et al. (2006: 684) who looked at brain function in regard to choices. They found “a key role for an emotional system in mediating decision biases.” In addition, Druckman and McDermott (2008: 318) reviewed the effects of emotion on the framing and selection of risks. They note that “emotions serve motivating functions” that impact how individuals make choices.
The discovery of the central role of affect in human behaviour, and therefore political behaviour, has increased calls for additional development and analysis of the impact of affect on people and the policy process. Cottam et al (2010: 49-50) state, “it is crucial that political psychology make advances in understanding the impact of affect emotions on behaviour.” The timing and placement of affect is critical because if: 1.) emotional priorities are pre-set (Slovic, 2004), 2.) affect is automatic (Zajonc, 1980; Lodge and Taber, 2005), and 3.) people’s decision-making is weighted in favour of prior knowledge, then affect’s “primacy” (Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc, 1980) could facilitate policymaking that encourages polarizations based on “like-feeling” (as opposed to simply like-minded) in-groups and out-groups as well as what Lodge and Taber (2005: 477) refer to as situations that “drive irrational bias.” Indeed, the pre-primed or cultural affective information could provide a source of data for “political knowledge” (Head, 2008: 5). Evidence of this value can be seen in Mandel’s study of how affect impacts on public attitudes related to counter-terrorism. Mandel concludes that understanding affect and risk perception can impact the “effectiveness of government plans to respond to disasters,
including terrorist attacks” (Mandel, 2011). Finally, Gruszcynski et al. (2012) pushed the boundary of the role of the body in political activity and found that there are elements of physiology (electrodermal responsiveness to emotional stimuli) that indicate “the more responsive the brain, the more likely to participate actively in politics” in an affective sense.
In all, the research in science, public policy, sociology and psychology all suggest that emotions play a role in the front seat, if not the driver’s seat, in decision-making. While the literature is not settled on the exact interplay between affect and cognition, the critical role of affect in concert with reason in initial decision-making has been measured and confirmed. As a result, where political science has previously banished emotion and affect in the name of a greater “scientific” approach, the natural sciences’ findings regarding affect in human behaviour suggest that political science must now locate a new role of affect within political behaviour. Or, put another way, the dominant theories of political research cannot encase themselves behind walls that ignore new scientific findings in the name of scientific credibility. The next step then is to bolster or challenge the growing attention of the political role of affect with models that incorporate it into the policy design process and begin a debate, or as Lowi (1992: 6) suggests, to use this information to take “a good guess about what makes democracy work.”
The inclusion of affect in the ontology of political behaviour matters because it offers a broader framework for political behaviour that is consistent with the finding of the natural sciences and provides greater insight into the likelihood and direction of policy responses. I engage with affect by focusing on the role of emotions as a starting point for an array of elements that influence the strength and design of informal and institutional policy thresholds regarding the outcomes from social issues and events. When aligned together, these can create opportunities for policy responses to occur. Beginning at affect changes a number of key causal relationships that follow in recognized policy design elements. Affect informs political behaviour, in part, by prioritizing feeling-laden targets and threats, which can lower the thresholds needed for policy action when outcomes from these threats are perceived to occur. As a result, these issues are likely to gain attention,
and policy responses are directed at avoiding dreaded outcomes and displacing fear or anger. This theoretical framework is addressed in greater detail below.
2.3 Proposing the high affect-low threshold (HALT) framework
The proposed framework employs four cultural, temporal, political, and structural elements of policy design. At the start of this causal relationship is affect, which has been discussed as the connection between issues and emotions. Prioritized amongst these connections are negative emotions related to fear, outrage, and disgust that associate “badness” or “goodness” with an object or outcome (Slovic, 2004). These feelings create mental profiles of hazards that connect targets and feelings together in a hierarchy of emotions toward different issue outcomes (Slovic, 2004). As a result, high affect profiles are created and prioritized when negative feelings for a target are linked with negative feelings about an outcome.
The level of importance that an issue is perceived to have by the public or policymakers is referred to as salience (Weaver, 2007). Perceptions of salience and importance are relative to the competitive visibility, availability, and relevance of an issue that is taking place. Issues and outcomes that navigate social interference and which can be easily imagined are most likely to be seen as salient because they illustrate dreaded outcomes. Increased salience can be perceived based on the relative frequency of an issue, such as repeated exposure in the media to a one-time incident. Event frequency can be framed as a regular occurrence or an emerging pattern, which can serve as a “shock to the system” (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994).
Moments when there is a “possibility of policy change” (Birkland, 1997: 6) are identified as policy windows. Whether as a result of what Kingdon (1984/1995) refers to as a convergence of streams, including policy problems, alternatives and entrepreneurs, or through random focusing events (Birkland, 1998), or policy community mobilization (Sabatier and Weible, 2007), these openings represent precious and vulnerable moments in the life of an issue where it is susceptible to policy action. Howlett (1998: 499) reviews
Kingdon (1984) and notes that window openings were sometimes governed by certain fortuitous happenings including seemingly unrelated external "focusing events," crises or accidents, or the presence or absence of policy entrepreneurs both within and outside governments while at other times they were affected by institutionalized events, such as elections or budgetary cycles.
Policy entrepreneurship involves those “game changers” and political actors who use their time, resources, and ideas to impact public perceptions and public policy (Mintrom and Norman, 2009). This includes elected officials, the media, and individual activists. However, in contrast with other conceptions of policy entrepreneurship, I argue that entrepreneurship requires obtaining the status needed to influence or bypass governance structures and compete equally against other entrepreneurs. “Outsider” activists who handcuff themselves to a White House fence for a cause would not be policy entrepreneurs unless they, their ideas, or coalition are also able to transcend structural limitations to influence the “insider” debate. Simply put, they must have the status to be political players. Finally, causal stories address the narratives that are contested to support or overturn the status quo. Problem definition development illustrates the way powerful stakeholders and opponents use rhetoric and symbols (Stone, 1989) to argue which issues are the problems, what is the cause, who is to blame, how big is the scope, and what is the solution.
The choices that governments or responsible agencies make to identified problems are policy responses (Birkland, 2011). Responses can include speeches, silence, or bluster, as well as real or symbolic actions toward stasis or change. Governments choose to do nothing, repeat an old policy in a new place, or choose something new and different altogether. Eulau and Prewitt (1973: 503) describe policies as a “purposive response to challenges from the physical and social environment.” The decision of a government to act or not to act is discussed as a policy response (Birkland, 2011). With these definitions in mind, a more detailed analysis of the proposed affect-threshold model can take place.
Figure 2.1 identifies the proposed causal relationship for the affect-threshold policy response framework. At the start of this analysis is the way in which levels of affect establish different thresholds for policy responses. I begin by arguing that the degree of fear and dread (affect) attributed to an outcome frames the targets associated with this outcome as emotional priorities (Slovic, 2004). Risk avoidance as an emotion begins this process. Feelings are amplified based on the relative importance (salience) of the dreaded outcome, when compared with other events and cultural or political attention and expectations. The emergence of an issue may shock one public but not another. However, if high degrees of affect and salience align, then these pressures can reach a political “boiling point” that opens policy windows in which policy entrepreneurs use competing problem definitions and causal stories to advocate for their solutions. In return, the policy outcomes offered by entrepreneurs respond to the perceptions of public fear, outrage, or disgust toward certain outcomes and their particular fears of dreaded consequences.
Events of this nature represent high affect-low threshold (HALT) scenarios that are the most likely to open policy windows and result in policy response. The likelihood of responses reflects the fear of outcomes by those involved and is measured against the degree to which solutions: 1.) address the dreaded outcomes of the public; and 2.) relieve concerns of leading policy entrepreneurs. High affect and high salience events are expected to be priorities on the political agenda, and these responses illustrate public policymaking as a multi-layer risk-avoidance and confidence-building exercise for the public and politicians. Finally, it is worth noting that high affect-low threshold policy response events have a stasis application as well. These types of events reinforce the path dependency of “changed” policies by establishing emotional connections to solutions that create higher thresholds for altering the policy after it has been put in place. The extraordinary threshold needed to alter the United States’ Patriot Act following the 9-11
terrorist attacks provides an example of this standard, as does the multi-pronged process for the repeal of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” ban on openly gay service in the military. In these cases, the emotional cement used to lay the foundation of these changes turned into political path dependency.
Figure 2.2 reflects issues related to negative affect and policy responses. To begin, it demonstrates the types of issues under each proposed category and highlights their characteristics by considering a spectrum of political issues whose different policy thresholds are influenced, in part, by their emotional nature. High Affect-High Threshold (HAHT) issues are topics that people care about and for which the threshold for opening the policy process is high. These matters are noted in the upper-left corner of Figure 2.2 and are distinguished based on three factors. First, they are issues with a high degree of emotion attached to them as a result of a combination of affective sources, including instinctual (pre-primed) and cultural feelings about an issue’s outcome. Secondly, the intensity and priority of emotions encourages policies and structures that alleviate emotional distress through structural controls that seek to avoid attention to the dreaded outcomes in the future by creating prolonged periods of policy stasis. Put another way, policy responses establish emotional, social, and legal structures that raise the thresholds for further responses. This provides relief to the public because these issues are perceived as largely settled public policies. Thirdly, high affect-high threshold issues often feature a strong legacy, path dependency, and policy entrepreneurship that can encourage policy diffusion.
High Affect-Low Threshold (HALT) issues or events are the chief focus of this chapter.
The characteristics of high affect-low threshold issues include a high degree of emotion for certain issue outcomes and for which political processes have a low tolerance for their occurrence. This status is based on 1.) a combination of instinctual pre-primed feelings (such as threats to survival) and culture sensibilities; 2.) the attribution of agency to given dreaded issues and outcomes; and 3.) the amplification of an issue to a dominant position within society through attention, which can aggregate multiple events and require an immediate response. Predisposed and prioritized emotions against threats are amplified by
the identification of an intentional actor perpetrating the threat (Decety and Cacioppo, 2012). The presence of an offender, who is identified as responsible for the potential dreaded outcome, establishes an in-group of the vulnerable, and the out-group of the agent, which makes the issue relevant to the broader public. As a result, high affect emotional reactions to the active agency of a perpetual threat demand that “something must be done” to bring an end to the open-ended situation. Thus, high affect-low threshold policy responses and policy change are most likely under these conditions (despite different issues or levels of threat) if the dreaded outcome is prioritized, seen as relevant to the public, and if the identified agent can be dispatched through real or symbolic means.
Figure 2.2 Proposed Model of Affect-to-Threshold Levels
Low Affect-High Threshold (LAHT) issues are characterized by the failure of dreaded outcomes to emotionally resonate with the public and a high threshold for policy action due to the lack of compelling causal stories or solutions. These are often intractable issue areas where the outcome may be severe; however, the lack of a visible, available, and resonant connection is reinforced by the emotional relief provided by attention biases against prioritizing the issues. Avoiding these issues is made easier through a lack of familiarity, yet this may change during salience-prone periods. Salience can be increased based on events of a dramatic nature (not just a car accident, but a 100 car pile-up), the outcome-related attributes (homelessness among children), and news-cycle openings (such as the holiday seasons, school breaks, periods of prosperity, or otherwise slow news periods).
Finally, I describe Low Affect-Low Threshold (LALT) issues as those which the public may not feel strongly about (such as private drug use, polygamy, voter fraud, and political sex scandals); however, attention to the issue can still result in a low threshold for policy responses because they involve negatively constructed or marginalized populations. Yet again, a shift in salience can trigger greater affective feedback to the dreaded outcome based on the presence of outcome-related variables, including proximity, severity, and the value of others involved. Telemarketers who take advantage of the elderly, voter fraud in small town elections, and polygamy by “deadbeat” dads all raise the profile of LALT issues based on the affective salience they trigger.
This framework has applications to a number of policy issues, particularly regarding issue-attention cycles (Peters and Hogwood, 1985). The ways in which issues “get hot,” “go viral,” “gain political inertia” or become a “fad” continue to be reviewed by sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, and economists. I suggest that high affect analysis of public policies can be incorporated into numerous studies. Increased attention to high affect issues with a low threshold of acceptance during salience-prone periods is likely to trigger policy responses, while issues that may receive more attention but have a lower affect-to-threshold ratio stay lower on the political agenda. For example, in Australia, the degree of public emotion for dreaded outcomes associated with construction
workers’ deaths in the workplace is markedly different than feelings for police officers who die in the workplace. On average,“the Australian building and construction industry contributes to the deaths of approximately 50 construction workers per annum” (Fleming et al , 2007), compared with statistics from the Australian Institute of Criminology, that “about one [police] officer per year is killed in Australia” (OIC, 2001). The different levels of emotional concern, resources, and attention to threshold acceptance about outcomes are present among these target groups, as is disproportionate funding.
At a much less critical level are reactions to political scandals, which can receive different levels of concern from the public and the media. In the case of two recent political events in the United States, there was a high degree of affective concern and a low threshold of acceptance regarding then Democratic congressman Anthony Weiner of New York exposing himself in “sexting” photos via Twitter. Yet, this is striking compared with the low-affective outrage and high threshold directed at Republican senator David Vitter of Louisiana following his admission of sex with a prostitute, outside his marriage (Foreman, 2007). In the one case, Congressman Weiner was forced to resign, even though there was no physical contact with any individuals, while in the other Senator Vitter remained in office and was re-elected in 2010.
In addition, the role of affect can be seen in human-wildlife conflicts that garner different levels of public emotion about the value of species (i.e. “things we like”) as well as the anxiety about fatal outcomes. Concern about hippopotamus bites on humans (and hippos themselves) in their natural habitat is vastly different from snakebites on humans. I suggest that for any policy issue, instinctual and cultural affect biases weight policy responses in one direction or another. Affect determines the priority that framing is given and pre-establishes a political context by raising or lowering the threshold for that outcome.
Finally, each variable within this framework exerts veto influence over whether policy responses occur. Whether the issue is sex scandals, baby-formula contamination, school shootings, nuclear reactor leaks, gas-price pump inflation, illegal immigration, ethnic
conflicts, or political corruption, the issue may never reach an initial crisis state, or if it does, achieve a policy response, if all the variables are not aligned. If there is no emotional cost tied to an outcome, then action is less likely. The rise of other higher salient events lowers the perceived importance of current events, and the innovations of entrepreneurs may not overcome structural impasses if they never reach the light of day. Causal stories may be most prone to stymieing the process, particularly when they are not perceived as feasible or consistent with an affective feeling, cultural values, or preexisting narrative. The figures below identify the implications of these veto points on the proposed model.
Process failures come in four main categories. High affect events that lack salience, such as veterans’ homelessness; high affect, salience-prone events that open a policy window; events that lack policy entrepreneurship such as the “Occupy Movement”; and lastly, high affect-high salience events that open a policy window and have policy entrepreneurs with access. However, there is a lack of consensus regarding causation of the dreaded outcome and solution. I argue that climate change is an example of this type of affect-related issue. In all, these snapshots highlight the dependency of this framework on each of the other elements, yet they also point to a view of political behaviour that offers a valuable conception of the policy process.
To complete the proposal of the HALT framework it is important to incorporate two additional steps. First, the nature of thresholds in public policy should be identified and secondly, a comparison is needed with other theoretical elements, such as focusing events and moral panics.
2.4
Incorporating Threshold Analysis into the HALT Framework
Threshold analysis provides an important component in the HALT framework because it connects the emotional and psychological reactions related to affect and salience with the actions of political actors who structure policy response options. A threshold is noted as the value point that is crossed when there is a significant deviation from an individual's
expected and acceptable outcome within a range. This range serves as a reference point that defines the scope and level of the deviation. While divergences note the potential for policy change, Wood and Doan (2003) highlight the role of thresholds in maintaining policy stability They note that "if most individuals are perceived as accepting a condition, then negative feedback maintains a stable equilibrium of continued acceptance" (Wood and Doan, 2003: 641). However, it is important to recognize that the theoretical literature on thresholds in public policy remains limited (Wood and Doan, 2003) even though thresholds are utilized in many policy domains.
Orshansky (1964) looked at thresholds for poverty and developed 124 thresholds. In criminal sentencing a “three-strikes” threshold was set in California law in 1994. On environmental issues thresholds have been noted for air pollution standards (Robinson, 1992), climate change thresholds by scientists (Boston, Bradstock and English, 2010: 120) and environmental pollution (Feinberg, 1984). In addition, collegiate sports have a marijuana testing threshold for athletes and during the conflict in Vietnam there was a perceived casualty threshold for allowable soldiers’ deaths. Thresholds are also shaped by institutions on the basis of national and international compromise. The U.S. Senate and the United National Security Council are good examples.
Landmark studies from economics and sociology (Coleman et al, 1966; Schelling, 1971; Granovetter, 1978) have been applied to more recent political analysis (Kuran, 1991; Wood and Doan, 2003; Cashmore and Howlett, 2006). Several key points emerge from this research. First, Schelling (1971) uses models of racial segregation to highlight how tolerating thresholds are based on the actions of others as well as the way individuals reference their geographic area. In the case of living near people who are black or white, "satisfaction depends on how far ones' 'neighborhood' extends" (Schelling, 1971: 149).
Secondly, a key factor in thresholds is the way a series of actions trigger a response. For example, Schelling (1971: 181) reviews Mayer's (1960) analysis of black families moving into a 700 house white community. He quotes Mayer (1960) noting that "[t]he selling of the third house (emphasis added) convinced everyone that the neighborhood was destined
to become 'mixed.' Interestingly, the role of attention to a third indicator as a cue for a threshold deviation from the norm and "nonacceptance of a condition" (Wood and Doan, 2003) repeats itself across a number of issues, including shark bites.
Thirdly, Schelling (1971) notes that the speed and order with which people leave an area is contingent on the level or strength of threshold they have. He notes that "the more dissatisfied leave first - one with the lesser tolerance" (Schelling, 1971: 168). This teaches an important lesson to political actors when considering ways to slow or hasten their involvement in the political process. Kuran (1991) examined the role of thresholds in the Eastern European Revolution and notes that "the speed of the anticommunist mobilization left most of them [the Communist Party operatives] with insufficient time to plan and execute a coordinated response" (Kuran, 1991: 41).
Fourthly, An important finding from threshold research is Granovetter's (1978) statement that "thresholds are situation specific" (Granovetter, 1978: 1436). One key to situational changes are the emotional drivers. Skocpol (1979) argues that revolution may ensue when the obstructionism by elites "generates a burst of antielite sentiment, which sets in motion an uprising aimed at transforming the social order." Yet, thresholds may also stay low when they might be expected to be higher based on changes in a situation or new information. This is consistent with a degenerative effect in information processing, power dynamics and social construction discussed by Schneider and Ingram (2005).
Fifthly, thresholds reflect the efforts of political actors to protect and benefit themselves. Pierson (2000) analyzed the way actors develop institutional structures that they believe provide increasing political benefits and how this can create path dependency for issue domains. Pierson (2000: 261) notes that these actions are based on “the short term consequences of their actions” and reflect electoral concerns. This is consistent with John (1998: 180) who notes that “[i]ndividual actors, and their interests are crucial.” As a result, an emphasis on short-term political gain encourages the construction of planned, but seemingly knee-jerk, tactics and decision-making.
Together, these factors illustrate the way policy stability can be understood and the important role of actors in setting threshold levels. Often, thresholds are bound to changeresistant institutional settings and rules by political actors seeking short-term gain. However, this works for both low and high thresholds In this case, I suggest that policy thresholds should be considered as the political construction of higher or lower resistance points within the policy process designed to limit penalties and benefit those in power. In this way actors may use threshold levels to create policy windows and opportunities that advantage them and their allies while restricting opponents.
Importantly, thresholds are established to limit access to the policymaking process by establishing social expectations and tolerance for certain issues, events, or stimuli within a designated range. These constructions include laws, norms, discourse, institutional rules and rituals as well as performative political repertoires. Thus, both high and low thresholds are intended to create resistance. These processes are designed to benefit inside-actors in keeping the policy process closed to outside-actors and opponents. Put another way, the “cards” of the public policy process “game” are dealt from ‘the House,’ and ‘the House’ usually wins. The lower threshold value points at which the policy process appears to open for an issue is the main subject of this dissertation. However, again, it is essential to note that the appearance of policy windows and openness in the policy process is still intended to reinforce resistance, limit opposing actors, and privilege underlying power dynamics.
Threshold management allows inside actors to fight back and use formal and informal means to establish the threshold of what a “problem” condition is for an event or issue and what policy response should follow based on governing and institutionalizing expectations. The power to nullify the contestation of a problem condition is politically valuable and therefore threshold variables include issues, events and any stimuli that can be used to represent a given problem – not simply collective public behavior.
In sum, the strength of policy thresholds is based on the way political actors attempt to manage costs and benefits. Emotional public distress is an example of a political cost
because public feelings about dreaded outcomes can lead to unpredictable policy windows (Kingdon, 1995). Planning ahead allows actors to maintain power (de Mesquita and Smith, 2009) and restrict access because unexpected opening in the policy process can invite new actors or venues to engage in the policymaking (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) Examples of unexpected policy windows are often found in the literature on focusing events and it is essential to note the similarities and differences between the nature of the HALT framework and these valuable policy concepts.
2.5 Distinguishing high affect-low threshold events from other policy phenomena
Frameworks may build on the good work of others, but they must also stand on their own. It is important to identify what distinguishes the affect-threshold framework from other policy design models, particularly focusing events and moral panics. Critiques of these theories will rightly ask how to determine where one type of event begins or ends and how emotions can be separated from daily anxieties (Poyting and Morgan, 2007: 2). The affect-to-outcome model relies on policy response analysis to differentiate itself.
Ultimately, it is this framework’s emphasis on the way that affect-to-outcomes and outcome-related variables change political behaviour through threat avoidance that illustrates a unique relationship between causal elements and policy responses. This framework identifies the way emotions begin the political process, set the political agenda, and influence policy change. It is important to note, however, that emotion is located in other complementary frameworks. To begin, there is a review of each concept, followed by an analysis of the similarities and differences of the models.
2.5.1
Focusing events
Focusing events have been built upon in the policy literature across a number of varied topics. Walker (1977) addressed the role of “pressing problems” in a review of Senate legislative action. Light (1982) reviews presidential decision-making, and White House staff note “focusing events” that arrive on the president’s desk. The role of these “triggering events” is built upon by Cobb and Elder (1983), Kingdon (1995), and
Baumgartner and Jones (1993). The most current definition has been produced by Birkland, who defines a focusing event as “an event that is sudden; relatively uncommon; can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms; has harms that are concentrated in a particular geographic area or community of interest; and that is known to policy makers and the public simultaneously” (Birkland, 1998: 54). Focusing events are important elements to the policy process because they re-allocate power following these occurrences. With powerful interests on the defensive regarding potential policy failures, media often highlight the plight of disadvantaged groups, giving them a window of opportunity to achieve policy change.
Capitalizing on the opportunities presented following focusing events is not easy. These situations highlight the importance of issue emergence and problem definition because defining the condition and causal story has a chain reaction that impacts which policy community can or should engage, based on the scope and cause, as well as what kinds of policy tools should be used as feasible solutions. The success of pro-change groups comes from two overarching factors: 1.) the visible emotions connected to the event itself that present dreaded outcomes; and 2.) the skill and organization of groups. Groups must balance a list of requirements to take advantage of these moments, including: trying to expand the scope of the issue; gaining access to and attention from the media; gaining the support of additional actors; organizing interested policy communities or coalitions; having a cohesive message; identifying the incumbent powerfuls’ policy failures; presenting workable solutions; and having the resources to sustain their efforts in between events.
Focusing events therefore can play a major role in punctuating policy equilibrium because they give disadvantaged groups the access to overturn powerful interests involved in the media, agenda setting, and policy domains. They make the disadvantaged groups players at the table. Examples of focusing events include Hurricane Katrina, the Three Mile Island nuclear leak, and the Fukishima nuclear reactor meltdown. These events all centred on the management of disasters or highly “focal” events; moral panics, however, are different in that they are based on the management of identified groups.
2.5.2 Moral panics
The use of the term “moral panic” is also relatively new and has evolved since its first use by Young in 1968 (Young, 2009). The labelling of moral panics began as a conversation about the “amplification of deviancy,” where marijuana use was identified as criminal “in the context of the new bohemianism” (Young, 2009: 5). As Young describes the history of moral panics, he makes clear that moral panics include an affective element in the contestation of fundamental social dynamics. He notes:
there is a great deal of emotional energy involved on both sides: the police pursue the deviant with zeal, the media thrive on the controversy, the public avidly follow the outrage and the deviants are galvanized and sometimes reconstituted by the response. There is energy; there is fascination and something edging on enjoyment: moral panics, like crime, are seductive events (Young, 2009: 4).
The identification of moral panics as attention-attracting, legacy-leaving, cultural conflicts has offered a theory regarding how certain issues, during certain times, can burn hot politically and then die off. Cohen (1972) suggests that the way in which issues arrive on the scene and disappear reveals that moral panics are really about the qualities related to the social reaction, such as the targeting of groups that undermine or disturb community values, more than the attributes of the acts or events being responded to themselves. In this way, a key feature of moral panics is the way that they thrive on an “insider” versus “outsider” model that can be highlighted by culture, geography, religion, or other demographic factors.
Examples of moral panics include witch trials, satanic cults, school shootings (Burns and Crawford, 1999), and youth violence (Cohen, 1972). Marsh and Melville (2011) reviewed the history of moral panic literature. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994: 156-158) identify five elements of a moral panic: i.) concern, ii.) hostility, iii.) consensus, iv.) disproportionality, and v.) volatility. Garland (2008) recommends the addition of two additional elements: first, the “moral dimension,” which considers the level of threat and reflection that is addressed toward the loss of revered social values (i.e. “the family”, “the home,” “a simpler time” and a “traditional” way of life) and secondly the “symptomatic” nature of the issue, in which it is considered a synecdoche for a broader statement about the state of society (Garland, 2008: 11).
2.5.3 Similarities and differences between moral panics, focusing events, and HALT models
In Table 2.1 below, I compare a number of factors across moral panic and focusing event models with the HALT framework elements. Establishing the varying theories’ similarities and differences is done by asking where benefits and burdens are laid, how the media is used, what role time plays, if there is a dominant top-down or bottom-up model, how they interact with the features of the HALT framework, and what the policy responses and legacies look like. To begin, I review their similarities and differences.
Focusing events, moral panics, and the HALT framework present a number of similarities and differences (Table 2.1). The overarching similarity among the models is the presence of sudden triggering events. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) note that transitioning moral panic episodes into action requires a “vehicle” or focusing event. Across the events, the responses to each provide a benefit to one group and a burden to the other. Each model illustrates a competition between in-group and out-group, advantaged and disadvantaged, marginalized and privileged groups. In addition, each operates within the context of underlying social anxiety. Unease regarding the current state can erupt from an event and be seen as symbolic of a bigger problem. Garland (2008) notes that the level of anxiety undercutting a relationship between groups is seen as a key element in moral panics. Lastly, each offers a legacy following a response; however, these have different impacts.
Table 2.1 Comparing focusing events, moral panics, and HALT events
Focusing events Moral panics HALT events
Who benefits? Disadvantaged. Advantaged. Advantaged. Who is burdened? Incumbent powerful Folk devils/deviants Folk devils/deviants
Target groups associated with negative outcomes
How is the media used? Reallocates power and symbols. Takes symbols and cues to sensitize and punish folk devils
What is the timeframe? Episodic Long-term
Bottom-up Top-down
Establishing the frequency and causal story
Both episodic and long-term Are responses usually topdown or bottom-up?
Usually top-down
(Affect)Are emotions seen as projected or pre-set?
(Salience) Does context matter?
(Policy entrepreneurs) What is their role?
(Causal stories) Where is it centred?
Projected
Focusing events are by definition salient.
Actors and coalitions attempt to lay blame and expand the scope.
Managing the disaster relief, blame and mitigation.
Stopping the event from happening again.
Are there legacies?
Disproportionate policy response?
Depends on the event and response by groups.
Disproportionate through savvy opportunism.
Policy outcomes? Disaster relief and failure review.
Pre-set
Moral panics pursue broad insider appeal to ensure salience.
Moral entrepreneurs attempt to expand the scope to societal failure.
Managing the deviant group.
Identifying the outsider status that further removes a deviant group from the community.
Can dramatically shift institutions.
Disproportionate by design to send a message.
Pre-set
HALT events can engender salience or be saliencedependent.
Policy entrepreneurs gain access to structures to deliver their preffered policy outcome.
Stopping the perceived dreaded outcome.
Identifying the way the issue is governable and based on an intentful agent.
Encourage structures of blame governance avoidance.
Guided by outcome avoidance for the entrepreneur.
Crackdown on group. Affective relief and aggregation prevention policies based on positively perceived options to relieve the aversive condition.
The roles of the events, responses, and legacies are markedly different across the models.
Following focusing events, this suddenness is generally seen to benefit disadvantaged groups (Birkland, 1998); however, in the case of moral panics, it is seen to benefit the advantaged groups who are using the reaction to send a message to further the deviance of a marginalized group. Two factors seem to be at play here: first, the outsider group is seen as criminally liable for the behaviour, act, or event that leads to the moral panic. And secondly, the act, no matter the severity, can be a facade for the panic and has more to do with the group in question than the offense in question. As a result, the insiders are prepared and resourced for the triggering event. Their advantages include having helped construct the target’s identity and having access to the response solutions.
In the case of HALT events, the benefit is aligned with moral panics in serving the advantaged, but for different reasons. Moral panics respond to threats by sending a message to the target group, the public, and the media that the group is not valued, while
the objective of HALT responses is to construct an emotional end to the situation through political, social, or institutional means. Alternatively, focusing events respond to the threat by providing relief and competing over the scope of the failure and blame. As a result, we see “over-zealous enforcement” of moral panics to send a message (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994: 155), “affect cessation responses” toward HALT events, as well as “action bias” (Zeckhauser and Pratt, 2009) from governments to avoid blame following focusing events. This represents the leading difference between moral panics, focusing events, and the HALT model.
The legacy or long-term impact from policy responses to these events has been raised in a number of areas. Garland (2008) addresses it with regard to moral panics, and notes that there can be short-term impacts or lasting legacies built into legislation, social institutions, policy communities, new folk devils, and conceptions of society. The legacy issue is repeated in discussions of focusing events, where blame governance and avoidance create new social and political structures to address natural and man-made disasters. In HALT events, legacies can have three effects: maintaining a low threshold of expectations for political responses to events, creating a correspondingly more competitive environment for policy entrepreneurs, and producing emotionally-laden policy responses that shift into the high affect-high threshold category. Fundamentally, these legacies can have an impact on democracy by shifting the ground and the players, particularly in political systems that are designed to be intractable and incremental.
In all, focusing events, moral panics, and HALT issues present an important contrast to the punctuated equilibrium model (Baumgarter and Jones, 2009), in which policy processes are disjointed. Focusing events are episodic (Birkland, 1998) while Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994: 170) note moral panics are “long-term social processes rather than as separate, discreet, time-bound episodes.” High affect-low threshold events move across both incremental and episodic processes. Pre-existing biases compete with, or are amplified by, cultural feelings. Policy responses under the HALT framework depend on emotional, social and political contexts. What is clear from comparing each model is the different ways in which threats are addressed and power is allocated.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter sought to begin answering two questions regarding the policy process. First, what factors influence the likelihood of policy responses? And secondly, what factors account for differences in responses to the same kinds of events across nations? To answer these questions, a high affect-low threshold (HALT) framework was proposed based on four elements: affect, salience, policy entrepreneurship and causal stories. Using this framework, I argued that policy responses are more likely when high affect, high salience issues and outcomes are involved because emotional priorities are allocated to these issues as a first step in political behaviour. This contrasts with the conventional features of causal stories and problem definitions. The combination of pre-set activity and attention begins a process of outcome avoidance that subjects issues to a lower tolerance threshold, particularly when the outcomes are frequent or subject to salience-prone periods. With certain kinds of policy windows more open to policy entrepreneurs, responses become more likely. The result is a process that begins and ends with a battle over outcomes to be avoided and where tactical meaning-making and confidence-building abounds. Here, agency is given to elements on the basis of cultural affect as well as policy entrepreneurship and causal story development. In addition, this analysis has highlighted the ways in which thresholds can be constructed to advantage certain actors and where the HALT framework diverges from the literature on focusing events and moral panics. The following chapters discuss each element of the HALT framework in greater detail and then apply these features to the three case studies in Florida, Cape Town, and New South Wales to explain why the policy responses occurred and why they differed. This discussion begins with an analysis of a central element of this thesis: the role of affect in public policy.
Chapter 3. The Political dimensions of affect
“An evil shape comes gliding below you, smoothly, negligently, as if tranced in idleness; the next instant, one monstrous convulsion has flung it hurtling into attack.” From A Pattern of Islands, Sir Arthur Grimble, 1952
3.1 Introduction
There are few phrases in the Western world that convey as much emotion or as clear a narrative as the phrases “man-eater” and “shark attack.” Indeed, even the word “shark,” particularly in a water setting, ignites public emotion, much like “fire” in a packed theater.
In addition to arousing emotion, Webster (1962: 45) notes that the word “shark” conveys particular imagery; it “immediately conjures a maneater, rather than a dogfish, angelfish, thresher or other harmless species.” The link between the cultural construction of these phrases and instinctual fear of their occurrence and outcomes dates back more than 2,500 years.
The objective of this chapter is to locate the presence of affect within the shark bite case studies of Florida, Cape Town, and Sydney. I argue that affect can be viewed in policy analysis in two ways: 1.) as an instinctual driver, in which primal emotions trigger survival behaviour; and 2.) as a cultural magnet that informs constructions, social biases, and worldviews. I hypothesize that affect can be seen to play a role in the policy process because the real or perceived nature of emotionally charged, high affect events lowers policy response thresholds as a function of: a.) threat avoidance and b.) emotional displacement. Shark bite policy responses provide optimal cases to evaluate this hypothesis because of the public emotion that surrounds human-shark conflicts, the welldocumented history of policy responses connected to public emotions, and the measurable differences in policy approaches.
Engagement on affect requires a review of a number of fundamental questions. First, what is affect? Second, how is affect measured? And thirdly, why is the measurement for affect used in this research valid? To begin, affect is defined as a broader set of emotions and
moods (Forgas, 1994; Dasborough et al., 2008). It is distinguished from emotions, in that emotions have higher degrees of strength and are temporary in nature (Frijda, 1993). In addition, emotion is set apart by Kennedy-Moore and Watson (1999:4) who state that emotions are quick and explicit evaluations of a situation. Plutchik (1980) divides emotions into eight primary emotions, which include fear, anger, joy, sadness, acceptance, disgust, anticipation, and surprise as well as discreet emotions, which are combinations of primary emotions. The evolutionary perspective on emotions is put forward by Plutchik and shared by Kennedy, Moore, and Watson (1999) who argue that emotions serve three purposes: adaption and survival, regulation, and communication.
Measuring affect is complex for two main reasons. First, there are difficulties in establishing reliable measurements to assess the presence of affect in a given situation (Cottam et al , 2009:49), and secondly, connecting the identified levels of affect with policy windows and responses is a challenge. Previous research in psychology and neuroscience has established the presence of affect by testing human subjects using a number of methods, including:
• self-reporting questionnaires (Larsen and Diener, 1987),
• facial recognition (Murphy and Zajonc, 1993),
• text analysis (Whissell, 1986; Young and Soroka, 2009; Osherenko and Andre, 2007),
• images (Cottam and Cottam, 2001),
• movies (Richards and Goss, 2000),
• eye movements (Humphrey et al , 2012) and
• neurobiological analysis of decision-making (Damasio, 2006).
Much of this analysis remains cutting-edge. For instance, continued deliberations occur regarding the uses of neuroimaging in political science (Theodiridi and Nelson, 2012). It is clear, however, that emotionally charged words have been demonstrated to evoke vivid images that stimulate emotional responses. As a result, discourse analysis is used as a reliable measure of affect (Whissell, 1986).
There are two chief indicators from language that assist in measuring emotion: the degree to which words are pleasant (or unpleasant) and whether they arouse (or activate) the reader (Sigelman and Whisell, 2002; Russell et al., 1989). Davis affirms that the roles of pleasantness and arousal are appropriate measures in discourse analysis based on neuroscience and psychology literature. He argues that emotions come from “the interaction of a valence (pleasant/unpleasant) dimension and a nervous system arousal or activation dimension” (Davis, 2011: 321). As a result, the “affect grid” (Russell et al., 1989) noted below in Figure 3.1 is used to record the dimensions of affect in this discourse analysis.
Russell et al. (1989: 493) state that “[t]he Affect Grid was designed to record judgments about single instances of affect. Examples would be judgments about current mood, the feeling expressed by a single facial gesture, or the feeling expressed by a single word.”
The illustration below (Figure 3.1) charts high arousal and pleasant feelings, high arousal and unpleasant feelings, low arousal and pleasant feelings, or low arousal and unpleasant feelings. My hypothesis argues that shark bite incidents will be shown to be high affect events, which is to say high arousal and unpleasant feelings. I therefore expect shark bites to be located in the upper left quadrant of the affect grid, denoted by the black circle.
I locate affect in these case studies by utilizing a mixed methods approach that includes (a) a systematized quantitative analysis of newspaper articles using Whissell’s Dictionary of Affect (DAL) (Whissell et al., 1986); (b) a quantitative content analysis of newspaper
Figure 3.1 Affect Grid (Russell, Weiss and Mendelsohn, 1989)
articles from the case studies; (c) a review of instinctual sensibilities toward sharks and shark bites; (d) a cultural review of affective language toward sharks and shark behaviour; and (e) an examination of the affective trends toward the militarization and criminalization of shark bites in the case study nations. Results of these analyses support the conclusion that shark bite incidents cue high affect responses. In particular, use of the phrase “shark attack” is identified as a key variable in connecting sharks and shark bites to prioritized emotional responses based on the fear of a particularly dreaded outcome. Policy reactions are enacted to avert these outcomes and displace social anxiety. This approach does not exclude other theories (Lavender and Hommel, 2007; Huelsman et al., 2003); however, it is consistent with Zajonc (1980), Slovic (2002), and Damasio (1996).
Affect should be added to the “arsenal” of political science research and integrated into policy design models because it provides a fundamental element in greater understanding of why policy change occurs. Solomon (1998:5) argues that emotions are “in themselves strategic and political.” Affect connects emotions with threat avoidance at a pace that demonstrates an important role in policy design. Lodge and Taber (2005: 456) suggest that “all sociopolitical concepts are affect laden.” The speed at which stimuli from sounds, words, images, or events trigger emotional priorities impacts public and political thresholds. Thus, the argument is not simply that affect is present, but that the presence of certain affective cues automatically arouses certain emotions to command behaviour (Lodge and Taber, 2005). Under this analysis, locating high affect within shark bite incidents represents more than the belief that people find shark bites to be frightening; rather, it suggests that these features can prompt a rapid cascade of emotional and political responses. This chapter now moves forward to analyze discourse in the three case studies, historical trends, and policy responses to measure affect around shark bites.
3.2 High affect measurements in newspaper articles following shark bites in Florida (2001), Cape Town (2004), and Sydney (2009)
The choice of wording in the new media during and following events is critical. Word usage elicits emotions, paints a picture, and allocates blame. Reporting on shark bites
from media and public institutions sets the stage for personal and collective considerations. As Edelman (1998: 131) notes “the language used to discuss public issues and public officials acquires its distinctive function from the fears and the hopes it arouses in us.”
Reviewing text from newspapers, government testimony, and speeches to determine affective values has been done for the past twenty years using discursive tools. The DAL contains 8,742 words that were sampled based on their frequency from the Kucera and Francis 1969 corpus of 1,000,000 words (Whissell et al., 1986). Measurements were taken on a three-point scale for (a) “pleasantness” with 1 being unpleasant, 2 in between, and 3 pleasant; (b) “activation” with 1 representing passive, 2 in between, and 3 active. And lastly, “imagery” is indicated with 1 equalling hard to imagine, 2 in between, and 3 easy to imagine (Whissell et al , 1986).
Text is selected and run through the DAL program to identify the quantified levels of pleasantness, activation, and imagery. Analyses of emotional language examine the connection between the words actors speak as a measure of emotion to inform behaviour (Black et al., 2011: 573) as well as the way reading or hearing certain words conjures affective sensitivities. The DAL has been utilized to show connections between emotive comments by US Supreme Court Justices during oral arguments and their voting behaviour (Black et al., 2011), to compare emotional images in the presidential rhetoric of Reagan’s and Clinton’s radio addresses (Sigelman and Whissell, 2002), the emotional language in open-ended surveys (Mossholder et al., 2003) and the change in affective tones in newspapers around nanotechnology (Davis, 2011).
In the case of nanotechnology, Davis (2011), used the DAL to look at the change in mean affective tone in reporting from science newspapers for each of the three categories over 22 years. He found that overall the measurements of pleasantness, imagery, and activation in reporting of nanotechnology were “in line” with standard English language. Davis also isolated “content themes” and compared them over time. He notes that this process allows for a “quantitative measures of the feeling that is being communicated by a reporter to the
reader” (Davis, 2011: 330). Davis also looked at the role of key words in connection with nanotechnology, such as “national security.” He found that highly affective key words within a theme can “leak over into the perception” of an issue more generally (Davis, 2011: 330).
I used the DAL to establish the affective nature of newspaper reports following shark bites in the case study locations of Florida, Cape Town, and Sydney, by identifying the affect level of key words. To begin, I reviewed the percent of negatively evaluative or emotional words (ranked in the DAL between 1.0 -1.49) to determine if the samples were comparable. In Florida, 3,552 out of 31,279 (11 percent) of words were unpleasant, with 1,098 out of 8,993 words (12 percent) in Cape Town and 2,206 out of 18,317 words (12 percent) in Sydney. I then selected the phrase “shark attack” in each set of articles and evaluated measures of its pleasantness, activation, and imagery scores against the DAL corpus of scores, reflected in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Comparing the DAL master mean scores and “attack” DAL score
The results show that “shark attack” discourse is more unpleasant, more active, and more easily brought to mind than mean average of DAL scores (Table 3.1). This analysis suggests that “attack” discourse is highly unpleasant and arousing when used, placing it within the upper left quadrant of the Affect Grid (as shown in Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2 Affect Grid with “attack” DAL score (Russell et al , 1989)
A content analysis was then conducted to measure the frequency of the term “attack” in each of the case studies. I reviewed use of the term in four ways: (i) number of mentions in proportion to average word count of the articles (ii) percentage of articles with “attack” in the headline, and (iii) the number of mentions in the main text. This analysis was attentive to the qualitative use of “attack” in examining each article. For example, there were instances in which “attacks” on other marine life were mentioned in articles or where the International Shark Attack File or Australian Shark Attack File are noted. These references were excluded from this analysis.
The newspaper accounts following shark bites in Florida (2001), Cape Town (20032004), and Sydney (2009) provide useful data for analyzing affect. Articles were selected starting on the first day of the month when the shark bites began until the last day of the month when the policy change occurred. News outlets were determined based on statewide coverage. The Associated Press was selected for Florida, the South African Press Association, African News Wire Service, and Cape Argus were used in Cape Town and the Sydney Morning Herald, Daily Telegraph, and The Australian were chosen in Sydney. The key word “shark attack” was used in Factiva to gather the widest number of articles during these periods. Articles were filtered for each location, which provided 25 articles from Sydney, 22 from Cape Town, and 49 from Florida. There are more articles from Florida because reporting by the Associated Press included a greater number of follow-up articles regarding one case in particular, the shark bite incident on the theneight-year-old Jessie Arbogast.
Chart 3.1 Ratio of “attack” wording to the total number of words per article
The results show that each location used “attack” in a significant manner. The longest articles were in the news media in Sydney, with an average length of 625 words, Florida was second with an average of 493 words, and Cape Town was the shortest at 414 words. However, newspaper articles in Cape Town referenced the phrase “attack” at the highest rate, when compared to the total number of words in an article. Here, “attack” was used once every 107 words, followed by Sydney at one “attack” per 126 words and Florida the least, with one “attack” per 158 words (shown in Chart 3.1).
Chart 3.2 shows that Sydney news media used the phrase most often with an average of 6 times per article (144 times in 23 articles), while Florida news reports used the term the least often with an average of 4 references per article (203 times over 49 articles). Cape Town reports were situated in the middle, using the word “attack” an average of 5 times per article (115 times in 22 articles).
An analysis of “attack” references in headlines (Chart 3.3) paints a different picture from the previous results. In Florida, “attack” appears in the headline 78 percent of the time (38 of 49), 64 percent in Cape Town (14 of 22), and only 30 percent in Sydney (7 of 23).
