February 2023
Equity markets kicked off the new year euphorically and with big share-price gains. However, the rest of the year won’t be a one-way street, in part because corporate earnings are likely to come under pressure. Investors also earned money with bonds in the early weeks of 2023. Since conventional government and corporate bonds have now resumed offering an attractive yield, investors are no longer forced to resort to less liquid and/or more complex interest-bearing alternatives for yield.
The risk of a recession in Europe has diminished in recent weeks. China’s economy is reopening, natural gas storage facilities are well filled, and energy prices have pulled back considerably. Suddenly the glass is half-full again – business sentiment and consumer confidence have brightened. However, the year 2023 will present a challenge for central banks. Policy rates are in restrictive territory by now, and there is an elevated risk of monetary-policy mistakes.
A raising of the US federal debt ceiling must be negotiated anew almost every year. The debt ceiling usually gets raised without any major friction, but not without
detours and often at the last minute. This year, however, the potential risks and side effects of the debt debate are graver than they’ve been in a long time. A tougher confrontational attitude in Congress indicates that a full-blown debt fracas in the Capitol looms, and it is unlikely to leave the financial markets indifferent.
The Bank of Japan is the mother of monetary accommodation. Monetary-policy innovation and creativity have kept interest rates in Japan close to zero for years now. Today, though, this stands in starker contrast than ever to the macroeconomic fundamentals and to monetary policy in the rest of the world. Japan’s central bank is under enormous pressure and is likely to be compelled by the market to end its monetary-policy experiment sooner rather than later.
Semi-liquid private-market investment vehicles, popularly known as evergreen vehicles, have developed into a rapidly growing asset class. But they recently became a victim of their own success when some of them became no longer able to service all of investors’ redemption requests. This shows once again that there is no free lunch on the financial markets.
The filling of European natural gas storage facilities last summer at historically high prices at times exceeding EUR 300 per MWh was not in vain. Thanks to the very good fill level at the start of winter, the unusual warm spell at the turn of the year and the strenuous efforts by consumers to cut gas use, storage facilities were still around 75% full as of the end of January. That’s 35 percentage points higher than at the same time last year and 20 percentage points above the average for the last five years. This comfortable situation has multiple beneficial consequences: the outlook for economic growth (more) and inflation (less) is improving, pressure has been taken off government budget deficits, and the outlook for winter 2023/24 is getting better. By now, not even the icy weather of the past couple of weeks has been able to shock the market any longer. Despite the cold temperatures, the price of natural gas has stayed at around EUR 60 per MWh, similar to the level prior to the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine.
The danger of a recession in Europe has abated in recent weeks. All of a sudden the glass is half-full again – business sentiment and consumer confidence have brightened. However, the year 2023 will present a challenge for central banks. There is an elevated risk of monetary-policy mistakes.
The outlook for the European economy has brightened lately. Economic activity in China has regained momentum since the rollback of the country’s zeroCOVID policy. This is likely to spark a near-term growth spurt there that will also radiate to Europe. The long stretch of mild winter temperatures and the steep drop in the price of natural gas have likewise boosted sentiment. Economic growth forecasts for the Eurozone have thus recently been revised upward. The Eurozone purchasing managers’ index rose to 50.2 points in January, climbing back above the 50 threshold that signifies expansion. Consumer sentiment likewise has rebounded from its nosedive last autumn. A recession in Europe may even not materialize at all or is at least likely to turn out very mild.
The improved economic activity outlook gives the European Central Bank (ECB) another argument besides rampant inflation for ratcheting the interest-rate level in the Eurozone higher. After raising its marginal lending rate for main refinancing operations to 3.00% in early January, the ECB looks set to implement another 50-basis-point hike in March, but will probably slow its
rate-hiking pace afterwards. Before long, the ECB will thus be heading into very restrictive monetary-policy territory well above the Eurozone’s potential rate of growth. In this realm, dangers to growth and to overindebted countries mount, as does the risk of a policy error that soon needs to be corrected.
