Chrysalis Spring 2024 Issue

Spring | 2024 | Printemps

Vol. XVI

The Journal of the International Development Studies Students’ Association of McGill University

Le journal de l’association des étudiant.e.s en développement international de l’Université McGill

COPYRIGHT

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Chrysalis is annually published by the International Development Studies Students’ Association (IDSSA) of McGill University in Montreal, Canada.

Chrysalis est publié annuellement par l’AEDI de l’Université McGill à Montréal, Canada.

To view electronic copies of the journal, visit www.idssamcgill.com/publications.

Pour voir une copie électronique de ce journal, visitez www.idssamcgill.com/ publications.

ISSN(Print) : 1198-6123

ISSN(Web) : 2369-8624

The opinions expressed in Chrysalis are those of the authors and contributors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial board, the peer review board or McGill University.

Les opinions présentées dans Chrysalis représentent celles des auteurs.rices et des contributeurs.trices, et non celles des éditeurs.rices, de l’AEDI ou de l’Université McGill.

Land Acknowledgement

McGill University is situated on land that has long been a site of meeting and exchange among Indigenous peoples. Today, we are in Tiohtià:ke (Montreal), on the larger Turtle Island (North America). We recognize that we are on unceded traditional territory, where the Haudenosaunee and Anishinabeg nations, specifically the Kanien’kehá:ka peoples, also known as the Keepers of the Eastern Door, are the traditional stewards of these lands and waters. We acknowledge the enduring presence and resilience of Indigenous peoples and their cultures and commit to working toward reconciliation and decolonization. It is important that we remain mindful of this history and context, and actively resist neocolonialism in all its forms.

Reconnaissance des Terres

L’Université McGill est située sur des terres qui ont longtemps servi de lieu de rassemblement et d’échange entre les peuples autochtones. Nous résidons actuellement à Tiohtià:ke (Montréal) qui est située sur la plus grande Île de la Tortue (Amérique du Nord). Nous reconnaissons que nous nous sommes rassemblé.es sur un territoire traditionnel non cédé où les nations Haudenosaunee et Anishinabeg, en particulier les peuples Kanien’kehá:ka, également connus comme les gardien. nes de la porte de l’Est, sont les gardien.nes traditionnel.les de ces terres et de ces eaux. Nous reconnaissons la présence durable et la résilience des peuples autochtones et de leurs cultures. Nous nous engageons à œuvrer à la réconciliation et la décolonisation. Il est important que nous restions conscient.es de cette histoire et de ce contexte, et que nous résistions activement au néo-colonialisme sous toutes ses formes.

Table of Contents

IV | Our Team | Notre équipe

V | Editor’s Note | Lettre du rédacteur en chef by Trang Do

1 | Strategic Apoliticism and Interpersonal Ties: the Success of Las Madres De Plaza De Mayo by Aliya Frendo and Sarah Ella Shijia Feng

10 | Sumak Kawsay and Neoliberalism: An Investigation into the Failures of Sumak Kawsay-Informed Policies in Ecuador by Zoë Wilson-Potter

17 | Operation Serval: Addressing Security Dilemmas Through Preventative Initiatives on the Global Scene by Emma Dutu

26 | Entrenched Exploitation: Uncovering the Complexities of DebtBondage in Pakistan’s Brick Kilns by Mahnoor Zaman

37 | Unraveling the Exploitation of Migrant Child Labour in the American Agriculture Industry by Jazmin Rodriguez

50 | Addressing Human Rights Violations Against Female Ethiopian Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon through the Proposal of a Purpose-Built Residence by Jenna Hicks

61 | Energy Crisis and Infrastructure FInancing Under Global Gateways: The Intermingling of Strategic Investment and Development Assistance by Aida Roy van Mierlo

72 | Transformative Masculinities: Engaging Men in Gender and Development Programs by Jasmin Rodriguez

77 | Meet the Authors | Rencontrez nos auteur.rices

79 | Meet the Editors | Rencontrez nos éditeur.rices

81 | Submission & Review Process | Processus de soumission et de révision

| CHRYSALIS

Our Team | Notre Équipe

Editor-in-Chief | Rédacteur en chef

Trang Do

Editorial Board | Comité éditorial

Amina Kudrati-Plummer

Anya Husiqin Zaretsky

Aviva Futornick

Bassem Sandeela

Camille Auger

Katherine Squitieri

Kayla Shulman

Peer Review Board | Comité de révision

Peer Reviewers | Réviseurs

Cecilia Doering

Haydée Dennard

Jana Lassiter

Logan Skye Startford Innes

Madeleine G. Glover

Nilofer Malik

Quitterie Janvier

Sophie Andrew

Mentors

Dr. Daniel Ruiz-Serna

Dr. Isabel Pike

Dr. Kazue Takamura

Dr. Khalid Medani

Prof. Timothy Hodges

Layout Editor | Éditrice de mise en page

Mia Advensky

Translation | Traduction

Jeanne Arnould

Lauren Kandalaft

Margaux Weisrock

Plem Kijamba

IDSSA VP Publications | VP publication AEDI

Kimberly Nicholson

EDITOR’S NOTE

Dear reader,

Welcome to the 16th edition of Chrysalis, the academic journal of the McGill University International Development Studies’ Students’ Association. Each year, we are honored to showcase the exceptional works of undergraduate students on topics related to international development.

I would like to thank everyone involved with Chrysalis for their relentless dedication and engagement with the journal. I am immensely grateful to the editorial board for the long hours they put into screening the journal submissions and perfecting all the small details in our publication. Thank you to our student peer-reviewers and peer review mentors for volunteering their time to bring out the best in each article. And finally, a special thanks goes out to our layout editor, Mia Advensky, who has been behind the beautiful designs on every single page of the journal for the past three years.

The Spring 2024 edition of Chrysalis is a testament to the diverse interests of our student body as well as our unity and perseverance in the face of global injustices. This edition offers rich insights into the pivotal role that women and indigenous belief systems played in historical events of international development. It casts a spotlight on critical yet underreported issues in our current world, such as debt-bondage in Pakistan’s brick kilns and human rights abuses against Ethiopian domestic migrant workers. And notably, it puts forward creative and compassionate ideas on how we can combat these issues and advocate for marginalized communities.

I sincerely hope that the journal not only sparks dialogue but also inspires our readers to take meaningful actions for a more equitable and just future.

Thank you,

Trang Do Editor-in-Chief, Chrysalis 2023-2024

NOTE DU RÉDACTEUR

Cher·ère·s lecteur·rice·s,

Bienvenue à la 16e édition de Chrysalis, la revue scientifique de l’Association des étudiant·e·s en développement international (AÉDI) de l’université McGill. Chaque année, nous sommes honoré·e·s de mettre en valeur les travaux exceptionnels d’étudiant·e·s de premier cycle sur des sujets liés au développement international.

J’aimerais remercier toutes les personnes impliquées avec Chrysalis pour leur dévouement et engagement incessant envers la revue. Je suis immensément reconnaissante envers le comité d’édition pour les longues heures que celui-ci a consacré à examiner les soumissions de la revue et à perfectionner tous les petits détails de notre publication. Merci à tous nos étudiant·e·s évaluateur·rice·s et mentor·e·s qui ont consacré de leur temps pour faire ressortir le meilleur de chaque article. Et enfin, un remerciement spécial à notre responsable de la mise en page, Mia Advenski, qui a été à l’origine de la magnifique conception de chaque page de la revue au cours des trois dernières années.

L’édition printemps 2024 de Chrysalis témoigne de la diversité des intérêts de notre corps étudiant ainsi que de notre unité et persévérance face aux injustices mondiales. Cette édition offre un aperçu riche du rôle central que les femmes et les systèmes de croyances autochtones ont joué dans les événements historiques du développement international. Elle met en lumière des problèmes critiques, mais sous-estimés dans notre monde actuel, tels que la servitude pour dettes dans les briqueteurs du Pakistan et les violations des droits de la personne contre les travailleuses domestiques migrantes éthiopiennes. Et notamment, elle propose des idées créatives et compatissantes sur la manière dont nous pouvons lutter contre ces problèmes et défendre les communautés marginalisées.

J’espère sincèrement que la revue non seulement suscitera le dialogue, mais qu’elle incitera également nos lecteur.rice.s à prendre des mesures significatives pour un avenir plus équitable et juste.

Merci,

Trang Do

Rédacteur en Chef, Chrysalis 2023-2024

Strategic Apoliticism and Interpersonal Ties: The Success of Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo

by: Aliya Frendo and Sarah Ella Shijia Feng

Abstract

Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo is an organization that first emerged in 1977 during Argentina’s repressive military regime led by Jorge Rafael Videla. Las Madres was composed of mothers searching for their children who disappeared during Videla’s rule. Our report examines how the organization emerged successfully during a highly oppressive political context and successfully sustained its activism. We find that through apolitical consolidation and interpersonal ties, Las Madres was able to avoid persecution and continue their activism for decades. Las Madres’ apolitical mission allowed for the unity of grieving mothers despite their political divides, and made their organization appear less threatening due to its goal of finding their children which transcended political ideology. By leaning into their apolitical role as mothers, they escaped public scrutiny and successfully publicized their mission even in a highly oppressive political context. The emotional connections between mothers undergoing an unconventional grieving process contributed to the emergence of Las Madres. They created a collective mission, transforming their grief into activism and sustaining it despite having geographically scattered members. This report presents key takeaways for aspiring local grassroots organizations drawn from the success of Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo.

Résumé

Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo (les Mères de la place de Mai) est une organisation qui est née en 1977 pendant le régime militaire répressif argentin mené par Jorge Rafael Videla. Las Madres était principalement composée de mères à la recherche de leurs enfants ayant disparus sous le régime de Videla. Notre rapport explique comment l’organisation a vu le jour et a réussi à maintenir son activisme avec succès dans un contexte politique répressif. Nous constatons que grâce à une consolidation apolitique et des liens interpersonnels, Las Madres a pu éviter la persécution et continuer son activisme pendant des décennies, tout en étant confronté à un énorme chagrin. La mission apolitique de Las Madres a permis l’unité des mères endeuillées malgré les divisions politiques et a fait paraître leur organisation moins menaçante de par son but de retrouver des enfants, but qui transcende les idéologies politiques. De plus, en s’appuyant sur leur rôle apolitique de mères, elles ont pu échapper à la surveillance du public et ont brillamment réussi à faire connaître leur mission, même dans un contexte politique extrêmement répressif. Les liens émotionnels entre les mères qui vivent un processus de

deuil non conventionnel ont participé à l’émergence de Las Madres. Elles ont créé une mission collective, transformer leur deuil en activisme et le maintenir malgré la dispersion géographique de leurs membres. Ce rapport présente les principaux enseignements tirés du succès de Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, à l’intention des organisations locales de base en devenir.

Introduction

Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo (The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) is an organization that first emerged on April 30, 1977, and developed into a formal structure in 1979.1 From 1976 to 1983, a repressive military regime led by Jorge Rafael Videla ruled Argentina, forcing society into silence.2 This “war against subversion,” also known as the “dirty war,” included confrontations with guerilla forces and disappearances of citizens by right-wing “death squads.”3 During the dirty war, the junta mainly targeted young people aged twenty to thirty, creating a prominent group of mothers who could relate to one another’s traumatic experiences of losing their children despite their differences in class and religion.4 Thus emerged Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Las Madres), a group composed exclusively of women, most of them mothers of disappeared children.5 The organization began as a group of fourteen women who routinely congregated at The Plaza de Mayo, a monument in downtown Buenos Aires erected to commemorate the independence movement on May 25, 1810 to “publicize the plight of their children” and to “break the silence” about their disappearances.6

Before joining Las Madres, mothers were an apolitical segment of Argentina’s population. Upon the disappearance of their children, families of

1 Marysa Navarro, “The Personal is Political: Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo,” in Power and Protest: Latin American Social Movements, edited by Susan Eckstein (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 241.

2 Navarro, 243.

3 Navarro, 244.

4 Navarro, 242.

5 Navarro, 247.

6 Navarro, 250.

the affected were excluded from social circles due to the regime’s inculcation of fear in society, rendering their grieving process unconventional. The organization grew in number as they marched around the Plaza every Thursday. However, police harassment throughout 1979 forced the mothers to meet in churches instead. Then, they became a formal organization to publicize the disappearances in Europe and the United States.7 Despite facing brutality, arrest, and murder, Las Madres sustained their powerful activism.

Las Madres was a unified organization that brought its members and mission from the private to the public sphere and successfully sustained its activism through apolitical consolidation and interpersonal ties. This report analyzes the tactics employed by Las Madres from its emergence in 1977 to the junta’s fall in 1983. It demonstrates how such tactics and characteristics contributed to its success both during the military’s oppressive regime and after the military’s fall. This report will first demonstrate that the organization’s strategic positioning as “apolitical” enabled it to gain members from diverse societal groups, endeared its image to the Argentinian public, and helped reduce its susceptibility to targeting by the junta. Then, it will elucidate how interpersonal ties contributed to Las Madres’ emergence, its members’ empowerment, and the organization’s sustained activism. Las Madres’ success, enabled by such factors, illuminates the potential of grassroots organizations to affect change when using these strategic tactics. In this case, success is not defined by Las Madres’ political gains and outcomes but instead by their outstanding

7 Navarro, 251.

ability to not only emerge in a heavily oppressive context, but also to sustain their activism for decades while faced with tremendous grief.

The Impact of Strategic Apoliticism on Consolidation and Staying in Power

Las Madres’ apoliticism allowed them to evade persecution in a politically oppressive context. Because of Argentina’s oppressive military regime, the mothers strategically positioned their work as “apolitical” to evade scrutiny by the public and suppression by the regime. They did so by separating their group’s mission from political ideology. For example, the group did not allow conventional politics or party affiliations to play a part in their association. Although the organization was founded primarily by working-class Catholic housewives, women from various classes and religious backgrounds joined, even if they often shared differing political viewpoints.8 Marta Vásquez, a member of Las Madres, explains that among this diverse group of women,“[p]reaching any ideology was something we did not allow. The only thing that moved us, always, has been the search for our children.”9 This strategy not only allowed for their movement to expand by building ties with those across the political divide, but crucially, this positioning also limited scrutiny and oppression by the military regime. In maintaining “very specific”10 messaging, they showed a divided public that the goal of finding their children transcended political ideology. Without a clear political affiliation, Las Madres were perceived as less threatening to the regime and thus were more successful in evading the persecution, which be-

8 Erin O’Connor, Mothers Making Latin America: Gender, Households, and Politics Since 1825 (New York: Wiley, 2014), 208.

9 Maria Posner and Matthew Posner, “Testimonies of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo,” Sources for America in the Modern World (1996).

10 Sally Thornton, “Grief Transformed: The Mothers of the Plaza De Mayo.” OMEGA, no. 41 (2000): 279.

fell more “conventionally” political groups.11

Although Las Madres did not directly use the language of “human rights” in their early years of activism under the military junta, their political strategy parallels that of other global human rights activism. A comparison with Amnesty International, a prominent human rights organization, reveals these similarities. Amnesty International was founded during the Cold War in 1961, a year before the Cuban Missile Crisis. In this highly politicized context, Amnesty International positioned itself as “non-sectarian and all-partied.”12 It maintained this perception by supporting human rights campaigns in countries with both right-wing and left-wing regimes and in “neutral” countries.13 Like Las Madres, Amnesty emphasized the difference between supporting a political ideology and supporting the actions of political regimes. In doing so, it avoided being relegated to the political sphere and “written off” by its opponents, thus building a wide breadth of supporters. While Las Madres did not use the language of “human rights” like Amnesty, it is clear that they employed parallel tactics to promote global human rights activism.

The positionality of Las Madres’ membership also contributed to others perceiving them as an apolitical body. Valeria Fabj argues that the members’ role as traditional mothers contributed to the perception of their organization as non-confrontational.14 The public did not view their work as political, but rather as an extension of their private role as mothers into public society. Thornton explains that “they never considered their mis-

11 O’Connor, Mothers Making Latin America, 208.

12 Peter Benenson, “The Forgotten Prisoners,” The Observer (London, EN), May 28, 1961.

13 Iwa Nawrocki, (Recorded Lecture, McGill, January 26, 2023).

14 Valeria Fabj, “Motherhood as Political Voice: The Rhetoric of the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo.” Communication Studies 4, no. 1 (1993): 2, https:// doi.org/10.1080/10510979309368379.

sion to be a feminist one”15 since viewing their activism as a feminist would go against their image as traditional women. They used maternity and maternal images to “signify a positive message of justice, peace, and love in direct opposition to the paternal, militaristic images of power, violence, and force.”16 Thus, their cause was seen as unifying rather than politically divisive. As previously discussed, being perceived as apolitical helped Las Madres consolidate its organization and maintain lasting power. Fabj demonstrates that the mothers were cognizant of and capitalized on this political benefit. The mothers refused to let men join their ranks for fear of this gendered advantage disappearing.17 Moreover, they used rhetoric which specifically drew on their role as mothers and emphasized certain traits such as self-sacrifice.18 In doing so, they leveraged their involvement in the private sphere and the esteem society had for the role of mothers to support their activism in the public sphere.

Furthermore, the symbols they chose to use, including wearing white headscarves and carrying pictures of their disappeared children, further reinforced the power of their identities as traditional, moral mothers.19 Finally, their lack of previous political experience, a byproduct of being women in a patriarchal society, also aided in this perception.20 By emphasizing traditional femininity, they embodied the conventional family values that the regime purported to uphold.21 Therefore, it was contradictory for the regime to persecute them. The positionality of Las Madres helped consolidate their movement and made it difficult to stop, even in a high-

15 Thornton, “Grief Transformed,” 279.

16 Thornton, 279.

17 O’Connor, Mothers Making Latin America, 208.

18 Valeria Fabj, “Motherhood as Political Voice,” 7.

19 O’Connor, Mothers Making Latin America, 208.

20 Lauren Burns, “Mothers with a Cause: The Political Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo.” University of Maryland Libraries (2015).

21 Valeria Fabj, “Motherhood as Political Voice,” 9.

ly politically and socially oppressive context.

The Power of Interpersonal Ties

The robust interpersonal ties within Las Madres unified the organization by empowering its members and creating a collective identity and mission, contributing to its sustained activism. The mothers of disappeared children underwent a unique grieving process. They did not receive consolation from friends due to the government’s policy of terror and guilt by association; conversely, they were avoided by friends and sometimes even family.22 Furthermore, there was rarely any evidence of their children’s death, nor was there any evidence of life. Therefore, the mothers of disappeared children could not complete the “first essential task of mourning,” which is accepting the loss’s reality.23 The absence of a support system created space for Las Madres to act not only as a vehicle to pressure the government, but also as a support group, strengthening the organization’s resolve and contributing to its sustained activism.

The emotional connections between grieving mothers empowered them to demand answers from the regime, contributing to the emergence of Las Madres. Extensive research examining various social movements has demonstrated that interpersonal bonds are often responsible for people’s galvanization into activists and political actors.24 Qualitative analysis of interviews with members of Las Madres conducted by Fernando Bosco reveals that they first mobilized through the development of interpersonal networks of grieving mothers. The women gathering at the Plaza were united by motherhood and their grief. Sharing their experiences allowed the mothers to feel empowered and to empower others; such empow-

22 Thornton, “Grief Transformed,” 279.

23 Thornton, 286.

24 Verta Taylor and Nancy E. Whittier, “Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobilization,” Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, (1992): 107.

erment became the “basis for activism.”25 Marta Vásquez, a member of Las Madres, describes the organization as “a group in which [mothers] leaned on each other” and that “the strength that one of [the mothers] lacked on a certain day, another had for that occasion.”26 By connecting emotionally and cultivating a united, supportive group with a specific mission, the grieving mothers came together to form Las Madres.

The interpersonal bonds and the tight-knit community forged due to the organization’s role as a support group empowered the mothers to partake in a mission greater than themselves, therefore strengthening Las Madres’ determination and unity. Being a part of the organization was often a life-changing experience for grieving mothers. In an interview, a member of Las Madres explained that she had “formed a new family” with the organization and that no one could “imagine how much [they] love[d] each other.”27 By uniting with others facing similar hardships, the mothers adopted a mission to address not only their personal losses but also the losses of countless Argentine mothers, as well as to keep the disappeared children’s legacies alive. The mothers saw their individual circumstances as “part of the larger repression,” and their grief transformed into “action for the good of all.”28 Vásquez recounts a mother who continued participating in the Thursday marches once her disappeared daughter had been freed. When asked why, the mother said the organization was “something stronger than [herself].”29 Such efforts to “[seek] meaning beyond

25 Fernando J. Bosco, “The Madres de Plaza de Mayo and Three Decades of Human Rights’ Activism: Embeddedness, Emotions, and Social Movements,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 96, no. 2 (2006): 351. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3694051.

