Introduction
Hezbollah, the Lebanese group often associated with terrorism, has pursued a different trajectory than the commonly assumed goal of nonstate actors to take over the state. Instead, Hezbollah has strived for a hybrid status, which allows the group to possess and exercise power without having the responsibilities that come with full state status. While Hezbollah has the military capability to take over the Lebanese state, it lacks international and domestic legitimacy beyond its loyalists and does not hold ideological power over non-followers. Therefore, the group has employed hybrid tactics to acquire and sustain power in Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s early objective of replacing the Lebanese state with an Islamic state proved unachievable in a multi-confessional country where no religious group or sect holds a majority. Thus, Hezbollah shifted its focus to social outreach to the Shia community, where it gained domestic legitimacy through military operations against Israeli occupation in Lebanon. However, as a non-state actor, Hezbollah faced an expiry date of its power after Israeli withdrawal, and it concluded that access to power in Lebanon is not achieved through sheer coercion but through elite pacts and exploiting weaknesses in the Lebanese state system.
To retain power while maintaining its exceptionality, Hezbollah became a hybrid actor, straddling both sides of the state/non-state demarcation line. This hybrid status granted Hezbollah legitimacy from the state as a supporting actor in defending the state from external threats without
taking orders from it, thus allowing Hezbollah to have de facto public authority in Lebanon. Through a long-term, systematic approach, Hezbollah has managed to acquire sufficient control to become the strongest political actor in Lebanon, playing the role of power broker and agenda setter that Syria used to enjoy in Lebanon before 2011.
Hezbollah’s hybridity has allowed it to influence and control the state in Lebanon both from within state institutions and outside them. Despite projecting an image of being above corruption, Hezbollah engages in actions such as siphoning off state resources that are also carried out by other political parties in Lebanon. Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s approach differs from the short-term approaches usually employed by other parties, and it has managed to cultivate influence and control over the state systematically.
Influence through state institutions
One of the most significant ways it does so is by having formal representation at the ministerial, parliamentary, and municipal levels. In the 1990s, Hezbollah shifted from being hostile towards the state to participating in elections and holding government posts. This allows the party to have a formal position of power and control state institutions, directing their activities to benefit its interests.
Hezbollah also relies on its March 8 allies, including the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), to extend its influence indirectly. The March 8
Alliance was formed after the assassination of former prime minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, with Hezbollah leading the formation of the alliance to strengthen its position.
In Lebanon, political parties exercise their power primarily through informal means, even within state institutions. For Hezbollah, the ability to rely on March 8 allies to serve its interests also allows the party to extend its reach beyond the presence of its members and supporters in those institutions. In this way, Hezbollah holds sway over the Lebanese state, despite not being directly responsible for the actions of state institutions.
Use of ministries
Hezbollah has used its ministerial representation to serve its interests.
From 2008 to 2019, the group effectively had veto power in the Lebanese cabinet, holding a third plus one of all ministerial posts. During the first technocratic cabinet formed in January 2020, Hezbollah insisted on being assigned both the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Finance in the next cabinet, gaining direct control over two key sectors linked to its interests. Control over specific ministries provides the group with a source of revenue and allows it to direct ministry resources in ways that benefit its own constituents. Ministerial control also helps cover up Hezbollah’s involvement in illicit activities.
For example, Mohamad Fneish, a senior Hezbollah official, headed the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform from 2009 to 2014, which handled the tendering for EU-funded solid waste management projects in northern Lebanon. However, an investigative report alleged that many of the projects were bogus and EU funds had been embezzled. In addition, the agriculture portfolio was held by a Hezbollah minister from 2009 to 2014, who was accused of “selectively distributing” government benefits aimed at improving agricultural infrastructure. Ministerial control can also help safeguard Hezbollah’s involvement in money laundering against state scrutiny, particularly in relation to cash flowing to Hezbollah from the Shia diaspora.
Furthermore, the group had been relying on ammonium nitrate for the manufacture of explosives, and purchased fertilizer from Syria through the Ministry of Agriculture, which was allegedly sold to Hezbollah agents.
Use of the civil service
Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanese state institutions goes beyond ministerial representation, as the party has extended its control to the civil service. The party helps Shia candidates prepare for Civil Service Board entrance examinations and uses its influence in parliament and government to pressure the board to reduce the pass mark or leak exam questions in advance to better prepare its own candidates.
Hezbollah’s control over the civil service allows it to generate revenue through the access to dedicated funds that each ministry’s directorgeneral has. This enables Hezbollah to access funds regardless of who is the minister at any given time. For example, the Ministry of Social Affairs funds the Al-Mabarrat Charity Association, which came under Hezbollah’s control following the death of its founder, and whose assets have been frozen in Lebanese banks since 2016 due to US sanctions.
