Chrysalis Spring 2017 Issue

CHRYSALIS

/ˈkrisələs/ noun: a transitional state vol. IX | Winter 2017

ISSN (Print): 1198-6123 ISSN (Web): 2369-8624

Chrysalis Volume IX | Winter 2017

THE UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

The Editors

Editor In Chief Gaby Gerecht Editorial Board Liam Galligan Ryan Shah Amisha Parikh-Friese Corrina Vali Shannon Chen See Design Editor Monica Silver

“

Editor’s Note

Dear Colleagues,

“Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world” – Nelson Mandela

As IDS students, we are passionate about making a difference and improving the lives of others. However, international development sometimes seems hopeless.

The news is overcrowded with stories of war in Syria, corrupt elections, and imminent environmental collapse.

Positive, successful change is rarely spoken of in the media or in our classes but it happens everyday as well. Here at McGill, Salima Visram, a former IDS student, designed a solar-panel backpack that allows students who live in areas without electricity to study after sunset. SLASummit, McGill’s own Latin American entrepreneurial competition, which was recently won by a McGill IDS student, has already started initiatives in Peru and Ecuador focusing on environmental sustainability and female empowerment. McGill students living in residence recently started a Skype-tutoring program for Syrian refugees abroad who plan on moving to Canada for university.

These students are only a small cross-section of the over 1,300 IDS students currently at McGill and thousands of alumni who work hard every day to improve the lives of others. We recognize that this venture is no small feat and the authors and editors of this journal have worked tirelessly to shine a light on difficult issues occurring all over the world—from our own backyard to Indonesia. I am infinitely grateful for their motivation to make this journal as incredible as it is and their responses to my daily messages and updates on Facebook. This journal would be nothing without them.

So, a heartfelt thanks to the International Development Studies Student Association for making this project possible, and my wonderful executive team who offered support and advice whenever needed.

Thank you also to our amazing design editor, Monica Silver, who designed the entire journal on her own. Without her, this journal would have been a collage of clip-art and stock photos.

Yours sincerely and most thankfully, Gaby Gerecht

Contents 8

JULIAN MAKHOUL

The Orthodoxy of Transitional Justice: Challenging Definitions of Justice

JESSICA FARBER

Uncovering the Roots of Crisis: A History of the Lenca in Western Honduras

25

16

QUINN BROWN

Practicing Family Reunification in Canada: Children First

REBECCA SUMMERS

The ASEAN-India Free Trade Area Agreement: Economic and Non-Economic Effects for India

32

SEJEONG PARK

41

Women, Violence and the State: An examination of state responsibility, the constitution, and civil society in the context of India

GABRIELLE DENIS

Fencing Religious Orthodoxy: Godly Nationalism and the Ahmadis in Indonesia

61

50

SOPHIE BEATON

Nigeria’s Urbanization: Accelerator or Agitator for Development?

The Orthodoxy of Transitional Justice: Challenging Definitions of Justice

mental relations and constitutional amendments. His decision to write on transitional justice in the post-war period was to further manifest a micro-political analysis on collective problem-solving in the developing world and apply it to the global north. Writing this piece has given him a critical perspective on the fluidity of problem-solving and reiterated the saliency of unique, contextual policy in contemporary development practices.

Julian Makhoul

Julian is an undergraduate student working towards a degree in honours Political Science, International Development Studies and Canadian Ethnic and Racial Studies. Julian has focused on public policy formation in the Canadian context, specifically within the framework of intergovernIntroduction

justice, then compare retributive and reor-

storative justice, and finally examine the

thodoxy, which seeks simply to end

importance of reconciliation and ‘truth

genocide, war, and violations of hu-

telling’ of past atrocities as local tools.

man rights, often disregards the pro-

It will argue that restorative justice

longed effects of these atrocities and

through reconciliation can better pro-

leaves victims struggling to cope with

vide the victims of human rights abuses

the

with resources for empowerment and

The

old

development

past. Alternatively,

development

through transitional justice can allow

progress.

for post-conflict progression. Transitional justice aims to address the last-

Who Defines Justice?

ing effects of crimes against humanity

by two distinct methods: retributive and

human rights violations leave victims

restorative justice. As a form of restor-

with lingering fear, sadness, contempt

ative

between

and trauma. Consequently, the major

the victims and perpetrators of human

debate that arises is who is responsible

rights abuses has come to the forefront

for bringing the perpetrators to justice.

as the key to overcoming the burdens of

A variety of actors, such as the states

traumatized groups. As reconciliation

involved, local elites, human rights or-

becomes increasingly salient in devel-

ganizations

opment discourse, cultural integration

systems attempt to define the terms of

has emerged as a significant factor to

justice. Transitional justice questions

consider throughout the process. A criti-

how post-conflict societies can transi-

cal analysis of transitional justice will

tion into stable and effective govern-

distinguish each method’s potential for

ments, given the reality of potentially

post-trauma societal development. This

state-sponsored wrongdoing and harm.

paper will first touch upon who defines

To address this issue, after the Second

justice,

reconciliation

8 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

Tragedies including war and

and

international

justice

World War the allied powers created the

of military tribunals held by the allied

International Criminal Court (ICC) to

forces after the Second World War. The

“help end impunity for the perpetrators

trials sought to prosecute the prominent

of the most serious crimes of concern

members of the political, military and

Al-

economic leadership of Nazi Germany

though the ICC has successfully sought

responsible for the Holocaust and other

and served justice to the perpetrators of

war crimes.3 American, Russian, French

atrocities, its strategy tends to general-

and British prosecutors sentenced these

ize and overlook case-specific concerns.

perpetrators to death for their crimes

This can lead to serious problems since

against humanity, however

each society views justice differently.

often criticize attempts to serve justice

To overcome these dilemmas, local

through the death penalty as a hypocriti-

elites can facilitate the path towards jus-

cal “criminalization of aggression.”4 It

tice. However in some cases, to main-

automatically denies the chance for

tain power local elites may encourage

victims of the crimes to receive other,

collective forgetting, a concept used to

perhaps more meaningful, reparations

selectively erase parts of history and

for the harm they have suffered. Defini-

rewrite past events. Therefore, an alter-

tively, retribution seeks to deter human

native solution that includes the aid of

rights abuses through law and order.

international actors may more effective-

During the Nuremberg Trials the “law”

ly define justice and develop solutions

was somewhat ambiguous, since the

oriented towards society’s well-being.

military tribunal prosecuted on the ba-

Initially, defining justice in retributive

sis of four different judicial systems and

terms can pave the way for transitional

charters. Another critique of retribution

justice.

is its negligence to include the voices of

to the international community.”

1

scholars

the mistreated, in this case, the Jews of Justice Through Retribution

Europe. Since the doctrine focuses on

The development of interna-

establishing blame for the past, it of-

tional law allows organizations such as

ten leaves the community and victims

the United Nations to adopt and pass

on the sidelines by marginalizing their

internationally binding legislation, pro-

voices in the justice-seeking process.5

tecting human rights and reducing the

Justice must allow a victimized com-

negative externalities of war and unsta-

munity to move forward without fear of

ble political transitions. Retributive jus-

the past being repeated. The Holocaust

tice focuses on crime as an act against

caused “profound effects on the way

the state and a violation of its laws. Ret-

the Jewish people see themselves and

ribution seeks justice through punish-

are seen by others”6, and the sanction-

ment, which is meant to deter crime and

ing of Nazi officials did not cure these

change behaviour. James Sterba studied

long-term psychological effects. A lack

the saliency of retributive justice as a

of confrontation between the victims

“necessary and sufficient moral require-

and the perpetrators also prevented the

An

victims from experiencing a necessary

example of its success can be traced back

catharsis.7 Misguided attempts to serve

to the 1945 Nuremberg Trials, a series

justice without concern for further so-

ment for a system of punishment.”

2

9 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

cietal development point to restorative

forgiveness in return. This provides

justice as a more sustainable and holis-

“those responsible for wrongdoing the

tic solution.

opportunity

to

accept

responsibility,

regain self-respect, and be reintegrated Justice Through Restoration

into the social settings whose norms

Whereas retributive justice can

they have violated without having to

inhibit sustainable development, res-

bear the stigma of their offence.”11 The

toration focuses on victims of crimes

Rwandan Genocide of 1994, which oc-

against humanity and paves the way

curred between the majority Hutu and

for meaningful resolutions. Political

minority Tutsi population, resulted in

psychologists define restoration as a

approximately 800,000 Rwandan deaths

universal

justice-seeking

framework,

by crimes against humanity.12 This con-

“distinctive in adopting its primary fo-

flict was in part a remnant of Belgian

cus as a central concern of justice for all

colonial rule, which favoured the Tutsi

with respect to how the victim, offender,

minority. Race segregated the commu-

and broader community collectively at-

nity, escalating the Hutu government’s

tempt to heal damaged relationships.”8

desire to exterminate the Tutsi presence

This form of justice is most salient due

in the region. Following the genocide,

to its inclusion of all those within the

officials enacted the traditional retribu-

conflict. Restoration not only allows

tive system to prosecute the perpetrators

for collective memory and catharsis

of the conflict, resulting in overcrowded

for those who were wronged, but also

prisons and a domestic criminal justice

reintegration policy and groundwork

system buckling under the weight of

for social harmony. Transitional justice

over 800,000 prisoners awaiting trial.13

becomes “a process involving affective,

The traditional system’s ineffectiveness

cognitive, and behavioural responses in

led to the development of an alternative:

which negative mentions towards and

the gacaca experimental restorative jus-

judgments about the offender are di-

tice system. As a local and community-

minished by trying to view the offender

based process,14 restorative justice uses a

with compassion, understanding and

radically differently framework to solve

perhaps even love.” 9 A major pitfall of

societal issues. It provides the Rwandan

restorative justice can be the placing of

people with a sense of ‘ownership’ over

guilt on perpetrators without forgive-

their unique experiences. To empower

ness from the community,10 which may

the victims, gacaca excludes elites such

further perpetuate isolation and division

as magistrates, elected officials and

within society. Thus, one of the critical

clergy from the role of judges,15 instead

steps in the restorative process is for-

opting for trusted members of the com-

giveness. As every culture practices

munity; in theory ensuring fairness and

some form of forgiveness, it is instru-

equality.16 Ultimately, this approach fo-

mental in restructuring and ameliorating

cuses on justice-seeking practices while

the effects of civil conflict. Restorative

adhering to local traditions and values.

justice pushes for initiative on behalf

Gacaca attempts to answer the question

of the perpetrators to make amends by

of “who defines justice?” By enabling

apologizing to victims and accepting

Rwandans to define justice on their own

10 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

terms in their own communities, it fos-

ereign or separatist pole, that separates

ters mutual respect and social solidar-

indigenous peoples and their self-gov-

ity. However, a caveat to this model can

erning institutions from Canadian juris-

be a sense of “responsibility” among

diction; second, the assimilationist or

victims to participate without tangible

equal citizenship pole, that aims to fully

sources of compensation, “which can

assimilate indigenous peoples into Ca-

render victims’ participation in gacaca

nadian society; and third, the incorpora-

more burdensome than reparative.”

17

tion or differentiated pole, which strikes

By avoiding traditional judicial sys-

a balance between the latter two. Appli-

tems, perpetrators are not forced to pro-

cation of the incorporation or differenti-

vide any material forms of reparation

ated pole prompted Canada to create a

to victims. Thus in the short-run, the

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

benefits of restorative justice are only

(TRC), which seeks to address one of

abstract. Its most significant results are

the most profound legacies of colonial

long-term, where it strengthens and de-

rule on indigenous peoples: the resi-

velops civil society. By fostering social

dential school system. Initially funded

relationships between sects, restora-

by the Canadian government’s Depart-

tion promotes opportunities within the

ment of Indian Affairs and Northern

community. In Rwanda’s case, gacaca

Development, these schools attempted

has made significant strides in elimi-

to eliminate the native identities of in-

nating the ethnic polarization between

digenous children and re-socialize them

two groups. With time and cooperation

into a ‘European way of life’. In 2015,

within the community, restorative jus-

the commission labeled them an act

tice can overcome the collectivization

of cultural genocide.18 The TRC was

of guilt and stimulate societal progress.

established in 2008 and completed in

Ultimately, reconciliation can achieve

2015, “to create a place of learning and

societal development after methods of

dialogue where the truths of their ex-

either restorative or retributive justice

periences [in residential schools] were

have been enacted, encouraging a better

honoured and kept safe for future gen-

future for the community.

erations.”19 The commission enables the victims – the indigenous peoples

Reconciliation

as

the

Ulti-

of Canada – and the perpetrator – the

mate Tool for Development

government of Canada – to effectively

Historically, indigenous popu-

practice restorative justice. On behalf of

lations struggled to gain political in-

the perpetrator, Canadian Prime Minis-

fluence and cultural recognition. Now,

ter Justin Trudeau publicly stated that:

colonial legacies in indigenous commu-

nities underlie many of their problems,

“The Government of Canada sincerely

such as the inability to overcome pov-

apologizes and asks forgiveness of the

erty, corruption and weak infrastructure.

Aboriginal peoples of this country for

In the Canadian context, three main

failing them so profoundly […] Moving

models have characterized the rela-

forward, one of our goals is to help lift

tionships between the government and

this burden from your shoulders, from

indigenous groups. The first is the sov-

those of your families, and from your 11 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

communities. It is to accept fully our re-

amongst all members. A successful rec-

sponsibilities – and our failings – as a

onciliation occurred in Australia where

government and as a nation.”

stark racial inequality produced a cul-

20

tural divide between indigenous peoples This demonstrates the saliency of truth

and non-indigenous settlers. To lessen

telling as a tool for development, as it

the inequities, the government devel-

prompted discourse on the need to sup-

oped an integration strategy to provide

port indigenous societies in Canada.

equal opportunities in employment and

Andrew Wesley, a survivor of the resi-

education.22 This proved to be a commit-

dential school system, voiced his child-

ted effort to integrate indigenous peoples

hood experiences in the TRC hearings:

into Australian society whilst respect-

ing their autonomy. Australia’s method

“To me, reconciliation didn’t mean

of reconciliation also demonstrated an

anything for a long time. Why should I

acceptance of colonial legacies. More-

reconcile? I didn’t do anything wrong.

over, reconciling offered equal oppor-

Why? I was taken away. I was beaten

tunity to access social services, enhanc-

up, but I didn’t do anything wrong. Why

ing intergroup relations and the overall

should I reconcile to the government?

quality of life for the indigenous popu-

[…] And as I get old, I started to under-

lation. These improvements exhibited

stand more that I have to talk about the

a pledge to sharing a common future

abuse and be able to release the pain I

with “an increased capacity for strategic

was carrying. Now I understand what

engagement by indigenous people with

reconciliation is all about. I understand.

the dominant society, […] draw(n) not

You know, when a hunter is about to go

only from the values and practices of

out and get food for his family, the night

indigenous people, but also from those

before he goes out, he speaks to the

of the general Australian society.”23

game that he’s going to bring home, to

By including the voices of indigenous

ask for forgiveness. From that mountain

peoples and by seeking to fulfill their

we were given the power to honour the

requests, the Australian government’s

people that abused us because we want

method of reconciliation was based in

to live a good life.”

consideration of local contexts. While

21

there is no universal policy for reconA common criticism of truth telling

ciliation, Australian practices provide

and reconciliation is that it is a timely

a generic framework for the Canadian

and precarious process. However, a key

government when attempting to address

benefit is its ability to be cumulative and

the differences between Canadian and

self-reinforcing. Each step towards rec-

indigenous cultures.

onciliation between the Canadian government and indigenous peoples legiti-

Concluding Remarks

mizes a greater process of restoration.

The achievement of reconciliation is

onciliation through restorative justice

signaled by fairness and respect within

proves to be a valuable tool for soci-

civil society, and a sense of inclusion

etal development, triumphing over the

In the post-war period, rec-

conventional method of retribution in 12 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

transitionary contexts. A major debate

3 History.com Staff. (2010). Nuremberg

has emerged on the jurisdiction over

Trials. Retrieved April 28, 2016, from

defining justice after traumatic events.

http://www.history.com/topics/world-

Do international organizations, military

war-ii/nuremberg-trials

tribunals, the state, or local communi-

4 David Luban, “Legal Modernism,”

ties define justice? There is no ultimate

(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan

solution to this question, rather actors

Press, 1994) 334

must carefully consider and incorporate

5 Retributive vs. Restorative Justice.

local contexts into any plan for transi-

(n.d.). Retrieved May 01, 2016, from

tional justice. Although traditional re-

http://www.cscsb.org/restorative_jus-

tributive justice in the Nuremberg Trials

tice/retribution_vs_restoration.html

created an assurance of security through

6

legal prosecution, it is critiqued as fall-

Its Effects on Survivors: An Overview,”

ing short in achieving true justice and

Political Psychology,

reparations for the victims of Nazi Ger-

147-157. 147

many. The more intimate means of re-

7 Ibid

storative justice in Rwanda proved to be

8 Goodstein, J., & Aquino, K. “And

a greater transition after the genocide,

restorative justice for all: Redemption,

amending societal polarizations through

forgiveness, and reintegration in organi-

forgiveness. Finally, reconciliation as

zations,” Journal of Organizational Be-

an instrument of restorative justice in

havior, 31 no. 4 (2009): 624-628. 625.

Canada and Australia’s Truth and Rec-

9 Ibid, p. 626

onciliation Commissions addressed the

10 Ibid

need to empower indigenous peoples

11 Ibid

by pressuring the state to formally rec-

12 Rwanda: How the genocide hap-

ognize past wrongs and contribute tan-

pened.