Indeed, there appears to be an inverse relationship for Florida and Sydney with respect to references to “attack” in the headline and text of the articles reviewed. In all, these results combine with the DAL data to show high frequency of high affect “shark attack” language during each of the case study periods.
3.2
Chart 3.3 Attack references in headlines
Attack References in Headlines
An analysis of “attack” references in headlines (Chart 3.3) paints a different picture from the previous results. In Florida, “attack” appears in the headline 78 percent of the time (38 of 49), 64 percent in Cape Town (14 of 22) and only 30 percent in Sydney (7 of 23). Indeed, there appears to be an inverse relationship for Florida and Sydney with respect to references to “attack” in the headline and text of the articles reviewed. In all, these results combine with the DAL data to show high frequency of high affect shark “attack” language during each of the case study periods.
A qualitative review of the language in context is important, particularly given perceived associations between “attack” language and fatal outcomes and the actual outcomes from shark bite incidents. There were no fatalities in any of the Florida articles with most “attacks” in the headline, nor were there any fatal shark bites in the Sydney reports that registered the most frequent usage per article. In Cape Town; however, three of the four shark bites included in reports were fatalities. Thus, emotional attack usage appears to be independent of severity.
3.3 Qualitative use of shark “attack” terminology
Examples from the three shark bite case studies reinforce the emotional nature of “attack” usage. Peace (2009: 12) notes that reports in Australia “often include a chronological table of in-shore attacks over the past five or ten years.” Bullet points in an article in the Daily Telegraph, entitled “Attacks by sharks at record numbers Year of swimming dangerously,” (Hildebrand, 2009) illustrates this point. It states:
* EIGHT attacks already this year, compared to five in 2008 according to the Shark Research Institute;
* FIFTY one attacks since 2000 compared to 13 in the 1990s, according to the State Government's own data;
* ALMOST double the number of serious attacks in Australia in the five years to 2008 (41) compared to the '90s, according to the International Shark Attack File;
These lists of “attacks” were excluded from the content analysis counts, and reports of Sydney shark bites still showed the most usage. This repeated use is also apparent in Florida articles by the Associated Press (AP, 2001c). One report on 16 July entitled “Shark Bites Panhandle Surfer Near Site of Boy’s Attack” about a surfer who was bitten by a shark uses the word “attack” 4 times in 129 words, stating:
The attack occurred about six miles from where young Jessie Arbogast was attacked earlier this month. Meanwhile, an 18-year-old tourist from Cincinnati was bitten on the foot Sunday by a 3foot shark while riding a boogie board off Amelia Island, about 38 miles north of Jacksonville, officials said. Tim Flanigan was being treated in the emergency room Monday morning at Shands Jacksonville hospital, an official said. His condition was not immediately available, she said. On Sunday, doctors treating Jessie said his brain may not have been damaged from blood loss after the attack. Jessie sometimes appears to understand what's going on around him, according to the medical team that reattached his arm after a 200 pound bull shark attacked him, also taking a large bite out of his thigh (instances in italics).
In addition to the dubious nature of conveying a shark bite 6 miles away as “near” another shark bite incident, this piece conflates the two meanings of the term “attack.”
The Cape Town media also use “shark attack” labelling in their reporting as well. In a
South African Press Association article (SAPA, 2005) in 2005 entitled “UK Tourist Battles Shark in Dreams,” the report follows up on a shark bite survivor and states:
Nightmarish images of a savage shark attack were disturbing his sleep, British tourist Chris Sullivan said on Wednesday. "Everytime I shut my eyes, the thing was just coming [towards me]... In my dreams I wasn't winning the battle," said Sullivan. He was speaking about Monday's attack at Noordhoek beach along the Cape coast, which saw him almost lose his right leg, and his life. Speaking to the media from a wheelchair at the Constantiaberg medi-clinic, Sullivan, 32, said he would have to face his nightmares on the road to full recovery. He described how in his dreams he fought the shark, reliving his fight with the shark, believed to be a Great White, and how the vivid image of the shark was starting to evanesce.
In all, this analysis has so far provided results that indicate that phrase “shark attack” is a high affect phrase using the DAL and that it is highly prevalent in its use in each of the
three case studies through a content analysis. The next elements of this review explain why the phrase “shark attack” in particular triggers a prioritized affective response and what evidence supports a trend of affective policy responses to displace emotions.
3.4 Prioritized instinctual affect toward sharks and shark bites
The emotional fear of sharks and shark bites is founded on an evolutionary survival instinct in which mortal anxiety is stimulated by (a) the nature of the threat (i.e. the fear of being eaten) and (b) the identity of the threat (i.e. fear of certain predators). The premise of this theory begins with James (1884, 1894) and Lange (1885), who address flight or fright and suggest that there is a connection between emotions and physiology. Dunn et al. (2006) explain that James and Lange were stating that an “emotion experience arises directly from the perception of change in the body: when we run from a bear in the woods, we are afraid because we run, rather than we run because we are afraid” (Dunn et al., 2006: 240). The implications of this theory can be seen in economics, psychology, sociology, and risk theory. As Slovic (2004: 973) notes, “long before there was probability neglect, risk assessment, or decision analysis, there were intuition, instinct and gut feeling to tell us whether an animal was safe to approach or the water was safe to drink.”
Lane and Chazan (1989: 335) highlight the first issue, being eaten, by noting that from a “genetic point of view” learning to eat projects upon us fears of being consumed. The characteristics of sharks as a powerful predator that can “attack” suddenly arouses specific fears of sharks (Lane and Chazan, 1989: 327). Papson (1992: 72) reviews documentary films of sharks and highlights the way films accent the dangerousness of sharks as creatures “from the deep.” He notes that films refer to “the primal fear of being attacked and eaten by something unseen” (Papson, 1992: 72). Yet, there is an important hierarchy built into our emotional memory that distinguishes between fear-relevant stimuli (such as sharks) and fear-irrelevant stimuli (such as coconuts). The fact that falling coconuts kill an average of 150 people each year and shark bites kill 10 is separate from the selectivity of this bias (Roach, 2006). Therefore, being eaten by a coconut is not a
great fear.
The prioritization of primal or “reflexive fear” against being eaten is tied to literature regarding particular animals, such as crocodiles (Caldicott et al , 2005), sharks (Krop and Krause, 1976) and snakes (Costello, 1982). This theory is also put forward by Isaac Marks (1987: 3), who writes:
Fear is a vital evolutionary legacy that leads an organism to avoid threat and has obvious survival value. It is an emotion produced by the perception of present or impending danger and it is normal in appropriate situations. Without fear few would survive long under natural conditions. Fear girds our loins for rapid action in the face of danger and alerts us to perform well under stress. It helps us fight the enemy, drive carefully, parachute safely, take exams, speak well to a critical audience, keep a foothold in climbing a mountain.
Building on the evolutionary nature of fear, Damasio (1996) argues that basic developmental traits may be stored in our memories and may now be stimulated by social environments to produce survival responses. Emotions play a key role, but may not be the only type of innate response that can influence behaviour. Damasio (1991) argues that “emotion-based biasing signals” (Dunn et al., 2006) are biologically produced and impact on decision-making. These signals are “somatic markers” (Damasio, 1991: 1417), which he explains by noting, “the brain has long had available, in evolution, a means to select good responses rather than bad ones in terms of survival. I suspect that the mechanism has been co-opted for behavioural guidance outside the realm of basic survival.” As a result, social functioning uses survival wiring in non-survival related settings.
Ohman and Mineka’s (2001) research largely supports the propositions of Marks (1987) and Damasio (1994). They compare conditioning studies of humans and non-human primates, monkeys. In one study, humans are shown pictures of “fear-relevant” stimuli for snakes and “fear-irrelevant” stimuli for butterflies (Ohman et al , 1998). Both showed responses consistent with threats to survival based on evolutionary adaption (Ohman and Mikeka, 2001: 515). They argue that fearful emotions are a critical example of evolution in humans and that fear responses necessarily function automatically and independently of cognitive information to avoid threats to extinction (Ohman and Mikeka, 2001: 483).
They argue that our genes’ emotional memory responses are selective and hierarchical
toward certain animals based on human exposure over time. They argue that fear learning is passed down and that fears, or phobias, function as evolutionary warning signs. Because evolutionary learning is a key component, threats that are common to past ancestors (such as fear of snakes) are more likely to concern people than contemporary dangers (e.g. car-crash phobias or climate change) (Ohman and Mineka, 2001: 483).
This research reinforces the position that emotional affect prioritizes itself on the basis of exposure to certain stimuli. Sharks, snakes, reptiles, and other predators are in a heightened category based on appearance and perceived behaviour. As a result, feelings toward “animals we like” are pre-wired and can be seen in attitudes today. This “fear learning” is therefore essential to survival (Ohman and Mineka, 2001).
The way in which this “fear learning” (Ohman and Mineka, 2001) can be applied to individual and collective political behaviour is seen in Lodge and Taber’s (2005) “hot cognition” proposal. They argue that there is an “affective-charge” to every symbol and political issue (Lodge and Taber, 2005: 456) that is automatic based on long-term memory. Lodge and Taber (2005) note that political issues can be primed, such as the emotional response to reading headline text about George W. Bush. Feelings about President Bush are activated and biased in this analysis in favour of prior beliefs. The automaticity with which this happens encodes emotions onto issues that makes re-framing more difficult because people tend to rely on their earlier impressions. If this prior attitude bias of long-term memory supported by Lodge and Taber (2005) is applied to the evolutionary memory model argued by Ohman and Mineka (2001), then it becomes clear to see why sharks and shark bites as political issues are easily recalled and resistant to change.
Positive or negative feelings toward animals are largely based on a species’ size, colour, location, and behaviour (Stokes 2007). Animals that look “alien,” including sharks, snakes, and reptiles, are given the lowest support. Stephen Kellert’s (1989) analysis of public perceptions toward animals showed that sharks ranked as the eighth most frightening animal to the public. In addition, Czech, Krausman, and Borkhataria (1998:
1110) found that animals considered “dangerous” receive more negative attitudes.
Affect prioritizes negativity based on real or perceived exposure to conflicts with dangerous animal behaviour. Zinn et al (1998) found that the context of human-wildlife conflicts, identity of the species, and control measures proposed were the variables that impacted support for response actions. Similarly, Kleivan, Bjerke, and Kaltenborn’s (2004) survey of the public found that respondent’s proximity to the animal and the “severity of animal behaviour” were key factors in the degree of perceived fear (Kleivan, Bjerke, and Kaltenborn 2004: 1655–1656).
For sharks, the scenario-specific behaviour of a few dangerous species has been projected into public feelings about sharks in general. As a result, the way incidents are defined for the public is an important factor that can impact all shark populations. Given the connections between evolutionary emotional memory regarding sharks and cultural narratives about humans and sharks, these shark bites on humans have a low threshold for social anxiety and threat aversion. Dobson (2008:51) notes that “shark attacks” can take on a life of their own as “shark panics.”
In particular, cultural contributions from media coverage of sharks, in film and in the news, reinforce frightening stereotypes about sharks. This includes children’s movies such as Finding Nemo (2003), in which the smell of fish blood sends a great white shark into frenzy, Shark Tale (2004), where the cartoon sharks were members of the mafia, and television programs such as the BBC’s Deadly 60, where multiple shark species are featured. In turn, public support for sharks remains low. Spruill’s (1997: 149) survey of 900 people showed that just 30% of respondents felt that killing sharks was a “serious problem.”
Another example of the roles of affect related to sharks are public responses to beach closings as a result of sharks, jellyfish, or whale migrations. The public has little emotional problem with these positively valued or negative but passing situations. This is contrast to the connotations with “shark-infested waters”. Affective priorities toward
outrage, disgust, and fear are highlighted here.
Thompson and Mintzes (2002) build on Kellert’s work by analyzing the connection between knowledge of sharks and attitudes. Indeed, they connect the negative public perceptions of sharks with declining shark population numbers (Thompson and Mintzes, 2002: 647), and their data show increases in supportive attitudes with education. Affect does not exist in a vacuum, however, and the use of education to balance one high affect emotion with another provides one avenue for addressing these issues. Meuser et al. (2009) looked at species’ attributes and found that endemism, the more local a species was, produced greater support for conservation. Neff and Yang (2012) measured endemic value against the presence of human-wildlife conflict by surveying levels of “pride” in local great white shark populations in a small n pilot survey (n=100) in the beach communities of Fish Hoek and Muizenberg in Cape Town, South Africa, before and after a shark bite at Fish Hoek beach in 2011. While support for sharks was low, in comparison to measurements for dolphins and seals, and stayed low; it did not drop. Indeed, respondent results showed no statistical decline in support for sharks following the shark bite.
3.5 High affect discourse towards sharks and shark bites
The origin of the terms “man-eater” and “attack” are reviewed to illustrate the way in which the scientific classification of sharks and shark behaviour has reinforced primal fears and established a legacy of high affect cues and stimuli for the public. In short, the use of the phrase “shark attack” to report on human-shark interactions demonized sharks and gave them instances of agency, which facilitated the militarization and criminalization of shark bites.
It is remarkable to note that the same scientific species listings by Carl Linneaus (1758) that identified humans as homo sapiens also started the discussion of white sharks, carcharaodon cacharias, as man-eaters. Linneaus’ categorization of white sharks included noting first, that “it strikes” (“dorfo plano”), second, that it had teeth of armor (“dentibus ferrates”) and third, that it was likely that this “hound” fish was responsible for
swallowing Jonah (Linneaus, 1758:235), whose story was widely published in the 1679 Lectiones morales in Prophetam Jonam by Angelo Paciuchelli and Charles de Marimont.
Linnaeus’ historic volumes redefined the scientific and social world. White sharks were singled out for their motivation: the man-eater. From here, the story of the danger posed by sharks grew. In Thomas Pennant’s volume British Zoology in 1812, a characteristic of white sharks was their “greediness after human flesh” (Pennant, 1812: 140). In 1845, Samuel Goodrich (1845: 317) wrote that the shark is the “dread of mankind in the seas where it is found.” In Hawaii, Titcomb and Pukui, (1951:4) note that the label the “niuhi” or “man-eater” was used in native songs, most likely referring to tiger sharks. “Maneater” comes to define white sharks in particular (Jordan and Gilbert, 1880); however, different geographic experiences inform local lore.
In Europe, colonial experiences shaped understandings of sharks. British big-game hunter Sir Samuel Baker’s expeditions in Asia and Africa led him to conclude that individual tigers, panthera tigris, can become “man-eaters” within a local area (Baker, 1890, Blanford, 1891), while “rogue elephants” were hunted in India (Nongbri, 2003). Thus, British explorers’ perceptions of repeated animal “attacks” against humans were explained as acts of individual animals that had gone “rogue.” This understanding appears to have been projected onto sharks. In 1899, William Bryce wrote in the British Medical Journal regarding three shark bites on three people on the same day in Egypt in Port Said (Bryce, 1899:1534). He noted that “many people have expressed the opinion that it must have been one shark which bit all three boys, and I think this very likely.”
Historical accounts in the US often differed, however, with scientists arguing that dangerous sharks could only be found in warmer southern waters. A report in The New York Times in 1865 recounts the story of Peter Johnson, a fisherman aboard a schooner in Lubec, Maine, who was bitten by a shark “that must have been of the species known as ‘man-eater’” (NY Times, 1865). Yet the report notes that “man-eaters” are “common in low latitudes” and “seldom, if ever attack mankind.” By 1916, the question of shark behaviour had arisen dramatically following a cluster of fatal shark bites in New Jersey. Initially, Dr. Frederic Augustus Lucas of the American Museum of Natural History stated
that it must not have been a shark because “sharks have no such powerful jaws” (Webster, 1962: 87). Yet, he later concluded that he was wrong and this shark must have been demented or “mad.”
In Australia, swimming during the day was illegal from the late 1830s until 1902 (Neff, 2012), and the first shark bite was reported at an ocean beach in Sydney in 1915 (Maxwell, 1949). Fatal incidents followed at Sydney beaches, yet responses were limited. New South Wales Fisheries expert David Stead offered a statement on shark behaviour in 1929, which noted “sharks do not patrol beaches on the off-chance of occasionally devouring human prey” (NSW, 1929: 2). As a result, an Australian government report referenced fatal shark bites as shark “accidents” a majority of the time (Neff, 2012).
However, more shark bites ensued in Australia, and a 1933 study by Sydney surgeon Sir Victor Coppleson, M.D., attempted to reconcile these competing international theories. Correspondence from the US urged him to address this disagreement and to warn the public of possible “shark rabies” (Coppleson archives, 1964). Coppleson concluded that the “evidence that sharks will attack man is complete” (Coppleson, 1933: 466). Following publication of his article, the terminology in Australia changed to favour the more dominant “shark attack” language, which portrayed sharks as “man-killers” (Coppleson, 1933). Yet, the question of how to label shark bites would persist. In 1949, Australian author Maxwell came to a prescient conclusion that a “shark consciousness” was beginning to emerge but wrote, “‘accidents’ is the correct word to use in connexion (sic) with shark tragedies” (Maxwell, 1949: 182).
The perception of shark bites in South Africa was closely aligned with colonial allies Australia and Britain. Barnard’s “Pictorial Guide to South African Fishes” in 1947 states that the “Maneater (Carchaodon carcharias) grows to 30-40 feet” long, and he notes that fossilized teeth from the species have been found 5 inches long “indicating a shark 100 feet in length” (Barnard, 1947:10-14). Barnard (1947: 9) notes, however, that the “Durban Grey Shark” and “Blackfin Shark” are “known to have attacked human beings far oftener that has the so-called Maneater.”
3.6 Connecting high affect discourse to policy responses: the militarization of sharks and shark bites
The discourse regarding sharks and shark bites was unchallenged at the turn of the 20th century because the advent of beach-going (and whaling) brought an increase in shark bites that appeared to confirm and expand on existing scientific beliefs and categorizations about sharks. The discoveries of human remains inside sharks seemed to “incriminate” sharks and prove scientists’ worst fears (Maxwell, 1949). Webster (1962) notes that one shark may be responsible for a series of bites, given the distance they travel. He states that in April 1930, “a shark that killed a man near East London, South Africa, was caught the following night ninety miles away with identifiable portions of the swimmer in its stomach” (Webster, 192:68). In addition, Coppleson (1958) notes a series of bites followed by a shark being killed and the lack of subsequent shark bites “for long periods following a shark hunt”. The connection between discourse and beach-going can be seen in the framing of shark bites as “menace” to the public, which followed initial shark bite incidents in the early 1900s. Sharks that were labeled as dangerous in Australia were now more so. Man-eating sharks in the US that were once limited to the South were now feared in the North. Sharks in South Africa were seen as a growing threat. The result was a militaristic response to sharks and shark bites based on the relative newness of surf lifesaving clubs, lifeguards, and first aid, as well as the remote nature of some locations.
Federal militaries were involved in each nation’s initial responses to shark bites, and a global awareness of sharks was beginning to take shape. The onset of World War II and the deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops across the Pacific would add to this process, as more sharks and people would come into contact than at any previous time in human history.
3.6.1 South Africa (1907-1959)
In South Africa, leading shark scientist David Davies (1965:18) notes that shark bites are “inextricably bound up with emotion, sensation, horror, local and national politics.” The
first response to shark bites in South Africa was to build a beach enclosure in Natal at the “Kenilworth Tea Room” beach from 1907 to 1928 (Davies, 1965: 69, 85). At home, the problem of shark bites continued with five shark bite incidents in the South Coast in 1940 and six shark bites in both 1944 and 1947. Davies (1965: 70) notes that within eight years (1943-1951) there were “twenty attacks which took place off the Durban beaches.” In 1952, Durban installed shark nets that were designed similarly to those used in New South Wales at several beaches (Davies, 1965).
During World War II, Davies (1965: 76) notes that the problem of shark bites became a “serious hazard” due to the “psychological problems involved in the presence of large numbers of Air Force, Navy, and merchant navy personnel in areas where shark attack could be expected.” A number of measures were taken among Allied forces abroad.
Following the war, shark bite incidents did not stop. In December 1957, there were four shark bites in 13 days in the Natal South Coast, of which three were in within miles of one another (Davies, 1965: 71). In response to the shark bite cluster, the South African Navy was enlisted, and a frigate, “the S.A.S. Vrystaat, was sent from Cape Town for the purpose of dropping 100 lb depth charges off the South Coast” (Davies, 1975: 71-72). More than 60 charges were dropped along the shoreline.
3.6.2 Australia (1922-1937)
Australia’s national consciousness first recognized shark bites in 1922 following the fatal bite on 18-year-old surf lifesaver Milton Coughlin during a community Beach Carnival at Coogee beach. This incident is important because the youth who helped him became a national hero. This was the first shark bite fatality for Sydney’s new Surf Life Savers and the response from the Surf Association called on the Government to put together a commission. In response, observation towers began to be put up, and Coogee beach tried to erect its first shark-proof enclosure.
In 1934, the NSW Shark Menace Advisory Committee wrote to the Australian Royal Navy requesting assistance. The Navy told the Committee that it was using torpedo nets
and explosives at Jervis Bay to address concerns about sharks during its training in the ocean. This attention continued as the Navy supported the development of shark repellents in the 1940s, and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) conducted shark patrols on beaches in the 1950s. Military concern regarding shark bites would return to Australia with the Sydney case study in 2009. Following a serious shark bite incident on a Navy diver, the Navy began issuing electronic “Shark Shields” to protect divers from sharks in 2010.
3.6.3 United States (1916-1946)
The militarized responses in the US began in 1916 following a cluster of four fatal shark bites over 12 days along a New Jersey river. The Governor of New Jersey refused to act, citing the length of the coastline, which prompted calls for action from President Woodrow Wilson. The shark bite incidents were discussed during the War Cabinet meeting on 14 July 1916 (Webster, 1962: 91). Webster (1962:91) notes that Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo “instructed the Coast Guard to ‘use every means of driving the sharks away or killing them.’” In addition, a local shark hunt took place at the direction of the state’s National Guard. A shark patrol began, in which boats dragged pieces of lamb up and down the river with “riflemen ready on the fantail to shoot any sharks that lunged at the bait” (Webster, 1962: 85). Steel and wooden fences were placed in the waters of river beaches (Webster, 1962: 86).
During World War II, shark bite stories of sharks following torpedoing of boats in the Pacific were particularly unsettling. The sinking of the Nova Scotia in 1942 and the USS Indianapolis in 1945 were key to movements to develop anti-shark technology. Davies (1965: 78) notes that stories of these incidents were affecting the “morale of Allied airforce and naval personnel.” As a result, the US began a new project in 1942 in the Office of Scientific Research and Development to protect service members adrift in the open ocean from shark bites (Davies, 1965: 79). The Office developed a packet called the “Shark Chaser” that was given to all personnel between 45th parallel North and South. Davies notes that this provided comfort and “considerable psychological value” (Davies,
1965: 80). The US Navy also issued a “Shark Sense” brochure to dissuade the concerns of pilots; however, the Japanese sinking of the USS. Indianapolis and resulting 60 to 80 shark fatalities (Sisneros and Nelson, 2001) made boat disasters and shark repellants an issue for government attention (Caldicott et al, 2001: 447). After the war, research continued, and in 1958, American attention to shark bites on humans led to studies of shark behaviour and the establishment of the US Navy’s Shark Research Panel (Caldicott et al., 2001: 447) and new discourse categorizing human-shark encounters.
The New Orleans Shark Symposium in 1958 was sponsored by Tulane University, the American Institute of Biological Sciences, the US Navy’s Office of Naval Research, and the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics. The symposium included 34 scientists from around the world. Shark “attack” classifications were suggested, with four categories outlined in a report by Schultz (Schultz, 1963). These included “unprovoked shark attacks,” in which sharks “make contact with the victim or gear,” “provoked shark attacks” that involve injuring, catching or annoying sharks, “boat attacks” that involve contact with boating equipment and “air and sea disasters” (Schultz, 1963). However, the global endorsement of updated scientific classifications maintained an underlying assumption about the intent of some sharks.
In each location, post-World War II, 1950s families saw an increase in leisure time. As this transition took place, the shift from a military to civilian responsibility took place. Davies (1965: 141) notes that “this increased usage of the sea is related to such factors as increasing population, improved methods of transport, shorter working hours, and the increase of leisure time.” The threat was no longer to the morale of service members but to the morale of tourists and voters.
3.7 The legacy of high affect discourse on policy responses: the criminalization of sharks and shark bites
Literature on criminalization is broad and includes research into mental illness (Abramson 1972; Steury, 1991; Engel and Silver 2001), and computer crime (Hollinger and LanzaKaduce, 1988), as well as labelling theory and moral panics (Cohen, 1972, 2009; Good and Ben-Yehuda, 1994). Institutional measures of this process which include arrests, prosecutions, and incarcerations (Steury, 1991), can be used as a measure as well as socio-political layering that combines media framing, policy actor advocacy (Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce, 1988), and legislative action. Targets of criminalization are identified for their objective harm, “deviant” behaviour, cultural conflicts, or threat to social norms. The dread associated with a threat to life or a treasured way of life results in methods of social control that attempt to reinforce the meaning behind these power dynamics. As a result, the criminalization of an issue is intended to do two things: first, send a message to society about what is valued, and secondly, to deter a perceived threat. Both of these messages are sent by placing an unjust burden or punishment on a less valued target (Engel and Silver, 2001).
Shark “attacks” became part of the political landscape as they moved from the realm of military governance and service member safety to civilian beach safety. The result was the criminalization of shark bites by states and local governments. Fundamental to this process is the meaning that is given to the action by labeling the offending behaviour, directing an authority to respond, and executing a community-supported response. Affect is central to this process, as emotional meaning and value are the triggers of the problem and inform the solution. These bites were addressed as crime waves with shark bites identified as “assaults,” and “molestations” (Webster, 1962). The notion that “the only good shark was a dead shark” (Gruber and Manire, 1991) was common. Indeed, Davies (1964: 65) wrote that the “Blue Pointer is a voracious and aggressive species which attacks humans and even small boats with little hesitation.”
t’Hart (1993: 41) notes “affective control” and the “‘management’ of individual and collective emotions generated by the breakdown of routine symbolic order.” This could be seen in 1935, when the New South Wales Shark Menace Advisory Committee submitted a report of beach safety recommendations following a series of shark bite incidents. The report stated it was acting to address a “fear complex” (NSW, 1935: 26) that had developed. The goals of criminalization therefore are to use policy selection as a way of displacing or shifting high affect emotions. The establishment of governance structures and symbols are designed to cue this transition and reflect the meaning given to the “ingroup” that is supported and the “out-group” that is punished. Dr. Coppleson testified before the Shark Menace Advisory Committee in 1934 and reported that one shark may be responsible for multiple incidents (NSW, 1935: 32).
The committee recommended the culling of sharks as part of a beach fishing operation to catch sharks in 1935, and state funding for shark nets along all New South Wales beaches began in 1937. Following World War II, the program was expanded to additional beaches. The invention of the bikini in 1950 was joined by the invention of the rogue shark theory. Dr. Coppleson followed up on his research in Australia explaining the motivations behind shark bites. He argued that the only sharks that bit humans were “rogue” sharks that had developed a taste for human flesh (Coppleson, 1950). He suggested that other sharks behaved “normally” and were not likely to bite and re-classified all shark “attacks” as those perpetrated by “rogue” sharks. In the 1950 Australian Medical Journal he wrote that
the continued presence of man-eating sharks, the attacks in sequence and cessation of attacks once a particular shark is caught, suggests the guilt, not of many sharks, but of one shark. It suggests the presence of a vicious shark, which patrols a certain area of the coast, of a river or of a harbor, for long periods (Coppleson, 1950).
This analysis moved sharks from “monsters of the deep” to a modern and potentially more terrifying assemblage of resident, serial killer sharks waiting just off shore. In response, Coppleson concluded that “such a shark must be hunted until it is destroyed” (Coppleson, 1950: 8). Moreover, Peace (2009; 12) notes that in Australia, “the metaphor of criminalist is amplified by the proliferation of verbs like ‘cruising’, ‘hanging about,’ ‘loitering,’ ‘prowling,’ lurking, [and] malingering.”
In 1957, in South Africa, laws were passed to establish the anti-sharks board in 1957. A statutory authority called the Natal Anti-Sharks Board was established. Action was taken at the local level to put barriers and nets in along beaches after 1957 and 1958 (Davies, 1965: 72). Davies (1965: 54) notes that the bull shark (or Zambezi shark, named for the Zambezi River) was seen as culpable for shark bites. He notes that “the incrimination of the Zambezi shark was obtained from the positive identification of tooth fragments.” Here we see that shark bites are reviewed as crime scenes, with evidence used to identify the perpetrator followed by efforts to respond.
The US began long-line catches in Hawaii in 1959 (Wetherbee et al., 1994) and New Jersey in 1961 (Carlson et al , 2008). Yet in Florida, historically, shark bites have had a number of distinguishing features. First, the severity has been reasonably low, with only 4 fatalities in the state between 1959 and 1990 (USLA, 2002: 1). Second, there has been only 1 fatality on a lifeguard (USLA, 2002: 2). This is an important characteristic, which is different from the experiences of South Africa and Australia. The absence of lifeguard fatalities also removed a high affect and outcome-related/relevant element. Third, there is a difference in the types of sharks involved in the shark bites. The species of shark is important because there are different emotional connotations toward certain sharks and because the style of shark bite incidents are different. Connecting a causal story about the shark bite may be easier with less known about a particular species. As a result, challenging the causal story monopoly on shark stereotypes becomes possible. The outcome was different in Florida, which should mean that the affect and emotion around the dreaded outcome are different in this case less.
The legacy of criminality from shark bites can be seen in each of the three case studies. Responses look at spatial (closeness to population centres), temporal (frequency of shark bites), and severity (number of fatalities). Chief amongst these are territorial responses. Government initiatives are aimed at (and titled) “shark control” rather than beach control, despite the fact that management of beaches may be more successful in reducing risks than attempting to manage shark species. Human encroachment on these coastal zones
can lead to habitat destruction, and overfishing that contribute to shark bites (Hazin et al., 2008). These locations also often serve as both locations where there is high water use by bathers and as waste zones from outfalls, which can increase the risk of a shark bite (Hazin et al , 2008)
3.8 The Impact of Jaws
Jaws stands out like no movie before its time. This film provides a critical linkage between the evolutionary fear of sharks and cultural stereotypes of shark behaviour that trigger affective cues to stimulate individual and political behaviour. As Biskind (1975:1) notes, “Jaws needs no introduction.” Based on the book Jaws (1974) by Peter Benchley, the film by director Steven Spielberg opened on 22 June 1975 in the US, and featured the story of a “rogue” shark terrorizing a small seaside community (Jaws 1975). Biskind (1975) labelled the film a “middle-class Moby Dick” for its broad appeal. The effect of Jaws included (a) increased public awareness of sharks; (b) greater public concern at east coast beaches; and (c) an increase in sport fishing and shark jaws or teeth. The film was Hollywood’s first summer blockbuster, and broke the record of gross domestic sales in the US as the fastest-selling movie of all time and the most profitable to date. Within 78 days, Jaws had gross income totalling USD$124,322,872 in the US alone (Rubey 1976).
In addition to ticket sales for the film, public fascination of sharks grew. Simon’s (1981) study of Jaws as a “fad” that influenced mass behaviour compared data before and after the release of the movie. Simon noted dramatic increases in the sales of shark jaws and teeth, newspaper coverage on sharks, shark books being published, museum attendance, and shark books checked out of the library (Simon, 1985). He states that a desire for shark teeth increased in particular, noting “after Jaws individual orders for 20,000 to 1000,000 took place with the heaviest order occurring in the summer of 1975” (Simon, 1985:776). The commercial response by the public’s fascination led to other Jaws-style films including, Mako: Jaws of Death (1976), Claws (1977) about a killer bear, Orca (1977), Piranha (1978), and Cujo, about a killer dog (1983). Sequels to Jaws included Jaws II (1978), Jaws III (1983), and Jaws: The Revenge (1987). Indeed, the place of sharks as the
stars within the movie industry would expand to include Deep Blue Sea (1999) and Open Water (2003). In 2013, the cable channel Scifi aired the film Sharknado (2013) about a tornado that envelopes hundreds of sharks and takes them inland, which received more than 604,000 tweets during its 90 minute broadcast, making it one of the most tweeted periods ever (Hayden, 2013).
Why the fascination with Jaws was successful while others failed to pique public interest is a key question that Simon (1981) considers. “Why will one film spark off a mass behaviour while another film (or television special or news story) will not” (Simon, 1981: 782). This question echoes the political dynamics of what elements make some issues hot topics, pressing problems of the “issue attention cycle” (Downs, 1972). Simon argues that media attention is key as well as topics that are “fascinating,” and pre-exist in the public’s mind. Rubey (1976) notes that the original Jaws “cashed in on the emotions already attached to people-eating sharks by creating fictional and filmic structures which involve audiences with the shark as an image.” In addition, Tan (1995: 30) notes that films elicit emotions in ways that are “self-enhancing.” Tan (1995: 30) notes that “once fear has been aroused, say by the sight of a shark fin amidst a crowd standing in the sea, as in Jaws (1975), the viewer is driven by an emotional tendency to keep watching this source of threat.” Fear of sharks remains a key legacy of Jaws in the public domain.
The movie Jaws was designed to tap into the public’s fears about sharks. Jaws took a primed affective subject and brought “these moments of primal terror” (Rubey, 1976) to life in several strategic ways. First, the script was deliberate. Victims of the shark included a young girl at night, a young boy in the middle of the day, an experienced fisherman, a man on the 4th of July, and Quint, a shark hunter and World War II veteran. The shark itself is described in hyperbolic terms and given scientific credibility through the marine biologist (Hooper) played by Robert Dreyfus as well as the use of real footage of white sharks from South Australia. Hooper describes the shark as a “rogue” building on the theory of Dr. Victor Coppleson. The film script (Jaws, 1975) reads:
Chief Brody: Now this shark that, that swims alone... Hooper: A rogue.
Chief Brody: Rogue, yeah, now this guy, he - he keeps swimming around in a place where the feeding is good until the food supply is gone, right?
Hooper: It's called Territoriality. That's the theory...A theory I happen to agree with.
Rubey notes “Jaws does treat the great white shark as something larger and more mysterious than a hungry fish. It develops from a mindless eating machine to a malevolent force” (Rubey, 1976). Echoing this sentiment, Time magazine ran an iconic cover of a shark, jaws open with the title “Super Shark” (Time, 1975).
Adding to the sense of dread that accompanies Jaws are the camera angles and the music. The “shark’s-eye camera” (Rubey, 1976) views the swimmers from below before coming in for an “attack.” The music also played a central role in the film, and stayed with the audience. The refrain, “duh-DUN, duh-DUN” aroused and cued the emotions of moviegoers during and after the film. It identified the presence of the shark without seeing the shark. Elhadari et al. (2006: 3) note that the use of a leitmotiv identifies “when the shark comes close in the movie Jaws.” Biskind (1975) describes the buildup as “the dinner theme” (Biancorosso, 2010: 320) and notes the important use of rapid heart beats cords to build anxiety. Beyond the film itself, the marketing of Jaws sought to highlight these primal connections. Gottlieb’s book The Jaws Log (1975: 94) notes that the film company’s production department spent 1.5 million dollars developing a marking campaign to advance “Jaws Consciousness.” The goal was to build up a social enemy along the lines of Frankenstein and King Kong that the public could identify with.
Gottlieb (1975: 93-94) states that the movie studio’s public relations team “planned the sort of saturation campaign usually only Presidential campaigns receive.” He highlights the role of radio commercials that were used to build up the thriller and “Jaws-mania” by stating, “none of men’s fantasies of evil can compare with the reality of “Jaws”” (Gottlieb, 1975: 94).
The impact of the film was a nationalized and internationalized increase in fear of sharks that existed apart from the reality of shark bites along the coast. Krop and Krause (1976: 293) reviewed cases of “shark phobia” and stated, “due to a mass viewing of the movie Jaws a widespread fear of sharks has been increasingly observed.” The New York Times
reported a spike in reporting of sharks along American east-coast beaches. An article states that, “[t]he impact of the motion picture “Jaws” is being felt along the East Coast where town authorities and lifeguards are being besieged with reports of sharks” (New York Times, 1975). Amplifying the marketing and merchandizing of Jaws were actual shark bites that occurred during the summer of 1975 in Daytona Beach, Florida. Simon (1981) reported declines in businesses in these areas up to “30%” however, it is unclear if this was the result of attention to the shark bites or the economic recession (Simon, 1981: 783).
Two reports were conducted following these incidents in Florida. The first report was conducted by an advisory committee of the Daytona Beach Area Chamber of Commerce in September 1975 (Bullion, 1976). The second was conducted by the Florida Sea Grant Program in November 1975. The Chamber of Commerce report stated that:
[T]he shark attack on a youth surfing off New Smyrna Beach in late Spring, 1975 became a national story that was linked to remarks on a national television program that alleged Daytona Beach to be one of the world’s most dangerous beaches for sharks. The attack and subsequent publicity, combined with widespread interest and concern with sharks caused many people from across the country to write or call Daytona concerning sharks (Bullion, 1976: 9).
However, the Chamber’s report found that the previous nature of minor shark bites with the booming population growth had not been a problem in the past. It stated, “shark attack in the area has been historically of a single rather than multiple nature” (Bullion, 1976: 9).
The scientific conference held in November was entitled, “Sharks and Man A perspective.” This included sessions on the “Impacts of Sharks on Tourism” and whether shark bites were a liability for lawsuits (Seaman, 1976: iii). The report on proceedings stated that, “[W]e are not aware that there are fewer visitors due to sharks” (Gaiser, 1976: 8).
Following the release of Jaws, shark derbies increased around the US and the world (Hueter, 1991). The New York Times reported on the increased attention. It quoted one captain who stated, “[t]hat movie broke the business wide open.” He added, “I would say
we had a 50 percent increase this season of people chartering boats to go out after shark and other big game” (Savage, 1975). In addition, an expansion of US fisheries in the 1970s identified sharks as an underutilized source (Sander, 2002). Previous perceptions had sharks seen as “a poor man’s marlin” (Stone et al , 1998: 216). The result was an increase in fishing of sharks, which placed man in a new role of controlling their fate. In 1993, the US National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) reported that “the appearance of man as a predator has confronted sharks with a mortality source that they cannot withstand'' (NMFS, 1993). This example mirrors the way movies influenced fast-acting policy developments, including the ban on nuclear power and anti-nuclear sentiment following the release of the movie The China Syndrome in 1979 (Sunstein, 2007) and the film War Games, which resulted in the criminalization of computer misuse in 1983 (Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce, 1988).
The release of the film Jaws in 1975 brought the graphic fear of a serial killer criminal shark home to millions and gave rise to the celluloid manifestation of the “man-eater” label, which suggested an intent-driven monster seeking out human prey. It painted the picture of a one-dimensional outcome for the human-shark experience, which I refer to as the “Jaws effect.” The impact of the public’s attention to this dreaded outcome can still be seen today as the phrase “shark attack” conjures schemas representative of the movie. Indeed, its wide scale popularity and familiarity has influenced future generations based on efforts to tap into this schema. In the US, the most-watched cable program of the year is Shark Week on the Discovery Channel. Nearly 30 million people watch this series each year. Papson (1992) reviewed the style of this documentary series in 1990 (it has run every year since 1987) and notes that “most encounters with the shark take place in feature films” (Papson, 1992: 68). As a result, the perceived reality of sharks is fictional, because documentaries use the devices of fictional movies to “capture viewer attention” (Papson, 1992: 67). Thus, for 25 years Shark Week has continued the tradition of Jaws by relying on the danger posed by sharks and the “threat of a shark attack to engage the viewer” (Papson, 1992: 75).
People associate sharks with the dreaded outcome from a fatal, consumptive event,
regardless of the actual outcome. This perceived outcome is already primed with a visual, based on latent fears. Leiserowitz (2004) notes that that “the vivid imagery and theme music from this movie still reverberate in the public mind, stoking individual fears, influencing behaviour (such as vacation and swimming preferences) and generating countless secondary ripple effects, including re-emergent, media-driven ‘shark panics’ such as was seen in the US in the summer of 2001” (Leiserowitz, 2004: 24).
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the first element of the HALT framework by locating the role of affect in decision-making and analysing data to affirm that the shark bite case studies in Florida, Cape Town, and Sydney were high affect events. Each location was represented by highly affective language in news accounts, experienced historically emotional incidents, and reacted with threat-averse policy actions. This supports the hypothesis that affect can function as the driver of survival-based behaviour and a magnet for cultural constructions. Affect can also be amplified by artificial stimuli, such as films and media.
A combination of affective and cultural sources influences the way issues are prioritized and impacts the opening of policy windows. For instance, a high affect issue such as race or local values may influence a policy response during a salience-prone period. Yet, it is also the case that cultural affect often builds upon instinctual affective sensibilities. In all, affective sensibilities are conditional to these combinations as well as contextual factors.
Individually or in combination, the intensity of affect to a given environment triggers individual behaviour that can influence political responses. As a result, it is important to consider the impact of multiple affective characteristics. The combination of an instinctually high affect event, like a shark bite, on a socially constructed high affect target population, such as a child, intensifies the affective nature of the event. Media coverage emphasizing the details of this event may further an emotional cascade that can engulf the political scene.
Shark bites provide a valuable study because the human-shark relationship is not a new
conflict. Current attitudes and policymaking are the continuation of a primal threat narrative that continues to evolve as animals, particularly people, live alongside apex predators, particularly sharks. The result is a political dynamic that is moderated heavily by pre-existing evolutionary judgments about life or death issues. This bias cannot be ignored in current policymaking and can extend to other issues. Evolutionarily prioritized emotions about select targets make them prone to social constructions and artificial stimuli. The priming of policy responses toward threat aversion and emotional displacement is policy-relevant data, particularly due to their reliance on speed as a function of survival. Indeed, the speed of emotional responses from shark bites is tied to the speed of political responses to alleviate the threat or emotion connected to the threat.
For sharks, the enactment of policies included shark hunts, shark derbies, and beach nets as punitive measures for the perceived public good. The criminalization of humanwildlife conflicts into animal violence moved crimes of nature to crimes by nature. The laws also offered a symbolic message about the low cultural value of sharks and the high cultural value placed on the beach and leisure activities.
This dissertation moves forward to review the the relationship between HALT elements by examining the way affect is facilitated or moderated by the social contexts and structures including (a) salience, (b) policy entrepreneurship and (c) causal stories. This includes a review of the way in which quick emotional responses interact with the speed of political responses. These may be mitigated by government experience with an issue, electoral majorities, established structures, and policy actor expertise. Quick political fixes to anxious moments may not always to be possible; however, ready-made solutions may facilitate an emotional transition to navigate the issue. Moreover, high affect characteristics may allow policy entrepreneurs to build policy responses that react to the emotion and speed the issues present. Davies notes that following clusters of shark bites, often “demands for immediate solution[s] have been made by individuals and local authorities” (Davies, 1965: 19). Indeed, this analysis is based on the premise that there is a relationship between prioritized affective characteristics, policy design elements, and the likelihood of policy responses. This idea will be examined in the following chapters.
Chapter 4. The way the capacity and contexts of salience influence policy responses
“It appears that people in general are less willing to accept a risk involving sharks than greater risks of almost any other kind ” (Gilbert, 1963: 46)
4.1 Introduction
This chapter examines how salience helps explain differences in policy responses and policy change. Previous research into agenda-setting and media-framing has largely focused on how politicians and actors can make certain issues more salient to the public (Kingdon, 1995). Here, this analysis assumes that instinctual and cultural affect has predisposed certain stimuli with features that people will find emotional and salient (Zajonc, 1980). For instance, survival is salient, as is threat avoidance (Ohman, 2000).
Recent research by Decety and Cacioppo (2012: 3072) has also shown that high affect events “alert the individual to the moral salience of a situation.” The task in this analysis is to illustrate the contexts and implications of salient characteristics on the policy process.
The chapter is divided into five parts. First, it examines the advantages and costs to salience. Secondly, it reviews the way cognitive biases and heuristics are advantaged when salience is high and resource capacity is low. Thirdly, I review and address the hypothesis regarding the policy implications that occur when coping mechanisms are at work during high affect-high salience events. Fourthly, the way competition, or a lack thereof, influences the public and policy attention is considered. And fifthly, I apply these theoretical elements to a review of global shark bite policy responses. In all, analyzing salient circumstances can provide insight into the speed, threshold, and direction of policies offered.