The shortfall in funding from Iran since 2018, heavy casualties among Hezbollah’s fighters in Syria, and the cost of its involvement in Iraq and Yemen have affected the party’s traditional social services to its own community.
Use of other state institutions and decrees
Hezbollah has been accused of using the mechanism of cabinet decrees regarding “public benefit associations” to import goods without paying customs fees and taxes, and to cover some of its security activities. One of Hezbollah’s organizations that has been granted a decree is Jihad alBinaa Association, which operates in partnership with Lebanese government entities, especially through municipalities and unions of municipalities in Shia-majority areas. Jihad al-Binaa has been able to import construction materials and other goods without paying customs duties and has used its ties with the Ministry of Transport and Public Works to expand Hezbollah’s security infrastructure.
Hezbollah’s involvement in the pharmaceutical trade is also an important source of revenue for the group, pointing to its entanglement in corruption. In 2012, a scandal erupted whereby pharmaceutical companies linked to a senior Hezbollahofficial’s brother were found to be dealing in counterfeit medicines and forging the signature of the then health minister. The involvement of Hezbollah in the pharmaceutical trade highlights the extent of corruption in the group’s activities.
Hezbollah also benefits from working closely with government ministries. The Martyr Foundation, another Hezbollah organization designated as a public benefit association, has been able to acquire state-subsidized medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and ambulances through its receipt of funding from the Ministry of Public Health.
Hezbollah also sustains influence through Lebanon’s municipalities, particularly in Beirut’s southern suburbs, where all municipalities are exclusively controlled by it or nominally by its ally; Amal. They formed the Union of Municipalities of Beirut Southern Suburbs, which acquires its own funds and can pool funding from municipalities for projects, often financed by international assistance. The Union is responsible for running the area’s municipal police force, which works under the direction of Hezbollah but whose members receive salaries from the state.
Hezbollah’s control of the membership of the Supreme Islamic Shia Council, a state institution affiliated with the Presidency of the Council
of Ministers, also allows the group to import a wide variety of goods through Beirut’s airport and port without paying customs fees.
Use of allies
Hezbollah has formed two major political alliances through coercion and collusion, seeking to subdue or crush opponents whether Shia or not. The alliance with Amal is particularly significant, as Nabih Berri, the leader of Amal, has been the speaker of the Lebanese parliament since 1992.
Hezbollah has Christian allies such as Marada and the FPM since 2005. This alliance has allowed Hezbollah to maintain a relatively minimal direct presence in the government, as the flow of services to its constituents and support for its interests can be channeled through its allies.
In entering an alliance with the FPM, Hezbollah had to support that party’s access to state and other financial resources, thereby consolidating Hezbollah’s collusion in the Lebanese system in which political and economic elites conduct deals to sustain their wealth and power.
Hezbollah is also able to exert influence through parliamentary committees in which it and its allies are members. These committees review, amend, and approve the content of legislation to be voted on by MPs. Hezbollah’s MPs and their allies are represented in all parliamentary committees, including the anti-corruption committee, and can push for the indefinite postponement of reviews of legislation as a means of
blocking measures that they regard as detrimental to their interests. For instance, Hezbollah plays a significant role in the parliamentary committee for women and children, where it has blocked legislation intended to raise the age of consent for marriage.
Influence through financial transactions and public contracts
Hezbollah is able to take advantage of weak financial and public contract regulations to benefit itself. Its increasing influence can be attributed in part to the cooperation between elites in Lebanon’s political system. While Hezbollah avoids entering into formal agreements with parties outside its alliance, informal cooperation and collusion among all parties is commonplace in the country.
Lebanon’s lack of a formal process requiring full transparency in the awarding of public tenders and contracts has enabled the country’s ruling parties, including Hezbollah, to exploit public contracts for their own benefit. Hezbollah affiliates have acquired many public contracts.
In 2019, Hezbollah adopted a public anti-corruption rhetoric, directed primarily at former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, whose 2005 government was widely seen as backed by the US. This rhetoric was also aimed at deflecting attention from the impact of tighter US sanctions on Hezbollah’s funding, which was reduced due to the financial crisis in Lebanon. Despite the anti-corruption rhetoric, Hezbollah increasingly
relied on informal partnerships with Christian business figures and government officials to conduct its financial affairs and evade sanctions. In September 2020, former minister of transport and public works Yusuf
Finyanus was sanctioned by the US for directing political and economic favors to Hezbollah, including ensuring Hezbollah-owned companies won government contracts worth millions of dollars and moving money from government ministries to Hezbollah-associated institutions. Finyanus was also accused of siphoning off money to Arch Consulting and Meamar Consulting while he was minister.