26 Posner and Posner, “Testimonies of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo,” 277.

27 Bosco, “The Madres de Plaza de Mayo,” 351.

28 Posner and Posner, “Testimonies of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo,” 277.

29 Posner and Posner, 277.

private pain” have helped the mothers deal with grief and created political actors out of housewives without prior political experience.30 The commitment of the mothers to Las Madres’ unified mission elucidates the strength of the interpersonal bonds created within the organization.

The interpersonal ties within Las Madres created the organization’s unified mission, transforming the mothers’ grief into activism. Sally Thornton writes that an important factor contributing to how the mothers dealt with their grief was “the support which they received from each other from their new extended family,” Las Madres.31 The mothers reported that meeting others who faced similar losses and forming a support group “saved their sanity and maybe even their lives,” especially when friends ostracized them in the context of political fear.32 The mothers’ losses and mutual support created bonds that encouraged them to share information they had gathered and “develop a sense of solidarity,” from which they “drew the strength” to demand information concerning their children.33 By sharing their knowledge and supporting each other, the mothers transformed their grief into activism, allowing them to deal with their loss, albeit unconventionally. In 1979, the junta passed legislation claiming the disappeared were dead and providing the families of the disappeared economic compensation.34 The mothers condemned the legislation and refused compensation, indicating that they would not cease their activism and allow the regime to be absolved of the harm it had done.35 Because the mothers could not come to closure regarding their loss, they tackled their grief through their collective goal of seeking justice, thus transforming their grief into activism.

30 Posner and Posner, 277.

31 Thornton, “Grief Transformed,” 279.

32 Thornton, 286.

33 Navarro, “The Personal is Political,” 254.

34 Thornton, “Grief Transformed,” 286.

35 Thornton, 286.

The emotional networks within Las Madres also created a collective identity for its growing number of members, contributing to the organization’s sustained activism despite having geographically scattered members. After the Madres’ initial gatherings in the Plaza, they expanded geographically by recruiting more members.36 Participation in social networks, from neighbourhood networks to political networks, involved more mothers in the organization, contributing to its growth. Las Madres’ emotional bonds and, thus, collective identity and mission have guided the organization’s activism and ensured its sustainability as a movement. These emotional bonds became embedded in a territorially dispersed network, sustaining the organization even when it was “extremely loose and uncoordinated” due to the lack of officially organized chapters nationwide. 37The case of Las Madres reveals that activism can be sustained even if an organization’s network is not formally organized and of broad territorial scope, provided that it has solid informal networks. Such sustainability is achievable through emotional ties developed by sharing painful experiences and through members’ collective identification.

The interpersonal bonds uniting Las Madres also helped the organization overcome challenges such as government repression and organizational division. Through their unity, the organization’s interactions with security forces mobilized the mothers instead of intimidating them.38 Upon interviewing members of Las Madres, Bosco found that much of what sustained the organization during times of government repression were the mothers’ emotional bonds, which provided “a feeling of belonging to a larger network of women who shared the same grievances.”39 Furthermore,

36 Bosco, “The Madres de Plaza de Mayo,” 351.

37 Bosco, 350.

38 Posner and Posner, “Testimonies of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo,” 278.

39 Bosco, “The Madres de Plaza de Mayo,” 350.

the mothers’ commitment to their collective identity is evidenced by the fact that the group remains in operation despite the fall of the military government in 1983. Since the rise of democracy in Argentina, Las Madres have shifted from their sole aim of finding their missing children to advocating for human rights for all.40 Moreover, despite disagreements in leadership which caused the organization’s division in 1986, members of both organizations, scattered between twenty cities in Argentina, identify themselves first as Madres de Plaza de Mayo, emphasizing their common experiences and collective identities as “mothers of the disappeared.”41 Over forty-five years later, Las Madres remains active, demonstrating the sustained activism the organization has achieved by creating robust emotional ties and hence a strong collective identity and mission.

Conclusion

Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo emerged successfully during a highly oppressive political context and successfully sustained its activism through apolitical consolidation and interpersonal ties. Las Madres’ apolitical mission allowed for the unity of grieving mothers despite political divides and made their organization appear less threatening due to its goal of finding their children, which transcended political ideology. Doing so effectively raised awareness surrounding human rights. Furthermore, by leaning into their apolitical role as mothers, they escaped public scrutiny and successfully publicized their mission even in a highly oppressive political context. The emotional connections between mothers undergoing an unconventional grieving process contributed to the emergence of Las Madres. They created a collective mission, transforming their grief into activism and sustaining it de-

40 María del Carmen Feijoó and Marcela Maróa Alejandra Nari, “Women and Democracy in Argentina,” in The Women’s Movement In Latin America, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1994), 107.

41 Bosco, “The Madres de Plaza de Mayo,” 361.

spite having geographically scattered members.

The mothers are now regarded as “heroines of Argentine society” because they were the only ones who “dared to speak in a silent society.”42 This report presents key takeaways for aspiring local grassroots organizations drawn from the success of Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo.

42 Marjorie Agosin, “A Visit to the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo,” Human Rights Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1987), 430.

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Thornton, Sally. “Grief Transformed: The Mothers of the Plaza De Mayo.” OMEGA 41 (2000): 279–89. https://doi. org/10.2190/YVKV-7601-8VKD-VM5T.

Sumak Kawsay and Neoliberalism: An Investigation into the Failures of Sumak Kawsay-Informed Policies in Ecuador

by: Zoë Wilson-Potter

Abstract

This essay discusses the emergence and significance of Sumak Kawsay, a Quechua concept that means the ‘good life’ and originates from the Andean Region of Latin America. Despite its incorporation into the constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia, the essay argues that strong neoliberal roots in Ecuador pose significant obstacles to the successful adoption of Sumak Kawsay, a biocentric and communal concept in nature, into mainstream policy. Through an analysis of the incompatible conceptualizations of citizenship between neoliberalism and Sumak Kawsay, this essay explores the failures of the Correa administration’s attempts to implement Sumak Kawsay-based policies in Ecuador. Despite these setbacks, this essay maintains that Sumak Kawsay retains value and potential for influencing mainstream discourse and politics, offering an alternative framework to challenge the neoliberal status quo. Through an examination of Sumak Kawsay’s origins, its clash with neoliberal ideology, and its enduring relevance, the next paragraphs highlight the complexities of incorporating Indigenous concepts into contemporary governance structures while underscoring their transformative potential.

Résumé

Cet essai traite de l’émergence et du sens de sumak kawsay, un concept quechua signifiant « bien vivre » provenant de la région andine en Amérique latine dans le contexte du discours sur le développement. En dépit de son incorporation dans les constitutions de l’Équateur et de la Bolivie, cet essai argumente spécifiquement que les fortes racines néolibérales de l’Équateur posent des obstacles signifiants à la réussite de l’adoption de sumak kawsay, un concept biocentrique et communal par nature, dans la politique courante. À travers une analyse des conceptualisations incompatibles de la citoyenneté entre le néolibéralisme et sumak kawsay, cet essai explore les échecs des essais de l’administration Correa afin de mettre en place les politiques de sumak kawsay en Équateur. Malgré ces écueils, cet essai soutient que le sumak kawsay conserve sa valeur et son potentiel pour influencer le discours et la politique de la culture dominante, en offrant un cadre alternatif pour remettre en question le statu quo néolibéral. En examinant les origines du sumak kawsay, son conflit avec l’idéologie néolibérale et sa pertinence durable, cet essai met en évidence les difficultés d’intégration des concepts autochtones dans les structures de gouvernance contemporaines, tout en soulignant leur potentiel de transformation.

Introduction

Indigenous concepts and theories rarely reach mainstream discourse. Against these odds, the biocentric, harmonious concept of Sumak Kawsay emerged from Ecuador and made a splash in Latin American––and eventually global––development discourse. Ecuador and Bolivia went to the extent of enshrining Sumak Kawsay into their respective constitutions in the 2000s. These were big steps in formally recognizing the Indigenous populations of their countries, and in giving value to their perspectives. However, I argue that despite President Correa of Ecuador’s attempts to incorporate the Quechua concept of Sumak Kawsay (Buen Vivir in Spanish) into politics, and the overwhelming potential of an Indigenous concept reaching mainstream discourse, the neoliberal instructions are too deeply entrenched in the Ecuadorian Government and society to successfully adopt an ideology created outside the web of capitalism. To demonstrate the legacy of neoliberalism in the ‘post-neoliberal’ world, I will explore the incompatibility of the neoliberal and the Sumak Kawsay conceptualizations of citizenship––the former based on private and extractive principles, and the latter on communal and biocentric values––through President Correa’s failure to execute land redistribution and conservation policies. Additionally, I assert that despite the failures of the neoliberal system, Sumak Kawsay still holds immense value and has a place in mainstream politics and discourse. This essay is structured as follows: first, I discuss the context and significance of Sumak Kawsay, highlighting the Quechua understanding of the concept. Second, to reveal the fundamental incoherence between neoliberalism and Sumak Kawsay, I investigate their respective, incompatible, perspectives on citizenship. Third, I reveal the effects of their incompatibility by analyzing the failures of the Correa administration to execute the biocentric and communal policies of Sumak Kawsay in Ecuadorian politics.

Finally, I posit the remaining value of Sumak Kawsay in politics and mainstream discourse, despite the failures of the neoliberal system.

The Context and Significance of Sumak Kawsay

Sumak Kawsay is a plural concept referring to the Quechua conceptualization of the good life. By emphasizing “classical elements of quality of life”1, Sumak Kawsay further invokes the notion that harmony within the community is the avenue to widespread well-being. Importantly, the community includes nature, or Pachamama (mother earth) –– thus calling for a harmonious relationship with, not on, the land. Castillo summarises this notion as the “harmonious living amongst human beings, nature, and with oneself.”2 Gudynas proposes that Sumak Kawsay entered mainstream discourse in a twofold manner: as a critical response to Western development theory on the one hand, and as an alternative to development influenced by Indigenous traditions on the other.3 The positioning of Sumak Kawsay as a concept free from the limits of Eurocentric thinking allows for the radical questioning of influential Western development norms. Gudynas highlights the unique nature of Sumak Kawsay’s potential to offer “valuable pathways to overcome the obsession with the word ‘development’, and explore alternatives within a pluricultural setting.”4

Before discussing the significance of Sumak Kawsay, it is necessary to examine the values of Sumak Kawsay to the Quechua people. Admittedly, it is challenging to find Indigenous sources on this concept, likely due to their removal from

1 Eduardo Gudynas, “Buen Vivir: Today’s Tomorrow,” Development 54, no. 4 (December 1, 2011): 441, https:// doi.org/10.1057/dev.2011.86.

2 M. A. Castillo, “Implementing Indigenous Paradigms: The Paradoxes of Actualizing Sumak Kawsay,” Administrative Theory & Praxis 44, no. 4 (October 2, 2022): 341, https://doi.org/10.1080/10841806.2022.2138196.

3 Gudynas, “Buen Vivir: Today’s Tomorrow,” 441.

4 Gudynas, 442.

western academia, language barriers, and the Indigenous emphasis on oral histories. However, Quick and Spartz provide a relevant analysis of the concept by examining Quechua art in the Tigua genre. The genre provides a visual conceptualization of the core concepts of Sumak Kawsay. Tigua developed in the 1970s as a touristic genre, resulting in its criticism for having ‘inauthentic’ artists appealing to the tourist gaze.5 Despite common criticism, interviews with Quechua artists prove that they paint the “nation as they see and experience it.”6 Artist Jean Caesar Umajinga painted a scene (Figure 1) which in his words, “demonstrated Buen Vivir.”7 When asked to explain Sumak Kawsay, or Buen Vivir in Spanish, Umajing responded with the statement: “The real buen vivir in the community, its fundamental basis, is that there should be unity.

tion of the buen vivir. And also having a source of money, having health, and education. That’s plainly the buen vivir: I feel truly good in life.”9

The importance of both a visual representation and a first-hand Quechua definition are crucial to avoiding misrepresentation of Sumak Kawsay.

Sumak Kawsay and Neoliberalism’s Competing Definitions of Citizenship

There should be mutual respect among the people, and no saying ‘You don’t deserve what you have’ or ‘No one deserves it.’ That’s the founda-

5 Joe Quick and James T. Spartz, “On the Pursuit of Good Living in Highland Ecuador: Critical Indigenous Discourses of Sumak Kawsay,” Latin American Research Review 53, no. 4 (December 2018): 761, https://doi. org/10.25222/larr.132

6 Quick and Spartz, 761.

7 Quick and Spartz, 761.

8 Quick and Spartz, “On the Pursuit of Good Living in Highland Ecuador,” 758.

While Sumak Kawsay has the potential to radically challenge the post-neoliberal development framework, there are fundamental differences between the Indigenous concept and the system which it attempts to infiltrate. Discussing their respective differences in regard to the nature of citizenship proves effective in revealing the incoherence between Sumak Kawsay and the neoliberal system. In the context of this essay, I present citizenship through a lens of the rights afforded to ‘citizens’ based on their relationship with the land. As previously discussed, Sumak Kawsay prescribes a heterogeneous, communal environment, where a harmonious relationship between the land and the people is emphasized. Citizenship is viewed through a lens of biocentrism and community, deriving from “interactions between diverse people, nature and communities,”10 calling for an emphasis on collective rights as opposed to individual rights. Radcliffe forges a helpful link by characterizing Sumak Kawsay under the lens of Differentiated Citizenship, a concept proposed by Young to combat the flawed neoliberal ideology of universal citizenship.11 Essentially, she argues that the neoliberal notion of universal citizenship, where every person is treated the same, has a major blind spot: it ignores individual and group differences. The 9 Quick and Spartz, 763.

10 Sarah A. Radcliffe, “Development for a Postneoliberal Era? Sumak Kawsay, Living Well and the Limits to Decolonisation in Ecuador,” Geoforum, SI - Party Politics, the Poor and the City: reflections from South Africa, 43, no. 2 (March 1, 2012): 242, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2011.09.003.

11 Radcliffe, “Development for a Postneoliberal Era?”, 242.

Figure 1: Painting depicting interpretation of Sumak Kawsay, or buen vivir, by Juan César Umajinga of Quilotoa.8

value of citizenship is decided by those in power who often only relate to elite citizens and are therefore removed from the cultural niches and needs of all citizens.12 The inequality of citizenship is emphasized when a minority group’s needs, such as the Quechua’s desires for land redistribution and conservation policies, actively contradict those of the powerful neoliberal state which prioritizes extraction over protection.

Broadly speaking, neoliberalism features a deregulated, free-market economy. Therefore, I propose that in the neoliberal, export-oriented country of Ecuador, multinational corporations or private enterprises are given priority citizenship over the Quehcua people. Once again, a disparity of citizenship deepens from a system of citizenship not limited to personhood, but rather one that places greater value on extractive and private entities than on the Indigenous Quechua population. The result of an unequal, private, and extractive system of citizenship is defined by Radcliffe as the “deregulation of labour relations, increasing precarious working conditions and worsening income security, causing falls in living standards for the majority as well as the over-exploitation of natural resources.”13 Ecuador was colonized by the Spanish for around 300 years, during which Indigenous populations were enslaved through the Encomienda system of forced labour where Spanish officials assumed the legal authority to extract labour from non-Christians, mineral deposits were exhausted, and the textile industry was exploited through low labour costs and abundant natural resources.14 As such, since their initial colonization in

12 Iris Marion Young, “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship,” Ethics 99, no. 2 (January 1989): 250–51, https://doi.org/10.1086/29.

13 Radcliffe, “Development for a Postneoliberal Era?”, 248.

14 Charles Nurse, “Ecuador,” in The State, Industrial Relations and the Labour Movement in Latin America, eds. J. Carrière, N. Haworth, and J. Roddick, Latin American Studies Series (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), 99–100, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-05905-8_4.

1531, Ecuador’s rich natural resources have fallen victim to foreign greed leading to the present day where the nation’s most profitable industry is the extraction and export of oil.15 While there are many issues with oil extraction, the degradation of the natural environment has the greatest negative impact on Sumak Kawsay, thus making clear the neoliberal system’s value of economic opportunities for advancement over harmony with nature. The result is a concentration of wealth and widespread income disparity, the opposite of a Sumak Kawsay-inspired system of citizenship. For example, Ecuador has one of the most unequal income distributions in Latin America, one of the most unequal regions in the world.16 Land is viewed as a resource to be taken from, rather than lived with, as Sumak Kawsay proposes. Thus, the neoliberal view of citizenship and land is limited to a private and extractive relationship.

The Failures of Sumak Kawsay-based Policies in Ecuador

Given the deep roots of neoliberalism, President Correa’s attempts to incorporate Sumak Kawsay into the Ecuadorian constitution are surprising and widely regarded as the “most radical constitutions of the world.”17 Radcliffe notes how the new constitution made a deliberate attempt to move past neoliberal ideals of citizenship that were individualistic and administered “by groups committed to the protection of property rights above all others.”18 The 2008 constitution, in contrast, references Sumak Kawsay five times; in the preamble it is stated: we “hereby decide to build … A new form of public coexistence, in diversity and in harmony with nature, to achieve the good way of living, the sumak kawsay.”19 Furthermore, Article 171 challenges the

15 Castillo, “Implementing Indigenous Paradigms,” 352.

16 Radcliffe, “Development for a Postneoliberal Era?”, 241.

17 Quick and Spartz, “On the Pursuit of Good Living in Highland Ecuador,” 758.

18 Radcliffe, “Development for a Postneoliberal Era?”, 243.

19 National Assembly Legislative and Oversight Commit-

neoliberal notion of citizenship by giving rights to the earth: ‘‘Nature or Pachamama [Mother Earth, in Kichwa], where life is reproduced and realised, has the right to full respect for its existence and maintenance and the regeneration of its natural cycles, structure, function and evolutionary processes.”20 These constitutional changes were dramatic, and accompanied by promises of a ‘Revolucion Agraria!’ However, Correa’s administration utterly failed to execute policies regarding the distribution and control of land.21 Goodwin discusses how Correa appeased disapproving landowning elites by not only leaving the primary export model intact, but by also signing a free trade agreement with the EU in 2017. Effectively, “medium and large scale capitalist firms appear to have been the primary beneficiaries of public spending on agriculture,” indicating a clear persistence of neoliberal values.22

A crucial indication of the neoliberal legacy is the failure of Correa’s proposed Yasuni ITT Initiative in 2010. The project intended to stop oil drilling in the Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini region of the Yasuni National Park, one of the most biodiverse regions in the world.23 The conditions of the policy were such that Ecuador would stop drilling in the region in exchange for payments from international nations equal to 50% of the value of the extraction. The income would then be invested in renewable energy sources and ecotourism. However, the project proved economically unviable after only $13.3 million of the globally promised $3 billion was tee, “Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador,” Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University, October 20, 2008.

20 Radcliffe, “Development for a Postneoliberal Era?”, 244.

21 Geoff Goodwin, “The Quest to Bring Land under Social and Political Control: Land Reform Struggles of the Past and Present in Ecuador,” Journal of Agrarian Change 17, no. 3 (2017): 30, https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12181.

22 Goodwin, “The Quest to Bring Land under Social and Political Control,” 34.

23 Castillo, “Implementing Indigenous Paradigms,” 352.

delivered to Ecuador.24 In response to the “world failing Ecuador,”25 Correa completely reversed the policy of Sumak Kawsay and greenlighted oil drilling in the fragile ecosystem.26 Correa’s intentions to advance Sumak Kawsay are undeniably present in the initial policy; but so are the deep roots of neoliberalism. The developed world’s interest in exploiting Ecuador’s natural resources and agricultural industry is certainly a factor in the policy’s failure; it actively encouraged neoliberal values of economic advancement through land extraction. Correa further demonstrated his own failure to adhere to a strictly Sumak Kawsay-based land reform policy with his proposal of several internationally backed mining projects, such a copper mine funded by Chinese mining company Ecuacorriente.27

Thus, I assert that Correa has largely ignored a central element of Sumak Kawsay in his policy development: land protection. Both the unintentional outcome of the Yasuni ITT Initiative, and the intentional outcome of the copper mining project not only actively contradict Sumak Kawsay, but also Article 171 of Correa’s own constitution which proposes that Pachamama (mother earth) “has the right to full respect for its existence and maintenance and the regeneration of its natural cycles.”28 The result is a continuation of unequal citizenship, with a greater value placed on extractive and private principles, rather than on communal and biocentric factors of citizenship. Quick and Spartz argue, then, that the neoliberal conception of citizenship only allows for “an extrapolation of indigenous concepts” and its function in politics is largely “reductive and cannot account for the semantic richness of the concept.”29 Further, Fernando Santos-Granero writes

24 Castillo, 352.

25 Castillo, 352.

26 Castillo, 352.

27 Castillo, 353.

28 Radcliffe, “Development for a Postneoliberal Era?”, 244.

29 Quick and Spartz, “On the Pursuit of Good Living in

that “proponents of buen vivir are vague as to its content, and … [have adopted] what can only be characterized as an indigenous neocolonialist stance.”30 While ‘Indigenous neocolonial’ sounds like an oxymoron, it is a helpful way to imagine Correa’s policies, and further enforces the notion that true Sumak Kawsay is fundamentally incompatible with the neoliberal state. Therefore, while neoliberal values continue to be the primary motivator of the majority of those in power, Sumak Kawsay cannot function to its fullest extent.