This analysis builds on the high affect-low threshold (HALT) framework by noting that salience comes with a price. Stimuli that have survival value, such as threats, changes in norms, and uncertainty, acquire advantaged importance and greater focus that also reduce
other resources. The circumstances that represent increased relevance and reduced capacity favour less complex narratives and responses. Policies that reinforce “known knowns,” heuristics, and “rules of thumb” (Sunstein, 2006) are more likely. This is consistent with the premises of “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1996) and “limited capacity” theory (Lang, 2000). Secondly, clustered stimuli produce faster responses followed by lower thresholds. This process relies on the adoption of heuristic elements, which feed illusory corollaries and historical analogies, based on an event’s representativeness and availability. These methods reinforce the clustering of “like” events based on their frequency, causal correlation, or both, and stimulate an aversion to dreaded aggregate outcomes. In response, policy reactions act to interrupt the outcome aggregation and associated emotional cascades, which can produce overreactions in the short term and policy legacies over the long term. This is consistent with Linville and Fischer’s (1991:19) “renewable resources model” and demonstrates the role of affect in multiple stages of the policy process. Salience is also often competition dependent. Policy responses are replete with instances of high affect issues or events gaining more or less political attention because of the presence of other issues; however, affective characteristics can be used to attract greater in-group attention.
In short, salience is a judgment about the relevance of stimuli compared to other competitive features at a given time (Behr and Iyengar, 1985; Humphreys and Garry, 2000; Wlezien, 2005). Policy responses are more likely when issues and events occur at the conflux of affective priorities, available resource capacity, and salience-prone contexts. Low-affect events may appear more salient during news vacuums or holiday seasons, while the accumulation of multiple high affect attributes may increase “sensitivity to risk” (Warr, 1987) and salience, presenting a fertile ground for policy attention.
Addressing the implications of salience is important because there are lingering questions about why policy responses occur and in what directions they go. In 1990, Burns and Slovic (1990:1) noted that “[a]fter a decade of research on the public experience of risk, no comprehensive theory has been shown to explain why ‘minor events,’ as assessed by
experts, sometimes spark much public alarm.” Research to address this issue included the development of the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF). However, in 2003, its creators noted that this model “does not itself address the basic political, sociological, or psychological process which might underlie amplification and attenuation” (Pidgeon, Kasperson and Slovic, 2003: 4). I suggest that affect could play a larger role in discussion of salience across issue areas and policy domains including agenda setting (Weaver, 1991), media framing (Eisman, 2003; Entman, 1993; Wasieleski, 2001; Zillman et al., 2004), voting behaviour, (Abramowitz 1985; Humphreys and Garry 2000; RePass 1971) and consumer purchasing (Wertenbroch and Dhar 2000). In the absence of a “silver bullet” in policy response analysis, gaining a better understanding of the interplay between emotional conditions, environmental conditions, and political conditions can advance existing research into “social shocks” (Lawless, 1977), policy lurches, “takeoffs” (Kasperson, 1992), and occasions for “punctuated equilibrium” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993/ 2009).
4.2 The advantages and costs of salient stimuli
4.2.1 Advantages
Competitive ecosystems of stimuli surround individuals each day. Advantages in terms of attention, importance, and relevance are allocated to support the time, energy, and resources of things that support survival and reproduction (McDermott et al., 2008). Stimuli that present a threat, a change, or the unknown are priorities that require greater focus to diagnose potential harms. Lang (2000) reviews the role of stimuli and notes that automatic attention is given to news a.) that is “relevant to the goals and needs of the individual” and b.) whose information “represents change or an unexpected occurrence in the environment” (Lang, 2000: 49). Giving salience to events is a way of avoiding dangers based on the perceived outcome from the situation.
Lang (2000: 62) connects emotions with survival by arguing that emotional issues with “survival value” command greater attention. She notes “stimuli that elicit emotion appear
to be stored much better than stimuli that do not elicit emotion” (Lang, 2000: 54). This is consistent with Nabi (2003) who adds, “because selective attention to threat-related information is expected, such information should be more readily retained in memory and more accessible to receivers” (Nabi, 2003: 227). However, cultural contributions play a large role in identifying threats.
Terror management theory states “cultural conceptions of reality serve the vital function of buffering the anxiety that results from awareness of human vulnerability and mortality” (Rosenblatt et al., 1989: 681). The resulting attention to survival means that the attributes of this issue are cared about more and these are the most relevant and salient characteristic of an event.
The emotional attraction to survival is representative of a natural “framing effect” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) in which fear and dread are used to diagnose threats to the status quo. Survival-laden issues would therefore be expected to be the most relevant and salient. The result is the establishment of a mental schema that is well-established with hazard profiles to make specific issue outcomes for survival-laden issues more available for easy recall (Slovic, 2007).
The policy implications of salience are significant. McDermott, Fowler, and Smirnov (2008:338) present a theory of evolutionary risk-sensitive optimal foraging theory and suggest that “cognitive hardwiring” would be expected to deal with problems related to “survival tasks, such as acquiring food and avoiding predators.” They argue that it is important to understand the contexts under which decision-making biases originate, because if decision-making is pre-wired to encourage survival, then “intervention is less likely to be successful in changing these risk predilections” (McDermott, Fowler, and Smirnov, 2008: 336). As a result, people will be more resistant to endeavors that attempt to overwrite innate biases. In addition, politicians could use this hardwiring against the public, to stimulate risk-seeking behaviour based on affectively linked evolutionary sensitivities to survival threats.
Lupia and Menning (2009) review the conditions under which this strategy of affective spin would be most successful. They note that the messaging is not one-sided, since actors require continued support from the public, and “crying wolf” can undermine long-term political legitimacy. Yet, political “wag the dog” examples in the United States range from emotional rallying following the bombing of Pearl Harbor to the Gulf of Tonkin and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. The case of shark bites provides a useful model for this consideration because future bites are nearly certain, meaning that the stoking of fears is politically safe.
4.2.2 Costs
The demand of time and energy from giving attention to curious, negative, or threatrelated news (such as slowly driving past a car crash) has been found to create resource drains in other cognitive areas. Lang (2000: 62) notes that studies have found that “the message that elicits arousal is recalled better, but that specific information contained in a message is remembered less well.” The risk-sensitive resource allocation ensures that energy is present to cue the recall of a potential threat; however, specific data about the threat is less readily available. This explains why different eye-witnesses to the same crime often give varying details. Indeed, outside of recognizing the danger, these details may be less necessary for survival than resource conservation. Importantly, events and stimuli that represent change require more resources to diagnose than “sameness.”
Freiberg (2001) notes that opposition to difference is natural and that change and difference can manifest in an “urge to expel” those things deemed different (Freiberg, 2001: 265, 269).
The limitations on the cognitive capacity of individuals to cope with highly salient stimuli are further restrained when that stimulus comes from multiple events, especially in close succession. These constraints of mental architecture are consistent with “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1996) and Linville and Fischer (1991:5) note that people can only manage a certain number of highly emotional events within a given a period of time. A “bottleneck” (Cobb and Elder, 1983) in emotional coping occurs, based on the limitations
of emotional processing and the complexity of the social environments (Jones, 1999:305).
Linville and Fischer (1991:10) add that:
The assumption that negative events deplete a person's resources is consistent with research showing that prolonged states of stress have a variety of negative emotional, cognitive, and physiological effects, including effects on the neuroendocrine and immune systems (see Baum et al., 1987; Jemmott & Locke, 1984; Krantz, Grunberg, & Baum, 1985). The accumulation of multiple stressful events is particularly harmful.
As a result, the capacity of individuals to absorb multiple negative events is limited, and coping mechanisms must work to resolve the overload. Linville and Fischer (1991:18) argue that individuals are unable to process the events individually with separate outcomes. As a result, one larger, more severe aggregate outcome is adopted. They add, “if two negative events occur close together in time, they must share a limited pool of loss-buffering resources, thus magnifying the negative impact of each event.” Thus, attention to certain stimuli, even of survival value, comes at a cost when occurring through multiple events and in quick succession.
4.3 The impact of biases and heuristics on salience
Heuristics and biases provide mental shortcuts that fill in gaps of information and reduce mental resource allocations. The study of these concepts arose from examinations of human psychology and challenges to expected utility (rational choice) theory. These biases, heuristics, and theories include probability judgments such as representativeness, availability, and memorability as well as prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky), temporal combining (Linville and Fischer, 1991), bounded rationality (Simon, 1996), and probability neglect (Sunstein, 2002). Each of these add to the salience of an issue or event by influencing perceptions about the likelihood, causality, severity, and relevance of a particular outcome. I review four main heuristics and biases: a.) availability, b.) representativeness, c.) illusory corollary and d.) historical analogies. However, I begin with a discussion of affective salience (Slovic and Weber, 2002), which I have noted previously (Chapter 3).
Affect plays a critical role in making issues and events salient because feelings about issues gain both attention and importance based on a combination of instinctual and cultural biases. Biases may be automatic and serve as latent influences on our judgments and behaviour (Zajonc, 1980). Affect is important as a resource for judging responses to previous experiences. If a past event caused great alarm, the affect related to a similar future, real or perceived, incident provides a fast response to inform judgments and behaviour (Slovic et al., 2007). For instance, Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001:188) note, “affect-rich outcomes yield pronounced overweighting of small probabilities,” while Fischoff (2002) states that “misfortunes are disproportionately salient.” Slovic (2007) argues that in these circumstances affect should be considered a heuristic that is relied upon to help make difficult decisions. I suggest, however, that its role is larger, as that of a fundamental operating system with biases to be examined. The way heuristics provide rapid shortcuts to influence preferences and politics is a valuable area of study.
4.3.1
The “availability” heuristic
The “availability” heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973: 207) deals with judgments about probability based on “the ease with which relevant instances come to mind.” This bias is also important in creating both a causal link and overestimation of likelihood on the basis of being in the forefront of one’s thoughts. This may be a function of an item’s recency, (e.g. I just saw that in the paper yesterday), vividness (e.g. I’ll never be able to get that picture out of my head), and familiarity (e.g. I see that all the time). Two examples illustrate the power of the availability heuristic.
First, the development of policy responses to computer crime was noted in Chapter 3 based on the way the threat was made familiar and available though the 1983 motion picture War Games. Computers had been used for theft for more than 20 years before laws criminalizing computer crimes were passed by the United States Congress in the mid-1980s. The threat from computer hackers was made more salient by the film War Games, in which a nuclear war with the Soviet Union is accidentally started by a “reckless” youth (Matthew Broderick). Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce (1988) reviewed the
way heightened emotions and the presence of an available crime with a representative target encouraged laws directed at computer crime in the United States. Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce (1988) note that the policy responses by Congress and the states “had to be done quickly” due to the “emotional climate” of the issue (Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce 1988: 107).
Availability is important because, as Fischhoff (2002: 739) notes, “people can track what they see” and this increases judgments about how likely an event is expected to occur. This is true for issues that are both real and artificially stimulated to make them more vivid. Brandstrom and Kuipers noted that this visibility is a key criteria. Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003) cite “the availability of information that arouses negative emotions: shocking pictures, shocking statistics, shocking witness statements” (Brandstrom and Kuipers, 2003: 291). The comparisons below in Table 4.1 provide a second example of the role of availability and “fright factors.” They contrast the number of fatal shark bite incidents in 2000, 2002, and 2010 with other comparable water activities, including boating, drowning, and canoeing, or kayaking. While survival is a salient feature for both issues, the availability to imagine scenarios of shark bites (as opposed to images of boating accidents, drowning, and canoe deaths) leads to an environment where they command more attention and seem more likely to occur.
In addition, the availability heuristic in this case includes the way hazards are linked to evolutionary memory. However, Sunstein (2006) argues that it is the different levels of availability to images of risk across cultures that helps explain different risk perceptions and issue salience. As a result, the more acute imagery increases levels of fear toward shark bites and greater salience when compared to dangers such as drowning. Yet added attention also comes with burdens on individual resources.
Table 4.1 Comparing boating fatalities, drowning, and canoe and kayak fatalities with annual and world-wide shark bite fatalities
US Boating fatalities in 2010 605
World-wide shark bite fatalities in 2010: 6
World-wide drowning fatalities in 2000: 281,771
World-wide shark bite fatalities in 2000: 11
4.3.2
Representativeness
Representativeness is described as the degree to which an accurate categorization is seen as likely based on perceptions about the characteristics of those involved (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972: 430). The saying, “where there’s smoke there’s fire” is an example of representativeness. Indeed, representativeness (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972) is a tool that reinforces perceptions of associations by characterizing the social ontology of a subject. For example, if someone appears to share the attributes of a Boston Red Sox baseball fan, based on gender (male) and location (living in Massachusetts), then he is judged to be representative of what a Red Sox fan should be, whether or not the variables of gender and where he lives are meaningful measures of being a Red Sox fan. Indeed, often they are not, and this can have significant implications if applied to policymaking
Representativeness can be seen in the policy process through the identification and response to threats and hazards. Indeed, the way stereotypes are used by society to allocate privilege, establish criminal profiles, categorize hazards profiles, and diagnose levels of threat all provide examples of representativeness. False stereotypes against marginalized populations are often subject to this bias (Schneider and Ingram, 1993). For instance, the United States military maintained a “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy that banned openly gay service between 1994 and 2010 based on the representativeness of “homosexual conduct” (Neff and Edgell, 2013). This included formal investigations and witch-hunts of service members who appeared to fit the image of gay or lesbian, based on their haircuts, photographs with people of the same sex, and clothing.
4.3.3
The illusory corollary
Biases establish powerful narratives that influence decision-making, particularly the “illusory corollary” and the “misperception hypothesis” that assumes two similar events are related (Gilovich et al., 2002: 613). Under these circumstances, perceptions reinforce causal links across multiple events, including when people perceive a connection between two unconnected events. Gilovich et al. (2002) reviewed shooting basketballs and
perceptions regarding the probability of making or missing a basket. Shooters with a “hot hand” were the subjects of the study. Gilovich et al. (2002:614) found that people were more likely to believe making a string of baskets increased the chances of making more and that missing baskets was an omen for missing future shots. This bias is supported by the availability of the images based on the recency of activity and the representativeness of what a “streak shooter” looks like (i.e. one who made the previous shot). The data shows that these biases can be counterintuitive where “people not only perceived random sequences as positively correlated, they also perceived negatively correlated sequences as random” (Gilovich et al., 2002: 614).
Considering the role of biases is important because biases may be used to fill in cognitive gaps and conserve energy in complex situations. Interpreting visible events as related is easier than calculating the variables that disprove a relationship. As a result, adequate causation is seen as the standard rather than accurate causation in looking at events. This conservation bias is consistent with Deborah analysis of “teleological fallacies.” Under this shortcut, the meaning of an event is taken from the outcome, or as Stone (1989: 290) puts it, the “effects of an action are its purpose.” Continuing with the basketball analogy, the fallacy in this scenario would be that the person shooting was meant to make the shot or have the “hot hand” by virtue of having had a high percentage game after the fact. This demonstrates how reliance on visuals can be fraught with prejudices.
4.3.4 Historical analogies
Historical analogies are described by t’Hart (2010: 106-107) as a cognitive heuristic in which whole situations are seen as representative of an event and responses mirror previously diagnosed incidents. t’Hart (2010: 107) notes, “[o]nce we classify a new situation A as being “just like” an old situation B, we provide ourselves with well established memories, lessons and action repertoires.” Historical analogies are part of an efficient mental architecture because they help save time and resources. Stone (1989) notes similarly that synecdotes provide a powerful model for the quick application
between incidents. They offer a model incident within which other episodes can be compared and understood.
Taken together, these biases suggest that high affect-high salience events are heuristicprone because under conditions of pressure the goal of identifying problems, avoiding threats, and conserving energy advantages shortcuts. Policies that use these shortcuts to promote well-known policies would also benefit. I now move on to a discussion of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which Sunstein (2002) interprets through a lens of emotion and McDermott et al. (2008) review in terms of survival threat decisionmaking.
4.4 How biases and prospect theory facilitate the aggregation of dreaded outcomes
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) addresses the way people’s behaviour violates expected utility theory because individuals will overweigh certainty under risk (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979:269). In short, prospect theory states that people are riskaverse when faced with gains and more risk-seeking when presented with losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Kahneman and Tversky (1981) argue that this process of decision-making preferences is established by two stages: first, through an editing and framing effect that defines options, outcomes, and probabilities based on the way the problem is developed, social norms, and characteristics of individuals (Tversky and Khaneman, 1981: 453). Secondly, the frame is evaluated based on the highest valued “prospect,” that is seen to dominate the others or is comparatively better (Kahneman and Tversky, 1986: 257). Yet, preferences change in what they describe as “pseudo-certainty,” when the framing changes but probabilities stay the same. The way in which conditions change preferences is critical, and one situation under which shifts occur is when separate or aggregate dreaded outcomes are considered.
4.4.1 Temporal combining of negative outcomes
Linville and Fischer (1991) build on their argument regarding the “limited capacities” of individuals to absorb certain volumes of stimuli. They apply prospect theory to policy responses and preferences by reviewing the way events are considered as separate or combined outcomes. Preferences for dealing with events are dependent upon whether they are gains or losses. Linville and Fischer (1991) note that there is “gain-savoring” when the news is good; however, there is also a preference for “loss-buffering” to cope with negative stimuli (Linville and Fischer, 1991: 6).
Linville and Fischer (1991) identified cases in which the consequences from multiple events can be “evaluated jointly” into aggregated mental outcomes as a coping mechanism (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981: 456). This also builds off Thaler and Johnson’s (1990) work regarding “hedonic editing.” As an example, they note that if someone buys one computer for $3,000 and then sells it for $4,000 there are two options: 1.) to consider the two events as separate, with both a gain and a loss, or 2.) to link the two events jointly and view the transaction in total as a net profit of $1,000. Importantly, Linville and Fischer (1991:7) note that this “alters the emotional impact of the transactions.” The weighting would increase the aggregate outcome for the negative events because “losses loom larger” (Linville and Fischer, 1991: 18). An illustration of aggregate outcomes or “temporal combining,” as well as separate gains, is noted below in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 Temporal combining of events, from Linville and Fischer (1991)
The policy implications of temporal combining and aggregate outcomes rely on the way responses link events together or separate them. In both, the role of emotions is key. Policy responses function as “positive” events to break up the aggregation and allow for separate events to be considered (Linville and Fischer, 1991: 10). Linville and Fisher (1991) note that this action serves as a “renewable resource” that draws attention away from negative stimuli and toward a more acceptable norm. However, the effects of a string of events may linger. Sequential events are disproportionately acted upon because long sequences may be more memorable than individual events (Gilovich et al. (2002:13).
In addition, the intensity of the events and an aggregate outcome may have an emotional legacy based on perceptions associated with retrospective impact bias (Wilson and Gilbert, 2003). Wilson (2003:422) describes this to mean that people “overestimate the intensity and duration of their emotional reactions to past events.” Temporally combined incidents can easily be conveyed as historical analogies that include certain types of problems and solutions, creating legacies for future cues. Moreover, the way temporal
combining and impact bias can be used in this way begins to explain why policy thresholds for high affect events may be lower, particularly following multiple negative incidents. Stimuli may cue fears of a historical aggregate outcome that is actually a number of events which have been temporally combined. Yet, applying this argument more broadly requires looking at the way negative emotional stimuli can impact policy considerations.
Sunstein (2002) addresses the role of emotions (more broadly, rather than affect) in prospect theory by putting forward the concept of “probability neglect.” He argues that when emotions are “too strong” (Sunstein, 2002: 67) they “crowd out” rational decisionmaking and people fail to account for probabilities. However, Lupia and Menning (2009) note that emotions do not always impair rational thinking. McDermott et al (2008) suggest that risk-based behaviour should be considered “ecologically rational,” based on an evolutionary perspective that promotes survival interests. Indeed, Sunstein (2002) acknowledges the value of quick emotional responses to avoid danger, but suggests that their application to government policy is problematic.
Combining the salience of survival and threats is complex because there are multiple variables to consider in policymaking. Sunstein (2002:68) argues “governments may end up engaging in extensive regulation precisely because intense emotional reactions are making people relatively insensitive to the (low) probability that the relevant dangers will come to fruition.” Sunstein (2002) does not, however, explain where emotions come from or fully address the benefits in this regulation. In addition, he fails to address how affect provides valuable information and stimuli for safety and assumes that people are making less optimal judgments because of emotions brought about by perceptions of worst-case scenarios. Likewise, McDermott et al (2008) argue that evolutionary-based wiring explains how prospect theory operates, but do not locate affect or emotion in their theory. Neither considers the central role that multiple events can play. This is important because, as Lupia and Menning (2009) have noted, actors utilize affect for their purposes. This can include aggregating negative outcomes in ways that make them appear more correlated, severe and intense, which influences policy responses to these events in the future. With
these factors in mind, I propose a hypothesis regarding the implications of temporal combining on the policy process.
4.5 Proposing a model for understanding the impact of temporal combining on policy responses
I propose a model for analyzing the relationship between multiple negative events and policy responses by looking at the way heuristics and biases reinforce Linville and Fischer’s (1991) temporal combining theory and “renewable resources” model. This begins by restating that Linville and Fischer (1991) found that people were averse to having multiple large losses on the same day. Within this finding, a number of points are important to note: first, the closeness in time between multiple negative events can present heightened aversion because the speed between when events occur increases the slope of the intensity of the perceived threat outcome, as well as the degrees of change and uncertainty from the norm (Warr, 1987). Secondly, the frequency of multiple negative events can be used to make them appear correlated if they are deemed representative of each other. However, a collective outcome can be produced by causal links even when events are separated by larger periods of time or distance. For instance, a series of arson fires may be perceived to be related, even if incidents are separated by decades, if a recent event is seen to be representative of previous incidents.
Thirdly, individuals’ limited capacity for absorbing multiple negative events encourages biases, heuristic shortcuts, and temporal combining (Linville and Fischer, 1991). This process of aggregation is made easier (and faster) between “like events.” The result is an increase in the acute nature of both the individual events and the aggregated outcome. As a result, the way actors and policy responses give meaning to repeating events as historical analogies can impact issue salience for years or decades to come.
Importantly, what matters in these situations is not the actual severity of the issue or event, but the way its salient features trigger real or perceived fears of dreaded individual or aggregate severe outcomes. This was demonstrated in the degree of salience and fear
between boating fatalities and shark bites (Table 4.1). The goal is therefore directed at risk perception reduction rather than risk reduction. Central to this process is how policy responses can be used as tools to separate an aggregate outcome, because clusters are perceived as the most severe and aversive. I now present three points in this hypothesis.
First, policy responses should occur faster for multiple negative events which: a.) occur more closely together and b.) are seen as correlated. This is based on the assumption that both people and governments desire loss-buffering following episodes where multiple negative events have been combined, or “extreme loss-clustering.” The aggregation of negative events represents one of the most averse situations because it demands greater energy and a reduced capacity of resources. This results in attempts to rapidly relieve this aversive condition. Immediate responses attempt to return situations to the norm in which individuals and communities consider their emotions based on separate outcomes.
Secondly, the direction of policy responses is focused on positively affective tools that disaggregate outcomes. Linville and Fischer’s (1991) “renewable resources” model argues that the introduction of a new “positive” event outcome interrupts the aggregation of negative outcomes. This advantages the selection of publicly acknowledged “positive” reactions to achieve the desired goal. The diagnosis of an event as representative of a familiar situation and the selection of a correspondingly acknowledged positive solution quickly shifts the affective states. The response meets the demand of providing emotional relief even though it may not reduce risk. As a result, policy responses favour historical path dependencies to relieve social anxiety and in order to disrupt the aggregation more rapidly.
Examples of recognized positive outcomes include events intended to symbolize justice, retribution, and understanding. These responses are illustrated when a scandal-ridden politician resigns from office, an investigation is announced following a disaster, or when a politician delivers a cathartic speech following a crisis. An implication of this feature suggests that policy responses need not burden the target if there are other positively
perceived options. However, preferences for the fastest and most reliable positive relief policy response may encourage visible punitive instruments.
Thirdly, previously clustered events will have low policy thresholds in the future because of their connection to dreaded aggregate outcomes. The fear that a subsequent individual event may represent both: a.) an emotionally intense individual incident; and b.) the cue for the beginning of a new dreaded cluster means that at the first sign of the hazard, responses should take place. When hazard stimuli are present, they can invoke framings around a historical analogy if the characteristics are seen as representative of that event. As a result, political thresholds are used as a policy tool to prevent future dread aggregation. This dread prevention is consistent with the evolutionary aspects of McDermott et al ’s (2008) theory of prospect theory analysis because under their argument “even a single negative experience resulting from encounters with predators or poisoned food may prove essential for survival” (McDermott et al., 2008: 337).
In all, this hypothesis begins to explain why knee-jerk political reactions are so fast and why thresholds remain low even after years of quiet on a previously negative multipleevent issue and then escalate disproportionately at the first sign of a problem. To evaluate these arguments, 11 incidents were selected in which there was a connection between incidents and policy responses.
4.6 Evaluating the hypothesis through a review of global shark bite policy responses
The table below (Table 4.2) reviews locations with multiple (two or more) shark bite incidents and the policy responses that followed. It identifies the jurisdiction of the shark bites, the years in which they occurred, and the total number within that year that preceded the policy response. Shark bites are noted, with fatalities in brackets. The date of the last incident before the policy is also noted, followed by the date of the preceding incident and the number of days in between. In addition, the date (if known) of the policy response announcement is included. The chart then indicates the number of days between the last shark bite incident and the policy response. The response is also identified based
on publicly available information from government documents, statements, and newspaper reports, including the International Shark Attack File (ISAF).
Table 4.2 The closeness of multiple events and the speed of policy responses
Central to this analysis is the way in which multiple shark bite incidents were clustered based on their frequency and proximity as well as perceived causality. Evidence of this can be seen in the application of the rogue shark theory (Coppleson, 1959) to shark bite narratives. The mythology that a single shark is responsible for multiple events because it has developed a taste for human blood (or flesh) and then returns to the same vicinity over large periods of time is a shortcut and historical analogy. This bias is aided by the availability and familiarity of the film Jaws (discussed in Chapter 3). In all, this narrative has come to dominate public lore and influence policy responses. Parts of the rogue shark theory were represented in seven of the 11 cases (63%) and include episodes in quick succession and separated by years.
In Dunedin, New Zealand, four shark bites over four years, between February 1964 and Christmas Day 1968, led to the installation of shark nets along three beaches. A government report states that the “series of fatal attacks” on the Otago Peninsula led to the installation (DOC, 2006: 7). New Zealand scientist Clinton Duffy stated in 2011 that he believed it was possible a rogue shark was involved in all of the incidents (Benson, 2011).
In Western Australia, the rogue shark theory was used to explain human-shark conflicts over six years between 1997 and 2003. Indeed, under this theory the period of quiet between incidents can be perceived as the continuation of threatening activity. The current premier of Western Australia, Colin Barnett, then a member of state Parliament, stated in the chamber (Hansard, 2003) that he believed a human-shark incident in 1997 (without injury), a fatal shark bite in 2000, and a human-shark incident involving a kayak in 2003 (without injury) were directly related and that the same shark was involved in all three events. He stated:
[t]hose three incidents in recent times have occurred in a fairly confined part of the Western Australian coast. They have all occurred under similar conditions: early in the morning, calm seas and a low grey cover of cloud. Those are what people now, in a somewhat nervous way call “bitey conditions” or “bitey weather”. There is no doubt in the view of most people who use the beach, in particular surf club members, that it is most likely the same shark returning to that place. I believe that shark will return again and that it poses a threat to people using the beach.
In this case, a correlation is presumed based on the representativeness of events and the multiple events’ outcomes are aggregated. In response, the Opposition demanded Government action on the basis of this historical analogy. This story repeats itself across the globe, and shark bite incidents that occur in close proximity and in quick succession are the most prone to clustering.
In 2010, a series of shark bites in Sharm El Sheik, Egypt, on the Red Sea, led to a shark hunt. Time magazine noted that “[o]ver six days, five swimmers were attacked by sharks” (Hauslohner, 2010). It was argued that one “rogue” white tip shark was responsible for more than one of the shark bites. In 2011, two fatal incidents also occurred in the Seychelles. The Seychelles Tourism Board Director, Alain St Ange, stated that it was caused by a "foreign shark" and he added, "[w]e need to find the beast and get it out of
our waters” (BBC, 2011). Indeed, context matters a great deal and the empirical analysis provided in Table 4.5 is broken down into two sub-categories to look at the contexts regarding the speed between incidents and the speed between incidents and policy responses.
4.6.1 Faster policy responses based on closer frequencies
The first argument suggested that the less time between incidents the faster policy responses would take place. The table below (Table 4.3) demonstrates that policy responses were relatively faster for more closely timed shark bite incidents. Six of the 11 cases (55%) included multiple events that occurred within seven days (one week) or less of each other. Of these, three of the six policy responses (50%) occurred within four days of the last incident. For example, in Russia, two serious shark bite incidents took place on two consecutive days, 30 miles from each other, on the coast of Sea of Japan, sparking a response from the government (Schwirtz, 2011). On 23 August, local governor Sergey Darkin stated, “[w]e are planning to take out a number of fishing boats to catch sharks in the near future” (RT.com, 2011).
Table 4.3 Evaluating the speed of policy responses between shark bite incidents
Interestingly, the role of severity is relevant but does not appear to be a critical factor. In two of the six incidents that occur within seven days of each other, there are no fatalities before the policy response. In addition, Western Australia had not responded with a shark hunt even though two previous incidents were fatal. Frequency rather than severity appears to be more closely related to policy responses. Yet, it is important to note that a
number of factors account for the speed of policy responses including political structures, previous experience, and policy entrepreneurship. These issues will be reviewed in Chapter 5. The objective data, however, provide an unfiltered look at the connection between multiple event frequency and policy responses.
Table 4.4 Evaluating the speed of policy responses from the last shark bite incident
7
2
4.6.2 Diversity of policy responses based on ‘positive’ public support
The third argument of this hypothesis suggests that governments would select simple policy responses for immediate relief because of the political pressures for speed, positive feedback, and dread-aggregation interruption. The data from Table 4.4 support this argument with “shark hunt” responses being used as the fastest policy response. Here we see a solution that is seen as available and positive based on a historical analogy to Jaws. Of the six policy responses that occur within 8 days or less of the last incident, shark hunts are utilized in all of them (100%). In addition, for policy responses that take longer than eight days, none of them included shark hunts. These slower options included shark nets, exclusion nets, and surfing bans.
4.6.3 Low policy thresholds for subsequent aggregate dreaded outcome stimuli
The final element of this hypothesis argues that the threshold for future responses would be lower for subsequent dreaded incidents or the stimuli indicative of those incidents if the initial experienced included multiple events. I conduct brief case analyses to illustrate these results, which follow up on locations that have previously experienced clusters and policy responses. For instance, in Western Australia in 2011, the government executed its
first shark hunt following the third fatal shark bite that year. This policy response stands out because the legal authorization for this shark hunt had taken place in 2000 and the approval had not been given previously, even following the previous two shark fatalities that year. Recently, the Western Australia Government announced a program to allow pre-emptive shark hunts following shark sightings in local waters. In addition, in Reunion Island, following three shark bite incidents in 2011, the region sanctioned a shark hunt, and again after one incident in 2012.
Immediate policy responses followed by a low threshold for the next policy response can also be seen in other issues. Repeated cases of “mad cow disease” (BSE) in Europe lowered thresholds for political action. Leiss and Powell (2005: 238) looked at responses to mad cow disease in Canada and found that “the incidence rate doesn’t matter” because any cases were representative of an unacceptable outcome. In addition, the threshold for concern was lowered following the cluster of cases. “A country is considered to be free from BSE if … for the preceding seven (7) years, the country of origin must have no reported clinical cases of BSE in indigenous bovines” (Leiss and Powell, 2005:238). A single case was enough under the precautionary principle to stop all imports under Canadian rules. McConnell (2003) also notes the excessive culls by the British during the foot and mouth spread.
In all, the dreaded feelings about both the intensified individual events and the cluster of aggregated outcomes impact policy responses. Shark attacks are prioritized by affective feelings. Frequent or infrequent incidents can trigger mental shortcuts, which convey the incidents as representative of each other, causally linked, and enabling clustering. The film Jaws is emblematic of a fictional historical analogy that reinforces dreaded emotions. When incidents occur, they are aggregated based on these biases and responded to with measures that seek dread mitigation in the short term and dread prevention over the long term. Yet it is the relative availability of salient stimuli in competitive contexts that alerts us to the threat and makes the role of media essential.
4.7 Competition between affective salience events
The fourth argument in this analysis suggested that salience was impacted by competition from other affective and salient events. Downs (1972: 42) argues that “there is a fierce struggle for space in the highly limited universe of newsprint and television viewing time.” The contest to make one issue more competitive than another encourages a.) the use (and reuse) of familiar and available frames that are the most widely recognized and b.) exposure to the largest possible populations. In this context, competition refers to the ease with which a bias can be utilized and the presence of other dominant issues that make these connections less available.
4.7.1
Threat-laden schemas
The way the public already gives greater attention to survival-related stimuli, for longer periods of time, encourages a threat-laden model for commercial advertisers interested in attracting and keeping viewership. Headlines promote the motto “if it bleeds it leads” (Kerbel, 2001). These narratives are particularly complicated because people communicate a problem that then is shared creating a contagion or social cascade (Sunstein, 2006). This can be seen across media platforms, particularly with social media. A sentiment analysis of Twitter posts by Bollen et al. (2011: 453) suggests “continued negative drivers seem to have an effect on public mood but this effect may be manifested by short bursts of negative sentiment.”
In addition, if a message is seen as relevant, the public may remain vigilant in looking out for it in the future, creating a self-reinforcing process. For instance, having viewed a political advertisement, people can look for them more and create a self-perpetuation from media information (Schemer, 2012: 15). Part of this is a function of familiarity (Loewenstein and Mather, 1990), and familiarity encourages patterns of response based on perceived experience with the stimuli.
Shark bites offer a competitive advantage because they are threat-laden and familiar. A report by Media Matters in July 2012 compared U. news outlet coverage of the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars by LIBOR with other stories and found that, “[t]he same outlets that found only 12 minutes of time to report on LIBOR from June 27 to July 12 during their evening programming devoted nearly 65 minutes to stories about sharks during that same time period” (Media Matters, 2012).
However, negative events do not always lead to policy responses if they occur during a competitive period. Events may not be subject to the availability heuristic (and historical analogies) even if their features can be correlated. Shark bite incidents within one week in California in June 1995, and in successive days in August 1995 in North Carolina, received little attention, in part because of other events. In California, the O.J. Simpson trial was dominating the news, and on the East coast of the United States Hurricane Felix coverage was taking place at the same time.
Given the value of existing frames, these schemas are defended. For example, Brooke Runnette, the former Executive Producer for the Discovery Channel’s Shark Week series noted in 2012 that “If sharks ever become boring, we’re not going to be on the air” (Eilperin, 2012). The pressure to maintain a certain social ontology for shark bites is a process that protects cues for dreaded outcomes that make shark “attacks” representative of each other and historical analogies. This process serves as a powerful tool in managing affective states of the public toward recognized hazards. Key to this process is exposing available frames to the widest possible audiences to attract attention.
4.7.2
Wider audiences
The availability of multiple affective characteristics increases the number of people who share any of those attributes to ensure the widest exposure, whether through social media or traditional coverage. Downs (1972) offers a threshold-style model of the “issue attention cycle” in which items are more likely to gain notice based on the “number of persons suffering,” the degree to which that suffering advantages the majority, and the
exciting nature of the issue or event (Downs, 1972: 41). This is consistent with Warr’s (1987) analysis of the “sensitivity to risks.” He states that sensitivity is based on several factors including a.) the nature of the threat, b.) severity, c.) likelihood, and d.) targets. Chadee et al (2007) adds to this by noting that “control” or lack of control from a perceived threat is an additional variable in the sensitivity of risk. This is consistent with Verbeke et al ’s (2007) analysis of “fright factors.” In addition, I suggest that the location and duration of the threat is also important because it exposes the issue to a larger audience. This can create an effect that makes it in the interest of politicians to end a problem episode quickly. For instance, the longer high gasoline prices increase without a solution, the larger the number of people impacted.
In all, the hazard profile of sharks attacks is firmly constructed given the value and emotions attributed to the identity of a.) the innocent victim, b.) the dangerous shark, and c.) the valued beach location. These details add to the cultural in-group, out-group associations and community sensibilities related to age (children), race, and sex of those involved. However, there remain concerns if a problem is not accurately representative. When the public does not know that it is dealing with false stereotypes it incorrectly informs the policy response and community education. Simply put, if all shark bites are “shark attacks,” then all of the incidents are “like” events that prejudice models of social reactions and policy responses.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the second element of the high affect-low threshold (HALT) framework by examining the role of salience in the development of policy responses. It has connected affect with salience to illustrate the way emotion and feelings influence agenda setting and prioritization. Salient characteristics are defined as those that are relevant in determining which issues or events an individual pays attention to and cares about relative to other accessible issues or events in a given situation.
Real or perceived threatening events are seen to be salient because their features provide survival value. Threatening issues or events are often aligned with contexts to make them the most relevant and important for consideration. Indeed, affective processes rank this data based on perceived benefits. Social cascades may follow as a way to promote threat awareness. The problem with salience prioritization in this case, however, is that threatening-event-attention (based on fearful outcomes) is a resource drain on individuals and communities, who already experience limited coping capacity. Therefore if multiple negative events occur, or are perceived to occur, they can overwhelm individuals and communities. As a result, separate events are joined together as an emotionally intense collective outcome.
Political responses attempt to reduce affect and salience in the short term through methods that quickly lower emotional intensity toward events or issues. A longer-term strategy is to use lower political thresholds as a policy tool for avoiding periods of overload in the future. By connecting affect, salience, and frequency in the context of dreaded outcome aggregation, I have attempted to begin addressing the quagmire raised by Moran, Rein, and Goodin (2006: 332) who argue that “[t]here appears to be no logical connection between objective indicators of the severity of the problem, such as frequency, their success rate, the number of escapees per anum, and the likelihood of major evaluation and learning efforts being undertaken at the political level.”
A larger question that remains is what function does salience provide? Is it a weakness, strength, or a means of learning and socializing? Is it reflective of protection, adaptation, or is it a vulnerability to be manipulated? McDermott et al. (2008) suggest that normative “rationality” missed key understandings of the contexts around risk-sensitive decisionmaking. In the case of risk-sensitive survival events, I concur and argue that emotions often optimize behaviour for survival. For instance, it would counter survival interests to buffer data from a series of threatening events. Rather, it is faster to combine data in an intense aggregated outcome to produce a response.
Finally, salience highlights the importance of speed in policy design. The speed of automatic emotional responses, images from TV, cognitive short cuts, emotional and physical responses as well as community feedback and policy reactions are all critical. We see affect impacting the speed of the problem and solution when salience is present.
The next chapter reviews the third and fourth elements of the HALT framework: policy entrepreneurship and causal stories. It looks at the role of actors in utilizing these stimuli and contexts to advocate for policy directions. In particular, it highlights the importance of alternative narratives and actors, including parents and victims, in dreaded aggregate outcome management.
Chapter 5. Policy entrepreneurship and causal stories
“Every once in a while, there's something that awakens the conscience of the country, and that tragic event did it in a way like nothing I've seen in my career. So we're here today to deal with a problem that requires immediate action, urgent action. And the president and I are determined to take action.” Vice President Joseph Biden, commenting following the Sandy Hook school shooting in 2013
5.1 Introduction
This chapter examines how policy entrepreneurship and causal stories influence policy responses. The impact of individual actors on the policy process has been a long-standing issue in political science. Analyses by Dahl (1961) looked at the role of different types of elites, Walker (1974, 1977) examined the actions of US senators, and Mintrom and Vergari (1996) reviewed the relationship between entrepreneurs and advocacy coalitions. At issue in this analysis is how the features of entrepreneurship impact the policy process and why this type of actor, rather than another, fits these moments. I address this relationship by reviewing five questions, including: who are policy entrepreneurs; what are the elements that constitute entrepreneurship; how do policy entrepreneurs use causal stories to impact the policy process; how do policy entrepreneurship and causal stories fit into the HALT model; and finally, how are these issues illustrated through an analysis of shark bite policy responses?
Kingdon’s (1984/1995) work on policy entrepreneurs serves as a starting point for this analysis. In his Multiple Streams Theory, he identifies policy entrepreneurs as “advocates who are willing to invest their resources time, energy, reputation, money to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain” (Kingdon, 1995: 179). He argues that the development of policy alternatives (i.e. the “policy stream”) is a central component of policymaking. More recent work by Zahariadis (2007) defines entrepreneurs as “power brokers who are manipulators of problematic preferences” (Zahariadis 2007:74). In each conception, the roles of causal stories are important in attaching a proposed solution to a problem condition.
Recent policy entrepreneurship literature has focused on the formal and informal positions of actors. The jobs and status of policy entrepreneurs offer different issue jurisdictions and levels of access. Sunstein (2006: 206) notes that “the voice of an influential politician comes with amplifiers.” In addition to Walker (1977), Carter and Scott (1994) have also analysed the role of members of Congress influencing foreign policy. Examples of unelected policy entrepreneurship have also been seen in a number of fields. This includes authors’ books such as The Jungle by Upton Sinclair (1906), Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), and Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed (1965), each of which directly led to policy changes. Moreover, Mackenzie (2004) has demonstrated the role of state-level bureaucrats as entrepreneurs in the Australian context by reviewing the role of the former Queensland Director of Cabinet Kevin Rudd.
Considering the role of policy entrepreneurs is important for several reasons. First, small groups of actors contest problems and solutions that influence all aspects of the policy process, including agenda setting, the development of policy alternatives, venue allocation, implementation, and policy evaluation. Rochefort and Cobb (1994) note that “for many types of social problems, one can identify a well-delineated, specialized community of operatives.” The significance of these actors’ contestations is shared by Schattschneider (1961), who affirms the critical role of these battles, noting:
Political conflict is not like an intercollegiate debate in which the opponents agree in advance on a definition of the issues. As a matter of fact, the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power, the antagonists can rarely agree on what the issues are because power is involved in the definition. He who determines what politics is about runs the country, because the definition of alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power (Schattschneider 1961, italics in original).
Secondly, this analysis is important because the definition of entrepreneurship is an unsettled and evolving issue in political science literature. Schneider and Teske (1992: 737) note that Riker’s (1986) analysis “transforms the notion of entrepreneurs from the study of heroic figures to the study of a larger class of individuals who help propel political and policy changes.” Lastly, refining ways to identify policy entrepreneurs helps inform the policy process. Locating entrepreneurs within the policymaking process is complex and difficult because many actors fail publicly in their policy entrepreneurship,
while others are successful and invisible. Analyzing the roles of entrepreneurship through HALT events is helpful because high affect moments invite entrepreneurial involvement in the policy process.
Entrepreneurship and causal stories are the final elements in the HALT framework because the averse problem conditions that characterize HALT events attract the kind of ready-made solutions that policy entrepreneurs facilitate. The use of causal stories provides a key tool in promoting one solution over others. These stories and solutions assist in providing affective relief and closing these unique policy windows. Thus, policy entrepreneurship relies on the attributes of the individual and the context of the policy window (Kingdon, 1995; Mackenzie, 2004).
In all, the actions of policy entrepreneurs seek to define new issues and re-define old issues to prejudice the policymaking process. This chapter moves forward with a review of the features of policy entrepreneurship, a proposal of core elements, and the identification of types of entrepreneurs. It concludes with a review of entrepreneurship involving shark bite policy responses.
5.2 Challenging the broad interpretations of policy entrepreneurship
The expanding literature on policy entrepreneurship has led to an increasing and evolving list of entrepreneurial characteristics. This includes features noted by Kingdon, 1984/1995), Roberts and King (1991), Mackenzie (2004), Schneider and Teske (1992), Walker (1977), and Mintrom and Norman (2009), which provide valuable information on entrepreneurial attributes; however, critical reviews are also needed. I challenge the broad interpretation of policy entrepreneurship by highlighting five key elements that have been discussed as necessary, and suggest they are better understood as characteristics of likely success. These include:
• Innovation;
• Expertise;
• Coalition building;
• Patience and resilience; and
• A strong defense of the idea after adoption.