(2008).

gible reparations. Real and effective

2016,

from

justice depends on inclusivity, trust, and

hi/1288230.stm

the ability to lay the groundwork for

13

different sects to coexist peacefully. Re-

Successful Experiment in Restorative

storative justice through reconciliation

Justice?” (2012, July 30).

will be the key to success in post-con-

April 29, 2016, from http://www.e-ir.

flict developmental policy worldwide.

info/2012/07/30/gacaca-a-successful-

Paul Chodoff, “The Holocaust and

Charlotte

18(1)

(1997):

Retrieved April

29,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ Clapham,

“Gacaca: A Retrieved

experiment-in-restorative-justice-2/ Notes

14 Chris Cunneen, “Thinking Criti-

1 ICC - About the Court. (n.d.). Re-

cally about Restorative Justice,” in E.

trieved May 01, 2016, from https://

MvLaughlin, R. Fergusson, G. Hughes,

www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about

and L. Westmarland (eds), (Restorative

the court/Pages/about the court.aspx

Justice: Critical Issues, London: Sage Publications, 2003) 182-194. 185

2 James Sterba, “Retributive Justice,”

15J. N. Clark, “The Three Rs: Retribu-

Political Theory, 5(3) (1997): 349-362.

tive Justice, Restorative Justice, and

Retrieved April 27, 2016. 352

Reconciliation,” Contemporary Justice Review, 11 (4) (2008): 331-350. 304 13 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

16 Jeremy Sarkin, “The Tension be-

cbc.ca/news/politics/truth-and-recon-

tween Justice and Reconciliation in

ciliation-commission-urges-canada-to-

Rwanda: Politics, Human Rights, Due

confront-cultural-genocide-of-residen-

Process and the Role of the Gacaca

tial-schools-1.3096229.

Courts in Dealing with the Genocide,” Journal of African Law, 45 (2) (2001):

Chodoff, Paul. “The Holocaust and Its

143-172. 164

Effects on Survivors: An Overview,”

17 Charlotte Clapham, 2012.

Political Psychology, 18 no. 1 (1997):

18 News, CBC. “Canada must con-

147-157.

front ‘cultural genocide’ of residential schools, Truth and Reconciliation re-

Clapham, Charlotte. “Gacaca: A Suc-

port says.” CBCnews. June 03, 2015.

cessful Experiment in Restorative Jus-

Accessed March 12, 2017. http://www.

tice?” (2012). Retrieved April 29, 2016,

cbc.ca/news/politics/truth-and-recon-

from

ciliation-commission-urges-canada-to-

gacaca-a-successful-experiment-in-re-

confront-cultural-genocide-of-residen-

storative-justice-2/

http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/30/

tial-schools-1.3096229.

19 National Centre for Truth and Rec-

Clark, J. N. “The Three Rs: Retributive

onciliation. (n.d.). Retrieved April 29,

Justice, Restorative Justice, and Recon-

2016, from http://nctr.ca/about.php

ciliation,”

20 Samuel L. Meyers, “If Not Reconcil-

Contemporary Justice Review, 11 no. 4

iation, Then What?” Review of Social

(2008): 331-350.

Economy, 58(3) (2001): 361-380.

21 “A selection of quotes from aborigi-

Cunneen, Chris. “Thinking Critically

nal leaders, residential school survi-

about Restorative Justice,” in E. Mv-

vors.” The Chronicle

Laughlin, R.

Herald. April 13,

2014. Accessed March 07, 2017. http://

Fergusson, G. Hughes, and L. Westmar-

thechronicleherald.ca/canada/1368464-

land (eds), Restorative Justice: Critical

a-selection-of-quotes-from-aboriginal-

Issues,

leaders-residential-school-survivors.

Sage Publications (2003): 182-194.

London:

23 David Martin, “Rethinking the Design of Indigenous Organizations: The

Goodstein, Jerry & Aquino, Karl, “And

need for strategic engagement.” Con-

restorative justice for all: Redemption,

tested Governance: Culture, power and

forgiveness, and reintegration in orga-

institutions

nizations,” Journal of Organizational

in

Indigenous Australia.

CAPER Monograph no. 29 (2008).

Behavior, 31 no. 4 (2009): 624-628.

History.com Staff. (2010). Nuremberg

BIBLIOGPRAHY News, CBC. “Canada must confront

Trials. Retrieved April 28, 2016, from

‘cultural

http://

genocide’

of

residential

schools, Truth and Reconciliation re-

www.history.com/topics/world-war-`/

port says.” CBCnews. June 03, 2015.

nuremberg-trials

Accessed March 12, 2017. http://www.

ICC - About the Court. (n.d.). Retrieved 14 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

May 01, 2016, from https://www.icc-

and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in

cpi.int/en_menus/ icc/about

Dealing with the Genocide.” Journal of

the

court/

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Martin, David. “Rethinking the Design of Indigenous Organizations: The need for strategic engagement.” Contested Governance: Culture, power nad instituions in Indigenous Australia (CAPER Monograph, 2008): 29.

Myers, S. L. “If Not Reconciliation, Then What?” Review of Social Economy, 58 no.3 (2000): 361-380.

National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation. (n.d.). Retrieved April 29, 2016, from http://nctr.ca/about.php Retributive

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tice/retribution_vs_restoration.html Rwanda: How the genocide happened.

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Commission.

(2015).

Retrieved April 29, 2016, from http:// pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2015/12/15/statement-prime-minister-release-final-report-truth-and-reconciliation-commission Sarkin, Jeremy. “The Tension between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Politics, Human Rights, Due Process 15 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

Uncovering the Roots of Crisis: A History of the Lenca in Western Honduras Jessica Farber

Jessica is finishing her fourth and final year of a B.A. in Honours International Development. She is the Editor-in-Chief of McGill’s Global Health Journal, The Prognosis, and currently works as a research assistant on corruption and governance reform in the Southern Cone of Latin America.

In Summer 2016, she was a Research AssociIntroduction

ate for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, publishing several pieces on human rights in Central America, and she was a 2015 McBurney Fellow for the McGill Institute for Health & Social Policy, working with an NGO in El Salvador. Her research interests lie in issues of forced migration & refugees, especially from Central America, as well as in global health equity.

military, and the private corporations

In 2015, Berta Cáceres, a Lenca

that are constructing these controversial

indigenous and environmental rights

development projects has accumulated

advocate and founder of the Civic

over the past year.2

Council of Popular and Indigenous

Since the Spanish first colonized

the

Honduras in the early sixteenth century,

prestigious international Goldman En-

indigenous peoples have lived on the

vironmental Prize for her leadership

margins of society: they have had few

in the global environmental and social

opportunities to participate in the for-

justice movement for for indigenous

mal economy, poor to nonexistent rep-

peoples. Since the 1990’s, Berta have

resentation in government, few protec-

carried out a peaceful yet vocal cam-

tions under the law, and limited access

paign to prevent the construction of the

to the justice system. As the Lenca are

multi-million dollar Agua Zarca dam on

thrusted into international spotlight in

the Gualcarque river, which is sacred to

the wake of Berta’s murder, it is nec-

the Lenca people. On March 3rd, 2016,

essary to re-examine the relationships

anonymous assassins gunned her down

between the Lenca, the government and

in her own home in La Esperanza.1

the land. This paper will examine the

Since Berta’s death, other anonymous

history of the indigenous Lenca popula-

hitmen have targeted and killed many

tion and will attempt to situate the plight

other land defenders across Honduras,

of this group within the context of the

with most of these murders remaining

broader historical patterns of exclusion

unsolved. Although the government has

and land-grabbing that have character-

been hostile towards any full investi-

ized the relationships between indig-

gation into these murders, evidence of

enous Honduran groups and the state.

collusion implicating the government,

The Lenca Under Spanish Colonialism

Hondurans

(COPINH),

received

16 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

The arrival of the Spanish to Honduras

Lenca cosmology, each physical place

in the early sixteenth century marked

has its own spirit, which should always

the beginning of a six century long his-

be respected and compensated for the

tory of exploitation and pillage. While

resources that humans take from them.8

the Lenca were one of the most success-

To appease the spirits, the Lenca often

ful indigenous groups in the region in

perform rituals called pagos a la tierra,

resisting the Spanish, they still suffered

payments to the earth, in order to pro-

The

vide balance, because9 if a spirit feels

Spanish were able to consolidate their

humans are ungrateful or are exploit-

power in Honduras through the use of

ing their resources, they might curse the

forced labor and the resettlement of the

family.10 The Lenca also have great re-

indigenous population. Despite royal

spect for their domestic animals and be-

decrees against slave labor, the Spanish

lieve in nagualism, companion animal

used the Lenca as human carriers, sold

spirits.11

immensely

under

colonization.

them as slaves or loaned them out to

Above all, the Lenca’s unique eco-

other settler groups, and demanded trib-

logical cosmology, and their inextri-

ute.3 In 1538 and 1540, the Spanish or-

cable bind to the biosphere make them

dered royal decrees for the colonizers to

natural stewards of the land. Yet since

deliver Christian education through the

the sixteenth century, Foreigners have

resettlement of indigenous populations

disregarded the Lenca attitude of re-

into centralized towns.4 Throughout the

spect and reciprocity towards the envi-

16th century, the indigenous population

ronment, which is not only an attack on

rapidly declined due to malnutrition,

their livelihoods, but their identity.

epidemics, and from the harsh condi-

Given the non-hierarchical rela-

tions from Spanish rule.5 Life under

tionship between humans and nature,

Spanish rule was so harsh that many

the Lenca believe that no one person

Lenca refrained from intercourse, com-

should be entitled to owning a piece of

mitted suicide and even killed their own

property, and that land should be owned

children to save them from slavery.6

and harvested communally.12 In the six-

Although Lempira, a famous Lenca

teenth century, the Spanish held similar

leader, united the Lenca to rebel against

views to the Lenca, imposing a model

the Spanish, resistance faltered follow-

of land tenure imported from Castile

ing Lempira’s murder by the Spanish in

whereby agricultural communities gov-

1637.

erned themselves and their communal lands through individual village coun-

Environmental Worldview

cils, called ejidos.13 After Honduras

The urgency of the fight of the

gained independence in 1821, the sys-

modern day Lenca to preserve their an-

tem of community governance endured,

cestral lands reflects their deep-rooted

the only difference being that these eji-

respect for the earth, that remains cen-

dos were under the purview of the state,

tral to their spirituality and culture.

rather than the crown.

They believe that humans are just one

part of the natural world, and thus have

ties in Honduras retained the rights to

a responsibility to protect it.7 In the

their land, local elites exerted consider-

14

While indigenous communi-

17 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

able influence over the poor rural popu-

ize communal land holdings as a major

lations through legal and financial lever-

impediment to development because

age. While the government continued to

they obstructed farmers’ ability to ac-

recognize the indigenous communities’

cess credit and invest in their land.18 In

rights to common property ownership

the name of “rationalizing land mar-

in the first half of the 20th century, the

kets,” agencies such as the World Bank

state started granting concessions to

and the International Monetary Fund

foreign corporations, notably American

pushed the Honduran state to regular-

fruit companies. This marked the begin-

ize and formalize the titling of the land,

ning of crippling debt and dependency

a move that would pose critical threats

on foreign corporations, which have

to the Lenca system of land tenure and

shaped the Honduran economy ever

thus their entire way of life.

since.15

However, in response to the

The Neoliberal Era

Cuban Revolution, which demonstrat-

ed how unequal land distribution can

liberal reform accelerated, as inter-

lead to violent and radical insurgency,

national donors ushered in a wave of

the Honduran military government in-

privatization. These reforms disrupted

troduced sweeping land reforms in the

the Lencas’ traditional modes of land

1972, redistributing much of the land

tenure and laid the foundation for the

that was previously owned by wealthy

wide-scale encroachment onto the land

elites.16 Yet as the geopolitical environ-

by local elites. Responding to interna-

ment and global economic consensus

tional donor pressure, the Honduran

changed in the 1980s, the Lenca saw a

government

waning recognition for their land and

state forest ownership allowing the state

way of life by their government and the

to sell communal lands.19 These reforms

international community. As a result of

declared secure private land tenure nec-

American interventions in the civil wars

essary for stimulating agricultural pro-

in El Salvador and Nicaragua, Ameri-

duction and lifting peasants out of pov-

can influence became more prominent

erty by providing access to credit.20

in Honduras, since the Americans con-

sidered the Honduran government to be

only failed to solve the problem of cred-

a major ally in the fight against commu-

it access and failed to lift the poor out

nism in Latin America. Through their

of poverty, they also exacerbated land

strategic position in Tegucigalpa, the

inequality.21 While the state argued that

United States also exerted influence on

formal legal titling of collective land

development policy, as they pressured

holdings helped peasants become ‘own-

the Honduran government to prioritize

ers’ of their land, in reality, it allowed

export-led development by re-distrib-

the oligarchy to acquire land in order to

uting land and promoting cooperative

grow cash crops on plantations.22 Many

enterprise.

indigenous families were forced to sell

These reforms also threatened

their land because they had no other

the Lenca’s informal tenure system, as

choice financially, while many others

international donors began to character-

were coerced through violence.23 Above

17

18 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

In the 1990s, the pace of neo-

passed

laws

privatizing

However, these reforms not

all, these reforms served to eliminate

stem elite land-grabbing.28 Spurred by

the traditional municipal system of

the rising global coffee prices, wealthy

land allocation that worked well for in-

families continued to engage in coer-

digenous communities for hundreds of

cive and often violent land-grabbing in

years.24

Lenca territory.29

Inspired by the successful up-

Mobilizing Against Margin-

risings of indigenous networks in Bo-

alization

livia and Ecuador, COPINH and other

While the government con-

indigenous advocacy bodies united to

tinued to sell off the indigenous com-

protest continued land-grabbing as well

munal land titles to both local and

as their broader political and econom-

foreign investors, previously disparate

ic marginalization. On July 20, 1995,

indigenous groups once again united in

COPINH led 2,000 indigenous Hondu-

resistance, building coalitions and mo-

rans to the capital and declared a hunger

bilizing against political and economic

strike outside the presidential headquar-

marginalization. While smaller advo-

ters, calling on the government to en-

cacy bodies for the Garifuna, Mesquito,

force the convention.30 The government

and the Lenca existed since the 1970s, it

responded by denouncing the demands,

was not until the 1990s that the groups

claiming that the opposition Partido Na-

began to organize collectively to pres-

cional was behind the protest.31

sure the government. In 1993, the Civic

However, after the election of pro-

Council of Popular and Indigenous Or-

gressive Manuel Zelaya in 2005, many

ganizations

(COPINH)

indigenous activists hoped that the gov-

–led in part by Berta Cáceres herself—

ernment would make strides in com-

formed to protest logging in the state of

batting indigenous marginalization and

Intibucá and demand recognition on a

land privatization. Although indigenous

national scale.25 Comprised of over 200

activists initially opposed Zelaya, he

Lenca activists, COPINH, pressured the

protected state-owned forests, voted in

Honduran government to ratify the In-

favor of the United Nations’ Declara-

ternational Labor Organization’s (ILO)

tion on the Rights of Indigenous People,

Convention 169 on Indigenous and

declared a moratorium on any further

Tribal Peoples in 1994.26 This binding

mining

international treaty mandates the right

ronmentalists in the drafting of a new

to free, prior, and informed consulta-

mining law, and accommodated social

tion of indigenous communities regard-

movements.32

of

Honduras

concessions,

included

envi-

ing any construction or projects on their land, prohibits the forced displacement of indigenous groups and protects their

“Open for Business” After Zelaya was removed in a coup

rights to their natural resources in their

d’état in 2009,

territories.27 In theory, this landmark

rightwing governments rolled back his

however, successive

achievement should protect indigenous

progressive reforms, declaring in 2011

communities from any incursions into

that Honduras was “open for busi-

their land.Yet due to limited enforce-

ness.”33 Almost immediately, the new

ment, ratification of ILO 169 failed to

government removed legal obstacles to 19 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

exploiting mining concessions, leading

nate the soil.37 Despite their refusal, the

to a greater demand for hydroelectric

mayor of the department of Intibucá,

energy.34 In September 2010 alone, the

the municipality where the dam is lo-

government granted 47 hydroelectric

cated, granted the construction permit

damn concessions, nearly all on Lenca

for the dam; in 2011, DESA bought the

territory,

consultation

land title using the local but non-Lenca

of the affected communities, in direct

Pineda-Madrid family, who as an inter-

violation of the international conven-

mediary, had initially acquired the land

tions.35 While indigenous activists like

through violence and coercion.38

the Lenca of COPINH have relentlessly

fought the new government to protect

the community, DESA went ahead with

their land and resources with some

construction. In April 2013, Berta Cáce-

success, they have faced legal repres-

res and other COPINH members orga-

sion and intense extrajudicial violence.

nized a blockade of the company road to

Since 2009, Honduras has become the

the river to block construction vehicles

most dangerous country in the world in

from entering.39 In the two years leading

which to be an environmental or land

up to Berta’s death, COPINH members

defender.

faced attacks (including murders) and

without

prior

36

Despite a lack of approval from

The conflict over the Agua

death threats for impeding construction.

