The Menton Times - Volume II, No. 3

NEWS

Second-Year Fraser Byers Produces Documentary About Ventimiglia’s Humanitarian Crisis

By Colette Yamashita Holcomb, English Sec tion Editor

In the idyllic bubble of Menton, it is easy to forget the humanitar ian crises occurring less than 20 kilome ters away in the Ital ian city of Ventimiglia. Yet, every year, over 30,000 migrants pass through the border town, risking their lives in hopes of a better fu ture. The 2020 closing of the Italian Red Cross Camp and an intensi fied French police pres ence has exacerbated the already dangerous

humanitarian conditions for migrants at the Fran co-Italian frontier.

SEE PAGE 2

Menton au Maroc: Sciences Pistes Fall Break With the BDE

By Peyton Dashiell, Staff Writer

After a long journey involving a late-night bus to Milan, three-a.m. airplane floor naps and a red-eye flight across the Mediter ranean, 55 Sciences Pistes (and three Chilean tourists who were also part of our tour group) emerged from Marrakesh Menara Airport on Monday morn ing exhausted but eager for the adventure ahead. Organized by none oth er than our Bureau Des Étudiants President, 2A Samy Bennouna, the Sciences Piste fall break trip to Morocco was a highly anticipated inter lude to the semester.

MENA

After hours of airport cha os — customs, currency exchange and the quest to collect the Bureau Des Étudiants speaker from baggage claim unscathed, we departed the airport for a serene morning at the Jardin Majorelle. We were met with a botanical labyrinth — an endless maze of intricately tiled paths, alleys of flowers and cerulean Art Deco Buildings enclosed by cacti. While we witnessed cats, turtles and fish, some credible Sciences Piste sources also sparked rumors of a rare Moroccan panda lurking in the shadows.

Le Mouvement en Iran: Un Phénomène à la Mode Pour la Communauté Internationale

By Amalia Heide, Staff Writer

«

Le mouvement tend vers une tendance ». Ce terme, chargé de méfiance, a été employé par Bahar (pseu donyme) pour décrire ses craintes quant à l’avenir du mouvement d’éman cipation des femmes en Iran.

Cette jeune femme ira nienne semble alarmée face à l’idée qu’un mou

vement qui la touche de si près puisse tout simple ment s’évaporer, comme c’est souvent le cas de la plupart des mouvements à vocation humanitaire qui deviennent viraux à l’échelle internationale sur les réseaux sociaux. Les utilisateurs passent d’une obsession fiévreuse et pas sionnée pour une cause à l’indifférence et à l’ou bli. Et tout cela en un clin d’œil.

Second-Year Fraser Byers Produces Documentary About Ventimiglia’s Humanitarian Crisis

By Colette Yamashita Holcomb, English Sec tion Editor

In the idyllic bubble of Menton, it is easy to forget the humanitarian crises occurring less than 20 kilo meters away in the Italian city of Ventimiglia. Yet, every year, over 30,000 migrants pass through the border town, risking their lives in hopes of a better future. The 2020 closing of the Italian Red Cross Camp and an intensified French police presence has exacerbated the already

dangerous humanitarian conditions for migrants at the Franco-Italian frontier.

After seeing the implica tions firsthand through volunteer work at the bor der, second-year Sciences Po student Fraser Byers wanted to bring aware ness to the migrant crisis by producing a documentary film detailing person al accounts of the journey to Europe and what daily life looks like for migrants. This past summer, he worked with friends Nico Romero and Zara Gounden

to create the Twen ty Miles More pro ject with the support of a Davis Project for Peace grant of $10,000. Romero, an aspiring film maker, is the director, cinematographer and edi tor. Gounden, a New York University student at NYU London, is the co-produc er, production accountant and secondary content writer.

Twenty Miles More aims to share the story of Ventimi glia as a representation of the complexity that emerg es when those in search of safety and security meet barriers to a better life.

“I believe that storytelling through this medium [doc umentaries] is the best way to share with audiences unadulterated accounts of the human tragedy occur ring in this region. Doc umentaries are a form of reporting that invites a visual element. [They] bring validity and often es tablish a greater emotional connection. I believe that these characteristics are inherent to responsible documentary storytelling [and] are crucial to shift

ing public opinion…” says Fraser Byers, the executive producer and water survey lead of Twenty Miles More.

Beyond the documentary, the project includes re search on the water quality of the Roya River — par ticularly seeking to answer whether the river is a safe water source for migrants. Without the Red Cross Camp, the Roya river has become the primary site where migrants bathe, use the bathroom and access drinking water. Aside from organic human waste, the river is polluted with gar bage and spilled oil, and there is concern that the water contains hazardous heavy metals from the up river industry.

“The Roya flows through both French and Italian territories where there is significant industrial and agricultural development — making the unknown chemical and organic qualities of the water a concern considering the high chance of dangerous

“ Twenty Miles More aims to share the story of Ven- timiglia as a representa- tion of the complexity that emerges when those in search of safety and securi- ty meet barriers to a better life.”

contaminants,” explained Byers.

Through this research, the project will help non-prof its and other organizations working in the area to pro vide safer drinking and bathing alternatives.

Over the summer, the crew was able to conduct primary filming and wa ter assessment and have now moved into post-pro duction. Filming began just four months after the beginning of the Ukraini

an-Russian war. The tim ing allowed for a unique framing of the treatment of primarily African and Asian migrants entering Ventimiglia in the context of the treatment of Ukrain ian refugees in other are as of France and Italy. Of particular concern is police treatment; throughout the documentary, law enforce ment is shown discrimi nating against migrants and even illegally refusing underage asylum seekers. Given the sensitive nature of much of the documenta

ry’s content and the depth of personal stories shared in the film, the project team wanted to ensure that they were taking an ethical approach to research and production. To do so, they worked with various or ganizations operating in Ventimiglia and generally in migrant advocacy and aid, such as Caritas, 20K, Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders).

These partnerships are also set to collaborate on

distribution; the team plans to share the unedited interviews with organiza tions. They are also apply ing to various film festivals to showcase the documen tary.

If you are interested in supporting the Twenty Miles More project, con tact Fraser Byers at fra serbyers@gmail.com or check out their website, 20milesmore.org.

What Does Giorgia Meloni Mean for Ventimiglia’s Migrant Population?

By Sophia Rottman, Eng lish Section Editor

Camp Roja was not the first refugee camp in Ventimiglia; whether it will be the last re mains to be seen. In 2014, an influx of migrants and ref ugees in Ventimiglia led to the creation of the informal “No Borders” camp. One year later, the “No Borders” camp was shut down. Still, the need for shelter and aid for refu gees and migrants persisted, prompting the Red Cross to open Camp Roja. However, its lack of a legal framework allowed the Prefecture of Im peria to close its doors in July 2020 easily. Originally built to host up to 180 people, the camp routinely operated well beyond its maximum capaci ty, once holding 800 people with a mere 360 beds.

When Italy imposed a coun try-wide lockdown at the be ginning of the COVID-19 pan demic, Camp Roja stopped receiving new arrivals, forc ing 200 people to seek ref uge on the streets. In accord ance with national policy, the prefect, Alberto Intini, an nounced that the camp would not receive anyone new until the pandemic was over. By June 2020, the number of people in the camp drastically decreased; only 30 residents remained. On July 30, 2020, the prefecture informed the Red Cross that Camp Roja would be shut down. The Red Cross’ pleas to keep it open were unsuccessful. Since the closure, migrants and refu gees in Ventimiglia are now in even more dangerous posi

tions — many lack basic needs like adequate shelter, water and food, often sleeping out side the train station, under an overpass or along the Roja.

Prime Minister Giorgia Mel oni’s new government, a coalition between her par ty, Fratelli d’Italia, the Lega and Forza Italia, is expected to be Italy’s most right-wing government since the Sec ond World War. In the 2018 election, Fratelli d’Italia won only 4.3% of the vote. Now, its ideas have gained significant ground. The party’s campaign promised to prevent refugee rescue boats from docking among other strict border controls. Meloni has suggest ed that the Italian Navy patrol the coast to stop migrants and refugees from reaching Italy, alongside a naval blockade of Africa’s Mediterranean coast.

Meloni’s new government is facing its first challenge: three NGO rescue boats in Italian waters. On Saturday, Nov. 5, Humanity One, run by the

German charity SOS Human ity, was allowed to enter the Sicilian port of Catania. After an onboard medical inspec tion, 144 migrants and refu gees were moved to a recep tion center: they were deemed to be experiencing emergency conditions. The remaining 35 were left on the ship and will likely be pushed back into international waters. SOS Humanity argues that all of the ship’s passengers were rescued at sea, which alone is supposed to qualify them for a safe port under internation al law. On Sunday, Nov. 6, It aly ordered Humanity One to leave the port of Catania. The captain refused.

Three other rescue ships re main at sea, two in Italian wa ters and one in international territory, with more than 900 additional migrants and refu gees. Their requests for a safe port have gone unanswered, and conditions onboard have deteriorated. Some NGOs say that Italy is breaching inter national sea rescue laws, ar

guing that anyone in danger must be disembarked at the nearest safe port. However, the new interior minister, Matteo Piantedosi, asserts that because the asylum seek ers first stepped aboard Hu manity One in Germany, they are not Italy’s responsibility according to the European Union Dublin Regulation.

Meloni’s victory has sparked concern amongst French mi grant rights advocates and organizations, who fear that the present conditions for refugees and migrants at the Franco-Italian border and Central Mediterranean may become more treacher ous. Amnesty International predicts that the increasing number of migrants and refu gees attempting to leave Italy for France will cause a “ping pong” effect between French and Italian authorities. Al ready facing pushback as they attempt the “pass of death” through the mountains from Ventimiglia to Menton, a worsening situation is highly concerning.

In 2022, a new permanent hosting center for migrants and refugees is set to open in the Ventimiglia area. Still, au thorities have yet to disclose specifics about the facility and its launch date. Amidst the Meloni administration’s hostility towards displaced populations, it now remains to be seen if Ventimiglia’s tentative resettlement center has even a fighting chance of opening.