5.2.1 Considerations of policy entrepreneurship requirements
Interrogating entrepreneurship has occurred from its start and there is evidence to support the evolving nature of the concept within political science literature. For instance, Mintrom and Vergari (1996: 424) note that policy entrepreneurship “will be refined in the years ahead.” This can also be seen in Roberts and King’s (1991: 149) proposal of four entrepreneurial activity structures that include “creative, intellectual activities” such as idea generation and dissemination, “strategic” actions, including developing a plan of action and heuristics, “mobilization and execution” such as gaining media attention and forming coalitions,, and lastly, “administrative and evaluative” functions to enact and review the program. In addition, Mintrom and Vergari (1996) suggest three requirements of policy entrepreneurship, stating:
First, they discover unfulfilled needs and suggest innovative means to satisfy them. Thus, they must be alert to opportunities (Kirzner, 1973). Second, entrepreneurs bear the reputational and, frequently, some of the financial and emotional risks involved in pursuing actions that have uncertain consequences. Third, they serve to resolve collective action problems by assembling and coordinating networks of individuals and organizations that have the talents and resources necessary to undertake change.
While these are valuable empirical contributions, it is critical to distinguish between attributes that make actors entrepreneurs and those that make the success of entrepreneurs more likely. This is a difficult task because multiple actors can have an impact within a policy domain, in different ways and at different times. As a result, reviewing cases where these elements are successful or unsuccessful provides useful data.
5.2.2 Distinguishing entrepreneurial attributes of success from core requirements
First, and perhaps most controversially, the promotion of innovative ideas is not a requirement of entrepreneurship. While innovation within social science has been a popular social science topic (Downs and Mohr, 1976) there are ample examples of entrepreneurship based on old ideas. For example, former British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher is seen as a policy entrepreneur (Barzelay, 2001: 2) regarding her role in pushing to shrink the size of the British civil service. However, the idea of civil service reform was not new or novel (Wildavsky, 1966). Still, definitions of innovative entrepreneurship remain, including the case for public entrepreneurship by Mack, Green and Vedlitz (2008: 235, emphasis added), who identify entrepreneurs as, “any elected official, bureaucratic employee, nonprofit manager, or private citizen who is perceived by his/her colleagues and friends to be instrumental in fostering innovative change to modify the way that public entities operate.” Indeed, while entrepreneurs may well have innovative ideas, the issue at hand is whether entrepreneurship requires it. I argue that this is not a necessary feature. Entrepreneurs often attach old solutions to new problems, and the reliance of traditional policies over innovation is common.
Secondly, expertise is not a requirement of entrepreneurship. There are countless examples of ill-informed entrepreneurs who successfully attach solutions to problems on the basis of access or power despite their ignorance. Weissert (1991) and Mackenzie (2004) note that expertise is useful because it helps entrepreneurs to mould an issue’s image and its future. An expert entrepreneur may be able to talk about an issue in more positive and convincing ways; however, this should be considered an attribute of success rather than a necessity. For instance, “think tanks” provide a valuable role as entrepreneurs (Roberts and King, 1991); however, they may not provide expertise but rather a mobilization strategy. In 2005, the Kansas State Board of Education debated a proposal to ban the teaching of evolution in public schools. Leading the effort and testifying before the Board was the Discovery Institute staff, who advocate neoDarwinian teachings, referred to as Intelligent Design. They argued that their position was that all of science should be taught, including Darwinian evolution, and any evidence to the contrary (Slevin, 2005). This was an example of entrepreneurship where tactics were present in influencing the agenda, and policy outcome, rather than issue expertise.
Thirdly, the focus on the need for coalition building (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996: 423) ignores the role of closed policy entrepreneurship that seeks to be invisible in order to achieve the desired outcomes. Indeed, having a coalition may hurt an entrepreneur’s
efforts behind the scenes because it can draw attention to the issue in ways that generate hurdles rather than promote enactment. For example, former US Congressman Bob Dornan’s (R-CA) covert inclusion of a legislative “rider” to ban HIV-positive service members from remaining in the military in 1996 was done on the basis of his individual committee membership (Neff and Edgell, 2013). Once this became public, Republican leaders approved a reversal that repealed the law. Dornan responded, stating, "[t]his disgusting act of cowardice with my purported leaders caving in to a pro-homosexual, draft-dodging pathological liar in the White House is pathetic” (Martinez, 1996). Thus, it was the lack of a coalition that made the initial effort successful. In addition, closed entrepreneurship also involves keeping issues off the policy agenda. Indeed, following the death of former senator John Chaffee (R-RI), Carl Pope, executive director of the environmental group the Sierra Club, stated ''[n]o one will ever know how many bad things did not happen in the last three years because John Chafee was there'' (Clymer, 1999).
Fourthly, resilience is seen as a crucial element of entrepreneurship (Weissert, 1991; Kingdon, 1995). Kingdon (1995) writes that “probably the most important, successful entrepreneurs are persistent” (Kingdon, 1995: 181). However, there are times when political windows open and entrepreneurship may occur without long-term struggles or the need for patience. United States President Barack Obama was elected in 2008 with majorities of his political party in both the House of Representatives and the US Senate. If he is considered an entrepreneur on any issue during his first two years (including universal health care, the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” or the START treaty) these were not the result of great resilience but rather particularly favourable policy environments. This is consistent with Weissert’s (1991) analysis of state legislators. She notes that those actors without “expertise and persistence,” who act during open policy windows, are not entrepreneurs and are better described as “policy opportunists” (Weissert, 1991: 264).
Lastly, one mark of entrepreneurship is the way actors “defend their views” (Snare, 1995: 415). This highlights an important role of entrepreneurship in protecting solutions and
ideas from attack long after they have been implemented. However, a strong defense may not be enough or even be required to ensure that action takes place. For instance,
President Kennedy’s entrepreneurship in 1961 to advance space travel and land a man on the moon in 1969 (Shulman, 1975) is noted despite his assassination in 1963. In addition, American Vice President Richard Cheney was a chief proponent of the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” by intelligence officials to gather information about potential threats (Gellman and Becker, 2007). However, despite his staunch defense (CBS/AP, 2009), one of President Obama’s first acts in 2009 was to issue an executive order banning the use of torture in future interrogations (Paust, 2010).
In all, entrepreneurship is an evolving concept (Botterill, 2013). Earlier definitions provide useful measures for considering the roles of actors and indicators of success. Indeed, the role of policy defense provides a useful tool of entrepreneurial identification because often the easiest way to recognize these actors within the policy process is to look for those defending the idea after its passage. However, it remains important to isolate core characteristics moving forward and ensure that the actions of individuals can be demonstrated (Botterill, 2013).
5.3 Proposing four core attributes of policy entrepreneurship
I argue for a narrow definition of entrepreneurship based on what actors contribute and receive from the policymaking process. Central to this is considering entrepreneurship in terms of the way ideas or solutions (including old ones) are brought to life by actors.
Building on existing literature, four essential traits for policy entrepreneurship are proposed:
• Serving as a relevant actor (Kingdon, 1995);
• Attaching their solution to a problem (Mintrom, 2000);
• Biasing political outcomes (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003; Botterill, 2013); and
• Gaining something from their engagement (Schneider and Teske, 1992).
Policy entrepreneurship requires influencing political outcomes. This point is consistent with Botterill (2013). Indeed, while all entrepreneurs are advocates, not all advocates are
policy entrepreneurs. For instance, it has been argued that putting an issue on the agenda is an example of entrepreneurship (Cobb and Elder, 1983) because the way an issue is framed on the agenda influences policy outcomes (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996). While this is true, this point concedes a central criterion, that the way an issue is framed is connected to its impact on policy outcomes. Advocacy that floats powerful ideas to gain great media attention is not entrepreneurship if it is not connected to a result. Agenda setters (such as Al Gore) and opinion leaders (such as American radio host Rush Limbaugh) may be policy entrepreneurs, but only after the ideas they promote (climate change and smaller government respectively) produce policies. It is simply not enough to have a great idea that sees no corresponding impact.
The four attributes in this definition assume varying degrees of entrepreneurship and success. Indeed, the failure to have any one of these would result in advocacy rather than entrepreneurship, which requires an analysis that scales the characteristics that have been noted (see Table 5.1). In all, these categorizations aid in identifying actors and their roles in the policymaking process.
5.3.1 Entrepreneurship requires being seen as a relevant actor by other decision makers
Locating oneself within an issue domain is critical to entrepreneurship because there needs to be a reason why people should listen to the entrepreneur (Kingdon, 1995). This includes making a claim of legitimacy on an issue by virtue of credibility, authenticity, or responsibility. Scientists have issued calls to action regarding environmental damage from climate change due to their responsibility “on our watch” (Guptara, 1999: 197). Another example may include responsibility based on jurisdictional position.
As Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Joe Biden convened a debate on the Violence Against Women Act in 1993. During the hearing he located his role in the debate, stating (Stolz, 1999):
Two years ago, I began a series of hearings held during 1990 and 1991 on the topics of rape, domestic violence, and existing legal protections. In tandem with those hearings, I introduced the Violence against Women Act the first comprehensive legislation attacking the problem. Through this process, I have come to believe more firmly than ever before that this Nation will be powerless
to change the course of violence against women, unless and until its citizens fully realize the devastation this violence yields (SJCRpt., 1992, p. III).
Senator Biden used his position to construct a “policy image” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) that included illustrating his position as an experienced expert on the issue. His leadership in this policy domain was seen to be contributing to a positive outcome. This highlights how relevant policy entrepreneurs must also be able to articulate the idea publicly, or privately, in a way that makes sense to others. They use the policy process to paint a picture of their desired outcome.
5.3.2 Entrepreneurship can be seen in the way solutions are attached to problems
The use of causal stories as a political instrument to attach solutions to problems distinguishes entrepreneurship from other more benign behaviour. Or put another way, when a causal story is used by an actor to prejudice the political process, entrepreneurship is taking place. As a result, I argue that the innovation of policy entrepreneurship is not in the discovery of a new idea but can but in the way solutions are connected to problems to achieve political outcomes (Mintrom, 2000). This includes two features: first, entrepreneurship relies on attaching ready-made or “pet solutions” (Kingdon, 1995) to external problems (Rinkus-Thompson, 1994: 406). Secondly, the causal story is often used to protect an entrepreneur’s role and status
The decision of which problems to attach solutions to is often calculated, however, because events can be both expected and unexpected, and this is not always the complete choice of the entrepreneur. Considering the role of problem conditions is important because Kingdon (1995: 182) notes that “a problem captures the attention of important people, and participants hook their proposals onto it, arguing that they represent solutions.” Entrepreneurs can attempt to attach solutions by generating problems that need solving (Lupia and Menning, 2009), taking advantage of focusing events (Birkland, 1997), utilizing routine policy windows (Walker, 1977), or exploiting policy failures (Brandstrom and Kuipers, 2003). As a result, Mackenzie (2004: 372) suggests that an actor’s “alertness” to potential moments of opportunity is a key attribute to the success of
entrepreneurs. This skill allows political actors to not only recognize approaching policy windows but to maximize them while open.
One example of innovative solution attaching involved former New York City Mayor Ed Koch. The Mayor’s “war on graffiti” (Dickinson, 2008) during the early 1980s was not new or innovative; however, the way he used the situation illustrates entrepreneurship. In this case, concern about graffiti and the broader negative implications of the art led the Mayor to recommend using German Shepherds to scare away artists as well as to paint subway cars white to provoke responses and escalate the issue (Ferrell, 1993). This campaign resulted in greater support among white, affluent voters and a reduction in graffiti art. Thus, “problems” may be manufactured to serve as the impetus for entrepreneurship capitalization. The problem is not simply hunted for; it is constructed to serve as a vehicle for the solution.
5.3.3 Entrepreneurship is reflected in the management of political outcomes
Entrepreneurship requires that the actors have the capacity to access decision makers for their issue, either because they are the decision makers, have the confidence of the decision makers, or have access to allies and networks that influence the decision makers (Zahariadis, 2007). The entrepreneurs function as the decision brokers throughout the process, even though they may have an outside or closed position. This requires: 1.) an understanding of the needs of players within the system; 2.) the skill to leverage one’s strengths on the process and 3.) influence within the institutional structures and venues deciding the issue. In short, policy entrepreneurship cannot exist without access to, and an understanding of, political processes, because policy entrepreneurs are agents who shepherd change.
Access is often a function of skill. The ability to broker decisions requires an understanding of the policy process, including actors and systems. This includes identifying and negotiating around competing problems and solutions (Mackenzie, 2004; Kingdon, 1995:181). Mintrom and Norman (2009) refer to this as “social acuity.” Indeed,
entrepreneurs can recognize the concerns of varying viewpoints (Mintrom and Norman, 2009) and manage the fears and needs of other players (Bardach, 1972) because policy actors cannot broker outcomes if they do not understand what the other sides want, fears, and why. Being able to broker the solution is essential because, as Snare (1995: 416) notes, “if compromise breaks down no decision is likely.”
Moreover, understanding the positions and feelings of other actors allows the entrepreneurs to be better at selling their solution as the best option. For instance, Houston and Richardson (2000) compare the competition between actors on the issue of air bag safety. They highlight the role of Dr. Richard Martinez of the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration as a successful entrepreneur. Key to being seen as effective was his expertise and ability to deflect the concerns from Congressional members in order to advance more regulations (Houston and Richardson, 2000).
One additional way that policy entrepreneurs manage their issue through the process supporters is by tailoring their problem and solution to more favourable venues (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). If a problem is aligned within an entrepreneur’s policy jurisdiction, this allows the actors to locate themselves more easily in the solution-making process. For example, US Senator John McCain is a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Recently, he identified a problem with the oversight of unmanned drone aircraft being operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. He stated, "[w]hat we really need to do is take this whole program out of the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency and put it into the Department of Defense” (Bresnahan, 2013). This would move the issue to a jurisdiction under his purview.
5.3.4
Entrepreneurs benefit from their engagement
The way actors benefit from their actions is a defining feature of entrepreneurship. Schneider and Teske (1992) highlight the benefits or profits gained as a key motivating factor in entrepreneurial action. Similarly, Jones (1994: 182) notes that entrepreneurs “seem to derive particular benefits out of the leadership activities.” The type of benefit
sought is related to a range of motivations and may be related to the issue or their position. Kingdon (1995) states that entrepreneurs are “motivated by combinations of several things: their straightforward concern about certain problems, their pursuit of such self-serving benefits as protecting or expanding their bureaucrat’s budget or claiming credit for accomplishment, their promotion of their policy values, and their simple pleasure in participating.” Indeed, while some entrepreneurs may seek “the collective good” (Jones, 1994: 197), others desire simple recognition. If a politician is the leading entrepreneur, then re-election interests are likely a leading outcome goal. However, if a scientific conservationist serves as the entrepreneur, then both the perceived public needs and their own conservation-minded approaches are more likely. In both, however, the benefit is theirs. Thus, while positions do not determine entrepreneurship, they do inform considerations about potential rewards.
An example of an entrepreneurial benefit can be seen in the rise of James Danforth “Dan” Quayle from the Senate to the vice presidency. His entrepreneurship on defense issues through the Senate Armed Services Committee included his push for military adoption of the Tomahawk cruise missile and the Patriot intercept missile systems, which were important attributes in his selection (Kengor, 2000:177-178).
In addition, Mintrom and Vergari (1996) highlight the way this motivation impacts the scope of the policy change sought. They highlight a key distinction between policy advocates and policy entrepreneurs, such as the difference between environmental lobbyists who may be happy with any change to air pollution laws, while policy entrepreneurs would seek more enduring goals, such as eliminating air pollution from coal plants in the state of Massachusetts. In short, entrepreneurs work to create “dynamic policy change” (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996: 423).
In summary, entrepreneurs play an important role in the policy process. One way this is demonstrated is by noting the features of success and failure in meeting their goals. Not all entrepreneurs are created equal, and this reinforces the value in understanding the contextual factors that advance their interests. This chapter now proposes a typology for
considering varying forms of policy entrepreneurship.
5.4 Identifying five categories of policy entrepreneurs
Policy entrepreneurs come in different forms because they rely on both “personal attributes and situational attributes” (Mack, Green, and Vedlitz 2008: 233). A gap remains, however, in explaining the different classifications of entrepreneurs to account for both endogenous and exogenous factors. Public policy literature notes the role of each, with internal factors shaping leadership styles and external factors escalating bursts in policy equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Birkland, 2011). Yet, it is unclear how these elements function together to influence policy responses.
Roberts and King (1991:151) address this problem in the literature by noting that research describes “public entrepreneurs” without qualification as “as policy entrepreneurs, political entrepreneurs, program entrepreneurs, bureaucratic entrepreneurs, administrative and executive entrepreneurs and issue entrepreneurs.” However, Kingdon (1995) notes that position is not the defining feature of entrepreneurship. In fact, he notes that the location of actors is “nearly irrelevant” (Kingdon, 1995: 180). It is the motivation of actors and the political instruments they use that are seen as the leading features. I build on this, suggesting that motivations, tools, and relative policy contexts provide a more complete picture.
I propose five fluid categories of entrepreneurship based on the relationship between the causal stories used and the nature of policy windows at work. These include:
• Technical policy entrepreneurship;
• Pragmatic policy entrepreneurship;
• Crusading policy entrepreneurship;
• Accidental policy entrepreneurship; and
• Opportunistic policy entrepreneurship.
The categorizations of technical, pragmatic, and crusading entrepreneurs build on the work of Snare (1995). Snare (1995) reviewed the way policy “analysts” may play one or
multiple roles. These actors have access to, and may be, decision makers who fall into two categories: pragmatists or crusaders (Snare, 1995: 408). Given that I argue that policy entrepreneurs are decision makers, these labels are adopted and explained below. Indeed, the characteristics of entrepreneurs can be seen in Snare’s (1995) explanation of policy analysts.
Snare (1995) argues that policy analysts are policy experts, policy advocates, and policy trouble-shooters (1995: 408). The analyst as a policy expert is someone who addresses the essence of the problem and may also be the technician (Meltsner, 1976) or “consulting critic.” The policy advocate proposes an idea, tries to push it on the agenda, and also attempts to implement it through their actions or the mobilization of allies (Snare, 1995). Lastly, the policy trouble-shooter attempts to facilitate the process and aid the decision maker. This analysis supports a flexible typology that links categories based on the way entrepreneurs shift roles and use different causal instruments during expected or unexpected policy windows (Figure 5.1).
5.4.1 Considering types of entrepreneurs, relative to the policy windows
Policy windows are political moments when policymaking processes are open to an issue or issues. They are by definition fleeting (Michaels, Goucher, and McCarthy, 2006: 984) and Kingdon (1995: 204) notes that policy windows are “small and scarce.” They may be
Figure 5.1. The presence of entrepreneurs during different policy windows
caused by different events and there are several kinds of windows. Kingdon (1995: 203) suggests that these have sources based on problems and politics. Under Kingdon’s theory, windows of opportunity based on the problem stream may include the emergence of new problems, sudden problems, crises, a redefined old problem, or a current policy failure (Kingdon, 1995). Within the political stream, changes in electoral majorities, the national mood, or “vigorous lobbying” (Kingdon, 1995: 203) can also bring issues and solutions to the surface. Political stream problems are more routine and can include annual legislative funding requirements or elections.
Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 137) as well as Wu, Ramesh, Howlett, and Fritzen (2010:18) identify four different policy windows from Kingdon’s (1995) research, including: routinized windows, discretionary windows, spillover problem windows, and random windows. Routinized windows are governed by procedures and processes such as budget timelines and sunset provisions. Discretionary windows are described as the openings created by decision-makers and may include the introduction of legislation or announcement of a new program (Wu et al., 2010). The latter two windows are created by exogenous factors. During random event windows, unforeseen focusing events prompt the opening in policymaking, while spillover windows are noted when a policy window is already open on another issue and the occurrence of another event is brought in for consideration (Wu et al., 2010: 18). I analyze these windows on the basis of their expected and unexpected nature and the way this timing presents different opportunities to entrepreneurs to advance their solution (Table 5.1).
5.4.2 Describing entrepreneurship during expected policy windows
The three entrepreneurial types are characterised during expected policy windows. These include: technical, pragmatic, and crusading policy entrepreneurs. Each is a player in the process working on the issue and engaged in both objective and political processes. Technical entrepreneurs use their technical causal story analysis to impact the policy response process. For instance, a scientist or technocrat becomes a technological policy entrepreneur when they utilize a causal story for the purposes of advantaging one outcome
over another. This can include arguments by climate change scientists in favour of emissions reductions and police officers regarding gun violence.
Pragmatic policy entrepreneurs are often bureaucrats or elected officials who are working on the issue and solution between the events and are engaged in the political process. They use an economic or process-based causal story to impact the policy response process. However, they can also use technical causal stories to add to their process-based narrative. The work of the bipartisan commission on deficit reduction led by former Senators Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles as well as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (i.e. the 9/11 Commission) are examples. Each examined systemic failures within economic and national security processes and offered recommendations back to procedural bodies.
Crusading policy entrepreneurs are moral entrepreneurs and issue advocates who are working on the issue and solution between the events. They use a values-based causal story to impact the policy response process. For instance, former Prime Minister John Howard took a stand against asylum seekers in 2001 following attempts by a Norwegian vessel, the Tampa, to enter Australian waters. When the ship issued a distress call, some on board entered the water. In response, the Australian naval forces were dispatched and the boat was refused entry into national waters. Prime Minister Howard used a nationalistic narrative to promote his position stating, “I don't want in Australia people who would throw their own children into the sea. I don't. I don't think any Australian does” (ABC, 2002). In short, all three are awaiting an unknown, but crusading entrepreneurs are also trying to generate a problem or opening that triggers a new policy window.
5.4.3 Describing entrepreneurship during unexpected policy windows
Entrepreneurship following unexpected events provides an important role because these situations can add two new types of entrepreneurship: accidental and opportunistic. In these cases, identifying the entrepreneur and their likely causal story is important because it is the leading instrument of their initial political participation.
The accidental and opportunistic entrepreneurs have windows of opportunity placed upon them inadvertently. Accidental entrepreneurs are not looking to be entrepreneurs from the outset but may become one within the process, while opportunistic entrepreneurs are affirmative actors looking for the chance to advance a solution. In these situations, circumstances have afforded them that opportunity.
In the case of accidental entrepreneurs their personal causal story impacts the policy response process. The lobbying by Ryan White for HIV/AIDS funding following his contraction of HIV/AIDS from a contaminated blood transfusion gave him a powerful voice on the issue (Franklin, 1988). This can also be seen in the efforts at gun control by former White House Press Secretary James Brady following his wounding in the 1981 assassination attempt on President Reagan (Moore, 1994)
Finally, opportunistic entrepreneurs use their authority and jurisdictional causal story to impact the policy response process following unexpected events. These are actors who wield power over an issue during an opportune moment. An example of an opportunistic entrepreneur is President Johnson’s actions on the Voting Rights Act of 1965, following the attack on marchers in Selma, Alabama. There was national outrage at the beatings and death of African American civil rights marchers between the 7th and 9th of March 1965.
As a result, President Johnson went on national television on March 13 to promote the rights of the protesters (Lee, 2002). On March 15 he presented the Act to a joint session of Congress, and the Voting Rights Act was passed by Congress on May 26.
5.4.4 Transitions between entrepreneurial categories
Entrepreneurial types can switch or combine roles (see Chart 5.1). Understanding these types of policy entrepreneurs and causal stories is important because these features highlight why policy outcomes are achieved or fail. For instance, a pragmatist with a technical causal story may be better positioned for expected events, rather than following unexpected focusing events, because they can put a response plan in place within the
system. In unexpected situations, crusading entrepreneurs may be advantaged because they will have a ready-made solution in mind and the high affect nature of the incidents demands a quick response.
Chart 5.1 Likely transitions of policy entrepreneurship based on policy window context
Expected Policy Windows Unexpected Policy Windows
Pragmatic Opportunistic
Crusader
Technological
Accidental
The two most noticeable shifts are the transition from an accidental entrepreneur to a crusading entrepreneur and a pragmatic elected entrepreneur who becomes an expert on an issue and through resilience (and longevity) has an opportunity to advance his or her solution. The chart (Chart 5.1) above notes the flow between the categories. For instance, pragmatic entrepreneurs are most likely to also have the chance to be opportunistic (and use jurisdictional causal stories) given their seniority, or technological, based on their time investment. Crusaders may attempt to be opportunistic, but gaining access to the proper jurisdictions is difficult and time-consuming. In addition, technological entrepreneurs are more likely to be brought in as jurisdictional deciders to “de-politicize” an issue. Alternatively, opportunistic and accidental entrepreneurs are less likely to also be technical entrepreneurs given the temporary and unexpected policy window. In addition, opportunistic entrepreneurs may utilize process-based causal stories, while accidental entrepreneurs are most likely to adopt crusading entrepreneurship given that it is their personal authenticity, rather than technical knowledge, that provides them with authority.
Given the advantages of being in an opportunistic position, pragmatists try to become technical experts through hearings and committee assignments. Indeed, patience may
reward access and speed of delivery in the long term because it can lead to greater resources. Mintrom and Vergari (1996: 424) note that “policy entrepreneurs will position themselves wherever they consider their activities will produce the highest expected returns.” Pragmatic entrepreneurs are more likely to be in the right position to be opportunistic entrepreneurs if they dedicate themselves to skills-building and longevity. This is consistent with the entrepreneurial aspect of resilience.
An example of entrepreneurial transitions can be seen following the tragic death of Polly Klass in California in 1993. In short, following the abduction, sexual assault, and murder of 12-year-old Polly Klass by a two-time convict, her father advocated for a new law to detect previous offenders and impose a mandatory “three strikes” penalty also known as “Polly’s law” (Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin, 2003). This proposal was embraced by Republican Governor Pete Wilson and enacted by the Democratic state legislature. In this case, her father moved from being an accidental entrepreneur to a crusading entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurs may also use a combination of expected and unexpected events to their advantage. For elected officials, they may rely on expected policy windows to become experts on budgeting matters, foreign policy, or defense. With these backgrounds, unexpected events can then provide opportunities. For instance, then Congressman Bill Richardson (D-NM) used his experience in foreign affairs to become an American envoy to a number of hostage negotiations, including Iraq, Bangladesh, and North Korea. He benefited from this experience when he was named US Ambassador to the United Nations.
In sum, the characteristics of the entrepreneur and the context of the situation combine to provide moments of political opportunity. In addition, the importance of causal stories has been noted. The next question is how causal stories are constructed to serve as a political tool to advantage entrepreneurs. This is important because the entrepreneur who has access to the most resources, tools, and symbols may be best positioned to advocate for his or her causal story and deliver a rapid policy response.
5.5 How policy entrepreneurs use causal stories to influence the policy process
Causal stories serve to attract concern, promote action, and encompass the widest coalition of allies by illustrating the way problems violate deeply held beliefs or symbols tap into affective feelings. Stone (2002: 209) argues that causal stories prejudice the political process in four ways They “challenge or protect an existing set of rules, institutions and interests,” allocate blame, legitimize actors, and build coalitions. I review these elements to highlight the way they act as policy instruments.
The use of causal stories is a tool of battle to try to control policy outcomes. The way the conditions of problem and solution are identified is important because, as Iyengar (1991: 11) notes, “people are exquisitely sensitive to contextual cues when they make decisions, formulate judgments, or express opinions. The manner in which a problem of choice is ‘framed’ is a contextual cue that may profoundly influence decision outcomes.” Perceptions about the conditions that are framed and the signals provided are more important than the actual risk conditions present (Brandstrom and Kuipers, 2003).
5.5.1 Causal stories challenge or protect power structures
Policy entrepreneurs use causal stories as a political instrument to advantage one outcome and to burden another. The larger the scope of a problem the more it challenges existing power structures. Boin, McConnell, and t’Hart (2008: 119) note that differences in “who precisely should be punished” can change the nature of the problem and solution. If the problem is blamed on a “network failure” then the cause can be spread around (Boin, McConnell, and t’Hart, 2008). However, “pinning down the root of failure to individuals or parts of organizations will facilitate scapegoat solutions” (Boin, McConnell, and t’Hart, 2008). Here we see the battle of causal stories in attaching the problem and solutions to the mental level. For instance, if a narrative indicts the system, then the politically powerful offer a counter-narrative that includes a scapegoat to protect their interests and position. While this may be noticed most during events like Watergate, examples of scapegoating can also be seen in the treatment of “welfare moms” (McGowan, 2000),
particularly when there are concerns about state-wide overspending in other areas.
Causal stories are valuable tools for policy entrepreneurs because they allow actors to attribute blame by focusing on already marginalized groups and historical analogies.
Schneider and Ingram (1993: 338) note that “some elements of design will differ depending on the social construction and political power of the target population.” Attributing blame toward marginalized populations is also an easy and quick response.
The scapegoating of an issue by projecting it onto someone else illustrates the way causal stories function as political instruments. Boin, McConnell, and t’Hart (2008) note that scapegoating offers a “blame absorption device” that can be an important tool for institutions (Boin, McConnell, and t’ Hart, 2008: 119). This analysis is shared by Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003: 299) who add that “having a scapegoat at hand for ritual sacrifice in the face of public criticism provides senior office-holders with one more option for surviving scandal and demonstrating resolute ‘crisis management.’” This is consistent with the affective relief hypothesis proposed under the HALT model.
5.5.2 Causal stories allocate blame
The way causal stories allocate blame is a powerful tool in the policy process. Blaming as an entrepreneurial process is designed to project intent on others and deflect blame off themselves by exposing biases to initial feelings. Indeed, Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003: 280) note that “actions and events in public policy become politicized when influential actors in the political arena succeed in framing them as blameworthy violations of crucial public values.”
Stone (1989: 285) argues that blame can be attributed in four competing frames: “mechanical, intentional, accidental and inadvertent.” The most powerful of these are the intentional and accidental (Stone, 1989: 284) because one is essentially blame-assuming while the other is blameless. In addition, Stone (1989) states that establishing initial intent is a key early consideration in causal stories, because whether issues can fit into the
natural world or the social world determines the degree to which they are governable. Actors are encouraged to find intent because this provides an avenue for action.
A key way to connect intent to an issue is based on the speed of the information. Initial perceptions are powerful in directing behaviour. Lupia and Menning (2009) note Witte (1992) who states “in an initial encounter with a threatening stimulus, we have minimal control over the onset of fear, particularly when our ability to counter the threat is low” (Lupia and Menning, 2009: 92). Kam and Simas (2010: 393) add that frames matter the most based “primarily on the first presentation.” As a result this can make historical analogies that tap into initial feelings toward an issue or group particularly powerful. This suspicion of intent may have survival value.
Decety and Cacioppo (2012) studied the speed of moral computations by looking at a subject’s reactions to pictures of “accidental harm” and “intentional harm” (Decety and Cacioppo, 2012: 3071). They found that emotional processing was faster when the harm was seen as intentional. They note that “the early engagement of the right amygdale/temporal pole and vmPFC evoked by the perception of intentional harmful actions suggests affective processes precede cognitive evaluative processes” (Decety and Cacioppo, 2012: 3071).
Central to each of these intent-based narratives is the agency of the enemy, which is a key element of threat amplification. An example of intent-based causal stories was identified by Cottam’s (1994) analysis of the “enemy image,” and Cottam and Cottam (2001) look at “image theory.” These constructions include the “diabolical enemy” who should be eliminated or contained and the “rogue” that should be taught a lesson. Here we see the way emotional depictions direct policy response typologies, and many of these are rooted in initial feelings. Intent is crucial to constructing affectively memorable problems.
Even when events are deemed natural occurrences, there may still be an effort to attribute blame for the event’s having not been prevented because it is politically powerful. For instance, Lodge and Hood (2002) reviewed waves of policies relating to dog bites on
humans in the UK and Germany. They note that news reports identified “devil dogs” within the context of “unprovoked” incidents (Lodge and Hood, 2002: 5). Thus, the incident was not framed as an act of nature or an accident, but rather a devil dog harming an innocent person in an unprovoked exchange.
5.5.3 Causal stories justify actors
Causal stories are a political tool that can justify the involvement of certain actors while excluding others. President George W. Bush adopted the concept of the “war on terror” following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks as a national strategy (Bush, 2001). The image was one of national defense, national offense, and national unity. This concept justified the actions of the United States and foreign governments by expanding the scope of the idea across the world. President Bush stated, “[e]very nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime” (Bush, 2001).
5.5.4 Causal stories attract coalitions by amplifying threats to select targets
Policy entrepreneurs attach their solutions to problems by constructing causal stories with negative consequences that attract supportive constituencies (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994). Often, this includes focusing on the severity, locality, vividity, and relevance of a problem to amplify loss aversion and stimulate behaviour supportive of the entrepreneur. Jerit (2009) looked at how actors used the discourse around policy consequences to change public opinion. Jerit (2009: 411) notes that “when political actors deliberate about the merits of a public policy, they often focus on its consequences, with supporters and opponents making contradictory predictions about the future.”
Lupia and Menning (2009: 91) suggest that there may be circumstances when politicians can “scare people into supporting politics that they would otherwise reject.” This latent power (Lukes, 1974) places the central element of politics in the hands of the leader or
policy entrepreneur because “the politician’s strategic decision is whether or not to say, “[t]he threat is present” (Lupia and Menning, 2009:91). An example of this can be seen in former American National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice’s use of the “mushroom cloud” analogy in the lead-up to the Iraq War in 2003.
Policy entrepreneurs articulate the harm of a potential situation on key groups to motivate citizen behaviour. For instance, the problem of hunger for the poor may motivate fewer voters than the problem of escalating gas prices, because more voters use cars than are exposed to those living in lower socio-economic conditions. This is important because as Schattschneider (1961) notes, issue expansion is critical to mobilize key target populations (Jones, 1994: 182). Causal stories attract allies to advocate for their solution by including themes that involve large swaths of the population, such as nationalism, fright factors, and symbols (Schneider and Ingram, 1993).
In addition, there is also public sensitivity to the proximity of a threat (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994). Michaels, Goucher, and McCarthy (2006: 985) note “that an event affects many people, whether in a geographic location or a community of interest, might spur policy entrepreneurs and interest groups to act.” Here, the issue is the size of the population impacted by a nearby danger. In addition, a specific location may be more sensitive to public feelings based on nationalistic sentiment. Cottam and Cottam (2001: 95) note that “the intensity of emotional responses to threats or opportunities for the national will be strong and volatile.” These factors can create perceptions of local pride and ownership toward landmarks that further amplify feelings when threats occur.
McDermott (2008: 29) notes that “loss aversion is exemplified by the endowment effect, whereby people value what they possess to a greater degree than they value an equally attractive alternative.” These factors begin to explain why communities are resistant to simply moving to a different beach when a shark bite occurs and why national landmarks are set apart as a different emotional quotient for consideration than a negative event at a remote or little-known location.
Lastly, key to expanding a coalition is choosing recognizable symbols that are available and fit within affective salience and “imagery heuristics” (Khaneman and Tversky, 1982) in order to “manipulate preferences” (Lau et al., 1991: 646). Here, causal stories are used to scare the public into joining an in-group moment and to limit opposition, highlighting further the way causal stories act as political instruments to bias outcomes.
In all, entrepreneurs’ constructions of causal stories highlight their role as political instruments within the policy process. Central to understanding why some issues rise and fall on the agenda is the nature of the problem condition. High affect-low threshold problems provide special elements that attract entrepreneurs within these policy windows and influence the direction of policy responses.
5.6 Where do policy entrepreneurs and causal stories fit into the HALT model?
The role of policy entrepreneurs following HALT events is especially important given that the emotional nature of these events can stimulate collective acute aversions to negative high affect situations at local and national levels. Indeed, it is this feature that attracts attention and makes these kinds of problems ones that gain public attention. Thus, the issue is not simply that there are problems, but rather stimuli that form distinctly memorable problems, which: 1.) destabilize equilibrium, opening policy windows; and 2.) invite entrepreneurship. This advantages ready-made solutions by actors to provide affective relief. To address these features, I review the characteristics of HALT problems, policy windows, and entrepreneurs.
5.6.1 The nature of the HALT problem
Problems are often identified when there is a difference between the reality of how things are and the normative goal of how they ought to be. As a result, there can be a change in behaviour to alter the state or a change in the way the problem is considered with the state remaining unchanged. The types of problems whose gaps receive attention and policy change are identified by Fiske and Taylor (1984). They note that “change is likely to
occur when the gap between the image and the information is sizable, unambiguous, memorable and stable” (Fiske and Taylor, 1984: 178).
High affect-low threshold problems are memorable ones. These are defined by the way aversions to high affect aggregate negative outcomes (i.e. HALT events) generate longterm salience and memorability. These memorable problems should be seen for their unique role in the policy process. The issue is not simply the degree to which an event is violent, vivid, or emotional but the degree to which that violence or emotion creates a lasting profile. Indeed, there are many severe problems that fail to be memorable.
Policy responses can reinforce the memorability of problems through the use of historical analogies in political communications, institutional structures (i.e. laws, departments, response teams,) and memorials. There is a natural connection between historical analogies and memorable problems since they frame and cue the affective aversion to the dreaded aggregate outcome. As a result, the individual events are looked at differently in the context of negative aggregate outcomes, which means that a common issue may be redefined as a as a new memorable problem.
These features are consistent with HALT events and highlight the role of affect and salience as well as the availability and representativeness heuristics in triggering policy responses. Moreover, causal stories are not simply rationally persuasive, they are emotionally persuasive. Stone (1989) notes that causal stories have a moral element to them. They cue symbols and apply metaphors based on emotionally charged feelings for or against a group. Here we see affective manipulation (Schneider and Teske, 1992).
Political speeches, such as populist appeals, employ these causal stories to raise emotions and win over the audience.
5.6.2 The nature of the HALT policy window
The policy processes of high affect-low threshold policy windows have three characteristics. First, the public and political tolerance (i.e. threshold) for the condition is
low, based on affective aversions. This promotes disequilibrium in which policy windows may be deisgned to open quickly. Secondly, the public and political actors seek rapid relief from the antagonistic state, which encourages ready-made solutions. These fast policy processes also are designed to close policy windows quickly. Thirdly, the public seeks escape from the prohibitive condition, which means they will move on and redirect their attention with or without political action. However, the public may punish efforts that delay or fail to facilitate more rapid affective relief, or if there is a distance between the anticipated timeline of relief and reality.
One marker of high affect issues is primed public sensitivity. Underlying levels of affective sensitivity influence public reactions to events and political responses that open policy windows. Indeed, rather than considering equilibrium as a straight line with raised lurches of progress at varying periods, political equilibrium is better illustrated in terms of the carnival game with a large group of overflowing coins dangling above the precipice (see Picture 5.1). Issue stimuli in civil society represent the coins; the size of the stack reflects the affective values involved (i.e. food contamination/school children/affluent schools) and their closeness to the ledge is the prioritization of affective sensibilities. This analogy is important because attention is not the only variable that determines how an issue may rise on the agenda or produce political disequilibrium. Moreover, while media attention can still trigger policy windows, the structure of problems before public attention is critical. Combinations of instinctual and cultural affective sensitivities may be present ahead of an incident and influence the level of a threshold before an event has occurred. As a result, it is useful to consider the elements of these unique policy windows.
Picture 5.1 Illustrations of policy equilibrium
The result is a political environment in which actors benefit from anticipating concerns of the public and creating windows that allow them to act quickly. High affect-low threshold policy processes favour solutions that can cue affective relief, and entrepreneurship involves having ready-made solutions that can provide this signal. In short, there are two problems for entrepreneurs to be solved during HALT conditions. The first is the perception of risk and the aversion to feelings about the problem condition (i.e. dreaded outcome), not necessarily the problem itself. The second, is the anticipated timeline for affective relief from this condition. The implications of these problems mean that a variety of solutions that fail to address the real risk may be adopted because they cue relief from a perceived dreaded outcome in a timely manner.
Examples of HALT windows can be seen in a number of issues. One example is the recent episode following Hurricane Sandy in New York and New Jersey. In particular, punishment for delays in allocating resources could be seen. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie was critical of the slow movement of aid to his state, stating (NJ.gov, 2013):
When Hurricane Andrew made landfall on Aug. 24, 1992, Congress and President Bush 41 responded within 31 days with a federal aid package. When Hurricane Gustav made landfall on Sept. 1 and then Hurricane Ike hit 12 days later, Congress and President Bush 43 responded in 17 days with a federal aid package. When Hurricane Katrina made landfall on Aug. 29, 2005, Congress and President Bush 43 responded with an initial $62.3 billion aid package in 10 days. Hurricane Sandy made landfall in New Jersey on Oct. 29, 2012 66 days ago.
During this same speech, the governor noted, again, the speed with which funding relief by Congress was allocated: “31 days for Andrew victims. 17 days for victims of Gustav and Ike. 10 days for victims of Katrina. For the victims of Sandy in New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut, it’s been 66 days and the wait continues” (NJ.gov, 2013). Here one political actor is exerting punishment on another group (Congress) on the basis of speed. These political interactions are best summarized in the following equation:
First, the fast input of a highly emotional issue is noted in the automaticity of affect (HA = high affect) to the dreaded outcome. Secondly, the fast analysis of intent (C = causal story) has been recognized as a feature that influences the diagnosing events. Thirdly, there is a reliance on biases and historical analogies as short cuts to quickly identify and
understand complex situations based on initial experiences or data (B= biases). Fourthly, the rapid clustering of high affect stimuli has been noted in limited capacity theory (LC = limited capacity). Fifthly, this combination prompts a temporary policy window (OW = open window) that is created by the actor’s recognition of the aversion, for which the public seeks closure. Sixth, during the opening the public seeks out fast relief from the aversion and has an anticipation of future positive emotional outcomes (Ea= emotional anticipation).
Together, these support actors and solutions that produce timely policy responses, that are perceived as positively affective measures, to relieve negative affect pressures (P = positive policy responses) and to cue a closing of the window (CW = closed window). As an equation this would read:
HALT= HA+C/LC+Ea+B =OW +(OW +P=CW).
In all, the speed of policy actions is a feature that is more relevant during HALT episodes because of how quickly the window is designed to open and how quickly it can close. The benefits of speed and the burdens of delay are stark. There are advantages in the type of actors advantaged, solutions selected (e.g. ready-made) and the speed with which they are delivered. Affective relief relies on speed, and political operatives may suffer during delays. As a result, it is important to consider the role of actors and policy subsystems during HALT events and how access to more quickly moving institutions, resources, or symbols may influence policymaking.
5.6.3 The nature of the HALT policy entrepreneur
There are two elements that stand out in the way policy entrepreneurs develop causal stories: certainty and speed. These elements play important roles because policy entrepreneurs understand that the public is vulnerable to stress during high affect-low threshold periods, and they care if the public is upset. Snare (1995: 417) notes that pragmatists “are interested in finding out if everyone is happy.” However, preferences are
also influenced by fear. Lupia and Menning (2009: 103) note that “when a citizenry’s psychological profile makes it less motivated or able to adapt to fear appeals, politicians will have greater ability to use fear to get their way.” As a result, certainty in causal stories and speed in response delivery are tools to advance political outcomes during fearful periods.
Certainty is afforded by political actors in a number of ways. First, they rely on previously enacted policies that are perceived to be successful as well as historical analogies. This initial option can be seen in the widespread adoption of biofuels as “green” solutions in a number of nations to reduce their reliance on OPEC oil producers. This has been seen as a convenient and inexpensive policy change by a number of nations. In this example, governments use existing agricultural production and convert it into bioethanol; sources include “food crops such as sugarcane, sugar beet, maize (corn), sorghum and wheat” (Charles et al., 2007: 5737). Charles et al. (2007: 5739) note that biofuels have been incorporated by governments, in part out of pressure to do something about climate change, and have become a widely utilized and popular option despite their limitations.
Aberbach and Christensen (2001: 411-412) note that these ready-made solutions also have advantages (and may be seen as successful) because they are inexpensive and applicable to any location. Solutions can also become “fashionable” (Aberbach and Christensen, 2001: 412), limiting the negative feedback to their adoption. In addition, entrepreneurs may employ widely known and available historical analogies. This includes applications from myths and film. Media and entertainment play into heuristics by packaging stories within existing causal narratives that keep false historical analogies alive. The narratives are designed to prompt attention and emotional responses that encourage greater attention to the program.
Entrepreneurs may also claim certainty regarding a fear or consequence that is difficult to refute. For instance, politicians are less likely to have opposing feedback to fear appeals on complex scientific issues. This advantages political actors over scientific ones since objective certainty is difficult to obtain. As a result, we see that policy entrepreneurs are
more likely to have solutions when they are likely to profit from them, and problems are more likely to be addressed when a solution is available (Schneider and Teske, 1992). In all, the more easily adapted the solution, the greater the benefit for the entrepreneurs.
The speed with which policy entrepreneurs act is often a function of available resources. More resources may provide greater access to the media, ready-made solutions, and the ability to execute a response more quickly. This can include suasion and a full range of policy instruments. President Obama’s response to the fatal shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary school in Connecticut provides an example of this entrepreneurship.