Zarca Dam, which Berta Caceres lost

Although the Inter-American Human

her life fighting, provides an illustra-

Rights Commission repeatedly urged

tive and tragic example of the link be-

the Honduran government to protect

tween violence and development in In-

Cáceres, the government did not pro-

digenous Honduras. The conflict over

vide any security for Berta Caceres in

the dam is based on competing claims

the months preceding March 3rd, 2016.

of resource ownership, since the Lenca

have communally owned the land sur-

government of current president Juan

rounding

the

Gualcarque

River

Until

November

2016,

the

for

Orlando Hernandez refused requests to

generations, and rely on the river to

allow the Inter-American Human Rights

maintain their livelihoods. However, as

Commission to carry out an indepen-

part of their hydroelectric development

dent and impartial investigation, When

plan, the post-coup government sold the

the government finally launched an in-

Gualcarque River concession in 2010 to

vestigation into her murder two months

Desarollos Energeticos, S.A. (DESA)

later due to growing international scru-

a Honduran corporation that recieves

tiny, they eventually arrested two men

most of its financing from foreign in-

linked to DESA, two active members of

vestors. Though DESA tried to peace-

the military, and a retired military offi-

fully convince the Lenca of Rio Blanco

cer. Yet evidence increasingly indicates

to approve the hydroelectric project,

that the assassins were not alone in plot-

the community refused, claiming that

ting the attack, and that they received

the dam would block the flow of water,

their orders from the state.40 During the

disrupt the flow of fish, flood farmable

trial, The Guardian disclosed testimony

land, and destroy their protected forests,

from a former Honduran military ser-

emit greenhouse gases and contami-

geant suggesting that Berta’s name had

20 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

appeared on a military “hit-list.”41 Fur-

such as the Lenca, can provide critical

thermore, the government’s reluctance

insight for the preservation of the en-

to interview the sole eyewitness to the

vironment that the whole world should

murder, as well as its initial attribution

listen to. As Berta Cáceres’ said in her

of the crime to burglary, suggests a gov-

acceptance speech of the 2015 Gold-

ernment cover-up.42

man Prize, “Despertemos, despertemos humanidad, ya no hay tiempo”—wake

Conclusion:“D espertemos,

up humanity, we’re out of time.

Despertemos”

Berta’s murder is not an

Notes

isolated incident. Just days after her

1 Lauren Carasik, “Blood in Honduras,

death, Lenca environmental activist,

Silence in the United States,” Boston

Nelson García was killed. Last July,

Review, 16 July 2016.

Lesbia Yaneth Garcia, another COPINH

2 Emma Tyrou, “Justice for Berta Cá-

employee, was also found dead from a

ceres: Yet Another Murder Proves that

machete attack. At least one member of

Death and Impunity Prevail,” Washing-

the military and one person working on

ton Report on the Hemisphere, vol. 36,

the hydroelectric project she was pro-

issue 11, 11 July 2016.

testing have been implicated in Yaneth

3 Black 135

García’s death.43 Since the 2009 coup,

4 Ibid.

over 120 other environmental defend-

5 Tucker 1996

ers have been murdered in Honduras.44

6 Newson 1986: 131

Furthermore, crimes against the Lenca

7 Tucker 2008: 57

and environmental defenders are rarely

8 Tucker 2008: 42

ever prosecuted, since no Honduran law

9 Ibid.

exists that protects indigenous peoples.

10 Ibid.

As the abuse, harassment and state per-

11 Black 131

secution against the Lenca continues

12 Ibid.

to escalate, it is important to reflect on

13 Ibid. 51-94

both the history of land grabbing and in-

14 Tucker 2008: 31

security the Lenca have endured as well

15 John Soluri, Banana cultures: Agri-

as the ways in which the group has suc-

culture, consumption, and environmen-

cessfully resisted incursions and gained

tal change in Honduras and the United

representation.

States, Austin:

Press, 2005.

Since the stark contrasts be-

University

of Texas

tween the environmental worldview of

16 Donald Schulz & Deborah Schulz,

the Lenca, which destabilizes the hier-

The United States, Honduras, and the

archy of humans to the natural world,

Crisis in Central America, Boulder, CO:

and that of the profit-driven transna-

Westview Press (1994): 29–30.

tional corporations destroying the land,

17 Tyler Shipley, “Enclosing the Com-

is a major cause of this violence, it

mons in Honduras,” American Journal

demands increased international atten-

of Economics and Sociology 75, no. 2

tion. In the face of rapidly accelerat-

(2016): 456-487.

ing climate change, indigenous groups

18 Ibid.

21 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

La

Environmental and Land Activists in

Gaceta: Diario Oficial de la República

Honduras, the Highest in the World.”

de Honduras, no. 4658, 19 November,

Global Witness. 4 March 2016. https://

1990.

www.globalwitness.org/en/press-re-

20 Stephen Boucher, Bradford Barham,

leases/global-witness-releases-new-

& Michael Carter, “The impact of “mar-

data-murder-rate-environmental-and-

ket friendly” reforms on credit and land

land-activists-honduras-highest-world/

19

“Ley

de

Municipalidades,”

markets in Honduras and Nicaragua,” World Development, 33, no. 1 (2005):

37 Joshua Nichols, “Rio Blanco Com-

107–128.

munities Take Action to Defend Rivers, Territory, and Life,” Intercontinental

21 Ralph Woodward, Central America:

Cry, April 9, 2013.

A Nation Divided. New York: Oxford

nentalcry.org/indigenous-peoples-be-

https://interconti-

University Press, (1999): 273.

gin-anti-hydro-dam-action-in-hondu-

22 Kerssen, Tanya. Grabbing power:

ras/

The new struggles for land, food and democracy in Northern Honduras. No.

38 Bird 4-8

1. Food First Books, 2013.

39 Bird 7

23 Ibid.

40 Nina Lakhani and Ed Pilkington,

24 Tucker 2008

“US investigating allegations Honduran

25 COPINH, “Who we are,” blog:

military had hitlist of activists to tar-

http://copinhenglish.blogspot.ca/p/

get.” The Guardian. 8 July 2016.

who-we-are.html

41 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

42 Moira Birss and Gustavo Castro-

27 International Labor Organization,

Soto, “In Crisis, we Find Hope.” The

“Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Con-

North American Congress on Latin

vention,” Geneva, 76th ILC session, 27

America. 28 April 2016.

June 1989.

43 Associated Press. “ Police in Hon-

28 Bird 17

duras arrest three in slaying of activist.”

29 Tucker 2008

13 July 2016. The Los Angeles Times.

30 Barahona and Rivas, 41

Accessed 26 August 2016. http://www.

31 Ibid.

latimes.com/world/la-fg-honduras-ac-

32 Shipley, “Genealogy of a Social

tivist-arrest-20160713-snap-story.html

Movement”

44 “7 more activists killed in year since

33 “Honduras is Open for Business.” 26

Berta Cáceres’ murder as Honduran

July 2011. The Council on Hemispheric

government ramps up crackdown.” 3

Affairs. Accessed 12 December 2016.

March 2017. Global Witness. Accessed

http://www.coha.org/honduras-is-open-

8 March 2017.

for-business/ 34 Ibid.

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35 Nina Lakhani, “Honduras dam proj-

Barahona, Marvin, and Ramón D. Ri-

ect shadowed by violence,” Al Jazeera,

vas, eds. Rompiendo el espejo: Visiones

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sobre los pueblos indígenas y negros en

36 “New Data on the Murder Rate of

Honduras. Editorial Guaymuras, 1998.

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Brady, Scott. “Revisiting a Honduran

Dunkerley, James. Power in the isth-

landscape described by Robert West: An

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1 (2009): 7-27.

Edelman,

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León,

Andrés.

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34(, no. 9

(2013): 1697-1722. doi:10.1080/01436 Birss, Moira and Gustavo Castro-Soto.

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“In Crisis, we Find Hope.” 28 April 2016. The North American Congress on

“General Assembly adopts Declaration

Latin America.

on Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” United Nations General Assembly Plenary,

Black, Nancy Johnson. The Frontier

107th & 108th Meetings, 13 September

Mission and Social Transformation in

2007. http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/

Western Honduras: The Order of Our

ga10612.doc.htm

Lady of Mercy, 1525-1773. Vol. 14.

Brill, 1995.

International Labor Organization, “Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Conven-

Boucher, Stephen R., Bradford L. Bar-

tion,” Geneva: 76th ILC session, 27

ham, and Michael R. Carter. “The im-

June 1989.

pact of “market-friendly” reforms on credit and land markets in Honduras

Lakhani, Nina. “Honduras dam proj-

and Nicaragua.” World Development

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24

December

2013.

http://www.al-

jazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/ Campbell, Lyle. “The last Lenca.” Inter-

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Lakhani, Nina and Ed Pilkington. “US Carasik, Lauren. “Blood in Honduras,

investigating allegations Honduran mil-

Silence in the United States.”16 July

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2016. Boston Review. Accessed 10 De-

July 2016. The Guardian. Accessed 26

cember 2016. http://bostonreview.net/

August 2016. https://www.theguardian.

world-us/lauren-carasik-blood-hondu-

com/world/2016/jul/08/honduras-mili-

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tary-hitlist-activists-us-investigation

Chapman, Anne. Los hijos del copal

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Universidad

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Central America:

Practicing Family Reunification in Canada: Children First Quinn Brown

Quinn Brown is a U3 student pursuing a degree in International Development Studies with a focus on Economics and Governance. Her interests include child advocacy and public policy, particularly studying how Canadian immigration policies affect immigrant and refugee children. This strong interest is reflected in her paper, which she researched and wrote in her Social Work “Policy and Practice for Refugees course. Her academic

experiences in Political Science and Economics helped her understand complex global security conflicts that lead to involuntary displacement.

Quinn furthered this knowledge by studying the efficacy of national immigration policies that aim to the best interest of extremely vulnerable populations. Quinn is a graduating student that aims to further this interest by pursuing a career in refugee advocacy, particularly focusing on children.

shown to diminish, as refugee parents

Introduction The Family Class of refugees is the

may face considerable socioeconomic

primary provision through which reset-

barriers to securing the financial capital

tled refugees apply to bring dependent

needed to undertake sponsorship.

children to Canada. The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) states the objective of the Family Class

Context

Firstly, It is important to note

is “to support the self-sufficiency and

how family reunification is affected

the social and economic well-being of

by domestic considerations that pre-

refugees by facilitating reunification

clude expedited resettlement of depen-

with their family members in Canada.”

1

dent children. The IRPA was enacted

This paper will demonstrate that the

in 20012 at a time when the West was

practices in place to facilitate family re-

reeling from the events of Septem-

unification in Canada do not sufficiently

ber 11th, 2001. Following the 9/11 at-

uphold Canada’s commitment to serve

tacks, “a strong majority of Canadians

the best interest of the child, a priority

[believed] that that many refugees are

enshrined in domestic legislation and

not ‘real refugees’… a concern that we

ratification of the United Nations Con-

are being taken advantage of by some

vention on the Rights of a Child. The

of those claiming to be refugees flee-

context in which the IRPA and ensuing

ing persecution.:3 The need for political

regulations were codified demonstrates

compromise between continued immi-

a movement away from humanitarian

gration and public opinion was reflected

principles in refugee resettlement and

in the early 2000s when, “the trend of

towards Canada’s economic interests.

a high volume of newcomers under the

Furthermore, the prospects of fam-

Family Class steadily declined to less

ily reunification trans-migration will be

than a third of all immigrants.”4 In25 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

stead, the government emphasized the

photo and video imagery and first-hand

market benefits of accepting “skilled

accounts from refugees themselves. The

immigrants”,

preferential

plight of refugees has become a visible,

treatment to the entrance of economic

almost tangible, experience that popula-

migrants. This trend has still continues,

tions in host countries have become re-

exemplified in the 2017-2018 targets for

sponsive to. One powerful example in

immigration published by the federal

Canada was the photo of Alan Kurdi, a

government, which lowered the target

Syrian asylum seeker found ashore on a

for humanitarian and refugee applicants

beach in Greece. After it was discovered

down 26%.5

that his family was denied their asylum

bestowing

claim in Canada, this photo became the Pre-Settlement

Conditions

and Excluded Family Members

The IRPA was designed with

reference point of immigration discussion in Canada’s 2015 federal election.

Crucial to this issue is the fact

broad language to leave the, “details

that advocates for refugee rights called

for the executive to design and imple-

attention to the brutishness of this provi-

ment through Immigration and Refugee

sion in Canada’s highest court, bringing

Protection Regulations (regulations)”.6

forward a Charter of Rights and Free-

The provisions of Family Class refugee

doms challenge on the grounds that it

resettlement articulated in the IRPA are

violated the right to life liberty and se-

constrained by certain procedures in the

curity of the person guaranteed in the

regulations in such a way that makes the

Charter’s Section 7. The Supreme Court

practice of family reunification difficult

found that this provision was not a vio-

even before refugee parents arrive in

lation of refugee’s Section 7 right to the

Canada.7 Section 117(9)(d) of the Regu-

“security of person” because the refugee

lation code, “denies family reunification

could appeal the decision as a Humani-

to anyone who was not examined by a

tarian and Compassionate application.”9

visa officer… it applies regardless of the

As the Canadian Council for Refugees

circumstances and with regard for the

emphatically stated, “the existence of a

best interests of any children affected”

discretionary remedy is not a substitute

(Canadian Council for Refugees, 2006,

for an acceptable review process… and

p.3).8 This provision overlooks the con-

there is no review process to ensure ade-

ditions that most often cause individuals

quate consideration of the best interests

to apply for refugee status, such as pro-

of a child.”10 The policy regulation that

tracted violence in civil wars and fear

excludes family members legitimizes

of persecution. Moreover, it negates a

a practice of distrust towards refugees,

refugee’s possible psychosocial trauma

and presents a concerted step away

that occurs before flight, and the chaos

from the best interests of a child in the

that may characterize the actual flight

context of family reunification. To pri-

experience. A remedy to this provision

oritize factual accuracy on an applica-

starts with humanizing the refugee dis-

tion over the psychosocial well being of

course. The media serves as a crucial

refugees separated from their family is

conduit for actualizing the tumultuous-

not only a misunderstanding of the con-

ness of this experience; disseminating

ditions a refugee may have experienced

26 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

during migration, but also a shirking

productive capabilities, as they devalue

of Canada’s humanitarian commitment

foreign education and overlook the so-

to foster positive refugee resettlement.

cial and structural support needed to

Furthermore, it an indisputable evasion

adjust to a new environment. There are

of Canada’s commitment to “the best

two regulations that are central to this

interests of a child”, as it requires that

section of analysis; first, the regulation

children be left behind if their parents

Section 133 (1)(h) that bars a sponsor

mistakenly did not include them in the

from bringing their dependent child to

application.

Canada if they are, “in default in respect

The aforementioned IRPA and

of the repayment of any debt…” to the

regulations that preclude resettlement

government of Canada.11 Second, Sec-

demonstrate a top-down understand-

tion 133(1)(k) of the regulations bars a

ing of situations of involuntary migra-

would-be sponsor “in receipt of social

tion. The bureaucratization of visa ap-

assistance for a reason other than dis-

plications and processing that occurs

ability” from sponsoring a dependent

in United Nations High Commissioner

child overseas.12 These two policies,

for Refugees (UNHCR) sites overseas

contextualized by the structural condi-

is exacerbated by stringent regulations

tions of employment and access to so-

here in Canada that can diminish the

cial services, may present problematic

prospects of family reunification.

practices for refugee parents, and therefore, their dependent children.

Prospect of Family Reunification

It is appropriate to first discuss

Section 133 (1)(h) of the regulations that The resettlement process for

bars refugees in debt to the government

refugees begins when they are forced to

to sponsor dependent children under

flee their country of origin in search of

the Family Class.13 Refugees often in-

freedom and security. The difficult pro-

cur debt due to the fact that the resettle-

cess does not become instantly resolved

ment process requires refugees to fund

upon arrival in Canada, particularly for

their own required medical examina-

refugees that are separated from mem-

tions, travel documentation, and trans-

bers of their family who remain in the

portation to Canada.14 The Immigration

country of origin. The sponsorship re-

Loans Program assists with payments,

quirements of the Family Class are

on the condition that the individual

subject to the regulations that negate

must begin to refund their loan within

the difficult socioeconomic conditions

thirty days of landing in Canada.15 The

that refugees may face post-settlement.

individual is considered to be in default

A refugee’s ability to secure adequate

to the government, and thus unable to

financial capital to support a family,

sponsor, “not only if they have failed

repay loans incurred during travel, and

to make payments but also if they have

qualify for sponsorship is, in turn, reli-

negotiated a revised repayment sched-

ant on practices that regulate the em-

ule to take into account their limited in-

ployment and social support of refu-

come on arrival to Canada.”16 Parents’

gees in Canada. These practices can be

income must be sufficient to refund an

discriminatory towards the refugee’s

immigration loan and also support the 27 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

family’s basic needs, all while travers-

dividual’s socioeconomic positioning in

ing the potentially difficult territory of

Canada’s capitalist, knowledge-based,

being a newcomer to Canada.

economy can be adversely affected by

While the government cannot

fund every refugee’s travel costs and medical exams out of the federal budget,

linguistic, citizenship, and educational concerns.