Giorgia Meloni, Italy's newly elected prime minister; Vice, Italy

Regulating ESG Investments Becomes More Pressing Amidst Greenwashing Trends

By Noor Ahmad, Staff Writ er

The 27th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, or COP27, is convening in the Egyp tian coastal city of Sharm elSheikh between the 6th and 18th of November 2022. The conference seeks to tackle global climate emergency issues: how to reduce green house gas emissions, adapt to the effects of climate change and finance climate action in developing countries. The conference seeks to build on the Paris Agreement in 2015, which set out goals to guide nations on how to reduce global greenhouse gas emis sions and limit global temper ature increase to two degrees Celsius. The agreement is a legally binding international treaty with 194 signatory Par ties.

The issue of climate change and financing the fight against it are nothing new. Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) investing has been rising for the last decade. ESG incorporates a broad set of principles that socially responsible invest ments should follow and are sometimes commingled with “green” investments, which focus primarily on environ mental impact. While there is no clear taxonomy for ESG, it broadly aims to curtail the effects of climate change, carbon emissions, environ mental pollution, deforesta

tion and water scarcity. The non-environmental catego ries of ESG encompass a wid er scope, including commu nity impact, human rights, diversity in company boards, bribery, and corruption. A report by the consulting firm Deloitte published earlier this year estimated $39 tril lion of assets in 2020 were ESG-focused versus $19 tril lion in 2014. This represents 36 percent of total global in vestments in 2020. The mag nitude and proportion of ESG investments are expected to rise dramatically in the com ing years, reaching $96 tril lion by 2025 and represent ing 58 percent of worldwide investments. Other measures put the projected amount in vested in ESG funds at a few trillion dollars. What is indis putable is that this sector is proliferating.

As interest in the environ ment and sustainability has increased, so has regulato ry focus. In 2021, the Eu ropean Union introduced its Sustainable Finance Dis closure Regu lation, which requires asset managers to provide in formation re garding their adherence to ESG invest ment stand ards. Three

categories were introduced in classifying investment funds: article six funds, which do not take sustainability into account; article eight funds, which promote ESG prac tices; and article nine funds, which is the highest ESG cat egory, with sustainability at the heart of its investment policies. Moreover, since Au gust 2022, the Markets in Financial Instruments Di rective II, a regulation seek ing to protect investors and standardize practices across the European Union, now requires financial advisors to evaluate not only the client’s risk tolerance but also their preferences for environmen tally sustainable investments.

The regulatory changes by the union are timely and possibly the beginning of a worldwide regulatory conver gence in how to classify envi ronmentally responsible in

vestments. The changes have come against a background of mis-selling and misrep resentation by some of the world’s largest asset manag ers. DWS, Deutsche Bank’s as set management arm, recent ly saw its CEO step down after evidence emerged that the firm failed to classify invest ments labelled ESG against the necessary criteria correct ly. The term “greenwashing,” which aptly describes DWS’s behavior, is one where a com pany tries to portray itself as more socially responsible and environmentally friendly than it is. The company may not meet the necessary stand ards and continue investing in environmentally harmful businesses. A German con sumer group recently filed a lawsuit against DWS alleging that its ESG Climate Tech fund was marketed as having zero percent investments in polluting sectors such as coal.

Yet, the fund’s investment policy allowed for invest ments in companies where up to 15 percent of their reve nues could be generated from these harmful industries. The problems faced by DWS are not a one-off event, and the prevalence of misrepresenta tion of what investment funds are doing versus what they are advertising is an issue concerning regulators beyond the European Union, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority reviewing both conduct and current regulation.

Promoting finance to tackle climate change in developing countries is one of the pillars of the Paris Agreement. Yet the investment world, which seemingly has a never-end ing stream of scandals and mis-selling driven by greed and a lack of ethics, is yet again undermining an ex istentially important focus. As the awareness of climate change has begun to alter the behavior of both individual and institutional investors and centered them on envi ronmentally positive goals, the investment world must step up and learn to police it self. Regulators will eventual ly catch up and create guide lines, but the intermediaries have a significant role as time passes and environmental catastrophe descends on hu manity. Let us hope that the outcome of COP27 is a clear message to the investment in dustry that it needs to address these shortcomings and take substantial steps to finance positive change.

The Hijab Is a Hot Political Topic for Islamists… but

Also the Secular West

By Ghazal Khalife, Staff Writer

Hijab is an Arabic word that translates to “curtain” or “cov ering.” It is now commonly used to refer to the headcov ers sometimes worn by Mus lim women. A lot of questions surround the hijab: Why is it worn? Is it a sign of oppres sion — an archaic symbol of patriarchal traditions? Does it fit in modern societies? What should we do about it? The fact that the hijab has become such a controversy shows how it has long left the private realm and become a matter of public debate and politicization.

In Iran: From a symbol of protest to a symbol of oppression

In its modern history, Iran has had a complicated re lationship with its religious identity and, thus, the role of the hijab. Reza Shah Pahlavi, who ruled Iran from 1925 to 1941, to abandon backward ness and tradition and pro mote modernization, issued the decree, “Kashef-e Hijab,” which banned all head cover ings for women as well as the “chador,” a full-body Iranian covering. Unsurprisingly, this decision, which was swiftly and strongly enforced across the country, was not received well by the more conserva tive population. The ban re stricted women’s freedom of movement, as many stayed at home or came out at night when they could hide from police, who were instructed to resort to physical violence to unveil hijabi women for

cibly. The shah’s decree ad hered to the premise that the hijab is antithetical to moder nity and women’s integration into society, a view that reso nates to this day. During the ceremony in which the shah announced “Kashef-e Hijab,” he stated that women “should stand out in society the same way they stand out in their homes.”

Fast forward to the years lead ing up to the Islamic Revolu tion, the hijab resurged in the social and political spheres as a sign of protest against west ernization and the Pahlavi dynasty’s attempt to repress Iran’s cultural and religious identity. It is worth noting, however, that at that point, wearing the veil was a choice, an expression of disenchant ment with a regime that dic

Nasibe Samsaei, an Iranian woman living in Turkey, cuts her ponytail off during a protest outside the Iranian consulate in Istanbul on September 21, 2022; Wikimedia commons

tated women’s clothing. Af ter the Islamic republic was established, veiling became mandatory and violently en forced by the morality police. Post-Revolution leader Ru hollah Khomeini described women who did not veil as “naked.” Consequently, the veil became a symbol of the resurrection of Islamic values and strict interpretation of the Quran. Women have been protesting the hijab mandate for decades in Iran — a move ment that culminated in the recent and ongoing protests. The hijab is simply another manifestation of the Islamic state’s political oppression; it is a reminder that the Islamic Republic can and will dictate the public’s life choices, that it does not tolerate diversion from its interpretation of re ligion and that its version of society is the right one.

The affiliation of the hijab with a political movement is not exclusive to Iran, howev er. The idea of the hijab was also politicized in post-colo nial Arab liberation move ments and their competing ideologies, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood. During the early period of decolo nization (1930s-40s), Mus lim women wore the hijab to reaffirm their pride in their heritage and Islamic identi ty, especially since European colonial soldiers unveiled in digenous women during “civ ilizing missions.” In Algeria, the veil became a focal point of the War of Independence as there was strong resent ment against the French for their unveiling and sexual ization of Algerian women. Unveiling ceremonies were popular, but the obsession with the hijab took on an even more sinister undertone. To

many, it hid mysterious sex ual objects cloaked beneath a layer of modesty, begging to be seen by the male gaze. This is epitomized by the school of French photographers who took photos of unveiled wom en and hypersexualized them; some of these images were even used in French postal cards.

In France: The symbol of a struggle with religious diversity

In contemporary France, the hijab remains a conten tious topic in government and public realms. Despite being worn by less than 2% of France’s population, the hijab dominates political dis cussions about secularism, immigration and Islam. Un der the pretext that it violates France’s sacred principle of “laicité,” a specific interpreta tion of secularism that guides French society, many law makers, even those affiliated with the centrist party, have fervently supported strict reg ulations on veiling. These in clude banning the headscarf in public schools and prohib iting citizens working in the public sector from wearing it. In February 2022, the French senate voted 160-143 in fa vor of banning the wearing of the hijab: “an ostentatious religious symbol” in sports competitions. How do these regulations fit into the larger context of French politics?

The prevalent argument is that the hijab is an “ostenta tious” religious symbol and, hence, incompatible with “laicité.” Many hijabis have countered this assertion by pointing out that the hijab is a religious obligation and a commitment to modesty as

opposed to being an inherent symbol of faith. As such, the rhetoric in support of restrict ing the hijab in favor of laïcité minimizes its significance for hijabi women and is some times used to emphasize the “otherness” of France’s Mus lim population.

France, like many Western countries, has undoubtedly struggled with its increasing diversity in the post-colonial context, especially with re cent migratory waves from predominantly Muslim coun tries. Since hijabi women are easily identifiable as Muslim, they have been subject to the most scrutiny and discrimina tion. When asked how wear ing the hijab changed peo ple’s perceptions about her in France, an anonymous Men ton first-year answered that “people’s perceptions defi nitely changed towards me as I started wearing the hijab because I was no longer seen as (who I am), but as ‘the hija bi girl.’ I particularly noticed (this) when people confused me for another hijabi girl or when the first interaction I had with a stranger would be regarding my hijab.”

Another angle from which to examine this issue is a more subtle extension of the “civi lizing mission” justification in which the hijab is consid ered a symbol of patriarchal oppression and incompatible with modern society. This may also be interpreted as an argument that encourages Muslim women to abandon a potentially important element of their identity in order to be accepted into French society. The fundamental problem with this “savior complex” narrative is that it assumes that all women are forced or

even conditioned into wear ing the hijab and not wearing it out of their own free will. While this unfortunately, can be the case in many Muslim communities, it cannot be generalized. Moreover, in stead of empowering women, banning the headscarf could inhibit many Muslim women from integrating productively into society since many civic and educational doors would be slammed shut for them.