Following the incident on 14 December 2012, the President issued 23 executive orders on 16 January 2013. In doing so he stated, “I intend to use whatever weight this office holds to make them a reality” (Obama, 2012). Here, the President used the authority given to him to act quickly. These actions constituted affective relief to a dreaded aggregate outcome in which the public sought rapid action and provided the President the opportunity to act as the policy entrepreneur to a HALT episode.
Lastly, it is also important to note that a unique feature of HALT events can be seen in their evaluation. Successful evaluation of a policy may be the closing of the window or achieving affective relief. Communities may also use coping mechanisms in the absence of a policy response as well as in response to one. The problem is that the perceived success of a policy may occur in the absence of any relief and create an unconnected and damaging institutional path dependency.
In all, policy entrepreneurs engage during HALT episodes because of the nature of the problem, policy window, and the search for ready-made solutions. I have argued that certain type of entrepreneurship are advantaged given the expected or unexpected nature of the events. The following section will examine that hypothesis using shark bite policy responses.
5.7 Illustrating policy entrepreneurship in the HALT model using shark bite policy responses
Shark bites provide the type of memorable problem and policy window that attract entrepreneurs because they are highly affective events (see Chapter 3). For instance, in his 1865 book Cape Cod, American author Henry David Thoreau wrote, “I have no doubt that one shark in a dozen years is enough to keep up the reputation of a beach a hundred miles long” (Thoreau, 1865/2009: 78). Connecting shark bite incidents with policy responses involves reviewing past research, identifying potential cases for investigation, and then evaluating those cases against 1.) the proposed requirements on entrepreneurship 2.) the typology of entrepreneurs, and 3.) the selection of causal stories. Together, these illustrate the way entrepreneurs use causal stories during certain policy windows to influence the policymaking process.
5.7.1 Previous research on shark bites and political behaviour
There have been two reviews on the way shark bites have an impact on political actors. First, Achen and Bartels (2004) reviewed election data to determine the impact of a series of fatal shark bites on the voting pattern in New Jersey for the 1916 Presidential election of Woodrow Wilson. They note that President Wilson and members of his cabinet were more attentive to these incidents because they were from New Jersey, and that the actions that were taken still resulted in punishment by voters. They analyzed voting by congressional districts and found, “disaffection for Wilson was widespread in the beach areas whose livelihood was most directly affected by the shark attacks (Achen and Bartels, 2004: 18). They conclude that “shark attacks are natural disasters in the purest sense of the term, and they have no governmental solution. Yet the voters punished anyway.” However, while these data clearly shows a decline in voting for Wilson in the affected regions, there are two issues that must be considered in voting behaviour: the nature of solutions and the conditional frame provided.
In the federal government’s case in 1916, it dispatched Coast Guard staff to assist in looking for sharks but stated that there was little it could do to solve the problem. The New York Times reported these events, stating:
If it is found that the man-eaters are present in numbers, Mr. Newtown said there was little hope that Coast Guard cutters or a patrol of motorboats could accomplish anything. No definite plan has been worked out. Secretary of Commerce Redfield told the Cabinet that the Bureau of Fisheries has been unable to offer any scientific explanation of the unprecedented attacks (New York Times, 1916).
This conditional frame failed to address the negative affective state of the public. This reinforced dissatisfaction and impacted voting because the entrepreneurship had not attached a solution to the problem, and the central problem was the aversive state and the expectation of timely affective relief. The voters’ reaction is consistent with Vis’s (2009) research on prospect theory, which notes “voters are more likely to punish incumbent governments when they are dissatisfied than to reward them when they are satisfied” (Vis, 2009:3).
The second study by Neff and Yang (2012) measured the confidence of beach community residents in government-funded programs in Cape Town, South Africa, before and after a shark bite in 2011. Following the shark bite, the city conducted a same-day investigation and issued a report the following day. This research found that there was no decline in the confidence of the public toward city-funded projects. The authors argue that one chief reason for this was the emergence of an adequate causal story regarding the role of a seal near the bather, which contributed to the shark bite (Neff and Yang, 2012: 547). This finding was supported by empirical survey data that saw a decline in the local pride felt toward seals after the incident.
In all, considering policy entrepreneurship in shark bite policy responses provides a useful way of identifying entrepreneurship in the policymaking process. Next, policy entrepreneurship is investigated in each of the eight cases noted in Chapter 4. These cases were selected based on the documentation of incidents and the identification of a policy
response. All of the incidents involved more than one shark bite; however, not all of the locations had previously reported shark bites.
5.7.2 Identifying policy entrepreneurship in shark bite policymaking
Eight shark bite events and policy responses are reviewed to examine policy entrepreneurship. Incidents and responses from Western Australia, Sharm El Shiekh, Hawaii, Primorye, the Seychelles, Reunion, Hong Kong, and Recife are described. The characteristics of these events are then applied to the entrepreneurship scale (Table 5.1).
In Western Australia in 2011, the Premier had been a leading advocate of shark hunts and supported the authorization of the first hunt by the Western Australia Department of Fisheries in 2012. He stated, "[t]his is not about being anti-shark," and added, "[i]t's simply about protecting the public during the summer period when tens of thousands of West Australians go to the beach and we want West Australians to be as safe as possible” (WA Today, 2011).
In Egypt in 2010, the mayor closed the beaches and approved a shark hunt. Two sharks were caught and the mayor re-opened the beaches. The next day a fatal bite took place (Zaki, 2010). This was followed by a causal story that the shark had been sent to Egypt by Israeli intelligence services. South Sinai Governor Muhammad Abdel Fadil Shousha stated, “What is being said about the Mossad throwing the deadly shark [in the sea] to hit tourism in Egypt is not out of the question, but it needs time to confirm” (Zaki, 2010). In 2011 in Russia, authorities from the Primorye region authorized a shark hunt following two serious shark bite incidents, and multiple boats were dispatched.
Table 5.1 Scaling policy entrepreneurship in a matrix to
compare central features
Entrepreneur
In Hawaii, the chairman of the House Finance Committee, state representative Joe Souki, introduced a bill in 1992 to fund a $150,000 shark control program to hunt sharks. In Reunion Island, regional authorities granted permission for a shark hunt following a series of shark bite incidents. At issue was the need to “protect leisure activities” (Nickel, 2011).
In the Seychelles, the private CEO of the Tourism Board, Alain St Ange, stated, “[w]e need to find the beast and get it out of our waters, we have requested help from South Africa and two experts are arriving in the country in the next day” (Global Post, 2011).
Lastly, in the cases of Hong Kong and Recife, limited information did not allow for an identification of the policy entrepreneur (see Table 5.1).
5.7.3
Evaluating entrepreneurship in shark bite policy responses
Applying these categories of entrepreneurship to the actors involved in responses considers how the type of window, causal story, and entrepreneurial type influence policymaking (Table 5.1). I argue that the actors noted were entrepreneurs based on the way they used causal stories to influence the process and gain a profit. To measure this, I have scaled their attributes and reviewed the results.
The scaling matrix (Table 5.1) reviews whether the characteristics of entrepreneurship are present in the policymaking process and attempts to identify the decision-brokering actor. Yet, it is important to begin by recognizing the limitations in entrepreneurial measurement, including the absence of identifiable actors. Elinor Ostrom (2007) notes a similar problem in locating “institutions,” which are invisible and require measuring products that come from shared concepts and norms. Indeed, analyzing the involvement of actors whose actions are based on closed entrepreneurship is more difficult than that of open or public entrepreneurs. In particular, measuring an actor’s access or benefit from engagement may be subject to the nature of centralized or decentralized decision-making systems.
The analysis of Russia and Hong Kong highlights the difficulties in identifying open entrepreneurship. For instance, in Russia, access to information was limited to those making public statements. In addition, the benefit is also unclear in some cases. In Egypt, determining the benefit or burden on an actor based on the entrepreneurship of the mayor was complicated based on changes in position related to the “Arab Spring.” For instance, other factors clearly contributed to the political fortunes of this official. In addition, the local role of powerful mayors in Reunion appears to be overshadowed by the institutional models. In Recife, little more is documented than, “[d]ue to the increase in shark attacks, all board-riding activities in the attack area were banned by a Government decree on 1 January 1995” (Hazin et al., 2008). Interestingly, the data suggest that most of the locations where the actor is hardest to identify also took the longest to enact change,
suggesting the role of multiple parties. Cases with identifiable, open, and public actors are clearer and noted below.
In Western Australia, Premier Colin Barnett acted as crusading and opportunistic entrepreneur. He was supportive of a shark hunt plan in 2003 between incidents as a state MP, based on the rogue shark theory. In 2012, he authorized the first use of the hunting method as Premier following the third incident. As a result, we see the use of a jurisdictional and values-based causal story that highlighted the role of the government in providing beach safety. With this frame he was seen as a relevant actor who had provided a solution to the problem, and influenced the political outcome because his solution took effect. His quick solution to kill the shark (to protect bathers) offered some certainty. Premier Barnett benefited from his actions, putting him in a stronger position for his 2013 re-election campaign. His Coalition Government held a 57-43 percent lead in the polls in October 2012, and he won with a significant margin in 2013. While shark hunts were not an innovative solution and he had no expertise in the area, the Premier did show great resilience and defense of shark hunts as a solution to shark bites.
In Egypt, the analysis shows that the characteristics of opportunistic entrepreneurship were present and that the mayor of Sharm El Sheikh was the likely actor. The narrative was a values-based causal story that argued that an unusual event was taking place for the region and that it may be targeting Egyptians. The mayor was seen as a relevant. He closed the beaches and was part of the authorization of the shark hunt. The mayor also reopened the beach after two sharks were caught. In this case, the shark hunt was seen as the solution to the problem, and it was authorized. The benefit in this case is noted as unclear. The solution was not innovative; he did not have expertise, and the level of resilience is unknown. However, he was resilient because he reauthorized a shark hunt again following another subsequent shark bite incident.
In Hawaii, state representative Joe Souki is identified as a pragmatic and opportunistic entrepreneur based on his position as chairman of the Finance Committee and his proposed solution to fund a USD$150,000 shark control (shark fishing) program to catch
large sharks. He put forward a causal story that “sharks have no natural enemies at that size (15 feet), so they continue to get more bold” (Essoyan, 1992). He was seen as a relevant actor, his solution was attached to the problem, and it was adopted. There was benefit to him in that he was elected Speaker of Hawaii State House the following year. However, the issue was not innovative and he was not an expert. His resilience and defense is unknown.
In Russia, the authorities from regional government were pragmatic and opportunistic entrepreneurs, though identifying an individual has been difficult. Yet, their policy responses involved both a shark hunt and asking people on the beach to sign a risk waiver to note they had been told about the shark. The authorities were seen as relevant, the solutions were attached to the problem, and it was adopted. The benefit to the actor(s) was unknown. The solution was not innovative and there was no expertise. In fact, the boats that were dispatched for the shark hunts did not have any gear to catch sharks. The entrepreneur’s actions were seen as resilient and defended, because the use of shark hunts continued following subsequent shark bites over the next two weeks.
In the Seychelles, the CEO acted as a crusading-opportunistic entrepreneur. He was seen as relevant based on his position as the head of private tourism on the island. This included oversight of the hotel industry, and the hotels offered fishermen funds to catch and kill sharks. He utilized a values-based causal story that the local area was under attack. His solution “to catch the beast” was attached to the problem (Flock, 2011). In addition, he saw a benefit from his engagement insofar as the following year he was named Seychelles Minister of Tourism and Culture (ETN, 2012).
5.7.4 Results
Three questions were posed for applying the proposed categorizations of entrepreneurship to shark bite policy response. First, the scale measurement sought to determine if the proposed core requirements were present in these cases. In addition, this would note if previously argued fundamentals were necessary. Secondly, it considered whether the
typology of entrepreneurship (also proposed) provided insight into the selection of policy responses. Lastly, it sought to identify the types of causal stories used by actors to influence the process.
In total, the result suggests that, even while identifying the actor is not always clear, these criteria provide a useful measure of entrepreneurship. Actors being seen as relevant factors, attaching solutions to problems, influencing political outcomes, and receiving benefits were all present in three of the four identified (or known) entrepreneurial cases. Identifying the benefit to the actors from their actions was unknown in three cases (Egypt, Russia, and Recife). Moreover, previous conceptions of entrepreneurial requirements were not affirmed. In six of the eight cases, the solution was not innovative. The prescribed beach enclosure in Hong Kong and the ban on surfing in Recife (while not completely unheard of) are unique interpretations and applications of the solutions. We also see that expertise was limited in impacting policy responses, with seven of the eight entrepreneurs failing to display expertise in their solution or causal story; however, in the eighth case this was undetermined (in Recife.) Resilience was also unknown in two cases (Hawaii and Egypt), however, it was seen to be present in six cases. Defense was seen in six cases, but also unknown in two cases (Hawaii and the Seychelles).
The largest proportion of entrepreneurial types was opportunistic and involved elected actors. Two were crusaders who used their position to advance moral causal stories, and three were pragmatic, choosing technical causal stories. None of the actors in these cases was identified in the accidental category. This suggests that these unexpected events function as focusing events that benefit elected and bureaucratic actors the most. Indeed, entrepreneurs with the most resources, including time, are advantaged, and this allows them to prepare for potential conflicts and be quick in their responses. For locations that had longer shark bite histories, such as Hawaii, Hong Kong, and Recife, they appeared to act as if the events were expected, which benefited pragmatic entrepreneurship with technical causal stories.
Finally, the types of causal stories were overwhelmingly values-based. This appears to be consistent with the high affect nature of the events. Other types of causal stories include jurisdictional and technical. It is important to note that because this analysis is looking at entrepreneurship relative to policy responses, this measurement is expected to be the most skewed.
Thus, distinguishing between required and successful characteristics of entrepreneurship advances analyses of policy entrepreneurs because it 1.) helps isolate entrepreneurial traits; 2.) aids in identifying the likely presence of entrepreneurs, even when actions are closed; and 3.) identifies the types of actors and stories that are privileged during certain expected or unexpected events. Indeed, while policy entrepreneurs do not play a role in every policy response (Mintrom and Norman, 2009), HALT periods invite shrewd policy entrepreneurs to seize the real but fleeting moment of opportunity to relieve the affective state and close the window. In all, elected actors and insider stakeholders appear to be advantaged entrepreneurs during these events. However, a political danger also exists where they are looked to for the solutions and sought after as entrepreneurs to provide affective relief within a small period of time. A solution may not appear to work, or work quickly enough, which encourages path dependencies.
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter has identified the final two pieces of the HALT framework by reviewing the ways in which policy entrepreneurship and causal stories are used to influence policy responses. This analysis began by examining the features of entrepreneurship, offered a narrow definition of how policy entrepreneurs could be considered, and proposed a typology for considering these actors. Causal stories also play a central role in defining entrepreneurship because of the way actors use narratives as political instruments that attach solutions to problems advantaging their political outcome. Indeed, these actors are not problem seekers for the sake of problem seeking, they are policy champions who utilize problem conditions to create space for their policy proposals or outcome. Entrepreneurs were then classified based on the types of causal stories they offered and
the expected or unexpected nature of policy windows.
The nature of HALT policy windows was identified as important because the public is averse to negative high affect, high salience problems. These situations can overwhelm the public, and this puts pressure on political actors to manage the opening of windows in order to control the process and utilize ready-made solutions. These solutions can provide, or cue, emotional relief. Indeed, if a solution is more available and seen as a solution to a problem, then there is a greater likelihood of attention to that issue and greater chance that that problem will be tackled (Michaels, Goucher, and McCarthy, 2006: 984). I then applied these proposed features and categories to eight shark bite policy responses. The results showed the difficulty in identifying actors, the benefit of elected office and the wide use of values-based causal stories. Yet, how these factors connect to direct the policy responses remains an open question.
In the next section of this thesis, the proposed HALT framework is applied to the three case studies in Florida, USA, Cape Town, South Africa, and New South Wales, Australia, to try to explain the differences in policymaking. I hypothesize that a series of shark bite incidents would be affective and salient, triggering an aggregate aversion that opens a temporary policy window and advantages the actor who 1 ) has the greatest access to decision-making authority, 2.) uses causal stories to advantage the outcome by offering certain solutions and, 3.) offers solutions that can be quickly adopted. The actors would be expected to be pragmatic and opportunistic entrepreneurs following unexpected events and technical entrepreneurs for potentially expected events because of the scientific nature of the incidents. Entrepreneurs’ stories are expected to be connected to historical analogies for policy solutions that provide affective relief and are expected to be quick.
In all, is important to consider that the issue moving forward is not simply the way in which responses to shark bites are achieved, but the implications of this framework on a broad range of issues. HALT issues present three fundamental issues for democratic governance that should be considered. First, policy responses must address the core problem of the adverse feelings to the dreaded condition. Secondly, public expectations
around the timeline for anticipated affective relief place a burden of time on the policy process. And thirdly, affective relief may be cued by something else that coincides with the policy response, making it appear successful and a model for future policymaking. As a result of these issues, understanding the differences between policy responses in Florida, Cape Town, and New South Wales can help provide insight into how best to govern during HALT periods.
Chapter 6. Case Study #1: USA: Florida
In 2001, “it seemed as if the nation was living a real-life version of ‘Jaws,’ in which every beach harbored a potential threat ” Juliet Eilperin, Washington Post reporter
Picture 6.1 Time (2001) Summer of the Shark
6.1 Introduction
This chapter examines why the US state of Florida adopted a policy banning eco-tourism shark feeding dives along its coast during the 2001 “Summer of the Shark” (Time, 2001). This activity is defined as “the practice of feeding sharks to attract numbers of animals to divers during the course of head boat dive tours” (State of Florida, 2000a: 2). The statutory regulation, described below, was voted on by the Florida Fish and Wildlife and Conservation Commission (otherwise known as the FWC) on 6 September 2001. The FWC was formed in 1999 and is made up of seven commissioners who are appointed to five-year terms by the Governor, in this case Republican John Ellis “Jeb” Bush, and confirmed by the state Senate.
This new rule (68B-5.005 Divers: Fish Feeding Prohibited; Prohibition of Fish Feeding for Hire; Definitions) came into effect on 1 January 2002, and states:
(1) No diver shall engage in the practice of fish feeding.
(2) No person shall operate any vessel for hire for the purpose of carrying passengers to any site in the saltwaters of the state to engage in fish feeding or to allow such passengers to observe fish feeding.
(3) For purposes of this rule:
(a) “Diver” means any person who is wholly or partially submerged in the water, and is equipped with a face mask, face mask and snorkel, or underwater breathing apparatus
(b) “Fish feeding” means the introduction of any food or other substance into the water by a diver for the purpose of feeding or attracting marine species, except for the purpose of harvesting such marine species as otherwise allowed by rules of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission.
Concern about ecological shark feeding dives as a form of commercial tourism in Florida arose between 1999 and 2001. The issue first appeared as a user-group conflict between spear fishermen and shark feeding dive companies. At issue were concerns from spear fishers that the practice of shark feeding near their diving locations would create an unsafe environment. They formed a local group called the Marine Safety Group and asked the FWC to ban the activity. In response, the shark feeding operators stated that there had never been an injury due to their work. Initially, the FWC endorsed a ban in early 2000; however, they suspended that process later in the year and supported voluntary guidelines moving forward. In May 2001, the Commission voted against banning shark feeding. Yet, by the end of the year the ban would be law. This analysis looks at the conditions that led to the enactment of the shark feeding ban and the role of the 2001 “Summer of the Shark.”
The four elements of the HALT hypothesis are used to examine why this policy response took shape. I argue that there is evidence in Florida that a.) shark bites were perceived as negative high affect events by the public and political actors; b.) the shark bites were perceived as highly salient by the public, media, and political actors, and included a dreaded outcome aggregation; c.) affective aversion to these incidents influenced a low threshold for policy action; and d.) policy entrepreneurs were advantaged in the adoption of their solution by the use of certainty in their causal stories and the speed with which the ready-made solution could be enacted.
In particular, the adoption of the ban on shark feeding was the result of three factors. First, the aversion to the high affect, high salience problem condition advantaged those actors
who could provide affective relief and respond quickly, namely Governor Bush and the Commission. Secondly, the ban was perceived by the Governor and commissioners to offer positive affective relief that could interrupt the aggregate negative outcome (which included fear of shark bites in Florida and financial losses to tourism). Indeed, supporting this perception were local and national organizations as well as elected leaders. Thirdly, the Governor used his strength as a pragmatic-opportunistic entrepreneur to encourage the removal of shark bites from the public agenda as a way of restoring confidence in Florida’s beaches. The commissioners worked as complementary technical-opportunistic entrepreneurs to eliminate the issue. They advanced a technical causal story, offered by shark bite expert George Burgess, which promoted the ban as the appropriate response. This narrative stated that eco-shark feeding could increase the risk around human-shark interactions and that the solution was “don’t feed the animals,” based on the well-known heuristic.
This analysis requires that each case study demonstrate that the policy response in question is a reaction to shark bite incident(s), because this research examines policy variations of these events. Three sources of data suggest that the ban on shark feeding off the coast of Florida in 2001 was a response to shark bites during the “Summer of the Shark.” During one-on-one interviews with stakeholders, they were asked if there was a connection between the FWC’s vote in favour of the ban on shark feeding and the occurrence of shark bites. One interviewee replied, “I don’t think there is any question that it was” (FL/M/3). Another who worked at the FWC was asked the same question and simply stated, “yes” (FL/M/5). In addition, a legislative proposal to ban shark feeding in the state legislature was prompted by the shark bites during the FWC’s deliberations. Lastly, media reporting of the FWC’s vote also considered this question. The New York Times stated, “[w]hether based on fear or fact, the commission's 6-to-1 vote to prohibit shark feeding underscores the increasing pressure on politicians and public safety experts to appear to be addressing the problem of shark attacks” (Canedy, 2001a). However, not all of the conclusions were the same. A letter from the FWC suggested that the vote had little relation to the shark bites. It states, “Commissioners have clearly stated that their decision is not linked to this summer’s highly publicized shark bite incidents” (State of
Florida, 2001b). In addition, one interviewee who worked with the FWC stated, “there was no attempt at a political level to insert some sort of a political answer to this particular situation” (FL/M/4). In all, while acknowledging some disagreement, this case study will provide a useful comparison with the other cases.
This chapter moves forward in two sections. First, it will review the shark bite locations and incident details. Secondly, I evaluate the evidence required to meet the HALT framework criteria, including affect, salience, policy entrepreneurship and causal stories. Together, these elements will aid in examining the policymaking process around Florida’s ban on shark feeding.
6.2 ‘Summer of the Shark’ details
Examining the “who, what, where and why” within shark bite episodes is an important aspect in applying the HALT framework because these contextual elements influence an incident’s emotional appeal. Details include a.) the location (i.e. where) of a shark bite(s) and b.) the specific nature of the events themselves (i.e. the who, what and perception of why). The location may impact degrees of affect, access to media coverage, levels of competition, the availability of political actors, and the narrative of causal stories. For instance, in the United States, previous policy responses have been largely determined by key episodes whose locations and details stand out. This includes the 1916 series of fatal shark bites in New Jersey, the 1948 sinking of the USS Indianapolis during World War II, and the June 1975 release of the motion picture Jaws noted in previous chapters. In this last example, the film depicted a fictional coastal town in Martha’s Vineyard experiencing a spate of shark bites, resulting in an explosion of local shark hunt derbies. The location and details in Florida are particularly important because Florida experiences the most shark bites of any state in the US
6.2.1
Location details
Three of Florida’s 44 counties feature in the “Summer of the Shark,” including Escambia county and the city of Pensacola (Picture 6.2), Volusia county and the city of New Smyrna (Pictures 6.3 and 6.4), and Broward County (Picture 6.5). However, only two of these areas experienced shark bites in 2001, Escambia and Volusia counties. While Escambia and the city of Pensacola do not have a history of shark bites, Volusia County holds a global record because it is home to New Smyrna Beach.
New Smyrna Beach includes more than 40 miles (64 kilometers) of coastline, making it one of the largest beaches in the state of Florida. It also has the most reported annual shark bites of any beach location around the globe. New Smyrna Beach has been labeled by American television and newspaper reports as the “shark attack capital of the world” (Regenold, 2008; Neff and Hueter, 2013; Amin et al., 2012). The beach gained its national reputation following the release of the motion picture Jaws and a series of publicized shark bite incidents in 1975. A lifeguard at New Smyrna Beach during that summer noted the impact of the movie in an interview, stating, “that whole summer [1975], when I stood up and blew my whistle to bring someone in closer the whole ocean evacuated, just like the scene in Jaws. Everyone picked their kids up and ran out. And it was this big deal, where it wasn’t before, it wasn’t before that movie. And ever since then it really has brought a heightened awareness of sharks” (FL/M/2).
Picture 6.2. Florida Panhandle and Pensacola
Picture 6.3. Volusia County
It is important to note that neither location was a significant Florida holiday destination, with Pensacola near Mobile, Alabama (84 kilometers away), as well as a three-hour drive to New Orleans, Louisiana (326 kilometers). Similarly, New Smyrna is located close to the neighboring Daytona International Speedway and the Walt Disney World Resort (90 kilometers away). Thus, while proximate to significant vacation spots such as Orlando and New Orleans, these cities remained distinct. Yet, the significance of these sites is reflected in the role Florida plays in the national dialogue. The state is seen as a leader and representative state of the United States. Previous debates on immigration, patientassisted suicide, and the 2000 presidential election have raised the profile of events in Florida. Bowman, West, and Gertz (2006: 145) have noted this important role as both a “‘megastate’, challenging California as a trendsetter in popular culture and public policy,” as well as for its place in the media spotlight. Indeed, Florida may have set a trend in 2001 as Hawaii passed a similar ban on shark feeding in 2002.
6.2.2 Shark bite details
There were five shark bite episodes during the “Summer of the Shark” that impacted Florida policymaking. The first was a focusing event (Birkland, 1998) involving a very serious injury to an eight-year-old boy along a Pensacola beach. This incident serves as the reference point for all other incidents. The second event involved another reported shark bite in Pensacola on a surfer the following week. Thirdly, there was a shark bite on an American lawyer in the Bahamas and the fourth was a cluster of six shark bites in two
Picture 6.4. New Smyrna Beach in Volusia County
Picture 6.5. Broward County
days at New Smyrna Beach. Lastly, there were two fatal shark bites off the coasts of North Carolina and Virginia in back-to-back days at the end of the summer. All of these events occurred between 6 July 2001 and 3 September, ahead of the FWC’s 6 September vote.
The incidents began on 6 July 2001 during the American 4th of July weekend. An 8-yearold boy from Mississippi, Jessie Arbogast, was bitten by a bull shark in shallow water in Pensacola (Picture 6.2). The shark bit off Jessie’s arm, causing him to stop breathing on the beach; however, CPR was done and he was taken to a hospital. A bystander had a gun and killed the shark so that a lifeguard could reach into the shark’s mouth to retrieve the arm. The arm was then surgically reattached in a 12-hour operation (CNN, 2001a). Jessie was left with long-term disabilities from the blood loss. Media attention was fixed on this incident with follow-up stories on his condition daily. One interviewee noted the way this event captured the media, stating, “[t]his was a story every single night – how’s he doing, how’s he doing, how’s he doing and it kept on going. And of course it got picked up by the national media” (FL/M/3).
An additional shark bite in the area of Jessie’s incident followed. On 16 July 2001, Michael Walters was bitten by a shark while surfing, also in Pensacola (CNN, 2001b).
The Associated Press connected these events in their proximity and danger noting that, “On the same day doctors offered good news about the condition of the 8-year-old boy healing after a shark tore off his arm, a surfer some six miles from that attack felt a shark's jaw close on his leg” (AP, 2001). Shark bites that followed were often framed as representative of the shark bite on Jessie.
On 4 August 2001, Krishna Thompson, a New York banker, was seriously injured and lost part of his leg while swimming in the Bahamas (CBS, 2001). This incident reinforced the severity of shark bites and connected the event to shark feeding operations in the Bahamas. Thompson accused his resort of negligence and consulted with well-known attorney Johnnie Cochran. Thompson threatened to sue the resort where he was staying, claiming that nearby shark-feeding operators contributed to his incident. A series of shark
bites in the middle of August at New Smyrna Beach further escalated the political situation.
Chart 6.1 Distribution of shark bites in Florida between 1 January 2001 and 6 September 2001
On 19 August 2001 three minor shark bite incidents occurred in one day, for the second consecutive day in a row, during a surfing competition at New Smyrna Beach. A total of six bites were reported in two days. In response, beach safety officials closed the area for the rest of that day and the next two days. This was the first time the beach had seen a closure of this degree for a shark bite in 30 years. Following the re-opening of the beach, shark bites continued on 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 29 August and 2 September. In all, there were a record 22 shark bites in 2001 at New Symrna Beach, its highest record up to that time. This represented 69% of all shark bites reported in the United States in 2001 (22 of 32).
The end-of-summer holiday weekend appeared to confirm the dangerousness of the shark problem and the perceived dreaded outcome from shark bites. There were two fatalities in three days during the Labor Day weekend. On 1 September 2001, 10-year-old David Peltier from Richmond, Virginia, died after being bitten by a shark off the coast of Virginia Beach. On 3 September a couple, Sergei Zaloukaev and Natalia Slobodskaya,
were seriously bitten while swimming off the coast of North Carolina. Sergei Zaloukaev died from his injuries (CNN, 2001c).
In all, there were 15 reported shark bites in the US between 6 July and 6 September with 12 of those in Florida (Chart 6.1). The tragic nature of some of these incidents as well as their frequency appeared to indicate an escalating problem. The perceived dreaded outcome from the shark bite on Jessie and familiar framing of shark “attacks” as deadly events was imposed on the cluster of shark bites in New Smyrna and the “Summer of the Shark” as a whole. However, shark bites across the US in 2001 were down 11 percent from 2000. It is important, therefore, to review the political circumstances in Florida, because this is chiefly a story about political behaviour rather than shark behaviour.
6.3 Explaining the selection of the ban on shark feeding as a policy response in Florida
The adoption of the ban on shark feeding was influenced by the way shark bites during the “Summer of the Shark” were given meaning as representative of dreaded outcomes and afforded competitive priority over other issues. In turn, the policy process was opened with new issues and actors. First, political actors were concerned about media reporting on shark bites and its impact on tourism in Florida. Secondly, the negative high affect events were aggregated into the “Summer of the Shark” so that all bites and outcomes were essentially attributed to Florida. Thirdly, the multiple contexts involving: a.) the continuation of shark bites and b.) the absence of other competitive stimuli made this a priority concern. And fourthly, the political power of Governor Jeb Bush allowed him to act as a pragmatic-opportunistic entrepreneur, articulate a problem and solution, and influence the FWC, who reopened a closed policy window to quickly adopt the shark feeding ban. In short, Governor Jeb Bush increased his profile and signaled the need to get shark bites out of the media headlines. Banning shark feeding was seen as the way to relieve the aversive situation.
I evaluate the way HALT characteristics influence the policy process in Florida by looking at public statements, media coverage, and three additional methods. First, I review the speed of policy responses at the local and state levels to support the high affect-low threshold nature of the events (Table 6.1). Secondly, I compare previous shark bite incidents with the case study episodes using a HALT features “thermometer” (see Charts 6.2-6.5). And thirdly, I utilize the model of policy entrepreneurship put forward in Chapter 5 to identify the role of actors and narratives (Table 6.2). These methods highlight the role of affect, salience, policy entrepreneurship, and causal stories.
6.3.1 Evidence of this case study as a negative high affect event
The adoption of the ban on shark feeding was influenced by the way shark bites during the “Summer of the Shark” were given meaning as dreaded outcomes. A combination of affective variables contributed to this, including: a.) the way shark “attacks” in Florida were connected to consumptive outcomes, and b.) the way shark feeding in Florida was connected to new more aggressive and intent-driven sharks.
The high affect of the “Summer of the Shark” incidents can be distinguished when compared to other shark bites. In comparing incidents in Florida, I begin by noting that there were different responses following bull shark bites on the west coast of Florida and following clusters of shark bites at New Smyrna Beach. In August 2000, Thadeus Kubinski died following a shark bite in an intracoastal waterway near St. Pete Beach on the Gulf of Mexico (Brassfield, 2000). Kubinski was 70 years old and was swimming off the dock at the back of his house with his wife when he was bitten by a bull shark and died of blood loss. There was no response following Mr. Kubinski’s death; however, in 2001 the serious injury to Jessie Arbogast brought far greater attention. Secondly, New Smyrna Beach provides a useful example because there were clusters of six shark bites in April 2001, before a later August 2001 spate of six shark bites that was connected to the “Summer of the Shark.”
These four episodes are compared using HALT characteristics through a description in charts 6.2-6.5. Features are divided between a list of affective inputs from the event and feedback stimuli. Input stimuli include the nature of the event details including: a.) the type of shark, b.) severity of the incident, c.) identity of the victim (including age, race, and sex), d.) the proximity of the event to a high-exposure media market, e.) the frequency of events in a locality, and f.) the presence of competitive affective stimuli. Feedback elements include i.) media reporting, perceived intent, ii.) representativeness to a dreaded outcome, iii.) availability, iv.) volume of media coverage, v.) presence of a policy entrepreneur and vi.) local policy response.
This analysis demonstrates how seemingly similar incidents can result in different policy responses. For instance, the fatal shark bite on Mr. Kubinski was seen as an “isolated incident” and “hotel operators said there were no cancellations” (Chachere, 2000).
However, Jessie Arbogast’s injury was seen as more unusual and aggressive. As a result, he received attention from Governor Bush, and a crackdown on pier fishing took place. In addition, in neither case did actors connect the fatal shark bite nor the cluster with the problem of shark feeding. In the latter case, what might have been called the “spring of the shark” resulted in little coverage or concern because the shark bites were perceived as minor, even when they involved a twelve-year-old surfer. Importantly, these events did generate some national media (Chart 6.5) but did not result in a response because the event was not tied to an intent-driven shark or representative dreaded outcome.
The change in perception of these events occurred when they were a.) representative of a dreaded outcome and b.) linked together across the different coasts. The incident in the Bahamas and the lawsuit that was threatened appear to have helped link these issues. This event appeared to connect the issue of shark bites and shark feeding in a way that had not been previously articulated. In response, activists mobilized to connect the two. CBS news reported on this potential relationship and interviewed the leader of the anti-shark feeding movement in Florida, Bob Dimond of the Marine Safety Group in Deerfield Beach. He stated that, "When you teach them to associate humans with food, you are greatly increasing the risk of attacks on humans" (CBS, 2001). In response, Bob Harris of
a pro-diving group stated, "[i]n the 30-year history of shark feeding, there has never been a single reported attack as far away as a mile from a feeding site" (CBS, 2001).
In addition, state representative Charlie Justice (from the west coast of Florida) announced a plan to introduce legislation to regulate or ban shark feeding statewide. He stated, "[t]here is a growing concern that with these shark feedings, sharks will eventually associate humans with food" (AP, 2001a). Indeed, these cases also highlight two different sets of policy thresholds. In the first instance, the human to human conflict had a longer temporal policy window (approximately 18 months) than the human-shark conflict (approximately 5 months).
Chart 6.2 and 6.3. Comparing HALT elements for Thaddeus Kuninski’s shark bite in 2000 and Jessie Arbogast’s shark bite in 2001.
Thaddeusus Kuninski (2000)
High Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Type of shark
Severity of injury to victim
Race of victim
Event feedback:
Media reporting (salience)
Perceived as representative of a dreaded outcome (causal story w/ affect)
Available (imaginable)
Low Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Age of victim
Sex of victim
Proximity of event to a high exposure media market
Objective frequency of events together on a locality
Presence of competitive affective stimuli (2000 election)
Event feedback:
Perceived intent (causal story w/ affect)
Local only or national media
Jessie Arbogast (2001)
High Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Type of shark
Severity of injury to victim
Age of victim
Race of victim
Presence of competitive affective stimuli
Event feedback:
Media reporting (salience)
Perceived intent (causal story w/ affect)
Perceived as representative of a dreaded outcome (causal story w/ affect)
Available (imaginable)
Local only or national media
Policy entrepreneur
Policy response (ban on pier fishing)
Low Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Sex of victim
Proximity of event to a high -exposure media market
Objective frequency of events together on a locality
Event feedback: N/A
Charts 6.4 and 6.5. Comparing HALT elements for shark bites at New Smyrna Beach in April 2001 and August 2001.
New Symrna Beach April (2001)
High Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Age of victim
Race of victim
Objective frequency of events together on a locality
Event feedback:
Media reporting (salience)
Available (imaginable)
Policy response (beach closed 3060 minutes)
Low Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Type of shark
Severity of injury to victim
Sex of victim
Proximity of event to a highexposure media market
Presence of competitive affective stimuli
Event feedback:
Perceived intent (causal story w/ affect)
Perceived as representative of a dreaded outcome (causal story w/ affect)
Local only or national media
New Smyrna Beach August (2001)
High Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Race of victim
Sex of victim
Objective frequency of events together on a locality
Presence of competitive affective stimuli
Event feedback:
Media reporting (salience)
Perceived intent (causal story w/ affect)
Perceived as representative of a dreaded outcome (causal story w/ affect)
Available (imaginable)
Local only or national media Policy entrepreneur
Policy response (beach closed 2 days)
Low Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Type of shark
Severity of injury to victim
Age of victim
Proximity of event to a high -exposure media market
Presence of competitive affective stimuli
Event feedback: N/A
6.3.2 Connecting Florida shark “attacks” to consumptive dreaded outcomes
The analysis of the HALT framework suggests that shark bites in Florida were connected to consumptive dreaded outcomes through two frames: the threat of being eaten and the threat from intent-driven sharks. Instinctual affect can be seen in these cases as survival
and reproduction related to being consumed. The fear of the vivid “bloodiness” for this dreaded outcome is affirmed by Harrison and Cantor (1999). They examined the effect of frightful movies on people and found that 65.2% of respondents found blood/injection and injury to be the most frequently frightful stimuli. Harrison and Cantor (1999) note that this fright is exemplified by the following reference to the film Jaws:
I don't think it was the shark or the actual deaths that frightened me, it was the blood. For about 2 months after the movie I had nightmares about blood. The nightmares didn't always involve sharks, but always contained gross amounts of blood. To this day I remain horrified of blood... (Harrison and Cantor, 2009: 106).
In addition, one interviewee noted, “[t]here are so many other ways to die, if you think about it… But something in the back of everybody’s brain has that primal thing about being eaten alive kind of a thing and that’s what feeds on it. It’s the ultimate horror story. And it goes back to Jaws and all the other things that have hyped up the shark stuff” (FL/M/2).
Another interviewee addressed the emotional weight of having young people as victims. They stated, “[c]ertainly children being attacked creates a tremendous emotional response. I am guessing that a woman being attacked creates more of a reaction than a man. And the perception that someone is an innocent victim” (M/FL/3). They added, “When you think about it, Spielberg was brilliant and Benchley was brilliant, going back to that first scene in Jaws with the young girl swimming, sort of this innocent victim. I think people feel that way more than they do about an older man or a fisherman” (M/FL/3). As a result, having an incident that involved an eight-year-old boy whose arm was consumed, and then retrieved, is a high affect event on two levels.
Neff and Heuter (2013) note that language has been used to link the threat of being consumed to great white sharks in particular. The man-eater label has been part of the taxonomic designation for certain shark species for hundreds of years. This label presumes the intent of sharks, great whites in particular, as man-eaters and moves shark bites from an instinctual fear to cultural fear as well.
The representativeness of great whites as a threatening man-eating species was an important affective tool in stirring emotion around the issue of shark feeding and shark bites. In 1999, the spear fishers group in Broward County chose high affect images as part of their strategy. For instance, a flyer was put out with the picture of a great white shark that stated, “South Florida dive operators are hand-feeding sharks and other dangerous marine predators approximately 200 YARDS OFF OUR BEACHES.”In addition, the image of great white sharks was also used by the media in Florida in 2001. One interviewee noted that “[t]here was some panic in 2001 and it was mainly due to the media coverage. I remember watching the news and the news reporter came on one of the local channels and she had a picture of a great white shark behind her and says ‘another shark attack’ at New Smyrna beach” (FL/M/2).
On 1 September beach patrol Deputy Chief Joe Wooden stated, "[u]nfortunately the greater public does not understand the difference between a shark attack and a bite ... often it's no worse than a dog bite, it's not life threatening, no limb is lost, we'll treat them on the beach and they can go home" (MacSwan, 2001). As a result of this concern, in May 2002 the United States Lifesaving Association put forward a position statement on “shark bite prevention and response” that stated that “many people harbor a disproportionate fear of being bitten by a shark, which can sometimes rise to virtual hysteria” (USLA, 2002: 1). The statement noted that it defines shark attacks as requiring multiple bites.
This language is important because “[s]hark attacks are seen more as violent attacks than as accidents.” (STATS, 2002). Cook (1987) also notes that the term “attack” can be used to reflect more gruesome and Jaws-inspired dreaded outcomes (Cook 1987: 97). Neff and Hueter (2013) address this and note that, “[a]fter Jaws, the shark “attack” profile was linked to the unforgettable images of the film and reinforced one, and only one, vivid and dreaded outcome. All shark “attacks” were perceived as equal, and wherever sharks roamed which is off most swimming beaches of the world going into the ocean meant you were risking your life to the bloodthirsty jaws of a shark.”
6.3.3 Connecting Florida shark feeding to more aggressive and intent-driven sharks
Florida’s shark bites were connected to the dreaded threat of more aggressive sharks through the causal story of George Burgess and the Marine Safety Group. One interviewee suggested that the issue was “entrainment,” which they described as: “where you are getting animals coming back and wanting to stay in one place, or being attracted to a single place by repetitive events in that single place” (FL/M/4). This process was seen as important because it “is integral to the development of a good dive site with feeding of animals because the very intent of that operation is just that, predictability. So you can guarantee that your guest has the opportunity to have that shark experience. It won’t do any good if you go to a different place and can’t deliver” (FL/M/4).
The importance of the film Jaws in connecting intent-based, man-eating shark attacks with the dread felt toward great white sharks cannot be understated. The affective importance of representations of sharks is noted by McComas (2006), Neff, and Hueter (2013), and Sunstein (2011). McComas (2006) notes the way reporting on shark bites in 2001 reflects perceptions of risk and suggests, “[t]he public’s reaction to the shark attacks off the East Coast offers an example of how affect can guide behaviour (e.g. images of shark attacks, perhaps even primed by the movie Jaws, provoke a visceral reaction to the water)” (McComas, 2007: 78). Shoning (1987: 3) notes that, “[e]ver since the movie "Jaws," there has been greater public interest in sharks and potential shark attacks on swimmers.” Indeed, Time magazine’s 2001 cover for “Summer of the Shark” (Picture 6.1) had a great white shark on the cover that appeared to be coming with intention for the reader.
Finally, it is also important to note that other factors may represent dreaded outcomes, particularly for political actors. The fear of litigation, blame, declines in tourism, or political punishment can be significant motivators. Indeed, the way these events involve prioritized affective sensibilities is key.
In all, this section has highlighted the competitive nature of high affect issues and their impact on policy action. Even similar high affect issues are different based on their perceived nature and context. This analysis of shark bite incidents suggests that if a perceived outcome has less affective stimuli or more affective competition than another issue, a policy response to the former is less likely. Characteristics that strengthen dreaded outcomes include inputs that are instinctually sensitive, vivid, and intent-driven, as well as feedback that is cued by trusted actors or the media. Together, these features depict a representative dreaded outcome that competes against other outcomes for attention. Yet, central to this analysis is the relative salience of an affective issue when competing against other affective stimuli.
6.4 Is there evidence of salience in Florida?
Evidence of high salience in the decision-making period during the “Summer of the Shark” can be seen in three elements. These include a.) the scope of media attention; b.) the salience-prone context and lack of competition; and c.) the speed of political attention. It is important to note that media coverage in Florida is often seen as representative of national news. Bowman, West, and Gertz (2006) note that “evidence that Florida is ‘hot’ is seen in news stories capturing national attention: the Elian Gonzalez case, shark attacks, the Gianni Versace murder” (Bowman, West, Gertz, 2006: 145). As a result, coverage of these stories can influence perceptions about issues across the country. Indeed, the “Summer of the Shark” is seen as a Florida event.