The Fed currently finds itself confronted with contradictory data. The US employment market is still robust on the surface, but various recession indicators like the US yield curve and the Conference Board Leading Economic Index that have a consistent track record of being very reliable have dimmed further lately. Inflation, in the meantime, is tending to recede more quickly than expected and could continue to surprise on the downside in the months ahead. The delayed effects of the massive rate-hiking in 2022 also have to be taken into consideration. Growth in the money supply has recently ground to a halt (see chart below). Against this backdrop, the Fed undertook only a small 25-basis-point rate hike in early February. The macro data in the weeks ahead will reveal whether that already marks the end of the line for the federal funds target rate.
A raising of the US debt ceiling must be negotiated anew almost every year. The debt ceiling usually gets raised without any major friction, but not without detours and often at the last minute. This year, however, the potential risks and side effects of the debt debate are graver than they’ve been in a long time. A tougher confrontational attitude in Congress indicates that a full-blown debt fracas in the Capitol looms, and it is unlikely to leave the financial markets indifferent.
The federal debt ceiling in the United States, which regularly has to be renegotiated and raised by Congress, will be reached in the days ahead. Using financial sleights of hand (“extraordinary measures”) that have become routine by now, the US Treasury can continue to meet its payment obligations for some time yet. Come summer, however, or perhaps not until October, all of the hacks and tricks will likely have been used up and federal coffers will be empty, and then a default looms. The protagonists in Washing -
ton, D.C., are well aware of this risk. The right wing of the Republican Party, which already revealed its destructive intentions in the disastrous soap opera surrounding the election of Kevin McCarthy to the Speakership of the US House of Representatives in early January, is actually bent on wreaking havoc and instrumentalizing the debt-ceiling-raising procedure to wring substantial budget-cut concessions from the Democrats, particularly in the area of social welfare spending. During the last three episodes of the debt debate in 2013, 2015 and 2021, the wrangling ulti-
mately came to a conciliatory ending usually at “five minutes to midnight,” but this time dislocations as bad as or even worse than the ones caused by the debt-ceiling showdown of 2011 loom. Back then, it took a sovereign credit rating downgrade by Standard & Poor’s (from AAA to AA) and a more than 10% drop in the stock market to bring politicians and policymakers to their senses. A similarly dire scenario for 2023 cannot be ruled out. This year, it seems entirely possible that a last-minute deal won’t be reached and that the US Treasury will be hamstrung in its ability to act and make payments for days or even weeks, with attendant risks and side effects.
If the US Treasury runs out of money by autumn if not earlier, a worst-case meltdown in the form of a default on US Treasury bonds would not immediately loom. In 2011 and 2013, the Treasury Department and the US Federal Reserve crafted emergency plans to ensure the punctual servicing of federal debt while deferring other payments. A similar prioritization plan is in place for the potential funding shortage on the horizon today. As soon as the hole in federal coffers gets dangerously close, federal spending is likely to be reduced temporarily by 30% to 40%, but interest payments will be safeguarded. Even though the USA thus doesn’t face insolvency in all probability, the debt ceiling presents a risk that can’t be ignored because prices for US credit default swaps (CDSs) regularly have risen significantly even during the less contentious debt-ceiling debates in recent years. That could happen again in 2023. And there might also be dislocations on the US Treasury bond market, which has already been plagued by low liquidity lately in any case. The equity market is also unlikely to come away completely unscathed. Shares of companies (such as defense contractors) that would be affected by temporary spending halts or by permanent federal budget cuts potentially needed to end the debt fracas could particularly come under pressure.
Maxed out again – The US Treasury will soon be out of cash US federal debt load and debt ceiling (in trillions of US-Dollars)
Protracted payment jams ultimately could also hurt consumer confidence. In 2011, uncertainty regarding the debt ceiling triggered the deepest plunge in consumer sentiment besides the one caused by the Great Financial Crisis. So, alongside volatile financial markets, economic growth also faces a potential setback. Altogether, the foreseeable debt-ceiling standoff arguably poses the biggest US domestic policy risk in 2023. European markets probably won’t be entirely spared from the potential chaos.
Conclusion: The last-minute “rescue” is a movie script that politicians in Washington, D.C., are all too familiar with. Precisely for this reason and due to the confrontation course that a few Republicans are dead set on, this year’s episode might not follow the classic screenplay for once. In the risk scenario, major dislocations on the financial markets and a small shock to economic growth loom. But even this year’s debt fracas likely will ultimately come to an end, and any asset-price dips will likely prove temporary.