The

Value of Sumak Kawsay in Politics and

Mainstream Discourse

From a stance of optimism, I believe that despite all the failures discussed above, Sumak Kawsay has had a positive influence, and will likely continue to grow in importance. Particularly due to its origin being outside the web of capitalism. I propose that with every advance Sumak Kawsay makes into government policy––including the failures I addressed above––it impedes upon, and replaces, a spot that a neoliberal value once held. For example, even though Ecuador now has a strikingly more neoliberal president in Guillermo Lasso, the constitution still upholds the principles of Sumak Kawsay. The importance, therefore, is its maintenance and continued prevalence in mainstream discourse. With the increasingly high demands to rethink sustainable development, the demand for alternative theories such as Sumak Kawsay will grow. Vanhulst and Beling agree by further asserting that Sumak Kawsay resonates with the growing desire to rethink citizenship by fundamentally altering the social organization,current consumption, and production patterns.31 Within the context of communal and biocentric citizenship, Vanhulst and Beling

Highland Ecuador,” 758.

30 Quick and Spartz, 758.

31 Julien Vanhulst and Adrian E. Beling, “Buen Vivir: Emergent Discourse within or beyond Sustainable Development?,” Ecological Economics 101 (May 1, 2014): 61, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.02.017.

conclude that Sumak Kawsay has the potential of enlarging “the frame of current debates and allowing for the potential emergence of novel conceptions, institutions and practices through collective learning.”32 Essentially, I assert that the bigger the splash the Quechua concept makes, the greater the potential for its influence.

Conclusion

I conclude that Sumak Kawsay has immense potential, and the impact it has made in the Ecuadorian constitution and mainstream discourse cannot be ignored. However, the actual outcomes have been dampened by active, and lingering, neoliberal values. This incompatibility of Sumak Kawsay and neoliberalism is best understood through their competing understandings of the relationship between citizenship and the land: the former argues for a communal and biocentric approach while the latter argues for a private and extractive relationship. The fundamental differences offered by analyzing these two definitions helps to understand the failures of Sumak Kawsay-based policies proposed by the Correa administration. The deep roots of neoliberalism in Ecuador’s history of colonization, exploitation, extraction, and in present day inequality, as well as the global neoliberal prominence, have created an environment that cannot house principles of Sumak Kawsay to an effective level. However, looking forward, these failures do not void Sumak Kawsay’s influence in mainstream discourse and politics of meaning, rather they highlight the flaws of the neoliberal system. The value of a concept created outside the web of capitalism, and one which can propose a radically alternative set of norms, is not lost in the to-date failures of the government to implement progressive, communal, and biocentric policies.

32 Vanhulst and Beling, “Buen Vivir: Emergent Discourse within or beyond Sustainable Development?”, 61.

References

Castillo, M. A. “Implementing Indigenous Paradigms: The Paradoxes of Actualizing Sumak Kawsay.” Administrative Theory & Praxis 44, no. 4 (October 2, 2022): 340–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/108418 06.2022.2138196.

Goodwin, Geoff. “The Quest to Bring Land under Social and Political Control: Land Reform Struggles of the Past and Present in Ecuador.” Journal of Agrarian Change 17, no. 3 (2017): 571–93. https:// doi.org/10.1111/joac.12181.

Gudynas, Eduardo. “Buen Vivir: Today’s Tomorrow.” Development 54, no. 4 (December 1, 2011): 441–47. https://doi.org/10.1057/dev.2011.86.

National Assembly Legislative and Oversight Committee. “Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador.” Political Database of the Americas. Georgetown University, October 20, 2008.. https://pdba.george town.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html.

Nurse, Charles. “Ecuador.” In The State, Industrial Relations and the Labour Movement in Latin America, edited by J. Carrière, N. Haworth, and J. Roddick. Latin American Studies Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-05905-8_4.

Quick, Joe, and James T. Spartz. “On the Pursuit of Good Living in Highland Ecuador: Critical Indigenous Discourses of Sumak Kawsay.” Latin American Research Review 53, no. 4 (December 2018): 757–69. https://doi.org/10.25222/larr.132.

Radcliffe, Sarah A. “Development for a Postneoliberal Era? Sumak Kawsay, Living Well and the Limits to Decolonisation in Ecuador.” Geoforum, SI - Party Politics, the Poor and the City: reflections from South Africa, 43, no. 2 (March 1, 2012): 240–49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2011.09.003.

Vanhulst, Julien, and Adrian E. Beling. “Buen Vivir: Emergent Discourse within or beyond Sustainable Development?” Ecological Economics 101 (May 1, 2014): 54–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecole con.2014.02.017.

Young, Iris Marion. “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship.” Ethics 99, no. 2 (January 1989): 250–74. https://doi.org/10.1086/29

Operation Serval: Addressing Security Dilemmas Through Preventative Initiatives on the Global Scene

by: Emma Dutu

Abstract

In 2013, a French military intervention, known under the name of Operation Serval, was deployed in Mali with the aim of preventing Jihadist groups from taking over the northern region of the country. The intervention was seen as a means for France to protect its economic and strategic interests in the region, including safeguarding access to profitable uranium mines in neighboring Niger and reinforcing its influence in the region, while also preventing the establishment of an African Al-Qaida stronghold in Mali. The intervention had a significant impact on Mali’s sovereignty, as it helped the government maintain control over its territory and prevent the country from becoming a failed state. However, the operation also had non-neglectable impacts on Mali’s own ability to control its territory and maintain its security. The framework of the security dilemma is applied to analyze the impact of Operation Serval on targeted groups and Mali’s sovereignty. The intervention led to new preventive initiatives on the global scene, such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the G5 Sahel Forces, which were tasked with stabilizing the nation and aiding the Malian government in the long-term.

Résumé

En 2013, une intervention militaire française, connue sous le nom de l’opération Serval, a été déployée au Mali dans l’intention d’empêcher les groupes islamistes de s’emparer de la région nord du pays. L’intervention était perçue comme un moyen pour la France de protéger ses intérêts économiques et stratégiques dans la région, notamment en garantissant l’accès aux mines d’uranium au Niger voisin et en renforçant son influence dans la région, tout en empêchant l’établissement d’un bastion africain d’Al-Qaïda au Mali. L’intervention a eu un impact significatif sur la souveraineté du Mali puisqu’elle a aidé le gouvernement à maintenir le contrôle sur son territoire et a empêché le pays de devenir un État en déliquescence. En revanche, l’opération a aussi eu des impacts non négligeables sur la capacité du Mali à contrôler son propre territoire et à maintenir sa sécurité. Le cadre du dilemme de la sécurité est appliqué afin d’analyser l’impact de l’opération Serval sur les groupes ciblés et la souveraineté du Mali. L’intervention a mené à de nouvelles initiatives préventives sur la scène globale, comme la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA), qui est chargée de stabiliser la nation et d’aider le gouvernement malien.

Introduction

In April 2012, a coalition of militant Jihadist groups with links to Al-Qaida took over northern Mali, leading to a political crisis and widespread violence in the region. Independent from France since 1960, Mali was targeted in a wave of Jihadist attacks by the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) and by Ansar Dine, a Salafi Jihadist group.1 These organizations sought to topple the government of Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré and annex the northern desert region of Azawad. The Malian government failed to retake control of the area, prompting France to intervene.

Operation Serval launched in Mali in January 2013, with the goal of stopping terrorist brutality and coercion while preventing the further establishment of a terrorist state in the region. The military goals of the operation were a great success, with French forces retaking important towns and cities in northern Mali and driving the Jihadist groups back to remote areas along Mali’s border. However, the operation also caused many civilian casualties and led to the substantial displacement of local populations.

Furthermore, there have been ongoing worries concerning the longevity of the operation’s development. The military intervention of Operation Serval created a security dilemma that complicated the relations between France, Mali, and terrorist groups, as each actor perceived the other as a potential threat. This intervention sparked significant debates regarding Mali’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which were challenged by the presence of foreign troops.

To face the unpredictable nature of those developments, the United Nations Multidimen-

1 Bruno Tertrais, Our Military Forces’ Struggle Against Lawless, Media Savvy Terrorist Adversaries (High Level Military Group, 2016), 66.

sional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established in December 2013 with the aim of stabilizing and aiding the Malian government in its efforts to quell the ongoing insurgency, subsequently taking over as a replacement for Operation Serval.

As such, by critically examining the impact of Operation Serval on targeted groups and state sovereignty, and considering its implications for the security dilemma, deeper insights into the complex dynamics of intervention and conflict in Mali can be obtained.

This paper argues that the presence of foreign troops in Mali placed the country’s internal administration under pressure, and sparked debate about the role outside parties should play in settling regional disputes. Using the security dilemma as an analytical lens, this paper will assess the impact of Operation Serval on targeted groups and on Mali’s sovereignty while highlighting the unintended consequences of anti-terrorist measures that resulted from this intervention. The first section of this paper will analyze the emergence of the security dilemma. The question of France’s impact on sovereignty will then be discussed, before looking at Mali’s sovereignty in the context of Operation Serval. The paper will conclude by examining the responses of other countries in regard to this conflict.

Operation Serval and the Security Dilemma

The security dilemma is a theory in international relations that describes a situation in which two or more states feel uncertain about each other’s intentions and military capabilities, leading them to take preventative actions that increase their own security, and consequently, increase the insecurity of the other states. In other words, the security dilemma arises when “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security de-

crease the security of others.”2 This creates a vicious cycle where each state feels the need to take more defensive measures to protect itself, leading to further insecurity and increasing the potential for conflict. The security dilemma is often perceived as a key factor in explaining conflict dynamics and interstate war. It emphasizes the importance of trust and cooperation between states in diminishing the risk of potential escalating aggression as each side seeks to protect its security.

As our contemporary and increasingly globalized world slowly redefines itself through a new paradigm of interconnectedness, hegemonic non-state actors are filling positions formerly held by traditional nation-states.3 Within this changing context, the security dilemma concept has expanded from the traditional notion of military defense against a fellow nation-state to that of complex and ambiguous intrastate conflict involving indirect internal security issues. As such, in the context of Operation Serval, the concern about escalating conflict involved multiple non-state and state parties: Jihadist groups, France and the Malian government.

Against this backdrop, France’s military intervention in Mali was designed to counter the perceived threat of Jihadist groups, which were considered a significant challenge to regional and international security. French President François Hollande, driven by concerns over the potential ramifications of an African Al Qaeda stronghold on France, deployed the French military to intervene in Mali, ordering his military to “step in, hunt the terrorists down, and help restore Mali’s democracy.”4 The root cause of the security

2 Charles L. “Glaser, The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 171, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/25054031

3 Max G. Manwaring, The Strategic Logic of the Contemporary Security Dilemma. (Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 15, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11721

4 Christopher S. Chivvis, The French War on Al Qa’ida in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 4

dilemma often lies in the fear and uncertainty that one state experiences regarding the potential reactions of the other state to its defensive actions. In the context of rising fears about the global threat of Jihadist groups, France’s military intervention was therefore deemed a necessary response to the perceived threat to international security posed by MOJWA and Ansar Dine. Operation Serval was driven by the fear that Mali could become an African stronghold for Al-Qaida, which would have significant implications for Western powers: “The outside world feared that if the Jihadists and Al Qaeda entrench themselves in northern Mali, the area would become yet another haven for terrorists threatening fragile African states and establishing a sanctuary in close proximity to Europe.”5 It can therefore be argued that the installation of that fear towards the potential Jihadist actions laid the foundations for the emergence of a security dilemma between the French government and extremist groups.

Concurrently, the Jihadist groups in Mali found themselves trapped in a security dilemma, whereby they perceived the presence of French forces as a threat to their own security and took the initiative to defend themselves against what they saw as an aggressive foreign intervention. The United Nations (UN) proposed a plan that involved deploying a multinational force comprised of troops from 14 member countries of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) to reinforce the inadequately equipped Malian military. This African-led force was to be assisted by a group of Western military advisors and specialized troops, primarily from France and the United States, to bolster intelligence, logistics, air support, and surveillance capabilities.6 Due to the inefficient organization of 5 Ahmed S. Hashim, “The War in Mali: Islamists, Tuaregs and French Intervention,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 5, no. 2 (2013): 6, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351123.

6 Hashim, “The War in Mali,” 6.

this plan, Jihadist forces on the ground had the opportunity to preemptively build up their strength against the African-led force. The proliferation of arms among the Jihadist forces can therefore be viewed as a pivotal factor that prompted France to take unilateral action and intervene without support from other international powers. As such, the security dilemma is highlighted in this situation because the preventative measures taken by the Jihadist organizations to protect their recently acquired territory were perceived as a threat to France’s security. This created a cycle of violence and insecurity that further exacerbated the security dilemmas felt by both parties.

France’s Intervention to Protect Mali’s Sovereignty

While the UN’s international approach to tackling the threats posed by Jihadist groups proved inefficient, France initiated Operation Serval to eliminate the extremist presence in northern Mali and restore the government’s authority in the region. As previously determined, the emergence of a security dilemma requires fear to become a mechanism for mutual armament. The prospect of those Jihadist groups establishing a base in northern Mali would directly threaten French interests in the region, leading France to fear losing its strategic economic benefits. In fact, the implementation of French military presence in the region was partially aimed at safeguarding the country’s uranium deposits in neighboring Niger, which remain crucial for the uninterrupted operation of France’s nuclear industry.7 France became fearful of extremist forces attacking the mines, which would have had dramatic consequences on France’s electricity supply. Thus, by protecting this crucial industry, France indirectly secured its political power, and by extent, its economic interests in Mali. 7 Marina E. Henke, “Why Did France Intervene in Mali in 2013? Examining the Role of Intervention Entrepreneurs,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 23, no. 3 (2017): 315, DOI: 10.1080/11926422.2017.1352004.

Moreover, France’s decision to intervene was partly motivated by a desire to prevent the establishment of an African Al-Qaida stronghold in Mali. Ansar Dine and MOJWA had widespread access to weapons and subscribed to a violent, anti-Western, and anti-modern ideology.8 As a result, Operation Serval was launched to counter the threat posed by the Jihadist groups and to protect France’s interests in the region. France was therefore concerned that, in addition to economic implications, the collapse of the Malian state might transform the country into a haven for terrorists that could potentially spread to France, undermining the country’s political stability.9 From a security dilemma perspective, France’s decision to launch Operation Serval can be understood as a response to the perceived threat posed by the potential collapse of the Malian state, the endangerment of French economic interests, and the establishment of a terrorist haven in the region. This fear served as a mechanism for France to mobilize its military and intervene against the Jihadist groups operating in Mali. Therefore, Operation Serval can be viewed as a means by which France countered the security threat posed by the Jihadist groups and protected its economic and strategic interests in the region.

Impact on Mali’s Sovereignty

While Operation Serval was considered a success for efficiently drawing Jihadist terrorist organizations out of the Sahel region, it should be noted that the intervention also had non-negligible impacts on Mali’s sovereignty, particularly regarding its ability to control its own territory and maintain its own security.

By recognizing the existence of a security dilemma between France, Mali, and the Jihadist groups, it is crucial to understand how the sov-

8 Chivvis, French War on Al Qa’ida, 4. 9 Chivvis, 4.

ereign actors differ from the non-state actors. A sovereign state can be defined as a political unit that exerts power over a delimited territory and its population while being recognized as legitimate by other states. The recognition of state sovereignty implies the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens and uphold the rule of law within its borders.10 In international relations, this principle is a key factor in determining the legitimate use of force by one state against another. Thus, in the context of Operation Serval, the concept of state sovereignty refers to Mali’s inability to control its own territory and maintain its own security. The French intervention therefore raises questions about Mali’s failed sovereignty as the state was unable to effectively address the threat posed by the terrorist groups on its own.

Mali requested France’s military aid as it faced a severe threat to its territorial integrity and security. As MOJWA and Ansar Dine took control of the northern part of the country with the explicit goal of declaring the independence of the Azawad state, region in northern Mali, the Malian government was unable to effectively respond to the threat posed by the Jihadist groups who took advantage of the government’s weak control over the sparsely populated northern region.11 As the Malian government was unable to combat such threats, foreign actors needed to intervene to try to control the Jihadist forces. The French intervention allowed the Malian government to maintain some semblance of sovereignty over its territory and to prevent the country from becoming a failed state. However, while Operation Serval was necessary to stop the terrorist control over the region and cease the spread of extremist ideologies throughout the rest of the country, it also undermined the legitimacy of the Malian government; “To truly regain its sovereignty and 10 David A. Lake, “The New Sovereignty in International Relations,” International Studies Review 5, no. 3 (2003): 305, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186572. 11 Henke, “Why Did France Intervene in Mali,” 314.

independence, the Malian state also needed reliable security forces that could hold the north without direct support from France or the United Nations.”12 Only the improvement of Mali’s military forces could preserve Mali’s long-term sovereignty and security. More than a question of short-term intervention, the whole structure of the Malian army needed to be redesigned to avoid further terrorist uprisings. Therefore, reconstituting the Malian army had to be a crucial part of the international post-conflict reconstruction effort.

In their concerted efforts to address the precarious security situation in Mali, the European Union (EU) pursued a multifaceted strategy aimed to rebuild the Malian army to a level where it possessed both the tactical and organizational infrastructure necessary to secure the northern region effectively.13 More than helping Mali against this specific threat, the EU also sought to give them the necessary tools to deal with future situations by themselves. Nevertheless, while this ideal goal was the target of the European effort, it was still insufficient to overcome the Malian’s army weaknesses, mainly due to the scarce number of soldiers and their inadequate training.14 The mission was thus extended by two years in April 2014, with the explicit aim of training an additional four battalions.15 This strategic decision underscored the EU’s commitment to foster long-term capacity building within Mali’s armed forces. However, the results of this prospect for future improvement are still to be observed.

Furthermore, Operation Serval exposed the limitations of Mali’s sovereignty in the face of external intervention. While the operation aimed to restore Mali’s territorial integrity, it was ultimately driven by France’s own security interests in the region. This raised questions about the extent to 12 Chivvis, French War on Al Qa’ida, 145.

13 Chivvis, 146.

14 Chivvis, 147.

15 Chivvis, 147.

which Mali’s sovereignty was being respected, and whether the country was used as a pawn in the broader geopolitical game between France and other regional powers. The French military controlled most of the military operations during Operation Serval, meaning Mali only had limited decision-making power over its own military operations. This lack of control can be seen during the final assault on Timbuktu, where the Malian army was excluded from the battle.16 Additionally, France established military bases in the city: “the Niger Bend necessitated control of the airstrips in the main northern towns so logistical lines could be set up to support operations there.”17 While the Malian government allowed the French military to establish these bases to fight more efficiently against the Jihadist forces, this decision deepened suspicions that the French government was challenging Malian state sovereignty. This notion was further entrenched when the French temporarily took all executive decisions and instigated the attacks by themselves. The presence of military bases in Mali further raised concerns among some Malians about the intervention’s long-term impact on the country’s sovereignty and independence.18 As such, while the military intervention was necessary to ensure Malian sovereign security, Operation Serval and concurrent foreign intervention undermined Mali’s ability to exercise the full extent of its sovereignty.

Response of Neighboring Countries: G5 Joint Force

In the aftermath of Operation Serval, several initiatives were launched to address the security threat in the Sahel region, including the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Conceived in 2014, this organization, composed of Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania,

16 Chivvis, 123.

17 Chivvis, 123.

18 Mathieu Bere, “Armed Rebellion, Violent Extremism, and the Challenges of International Intervention in Mali,” African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review 7, no. 2 (2017): 79, https://doi.org/10.2979/africonfpeacrevi.7.2.03.

Niger, and Chad, was created to respond to the “security and development challenges facing the Sahel region.”19 The priority of those countries’ aggregation was to create a joint armed force to help face the growing security threats posed by terrorism. As part of its security mandate, the G5 created the Joint Task Force in 2017. This Force was seen as a way of reducing the reliance on foreign forces in the region.20 Having the ability to defend themselves without the help of external forces would increase their sovereignty, which would thereby reinforce their legitimacy on the international scene. Officially, the G5 Joint Force adopted a peace-enforcement mandate rather than a peacekeeping one.21 While this approach effectively tackled situations where peace has already been breached, it did not address the underlying structural problems at the root of the conflict. In other words, peace-enforcement restores peace and security following an act of aggression and violence, but it fails to resolve systemic issues underlying current and future terrorism.