6.4.1 The scope of media attention
The scope of media attention to the “Summer of the Shark” was intense because the shark bites in Florida presented ideal media salience. They included: a.) affective sensitivity to the issue or event, b.) available media resources based on capacity or competition; and c.) exposure to a wide audience. The way this combination creates a cascade is important to note. For instance, one interviewee highlighted this point by stating:
Once they [the media] decided this was something they wanted to continue to follow, and especially as they got word of some other incidents that were happening, the media started putting all these resources into tracking what sharks were doing. They put helicopters up in the air, and of course when the helicopters went up they saw these big packs of sharks and showed this very dramatic footage (FL/M/3).
To review the media’s attention, I conducted a content analysis using a Factiva search of articles in North American news media outlets in 2001. These articles included the phrase “shark attack” between July and September and totalled 1,525. The chart below (Chart 6.6) shows a spike in coverage in the month of July brought on by the Jessie Arbogast incident. In addition, the number of articles is under-represented because the 393 articles in the month of September only includes seven days, from 1 September until 8 September.
Chart 6.6. Distribution of monthly media stories on “shark attacks” in North America in 2001.
In addition, the scope and resources dedicated to the media coverage is confirmed through media report and firsthand interviews. Beach patrol Deputy Chief Joe Wooden reported that “international media kept the shark frenzy in high gear. During a 14-day period last August; beach patrol officers conducted over 300 shark bite interviews” (Wooden, 2002).
The widespread distribution of stories regarding the shark bites reflects the high level of salience. The data in the chart (Chart 6.7) show media reports from North American news outlets that included the key words “shark attack” between 1 July 2001 and 8 September
2001. Coverage included major national television networks and newswires, including the Associated Press, Reuters, CNN, and The New York Times. This coverage also included the 30 July Time magazine’s cover, CBS Evening News, The National Review, Dateline NBC, and Rush Limbaugh’s radio program.
6.4.2 The salience-prone context and lack of competition
The summer of 2001 was a salience-prone period due to a.) the frequency of bites; and b.) the lack of competition. The first contextual issue is that the bites continued throughout the summer. This frequency provided a platform for media coverage and reinforced an aggregate negative outcome where bites in a given period (6 bites in 48 hours, 6 bites in 6 days, and 10 bites in 10 days) expanded the scope of the problem. In addition to media coverage, this had implications on people’s perceptions at the time. For instance, a New Smyrna surfer (and previous shark bite victim) stated, “so many people had been bitten in such a short window of time that, to my recollection, no one was doing much complaining about the beach being closed” (FL/M/1). In addition, one of the beach safety staff noted that the frequency and proximity of shark bites were the key issues in raising the level of
Chart 6.7. Distribution of media outlets with “shark attack” media stories in 2001 in the US
The Associated Press CBS Network CNN ABC Network NBC Network
Reuters
The New York Times
attention and concern at New Smyrna. He stated, “[w]e had three minor bites in one day and that’s really what did it” (FL/M/2). The interviewee added, “2001 was the first time we ever closed a large section of beach because of shark bites. Now we post warning signs in that area. Swim at your own risk kind of thing” (FL/M/2).
In addition, this was a quiet news period and included two holiday weekends. One interviewee noted that, “[t]here are a lot of things that make that 2001 stand out. I kinda think that one of the reasons, there wasn’t anything else going on. And the 24 news cycle has to report something and that was the flavor of the month” (FL/M/2). Another interviewee noted that the way Jessie Arbogast’s bite was “followed up with a series of other attacks in particular areas that raised some red flags in the public’s mind and pretty soon we had this phenomenon happening in the absence of no other really national news. There was nothing, the economy was pretty good that year; there were no other serious political stories. The only other story was the congressman, and so this shark story got a life of its own” (FL/M/3).
Both of these comments are supported by Eisman (2003: 56), who notes that “[t]he top four stories were – in order of most coverage to least – the wild forest fires in the Western United States, the political scandal surrounding the missing DC intern Chandra Levy, the so-called ‘Summer of the Shark,’ and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” The media attention triggered political attention.
6.4.3 The speed of political attention
There were political activities at the local, state, and federal level consistent with the high political salience of the events. The question being asked is how soon after the last shark bite was political action taken during this “Summer of the Shark” aggregation. This can be seen in the table below (Table 6.1). The review shows quick responses at multiple levels of government. First, Governor Bush visited Jessie in the hospital on 12 July 2001, six days after the incident. Secondly, the local harbourmaster at a private pier in Pensacola banned fish cleaning on piers two days after the second bite in the area, on 18
July. The pier was near the site where Jessie Arbogast was bitten and they “began the crackdown Monday because of attacks” (Kaczor, 2001). Thirdly, New Smyrna beach was closed for the first time in over 30 years on the same day as the third bite incident, on the second day. Lastly, the ban on shark feeding took place statewide three days after the fatal shark bite in Virginia.
Table 6.1 Measuring the speed of political attention to shark bites Location
Crack down on pier fishing at the local beach level State Florida
Ban of shark feeding at the state level
Meeting with family of Jessie
The actions of state representative Charlie Justice also illustrate the speed of political attention. On 24 July 2001, the news magazine program Dateline NBC had an episode on shark feeding. The following day, on 25 July, Justice released a statement with a proposal to introduce a bill to ban shark feeding in Florida. In addition, speed in political attention can also be seen in the other shark bite incidents outside of Florida. Following the fatal shark bite in Virginia, Governor Gilmore of Virginia immediately called for a task force. The announcement was made three days after the fatality, and the task force held its first meeting immediately following the press conference. The chairman of the task force noted, “[w]e do not intend to let this issue linger” (AP, 2001b).
Lastly, the state and federal governments held events to counter the media coverage heading into the summer of 2002. Florida’s Sea Grant program conducted a local conference to dispel myths from media reporting in the “Summer of the Shark,” and the National Marine Fisheries Service held an event to address misperceptions about shark
bites. At the latter, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, Tim Keeney, noted that “[w]e are here today to replace the public’s fear of Jaws with the respect and awareness of these awesome and inspiring creatures” (NOAA, 2002).
In all, the shark bites in Florida during the summer of 2001 occurred during a highly salient and salience-prone period of time. The period included included attention from media and politicians that culminated in a high-negative-affect, high salience aggregation that was represented by the name “Summer of the Shark” and connected the group of events with a dreaded outcome. This repeated intensity of emotional events without an end date created an aversion to the present situation and created a new dreaded outcome for politicians tourists who were scared of coming to Florida. As a result, these events precipitated the need for a policy entrepreneur to help relieve the aversive condition.
6.5 Evidence of the role of policy entrepreneurs and causal stories
There are four elements that provide evidence to support the argument that policy entrepreneurship and causal stories were used to advantage the shark feeding ban policy response in Florida in 2001. I focus on the role of Governor Jeb Bush as the lead pragmatic-opportunistic entrepreneur. First, the Governor was a relevant and dominant player in establishing concern about tourism during this period. Secondly, the Governor’s office attached the ban as a solution to the problem of tourist concerns regarding more aggressive sharks. Thirdly, the Governor influenced the political outcome with the FWC through his public cueing and statements, and fourthly, the Governor benefited from this engagement. These features are compared with other actors below in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 Policy entrepreneurship matrix
Entrepreneur: George Burgess Bob Diamond Erich Ritter Commissioner Meehan of FWC Governor Bush
Type of entrepreneurship TechnicalOpportunistic
Opportunistic PragmaticOpportunistic PragmaticOpportunistic Types of causal story Technical
Seen as a relevant actor?
Their solution attached to problem?
Influence political outcome?
Benefit from engagement?
Innovative Idea?
Expertise? Yes
Resilience ?
Adoption of solution?
Governor Bush was a relevant player in responding to the shark bites in Florida by supporting the victims and defending the state from sensationalized media reporting. Following the first bite incident of the “Summer of the Shark,” the governor discussed his upcoming visit to Jessie’s hospital on 12 July, stating, “I just hope he survives," and added, "[i]t's an incredible story" (Simonich, 2001). The governor then visited Jessie and his parents in the hospital and the story was reported on NBC Nightly News. Governor Bush stated, “[t]hese are wonderful parents that are totally focused on the recovery of their child” (NBC, 2001).
6.5.1 The Governor was a relevant and dominant player in establishing concern about tourism
In addition, Governor Bush’s narrative focused on the role of sensational media reporting in causing state tourism losses and the economic damage. This pitted the irresponsible media against the well-being of the state. Identifying media outlets as “the problem” is a familiar and popular approach (Crawford, 2006). The result was a message that placed the
Governor as the chief defender of the state’s good name and economic prosperity, as well as consoler for those bitten.
6.5.2 The Governor’s office attached the ban as a solution to the problem of tourists’ shark bite concerns
The Governor’s office kept an eye on the growing concern around shark bites in Florida during the “Summer of the Shark.” The first issue was identifying the problem and dreaded outcome. The problem was articulated as the media’s fixation on shark bites in Florida, not the shark bites themselves, and the dreaded outcome was identified as the loss of vital tourism in the state. The office of Governor Jeb Bush drafted a constituent letter that stated, “[t]his issue has become increasingly sensitive due to the recent highly publicized shark attack occurrences in Florida and the Bahamas” (State of Florida, 2001b). In addition, the Governor himself spoke on the issue of media reporting of shark bites in Florida on 29 August 2001, noting that ''We don't have a problem to the extent that it's being described, and the amount of coverage is disproportional to the problem that we face,'' (NY Times, 2001). The Associated Press also reported that “Bush blamed the loss of business on inflated reports of shark attacks by media outlets scrambling for material in these days of ‘24-hour, seven-days-a-week cable news’" (Branom, 2001).
The ban on shark feeding was seen as a solution because it would interrupt the string of bad news, provide a positive message, and signal to tourists that Florida was addressing the issue. These connections were noted in a 2001 letter drafted by the Governor’s office which stated, “we have received many comments from people who have told us they might stop coming to Florida altogether if ‘shark feeding’ is not banned” (State of Florida, 2001a). Indeed, the consideration of the ban provided a governable element during a period of uncertainty. McComas (2006: 77) notes that “shark attacks occurring off the coasts of Florida, Virginia, and North Carolina, including two fatal attacks around Labor Day weekend, resulted in a media ‘feeding frenzy’ that increased perceptions around the likelihood of shark ‘attacks,’ frightened vacationers away, and dampened tourism along the East Coast.” In all, sensationalized media reporting and tourist losses were
uncontested causal stories with little opposition. Their dominance was seen after the vote of the FWC in a statement by the Humane Society of the United States that, “[t]he lifeblood of Florida is tourism and this has been the summer of the shark” (AP, 2001d).
6.5.3 The governor influenced the political outcome with the FWC
The Governor and his office began to mobilize state agencies. Gannett News Service reported on 31 August that the Governor’s office had ordered that a new web page be developed by the Florida Marine Research Institute (FMRI) to counter the perception of the state as a shark bite hot spot, given tourism concerns (LaPolt, 2001). The report stated, “the governor’s tourism office last week gave the marine institute 72 hours to draw up a consumer-friendly Web page with shark facts and swimming tips” (LaPolt, 2001). The short time frame provided is consistent with a low threshold for shark bites.
While the FWC is an independent agency, it is important to note that it is also a political agency with political appointees. In 2002, a commissioner of the FWC, David Meehan, and his wife contributed USD$500 each to the re-election campaign of Governor Jeb Bush. They had also contributed in 1997 for the 1998 election campaign. Central to my argument is that this political body was influenced in its decisions by the cuing of the Governor during this intense period. This is supported by several points.
First, as early as 2000, the FWC wrote that, “[g]iven the economic benefits to the South Florida coast from providing water-related activities even the perception of a problem is a problem” (State of Florida, 2000b: 3). Secondly, two interviewees noted the politicization involved on this issue. One stated, “[i]t was a political snake pit” and added, the FWC “just caved under all this hysteria and it just became the easiest thing for them to do, just to completely to ban it period. Let’s not get into it. Figuring out how to do this well, let’s just not allow it at all” (FL/M/3). This is consistent with another interviewee who noted that “[i]t was probably a good political way to go ahead and take care of two problems with one thing and if shark attacks were reduced after this then they could lay claim to this as a policy that worked as well” (FL/M/4).
It is therefore important to note that the same time that the Governor was asking the FMRI to quickly develop a website, was personally issuing public statements, and his office was writing letters in favour of the ban, the FWC was drafting a legal framework to place shark feeding back on the agenda in a way that it could be effectively banned.
On 28 August 2001, a legal memo on the state constitutional authority of the FWC to regulate shark feeding was written by the Deputy Chief Counsel to the FWC Executive Director. It stated that, “[i]n this case, the Commission need not have conclusive scientific evidence that marine life feeding disrupts the behaviour of marine species to the detriment of those species. It need only find based on the best evidence available, that there is a risk that wildlife or marine life feeding disrupts that behaviour of those species to the extent that it may pose a danger to public safety” (State of Florida, 2001c: 2).
In short, shark feeding could be banned by the FWC without any new information. This is particularly important because in announcing the commission’s decision to ban shark feeding, commission chairman David Meehan stated, “[f]eeding marine life disrupts the natural behaviour and feeding habits of fish and other animals. That is not in the best interest of marine life, and it could pose a threat to public safety” (Marine Safety Group, 2001). The comments and actions of the governor and the governor’s office, just days before this issue was raised, cued the commission to act in favour of the ban. This is seen to be a largely political decision with ties between the parties. Indeed, Commissioner Meehan was reappointed to the FWC by Governor Bush for a second term in 2003.
6.5.4 Governor Bush benefited from the engagement
It is clear that there were benefits gained by the governor’s actions during the “Summer of the Shark.” For instance, Governor Bush was re-elected to a second term. Morevover, the Governor had filed his paperwork for re-election on 6 July 2001, the same day as the Jessie Arbrogast bite. During this period, polling showed that his re-election was uncertain. In August 2001, The New York Times reported, “A new Mason-Dixon poll conducted for Florida newspapers and broadcasters shows that just under 50 percent of
voters now have a favorable impression of Governor Bush, compared with a high of about 60 percent in April 1999” (Ayers, 2001).
Establishing exact benefits over time is made difficult given the significant impact of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. The effect these attacks had on the political climate was dramatic; however, in the period before these events, during the “Summer of the Shark,” the Governor stood to gain from a quick response, the perception of strong leadership, and the provision of a visible response.
In all, Governor Bush used his position as the state’s chief executive to influence the selection and timing of the FWC’s ban on shark feeding. He used the political process and his jurisdictional powers to signal the need for action, and the ban provided a trusted and visible symbol of government intervention. This entrepreneurial role relied on the strength of causal stories. There was no contesting Governors Bush’s authority or his narrative. In turn, Florida’s ban has been seen as successful and has led other jurisdictions to consider or enact bans of their own. The action of the Governor shepherded in the quick application of a ready-made solution consistent with the HALT framework.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the application of the HALT framework’s four element of affect, salience, policy entrepreneurship and causal stories as a means of understanding the policymaking process. It was applied to the first case study, which looked at the 2001 adoption of the shark feeding ban in Florida during the “Summer of the Shark.” At issue was the central role of the perception of a dreaded outcome. The “Summer of the Shark” was more than a label; it came to represent a heuristic for the negative high affect aggregation of shark bites as one larger, different, and more intense problem. The fear was not that there will be a shark bite or that someone will be bitten while shark feeding, but rather that shark feeding creates more aggressive sharks, which alters their intent. This was connected to tourism because while people were not going to stop coming to Florida because of minor bites on surfers, they may if Florida appeared to be training sharks to
bite people. This aggregate catastrophization embraced the most perilous imagery of shark bite outcomes and was consistent with the idea behind the rogue shark theory, that sharks can develop a taste for humans. As a result, Governor Bush stepped in to act as the entrepreneur and influenced the FWC to remove shark feeding from the agenda by passing the ban. Thus, the ban on shark feeding provided affective relief to the aggregation around both shark bites and tourism losses.
This case study on the politics of shark bites begins to illustrate the way the HALT framework provides new insight into the policy process. It highlights the way affect is linked to intent as a feature of powerful dreaded outcomes. It illustrates that responses are more likely toward aversive conditions that gain priority and have flexible policy subsystems. Indeed, given the right context, in particular the lack of competition and ability of actors to act, the priority given to these events puts pressure on the political process to respond. Entrepreneurs act to maintain power by addressing the perceived dreaded outcome rather than the objective risk from the event. In Florida, the shark feeding ban during the “Summer of the Shark” was not a knee-jerk reaction, or flip-flop, but rather a strategic move by actors to address their own dreaded outcome. As a result, the solution served to alleviate public concerns and restore confidence as a function of protecting themselves. This analysis now evaluates the HALT framework in a second shark bite policy response case study: Cape Town, South Africa. Here the policy was different, providing a valuable example for examination.
Chapter
7. Case Study #2: South Africa: Cape Town
7.1 Introduction
This chapter examines why the City of Cape Town adopted a first-of-its-kind “Shark Spotting” program in 2005 in response to a series of shark bites. The program involves placing full-time trained “lookouts” on hills and mountainsides adjacent to local residential beaches (Kock et al., 2012). Spotters use polarized binoculars to watch for the presence of sharks and alert bathers (see Picture 7.1). If a shark is located, the spotter uses a hand-held radio to notify staff on the beach, including surf lifesavers, and an alarm is sounded to alert bathers to exit the water (Kock et al , 2012). Differently colored flags are placed on the beaches to note whether sharks have been spotted and if so, how recently. If weather conditions prevent effective observation (such as clouds or wind) flags are raised to note this. Spotters work seven days a week, 365 days a year.
An initial City grant of R400,000 (approximately USD$57,000) was provided on 28 November 2005 as part of the City of Cape Town’s “Urban Renewal Programme” (City of Cape Town, 2005). In announcing the funds, City Councillor Carol Beerwinkel stated, “people from local communities and lifesaving clubs will be trained to become shark spotters and skilled in first aid to respond to any shark attacks. While building capacity and creating jobs, these programmes will also provide a valuable service to both locals
Picture 7.1 Shark Spotter on the cliffs above Fish Hoek beach
(photo courtesy of Alison Kock and Shark Spotters)
and tourists utilizing our beaches” (City of Cape Town, 2005a). The funding formalized existing programs at two beaches, created a partnership with community groups, and expanded the program to five additional beach locations.
I apply the HALT hypothesis to this case study and argue that the City of Cape Town adopted the Shark Spotting program because of four factors First, an aversion to the negative high affect and high salience nature of clustered fatal shark bites in False Bay advantaged policy entrepreneurs who could provide affective relief. Three fatal shark bites in three years were aggregated and included two people being consumed, which was representative of a dreaded shark “attack” outcome. Secondly, the Shark Spotting program was seen to provide affective relief after being employed locally. The speed of the policy response is important in this case, because the type of policy adopted relied on the perception that it would provide positive affective relief. In particular, a familiar menu of options should be adopted more quickly than newer solutions. In contrast to Florida, the first-of-its-kind response in Cape Town should have been slower in adoption until it was more proven. Thirdly, the entrepreneurs acted as pragmatic and crusaderopportunistic entrepreneurs who used insight into the system, access to decision-makers, and the availability of community-based shark spotting efforts as a ready-made solution to guide the funding of a more formal, expanded program through the city council. Lastly, a technical causal story was put forward, supported by scientists, which disqualified other shark management options as unfeasible and offered data to support shark spotting as the solution. In all, the Shark Spotting program offered a tangible risk-reduction initiative that was endorsed both as a means of affective relief and aggregation prevention.
As with Chapter 6, this analysis requires demonstrating that the policy response being reviewed was a reaction to shark bite incident(s). There is overwhelming data to support this conclusion for this case study. Responses from ten one-on-one interviews conducted in Cape Town, government document analysis, and media reports all confirm the Shark Spotters program as a response to the shark bite incidents. For instance, below is a bolded section of a City of Cape Town coastal management report (Cape Town, 2005b), covering November 2004–October 2005, which stated:
“The City has recognised the need to proactively develop safety and awareness strategies with the intention of lowering the risk of attack and minimising misinformation surrounding sharks and their threat to coastal users. As such the City has:
• Convened the City Shark Working Group with representation from MCM, PAWC, TMNP, Iziko Museums, NGO’s, SA Lifesaving, and NSRI;
• Continued to monitor and record all shark sightings;
• Worked with the AfriOceans Conservation Alliance in developing shark awareness signage;
• Provided R400 000 funding to finance the shark spotting programmes at Fish Hoek and Muizenberg and initiating similar programmes at Monwabisi, Mnandi, Blue Waters, Sunrise and Macassar beaches.”
In addition, the city noted that the goal of its 2005 investment was “a long-term approach that will ensure both the conservation of the White Shark while lowering the risk of shark attack” (City of Cape Town, 2005a). A 2006 report on Cape Town beach safety also noted that because of “increased fear by water users (particularly in False Bay), two community-driven programmes were started out of a need to improve the safety of recreational water users in 2004. The amalgamation of these two initiatives resulted in the Shark Spotting Programme” (Oelofse and Kamp, 2006: 122).
This chapter moves forward by first reviewing the political context, geographic landscape and details of the relevant shark bite incidents. It then analyzes the application of the HALT framework to review the role of affect, salience, policy entrepreneurship, and causal stories in influencing Cape Town’s adoption of the Shark Spotting program.
7.2 Cape Town context
Historically, Cape Town has had a lower number of shark bite incidents than other parts of South Africa, given the colder weather and smaller number of people in the water. A 1960 report by the United States Department of Defense noted that there had only been six reported shark bite incidents in Cape Town through 1958, compared to 29 in Durban (Schultz, 1963). However, more recently, records show more shark bites on the Cape Peninsula, which outnumber the total in KwaZulu-Natal (NSB, 2013). This change is the result, in part, of an increase in coastal recreation along the Cape brought on by removal
of apartheid laws, because the presence of “white-only” beaches and “black” beaches impacted both domestic lives and international tourism.
7.2.1
Political changes in South Africa
The transition toward democracy and the end of South African apartheid in 1994 (Rospaber, 2002) resulted in major demographic shifts, as populations were free to move about the nation, and international tourists were encouraged to visit. Prochazka and Kruger reviewed beach utilization in the Western Cape and noted, “the population of Cape Town roughly doubled in the years 1994 to 1997, following the removal of Apartheid laws restricting where people could legally live” (Prochazka and Kruger (2001: 25). This also resulted in a “tourist boom” once it was “politically acceptable” to visit the country (Prochazka and Kruger, 2001: 25), with most tourists coming from the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany. However, with new laws and increased tourism came coastal management challenges. Governance of coastal management and beach safety, including shark bites, has been described as “unclear and complex” (Oelofse, 2006: 32). Indeed, this was made more complicated by divided government, and included tensions between political parties. The Democratic Alliance (DA), has been a ruling party in the City of Cape Town, while the African National Congress (ANC) governs at the national level.
7.2.2
Location details
Geographically, Cape Town is the second largest city in South Africa (Boraine et al., 2006). It is one of the most iconic locations in the world, featuring Table Mountain and the Cape of Good Hope, which connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Indian Ocean to create a unique arrangement of marine ecosystem diversity. A feature of this geography is False Bay, a body of water that encompasses both Cape Town and Cape Point (Pictures 7.2 and 7.3). False Bay is a “biological hot spot” (Cowling et al., 1996; Neff and Yang, 2013) for southern right whales and large pods of common dolphin. False Bay is also home to Seal Island (Picture 7.3), which is approximately 14 kilometers from the
coastline and hosts upwards of 60,000 cape fur seals (Martin et al., 2005) as well as a large population of great white sharks (Kock, 2012). Coastal residents and fishermen, in addition to tourists, all share the bay with these species during the year. The beaches within False Bay are the focus of this study.
Fish Hoek and Muizenberg are two beach-side communities within False Bay that stand out in this analysis of shark bite policymaking (Picture 7.2). Fish Hoek beach is predominantly a swimming beach and known as the “bathing place for local Fish Hoek residents” (CPT/M/2) while Muizenberg is a well-known surfing beach where “you get tourists … learners or beginners” (CPT/M/2; Thompson, 2011: 2123). The two beaches are proximate to one another (10 kilometers apart) and make up a majority of Cape Town beach attendees. In addition, False Bay is home to fishing villages with trek net fishermen (also known as beach-seine fishing), who use the cliffs in Fish Hoek and other areas to spot fish and then use boats with nets attached to scoop them up and bring them into shore (Lamberth et al., 1995).
Beach-going in Cape Town is different than in many other major coastal tourist venues because the water is colder, ranging “from a mean summer temperature of 21.5°C to a mean winter temperature of 13.2°C” (Kock, 2012). As a result, coastal tourism is not just swimming; and includes paddle boarding, kayaking, eco-tourism, hiking, cultural events,
Picture 7.2 False Bay, Fish Hoek beach and Muizenberg beach
Picture 7.3 Seal Island
and general sightseeing. According to Prochazka and Kruger (2010: 25) “the primary objective of beach visitors was relaxation, with 56% engaged in passive activities.”
7.2.3 Shark bite details
There are five key shark bite incidents that influenced the policymaking process for this case study. Each took place between 2003 and 2005 and occurred within or near False Bay. In brief, the first was a fatality on a body-boarder that was seen as a tragic aberration. The second, on a surfer, was serious but non-fatal. The third shark bite involved a fatality on a grandmother during her morning swim. The fourth shark bite was non-serious, while a fifth was also fatal. The chart (Chart 7.1) notes the cumulative nature of these bites and fatalities, and a description of the events below highlights the characteristics of these incidents
On 12 September 2003, 19-year-old David Bornman was body boarding at Noordhoek beach in Cape Town, near the town of Kommetjie (Picture 7.2), a short distance (11 kilometers) from Fish Hoek beach. While there, he was bitten by a white shark and died of severe wounds on the beach. The gruesome nature of this event was amplified by a media incident that was noted by a first responder who was interviewed. They stated that they, “took some photographs of his body for forensics on the request of the doctor and the photos got out and caused mayhem” (CPT/M4).
Chart 7.1 Cumulative shark bites and fatalities in Cape Town (2003-2005)
On 5 April 2004, 16-year-old J.P. Andrews was surfing at Muizenberg beach (Picture 7.3) when he was bitten by a great white shark. His right leg was taken off at the hip and he had flat-lined when paramedics from the National Sea Rescue Institute (NSRI) arrived. As resuscitation efforts continued and he was being loaded into the ambulance, his pulse returned. Ian Klopper, the lead medic on the scene noted that “[i]n 20 years of working with massive trauma, I’ve never seen anyone come back from death like this” (Bateman 2004). Following the bite on J.P. there was a drop in surf school bookings at Muizenberg. Small business operators began paying car guards, who were located at higher vantage points, to watch for sharks. The organizer, Greg Bertish, had his phone in a plastic bag on his surfboard and if they saw a shark the guards were asked to ring him. This began the local shark-spotting effort.
On 15 November 2004, 77-year-old Tyna Webb was doing her morning swim at Fish Hoek beach around 7:00 am, 150 meters from shore, when local trek fishermen looking for fish spotted a white shark approaching her. The fishermen shouted; however, Mrs. Webb was unable to hear the warning, and onlookers watched as the shark bit Mrs. Webb a number of times. Only her swimming cap was recovered. Given her distance from the beach, surf lifesavers did not close the beach; however, this was considered a rare fully consumptive event. This was the first fatal shark bite at Fish Hoek beach in over a century.
After this event, the Fish Hoek Surf Lifesaving Club began paying local fishermen to look out from their hillside watch locations to alert them of sharks (Williams, 2004). In addition, the organizers at Muizenberg beach formalized their daily spotting efforts. However, two additional events occurred in the area. On 29 March 2005, 32-year-old Chris Sullivan of Britain was bitten on his calf and foot by a white shark while surfing at Muizenberg, resulting in non-life threatening injuries; however, there was a subsequent fatal shark bite two months later.
On 5 June 2005, Henri Murray, a student at Stellenbosch University, was bitten by a white shark while spear fishing at Miller’s Point with a friend in shallow water near
Simon’s Town (Picture 7.2). This location is also near Fish Hoek (8.6 kilometers away) and appeared to be a consumptive event, with no remains found. His friend reported that the white shark approached Henri three times. Henri was able to fend off the shark with his spear on the first two approaches but he was taken on the third.
There were five shark bite incidents and three fatalities within three years in or around False Bay before the approval of the Shark Spotting program (see Chart 7.1). In addition, there was one non-injurious shark encounter between a white shark and a kayaker, Trevor Wright, near Fish Hoek on 3 October 2005. This is not recorded as a shark “attack” in keeping with city staff member Gregg Olefse’s statement at the time that “Saturday's attack does not really qualify as a full-blown attack” (Powell, 2005).
7.3 Explaining the support for the Shark Spotters program as a policy response in Cape Town
The city’s adoption of the Shark Spotting program was influenced by the high affect nature of the shark bite events, which included the way affective characteristics build upon one another to portray a dominant dreaded outcome. A perception of intent was created by the connections between the objective reality of the white shark behaviour, the consumptive outcomes on two bathers, and the frequency of bites in a concentrated region that appeared to support theories about trainable and intent-driven rogue sharks. These negative high affect events were aggregated, which made them highly salient. This included the narrative that cage diving operations were training sharks to eat people. This was an affectively competitive narrative within local news tabloids.
The political process then opened up because community stakeholders had access to decision-makers and were concerned that politicians would assert control over the process and adopt lethal shark control policies. The political power of these community stakeholders allowed them to serve as pragmatic and crusader-opportunistic entrepreneurs. They articulated the problem and solution, influenced the city council, and gained funding for the Shark Spotting program. In short, stakeholders located themselves
as key resources for the decision-makers during a time when action was needed to provide affective relief and prevent future localized aggregations, which would prevent clustered bites. The Shark Spotting program was perceived as this solution.
I measure the HALT characteristics for this policy response by examining feedback from interviews, media coverage, government reports, and releases, as well as the HALT thermometers (Charts 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4), speed of responses, (Table 7.1) and entrepreneurship matrix (Table 7.2). Together, these illustrate the role of affect, salience, policy entrepreneurs, and causal stories in influencing the speed and direction of this policy.
7.3.1 Evidence of this case study as a negative high affect event
The Shark Spotting program was adopted in Cape Town because the high affect shark bites became seen as representative of dreaded shark “attack” outcomes. The dreaded outcome was linked to: 1.) the consumptive nature of the events, and 2.) the connection to the rogue shark theory. There was a perception that the shark bite was intentful, with frequency seen as a symptom of intent.
Consumption was critical to the instinctual fear of being eaten alive. One spotter stated, “[t]he negatives on sharks, especially after the Tyna incident, it was so traumatic and tragic. Given the fact that she was eaten completely, that was the scariest thing ever, and that actually made people want to go out and hunt the animal. With J.P., I never heard any negatives compared to the incident on Tyna” (CPT/M/2).
In addition, the rogue shark theory appeared to provide a valid historical analogy for understanding the shark bites and consumptions. Part of this was the size of the shark. One report stated that, “an exceptionally large shark, believed to be a six-metre-long Great White, seized the elderly resident of Sunny Cove, Fish Hoek, in its jaws” (Du Plessis, 2004a).
The rogue shark theory gained supporters following the second fatality. One interviewee noted that, “[t]here is a community of people on the Cape peninsula that do believe that there is a rogue shark that is responsible for all these attacks (CPT/F/1). There was a call for the shark to be killed based on the perceived link between the consumption of Tyna Webb and Henri Murray.” The interviewee added, “[t]he media does link it back to the other attack on Tyna, saying ‘same spot’ and there are quotes or innuendo that it’s the same animal that has come back, so I think it is quite prevalent” (CPT/F/1). Under the rogue shark theory, the only way to address the problem of sharks that have a taste for human blood is to kill them (Coppleson, 1958).
Support for this action included a statement from Henri Murray’s father, who was quoted as saying, “that particular shark is dangerous and if we can stop it, we should” (Morrison, 2005). This sentiment was echoed by Godfrey Mocke of the local organization Swimsafe Project who stated, “[a]nimals have a way of communicating and we should teach them to respect our territory.” He added, “[i]f you stick a grenade down its throat you send a clear message to the sharks this is not a safe place to hunt” (du Venage, 2005). This narrative is consistent with both the militarization and criminalization of shark behaviour. In response to these comments, Geremy Cliff of the Natal Sharks Board and the City’s Shark Working Group stated that the theory was false. Gregg Oelofse from the City stated, “[n]o evidence has shown that sharks become so-called ‘rogue sharks,’ ‘man-eaters,’ or ‘problem animals'” (Morrison, 2005).
In addition, a narrative and group of actors emerged to explain these events by blaming commercial cage-diving operations at Seal Island for, essentially, training sharks to associate humans with food. This provided a target for the public and media. Activists argued that cage diving was contributing to the shark bites through their chumming activities, in which fish oil is mixed with fish particles to create a slick that attracts sharks to tourist boats. This causal story appeared to link all of the shark bites and dreaded outcomes together, in which rogue sharks may have been trained to come after swimmers.
This narrative was articulated by a local organization, the Shark Concern Group, which called on the Environment Minister to ban chumming from cage diving boats (Gosling, 2004). South African Shark bite survivor Craig Bovim founded the Shark Concern Group in 2004 after he was bitten by a white shark in 2002. On 14 June 2005 he wrote a letter to the national government on behalf of himself and 16 others (including Greg Bertish) that connected shark cage dive operations, and specifically the practice of chumming the water, with the recent spate of shark bites. He stated, “[w]e request urgent action to ban the use of baits, attractants and ‘chumming’ for shark viewing by tourists in South Africa.” (Surfvillage.com, 2005).
Measuring affective concerns regarding these issues is difficult. However, I reviewed community concerns noted in town hall meetings as well as in holiday bookings. The dreaded outcome from consuming rogue sharks was seen as related to personal safety, the lack of water use, and the economy. One interviewee noted that “[p]eople will not come to Cape Town to swim. If you say you live in Fish Hoek they [people] will say that’s the land of the great white shark. That is a world-wide thing” (CPT/M/3).
The business impact was significant, if localized. One interviewee stated that, “[a]t Muizenberg in 2003, when J.P. lost his leg to a white shark, it really hammered the local surf board industry” (CPT/M/1). Another interviewee noted that they attended a number of Fish Hoek town hall meetings between 2004 and 2005 and, “there was a lot of interest, and at the end there was a huge divide between the people. You would have someone stand up and say the sharks are a problem we should get rid of them, and then others standing up” to protect them (CPT/F/1). The business losses in Fish Hoek were also noted by a number of interviews. One interviewee stated that “[w]hen there has been shark attacks at Fish Hoek, less people go to Fish Hoek beach on a Saturday afternoon” (CPT/M/1). While another said, “[t]he cost to tourism is extensive; it has affected the bucket and spade brigade. And Fish Hoek particularly has been a seaside resort where people can come and bring their families.” They added, “From a management point of view, if you talk to guest houses or hotels, they will you that their occupancies are down” (CPT/M/3). In all, the fear of white sharks consuming bathers had an impact on local life.
7.3.2 Distinguishing high affect events and policy responses from previous episodes
This period involved three fatalities over three years; however, the city’s policy response to formally fund the Shark Spotting program occurred only after the last of these events. While the number of reported incidents suggests an aggregation, and policy response could have occurred with the fatal shark bite on Tyna Webb, it did not because the event was not seen to be representative of a dreaded outcome. To review the differences between the three fatal incidents, the HALT thermometers (Charts 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4) are used to identify the characteristics of input and feedback.
There are key differences in the affect, salience, entrepreneurship, and causal stories for the events. For instance, David Bornman’s fatal incident was the first of the perceived series and therefore not linked to other events. Tyna Webb was swimming far from shore, 150 meters out, and was described by friends and family as knowing the risks at that distance. In addition, following the shark bite fatality on Tyna, there was no consensus regarding solutions. Suggestions for exclusion nets or culling by other actors were shown to be unfeasible, and those actors lacked access to the Council.
Not every high affect event leads to a response. As one interviewee noted, “[t]he day that somebody’s daughter is bitten all bets are off. A lot of it depends on who is bitten, what the activity was, the information that’s been provided beforehand, how well informed that person and their family are” (CPT/M/1). For instance, while Henri Murray’s father may have acted as an accidental entrepreneur to promote killing the shark responsible, Tyna Webb’s daughter acted as an accidental entrepreneur to provide affective relief and challenge calls to hunt the shark.
Following Tyna’s death, the Cape Argus newspaper reported that “[e]motions are running high after a shark killed an elderly woman in the Fish Hoek bay on Monday morning, and calls for the shark to be killed and for shark nets at swimming spots are on the rise” (Smetherham, 2004). Negative policy responses, however, were stymied by the accidental entrepreneurship of Tyna’s daughter. Isabelle Spies, one of Tyna's daughters, spoke out
regarding the need to protect white sharks from revenge attacks, stating, “[m]y mother would be horrified (by this). She had such a respect for life in any form” (Morrison, 2005). She added, "a revenge attack would be the last thing that my mom, who was such a gentle person, would want. She said that she respected the shark's dominion, that when she went swimming she knew she was entering their domain. My mom's wishes should be respected. She was the person who was attacked, after all" (Smetherham, 2004).
The third fatal incident with Henri Murray presented a number of different features. First, there was a more compelling causal story based on a pattern of intent-based shark bites. Secondly, there were effective policy entrepreneurs. Thirdly, there was an emerging solution. Fourthly, there was added pressure from competing groups. There was also the fear among community stakeholders regarding the involvement of politicians who were considering installing shark culling measures. The potential for these competing proposals (Dudley et al., 2006: 118) advanced the entrepreneurial pace of work in Cape Town. A 2006 specialist report notes that, “in 2005, the NSB was approached by a local interest group who proposed that the concept [of shark nets] be revisited” (Dudley et al., 2006: 118). An expansion of influential actors would have disadvantaged insiders unless they were able to pre-empt any policy decision.
The shark bite event on Henri Murray became a policy response because the negative high affect event was seen as a dreaded and distressing problem condition for the public and shark conservation-minded community stakeholders. The incident appears to have crossed the threshold based on the dreaded outcome of a killer shark preying on the region, and that placed pressure on the stakeholders to act as entrepreneurs and pre-empt the policy process. The Henri Murray event represented the aggregation as the third fatal event in three years. Kock and Johnson (2006: 1) note that “there has also been a localized spate of shark bite incidents on beaches along the Cape Penninsula.” Cliff (2006: 20) also noted that the cluster included “Four of the attacks were fatal, three of which were in the last three years.” As a result, the dreaded-outcome aggregation of this event yields a policy opportunity, because the policy window opens at a time when the stakeholder
entrepreneurs had access to the Council and a newly conceived, but still ready-made, solution was available in the Shark Spotter program.
Chart 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 Comparing HALT elements for three shark bite fatalities: David Bornman in 2003, Tyna Webb in 2004, and Henri Murray in 2005.
David Bornman (2003)
High Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Type of shark (affect)
Severity of injury to victim (affect)
Age of victim (affect)
Race of victim (affect)
Event feedback:
Media reporting (salience)
Perceived as representative of a dreaded outcome (causal story w/ affect)
Availability (salience)
Perceived intent (causal story w/ affect)
Low Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Sex of victim
Activity of victim
Proximity of event to a high exposure media market
Objective frequency of events together on a locality
Presence of competitive affective stimuli
Event feedback:
Location
Frequency of event
Local only or national media
Tyna Webb (2004)
High Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Type of shark (affect)
Severity of injury to victim (affect)
Sex of victim (affect)
Race of victim (affect)
Location (salience)
No presence of competitive affective stimuli (salience)
Proximity of event to a high exposure media market (salience)
Objective frequency of events together on a locality (salience/affect)
Event feedback:
Media reporting (salience)
Frequency of event (salience)
Perceived intent (causal story w/ affect)
Perceived as representative of a dreaded outcome (causal story w/ affect)
Availability (salience)
Local only or national media (salience)
Policy response (shark spotter)
Low Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Age of victim
Activity of victim
Event feedback: Policy entrepreneur
Henri Murray (2005)
High Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Type of shark (affect)
Severity of injury to victim (affect)
Age of victim (affect)
Sex of victim (affect)
Race of victim (affect)
Location (salience)
No presence of competitive affective stimuli (salience)
Proximity of event to a high exposure media market (salience)
Objective frequency of events together on a locality (salience/affect)
Event feedback:
Media reporting (salience)
Frequency of event (salience)
Perceived intent (causal story w/ affect)
Perceived as representative of a dreaded outcome (causal story w/ affect)
Available (imaginable)
Local only or national media
Policy entrepreneur
Policy response (meeting)
Low Affect Characteristics
Event details: Activity of victim
Event feedback: N/A
7.4 Is there evidence of salience in Cape Town?
There is evidence that shows that shark bite events in Cape Town were highly salient based on two factors: 1.) heightened local media attention and international coverage, and 2.) the speed of political attention. In addition, I suggest that the salience-prone nature of Cape Town tabloid newspapers contributed to the aggregation of events.
7.4.1 The scope of media attention
Domestic and international media attention in Cape Town peaked with the incident on Tyna Webb. One interviewee noted that “[p]rior to Tyna, there was no media machine” (CPT/M/4). After the event, the Cape Times reported that “many people have phoned radio show hosts and written letters to MCM [Marine and Coastal Management] saying the shark should be killed” (Smetherham, 2004).
7.5 Comparison
The chart (Chart 7.5) reviews the number of Factiva-related media stories and Cape Argus reports within two weeks of each incident, using the name as the key-words. Factiva’s
Chart
of shark bite media stories in Factiva and Cape Argus
David Bornman Tyna Webb
Henri Murray
Factiva Media Stories
Cape Argus Media Stories
data archives do not include any Cape Argus stories before 2006. The analysis shows the high interest in the incident on Tyna Webb with 36 stories from domestic and international sources, which included Reuters, Agence France Presse, the Associated Press, and the Wall Street Journal. The nature of this event made it a representative dreaded outcome for other shark bite incidents. Interestingly, there was relatively little interest in the David Bornman incident in either search and more Cape Argus stories on Henri Murray than Tyna Webb.
The increased international attention to shark bites in Cape Town was also evident in first-responder actions after the bites. A responder who was interviewed noted:
When we have a shark-related incident it is a high profile incident and we have to be seen to be doing everything. We have international press watching us. We have got to have a helicopter there, we have to have rescue boats there, and by nature of the shark attack the patient has been devoured in a couple of the incidents; however, we have to remain searching for a couple of days because it looks like we are not doing anything, while the eyes of the world are upon us (CPT/M/4).
As a result of these concerns and attention, first responder actions on the scene essentially served to provide affective relief to the incident. The same first responder noted that these issues were present following the Tyna Webb incident:
Tyna Webb, there was no doubt that the patient was dead but because of the severity of the attack there is a high possibility of body parts being left behind and one of the major fears was that a body part, a head, an arm, a leg could wash up and cause mayhem if found by members of the public, photographed and then disseminated. Can you imagine a severed head washing up and a couple of days later those photos doing the rounds and then mass hysteria of multimedia (CPT/M4).
7.4.2
The speed of political attention
A review of the temporal political attention given to these events examines the speed of salience toward shark bites in Cape Town. Responses at Muizenberg and Fish Hoek beaches include closing the beach (local surf lifesavers), helicopter patrols (volunteer services) and local community meetings (by the city). The table below (Table 7.1) collates these response times. For instance, at Muizenberg one interviewee noted that, “[a]fter J.P. Andrews was attacked, a Shark Working Group was set up and said who’s in charge of what” (CPT/M/4).
At Fish Hoek, one Surf Club member noted that following the bite on Tyna Webb, “It is intense, we have to, and the City of Cape Town have to, be seen to be doing something about it” (CPT/M/3). This local community-based response was rapid. The 2006 report notes, “[f]ollowing the attack on Mrs. Webb, the shark spotting programmes at both beaches grew in stature, as well as formality, overnight” (Oelofse and Kamp, 2006: 122).
On 17 November 2004, two days after the shark bite on Tyna Webb, the Fish Hoek life savers announced a response plan. They stated that in addition to a louder siren and flags on the beach, “[s]teps are being taken to employ a trek fisherman spotter on a permanent basis from 07h00 to 19h00 throughout the peak season at times when the Trek Fishermen are not spotting for fish. This will be subject to sponsorship being found” (Williams, 2004).
Following the fatal shark bite on Henri Murray, additional steps were also taken. For instance, “[i]n June 2005, the city and its key partners, DEAT and WWF, started a process to assess the full range of possible causes and potential management responses so as to accurately inform the decision-making process” (Nel, 2006). This included a Shark Working Group meeting on 8 June that issued three points. First, it stated that there would continue to be scientific montoring of sharks. Secondly, there would be an ongoing process to consider beach safety and an external review of cage diving. And thirdly, it noted that rogue sharks do not exist (Morrison, 2005).