Sources: Bloomberg, Kaiser Partner Privatbank
Equity markets started off the new year euphorically, and investors also resumed earning money with bonds in the first weeks of 2023. Conventional interest-bearing securities are now offering attractive yields again, and investors are no longer forced to resort to less liquid and/or more complex interest-bearing alternatives for yield.
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Equities: Strong January
• Equity markets started off the new year euphorically. European stocks and emerging markets in particular registered big share-price gains north of 10% in some instances. Reduced risks of a recession in Europe, a drop in energy prices and the reopening of China’s economy drove the robust start to the year. So, as the new year gets into full swing, the scenario that we outlined in our outlook for 2023 – one in which equity bears get caught on the wrong foot in the first half and can’t get the cheap stock purchase prices they were hoping for – appears to be unfolding. However, in the wake of the rally of the past weeks, it has to be noted that the near-term risk/reward tradeoff is now neutral at best. Further swift share-price gains are unlikely. From a technical analysis perspective, a sustained breakout by the S&P 500 out of its downtrend channel would be desirable to confirm a medium-term trend reversal on the US bellwether market. But even if that happens, the performance of equity markets over the further course of this year is unlikely to be a one-way street.
• The outlook for corporate profit margins and earnings urges a certain degree of caution. Many companies opportunistically exploited the rampant inflation during the past several quarters to raise prices. This propelled profit margins to new all-time highs. Now, however, disinflation looks set to become the dominant topic in the months ahead. Corporate pricing power will likely suffer as a result, and this is bound to put downward pressure on profit margins. We see further downward potential for analysts’ earnings estimates despite the correction to a certain degree in recent weeks. Even in the best-case economic activity scenario (with no recession), corporate earnings look set to pull back by around 15% from their peak. In the
ongoing reporting season for the fourth quarter of 2022, the overwhelming majority of companies thus far have issued guarded guidance for the remainder of this year.
• Investors also resumed earning money with bonds in the first weeks of 2023. Although central banks have stuck to their restrictive monetary-policy course to date, yields on long-term bonds have recently pulled back some more, further steepening the inversion of yield curves. This inversion is observable by now even at the very short end of the curve: in the USA, the yield on 2-year Treasury notes dropped below the federal funds rate. In the past, this consistently marked the end of the Federal Reserve rate-hiking cycle and presaged an imminent recession. If that’s the case again this time around, government bonds appear destined to continue performing well this year. If a recession doesn’t come to pass, bonds are likely to deliver a solid, albeit less spectacular, performance on the back of the expected disinflation in the months ahead.
• Since conventional government and corporate bonds have now resumed offering an attractive yield, investors are no longer forced to resort to less liquid and/or more complex interest-bearing alternatives for yield. The sea change in interest rates causes niche assets like microfinance bonds, for example, to lose attractiveness. We are downgrading our tactical stance on this asset class and are making corresponding adjustments to portfolios. Although insurance-linked bonds likewise belong to the “interest-bearing alternatives” category, they remain interesting this year in view of their substantially increased risk premiums and variable interest rates.
Alternative assets: Sparkling start to the year for gold
• US dollar weakness combined with falling real interest rates propelled the price of gold to a rocketlike start into 2023. The price of the precious metal has jumped 20% since November of last year. Its upward momentum looks set to ebb, though, at the psychological and technical resistance barrier
The gold price was given a rocket start into the investment year 2023
Higher construction costs and poorer financing conditions are putting pressure on price levels in more and more countries and real estate segments
at the USD 2,000-per-ounce level, if not before then. However, looking ahead to the full year, gold remains a sensible asset to blend into portfolios in a variety of macroeconomic scenarios.
• The continually tightening interest-rate environment has dimmed the near-term outlook for real estate markets. An increase in construction costs and costlier financing conditions are pushing property prices down in more and more countries and real estate segments. This has also recently been reflected (with a time lag) in the share prices of unlisted real estate funds. Investors should exercise restraint with regard to real estate investments in the months ahead. We accordingly have downgraded this asset class in our tactical asset allocation. Semi-liquid real estate products in particular could remain under pressure for the time being (see the article in the “Drawdown: All about private banking” section).
