The Menton Times - Volume II, No. 3

VOLUME II, NO. 3

NOVEMBER 2022

FEATURE

Menton au Maroc: Sciences Pistes Fall Break With the BDE

By Peyton Staff Writer

NEWS

Second-Year Fraser Byers Produces Documentary About Ventimiglia’s Humanitarian Crisis

By Colette Yamashita Holcomb, English Section Editor

humanitarian conditions for migrants at the Franco-Italian frontier.

In the idyllic bubble of Menton, it is easy to forget the humanitarian crises occurring less than 20 kilometers away in the Italian city of Ventimiglia.

Yet, every year, over 30,000 migrants pass through the border town, risking their lives in hopes of a better future. The 2020 closing of the Italian Red Cross Camp and an intensified French police presence has exacerbated the already dangerous

SEE PAGE 2

Dashiell,

After a long journey involving a late-night bus to Milan, three-a.m. airplane floor naps and a red-eye flight across the Mediterranean, 55 Sciences Pistes (and three Chilean tourists who were also part of our tour group) emerged from Marrakesh Menara Airport on Monday morning exhausted but eager for the adventure ahead.

Organized by none other than our Bureau Des Étudiants President, 2A Samy Bennouna, the Sciences Piste fall break trip to Morocco was a highly anticipated interlude to the semester.

After hours of airport chaos — customs, currency exchange and the quest to collect the Bureau Des Étudiants speaker from baggage claim unscathed, we departed the airport for a serene morning at the Jardin Majorelle. We were met with a botanical labyrinth — an endless maze of intricately tiled paths, alleys of flowers and cerulean Art Deco Buildings enclosed by cacti. While we witnessed cats, turtles and fish, some credible Sciences Piste sources also sparked rumors of a rare Moroccan panda lurking in the shadows.

SEE PAGE 12

MENA

Le Mouvement en Iran: Un Phénomène à la Mode Pour la Communauté Internationale

By Amalia Heide, Staff Writer « Le mouvement tend vers une tendance ». Ce terme, chargé de méfiance, a été employé par Bahar (pseudonyme) pour décrire ses craintes quant à l’avenir du mouvement d’émancipation des femmes en Iran.

Cette jeune femme iranienne semble alarmée face à l’idée qu’un mou-

vement qui la touche de si près puisse tout simplement s’évaporer, comme c’est souvent le cas de la plupart des mouvements à vocation humanitaire qui deviennent viraux à l’échelle internationale sur les réseaux sociaux. Les utilisateurs passent d’une obsession fiévreuse et passionnée pour une cause à l’indifférence et à l’oubli. Et tout cela en un clin d’œil.

SEE PAGE 24

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The Menton Times

NOVEMBER 2022

Second-Year Fraser Byers Produces Documentary About Ventimiglia’s Humanitarian Crisis

By Colette Yamashita Holcomb, English Section Editor

dangerous humanitarian conditions for migrants at the Franco-Italian frontier.

In the idyllic bubble of Menton, it is easy to forget the humanitarian crises occurring less than 20 kilometers away in the Italian city of Ventimiglia. Yet, every year, over 30,000 migrants pass through the border town, risking their lives in hopes of a better future. The 2020 closing of the Italian Red Cross Camp and an intensified French police presence has exacerbated the already

After seeing the implications firsthand through volunteer work at the border, second-year Sciences Po student Fraser Byers wanted to bring awareness to the migrant crisis by producing a documentary film detailing personal accounts of the journey to Europe and what daily life looks like for migrants.

This past summer, he worked with friends Nico Romero and Zara Gounden

to create “ Twenty Miles More aims the Twen- to share the story of Venty Miles timiglia as a representaMore pro- tion of the complexity that ject with emerges when those in the sup- search of safety and securiport of ty meet barriers to a better a Davis life.”

Project for Peace grant of $10,000. ing public opinion…” says Romero, an aspiring film- Fraser Byers, the executive maker, is the director, producer and water survey cinematographer and edi- lead of Twenty Miles More. tor. Gounden, a New York University student at NYU Beyond the documentary, London, is the co-produc- the project includes reer, production accountant search on the water quality and secondary content of the Roya River — parwriter. ticularly seeking to answer whether the river is a safe Twenty Miles More aims to water source for migrants. share the story of Ventimi- Without the Red Cross glia as a representation of Camp, the Roya river has the complexity that emerg- become the primary site es when those in search of where migrants bathe, use safety and security meet the bathroom and access barriers to a better life. drinking water. Aside from organic human waste, the “I believe that storytelling river is polluted with garthrough this medium [doc- bage and spilled oil, and umentaries] is the best way there is concern that the to share with audiences water contains hazardous unadulterated accounts of heavy metals from the upthe human tragedy occur- river industry. ring in this region. Documentaries are a form “The Roya flows through of reporting that invites both French and Italian a visual element. [They] territories where there is bring validity and often es- significant industrial and tablish a greater emotional agricultural development connection. I believe that — making the unknown these characteristics are chemical and organic inherent to responsible qualities of the water a documentary storytelling concern considering the [and] are crucial to shift- high chance of dangerous

News

NOVEMBER 2022

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20 Miles More project

contaminants,” explained Byers.

Through this research, the project will help non-profits and other organizations working in the area to provide safer drinking and bathing alternatives.

Over the summer, the crew was able to conduct primary filming and water assessment and have now moved into post-production. Filming began just four months after the beginning of the Ukraini-

an-Russian war. The timing allowed for a unique framing of the treatment of primarily African and Asian migrants entering Ventimiglia in the context of the treatment of Ukrainian refugees in other areas of France and Italy. Of particular concern is police treatment; throughout the documentary, law enforcement is shown discriminating against migrants and even illegally refusing underage asylum seekers.

Given the sensitive nature of much of the documenta-

ry’s content and the depth of personal stories shared in the film, the project team wanted to ensure that they were taking an ethical approach to research and production. To do so, they worked with various organizations operating in Ventimiglia and generally in migrant advocacy and aid, such as Caritas, 20K, Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders).

These partnerships are also set to collaborate on

distribution; the team plans to share the unedited interviews with organizations. They are also applying to various film festivals to showcase the documentary.

If you are interested in supporting the Twenty Miles More project, contact Fraser Byers at fraserbyers@gmail.com or check out their website, 20milesmore.org.

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NOVEMBER 2022

What Does Giorgia Meloni Mean for Ventimiglia’s Migrant Population?

By Sophia Rottman, English Section Editor Camp Roja was not the first refugee camp in Ventimiglia; whether it will be the last remains to be seen. In 2014, an influx of migrants and refugees in Ventimiglia led to the creation of the informal “No Borders” camp. One year later, the “No Borders” camp was shut down. Still, the need for shelter and aid for refugees and migrants persisted, prompting the Red Cross to open Camp Roja. However, its lack of a legal framework allowed the Prefecture of Imperia to close its doors in July 2020 easily. Originally built to host up to 180 people, the camp routinely operated well beyond its maximum capacity, once holding 800 people with a mere 360 beds.

When Italy imposed a country-wide lockdown at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Camp Roja stopped receiving new arrivals, forcing 200 people to seek refuge on the streets. In accordance with national policy, the prefect, Alberto Intini, announced that the camp would not receive anyone new until the pandemic was over. By June 2020, the number of people in the camp drastically decreased; only 30 residents remained. On July 30, 2020, the prefecture informed the Red Cross that Camp Roja would be shut down. The Red Cross’ pleas to keep it open were unsuccessful. Since the closure, migrants and refugees in Ventimiglia are now in even more dangerous posi-

Giorgia Meloni, Italy's newly elected prime minister; Vice, Italy

tions — many lack basic needs like adequate shelter, water and food, often sleeping outside the train station, under an overpass or along the Roja.

Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s new government, a coalition between her party, Fratelli d’Italia, the Lega and Forza Italia, is expected to be Italy’s most right-wing government since the Second World War. In the 2018 election, Fratelli d’Italia won only 4.3% of the vote. Now, its ideas have gained significant ground. The party’s campaign promised to prevent refugee rescue boats from docking among other strict border controls. Meloni has suggested that the Italian Navy patrol the coast to stop migrants and refugees from reaching Italy, alongside a naval blockade of Africa’s Mediterranean coast.

Meloni’s new government is facing its first challenge: three NGO rescue boats in Italian waters. On Saturday, Nov. 5, Humanity One, run by the

German charity SOS Humanity, was allowed to enter the Sicilian port of Catania. After an onboard medical inspection, 144 migrants and refugees were moved to a reception center: they were deemed to be experiencing emergency conditions. The remaining 35 were left on the ship and will likely be pushed back into international waters. SOS Humanity argues that all of the ship’s passengers were rescued at sea, which alone is supposed to qualify them for a safe port under international law. On Sunday, Nov. 6, Italy ordered Humanity One to leave the port of Catania. The captain refused.

Three other rescue ships remain at sea, two in Italian waters and one in international territory, with more than 900 additional migrants and refugees. Their requests for a safe port have gone unanswered, and conditions onboard have deteriorated. Some NGOs say that Italy is breaching international sea rescue laws, ar-

guing that anyone in danger must be disembarked at the nearest safe port. However, the new interior minister, Matteo Piantedosi, asserts that because the asylum seekers first stepped aboard Humanity One in Germany, they are not Italy’s responsibility according to the European Union Dublin Regulation.

Meloni’s victory has sparked concern amongst French migrant rights advocates and organizations, who fear that the present conditions for refugees and migrants at the Franco-Italian border and Central Mediterranean may become more treacherous. Amnesty International predicts that the increasing number of migrants and refugees attempting to leave Italy for France will cause a “ping pong” effect between French and Italian authorities. Already facing pushback as they attempt the “pass of death” through the mountains from Ventimiglia to Menton, a worsening situation is highly concerning.

