Policy Entrepreneurship and Dont Ask Don t Tell by Chris Pepin-Neff

TheRiseofRepeal:PolicyEntrepreneurship andDon’tAsk,Don’tTell

CHRISTOPHERL.NEFF,MPP

DepartmentofGovernmentandInternationalRelations,UniversityofSydney, Sydney,Australia

LUKER.EDGELL,BLAS

DepartmentofGenderandCulturalStudies,UniversityofSydney,Sydney,Australia

WereportonpolicyentrepreneurshipbyServicemembersLegal DefenseNetwork(SLDN)andhowitslegislativestrategiesused mini-windowsofopportunitytoshiftCapitolHillperspectivesof Don’tAsk,Don’tTell(DADT)frompoliticalplutoniumtoanemergingissuerequiringasecondlook.Fourphasesinthelegislative historyofDADTareidentiﬁed:radioactive,contested,emerging, andviable.Inall,thisarticlearguesthatSLDN’sentrepreneurship focusedoncontestingcongressionalsensibilitiestowaitordeferon repeal,maintainedthateverydischargewasdamagingandtransitionedtowardapost-repealmindset.Finally,weillustratethe importanceofthesetransitionsbycomparingSLDN’s2004estimatedvotecountfortheintroductionoftheMilitaryReadiness EnhancementActwiththeﬁnal2010votingresultsontheDon’t Ask,Don’tTellRepealAct.

KEYWORDSDon’tAsk,Don’tTell,agendasetting,policy entrepreneur,gayrights

TheauthorswishtothanktheUniversityofSydneyFacultyofArtsandSocialSciences andtheFacultyofScienceaswellasseveralindividualsfortheirleadershipandsupport, including:AaronBelkin,DeniseRiordan,DixonOsburn,SharraGreer,KathiWestcott,Jeff Cleghorn,SharonAlexander-Debbage,AlecPapazian,andNathanielFrank.Specialthanksto MeganMackenzieandthereviewersfortheircommentsonpreviousversions.

AddresscorrespondencetoChristopherL.Neff,DepartmentofGovernmentand InternationalRelations,Room269,MerewetherBuilding(H04),TheUniversityofSydney, NSW,2042,Australia.E-mail:Christopher.neff@sydney.edu.au

ThedramaticshiftinthepolicydirectionofDon’tAsk,Don’tTell(DADT) between1993and2011offersanimportantcasestudyforthegayrights movementandpolicychangeresearchers.Thispaperprovidesafirst-hand accountofhowtheissueofgaysinthemilitary1 reemergedinCongress andhowrepeallegislationwasintroducedintheHouseofRepresentatives in2005.2 WereportonpolicyentrepreneurshipbyServicemembersLegal DefenseNetwork(SLDN)andhowtheirlegislativestrategiesusedminiwindowsofopportunitytoshiftCapitolHillperspectivesofDADTfrom politicalplutoniumtoanemergingissuerequiringasecondlook.SLDNdid thisbymobilizingaroundthreeunforeseenevents:first,theyreengagedthe SenateontheissuebyopposingPresidentGeorgeW.Bush’s2002nominationofMaj.Gen.RobertClark.Second,staffbuiltacoalitionofcongressional officesandorganizedforlegislativeactionfollowingthe2002dischargeof gayArabiclinguists.Lastly,SLDNrecruitedsupportiveofficesandexercised atestrunfortheintroductionofrepeallegislationduringHouseRepublican’s 2004fightoverROTCuniversityrestrictions.

Criticaltotheseactionswerethecongressionalcontexts.Fourphases inthelegislativehistoryofDADTareidentiﬁed:radioactive,contested, emerging,andviable.Intheradioactivephase(1993–2002),Congresswas overwhelminglyhostiletothisissue;inthecontestedphase(2002–2005), opposingargumentsgainednewtraction;duringtheemergingperiod (2005–2009),argumentsandpoliticalstructuresalignedtochallengerepeal; and,mostrecently,aviablephase(2009–2010)sawthealignmentofpoliticalarguments,structures,andleadershiptomakerepealsuccesspossible. Inall,thisarticlearguesthatSLDN’sentrepreneurshipfocusedoncontestingcongressionalsensibilitiestowaitordeferonrepeal,maintainedthat everydischargewasdamagingandtransitionedtowardapost-repealmind set.Finally,weillustratetheimportanceofthesetransitionsthroughacomparisonofa2004votecountusedtoprepareforintroductionoftheMilitary ReadinessEnhancementActwiththeﬁnal2010votingresultsontheDon’t Ask,Don’tTellRepealAct.

POLICYENTREPRENEURSHIP

Policyentrepreneursareexpertsinafieldthatdedicatetheirtimeand resourcestobrokeringdesiredoutcomes(Kingdon,1984).Theycaninclude issuespecialists,congressionalstaff,orelectedofficials(Mackenzie,2004; Walker,1977;Weiss,1989).DavidRochefortandRogerCobb(1994)explain theroleoftheseentrepreneursaspolicyactorswhostrategicallycultivate issuesthroughproblemdefinitions,thatreframeotherwisenormalevents asproblemsthatgovernmentneedstosolve.Policyspaceiscreatedfor issuesbyhighlightingtheirseverityandproximity.Thesequalitiesofsavvy,

compromise,andaccessareuniqueandcanbeseeninindividualpolicy entrepreneursorteams.

Thegayrightsmovementisrepletewithexamplesofpowerfulpolicy entrepreneurshipfromindividualsandadvocacygroups.HarryHay,Franklin Kameny,BarbaraGiddings,HarveyMilk,andLarryKramerbeginalong listofnotableactorswho(bothasindividualsandinteams)accumulated thenecessaryexpertise,skills,andnetworkstoadvocatefortheirissues. Akeyfeatureofpolicyentrepreneurshipispatience.Ittakestimetobe positionedappropriatelywithinthesystem,towaitforpolicywindows,or engineeropportunities.Ifthepoliticalterrainisnotfavorable,theseactors willcrosstootherjurisdictionsorvenuestopursuetheirgoal(Mackenzie, 2004;Mintrom&Norman,2009).Inshort,policyentrepreneurshipinvolves beinga skilledhunter thatseeksopeningsandasavvy outcomebroker when thesemomentsarise.