The hijab: An individual ex perience

Ultimately, politicizing the hijab reduces women’s bodies to social matters; it risks rid ding them of their bodily au tonomy, as observed in both extremes of hijab regulations. Every Muslim woman expe riences the hijab differently, and while it is normal and even vital to discuss the mo tivations behind wearing the hijab, employing it as a po litical tool to control women, garner votes or advance a po litical agenda constricts not only Muslim women but also distorts the deeply personal nature of this religious prac tice.

Brazil Election: What Does Lula’s

Comeback Mean for Brazil and the World?

By Catarina Vita, Staff Writer

From conversations in Brazilian bars to presidential debates that seem more informal than the latter, different opinions about the country’s political past, present and future have recently surfaced. When Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, announced his candidacy for president at the beginning of 2020, strong emotions ranging from extreme concern to joy competed in Brazil’s socio-political arena. In 2018 Lula was imprisoned for his involvement in the

served as Brazil’s president for the last four years. The political stage was, thus, set for a direct tussle between the two adversaries and a possible end to the conservative-leftist national divide.

Context

high-profile Operation Lava Jato corruption and money laundering scan dal. Still, she was released a year later when his arrest was ruled unconstitution al. In March 2020, Lula formally announced his presidential candidacy to the press. His opponent, Jair Bolsonaro, whose con servative populist ideals and anti-Lulism comprise his main characteristics,

The Partido dos Tra balhadores (PT), the political party that Lula rep resents, ruled Brazil for years. Lula and Dilma Rousseff, his successor, were among the rulers with the highest approval rates in the country’s history. By spearheading the bolsa fa milia welfare program, monetary aid for families in need and af firmative ac tion to boost the mobility of margin alized ethnic groups, the PT systematically tackles Brazil’s social inequalities. . Nonetheless, allegations of money laundering and corruption quickly destabi lized the party, culminating in Rousseff’s impeachment and Lula’s imprisonment.

Jair Bolsonaro emerged in the public eye after be ing one of the firmest ad

vocates for Dilma’s im peachment. His proposals included neoliberal eco nomic practices, such as privatization, which has encouraged lucrative prac tices such as the deforestation of the Amazon Rain forest. He had also shown himself an enemy of Brazilian public universities, cutting funds for these in stitutions throughout his mandate. A vocal defend er of Brazil’s 1964-1985 military dic tatorship, he also endeav ored to loos en gun laws. Amid wide spread out rage against PT’s embroilment in Lava Jato, Bolsonaro easily as cended to presidency in 2018. His victory for the middle to upper-class of Brazil, where “anti-PTism” dominated, spelled the end of corruption and the start of strong leadership. Con sidering the flow of events from 2018 to the present, this was not the outcome of Bolsonaro’s mandate.

From the start of his time in office, Bolsonaro fasttracked deforestation processes in the Amazon Rainforest and neglected

African religious persecu tion. He diverted attention from the latter by stoking anger about “Christophobia,” the supposed discrim ination against Brazil’s Christian community. The COVID-19 pandemic then emerged, and Bolsonaro, denying vaccine proposals and appointing four differ ent Ministers of Health in a year, drove Brazil into a downward spiral of unrest.

In the nation’s Northern region, the excessive burn ing of the Amazon Rainfor est prompted a saturation of patients with respirato ry problems in public hos pitals. In Amapá, there was a general blackout and lack of respirators for COV ID-19 patients.

The Elections

Since Brazil welcomes more than two political candidates, politicians from various parties had campaigns and participat ed in the presidential de

“In 2018 Lula was imprisoned for his involvement in the high- profile Operation Lava Jato corruption and money laundering scandal.”

“From the start of his time in office, Bolsonaro fast- tracked processesdeforestation in the Amazon Rainforest and neglected African persecution.religious “

bate. On Oct. 2, Brazilians cast their ballots for pres idential candidates and re gional representatives. Be sides Lula and Bolsonaro, the most-voted candidate was Simone Tebet, who won over 4.16% of the pub lic. Since no candidate had over 50% of the votes, the next president was deter mined in a runoff election held on Oct. 30.

During this 28-day inter val, both candidates raced for the Brazilian majority. This period only weakened the Bolsonarist campaign. Carla Zambelli, a politician and ally of Bolsonaro, drew a gun in public; open carry has been illegal in Brazil since 2005. Roberto Jefferson, another prom inent supporter of Bol sonaro, was imprisoned

and attacked the police with fire weapons, causing many police officers to vote against Bolsonaro.

Despite Lula carrying the majority in both shifts and clinching the presidency, regional representation in Brazil virtually belongs to rightist and conserv ative-leading members. More than half of Parlia ment subscribes to the ideologically inconsist ent centrão; congressmen championing the centerright regularly make alli ances with far-right politi cians.

The Future: What does it mean for the world?

Generally, the internation al community received the election outcome positive

ly, and it was lauded as a victory for environmental preservation and religious and ethnic tolerance.

Nonetheless, with Bolson aro’s continued presence in the political realm, Lula will face obstacles. The for

insinuations of a possible coup, the world must re main alert. Furthermore, the inconsistency between Lula’s proposals and Par liamentary political per suasions

slow the process of passing Lula-fa vorable laws. Although Lula’s victo ry is a great step towards Brazilian sta bility and democracy, it is unfortunately not the only determinant.

mer president has previ ously asserted his belief in the illegitimacy of Brazil’s electoral process. Joining this with his overall ap preciation of the military dictatorship in Brazil

and

“Generally, theinternational community received the election outcome positively, and it was lauded as a victory for preservationenvironmental and religious and ethnic tolerance.”

may

The two front-runners in Brazil's presidential elections in the final days of campaigning.

Left: President Jair Bolsonaro. Right: Former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva; NPR

No, Mr. Borell, This Is Not the Image We Want the EU to Project!

By Pau Carbonell, Guest Writer for EUROSOC

Things are not going well for the European Union High Foreign Affairs Rep resentative Josep Borrell. After delivering one of the worst diplomatic speech es of recent years, Borrell remained stoic amid the flurry of criticism that has fallen upon him in the European Parliament.

On Oct. 13, Borell made Eurocentric and inauspi cious statements during his inauguration of the new European Diplomat ic Academy in Brussels. His opening speech was supposed to encourage

European diplomats to act with humility and respect towards global denizens. Instead, he communicated the opposite message: “Europe is a garden… Most of the rest of the world is

a jungle, and the jungle could invade the garden… Keep the garden, be good gardeners. But your duty will not be to take care of

the garden itself but [of] the jungle outside… they will not protect the garden by building walls. A nice small garden surrounded by high walls in order to prevent the jungle from coming in is not going to be a solu tion. Because the jungle has a strong growth ca pacity, and the wall will never be high enough in or der to protect the garden.”

Even as Borell was deliv ering his speech tinged with racist and imperialist overtones, people in the

audience felt uncomfort able, realizing how such a metaphor would damage European diplomacy.

The fact is that his remarks mirror the age-old distinction between European “civilization” and the “bar baric” lands beyond.

Since the 19th and 20th centuries, the garden anal ogy has been used by writ ers like John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville to justify global European colonization and temper resistance to expansionist sentiment. The danger of Borell’s speech lies in the reappearance of neo-colo nial rhetoric in a century wherein Europe’s foreign policy is officially commit ted to aiding postcolonial economies and institu tions.

The implications of this speech are not and should not be diminished in the scope of their importance. In the modern world, people and nations are constantly listening and Borell’s words have been heard worldwide. Apart from harsh criticisms of the speech spouted by politicians, journalists and columnists globally, Borell has alienated European allies and strengthened its enemies.

The United Arab Emirates summoned the inter

“The implications of this speech are not and should not be diminished in the scope of their importance.”

for the European Union High Foreign Affairs Representative Josep Borrell;

im head of the European Union mission in the coun try, Emil Paulsen, to dis cuss the “racist” inaugura tion and Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov said that “the gar den Borell talks about was built by plundering the jungle of the rest of the world during the colonial regime.”

A piece in The New York Times has best sum marized the gravity of the situation. Matina Stevis-Gridneff report ed that Josep Borrell’s comments opened co lonial wounds at a time when the European Union was working on ameliorating its legacy internationally. But this new scandal should not surprise those knowl edgeable about Europe an affairs — Borrell, who has served in his role since December 2019, has been involved in nu merous diplomatic scan dals during his tenure. Yet, this was a new low. With an ever-expanding divergence between the Central European and Eastern European mem ber states, tense glob al multipolar outlooks and, in particular, Rus sia’s Ukrainian invasion, European policy cannot afford this type of dis course. Borell’s paternal istic smugness, vainness, conceit and supremacism will hinder Europe from reinforcing old alliances or forging new ones.

In her work “The European Union, Foreign Policy in a Changing World,” Lon don School of Economics

professor Karen E. Smith asserts that the European Union should pursue three foreign policy objectives if it wants to remain a global superpower. Firstly it must encourage regional coop eration and integration. Secondly, it should pro mote human rights. Third ly, the union ought to bol

Niccolò Machiavelli’s quote, “politics have no relation to morals,” does not seem to resonate with 21st-century European foreign policy — at least not nominally. Europe can only operate so long as it remains legitimate in the eyes of the governed. The notions of cooperation, in

only the type of discourse that Europe has been fe verishly trying to avoid since the advent of unipo larity in the post-Cold War era, but because it was the face of European Foreign Policy, who said it.

This blunder is representa tive of two situations that could be surfacing in the department of European Foreign Affairs. On the one hand, one could hypothetically consider this statement as merely the personal opinion of Josep Borrell. On the other hand, one could interpret it as a damning glimpse into the ideological core of Euro pean foreign policy. I hope that reality is closer to the former of the two explana tions.

Borell’s garden allego ry adds to a lengthening laundry list of statements showcasing the unmod ern outlooks of European foreign policy movers and shakers. It is indicative of the growing feeling of won der and uncertainty as to how Europe plans to face the increasing challeng es of modernity in a time where once again, war, vi olence and division are on the rise.

ster democracy and good governance.