In 2022, a new permanent hosting center for migrants and refugees is set to open in the Ventimiglia area. Still, authorities have yet to disclose specifics about the facility and its launch date. Amidst the Meloni administration’s hostility towards displaced populations, it now remains to be seen if Ventimiglia’s tentative resettlement center has even a fighting chance of opening.

Opinion

NOVEMBER 2022

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Regulating ESG Investments Becomes More Pressing Amidst Greenwashing Trends

By Noor Ahmad, Staff Writer

The 27th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, or COP27, is convening in the Egyptian coastal city of Sharm elSheikh between the 6th and 18th of November 2022. The conference seeks to tackle global climate emergency issues: how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, adapt to the effects of climate change and finance climate action in developing countries. The conference seeks to build on the Paris Agreement in 2015, which set out goals to guide nations on how to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and limit global temperature increase to two degrees Celsius. The agreement is a legally binding international treaty with 194 signatory Parties.

The issue of climate change and financing the fight against it are nothing new.

Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) investing has been rising for the last decade. ESG incorporates a broad set of principles that socially responsible investments should follow and are sometimes commingled with “green” investments, which focus primarily on environmental impact. While there is no clear taxonomy for ESG, it broadly aims to curtail the effects of climate change, carbon emissions, environmental pollution, deforesta-

tion and water scarcity. The non-environmental categories of ESG encompass a wider scope, including community impact, human rights, diversity in company boards, bribery, and corruption. A report by the consulting firm Deloitte published earlier this year estimated $39 trillion of assets in 2020 were ESG-focused versus $19 trillion in 2014. This represents 36 percent of total global investments in 2020. The magnitude and proportion of ESG investments are expected to rise dramatically in the coming years, reaching $96 trillion by 2025 and representing 58 percent of worldwide investments. Other measures put the projected amount invested in ESG funds at a few trillion dollars. What is indisputable is that this sector is proliferating.

As interest in the environment and sustainability has increased, so has regulatory focus. In 2021, the European Union introduced its Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation, which requires asset managers to provide information regarding their adherence to ESG investment standards.

Three

categories were introduced in classifying investment funds: article six funds, which do not take sustainability into account; article eight funds, which promote ESG practices; and article nine funds, which is the highest ESG category, with sustainability at the heart of its investment policies. Moreover, since August 2022, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II, a regulation seeking to protect investors and standardize practices across the European Union, now requires financial advisors to evaluate not only the client’s risk tolerance but also their preferences for environmentally sustainable investments.

The regulatory changes by the union are timely and possibly the beginning of a worldwide regulatory convergence in how to classify environmentally responsible in-

vestments. The changes have come against a background of mis-selling and misrepresentation by some of the world’s largest asset managers. DWS, Deutsche Bank’s asset management arm, recently saw its CEO step down after evidence emerged that the firm failed to classify investments labelled ESG against the necessary criteria correctly. The term “greenwashing,” which aptly describes DWS’s behavior, is one where a company tries to portray itself as more socially responsible and environmentally friendly than it is. The company may not meet the necessary standards and continue investing in environmentally harmful businesses. A German consumer group recently filed a lawsuit against DWS alleging that its ESG Climate Tech fund was marketed as having zero percent investments in polluting sectors such as coal.

Greenwashing’s detector; Vanderbilt business review

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Yet, the fund’s investment policy allowed for investments in companies where up to 15 percent of their revenues could be generated from these harmful industries. The problems faced by DWS are not a one-off event, and the prevalence of misrepresentation of what investment funds are doing versus what they are advertising is an issue concerning regulators beyond the European Union, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority reviewing both conduct and current regulation.

Promoting finance to tackle climate change in developing countries is one of the pillars of the Paris Agreement. Yet the investment world, which seemingly has a never-ending stream of scandals and mis-selling driven by greed and a lack of ethics, is yet again undermining an existentially important focus.

As the awareness of climate change has begun to alter the behavior of both individual and institutional investors and centered them on environmentally positive goals, the investment world must step up and learn to police itself. Regulators will eventually catch up and create guidelines, but the intermediaries have a significant role as time passes and environmental catastrophe descends on humanity. Let us hope that the outcome of COP27 is a clear message to the investment industry that it needs to address these shortcomings and take substantial steps to finance positive change.

NOVEMBER 2022

The Hijab Is a Hot Political Topic for Islamists… but Also the Secular West

By Ghazal Khalife, Staff Writer Hijab is an Arabic word that translates to “curtain” or “covering.” It is now commonly used to refer to the headcovers sometimes worn by Muslim women. A lot of questions surround the hijab: Why is it worn? Is it a sign of oppression — an archaic symbol of patriarchal traditions? Does it fit in modern societies?

What should we do about it?

The fact that the hijab has become such a controversy shows how it has long left the private realm and become a matter of public debate and politicization.

In Iran: From a symbol of protest to a symbol of oppression

In its modern history, Iran has had a complicated relationship with its religious identity and, thus, the role of the hijab. Reza Shah Pahlavi, who ruled Iran from 1925 to 1941, to abandon backwardness and tradition and promote modernization, issued the decree, “Kashef-e Hijab,” which banned all head coverings for women as well as the “chador,” a full-body Iranian covering. Unsurprisingly, this decision, which was swiftly and strongly enforced across the country, was not received well by the more conservative population. The ban restricted women’s freedom of movement, as many stayed at home or came out at night when they could hide from police, who were instructed to resort to physical violence to unveil hijabi women for-

cibly. The shah’s decree adhered to the premise that the hijab is antithetical to modernity and women’s integration into society, a view that resonates to this day. During the ceremony in which the shah announced “Kashef-e Hijab,” he stated that women “should stand out in society the same way they stand out in their homes.”

Fast forward to the years leading up to the Islamic Revolution, the hijab resurged in the social and political spheres as a sign of protest against westernization and the Pahlavi dynasty’s attempt to repress Iran’s cultural and religious identity. It is worth noting, however, that at that point, wearing the veil was a choice, an expression of disenchantment with a regime that dic-

Nasibe Samsaei, an Iranian woman living in Turkey, cuts her ponytail off during a protest outside the Iranian consulate in Istanbul on September 21, 2022; Wikimedia commons

Opinion

NOVEMBER 2022

tated women’s clothing. After the Islamic republic was established, veiling became mandatory and violently enforced by the morality police.

Post-Revolution leader Ruhollah Khomeini described women who did not veil as “naked.” Consequently, the veil became a symbol of the resurrection of Islamic values and strict interpretation of the Quran. Women have been protesting the hijab mandate for decades in Iran — a movement that culminated in the recent and ongoing protests.

The hijab is simply another manifestation of the Islamic state’s political oppression; it is a reminder that the Islamic Republic can and will dictate the public’s life choices, that it does not tolerate diversion from its interpretation of religion and that its version of society is the right one.

The affiliation of the hijab with a political movement is not exclusive to Iran, however. The idea of the hijab was also politicized in post-colonial Arab liberation movements and their competing ideologies, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood. During the early period of decolonization (1930s-40s), Muslim women wore the hijab to reaffirm their pride in their heritage and Islamic identity, especially since European colonial soldiers unveiled indigenous women during “civilizing missions.” In Algeria, the veil became a focal point of the War of Independence as there was strong resentment against the French for their unveiling and sexualization of Algerian women.

Unveiling ceremonies were popular, but the obsession with the hijab took on an even more sinister undertone. To

many, it hid mysterious sexual objects cloaked beneath a layer of modesty, begging to be seen by the male gaze. This is epitomized by the school of French photographers who took photos of unveiled women and hypersexualized them; some of these images were even used in French postal cards.

In France: The symbol of a struggle with religious diversity In contemporary France, the hijab remains a contentious topic in government and public realms. Despite being worn by less than 2% of France’s population, the hijab dominates political discussions about secularism, immigration and Islam. Under the pretext that it violates France’s sacred principle of “laicité,” a specific interpretation of secularism that guides French society, many lawmakers, even those affiliated with the centrist party, have fervently supported strict regulations on veiling. These include banning the headscarf in public schools and prohibiting citizens working in the public sector from wearing it.

In February 2022, the French senate voted 160-143 in favor of banning the wearing of the hijab: “an ostentatious religious symbol” in sports competitions. How do these regulations fit into the larger context of French politics?

The prevalent argument is that the hijab is an “ostentatious” religious symbol and, hence, incompatible with “laicité.” Many hijabis have countered this assertion by pointing out that the hijab is a religious obligation and a commitment to modesty as

opposed to being an inherent symbol of faith. As such, the rhetoric in support of restricting the hijab in favor of laïcité minimizes its significance for hijabi women and is sometimes used to emphasize the “otherness” of France’s Muslim population.

France, like many Western countries, has undoubtedly struggled with its increasing diversity in the post-colonial context, especially with recent migratory waves from predominantly Muslim countries. Since hijabi women are easily identifiable as Muslim, they have been subject to the most scrutiny and discrimination. When asked how wearing the hijab changed people’s perceptions about her in France, an anonymous Menton first-year answered that “people’s perceptions definitely changed towards me as I started wearing the hijab because I was no longer seen as (who I am), but as ‘the hijabi girl.’ I particularly noticed (this) when people confused me for another hijabi girl or when the first interaction I had with a stranger would be regarding my hijab.”

Another angle from which to examine this issue is a more subtle extension of the “civilizing mission” justification in which the hijab is considered a symbol of patriarchal oppression and incompatible with modern society. This may also be interpreted as an argument that encourages Muslim women to abandon a potentially important element of their identity in order to be accepted into French society.

The fundamental problem with this “savior complex” narrative is that it assumes that all women are forced or

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even conditioned into wearing the hijab and not wearing it out of their own free will.

While this unfortunately, can be the case in many Muslim communities, it cannot be generalized. Moreover, instead of empowering women, banning the headscarf could inhibit many Muslim women from integrating productively into society since many civic and educational doors would be slammed shut for them.

The hijab: An individual experience Ultimately, politicizing the hijab reduces women’s bodies to social matters; it risks ridding them of their bodily autonomy, as observed in both extremes of hijab regulations.