Thestudyofteamswithinorganizationshasbeenanunderresearched componentofpolicyentrepreneurshipaswellasgaystudies.TheMattachine Society,DaughtersofBilitis,GayActivistAlliance(ofNewYorkand Washington,DC),aswellastheCampaignforMilitaryServiceandHuman RightsCampaign(HRC)haveallincludedcommittees,departments,and teamsofentrepreneurs.Buildingstrongcoalitionsisanessentialcomponent forpolicyactors(Mintrom&Norman,2009).Theirgoalistomarshalenough force(ofideas,people,symbols,rhetoric,andresources)toplayapivotal roleinestablishingpoliticalinertiafortheirintendedchange.Thishighlevel ofexpertise,ambitionandaccessallowspolicyentrepreneurstoadvocatefor theiroutcomebyidentifyingthefailingsofthepresentsystem,thedangers ofalternativesandthesecurityandfeasibilityoftheirposition.Thestaffof SLDN,ofwhichI(C.L.Neff)wasamember,providesanexampleofpolicy entrepreneurshiponDADTbetween2002and2005becauseitwastheonly organizationworkingfulltimeontheissuefollowingthepassageofthelaw.

SLDNwasfoundedin1993byattorneysDixonOsburnandMichelle Beneckeandﬁnancedthroughprivatecontributions.Itschiefrolewasto providefreelegalservicestoservicemembersaffectedbythelaw,butalso includedassistinginfederalcourtchallengesandregulatoryoversight.Inthe earlydaysofDADT,thehopewasthatthelawwouldbedeclaredunconstitutionalbythecourtsorthattheClintonAdministrationwouldbalancethe rightsofgaytroopswiththelimitationsofthelaw.Neitheroccurredand Congresswasloathetopromoteopenlygayanything.

THEENTREPRENEURIALTEAM

IwaspartoftheentrepreneurialteamatSLDNalongwithattorneysKathi Westcott,SharraGreer,SharonAlexander,andJeffCleghorn.KathiWestcott alsohadexperienceinpolicyissuesduringherpreviousworkforPeoplefor

theAmericanWayandSharonAlexanderhadworkedforHRC.IhadpreviouslyworkedforSen.HarryReid(D-NV)andSen.JohnWarner(R-VA),and wasresponsiblefordevelopingandimplementingthelegislativerepealintroductionstrategy;yet,thiswas—frombeginningtoend—ateamendeavor. KathiWescottandIattendedmanymeetingstogether,JeffCleghornwas instrumentalintheArabiclinguistsstory,andSharonAlexanderwascentral tothedraftingoflegislation.AsDepartmentHeadforLawandPolicy,Sharra Greeroversawourteam.

Additionally,coalitionallieswerecriticaltotheseeffortsincluding ChristopherLabonteatHRC,TanyaClayatPeoplefortheAmericanWay, ChristopherBarronatLogCabinRepublicans,AaronBelkinatthe(then) CenterfortheStudyofSexualMinoritiesintheMilitary,andEricSternatthe DemocraticNationalCommittee.However,in2002,theissueofopenlygay militaryservicewasinthepoliticalwastelandofloserissuesanditwouldbe threeyearsbeforeanylegislativeactiontookplace.

DADTREPEALASRADIOACTIVE(1993–2002)

Theissueofgaysinthemilitarybecamelegislativelyradioactiveasthe painfulpoliticalprocessofwhatbecameknownastheDon’tAsk,Don’t Tellpolicytookshape(U.S.Code,Title10S654).Ninehearingswereheld intheSenateandﬁveintheHousein1993.Sen.SamNunn(D-GA)chaired theSenateArmedServicesCommitteeandledtheefforttoenacttheban. AttemptsbySen.BarbaraBoxer(D-CA)andCong.MartyMeehan(D-MA)to deletetheprohibitiononopenlygayservicefailed(CongressionalRecord, 1993,HouseAmendment316).Inaddition,thePresident’slossesmounted ashiseffortsathealthcarereformwentdownandtheDemocraticPartylost itsmajorityinCongressinthehistoric1994electoraldefeat.

Republicanmembersinthenewmajorityattemptedtocapitalizeonthe weakpoliticalsupportforgaysinthemilitary.In1996,Cong.BobDornan (R-CA)successfullyledanefforttopassananti-gaybanorexpulsionprovisiononactivedutyservicememberswhowerediagnosedwithHIV.This legislativeriderpassedbothchambersandwassignedintolawinFebruary 1996beforelaterbeingrepealedthefollowingApril.InJuly1996,Cong. DuncanHunter(R-CA)wonpassageofarepealofDADTintheHouse,to reinstatepreviousrestrictions,buthisbillfailedintheSenate.Thecollective politicaltraumaexperiencedbyDemocratsaroundDADTmeantthatphrases like“ill-fated”(Brewer,2008,p.70)and“expendingpreciouspoliticalcapital”(Siciliano,1994)stillechoedthroughCongressonthisissuein2002. Ihadbeentoldrepeatedlybycongressionalstaffin2002thatthepitfalls fromtheeventsof1993,1994,and1996hadcementedforcongressional survivorsthebeliefthattheseissueswerepoliticalplutoniumandshouldbe leftalone.

C.L.NeffandL.R.Edgell

Thehomophobia-relatedmurderofPrivateFirstClass(PFC)Barry Winchellin1999,whileasleeponbaseatFortCampbell,KY,reinforceda hands-offapproachbyCongress.Themurder,byfellowsoldiers,wasframed asaDepartmentofDefenseissue.PresidentClintonstatedthatthepolicy was“outofwhack”(Richter,1999)andinDecember,1999,“SecretaryCohen orderedanInspectorGeneralsurveytoassessanti-gayharassment”(Sobel, Westcott,Benecke,Osburn,&Cleghorn,2000,p.iv).Noeffortwasmadeto legislativelychangethelaw,withthefocusonPentagonanti-harassment measures.Thisperiodofcongressionaldormancychangedin2002with PresidentBush’snominationforpromotionofthenMaj.Gen.RobertClark, theformerCommandingGeneralatFortCampbell.