According to Smith, these factors are important since they all legitimize the Eu ropean Union’s instru ments to leverage in future international economic, diplomatic or military re lations.

tegration, democracy, good governance and human rights included in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty demon strate how union leaders have embraced the issues that its citizens seem to find important. That is pre cisely why Borell’s speech is surprising — it is not

Menton au Maroc: Sciences Pistes Spend Fall Break With the BDE

By Peyton Dashiell, Staff Writer

After a long journey in volving a late-night bus to Milan, three-a.m. airplane floor naps and a red-eye flight across the Mediter ranean, 55 Sciences Pistes (and three Chilean tourists who were also part of our tour group) emerged from Marrakesh Menara Airport on Monday morning exhausted but eager for the adventure ahead. Orga nized by none other than our Bureau Des Élèves President, 2A Samy Ben nouna, the Sciences Piste fall break trip to Morocco was a highly anticipated interlude to the semester.

After hours of airport cha os — customs, currency exchange and the quest to collect the Bureau Des

Étudiants speaker from baggage claim unscathed, we departed the airport for a serene morning at the Jardin Majorelle. We were met with a botanical labyrinth — an endless maze of intricately tiled paths, alleys of flowers and cerulean Art Deco Buildings enclosed by cacti. While we witnessed cats, turtles and fish, some credible Sciences Piste sources also sparked rumors of a rare Moroccan panda lurking in the shadows.

Following an afternoon of touring the medina, we began to explore the souq and main square of Mar rakesh, Jemaa el-Fna, on our own. There we faced an overwhelming collection of

vendors and entertainers, including snake charmers and well-dressed monkeys on leashes. When Bennouna promised the group a fancy restaurant experience, none of us knew what to anticipate. Yet, the experience at Chez Ali surpassed all of our wildest dreams. After a dinner of soup, cous cous and tagine, we were met with a production ri valing any parade, movie or dance ensemble seen before. Featuring camels, horse racing, horseback acrobatics, sheep and belly dancing, the spectacle end ed with a flaming, build ing-sized “maa salama” sign bidding us farewell as we returned to our ri ads. Our desert escapade

began the following morn ing. Fueled by a tradition al Moroccan breakfast, we escaped the urban sprawl of Marrakesh on a bus ride through the winding hills of the Dades Gorges. Af ter several stops at scenic

viewpoints overlooking valleys, we reached anoth er riad in the evening — a collection of hotel rooms overlooking a tiled indoor garden. After dinner, the first international Bureau Des Étudiants party began, proving that the transcon tinental journey of the bu reau’s speaker was for a good cause after all.

The following day, we con tinued through the desert to Merzouga, stopping at a shop for souvenirs and “djellabas” — brightly colored dresses with embroi dered designs typically worn on special occasions. With varying levels of co ercion and enthusiasm, every Sciences Piste even tually donned a djellaba and matching scarf for one of the many group pho tos captured on the trip. Afterward, the souvenir shopping began in ear nest, and many people ex perienced their first foray into bargaining — heated exchanges ensued as stu dents battled for the best scarf prices.

Our bus ride continued through the afternoon, with most of the bunch dozing off after the hectic two days of travel. Howev er, several enthusiastic Sci ences Pistes made an effort to rouse their bus-mates with music and chants. Second-year student Lisé Thorsen harnessed her creativity to create a new Menton chant, which she zealously taught to all of her sleepy travel compan ions:

Menton in the flesh Shisha sesh in Marrakesh Wesh wesh You’re so fresh Mesh mesh Comme une pêche

On Wednesday afternoon, we reached the Sahara desert frontier, close to Algeria’s border. The trek through the sand dunes to our campsite began on ATVs and concluded with camel rides.

for the long-awaited desert party featuring music by DJ Spencer. After the late night, a motivated group arose from bed at 7 a.m. to watch the sunrise from the dunes. Although the wait was frigid, the dawn’s

We reached the Hassan II Mosque, which over looks the Atlantic Ocean and boasts a laser point ed towards Mecca atop its minaret. We hastened to stretch our legs, snap some pictures and take in the miles of marble floor in front of us before return ing to Casablanca to catch our flight back home. We hurriedly used up the last of our dirhams in Morocco’s final hour, shuffled our bags to the airplane’s weight limit, and began to reflect on the trip as we set tled into our seats.

More than just a fall break trip, our five days in Mo rocco solidified the spirit of the Menton Ummah.

After multiple mishaps on the ATV — our vehicles quickly became engulfed in the steep dunes — I can say that the camel portion of our journey may have been the more suitable leg for our group of large ly-licenseless-Europeans. Balancing on the backs of camels (technically drome daries) with the desert sun set flooding the horizon, we arrived at our camp as the sky blended into purple.

The dinner menu, a famil iar and comforting selec tion of salad, tagine and pasta with an unexpected platter of eggplant par mesan, elicited shrieks of surprise and joy from the vegetarian table. We gathered in the dunes till the wee hours of the morning

light was well worth the early alarms. The morning excursion proved to be a refreshing wake-up for the day that awaited us. After nearly nine hours on buses, we reached Marrakesh late in the evening, splitting up to em bark on our own adventures across the city for our last night in Morocco.

Our final day start ed with a drive to Casablanca, Mo rocco’s economic capital and largest city. After the Casa blanca pitstop, we embarked on a bus ride along the sea side.

“Menton in the flesh Shisha sesh in Marrakesh Wesh wesh You’re so fresh Mesh mesh Comme une pêche”

Is Egypt a Model for Green Development?

By Katie-Anne Harris, Guest Writer for Envi ronnementon

Egypt’s national objec tives for 2030, known as Vision 2030, have been implemented to meet the United Nation’s Sustain able Development Goals. One of this strategy’s major aims is to ensure that 15% of government in vestment goes into green development projects, and this figure is set to in crease to 50% by 2025. This is not the first time Egypt has made its aspira tion to be the voice of Afri ca clear. The country just hosted the United Nations Climate Change Confer ence — popularly referred to as COP27.

In September, Egypt or ganized the meeting of Af rican ministers of finance, economy, development and environment to for mulate a unified vision for funding a transition to a greener economy. Amid Egypt’s recent moves to as sert itself as an eco-friend ly regional power, it seems fitting to eplore key exam ples of green development inititives spearheaded by the country in the last years.

Renewable Energy in Egypt

Egypt has invested in a multitude of renewable energy sources. The Inter national Trade Adminis tration reported that the

government’s strategy is to make renewable ener gy generate 42% of energy by 2035, with wind energy making up 14%, hydroelec tricity accounting for 2% and solar energy account ing for 25% of electricity generated by renewable resources. An example of a develop ment project putting Egypt on track to meet these goals is the Benban Solar Park, which was completed in 2019. It has 32 solar plants with four substations, holding up to 1.65-giga watt capacity, making the Benban plant one of the largest solar power sites in the world. This development project illustrates the Egyptian government’s ca pability and commitment

to meet its sustainable de velopment goals.

Another example of suc cessful green energy proj ects in Egypt is its biogas units which convert waste into electricity. Through this Fayoum-based proj ect, biogas is obtained from the fermentation of organic waste. These units will provide a renewable energy source for household cooking and will also be used to produce organ ic fertilizer to improve soil properties in the region.

Egypt is experiencing a rapid rate of urbanization, thus, augmenting the im portance of transportation. To help prevent congestion

Cairo’s Monorail

The entrance of the Sharm El Sheikh International Convention Centre during the COP27 climate summit in Egypt's Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt

and alleviate pollution, Egypt’s National Authority for Tunnels awarded a 4.5 billion dollar contract to UK Export Finance to build, operate, and main tain a monorail system for 30 years.

It is set to become the world’s longest monorail while producing zero emis sions and almost no noise. This project helps reduce emissions, lessen sound pollution and provide im portant public infrastruc ture for the population of Cairo.

Green Cities

Kharga has been declared the first green city in Egypt. There is no industrial pol lution in the city due to the absence of industrial factories. Moreover, the city depends on renewable energy sources to gener ate government agencies, streetlights and places of worship and to extract wa ter from irrigation wells

and homes. There are monitoring stations for air quality, water quality, and noise pollution to ensure the city complies with en vironmental laws and leg

looking at the successful green transformation of Kharga.

Green Bonds

Egypt is the first country in the Middle East and North Africa region to issue green bonds.

Takeaways

islation.

Finally, the city holds many bike lanes to encour age zero-emission trans portation.

There has been a plan to build 45 new cities in Egypt to accommodate its growing population. These cities will be developed in line with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s Green Cities Program. There is no doubt that Egypt can build new green cities when

Green bonds are financial instruments that are used to fund new environmen tal projects while returning fixed income to investors. These bonds offer investors the opportunity to mitigate the climate emergency while receiving returns like those expected from tradi tional investments.

A report by Crédit Agri cole claims that there is 1.9 billion dollars in green bonds that can be used to fund green projects. 16% of these bonds are for renew able energy projects, 19% for clean transportation, 26% for water and waste water management and 39% for pollution prevention and control.

These examples of green development projects indi cate that Egypt is on track to reach its sustainable development goals in line with the goals set out by the United Nations. These projects not only contribute to ensuring en vironmental integrity but also help meet goals to improve the quality of life of Egyptian citizens. The economic and sustainable benefits of these develop ment projects generate jobs, improve public infra structure and help combat pollution, all of which con tribute to the well-being of Egyptian citizens.

It is essential to look back on successful development projects in Egypt to understand why the country is eligible to be the voice for other African nations during COP27.

“Egypt is the first country in the Middle East and North Africa region to issue green bonds.”

Whipping Up Lebanese Dishes Has Never Been Easier

By Angela Saab Saade, Staff Writer

Welcome back, fellow eaters! Last month, I prom ised you exciting tradition al recipes that are quick, easy to make and deli cious. Today, I shall fulfill my pledge. Let us celebrate Lebanese independence, acquired on Nov. 22, 1943, with two meals prepared straight from my grand ma’s kitchen, who, like her fellow Arab grandmothers, does not joke when it comes to food “Mdardara”

Essential kitchen appliances:

• One medium or large pot

• Strainer Knife

• Wooden spoon

• Cup (for measuring purposes)

• Ladle (for serving purposes)

Also known as mujaddara in other colloquial Arabic dialects, such as Syrian Ar abic, “mdardara” has been one of my favorite meals, especially after transfer ring to a more vegetarian diet. “Mdardara” is a pro tein-dense plant-based meal that is convenient to prepare, and it involves lots of lentils, one of my fa vorite ingredients to cook with (after corn, clearly).