Use of state commercial and finance regulations
Hezbollah also exploits Lebanon’s free-trade zones by allowing expatriate businesspeople to register several businesses under their names, their relatives’, or affiliates’ names. These companies work in fields such as construction, real estate, engineering, tourism, entertainment, leisure, jewelry, general commerce, and art, and use freetrade zones to import, store, and re-export goods. Since the official records of these companies are often vague, it is easier for them to operate without being tracked.
Another example of Hezbollah exploiting the murkiness of Lebanese regulations is al-Qard al-Hassan, an association established in 1982. Following the 2019 financial crisis in Lebanon and increased international sanctions against Hezbollah, the group and its affiliates
largely stopped using Lebanese banks and turned to al-Qard al-Hassan for financial transactions. While the association was registered as an NGO at the Ministry of Interior in 1987, it operates as a microcredit lending agency and a de-facto bank that enables Hezbollah to pay its members and transfer money. As it is not classified as a bank or a financial institution, it is not subject to banking laws governing cash and lending transactions and is not tied to the Bank of Lebanon. Al-Qard al-Hassan is a key source of gold and foreign currencies for Hezbollah and is used to channel cash funds in US dollars outside of the Lebanese banking system.
Influence through land border control
The explosion at the Port of Beirut on August 4th, 2020 was a tragic event that shook Lebanon and garnered international attention. The blast, caused by a large quantity of ammonium nitrate mixed with other chemicals, devastated the port and surrounding residential areas, resulting in hundreds of casualties. The incident has brought to light concerns about the involvement of Hezbollah in the port and in the Syrian conflict, where they support the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Hezbollah has a well-documented history of using ammonium nitrate to create explosives, which is also a component of the barrel bombs used by the Assad regime in Syria. The group’s influence over the port and the Lebanese-Syrian border is closely linked to the weakened state of Lebanon and the country’s pervasive corruption.
Hezbollah has de facto control over the country’s border with Syria. This control is exerted through collusion with state authorities. Since the Syrian military occupation of Lebanon, which began in 1976 and ended in 2005, Lebanon and Syria have had a ‘special relationship’ that has made the border between the two countries highly porous. Weak state oversight, corruption within the Customs Administration and other state institutions, and vested interests by members of the country’s elites involved in licit and illicit trade, have all contributed to the LebaneseSyrian border being managed largely notionally.
As Hezbollah uses Syrian territory to train and deploy fighters, as well as a conduit for weapons flowing from Iran and to smuggle drugs, goods, and arms in both directions, the group has long strived to exert control over the border. Its involvement in the Syrian conflict has intensified its cross-border activities, and it currently has de facto authority over the entire border.
Hezbollah’s smuggling of goods, including narcotics, is an important source of revenue for the group. The extent of its engagement in goods smuggling has increased over the past two years as both Lebanon and Syria have been hit by severe economic crises. In 2020, Hezbollah’s smuggling of subsidized goods for sale in Syria attracted significant public attention. The group smuggles diesel oil and gasoline from Lebanon to Syria through collaboration with Maher al-Assad and his Fourth Brigade. Hezbollah secures the routes for the trucks from the Lebanese stations towards the Lebanon-Syria border without necessarily
going via the Lebanese official border crossings. Once on Syrian territory, Hezbollah’s operatives, in collaboration with Fourth Brigade soldiers, would escort the trucks to their final destinations.
Hezbollah’s smuggling operations not only generate income but also serve as political leverage. The FPM formed an alliance with Hezbollah and expanded its presence in Lebanon by opening various businesses, including shops selling goods obtained through Hezbollah’s smuggling routes at cheaper prices. Hezbollah also helped the FPM by supporting the opening of new offices to provide social services to the local community.
Use of the Port of Beirut
Since 1993, the Port of Beirut has been run by a “Transitional Commission” that handles all financial matters of the port without any oversight from the government. The commission uses public funds but is neither a public nor private entity, making its governance opaque. Hezbollah’s involvement in the port grew over the years through its connections with political elites and parties represented in the commission. Hezbollah also benefits from existing corruption throughout state entities linked to the port to generate revenue and import and export illicit goods.
Unnamed sources have claimed that, as a result of corruption, the Lebanese state only receives $800 million in customs fees annually from
the port, rather than the estimated $3 billion that it should legitimately earn through customs revenue. The sources allege that the missing revenue is shared with Hezbollah, providing another income stream for the group.
Hezbollah differs from its rivals in the extent of its use of the Port of Beirut to transport drugs, weapons, and explosive material both in and out of Lebanon without any state oversight or inspections of the hangars it uses. Materials used to make explosives are stored at the port and temporarily gathered to be prepared for shipment abroad. In 2019, the US Treasury added high-ranking Hezbollah official Wafiq Safa to the sanctions list, stating that he facilitated the passage of illegal drugs and weapons into the port of Beirut. However, imposing sanctions on Safa did not curb Hezbollah’s control over the port.