DADTREPEALASCONTESTED(2002–2005)

ClarkNomination

PresidentBush’sOctober2002nominationofMaj.Gen.RobertClarktothe rankoflieutenantgeneralprovidedtheﬁrstmini-windowforSLDNpolicy entrepreneurstohuntfornewopeningsinDADT.First,SLDNhiredstaffto establishalegislativeagendathatwouldlaterincluderepeal.Second,PFC Winchell’sparentsworkedwithSLDNtocontestthesuccessofDADTand offeredatragicexampleofitspolicyfailures.Third,senatorswereengaged personallyontheissueofgaysinthemilitarycreatingspaceforarenewed debate.Inparticular,Sen.KennedyledachallengetothelawontheSenate ﬂoorbasedonmoralgrounds.

Since1999,SLDNhadbeeninvolvedintheinvestigationofthemurderofPFCBarryWinchell.AttorneyKathiWestcotthadworkedcloselywith Barry’sparents,Patricia(Pat)andWallace(Wally)Kutteles.Itwasclearto herandSLDNstaffthatMaj.Gen.Clarkhadtoleratedananti-gayclimate thatcontributedtohisdeath.FollowingClark’snominationforpromotion, sheandfellowattorneyJeffCleghornrecognizedthatopposingthenominationwouldrequiretheorganizationtodedicatenewresourcesandstaff up.Iinitiallyjoinedtheteamasapolicyassociate,and,inNovember2002, ourworkbegan.SLDNwasjoinedbyPeoplefortheAmericanWayand theNationalOrganizationforWomen(NOW)inopposingthenomination, whichwasreferredtotheSenateArmedServicesCommittee(NOW,2002).

SLDNstaffworkedcloselywiththeKuttelestodiscussthenomination withkeysenators.Sen.Kennedywasparticularlyconcerned.Tohim,itwas clearthattherehadbeenproblemsatthebaseandthemurderwasatragic indicatorofamassivepolicyfailure.Nominationsforseniormilitaryofﬁcerpromotionsarehandledconﬁdentiallybysenatorsandinvolveprivate butroutineexecutivesessionsthatoftenresultinuncontroversialapprovals. So,itcameasasurprisetomany,whenSenateArmedServicesCommittee ChairmanCarlLevin(D-MI)adjournedconsiderationoftheMaj.Gen.Clark

nominationwithoutavotein2002.Thecongressionaltermhadendedand withthatallnominationswouldneedtoberesubmitted.Thismovefacilitated anominationﬁghtthatwouldcontinueforthenext14months.

AchangeintheSenate’smajorityin2003madeSen.Warnerthe ChairmanoftheArmedServicesCommittee.Asexpected,PresidentBush renominatedMaj.Gen.ClarkinMarch.Partofourjobwastoassistinsetting upkeySenatemeetings.BetweenOctober28,2002,andDecember18,2002, SLDNheld9Senatemeetings,whilein2003,theKuttelesandSLDNcollectivelyattended56meetingsaheadoftheMaj.Gen.Clarknomination.Broken downbyparty,SLDNincreasedmeetingsinDemocraticSenateofﬁcestoits highestlevelever(37).Theyalsoincreasedthenumberofmeetingswith RepublicanSenateofﬁcesto19.Somemeetingswereheldwithstaff,while otherswereone-on-onemeetingswithsenators.

Inoneinstance,wecalledSen.Warner’sofﬁceandaskedforaprofessionalcommitteestaffertomeetwithPFCWinchell’sparents.Iwastold “undernocircumstanceswillImeetwithyouorthem”(C.Neff,personal communication,April,2003).ThishostilitymotivatedSLDNandtheKutteles toreachouttoSen.Warnerhimselfandameetingwassetupbetween theKutteles,Sen.Warner,andSen.LevinonMay14,2003.Justbeforethis meeting,theKuttelesandSLDNstaffmetwithSen.Kennedy.PatandWally toldhimoftheirfamily’scommitmentandserviceinthemilitary.Wallyhad servedinKoreaandtheyhadanothersonintheArmedServices.Senator Kennedysaidthathewasmovedthatafamilythathadlosttheirsonso tragicallyremainedpro-military.ThemeetingendedandSen.Kennedysaid thathehopedtheupcomingdiscussionwithSen.Warnerwouldbepositive.WallywouldlaterrecountthatbeforetheformalitiesbeganwithSens. WarnerandLevin,Warnerleanedforwardandsaidtohim,“Ihearthatyou servedinKorea”(C.Neff,personalcommunication,May14,2003).

PatandWallyKuttelesalsoattendedone-on-onemeetingswithSen. HillaryClinton(D-NY),Sen.MarkDayton(D-MN),Sen.SusanCollins(R-ME), Sen.JamesTalent(R-MO),Sen.SaxbyChambliss(R-GA),andSen.Daniel Akaka(D-HI).Importantly,theincreasedattentionbysenatorsthemselves, notjuststaff,whowerehandlingtheconﬁdentialaspectsofthenomination,demonstratedwhofuturealliesonDADTrepealmaybe.Sen.Collins discussedthenominationon NBCNightlyNews announcingthat,“thereis compellingevidencethattherewereproblemsatthisbase”(Schindler,2003). Withbipartisanattention,anewframeemergedaroundDADTandBarry Winchell’smotherwastheleadingmessenger.PatKuttelesputforwarda moralargumentagainstthepolicy,tellingthe SanAntonioCurrent ,“‘Don’t ask,don’ttell’createsanatmosphereofviolenceand ... themilitaryis thebiggestdiscriminatorinthecountry.Wehopeitwillchangeasanother generationcomesinthatisn’tasbiased”(Sorg,2003).