Recipe:

Ingredients:

• One cup of lentils

• Half a cup of rice

• Two cups of water

• One big (or two me dium-sized) yellow onion

• Two tablespoons of olive oil

• Salt

• Pepper and curcuma (optional)

1. Soak the rice and len tils together in water for 10-20 minutes.

2. Meanwhile, chop your onion into cubes.

3. Add a tablespoon of olive oil in the pot and place it on the stove over low-medium heat.

4. Add the chopped onion cubes and occasionally stir for five to ten min utes. The goal is for the low heat to facilitate an onion-sweating pro cess which should ren der them slightly trans lucent.

5. Once your onion is ready, strain the rice and lentils and add them to the pot.

6. Put another tablespoon of olive oil in the pot with the onion, rice and lentils and sprinkle some salt, pepper and cumin to taste.

7. Stir all ingredients to gether, add two cups of water and bring to a boil.

8. Once the water reaches boiling point, reduce the heat to low, and al low everything to cook slowly. Do not cover the pot or stir the in gredients! Check up on your “mdardara” every few minutes.

9. Once the water is absorbed, give it a taste test and either add some water if the len tils and rice are not fully cooked or turn the heat off.

“Mdardara” may be con sumed on its own — cold or warm, and it may also be served with your choice of salad or “laban,” a fer mented dairy product that I am obsessed with. Sad ly, it is unavailable in the stores of Menton. For a “laban” alternative, you can use plain kefir or greek yogurt with a dash of olive oil and salt.

“

Rishta”

Aside from meaning mar riage proposals in Urdu and Hindi, “rishta” also refers to my grandma’s favorite childhood meal, which makes it very dear to my heart. I only learned about it recently over the autumn break, which was the perfect timing for me to be able to share it with you! Is that not truly heart warming? I can certainly feel our beautiful friend ship blossoming with ev ery passing Menton Times Issue.

Ingredients:

• One cup of lentils

• One-two cups of spa ghetti (I use tagli atelle, but any kind of pasta works)

• Six cups of water

• One large (or two me dium-sized) yellow onion

• One large (or two medium-sized) red onion

• Two cloves of gar lic (or more or less, based on preference)

• Half a lemon or two to three tablespoons of lemon juice

• Olive oil

• Salt

• Pepper and cumin (optional)

• One bunch of cilantro leaves (optional)

• Vegetable broth (optional)

Recipe:

1. Soak the lentils in water for 10-20 minutes

2. Meanwhile, chop your onions into slices and press two cloves of gar lic.

3. Add a tablespoon of olive oil to the pot and place it on the stove over low-medium heat.

4. Add the chopped onion cubes and occasion ally stir for five to 10 minutes. Allow them to sweat and transform into slices of translu cent joy.

5. Once your onion cubes are ready, strain the lentils and add them to the pot.

6. Add another tablespoon of olive oil, and sprin kle some salt, pepper a cumin to taste.

7. Stir all ingredients to gether, add six cups of water, and keep the temperature high.

A fellow Sciences Piste brought to my attention that “rishta” is similar to

a traditional Italian dish — Pasta e lenticchie. Like its antecedent, “rishta” in cludes a healthy dose of lentils.

Depending on personal preference and the desired lentil-pasta ratio, more or less spaghetti may be add ed. You might also have to add more water to cook the pasta if the lentils have al ready absorbed too much of it.

1. Once the pasta is cooked, turn the heat off.

Estimated Price Calcu lations:

Aldi sells five hundred grams of raw lentils for under one and a half eu ros. This means that a cup of lentils, equivalent to roughly two hundred and fifty grams, costs be tween half and two-thirds of a euro. Slightly cheaper calculations apply to rice purchased from any of the three big stores, making our rice costs equivalent to about a quarter to half a euro.

As for the pasta, the rel ative quantity used pric es under half a euro. The onion(s), olive oil and

salt should not amount to more than one and a half to two euros, making each of the aforementioned meals cost under three euros for quantities yielding two to three servings!

Fellow eaters, whether my favorite meal or my grand ma’s seems more tasteful to you, I hope you give at least one of them a try. It is not common to find traditional Lebanese recipes that do not require long hours of preparation, so I encourage you to seize the opportunity. If any ques tions or comments should arise in your Lebanese cooking journeys, do not hesitate to contact me or the Google search engine, preferably). Next month, we shall draw inspiration from holiday joy and pre pare sweet treats adequate for our seasonal celebra tions. Until then, eat up and sahtein!

You may add less water, depending on the end-re sult texture you want. The less water, the less souplike the “rishta” will be. You may also add vegetable broth and cilantro leaves for additional flavor.

1. Once the water begins to boil, bring the heat to a low so that every thing slowly cooks.

2. Once the lentils are fairly cooked, in about ten-fifteen minutes, break up about a cup or two of spaghetti and put them into the pot.

“Is that not truly heartwarming?”

To All the Disillusioned Autumn

Lovers, You are Not Alone

By Colin Lim, Staff Writ er

The weather has always been a classic non-controversial conversation starter. References to the weather being the subject of unimaginative, banal small talk span from The American Claimant by Mark Twain to Taylor Swift’s sappy, poetic bal lad “Back to December.”

As the Northern Hemi sphere transitions from summer to winter, there is an interstitial period that most of the global population has the joy of experiencing — autumn.

Growing up in northern California, transplants from other parts of the country and the world would inform me that our state was a barren desert with no seasons. This was a bizarre claim to make in the home land of the coast red wood, with its temperate Mediterranean climate and its drought-resistant yet evergreen native veg etation that graces the hills John Steinbeck de scribed as “a brown which was not brown but a gold and saffron and red—an indescribable color” in his chef-d’œuvre, “East of Eden.” The leaves of the non-native maples, oaks, elms, ginkgos and magno lias would turn an equally, if not more, impressive

“gold and saffron and red” and fill the air with an overwhelming sense of co ziness and joy.

Upon arrival in Menton, I enjoyed the scorchingly hot summer weather and the sunshine that the Côte

welcoming, joyful foli age-covered streetscapes; winter reminds her of play ing with her dogs in the crisp snow and going on brisk walks with friends. These recollections con trast Menton’s lack of a true autumn and winter,

Menton and the “gloomy, depressing rainy winter season.” Afifi states that her emotions are closely tied to the weather, and although she now is accli mating to the seasonal pat terns of Menton, not being able to enjoy the beach for several months of the year and hav ing classes before sunrise and after sunset are aspects of the town that she finds less than ideal.

d’Azur is renowned for. As the seasons changed, though, I found myself dis appointed by the lack of “gold and saffron and red” leaves, pumpkins and the other autumnal accouter ments that I became accus tomed to back home.

Like me, Menton sec ond-year Sara Kovacheva has a certain tenderness for turning seasons. Her Bulgarian hometown’s autumn memories are of

which makes Kovacheva sad.

Now in her last year in Menton, she has come to appreciate the Mentonese version of autumn.

Similarly, second-year Yasmine Afifi affectionate ly recalls the four palpable seasons of her native Casa blanca, Morocco. She does not enjoy the fact that there is very little transitional period between the “beautiful summer weather” of

Absence does make the heart grow fonder for many students at Sciences Po Men ton, but fellow au tumn lovers need not wander too far to experience fall foliage. The trees in Square Victoria and the plaza abutting the parking lot behind the Marché des Halles are presently shed ding their leaves, albeit rather unimpressively. The Roya Valley, nestled in the foothills of the Alps, also offers some colorful trees for those willing to make the trek.

We should be grateful, at least, that we do not have to trudge through feet of snow to get to class.

Cloudy day in Menton; Jilly Bennett photography

Arab Intellectals That Every Sciences

Piste Should Know: Michel Aflaq

By Emilia Kohlmeyer, Staff Writer

Michel Alflaq’s Baathism is difficult to recognize in con temporary Baathist ideolo gy that still occupies Syrian and Iraqi thought. However, neo-Baathism finds its roots in the ideas of the Syrian in tellectual Michel Aflaq, who inspired generations of an ti-imperialist revolutionaries and radicals.

Michel Aflaq was born to a middle-class Greek-Ortho dox family in Damascus. He received western education during his childhood under the French Mandate and lat er studied on a scholarship at the Sorbonne. His politics were strongly influenced by the instability Syria experi enced during the Great Syr ian Revolt of 1925 and postWWII Europe, which brought uncertainty to the Middle East.

During his time in Paris, he first interacted with ideol

ogies such as communism, Marxism, socialism and na tionalism. He formed the Un ion of Arab students, which called for the decolonization of Arab lands. Upon his re turn to Syria, Aflaq and Salah al Din al Bitar, a Sunni Mus lim, co-founded the Baath “renaissance” party, which would extend to many other Arab countries, most notably Iraq.

Michel Aflaq’s principles are embodied in the Baathist slogan, “unity, freedom and socialism.” Aflaq’s quest for unity stems from his concep tion of the Arab nation. The essence of the Arab nation unveils itself through an eter nal Arab revelation, which experienced its last rise when Islam unified the Arab world. The Arab nation is primarily bounded by its common lan guage, which Aflaq regards as its primary source of social norms and perception.

Restoring the glory of the Arab world, in his view, was only possible by a complete structural transforma tion achieved only through a revolution, “inqilab,” on the foundation of nationalism and socialism.

Nationalism, as an ideolo gy, was to be the key vehi cle in unify ing the lower classes against the political elites. Aflaq, a Greek Or

thodox Christian, pursued a secular pan-Arab nationalist vision, which regarded re ligion as a force of division within the Arab nation. How ever, he regarded Islam by its “intense moral” nature to have inspired Arabs to “break through their entrenched reality,” as he outlined in a lecture in 1943. According to him, Islam represents an innate part of Arab culture, and he asserted that “Islam was an Arab movement. Its meaning was Arab renewal and its perfection. So the lan guage that Islam descended with was Arabic. Its outlook and understanding were of an Arab mind. The qualities it encouraged were apparent or hidden Arab values, and the faults it addressed were faults the Arabs were to vanquish.” Furthermore, his writings were known to contain nu merous Quranic references.