While Operation Serval was not directly responsible for establishing the G5 Sahel Joint Force, it played an essential role in highlighting the need for a coordinated regional response to the security challenge in the Sahel.22 The French intervention represents an example of how extremist Jihadist groups can impact both the domestic region and Western interests. Foreign powers may invest in other countries to increase their economic and political aims, but the presence of terrorist groups may threaten those interests. As a result, foreign countries may intervene within other states by increasing their military and defense capabilities as a preventive measure against potential terrorist

19 International Crisis Group, “What Is the G5?” in Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force (International Crisis Group, 2017), 1. http://www.jstor.org/stable/ resrep31276.5.

20 International Crisis Group, 2. 21 International Crisis Group, 1. 22 International Crisis Group, 2.

attacks. This response illustrates the security dilemma, where a cycle of mistrust and arms buildup can arise when others perceive one actor’s security measures as a threat. Building up military and defense capabilities can serve as a deterrent to terrorist attacks, but it can also be seen as an aggressive move and indication of hostile intentions. Therefore, Operation Serval can be considered an instance of foreign intervention that made Mali’s neighboring countries consider the risk posed by terrorist organizations more seriously.

The central aim of the G5 Joint Force was to combat terrorism and prevent its recurrence. However, forming alliances between countries to achieve this objective raises concerns about the security dilemma. Establishing a preventative joint military force may unintentionally stimulate further terrorist attacks as a retaliation measure. This phenomenon may occur due to the perceived threat that the G5 Forces pose to terrorist organizations, which may respond with increased aggressiveness to demonstrate their power and intimidate opposing forces.

Indeed, the security dilemma continues to be an inevitable problem that can be linked to the cause of multiple attacks directed toward the G5 Sahel Joint Force. In 2017, the headquarters of the Joint Force in Mali was targeted by a terrorist attack, resulting in the death of several soldiers.23 The attack was viewed as a response to the joint military force’s efforts to counter terrorism in the region, which were perceived as a threat to the terrorist groups operating in the Sahel. The Chairman of the G5 Force, Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou, condemned in a statement “this cowardly act by criminal organizations whose aim is to destabilize one of the essential instruments for the stability of our subregion, in this case, the

23 “UN Condemns Deadly Attack against G5 Sahel Force Headquarters in Mali,” UN News, June 30, 2018. https:// news.un.org/en/story/2018/06/1013642.

Joint Force of the G5 Sahel.”24 By striking the heart of the organization, the Al-Qaida Support Group for Islam and Muslims weakened the anti-terrorist forces while transmitting a message of power. This attack can be viewed as a display of power that conveys a warning message to the opposing foreign military forces, and can be interpreted as a retaliatory measure in response to the Joint Force’s anti-terrorism efforts. In other words, by targeting the organization, the perpetrators sought to undermine the effectiveness of the anti-terrorist Joint Forces while also communicating their ability to strike high-value targets as an intimidation tactic. These attacks illustrate the security dilemma that arises when countries form alliances to combat terrorist groups, highlighting the complexity of addressing terrorism and the need to consider the potential unintended consequences of anti-terrorism efforts.

Conclusion

This research paper has analyzed the impact of Operation Serval on France’s and Mali’s sovereignties while considering the outcomes that resulted from the terrorist attacks with a focus on the security dilemma that arose from the intervention. Operation Serval not only complicated the relations between France and Mali, but also sparked debates regarding the integrity of Mali’s sovereignty and security. The presence of foreign troops in Mali challenged its internal governance and raised questions about the role of external actors in resolving regional conflicts. By applying the lens of the security dilemma to Operation Serval, this research paper has demonstrated the unintended consequences of the G5 Sahel Joint Force as an anti-terrorist measure by concluding that the organization involuntarily increased terrorist attacks. The dimension of the security dilemma helps understand how countries and 24 “Headquarters of G5 Sahel Anti-Terror Force Attacked in Central Mali,” FRANCE 24, June 29, 2018, https://www. france24.com/en/20180629-attack-mali-g5-sahel-militarybase.

non-state actors react to preventative armed measures, in addition to perceiving how those military buildups can influence foreign politics.

References

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Boeke, Sergei, and Bart Schuurman. “Operation ‘Serval’: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014.” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 6 (2015): 801–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.104 5494.

Chivvis, Christopher S. The French War on Al Qa’ida in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2016. DOI:10.1017/CBO9781316343388.

“Headquarters of G5 Sahel Anti-Terror Force Attacked in Central Mali.” FRANCE 24. June 29, 2018. https://www.f rance24.com/en/20180629-attack-mali-g5-sahel-military-base.

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International Crisis Group. “What Is the G5?” in Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force. International Cri sis Group, 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep31276.5.

Lake, David A. “The New Sovereignty in International Relations.” International Studies Review 5, no. 3, 303–23. 2003. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186572.

Manwaring, Max G. “The Strategic Logic of the Contemporary Security Dilemma.” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11721.

Tertrais, Bruno. “Our Military Forces’ Struggle Against Lawless, Media Savvy Terrorist Adversaries.” In Our Military Forces’ Struggle Against Lawless, Media Savvy Terrorist Adversaries, 2nd Edition. High Level Military Group. 2016. http://www.high-level-military-group.org/pdf/hlmg-lawless-media-savvy-terrorist-adversaries.pdf.

“UN Condemns Deadly Attack against G5 Sahel Force Headquarters in Mali.” UN News. June 30, 2018. https://news. un.org/en/story/2018/06/1013642.

Entrenched Exploitation: Uncovering the Complexities of Debt-Bondage in Pakistan’s Brick Kilns

by: Mahnoor Zaman

Abstract

This paper explores debt-bondage in Pakistan’s brick kiln sector. The practice continues in spite of legal frameworks, such as Pakistan’s constitutional ban on forced labor and slavery, and the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, reflecting larger challenges in Pakistan’s human rights practices. The government’s inability to address and defend minority rights, a corrupt legal system, and the lack of successful land reforms are the main causes of debt-bondage’s continued existence. This essay addresses systemic challenges in the legal system and argues for comprehensive reforms to fit with global commitments, such as Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8.7, which aim to eradicate exploitative labor practices. By doing so, the paper contributes to a nuanced understanding of the complexity surrounding the continuance of exploitative labor practices in Pakistan.

Résumé

Cet article explore le problème persistant de la servitude pour dettes dans le secteur des briqueteries au Pakistan. Cette pratique se poursuit en dépit de cadres juridiques, tels que l'interdiction du travail forcé et de l'esclavage par la constitution pakistanaise et la Convention supplémentaire sur l'abolition de l'esclavage de 1956, ce qui reflète des défis plus importants dans les pratiques du Pakistan en matière des droits de la personne. L'incapacité persistante du gouvernement à traiter et à défendre les droits des minorités, un système juridique corrompu et l'absence de réformes agraires réussies sont les causes principales de la persistance de la servitude pour dettes. Cet article aborde les défis systémiques et plaide en faveur de réformes compréhensives pour s'adapter aux engagements mondiaux, tel que l'objectif de développement durable 8.7, qui vise à éradiquer les pratiques d'exploitation de main-d'œuvre. Ce faisant, il contribue à une compréhension nuancée de la complexité qui entoure la poursuite des pratiques d'exploitation au travail.

Introduction

Pakistan falls within the global Brick-Belt region,1 and the brick-making industry is one of the oldest in the subcontinent. It primarily occurs in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. The brick kiln industry represents a unique mode of industrial relations, which replicates the feudal-serf relationship.2 Peshgi, the initial loan one takes on from an employer, binds workers with debt, and demanding forced labor until repayment. Exploitative interest rates sustain this cycle, entrapping generations entire families trying to pay off a loan that usually has no contractual validity and are mostly oral agreements.3 This initial loan multiplies and becomes the only form of income for families. Within the broader global human rights discourse, there is an established commitment to end slavery practices in the international policy community. SDG 8.7 states: “Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labor, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labor in all its forms.”4 The recognition of debt bondage as a form of slavery began in 1956, with the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery. In domestic law, provisions

1 Xiaodong Li et al., “Aging Brick Kilns in the Asian Brick Belt Using a Long Time Series of Landsat Sensor Data to Inform the Study of Modern Day Slavery,” IGARSS 2019 - 2019 IEEE International Geoscience and Remote Sensing Symposium, July 2019, https://doi.org/10.1109/ igarss.2019.8898981.

2 Muhammad Javed Iqbal, “Bonded Labor in the Brick Kiln Industry of Pakistan,” The Lahore Journal of Economics 11, no. 1 (2006): 2, https://doi.org/10.35536/ lje.2006.v11.i1.a6.

3 Antonio De Lauri, “The Absence of Freedom: Debt, Bondage and Desire among Pakistani Brick Kiln Workers,” Journal of Global Slavery 2, no. 1-2 (2017): 122–38, https://doi.org/10.1163/2405836X-00201004.

4 David Brown et al., “Modern Slavery, Environmental Degradation and Climate Change: Fisheries, Field, Forests and Factories,” Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space 4, no. 2 (2021): 191–207, https://doi. org/10.1177/2514848619887156.

against slavery are noted in the 1973 Constitution in article 11 (criminalization of slavery), and the 1860 Penal Code, article 367, 370, and 371, which prohibit buying or disposing of a person as a slave, dealing in slaves, kidnapping, or abducting a person and subjecting them to slavery.5

Despite legal measures like the Bonded Labour (Abolition) System Act of 1992 and subsequent ordinances, debt bondage persists in the country.6 Pakistan’s brick kiln industry represents a microcosm of broader global challenges in upholding human rights. In this essay, I argue that debt-bondage practices in defiance of anti-slavery laws within Pakistan’s brick kiln industry persist due the absence of effective land reforms, corrupt legal systems, and the government’s consistent failure to address and protect minority rights, despite legislative protections.

Unequal Land Ownership System and Ineffective Reforms

Pakistan’s lack of effective land reforms is at the core of perpetuating the debt-bondage system. Feudalism has deep roots entrenched in local history and society. In Pakistan, classical feudalism manifests through the jagirdari (landowning) system. Scholar Braden Powell explains that jagirdar (landowners) were given grants by the British which allowed them to collect revenues while maintaining order and supporting state service with a body of troops when necessary.7 Colonial governance, through “indirect rule,” left local elites in control of many regions, resulting in the acquisition of extensive land by landlords during this period. This immense control of land

5 “Pakistan.” Antislavery in Domestic Legislation, June 29, 2021. https://antislaverylaw.ac.uk/country/pakistan /#:~:text=Provisions%20related%20to%20slavery%20are,to%20subject%20to%20slavery%20

6 De Lauri, “The Absence of Freedom.”

7 Ronald Herring, “Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and ‘eradication of Feudalism’ in Pakistan ,” Economic and Political Weekly 15, no. 12. (1980): 601 https://www.jstor.org/stable/4368495.

by the elite established an inequitable wealth system, which has manifested through the control of the socioeconomically disadvantaged, under the power of jagirdars. In order for their sustenance, the socioeconomically disadvantaged have relied on local land owners to employ them. This employment system degenerated into debt-bondage.

The historical roots of the land revenue system trace back to early Mughal era, after which it was formalized by British colonial laws, such as the Transfer of Property Act (1882), Punjab Tenancy Act (1887), Land Acquisition Act (1894), and Punjab Alienation Act (1900), all still in effect today.8 In fact, in Pakistan, most landowners gained land during the colonial period. Professor Kosambi calls the mode of production before the colonial period “feudalism from above” and after colonialism “feudalism from below.”9 The existence of contemporary slavery, be attributed to the establishment of English land laws, and implications of colonialism within local systems in the Indian subcontinent to a certain extent. After partition in 1947, Pakistan had already established a land owning system, and by 1968, only 22 families controlled two-thirds of Pakistan’s industrial assets, 80% of banking, and 70% of insurance.10 Of this, more than 80% of the land in Sindh and more than 50% land in Punjab was owned by powerful landlords.11 Despite attempts at land reform in 1959, 1972, and 1977, unequal land dis-

8 Preetmohinder Singh Aulakh, “British Empire, Land Tenure and the Search for an Ideal Proprietor: 1868-1875,” PhD diss., Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 2022. https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/phd/81.

9 Nadeem Malik, “Bonded Labour in Pakistan,” Advances in Anthropology 6, no. 4 (2016): 127–136, doi: 10.4236/ aa.2016.64012.

10 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “The Regime of Yahya Khan, 1969–1971,” in The Vangaurd of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan (Berkley: University of California Press, 1994). http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ ft9j49p32d/.

11 Muhammad Abbasi, “Judicial Islamisation of Land Reforms Laws in Pakistan: Triumph ,” Islamic Studies 57, no. 3/4 (2018): 214, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26758932.

tribution persisted. In 1959, Ayub Khan’s martial law government initiated Ayub’s land reforms, major land reforms that set a land ownership ceiling applicable only to West Pakistan.12 These reforms restricted ownership to 500 acres of irrigated or 1000 acres of unirrigated land or 36000 produce index units, with excess land acquired by the government and redistributed to tenants.

The Green Revolution’s Potential in Changing Power Structures (1960-70s)

Technological advancement had the potential to mitigate debt-bondage, but unequal land distribution hindered growth, despite legislative reforms. In the 1960s, the Green Revolution increased better access to technology, shifting the advantage from labor input to capital efficiency. It had the potential to limit forced labor, but the technology accelerated agricultural growth without altering the rural power structure.13 Author Akmal Hussain asserts the unequal distribution of land has led to polarizing opinions with the introduction of new agricultural technology, hindering agricultural growth and creating social tensions. The manual labor and landowning system benefits the rural elite while worsening conditions for the majority. This imbalance arose as the new technology favored large landowners.14 Future growth, he asserts, hinges on empowering small farmers through institutional change and land reforms for equitable growth and increased yields.15 Reforms introduced in 1972 by Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto aimed to break up wealth concentration and income disparities by lowering individual land ceilings, redistributing excess land to landless tenants, and implementing changes in tenant evictions and financial responsibilities.

12 Until 1971, there was West Pakistan (present-day Pakistan) and East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh)

13 Akmal Hussain, “Land Reforms in Pakistan: A Reconsideration,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 16, no. 1 (1984): 46–52, https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.1984.1 0409782.

14 Hussain, 1–2.

15 Hussain, 1–2.

The Law Reforms Act of 1977 operated alongside the 1972 regulations, imposing limits on individual land holdings and altering calculation methods. It did not repeal the 1972 regulations, but was designed to operate concurrently with them. The significant alteration was that individual holdings, including any shares in collective lands, were limited to 100 acres of irrigated land or 200 acres of unirrigated land. Additionally, the combined total of irrigated and unirrigated land could not exceed 100 acres of irrigated land, with the ratio being one acre of irrigated land considered equivalent to two acres of unirrigated land. The 1959 land reforms in Pakistan aimed at land ceilings for individuals rather than families, allowing many big landlords to bypass the limits and retain vast holdings without declaration. Even those who declared excess land often retained substantial acreage.16 Many landlords completely evaded the redistribution by claiming exemptions, “gifting” land, officially gifting land, transferring land to others within the family.17

Ultimately, the reforms failed to diminish the economic power of the elite. Similarly, the 1972 reforms also fell short in redistributing land, leaving a highly unequal distribution with 30 percent owned by the top 0.5 percent landowners.18 Even with land reforms, landlords chose not to declare their ownership, indicating a lack of necessary political determination to enforce these reforms. Only 0.6 percent of the land was reclaimed, benefiting less than 10% of completely landless tenants.19 In 1977, there was an optimistic attempt by Prime Minister Bhutto, who introduced the National Charter for Cultivators, which stated that lands which were not in public use were to 16 Hussain, 1–2.

17 Shahrukh Khan et al., “The Case for Land and Agrarian Reforms in Pakistan,” Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2001. https://sdpi.org/sdpiweb/publications/files/ PB12-The%20Case%20for%20Land%20and %20Agrarian.pdf..

18 Hussain, “Land Reforms in Pakistan”, 1–2.

19 Khan et al., “The Case for Land.”

be given to landless farmers. However, the overthrow of the Bhutto government by authoritarian leader Zia ul-Haq, and the subsequent imposition of a martial law regime, prevented the implementation of these laws. Haq’s privatization laws further removed the effectiveness of land reforms.

Connecting Modern-Day Brick-Kiln Slavery to Historical Example

The topic of socioeconomic inequality as the backbone of slavery in brick kilns contemporary political discussions echo calls for social and economic equality to which the Haitian Revolution stands as a historical precedent, illustrating the magnitude of the challenges within the brick industry. Philip Kaisary discusses how the Haitian Revolution challenged existing power structures and laid the groundwork for redefining socioeconomic rights.20 Haiti challenges the influential theory of “generational” rights, a concept originating in the 1970s. This theory contends that the historical progression of rights from civil and political to economic and social aspects, albeit without explicitly using the terminology of “generations.” Pakistan’s consistent failed effort with land reforms showcases the entrenched system of land ownership, whereby the socioeconomically disadvantaged have never been able to acquire land. Rather, they have been dependent on land elites to provide for them by employing them, effectively showcasing that second-generation socioeconomic rights in Pakistan are also intertwined with first generation rights. A lack of socioeconomic rights influences a lack of political rights in a cycle, which then affirms existing land tenures

What differentiates brick-kiln bondage from other debt-bondage, is its multi-generational involvement of entire families and the ownership

20 Philip Kaisary, “The Haitian Revolution and Socio-economic Rights,” in Social Rights and the Politics of Obligation in History, ed. S. L. B. Jensen and C. Walton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 82–98.

system.21 These small-scale brick kilns are located in the outskirts of urban areas, as well as in rural regions, employing bonded laborers who are typically landless families from impoverished backgrounds and ethno-religious minority groups,22 namely Christians. Children working at these brick kilns are often considered part of the bonded family unit and work alongside their parents, receiving no separate compensation. Some children inherit debts from their parents, becoming bonded laborers themselves for extended periods of time.23 Families engaged in brick kiln labor are entirely reliant on the owners due to indebtedness through peshgi system used for meeting their consumption needs. A significant portion of the brick kiln workforce comprises children, with around 60 percent below the age of 13. These children are deprived of freedom outside the kiln premises, face high mortality rates, and are prone to blindness due to the conditions of working under debt bondage. Additionally, brick kiln owners often keep children as hostages when the parents leave the kiln premises.24 As per statements from kiln owners or overseers of kilns, leases typically extend for several years, but are usually less than a decade.25 These agreements often specify a particular depth for excavation of mud (to make the bricks based on a quota system of production).26 In urban expansion zones or fertile agricultural regions, lease durations might shorten to a few years under circumstances such as extensive prior mud extraction, anticipated relief in irrigation water scarcity, or the landowner’s desire for flexibility in negotiating lease modifications amid expectations of local eco-

21 Malik, “Bonded Labour in Pakistan ,” 6–7.

22 Malik, 6–7.

23 Malik, 6–7.

24 Malik, 6–7.

25 ILO, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-Up (ILO, 2022), 19, https:// www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_716594. pdf.

26 ILO, 19.

nomic improvement.27 This results in frequent ownership turnover, though the labor remains intact, and there is lack of transparency regarding how much debt actually remains and what violations occur under what owner. Most notably, families work entire lives in these kilns, notwithstanding ownership changes, or retirement.

Failures of The Legal System

Corruption and inefficiency in the legal system has perpetuated human rights abuses in brick kilns. Laws in Pakistan aimed at addressing bonded labor have limited and ineffective solutions with negligible long-term effects. The Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act, enacted in 1992, was a direct response to the Darshan Masih case ruling by the Supreme Court. This case began on July 30, 1988, when the Chief Justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court received a telegram signed by Darshan Masih, an 11-year old bonded laborer,28 and 20 brick kiln laborers, including women and other children, urgently seeking assistance against the actions of the brick kiln owners. In a letter, the workers asserted that brick kiln owners subjected them to persistent and unjust working conditions.29 They also sought the Court’s intervention regarding the unjust arrest and confinement of brick kiln laborers by police officers acting in favor of the kiln owners.30 The law falls short in eliminating the significant problem of bonded labor. The prescribed punishment for engaging in bonded labor ranges from two to five years in prison, which is 27 ILO, 19.

28 UNHCR, Submission by UNHCR UN Special Rapporteur on Climate Change: Report on addressing the human rights implications of climate change displacement including legal protection of people displaced across international borders (January 2023), 41, https://www.refworld.org/ reference/themreport/unhcr/2023/en/124267.

29 Shayan Manzar, “A Concoction of Powers: The Jurisprudential Development of Article 184 (3) & Its Procedural Requirements,” LUMS Law Journal 8 (2021): 11, https:// sahsol.lums.edu.pk/sites/default/files/2022-09/a _concoction_of_powers.pdf.