Every Muslim woman experiences the hijab differently, and while it is normal and even vital to discuss the motivations behind wearing the hijab, employing it as a political tool to control women, garner votes or advance a political agenda constricts not only Muslim women but also distorts the deeply personal nature of this religious practice.

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The Menton Times

NOVEMBER 2022

Brazil Election: What Does Lula’s Comeback Mean for Brazil and the World?

By Catarina Vita, Staff Writer From conversations in Brazilian bars to presidential debates that seem more informal than the latter, different opinions about the country’s political past, present and future have recently surfaced. When Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, announced his candidacy for president at the beginning of 2020, strong emotions ranging from extreme concern to joy competed in Brazil’s socio-political arena. In 2018 Lula was imprisoned for his involvement in the

served as Brazil’s president for the last four years. The political stage was, thus, set for a direct tussle between the two adversaries and a possible end to the conservative-leftist national divide.

Context

The Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), the political party that Lula represents, ruled Brazil for years. Lula and Dilma Rousseff, his successor, were among the rulers with the highest approval rates in the country’s history. By spearheading the bolsa familia welfare program, “In 2018 Lula was monetary aid imprisoned for his for families in involvement in the highneed and afprofile Operation Lava firmative acJato corruption and money tion to boost laundering scandal.” the mobility of marginhigh-profile Operation alized ethnic groups, the Lava Jato corruption and PT systematically tackles money laundering scan- Brazil’s social inequalities. dal. Still, she was released . Nonetheless, allegations a year later when his arrest of money laundering and was ruled unconstitution- corruption quickly destabial. In March 2020, Lula lized the party, culminating formally announced his in Rousseff’s impeachment presidential candidacy to and Lula’s imprisonment. the press. His opponent, Jair Bolsonaro, whose con- Jair Bolsonaro emerged servative populist ideals in the public eye after beand anti-Lulism comprise ing one of the firmest adhis main characteristics,

vocates for Dilma’s im- African religious persecupeachment. His proposals tion. He diverted attention included neoliberal eco- from the latter by stoking nomic practices, such as anger about “Christophoprivatization, which has bia,” the supposed discrimencouraged lucrative prac- ination against Brazil’s tices such as the deforest- Christian community. The ation of the Amazon Rain- COVID-19 pandemic then forest. He had also shown emerged, and Bolsonaro, himself an enemy of Bra- denying vaccine proposals zilian public universities, and appointing four differcutting funds for these in- ent Ministers of Health in stitutions throughout his a year, drove Brazil into a mandate. A vocal defend- downward spiral of unrest. er of Brazil’s 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 8 5 “From the start of his time military dic- in office, Bolsonaro fasttatorship, he tracked deforestation also endeav- processes in the Amazon ored to loos- Rainforest and neglected en gun laws. African religious Amid wide- persecution. “ spread outrage against PT’s embroilment in Lava In the nation’s Northern Jato, Bolsonaro easily as- region, the excessive burncended to presidency in ing of the Amazon Rainfor2018. His victory for the est prompted a saturation middle to upper-class of of patients with respiratoBrazil, where “anti-PTism” ry problems in public hosdominated, spelled the end pitals. In Amapá, there was of corruption and the start a general blackout and lack of strong leadership. Con- of respirators for COVsidering the flow of events ID-19 patients. from 2018 to the present, this was not the outcome The Elections of Bolsonaro’s mandate.

Since Brazil welcomes From the start of his time more than two political in office, Bolsonaro fast- candidates, politicians tracked deforestation from various parties had processes in the Amazon campaigns and participatRainforest and neglected ed in the presidential de-

Opinion

NOVEMBER 2022

bate. On Oct. 2, Brazilians cast their ballots for presidential candidates and regional representatives. Besides Lula and Bolsonaro, the most-voted candidate was Simone Tebet, who won over 4.16% of the public. Since no candidate had over 50% of the votes, the next president was determined in a runoff election held on Oct. 30.

During this 28-day interval, both candidates raced for the Brazilian majority.

This period only weakened the Bolsonarist campaign.

Carla Zambelli, a politician and ally of Bolsonaro, drew a gun in public; open carry has been illegal in Brazil since 2005. Roberto Jefferson, another prominent supporter of Bolsonaro, was imprisoned

and attacked the police with fire weapons, causing many police officers to vote against Bolsonaro.

Despite Lula carrying the majority in both shifts and clinching the presidency, regional representation in Brazil virtually belongs to rightist and conservative-leading members.

More than half of Parliament subscribes to the ideologically inconsistent centrão; congressmen championing the centerright regularly make alliances with far-right politicians.

The Future: What does it mean for the world?

Generally, the international community received the election outcome positive-

ly, and it was lauded as a victory for environmental preservation and religious and ethnic tolerance.

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insinuations of a possible coup, the world must remain alert. Furthermore, the inconsistency between Lula’s proposals and ParNonetheless, with Bolson- liamentary political peraro’s continued presence suasions may slow the in the political realm, Lula process of passing Lula-fawill face obstacles. The for- vorable laws. Although Lula’s victory is a great “Generally, the step towards international community Brazilian stareceived the election bility and deoutcome positively, mocracy, it is and it was lauded as a unfortunately victory for environmental not the only preservation and religious determinant.

and ethnic tolerance.” mer president has previously asserted his belief in the illegitimacy of Brazil’s electoral process. Joining this with his overall appreciation of the military dictatorship in Brazil and

The two front-runners in Brazil's presidential elections in the final days of campaigning.

Left: President Jair Bolsonaro. Right: Former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva; NPR

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The Menton Times

NOVEMBER 2022

No, Mr. Borell, This Is Not the Image We Want the EU to Project!

By Pau Carbonell, Guest Writer for EUROSOC

European diplomats to act the garden itself but [of] with humility and respect the jungle outside… they towards global denizens. will not protect the garden Instead, he communicated by building walls. A nice small garden surrounded Things are not going well the opposite message: for the European Union “Europe is a garden… Most by high walls in order to High Foreign Affairs Rep- of the rest of the world is prevent the jungle from coming in resentative Josep Borrell. is not going After delivering one of the to be a soluworst diplomatic speech“The implications of Because es of recent years, Borrell this speech are not and tion. the jungle remained stoic amid the should not be diminhas a strong flurry of criticism that growth cahas fallen upon him in ished in the scope of pacity, and the European Parliament. their importance.” the wall will On Oct. 13, Borell made never be high Eurocentric and inauspienough in orcious statements during his inauguration of the a jungle, and the jungle der to protect the garden.” new European Diplomat- could invade the garden… Even as Borell was delivic Academy in Brussels. Keep the garden, be good ering his speech tinged His opening speech was gardeners. But your duty with racist and imperialist supposed to encourage will not be to take care of overtones, people in the

audience felt uncomfortable, realizing how such a metaphor would damage European diplomacy.

The fact is that his remarks mirror the age-old distinction between European “civilization” and the “barbaric” lands beyond.

Since the 19th and 20th centuries, the garden analogy has been used by writers like John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville to justify global European colonization and temper resistance to expansionist sentiment. The danger of Borell’s speech lies in the reappearance of neo-colonial rhetoric in a century wherein Europe’s foreign policy is officially committed to aiding postcolonial economies and institutions.

The implications of this speech are not and should not be diminished in the scope of their importance.

In the modern world, people and nations are constantly listening and Borell’s words have been heard worldwide. Apart from harsh criticisms of the speech spouted by politicians, journalists and columnists globally, Borell has alienated European allies and strengthened its enemies.

Things are not going well for the European Union High Foreign Affairs Representative Josep Borrell; Salamanca, octubre de 2005

The United Arab Emirates summoned the inter-

Feature

NOVEMBER 2022

im head of the European Union mission in the country, Emil Paulsen, to discuss the “racist” inauguration and Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov said that “the garden Borell talks about was built by plundering the jungle of the rest of the world during the colonial regime.”

A piece in The New York Times has best summarized the gravity of the situation. Matina Stevis-Gridneff reported that Josep Borrell’s comments opened colonial wounds at a time when the European Union was working on ameliorating its legacy internationally. But this new scandal should not surprise those knowledgeable about European affairs — Borrell, who has served in his role since December 2019, has been involved in numerous diplomatic scandals during his tenure.

Yet, this was a new low.

With an ever-expanding divergence between the Central European and Eastern European member states, tense global multipolar outlooks and, in particular, Russia’s Ukrainian invasion, European policy cannot afford this type of discourse. Borell’s paternalistic smugness, vainness, conceit and supremacism will hinder Europe from reinforcing old alliances or forging new ones.

In her work “The European Union, Foreign Policy in a Changing World,” London School of Economics

professor Karen E. Smith asserts that the European Union should pursue three foreign policy objectives if it wants to remain a global superpower. Firstly it must encourage regional cooperation and integration.

Secondly, it should promote human rights. Thirdly, the union ought to bol-

Niccolò Machiavelli’s quote, “politics have no relation to morals,” does not seem to resonate with 21st-century European foreign policy — at least not nominally. Europe can only operate so long as it remains legitimate in the eyes of the governed. The notions of cooperation, in-

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only the type of discourse that Europe has been feverishly trying to avoid since the advent of unipolarity in the post-Cold War era, but because it was the face of European Foreign Policy, who said it.

This blunder is representative of two situations that could be surfacing in the department of European Foreign Affairs. On the one hand, one could hypothetically consider this statement as merely the personal opinion of Josep Borrell. On the other hand, one could interpret it as a damning glimpse into the ideological core of European foreign policy. I hope that reality is closer to the former of the two explanations.

Borell’s garden allegory adds to a lengthening laundry list of statements showcasing the unmodern outlooks of European foreign policy movers and shakers. It is indicative of the growing feeling of wonder and uncertainty as to how Europe plans to face the increasing challenges of modernity in a time where once again, war, violence and division are on the rise.

ster democracy and good governance.