Oneadditionalanecdotecapturesthepersonalnatureofthisnomination ﬁght.Onthedayofthesecondprivateexecutivesessionbetweensenators

andMaj.Gen.Clarkhimself,IwasstandingoutsideSen.Warner’soffice. Therehadbeenachancethatfollowingthesessiontherewouldbean immediatevoteontheSenatefloor.Iwasholdingpositiontoseehowthings transpiredwhenMaj.Gen.ClarkandhiseightPentagonstaffarrivedinthe hallway,standingacrossfromme.Aswestoodoneithersideofthelong marblehallway,Sen.Warneremergedfromacommitteemeetingroom.He lookedatMaj.Gen.Clarkandhisentourageandthenwalkeduptome.He said,“HelloChris,wearegoingtotakeabreakfor10minutesforavoteon thefloorandthenwe’llbebackuphere.Okay?”Isaid,“Okay.”TheSenator walkedoffwithoutspeakingtotheGeneralorhissurprisedstaff.

Theexecutivesessiontookplace,butthefinalvotedidnot.Aholdwas placedonMaj.Gen.Clark’snominationthatblockeditfromfinalconsideration.WecalledSenateDemocraticofficestoseewhichofficehadplaced thehold,butnooneknew.SeveraldayspassedandKathi,Sharra,Sharon, andIwentasateamtotheNationalGayandLesbianTaskForce’s“Creating ChangeConference”inMiami,FL.Onthefinalday,wewerepackingup ourdisplaytableintheconferencelobbywhenwereceivedwordthatSen. JimBunning(R-KY)hadretaliatedwithacounter-holdofhisown,toforcea voteontheMaj.Gen.Clarknomination.Sen.Bunningwasnowblockingall DepartmentofDefensenominations,ineveryservice,fromapproval(Maze, 2003).

TheSLDNteamsteppedoutsidethehotel,totheswimmingpool,to discussthislatesttwistinevents.Wenotedthatnogeneralofﬁcercouldnow allowharassmentofgaytroopsattheirbaseandfeelimpervious.Itwasat thismoment,sittingtogether,thatwemadeacollectivedecision:thetime hadcometodraftandintroducelegislationtoendDADT.Thismini-window intheSenatehadbeenmadelargerandittaughtusthattherewasmore roomtonavigatepoliticallyonDADT.Asateam,wecoulddothis.Wenow hadtheexperiencetotakethisstepandbelievedthataboveall,gayservice membershadwaitedlongenough.Thelawwouldbecontestedonlegislative groundsandtheworkwouldbeginimmediately.

ThenominationﬁghtendedonNovember18,2003(Files,2003).AcompromisewasreachedbyMajorityLeaderTomDaschle(D-SD),Sen.Bunning andthemysteryholdinwhichthenominationwouldcometoavote,but onlyaftertwohoursofﬂoordebate(CongressionalRecord,2003,S15029). Thiswasthelongestdebateongaysinthemilitarysince1993and10senatorswouldparticipate.Sens.Kennedy,FrankLautenberg(D-NJ),andDayton spokeagainstthepromotionandSens.Warner,Levin,BillFrist(R-TN),John Cornyn(R-TX),JeffSessions(R-MS),Chambliss,andBunningspokeinfavor (CongressionalRecord,2003,S15029).

Sen.KennedychallengedthemoralityofDADTandstatedthat,“sucha crimesendsthepoisonousmessagethatsomemembersofthecommunity deservetobevictimizedsolelybecauseofwhotheyare”(Congressional Record,2003,S15029).HeaddedthatofalltheArmy’s271DADTdischarges

in1999,120werefromFortCampbell,comparedwithsixtheyearbefore. ThenatureofDADThadaffectedthewholebase.Sen.Daytonechoedthis sentimentstating,“IamnotproudofanArmy,oranyotherinstitutionin thiscountry,thatpermitsdiscriminationagainstmenandwomenbecauseof theirsexualpreference.”Headded,“Themilitarysystemthatallowedthat atrocitytooccurremains”(CongressionalRecord,2003,S15038).

Sens.RussFeingold(D-WI),JohnKerry(D-MA),andAkakaalsoadded theircommentstotherecord.Sen.Feingoldnotedthat,“theunusually lengthyandcontroversialnominationofGen.Clarkhas,onceagain,brought attentiontothefailureofthePentagon’spolicytowardsgayservicemembers.”Heconcluded,“Ifearthatthispolicymayhavebeenacontributing factorintheJune5,1999,brutalmurderofPVTBarryWinchell “The ’Don’tAsk,Don’tTell’policyhasfailed”(CongressionalRecord,2003, S15042).

SLDNhadjumpstartedpoliticaloperations,workedwiththeKuttelesto reachSenatorsandbeeninspiredtointroducerepeallegislation.Thedebate overgaysinthemilitaryhadbegunagainintheSenate,yet,theSenateasa repealvenueremainedinhospitablebecausebipartisansupportwaselusive. SLDNwouldturntotheHouseasthelegislativebattlegroundforDADT repeal.

ArabicLinguistDischarges

StoriesofgayArabiclinguistsbeingﬁredunderDADTturnedoutto beagamechangerforrepeal.OnNovember18,2002,NathanielFrank (2002)publishedanarticleinthe NewRepublic, tellingthestoryofseven gayArabiclinguistswhoweredischargedintwomonthsfromtheDefense LanguageInstitute.Thiseventcreatedasecondmini-windowofopportunity thatshiftedthelegislativegroundinCongressinseveralways.First,congressionalofﬁcesbecameinterestedinlegislationthatwouldprotectgayArabic linguistsfromdischarge.Second,thisprovidedacriticalpressurepointto contesteverydischargeunderthelaw.Third,ithighlightedasalientnational framewhereDADTwascounterproductiveatbestandunderminedmilitary readinessatworst.

SLDN’sincreasedpresenceontheHillwascentraltocapitalizingon thispoliticalopening.TheteambeganwidespreadmeetingswithHouse officestoreintroducetheissue.Tooursurprise,anumberofcongressional officesexpressedinterestinintroducinglegislativecarveoutstoexemptgay servicememberswithlanguagetrainingfromDADTdischarges.ThisattentionincreasedoverthecomingmonthsinboththeHouseandtheSenate. AtSLDN,itemphasizedtheneedforastrategiclegislativeplan.Wehad huntedforanopeningandnownewpolicyspacewasbeingpresented.But itwascrucialtouseourexpertisetobrokerthebestoutcomeforalltroops. WebelievedthataquickfixtotheArabiclinguiststorywouldplayinto

Republicans’handsandremoveanessentialargumenttototalrepeal:that thiswasemblematicofawide-spreadpolicyfailure.Yet,therewasareal chancethatanofficemaygorogueandintroducelegislationontheirownat anytime.Asaresult,SLDNbeganatwo-prongedstrategy:first,toestablish thecongressionalleaderontheissueofgaysinthemilitaryintheHouseand, second,tobringallinterestedofficestogetherinacoregroupthatwould keepthemintheloopandbuildastrategythatwasonthesamepage.