These responses are consistent with the HALT model. To meet the HALT requirements, there would be an expectation of speed following the aggregation. Here we see that three days following the Henri Murray bite, the city has increased its speed and held a meeting. Future stimuli after the Trevor Wright incident are also consistent with HALT, with the city endorsement of local shark spotting efforts
Table 7.1 Reviewing the
JP Andrews (05 Apr 2004)
Tyna Webb (15 Nov 2004)
Chris Sullivan (29 Mar 2005)
Murray (05 Jun 2005)
companies
companies
(03 Oct 2005)
At first, however, the delay in city funding appears to violate the HALT hypothesis. The incidents were high affect, highly salient, and aggregated. Moreover, the weaker policy network at the city level and the presence of entrepreneurs would appear to present ideal
HALT conditions. Indeed, while the response from the local actors was fast (24–72 hours), the policy response from the city was relatively slower (56 days). However, there is one important factor to consider. The hypothesis stated that the speed of policy responses was influenced by the degree to which it provided recognized affective relief, which suggested historically analogous path dependencies. Therefore, the speed of responses is subject to established norms (such as familiar shark hunts, bans, or shark nets) or perceived solutions to a problem. In Cape Town, we see a first-of-its-kind program in Shark Spotting, whose feasibility and affective value are unknown. As a result, we should expect the policy response process to be slow until the program has proven to provide affective relief. Thus, availability of policy responses is tied to presence
of affective competition, the recognition of positive affective relief, and the strength of the policy subsystem. These are linked because even if a subsystem is weak, selecting desired responses can be resistant in the face of unproven affective relief. In this case, the existing ready-made solutions were taken off the table, providing an uncertainty to the proposed options, and there was no pre-existing expectation that the city would get involved. Also impacting this response was the salience-prone nature of media coverage.
7.4.3 The salience-prone context of tabloid reporting in South Africa
Tabloid newspapers may have contributed to the salience-prone context of these shark bite episodes because of their increased circulation and readership among South Africans as well as their more aggressive reporting. A review of public perceptions of tabloid reporting by Wasserman (2008) found that tabloids have created a “newspaper revolution” in South Africa. Tabloids are among the best-selling papers in the country, including Cape Town, and there is widespread support for tabloids because they are seen as more representative of the public and consistent with the breaking down of elite systems that came with the downfall of apartheid. Wasserman (2008) notes how Cape Town residents feelings about tabloids. They stated:
We read (in the tabloids) about murders, drugs, baby rapes things that happen every day. The other newspapers don’t give enough attention to those problems. Drugs are a big problem here on the Cape Flats. The small newspapers (tabloids HW) spell it out for you: this is the problem, what is the government doing about it? The big newspapers don’t have many stories about it.
The connection between shark bites and tabloid coverage in Cape Town can be seen in daily coverage. In 2006, the Finding a Balance specialist report on human-shark interactions in Cape Town noted the shifting priorities of the media. It stated, “[i]ncreased competition and a shift of journalistic values in certain quarters has contributed to more active searches for ‘shock’ stories, i.e. those that titillate the public and promote sales. Needless to say, an examination of current weekly tabloids confirm that ‘shark eats man’ is a bestselling story line” (Rochat, 2006: 151). In short, the connection between reporting on shark bites and criminal activity conflates the issues and furthers the criminalization process.
In all, the shark bites continued to be considered important relative to other competitive issues because the aggregation of bites represented an escalated and aversive state. This sustained distress prompted political actors to look for options, which resulted in the opening of a policy window. The city’s consideration of Shark Spotting as a formal, longterm policy response, however, would require that it provide affective relief to this problem condition.
7.5 Evidence of Shark Spotters providing affective relief and policy windows
Policy responses must demonstrate that they provide affective relief to be utilized by actors. For some, this is assumed; however, for a first-of-its-kind program, this policy process would take time. The Shark Spotters program evolved through experimentation and was seen to provide affective relief through a.) historically analogous success, b.) feedback from the public and organizations, and c.) the absence of a shark bite during its use.
7.5.1 Shark Spotters’ affective relief
Shark Spotting did not begin as the program it is today. In Muizenberg car guards phoned down to surf camps as a business program to customers and in Fish Hoek trek fishmen were hired by the Fish Hoek Surf Lifesaving Club to help watch their trainees and nippers. Indeed, one interviewee noted that the city adopted and boosted the Shark Spotter program, “once it was proven to be effective” (CPT/M/2). One interviewee stated, “[t]he city couldn’t get involved from the beginning because they didn’t know if it was going to be effective or not” (CPT/M/2). The program was designed only for the specific groups, and community stakeholders noted that the process emerged through “trial and error” (CPT/M/1). In addition, a Cape Argus report noted that “short-term shark protection methods included aircraft patrols and increasing the number of lookout points along beaches in the Cape” (Roelf, 2004). Indeed, shark spotting was not seen as a viable long term option. An entrepreneur noted that it emerged from a “bit of trial and error” and that they “stumbled onto it” (CPT/M/1).
The success of local trek fishermen was seen as a historically supportive model for shark spotting. An entrepreneur noted that trek fishers “were really the starting point” (CPT/M/1). This story was echoed by one of the first spotters at Muizenberg who was interviewed and stated, “[o]n the Muizenberg side, they adopted the fishermen thing, because at Fish Hoek they had fishermen who spotted and sometimes saw sharks and they would alert the people. So that the whole idea was adopted from Fish Hoek, from basic fishermen, and that was it” (CPT/M/2). This model can be seen to have provided affective relief based on the way it “restored a significant degree of confidence” to water users. Another interviewee from Fish Hoek added, “traditionally, the fishermen have been using fish spotting from those same positions for a hundred years. And so it was a natural progression for people to stand on the mountain and try to see the sharks, which would be a way of forewarning those on the beach” (CPT/M/3).
Making “fish watching” work as “shark spotting” involved logistical hurdles despite its history within the fishing communities and the ability for anyone to see sharks from the hillside. This required both a practical and historical approach as well as feedback from the public to endorse the program. At the local level, shark spotting began to emerge as an effective confidence-building measure. One of the Shark Spotters at Muizenberg was interviewed and noted that “after JP they had to do something that would actually be reassuring [to] their customers that they were at least doing something that will actually try to prevent the attacks from happening” (CPT/M/2). The effectiveness of this system was affirmed by Martin Williams, the Chairperson of the Fish Hoek Life Saving Club, who stated, “[t]he fact that people were out of the water within a minute of a shark alert shows that the system is working" (Gophe, 2004). Another interviewee stated, “[t]he reaction from the parents and the lifesavers was you need to do something” (CPT/M/3).
In addition, shark spotting was also the easiest option. At Fish Hoek, one of the Surf Life Saving Club members explained the adoption by stating that, “[i]t’s the easiest, it was an easier decision to make because the Cape peninsula and particularly Fish Hoek is unique, in that we have the shark, we have reasonably clear waters, and we have extensive vantage points because of the various mountains that we have around here” (CPT/M/3).
Other infeasible options were taken off the table. At Fish Hoek, the interviewee stated that “[t]he net itself is not a solution” (CPT/M/3) because of the kelp, sharks, whales and other sealife. They added, “[t]here was no way that shark nets, as we have on the Natal coast, would not be a solution” (CPT/M/3). One of the key factors was community values toward marine life on the Cape. “We have a history of conserving wildlife. We have gone past the shoot to kill to try and solve the problem, we are way beyond that” (CPT/M/3).
Another interviewee echoed these comments, noting “[w]e have a history of conservation, like the national parks and conserve other dangerous animals,” and “us[e] the shark as a tourist commodity to have a balance rather than getting rid of the problem” (CPT/M/5).
Lastly, the absence of a reported shark bite at a beach while a Shark Spotter was in operation was significant in building support.
7.5.2
The Shark Spotters window of opportunity
Responses from the city varied as the policy window opened. On 17 November 2004, Robin Carlisle, the environment spokesperson for the Democratic Alliance (DA) stated, "[t]he provincial and municipal authorities must now decide upon a policy that will reduce to acceptable levels the risk of swimming in our seas" (Smetherham, 2004).
On 4 December 2004 a media report noted that, “The City of Cape Town this week formed a working group that will include a wide network of people to work on sharkrelated issues” (Bamford, 2004). Fish Hoek DA Ward Councilor Felicity Purchase noted that the early-warning system was working and that a trust fund was being set up to pay fishmen on the cliffs (Bamford, 2004). The councilor stated, “[i]f a fisherman sees a shark he will radio law enforcement and the lifesavers, the siren will sound and the flag will go up” (Bamford, 2004).
This continued following the shark encounter with Trevor Wright and his kayak in October 2005. Gregg Olofse of the city stated, “[w]e also recommend that people swim at Muizenberg and Fish Hoek where there are shark-watching programmes" (Cape Times,
2005). Therefore, the endorsement of the “shark-watching” program had become part of the immediate response.
The responses locally and at the city level were quick and consistent with the HALT hypothesis. We would expect the known responses to be faster than unknown responses. This would begin to explain why the meetings and working groups were more immediate and the Shark Spotting program took longer. Indeed, the delay by city authorities was criticized in the Finding a Balance Report. Oelofse and Kamp (2006) note that, “[a]ctive involvement by authorities in the shark spotting programmes and in providing financial assistance were slow in response to a clear community safety need” (Oelofse and Kamp, 2006: 123). In addition, they state:
Both spotting programmes, particularly the Muizenberg programme made continued requests to the City for assistance for both equipment and funding. Little or no help to the two programmes was forthcoming from the Council. It was only after 12 months, in November 2005 that the City finally provided an initial R400,000 of funding for the two existing programmes as well as commitment to expanding the shark spotting to additional areas.
At issue is the selection of this policy response for adoption following a series of shark bites. Interestingly, blame was largely shifted away from the sharks involved and instead focused on people as the problem. Some suggested that Tyna knew the risks and that the chumming by local cage diving operations in False Bay was causing the shark bites. In turn, the aggregation of dreaded outcomes was not about blame, but rather the close proximity of fatal events on an area and the signal of a change in shark behaviour. In response, community-level affective relief was fast at Fish Hoek and Muizenberg. However, the unresolved issue of water-user governance in Cape Town (and more broadly in most of South Africa) slowed down the process. Indeed, there was little expectation of a state or national level response given that none had occurred since the Durban episode in 1957. Thus, community stakeholder entrepreneurs needed to construct an institutional framework for dealing with shark bite issues.
7.6 Evidence of policy entrepreneurs and causal stories
The community stakeholders are seen as the entrepreneurs for their role in influencing the City of Cape Town’s adoption of the Shark Spotting program. They were seen as relevant actors, connected the program as the solution to an ongoing problem, influenced the outcome, and gained a benefit from the engagement. What we see are the actions of key insiders who are well-placed to be both pragmatic and crusading-opportunistic entrepreneurs. They used technical information to construct a causal story that eliminated shark nets and drum lines from consideration and installed their program as the desired outcome.
The emergence of Shark Spotting as a city program comes as a competition for policy space grew following Henri Murray’s incident. Local actors including the Muizenberg small businesses, Natal Sharks Board, the Fish Hoek Surf Life Saving Club, the Shark Concern Group, and Swimsafe all competed with options and responses to the shark bite incidents. The HALT policy entrepreneur matrix below (Table 7.2) is used to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the actors in this process.
Table 7.2. HALT Policy entrepreneur matrix
Entrepreneur: Mike Schippleroot Greg Bertish Geremy Cliff Craig Bovim Community Stakeholders
Type of entrepreneurship
Types of causal story
Seen as a relevant actor?
Their solution attached to problem?
Influence political outcome?
Benefit from engagement?
Opportunistic
Opportunistic
Opportunistic
Crusading Pragmatic/CrusaderOpportunistic
7.6.1 Stakeholder entrepreneurs were relevant and dominant players in establishing policy
The pragmatic and crusading-opportunistic entrepreneurs were seen as relevant actors by political decision-makers and other groups. They exercised political power as leading participants of important meetings, including the city’s Shark Working Group. The entrepreneurs’ positions located them within the solution-making process. In addition, other groups noted that “[they] were the instigator[s]” (CPT/F/1). An interviewee stated that as policy decisions were being made among the groups “there were a lot of little get togethers” (CPT/F/1). Indeed, given the local nature of the initial community-based responses, a number of inside stakeholders are more likely to be involved as entrepreneurs in the policy process.
7.6.2 Community stakeholders attached the Shark Spotting as the solution to the problem of shark bite concerns
The pragmatic and crusading entrepreneurs did three things to attach the solution to the problem, including 1.) providing photographic data of sharks near local beaches, 2.) institutionalizing the program by attaching it to job creation, and 3.) disqualifying other options. First, the entrepreneurs illustrated the degree to which the problem was not isolated or going away. Cliff watching had begun in 2004, and these data were used to place Shark Spotting on the council’s agenda. An entrepreneur noted that data were used to convey the importance of “invest[ing] in some kind of shark safety measures.” (CPT/M/1).
As a result, the Shark Spotting solution was identified as an early-warning system to keep sharks near the in-shore from coming into contact with people. Importantly, the issue was not simply the presence of sharks but the concentrated localization of sharks and people that increased the chances of multiple proximate events, as previously seen. Moreover, the concern was that another cluster of shark bites could spiral out of control and lead toward a shark cull. An entrepreneur summed this issue up by stating:
[The] strategy was to reduce the frequency and extend the time periods between these events and then people have a tolerance to absorb them.” They added, “So our concern at the time was that we recognized very quickly that if we have 3, 4 or 5 very serious or fatal shark attacks in the space of a couple of months then we would lose control of the situation and social pressure would be brought to bear on political decision makers who would without question bring in the kinds of control measures that we were trying desperately to avoid which is, as you dress it up as shark nets or drum lines (CPT/M/1).
The problem of frequency and concentration in Cape Town was echoed by a number of experts. Dudley (2006: 104) notes the relationship between shark bites and policy responses stating that “it would appear that responses are initiated when frequency of shark attack reaches a level such that there are negative economic consequences and/or there is sustained public demand.” This is consistent with an interviewee who stated, “I think one of the critical variables when it comes to the fallout of a shark bite incident is the amount of time in between those incidents” (CPT/F/1).
Indeed, the role of Shark Spotters in providing both affective relief and aggregation prevention was significant in its role as a solution. One entrepreneur stated, “[t]he first premise for the shark spotting program was to put in place something which would create a buffer between the events that are going to take place on our coastline and to try and mitigate, as much as we could, to try and prevent a situation where we lost control of the social demand by people on the politicians” (CPT/M/1). In addition, Oelofse (2006: 39) adds “[i]f it were not for two community-driven programmes, although only speculation at this point, it is highly likely that in the last 18 months there could have been more injuries and fatalities in Cape Town, and governance may well have found themselves in a very different situation.” Therefore, the Shark Spotting program, as an aggregation prevention tool, was visible to inside and outside actors.
A second premise for the program was the employment and training of local Shark Spotters. The program provided a valued asset to the community, consistent with a move toward capacity-building around tourist activities in South Africa (Binns and Nel, 2002: 242). Local governments had been asked to adopt “pro-poor” strategies that emphasized community development and alleviated poverty (Binns and Nel, 2002: 236). Job creation was a key component (Binns and Nel, 2001: 237) and the jobs created by the Shark
Spotter program were a structural and institutional asset. One interviewee noted the importance of job creation stating, “Twenty-two people for a change can put food on the table and that makes a big difference for the community” (CPT/M/2).
Thirdly, other options could not be attached to the problem because they were seen as unfeasible. The entrepreneurs used technical causal stories provided by scientists regarding the residence patterns of white sharks in Cape Town. For instance, an article in the Cape Argus noted the swimming region of sharks with Geremy Cliff from the Natal Sharks Board (Du Plessis, 2004). The article states that white sharks do “not necessarily remain in a certain range and could travel vast distances in the course of their lives” (Du Plessis, 2004). This meant to the stakeholders that traditional shark nets (those used in Durban and Sydney) would likely be ineffective.
In all, the program was attached as the solution to the problem because, as they noted: “we had to do something” and “the program was the best bet at meeting those objectives. One, bring some level of safety and some confidence to people to use that space and to retain it as a useful space” (CPT/M/1). The Shark Spotter program providing affective relief was reasonable because “there is no alternative for us at the moment” and helped with a core goal of “job creation” (CPT/M/1).
7.6.3 Community stakeholders influenced the outcome
The entrepreneurs influenced the outcome first by pre-empting the search for other solutions with support for the Shark Spotting program, and secondly by working with the media. The city council’s preliminary funding of the program in 2005 essentially adopted it as the solution at the start of the process. Secondly, the entrepreneurs noted that numerous discussions with reporters, attention to the news cycle, and understanding the needs of journalists and editors aided their efforts. As a result, the entrepreneurs were able to place stories that were advantageous to both parties and which supported ongoing discussions with the city council.
7.6.4
Community stakeholders benefited from the outcome
The entrepreneurs are seen to have benefited from their engagement in the process because it kept the issue out of the hands of politicians. In addition, the city supported further funding for the program in 2007 under a five-year allocation, which was renewed in 2012. The pragmatic and crusader-opportunistic entrepreneurs guided the Spotters program through the process and were able to institutionalize the program.
In all, the entrepreneurs’ skills and causal story were used as political instruments to influence the city’s adoption of the Shark Spotting program, leave the issue in the hands of experts, and prevent the adoption of other measures that could kill sharks. The causal story that the Shark Spotting program was successful (like trek netters) and that this program provided needed jobs was also strong. Lastly, the political analysis of the entrepreneurs was consistent with the HALT framework. The Shark Spotting policy response was intended to address the way multiple negative high affect shark bites can be highly salient episodes that lower policy thresholds and invite policy proposals. As a result, the Shark Spotting policy attempts to prevent future aggregations, thus improving beach safety and keeping stakeholders in control of the policy process.
7.7
Conclusion
This chapter applied the HALT framework to the second case study in Cape Town. It examined why the City of Cape Town adopted the Shark Spotting program following a series of shark bite incidents. The HALT analysis has demonstrated the way affective characteristics, high salience periods, and causal stories influenced the dominance of dreaded outcomes to lower policy thresholds and open political windows. In addition, the presence of policy entrepreneurs, namely the community stakeholders, with access to the decision-making process, and a positively affective ready-made solution influenced the process and led to the adoption of the innovative Shark Spotting program.
There are a number of key points taken from the case study that affirm the HALT framework. First, the illusory corollary is profound. Available events that seem representative are connected, and historical analogies build upon these events. Indeed, the frequency of incidents appears to prove the theory and serve as evidence of intent. Secondly, time is a key variable in this analysis. The temporal connection between the presence of the Shark Spotting program and the absence of shark bites at those beaches was seen as causal relationship and furthered an endorsement of the program. Once the program was seen to provide affective relief, policy entrepreneurs promoted the program through the council as a means of aggregation prevention. Thirdly, while policy responses occurred quickly in keeping with the HALT framework, the first-of-its-kind measure took longer. Fourthly, the aggregation represented the dreaded outcome of intentful sharks based on their connection to historical analogies and proximate events This narrative added to the aggregating factors of the case. Lastly, it is important to note that while there may be reasons why one high affect issue triggers a policy response but another does not, the differences are lost in the aggregate interpretation of events as they become linked as one larger, more intense event.
Chapter 8. Case Study #3: Australia: New South Wales
8.1 Introduction
This chapter uses the HALT framework to examine why the state of New South Wales (NSW) adopted aerial shark patrols for local beaches following a series of shark bites in 2009 that the media dubbed Australia’s “Summer of the Shark” (Owen, 2009). The program entailed helicopter observation passes over populated beaches at approximately 500 feet for two minutes at a time in the mornings and late afternoons. If a shark or bait fish were seen, the observer documented the sighting and reported it to the beach. Funding for the program was announced on 11 November 2009 by the Minister for Primary Industries Ian Macdonald, who stated, “[t]he trial will include the 51 beaches that are currently part of the New South Wales shark meshing program. The shark meshing program covers approximately 202 kilometres of coastline between Newcastle and Wollongong, which includes the most popular and heavily frequented beaches of the Sydney metropolitan area” (Parliament of NSW, Legislative Council, 11 November 2009). Initial funding of AUD$150,000 was provided for the trial.
I investigate this final case study by looking at the role of affect, salience, policy entrepreneurship and causal stories. I argue that NSW adopted the aerial patrols based on three factors: First, the cluster of three shark bites in 19 days within Sydney were negative
Picture 8.1 Newspaper cover of a Bull shark in 2009 in Sydney Harbour
high affect and high salience events that were aggregated becaususe they were seen as representative of a dreaded shark “‘attack”’ outcome. This aggregation made the “‘problem of sharks”’ more memorable to the public and attractive to the media. Secondly, positive feelings toward aerial shark patrols along beaches, which date back to the 1930’s in Ausustralia, provided a ready-made, positively affective policy option.
Thirdly, a policy entrepreneur, namely Minister Macdonald, lowered the policy threshold for adopting aerial patrols to gain positive media coverage during a period of controversy around other events.
In particular, this analysis shows the way in which a series of negative events for Minister Macdonald during consideration of shark bite policy responses effectively created a HALT within a HALT situation. In 2009, the Minister faced negative media stories, was demoted within the Cabinet, and calls grew for his resignation. As a result, he used his role as Minister to open a policy window and adopt aerial patrols, which were much more popular than him, and to gain media attention that interrupted the bad news cycles. Thus, the Minister attempted to interrupt a negative high affect period in his life by introducing positively affective relief and announcing aerial patrols to improve his image. Central to this analysis is the Government’s position, which had been opposed to funding aerial patrols since 2007, and which was affirmed immediately following the cluster of shark bites in March 2009.
In short, Minister Macdonald used his centralized control over this policy domain to a.) select the policy option, b.) manipulate the timing of the policy announcement, and c.) exploit the positive affective value of the policy by directing its timetable for use and distribution to gain positive media stories.
As with previous chapters, this examination requires demonstrating how the policy is a response to shark bite incident(s). The evidence supports this assertion because the political value of the policy response relied on its relationship to the shark bites. For instance, in announcing the funding to Parliament, Minister Macdonald began by stating, “[t]here is no doubt the shark, and fear of shark attack, has a special place in the
Australian psyche” (Parliament of NSW, Legislative Council, 11 November 2009). And he added, “a helicopter aerial surveillance trial will be conducted on key dates this summer. It is part of this Government's ongoing and extensive efforts to improve safety for the swimmers, surfers, divers and other recreational water users at our State's beaches” (Parliament of NSW, Legislative Council, 11 November 2009).
This chapter reviews the context in NSW and applies the HALT framework, with special attention to the opening of the policy window based on the personal circumstances of Minister Macdonald. In all, this analysis uses the characteristics of affect, salience, policy entrepreneurship, and causal stories that make up HALT to explain this policy response as an example of political exploitation (Lupia and Menning, 2009; Zahariadis, 2007).
8.2 New South Wales context
8.2.1 Political context in New South Wales
There are two issues in the political context of NSW that should be noted: the NSW Government’s previous position on aerial patrols and the tenuous circumstances of then Department of Primary Industries Minister Ian Macdonald. First, aerial shark patrols as a means of shark protection in Sydney date back more than 80 years. They began as a volunteer service in the 1930s and were later supplemented and funded by the State Government (Maxwell, 1949: 191). However, this funding was discontinued in 2007 following a 2006 NSW Scientific Shark Summit report that concluded, “aerial patrols are not a good way for sighting sharks and reducing the risk of shark attack” (NSW, 2006). Data from patrols in Western Australia as well as scientists such as Dr. Vic Peddemors, who later worked at the NSW Department of Fisheries, supported this consensus position. As a result, “[t]he NSW government withdrew its support for the use of aerial patrols” (Robbins et al., 2012).
Secondly, Minister Macdonald was a member of the Labor party and of the New South Wales Legislative Council from 1988-2010. The New South Wales Government’s
governing Labor party had been involved in a number of leadership changes and corruption scandals in 2008 and 2009. A review of NSW Premiers and Cabinets within recent Labor governments by Fawcett (2012:74) notes that “Ministerial resignations and leadership speculation dominated the premierships of Morris Iemma, Nathan Rees and Kristina Keneally.” Macdonald was accused of having conducted illegal activities while under the Rees Government. In 2009, this included the misuse of ministerial funds and corruption. Yet, Premier Rees’ hold on power was also under threat (Clune, 2012: 229), making this period of instability highly susceptible to the day-by-day media cycle. This fragile and politically competitive nature culminated in the sacking of Premier Rees and the return of Macdonald to Cabinet on 8 December 2009. However, in June 2010, Macdonald resigned from the NSW parliament following revelations regarding inappropriate allocations of Government travel expenses (ABC, 2010). Since then, Macdonald’s activities as Minister have been raised before the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 2012 (ICAC, 2012).
8.2.2 Location details
Shark bites in Sydney Harbour, Bondi beach, and Avalon beach, the capital of the state of New South Wales, are the main focus of this case study. Each location is iconic, with tourism and beach recreation significant contributors to the NSW economy. Historically, since white settlement (Taylor, 1926), Sydney Harbour has been considered by many to be “Australia’s birthplace” (Hoskins, 2009: 301). It is home to the Sydney Harbour Bridge, which opened in 1932, and the Sydney Opera House, which opened in 1973. However, the Harbour has also been the scene for a number of sensationalized shark bite incidents, for instance, “the first report of a shark attack in an Australian newspaper in Cockle bay” (Sturma, 1986) in 1807. A law was later passed in 1834 banning convicts from swimming in Sydney Harbour. Author Mark Twain noted during his visit that “Sydney Harbour is populous with the finest breeds of man-eating sharks in the world” (Twain, 1897). In addition, Dr. Victor Coppleson focused his analysis and theory of “rogue” sharks in part on the recurrence of shark bites in and around Sydney Harbour (see Picture 8.4) The last fatal shark bite in Sydney Harbour was in 1963 and
involved an actress, Marcia Hathaway. This incident received international media attention. In all, there had been six shark bites in the Harbour since 1942 (Coppleson, 1958).
Picture 8.3 Sydney Harbour
Picture 8.4 Sydney Harbour shark bite locations (1942-1963) from the Coppleson Archives
Bondi beach is 900 metres long (NSW, 2009) and often regarded as the front yard of the nation (Picture 8.5). The Australian Government’s Department of Environment website notes that Bondi “has played a central role in the development of Australia's beach culture and in developing our sense of national identity” (NSW, 2013). Bondi is the most popular swimming beach in the country and is also proximate to Sydney Harbour. In relative distance, Bondi is only six kilometers from the south side of Sydney Harbour and also has
Picture 8.2 New South Wales
Avalon beach
Sydney Harbour
Bondi beach
a history of shark bites. There have been eight shark bite incidents at Bondi, dating back to 1928, with two fatalities (NSW, 2009). The last fatal shark bite at Bondi was in 1929 (Neff, 2012).
Avalon beach is part of the “northern beaches,” 35 kilometers north of Sydney, and is considered to be a surfing beach (Picture 8.6). The beach is known for its iconic beauty. For instance, the American television program Baywatch asked to film part of the series there in 1999 (Booth, 2012).
Prior to the most recent introduction of aerial patrols, beach safety at each location in NSW has been managed in several ways. This is consistent with coastal zone management in which, “most land and resource management is a matter of state government jurisdiction, although the Commonwealth retains considerable responsibilities and influence” (Haward, 1995). First, the local councils have professional life savers who work at their beaches, and some harbor beaches have exclusion nets (NSW, 2009). Secondly, volunteer surf lifesavers provide additional support services. Lastly, the Department of Fisheries (which is part of the Department of Primary Industries) provides oversight of the shark meshing program along the NSW coastline.
8.2.3 Shark bite details
While these three locations are the main focus, there are four key shark bite incidents that influenced the policymaking process in NSW. The first three occurred within a span of 19
Picture 8.5 Bondi beach
Picture 8.6 Avalon beach
days in February and March 2009 in Sydney, while the fourth occurred on 8 November in South Australia. The first involved a navy diver, while the second and third involved surfers. The fourth involved a spear fisherman. All were non-fatal; however, there were significant injuries.
On 11 February 2009, 31-year-old Royal Australian Navy able seaman Paul de Gelder was conducting anti-terrorism exercises in Sydney Harbour (Picture 8.2) at approximately 7:00 am when he was bitten repeatedly by a bull shark. A report by the NSW Department of Fisheries (NSW, 2009) noted, “[t]he victim was swimming on the surface within open waters when the attack occurred. Substantial damage to the victim’s upper right leg and right hand occurred during the attack” (NSW, 2009: 105). He was brought to the hospital and his right arm and leg were amputated.
On 12 February 2009, 33-year-old Glenn Orgias was surfing at Bondi beach at 7:30 pm when he was bitten on his arm by a white shark. Orgias was able to ride a wave to the shore and was assisted by fellow surfers until an ambulance arrived. The NSW report states, “[t]he victim’s left hand was almost severed from a bite through the wrist, eventually resulting in amputation” (NSW, 2009: 106).
The third incident took place on 1 March 2009. It involved 15-year-old Andrew Lindop who was surfing at 6:45 am (NSW, 2009) at Avalon beach with his father. Lindop was bitten on his lower leg and thigh by a white shark. His injuries were serious but he did not lose his leg. This incident was the first unprovoked shark bite ever reported at the beach. Importantly, shark nets from the beach meshing program were in the water at both Bondi and Avalon beach at the time of the shark bites.
Another shark bite occurred on 8 November at the start of the 2009-2010 Australian summer. Dean Brougham, 25, was south of Adelaide in South Australia and had just begun scuba diving when he was bitten on the leg. While the shark had ahold of him, he punched the shark, injuring his hand, and it released him. The type of shark was unknown but was most likely a whaler or great white. In all, these events are examined to identify
the way shark bites and policy responses gained public attention and became politically valuable to Minister Macdonald. Thus, this is a story about circling political threats as well as sharks.
8.3 Explaining the support for the aerial patrols program as a policy response in New South Wales
The HALT framework will be used to review the adoption of aerial patrols by identifying three elements in this analysis: the way a cluster of shark bites in NSW represented negative high affect events and became representative of a dreaded outcome, how these events were highly salient, and why the policy threshold for aerial patrols was lowered by Minister Macdonald to allow their adoption. Central to this analysis is the way shark bites become memorable, emotional problems in which public fears can be cued, and the way positive affective relief can be provided by aerial patrols as a ready-made solution. To begin, it is important to note how the shark bites came to be seen as representative of a dreaded outcome.
8.3.1 Evidence of this case study as a negative high affect event
The evidence of the negative high affect nature of these shark bites can be seen in a review of the characteristics of these events and public responses. One indicator of perceived public affect is media reporting, while another is attendance trends at beaches. Bondi beach attendance is utilized as an example. The role of affect in influencing the adoption of aerial patrols will be shown by reviewing the way these features combined to present a dreaded outcome from shark “attacks” based on consumptive, intent-driven sharks. This outcome provides a memorable aversive condition for the summer of 2009.
The consumptive nature of the shark bites included the loss of multiple limbs for two of the three victims in Sydney. The Australian Associated Press reported that “Navy clearance diver Paul de Gelder was lucky to survive after being mauled … causing him to lose a hand and leg” (Christian et al., 2009). The Australian Broadcasting Company reported on the shark bite on Glenn Orgias noting a great white had, “nearly ripped off his
hand” and that “leeches were used as part of the effort to restore blood flow to the hand” (ABC, 2009a). Newspapers also stated that Andrew Lindop had also been “mauled,” with the shark “biting deeply into his left leg” (Barrowclough, 2009) and a fellow surfer telling the Herald Sun, “[h]is dad was calming him and the boy was in shock. His leg was a mess” (Herald Sun, 2009). In all, Agence France Presse brought the three incidents together noting:
On February 11, a navy diver was attacked by a bull shark in Sydney Harbour, not far from the famous Opera House, suffering serious injuries that forced doctors to amputate an arm and a leg. Thirty-six hours later, a 2.5-metre (8.2-foot) great white the maneaters made famous in Steven Spielberg's "Jaws" savaged a surfer off Sydney's most popular tourist beach, Bondi. The man's hand was left hanging by a three centimetre (1.2-inch) flap of skin but surgeons managed to reattach it after using leeches to restore blood flow.
Thus, the notion that these incidents were consumptive events in which the shark was intentionally eating the people, who were lucky to survive, established a familiar frame of the incidents as vivid, intent-based shark “attacks.” Indeed, the language in a NSW report on the incidents affirmed this frame, consistent with the criminalization of sharks. For instance, it notes the “[s]pecies implicated in the attack” (NSW, 2009: 105 emphasis added). Media attention following the third incident looked for answers. The Times of London reported, “[j]ust when Australians thought it was safe to go back into the water, a third shark attack in as many weeks has emptied beaches and reopened the debate about the numbers of predators around the country's coast” (Barrowclough, 2009).
The negative affect associated with the shark bites can also be seen in the discourse around the number of sharks and the ties to historical analogies in key locations. For instance, in 2009, there appeared to be a perception of intent created by fishing regulations that were bringing more sharks to the area. Following the second shark bite, Reuters reported that experts stated the environmental regulations had “created a cleaner marine environment, [that] is attracting sharks closer to shore chasing fish” (Reuters, 2009). The shark bites were seen as evidence of this problem. Opposition member Duncan Gay stated to the media, "The six-winged patrols tell us there's a 16 per cent increase in shark numbers (ABC, 2009). He added in Parliament, “the rising amounts of baitfish [are] attracting more sharks this year” (Hansard, 2009). In all, the dreaded
outcome narrative stated that more sharks were here to eat people, and there were historical comparisons at these locations to base these assumptions on.
Australia has the most recurrent history of reported shark bites of the three case study locations. There had been two previous aggregations from shark bites in New South Wales that led to policy reviews. These periods included multiple incidents at Bondi beach, Sydney Harbour, and the northern beaches region. In particular, there were three shark bites at Bondi between April 1928 and February 1929 as well as a fourth in February 1929 at Maroubra Beach. A city history notes that, “these two fatalities had a very high media profile, as they occurred with a month of each other in 1929 on Sydney’s most popular beach. This fed the erroneous belief that a serious shark ‘menace’ existed at Bondi Beach” (Waverly Council, 2007). This led to the first government review and the Shark Menace Committee in 1929 (Neff, 2012).
The second review took place in 1935 following a spate of shark bites in 1934 at Queenscliff, Dee Why, and North Steyne beaches, all of which are proximate to each other. A Shark Menace Advisory Committee was formed by the state Government (Neff, 2012). The committee stated that their work needed to address the “fear complex” that had developed among the public (NSW, 1935). In response, shark nets were recommended and placed at local beaches in 1937 (Neff, 2012).
Given the history of shark bites at Bondi and Sydney Harbour, these locations represented sensitive, national sites during 2009. This point was noted by one interviewee who stated, “the three that were the big ones, certainly of all places, god forbid. And two at netted beaches obviously caused a bit of a furor. And caused the government to act because they had to be seen to be doing something” (SYD/M/1). Together, the consumptive, intentbased and increasing threat in historic areas, with these issues, were seen as negative affective events. One indicator of public feelings in 2009 was beach attendance at Bondi following the shark bite.
Chart 8.1 Comparing reported Bondi beach attendance in 2009 and 2010
The line graph above (Chart 8.1), notes reported beach attendance at Bondi beach in 2009 and the same period in 2010. Comparing these data emphasizes trends rather than numeric reporting because beach attendance reporting is often flawed. These figures illustrate midpatrol attendance reports for seven-day periods between 1 January and 31 March 2009. Importantly, what is being reviewed is not the declines that are a normal part of the end of summer cycle, but the way weekend activity continues in peaks and valleys as the summer season finishes. For instance, school holidays in 2009 ran from 26 January, while University undergraduates began their studies on 2 March. The chart illustrates peak attendance during weekends, for instance 3 January and 4 January are a Saturday and Sunday respectively. Other spikes include the weekend of 24 January and 25 January, as well as a large spike during the New Year’s holiday.
In Chart 8.1 there is a drop in beach attendance, which coincides with the shark bite at Bondi. This is followed by a recovery period that is slower and below the peaks and valleys for the same period in 2010, which did not experience a shark bite. This tepid recovery in 2009 is indicative of public feelings and negative affect from the shark bite. However, other elements including weather are also factors. For instance, Bondi beach was closed immediately after the incidents and the following morning. Yet, overall, attendance appeared to be down for the remainder of the month. From here, establishing
Shark bite at Bondi
the HALT features of each event over the 19-day period aids in seeing how these events contribute to a new memorable and representative problem condition.
8.3.2
Distinguishing high affect events and policy responses
Reviewing the different features of the shark bite incidents’ affective characteristics and the way they accumulate helps shows the connection between the emotional and political thresholds of events. The differences and similarities between the affect, salience, entrepreneurship, and causal stories of the three Sydney incidents are reviewed using the HALT thermometers (Charts 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4) to identify the characteristics of input and feedback.
In the first case there was no correlating frequency. There was high affect because of the type of shark, the severity of the injury, the activity of the victim, as well as the location. The identity of the victim as a naval diver conducting anti-terror exercises in a familiar location all added to the availability and vivid nature of the event. In addition, there was a high degree of media reporting, with little competitive stimuli given that Sydney Harbour is in close proximity to a large metropolitan media outlet.
In the second case, we see high affect around the type of shark, which was a great white, as well as the nature of the consumptive injury. Bondi beach is also seen as a high affect location, and the sequential frequency of the incident adds to a perception of intent on the part of the shark. A report following this incident in the Australian Associated Press noted, “Swimmers are being urged not to panic after the second Sydney shark attack in as many days at two of city's most iconic locations” (AAP, 2009a).
In the third incident, the dreaded outcome of consumptive and intent-based sharks comes to the forefront. This incident also includes a white shark, has a high frequency as the third event in 19 days, and involves a policy entrepreneur and policy response, which the other events did not. One interviewee noted that the situation in Sydney was similar to other international locations. For instance, “there were beaches where people got
occasionally nibbled, but the gap between nibbles was sufficiently long that it didn’t force any change. It is only when you get a sequential series of nibbles that it goes into the public domain and potentially government have to act” (SYD/1/M). In all, the representative dreaded outcome from these events established a memorable problem condition in familiar locations for the 2009 “Summer of the Shark” and a government review was announced; however, this response did not include aerial patrols.
Charts 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4. Comparing HALT elements for three shark bite incidents: Paul de Gelder, Glen Orgias and Andrew Lindop.
Paul de Gelder (11 Feb. 2009)
High Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Type of shark (affect)
Severity of injury to victim (affect)
Race of victim (affect)
Activity of victim (salience)
Location (salience)
Event feedback:
Media reporting (salience)
No presence of competitive affective stimuli (salience)
Proximity of event to a high exposure media market (salience)
Local only or national media
Availability (salience)
Perceived intent (causal story w/ affect)
Low
Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Age of victim (affect)
Sex of victim
Objective frequency of events together on a locality
Event feedback: N/A
Andrew Lindop (1 Mar 2009)
High Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Type of shark (affect)
Severity of injury to victim (affect)
Race of victim (affect)
Location (salience)
Proximity of event to a high -exposure media market (salience)
Objective frequency of events together on a locality (salience/affect)
Event feedback:
Media reporting (salience)
No presence of competitive affective stimuli (salience)
Perceived intent (causal story w/ affect)
Perceived as representative of a dreaded outcome (causal story w/ affect
Availability (salience)
Local only or national media (salience)
Low Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Sex of victim (affect)
Age of victim
Activity of victim
Event feedback: N/A
Policy entrepreneur
High Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Type of shark (affect)
Severity of injury to victim (affect)
Age of victim (affect)
Race of victim (affect)
Location (salience)
No presence of competitive affective stimuli (salience)
Proximity of event to a high exposure media market (salience)
Objective frequency of events together on a locality (salience/affect)
Event feedback:
Media reporting (salience)
Perceived intent (causal story w/ affect)
Perceived as representative of a dreaded outcome (causal story w/ affect)
Available (imaginable)
Local only or national media
Policy entrepreneur
Policy response (Govt review)
Low Affect Characteristics
Event details:
Activity of victim
Sex of victim (affect)
Event feedback: N/A
Glenn Orgias (12 Feb. 2009)
8.4 Is there evidence of salience in New South Wales?
The salient nature of sharks and shark bites can provide people with survival value, which offers an effective hook to the media that can also be used by politicians. This section reviews the evidence of salience toward shark bites in Sydney and the impact this had in influencing the adoption of aerial patrols. There is evidence that shark bite events in Sydney were highly salient based on three factors: a.) heightened local and international media attention, b.) salience-prone nature of shark bites in Sydney specifically, and c.) the speed of political attention. I suggest that these features impact the help provide an advantageous venue for political maneuvering.
8.4.1 The scope of media attention
The salience of the March 2009 shark bite stories can be seen in media reports at the time. A review using Factiva shows that there were 438 media stories on shark bites over 19 days, between 11 February and 2 March 2009. Of these, 329 were from Australian news outlets and 109 were from international sources. This period of intensity culminated in the “Summer of the Shark” label. Owen (2009: 16) notes the dramatic nature of the media coverage, stating that in Australia it “generated massive media coverage of the kind usually associated with national tragedies” (Owen, 2009: 16).
Chart 8.5 Reviewing international and domestic media reports for the three Sydney shark bite incidents in 2009.
Media Stories on the incident in Australia
Media Stories on the incident Internationally
The chart above (Chart 8.5) notes the peaks in media coverage. For instance, there were 178 stories by Australian media on five individual days encompassing the incidents and day after. There were 39 stories from international sources for a total of 217 articles on shark bites on five days within a three-week period. Domestic coverage of the first two shark bite incidents were similarly heightened with 51 stories from Australian media on Seaman de Gelder (55 in total), and 50 following the shark bite on Glen Orgias at Bondi (62 total) for large one-day totals.
In all, the domestic coverage, in particular, highlights the spectacularly salient nature of these events over a short period of time. The implications for this level of salience include the way politicians may be able to rely on the likelihood that the media will report on similar or related stories, relative to what else may be going on, and that the story will be perceived as positive.
8.4.2 The salience-prone context in New South Wales
Salience is not the same, however, across periods of time or locations for the same kinds of events. I demonstrate how shark bites are more salience-prone in Sydney based on three factors: increased reporting in Sydney compared to other Australian locations, the more negative tone of media reporting in Australia compared with the United States, and the lack of competitive stimuli or news.
First, a comparison of media reporting of the incidents in Sydney in March and South Australia in November 2009 highlights the differences in regional press coverage at both the domestic and international level. Only 10 stories in total were reported on the incident in South Australia over two days despite the high-profile nature of the incident (Chart 8.6). Moreover, the increased reporting in Sydney during this period is greater than a high-profile cluster of fatal shark bites in Western Australia. A review of domestic media reports using Factiva in 2011 following three shark bites near Perth between 1 September and 25 October 2011 shows a total of 63 domestic stories and nine international stories.
These data suggest greater attention and salience relative to the population and exposure to the Sydney media market.
Chart 8.6 Comparing media reports following shark bite incidents in February, March and November 2009
Media Stories on the incident in Australia
Media Stories on the incident Internationally
Secondly, the tone of media reporting among Australian media suggests a more negative angle. Research by Muter et al (2012) reviewed a decade of media reporting data on sharks and shark bites in Australia and the United States. Three points stand out from this comparison and are noted in Table 8.2. To begin, there is 12% more framing about “shark attacks on people” (Muter et al., 2012). In addition, scientists contribute to Australian shark media stories 10% percent less and politicians in Australian media reports contribute 6.7% more than American reports. This suggests a more politicized and negative narrative for media reports in Australia.
Table 8.1 Summary of Muter et al. (2013) content analysis of Australian and US shark bite media reports between 2000-2010.
In addition, a review by Neff and Hueter (2013) found that the 2009 NSW Report into the Shark Meshing Program over-reported shark “attacks” (Table 8.2). The government review reported on 200 shark “attacks” between 1900 and 2009; however, 38 of these incidents did not involve any injury to the bather. Given the reliance of the media on government data, this is an indicator of more negative over-reporting of shark “attacks.” This is consistent with a content analysis noted in Chapter 3 that showed that Australian media were more likely to mention “attacks” in their text in 2009 than Florida media reports in 2001.
Table 8.2 Summary of Neff and Hueter’s (2013) review of the NSW Government shark “attack” reporting
Thirdly, the summer of 2009 was a slow news cycle in NSW. In particular, in March 2009, there was no election, with the next federal Australian election in 2010 and the next state election in 2011. A comparison between reporting and competitive stories in the United States and Australia in February and March (Chart 8E) shows that international media attention on the first incident in Sydney, in particular, was lower than might have been expected based on other stimuli. For instance, on 10 February (11 February in
Australia) a tornado killed 10 people in Oklahoma. However, there was a small news opening on 12 February that coincides with greater US reporting on the incident before a night-time plane crash killed 50 people in up-state New York. This was also the same night that singer Rhianna was a victim of domestic abuse by her boyfriend singer Chris Brown. As a result, news coverage on the following day declined. By the end of the month, there were fewer competitive issues in the news, and international reports had increased. Together, these factors highlight the strength of domestic media salience in Sydney during this period and the connection this can have with political pressures and opportunities.