According to Smith, these factors are important since they all legitimize the European Union’s instruments to leverage in future international economic, diplomatic or military relations.

tegration, democracy, good governance and human rights included in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty demonstrate how union leaders have embraced the issues that its citizens seem to find important. That is precisely why Borell’s speech is surprising — it is not

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The Menton Times

NOVEMBER 2022

Menton au Maroc: Sciences Pistes Spend Fall Break With the BDE

By Peyton Staff Writer

Dashiell,

After a long journey involving a late-night bus to Milan, three-a.m. airplane floor naps and a red-eye flight across the Mediterranean, 55 Sciences Pistes (and three Chilean tourists who were also part of our tour group) emerged from Marrakesh Menara Airport on Monday morning exhausted but eager for the adventure ahead. Organized by none other than our Bureau Des Élèves President, 2A Samy Bennouna, the Sciences Piste fall break trip to Morocco was a highly anticipated interlude to the semester.

After hours of airport chaos — customs, currency exchange and the quest to collect the Bureau Des

Étudiants speaker from baggage claim unscathed, we departed the airport for a serene morning at the Jardin Majorelle. We were met with a botanical labyrinth — an endless maze of intricately tiled paths, alleys of flowers and cerulean Art Deco Buildings enclosed by cacti. While we witnessed cats, turtles and fish, some credible Sciences Piste sources also sparked rumors of a rare Moroccan panda lurking in the shadows.

Following an afternoon of touring the medina, we began to explore the souq and main square of Marrakesh, Jemaa el-Fna, on our own. There we faced an overwhelming collection of

vendors and entertainers, including snake charmers and well-dressed monkeys on leashes. When Bennouna promised the group a fancy restaurant experience, none of us knew what to anticipate.

Yet, the experience at Chez Ali surpassed all of our wildest dreams. After a dinner of soup, couscous and tagine, we were met with a production rivaling any parade, movie or dance ensemble seen before. Featuring camels, horse racing, horseback acrobatics, sheep and belly dancing, the spectacle ended with a flaming, building-sized “maa salama” sign bidding us farewell as we returned to our riads. Our desert escapade

began the following morning. Fueled by a traditional Moroccan breakfast, we escaped the urban sprawl of Marrakesh on a bus ride through the winding hills of the Dades Gorges. After several stops at scenic

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viewpoints overlooking valleys, we reached another riad in the evening — a collection of hotel rooms overlooking a tiled indoor garden. After dinner, the first international Bureau Des Étudiants party began, proving that the transcontinental journey of the bureau’s speaker was for a good cause after all.

The following day, we continued through the desert to Merzouga, stopping at a shop for souvenirs and “djellabas” — brightly colored dresses with embroidered designs typically worn on special occasions.

With varying levels of coercion and enthusiasm, every Sciences Piste eventually donned a djellaba and matching scarf for one of the many group photos captured on the trip.

Afterward, the souvenir shopping began in earnest, and many people experienced their first foray into bargaining — heated exchanges ensued as students battled for the best scarf prices.

Our bus ride continued through the afternoon, with most of the bunch dozing off after the hectic two days of travel. However, several enthusiastic Sciences Pistes made an effort to rouse their bus-mates with music and chants.

Second-year student Lisé Thorsen harnessed her creativity to create a new Menton chant, which she zealously taught to all of her sleepy travel companions: Menton in the flesh Shisha sesh in Marrakesh Wesh wesh You’re so fresh Mesh mesh Comme une pêche

On Wednesday afternoon, we reached the Sahara desert frontier, close to Algeria’s border. The trek through the sand dunes to our campsite began on ATVs and concluded with camel rides.

for the long-awaited desert party featuring music by DJ Spencer. After the late night, a motivated group arose from bed at 7 a.m. to watch the sunrise from the dunes. Although the wait was frigid, the dawn’s

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We reached the Hassan II Mosque, which overlooks the Atlantic Ocean and boasts a laser pointed towards Mecca atop its minaret. We hastened to stretch our legs, snap some pictures and take in the miles of marble floor in front of us before returning to Casablanca to catch our flight back home. We hurriedly used up the last of our dirhams in Morocco’s final hour, shuffled our bags to the airplane’s weight limit, and began to reflect on the trip as we settled into our seats.

More than just a fall break trip, our five days in Morocco solidified the spirit of the Menton Ummah.

After multiple mishaps on the ATV — our vehicles quickly became engulfed in the steep dunes — I can say that the camel portion of our journey may have been the more suitable leg for our group of largely-licenseless-Europeans.

Balancing on the backs of camels (technically dromedaries) with the desert sunset flooding the horizon, we arrived at our camp as the sky blended into purple.

light was well worth the early alarms. The morning excursion proved to be a refreshing wake-up for the day that awaited us.

After nearly nine hours on buses, we reached Marrakesh late in the evening, splitting up to embark on our own adventures across the city for our last night in Morocco.

The dinner menu, a familiar and comforting selection of salad, tagine and pasta with an unexpected platter of eggplant parmesan, elicited shrieks of surprise and joy from the vegetarian table. We gathered in the dunes till the wee hours of the morning

Our final day started with a drive to Casablanca, Morocco’s economic capital and largest city. After the Casablanca pitstop, we embarked on a bus ride along the seaside.

“Menton in the flesh Shisha sesh in Marrakesh Wesh wesh You’re so fresh Mesh mesh Comme une pêche”

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The Menton Times

NOVEMBER 2022

Is Egypt a Model for Green Development?

By Katie-Anne Harris, In September, Egypt orGuest Writer for Envi- ganized the meeting of Afronnementon rican ministers of finance, economy, development Egypt’s national objec- and environment to fortives for 2030, known as mulate a unified vision for Vision 2030, have been funding a transition to a implemented to meet the greener economy. Amid United Nation’s Sustain- Egypt’s recent moves to asable Development Goals. sert itself as an eco-friendOne of this strategy’s ma- ly regional power, it seems jor aims is to ensure that fitting to eplore key exam15% of government in- ples of green development vestment goes into green inititives spearheaded development projects, by the country in the last and this figure is set to in- years. crease to 50% by 2025.

This is not the first time Renewable Energy in Egypt has made its aspira- Egypt tion to be the voice of Africa clear. The country just Egypt has invested in a hosted the United Nations multitude of renewable Climate Change Confer- energy sources. The Interence — popularly referred national Trade Administo as COP27. tration reported that the

government’s strategy is to make renewable energy generate 42% of energy by 2035, with wind energy making up 14%, hydroelectricity accounting for 2% and solar energy accounting for 25% of electricity generated by renewable resources.

An example of a development project putting Egypt on track to meet these goals is the Benban Solar Park, which was completed in 2019. It has 32 solar plants with four substations, holding up to 1.65-gigawatt capacity, making the Benban plant one of the largest solar power sites in the world. This development project illustrates the Egyptian government’s capability and commitment

to meet its sustainable development goals.

Another example of successful green energy projects in Egypt is its biogas units which convert waste into electricity. Through this Fayoum-based project, biogas is obtained from the fermentation of organic waste. These units will provide a renewable energy source for household cooking and will also be used to produce organic fertilizer to improve soil properties in the region.

Cairo’s Monorail Egypt is experiencing a rapid rate of urbanization, thus, augmenting the importance of transportation.

To help prevent congestion

The entrance of the Sharm El Sheikh International Convention Centre during the COP27 climate summit in Egypt's Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt November 9, 2022; REUTERS/Emilie Madi

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and alleviate pollution, Egypt’s National Authority for Tunnels awarded a 4.5 billion dollar contract to UK Export Finance to build, operate, and maintain a monorail system for 30 years.

It is set to become the world’s longest monorail while producing zero emissions and almost no noise.

This project helps reduce emissions, lessen sound pollution and provide important public infrastructure for the population of Cairo.

Green Cities Kharga has been declared the first green city in Egypt.

There is no industrial pollution in the city due to the absence of industrial factories. Moreover, the city depends on renewable energy sources to generate government agencies, streetlights and places of worship and to extract water from irrigation wells

and homes. There are monitoring stations for air quality, water quality, and noise pollution to ensure the city complies with environmental laws and leg-

“Egypt is the first country in the Middle East and North Africa region to issue green bonds.” islation.

Finally, the city holds many bike lanes to encourage zero-emission transportation.

There has been a plan to build 45 new cities in Egypt to accommodate its growing population. These cities will be developed in line with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s Green Cities Program. There is no doubt that Egypt can build new green cities when

looking at the successful green transformation of Kharga.

Green Bonds Egypt is the first country in the Middle East and North Africa region to issue green bonds.

Green bonds are financial instruments that are used to fund new environmental projects while returning fixed income to investors.

These bonds offer investors the opportunity to mitigate the climate emergency while receiving returns like those expected from traditional investments.

A report by Crédit Agricole claims that there is 1.9 billion dollars in green bonds that can be used to fund green projects. 16% of these bonds are for renewable energy projects, 19% for clean transportation, 26% for water and wastewater management and 39% for pollution prevention and control.

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Takeaways These examples of green development projects indicate that Egypt is on track to reach its sustainable development goals in line with the goals set out by the United Nations.

These projects not only contribute to ensuring environmental integrity but also help meet goals to improve the quality of life of Egyptian citizens. The economic and sustainable benefits of these development projects generate jobs, improve public infrastructure and help combat pollution, all of which contribute to the well-being of Egyptian citizens.

It is essential to look back on successful development projects in Egypt to understand why the country is eligible to be the voice for other African nations during COP27.