The second pillar of his strat egy of transforming the Arab world was socialism. Dur ing his studies in France, he was particularly exposed to Marxist thought, although he later declared communism to be “Western and alien to everything Arab.” Instead of relying solely on pure ideol ogy, Aflaq drew on certain Marxist tenets, such as dia lectical materialism. Howev er, he translated the struggle of the working classes into the united Arab struggle against Western capitalists. While supporting inheritance rights and private ownership, Aflaq advocated for wealth redistribution, greater public ownership of key industries, and workers’ participation in profit-sharing and manageri

al matters. His socialist vision envisaged economic justice as forming the foundation of the new Arab nation-state, which should be democratic and a defender of fundamen tal rights such as free speech. However, despite supporting these values, he considered it necessary for the Baath party to claim the required author ity to create the conditions where individual ideas could flourish after decades of im perialism and elitist ideology. Only then would the people be capable of forming their demands.

His politics have been de scribed as many things, from radically leftist to fascist, al though in practice, they were rather vague and formulated to appeal to the masses.

After the split of the United Arab Republic, a union be tween Syria and Egypt un der Nasser that Aflaq had cautiously advocated for, the influence of the original Ba athist generation began to decline. Successive military coups during the 1960s and a humbling defeat against Is rael in 1967 culminated in a neo-Baathist coup instigated by Hafez al-Assad, whose son remains president today.

Aflaq fled Assad’s Syria to Iraq under the protection of his follower Saddam Hus sein and his Iraqi branch of the Baath party. Michel Aflaq died in Paris in 1986 and was buried in a mausoleum in Iraq, which, upon the Ameri can invasion, was repurposed as a gym for US soldiers and is now a shopping mall.

As Netanyahu Regains Power, the FarRight Flourishes

By Peyton Dashiell, Staff Writer

With nearly all votes counted from the Nov. 1, 2022, Israeli election, former Prime Min ister Benjamin Netanyahu is poised to return to the role, continuing his reign as the longest-serving prime min ister in Israeli history. As his Likud party and several rightwing coalition partners ob tained a stable parliamentary majority, there may be an end in sight for Israel’s protract ed political crisis, which has sparked five snap elections since 2019.

Netanyahu, who former ly served as Prime Minister from 1996 to 1999 and 2009 to 2021, leads the center-right Likud party. His decades-long political career has overseen the Oslo Accords, both Inti fadas, disengagement from Gaza and the Abraham Ac cords. Netanyahu’s position on Palestinian statehood has shifted many times. Af ter opposing a Palestinian state early in his career, he reversed course in his 2009 Bar Ilan speech, supporting a two-state solution as long as the Palestinian govern ment agreed to demilitarize. However, he condemned a two-state solution ahead of the 2015 Israeli elections, and many of his coalition partners support full Israeli annexa tion of the West Bank.

Within Israel, Netanyahu ad vocates for free-market prin ciples — he has eased Israeli foreign exchange controls, reduced the size of the public

sector and passed anti-mo nopoly and anti-cartel laws to increase economic com petition. Regionally, he has attempted to maintain a del icate power balance with Iran and Saudi Arabia, strongly condemning any Western nuclear deal with Iran as a threat to Israel’s security. And despite his alignment with religiously conservative parties, Netanyahu himself comes from a secular back ground and supports some progressive social issues like same-sex marriage.

In 2019, Netanyahu was in dicted on charges of bribery, fraud and breach of trust, all of which he denies. The inves tigation into these charges is ongoing; a loophole in Israe li law requires officials under investigation for corruption to resign from all government offices except that of prime minister, allowing Netanyahu to take office despite his legal battles. His trial resumed on November 7 — the Jerusalem District Court will hear testi mony regarding the Gifts Af fairs, in which Netanyahu and his wife are accused of accept ing $200,000 in gifts from billionaire Arnon Milchan in exchange for helping him ob tain a U.S. visa and securing tax exemptions.

Israel is a parliamentary de mocracy — the Israeli Pres ident, whose power is most ly ceremonial, nominates a member of the parliament (Knesset) to become Prime Minister, typically the lead er of the largest party. The nominee is then tasked with

creating a multi-party coali tion with at least 61 out of 120 Knesset seats to retain power. This election was the fifth in four years due to a parliamen tary crisis over Netanyahu’s leadership — the liberal wing of the Knesset has refused to create a coalition with Netan yahu, while Likud has insist ed on keeping Netanyahu as party leader, resulting in an unstable coalition majority.

In this election, Likud secured 32 Knesset seats, the largest share of any party. The Yesh Atid coalition, led by outgo ing Prime Minister Yair Lap id, earned the second-largest share with 24 seats. Netanya hu has begun coalition talks

Arabs and labeled as terrorist organizations by the United States, the European Union and Japan. Ben Gvir, who was disqualified from service in the Israeli Defense Forces due to his radical views, has faced dozens of hate speech charges and called for the ex pulsion of Palestinian citizens of Israel viewed as disloyal to the Israeli government.

with the Religious Zionism, Shas and United Torah Juda ism parties, which won 14, 11 and seven seats, respective ly. Overall, the coalition will hold 64 seats, safeguarding it against the fragility of past coalitions with smaller ma jorities.

The far-right Religious Zion ist party, led by Bezalel Smo trich, merged with Itamar Ben Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) party to gain 14 Knesset seats and join Ne tanyahu’s coalition. Ben Gvir is associated with the Kaha nist movement and Kach par ty — both banned by Israel in 1994 due to incitement of terrorism and racism against

The domestic agendas of Re ligious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit espouse religious conservatism — both parties oppose same-sex marriage and call for increased federal funding for religious studies. Additionally, Religious Zi onism has expressed aims to vest the Knesset with the power to over ride the Israeli High Court. Right-wing leaders have heavily criticized the High Court for rulings on settlement construction, detention of African asylum seekers and the ability of Re form and Conservative Jew ish converts to gain Israeli citizenship.

While Netanyahu distanced himself from Ben Gvir on the campaign trail, the lead ers met in coalition talks in Tel Aviv on Nov. 7. Ben Gvir expressed his aim to become public security minister, a role that manages police oversight and training.

The success of Religious Zion ism and Otzma Yehudit came at the expense of the Israeli left. For the first time since its establishment in 1992, left-

“... Netanyahu was indicted on charges of bribery, fraud and breach of trust, all of which he denies.”

wing party Meretz failed to pass the electoral threshold and gain any Knesset rep resentation. Meretz leader Zehava Galon denounced the Religious Zionist party and labeled the election results a “disaster for Meretz, a disas ter for the country, and yes, a disaster for me personally.”

Prime Minister Yair Lapid has garnered blame for block ing coalition efforts between Meretz and Yesh Atid, claim ing that both parties would securely pass the threshold. A fellow Sciences Po Menton student has supported Meretz in the past five elections due to their resistance to West Bank annexation and advo cacy against human rights violations. They reject the narrative that Lapid is solely culpable for left-wing fail ures: “I believe the respective leaders of each party are to be blamed for not being willing to unite their lists as well as providing voters with a solid ideological alternative which is not merely a negation of their opponents.”

Arab parties Ra’am and Ha dash Ta’al increased their seats to five each, while the Balad party failed to cross the electoral threshold. The three parties, along with Mada, previously comprised The Joint List, a coalition of Arab-majority parties that served as the third largest fac tion in the Knesset. However, the coalition dissolved in Sep tember after several members from different parties left due to ideological disputes. Pales tinian citizens of Israel, who make up nearly one-fifth of the Israeli population, have much lower voter turnout rates than Jewish Israelis — only 55 percent cast votes this cycle.

While second-year Sama Nabulsi attributes this low turnout to the Knesset’s disin terest in ameliorating Pales tinian conditions, she doesn’t believe that past anti-Pales tinian legislation or disillu sionment from prior coalition shortcomings should discour age Palestinian citizens from voting: “I think Palestinians with the ability to vote should vote for three main reasons. First, to push the power away from far-right and generally racist parties. Second, if they choose to vote for Arab par ties, to be able to secure some control and representation in the parliament. And third, to be able to build strength in the Palestinian voice for future elections and parlia ments, a higher voter turnout creates an efficient voting bloc that would help constitute what the future government may look like. I don’t know how far a Palestinian voice can go in the makeup of the Israeli parliament today, but I believe that the battle isn’t over yet.”

Reversing trends seen global ly, the rightward shift in this election was primarily driven by young, first-time voters — supporters of right-wing, religious parties specifically skewed young, male and Or thodox. A pre-election survey from the Israel Democracy Institute found that 71 per cent of Israelis under age 24 identify as right-wing, com pared to 47 percent of those 35 and older. Once a politi cal pariah, Itamar Ben Gvir enjoys support from the in coming prime minister, and Religious Zionism is now the third largest party in the Knesset. Regarding overall election consequences, an anonymous second-year said, “there are many concerns that arise from this election, from the incorporation of once extremist and radical views into the Israeli politi cal mainstream to dangers to Israel’s democracy, especially within the judiciary.” They also noted increased division within Israeli politics: “the high number of Orthodox and

Ultra-Orthodox lawmakers and the ever-increasing rift between Israel and Diaspora Jews also offer little reason for hope.”

Despite his cumulative 15 years in office, Netanyahu’s third term is unlikely to bring stagnancy to Israeli politics. Emboldened by his strong coalition majority, Netanya hu can pursue an ambitious agenda — he has highlight ed normalization with Arab countries as a key priority, building upon the 2020 Abra ham Accords he signed with former U.S. President Donald Trump. However, questions remain about the impact of his religious, right-wing coali tion partners — will they sig nificantly shape Israeli secu rity and social issues, or will Netanyahu work to temper their aims and maintain the status quo? After two political comebacks and an ongoing le gal battle, this term presents Netanyahu’s final opportuni ty to alter his legacy.