30 Manzar, 11.

deemed inadequate. Moreover, the Act fails to alter the mindset of law enforcement entities, who can be influenced through bribes by influential figures like feudal lords and brick-kiln owners to apprehend and return fleeing workers, essentially perpetuating the cycle of indebtedness. Although Section 15 of the Act mandates the establishment of Vigilance Committees in Pakistani districts, in practice, such committees do not exist. Furthermore, the 18th constitutional amendment shifted the responsibility of labor inspection from the federal to the provincial governments. However, the implementation of these changes is expected to take a considerable amount of time, further delaying effective measures against bonded labor.31

To increase effectiveness, the responsibility for this law was decentralized into the provinces in Pakistan, requiring them to create corresponding legislation. Despite cases being presented in courts, convictions are infrequent. Among labor law violations, the conditions in the kilns require legal action as well. For example, bonded women report a high level of sexual abuse and rape by the landowners.32 On account of reporting rape or sexual assault, Pakistan’s police officers are known to exploit and rape women victims of violence in their custody,33 and police often return “runaway” women bonded laborers to brick kilns and landowners on the ground that they avoid debt payment.34 Author Kelly Shannon asserts that while scholars agree on social, political, economic rights as second-generation rights, women’s rights are excluded, primarily because abuse occurs largely by private citizens

31 Muhammad Munir, “Trafficking in Persons: Faulty Regulations, Pervasive Corruption and Flawed Prevention in Pakistan,” Pakistan Journal of Criminology 9, no. 3 (July 2017): 56-65, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2613913.

32 Subha Malik and Madiha Nadeem, “Bonded Laborers: Women as Victims - A Curse that Lingers On,” Journal of Arts and Social Sciences 3, no. 1 (2016): 12. https://jass.pk/ assets/allabs/issue5-2.pdf.

33 Munir, “Trafficking in Persons,” 56–65.

34 Munir, 56–65.

and not States.35 Women’s socioeconomic rights (second-generation rights) are inherently interconnected with their civil and political rights (first-generation rights) as it is their socioeconomic conditions which are pivotal for the effective exercise of their fundamental rights and liberties. Not only the involvement of abuse by private citizens, but also the law enforcement, must be considered part of a larger issue with the legal system of the State. As highlighted in the ILO Report of 2012, individuals engaged in bonded labor operate with impunity.

The report accuses certain officials of accepting bribes to overlook trafficking activities conducted by brothel owners, landowners, and factory owners.36 Notably, cases of ownership or connections with active or retired police and army officers in Punjab and Sindh were identified. Jagirdars are in charge of the local law enforcement agencies, and they also have sway in both local and national politics. Additionally, owners of multiple kilns, often from influential political families, exert significant control over local and provincial administration, thus overseeing kiln operations closely.37 Despite the legislative efforts, the inadequate laws, alongside poverty and allegations of officials accepting bribes, have hindered the effective eradication of bonded labor in these kilns and increased prevalence of corruption and inefficiency.

35 Kelly J. Shannon, “The Right to Bodily Integrity: Women’s Rights as Human Rights and the International Movement to End Female Genital Mutilation, 1970s-1990s” in The Human Rights Revolution: An International History, ed. Akira Iriye et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 285–310.

36 Munir, “Trafficking in Persons,” 56–65.

37 “Pakistan - United States Department of State,” U.S. Department of State, December 7, 2023, https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/pakistan/, 66.

Pakistani Christians Overrepresented in Bonded Labourer Demographics

The immensely disproportionate violation of human rights in the Christian community can be attributed to the government’s historical issues of national identity and failure in protecting minorities. Bonded labor notably impacts Christians in brick kilns, perpetuating severe economic inequality, which leaves laborers suffering from unpayable debts.38 Around 80% of brick kiln workers are Christians, who endure significant financial burdens, as reported by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.39 This marginalization is due to an unspoken cast system, religious discrimination, and overall, a failure of governmental protection. Christian missionaries followed British Imperial expansion into India from the early 19th century. Eager to establish a presence in the Punjab, the last region under British control, they set up a mission station in Lahore, Pakistan, by 1852.40

Conversion itself largely occurred within India’s Dalit (untouchable) caste, and scholars emphasize that people sought to join the religion due to a desire to integrate into the dominant ruling community in order to increase their socioeconomic status.4142 Scholars Surinder S. Jodhka and Ghanshyam Shah state that “caste in Pakistan, its

38 Sara Singha, “Caste Out: Christian Dalits in Pakistan,” The Political Quarterly 93 (2022): 488-497, https://doi. org/10.1111/1467-923X.13153.

39 Singha, 488–497.

40 Roger Ballard, “The Christians of Pakistan - a Historical Overview and an Assessment of Their Current Position,” CASAS Online Papers - Religion 18 (2012), DOI: 10.11588/xarep.00003372.

41 Edwina Pio and Jawad Syed, “Marked by the Cross: The Persecution of Christians in Pakistan,” in Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan, ed. Jawad Syed, Edwina Pio, Tahir Kamran, and Ali Zaidi (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1349-94966-3_7.

42 Huma Pervaiz and Tahir Mahmood, “Mass Conversion to Christianity: A Case Study of Chuhra Community in Sialkot District (1880-1930),” Pakistan Vision 19, no. 1 (2018): 40–59.

presence, in the form of social intercourse, birth based occupation, segregation in residence and taboo in social relationship is very widely recognized.” They also argue that “the Pakistani State uses Islamic identity and ideology to completely deny the presence of caste in the social and economic life of the country even when castebased identities and caste related discrimination are rampant.”43 Moreover, the oppression faced by Christians is perhaps due to religious discrimination. Contrary to the remarks made on 11 August 1947, by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, as the first Governor-General of Pakistan, who asserted: “You are free, you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State…We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one States”44 the Objectives Resolution, implemented in 1949, marginalized Christians and initiated a trend of eroding Christians’ rights. The resolution led to the formation of committees like the Basic Principles Committee (BPC), which upheld the Resolution as a guiding principle for State policies.45 This unilateralist approach prioritized a singular religious vision over social and religious diversity. In subsequent years, Christians have faced stigmatization due to caste associations, reinforcing a biased view of religious minorities.46 Since Pakistan’s inception, defining religious minorities has been pivotal for national identity, with the Muslim majority being the defining factor. Considering the country’s history with caste, as well as the dominant narrative that Paki-

43 Surinder S. Jodhka and Ghanshyam Shah, “Comparative contexts of discrimination: caste and untouchability in South Asia’s,” Indian Institute of Dalit Studies 4, no. 5 (2010): 14.

44 Roger D. Long et al., State and Nation-Building in Pakistan: Beyond Islam and Security (London: Routledge/ Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 180–89.

45 Roger D. Long et al., 180–89.

46 Roger D. Long et al., 180–89.

stan is a Muslim country, the Christian community’s human rights violations have been ignored by the government’s historical issues of national identity; whether it is secular or not, whether there is a caste system or not. Consequently, the government has failed in protecting minorities.

Conclusion

Human rights violations in Pakistan’s brick kilns persist largely due the absence of effective land reforms, corrupt legal systems, and the government’s consistent failure to address and protect minority rights. Slavery occurs despite clear national anti-slavery laws, as well as ratified international laws. Referring back to Kaisary, as exemplified by the debt-bondage in brick kilns, socioeconomic rights cannot be accurately identified as “second-generation rights,” because they inherently have to do with the political, civil, legal, social, and economic rights. The land tenure system is the main driver of debt-bondage, but the violations that occur can be attributed to ineffective and corrupt legal systems. Moreover, the disproportionate religious identity of bonded laborers can potentially be explained by the government’s failure to protect Christian’s rights early into the formation of the country.

References

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Li, Xiao, Giles Foody, Doreen Boyd, and Feng Ling. “Aging Brick Kilns in the Asian Brick Belt Using a Long Time Series of Landsat Sensor Data to Inform the Study of Modern Day Slavery.” In IGARSS 2019 - 2019 IEEE International Geoscience and Remote Sensing Symposium, 130–133, 2019. doi: 10.1109/IG ARSS.2019.8898981.

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Unraveling the Exploitation of Migrant Child Labour in the American Agriculture Industry

by: Jasmin Rodriguez

Abstract

Discourses on child labour exploitation too often frame the issue as a distant problem, a concern limited to sweatshops or the like in faraway regions in the developing world. However, migrant children in the United States encounter child labour exploitation very similar to their counterparts in developing countries and yet it is an underrepresented issue within the broader context of child labour. This research paper investigates the significant gaps in protection and enforcement in the American agriculture industry that perpetuate migrant child labour in the United States.Additionally, it explores the inadequate provision of support and services for unaccompanied migrant children, which leave them vulnerable to exploitation by their sponsors. The findings also demonstrate how these gaps endanger migrant children’s welfare, safety, and educational opportunities. Thus, this is a clear violation of the International Labour Organization’s Convention No. 182 Article 3, which emphasizes the right of every child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing work that is likely to be hazardous or harmful to children’s health or development.

Résumé

Les discours sur l’exploitation du travail des enfants présentent trop souvent la question comme un problème lointain, une préoccupation limitée aux ateliers clandestins ou à des milieux semblables dans des régions éloignées du monde en développement. Pourtant, les enfants migrants aux États-Unis sont confrontés à des niveaux d’exploitation très similaires à ceux de leurs homologues des pays en développement, bien que ce problème reste sous-représenté dans le contexte plus large du travail des enfants. Cette étude examine les lacunes importantes en matière de protection et d’application de la loi dans l’industrie agricole américaine qui perpétue l’exploitation des enfants migrants aux États-Unis. Elle analyse également le manque de soutien ou de services disponibles pour les enfants non accompagnés, ce qui les rend susceptibles d’être exploités par leurs parrains. Les conclusions démontrent que ces lacunes mettent en péril le bien-être, la sécurité et les possibilités d’éducation des enfants migrants, et constituent donc une violation claire de l’Article 3 de la Convention n° 182 de l’OIT qui souligne le droit de tout enfant d’être protégé contre l’exploitation économique et de ne pas être astreint à un travail susceptible d’être dangereux ou de nuire à sa santé ou à son développement.

Introduction

It is imperative to recognize that child labour exists not only in remote corners of the developing world as often portrayed in Western narratives. Rather, it is a pervasive issue that exists within our own communities, industries, and supply chains. In the United States, despite legal safeguards such as the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) migrant children face child labour conditions similar to those in developing countries.1 Nonetheless, the labour exploitation of migrant children in the U.S. is an underrepresented issue within the broader context of child labour.

Under Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, the International Labour Organization (ILO) emphasizes the need to protect children from work that is likely to harm their health and development.2 Yet, despite agriculture being one of the most dangerous industries in the U.S., unaccompanied migrant children (UMC) make up 10 percent of the American migrant agricultural labour force.3 Child agricultural workers frequently work for long hours in scorching heat, haul heavy loads of produce, are exposed to toxic pesticides, and suffer high rates of injury from sharp knives and other dangerous tools. The well-being of these migrant children is also jeopardized by the absence of social assistance and the added strains of economic self-reliance, especially in the case of UMC who often find them-

1 Maoyong Fan, Mimi Huston, and Anita Pena, “Determinants of Child Labor in the Modern United States: Evidence from Agricultural Workers and Their Children and Concerns for Ongoing Public Policy,” Economics Bulletin 36, Issue 1 (December 24, 2014): 2, https://ssrn.com/ abstract=2542369.

2 International Labor Organization, “Convention 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour,” Geneva, Switzerland, 87th ILC session. (1999), Article 3(d).

3 Jennie A. McLaurin and Amy K. Liebman, “Unique Agricultural Safety and Health Issues of Migrant and Immigrant Children,” Journal of Agromedicine 17, no. 2 (April 2012): 186, https://doi.org/10.1080/105992 4x.2012.658010

selves indebted to their sponsors. These sponsors are individuals who agree to provide care and support for UMC while their immigration case is being processed, although they are not necessarily their legal guardians. Migrant child labour in the American agriculture industry is thus a clear violation of the ILO’s Convention No. 182 Article 3, which emphasizes the right of every child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing work that is likely to be hazardous or harmful to children’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social development. In this research paper, I will investigate the significant gaps in protection and enforcement in the agriculture industry that currently contribute to migrant child labour in the United States, as well as the lack of support and services available to UMC, which makes them susceptible to being exploited by their sponsors. Furthermore, I will propose a 10-year strategy to address this human rights issue systematically with four phases. I will only focus on phase two, which reforms the current legal and regulatory gaps in the United States that exclude agriculture from many health, safety, and child labour protections.

The first section of this paper will overview the complex nature of agricultural labour and examine the exclusions, exemptions, and loopholes that affect the American agriculture industry. It will also assess how they endanger the welfare, safety, and educational opportunities of child migrant labourers. In the second section, I will investigate the lack of resources and oversight of UMC’s integration into the U.S., which makes them susceptible to exploitation by their sponsors who coerce them to work. In the third section, I will extrapolate how migrant child labour in American agriculture violates Article 3 of the ILO’s Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labour. In the fourth section, I will give a brief overview of the 10-year four-phase strategy, only diving into phase two of this strategy: re-

forming current legal and regulatory gaps. The last section will then go over one main obstacle to phase two, namely how many migrant children often rely on their employment to financially sustain themselves and/or their families.

The American Agriculture Industry

In the U.S., agriculture has always been an area with the weakest child labour protections. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provides distinct regulations for non-agricultural and agricultural employment, and the enforcement of employer sanctions is notably lenient in certain sectors, including agriculture.4 For example, the age, hour, overtime, and minimum wage provisions of the FLSA do not apply to agriculture and seventeen states exempt agriculture from child labour laws.5 According to the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor Employment Standards Administration, there are no age or hour limitations for children working on small farms outside of school hours, provided they have parental permission under current legislation.6 Moreover, children aged 12-13 can work on farms of any size with parental consent and those aged 14-15 can work in the fields without parental permission, but restrictions on hazardous tasks still apply. However, once individuals reach the age of 16, there are no restrictions on youth agricultural labourers, even from performing hazardous work, unlike the restrictions that apply to children under age 18 in non-agricultural jobs. 7

According to the National Agricultural Workers

4 Fan et al., “ Determinants of Child Labor,” 1.

5 John A. Fliter, “Contemporary Child Labour Issues,” in Child Labor in America: The Epic Legal Struggle to Protect Children (University Press of Kansas, 2018), 230, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv7h0t22.

6 U. S. Department of Labor Employment Standards Administration Wage and Hour Division. “Child Labor Requirements in Agricultural Occupations Under the Fair Labor Standards Act.” Child Labor Bulletin 102, WH1295, (2007).

7 Fan et al., “Determinants of Child Labor,” 1.

Survey (NAWS), an employment-based survey on the demographic, employment, and health characteristics of the U.S. crop labour force, an increasing number of migrant farmworkers in the United States come from Mexican and Central American populations.8 Paul Green, an American marketing professor and statistician, asserts that the stability of the American agricultural industry is reliant on the low-wage labour provided by migrant and seasonal farm workers.9 Despite the efforts of established labour unions and emerging labour organizations to prevent exploitation, migrant farmworkers are often driven by economic desperation, making them vulnerable to harsh working conditions, inadequate wages, and a lack of essential employment protections.10 The vulnerability of migrant farmworkers hence enables specific agricultural sectors to reap significant profits.11 This cycle of economic need, which has only heightened since the COVID-19 pandemic, exacerbates their susceptibility and creates a challenging environment for implementing lasting changes in the agricultural sector.12 Migrant children are desirable employees and most vulnerable to exploitation, not simply because their wages are cheap or nonexistent but also because children, due to their age and dependence, often lack the legal agency, knowledge, and power to advocate for their rights in the labour market.13 This vulnerability is compounded by factors, such as language barriers, cultural disparities, and a lack of awareness about existing labour laws.

8 McLaurin and Liebman, “Unique Agricultural Safety and Health Issues,” 187.

9 Paul E. Green, “The Undocumented: Educating the Children of Migrant Workers in America,” Bilingual Research Journal 27, no. 1 (April 2003): 54, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 15235882.2003.10162591.

10 Green, 54.

11 Green, 54.

12 Hannah Dreier, “Alone and Exploited, Migrant Children Work Brutal Jobs across the U.S.,” The New York Times, February 25, 2023, https://www.nytimes. com/2023/02/25/us/unaccompanied-migrant-child-workers-exploitat ion.html.

13 Fan et al., “Determinants of Child Labor,” 2.

Many scholarly works addressing agricultural child labour commonly propose that its root cause can be traced to children of farmworkers frequently accompanying their parents to the fields from a very early age.14 Scholars attribute the casual accompaniment of children to their parents’ worksite to the lack of childcare and other social supports.15 According to a report by the United States General Accounting Office, 7 percent of farmworker parents took preschool children with them to the field to work.16 Many children of farmworkers report beginning to work regularly as early as age 10. Frequently, migrant children may be working from 16 to 18 hours per week by age 12 and not long afterward, most drop out of school.17

However, migrant children accompanying their parents to the fields is not the only way they are integrated into America’s agricultural industry. In her investigative article “Alone and Exploited, Migrant Children Work Brutal Jobs Across the U.S.,” New York Times journalist Hannah Dreier uncovered a harrowing reality that extends beyond familial involvement in the fields. From interviewing more than 100 migrant child workers in 20 states, Dreier reveals a distressing pattern of UMC, travelling from Central America to the U.S., where they find themselves vulnerable to exploitation and subjected to gruelling labour conditions in various sectors across the country, including agriculture.18 A significant portion of these UMCs find themselves under immense pressure to generate income, driven by the dual obligations of supporting their families back home and settling debts illegally imposed by their sponsors.19 These debts typically encom-

14 Fan et al., 1

15 McLaurin and Liebman, “Unique Agricultural Safety and Health Issues,” 187.

16 McLaurin and Liebman, 187.

17 Green, “The Undocumented,” 63.

18 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

19 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

pass smuggling fees, rental expenses, and basic living costs. This financial burden exacerbates the vulnerability of these young migrants, compelling them to endure harsh labor conditions and sacrificing their well-being in pursuit of economic stability for themselves and their families.

Unaccompanied Migrant Children’s Integration Into The United States

Upon apprehension at the U.S.-Mexico border, unaccompanied migrant children (UMC) are placed in federal custody until the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) can find a suitable permanent placement with an adult sponsor that can ensure the child’s physical and mental well-being.20 It is important to clarify that sponsors of UMC are distinct from court-appointed legal guardians. While legal guardianship involves a formal legal process overseen by the courts, sponsors are not involved in any formal legal process when being appointed.21 Instead, sponsors are individuals who voluntarily agree to provide care and support for UMC while their immigration case is being processed. In accordance with the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), once an adult sponsor is identified, home studies are mandatory for cases where the child has a disability, is a victim of severe trafficking, abuse or neglect, or if there is a perceived risk to the child from the sponsor (e.g., maltreatment, exploitation, or trafficking).22 Moreover, for the UMC whose sponsors undergo the home study process, Post-Release Services (PRS) are required to ensure their welfare and

20 Jodi Berger Cardoso et al., “Integration of Unaccompanied Migrant Youth in the United States: A Call for Research,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45, no. 2 (December 20, 2017): 276, https://doi.org/10.1080/13691 83x.2017.1404261.

21 Youth Center for Immigrant Children’s Rights, “Resource: Brief Summary of the Process for Sponsoring a Child’s Release from Office of Refugee Resettlement Custody,” (September 24, 2021).

22 Berger Cardoso et al., “Integration of Unaccompanied Migrant Youth in the United States,” 276.

support after they are released to their sponsors.23 Typically, non-profit organizations are responsible for providing PRS, and these services encompass assessing the youth’s safety and well-being, family case management, and making referrals for health, and educational services.24 Referrals for PRS also extend to youth who report having significant mental health needs or other issues to ORR screeners at detention facilities for which social services are deemed appropriate.25

Scholars Benjamin Roth and Breanne Grace contend that relying on children’s self-reports of severe maltreatment, exploitation, or trafficking to issue PRS referrals is problematic because children are likely to underreport these issues when interacting with ORR screeners at detention facilities.26 Frequently, such experiences come to light as the youth adapts to living with families after decisions regarding PRS referrals have already been made.27 Between October 2013 and July 2016, the ORR assigned more than 123,000 UMC to adult sponsors living in the United States.28 However, less than 10 percent of these children received follow-up services post-release from ORR custody.29 This small percentage of children receiving PRS services means little is known about what happens to the majority of UMC after post-release from the ORR.

According to Dreier, the number of UMC entering the United States reached a peak of 130,000 in 2022 alone.30 Due to this substantial surge of migrant children, the Biden administration has in-

23 Berger Cardoso et al., 276.

24 Berger Cardoso et al., 276.

25 Berger Cardoso et al., 276.

26 Benjamin J. Roth and Breanne L. Grace, “Falling through the Cracks: The Paradox of Post-Release Services for Unaccompanied Child Migrants,” Children and Youth Services Review 58 (November 2015): 247.