8.4.3 The speed of political attention in New South Wales
Salience can be seen in the speed of political attention to exit an aversive condition. This section reviews temporal political attention to indicate the salience of shark bites in Sydney (Table 8.3). The political responses and statements by actors and institutions were quick and represented the State Government’s first shark-based review of beach safety policies since 1935, but did not include formal changes in policy (NSW, 2009).
Statements were made by Minister Macdonald, NSW state Premier Nathan Rees, and Federal Minister for the Environment Peter Garrett to the Sydney Morning Herald on 1 March 2009, the same day as the third shark bite, on Andrew Lindop. The Premier addressed the question of whether the third shark bite necessitated more aerial patrols and he stated, "the advice to me is that aerial patrols currently are more than adequate" (Harvey, Murphy, and Darth, 2009). Instead, the government’s response placed additional responsibility on bathers. The Premier added, "Sharks are out there and if you put yourself in their domain at dawn and dusk then the risk is higher" (Harvey, Murphy, and Darth, 2009). This was echoed in the same article by Federal Environment Minister Peter Garrett who stated, "There is an extra degree of caution required" (Harvey, Murphy, and Darth, 2009).
In addition, Minister Macdonald stated that the government was already taking steps to track sharks in Sydney Harbour. On 3 March, he addressed the media and added “[t]he recent shark attacks in the Sydney area have caused community concern and it should be known the government is taking action” (Cranston, 2009). The plan would include soliciting public comments, reviewing existing programs, and issuing new policies. This action was made public in a Department of Fisheries “Report into the NSW Shark Meshing (Bather Protection) Program” (NSW, 2009).
The findings from the State report were issued in September 2009. The Minister announced the new initiatives in state Parliament asserting, “[t]he Government is introducing a range of new management arrangements and science-based measures to improve the program following a review conducted earlier this year. One of the new initiatives is the SharkSmart education campaign. The SharkSmart campaign will be rolled out this spring and summer and it will focus on how the public can increase their safety and further reduce the risk of shark attack” (Parliament of NSW, Legislative Council, 3 September 2009). He added, “[o]ther initiatives the Government is looking at include improved scientific outputs, such as the development of a strategic research and monitoring program in the next 12 months of the program. Shark nets will also be checked more regularly in an effort to reduce environmental impacts” (Parliament of NSW, Legislative Council, 3 September 2009).
Table 8.3 Reviewing the speed of political attention to Sydney shark bites
In November 2009, the South Australia Premier also acted quickly following the shark bite on 8 November. The Premier announced the start of aerial patrols in the state two days later, on 10 November. He stated to the media that, “[t]here's also been a larger number of shark sightings and I guess what happened over the weekend with this brave young man just brings it into even sharper focus. We don't want people having to fight off sharks by punching them in the mouth” (ABC, 2009) This announcement moved up the scheduled start of aerial patrol by one month. In all, the speeds of the policy responses in NSW and South Australia were consistent with the HALT framework, with the fastest responses following the aggregation of multiple events.
Yet, while this was a high affect-low threshold period in NSW, not all policy responses were adopted, including aerial patrols, because actors with access did not support them. This occurred despite pressures from the Australian Aerial Patrol, the state Opposition, and a private operator named Michael Brown who operated a helicopter patrol service called SurfWatch. In response to criticism about the absence of aerial patrols Minister Macdonald noted that, "[t]he problem is if you look at each three cases that occurred in Sydney in recent times, there would not have been aerial surveillance practical to be used in that situation" (AAP, 2009c).
In addition, the Minister’s office questioned the motives behind aerial patrol operators’ calls for new funding. The Minister’s office stated, “[w]hile Mr. Brown might be happy if we spent tens of thousands on his service, we are interested in considered science-based responses, not knee-jerk reactions" (Ramachandran, 2009). One interview noted that the original government position against the aerial patrols was based on the evidence in the 2006 report and consultation with experts. They stated:
Minister Macdonald accepted that [scientific finding] and the Shark Summit committee [in 2006] accepted that. And [the Government] decided that they would rather spend their money on jet skis and things like that. And we managed to keep that mind set. But basically, the Government followed that line of ‘expert analysis suggests that aerial surveys are useless. We are not putting government money into helicopter pilot’s pockets’ (SYD/M/1).
In all, this analysis highlights the presence of a high affect-low threshold situation for some policy responses as well as what is missing. On the issue of aerial patrols the policy window was closed. This would change, however, later in 2009.
8.5 Evidence of a policy window and aerial patrols providing affective relief
This section reviews the evidence of a policy window and the affective relief of aerial patrols, as well as the impact these factors had in influencing the adoption of the policy response. I suggest that Minister Macdonald lowered the policy threshold for aerial patrols and opened a policy window for their consideration in November 2009 based on his personal political peril. Indeed, the adoption of aerial patrols in NSW came from a ‘HALT within a HALT’ situation that centered on a.) the Minister’s political difficulties, b.) the availability of a ready-made solution that was positively perceived, and c.) the opportunity presented for media coverage from the shark bite in South Australia. In all, two important points are noted: the highly salient announcement of aerial patrols did produce positive media stories for Minister Macdonald on 11 and 12 November and the Minister was sacked from the Cabinet by the Premier on 15 November.
8.5.1
The political peril of Minister Macdonald
The HALT model reviews the relationship between emotional issues and policy thresholds. It is argued that the greater the emotional pressures on key political actors the more likely a policy window will open to relieve the aversive condition. In this case, the negative high affect pressures are centered on Minister Macdonald and the problem condition is his. There are five cumulative factors that led to the presumption that the aerial patrols were adopted based on political survival.
First, the government’s formal policy response to the shark bites was released in September without any mention of aerial patrols. On 3 September, the Minister announced an education program, scientific tagging, and increased environmental management. Indeed, the Minister was reportedly against aerial patrols on 10 November 2009, one day before the program was announced. In addition, Minister Macdonald did not switch on any other aspect of the Government’s shark response policy except for aerial patrols. One interviewee noted, “[t]hat is the only thing that he flips on” (SYD/M/1).
Secondly, the absence of other actors centers this decision squarely within the Minister’s power. Thirdly, while not publicly known, the Minister had agreed to a compromise preselection deal in 2006 to retire in 2009, a pledge he would not fulfill, further straining relations within his party. In March 2013, former colleague Luke Foley testified before ICAC that a compromise was struck and Minister Macdonald would “retire in 2009” (Davies, 2013).
Fourthly, the media reported on politically corrupt acts or misuse of state resources in two weeks in July 2009, including expenses for Macdonald and his staff as well as coal mining contracts for allies. On 15 July, a story in the Sydney Morning Herald noted that Minister Macdonald had spent “AUD$150,000 on lunches, dinners and accommodation for a wine advisory group he created” (Clennell, 2009a). This was followed by calls for his firing, which included the Opposition leader. The Opposition labeled him “Sir Lunchalot” and Opposition Leader Barry O’Farrell stated, "Mr Macdonald is a disgrace, and if Nathan Rees had any authority or standards he would sack him" (Clennell, 2009a).
On 20 July, Minister Macdonald was accused of corruption in an article by the Sydney Morning Herald. In this piece, the acting Opposition Leader stated, “For too long Ian Macdonald has been allowed to get away with whatever he likes. He is a repeat offender when it comes to feathering his own nest at the expense of taxpayers and looking after his mates. There will be more questions to come over the suitability of Ian Macdonald” (Clennell, 2009b). On 9 September, Opposition member Michael Gallagher noted in
response to a reply from Macdonald that he would provide the information the following week, “You may not be here then.”
Fifthly, the Premier demoted Minister Macdonald’s ministerial portfolio by removing him from his position as Energy Minister in a cabinet reshuffle on 12 September 2009. A media report noted that the Premier “was unable to dump Mr Macdonald until now, after the NSW Australian Labor Party (ALP) state conference gave Mr. Rees the power to choose his own cabinet. Previously premiers had their frontbench team dictated to them by the caucus” (Sydney Morning Herald, 2009). In addition, the policy window presented here coincided with a sitting of state Parliament for the week of 10 November, the last sitting before the NSW ALP state conference on 14 November. This provided the last opportunity for positive media coverage ahead of the meeting. During this sitting, questions about the Minister’s potential corruption continued, including on 11 November 2009. With these pressures mounting, the Minister faced an escalating and aversive condition to try and escape.
8.5.2 The affective relief of aerial patrols
Political actors open policy windows to advantage their outcomes and rely on positive perceptions of their responses. The promotion of aerial surveillance by Macdonald was a shrewd political maneuver given the high degree of public support for it. There are two main ways in which aerial patrols were perceived to provide affective relief and political advantage.
First, aerial patrols offered historically analogous relief based on past perceived success (NSW, 2006). Aerial patrols had run in locations in the past and feedback suggested increased public confidence (and the potential for added safety) from visible planes or helicopters overhead. Maxwell (1949: 191) notes that previous aerial patrols in NSW had provided some “psychological comfort” to the public. In addition, the use of aerial patrols and observation towers in other locations is seen as an indicator of their usefulness in shark bite prevention.
Secondly, the support from other actors, including the Opposition and aerial patrol operators suggests a wide consensus. Indeed, the advocacy by aerial patrol operators who note having seen sharks suggests evidence of their value. Robbins et al. (2012) note that “[e]ach year, the operators cite large numbers of shark sightings, resulting in substantial public support for this form of perceived protection against shark attack.” In short, the argument that aerial patrols are not effective is less convincing than the asserting that everything that can be done should be done and that this may offer benefits.
8.5.3 Media opportunity for Minister Macdonald
The occurrence of the shark bite in South Australia provided a valuable media opportunity to Minister Macdonald. Chart 8.7 reviews media stories on policy responses on 10-12 November 2009. On 10 November there were two stories on South Australia’s aerial patrols program and one story on NSW’s SharkSmart campaign. On 11 November, the Minister announced NSW’s aerial patrols program, which resulted in two of the three stories and on 12 November an additional five stories. Put another way, following the shark bite in South Australia, the first media story from the Minister (10 November) was based on the SharkSmart campaign and resulted in little media. However, the emergence of the second story on a policy change in favour of aerial patrols on 11 November resulted in positive coverage from major media outlets such as Reuters, the ABC, Daily Telegraph, Southern Courier and the Daily News. This suggests that Macdonald may have been attempting to capitalize on the high affect-high salience nature of the events in South Australia as early as 10 November, but continued to pick between salient issues.
Chart 8.7 Media reports on aerial patrols and the SharkSmart campaign
November 10, 2009
November 11, 2009 November 12, 2009
In all, the issue at hand is not simply what the policy response was, but the time at which it was announced and the period of time for which it was allocated. Macdonald adopted aerial shark patrols during the holiday period that included the Australia Day weekend. The time that the announcement was made provided a valuable and opportune political period. For instance, one interviewee noted, “I think he was just looking for, at a lean time, media coverage. It has become abundantly clear that in Australia Ministers need to be in the media, preferably for good news stories and so this would have been a good news story, when Minister Macdonald was, at the time, undergoing a lot of bad press” (SYD/M/1). The goal was to boost public confidence during a symbolic period of time and directed at key locations.
Macdonald opened the policy window during this period because he cared less about diverting from government policy on aerial patrols after he was demoted from the Cabinet and instead saw this as an advantageous move. Gaining positive press was more important given the previous bad news cycles. In short, he attempted to provide affective relief to interrupt the aggregation or clustering of a series of controversies. Indeed, one interviewee noted, that the Minister “needed to get a slightly different angle on things and suddenly the aerial surveys were given the go ahead under the auspices of a research pilot study. Now, obviously, that was political. That’s basically the only thing” (SYD/M/1).
Minister Macdonald aerial patrol stories
South Australia aerial patrol stories
Minister Macdonald Shark Smart stories
8.6 Evidence of policy entrepreneurs and causal stories
The last element of the HALT analysis is the role of entrepreneurs and their causal stories in facilitating and taking advantage of policy windows. This section will demonstrate the evidence of policy entrepreneurship and the important role of the actor and causal stories in influencing and manipulating the policy response. In short, this is a story of strong, direct, entrepreneurial involvement. Macdonald was the lead entrepreneur for his role in influencing the NSW government’s funding of the aerial patrol program. He was seen as a relevant actor, connected the trial program as the solution to dreaded condition, influenced the outcome, and hoped to gain a benefit from his actions. In addition, he acted particularly quickly following the shark bite in South Australia, and used a technical causal story of the way aerial patrols supported beach meshing and ongoing scientific research as a political tool.
Table 8.4 HALT Policy entrepreneurship matrix
Entrepreneur: Michael Brown Minister Macdonald Dr. Vic Pedemmors
Type of entrepreneurship CrusadingOpportunistic PragmaticOpportunistic Technical-Opportunistic
Types of causal story Technical Technical Technical
Seen as a relevant actor? No Yes Yes
Their solution attached to problem? Yes Yes No
Influence political outcome? Yes Yes No
Benefit from engagement? Yes Yes No
Innovative Idea? No No No
Expertise? No No Yes
Resilience? Yes Unknown Yes
Defense? Yes Unknown Yes
Adoption of solution? Yes Yes No
8.6.1 Minister Macdonald was a relevant and dominant player in establishing policy
Entrepreneurs locate themselves as relevant actors during these events as a way to manage the solution-making process. Macdonald began his engagement by addressing the media following the first cluster of shark bites, answering questions in Parliament, and again, at
the start of the 2009-2010 summer. Following the shark bite on Glenn Orgias, the Minister issued a statement on the identity of the shark. He released the Government’s Public Consultation document in Parliament on 3 September 2009, and also answered questions in state Parliament from the Opposition regarding shark nets on 22 September 2009. The Minister also engaged with the media on 10 November on the SharkSmart program and finally on 11 November regarding aerial patrols.
8.6.2 Minister Macdonald attached the spotters as the solution to the problem of shark bite concerns
Attaching solutions to problems is a core requirement of policy entrepreneurship, and the way these solutions are attached is often the most entrepreneurial activity of political actors. In this case, the solution to be attached with the November policy window was articulated as a.) doing everything possible to improve beach safety and reduce shark bites heading into the summer period, and b.) adding the program as a scientific project. Previously, the Opposition had stated that the failure to employ aerial patrols meant that the government was taking every reasonable step to safeguard beach goers. The introduction of the trial program was intended to provide the Minister with positive media that would portray him as doing everything possible to prevent shark bites at specific beaches and to protect the public. In introducing the program he stated, “[t]here are no 100 per cent guarantees when swimmers enter the ocean, but the Government is doing all it can to minimise the risks” (Parliament of NSW, Legislative Council, 11 November 2009).
In addition, the Minister connected concerns from shark bites to the summer period, which had seen the memorable aggregation in March. In announcing the SharkSmart campaign he stated, “[m]any families are currently enjoying school holidays on NSW's beautiful beaches and the distribution of the SharkSmart brochure is designed to coincide with this peak time” (Casino.nsw.au, 2009). His comments in Parliament regarding the time frames for the aerial patrols echoed these priorities, “[t]he trial will be conducted every weekend and each public holiday between 19 December 2009 and 10 January 2010
as well as the Australia Day long weekend, weather permitting. For optimal effectiveness the patrols will be conducted in the early morning, between 7.00 a.m. and 9.00 a.m., and in the afternoon between 3.00 p.m. and 6.00 p.m., in order to provide the best opportunities to spot sharks that may potentially pose a threat to bathers” (Parliament of NSW, Legislative Council, 11 November 2009). The temporal importance of beach season is also critical because this is the time of year when the public wants peace of mind.
On 11 November the Minister also framed the scientific causal story telling state Parliament, “This is a scientific program” (Parliament of NSW, Legislative Council, 11 November 2009). He added, “[t]he observer will be required to identify the species of shark, if possible, from the air; capture high-quality aerial photographs that will allow for shark species to be identified and allow the number of beach users to be counted” (Parliament of NSW, Legislative Council, 11 November 2009).
8.6.3 Minister Macdonald influenced the outcome
Actors must influence the policy outcome to fulfill the requirements of policy entrepreneurship. Minister Macdonald influenced the outcome through direct ministerial action. Consultation did not occur within the government at large. Indeed, when the decision was made to announce the aerial patrols one interviewee noted, “that was not done in any consultation with scientists” (SYD/M/1). Influencing the outcome is also a core element of exploitation because it is set to the entrepreneurs’ timeline. They choose the policy response that is recognized as positive, a period of time for the announcement that advantages them, and the period of time and locations that the enacted policy covers that offers them the benefit.
8.6.4 Minister Macdonald benefited from the outcome
The benefit most often gained by political actors engaged in politics is keeping the power they have (Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). Media
plays a significant role in aiding and reinforcing power dynamics that help political elites maintain power. Macdonald benefited during this policy window in that he received the positive media he sought (Chart 8G). For example, media coverage from the Manly Daily included a 12 November editorial that stated, “[t]he State Government's decision to rethink its opposition to funding an aerial shark watch service is welcome” (Manly Daily, 2009). It added, “[w]e can only hope the trial provides the type of evidence the government will need to justify the estimated $150,000 needed to provide the life saving service. Mr. Macdonald has made the right decision. Sometimes it is not cheap to buy peace of mind” (Manly Daily, 2009).
The positive media attention did not reduce the risk of Macdonald being sacked; however, it did offer him a short term benefit. This goal and benefit is consistent with HALT events in that the response may not be about reducing the actual risk of the dreaded outcome, but rather the perception of the risk by interrupting the aversive condition. This use of policy tools at both the personal level and political level illustrates the way individual HALT events within someone’s personal experience can exist within a broader HALT context.
8.7 Conclusion
This chapter used the HALT framework to examine the factors that influenced the adoption of aerial patrols in New South Wales in 2009. Following a cluster of negative high affect-high salience shark bites in March 2009 the events were aggregated into a memorable problem condition. Faced with political peril, Minister Macdonald lowered the threshold and opened up the policy process to include aerial patrols because they were positively perceived. He acted as a pragmatic-opportunistic entrepreneur and announced the program in Parliament using a technical causal story. This response was aimed at encouraging positive affect to aid his political survival. In all, the story this case study tells is not one of ordinary political corruption, but the way HALT events can be used for practical political gain.
The characteristics of HALT events make them particularly susceptible to the political machinations of actors for four reasons. First, because they are high affect, these are issues that people care about when brought to their attention. Secondly, the relative high salience means that media coverage often seeks to take advantage of this public sensitivity. Thirdly, policy responses may occur during a HALT policy window to provide affective relief in the present moment or as aggregation prevention in anticipation of an aversion to a future dreaded event. As a result of this low threshold and long memory, the engagement by policy entrepreneurs and the introduction of added measures is not unexpected. Fourthly, actors or entrepreneurs can therefore exploit the memorable fears of the public, salience-prone media, and low policy thresholds to help advance their solutions or personal standing. In particular, these events advantage pragmatic entrepreneurs, who are often elected officials, because they have access to centralized political structures that may not challenge their enactment of solutions. Understanding these HALT features helps provide a framework for analyzing actor behaviour more critically following seemingly knee-jerk policy responses.
There are two additional points of note from this case study. First is the ease with which the media was manipulated by a politician based on the high affect nature of the issue he presented. In this case, media zeal for shark-related news may have trumped a questionable policy change. Secondly, this case also highlights why a certain policy response did not initially occur following an emotional series of events. Any element of the HALT model can veto the policymaking process. It was only when the threshold was lowered by the entrepreneur that the policy window opened and aerial patrols were adopted.
In all, this case illustrates the durability of the HALT framework in understanding policy responses across a range of different situations. The final chapter of this thesis now concludes with a review of the chief findings and implications of this study.
Chapter 9. Conclusion
“It is critical in the future to begin to understand which aspects of policy making are due to more general dynamics based in human cognition and organizational behaviour and which are due to the particulars of the institutions under study ” (True, Jones, and Baumgartner, 2007: 176)
Picture 9.1 White shark near a kayaker in Cape Cod in 2012
9.1 Introduction
The landscape for this doctoral research changed significantly over the course of study. The “politics of shark attacks” moved from being a remote and abstract theory-building public policy analysis to a more contemporary political issue. Following tragic shark bite incidents in Western Australia, Reunion Island, and Cape Cod in the United States (Picture 9.1), I presented the elements of the HALT framework as a way for policymakers and stakeholders to consider these events. The role of emotions toward dreaded outcomes, the media and summer salience-prone periods, and the role of actors as potential entrepreneurs and the importance of causal stories were often discussed. Each location remains a work in progress.
At the core of this research is an attempt to understand and inform the decision-making pressures that influence low threshold, seemingly knee-jerk, responses. One key obstacle to an evidence-based model; however, appeared to be the way the representative dreaded
outcome from shark “attacks” dominates the process. To inform this discourse, a proposal was put forward by myself and Dr. Robert Hueter for the largest scientific shark society in the world, the American Elasmobranch Society (AES) in 2013 to address the way shark “attack” media reporting impacts public perceptions. In response, the AES voted to urge greater media consideration of outcome-based categories following human-shark interactions The Australian Shark Attack File has adopted these new categories.
In all, a new dialogue has started regarding shark bite policymaking specifically and I hope this will extend to seemingly knee-jerk policy responses more broadly. The fundamental test of this dissertation; however, remains. This final chapter moves forward by reviewing the way the HALT framework helps answer the research question, may be a tool to analyze policy responses, and can assist policymakers in addressing the practical realities of difficult circumstances.
9.2 Reviewing the utility of the HALT framework in policy response analysis
This dissertation posed the research question: What are the factors that explain policy responses to shark bites in Florida, Cape Town, and New South Wales? A theoretical framework was proposed to analyze this question that highlighted the role of affect (Chapter 2), salience (Chapter 3), policy entrepreneurship, and causal stories (Chapter 4) in the policymaking process. I hypothesized that an examination of policymaking following shark bites should consider them as high affect-low threshold (HALT) events in order to review the way feelings toward dreaded outcomes influence policy thresholds, preference formation, and policy outputs. The HALT framework was then applied to three case studies to investigate different policy responses. In Florida, the FWC’s 2001 adoption of a shark-feeding ban was reviewed. In Cape Town, the City Council’s funding for the Shark Spotter program in 2004 was examined. And in New South Wales, the Department of Primary Industries’ adoption of aerial beach patrols was investigated. The framework informed the answers to these questions and challenged conventional wisdoms about emotional events and policymaking, offering a broader analysis about seemingly knee-jerk responses and policy overreactions. In all, this study has identified the way
emotions play a role in the kinds of public problems that can quickly become problems for political actors. It has taken a process tracing and theory-building approach to policy analysis and used comparative studies in three different countries to examine the HALT framework’s applicability. This provides a valuable way of thinking about policy responses to highly emotional issues.
This concluding chapter addresses three questions. These are: 1.) why the HALT framework is an original contribution of knowledge to the field, 2.) what the comparison between the shark bite case studies reveals, and 3.) how HALT and other affect-tooutcome categories can be applied more broadly to policy analysis.
9.3 Why is the HALT framework an original contribution?
This review of policymaking focused on the way the emotional nature of issues, specifically feelings toward certain perceived outcomes and events can influence actors to lower policy thresholds and trigger windows of opportunity. At its core, this dissertation reviewed a central question in political science: what makes policy responses occur? While the HALT framework does not provide an answer in every instance, it does add to the conceptual architecture that produces better understandings. It embraces a number of key theories, including Zajonc’s (1980), Damasio’s (1996) and Slovic’s (2004) analyses of affect, Linville and Fischer’s (1991) prospect theory, Warr’s (1985) sensitivity to risk and Lodge and Taber’s (2005) analysis of ‘hot cognition.’ The framework stands out because it locates affect centrally within the policy process and does not limit its influence to agenda setting, issue attention, or cathartic displays.
9.3.1 HALT locates affect within the policy process
The HALT framework is an original contribution to the discipline because of the manner in which it locates affect and emotion within the policy process. Previously, affect has primarily been used in psychology, political psychology, and sociology; however, it is
given a principle role in the policymaking process in the HALT framework. Here, the timing and sources of affect are central to policy development.
Affect provides an initial source of data that impacts the emotional weighting of political issues and events. In these cases, the timing of negative high affect toward an issue’s outcome is emphasized. For instance, instinctual affect can influence political prioritization even before an issue comes to light because affective feelings that provide survival value are pre-primed political issues. Placing affect in the opening sequence of preference shaping acknowledges that hard-wired feelings may have more weight or sensitivity as issues gain attention.
The HALT framework is also unique in the way sources of affect are derived from multiple locations. While some sources are instinctual and provide survival value, others are cultural and are guided by social learning, values, and group dynamics. These may be, and often are, combined. As a result, affect influences an issue’s salience because a combination of affective sources and characteristics increases the relative importance of an issue once it is given attention. For example, attentive feelings against spiders on the basis of survival are heightened by cultural values that may further stigmatize them as a target or out-group related to a dreaded outcome. This starting point for affect influences multiple aspects of the policy process because affect is the first domino to fall. Affect impacts issue attention, agenda setting, the development of policy alternatives, the involvement of actors, policy implementation, and evaluation.
Importantly, the HALT framework highlights how the role of affect in the political realm relies on contextual factors. Emotion alone toward a dreaded outcome is not enough to lower policy thresholds or engender a policy response, and actors attempt to reinforce their position against dreaded outcomes. Therefore, the contestation of dreaded outcomes for the public and political actors is highlighted by this research. In all, the HALT framework brings together a number key points from other disciplines to provide an additional way to conduct public policy analysis.
9.4 What does the comparison in Florida, Cape Town, and NSW tell us?
This dissertation also provides an original contribution to the field through a comparative case study of a new area of research. Little previous literature had examined the development of policy responses to sharks bites, even though they represent the most widespread human wildlife conflict in the world. I compared different policy responses in Florida, Cape Town, and Sydney using the HALT framework. Four points were learned from this comparative analysis: First, negative high affect and high salience features established representative dreaded outcomes. Secondly, policy responses occurred when policy entrepreneurs lowered policy thresholds to escape these dreaded outcomes. Thirdly, policy responses differed because the actors’ access to resources shaped the way they could provide positive affective relief to the dreaded outcome. Fourthly, historical analogies were more important than scientific evidence in the construction of causal stories.
9.4.1 Negative high affect periods established representative dreaded outcomes in Florida, Cape Town, and NSW
Each case study occurred in a negative high affect period. In Florida, the nature of the shark bite on Jessie Arbogast was followed by the close proximity of shark bites in New Smyrna Beach and the appearance of a new danger from shark feeding, which led to concerns about tourism. The continuation of incidents and potential blame toward Governor Bush during a state gubernatorial election year established a representative dreaded outcome. In Cape Town, the cluster of fatal shark bites and their close proximity to each other increased the engagement by local actors. The dreaded outcome for the community stakeholders was that politicians would take shark control policy out of their hands and put in place lethal measures. In NSW, the growing list of controversies for Minister Macdonald, negative media coverage, and his demotion within Cabinet presented a representative dreaded outcome unrelated to sharks: the potential for being sacked. In each case, the representation of a dreaded outcome presented a threat to the power and position of a policy entrepreneur.
9.4.2 High salience turned the events into aggregate dreaded outcomes
Salience was important in each case because the attention on the series of shark bites facilitated the linking of events into aggregate dreaded outcomes and problem conditions. In addition, the salience-prone nature within each case is particularly important because news cycle naturally disaggregate. However, during high affect-high salience fixations, this attention can facilitate limited social capacity and prompt temporal combining. This creates an aversive problem condition for the public and potential political pain for actors. Thus, the entrepreneur champions a response at the point of aggregation, where multiple high affect and high salience events meet limited capacity.
In Florida, the high affect nature of the shark bite on Jessie Arbogast drew in media attention, which was aided by the frequency of bites at New Smyrna Beach, the visible (i.e. filmable) nature of sharks off Florida shores and the lack of other compelling news stories. Correlative intent was reinforced due to the consumptive nature of the Arbogast incident and the continual recurrence of events. These factors culminated in intense pressures on the governor to act. In Cape Town, the consumptive nature of the events and the recurrent frequency in localized areas of False Bay painted an intent-based dreaded outcome for the public that was highly salient. In particular, attention from tabloids and the theory of rogue shark territoriality added to the aggregate nature of the events and dreaded outcome. This created a political problem condition for key insider community stakeholders, where control of the policy process (and potential harm to shark conservation) was linked to future localized aggregations. In New South Wales, media salience and coverage of Macdonald’s multiple controversies included Government fragility and his demotion. This atmosphere led to the aggregation of his personal political difficulties as a dreaded outcome and problem condition.
9.4.3 Policy entrepreneurs in Florida, Cape Town, and NSW played vital roles in lowering policy thresholds to enable policy responses based on dreaded outcomes.
The political peril and opportunity for policy entrepreneurs from the negative high affecthigh salience aggregated dreaded outcomes led them to open the policy processes in Florida, Cape Town, and NSW in order to facilitate their own policy response. Indeed the associated burdens and benefits afforded to these individuals facilitated these actions. In two cases, the pragmatic-opportunistic entrepreneurs had elected constituencies to worry about, while one was an unelected technical entrepreneur (see Table 9.1). Each actor; however, met the four core requirements of entrepreneurship set out in Chapter 6.
In Florida, the Governor was burdened by a focus on his actions to the shark bites, the election, the response by the FWC, whose members he appointed, and the state’s reliance on tourism. In turn, Governor Bush benefited from a centralized process in which he used the media to signal a policy opening and direct the political path forward for the FWC. In Cape Town, the community stakeholders were part of the policy process because the program originated with them. Their constituency was each other based on a common vision of bather safety and shark conservation. The benefits for the stakeholders could be seen in their command of a decentralized process in which their access and experience allowed them open a policy window, keep some options off the agenda, and achieve the outcome they wanted. In NSW, Minister Macdonald was burdened by the negative media stories and political attacks; however, he benefited by having responsibility for shark bites and authority to make policy with in a centralized process. With the resources of the Department at his disposal and the opportunity from a shark bite in South Australia he opened a policy window to his advantage.
Types of causal story Technical Technical Technical
Seen as a relevant actor? Yes Yes
Their solution attached to problem? Yes
Influence political outcome? Yes
Benefit from engagement? Yes Yes Yes
Innovative Idea? No Yes No
Expertise? No No No
Resilience? Unknown Yes Unknown
Defense? Yes Yes Unknown
Adoption of solution? Yes Yes Yes
9.4.4 Entrepreneurs used policy responses to provide affective relief to their dreaded outcome in Florida, Cape Town, and NSW
The policy solutions selected by each entrepreneur were different because they were based on what would provide affective relief to the perceived representative dreaded outcome from the options available to the actor. In Florida, the adoption of the shark feeding ban was seen as a positive step at countering the narrative that shark bites and shark feeding were connected. In addition, the FWC’s regulatory ban was within the informal control of the Governor. In Cape Town, the Shark Spotter program began as a local initiative that gained supporters and showed its public value. It was also augmented as the entrepreneurs brought more groups together. As a result, the program provided both affective relief and limited future clusters of shark bites in localized areas. In NSW, the adoption of aerial patrols was aimed media attention, to interrupt negative news stories about Macdonald’s controversies. This was effective and gained positive press, but did not forestall his sacking. In each situation, the policy tools were used by policy entrepreneurs to disaggregate the high affect-high salience averse contexts and benefit themselves.
Table 9.2 Reviewing the speed of political attention in Florida, Cape Town and NSW
This study argues that policy windows often open because it is in the advantage of the policy entrepreneur to open the policy process. These actors lower thresholds, act as entrepreneurs, and enact solutions to manage dreaded outcomes that threaten their power. The table (Table 9.2) also highlights the way speed is used to provide relief from the aversive condition. In Florida and NSW, ready-made solutions with positive affective relief were used because they were quickly accessible. However, in Cape Town, where innovation was needed and positive relief had to be established, the response was slower. Other potential reasons for the slowness in Cape Town may have been that the costs or political distress for the entrepreneurs was lower given that they were community stakeholders and not elected politicians. In addition, the lack of initial ready-made solutions and low expectations for a city response may have also contributed to speed.
9.4.5 Historical analogies dominated scientific evidence in causal stories in Florida, Cape Town, and NSW.
This study demonstrates the dominance of historical analogies as technical causal stories over scientific accuracy. In Florida, the FWC used the familiar heuristic “don’t feed the animals” as a technical causal story that served as a political tool to favour the adoption of a shark feeding ban. The scientific evidence of a connection between shark feeding and shark bites did not exist; however, this familiar saying was seen as a reliable basis for the ban. In Cape Town, the entrepreneurs emphasized that shark nets were not scientifically feasible due to white shark movements in the region. This served as the basis for a causal story that advantaged innovation in the search for a solution. However, the scientific evidence to support this conclusion in False Bay remains in doubt. Yet, it provided a
valuable tool that afforded time to the entrepreneurs to develop their alternatives. In NSW, Minister Macdonald highlighted selected statements from a 2006 Scientific Shark Summit Report, whose overall conclusion was that aerial patrols were significantly limited, as the basis for a technical causal story in favour of their adoption. He also used historical support for aerial patrols during the summertime as an added element in their favour. This analysis showed that the strength of actors with centralized power was important in each case. Their access and ability to wield narratives as well as to dominate scientific claims rested on the way their positions were legitimized and their narrative tapped into familiar, historical, and adequate causal points.
I find from these cases that emotional stimuli alone did not cause the policy responses to occur. This study suggests that highly emotional events as a standalone element do not lead to policy responses. Nor is the highest level of media attention, to the highest emotional event, guaranteed to lead to a policy response. Instead, what was demonstrated by the application of the HALT framework to these case studies was that policy responses resulted from the way negative high affect and high salience stimuli were aggregated into a representative dreaded outcome. This condition made the events more intense and aversive for the public while also presenting threats and opportunities to key political actors. These pressures served as the causal mechanism that encouraged entrepreneurs to lower policy thresholds and open policy windows to facilitate a solution that would provide them with affective relief.
These shark bite case studies highlight the way the HALT framework may be used to offer a cautionary note to the public about policy evaluation. In these cases, responses to shark bites are seen as politically successful because they: 1.) appear to provide affective relief; and 2.) appear to be successful in reducing bites. However, shark bites are so rare and unpredictable that responses may appear successful based on natural ecosystem conditions that forestall shark bite incidents rather than the policy itself. This would explain the lack of policy learning in this domain and the longevity of path dependent responses. Given this situation, it is more likely that politicians can use false narratives
that confirm their political narrative because their policy response is likely to be seen to work.
9.5 What are the broad applications of the HALT framework?
Shark bite policy responses do not stand in isolation. They are an example of seemingly knee-jerk policymaking that exists on a number of issues. The HALT framework has demonstrated how these conditions can lead to ineffective governance and public exploitation. There are three key findings that can be applied to other issue areas. First, knee-jerk policymaking can be complex and deliberate. Secondly, seemingly overreactive policy responses should consider the affective weight of perceived dreaded outcomes. And thirdly, the HALT framework can be applied to other issues based on four affect-threshold categories.
9.5.1 How the HALT framework informs knee-jerk policy and policy overreactions
The way the HALT framework places the role of affect within the policy process is important because there is often a presumption that highly emotional events lead to kneejerk reactions. This research does not support this as a stand-alone conclusion. These seemingly knee-jerk policy outcomes are better considered based on an analysis involving these multiple HALT variables. A combination of factors leads to lower thresholds for certain issues and situations, with occasionally quick policy responses. Looking at these factors allows for an improved analysis that can review and predict the kinds of issues, subsystem actors and policy responses one might expect.
Future HALT research might examine the usage of immediate domestic aid packages following Hurricane Katrina, US Presidential use of the National Strategic Petroleum Reserve during gasoline price increases, and the issuing of US Presidential executive orders following mass shootings. In each case, pressures and measurements reinforce the benefits of short-term political success. However, effective governance may require a certain degree of long-term policymaking. Therefore, it is important to build frameworks
that allow for critical analyses of these processes, especially when they appear to be kneejerk responses or overreactions.
The affective weight of outcomes is important to consider. Political reactions are relative to the total perceived costs, benefits and expectations. Identifying policy responses in this way begins to provide a framework to explain policy overreactions. For example, it may appear that shark bite policies are simple cases that can be explained by the highest rates of shark bite incidents or most severe injuries, yet this is not the case. Shark bites are not low probability-high consequence events (Sunstein, 2002). Rather, in the context of global disasters, they are low probability, low consequence events that are tragic and often high public anxiety because of the representative dreaded outcome. Moreover, what is high consequence about shark bites is the aversion to the representative of dreaded outcome of shark “attacks.” Therefore, it is often not the event itself, but the dreaded outcome the event represents that is at issue. In this way, policy responses may be affectively proportional to the level of dread but appear to be overreactions to the objective harm.
9.5.2 The HALT framework and “policy relief damage”
The implication of this analysis is that HALT events that include policy responses will lead to either affective relief or aggregation prevention. Entrepreneurs may provide shortterm, affective relief if they believe similar future events will not occur, will be in their favour, they have no other choice, or that alternative solutions offer a more severe dreaded outcome than the current problem condition. Alternatively, they may embrace aggregation prevention if they think future similar events pose an unmanageable or blamable threat. As a result, HALT issues represent a class of perilous and opportunistic moments that are managed by policy entrepreneurs to maintain power. Politicians encourage low thresholds for some issues, to allow themselves the ability to open policy windows and offer their solutions to relieve the aversive condition. This is important because if HALT events are understood as aversive conditions for the public and threatladen opportunities for political actors, then this may enable a governance cycle where
political elites select affective relief tools that people think they want (in terms of providing affective relief), when in actuality the policy tool serves to facilitate their own manipulation and exploitation.
These downsides from HALT policy responses occur when they result in relief policy damage In these cases, the public asks for and receives immediate, recognized, and positive affective relief in the form of policies that can cause them long-term harm and produce degenerative institutional legacies, while bolstering political actors. These policy responses act as emotional circuit breakers that relieve emotional distress, which may change the condition under which people are judging their level of risk, even if neither condition nor probability has changed. In short, the policy addresses the perception of risk but not the underlying risk itself. Indeed, the danger may increase as a result of the policy relief. This chapter moves ahead with a more optimistic and broader look at the different levels of affect and issue thresholds. Indeed, future research may consider the possibility of relief policy benefit based on the provision of affective relief tools that provide longterm gains to the public based on the way actors are more restricted within subsystems.
9.5.3 Considering the implications of the affect-threshold framework on other issues
The HALT framework can serve as the basis for an expanded view of issues through the three other affect-threshold categories noted in Chart 9.1. These include: high affect-high threshold (HAHT), low affect-high threshold (LAHT), and low affect-low threshold (LALT) categories. Here we see the greater role that policy subsystem strength plays, because for issues with significant dreaded outcomes, actors will build strong institutions with higher thresholds to protect themselves. Locating issues based on a perception of their degrees of affect and threshold levels illustrates a shifting continuum of issues, relative to certain national, cultural, and experiential contexts. Chart 9.1 is identical to the one that began this dissertation. However, here, I emphasize the way in which these affect-threshold categories can review a spectrum of issues within the policy process based on public feelings toward their dreaded outcomes. In particular, these political issues are located in an American-Australian context, noting that placing issues along the
spectrum is somewhat subjective.
Chart 9.1 Incorporating multiple issues into the (negative) affect-threshold categories
With the findings and data from the case studies, what appear to emerge more clearly are concentrations of issue types in each quadrant with survival-based fears located in the furthest corner of the HALT category and values-based fears located in the LALT category. In addition, tolerable or difficult to solve (i.e. intractable) problems appear in the LAHT category, while less tolerable problems that exist within stalemates (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 206) occupy the HAHT corner.
Indeed, there are governance models that reflect the distributions within Chart 9.1. Issues in the LALT category may be considered “low hanging fruit” and represent socially undesirable issues. Other HALT issues include extreme weather events and mass school shootings. In addition, these affect-threshold categories are consistent with a number of other theoretical approaches, including the social construction of target populations (Schneider and Ingram, 1993) and social group mobilization. For instance, it is possible that the greater the number of interest groups involved in an issue the more likely a policy
stalemate as well. Therefore these levels may reflect the general strength of policy subsystems, while others have more fluid power structures.
The affect-threshold category for an issue can change based on the context or type of causal story applied to it (Stone, 1989). For example, cultural values and sensibilities toward sex and political sex scandals in the LALT category are considered differently in France than they are in the United States (Benson and Saguy, 2005). I suggest that this flexibility is a strength of the framework rather than a liability. This feature adds to the level of policy analysis by interrogating why an issue is in a given position as a starting point.
9.5.4 Future questions
This dissertation concludes by noting future questions, limitations, and personal findings. The questions for future research include how the role of governability can be reviewed in relation to government responses. Political actors work on a number of ungovernable issues while neglecting more governable problems. Understanding where these fit into the affect-threshold framework would help identify potential exploitation. In addition, how political actors respond when surveyed about dreaded outcomes would provide a valuable experiment for this research. Questioning the public or politicians about consequences needs to be done in a way that incorporates contextually dependent variables, including limited capacity and increased salience. Another question returns to the issue of scientific evidence in developing causal stories. Where science fits in to short-term policymaking is an important question of effective governance. Lastly, while a quantitative analysis applying the HALT framework across a large number of countries was outside the scope of this dissertation, it would provide a valuable next step in evaluation of the framework
9.6 Conclusion
The aim of this dissertation was to explain the factors that influence policy responses to shark bites by establishing the applicability and durability of the HALT framework. This
was done through qualitative comparative case studies in Florida, Cape Town, and New South Wales. To briefly recap, I conclude that policy responses occurred in these cases because political actors lowered thresholds in response to high affect-high salience issues whose representative dreaded outcome was a threat to their power. This aversive condition was created at the point of aggregation when there was limited social capacity. Political actors seek to escape this dreaded outcome and this preferences the speed and direction of policy solutions and causal stories because entrepreneurs benefit by providing timely affective relief. These elements help reveal how knee-jerk policy responses that appear automatic are in fact more calculated reactions based on the alignment of HALT characteristics. This framework can be applied more broadly to other issues.
While there are limitations to be addressed in future research, there are also strengths to be explored. For instance, this framework may help in addressing the “collective action problem” because affective relief from an aversive condition requires individual consent. People must accept that the policy response is a positively affective interruption before they will receive relief from the problem condition. At the point of acceptance they may share in collective relief; however, they will continue to experience the aversive state if they do not. This may address the “free-rider” problem, where one person benefits without paying for the cost of the benefit or resource (Ostrom, 1990) Secondly, this framework can be proven wrong. Its claims about the speed of policy responses relative to perceived affective relief, for example, can be falsified by empirical evidence. The reasons for and the implications of speed in policy responses are important areas of future study.
Political science has often been based on taking emotion out of the policymaking process. This research has been concerned with putting emotion into policy analysis. The HALT framework has offered a number of new considerations and qualitative tools to aid in future analysis. First, the HALT thermometer may be used to examine the way the perceived affective and salient features of an issue can be aggregated into a more intense dreaded outcome. Secondly, I built on the role of salience and framing by expanding on the way issues are aggregated. Thirdly, I have refined the categorizations of policy
entrepreneurship and suggested a matrix for comparative work. Fourthly, I have examined the role of speed as an indication of the way political actors lower policy thresholds in response to these aversive conditions. Together, these elements help analyze why responses occur, why they differ, and who is benefited and burdened by their speed and direction. In short, this dissertation has made an original contribution because the HALT framework offers a new way of considering emotion in the policymaking process and provides an original comparative case study of shark bite policy responses in the United States, South Africa, and Australia. This research also fills a gap in knowledge regarding the factors that trigger policy responses. Thus, the politics of shark “attacks” provides lessons about how certain issues align with the policy process more easily than others and how affect can play a role from the very start of policymaking.
This dissertation highlights how policymaking may say less about people’s feelings toward the target (e.g. sharks) than about their feelings toward the perceived dreaded outcome (e.g. shark bites). For sharks, this is an encouraging thought for the future of their conservation; however, it suggests that education should continue to be directed at informing the public about the multiple outcomes from human-shark interactions. In addition, I conclude that emotion alone is not enough to start the policy process. This is an important point because highly emotional issues can lead to expectations of rapid relief. Addressing public expectations to emotional issues and events may be difficult, but it could reduce the need for short term, knee-jerk policy responses and improve long-term governance.
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