Hezbollah’s involvement in importing and exporting ammonium nitrate through the port has raised questions about its link to the ammonium nitrate that caused the explosion in Beirut in August 2020. The opaque governance of the port and corruption within state entities linked to it have facilitated Hezbollah’s control and use of the port for illicit activities.
Influence over military and security institutions
Hezbollah has been allowed to maintain a significant arsenal of weapons and use force under the pretext of national security since 2008, thanks to the state’s security formula: “the army, the people and the resistance”.
The Taif Agreement in 1989 ended the Lebanese Civil War and required the disbandment of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, with the national army being strengthened. Nonetheless, the agreement acknowledged the need to free Lebanese territories from Israeli occupation, and Hezbollah received special status from the Lebanese government controlled by Syria’s dominance to take on this journey of liberation.
In 2008, Hezbollah employed its weapons against Lebanese citizens in response to the government’s efforts to dismantle its telecommunications network and dismiss a pro-Hezbollah airport security head. This resulted in a military takeover of Beirut and the creation of a new national unity administration, in which Hezbollah and its allies had veto rights for the first time.
Hezbollah has regularly used the “army, people, resistance” formula to justify its activities since 2008, citing it as evidence of its increased influence in Beirut government institutions and Lebanon’s political, military, and security organizations. The formula allowed the group to expand its permitted activities under the guise of safeguarding Lebanon from “any aggression.” However, the formula obstructs security sector reform measures such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, and puts Hezbollah in a position of dominance in Lebanon’s hybrid security architecture.
Hezbollah’s growing power since 2008, coupled with its alliance with the Free Patriotic Movement, has reinforced its influence in the Lebanese state. Hezbollah’s retention of its unique status is critical to the FPM’s retention of power, making it the primary force in Lebanese politics. However, the hybridity problem is that the Lebanese Armed Forces must remain weak and incapable of assuming the national defense role on their own for Hezbollah to maintain its special status. Hezbollah’s security formula establishes a clear divide between the army and “the resistance” , making security sector reform measures impossible.
Hezbollah has effectively gained control of military intelligence through Shia officers, giving it a powerful tool of repression in Lebanon. This has been particularly evident during the mass protests that began in October 2019, which challenged the political status quo in Lebanon. The military intelligence arrested and interrogated a number of activists involved in the protests, while some activists and others critical of Hezbollah have been tried before military tribunals or threatened with such trials. Overall, Hezbollah's control over military intelligence and infiltration of the state security apparatus have given it significant power to suppress dissent and protect its interests in Lebanon.
Will Hezbollah take over the Lebanese state?
Hezbollah’s influence on the Lebanese state has spread its reach from the presidency to the civil service and military and security institutions.
Hezbollah’s influence results from several factors, including its external patron, Iran; its superior organization, funding, resources, and followers, and the party’s long-term strategy. The Lebanese state’s weaknesses have allowed Hezbollah to exploit and systematize its influence more than other political parties.
Although Hezbollah’s military capabilities are allegedly stronger than those of the Lebanese Armed Forces, none of the other political actors in Lebanon has a militia that can rival Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s arsenal and fighter capacity have grown over the past three decades, and a takeover by force is unacceptable to non-Shia communities, which would spark another civil war. In addition, being a formal state actor would subject Hezbollah to domestic scrutiny, especially after mass protests since 2019 that exposed state institutions’ weaknesses, and as Lebanon edges closer to bankruptcy. Hezbollah is already blamed for corruption and mismanagement of the country, and being the sole state authority would face calls for accountability,whichisnot in the party’s interest. Hezbollah is classed as a terrorist organization by many Western governments, and a takeover would result in Lebanon being viewed as a pariah state, with foreign aid cutoff, which would harm the country’s already fragile economy.
Hezbollah presents itself as being free from greed and post-sectarian, but its involvement in the Syrian conflict has indicated that it champions the Shia’s interests, making it unlikely that a takeover by force would sustain power, as it would impose one sect’s interests over those of others.
Therefore, having hybrid status is ideal for Hezbollah, as it can wield power in Lebanon without facing the possibility of civil war or international sanctions, intimidate its opponents while retaining its weapons, and remain the de facto authority in Lebanon without addressing the needs of the country's citizens at large. However, Hezbollah’s influence will continue to undermine Lebanon’s governance and contribute to the country’s instability.
Linda Khatib, How Hezbollah holds sway over the Lebanese State, Middle East and North Africa Programme, 2021.
The views and opinions expressed in this summary are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the Lebanese Forces Party.