27 Roth and Grace, 247.

28 Berger Cardoso et al., 276.

29 Berger Cardoso et al., 276.

30 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

tensified its expectations on ORR staff to promptly relocate the children from shelters and release them to sponsors, resulting in a rush through the sponsor vetting process.31 Although PRS are only mandatory for select cases, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) within the ORR is required to check on all minors by calling them a month after they begin living with their sponsors.32 However, over the last two years, the agency was unable to establish communication with one-third of migrant children overall.33

The limited post-release resources available to UMC and the DHHS’ failure to establish oversight over these children’s integration into their new homes have a direct correlation with migrant children facing exploitative labour practices. In interviews with over 60 DHHS caseworkers, the majority estimated that approximately two-thirds of all UMC engage in full-time employment.34 As explained by Annette Passalacqua, an ex-caseworker of the DHHS in Central Florida, sponsoring migrant children has become a kind of business.35 Sponsors have an obligation to enroll migrant children in school. Nevertheless, upon arrival, some children discover that they are expected to contribute to rent and living expenses and must manage both classes and substantial workloads., while others are not enrolled in school at all.36 Passalacqua observed numerous instances of children being compelled to work and a reluctance of law enforcement to investigate these cases.37 Thus, she significantly reduced her reporting efforts and instead opted to inform the children that they were entitled to lunch breaks and overtime.38 Dreier also reveals a case in Texas where a caseworker encountered

31 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

32 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

33 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

34 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

35 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

36 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

37 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

38 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

an individual preying on impoverished families in Guatemala. This person enticed families with promises of wealth in exchange for sending their children across the border, ultimately sponsoring 13 children and leasing them out.39

The profound findings of Dreier’s investigative article bring to light a critical gap in the existing literature concerning UMC, revealing a disturbing reality that unfolds under the very gaze of the American government. These children, often alone and vulnerable, become entangled in a web of systemic exploitation, facing hazardous conditions and compromising their well-being in pursuit of economic survival. The implications of Dreier’s investigation underscore the urgent need for increased awareness and comprehensive reforms in labour practices and child protection within the broader context of immigration and employment policies to address the systemic exploitation faced by UMC in the United States.

The Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention No. 182 Article 3

The ILO Convention No. 182, also known as the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, is an international human rights treaty which emphasizes that the exploitation of children through the worst forms of labour is not only a labour concern, but also a fundamental violation of their human rights.40 The convention can be understood as an extension of the principles outlined in Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), an international convention under the United Nations. Article 23 of the UDHR states the following:

Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. […] Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection […].

While Article 23 broadly addresses the rights of all individuals, including children, to fair and just working conditions, the ILO Convention No. 182 specifically focuses on the protection of children from the worst forms of child labour.

The ILO Convention No. 182 serves as a more targeted and comprehensive human rights instrument to address specific abuses and exploitative practices in the labour force that jeopardize the health, safety, development, and well-being of children. In particular, Article 3 of the convention emphasizes the right of every child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing work that is likely to be hazardous or harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social development:

[…] the term the worst forms of child labour comprises:

39 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

40 International Labor Organization, “Convention 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour.”

(a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; (b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography or for pornographic performances; (c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties; (d) work which, by its nature or the circum-

41 United Nations General Assembly, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” (Paris, 1948), Article 23.

stances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.

Article 3 of the convention recognizes the inherent dignity and rights of the child, aiming to eliminate and prohibit the most egregious forms of child labour, which are considered incompatible with the child’s well-being and development.

Migrant child labour in the U.S.’ agriculture industry violates Article 3 of the ILO Convention No. 182 in two profound ways. Firstly, the debt bondage that some UMC find themselves in, owing their sponsors rent, groceries, and other miscellaneous expenses, constitutes a clear infringement of Article 3(a) of the ILO Convention No. 182, which specifically prohibits forms of forced or compulsory labour, including situations where children are compelled to work against their will to repay a debt. In the context of UMC, as illustrated by Dreier, this type of debt bondage occurs when sponsors exploit the vulnerable situation of these children, often leveraging their lack of legal status, limited resources, and dependency on the sponsor for survival.43 The violation is twofold: firstly, the children are subjected to a form of involuntary labour as they work to repay the debts incurred for basic necessities; and second, the situation exploits the vulnerability of children who may lack legal protections or alternatives due to their immigration status.

Secondly, the multitude of risks all child farmworkers face is a direct violation of Article 3(d) of the ILO Convention No. 182, which explicitly prohibits the engagement of children in work that is likely to harm their health, safety, or morals. Studies on child farmworkers collectively reveal the disturbing reality of how they 42 International Labor Organization, “Convention 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour,” Article 3. 43 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

are frequently exposed to severe hazards in their agricultural work.44 The exposure to risks from heavy machinery, tools, animals, and adverse weather conditions, coupled with the heightened threat of pesticide intoxication, poisoning, and musculoskeletal issues arising from strenuous labour, vividly illustrates the gruelling and harsh conditions these children endure.45 Furthermore, the work culture on farms employing Latinx child farmworkers places limited value on safety. Survey interviews conducted in 2017 with 202 Latinx children, aged 10 to 17 years old, employed on North Carolina farms found that their work safety climate was low since their supervisors were only interested in doing the job fast and cheaply.46 Few received safety training for tools (40.6%), machinery (24.3%), or pesticides (26.0%) and many did not have field sanitation services available (e.g., 37.1 percent had water for washing, 19.8 percent had soap).47

The findings from these studies emphasize that child farmworkers are often exposed to a combination of hazardous elements inherent in agricultural labour. Heavy machinery poses a threat to their physical safety, tools and animals introduce additional risks, and the unpredictable nature of weather further compounds the dangers they face. The extreme risk of pesticide intoxication and poisoning further magnifies the severity of the hazards inherent in their work. The exposure

44 Thomas A. Arcury et al., “Work Safety Culture of Latinx Child Farmworkers in North Carolina,” American Journal of Industrial Medicine 63, no. 10 (July 23, 2020): 917–927, https://doi.org/10.1002/ajim.23161; Jennie Gamlin and Therese Hesketh, “Child Work in Agriculture: Acute and Chronic Health Hazards,” Children, Youth and Environments 17, no. 4 (2007): 1–23, https://doi. org/10.1353/cye.2007.0019; Anaclaudia G. Fassa et al., “Child Labor and Health: Problems and Perspectives,” International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health 6, no. 1 (January 2000): 55–62, https://doi. org/10.1179/oeh.2000.6.1.55.

45 Arcury et al., 917–927; Gamlin and Hesketh, 1–23; Fassa et al., 55–62.

46 Arcury et al., 917.

47 Arcury et al., 917.

of these children to such hazardous conditions not only jeopardizes their immediate well-being but also has long-term implications for their physical and mental health. These hazardous working conditions that migrant child labourers face on a daily basis and the instances where child labourers are coerced to work to pay off debts to their sponsors underscores the urgent need for robust measures to protect them. Necessary changes include the enforcement of existing labour laws, the implementation of safety standards, and the development of targeted interventions that prioritize the rights and well-being of these vulnerable children.

It is worth then to examine why despite a clear moral imperative to eliminate child labour exploitation and a commitment through the Convention No. 18248 to do so, the United States makes little effort to effectuate change. According to the ILO’s International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor:

[F]ew human rights abuses are so unanimously condemned, while being so universally practiced, as child labor. By any objective measure, this issue should be high on the global agenda, but in practice it is surrounded by a wall of silence and perpetuated by ignorance.

In this statement, the ILO highlights the disconcerting disjunction between the widespread acknowledgement of child labour as a human rights issue and the insufficient collective efforts to address and eliminate it. Despite its human rights implications, child labour often faces a “wall of silence,” suggesting a collective neglect of the problem. This “wall of silence” suggests not only a lack of vocal condemnation but also an unsettling acceptance or ignorance of the

48 United Nations, “Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labour Receives Universal Ratification,” UN News, August 4, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/08/1069492.

49 International Labor Organization, IPEC program document, Geneva, Switzerland. (1993): 1.

problem. All 187 member countries of the UN International Labour Organization, including the United States, have ratified Convention No. 182. However, this symbolic ‘commitment’ to combat child labour seems more performative than substantial.50 The reluctance of U.S. lawmakers to reform the FLSA to apply child labour laws to the agricultural industry, the U.S. government’s unwillingness to provide adequate support and services to UMC, and law enforcement’s reluctance to investigate the numerous cases of sponsors exploiting UMC are all key contributors to this “wall of silence” within the U.S.. This silence becomes a shield that perpetuates the continuation of child labour, allowing it to persist unchecked. I believe that this “wall of silence” stems from a combination of factors, including limited access to information, societal apathy, and economic interests that prioritize cheap labour over the well-being of children.

Strategy to Combat Child Labour

To comprehensively address this violation of Article 3 of the ILO Convention No. 182, I propose a strategic 10-year plan structured into four key phases: implementing support and social services for migrant families to reduce economic vulnerabilities that lead to child labour and more PRS resources for all UMC; reforming current legal and regulatory gaps in the United States that exclude agriculture from many health, safety, and child labour protections and provide heightened protections for UMC; improving mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing child labour laws, and implementing harsher sanctions and penalties to agribusinesses that violate child labour laws, complicit hiring agencies, and the sponsors of UMC who exploit them. However, I will only focus on the second phase of this strategy.

Phase two of the proposed strategy aims to cre-

50 United Nations, “Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labour.”

ate a legal environment that not only prevents migrant children from engaging in hazardous agricultural work, but also directly addresses situations where debt bondage leads to their exploitation. The first legal gap to fill is within the FLSA, which, as mentioned earlier, provides distinct regulations for agricultural and non-agricultural professions. The FLSA states that its child labour provisions are “designed to protect the educational opportunities of youth and prohibit their employment in jobs that are detrimental to their health and safety.”51 However, it excludes the agriculture industry, an industry filled with hazardous working conditions as outlined earlier. Stricter age limits, reducing working hours, and enhancing safety standards for young workers in agriculture are essential for preventing children from engaging in work harmful to their health and development. Thus, child labour laws should be applied across all sectors including agriculture. This approach ensures that legal protections are consistent across industries, safeguarding the rights and well-being of migrant children in all forms of employment.

Furthermore, to address the challenges of coercion and debt bondage specific to UMC, orientation programs for UMC upon arrival to inform them of their rights, legal protections, and avenues for support should be mandatory. By ensuring that these children are equipped with knowledge about their rights and the legal recourse available to them, their exploitation can be prevented. This proactive approach would empower UMC, offering them the necessary tools to navigate their circumstances, seek assistance, and ultimately break free from situations of debt bondage and labour exploitation.

Moreover, making PRS services mandatory for all UMC post-release from the ORR would es-

51 U.S. Department of Labour, “Workers Under 18,” (2023).

tablish a structured and continuous system of support that addresses the unique challenges that UMC face after leaving ORR custody as they transition into their sponsor households. Mandating PRS would not only establish a sustained network that provides continued assistance for these children as they navigate their new environment, but would also act as a protective measure against potential exploitation and harmful conditions. By combining mandatory orientation programs upon arrival with obligatory PRS services post-release, these children are not only empowered through education and awareness of their rights, but they are also given a safety net to ensure their ongoing well-being and protection.

The Challenge: Children Who Rely on Their Wages

While reforming agricultural labour laws and heightening surveillance and enforcement of these laws is essential in ensuring the safety of migrant children and upholding their human rights, their situation presents a complex challenge due to their socio-economic realities. Migrant child labourers commonly face challenges, such as poverty, inadequate healthcare, substandard housing, and remarkably low educational achievement, which often compel migrant children to work in agriculture.52 For many, working is a way to avoid extreme poverty. Their earnings are critical for their economic stability and to meet basic needs, such as food, shelter, clothing, and access to healthcare. For migrant children whose parents are migrant farmworkers, they learn early on that they must help their parents because work availability is not steady.53

In the case of UMC, their journey to the United States is often fueled by their parents’ awareness that adults might be turned away at the border or quickly deported. In such circumstances,

52 Green, “The Undocumented,” 62. 53 Green, 63.

parents may choose to send their children with the hope that remittances will provide financial support for the family back home.54 Although as discussed earlier, in some instances, the situation takes a darker turn, and UMC find themselves exploited by sponsors who take advantage of their vulnerable status and end up living alone. As one migrant child told Dreier in an interview, his family’s critical poverty left them no choice but to send him to America to send remittances back.55 However, once he arrived in Florida, he found that he had to find his own place to live and was indebted to his sponsor.56 As Dreier highlights, according to a review of court databases, federal prosecutors have only brought about 30 cases involving forced labour of UMC in the past decade.57 This example underscores the harsh reality faced by many UMC who are thrust into precarious situations, grappling with the weight of familial expectations and the harsh realities of survival in a foreign country.

Thus, simply prohibiting child labour and improving legal mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing child labour laws without addressing the underlying structural inequalities and socio-economic disparities may inadvertently worsen the already precarious situations that these children and their families face. Removing work opportunities from these children who rely on their wages to help their families or to save for their future could push them into more precarious informal economic conditions. Dreier’s article, for example, touches on how there is also an increasing issue of migrant children obtaining false identification to secure work in non-agricultural industries.58 Without legal avenues for employment, these children may seek work in informal sectors where there is often less regulation, low-

54 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

55 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

56 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

57 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

58 Dreier, “Alone and Exploited.”

er pay, and higher vulnerability to exploitation.

Conclusion

In this research paper, I have demonstrated how the substantial deficiencies in protection and enforcement within the United States agricultural industry, coupled with the absence of adequate support or services for UMC, are perpetuating migrant child labour in the United States which blatantly breaches of Article 3 of the ILO’s Convention No. 182. This convention underscores every child’s right to safeguards against economic exploitation and exposure to work that jeopardizes their health and/or development. However, the utilization of migrant child labor within America’s agricultural sector constitutes a dual infringement: first, the imposition of debt bondage by certain sponsors onto UMC contravenes Article 3(a) of the convention, which prohibits various forms of forced or compulsory labour, including situations of debt bondage; second, the numerous hazards encountered by all child farmworkers directly contravene Article 3(d) of the Convention, which expressly forbids involving children in work likely to jeopardize their health, safety, and/or morals.

To address this human rights issue, I proposed a 10-year strategy comprising four phases, with phase two focusing extensively on reforming existing legal and regulatory exclusions, exemptions, and loopholes in the United States legal framework that leave agriculture largely exempt from numerous health, safety, and child labour safeguards. This phase involves the implementation of mandatory orientation programs for UMC upon arrival with obligatory PRS services post-release, along with reforming the FLSA to apply child labour laws to the agriculture industry, which is currently exempted. However, a perplexing obstacle to this phase that is essential to consider is how these reforms would impact migrant children who depend on their

employment to financially sustain themselves and their families. Merely banning child labour and enhancing mechanisms for overseeing and enforcing child labour legislation, without addressing the underlying socio-economic factors, could inadvertently exacerbate the already precarious circumstances faced by these children. Evidently, this is a complex issue that demands further investigation and heightened attention. The prevailing “wall of silence” surrounding migrant child labour in the U.S. only serves to perpetuate this grave human rights issue further.

References

Arcury, Thomas A., Sara A. Quandt, Taylor J. Arnold, Haiying Chen, Joanne C. Sandberg, Gregory D. Kearney, and Stephanie S. Daniel. “Work Safety Culture of Latinx Child Farmworkers in North Carolina.” American Journal of Industrial Medicine 63, no. 10 (July 23, 2020): 917–27. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajim.23161.

Berger Cardoso, Jodi, Kalina Brabeck, Dennis Stinchcomb, Lauren Heidbrink, Olga Acosta Price, Óscar F. Gil-García, Thomas M. Crea, and Luis H. Zayas. “Integration of Unaccompanied Migrant Youth in the United States: A Call for Research.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45, no. 2 (December 20, 2017): 273–292. https://doi.org /10.1080/1369183x.2017.1404261.

Dreier, Hannah. “Alone and Exploited, Migrant Children Work Brutal Jobs across the U.S.” The New York Times, (Feb ruary 25, 2023). https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/25/us/unaccompanied-migrant-child-workers-exploitat ion. html.

Fan, Maoyong, Mimi Huston, and Anita Pena. “Determinants of Child Labor in the Modern United States: Evidence from Agricultural Workers and Their Children and Concerns for Ongoing Public Policy.” Economics Bulletin 36, Issue 1 (December 24, 2014): 125-145. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2542369.

Fassa, Anaclaudia G., Luiz Augusto Facchini, Marinel M. Dall’Agnol, and David C. Christiani. “Child Labor and Health: Problems and Perspectives.” International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health 6, no. 1 (January 2000): 55–62. https://doi.org/10.1179/oeh.2000.6.1.55.

Fliter, John A.“Contemporary Child Labour Issues.” In Child Labor in America: The Epic Legal Struggle to Protect Chil dren. University Press of Kansas, 2018. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv7h0t22.

Green, Paul E. “The Undocumented: Educating the Children of Migrant Workers in America.” Bilingual Research Jour nal 27, no. 1 (April 2003): 51–71. https://doi.org/10.1080/15235882.2003.10162591.

Gamlin, Jennie, and Therese Hesketh. “Child Work in Agriculture: Acute and Chronic Health Hazards.” Children, Youth and Environments 17, no. 4 (2007): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1353/cye.2007.0019.

International Labor Organization. IPEC program document, Geneva, Switzerland. (1993). International Labor Organi zation. “Convention 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour.” Geneva, Switzerland, 87th ILC session. (1999). https://www.ilo.org/dyn/norm lex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_C ODE:C182

McLaurin, Jennie A., and Amy K. Liebman. “Unique Agricultural Safety and Health Issues of Migrant and Immigrant Children.” Journal of Agromedicine 17, no. 2 (April 2012): 186–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/105992 4x.2012.658010.

Otis, Jack, Eileen Mayers Pasztor, and Emily Jean McFadden. “Child Labor: A Forgotten Focus for Child Welfare.” Child Welfare 80, no. 5 (2001): 611–22.

Roth, Benjamin J., and Breanne L. Grace. “Falling through the Cracks: The Paradox of Post-Release Services for Unaccompanied Child Migrants.” Children and Youth Services Review 58 (November 2015): 244–52. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2015.10.007.

UN General Assembly. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” (Paris, 1948), Article 3. http://www.un.org/en/univer sal-declaration-human-rights/

United Nations. “Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labour Receives Universal Ratification.” UN News, (August 4, 2020). https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/08/1069492.

U.S. Department of Labour. “Workers Under 18.” (2023). https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/hiring/workersunder18#:~: text=Generally%20speaking%2C%20the%20Fair%20Labor,being%20employed%20in%20hazardous%20occu pations

U.S. Department of Labor Employment Standards Administration Wage and Hour Division. “Child Labor Requirements in Agricultural Occupations Under the Fair Labor Standards Act.” Child Labor Bulletin 102, WH-1295, (2007). Youth Center for Immigrant Children’s Rights. “Resource: Brief Summary of the Process for Sponsoring a Child’s Release from Office of Refugee Resettlement Custody.” (September 24, 2021). https://www.theyoungcenter.org/ stories/2021/9/24/resource-brief-summary-of-the-process-for-sponsoring-a-childs-release-from-office-of-refu gee-resettlement-custody.

Addressing Human Rights Violations Against Female Ethiopian Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon through

the Proposal of a Purpose-Built

Residence

by: Jenna Hicks

Abstract

This paper examines the pervasive issue of cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment experienced by female Ethiopian migrant domestic workers (MDWs) under Lebanon’s kafala system. It identifies the unique situation female Ethiopian MDWs in Lebanon find themselves in and provides an in-depth analysis of the systemic vulnerabilities they face. This paper seeks to address the human rights violations against Ethiopian MDWs, including but not limited to verbal, physical, and sexual abuse within the private sphere of their employer’s residence. It does so by proposing the construction and utilization of a purpose-built residence building designed specifically for Ethiopian MDWs in Daura, Lebanon. The residence building aims to reduce Ethiopian MDWs’ dependence on employers that leaves them susceptible to abuse by providing alternate living arrangements off-site. The strategy involves a four-year plan for construction, implementation, and monitoring of the residence building, which includes housing, support services, and social networks. Lastly, the paper discusses potential limitations and unintended consequences of the proposed residence building, particularly the risk of exacerbating abuse in the public sphere due to the increased visibility a residence building brings. The proposed approach represents a possible step towards addressing the human rights violations faced by female Ethiopian migrant domestic workers in Lebanon and underscores the importance of ensuring their safety and autonomy.