An interview-based study by

the debt repayment system and require-

the Journal of International Migration

ments for sponsorship can delay family

and Integration states, “finding steady

reunification. It is problematic that the

employment at a level appropriate to

practice of family reunification, specifi-

their (refugees) educational attainment

cally as it pertains to children, is almost

prior occupational standing was the

totally reliant on the economic and fi-

main problem.”19 Although immigrants

nancial situation of the parents. The

and refugees account for a greater per-

practice of reunifying families to serve

centage of the labour force, there is

the best interests of child is devalued by

a greater propensity they will be em-

financial requirements that overlook the

ployed in the service or skill (i.e. trade,

structural constraints adults may face as

manual labour, etc.) sectors, which pay

newly settled refugees in Canada.

lower wages. The result is that, “a higher degree of earnings inequality likely will

Post-Settlement

make it harder for immigrants to be-

After a refugee parent has

come integrated fully into the Canadian

landed in Canada, the opportunity to

economy.”20 Another study conducted

sponsor a dependent child continues

interviews with newly arrived Chinese

to balance on their financial security. If

and Somali refugees in Canada finding

the parent(s) did not incur debt to the

that, “these newcomers reported that the

government trans-migration, but have

main barriers to obtaining employment

little disposable income to provide for

are: non-recognition of foreign qualifi-

the family, “an alternate source of in-

cations, lack of Canadian work experi-

come is required, at least in the interim,

ence… inadequate job search skills, and

which social assistance frequently pro-

language difficulties.”21 This empirical

vides.”17 The conditions a refugee par-

finding exemplifies the problem with

ent may face post-resettlement could

Section 133 (1) (k): this policy wholly

force them to choose between support-

negates the variety of practices that dis-

ing themselves and their accompanying

advantage certain labour market partici-

family with supplemented income from

pants, preventing the participants from

government

securing financial capital required for

welfare,

or,

sponsoring

their dependent children abroad. The Canadian Council for Refugees finds

sponsorship.

The practice of family reunifi-

that, “even with a work permit, it can be

cation, particularly when the best inter-

hard to find a job, particularly for people

ests of a child are at stake, is too heavily

who are suffering from trauma and the

dependent on refugee parents’ socio-

impact of violence and persecution in

economic standing. The two subsec-

their home country. Many speak neither

tions of Section 133 of the regulations

English nor French.”18 Therefore, an in-

wholly negate any consideration of the

28 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

difficulties adult refugees may encoun-

6 Kelley, Ninette and Trebilcock, Mi-

ter when entering the job market, based

chael.

on employment practices that reflect an

History of Canadian Immigration Poli-

affinity towards English - and French -

cy. University of Toronto Press, 2010.

speaking, Western-educated, Canadian

425.

citizens.

7 Immigration and Refugee Protection

The Making of the Mosaic: A

Act, Statutes of Canada 2001, c.27.

Conclusion

The refugee discourse is most

8 Non-Citizens in Canada: Equally Human, Equally Entitled to Rights. Report.

often framed as a political issue that in-

Canadian Council for Refugees, 2006.

tersects global security, foreign policy

9 De Guzman v. Canada, Supreme

and national interests. It is crucial to ex-

Court of Canada, FCA 436, 2005.

amine the role that family reunification

10 Non-Citizens in Canada: Equally

holds in ensuring a positive experience

Human, Equally Entitled to Rights. Re-

for refugees resettling in a new country.

port. Canadian Council for Refugees,

Family reunification is most effective

2006.

for children who may have already ex-

11 Immigration and Refugee Protection

perienced psychosocial trauma before,

Act, Statutes of Canada 2001, c.27.

or during, involuntary migration. For

12 Ibid.

Canada to uphold the best interests of a

13 Ibid.

child in immigration and refugee policy,

14 Non-Citizens in Canada: Equally

there must be a reconditioning of regu-

Human, Equally Entitled to Rights. Re-

lations that qualify sponsorship; regula-

port. Canadian Council for Refugees,

tions that are less dependent on financial

2006. 4.

capital and recognizant of the unique-

15 Ibid. 9.

ness of refugeehood.

16 Canadian Council for Refugees, Impacts on Children of the Immigration

Notes

and Refugee Protection Act. 9.

1 Immigration and Refugee Protection

17

Act, Statutes of Canada 2001, c.27.

FAQs. Report. Canadian Council for

2 Ibid.

Refugees, 2015.

3 Mendelsohn, Matthew. Canada’s So-

18 Ibid.

cial Contract: Evidence from Public

19 Krahn, H., T. Derwing, T. Mulder,

Opinion. Report. Canadian Policy Re-

and L. Wilkinson. “Educated and Un-

search Networks. 8.

deremployed: Refugee Integration into

4 Neborak, Jacklyn. Family Reunifi-

the Canadian Labour Market.” Journal

cation? A Critical Analysis of Citizen-

of International Migration and Integra-

ship and Immigration: Canada’s 2013

tion 1, no. 1 (2000). 66.

Reforms to the Family Class. Report.

20 Beach, C., A. Green, and C. Wors-

RCIS Working Papers, 2013. 3.

wick.

5 Immigration, Refugees and Citizen-

Skilled Immigration Policy: An evalua-

ship Canada, Government of Canada.

tive Approach. Howe Institute. 2.

Supplementary Information 2016 Im-

21 Stewart, Miriam, Joan Anderson,

migration Levels Plan, 2016.

Morton Beiser, Edward Mwakarimba,

Refugees

and

Towards

social

Improving

assistance:

Canada’s

29 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

Anne Neufeld, Laura Simich, and Denise Spitzer. “Multicultrual Meanings

Mendelsohn, Matthew. Canada’s Social

of Social Support among Immigrants

Contract: Evidence from Public Opin-

and Refugees.” Journal of International

ion. Report. Canadian Policy Research

Migration 46, no. 3 (July 10, 2008):

Networks.

123-59.

Neborak, Jacklyn. Family ReunificaBibliography

tion? A Critical Analysis of Citizen-

Beach, C., A. Green, and C. Worswick.

ship and Immigration: Canada’s 2013

Towards Improving Canada’s Skilled

Reforms to the Family Class. Report.

Immigration Policy: An evaluative Ap-

RCIS Working Papers, 2013.

proach. Howe Institute.

Non-Citizens in Canada: Equally HuCanadian Council for Refugees, Im-

man, Equally Entitled to Rights. Report.

pacts on Children of the Immigration

Canadian Council for Refugees, 2006.

and Refugee Protection Act. 9.

Refugees and social assistance: FAQs. De Guzman v. Canada, Supreme Court

Report. Canadian Council for Refugees,

of Canada, FCA 436, 2005.

2015.

Rousseau, C., C. M. Rufagari, D. Ba-

Humanitarian and compassionate as-

gilishya, and T. Measham. “Remaking

sessment: Best interests of a child. Re-

family life: strategies for re-establishing

port. Government of Canada, 2006.

continuity among Congolese refugees during the family reunification process.”

Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship

Journal of Social Science & Medicine

Canada, Government of Canada. Sup-

59, no. 5 (2004).

plementary Information 2016 Immigration Levels Plan, 2016.

Stewart, Miriam, Joan Anderson, Morton Beiser, Edward Mwakarimba, Anne

Immigration and Refugee Protection

Neufeld, Laura Simich, and Denise

Act, Statutes of Canada 2001, c.27.

Spitzer.

http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/i-2.5/

Social Support among Immigrants and

“Multicultrual

Meanings

of

Refugees.” Journal of International MiKrahn, H., T. Derwing, T. Mulder, and

gration 46, no. 3 (July 10, 2008): 123-

L. Wilkinson. “Educated and Under-

59.

employed: Refugee Integration into the Canadian Labour Market.” Journal of

Silvius,

International Migration and Integration

Praznik. Refugees and Family Reuni-

1, no. 1 (2000).

fication. Report. Canadian Center for

R.,

E.

Halldorson,

and

J.

Policy Alternatives.

Kelley, Ninette and Trebilcock, Michael.

The Making of the Mosaic: A

United Nations High Commissioner for

History of Canadian Immigration Poli-

Refugees. “Figures at a Glance.” UN-

cy. University of Toronto Press, 2010.

HCR. http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-

30 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

a-glance.html.

31 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

The ASEAN-India Free Trade Area Agreement: Economic and NonEconomic Effects for India

is concerned with the intersection of economics and public policy, analyzing both theoretical policy goals and their practical consequences. To this end she chose to write about the effects of a new free trade area agreement for her class, “Economic Development”.

Rebecca Summers

Rebecca Summers is a U2 student pursuing a double major degree in Economics and IDS. She Introduction

encourage trade links and provide for-

While India was an economic

eign resources for India. This LEP con-

and strategic ally of the Soviet Union

ceptualization was the first step in creat-

during the Cold War, most of Southeast

ing a free trade area between Southeast

Asia was anti-communist, creating a

Asia and India.4

rift between India and Southeast Asia.

India’s opinion of Southeast Asia as an

Trade Area (AIFTA) framework agree-

undeveloped and unattractive region

ment was signed in Bali, Indonesia, on

further intensified this schism.1 Follow-

October 8th, 2003.5 This paper will first

ing the fall of the USSR and the end of

introduce the member states of ASEAN,

the Cold War in 1989, India faced an

their economies, and how ASEAN oper-

economic crisis and a severe balance-

ates as a bloc. Secondly, it will present

of-payments deficit. With the rise of

AIFTA’s objectives and commitments,

globalization and international trade,

including a summary of the schedule

India’s only chance of economic sur-

of tariff elimination. Thirdly, this pa-

vival was to secure foreign investment

per will present the main criticisms of

and establish new international trade re-

AIFTA, namely the fear of decreased

lations.2

domestic prices and the misconception

The Indian government trans-

The initial ASEAN-India Free

of greater market access.

formed its economy with this modern-

ized outlook. Privatization, improved

macroeconomic effects of the agree-

infrastructure, and strategic education

ment, by presenting two reports that

plans

India’s

predict the benefits of AIFTA and com-

Gross National Product (GNP.)3 One

pare these hypotheses with raw data

initiative that resulted in marked eco-

from the World Bank to determine their

nomic success was the national Look

factuality. Finally, it will analyze the

East Policy (LEP.) This policy was de-

development-focused,

signed to connect India with previously

effects of AIFTA such as policy cohe-

neglected Southeast Asian nations to

sion on national health objectives and

dramatically

increased

32 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

The paper will then study the

non-economic

anti-terrorism measures. The paper will

Objectives

conclude with a broad overview of the

effects of AIFTA and a prediction of the

Trade Area (AIFTA) agreement seeks to

future of this agreement.

improve economic conditions, increase

The

ASEAN-India

FWree

the ease of trade, and ensure a greater About the ASEAN Bloc

flow of investment within the region.

ASEAN is an economic and

According to the World Bank, this is

political organization among Brunei,

achieved by “progressively [liberaliz-

Cambodia,

Malay-

ing] and [promoting] trade in goods and

sia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore,

services as well as [creating] a transpar-

Thailand, and Vietnam. It has a land

ent, liberal and facilitative investment

area of nearly 4.5 million kilometres,

regime.”10 In addition, AIFTA explores

is comprised of approximately 600 mil-

innovative and original economic de-

lion people, and has a combined Gross

velopment measures designed to inte-

Domestic Product (GDP) of 2.57 trillion

grate the members’ economies more ef-

USD in 2016.6 India is ASEAN’s fourth-

fectively with the purpose of reducing

greatest trading partner, with ASEAN-

the development gap between them.

Indonesia,

Laos,

Indian trade valued at 65.04 billion USD in 2016.7

Commitments

A significant feature of ASEAN is that it

does not have a hegemon state that can

agreement regarding the trade of goods

use its power to influence other mem-

eliminates the tariffs from approximate-

bers to act according to its own purpos-

ly 4,000 products, including electronics,

es. The founding states are

chemicals, machinery, and textiles trad-

similar in

In practice, the aspect of the

terms of their economies and militaries,

ed within the region.11 These goods are

and even late members are alike regard-

divided into five different tracks: nor-

less of their level of development. ASE-

mal, sensitive, highly sensitive, special

AN was initially designed to reduce the

products, and the exclusion list.12 Each

tense relationships within the region,

track has a separate tariff reduction rate

allowing each member to focus on its

and elimination date, depending on the

own domestic concerns rather than in-

sensitivity of the good to the Indian do-

tra-region difficulties.8 The group rests

mestic economy. The highly sensitive

on the belief that all policies should be

track, for example, has a much later

voluntarily adopted and that each state

tariff elimination date of 2019, and the

must respect each other’s right to sov-

exclusion list protects India’s key do-

ereignty. It presents a platform for dia-

mestic products from any tariff reduc-

logue and discussion that is neutral and

tion whatsoever. Therefore, the nego-

non-threatening, and as such is capable

tiations have provided some safeguard

of making great strides amongst mem-

measures to protect India’s interests in

ber and non-member states alike.9

different sectors.13

The

Criticisms of AIFTA

ASEAN-India

Free

Trade

Area: Objectives and Commit-

Opposition against AIFTA of-

ments 33 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

ten stems from the fear of an increase

existing free trade agreements before

of imports in goods India already pro-

the adoption of AIFTA.17 Therefore,

duces, thus causing a domestic price

the gains from a larger market may not

decrease. This concern is best expressed

be as prosperous as imagined because

contextually: India currently has a trade

AIFTA does not provide India access to

surplus with Vietnam of over 1 billion

a significantly new market.

USD; Vietnam imports more goods from India than it is exporting to India.

Macroeconomic Effects

To reduce the deficit, Vietnam has great-

Existing Research

ly depressed prices of its exports. Other

countries such as Cambodia, Laos, and

was prepared for 14th Annual Confer-

Myanmar all show economic improve-

ence on Global Economic Analysis that

ment at rates even greater than Vietnam,

measured the effect AIFTA would have

which will cause an increase of Indian

on differing macroeconomic variables.

exports to these countries as well.14 As

The study compared how these effects

a result, one may argue that these na-

would vary depending on the level of

tions will have essentially no other op-

liberalization (either total or partial,

tion but to increase their exports to India

where partial is the current case with

at any cost, as was the case with Viet-

AIFTA due to its various tariff tracks),

nam. As they are agro-focused states,

and perfect versus imperfect compe-

these price-cut exports will be com-

tition in the market. In summary, the

peting with India’s very own products,

study predicted an increase in India’s

driving down market prices across the

GDP and imports in the years to come.18

country.15 By depressing market prices

to remain competitive, farmers will re-

report by Standard Chartered suggests

ceive less compensation for the sale of

ASEAN-Indian trade will grow expo-

their goods, resulting in less income to

nentially in the coming decades. Ac-

support themselves and their family.

cording to its analysis, trade is to reach

Considering that in 2013, the agricul-

280 billion USD in the next ten years.

tural sector employed nearly 50% of

At the publication date, this figure was

the Indian population, price-cut exports

worth 80 billion and growing at a ten-

would result in a devastating decrease

year historic rate of 23%. India’s ex-

of the country’s Gross National Income

ports to the bloc were approximately

and standard of living.16

33 billion USD. The report remarked

Furthermore, one of India’s

that these projections were based on the

motivations for signing AIFTA was to

assumption that India’s export to GDP

gain access to a broader market. While

ratio would continue to grow as it ad-

this is a reasonable objective for a free

opted a greater role in the international

trade agreement, in the case of India it

economy.19

In 2011, a simulation study

Moreover,

a

2014

research

may be considered redundant. 60% of India’s current trade with ASEAN na-

Raw Data Analysis

tions is to Singapore and Thailand, two

countries with which India already had

nificantly from 2010 to 2012, however

34 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

India’s GDP growth fell sig-

it has since increased steadily.20 Despite

Health Objectives

this change in growth, which is likely

attributed to the 2008-2009 financial

lar health values and objectives. How-

crisis, actual GDP at current market

ever, as opposed to ASEAN’s progres-

prices has risen dramatically in a steady

sive healthcare policies, India struggles

upwards trend from 1.7 trillion USD in

to implement successful health policies

2010 to 2.04 trillion USD in 2014; an

due to inconsistent policy structures and

increase of 20% in the four years fol-

a severe lack of resources.25

lowing the finalization of the agree-

ment.21

in an official “Plan of Action to Imple-

ASEAN and India share simi-

The two regions have united

Despite an increase from 2010

ment the ASEAN-India Partnership for

to 2013, exports as a percent of GDP

Peace, Progress and Prosperity.” Goals

significantly decreased in the 2013-2014

of this plan include the development

fiscal year, allowing for a net change of

of quality pharmaceuticals, decreasing

only +1.2% after four years.22 Imports

medicine costs, improving diagnostic

as a percent of GDP spiked from 2010

and therapeutic supplies for HIV/AIDS,

to 2012, but have since decreased every

and increasing the quality and quan-

year, allowing for a net change of -0.9%

tity of drugs for various fatal diseases.26

in the four years following the finaliza-

With the combined effort, both regions

tion of the agreement.23 During this pe-

will benefit from the stronger tie that

riod, unemployed remained stable with

AIFTA has afforded in ways beyond the

a net change of only +0.1%.24

scope of pure economic growth.

The Standard Chartered report

made its predictions based off the as-

Terrorism

sumption that exports as a percent of

GDP would remain constant but in the

AN countries have dealt with local acts

2013-2014 fiscal year the ratio actually

of terrorism, there is the possibility of

decreased dramatically. It is unclear

cooperation

whether the 280 billion USD figure

policies. Southeast Asia is considered to

in ten years will actually be reached,

be both the base of operations and the

which depends on how India adjusts to

prime target of radical Islamic extremist

its fall in exports, and whether it is able

groups due to a long history of political-

to adequately offset this change.

religious violence in the region.27

Considering that many ASE-

regarding

Conversely,

anti-terrorism

India’s

primary

Non-Economic Effects

source of conflict originates from its

The new connection between

long-term hostility with Pakistan. With

India and Southeast Asia bears more

a strengthened ASEAN-Indian relation-

than economic changes, such as the ini-

ship, both Pakistan and India can learn

tiation of cohesive policies regarding

from one another’s experiences to better

health and terrorism. This section will

address their Muslim communities and

outline each region’s respective stance

minority conflicts. The ASEAN-India

on these issues and how each has been

Joint Declaration for Cooperation to

affected by the AIFTA agreement.