TheleadofficeintheHousewasRep.MartyMeehan(D-MA).Cong. Meehan’sfirstbillasafreshmanin1993wasanamendmenttocutDADT languagefromthe1994DefenseAuthorizationBillandhehadremainedsupportiveofopenlygayserviceeversince.SLDNandCong.Meehanworked togethertoraiseawarenessofDADT-relatedissuesintheLGBTcommunity andinCongress.MeehanservedasthekeynoteforSLDN’sJune2003(and first)LobbyDayandwecoordinatedthestartofDADTcoregroupmeetings intheHouseonJuly14,2003.Thispartnershipwasmanagedbetweenmyself andMeehan’slegislativeassistantformilitaryissues,LaurenBriggerman.

TheprimaryissuesbeingaddressedbyHouseofficeswerehowtocapitalizeonthepolicyfailuresraisedbytheArabiclinguistdischarges.The conclusionreachedwasthatmoredatawasneededtoexpandthescopeof theharmcausedbyDADT.Governmentsourceswereemphasizedgiventhe needtocontestDADTinawaythatgavecovertofrightenedRepresentatives (fromtheradioactiveperiod)andprovidedhardevidencetoundermine existingrationales.Asaresult,wesoughtinformationonthefinancial andmilitaryreadinesscostsofDADTinajointlettertotheGovernment AccountabilityOffice(GAO),signedby22membersofCongress.Theletter totheGAO(2005)wasbroadandaskedfordatarelatedto“theseparation ofservicememberswithcriticaloccupations”(p.2).Ourstrategywasto gatherdatathatwouldallowustocontesteverydischargeunderDADTand toascribeapoliticalpenaltyforsupportersofthecurrentlaw.Thiswasan importantlessonofthelinguistissue.Previously,dischargeshadbeenperceivedasameasureofsuccess;however,wedeterminedthat(withdata) eachdischargecouldrepresentmeasureofpolicyfailure.

Inthisstageofthecontestingprocess,itwasimportanttobothcutinto DADTandbuildalong-termcoalition.SLDNbelievedthatpromotingsmall successfulprojectswouldhelpofﬁcesfeelmorecomfortableontheissueand playanadditionalroleinmakingDADTlessradioactivepolitically.Itwas notenoughtolookforeasyentrypointstomakeastatement.Weknewthat howrepealwascontestedneededtobesituatedinamannerthatwould makeitapproachable,andshiftitfromaloserissuetoonethatprovided futurepoliticalgain.Thehopewasthattheseactionswouldbuildsupportfor cosponsorsoffuturerepeallegislation.InadditiontothelettertotheGAO, thecoregroupsendajointletterfromtwenty-twoofﬁcestothePentagon pressingthemforgreateractiononthemilitary’santi-harassmentactionplan andsentajointletterrequestinganupdatedreportonDADTfromthe

CongressionalResearchService.Indeed,aninternalSLDNmemodraftedby theauthorin2004noted,“SLDN’scurrentmodelforcoregroupmeetingsis thefoundationofitsrepealefforts.Coregroupattendeesarethefrontline ofﬁcesforSLDNandrepresentthenumberofimmediateco-sponsorsSLDN shouldexpectoncelegislationisintroduced.”

TheincreaseincoregroupactivityreflectedanincreaseinoverallHouse meetings.ThebiggestincreasewasamongDemocraticofficeswheremeetingsjumpedfrom7intheHousein2002,to46in2003,and65in2004 (seeFigure1).SLDNmobilizedgrassrootsmembersandheldannuallobby daysin2003and2004thatboostedcongressionalstaffcontactsinoffices andintelligenceontheirDADTposition.

Thelegislativecontext;however,didnotexistinavacuum.Theyears 2002–2004wereimportantasthemovementcollectivelychallengednorms aroundgayrightsinanumberofvenues.Thecourtcase Lawrencev.Texas (June2003)fundamentallychangedthelegalstatusofgayAmericans.The comingoutofretiredflagandgeneralofficerswashistoricasBrig.Gen. KeithKerr,Brig.Gen.VirgilRichard,andRADMAlanSteinman(December 2003)appearedin PeopleMagazine .Inaddition,directchallengestoDADT tookplaceinfederalcourtfilingsbytheLogCabinRepublicansin LCRv. Rumsfeld (October,2004)andSLDN’s Cookv.Rumsfeld (December2006) Alloftheseactionsrevealthecrucialroleofalliedorganizationsandthink tanks,suchasthePalmCenter,whoseresearchonforeignmilitariesprovidedkeyinformationthroughoutthisperiod.SLDN’sroleasapolicy entrepreneurrequiredbalancingtheseelements.ByworkingwithHouse

SLDNSenateandHouseMeetingsfromOctober2002toMarch2005.

FIGURE1

C.L.NeffandL.R.Edgell

membersindraftinglegislativelanguage,wewereabletoformmonthly coalitionroundtablemeetingsandmanagetheintroductionstrategy.What wasunknownatthetimewasthatRepublicanoppositiontoanROTC campus-accessissuewouldhelpSLDNandHouseofﬁcestoprepareforthe introductionofrepealbydemonstratingthatDADTwasacontestedissue withpotential.