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The Menton Times

NOVEMBER 2022

Whipping Up Lebanese Dishes Has Never Been Easier

By Angela Saab Saade, Staff Writer Welcome back, fellow eaters! Last month, I promised you exciting traditional recipes that are quick, easy to make and delicious. Today, I shall fulfill my pledge. Let us celebrate Lebanese independence, acquired on Nov. 22, 1943, with two meals prepared straight from my grandma’s kitchen, who, like her fellow Arab grandmothers, does not joke when it comes to food “Mdardara” Essential kitchen appliances: • One medium or large pot • Strainer Knife • Wooden spoon • Cup (for measuring purposes) • Ladle (for serving purposes)

1. Soak the rice and lentils together in water Also known as mujaddara for 10-20 minutes. in other colloquial Arabic dialects, such as Syrian Ar- 2. Meanwhile, chop your onion into cubes. abic, “mdardara” has been one of my favorite meals, 3. Add a tablespoon of olive oil in the pot and especially after transferplace it on the stove ring to a more vegetarian over low-medium heat. diet. “Mdardara” is a protein-dense plant-based 4. Add the chopped onion cubes and occasionally meal that is convenient to stir for five to ten minprepare, and it involves utes. The goal is for the lots of lentils, one of my falow heat to facilitate an vorite ingredients to cook onion-sweating prowith (after corn, clearly). cess which should render them slightly transRecipe: lucent.

5. Once your onion is ready, strain the rice Ingredients: and lentils and add • One cup of lentils them to the pot.

• Half a cup of rice 6. Put another tablespoon • Two cups of water of olive oil in the pot • One big (or two mewith the onion, rice dium-sized) yellow and lentils and sprinkle onion some salt, pepper and • Two tablespoons of cumin to taste. olive oil 7. Stir all ingredients to• Salt gether, add two cups • Pepper and curcuma of water and bring to a (optional) boil.

8. Once the water reaches boiling point, reduce the heat to low, and allow everything to cook slowly. Do not cover the pot or stir the ingredients! Check up on your “mdardara” every few minutes.

9. Once the water is absorbed, give it a taste test and either add some water if the lentils and rice are not fully cooked or turn the heat off.

“Mdardara” may be consumed on its own — cold or warm, and it may also be served with your choice of salad or “laban,” a fermented dairy product that I am obsessed with. Sadly, it is unavailable in the stores of Menton. For a “laban” alternative, you can use plain kefir or greek yogurt with a dash of olive oil and salt.

“Rishta” Aside from meaning marriage proposals in Urdu and Hindi, “rishta” also refers to my grandma’s favorite childhood meal, which makes it very dear to my heart. I only learned about it recently over the autumn break, which was the perfect timing for me to be able to share it with you! Is that not truly heartwarming? I can certainly feel our beautiful friendship blossoming with every passing Menton Times Issue.

Lebanese cuisine; Angela

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Ingredients: • One cup of lentils • One-two cups of spaghetti (I use tagliatelle, but any kind of pasta works) • Six cups of water • One large (or two medium-sized) yellow onion • One large (or two medium-sized) red onion • Two cloves of garlic (or more or less, based on preference) • Half a lemon or two to three tablespoons of lemon juice • Olive oil • Salt • Pepper and cumin (optional) • One bunch of cilantro leaves (optional) • Vegetable broth (optional)

Depending on personal preference and the desired lentil-pasta ratio, more or less spaghetti may be added. You might also have to add more water to cook the pasta if the lentils have already absorbed too much a traditional Italian dish of it.

— Pasta e lenticchie. Like its antecedent, “rishta” in1. Once the pasta is cludes a healthy dose of cooked, turn the heat lentils. off.

7. Stir all ingredients together, add six cups of water, and keep the temperature high.

A fellow Sciences Piste brought to my attention that “rishta” is similar to

Estimated Price Calculations:

salt should not amount to more than one and a half to two euros, making each of the aforementioned meals cost under three euros for quantities yielding two to three servings!

Fellow eaters, whether my favorite meal or my grandma’s seems more tasteful to you, I hope you give at least one of them a try. It is not common to find traditional Lebanese recipes that do not require long hours of preparation, so I encourage you to seize the opportunity. If any questions or comments should arise in your Lebanese cooking journeys, do not hesitate to contact me or the Google search engine, preferably). Next month, we shall draw inspiration from holiday joy and prepare sweet treats adequate for our seasonal celebrations. Until then, eat up and sahtein!

Aldi sells five hundred grams of raw lentils for under one and a half euros. This means that a cup of lentils, equivalent to roughly two hundred and fifty grams, costs between half and two-thirds of a euro. Slightly cheaper calculations apply to rice purchased from any of the three big stores, making our rice costs equivalent to about a quarter to half a euro.

As for the pasta, the relative quantity used pric- “Is that not truly es under half a euro. The heartwarming?” onion(s), olive oil and

Recipe: 1. Soak the lentils in water for 10-20 minutes 2. Meanwhile, chop your onions into slices and press two cloves of garlic.

3. Add a tablespoon of olive oil to the pot and place it on the stove over low-medium heat.

4. Add the chopped onion cubes and occasionally stir for five to 10 minutes. Allow them to sweat and transform into slices of translucent joy.

5. Once your onion cubes are ready, strain the lentils and add them to the pot.

6. Add another tablespoon of olive oil, and sprinkle some salt, pepper a cumin to taste.

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You may add less water, depending on the end-result texture you want. The less water, the less souplike the “rishta” will be.

You may also add vegetable broth and cilantro leaves for additional flavor.

1. Once the water begins to boil, bring the heat to a low so that everything slowly cooks.

2. Once the lentils are fairly cooked, in about ten-fifteen minutes, break up about a cup or two of spaghetti and put them into the pot.

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The Menton Times

NOVEMBER 2022

To All the Disillusioned Autumn Lovers, You are Not Alone

By Colin Lim, Staff Writer The weather has always been a classic non-controversial conversation starter. References to the weather being the subject of unimaginative, banal small talk span from The American Claimant by Mark Twain to Taylor Swift’s sappy, poetic ballad “Back to December.”

“gold and saffron and red” and fill the air with an overwhelming sense of coziness and joy.

Upon arrival in Menton, I enjoyed the scorchingly hot summer weather and the sunshine that the Côte

welcoming, joyful foliage-covered streetscapes; winter reminds her of playing with her dogs in the crisp snow and going on brisk walks with friends.

These recollections contrast Menton’s lack of a true autumn and winter,

As the Northern Hemisphere transitions from summer to winter, there is an interstitial period that most of the global population has the joy of experiencing — autumn.

Growing up in northern California, transplants from other parts of the country and the world would inform me that our state was a barren desert with no seasons.

This was a bizarre claim to make in the homeland of the coast redwood, with its temperate Mediterranean climate and its drought-resistant yet evergreen native vegetation that graces the hills John Steinbeck described as “a brown which was not brown but a gold and saffron and red—an indescribable color” in his chef-d’œuvre, “East of Eden.” The leaves of the non-native maples, oaks, elms, ginkgos and magnolias would turn an equally, if not more, impressive

Cloudy day in Menton; Jilly Bennett photography

d’Azur is renowned for.

As the seasons changed, though, I found myself disappointed by the lack of “gold and saffron and red” leaves, pumpkins and the other autumnal accouterments that I became accustomed to back home.

Like me, Menton second-year Sara Kovacheva has a certain tenderness for turning seasons. Her Bulgarian hometown’s autumn memories are of

which makes Kovacheva sad.

Now in her last year in Menton, she has come to appreciate the Mentonese version of autumn.

Similarly, second-year Yasmine Afifi affectionately recalls the four palpable seasons of her native Casablanca, Morocco. She does not enjoy the fact that there is very little transitional period between the “beautiful summer weather” of

Menton and the “gloomy, depressing rainy winter season.” Afifi states that her emotions are closely tied to the weather, and although she now is acclimating to the seasonal patterns of Menton, not being able to enjoy the beach for several months of the year and having classes before sunrise and after sunset are aspects of the town that she finds less than ideal.

Absence does make the heart grow fonder for many students at Sciences Po Menton, but fellow autumn lovers need not wander too far to experience fall foliage. The trees in Square Victoria and the plaza abutting the parking lot behind the Marché des Halles are presently shedding their leaves, albeit rather unimpressively. The Roya Valley, nestled in the foothills of the Alps, also offers some colorful trees for those willing to make the trek.

We should be grateful, at least, that we do not have to trudge through feet of snow to get to class.

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Arab Intellectals That Every Sciences Piste Should Know: Michel Aflaq

By Emilia Staff Writer

Kohlmeyer,

Michel Alflaq’s Baathism is difficult to recognize in contemporary Baathist ideology that still occupies Syrian and Iraqi thought. However, neo-Baathism finds its roots in the ideas of the Syrian intellectual Michel Aflaq, who inspired generations of anti-imperialist revolutionaries and radicals.

Michel Aflaq was born to a middle-class Greek-Orthodox family in Damascus. He received western education during his childhood under the French Mandate and later studied on a scholarship at the Sorbonne. His politics were strongly influenced by the instability Syria experienced during the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925 and postWWII Europe, which brought uncertainty to the Middle East.

During his time in Paris, he first interacted with ideol-

ogies such as communism, Marxism, socialism and nationalism. He formed the Union of Arab students, which called for the decolonization of Arab lands. Upon his return to Syria, Aflaq and Salah al Din al Bitar, a Sunni Muslim, co-founded the Baath “renaissance” party, which would extend to many other Arab countries, most notably Iraq.

Michel Aflaq’s principles are embodied in the Baathist slogan, “unity, freedom and socialism.” Aflaq’s quest for unity stems from his conception of the Arab nation. The essence of the Arab nation unveils itself through an eternal Arab revelation, which experienced its last rise when Islam unified the Arab world.

The Arab nation is primarily bounded by its common language, which Aflaq regards as its primary source of social norms and perception.

Restoring the glory of the Arab world, in his view, was only possible by a complete structural transformation achieved only through a revolution, “inqilab,” on the foundation of nationalism and socialism.

Nationalism, as an ideology, was to be the key vehicle in unifying the lower classes against the political elites.