Combat

International

Terrorism

ad-

35 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

dressed such cooperation with a plat-

Appendix

form to reduce terrorism through the

Figure 1

flow of information, intelligence, and training measures.28 Concluding Observations

As a trade agreement in goods

and services between the ASEAN bloc and India, AIFTA reduces tariffs on certain goods to increase exchange between the two regions. Despite con-

Source: Parthapratim Pal and Mitali

cerns about which countries will benefit

Dasgupta,

the most from the agreement and how

Trade

to protect domestic farmers from price

Economic and Political Weekly 44, no.

decreases, AIFTA provides safeguards

38 (2009): 12, http://www.jstor.org/sta-

for the primary domestic sectors and

ble/25663562

“The

ASEAN-India

Agreement:

An

Free

Assessment,”

protects against any dramatic drop in exports.

Figure 2 As discussed in section five,

India has experienced a trade surplus since the implementation of AIFTA. Following the 2008-2009 financial crisis, GDP growth has steadily increased, and nominal GDP has grown exponentially. Standard Chartered predicts that ASEAN-Indian trade will grow from 80 billion USD to 280 billion USD by 2024. These are all extremely positive changes for India’s economy, and indicate that AIFTA has and will continue to be highly economically beneficial.

Finally, a stronger relationship

between India and ASEAN welcomes

Source: Biswajit Nag and Chandrima

the possibility of closer policy ties to

Sikdar, “India-ASEAN FTA: Implica-

reach common goals. Health objectives

tion of Phased Liberalisation,” Univer-

and counter-terrorism actions provide

sity of Venice (Venice: 2011), 15.

two areas where the regions can work together to share information and resources to ensure mutual benefits. In this sense, AIFTA provides not only economic prosperity, but also non-economic development benefits that will serve to drastically improve India’s political security and standard of living.

36 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

Figure 3

Figure 5

GDP growth (annual %) in India

India’s Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)

Source: The World Bank, “GDP growth

Source: The World Bank, “Exports of

(annual %),” The World Bank: Data In-

goods and services (% of GDP),” The

dicators,

http://data.worldbank.org/in-

World Bank: Data Indicators, http://

dicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/coun-

data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.

tries/IN?display=graph (accessed April

GNFS.ZS?display=graph

8, 2016).

April 8, 2016).

Figure 4

Figure 6

India’s GDP at market prices (current

India’s Imports of Goods and Services

US$)

(% of GDP)

(accessed

Source: The World Bank, “Imports of Source: The World Bank, “GDP at

goods and sercices (% of GDP),” The

market

The

World Bank: Data Indicators, http://

World Bank: Data Indicators, http://

data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.IMP.

data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.

GNFS.ZS?display=graph

MKTP.CD/countries/IN?display=graph

April 8, 2016).

prices

(current

US$),”

(accessed

(accessed April 9, 2016).

37 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

Figure 7

8 Amador, Bobillo, Peñalber. “Issues

Total Unemployment in India (% of to-

and Challenges,” 112-113.

tal labour force)

9 Ibid.

10 World Bank, India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. (Bali: 2010) http:// wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/ASEAN-India.pdf.

11

Tangkilisan,

ASEAN-India

Free

Trade Area Part I. 12 Appendix, Figure 1.

13 K. J. Joseph, “ASEAN-India Pact Source: The World Bank, “Unemploy-

and Plantations: Realities of the Myths,”

ment, total (% of total labour force),”

Economic and Political Weekly 44, no.

The World Bank: Data Indicators, http://

44 (2009): 14-15, http://www.jstor.org/

data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.

stable/25663724.

TOTL.ZS/countries/IN?display=graph

14 Joseph, “ASEAN-India Pact and

(accessed April 9, 2016).

Plantations,” 15.

15 Ibid.

Notes

16 The World Bank, “Employment in

1 Julio S. Amador III, Ariana Bobillo,

agriculture (% of total employment),”

and Amirah Peñalber. “Issues and Chal-

The World Bank: Data Indicators, http://

lenges

Relations:

data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.

Political-Security Aspects,” India Quar-

EMPL.ZS/countries/IN?display=graph

terly 72, no. 2 (2011): 112, http://iqq.

(accessed April 9, 2016.)

sagepub.com.

17 Parthapratim Pal and Mitali Das-

2 Amador, Bobillo, Peñalber. “Issues

gupta, “The ASEAN-India Free Trade

and Challenges,” 112.

Agreement:

3 Ibid.

nomic and Political Weekly 44, no. 38

4 Ibid.

(2009):

5 Alex Tangkilisan, ASEAN-India Free

stable/25663562.

Trade Area Part I: Introduction, Febru-

18 Appendix, Figure 2.

ary 7, 2013. http://www.aseanbriefing.

19 “Indian exports to ASEAN to touch

com/news/2013/02/07/asean-india-

$280 billion in 10 years: Standard Char-

free-trade-area-part-i-introduction.html.

tered,” Times of India, August 12, 2014,

6 Association of Southeast Asian Na-

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/in-

tions, “ASEAN GDP Grows by 4.6%,”

dia/Indian-exports-to-Asean-to-touch-

ASEAN Secretariat News, http://asean.

280-billion-in-10-years-Standard-

org/asean-gdp-grows-by-46/ (accessed

Chartered/articleshow/40857071.cms

March 6, 2017.)

(accessed April 8, 2016).

in

ASEAN-India

An

13-14,

Assessment,”

http://www.jstor.org/

7 Ministry of External Affairs, “ASE-

20 Figure 3, Appendix.

AN-India

Government

21 Figure 4, Appendix.

http://www.mea.gov.in/

22 Figure 5, Appendix.

of

Relations,”

India,

aseanindia/20-years.htm

(accessed

March 6, 2017.)

38 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

Eco-

23 Figure 6, Appendix.

24 Figure 7, Appendix.

25 Amador, Bobillo, Peñalber. “Issues

(2009):

and Challenges,” 119.

stable/25663562.

11-15.

http://www.jstor.org/

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid, 115.

Ministry of External Affairs. “ASEAN-

28 Ibid.

India Relations.” Government of India.

Accessed March 6, 2017. http://www. mea.gov.in/aseanindia/20-years.htm.

Bibliography Amador III, Julio S., Ariana Bobillo, and Amirah Peñalber. “Issues and Chal-

Tangkilisan,

lenges

Relations:

Free Trade Area Part I: Introduction.

Political-Security Aspects.” India Quar-

February 7, 2013. Accessed April 6,

terly 72, no. 2 (2011): 112-120. http://

2016.

iqq.sagepub.com.

news/2013/02/07/asean-india-free-

in

ASEAN-India

Alex.

ASEAN-India

http://www.aseanbriefing.com/

trade-area-part-i-introduction.html.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

“ASEAN GDP Grows by 4.6%.” ASE-

The World Bank. “Employment in agri-

AN Secretariat News. Accessed March

culture (% of total employment).” The

6,

World Bank: Data Indicators. Accessed

2017.

http://asean.org/asean-gdp-

April 9, 2016. http://data.worldbank.

grows-by-46/.

org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS/coun“Indian exports to ASEAN to touch

tries/IN?display=graph.

$280 billion in 10 years: Standard Chartered.” Times of India, August 12,

The World Bank. “Exports of goods and

2014. Accessed April 8, 2016. http://

services (% of GDP).” The World Bank:

timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indi-

Data

an-exports-to-Asean-to-touch-280-bil-

2016. http://data.worldbank.org/indica-

lion-in-10-years-Standard-Chartered/

tor/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?display=graph.

Indicators.

Accessed

April

8,

articleshow/40857071.cms.

The World Bank. “GDP growth (anJoseph, K. J. “ASEAN-India Pact and

nual %).” The World Bank: Data In-

Plantations: Realities of the Myths.”

dicators.

Economic and Political Weekly 44, no.

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/

44 (2009): 14-18. http://www.jstor.org/

N Y. G D P. M K T P. K D . Z G / c o u n t r i e s /

stable/25663724.

IN?display=graph.

Nag, Biswajit and Chandrima Sikdar.

The World Bank. “GDP at market pric-

“India-ASEAN FTA: Implication of

es (current US$).” The World Bank:

Phased Liberalisation.” University of

Data

Venice Press (Venice: 2011), 15.

2016.

Accessed

Indicators.

April

Accessed

8,

2016.

April

9,

http://data.worldbank.org/indi-

cator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries/ Pal,

Parthapratim

and

Mitali

Das-

IN?display=graph.

gupta. “The ASEAN-India Free Trade Eco-

The World Bank. “Imports of goods and

nomic and Political Weekly 44, no. 38

sercices (% of GDP).” The World Bank:

Agreement:

An

Assessment.”

39 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

Data

Indicators.

Accessed

April

8,

2016. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS?display=graph.

The World Bank. India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. (Bali: 2010)

Ac-

cessed April 9, 2016. http://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/ASEAN-India.pdf.

The World Bank. “Unemployment, total (% of total labour force).” The World Bank: Data Indicators. Accessed April 9, 2016. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS/countries/ IN?display=graph.

40 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

Women, Violence and the State: An examination of state responsibility, the constitution, and civil society in the context of India Sejeong Park

Sejeong Park is Korean, but was born in France.

She is currently pursuing a double-major in PoIntroduction

litical Science and Psychology. Her research interests are in human rights, and the role of discourse in advancing the interests of marginalized groups. Sejeong believes existing norms that maintain power structures can be challenged, which is why she chose to write about postcolonial constitutionalism and all-women’s courts. These two powerful forces behind the women’s liberation movement in India present a brighter outlook on the prospects for the women’s movement globally.

state accountable to its duties enshrined independence

in the constitution, thereby contribut-

in 1947, India established itself as a

ing to changes in the law that further

democracy with a constitution that de-

empower women in their struggle for

clared all persons equal, guaranteeing

equality. This paper aims to critically ex-

the right to equal protection under the

amine the role of the state in advancing

law.1 Despite the legal commitment to

women’s rights by assessing the rela-

equality, in reality women appear to be

tionship between state and civil society.

barred from such protections. In effect,

It will also assess the capacity of legal

women’s exclusion from constitutional

reforms to effect considerable changes.

guarantees is especially evident in per-

This paper will then look at theories of

sistently high numbers of incidents of

“constitutionalism,” and evaluate these

targeted violence against women.2 Syl-

theories in the Indian context. Finally,

via Vatuk, a professor at the University

it will look at grassroots mobilization –

of Illinois at Chicago, attributes the

embodied by all-women’s courts such

stagnancy in achieving significant gen-

as the nari adalats – and their capac-

der reform to the patriarchal nature of

ity for raising collective-consciousness,

the post-colonial Indian state.3

encouraging resistance against gender-

This paper will contest this

based violence, and giving silenced

argument by suggesting that historical

concerns formal representation by act-

enactments by Indian political bodies,

ing as sites of alternate dispute resolu-

features of the Indian constitution, and

tion.

After

gaining

movements in civil society have enabled – and will continue to enable – the

Historical Context

push for gender equity. It will also argue

that grassroots social activism holds the

ten referred to the lamentable status of

The British colonial state of-

41 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

Indian women to legitimize its colonial

cultural authenticity.8 The implication

rule. By pointing to the oppression of

of Chatterjee’s contention is that the

women under patriarchal traditions that

reforms targeting women passed under

were “inherently part of Indian culture,”

nationalist leaders simultaneously ad-

the British demonstrated the “back-

vanced an anti-imperialist agenda and

Consequently, the

embedded patriarchy in post-colonial

nationalist project eagerly sought to cast

Indian culture and society. Indeed, by

away India’s backward image that the

raising Indian girls with the ideal of the

wardness of India.”

4

colonial state had imposed. The move-

“new Indian woman,”9 feminine virtues

ment promoted women’s participation

of chastity, passivity and motherhood

in order to unify India and legitimize

were encrusted as a cultural way-of-

their anti-imperialist agenda. Ironically,

being. Merging women’s duty to protect

this inclusion did more to damage than

culture with their individuality created

help the women’s movement as women

a seemingly contradictory binary where

were given greater political and social

women’s interests for their welfare

freedoms, but only within the boundar-

seemed to contradict the values that

ies the nationalists deemed appropriate.

were part of their cultural reality. This

For example, nationalist leaders such as

produced a self-censorship in women’s

Gandhi promoted women’s education,

politicization at the individual level

but saw education as a tool to “improve their traditional roles as wives and

The Rise of the Women’s Move-

mothers in the patriarchal family”.5 The

ment

nationalists saw any efforts to challenge

existing gender norms as dishonorable

century, the women’s movement began

assaults on Indian cultural authentic-

to recognize and challenge the binary

ity.6 Effectively, the nationalist incor-

between cultural identity and individual

poration forced women into a dilemma

welfare. As highlighted by Maiyatree

where they had to choose between re-

Chaudhuri, there was a notable shift

maining “modern Indian women” and

in the women’s movement around the

promoting their rights.7

1970s when women began demanding

The

nationalist

project

was

Towards the end of the 20th

“ameliorative intervention” from the

detrimental to the women’s movement

state.10 There was a growing realiza-

not only by limiting their mobilization

tion that the systematization of patriar-

in the public sphere, but also by induc-

chy stemmed from a critical “intersec-

ing a subtle domination of the mind

tion” between law, culture, and society.

through socialization and cultural val-

Hence, women attempted to break away

ues. As suggested by Partha Chatterjee,

from their initial alliance with national-

an anthropology professor at Colum-

ist male elites in order to re-center their

bia University, gender norms claiming

political agenda.11

to preserve women’s “feminine” and

“maternal” nature were embedded in

feminism in the 1970s,12 as well as the

voting and education reforms under the

growth of feminist academia, strength-

guise of protecting Indian pre-colonial

ened the women’s movement in India.

The second wave of Western

Ironically, the nationalists’ desire to 42 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

prove India’s modernization through

educational reforms bred openings for

preted, implemented and enforced, they

If laws are not actively inter-

elite women to access opportunities in

cannot institute substantive changes be-

higher education.13 The rise in Indian

yond mere “formal” recognition of such

women scholars spurred the growth of

notions.19 A mechanism is necessary to

women’s and subaltern studies.14 Com-

ensure the state adheres to principles

bined with changes in research agendas,

of equality and justice and counterbal-

there was a better representation – phys-

ances the predominance of patriarchal

ically in numbers and metaphorically in

influences.

the literature – of women deconstruct-

ing the externally attributed identities

women’s movement have appealed to

used to pass reforms that claimed to

legal institutions and espoused a vi-

promote women’s interests, and recon-

sion of “constitutionalism” to advance

structing a narrative epistemologically

women’s rights. The Indian govern-

based on women’s actual experiences.15

ment formed the Verma Committee in

Supporters and allies of the

response to the public outrage at the Legal Reforms and Constitu-

brutal gang rape and subsequent death

tionalism

of a young woman in New Delhi, India,

One of the main issues raised

in December 2012. The Verma Commit-

by the Indian women’s movement was

tee Report, published in January 2013,

violence against women. The state’s

called for the integration of constitu-

primary response was legal reforms,

tional values into the law in the combat

such as the “Protection of Women from

against gendered violence.20 The report

Domestic

(PWDVA)”

stated that the overturn of “gender bias”

passed in 2005. The PWDVA extended

in the “societal mindset” crucially de-

protections for women’s rights within

pended on the state’s commitment to

the family by refining the definition of

dismantling social norms that prohibit-

“domestic violence” and thereby the

ed the realization of “the constitutional

terms and circumstances under which

promise of equality…for the women-

such complaints can be filed,16 as well

folk.”21 By defining women’s rights as

as the civil remedies that can be ob-

one recognized by the constitution, the

tained.17 Unprecedentedly at the time,

report established women’s legitimate

it included psychological, verbal, and

right to gender equality and exposed the

economic abuse in addition to physical

state’s failure in complying with its con-

Violence

Act

and sexual abuse as punishable offens-

stitutional duties.22

es.18 On paper, the PWDVA promised

expansive safeguards against gendered

Indian constitution was drafted in the

violence. Yet, increasingly high num-

“spirit of democracy” and attempted to

bers of incidents persisted, suggesting

simultaneously respect the diversity of

that the criminalization of domestic vio-

its people and ensure their equal rights

lence was not sufficient in either deter-

and protections.23 Yet the constitution

ring perpetrators from committing acts

is also seen as “a live document,” with

of violence or encouraging women to

fluidity and flexibility that allow it to be

report such occurrences.

adapted across time and in response to

Granville Austin notes that the

43 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

changes in society.24 As such, under the

turn, this judicial activism can further

constitution individuals may be empow-

empower women to challenge the laws,

ered or disempowered vis-à-vis other

norms, and traditions perpetuating their

social actors. This outcome depends on

oppression. Therefore, an alliance be-

the context of their social relations and

tween courts and women would hold the

the extent to which formal institutions

state accountable and require the state

recognize the viability of the particular

to recognize and implement women’s

interaction

rights when interpreting the law.