RepublicanOppositiontoUniversityROTCPolicies

TheHouseRepublican’sMarch2004debateontheMilitaryRecruiterEqual AccesstoCampusActprovidedthethirdmini-windowofopportunityfor SLDN.ThisdebateassistedSLDNandCong.Meehan’sofficeingainingnew membersofthecoregroup,andprovidedanimportanttoolthatcouldhelp predictthefuturevotecountforrepeal(CongressionalRecord,2004,H1695701).AtissueforRepublicansanduniversitieswasthecontinuedstrengthof theSolomonAmendment,aprovisionthatbannedfederalfundingforcollegesanduniversitieswhoprohibitedROTConcampus(basedonacollege’s nondiscriminationpolicies).WhiletheRepublicanmajoritywasassureda victoryonanyfloorvote,thedebatewasusedasamobilizingopportunity.SLDNprovidedtalkingpointstoofficestosupportthemandreinforce themomentumbuiltbythecoregroup.RepublicanswoulddebateROTC recruiteraccessandDemocratswoulddebateDADT.

RemarkswereofferedbynineteenmembersofCongressduringthis ﬂoordebate,thelongestdiscussionofgaysinthemilitarysince1993. SpeakersincludedReps.JohnBoehner(R-OH),EricCantor(R-VA),Ike Skelton(D-MO),BuckMcKeon(R-CA),andMeehan.Talkingpointswere notneeded;however,forCong.BarneyFrank(D-MA),whosetthetonefor allDemocrats.Hestated,“wehavefewerArabic-speakingtranslatorsinthe militarytodaybecauseofthepolicywhichkickedoutanumberofpeople attheArmylanguageschoolbecausetheywerediscoveredtobegay.These werepeoplewhowould,iftheyhadnotbeenkickedoutsometimeago, beenavailabletodaytodothatimportantjoboftranslation”(Congressional Record2004,H1699).ThelinguistargumentwassharedbyCong.SamFarr (D-CA)whostated,“Equalitywasnotaconcernforthemilitaryin2002when theydischargedsixteenArabiclinguistsfromtheDefenseLanguageInstitute inmydistrict”(CongressionalRecord2004,H1710).Finally,Rep.PeteStark (D-CA)offeredasolutionstating,“weoughttobevotingtodaytooverturnthemilitary’sdon’taskdon’ttellpolicyandinstitutingapolicythat prohibitsdiscriminationbasedonsexualorientation”(CongressionalRecord 2004,H1710).

ThedebateconcludedonanamendmentthatpassedtheHouse34381onMarch30,2004(CongressionalRecord,2003,H1695-701).Withthese votesinhand,LaurenBriggermanandIsetouttocontactthoseofﬁces whoopposedtheamendmentandwerenotpartofthecoregroup.Ofﬁces

werealsomicro-targetedduringSLDN’s2004LobbyDayinMayandasked iftheywouldjointhegroup.Inaddition,thedebatewasrevealingbecause noresponsehadcometothepro-repealargumentspresented.Following nearlytwoyearsofcontestingDADT,therewasnopoliticallydamaging response.ThenewframeforDADTrepealconsiderationinCongresswas coinedbyKathiWestcott,whotitledourdraftedlegislationthe“Military ReadinessEnhancementAct.”Acarefulpoliticalorchestrationwouldnow movetorepealintroduction.DADTwasnowmorethanacontestedissue, repealwasemerging.

DADTREPEALASANEMERGINGISSUE(2005–2008)

SLDN’slegislativeplanwasoutlinedinamemodraftedbyC.L.Nefffor theintroductionofDADTrepealinDecember2004.Itnotedattentionto the“pre-introductionstrategy,introductionstrategy,andpostintroduction strategy”(SLDN,2004).Thepre-introductionstepswereinplace,withcore groupofficeslineduptobecosponsors.Inparticular,thememonotedthat “SLDNhasmetwithover200congressionalofficessinceNovember2002.” OfficesandallieshadagreeduponSLDNandCong.Meehan’slegislative language.TheMilitaryReadinessEnhancementActwaswritteninawaythat transitionedtheissuetoanemergingstatusbyofferingapictureofwhat openlygayservicelookedlike.

Therepeallanguageincludedthreepillarsthathadbeenconstructed bySLDN,congressionalofficesandthelawfirmWilmerCutlerPickering. First,thebanwouldbeeliminated.Second,DADTwouldbereplacedwith anaffirmativenon-discriminationpolicyandtherighttoopenserviceinthe military.Finally,servicememberswhohadbeendischargedunderthepolicy wouldhavetheopportunitytobeconsideredforreenlistment.Thesewere intendedasstartingpoints,thebeginningofaprocesstoderailDADT.Inan outcomebrokerrole,SLDN’sgoalwastoestablishahighbarwithinthelegislativelanguageforcongressionalsupportofopenlygayservice,sothatthe managementofthisbillandanyfuturelegislationwouldbemoreworkable.

Ensuringthatintroductionwentsmoothlyandwithfewsurpriseswas achiefconcernthatrequiredmonthsofplanning.SLDNviewedthisasa crucialtestofitsroleasbothexpertsonDADTandapoliticalorganization leadingrepeal.The2004SLDNmemorandumnotedtheseconcernsstating:

BetweenthereleaseofanimpendingGAOReportandSLDN’sDADTlitigation,therearefewscenariosunderwhichlegislationregarding“Don’t Ask,Don’tTell”won’tbeintroducedintheﬁrstsessionofthe109th Congress.TheonlyquestionsarewhetheritwillbeoppositionlegislationorhelpfullegislationandwhetheritwillbeSLDN’slegislationora rogueintroduction.

Toaddressthisissue,LaurenBriggermanandIattended28meetings betweenJanuary1andMarch2,2005.SLDNpreparedtoplaybothoffense anddefenseatthesametimeandadoptedaPowelldoctrineforDADT introduction,tointroducethebillwithoverwhelmingforce.Ourtargetwas 50bipartisancosponsorsatintroduction.Webelievedthatthiswouldpresent astrong,activefrontandlimitanypotentialRepublicanbacklash.Inaddition,wehaddiscussedtheneedtoplaceaSenateholdonanyanti-gay legislationifRepublicansresponded,andourexperiencewiththeClark nominationgaveusconﬁdencethatthiswaspossible.Withadefensive planinplace,SLDNassumedanaggressivestanceawaitingtheintroduction, whichwouldbetriggeredbythelong-awaitedGAOreport.Weexpected thatthisreportwouldpresentanewpictureofDADTasanationalfailureandtheintroductionofrepeallegislationpresentedthesolutiontothis problem.