Currencies: Is the euro poised to take a breather?
• EUR/USD: While macroeconomic data for the Eurozone have continued to surprise on the upside lately, they have come in on the disappointing side in the USA. A divergence in favor of the euro is also shaping up on the monetary-policy front. The European Central Bank is sticking with its hawkish rhetoric and envisages further interest-rate hikes while the US Federal Reserve is approaching the end of its rate-hiking cycle. However, in the wake of the recent rally, the euro’s comeback now gradually appears to be reaching the end of the road, as evidenced also by investors’ frothy speculative net long positioning in the euro.
• GBP/USD: The British pound also gained ground against the US dollar in January, though that was mainly due to pronounced dollar weakness. The UK’s fundamentals, in fact, remain very dismal.
US stocks outperformed the rest of the world for more than a decade. European investors with a high home bias often looked westward with envy. The recipe behind US stocks’ dominance was low interest rates, surging corporate earnings (particularly in the technology sector) and a strong US dollar. But every trend eventually comes to an end – the underlying fundamentals flipped last year, enabling mainly European and emerging-market stocks to regain significant ground since autumn. The MSCI World index excluding the USA overcame its long-term downtrend line. The reopening of China’s economy after the rollback of the country’s zero-COVID policy, cheap(er) stock valuations and the downturn in the price of the overvalued US dollar are some arguments suggesting that the current trend reversal is sustainable. This makes it all the more important right now for investors to check if their portfolios have excessive exposure to US stocks.
Among the world’s industrialized countries, the UK is the one facing the greatest risk of a recession and inflation. The Bank of England will hardly be able to raise its policy rate enough to retore the pound’s attractiveness for investors.
• EUR/CHF: The EUR/CHF exchange rate has climbed back above parity in recent weeks on the back of the abated risk of a recession in the Eurozone and the prospect of a widening interest-rate differential in favor of the euro. Another interest-hike by the Swiss National Bank in March might already be the last one, but the ECB is likely to keep on raising rates afterwards. If the “europhoria” continues, the value of the euro could conceivably climb to as high as 1.05 against the franc during the course of this year, but the franc’s long-term strength is undebatable, in our view.
The end of the US bull market? – It’s the rest of the world’s time now MSCI USA vs. MSCI World ex-USA
Sources: Bloomberg, Kaiser Partner Privatbank
The Bank of Japan is the mother of monetary accommodation. Monetary-policy innovation and creativity have kept interest rates in Japan close to zero for years now. Today, this stands in starker contrast than ever to the macroeconomic fundamentals and to monetary policy in the rest of the world. Japan’s central bank is under enormous pressure and is likely to be compelled by the market to end its monetary-policy experiment sooner rather than later.
A big monetary-policy experiment has been underway in Japan for years (or, more accurately, for decades).
An entire generation there practically knows nothing other than zero interest rates and deflation (risks). The architect, implementer and mouthpiece of this monetary policy is Haruhiko Kuroda, who has headed the Bank of Japan (BoJ) for the last decade. He took office in 2013 with a pledge to reach an inflation rate of 2% “at the earliest date possible” – a promise he was never able to keep, though not for want of ideas about how to do that. After incessant securities-buying made the BoJ in 2016 the owner of already more than half of all Japanese bonds outstanding, Kuroda invented the concept of “controlling the yield curve.” Instead of purchasing a certain amount of government bonds every month, the BoJ pledged to keep market interest rates within a certain range. The cardinal interest rate in this endeavor was the 10-year government bond yield, which initially was maintained in range of +/–0.1%, which was later widened to +/– 0.25%.
Japanese bond market (including almost completely dried-up liquidity) to this day. In December, the BoJ finally saw itself compelled to release some steam from the kettle and to double the width of the trading range for 10-year Japanese government bonds to +/– 0.50%. But since then, the financial market has begun speculating in earnest on an end to yield curve controls. In the four weeks alone after this monetary policy “easing measure,” the BoJ had to buy up well over JPY 30 trillion worth of bonds (equal to 6% of Japan’s annual economic output) to keep yields within the tolerance range.