These features of the constitu-

Certainly,

the

prospect

of

tion can become a source of opportunity

constitutionalism in light of women’s

and limitation for the advancement of

emancipation

women’s rights. The constitution, in its

Constitutionalism as a tool for women’s

essence, upholds equality for women.

emancipation is only viable if judges

However, women’s individual rights es-

hold values compatible with women’s

pecially with regard to violence, are of-

emancipation

ten dissolved when contested in light of

This

other rights, such as group rights: a right

heavily on the people constituting state

borne by a group qua group, therefore,

institutions, as state-led decisions and

a right held collectivity rather than an

actions could either support or repress

individually. Group rights can become

the movement, and either consolidate or

potential threats to individual rights, be-

abolish newly passed laws in the long

can

and

assumption’s

be

double-edged.

gender

equality.27

veracity

depends

cause the voice of the individual can be

run.28 Legal reforms are necessary but

overshadowed by the weight of the col-

not sufficient for attaining gender eq-

lective. Nonetheless, greater protection

uity. Hence, grassroots organizations

of women’s rights relies on the “good

must be strengthened in order for them

will” of institutional actors becoming

to empower women’s agency, spread

allies of the women’s movement and in-

discourse centered on women’s rights,

terpreting legal doctrines in accordance

and counter the patriarchal status quo.

with the constitution, despite the trend of judicial hostility towards women’s

Nari

individual rights.

Courts

Narain proposes that allies can

Adalats:

All

Women’s

Nari Adalats are all women’s

be found in the judiciary whose “judi-

courts in India. As shown by a case study

cial creativity” and capacity for juris-

on Nari Adalats conducted by Kethinei

prudence can act as tools to consolidate

et al., these courts are highly effective

women’s rights by advancing the vision

in raising collective consciousness and

that women have inherent rights as hu-

giving women a greater sense of agency

mans.25 By drawing on international

against the societal stigma attributed to

human rights law as well as transna-

victims of violence.29 Women’s courts

tional jurisprudence to fill in the gaps

enable women to receive peer support

of national and local statutes, courts

that encourages them to resist practices

can maximize their capacity to advocate

they have previously accepted and tol-

for women’s fundamental equality.26 In

erated.

44 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

In

addition

to

encouraging

the typical current of patriarchy often

these

seen in other bodies such as religious

courts play an instrumental part in legal

personal law courts.33 Hence, all wom-

advocacy by acting as sites for “alter-

en’s courts’ presence in the community

native dispute resolution.”30 Compared

and impact on formal bodies enhance

to traditional judicial bodies that tend to

the representation and advancement of

be male-dominated, all-women’s courts

women’s interests in India in both the

have proved more efficient in supply-

long and short term.

women’s

self-empowerment,

ing legal aid to women. Interviews with past clients show that women are

Conclusion

more willing to file their case against

men with Nari Adalats, as they feel that

permeate the legal, cultural, and social

these courts lay more equitable rulings

spheres. Gendered norms and values

accounting for the positions of both in-

endanger the notion of the ideal Indian

volved parties, without privileging one

woman as one who is passive and re-

perspective over the other. Moreover,

spects her motherly duty towards the na-

all-women’s courts ensure the applica-

tion, culture, and family. The conflation

tion of the terms and conditions in their

of individual and cultural identity forces

rulings within their communities, ex-

women to balance a false binary of indi-

panding their roles beyond the phase of

vidual welfare and cultural authenticity.

dispute resolution.

Ultimately, women’s protection against

Vatuk questions the actual im-

violence necessitates changes at the po-

pact of all-women’s courts, which are

litical level in the law, and at the socio-

considered external (external to what?)

cultural level in society, as patriarchal

and therefore lesser to formal legal bod-

norms dominate both of these spheres.

ies.31 However, as argued by Vasudha

In India, patriarchal notions

Reinterpretation of the legal,

Nagaraj, a practicing lawyer in the

cultural, and societal discourse that

Andhra Pradesh High Court, the status

normalizes

of all-women’s courts as informal and

and systematizes gendered discrimina-

peripheral has not reduced their impact

tion depends on an alliance between the

on central judicial processes and deci-

state and civil society. The Indian con-

sions. On the contrary, these alternative

stitution enshrines equality and equal

sites’ assessments of cases and rulings

protection under the law for all, includ-

are well received and welcomed by cen-

ing women. By acting upon women’s

tral judicial bodies.32 This is concrete

constitutional rights for welfare and

evidence of the integration of women’s

protection, there are opportunities to

interests into formal laws and legisla-

strengthen the women’s demands for

tions through the recommendations that

greater recognition of their rights and

all-women’s courts make. All-women’s

individuality. Courts have the flexibility

courts are led by a mandate to re-po-

to interpret transnational documents in

sition women at the center of the judi-

support of the women’s movements in

cial procedure and promote resolutions

individual cases. Finally, grassroots mo-

protecting women’s interests against

bilization can raise women’s concerns

violence

against

women

that have been previously suppressed, 45 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

and promote a different narrative re-

means to ensure gender justice.

centered on women and their interests.

4 Vrinda Narain, “Feminism, National-

Though radical change might not occur

ism, and Colonialism,” in Reclaiming

in the short run, increased awareness

the Nation: Muslim women and the law

of women’s rights, legal reforms, and

in India (Toronto: University of Toronto

grassroots activism have all been neces-

Press, 2001), 36.

sary steps towards female emancipation

5 Ila Patel, “The Contemporary Wom-

in the long term.

en’s Movement and Women’s Education in India,” International Review of

Notes

Education 44 (1998), 159

1 Constitution of India, Section 3, Ar-

6 Ibid, 41-43.

ticles 14 and 15 (revised: 2016).

7 Top of FormMrinalini Sinha, “Re-

2 Sesha Kethineni, Murugesan Srini-

fashioning

vasan, and Suman Kakar, “Combating

and

Violence Against Women in India: Nari

India,”Feminist Studies 26 (2000), 625

Adaltas

Bottom of Form

and

Gender-based

Justice,”

Mother

Nationalism

India: in

Feminism

Late-Colonial

in Women & Criminal Justice (2016),

8 Partha Chatterjee, “The Nationalist

1-2. A report in 2013 by the Indian Na-

Resolution of the Women’s Question,”

tional Crime Records Bureau notes over

in Recasting Women: Essays in Indian

309,000 documented incidents of crimes

colonial history (New Dehli: Kali for

against women. Kethineni et al suggest,

Women, 1990), 246-249

however, that the number of document-

9 The figure of the “new Indian woman”

ed incidents does not accurately capture

presents the ideal Indian woman as obe-

the actual scope of domestic violence

dient, dutiful, submissive and sacrificing

in India under the premise that many

throughout her transient role as daugh-

Indian women are often deterred from

ter, mother and wife. Furthermore, be-

reporting these crimes to the police and

ginning in the second-half of the 20th

other law-enforcement bodies.

century, the perfect Indian woman was

3 Sylvia Vatuk, “Islamic Feminism in

seen as one who was educated and of

India: Indian Muslim Women Activ-

the upper-class, thereby adding an elitist

ists and the Reform of Muslim Per-

dimension who can qualify as an ideal

sonal

woman in India.

Law,”

Modern Asian

Studies

42 (2008). Vatuk voices her concerns

10 Maiyatree Chauduhri, “Feminism in

about Islamist feminist and their efforts

India: The Tale and its Telling,” in Re-

to reform Muslim personal law by de-

vue Tiers Monde 209 (2012), 27-31.

manding for the re-interpretation of the

11 Ibid, 31-32.

Qu’ran which they believe has been dis-

12 The women’s movement in India in

torted by the male-led judiciary. Vatuk

the 1970s coincided with the second

claims these efforts to be misguided, for

wave of Western feminism as well as

an emphasis on the Qu’ran detracts this

the “UN Decade for Women: Equality,

movement from vernacularising univer-

Development, and Peace” which in-

sal human rights or campaigning for the

creased the saliency of the movement

passage of a gender-neutral civil code,

as well as empowered Indian women

which she perceives as more effective

themselves in the strategies and visions

46 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

they adopted.

report as “Verma Committee Report”

13 It is important to acknowledge that

for the purpose of conciseness in this

access to education was largely limited

paper.

to a small pool of select, elite women

21 Ibid, Preface, Articles 5 and 6.

of the upper class. Nonetheless, it can

22 Vrinda Narain, “Postcolonial Consti-

be argued that this limited access still

tutionalism in India: Complexities and

allowed a greater number of women –

Contradictions,”

relative to the past – to enter academia,

Interdisciplinary Law Journal 25, 108.

enabling a better representation of wom-

23 At the core of this junction is the

en’s perspective in the scholarly world.

debate on whether the recognition of

The actual inclusion of women in aca-

group rights is necessarily in conflict

demia implies the better and more apt

with recognition of individual rights.

addressing of the “women’s question,”

In India, the debate on group rights vs.

as the people seeking answers to this

individual rights is especially salient

question are women themselves. There-

with respect to legal pluralism under

fore, by virtue of representing their own

“religious personal law.” For, indeed,

voices in topics and questions about

personal laws are seen as protected by

them, Indian women and their academic

the state’s position of “neutrality” vis-à-

contributions enable the deconstruction

vis religion, and minority groups argue

of the “Third World Women” figure in

their group right for self-governance

the West as well as the victim subject

of private affairs according to personal

generated by colonial and nationalist

laws on the premise that such recogni-

actors.

tion is guaranteed to them under the

14 Vina Mazumdar, “Women’s Studies

constitutional principle of respect for

and the Women’s Movement in India:

cultural diversity.

An Overview,” Women’s Studies Quar-

24 Granville Austin, The Indian Con-

terly 22 (1994), 44-45.

stitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (New

15 Ibid, 45.

Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1966),

16 Protection of Women from Domestic

59.

Violence Act (2005), Chapter 2.

25 Vrinda Narain, “Postcolonial Consti-

17 Ibid, Chapter 4

tutionalism in India”, 132-33.

18 Kethineni et al, “Combating Vio-

26 Ibid, 112-113; see also Vishaka v.

lence Against Women in India”, 2.

State of Rajasthan (1997).

19 Catharine MacKinnon, “Sex Equal-

27 Ibid, 132-33.

ity Under the Constitution,” Interna-

28 Richard Vallely, “The Strange Career

tional Journal of Constitutional Law 4

of African American Voting and Office-

(2006), 183-86. I am here drawing on

Holding,” The Two Reconstructions:

Catharine MacKinnon’s model of dis-

The struggle for black enfranchise-

tinguishing between “formal equality”

ment (Chicago and London: Univer-

and “substantive equality.”

sity of Chicago Press, 2004). I borrow

20 J.S. Verma, Leila Seth and Gopal

from Vallely’s analysis of the “strange

Subramanium. Report of the Commit-

career” of African Americans’ right to

tee on Amendments to Criminal Law

franchise, specifically drawing on his

(2013): Hereinafter, I will report to the

identification of jurisprudence and the

Southern

California

47 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

crucial role played by courts in the later

Chatterjee,

stabilization of the black right to vote

Resolution of the Women’s Question,”

post-1960s.

in Recasting Women: Essays in Indian

29 Kethineni et al, “Combating Violence

colonial history (New Delhi: Kali for

Against Women in India”, 4-5.

Women, 1990): 233-252.

Partha.

“The

Nationalist

30 Ibid, 5-6.

31 Sylvia Vatuk, “Women’s Courts in

Chauduhri, Maiyatree. “Feminism in

India: An Alternative Dispute Resolu-

India: The tale and its telling.” Revue

tion Body for Women in Distress.” The

Tiers Monde 209 (2012): 19-36.

Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law (2013),” 94.

Constitution of India (revised in 2016).

32 Vasudha Nagaraj, “Local and Customary Forums: Adapting and Innovat-

Kethineni, Sesha et al. “Combatting

ing Rules of Formal Law,” Indian Jour-

Violence

nal of Gender Studies 17 (2010), 443.

Nari adalats and gender-based justice.”

33 It may be helpful to remind that be-

Women and Criminal Justice (2016):

fore the creation of all-women’s courts,

1-20.

against

Women

in

India:

all criminal cases were dealt in all-male courts – be they state-led according to

MacKinnon, Catharine. “Sex Equality

the Constitution or community-led ac-

under the Constitution of India: Prob-

cording to religious personal laws. As a

lems, prospects, and ‘personal laws’.”

result, women and their opinions were

International Journal of Constitutional

often completely marginalized and ex-

Law 4 (2006): 181-202.

cluded from the hearing and procedure.

Therefore, the re-centering of women

Mazumdar, Vina. “Women’s Studies

within all-women courts greatly en-

and the Women’s Movement in India:

hanced women’s experiences in all-

An overview,” Women’s Studies Quar-

women’s courts and increased their

terly 22 (1994): 42-54.

sense of empowerment, for women-

Top of Form

victims could feel that their voices

Bottom of Form

were truly heard and their welfare truly sought for.

Nagaraj, Vasudha. “Local and Customary Forums: Adapting and innovating

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49 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

Fencing Religious Orthodoxy: Godly Nationalism and the Ahmadis in Indonesia Gabrielle Denis

Gabrielle Denis is a French U3 student pursuing an honours degree in Political Science, with minors in Economics and Sociology. She has developed a strong interest in the interaction of religion and politics, and more particularly, in the relationship between organized religion and nation-state in democratic contexts. Focusing on Introduction

the plight of the Ahmadis in godly nationalist Indonesia, she seeks to challenge existing Eurocentric models of church and state relations. This research has also brought her to question the contemporary dynamics and implications of nation-formation more broadly: as categories of difference such as religion, race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality are mobilized towards exclusionary nation-building, liberal democratic norms of fundamental equality before the law and social pluralism come increasingly under threat.

community at large - are perceived as a

On 6 February 2011, Muslim neigh-

threat by state elites and religious mass

bours lynched three Ahmadis to death in

organizations to Indonesian identity and

their home of Cikeusik.1 Not only were

stability; the collusive effects of godly

the perpetrators given light sentences

nationalism are seen as a means to miti-

despite the hatred and violence of their

gate this perceived threat. Second, re-

crime, but one victim was sentenced to

ligion has gained growing significance

a longer imprisonment than his oppres-

as a social identifier due to New Order

sors.2 This paper seeks to account for the

policies in Indonesia, precipitating ris-

dynamics leading up to the increasingly

ing religious conservatism and the Sant-

violent forms of intolerance perpetrated

rification of positions of power. Third,

against Ahmadis in post-Suharto Indo-

it is more difficult for Indonesian Sunni

nesia, of which the Cikeusik episode is

Muslims to tolerate internal pluralism

one example. I argue that these manifes-

than external pluralism, rendering intol-

tations of intolerance are rooted in the

erance against Ahmadis more systemat-

increasing emphasis on religious ortho-

ic and violent than the intolerance perpe-

doxy in delimiting the Indonesian state-

trated against other religious minorities.

ideology of ‘godly nationalism.’ This

The first section conveys the theoretical

emphasis has gained prevalence despite

and historical background of the argu-

continued claims of liberal democratic

ment. The second section describes and

governance.

are

analyzes the three mechanisms of the

identified to explain this. First, ethno-

argument. The final section, defines the

religious divisions - both in the Mus-

implications that are considered within

lim community and in the Indonesian

and beyond Indonesia.

Three

mechanisms

50 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

THEORETICAL

AND

HISTORICAL

other benefits of citizenship so long as

BACKGROUND

they believe in one of the state-sanc-

Theoretical Background

tioned pathways to God. Therefore, this

A nation can be effectively built on

form of nationalism implies the rejec-

exclusionary dynamics inherent to cat-

tion of certain groups in society that

egories of difference such as gender,

do not follow the state’s interpretation

race, and religion. In particular, the in-

of religion. This juncture of both reli-

herently exclusionary practices of both

gious and national exclusionary dynam-

nation and religion can produce force-

ics has productive, community-forming

ful national collusion when combined.

effects: the persecution of heterodoxy

However, Benedict Anderson’s defini-

brings together groups that are “other-

tion of nationalism infamously omits re-

wise at odds due to differences in re-

ligion. In Nation and Religion, van der

ligious doctrine, political interests, or

Veer successfully demonstrates that this

economic class.”7 Religious intolerance

dichotomy between religion and a mod-

and nation-building are thus intertwined

ern and secular nationalism is an ideo-

in a “mutually-constitutive process.”8

logical element of the Western, largely Weberian, discourse of modernity.3 In

‘Deviance’ and ‘Heresy’ of the

fact, the two are intrinsically linked: as

Ahmadiyah in Indonesia.

nationalism feeds on available symbolic

The Ahmadiyah sect emerged in the

repertoires of identity, and as religion

1880s in Punjab, and, due to its reform-

significantly shapes ideas of language,

ism, was quickly rejected upon its arriv-

race, and history, religion has a signifi-

al in Indonesia in the 1920’s as a devi-

cant impact on nation-formation.4 Build-

ant sect of Islam by the five main Sunni

ing on van der Veer’s analysis, in Faith

institutions - Rabita al-’?lam al-Islami,

in Nation, Anthony Marx shows that

Majelis Ulama Indonesia, the Council

exclusion is the basis of unity, and more

of the Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Or-

specifically, that religious sectarianism

ganization of Islamic Cooperation, Mu-

can be productive for nation-building.5

hammadiyah, and Nahdlatul Ulama.9

In this vein, several typologies of the re-

The disagreement between mainstream

lationship between religion and nation

Islam and the Ahmadiyah regards the

have emerged: religious nationalism,

latter’s status in terms of the classical

secular nationalism, and more recently,

fiqh categories in Islamic law: while

‘godly’ nationalism. The term, coined

Ahmadiyah followers see themselves

by Menchik, reflects the specificity of

as reformers of Islam, mainstream Is-

the Indonesian case.

lam rejects them as apostates- which

A godly nation is “an imagined com-

has been interpreted as a generic ac-

munity bound by a common, orthodox

cusation of heterodoxy or heresy. Sev-

theism and mobilized through the state

eral Muslim organizations issued fatwas

in cooperation with religious organiza-

(decrees of religious law) declaring the

tions in society.”6 Under godly national-

heterodoxy, if not the outright heresy, of

ism, citizens are full members of civil

Ahmadiyah.10 Informed in large part by

society and receive state protection and

Sunni orthodoxy, mainstream Islam’s categorization of the Ahmadiyah has 51 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

significant legal ramifications: apostasy

sian nation was given its godly nature

under Islamic law is a sin that requires

through a limited and non-neutral form

punitive castigation through the istitaba

of religious pluralism. This is particular-

procedure, for orthodoxy to be main-

ly clear in three institutions established

tained in the ummah.11 Through fatwas,

in the early years of independence by

mainstream Islam has provided ground

President Sukarno: the nation-state ide-

for the legitimation of violent intoler-

ology of Pancasila, the 1955 Blasphemy

ance of the Ahmadis.