Aflaq, a Greek OrMichel Aflaq; Wikimedia commons

thodox Christian, pursued a secular pan-Arab nationalist vision, which regarded religion as a force of division within the Arab nation. However, he regarded Islam by its “intense moral” nature to have inspired Arabs to “break through their entrenched reality,” as he outlined in a lecture in 1943. According to him, Islam represents an innate part of Arab culture, and he asserted that “Islam was an Arab movement. Its meaning was Arab renewal and its perfection. So the language that Islam descended with was Arabic. Its outlook and understanding were of an Arab mind. The qualities it encouraged were apparent or hidden Arab values, and the faults it addressed were faults the Arabs were to vanquish.”

Furthermore, his writings were known to contain numerous Quranic references.

The second pillar of his strategy of transforming the Arab world was socialism. During his studies in France, he was particularly exposed to Marxist thought, although he later declared communism to be “Western and alien to everything Arab.” Instead of relying solely on pure ideology, Aflaq drew on certain Marxist tenets, such as dialectical materialism. However, he translated the struggle of the working classes into the united Arab struggle against Western capitalists.

While supporting inheritance rights and private ownership, Aflaq advocated for wealth redistribution, greater public ownership of key industries, and workers’ participation in profit-sharing and manageri-

al matters. His socialist vision envisaged economic justice as forming the foundation of the new Arab nation-state, which should be democratic and a defender of fundamental rights such as free speech.

However, despite supporting these values, he considered it necessary for the Baath party to claim the required authority to create the conditions where individual ideas could flourish after decades of imperialism and elitist ideology.

Only then would the people be capable of forming their demands.

His politics have been described as many things, from radically leftist to fascist, although in practice, they were rather vague and formulated to appeal to the masses.

After the split of the United Arab Republic, a union between Syria and Egypt under Nasser that Aflaq had cautiously advocated for, the influence of the original Baathist generation began to decline. Successive military coups during the 1960s and a humbling defeat against Israel in 1967 culminated in a neo-Baathist coup instigated

by Hafez al-Assad, whose son remains president today.

Aflaq fled Assad’s Syria to Iraq under the protection of his follower Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi branch of the Baath party. Michel Aflaq died in Paris in 1986 and was buried in a mausoleum in Iraq, which, upon the American invasion, was repurposed as a gym for US soldiers and is now a shopping mall.

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The Menton Times

NOVEMBER 2022

As Netanyahu Regains Power, the FarRight Flourishes

By Peyton Dashiell, Staff Writer With nearly all votes counted from the Nov. 1, 2022, Israeli election, former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is poised to return to the role, continuing his reign as the longest-serving prime minister in Israeli history. As his Likud party and several rightwing coalition partners obtained a stable parliamentary majority, there may be an end in sight for Israel’s protracted political crisis, which has sparked five snap elections since 2019.

Netanyahu, who formerly served as Prime Minister from 1996 to 1999 and 2009 to 2021, leads the center-right Likud party. His decades-long political career has overseen the Oslo Accords, both Intifadas, disengagement from Gaza and the Abraham Accords. Netanyahu’s position on Palestinian statehood has shifted many times. After opposing a Palestinian state early in his career, he reversed course in his 2009 Bar Ilan speech, supporting a two-state solution as long as the Palestinian government agreed to demilitarize.

However, he condemned a two-state solution ahead of the 2015 Israeli elections, and many of his coalition partners support full Israeli annexation of the West Bank.

Within Israel, Netanyahu advocates for free-market principles — he has eased Israeli foreign exchange controls, reduced the size of the public

sector and passed anti-monopoly and anti-cartel laws to increase economic competition. Regionally, he has attempted to maintain a delicate power balance with Iran and Saudi Arabia, strongly condemning any Western nuclear deal with Iran as a threat to Israel’s security.

And despite his alignment with religiously conservative parties, Netanyahu himself comes from a secular background and supports some progressive social issues like same-sex marriage.

In 2019, Netanyahu was indicted on charges of bribery, fraud and breach of trust, all of which he denies. The investigation into these charges is ongoing; a loophole in Israeli law requires officials under investigation for corruption to resign from all government offices except that of prime minister, allowing Netanyahu to take office despite his legal battles. His trial resumed on November 7 — the Jerusalem District Court will hear testimony regarding the Gifts Affairs, in which Netanyahu and his wife are accused of accepting $200,000 in gifts from billionaire Arnon Milchan in exchange for helping him obtain a U.S. visa and securing tax exemptions.

Israel is a parliamentary democracy — the Israeli President, whose power is mostly ceremonial, nominates a member of the parliament (Knesset) to become Prime Minister, typically the leader of the largest party. The nominee is then tasked with

creating a multi-party coalition with at least 61 out of 120 Knesset seats to retain power.

This election was the fifth in four years due to a parliamentary crisis over Netanyahu’s leadership — the liberal wing of the Knesset has refused to create a coalition with Netanyahu, while Likud has insisted on keeping Netanyahu as party leader, resulting in an unstable coalition majority.

Arabs and labeled as terrorist organizations by the United States, the European Union and Japan. Ben Gvir, who was disqualified from service in the Israeli Defense Forces due to his radical views, has faced dozens of hate speech charges and called for the expulsion of Palestinian citizens of Israel viewed as disloyal to the Israeli government.

The domestic agendas of Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit espouse religious conservatism — both parties oppose same-sex marriage and call for increased federal funding for religious studies.

Additionally, Religious Zionism has expressed aims to vest the Knesset with “... Netanyahu was the power to overindicted on charges ride the Israeli High of bribery, fraud and Court. Right-wing breach of trust, all of leaders have heavily which he denies.” criticized the High Court for rulings with the Religious Zionism, on settlement construction, Shas and United Torah Juda- detention of African asylum ism parties, which won 14, 11 seekers and the ability of Reand seven seats, respective- form and Conservative Jewly. Overall, the coalition will ish converts to gain Israeli hold 64 seats, safeguarding citizenship. it against the fragility of past coalitions with smaller ma- While Netanyahu distanced jorities. himself from Ben Gvir on the campaign trail, the leadThe far-right Religious Zion- ers met in coalition talks in ist party, led by Bezalel Smo- Tel Aviv on Nov. 7. Ben Gvir trich, merged with Itamar expressed his aim to become Ben Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit public security minister, a (Jewish Power) party to gain role that manages police 14 Knesset seats and join Ne- oversight and training. tanyahu’s coalition. Ben Gvir is associated with the Kaha- The success of Religious Zionnist movement and Kach par- ism and Otzma Yehudit came ty — both banned by Israel at the expense of the Israeli in 1994 due to incitement of left. For the first time since its terrorism and racism against establishment in 1992, leftIn this election, Likud secured 32 Knesset seats, the largest share of any party. The Yesh Atid coalition, led by outgoing Prime Minister Yair Lapid, earned the second-largest share with 24 seats. Netanyahu has begun coalition talks

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wing party Meretz failed to pass the electoral threshold and gain any Knesset representation. Meretz leader Zehava Galon denounced the Religious Zionist party and labeled the election results a “disaster for Meretz, a disaster for the country, and yes, a disaster for me personally.”

Prime Minister Yair Lapid has garnered blame for blocking coalition efforts between Meretz and Yesh Atid, claiming that both parties would securely pass the threshold.

A fellow Sciences Po Menton student has supported Meretz in the past five elections due to their resistance to West Bank annexation and advocacy against human rights violations. They reject the narrative that Lapid is solely culpable for left-wing failures: “I believe the respective leaders of each party are to be blamed for not being willing to unite their lists as well as providing voters with a solid ideological alternative which is not merely a negation of their opponents.”

Arab parties Ra’am and Hadash Ta’al increased their seats to five each, while the Balad party failed to cross the electoral threshold. The three parties, along with Mada, previously comprised The Joint List, a coalition of Arab-majority parties that served as the third largest faction in the Knesset. However, the coalition dissolved in September after several members from different parties left due to ideological disputes. Palestinian citizens of Israel, who make up nearly one-fifth of the Israeli population, have much lower voter turnout rates than Jewish Israelis — only 55 percent cast votes this cycle.

While second-year Sama Nabulsi attributes this low turnout to the Knesset’s disinterest in ameliorating Palestinian conditions, she doesn’t believe that past anti-Palestinian legislation or disillusionment from prior coalition shortcomings should discourage Palestinian citizens from voting: “I think Palestinians with the ability to vote should vote for three main reasons.

First, to push the power away from far-right and generally racist parties. Second, if they choose to vote for Arab parties, to be able to secure some control and representation in the parliament. And third, to be able to build strength in the Palestinian voice for future elections and parliaments, a higher voter turnout creates an efficient voting bloc that would help constitute what the future government may look like. I don’t know how far a Palestinian voice can go in the makeup of the Israeli parliament today, but I believe that the battle isn’t over yet.”

Reversing trends seen globally, the rightward shift in this election was primarily driven by young, first-time voters — supporters of right-wing, religious parties specifically skewed young, male and Orthodox. A pre-election survey from the Israel Democracy Institute found that 71 percent of Israelis under age 24 identify as right-wing, compared to 47 percent of those 35 and older. Once a political pariah, Itamar Ben Gvir enjoys support from the incoming prime minister, and Religious Zionism is now the third largest party in the Knesset. Regarding overall election consequences, an anonymous second-year said, “there are many concerns that arise from this election, from the incorporation of once extremist and radical views into the Israeli political mainstream to dangers to Israel’s democracy, especially within the judiciary.” They also noted increased division within Israeli politics: “the high number of Orthodox and

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Ultra-Orthodox lawmakers and the ever-increasing rift between Israel and Diaspora Jews also offer little reason for hope.”

Despite his cumulative 15 years in office, Netanyahu’s third term is unlikely to bring stagnancy to Israeli politics.

Emboldened by his strong coalition majority, Netanyahu can pursue an ambitious agenda — he has highlighted normalization with Arab countries as a key priority, building upon the 2020 Abraham Accords he signed with former U.S. President Donald Trump. However, questions remain about the impact of his religious, right-wing coalition partners — will they significantly shape Israeli security and social issues, or will Netanyahu work to temper their aims and maintain the status quo? After two political comebacks and an ongoing legal battle, this term presents Netanyahu’s final opportunity to alter his legacy.