Résumé

Cet article examine le problème envahissant concernant le traitement cruel, inhumain et dégradant vécu par les travailleuses domestiques migrantes (TDMs) éthiopiennes sous le système de la kafala au Liban. Il identifie la situation unique dans laquelle les TDMs éthiopiennes au Liban se trouvent et fournit une analyse approfondie des vulnérabilités systémiques auxquelles elles font face. Cet article cherche à aborder les violations des droits de la personne contre les TDMs éthiopiennes, y compris, mais sans s’y limiter, l’abus verbal, physique et sexuel dans la sphère privée de la résidence de leurs employeurs. Pour ce faire, il propose la construction et l’utilisation d’un immeuble de résidence spécialement conçu pour les TDMs éthiopiennes à Daura, au Liban. L’immeuble de résidence a pour but

de fournir un mode de vie alternatif hors site. La stratégie implique un plan sur quatre ans pour la construction, l’implémentation et la surveillance de l’immeuble de résidence qui inclut le logement ainsi que l’accès à des services de support et à des réseaux sociaux. Finalement, l’article discute des potentielles limitations et conséquences inattendues de l’immeuble de résidence proposé, plus particulièrement des risques d’exacerber les abus dans la sphère publique en raison de la visibilité accrue qu’apporte un immeuble de résidence conçu pour les TDMs. L’approche proposée représente un possible pas vers la lutte contre les violations des droits humains auxquelles sont confrontées les travailleuses domestiques migrantes éthiopiennes au Liban et souligne l’importance d’assurer leur sécurité et leur autonomie.

Introduction

Human rights are the fundamental and basic rights each person on this planet deserves, yet violations of these rights are pervasive, especially amongst migrants. This paper is an attempt to draw attention to and address one specific human right violation against one specific group of migrants. To do so, it proposes the construction and utilization of a residence building in Daura, Lebanon over a four-year period to address the abuse which constitutes cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment against female Ethiopian migrant domestic workers under the kafala system in Lebanon. The paper proceeds as follows. To begin, the first section of the paper will provide context of the ongoing situation in Lebanon while describing the Ethiopian migrant domestic workers who are working there and the conditions that allow for human rights violations. In the second section, the paper will explore the verbal, physical, and sexual abuse which is occurring against Ethiopian migrant domestic workers constituting a violation of Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the third section, the paper will propose an original approach to address the cruel treatment against the female Ethiopian migrant domestic workers. The approach proposed is the construction and implementation of a residence building in Daura designed to relocate migrant workers from their employer’s residences. Lastly, a limitation of this approach

will be considered; namely, the risk of exacerbating cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment in the public sphere as a result of the Ethiopian migrant domestic worker residence building.

Ethiopian Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon under the Kafala System

A migrant worker is defined as a person who is paid to engage in a specific task within a state of which they are not a national.1 Domestic work encompasses household tasks, “such as cleaning, cooking, and caring for children or the elderly.”2 Taken together, migrant domestic workers (MDWs) constitute economic migrants who are employed in the domestic sector completing household tasks and receiving compensation. Lebanon is a common destination for migrant domestic workers as there are more than 200,000, with an estimated 20,000 being Ethiopian MDWs, of which the vast majority are female.3 The importance of this work is highlighted by the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) finding, that domestic work accounts for 7.5 percent of female employment worldwide, thus signify-

1 Yeshiwas Degu Belay, “Migration and State Responsibility: Ethiopian Domestic Workers in Lebanon” International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications 4, no. 5 (2014): 2.

2 Virginia Mantouvalou, “Migrant Workers.” In Structural Injustice and Workers’ Rights, ed. Virginia Mantouvalou, (Oxford University Press, 2023), 33. https://doi. org/10.1093/oso/9780192857156.003.0003.

3 Belay, “Migration and State Responsibility,” 1.

ing an important source of women’s income on a global scale.4 Migrant domestic workers, primarily from developing countries, move abroad looking for better employment opportunities to send remittances back home to support their families. The phenomenon is especially true for Ethiopian women MDWs because the unemployment rate for women is much larger than that of men, 24.2% compared to 11.4%, respectively.5 Many Ethiopian migrant women are the eldest daughter of a low-income family, sent abroad to support her parents and/or younger siblings.6 Ethiopian migrant domestic workers are typically employed for short-term contracts between two to three years and earn around $100-150 USD per month. They often follow a circular migration trajectory, returning to Ethiopia for a break following the end of their contract before taking up another one. 7

In Lebanon, female Ethiopian migrant domestic workers are subject to the kafala system, as are most MDWs employed across the Middle East. The kafala system outlines the conditions under which migrant workers can be hired and the conditions they are subject to while they are in their host country. The system involves a sponsor (the employer) who is legally responsible for the MDW throughout their contract, rendering the MDW entirely dependent upon their sponsor for the duration of their stay.8 One feature of kafala is that the migrant domestic workers cannot change employers or break their contract without permission in the form of a ‘release waiver’ from their employer. If they attempt to do so, their sta-

4 Belay, 1.

5 Bina Fernandez, Ethiopian Migrant Domestic Workers: Migrant Agency and Social Change. (Palgrave Pivot Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 33. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24055-4.

6 Fernandez, 4–5.

7 Fernandez, 2.

8 Jasmin Lilian Diab et al., “The Gender Dimensions of Sexual Violence against Migrant Domestic Workers in Post-2019 Lebanon.” Frontiers in Sociology 7, (2023): 2. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2022.1091957.

tus becomes illegal and they risk deportation or detention.9 The sponsor is also fully responsible for their migrant domestic workers’ airfare, employment visas, work permits, wages, and often, their place of residence.10 These responsibilities foster a paternalistic relationship between the MDW and their employer. The sponsor is in control of most decisions for their employee, inhibiting their MDW’s autonomy and self-determination while creating a massive power imbalance.

The purpose of kafala, which was originally designed as a social mechanism for Middle Eastern countries to host foreigners, has been reshaped as migration increased. It now functions as a politico-legal framework to govern and control migrant labour.11 The restructuring of the kafala system provides the legal foundation which allows for migrant workers, without affording them the privilege of legal protections. Although they can legally enter and exit Lebanon under the kafala sponsorship program, Ethiopian MDWs are legally invisible, as Lebanon’s labour laws do not apply to domestic workers.12 Moreover, despite Lebanon being a party to 49 International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions regarding labour standards, it has never ratified any which specifically protect migrant workers.13 Migrant domestic workers are unable to form unions because they are excluded from labour laws, exacerbating their legal invisibility. MDWs also lack opportunities to mobilize informal unions or communicate with other individuals in similar positions, because they are extremely isolated and lack a circle of co-workers.14 This is especially true of live-in MDWs, whereby the employee lives at the residence of their employer. According to the 2016 ILO Study of Employers

9 Diab et al., “The Gender Dimensions”, 2.

10 Belay, “Migration and State Responsibility,” 2.

11 Fernandez, Ethiopian Migrant Domestic Workers, 56.

12 Belay, “Migration and State Responsibility,” 1.

13 Belay, 4.

14 Mantouvalou, “Migrant Workers.”, 33.

of MDWs in Lebanon, the largest proportion of live-in MDWs (42.1%), are Ethiopian.15 The lack of opportunities to communicate with other MDWs can be exemplified by the fact that livein workers often need permission to go out of the house.16 The 2016 ILO study found that “22.5% of all employers in the survey either always or sometimes lock the domestic worker inside the house” in these extreme cases, permission is not requested by employers, but required.17 Therefore, the lack of legal protections afforded to MDWs renders them invisible and in doing so reinforces their vulnerability under kafala.

In addition to being legally invisible, migrant domestic workers also remain unseen within the realm of domestic work, a sector that is traditionally concealed from the public eye. The inherent nature of domestic work being performed in the private sphere enables abuse, as these workplaces remain largely out of public scrutiny. As Virginia Mantouvalou points out, “this work sector is excluded from protective rules or treated differently to workers in other fields, such as through working time regulation, regulation of night work, and occupational health and safety protection.”18 Without occupational health and safety regulations, employers can easily exploit the nature of domestic work. Moreover, gender-based discrimination devalues domestic work, further denying transparency in this sector of work. Due to the large majority of female workers, the informal workforce has faced discrimination, perpetuating a narrative that undermines its status as

15 International Labour Organization “A Study of the Employers of Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon: Intertwined.” Report, September 19, 2016: 7. http://www. ilo.org/beirut/publications/WCMS_524149/lang--en/index.htm.

16 Amrita Pande, “‘The Paper That You Have in Your Hand Is My Freedom’: Migrant Domestic Work and the Sponsorship (Kafala) System in Lebanon.” The International Migration Review 47, no. 2 (2013): 428.

17 ILO, “Intertwined”, 33.

18 Mantouvalou, “Migrant Workers.”, 34.

‘real’ work.19 This gendered devaluation further contributes to the invisibility of MDWs, allowing their vulnerabilities to persist unaddressed.

Human Rights Violation: Cruel, Inhumane, and Degrading Treatment

The intersecting layers between the kafala system, the Lebanese labour laws, and the nature of domestic work for live-in MDWs have provided the landscape for greatly uneven power dynamics. This imbalance not only allows for, but enables verbal, physical and sexual abuse to occur systematically against female Ethiopian MDWs in Lebanon. These abuses constitute a violation of Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): “no one shall be subjected to [...] cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment.”20 The abuse against female Ethiopian MDWs has been widespread and coupled with the lack of legal protections, it has led states, including Ethiopia, to ban their citizens from working in Lebanon.21 Despite Ethiopia’s efforts, these restrictive migration policies have the opposite effect, pushing women and girls into dangerous and illegal recruitment channels, making them vulnerable to traffickers.22 Therefore, although Ethiopia has attempted to decrease the numbers of female MDWs migrating to Lebanon for work, it has had little success in doing so.

The abuse that female Ethiopian migrant do19 Ai-jen Poo and Natalicia Tracy. “Invisibility, Forced Labor, and Domestic Work,” in The Historical Roots of Human Trafficking: Informing Primary Prevention of Commercialized Violence, ed. Makini Chisolm-Straker and Katherine Chon, (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021), 53. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03070675-3_4.

20 United Nations. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Accessed February 19, 2024. https://www.un.org/ en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights.

21 Yeshiwas Degu Belay, “Migration and State Responsibility,” 1.

22 Khaled A. Beydoun, “The Trafficking of Ethiopian Domestic Workers into Lebanon: Navigating Through a Novel Passage of the International Maid Trade.” Berkeley Journal of International Law 24, no. 3 (2006): 1014.

mestic workers in Lebanon face takes the form of verbal, physical and/or sexual harassment and assault. These abuses are widespread and are among the most common complaints made by domestic workers in Lebanon to embassies and non-governmental organizations.23 One example of widespread cruel treatment involves trapping the migrant domestic worker inside the house. 80% of employers do not allow their MDW to leave the house on their day off.24 Physical violence is another common form of abuse against Ethiopian MDWs, which violates Article 5 of the UDHR. Bina Fernandez illustrates this abuse when quoting a migrant domestic worker’s experience in Lebanon. The MDW describes a time when her employer slammed her against the wall with such force that everything became dark and she believed she was going to die.25 In addition to physical violence, Ethiopian MDWs also face racist verbal comments and behaviour. For instance, Ethiopian MDWs have experienced their employers insulting them, calling Ethiopia poor, viewing them as rubbish, and even refusing to eat food that the MDW had touched.26 The physical and verbal abuse alone constitutes inhumane and degrading treatment, but the sexual abuse they face is particularly harmful.

Female Ethiopian MDWs in Lebanon are also often subject to various forms of sexual harassment by their employers. These including inappropriate staring, sexually suggestive comments or jokes, intrusive questions regarding their sex lives, showing their private parts, unwelcome inappropriate physical contact, sexually explicit messages or calls, repeated/inappropriate invitations to dates, sexually explicit pictures, actual or 23 Human Rights Watch. “Lebanon: Protect Domestic Workers From Abuse, Exploitation,” April 29, 2008. https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/29/lebanon-protect-domestic-workers-abuse-exploitation.

24 Yeshiwas Degu Belay, “Migration and State Responsibility,” 5.

25 Fernandez, Ethiopian Migrant Domestic Workers, 69.

26 Fernandez, 59.

attempted rape or sexual assault, non-consensual photo/video taking of a sexual nature, and requests or pressure for sex/other sexual acts.27 One study from the Lebanese American University focused on the gender dimensions of sexual violence against MDWs in Lebanon. The majority (86%) of the respondents were from Ethiopia and the Philippines. Individuals were asked whether they had experienced at least one incident of sexual harassment during their employment in Lebanon and 68% respondents claimed they had.28 The respondents also reported experiencing other abuses and inhumane treatment at the hands of their employers, including being deprived of food, physical violence, and psychological harassment such as gaslighting and re-traumatization.29 The survey also shed light on the fact that most of these incidents of abuse took place either in the MDWs’ ‘private’ room or around other parts of the employer’s residence.30 Even if MDWs can escape from the house of their employer in response to these abuses, the kafala system renders them illegal.31 This exacerbates the vulnerability of these workers, making it difficult, if not impossible, for them to seek safety or justice.

Strategy: Ethiopian MDW Residence Building

To address female Ethiopian MDWs in Lebanon being subject to detrimental forms of abuse by their employers, this paper proposes the construction of a residence building designed to house them. The aim is to reduce the number of MDWs living in their employer’s house. The entire project will take place over the course of four years. The initial two years will be designated for the construction of the building and the following two years will be designated for housing the MDWs and monitoring their well-being. The

27 Diab et al., “The Gender Dimensions,” 1.

28 Diab et al., 1.

29 Diab et al., 5.

30 Diab et al., 4.

31 Belay, “Migration and State Responsibility,” 2.

residence building will accommodate 100 Ethiopian MDWs and will offer one-, two-, three- and four-bedroom apartments. This design accommodates the MDWs preferences and provides the opportunity for the development of social relations amongst residents. Each unit will be fully furnished, equipped with a living space, bathroom, and full kitchen. The building will also offer internet access to ensure the Ethiopian MDWs can easily stay in contact with their families. The KAFA (Enough) Violence and Exploitation Listening and Counseling Centre will have an office in the residence building. At least one employee will be on-site 24/7 to assist with any needs of the MDWs. The centre can support survivors in healing from the abuse they have faced from employers by providing forensic examiners, legal counseling, and psychotherapy.32 Offering a building with supports in place is crucial to ensuring the safety and well being of the MDWs.

The location of such a building is also important to its success and the overall well being of those living there. The residence building will be built in the suburb of Daura in Beirut, Lebanon. Daura is located on the edge of the city, at a major transport intersection. It is in proximity to many other parts of Beirut, making it easily accessible for MDWs to get to and from their employer’s house.33 Already a social hub for migrant workers, Daura is the perfect location for the residence building. The main street has plenty of Ethiopian restaurants and grocery stores already there.34 Situating the residence building in a suburb which has an existing Ethiopian presence is beneficial for many reasons. First, it helps protect residents against racism. Second, it comforts migrant domestic workers who have moved away from home to a foreign country

32 KAFA Enough Violence and Exploitation. “Exploitation and Trafficking in Women,” May 2, 2021. https://kafa. org.lb/en/node/176.

33 Fernandez, Ethiopian Migrant Domestic Workers, 81.

34 Pande, “Migrant Domestic Work”, 432.

alone. Third, it provides another outlet which can facilitate social connections across migrant domestic workers. Additionally, Daura offers many useful services such as “African salons that offer ‘braiding’, stores with international calling, and Western Union outlets for sending remittances back home.”35 For these reasons, Daura appears to be the perfect location for a residence building housing Ethiopian MDWs in Lebanon.

The construction and implementation of a residence building designed for Ethiopian MDWs addresses the issue of abuse and violation of Article 5 for a variety of reasons. Firstly, even if cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment occurs in some capacity despite the MDW living off-site, the number of hours the MDW resides in the home of their employer is still significantly reduced. This diminishes the opportunities for these abuses to occur. If the employers are away at work for the majority of the day, there would be even less time for the migrant domestic worker to be alone in the home with their employer. This approach may also encourage employers to treat their employees better. A separate living arrangement would mean MDWs would no longer be hidden and locked away in their employer’s house. The secrecy of working conditions would be eliminated, increasing the likelihood of abuse being exposed and reducing the chances of the employer escaping accountability. Furthermore, the incentives for employers to treat their MDW well may increase, since living off-site makes it easier for a migrant domestic worker to escape. If an employer wants to keep their employee, they now have an incentive to treat them in a respectful manner. A residence building for Ethiopian MDWs also allows for more open channels of communication, particularly with the KAFA services on-site. This may also force the employer to think twice before verbally, physically or sexually assaulting their employee, as 35 Pande, 432.

access to reporting channels will increase and subsequently action will be taken against the employer. Social connections between other MDWs may also encourage survivors to come forward while increasing the trade of information about which employers are abusive. Sponsors are dissuaded from using degrading treatment, seeking to build a good reputation throughout the industry to attract future employees.

The residence building project will be an International Organization for Migration (IOM) headed pilot with the potential for expansion. More buildings will be created if the initiative is proven to be successful in reducing the cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment of MDWs. The International Organization for Migration is an intergovernmental organization which entered into an agreement with the United Nations (UN), thus becoming a related organization.36 As a related organization, the IOM agrees to work with the “UN system in harmony with the purposes and principles in articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.”37 The issue of migrant workers’ human rights has become increasingly a concern throughout the UN in recent years, and the construction of an off-site residence for at-risk MDWs is one step in the right direction for the UN.38 The IOM will head the project because of their focus on ensuring orderly and humane management of migration, as well as their continual support of multiregional and global projects.39 The funding to support the project will be primarily from donors and

36 United Nations, “International Migration.” Accessed February 19, 2024. https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/ migration.

37 International Organization for Migration, “IOM in the UN System: Some Fundamentals” Accessed March 2, 2024.

38 Belay, “Migration and State Responsibility,” 2. 39 International Organization for Migration. “Migration Management.” Accessed February 19, 2024. https://www. iom.int/migration-management.

private sector partnerships within the IOM.40

The success of living off-site in addressing violations of Article 5 against female Ethiopian MDWs will be measured through anonymous surveys taken in six-month intervals over the course of two years. This will provide more data to the UN regarding the situation of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon. Two years is the ideal timeline, as it aligns with the average duration of an Ethiopian MDWs contract, which is typically two to three years.41 The surveys will include a variety of questions, including overall satisfaction with the living arrangement, the frequency and level of abuse at the hands of their employer, and frequency and level of abuse experienced within the new living arrangement. These surveys will be compared to the current statistics provided by KAFA and the ILO regarding the degree of abuse Ethiopian MDWs in Lebanon have been experiencing while living in the residence of their employer. For instance, KAFA and the International Labour Organization released a study, Intertwined, a Study of Employers of Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon which found that 42% of respondents worked more than eight hours a day.42 The purpose of the residence building is to reduce the number of hours in an employer’s home, hoping to decrease the chances of abuse. Thus, one indicator of reduced abuse could be reduced working hours, which could be compared to the current statistic of 42% found in the Intertwined study. By comparing various indicators and statistics across surveys, the frequency and level of abuse can be monitored. If it decreases among those living in the residence building compared to livein workers, the goal of the project will have been achieved. Subsequently, the model can be replicated with additional residence buildings being

40 IOM, “Migration Management.”

41 Fernandez, Ethiopian Migrant Domestic Workers, 2.

42 ILO, “Intertwined,” 30.

built. The occupants of new buildings can also be surveyed to increase the sample size and gather a more accurate result to ensure the cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment is still decreasing.

Obstacle: Cruel, Inhumane, and Degrading Treatment in the Public Sphere

Although the construction and use of a residence building to house female Ethiopian MDWs in Lebanon may prove to be a promising approach in addressing violations of Article 5 of the UDHR, it is important to consider potential limitations or unintended consequences. In this case, one particular obstacle is that abuse may manifest in the public sphere, instead of the private sphere of an employer’s residence. In addition to being legally invisible, the intersectionality of discrimination based on gender, nationality, class, and race makes female Ethiopian migrant domestic workers a particularly vulnerable group in Lebanon. Ethiopian MDWs tend to be “structurally discriminated against and given a lower subservient status in society.”43 This is exemplified by the socio-cultural perception of Ethiopian MDWs in Lebanon as ‘abd’, which means slave in Arabic, rather than viewed and respected as the foreign workers they are.44 Viewing Ethiopian MDWs as slaves has meant that their employers treat them as property, instead of as people, which results in violence. Diab et al. highlight this, explaining that “Lebanese men ‘exotify and objectify black women;’ hence leading to a dehumanization of black women, and the propagation of more physical violence against them.”45 This intersection of racism and sexism leaves Ethiopian MDWs extremely vulnerable to discrimination and violence.

Currently, Ethiopian MDWs are out of the public eye, hidden in the house of their employers with little access to social opportunities in soci43 Beydoun, Trafficking of Ethiopian Domestic Workers, 1010.