Law, and the Departemen Agama (Department of Religion). The first consti-

Violent Intolerance against Ah-

tutionalized monotheism by enshrining

madis

“belief in God” as the first principle of

Intolerance has ensued against the

the Indonesian state and nation.17 The

Ahmadiyah sect, with different degrees

second allowed the state to engage in

of violence. General bias and discrimi-

the delimitation of the boundaries of or-

nation in state authorities and institu-

thodox theism and religious deviance.18

tions is the norm. Before the law, Ah-

The third defined ‘agama’ (a narrower

madis have lost their rights to freedom

equivalent

of thought, conscience and religion, and

those traditions that are “monotheistic

their equality with other Indonesian cit-

[...] with belief in the existence of One

izens.12 Furthermore, the Ahmadis are

Supreme God, a holy book, a prophet,

subject to significantly vicious instances

and a way of life for its adherents,” in

of intolerance, such as hate speech and

contrast to the terms ‘aliran sesat’ (devi-

of

‘religion’)

to

include

demonization, the burning of mosques,

ant stream) and ‘kepercayaan’ (faith).19

neighbourhoods,

educational

Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hin-

campuses and even houses, as well as

duism, Buddhism, and Confucianism

lynchings and killings.13 Both quantita-

are recognized as ‘agama’ by the Depag.

tively and qualitatively, discrimination

These three institutions jointly work to-

against the Ahmadiyah in post-Suharto

wards the official definition and delimi-

Indonesia is far more severe than dis-

tation of religion, and as such discrimi-

crimination

natively interfere in the private matter

offices,

perpetrated

against

any

other religious minority.14,15 This is in

of individual belief.20 Therefore, there is

part due to the place of relative toler-

a dual narrative to Indonesia’s religious

ance for certain religious minorities in

pluralism. On one hand, Indonesian na-

Islam: ahl al-kitab (people of the Book),

tionalism is inclusive of the six state-

including Jews for instance, have been

sanctioned religions. On the other hand,

accepted theologically in Muslim soci-

not only does Indonesian nationalism

ety.16 No such tolerance is theologically

define the boundaries of orthodoxy of

justified in Islam for heretics however,

these state-sanctioned religions, but it

which provides legitimation for violent

also is strictly exclusive of religious

intolerance towards Ahmadis.

traditions that fall outside the statedefined boundaries, traditions which

Godly nationalism in Indonesia Upon independence, the Indone52 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

then become categorized as heterodox ‘streams’ or ‘faiths’. In that sense, the

religious pluralism of Indonesian na-

against the central government in Jakar-

tionalism is limited and non-neutral -

ta, and these attempts have sought legit-

and as such, Indonesian nationalism can

imation in ethno-religious differences.25

be said to be ‘godly’.

Under the New Order, the authoritarian regime and its close alliance with the

Accounting for Orthodoxy

military provided the state with instru-

in Godly Nationalism and its

ments to repress and contain diverg-

Consequences

ing provinces in a multi-religious and

Ethno-Religious Threats

to

Divisions

Indonesian

as

multi-ethnic political entity. However,

Identity,

the democratic transition has provided

Unity, and Stability

opportunities for re-negotiation of the

The explicit delimitation of religious

terms of inclusion in or secession from

orthodoxy is embraced by both the In-

the central government - which, in the

donesian Muslim community and the

process of democratization, noticeably

Indonesian state as a means to respond

lost the New Order’s repressive power.26

to ethno-religious divisions, perceived

In that sense, the explicit delimitation of

as threats to the identity and stability of

religious orthodoxy in the post-Suharto

the community, nation, and state.

period can be seen as a means of rein-

The Muslim community in Indonesia is ethnically, geographically, socio-

forcing the legitimacy of the state’s rule over fractious ethno-religious groups.27

economically and ideologically diverse if not outright divided.21 As a result of

The

this fragmentation, the influence of Is-

Identity and the Santrification of

Prominence

of

Religious

lam on politics has been kept to a mini-

Civil and Public Power

mum. For those who wish to see Islam

As religion gained growing signifi-

fulfill public and political ambitions,

cance as a social identifier, increasingly

the lack of cohesiveness in the Mus-

rigid and conservative interpretations of

lim community is a barrier to political

the first Pancasila principle - “belief in

impact.22 As godly nationalism defines

God” - emerged, thus allowing for the

the boundaries of religious orthodoxy, it

Santrification of civil and public power.

has a collusive effect, “[congealing] the

Under Suharto’s New Order regime,

fractious Muslim groups,” thus acting in

at least until the late 1980s, the ‘nation-

the interest of social actors in the Mus-

al enemy’ was sought within national

lim community who wish for a greater

boundaries: Islam was designated as

prevalence of Islam in Indonesian poli-

a dangerous social force.28 As a result,

tics.23

the New Order only sharpened reliIn the Indonesian community at

gious identities: a more assertive Mus-

large, godly nationalism seeks to cre-

lim identity was promoted by different

ate a nation-state that encompasses all

voices in response to the regime’s hos-

confessional and ethnic diversity, while

tility.29 With the rehabilitation of Islam

limiting threats of fragmentation and se-

in civil society and in the state in the

cession.24 Indeed, in the uncertainty of

last decade of Suharto’s rule, Muslim

the post-Suharto context, several armed

religious identity rose to an even higher

secessionist

attempts

were

waged 53 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

level of prominence. Following Indonesia’s democratic transition, the climate of uncertainty increased the salience of Islam as a normative reference point.30 This reinforcement of religious identity prepared ground for more rigid interpretations of the first Pancasila principle: as religion grew in prevalence over other markers of identity, religious conservatism tainted interpretations of Indonesia’s godly nationalism.

Santrification has gained momentum. The term Santrification refers to the growing prevalence of followers of the santri variant of Indonesian Islam in positions of power in state institutions and civil society, resulting in the promotion and diffusion of santri-sanctioned discourses on Islam. The santri variant is rooted in the urban and rural middle-class, and is characterized by its modernist stance, accompanied by a distinctive language of authenticity and orthodoxy in Islam.31 The importance of Santrification is particularly apparent in the overall shift towards more puritanical and conservative positions on the part of leaders of religious organizations in civil society and on the part of strategic holders of public office in the postSuharto period. Santri public officials generally portray themselves as “true defenders of the Islamic ummah [community]”, and are eager to embrace their public office and prerogatives as well as social media and communication technologies in order to advance conservative religious visions and agendas.32 As positions of power are Santrified, the santri-sanctioned discourse on Islam becomes dominant, promoting emphasis on religious orthodoxy when defining the boundaries of the godly Indonesian nation.33 54 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

Variance in Tolerance: External and Internal Pluralism According to Social Identity Theory (SIT), it should be more difficult for Indonesian Islam to tolerate internal pluralism than external pluralism. This would cause intolerance against Ahmadis to be more systematic and violent than the intolerance perpetrated against non-Muslim religious minorities.

SIT contends that tolerance of external pluralism (multiplicity of outgroups) is easier than tolerance of internal pluralism (variation and diversity in one’s in-group),34 as tolerance of internal pluralism brings into question the fundamental components of one’s identity. It has often been highlighted that the intolerance shown towards the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia is a clear application of SIT.35 In SIT terms, the Ahmadiyah’s claim to equal status with mainstream Islam - which conceives itself as the aggregation of the santri and abangan variants - has been perceived by the latter as a “viable and dangerous” threat to its legitimacy and stability.36

As a result of the contested

position of the Ahmadiyah in Islam, Ahmadis in Indonesia have come to occupy a liminal position. The charge of heresy issued by mainstream Indonesian Islam in its intolerance of internal pluralism, combined with the Ahmadiyah’s continued claim of Muslim-hood, has resulted in the Ahmadiyah’s ambiguous status, in a “zone of indistinction between Muslims and non-Muslims.”37 This positioning renders the Ahmadis particularly vulnerable to persecution: not only are they deprived of their rights as Muslims by mainstream Islam, but their rights as a non-Muslim religious

minority also remain suspended until

ary dynamics are reflected in the rise in

they comply with mainstream Islam’s

popularity of pious politicians - more

demands of splitting into a religion in-

than eight in ten Americans would vote

dependent from Islam.38

for a Catholic, Jewish, or Mormon presidential candidate, while only five in ten

Conclusion

would consider voting for an atheist.42

It is crucial to consider the pres-

Although religion and liberal de-

ent and future implications of these

mocracy can be compatible, it is imper-

phenomena for liberal democracy. With

ative to consider the nature of the nation

godly nationalism, Indonesia violates

over which the state rules, as well as

the principle of state neutrality towards

the processes through which the nation

religion, despite claims to govern over

has emerged, in order to assess the sub-

a “free and democratic society.”39 Also,

stantiality of liberal democracy on the

Indonesia violates the liberal demo-

ground. As nations built upon dark and

cratic principle of religious freedom

essentially illiberal dynamics of exclu-

enshrined in Article 29 of its 1945 con-

sion are inherently incompatible with

stitution, which stipulates “the state

liberal democracy, it is crucial for aspir-

guarantees the freedom of all residents

ing liberal democracies to question the

to embrace their own religion and to

mechanisms producing their national

worship according to their own religion

communities.

and beliefs.”40 As crucial liberal democratic principles of state neutrality and

Notes

religious freedom are violated, what re-

1 Burhani, Ahmad N.”Hating the Ah-

mains of liberal democracy in the mod-

madiyya: the Place of “Heretics” in

ern era of the nation-state?

Contemporary Indonesian Muslim So-

It is interesting to note that the

ciety.” Contemporary Islam: Dynamics

policies and practices of several West-

of Muslim Life. 8.2 (2014): 135. Print.;

ern states - accepted in conventional

Ichwan, Moch Nur. “Towards a Puri-

wisdom as undeniable strongholds of

tanical Moderate Islam: The Majelis

liberal democracy - have been identi-

Ulama Indonesia and the Politics of

fied as closely resembling that of godly

Religious Orthodoxy.” Contemporary

nationalist Indonesia, thus question-

Developments in Indonesian Islam: Ex-

ing the validity of their claimed liberal

plaining the ‘Conservative Turn’. Ed.

democratic values and regime. The U.S.

by Martin van Bruinessen. Singapore:

and the U.K. as well as Tunisia and

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

Turkey seem to constitute such cases.41

2013. 88. Print.

The specific mention of “One Nation

2 Ibid. 143.

under God” in the American Pledge of

3 Van der Veer, Peter, and Hartmut

Allegiance, clearly excludes atheism

Lehmann. Nation and Religion: Per-

and polytheism from the conception of

spectives on Europe and Asia. Princ-

the American nation, in a dynamic that

eton, N.J: Princeton University Press,

seems blatantly similar to that of the

1999. 3-6. Print.

first Pancasila principle; the socio-po-

4 Ibid. 7-9, 20.

litical repercussions of such exclusion-

5 Marx, Anthony W. Faith in Nation: 55 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

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Mark, Mariani Yahya, Inayah Rohmani-

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

yah, Diana M. Coleman, Chris Lundry,

21, 28. Print.

and Ali Amin. “The Islamic Defend-

6 Menchik, Jeremy. “Productive Intol-

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the State in Indonesia.” Contemporary

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Islam: Dynamics of Muslim Life. 8.2

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14 McCoy, M.E. “Purifying Islam in

8 Ibid.

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9 Burhani, Ahmad N.”Hating the Ah-

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Intolerance.” Rhetoric and Public Af-

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15 Woodward, Mark, Mariani Yahya,

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11 Ibid. 298-299.

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12 Ichwan, Moch Nur. “Towards a Pu-

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Print.

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16 Burhani, Ahmad N.”Hating the Ah-

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13 McCoy, M.E. “Purifying Islam in

17 Menchik, Jeremy. “Productive In-

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Burhani, Ahmad N.”Hating the Ah-

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tergroup Relations. Cambridge [Cam-

tion Building in Southeast Asia: Malay-

bridgeshire:

sia and Indonesia in Comparative Per-

Press, 1982. Print.

spective.” Pacific Affairs. 75.3 (2002):

35 Buckley, Philip. “Islam and the State

374. Print.

in Southeast Asia.” Political Science

Cambridge

University

57 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

476: Religion and Politics, 6 April 2016,

Print.

McGill

Cana-

42 Emmerson, Donald K. “One Nation

Ahmad

Under God? History, Faith, and Identity

N.”Hating the Ahmadiyya: the Place of

in Indonesia.” Religion and Religiosity

“Heretics” in Contemporary Indonesian

in the Philippines and Indonesia: Essays

Muslim Society.” Contemporary Islam:

on State, Society, and Public Creeds.

Dynamics of Muslim Life. 8.2 (2014):

Ed. by Theodore Friend. Washington,

133-152. Print.

D.C: Southeast Asia Studies Program,

36 Ibid. 138-139.

Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced In-

37 Ibid. 135, 144-149.

ternational

38 Ibid. 145.

University, 2006. 78. Print.; Menchik,

39 Audi, Robert. “The Separation of

Jeremy. “Productive Intolerance: Godly

Church and State and the Obligations

Nationalism in Indonesia.” Compara-

of Citizenship.” Philosophy & Public

tive Studies in Society and History. 56.3

Affairs. 18.3 (1989): 264-5.; Salim, Ar-

(2014): 620-621. Print.

da.

University,

Guest

Montréal,

Lecture.;Burhani,

Studies,

Johns

Hopkins

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on State, Society, and Public Creeds.

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----. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democ-

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Comparative Studies in Society and History. 56.3 (2014): 591-621. Print.

Salim, Arskal. “Muslim Politics in Indonesia’s Democratisation: The Religious Majority and the Rights of Minorities in the Post-New Order Era.” Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance. Ed. by Ross H. McLeod and Andrew J. MacIntyre. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 60 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

Islam:

Dynamics

of

Nigeria’s Urbanization: Accelerator or Agitator for Development?

Sophie Beaton

Sophie Beaton is a U2 student pursuing a degree in International Development Studies with a minor in Management. Throughout her studies, she has been most interested in topics surrounding economic growth and population changes. For these reasons, she chose to write about Nigeria’s urbanization dilemma for her “Economic DevelIntroduction:

Urbanization

opment” class. When studying International Development, she has been concerned with the homogenous approach to development often utilized by international organizations.

She feels strongly that economic growth is not the sole benchmark of a nation’s success as it must always be analyzed against a variety of socioeconomic indicators in order to determine its true impact.

world is exceeding most cities’ capacity

Then and Now

to provide adequate services for their

Nearly half of the world’s pop-

citizens.5 Nigeria is of particular con-

ulation resides in cities and this number

cern as it is the most populated coun-

is only expected to rise.1 According to

try in Africa, has the highest population

the UN, cities will be home to the ma-

growth rate in the world, and 50 percent

jority of the two-billion person popula-

of its population already lives in urban

tion increase over the next thirty years.

areas.6

Moreover, 50 percent of this growth

rioration can be expected if Nigeria is

is expected to take place in only nine

unable to match its rapid urbanization

countries, all of which are in the devel-

with GDP growth, reduction in unem-

oping world.2

ployment, better living conditions, and

access to reliable infrastructure and san-

For developed countries, ur-

Further

socioeconomic

dete-

banization and socioeconomic develop-

itation facilities.

ment were positively correlated when

they transitioned from agrarian to in-

ria’s level of preparation in handling

dustrialized economies. Cities enabled

the urbanization it has undergone and is

the concentration of commercial activi-

going to experience. It will analyze data

ties, transport facilities and governmen-

from 1995 to 2015 to determine if Nige-

tal institutions, which are all crucial to

ria has met urban population increases

poverty reduction.3 Urban living also

with the appropriate sustainability mea-

tended to be associated with enhanced

sures. First, the paper will provide a

educational

to

brief overview of Nigeria’s social, polit-

health care and other social services,

ical, cultural and economic conditions.

and strong cultural and political partici-

Next, it will examine if the rise in Nige-

pation.4

ria’s urban population is, in fact, a result

opportunities,

access

However, today, the rapid ur-

banization occurring in the developing

of

This paper will assess Nige-

urbanization and not simply total

population growth. Then, it will analyze 61 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

our finding against unemployment lev-

relation to other indicators to establish

els, slum prevalence, growth in Gross

whether Nigeria will create or squander

Domestic Product (GDP), and access to

potential economic and social prosper-

infrastructure. The paper will use these

ity.15

measures as a proxy to represent overall quality of life to determine whether

Nigeria’s Urban Growth: Ur-

Nigeria will be able to support sustain-

banization or Total Popula-

able urban growth. Finally, it will offer

tion Growth?

policy options that will explore how Ni-

geria could implement certain strategies

increase in the proportion of people liv-

to ensure a better future for its urban

ing in urban areas as opposed to rural

dwellers.

areas. An increase in the urbanization

Urbanization is defined as an

rate is experienced “whenever urban Nigeria: The Giant of Africa

population growth exceeds rural popu-

Nigeria is the most populous

lation growth”.15 On the other hand, the

country in Africa and the seventh most

total population growth rate refers to

populated country in the world with a

the growth rate of a country’s overall

population growth rate of 2.45 percent

population, regardless of urban-rural

in 2015.7

discrepancies.16 Therefore, it is essential

Nigeria

is

Africa’s

largest

to examine if Nigeria’s growing urban

economy and since the 1970s, oil has

population is a result of urbanization

been its dominant source of income.

as opposed to total population growth.

