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August 2014 1393 مرداد
5 Things to Know About the Extended Nuclear Talks with Iran
by Paul Pillar (source: LobeLog, via the National Interest)
Can Iran build bridges to regional foes?
Islamic State extremists in Iraq have created a common enemy in the region. But Iran has to tackle deep distrust – and keep nuclear talks on track – to forge a new relationship with its Arab neighbors. By Scott Peterson, ChristianScienceMonitor
TEHRAN, IRAN — To clinch a nuclear deal, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has to reassure world powers. But to achieve long-term regional stability, he has to overcome deeply sown suspicions and rivalries withIran’s Persian Gulf neighbors at a time of tremendous sectarian tension. Iran and five world powers agreed on July 18 to extend by four months a deadline for reaching a final deal aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb, in exchange for sanctions relief. The negotiators now have until November 20 to reach a deal. But Mr. Rouhani is up against more than 30 years of distrust. In 1987, Iranian revolutionaries carrying images of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini sparked riots during the hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia, leaving more than 400 dead. For years, Saudi Arabia and smaller Gulf states have accused Iran of sowing discord within their own Shiite communities. And in 2010, WikiLeaks revealed that Saudi King Abdullah had been secretly and repeatedly pushing Washington to “cut off the head of the snake” by launching military strikes against Iran. The rivalry between these regional heavyweights has defined power politics in the Gulf for decades. But today Rouhani calls Saudi Arabia a “friend and brother.” He traveled to Oman in March, and he hosted the emir of Kuwait in early June. His outreach has helped set hardliners in Sunni states back on their heels. “The moderation discourse brought by Dr. Rouhani is isolating the extremist voices inside these [Persian Gulf] countries,” says Kayhan Barzegar, head of the Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran. “Saudi Arabia, under pressure to accept the new reality of Iran, is trying to manage its relations with Iran – they can’t just ignore that something new has happened inside Iran, the moderate government,” Mr. Barzegar says. The enmity cuts both ways. Though Iran has always couched its 1979 revolution in Pan-Islamic terms – as an example of religious rule to be followed by both Shiites and Sunnis – its majority ethnic Persians have historically looked down on their Arab neighbors. In the devastating Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, every Arab nation but Syria
lined up to support Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein – a link with Syria that continues today. “If Iran is a strong state, past experience shows that the Arab states try to get much closer to us,” says Davoud Hermidas Bavand, a political analyst and professor in Tehran. “Whenever and wherever we are in a very weak position, they try to develop a sense of hostility towards Iran. This is a reality.” The Syrian war is driving Iran and the Gulf further apart. Iran has backed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, while Syrian rebels and foreign jihadists fighting alongside them have received critical support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait.
Mutual danger The Gulf support – which has included calls from some radical clerics to wage an anti-Shiite battle in Syria – has strengthened the most radical and best-equipped group, the Islamic State (formerly the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), which in early June advanced across north and central Iraq, where it now threatens Shiite shrines. But Islamic State’s threats extend to Sunni states that cooperate with the West – aspirational maps of the new Islamic State stretch from Algeria to Afghanistan, gobbling up every Persian Gulf state. The mutual danger could help mend relations. With Islamic State militants controlling chunks of two Arab countries (Syria and Iraq), capturing military equipment, and attracting recruits with the declaration of the first Sunni caliphate in 90 years, Iran and its neighbors have plenty to talk about other than their differences. The menace of Islamic State has created common ground between even Iran and its greatest enemy, the United States. Rouhani announced in mid-June he might be willing to work with the US in Iraq, though other officials reject that possibility.
Accused of meddling While Rouhani has pledged to extend his message of “moderation” and “wisdom” to ties with neighbors, the view looking back across the Persian Gulf is skeptical. “[Iran] has never been an easy neighbor,” says Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a political scientist in the United Arab Emirates. “It’s difficult as a society, as a political system, as a negotiator. Sometimes it becomes more difficult, sometimes less difficult, but it is always difficult.” PLEASE GO TO PAGE 53
The recently extended nuclear negotiations with Iran have had to compete for front-page attention with acute crises elsewhere. The agreement to extend both the negotiations and the interim commitments associated with them for another four months has nonetheless provoked comments from the usual quarters, including those who have never wanted any agreement with Iran and continue to try to sabotage the negotiations. Here are some key facts to bear in mind about the extension itself: 1) The extension makes possible a continuation of major negotiating progress. The progress to date has been remarkable. Few would have predicted it even a year ago. As Secretary Kerry commented in a statement, it was less than a year ago that a U.S. secretary of state and an Iranian foreign minister met for the first time in more than three decades. The key events making this possible were the advent of a new Iranian president with a much different orientation from that of his predecessor, and the willingness of the United States and its negotiating partners to seize this opportunity. The negotiations have gone from a standing start with no communication to an important interim agreement and a common text for a final agreement, with some remaining bracketed language and gaps yet to be negotiated. 2) The need for an extension is not surprising. In fact, the interim agreement, known as the Joint Plan of Action, that was reached last November specifically provided for the possibility of an extension beyond the original target date. The matters being negotiated are complicated and highly technical, from the design of nuclear reactors to the details of international financial transactions. 3) Both sides are negotiating seriously. The Iranian side has demonstrated its seriousness through its compliance, as confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, with all of its commitments under the Joint Plan of Action. It also has demonstrated its seriousness through its acceptance already of lopsided concessions while gaining little
so far in return (see next key fact). Nothing in the history of these talks, or of the history of the Iranian nuclear issue before the talks began, suggests that Iran needs to be squeezed harder to get it to negotiate earnestly and flexibly. 4) Iran already has the biggest motivation to conclude the negotiations swiftly. The P5+1 (the United States and its negotiating partners) clearly got the better deal in the interim agreement. The Joint Plan of Action froze or rolled back the aspects of Iran’s nuclear program with the most concern regarding possible weapons proliferation, as well as introducing international inspections more intrusive and frequent than what any other nation undergoes. In return Iran got only minor sanctions relief, involving peripheral matters such as airplane parts and access to a small fraction of its overseas financial assets to which it has been denied access. This pattern continues under the additional agreement struck as part of last week’s extension of the talks. Iran has committed to hasten the conversion of its remaining supply of medium enriched uranium into reactor fuel plates, which would make it even more difficult to use the material in weapons. In return it gets access to only a small additional slice ($2.8 billion out of more than $100 billion) of its frozen overseas financial assets. The main, debilitating sanctions regarding oil and banking remain in place. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani directly, and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei indirectly, have a big economic and political stake in reaching a final agreement promptly. 5) Diplomacy remains the surest way to preclude an Iranian nuclear weapon. The extension does not change this reality. With a negotiated agreement, Iran’s nuclear activities would be subject to the most extensive international inspection and monitoring arrangements ever implemented, and Iran would have multiple major motivations not to let the agreement break down. Without an agreement, there would be far less comprehensive inspections, much less of an Iranian stake in keeping its program peaceful, and a political swing in Tehran away from those most determined to keep it peaceful.