In the runup the central bank’s policy meeting on January 18, there was thus mounting speculation that BoJ Governor Kuroda might declare an end to yield curve controls. However, Kuroda stuck to his mantra that the BoJ’s current monetary policy is appropriate, sustainable, and necessary to but-tress economic activity. In its updated forecasts, the BoJ expects core inflation to drop back below 2% for the next two fiscal years and thus does not see any inflation problem. The financial
At a time of zero and negative interest rates around the globe in recent years, the BoJ seemed to have found the ideal tool for constructing a permanent artificial world of ultralow interest rates. But with the onset twelve months ago of extremely rapid rate-hiking by every (other) central bank around the world, the BoJ became an outlier. Moreover, its monetary policy in the meantime has also become increasingly askew in relation to Japan’s own macroeconomic conditions because inflation has arrived in Japan as well by now. Japan’s core inflation rate (excluding energy) climbed to a 30-year high of 3% in December and thus has exceeded the 2% inflation target for nine consecutive months already. Furthermore, Kuroda’s going it alone on monetary policy is not without risks and side effects, which have included a massive depreciation of the Japanese yen (until October of last year) and a resulting surge in import costs, huge currency interventions (last autumn), and regularly recurring stress episodes on the Sources: Bloomberg, Kaiser Partner Privatbank
Rather, more and more market participants are betting on an inevitable - and possibly turbulentend to Japan's monetary policy experiment sooner or later
market, though, does not believe these reassurances (any longer). In fact, more and more market participants are betting on an inevitable and potentially turbulent end to Japan’s monetary-policy exper-iment sooner or later. Some hedge funds consider a bet against Japanese government bonds a rare instance of a truly asymmetric trade, one with (almost) no downside potential but with a high pos-sible return. The speculative action has also been stoked lately by rumors that the BoJ is getting set to make its inflation targeting more flexible. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida could arrange a flexible inflation target with the future BoJ governor once Kuroda steps down in April. It would arguably mark the preparation for a long-overdue U-turn in monetary policy. Such a turnaround would have to be well orchestrated by Japan’s central bankers because it isn’t entirely without risk. The Japa-nese yen, which is still massively undervalued despite the correction in recent weeks, would likely further appreciate. The Nikkei initially would probably perform poorly in response to that. It would become less attractive for those Japanese investors who heretofore have invested most of their money outside Japan to continue doing so. They could pull their money out of Western markets. It would also become less attractive for carry traders who heretofore
have borrowed cheaply in yen to invest and earn higher returns elsewhere. A big interest-rate shock could ripple through Japan’s economy. Economic actors who heretofore have operated with high leverage thanks to the cheap money could particularly come under pressure in such a scenario. Financial institutions, however, would likely profit from a potential return of interestrate conditions to normal.
Conclusion: An end to Japan’s big monetary-policy experiment appears to be only a matter of time, but BoJ Governor Kuroda will probably leave the job of unwinding it to his successor. Returning to “more normal” interest-rate levels will be a balancing act and will require a masterly feat of communication. An overly abrupt change of course could spark turmoil on the financial markets. Further widening the interest-rate corridor could be a first step. One key indicator worth watching in the weeks ahead is the upcoming rounds of wage negotiations in Japan. Are large corporations dropping the deflationary mindset? If they are, that could seal the end of yield curve controls.
Semi-liquid private-market investment vehicles, popularly known as evergreen vehicles, have developed into a rapidly growing asset class. But they recently became a victim of their own success when some of them became no longer able to service all of investors’ redemption requests. This shows once again that there is no free lunch on the financial markets.
An ingenious construct – but only in theory?
Semi-liquid private-market investment vehicles have enjoyed growing popularity in recent years. On paper, these open-ended investment vehicles (hence the moniker “evergreen”) promise a win-win situation. They enable private-market managers to exploit a new sales channel, and they give retail investors access to the world of private equity, private credit, and private real estate and infrastructure markets – access that used to be reserved almost exclusively for institutional investors. Moreover, they make an asset class that normally requires an investment term of five years (and sometimes much longer) and which is thus highly illiquid tradeable. Semi-liquid products offer monthly or at least quarterly liquidity. These constructs are nothing new per se. They’ve proven themselves in practice for years, and some have more than a ten-year track record. However, semi-liquid investment vehicles invariably make headlines when the liquidity mechanism that works in theory gets put to the test, which usually happens during times of elevated volatility and falling stock prices on equity markets. Most recently, various private real estate funds in the USA such as Blackstone's BREIT, Starwood's SREIT or KKR's KREST were hit.