OnFebruary23,2005,theGAOreleasedthemostcompletereviewon themilitaryreadinesscostsofDon’tAsk,Don’tTell.Itfoundthat757service membersweredischargedfromcriticaloccupationsandspecialties,including300foreignlanguagespecialists(GAO,2005).Afterthereportwasmade public,Cong.Meehantoldthe BostonGlobe ,“theconventionaljustiﬁcation forDon’tAsk,Don’tTellhasbeenthatallowinggaystoserveundermines militaryreadiness.Nowwehavethenumberstoprovethatthepolicy itselfisunderminingourmilitaryreadiness”(Bender,2005)Asplanned,the MilitaryReadinessEnhancementActwasintroducedonMarch2,andthis included57cosponsors,abipartisanbillincludingRep.ChristopherShays (R-CT;CongressionalRecord,2005,H.R.1059).Withtheoriginalcosponsors onboard,thebillwouldattain107totalcosponsorsbytheendoftheyear. Theissueofopenlygayservicehadagainreturnedtothecongressional legislativeagenda.

SLDN’sresponsestothesmallwindowsofopportunityillustratedour roleaspolicyentrepreneurs.Weexpandedthescopeofourwork,built astrongcoalitionofoffices,andtransitionedtheissuefromastatusof radioactiveisolationtoaproblemthatcouldattractbroadcongressionalsupport.Followingtheemergenceofrepeal,itisinstructivetolookatthefinal transitiontowardaviableperiodthatfulfilledthisgoalofopenservicein 2010.

ThefactorsthatmovedDADTfromanemergingstatustoaviablestatus includedstructuralchangesbasedonelectoralshifts,thechangeinpolitical beneﬁtsversuscostsandleadershipfromPresidentObama.Forinstance, DADTrepealwasnotviablein2007and2008duetoalackofsupport(and likelyveto)bytheBushAdministration,evenwithDemocraticmajorities intheHouseandSenate.Thecomparisonbelowhighlightsthewaysin whichthisviablestagecanbeanalyzedusingthe2004SLDNestimated votecountandthe2010actual(ﬁnal)votesonrepealintheHouseand Senate.

Comparing2004’sVoteCountto2010’sResults

Akeytoolintheleaduptolegislativeintroductionin2005wasamatrix createdin2004thatpredictedhowmembersoftheHouseandSenatewould likelyvoteinfavorofDADTrepealifthevotewasheldatthattime.This estimatedvotecountwasusedasaplanningtooltoprioritizeoutreachfor cosponsorsandtoidentifyofficesthatmaybemovableontheissue.This analysislooksatthefinaloverallresultsandthenreviewshowtheseindicate atransitiontotheviabilityphase.Tables1and2comparetheprojected 2004votecountsintheHouseandSenatewiththeactualfinalvotecounts, acrosssixestimatedcategories:yes,leaningyes,undecided,no,leaningno, andunknown(basedonbeingnewtoCongress).Thismeasurementcan onlyreflectonelectedmemberswhowereinCongressin2004andalso votedontheDon’tAsk,Don’tTellRepealActin2010.

TheestimatedHousevotecount(seeTable1)notesthepredictedpositionsonrepealin2004,whichcalculatedthattherewere106estimated yesvotes,55leaningyesvotes,25undecided,15leaningno,194no,and 40membersidentiﬁedasnewtoCongress.Wethenasked,ofthesepredictions,whichmemberswerestillinCongressin2010andhowdidthey voteonrepeal?Thissectionnotesthatoverall70%ofmembersremainedin Congressforthe2010voteintheHouse;however,thechangeinpartymajorityin2008isasigniﬁcantevent.Finally,Table1illustratesthetallyofactual yesandnovotesamongthememberswhowerestillinCongressin2010and notesthepercentagethatwasestimatedaccurately.ThenumberofunaccountedmemberswasattributedtothosewhowerenolongerinCongress.

Theresultsofthecomparisonshowthatofthosewhowerepredictedtovoteyesorleaningyes,mostdid.However,twomembers whowerepredictedasleaningyesvotedno:Rep.Gerlach(R-MD)and Rep.Frelinghuysen(R-NJ).Inaddition,9.2%oftheestimatednovotes (11members)from2004votedinfavorofrepealin2010.Theseincluded

TABLE1 HouseComparisonof2004EstimateVoteCountand2010FinalVote

Predicted positionson repealin2004

Total membersstill inCongressin 2010

Voted for repealin 2010

Voted against repealin 2010 Didnot votein 2010 Nolongerin Congress

Percentage predicted correctly

Yes(106)86(80%)85012098.8% LeaningYes(55)43(78%)39221290.7% Undecided(25)19(76%)1441673.7%foryes 21.1%forno LeaningNo(15)8(53%)260775% No(194)119(61%)1110627589.1% Unknown(40)30(75%)141511046%foryes; 50%forno

Total:435305(70%)1651337130

TABLE2 SenateComparisonof2004EstimateVoteCountand2010FinalVote

Predicted positionon repealin2004

Total membersleft in2010

Voted for repealin 2010

Voted against repealin 2010 Didnot votein 2010 Nolongerin Congress Percentage predicted correctly

Yes(29)21(72.4%)21008100%

Leaningyes(12)9(75%)9003100%

Undecided(13)10(76.9%)910390%foryes; 10%forno

LeaningNo(5)3(60%)120267%

No(41)26(63.4%)12231584.6%

Total:10069(69%)4125331

Reps.Boucher(D-VA),Boyd(D-FL),Costello(D-IL),Dreier(R-CA),Edwards (D-TX),Ehlers(R-MI),Flake(R-AZ),Gordon(D-TN),Holden(D-PA),Paul (R-TX),andPlatts(R-PA).

IntheSenate,69%ofmembersfrom2004werestillintheSenatefor therepealvotein2010.Ofthosepredictedtovoteyesorleaningyes,100% votedinfavorwhile89.1%ofpredictednovotesvotedagainstrepealin 2010.ThisshiftfromexpectedtoactualvotesbySen.Voinovich(R-OH) andSen.Burr(R-NC)supporttheconclusionthatanewphaseofpolitical viabilitywaspresentduringthisperiodofDADTrepealconsideration.