Is the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Organisation?

By Isabella Hehl Dalla Zuanna, Staff Writer

Where lies the limit between a strong ideological religious group with a history of vio lence and a terrorist organ ization? After how many vi olent attacks do these stop being exceptions and instead a major characteristic of the

to find a universal Islamic system of rule. Embracing political activism, social re sponsibility, charitable works and social support programs, the Brotherhood seeks to serve its main support base of low-income populations. The organization’s current leader in Egypt is Mohamed Badie, who is currently in prison,

group? Can an organization that participated in and led alleged plots, assassinations and government overthrows truly change and become non-violent? These are the questions that outline the struggle of countries today when deciding whether or not the Muslim Brotherhood should be labeled a terrorist organization or a religious and political movement. Considered the oldest political group within the Arab world, the Muslim Brotherhood is rejected by multiple Arab countries who designate it as a terrorist organization, such as Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Sau di Arabia and even non-Arab country Russia. Founded in 1928 in Egypt by an Islamic teacher and scholar, Hassan al-Banna, the Muslim Broth erhood’s original goal was

serving numerous life and death sentences for, among other charges, murder, incite ment of violence, support of Islamist President Mohamed Morsi, vandalism and incite ment to terrorism. Some of the group’s international off shoots are the Islamic Con stitutional Movement in Ku wait, Tunisia’s Ennahda and Hamas in Palestine, some of whose founding members were originally in the Broth erhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood has a complicated political histo ry within Egypt, which was only exacerbated by broth erhood member Mohamed Mohamed Morsi Eissa alAyyat’s, stint as president between 2012 to 2013. Morsi was nominated as a backup candidate but became the of ficial President when Kharait El-Shater was disqualified in

the elections. Through a tem porary constitutional decla ration in November of 2012, Morsi granted himself un limited power, described by some as an “Islamist coup.” Soon, with accusations of re pressing the freedom of press and demonstrations, major protests began in 2012 and ended in June of 2013, when now-President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi removed Morsi from office in a coup-d’état, com monly referred to as the June 30 Revolution. Presently, many of the Brotherhood’s re maining members have been accused by the Egyptian gov ernment of supporting Morsi, a criminal act in the eyes of the Sisi regime. Through a temporary constitutional dec laration in November of 2012, Morsi granted himself un limited power, described by some as an “Islamist coup.” Soon, with accusations of re pressing the freedom of press and demonstrations, major

day. Their resilience poses a risk to Sisi’s legitimacy and the stability of the Egyptian state. Currently, the Egyptian government holds thousands of the group’s members in prison, where they often face abuse, violating internation al prison standards, such as the freedom from torture outlined in the Declaration of Human Rights. Other pre ventative measures against the organization include con fiscating its assets and media censorship. Sisi believes that the ends justify the means — it is worth suppressing a violent terrorist organization that has previously threat ened political leadership for national security. However, the Brotherhood has claimed to reject violence and wishes to participate in mainstream politics. Are governments to believe that they are still a terrorist organization, or should they be treated as any other religious and political

protests began in 2012 and ended in June 2013, when now-President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi removed Morsi from office in a coup-d’état, com monly referred to as the June 30 Revolution.

Since then, the government has labeled the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. Sisi’s administration has im plemented aggressive poli cies which aim to eradicate Brotherhood leadership and isolate it by spreading a nar rative that links it to violent Islamism.

Yet, the Muslim Brotherhood miraculously still prevails to

movement?

The Egyptian government justifies its classification of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization by describing it as a group with “blood on its hands,” due to their connection with Morsi, the multiple terrorist attacks orchestrated by Brotherhood members and because many offshoot organizations of the Brotherhood are jihadists. They claim that the Broth erhood’s attempts to prove it has become a non-violent organization are only a ma nipulative tactic to regain public and media popularity.

“Where lies the limit between a strong ideological religious group with a history of violence and a ter rorist organization?”

Muslim Brotherhood; Foreign Policy

At this point, they will once more resort to violence. Ter rorist attacks led by members of the organization include the bombing of a police bus in Rashid in 2015, wound ing dozens of policemen and killing four, the burning of the Gen eral Court of Fayoum Governate in Fayoum, the setting of fires at the Friends of the Bible Society building in Fayoum, storming police stations in Youssef Al-Siddiq and Tami ya, and the theft of ammuni tions.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s perennial challenge of effec tively mixing religion with politics has historically end ed in violence and strife, as was the case for Egypt in 2012-2013. Gamel Abdel-Ga wad, a political analyst from Al-Ahram, wrote that “Egypt began to stabilize only after Al-Sisi was elected president in May 2014, and even then, the country was still forced to fight the remnants of ter rorist groups and help the state stand on its feet again. Despite its defeat on June 30, 2013, the Brotherhood re sumed its war against the new regime, resorting to terror ism and assassinations and launching a media war.”

Another aspect that would justify categorizing the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization would be that many offshoots of the group are known to be violent and dangerous jihadists, such as “Liwaa al-Thawra,” “Pop ular Resistance,” “Helwan Brigades,” “Ajnad Misr” and “Revolutionary Punishment.” According to the Egyptian government, these offshoots did not only originate from the group but were financed and led by them. However,

Sisi’s claims are disputed by other states and independent journalists. The Tahir Insti tute for Middle East Policy stated that “understanding the Salafist influence is im portant for it highlights how

of the group have openly sup ported the violence against Coptic Christians in Egypt, as well as antisemitic behavior when discussing their views on the Holocaust.

[Ajnad Misr] and similar [groups] that may pop up are not necessarily an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood and its ideological outlook, as the government contends.”

Even though the Muslim Brotherhood’s rightful char acterization may be up for debate, it is indisputable that they have a history of vio lence, starting at their roots. The group’s founder, Hassan al-Banna, once said, “Jihad is an obligation from Allah and every Muslim and can not be ignored nor evaded.”

In his book “The Way of Ji had,” he wrote: “Jihad means the fighting of the unbeliev ers and involves all possible efforts that are necessary to dismantle the power of the enemies of Islam, including beating them, plundering their wealth, destroying their places of worship, and smash

An Egyptian Sciences Piste, who has asked to remain anonymous, described the “atrocious” acts of terror by the Brotherhood: “words cannot describe the hate I have for them, and how they made it more complicated to get into a place of worship. Until today, before entering churches, bags are checked, you go through scanners, and they sometimes even ask for your ID (which indicates your religion).”

ing their idols.” This ideology was followed not only during the Brotherhood’s terrorist attacks but also when they mourned the death of Osama bin Laden. Numerous clerics

Most violent extremist acts and quotes come from the three years following the June 30 Revolution and have not occurred more recently. How ever, the Brotherhood’sHa mas branch still currently participates in suicide bomb ings, kidnappings and rocket attacks with civilian targets, all of which the Brotherhood view as a legitimate response to Israeli occupation. Its other branches, conversely, only very loosely associate themselves with the Broth erhood and arguably cannot concretely be connected. The Egyptian media and govern ment propagate myths about the organization being affili ated with large jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda. While some Brotherhood members quit the group in frustration with the organiza tion’s policy on non-violence and joined groups such as Al Qaeda, the Brotherhood has repeatedly denounced the infamous ji hadist group.

Most experts outside of Egypt have agreed that the organi zation cannot be classified as a terrorist group. Even when the Donald Trump presiden

cy tried to label it as such, the Trump administration could not find enough evidence. David D. Kirkpatrick from the New York Times argued that “the main international advocates for the designa tion are Mr. el-Sisi of Egypt and his authoritarian allies in Saudi Arabia and the Unit ed Arab Emirates. Alarmed that Muslim Brotherhood parties might rise to power through elections, all three governments have cracked down on the Islamists and pressed their allies to do the same. They argue that the Brotherhood’s Islamic ideol ogy makes it a threat to the idea of the nation-state and thus a threat to the region’s stability.” As a result, wheth er or not it is for Sisi’s polit ical gain, if one only looks at the present day, there is not enough proof to label the Muslim Brotherhood as a ter rorist organization. Howev er, it cannot be easy to erase its history of violence. The anonymous Sciences Piste stated, “what makes it more alarming to me is how some of the churches that were bombed were ones my par ents had been to throughout their childhoods, and that’s not anything they can forgive the Muslim Brotherhood for committing. I would not trust a Muslim Brotherhood-based government.”

It is logical why countries might define the Brotherhood differently based on their ge ographical location. Coun tries far from the conflict — unaffected by the group’s historical violence — would understandably be more eas ily ready to believe the Broth erhood has evolved. In con trast, countries with a more personal relationship with the organization who still see the psychological scars caused by the Brotherhood today would be more inclined to stay wary. Overall, the rational labe

“...“blood on its hands,” due to their connection with Morsi, the multiple terrorist attacks orchestrated by Brotherhood members and because many offshoot organizations of the Brotherhood are jihadists.”

“Are governments to be- lieve that they are still a terrorist organization, or should they be treated as any other religious and po- litical movement?”

ling of the group as terrorist or non-terrorist depends on how long one believes a peri od of non-violence must last until the group in question has definitively shifted away from terrorism. Arguably, since it has only been about half a decade in the case of the Brotherhood, it might be premature to claim that they have completely veered away from terrorism.

The Brotherhood being la beled as a terrorist organi zation in Egypt is enforced by Article 7 of the Terrorist Entities Law. Their meetings are banned, all of its activities have been shut down, fund ing is prohibited, all of the group’s assets and its mem bers are frozen, and it cannot access any social media or express itself digitally. As a result, the Muslim Brother hood, which has often wished to become a part of the main stream political conversation, is strictly banned from all public activity.

Even if some can consider these measures as unfair since the Muslim Brotherhood is characterized by most as a non-terrorist organization, it cannot be disputed that the organization stands for extreme and arguably high ly dangerous and intolerant values such as a support for a totalitarian system operating under sharia law and various forms of religious discrimina tion. Today, the Brotherhood attempts to gradually return to the Egyptian street through its “Change Movement of the Muslim Brotherhood,” also called the “Kemalist move ment,” after Muhammad Ka mal, who led major terrorist operations in Egypt in 2014. Whether or not this is a prel ude to violence that could once again destabilize Egyp tian politics remains yet to be seen.