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The Menton Times

Is the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Organisation?

By Isabella Hehl Dalla Zuanna, Staff Writer Where lies the limit between a strong ideological religious group with a history of violence and a terrorist organization? After how many violent attacks do these stop being exceptions and instead a major characteristic of the

to find a universal Islamic system of rule. Embracing political activism, social responsibility, charitable works and social support programs, the Brotherhood seeks to serve its main support base of low-income populations. The organization’s current leader in Egypt is Mohamed Badie, who is currently in prison,

Muslim Brotherhood; Foreign Policy

group? Can an organization that participated in and led alleged plots, assassinations and government overthrows truly change and become non-violent? These are the questions that outline the struggle of countries today when deciding whether or not the Muslim Brotherhood should be labeled a terrorist organization or a religious and political movement.

Considered the oldest political group within the Arab world, the Muslim Brotherhood is rejected by multiple Arab countries who designate it as a terrorist organization, such as Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and even non-Arab country Russia. Founded in 1928 in Egypt by an Islamic teacher and scholar, Hassan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood’s original goal was

serving numerous life and death sentences for, among other charges, murder, incitement of violence, support of Islamist President Mohamed Morsi, vandalism and incitement to terrorism. Some of the group’s international offshoots are the Islamic Constitutional Movement in Kuwait, Tunisia’s Ennahda and Hamas in Palestine, some of whose founding members were originally in the Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood has a complicated political history within Egypt, which was only exacerbated by brotherhood member Mohamed Mohamed Morsi Eissa alAyyat’s, stint as president between 2012 to 2013. Morsi was nominated as a backup candidate but became the official President when Kharait El-Shater was disqualified in

the elections. Through a temporary constitutional declaration in November of 2012, Morsi granted himself unlimited power, described by some as an “Islamist coup.”

Soon, with accusations of repressing the freedom of press and demonstrations, major protests began in 2012 and ended in June of 2013, when now-President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi removed Morsi from office in a coup-d’état, commonly referred to as the June 30 Revolution. Presently, many of the Brotherhood’s remaining members have been accused by the Egyptian government of supporting Morsi, a criminal act in the eyes of the Sisi regime. Through a temporary constitutional declaration in November of 2012, Morsi granted himself unlimited power, described by some as an “Islamist coup.”

Soon, with accusations of repressing the freedom of press and demonstrations, major

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day. Their resilience poses a risk to Sisi’s legitimacy and the stability of the Egyptian state. Currently, the Egyptian government holds thousands of the group’s members in prison, where they often face abuse, violating international prison standards, such as the freedom from torture outlined in the Declaration of Human Rights. Other preventative measures against the organization include confiscating its assets and media censorship. Sisi believes that the ends justify the means — it is worth suppressing a violent terrorist organization that has previously threatened political leadership for national security. However, the Brotherhood has claimed to reject violence and wishes to participate in mainstream politics. Are governments to believe that they are still a terrorist organization, or should they be treated as any other religious and political

“Where lies the limit between a strong ideological religious group with a history of violence and a terrorist organization?” protests began in 2012 and ended in June 2013, when now-President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi removed Morsi from office in a coup-d’état, commonly referred to as the June 30 Revolution.

Since then, the government has labeled the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.

Sisi’s administration has implemented aggressive policies which aim to eradicate Brotherhood leadership and isolate it by spreading a narrative that links it to violent Islamism.

Yet, the Muslim Brotherhood miraculously still prevails to-

movement?

The Egyptian government justifies its classification of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization by describing it as a group with “blood on its hands,” due to their connection with Morsi, the multiple terrorist attacks orchestrated by Brotherhood members and because many offshoot organizations of the Brotherhood are jihadists.

They claim that the Brotherhood’s attempts to prove it has become a non-violent organization are only a manipulative tactic to regain public and media popularity.

NOVEMBER 2022 At this point, they will once Sisi’s claims are disputed by of the group have openly supmore resort to violence. Ter- other states and independent ported the violence against rorist attacks led by members journalists. The Tahir Insti- Coptic Christians in Egypt, as of the organization include tute for Middle East Policy well as antisemitic behavior the bombing of a police bus stated that “understanding when discussing their views in Rashid in 2015, wound- the Salafist influence is im- on the Holocaust. ing dozens of policemen and portant for it highlights how An Egyptian Sciences Piste, killing four, who has asked to remain the burning “...“blood on its hands,” anonymous, described the of the Gen- due to their connection with “atrocious” acts of terror by eral Court Morsi, the multiple terrorthe Brotherhood: “words of Fayoum ist attacks orchestrated by cannot describe the hate I Governate Brotherhood members and have for them, and how they in Fayoum, because many offshoot ormade it more complicated to the setting ganizations of the Brotherget into a place of worship. of fires at hood are jihadists.”

Until today, before entering the Friends churches, bags are checked, of the Bible you go through scanners, and Society building in Fayoum, [Ajnad Misr] and similar they sometimes even ask for storming police stations in [groups] that may pop up are your ID (which indicates your Youssef Al-Siddiq and Tami- not necessarily an extension religion).” ya, and the theft of ammuni- of the Muslim Brotherhood Most violent extremist acts tions. and its ideological outlook, as and quotes come from the The Muslim Brotherhood’s the government contends.” three years following the June perennial challenge of effec30 Revolution and have not tively mixing religion with Even though the Muslim occurred more recently. Howpolitics has historically end- Brotherhood’s rightful char- ever, the Brotherhood’sHaed in violence and strife, as acterization may be up for mas branch still currently was the case for Egypt in debate, it is indisputable that participates in suicide bomb2012-2013. Gamel Abdel-Ga- they have a history of vio- ings, kidnappings and rocket wad, a political analyst from lence, starting at their roots. attacks with civilian targets, Al-Ahram, wrote that “Egypt The group’s founder, Hassan all of which the Brotherhood began to stabilize only after al-Banna, once said, “Jihad view as a legitimate response Al-Sisi was elected president is an obligation from Allah to Israeli occupation. Its in May 2014, and even then, and every Muslim and can- other branches, conversely, the country was still forced not be ignored nor evaded.” only very loosely associate to fight the remnants of ter- In his book “The Way of Ji- themselves with the Brothrorist groups and help the had,” he wrote: “Jihad means erhood and arguably cannot state stand on its feet again. the fighting of the unbeliev- concretely be connected. The Despite its defeat on June ers and involves all possible Egyptian media and govern30, 2013, the Brotherhood re- efforts that are necessary to ment propagate myths about sumed its war against the new dismantle the power of the the organization being affiliregime, resorting to terror- enemies of Islam, including ated with large jihadist groups ism and assassinations and beating them, plundering such as Al Qaeda. While some launching a media war.” their wealth, destroying their Brotherhood members quit Another aspect that would places of worship, and smash- the group in frustration with justify categorizing the the organizaBrotherhood as a terrorist “Are governments to be- tion’s policy on organization would be that lieve that they are still a non-violence many offshoots of the group terrorist organization, or and joined are known to be violent and should they be treated as groups such as dangerous jihadists, such as any other religious and po- Al Qaeda, the “Liwaa al-Thawra,” “Pop- litical movement?”

Brotherhood ular Resistance,” “Helwan has repeatedly Brigades,” “Ajnad Misr” and ing their idols.” This ideology denounced the infamous ji“Revolutionary Punishment.” was followed not only during hadist group.

According to the Egyptian the Brotherhood’s terrorist Most experts outside of Egypt government, these offshoots attacks but also when they have agreed that the organidid not only originate from mourned the death of Osama zation cannot be classified as the group but were financed bin Laden. Numerous clerics a terrorist group. Even when and led by them. However, the Donald Trump presiden-

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cy tried to label it as such, the Trump administration could not find enough evidence.

David D. Kirkpatrick from the New York Times argued that “the main international advocates for the designation are Mr. el-Sisi of Egypt and his authoritarian allies in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Alarmed that Muslim Brotherhood parties might rise to power through elections, all three governments have cracked down on the Islamists and pressed their allies to do the same. They argue that the Brotherhood’s Islamic ideology makes it a threat to the idea of the nation-state and thus a threat to the region’s stability.” As a result, whether or not it is for Sisi’s political gain, if one only looks at the present day, there is not enough proof to label the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. However, it cannot be easy to erase its history of violence. The anonymous Sciences Piste stated, “what makes it more alarming to me is how some of the churches that were bombed were ones my parents had been to throughout their childhoods, and that’s not anything they can forgive the Muslim Brotherhood for committing. I would not trust a Muslim Brotherhood-based government.”

It is logical why countries might define the Brotherhood differently based on their geographical location. Countries far from the conflict — unaffected by the group’s historical violence — would understandably be more easily ready to believe the Brotherhood has evolved. In contrast, countries with a more personal relationship with the organization who still see the psychological scars caused by the Brotherhood today would be more inclined to stay wary.

Overall, the rational labe-

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ling of the group as terrorist or non-terrorist depends on how long one believes a period of non-violence must last until the group in question has definitively shifted away from terrorism. Arguably, since it has only been about half a decade in the case of the Brotherhood, it might be premature to claim that they have completely veered away from terrorism.

The Brotherhood being labeled as a terrorist organization in Egypt is enforced

by Article 7 of the Terrorist Entities Law. Their meetings are banned, all of its activities have been shut down, funding is prohibited, all of the group’s assets and its members are frozen, and it cannot access any social media or express itself digitally. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood, which has often wished to become a part of the mainstream political conversation, is strictly banned from all public activity.

Even if some can consider these measures as unfair since the Muslim Brotherhood is characterized by most as a non-terrorist organization, it cannot be disputed that the organization stands for extreme and arguably highly dangerous and intolerant values such as a support for a totalitarian system operating under sharia law and various forms of religious discrimination. Today, the Brotherhood attempts to gradually return to the Egyptian street through its “Change Movement of the Muslim Brotherhood,” also called the “Kemalist movement,” after Muhammad Kamal, who led major terrorist operations in Egypt in 2014.