Theroleofelectoralviabilitycanbestbeseenbyﬁrstlookingatthe changeinelectoralmajorityofthosewhosevotemovedfromundecidedto yes.OftheHousememberswhowereundecidedin2004,73.7%votedfor repealand92.9%ofthesewereDemocrats.AmongSenatorswhowereundecidedonrepealin2004,90%votedinfavorofrepealin2010and77.8%of thesewereDemocrats.ThesevenpredictedundecidedDemocraticSenators includedMaxBaucus(D-MT),KentConrad(D-ND),HerbKohl(D-WI), BillNelson(D-FL),MarkPryor(D-AR),JayRockefeller(D-WV),andArlen Specter(D-PA).Theelectoralchangecanalsobeseenintheshiftbetween thepredictednoandyescategorieswithsixDemocraticRepresentatives ultimatelyvotingyesonrepeal.Intotal,20DemocratsintheHousevoted infavorofrepealafterhavingbeenpredictedasundecided,leaningno, orno.

Thesecondissueofviabilityrelatestoachangeinthecostsorpenaltiesinsupportingrepealaswellasthepoliticalbenefitsofbeingsupportive ofahistoricvoteforequality.Wearguethatthisisreflectedintheshift betweenanumberofpredictedandactualRepublicanvotes.FourSenate Republicansvariedfromtheirundecided,leaningno,andnopredictionsto voteyesinfavorofrepeal.Thereareanumberofpotentialreasonsfor thesemovementsbyRepublicans.Thefirstisthatthevotecountwasintentionallywrittentobecautiousandconservative,sothismaybeaninternal bias.Anyofficesthatwerenotconfirmedasbeingpro-repealwerekept

intheseothercategories.Inaddition,somemembersappeartohavebeen pro-repeal(suchasCong.Drier)butrefusedmeetingswithSLDNorrefused tostatetheirposition.OtherRepublicanmembersseemtohavebeenon thefenceandultimatelyvotedforrepealafterpassagewasalreadyassured ineachChamber.Forinstance,Sens.JohnEnsign(R-NV)andSenatorBurr votedforrepealafterthecloturevote(ﬁlibuster)wasoverridden.Thetotal numberofRepublicansintheSenatevotingforrepealalsoseemstohave providedcoverforothers.Last,itshouldalsoberecognizedthatleadership byPresidentObama,theDepartmentofDefense’sWorkingGroupReport, andleadershipbyDefenseSecretaryGatesandAdmiralMullenprovided additionalimpetusforpro-repealvotes(Montopoli,2010).Inthiscase,the Pentagonreportin2010functionedinthesamewayastheGAOreportin 2005.

Anumberofpointscanbedrawnwhencomparingthepredictedand actualvotes.First,whiletheissuewaslargelythesame,theseweretwo differentpiecesoflegislation.AnumberofamendmentsontheSenateside mayhaveinfluencedswingvotesbymembers.Second,the30%difference inmembershipforbothchambersin2010largelyreflectedadeclineinthe numberofRepublicansfollowingtheDemocrats2009takeoveroftheHouse. Thisdatasuggeststhatelectoralchangesbetween2004and2010provedto beacrucialfactorthatledtorepeal.Inaddition,itisimportanttonotethe significantroleofgayadvocates,organizations,andallieswhoa)educated HouseandSenatememberstoimpacttheirvotes,b)educatedthepublic,and c)maintainedpoliticalpressuretoachievefinalrepealsuccess.Thisarticleis premisedonthesubstantialroleofentrepreneursduringeachphaseofthe repealprocessandencouragesfurtherresearchonthisissue.

CONCLUSION

WereportedontheroleofSLDNinusingmini-windowsofopportunityto reframeDADTasalegislativeissue;buildaconsensusforactioninCongress; anddraftandmanagetheintroductionofrepeallegislationwithHouseallies. WhileDADTmaynowberecognizedasanissuewhosetimehadcome, thereweremanybattlesonthatpath(andmanymorethandocumented inthisarticle).Wearguethattheperiodbeforeanissuereachesconsensus isoftenlefttothepolicyentrepreneurs.Howtheseactorsmanageplanned andunplannedeventsisanunderstudiedareaofpolicychangeresearchand deservesgreaterattention.

Anumberofconclusionsaredemonstratedinthisreview.First, PresidentGeorgeW.BushcanbecreditedforescalatingtherepealofDADT. HisnominationofMaj.Gen.ClarkforpromotionfollowingPFCWinchell’s murdergalvanizedtheteamatSLDN.Second,thedischargeofgayArabic linguistsservedtomobilizetheeffortfurtherbyinvolvingkeyHouseofﬁces.

Third,Republicanattacksoncollegesanduniversities’ROTCprogramsprovidedanorganizingmomentandtestrunforaredeﬁnedrepealargument. Finally,SLDNstaffusedtheseeventsasopportunitiestohastenandengineertheintroductionofrepeallegislationbychangingperceptionsofthe issuefromradioactivetocontested,and,ﬁnally,toanemergingissuein Congress.

NOTES

1.Theauthorswishtohighlightthattheuseoftheterm“gay”isintendedtoreﬂectallmembersoftheLGBTQIcommunity,includinglesbian,bisexual,transgender,intersex,andqueer-identiﬁed individuals.

2.Thisresearchisbasedonparticipant-observationandsupportingdocumentation.Dataforthis analysisreliesonpubliclyavailablesources,workdocuments,personalcommunications,andfirsthand meetings.Thelimitationsofconfirmingfirsthandknowledgearesupportedbyindependentsourceswhere possible,includingorganizationalmemorandum,newspaperreports,andtheCongressionalRecord.The votecountdocumentwaspreparedwithassistancefromSLDNinterns.Itwasdeterminedthrougha reviewofpreviouscongressionalvotesandanyadditionalinformationfrommeetingswithoffices.

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Policy Entrepreneurship and Dont Ask Don t Tell

Journal of Homosexuality

The Rise of Repeal: Policy Entrepreneurship and Don't Ask, Don't Tell

Edgell, BLAS