Le mouvement en Iran: Un Phénomène à la Mode Pour la Communauté Internationale

By Amalia Heide, Staff Writer

« Le mouvement tend vers une tendance ». Ce terme, chargé de méfiance, a été employé par Bahar (pseu donyme) pour décrire ses craintes quant à l’avenir du mouvement d’émancipa tion des femmes en Iran.

Cette jeune femme irani enne semble alarmée face à l’idée qu’un mouvement qui la touche de si près puisse tout simplement s’évaporer, comme c’est souvent le cas de la plupart des mouvements à vocation humanitaire qui deviennent viraux à l’échelle internationale sur les réseaux

sociaux. Les utilisateurs pas sent d’une obsession fiévreuse et passionnée pour une cause à l’indifférence et à l’oubli. Et tout cela en un clin d’œil.

La viralisation excessive d’une cause génère donc une saturation et un ennui chez les utilisateurs qui ne sont pas directement con cernés. C’est pourquoi, au cours d’une semaine, on as siste à un défilé sans fin de posts sur les réseaux sociaux sur un sujet précis, partagés automatiquement et sans réelle réflexion. La semaine suivante, les mêmes utilisa teurs, qui semblaient si en gagés, se lassent de voir le même message encore et en

core et deviennent obsédés par une autre campagne.

Mais qu’implique également cette viralisation démesurée ? Elle réduit une réalité très concrète à quelque chose d’abstrait ou de « symbolique », en détournant l’attention des personnes réellement concernées par le problème. C’est pourquoi Bahar a l’im pression que les utilisateurs des médias sociaux actuels accordent plus d’attention aux paroles et aux actions des influenceurs occidentaux qu’aux femmes iraniennes, dont la liberté est limitée à son expression minimale par le régime. Même lorsque les actions de ces influenceurs sont plus importantes que le simple partage d’un post, la signifi cation de cette action ne sera pas la même ni aura le même poids que si elle était réal isée par une femme iranienne. Prenez, par exemple, les femmes qui ont rasé leurs cheveux en signe de soutien aux femmes iraniennes. Les impli cations d’un tel acte ne sont pas les mêmes pour une femme oc cidentale vivant dans un État de droit que pour une femme ira nienne qui met sa vie en danger. Il est vrai, cependant, qu’il s’agit d’une forme de sensi bilisation et de faire prendre conscience

au plus grand nombre, ce dont Bahar est très recon naissante. Il est indéniable que l’effet positif est très fort.

Cependant, il faut toujours être conscient des limites de ces campagnes de sensibili sation. Surtout quand, une fois les cheveux coupés par exemple, les influenceurs occidentaux estiment que leur rôle a été fait et passent à un autre sujet pour diver tir leurs followers. Ont-elles coupé leurs cheveux pour soutenir une cause noble ou pour créer du sensationnel et des visuels sur leur page ?

Mais alors, comment pou vons-nous, en tant que membres de la communauté internationale, contribuer à changer cette réalité con crète dans laquelle vivent des millions d’iraniennes ? Se lon Bahar, l’essentiel est de s’informer avant de partager sur le sujet et non de publier aléatoirement afin suivre une tendance, surtout pour ne pas laisser une vision occidentale et anti-islamique du problème s’imposer à l’opinion pub lique. Ce n’est pas la religion musulmane qui génère le

problème act uel en Iran, ni le port du voile lui-même, mais la répression au toritaire, violente et systématique d’un régime qui ne permet pas aux femmes de décider du cours de leur vie ni du rapport qu’elles souhaitent en tretenir avec la religion. Dans le même temps, les membres de la communauté internationale peuvent aider les femmes ira

una causa a la indiferencia y el olvido de la misma. Y todo en un abrir y cerrar de ojos.

La viralización excesiva de una causa genera por lo tan to saturación y hastío en los usuarios que no se ven afec tados de manera directa. Es por eso que a lo largo de una semana, hay un desfile inter minable de publicaciones en las redes sociales sobre un tema específico, compartidas de manera automática y sin una reflexión real. La semana siguiente, los mismos usuar ios, que tan comprometidos parecían, se aburren de ver la misma publicación una y otra vez y pasan a obsesionarse con otra causa, volviendo a

mujeres iranies. Las implica ciones de dicha accion no son las mismas para una mujer occidental viviendo en un Es tado de derecho que para una mujer irani que pone su vida en peligro al hacer lo mismo.

Es verdad de todas mane ras de que es una forma de spread awarness, algo que agradece Bahar, pero hay que ser conscientes de sus lim ites. Sobretodo cuando, una vez la mecha de pelo corta da, las influencers occiden tales sienten que su parte ya fue hecha y pasan a otro tema para mantener entret enidos a sus seguidores. En el fondo se cortaron el pelo por apoyar una causa justa o para crear sensacionalismo y vizualicaciones en su pagina?

niennes en faisant pression sur les autorités de l’État afin qu’à leur tour, elles fassent pression sur l’ONU pour que le régime iranien actuel com mence à respecter les droits fondamentaux de ses femmes.

producirse el mismo proceso.

“The movement tends into a trend”. Este terme, carga do de recelo, fue utilizado por Bahar (seudónimo) para describir sus miedos con respecto al futuro del mov imiento de emancipación de las mujeres en Irán.

Esta joven irani parece alar mada frente a la posibilidad de que un movimiento que la toca tan de cerca se evapore en el aire, como suele pasar con todos los movimientos de reivindicación social que se viralizan a nivel internacion al en las redes sociales. Los usuarios pasan de sentir una obsesión febril y pasional por

Pero que implica además esta viralización excesiva? Se reduce a algo abstracto o “simbólico” una realidad su mamente concreta, quitan do el foco de las personas que están verdaderamente implicadas en la problem atica. Es por ello que Bahar tiene la impresión de que actualmente los usuarios de las redes sociales le prestan más atención a las palabras y acciones de influencers oc cidentales que a las mujeres iranies que ven su libertad limitada a su minima expre sion por el regimen. Inclusive cuando las acciones de dichos influencers es mas significa tiva que el simple partage de una publicacion, el significa do de dicha accion no va a ser el mismo ni va a tener el mis mo peso que si lo hiciera una mujer irani. Tomemos como ejemplo raparse el pelo como muestra de apoyo hacia las

Pero entonces, como podem os en tanto que miembros de la comunidad internacional contribuir a que esta reali dad concreta en la que viven millones de mujeres iranies cambie? Segun Bahar, lo principal es Informarse y lue go compartir sobre el tema y no unicamente publicar por seguir una moda. Informarse es esencial, sobretodo para no dejar que una vision occi dental y anti-islamica sobre la problematica se imponga en la opinion publica. No es la religion musulmana la que genera problema, ni el port du voile en si, sino la represion autoritaria, violenta y sis tematica de un regimen que no da lugar a que las mujeres decidan sobre el curso de sus vidas ni sobre la relacion que desean tener con la religion. A su vez, es importante hac er presion sobre las autori dades estatales para que, a leur tour, estas hagan presion en la ONU para que el regi men irani vigente comience a respetar los derechos fun damentales de sus mujeres.

“Ont-elles coupé leurs cheveux pour soutenir une cause noble ou pour créer du sensationnel et des visuels sur leur page ?”

A Day Before Winter, OPEC Cuts Oil Production by Two Million Barrels

By Leo Gerza, Staff Writer

On Oct. 5t, following a meet ing in its Vienna headquar ters, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun tries (OPEC) announced that its member countries would be cutting oil production by two percent, or two million barrels a day, taking effect in November. The announce ment was made against the backdrop of rising energy costs and a looming global recession. Indeed, it is glob al economic uncertainty that the organization claims un derpins its decision to cut oil production, citing its desire to balance supply in the face of decreasing demand as its core motivation.

Founded in 1960, the Organ ization of the Petroleum Ex porting Countries sought to counter the United States’ he gemony over oil production and now controls 40% of pro duction and 80% of the world’s reserves, vesting the cartel with immense pricing pow er. The organization has not

shied away from exercising its dominance. Older genera tions are haunted by the dev astating effects the cartel’s oil embargo had on the price of oil and the U.S. economy in the 1970s. Its recent actions

have again highlighted its pricing power, as oil prices surged from $76.71 per barrel to $92.64 in response to its announcement that it would cut production.

At first glance, the decision seems motivated by the desire to steer prices back toward the highs they experienced earlier this year. The price of oil hit a peak of $122 in June; howev er, since then, it has steadily fallen to below $90. The an nouncement was designed, in part, to counter falling prices and benefit the revenues re ceived from oil exports. Oth er factors are contributing to the volatility of global oil

prices. Supply shocks linger ing from the COVID-19 pan demic — which saw oil prices briefly slip into the negatives — mean that global supply cannot keep up with demand rapidly returning to pre-pan demic lev els due to the robust expansion ary fis cal policy wielded by western leaders as an answer to the pandemic. Equally, many countries, es pecially those in Europe, that have chosen to halt buying oil from Russia in response to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine are facing unprecedented supply challenges as they seek alternatives to their long-last ing reliance on Russian gas imports.

According to National Public Radio, some pressure from Russia may have invigorated the decision-making process, as “they effectively came and asked OPEC to cut produc tion by a million barrels a day.” Such observations fur

ther suggest the protagonist role that the war in Ukraine is playing in the emerging re source crisis. This, especial ly, has influenced calls from some governments for Volod ymyr Zelensky to enter nego tiations with Putin to de-esca late the conflict.

Beyond the immediate price increase of oil, the impacts of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun tries’ decision will perpetuate a common trend in the past year. Energy firms drilling for and selling oil will see profits rise even higher as they con tinue to reap record profits. British Petroleum (BP) an nounced $8.2 billion in prof it at the end of October, its second highest on record. At the same time, households face even higher costs just as winter begins setting in, with the prospect of energy ration ing not out of the question in many European countries.

“The announcement was made against the backdrop of rising energy costs and a looming global recession.”