Whether or not this is a prelude to violence that could once again destabilize Egyptian politics remains yet to be seen.

NOVEMBER 2022

Le mouvement en Iran: Un Phénomène à la Mode Pour la Communauté Internationale

By Amalia Heide, Staff Writer « Le mouvement tend vers une tendance ». Ce terme, chargé de méfiance, a été employé par Bahar (pseudonyme) pour décrire ses craintes quant à l’avenir du mouvement d’émancipation des femmes en Iran.

Cette jeune femme iranienne semble alarmée face à l’idée qu’un mouvement qui la touche de si près puisse tout simplement s’évaporer, comme c’est souvent le cas de la plupart des mouvements à vocation humanitaire qui deviennent viraux à l’échelle internationale sur les réseaux

sociaux. Les utilisateurs passent d’une obsession fiévreuse et passionnée pour une cause à l’indifférence et à l’oubli.

Et tout cela en un clin d’œil.

La viralisation excessive d’une cause génère donc une saturation et un ennui chez les utilisateurs qui ne sont pas directement concernés. C’est pourquoi, au cours d’une semaine, on assiste à un défilé sans fin de posts sur les réseaux sociaux sur un sujet précis, partagés automatiquement et sans réelle réflexion. La semaine suivante, les mêmes utilisateurs, qui semblaient si engagés, se lassent de voir le même message encore et en-

core et deviennent obsédés par une autre campagne.

Mais qu’implique également cette viralisation démesurée ? Elle réduit une réalité très concrète à quelque chose d’abstrait ou de « symbolique », en détournant l’attention des personnes réellement concernées par le problème.

C’est pourquoi Bahar a l’impression que les utilisateurs des médias sociaux actuels accordent plus d’attention aux paroles et aux actions des influenceurs occidentaux qu’aux femmes iraniennes, dont la liberté est limitée à son expression minimale par le régime. Même lorsque les actions de ces influenceurs sont plus importantes que le simple partage d’un post, la signification de cette action ne sera pas la même ni aura le même poids que si elle était réalisée par une femme iranienne. Prenez, par exemple, les femmes qui ont rasé leurs cheveux en signe de soutien aux femmes iraniennes. Les implications d’un tel acte ne sont pas les mêmes pour une femme occidentale vivant dans un État de droit que pour une femme iranienne qui met sa vie en danger. Il est vrai, cependant, qu’il s’agit d’une forme de sensibilisation et de faire prendre conscience

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e

au plus grand nombre, ce dont Bahar est très reconnaissante. Il est indéniable que l’effet positif est très fort.

Cependant, il faut toujours être conscient des limites de ces campagnes de sensibilisation. Surtout quand, une fois les cheveux coupés par exemple, les influenceurs occidentaux estiment que leur rôle a été fait et passent à un autre sujet pour divertir leurs followers. Ont-elles coupé leurs cheveux pour soutenir une cause noble ou pour créer du sensationnel et des visuels sur leur page ?

Mais alors, comment pouvons-nous, en tant que membres de la communauté internationale, contribuer à changer cette réalité concrète dans laquelle vivent des millions d’iraniennes ? Selon Bahar, l’essentiel est de s’informer avant de partager sur le sujet et non de publier aléatoirement afin suivre une tendance, surtout pour ne pas laisser une vision occidentale et anti-islamique du problème s’imposer à l’opinion publique. Ce n’est pas la religion musulmane qui génère le

problème actuel en Iran, ni le port du voile lui-même, mais la répression autoritaire, violente et systématique d’un régime qui ne permet pas aux femmes de décider du cours de leur vie ni du rapport qu’elles souhaitent entretenir avec la religion.

Dans le même temps, les membres de la communauté internationale peuvent aider les femmes ira-

una causa a la indiferencia y el olvido de la misma. Y todo en un abrir y cerrar de ojos.

La viralización excesiva de una causa genera por lo tanto saturación y hastío en los usuarios que no se ven afectados de manera directa. Es por eso que a lo largo de una semana, hay un desfile interminable de publicaciones en las redes sociales sobre un tema específico, compartidas de manera automática y sin una reflexión real. La semana siguiente, los mismos usuarios, que tan comprometidos parecían, se aburren de ver la misma publicación una y otra vez y pasan a obsesionarse con otra causa, volviendo a

“Ont-elles coupé leurs cheveux pour soutenir une cause noble ou pour créer du sensationnel et des visuels sur leur page ?” niennes en faisant pression sur les autorités de l’État afin qu’à leur tour, elles fassent pression sur l’ONU pour que le régime iranien actuel commence à respecter les droits fondamentaux de ses femmes.

--------------------------------“The movement tends into a trend”. Este terme, cargado de recelo, fue utilizado por Bahar (seudónimo) para describir sus miedos con respecto al futuro del movimiento de emancipación de las mujeres en Irán.

Esta joven irani parece alarmada frente a la posibilidad de que un movimiento que la toca tan de cerca se evapore en el aire, como suele pasar con todos los movimientos de reivindicación social que se viralizan a nivel internacional en las redes sociales. Los usuarios pasan de sentir una obsesión febril y pasional por

producirse el mismo proceso.

Pero que implica además esta viralización excesiva?

Se reduce a algo abstracto o “simbólico” una realidad sumamente concreta, quitando el foco de las personas que están verdaderamente implicadas en la problematica. Es por ello que Bahar tiene la impresión de que actualmente los usuarios de las redes sociales le prestan más atención a las palabras y acciones de influencers occidentales que a las mujeres iranies que ven su libertad limitada a su minima expresion por el regimen. Inclusive cuando las acciones de dichos influencers es mas significativa que el simple partage de una publicacion, el significado de dicha accion no va a ser el mismo ni va a tener el mismo peso que si lo hiciera una mujer irani. Tomemos como ejemplo raparse el pelo como muestra de apoyo hacia las

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mujeres iranies. Las implicaciones de dicha accion no son las mismas para una mujer occidental viviendo en un Estado de derecho que para una mujer irani que pone su vida en peligro al hacer lo mismo.

Es verdad de todas maneras de que es una forma de spread awarness, algo que agradece Bahar, pero hay que ser conscientes de sus limites. Sobretodo cuando, una vez la mecha de pelo cortada, las influencers occidentales sienten que su parte ya fue hecha y pasan a otro tema para mantener entretenidos a sus seguidores. En el fondo se cortaron el pelo por apoyar una causa justa o para crear sensacionalismo y vizualicaciones en su pagina?

Pero entonces, como podemos en tanto que miembros de la comunidad internacional contribuir a que esta realidad concreta en la que viven millones de mujeres iranies cambie? Segun Bahar, lo principal es Informarse y luego compartir sobre el tema y no unicamente publicar por seguir una moda. Informarse es esencial, sobretodo para no dejar que una vision occidental y anti-islamica sobre la problematica se imponga en la opinion publica. No es la religion musulmana la que genera problema, ni el port du voile en si, sino la represion autoritaria, violenta y sistematica de un regimen que no da lugar a que las mujeres decidan sobre el curso de sus vidas ni sobre la relacion que desean tener con la religion.

A su vez, es importante hacer presion sobre las autoridades estatales para que, a leur tour, estas hagan presion en la ONU para que el regimen irani vigente comience a respetar los derechos fundamentales de sus mujeres.

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NOVEMBER 2022

A Day Before Winter, OPEC Cuts Oil Production by Two Million Barrels

By Leo Gerza, Staff Writer

On Oct. 5t, following a meeting in its Vienna headquarters, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced that its member countries would be cutting oil production by two percent, or two million barrels a day, taking effect in November. The announcement was made against the backdrop of rising energy costs and a looming global recession. Indeed, it is global economic uncertainty that the organization claims underpins its decision to cut oil production, citing its desire to balance supply in the face of decreasing demand as its core motivation.

Founded in 1960, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries sought to counter the United States’ hegemony over oil production and now controls 40% of production and 80% of the world’s reserves, vesting the cartel with immense pricing power. The organization has not

shied away from exercising its dominance. Older generations are haunted by the devastating effects the cartel’s oil embargo had on the price of oil and the U.S. economy in the 1970s. Its recent actions

prices. Supply shocks lingering from the COVID-19 pandemic — which saw oil prices briefly slip into the negatives — mean that global supply cannot keep up with demand rapidly returning to pre-pandemic lev“The announcement was madeels due to against the backdrop of risingthe robust energy costs and a loomingexpansionglobal recession.” ary fiscal policy have again highlighted its wielded by western leaders as pricing power, as oil prices an answer to the pandemic. surged from $76.71 per barrel Equally, many countries, esto $92.64 in response to its pecially those in Europe, that announcement that it would have chosen to halt buying oil cut production. from Russia in response to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine At first glance, the decision are facing unprecedented seems motivated by the desire supply challenges as they seek to steer prices back toward the alternatives to their long-lasthighs they experienced earlier ing reliance on Russian gas this year. The price of oil hit a imports. peak of $122 in June; however, since then, it has steadily According to National Public fallen to below $90. The an- Radio, some pressure from nouncement was designed, in Russia may have invigorated part, to counter falling prices the decision-making process, and benefit the revenues re- as “they effectively came and ceived from oil exports. Oth- asked OPEC to cut producer factors are contributing tion by a million barrels a to the volatility of global oil day.” Such observations fur-

ther suggest the protagonist role that the war in Ukraine is playing in the emerging resource crisis. This, especially, has influenced calls from some governments for Volodymyr Zelensky to enter negotiations with Putin to de-escalate the conflict.

Beyond the immediate price increase of oil, the impacts of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries’ decision will perpetuate a common trend in the past year. Energy firms drilling for and selling oil will see profits rise even higher as they continue to reap record profits.

British Petroleum (BP) announced $8.2 billion in profit at the end of October, its second highest on record. At the same time, households face even higher costs just as winter begins setting in, with the prospect of energy rationing not out of the question in many European countries.