However, over the last five years, the

While the average rate of change in

country has worked to diversify its

the urban population was 4.6 percent

economy.8Unfortunately, this economic

between 1995-2015, it was only 1.3

diversification has not resulted in an

percent in the rural population during

enhanced quality of life for Nigerians -

this period. Moreover, the average rate

over 62 percent of the population still

of change of the urban population ex-

lives in extreme poverty.9 The fall in oil

ceeded that of the total population by 2

prices in 2015, translated to a decline in

percent.

Nigeria’s GDP growth and a contrac-

sented above, it is clear that the growth

tion in non-oil sectors due to economic

of Nigeria’s urban population can be at-

policy uncertainty.10 Furthermore, Ni-

tributed to urbanization.

17

Based on the evidence pre-

geria’s rapidly expanding population is expected to put increased pressure on its

Urbanization and Socioeco-

current economic situation.11

nomic Indicators

Nigeria’s

population

growth

This paper will now examine

has led to a vast expansion in its urban

four data indicators that act as a proxy

population. Currently, 48 percent of Ni-

for living standards to determine if, and

geria’s population lives in urban areas.12

how each indicator was affected by ur-

Between 2014 and 2050, it is projected

banization from 1995 to 2015.

that Nigeria’s urban dwellers will in-

Urbanization and GDP

crease by 212 million.13 It is important

From 1995 to 2015, the growth rate

to analyze this wave of urbanization in

of Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product

62 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

(GDP) per capita fluctuated greatly,

infrastructure”.27

whereas the annual urbanization rate was approximately 4 percent.18,19 There-

Urbanization and Unemployment

fore, there is no correlation between

urbanization and per capita income in

mained at approximately 7.5 percent

this case since Nigeria’s urban popula-

from 1995 to 2015.28 It must be noted

tion grew steadily, while its GDP did

that

not. This is contradictory to the general

have received major criticism since the

notion that urbanization is strongly cor-

National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) re-

related with economic development.20

cently changed the measurements used

In the long term, urbanization is a

to categorize full-time employment and

natural outcome of economic develop-

unemployment. Additionally, the NBS

ment. However, the speed of urbaniza-

added an “underemployment” category,

tion has no relation to or effect on eco-

revealing that many Nigerians work

nomic growth rates in the short term.21

in low productivity or informal sector

Furthermore, accelerated urbanization

jobs.29 Thus, employment data is unreli-

without a corresponding level of eco-

able and other evidence from empirical

nomic growth is often observed, espe-

studies finds Nigeria’s unemployment

cially in developing countries.22 Nigeria

numbers to be closer to 20 to 30 per-

will experience lower living standards

cent.30

if urbanization occurs without similar

As depicted in the Harris Todaro model,

increases in income per capita and is

rural to urban migration is prevalent in

coupled with a stagnation or decline in

an economy in which individuals be-

other socioeconomic conditions.

lieve that there is a higher probability of

Unemployment in Nigeria re-

Nigeria’s

employment

statistics

securing employment in an urban setUrbanization and Slum Creation

ting.31 In Nigeria, the lack of rural infra-

Slum creation is a key mea-

structure creates a greater “rural-urban

sure for examining the Nigerian gov-

differential” and thus, heightened rural-

ernment’s ability to provide sustainable

urban migration. However, unemploy-

housing for its growing urban popula-

ment is high in Nigeria’s urban areas,

tion.23 While the slum population as a

and is largely a result of rural-urban mi-

proportion of the urban population has

gration.32 Rural-urban migrants expect

decreased slightly over the last 20 years,

higher employment opportunities in ur-

50 percent of Nigeria’s urban popula-

ban settings, when in reality migration

tion still lives in slums and squatter

results in more workers waiting through

settlements.24 Moreover, the absolute

unproductive spells of unemployment.33

slum population in urban areas in-

Urbanization and Access to Basic Ser-

creased from 1995 to 2015.25 As urban-

vices

ization in Nigeria rises, the number of individuals living in slums also appears

Safe Water

to increase,26 suggesting “rapid urban

population growth has outpaced the

the majority of Nigeria’s urban popu-

ability of city authorities to provide for

lation has enjoyed access to improved

housing and environmental and health

water sources over the past 20 years.34

According to the World Bank,

63 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

However, other sources’ estimates show

from upgrading services and infrastruc-

urban water access as low as 35 percent

ture because a larger urban population

in 2006. While this source is dated, it

is dependent on limited public finances.

is a relevant comparison to the World

Hence, academics refer to the current

Bank figures because they span over 20

wave of urbanization in African nations

years from 1995 to 2015.35 Additionally,

as “the urbanization of poverty”.41 Sec-

both these estimates do not take into

ond, slum dwellers often experience po-

consideration service quality or afford-

litical exclusion, rejection of financial

ability.36 Nigeria’s water infrastructure

loans, and barring from education. They

suffers from years of poor maintenance

do not have access to processes and

and operations, posing a problem for

institutions that would enable them to

long-term sustainability in the face of

lift themselves out of poverty.42 Third,

rapid urbanization.37

unemployment historically leads to a decline in productivity and slows down

Sanitation Facilities

economic development. It causes the

The primary function of sani-

deterioration of valuable labor skills and

tation facilities is to ensure the hygienic

forces people into underemployment or

separation of human waste from human

informal employment.43 Lastly, limited

contact, which is important for dis-

access to basic services jeopardizes the

ease control. Regrettably, the percent-

health of the entire urban population.

age of the urban population that has

For example, diarrheal infections, which

access to improved sanitation facili-

are the most deadly infections affecting

ties has decreased as urbanization has

children globally, are highly linked with

increased.38As of 2015, approximately

“insufficient water supply, inadequate

63 percent of Nigeria’s urban dwellers

sanitation,

did not have access to effective sanita-

communicable disease agents, and poor

tion facilities and were therefore at risk

hygiene practices”.44

water

contaminated

with

of contracting various waterborne disPolicy Options for Improv-

eases.39

As urbanization strains Nige-

ing Living Conditions

ria’s urban infrastructure, a deteriora-

tion in both water and sanitation facili-

options, which if taken into consider-

ties is projected.

ation and implemented, have the po-

To conclude, this paper offers

tential to harness the economic develData Implications: The Future

opment opportunities that urbanization

of

provides.

Nigeria’s

Urban

Popula-

tion

Urbanization

negatively

af-

Reduce Urban Bias

fects the standard of living for Nige-

ria’s urban dwellers. First, urbanization

ment can significantly reduce the rate

without corresponding GDP growth has

of urbanization. Increasing non-farm

resulted in “urban poverty and chaotic

employment

physical expansion”.40 It also constricts

ing credit access, and comprehensive

local Nigerian governmental institutions

agricultural training will better enable

64 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

Combating

rural

unemploy-

opportunities,

improv-

the integrated development of the ru-

Appendix

ral sector.45 The reorientation of social

Appendix A - % of Population Urban

investment toward rural areas and rural infrastructure will also reduce the push toward urban migration. Additionally, these measures will reduce urban unemployment as they will discourage urban migration.46 Expand Labour-Intensive Industries

It is recommended that the Ni-

United Nations, “UNdata”. Data.un.org.

gerian government work to expand industries that are labour intensive as op-

Appendix B - Average Rate of Change

posed to those that are capital intensive

of the Urban Populations vs The Rural

through investment or improved access

Population vs The Total Population (%)

to credit.47 Alternatively, the redistribution of income to the rural poor will also promote labour-intensive industries because this segment of the population tends to demand products that come from these industries.48 Tackle Urban Slum Conditions

Slum dwellers are susceptible

to and often experience seizures of land, house demolitions, and denial of prop-

United Nations, “UNdata”. Data.un.org.

erty rights. Their lack of proper housing renders them more vulnerable to

Appendix C - GDP Growth Per Capita

disease, extreme weather events, and

Growth (%)

other unforeseen disasters.49 As 50 percent of Nigeria’s urban population lives in slums, improving these conditions is crucial for the majority of the urban population.

Overall, urbanization is a pre-

cursor to development and, as Africa’s largest economy, Nigeria is the best positioned country in the region to effectively harness opportunities it creates.

World Bank, “World Development Indi-

With the correct policy implementation,

cators”. Data.worldbank.org.

Nigeria possesses the ability to increase the standard of living for its urban and rural populations.

65 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

Appendix D - Slum population as per-

Appendix G - Improved water source,

centage of urban population

urban (% of population with access)

United Nations, “Millennium Develop-

World Bank, “World Development Indi-

ment Goals Indicators”. Mdgs.un.org.

cators”. Data.worldbank.org.

Appendix E - Slum Population in Urban

Appendix H - Improved sanitation fa-

Areas (thousands)

cilities, urban (% of urban population with access)

United Nations, “Millennium Development Goals Indicators”. Mdgs.un.org.

World Bank, “World Development Indicators”. Data.worldbank.org.

Appendix F - Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)

Notes 1 United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision (New York: United Nations, 2014).

2 Rick Gladstone, “India? Will Be Most Populous Country Sooner Than Thought, U.N. Says”, The New York Times, July 29th, 2015.

3 United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision

World Bank, “World Development Indi-

4 Ibid.

cators”. Data.worldbank.org.

5 Barney Cohen, Urbanization in Developing Countries: Current Trends, Future Projections, and Key Challenges for Sustainability, (Washington: Else-

66 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

vier, 2001) 63-80.

29 Ibid.

6 Rick Gladstone, “India? Will Be

30 Jean-Claude Bolay, Slums and Ur-

Most Populous Country Sooner Than

ban Development: Questions on Society

Thought, U.N. Says”,

and Globalisation (Springer, 2006).

7

31 Appendix F.

8 UNESCO, “Nigeria”, United Nations

33 Tolu Ogunlesi, “FactSheet: How Ni-

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-

geria’s Unemployment Rate is Calcu-

ganization, 2016.

lated”, Africa Check, 2015.

9 Central Intelligence Agency, “The

34 David Adesoji, Sustainable Urban-

World Factbook: Nigeria”.

ization: Issues and Challenges for Ef-

10 Ibid.

fective Urban Governance in Nigeria

11 Ibid.

(Osun State: Obafemi Awolowo Uni-

12 International Monetary Fund, Meet-

versity, 2011).

ing Everyone’s Needs (Washington: In-

35 Michael Todaro, “Urbanization and

ternational Monetary Fund, 2005).

Rural-Urban Migration”

13 Central Intelligence Agency, “The

36 David Adesoji, Sustainable Urban-

World Factbook: Nigeria”.

ization: Issues and Challenges for Ef-

14 United Nations, World Urbanization

fective Urban Governance in Nigeria

Prospects: The 2014 Revision

37 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

38 Appendix G.

16 Michael Todaro, “Urbanization and

39 Emmanuel M Akpabio, Water Mean-

Rural-Urban Migration” in Economic

ings, Sanitation Practices and Hygiene

Development

Behaviours in the Cultural Mirror: A

(New

York:

Pearson,

2014).

Perspective from Nigeria (London: IWA

17 Ibid.

Publishing, 2011).

18 Michael Todaro, “Urbanization and

40 UN Water, “Water and Urbaniza-

Rural-Urban Migration” in Economic

tion”. Unwater.org.

Development

41 Emmanuel M Akpabio, Water Mean-

(New

York:

Pearson,

2014).

ings, Sanitation Practices and Hygiene

19 Ibid.

Behaviours in the Cultural Mirror: A

20 Appendix B.

Perspective from Nigeria

21 Appendix C.

42 Appendix H.

22 Appendix A.

43 Center for Disease Control and Pre-

23 Mingxing Chen, The Global Pattern

vention, “Global WASH-Related Dis-

of Urbanization and Economic Growth:

eases and Contaminants”. Cdc.gov.

Evidence from the Last Three Decades

44 ECOSOC, Achieving the Millen-

(PLoS One, 2014).

nium Development Goals through Sus-

24 Ibid.

tainable Urbanization in Africa (United

25 Ibid.

Nations, 2014).

26 Giok Ling Ooi, Urbanization and

45 Ibid.

Slum Formation (Springer, 2007).

46 Dana Johnson, “The Negative Im-

27 Appendix D.

pact of Slums”. BorgenProject.org.

28 Appendix E.

47 David Adesoji, Sustainable Urban67 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

ization: Issues and Challenges for Ef-

Behaviours in the Cultural Mirror: A

fective Urban Governance in Nigeria

Perspective from Nigeria (London: IWA

48 Center for Disease Control and Pre-

Publishing, 2011)

vention, “Global WASH-Related Diseases and Contaminants”

Giok Ling Ooi, Urbanization and Slum

49 Michael Todaro, “Urbanization and

Formation (Springer, 2007).

Rural-Urban Migration” 50 Ibid.

International Monetary Fund, Meeting

51 Ibid.

Everyone’s Needs (Washington: Inter-

52 Ibid.

national Monetary Fund, 2015).

53 Ibid.

Jean-Claude Bolay, Slums and Urban

54 Ibid.

Development: Questions on Society and Bibliography

Globalisation (Springer, 2006).

Barney Cohen, Urbanization in Developing Countries: Current Trends, Future

Michael Todaro, “Urbanization and Ru-

Projections, and Key Challenges for

ral-Urban Migration” in Economic De-

Sustainability, (Washington: Elsevier,

velopment (New York: Pearson, 2014).

2001) 63-80 Mingxing Chen, The Global Pattern of Center for Disease Control and Preven-

Urbanization and Economic Growth:

tion, “Global WASH-Related Diseases

Evidence from the Last Three Decades

and Contaminants”. Cdc.gov.

(PLoS One, 2014).

Central

Intelligence

Agency,

“The

World Factbook: Nigeria”. Cia.gov.

Rick

Gladstone,

“India?

Will

Be

Most Populous Country Sooner Than Thought, U.N. Says”, The New York

Dana Johnson, “The Negative Impact of

Times, July 29th, 2015.

Slums”. BorgenProject.org.

Tolu Ogunlesi, “FactSheet: How NigeDavid Adesoji, Sustainable Urbaniza-

ria’s Unemployment Rate is Calculat-

tion: Issues and Challenges for Ef-

ed”, Africa Check, 2015.

fective Urban Governance in Nigeria (Osun State: Obafemi Awolowo Uni-

UNESCO, “Nigeria”, United Nations

versity, 2011).

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2016.

ECOSOC, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals through Sustain-

United Nations, World Urbanization

able Urbanization in Africa (United Na-

Prospects: The 2014 Revision (New

tions, 2014).

York: United Nations, 2014).

Emmanuel M Akpabio, Water Mean-

UN Water, “Water and Urbanization”.

ings, Sanitation Practices and Hygiene

Unwater.org.

68 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

Meet the Editors GABY GERECHT

Gaby Gerecht is a French born American who has lived most her life in the U.S. and Europe.

She is currently a U3 student pursuing degrees in International Development and Arabic. Her interests include human rights and public policy in the Middle East, specifically in the Levant.

She has previously worked with several NGOs in Lebanon and Washington D.C. and was a foreign policy intern for a U.S. Senator. After graduating in May, Gaby hopes to continue working on development policies with NGOs and governments.

LIAM GALLIGAN

Liam Galligan is a U3 history/international development studies joint honours student from New York. He is interested in sustainable development, food security, and global extractives conflicts, and has worked as an intern for the New York City Parks Department and a nonprofit that manages community gardens.

RYAN SHAH

Ryan Shah is U3 student in the joint honours Political Science and International Development Studies program. He is passionate about critical history, social justice and developing alternative, inclusive modes of governance. His time as a copy editor for Latitudes has allowed Ryan to further interrogate traditional academic and political orthodoxy and develop his editing abilities by working with the journal’s phenomenal contributors and editorial team.

69 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017

AMISHA PARIKH-FRIESE

Amisha is in her third year studying honours Political Science with a minor concentration in Communications. She is particularly interested in the role of both formal political institutions and grassroots movements in promoting human rights. Along with the pleasure of critiquing others’ syntax and grammar, Amisha has enjoyed the opportunity to be involved in this original and inspiring dialogue about international development.

CORRINA VALI

Corrina Vali is a third-year student studying Honours International Development and Economics at McGill. Her academic interests include economic growth and development, comparative analysis of development models and population dynamics. She interned at the Canadian Council for Refugees last year, where she conducted policy analysis and data visualization under the Executive Director of the organization. Upon graduation, Corrina aims to work in shaping development policy through international organizations and public agencies.

SHANNON CHEN SEE

Shannon Chen See was born and raised in Jamaica, and is pursuing an honours degree in International Development with a minor concentration in Social Entrepreneurship. She has a strong interest in the roles of social enterprise and class issues in development, as well as experience in a policy research think tank. Shannon aspires to return to Jamaica to either start her own social enterprise, or to work in public policy.

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MONICA SILVER

Monica Silver is a U1 student pursuing Joint Honours Political Science International Development with a Minor in Social Entrepreneurship. Monica’s focus is in economics. She has a particular interest in international labour standards and the role of government and international organizations in maintaining a safe and productive workplace for all. This interest was sparked when she received a job with the Government of Canada Labour Program, which she plans on continuing after she graduates. She sends her sincere thanks to the editing team for their work and support.

71 Chrysalsis Volume IX | Winter 2017