The aforementioned investment vehicles had to introduce “gating” to restrict the redemption of fund units because withdrawal requests exceeded the set limit (a quarterly maximum of 5%, for example, in the case of Blackstone’s BREIT). It’s entirely understandable that (too) many investors suddenly wanted to head for the exit all at the same time. After posting massive value appreciation upward of 30% in 2021, the Blackstone fund, for instance, gained another 9% in 2022 through end-September. Meanwhile, almost every asset class, including exchange-listed real estate investment trusts (REITs), registered massive price drawdowns over the first three quarters of 2022. Faced with this situation, it was tempting for many investors to take profits on semi-liquid products in order to stanch losses elsewhere or even simply to take advantage of the more attractive valuations today on liquid markets. Because precisely during turbulent market periods, valuations and valuation philosophies on public and private markets (and between public- and private-market managers) drift apart, and criticism of private markets grows louder. That’s because while liquid equity markets often overreact in downward scenarios, private-market man-
agers frequently are slow (and reluctant?) to adjust the valuations of their investment assets to the new fundamentals data.
So, are evergreen vehicles a faulty construct? Not necessarily. The redemption limits for semi-liquid funds are necessary and ultimately serve to protect investors in them. They ensure that fund managers are not forced to sell assets in a panic and probably at bad prices just to honor share redemptions. Furthermore, evergreen vehicles are superior to the many exchange-listed investment trusts on the London Stock Exchange, for instance, that likewise invest in private-market assets. Those investment trusts often lack liquidity, which largely makes it impossible to execute large-scale transactions without affecting the market price. Moreover, during periods of stress, they usually trade at big discounts to their “intrinsic value” and thus are at least as volatile as conventional equity investments. The evergreen structure therefore has advantages: it enables access to illiquid assets without requiring a yearslong commitment and smooths performance across the entire economic and investment cycle. However, these attractive features don’t come for free: during phases of elevated volatility – precisely when investors often seek liquidity – liquidity can dry up. Moreover, during market recovery phases, semi-liquid instruments can turn out to be comparative “lame ducks” due to the inertia of the underlying valuation approaches. This shows once more that
there is no free lunch on the financial markets. Having your cake and eating it too doesn’t work here, not even in the case of evergreen private-market funds.
Conclusion: Semi-liquid private-market investment vehicles fulfill their purpose and give retail investors uncomplicated access to private assets. When it comes to liquidity, though, their accent is on “semi”. Investors therefore should pursue a long-term investment horizon with these instruments and should refrain from trying to time the market. The universe of evergreen vehicles looks set to expand further in 2023, and many providers are in the starting blocks. At the moment, however, it’s worth taking a look again at exchangetraded investment instruments at least in the real estate sector. They currently are much more attractively valued relative to semi-liquid products and have longer-term outperformance potential.
Semi-liquid private market investments fulfil their purpose and provide uncomplicated access for private investors
• February 14: Valentine’s Day
Saint Valentine of Terni, the bishop of the Italian city of Terni in the third century, today is regarded as the originator of Valentine’s Day. Legend has it that the Roman clergyman performed Christian weddings for courting couples in defiance of a ban by Emperor Claudius Gothicus (268–270 A.D.) and gave them flowers from his own garden as a present.
• March 1: Purchasing managers’ indices for China
Now that China’s zero-COVID policy has ended, hopes for growth in 2023 are being pinned in part on the Middle Kingdom. The leaders in Beijing look set to dial back their reform efforts and to grant priority to economic growth at least for the near term. Purchasing managers’ indices give an indication of whether those endeavors are bearing fruit.
• March 3: Employee Appreciation Day
Only a happy employee is a productive employee…? On the first Friday of every March – Employee Appreciation Day – employers are supposed to pay tribute to their workers for a job (hopefully) well done. The impact of recognition of this kind on employees’ well-being and work commitment shouldn’t be underestimated, according to studies.
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