44 Fernandez, Ethiopian Migrant Domestic Workers, 58. 45 Diab et al. “The Gender Dimensions”, 6.

ety. Although they may be subject to the abuse at the hands of their employer, this living arrangement may actually be safer than the abuse and racism they could face in the public sphere. For instance, the prevailing perception of Ethiopian MDWs as property and lesser-than raises concerns about Lebanese citizens not accepting them as equals in society. This rejection could result in social backlash, involving hate crimes against these women. Additionally, employers of MDWs might retaliate against the residence building by exerting more abuse and control over the MDWs to compensate for the perceived loss of control the building establishes. Despite an increase in chances that abuses may come to light, employers might not be dissuaded because the “increased socio-cultural and geographic distance between employers and domestic workers makes discriminatory and abusive behaviour more socially permissible.”46 Therefore, even if their human rights violations come to the forefront, the prevalence of racism against Ethiopians may hinder public concern or the initiative of punitive actions.

Implementing a residence building for Ethiopian MDWs may also exacerbate the racism and discrimination which has already been taking place against Ethiopian MDWs. Increasing the integration of female workers into the public sphere also increases the chances of abuse and violence against them. Until recently, migrant domestic workers were prohibited from using the country’s public beaches, a demonstration that MDWs were not viewed as equals.47 Although legal changes have abolished such exclusionary laws in theory, in practice many Lebanese citizens still take up cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment as a means of socially enforcing these rules to keep domestic workers ‘in their place.’48 In addition to exclusive laws in the public sphere,

46 Fernandez, Ethiopian Migrant Domestic Workers, 58.

47 Fernandez, 82.

48 Fernandez, 82.

negative attitudes and behaviours toward MDWs manifest in various forms. Examples range from being treated with a lack of respect when entering shops/restaurants as owners may believe they cannot afford the items, to facing sexualized and/or racialized harassment including assault.49 Frequently accessed public spaces such as shopping centres and public transport, are also some of the most common spaces Ethiopian women are marginalized as a result of their gender, race and migrant status.50 Creating a public residence building which requires more public interaction than live-in MDWs currently have may create a potential risk of exacerbating verbal, physical, and sexual abuse that constitutes a violation of Article 5 of the UDHR. Violations may be shifted from the confinement of private residences to unfolding in the public sphere.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the context within which Ethiopian migrant domestic workers in Lebanon are situated, as well as conducted an in-depth analysis of the conditions which have fostered human rights abuses. It has focused specifically on the infringement of Article 5 under the UDHR, namely that of verbal, sexual and physical abuse against the MDWs that constitute cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment. Following that, the strategy proposed to combat this abuse involves a four-year plan to build and monitor a purpose-built residence building in Daura, Lebanon. It will relocate Ethiopian MDWs from the private sphere, an environment which is conducive to abuse, into the public sphere. While the strategy is promising, it was important to consider potential obstacles, specifically that of shifting violations out of the private and into the public sphere. Despite such important considerations, the importance of mitigating ongoing violations of Article 5 outweighs these

49 Fernandez, 82.

50 Fernandez, 82.

hypothetical challenges. Moreover, the purpose of the pilot project is to evaluate the positive and negative impacts to assess whether this project should be expanded. Therefore, while anticipating backlash and unintended consequences are valid considerations, they are not a valid reason to hinder the progress of this strategy to address current pressing human rights abuses against female Ethiopian migrant domestic workers.

References

Belay, Yeshiwas Degu. “Migration and State Responsibility: Ethiopian Domestic Workers in Lebanon” International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications 4, no. 5 (2014): 1–8.

Beydoun, Khaled A. “The Trafficking of Ethiopian Domestic Workers into Lebanon: Navigating Through a Novel Pas sage of the International Maid Trade.” Berkeley Journal of International Law 24, no. 3 (2006): 1009–1045.

Diab, Jasmin Lilian, Banchi Yimer, Tsigereda Birhanu, Ariane Kitoko, Amira Gidey, and Francisca Ankrah. “The Gender

Dimensions of Sexual Violence against Migrant Domestic Workers in Post-2019 Lebanon.” Frontiers in Sociol ogy 7, (2023). https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2022.1091957

Fernandez, Bina. Ethiopian Migrant Domestic Workers: Migrant Agency and Social Change. Palgrave Pivot Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24055-4.

Human Rights Watch. “Lebanon: Protect Domestic Workers From Abuse, Exploitation,” April 29, 2008. https://www. hrw.org/news/2008/04/29/lebanon-protect-domestic-workers-abuse-exploitation.

International Labour Organization “A Study of the Employers of Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon: Intertwined.” Report, September 19, 2016. http://www.ilo.org/beirut/publications/WCMS_524149/lang--en/index.htm.

International Organization for Migration, “IOM in the UN System: Some Fundamentals” Accessed March 2, 2024.

International Organization for Migration. “Migration Management.” Accessed February 19, 2024. https://www.iom.int/ migration-management.

KAFA Enough Violence and Exploitation. “Exploitation and Trafficking in Women,” May 2, 2021. https://kafa.org.lb/en/ node/176.

Mantouvalou, Virginia. “Migrant Workers.” In Structural Injustice and Workers’ Rights, edited by Virginia Mantouvalou. Oxford University Press, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192857156.003.0003.

Pande, Amrita. “‘The Paper That You Have in Your Hand Is My Freedom’: Migrant Domestic Work and the Sponsorship (Kafala) System in Lebanon.” The International Migration Review 47, no. 2 (2013): 414–41. https://doi. org/10.1111/imre.12025.

Poo, Ai-jen, and Natalicia Tracy. “Invisibility, Forced Labor, and Domestic Work.” In The Historical Roots of Human Trafficking: Informing Primary Prevention of Commercialized Violence, edited by Makini Chisolm-Straker and Katherine Chon, 51–63. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03070675-3_4.

United Nations. “International Migration.” Accessed February 19, 2024. https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/migration. United Nations. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Accessed February 19, 2024. https://www.un.org/en/aboutus/universal-declaration-of-human-rights.

Energy Crisis and Infrastructure Financing Under Global Gateways: The Intermingling of Strategic Investment and Development Assistance

by: Aida Roy van Mierlo

Abstract

In the wake of the energy crisis precipitated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) has intensified its efforts towards a renewable energy transition and infrastructure development. This paper examines the interplay between strategic investment and development assistance within the context of the EU’s Global Gateways initiative. Through a comprehensive analysis of the EU’s response to the energy crisis and its impact on infrastructure financing in developing countries, the paper argues that the crisis accelerated the financialization of developmental policy and the compounding of development aid and strategic objectives. Despite commitments to support developing countries in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Paris Agreement targets, the trajectory of international private capital flows suggests that filling the financing gap remains challenging. The paper elucidates how the EU’s emphasis on energy security and green development has led to a prioritization of projects benefiting EU interests, often at the expense of addressing the immediate needs of developing countries. Drawing on case studies and empirical data, it highlights disparities in investment distribution, with a focus on projects facilitating resource extraction and energy export to Europe. While acknowledging the potential of renewable energy investments to spur economic growth and employment opportunities in developing nations, the paper contends that such initiatives conflate development and geopolitical agendas and primarily serve EU objectives rather than fostering inclusive development.

Résumé

À la suite de la crise énergétique précipitée par l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine, l’Union européenne (UE) a intensifié ses efforts en faveur de la transition vers les énergies renouvelables et du développement des infrastructures. Cet article examine l’interaction entre l’investissement stratégique et l’aide au développement dans le contexte de l’initiative « Global Gateway » (portail mondial) de l’UE. À travers une analyse complète de la réponse de l’UE à la crise énergétique et de son impact sur le financement des infrastructures dans les pays en développement, l’article soutient que la crise a accéléré la financiarisation de la politique de développement et la combinaison de l’aide au développement et des objectifs stratégiques. Malgré les engagements pris pour aider les pays en développement à atteindre les objectifs de dévelop-

pement durable (ODD) et les objectifs de l’Accord de Paris, la trajectoire des flux de capitaux privés internationaux suggère qu’il reste difficile de combler le déficit de financement. Cet article explique comment l’accent mis par l’UE sur la sécurité énergétique et le développement vert a conduit à donner la priorité à des projets bénéficiant aux intérêts de l’UE, souvent au détriment de la satisfaction des besoins immédiats des pays en développement. S’appuyant sur des études de cas et des données empiriques, il met en évidence les disparités dans la répartition des investissements, en se concentrant sur les projets facilitant l’extraction des ressources et l’exportation de l’énergie vers l’Europe. L’analyse souligne l’approche géostratégique de l’UE en matière d’investissement dans les infrastructures et ses implications pour les priorités de développement dans les pays partenaires. Tout en reconnaissant le potentiel des investissements dans les énergies renouvelables pour stimuler la croissance économique et les opportunités d’emploi dans les pays en développement, l’article soutient que de telles initiatives servent principalement les objectifs de l’UE plutôt que de favoriser un développement inclusif. En mettant en lumière l’amalgame entre le développement et les agendas géopolitiques, le document contribue à une compréhension nuancée des dynamiques complexes qui façonnent le financement des infrastructures dans le cadre de l’initiative « Global Gateway ».

Introduction

Prior to COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United Nations (UN) estimated that developing countries faced an annual financing shortfall of US$2.5 trillion to advance the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement climate objectives. The G20 Infrastructure Investors Dialogue estimated in 2020 that the volume of global infrastructure investment needed by 2040 was US$81 trillion, US$53 trillion of which is needed in developing countries.1 The 2015 Paris Agreement explicitly emphasized the necessity for an equitable transition to a net-zero economy. Indeed, with the establishment of the SDGs came a period of increasing focus on long-term planning, inclusive decision-making and transformation of the development paradigm, calling for partnerships forged on mutual terms and a more equal foot-

1 Dirk Schoenmaker and Ulrich Volz, Scaling Up Sustainable Finance and Investment in the Global South (Paris & London: CEPR Press, 2022). https://cepr.org/publications/ books-and-reports/scaling-sustainable-finance-and-investment-global-south.

ing, in which the mitigation of climate change, reduction of new emissions, and the transition to clean energy sources became more important.2 This stands in sharp contrast to the partnerships in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) era, defined by aid flows from the Global North to the Global South, debt relief, and trade access. From 2020 onwards, the pledges by high income countries (HICs), which include not only direct assistance but rather call upon a mix of public and private sources of financing through the development of concessional funding, development finance (DFI), and Multilateral Development Banks (MDB), amounted to US$100 billion per year of funding to help low income countries (LICs) develop using clean technologies and adapt to climate change.

In this context, the European Union (EU) 2 Arkebe Oqubay, “Achieving inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and the SDGs in the post-COVID-19 world,” Development Matters, October 26, 2020, https:// oecd-development-matters.org/2020/10/26/achieving-inclusive-and-sustainable-industrialisation-and-the-sdgs-inthe-post-covid-19-world/.

launched the Global Gateway Initiative in December 2021 to mobilise €300 billion in infrastructure investment, composed of investments, private capital, and development banks, by 2027 and to strengthen health, education, and research systems across the world. It is the EU’s contribution to narrowing the global investment gap worldwide. This initiative unifies approaches to development and projects from recent years under one umbrella. The EU’s Global Gateway strategy aims to “boost smart, clean and secure connections in digital, energy and transport sectors, and to strengthen health, education and research systems across the world,” aligned with the SDGs and the Paris Agreement.3

From May to October 2022, as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, gas flows from Russia to the EU fell by 80 percent and the prices of fossil fuels dramatically increased.4 For Europe, the crisis was a dramatic reminder of the vulnerability of large-scale infrastructure and energy supply chains.5 It raised questions about the feasibility of the EU’s climate policies, infrastructure investment goals, and commitment to inclusive development in a period of increased geopolitical tension.6 This paper explores how

3 European Commission. “Global Gateway”, accessed November 14, 2023, https://commission.europa.eu/ strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global-gateway_en.

4 Alex Kozul-Wright, “Year of war in Ukraine left developing nations picking up pieces,” Al-Jazeera, February 19, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/2/19/ayear-of-war-in-ukraine-has-left-developing-countriespicking-up-pieces.

5 Alberto Rizzi and Arturo Varvelli, “Opening the Global Gateway: Why the EU should invest more in the southern neighbourhood,” ECFR Policy Brief, March 14, 2023, https://ecfr.eu/publication/opening-the-global-gatewaywhy-the-eu-should-invest-more-in-the-southern-neighbourhood/.

6 Laura Parry-Davies, “The Energy Transition or Development – Will Developing Countries Need to Choose?” Development Matters, October 22, 2022, https:// oecd-development-matters.org/2022/12/13/the-energy-transition-or-development-will-developing-countries-need-to-choose/.

this energy crisis affects the EU’s commitment to infrastructure development and inclusive growth in developing countries. As the Russian invasion of Ukraine accelerated the turn to renewable resources, it also accelerated the financialization of developmental policy and the compounding of development aid and strategic policy, as the EU reoriented funds and capital to clean energy infrastructure investment, which resulted in a focus on infrastructure projects directly benefiting the EU.

The crisis rendered the EU more sensitive to the risks of investing in developing economies and led to an intensified prioritization of EU interests in foreign development and partnership, in addition to the leveraging of development aid to serve those interests. Though the turn towards renewable resources is positive globally and drives investment that can provide new opportunities for developing countries, the appeal to energy security and green goals allows a compounding of development and geopolitical objectives, as well as their respective budgets. The funds the EU invests in developing countries, despite the risks of investment that stem from the increased debt crisis in the Global South, are used in projects that largely benefit the EU’s interest. Said funds are nevertheless included in calculations of EU countries’ existing aid budgets. This dynamic creates an environment in which developing countries’ infrastructure needs are relegated to the second stage. Developing countries’ participation in the energy transition is therefore limited to the supply of raw materials and energy, while official discourse increasingly promotes partnerships based on equal footing and ‘win-win’ initiatives. As such, this essay argues that though the energy crisis caused by the Russian Invasion of Ukraine had the positive impact of accelerating the transition to clean energy and of bringing investment in infrastructure building to developing countries despite the increasingly risky investing environment, the investments made under the

Global Gateway Project in developing countries are primarily dedicated to projects that directly benefit the EU, sidelining the immediate needs of developing countries. This paper will first discuss the increased investment risks resulting from the invasion, then the effect of net-zero objectives on investments, then analyse how strategic investment and development aid are commingled, to the detriment of developing countries.

Initial Reluctance to Invest in LICs

Developing countries, as holders of a large portion of the Earth’s natural resource endowment, are crucial to the achievement of net-zero objectives that nearly 200 nations are committed to achieving by 2050.7 For instance, Africa accounts for 80 percent of the world’s platinum reserves, 50 percent of cobalt reserves, and 40 percent of manganese reserves, as well as huge deposits of graphite and lithium.8 Countries in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region hold great renewable energy potential in solar production, Argentina has high wind power potential, and Chile has large reserves of minerals.9 For developing countries to provide a steady and secure supply of renewable energy and critical minerals, and to be included in and benefit from the transition to renewable energy, they do, however, require extensive infrastructure development. Due to developing countries’ limited access to capital and borrowing, and given the fact that more than 80 percent of financial assets are held in OECD countries, it is crucial for international sources of financing and developed countries to play a large

7 Annabell Farr et al., “The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bring,” McKinsey Global Institute, January 2022, https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/ mckinsey/business%20functions/sustainability/our%20 insights/the%20net%20zero%20transition%20what%20 it%20would%20cost%20what%20it%20could%20bring/ the-net-zero-transition-executive-summary.pdf.

8 IEA, Financing Clean Energy in Africa, (Paris: IEA, September 2023), https://www.iea.org/reports/financing-clean-energy-in-africa.

9 Farr et al., “The net-zero transition.”

role in financing infrastructure development. 10However, the majority of investments in infrastructure take place outside developing countries.

Despite the clear need for private capital, about three-quarters of global private investment in infrastructure occurs in high-income countries, while developing countries attract only a quarter of global investment.11 For instance, only 2 percent of global renewable energy investments have been made in Africa, and though the continent accounts for 60 percent of the best solar resources worldwide, it currently holds only 1 percent of solar photovoltaic capacity.12 A 2021 study from the Overseas Development Institute found that while the investments of DFIs and MDBs to LICs increased by US$340 million annually from 2013 to 2018, annual foreign direct investment inflows, that are not driven by a development motive, to these countries decreased by US$11 billion over the same period, leading to a net decrease in investment.13 This disparity is a consequence of the perceived and actual risks of investment in develo.ping countries. A prominent risk of investing in clean energy infrastructure in developing countries, in addition to the high cost of capital, is that there may not always be sufficient know-how and capacity on the ground to implement and operate projects. There is often a lack of skilled labour that can offer in-

10 Schoenmaker and Volz, Scaling Up.

11 Sebnem Erol Madan, “How can developing countries get to net zero in a financeable and affordable way?” World Bank Blogs, February 9, 2022, https://blogs.worldbank. org/ppps/how-can-developing-countries-get-net-zero-financeable-and-affordable-way.

12 Maurizio Bezzeccheri, Francesca Ciacca, and Marta Martinez, “Accelerating the green energy transition in emerging markets in times of crisis,” Development Matters, January 20, 2023, https://oecd-development-matters. org/2023/01/20/accelerating-the-green-energy-transition-in-emerging-markets-in-times-of-crisis/.

13 Samantha Attridge and Matthew Gouett, “ Development finance institutions: the need for bold action to invest better,” Overseas Development Institute Report, April 2021: 3, https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/86222.

stallation support or do maintenance, and the integration of new technologies into other systems can pose a challenge. This risk causes difficulties in operating and scaling up investments, and results in low productivity. As such, the cost of clean energy generation projects can be at least two to three times higher in developing economies than in developed economies and China. 14

There are further institutional constraints that generally limit investment in developing countries. The current financial sectors in developing countries are not modernised and are too thin to permit the kind of financing activity needed to support global investment.15 This constraint is strengthened by the fact that past commodity booms have shown that spikes in demand for critical minerals and clean energy tend to unleash large waves of corruption. Additionally, informality and the dominance of small to medium enterprises in an area with weak institutional capacity creates an investing environment that suffers from a lack of standardisation, information asymmetries, and different regulatory environments. The lack of disclosure and the scarcity of data create difficulty in identifying bankable projects, which discourages foreign investors, as international shareholders increasingly demand information to evaluate the environmental and social consequences of their investments.16 For frontier renewable energy technologies, such as green hydrogen, battery storage, and large-scale solar power, the technological risks of building infrastructure in new contexts further exacerbate the reluctance to invest in infrastructure in developing economies.

Increased investments risks from the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

The Russian invasion of Ukraine engendered a

14 IEA, “Financing Clean Energy in Africa”.

15 Schoenmaker and Volz, Scaling Up.

16 Schoenmaker and Volz, Scaling Up.

debt crisis in the Global South, putting the risks of investing in infrastructure into focus. Indeed, 54 countries were facing a debt crisis at the end of 2023.17 Infrastructure projects, which require considerable amounts of financing and present high financial risks, often need some sovereign support in the form of default guarantees, which is often financed by sovereign lending, lending by the government. Investments in renewable energy projects, where equipment is imported and paid for in hard currency, a currency that comes from a country with a strong economy and stable political structure that is not subject to great fluctuations in value, and where future revenues are denominated in local currency, which can fluctuate, are especially impacted by potential sovereign defaults, the debt incurred by a nation’s government. They as such are more readily identified as not bankable.

As an effect of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, investors withdrew their funds from developing countries’ financial assets for higher yields in the United States (US). During the first part of 2022, investors withdrew more than US$50 billion from emerging markets bond funds, the worst outflows in more than 17 years.18 Additionally, official development assistance from HICs governments excluding aid to Ukraine slightly decreased, from US$171 billion to US$166 billion.19 Tens of countries’ currencies depreciated against the US dollar in 2022. This depreciation made not only imports more expensive, but also the servicing of foreign debt.20 It limited the fiscal space available for developing countries to invest in their devel-

17 Debt Justice, “Global South Debt”, Debt Justice Campaign, consulted December 5, 2023, https://debtjustice. org.uk/campaigns/no-new-debt-trap.

18 Schoenmaker and Volz, Scaling Up.

19 Euan Ritchie, “New DAC data reveals the impact of the Ukraine invasion on aid,” Development Initiatives, April 17, 2023, https://devinit.org/blog/new-dac-data-revealsimpact-of-ukraine-invasion-on-aid/.

20 Kozul-Wright, “Year of war in Ukraine left developing nations picking up pieces.”

opment, as over-indebted governments could not invest nor offer sovereign support. This stands in sharp contrast to the situation in HICs that could afford to increase their public debt with low risks of facing deteriorating financing conditions. In short, the Russian invasion of Ukraine exacerbated the risks of investing in developing nations, prompting capital flight, currency depreciation, and limiting fiscal space for development. The debt crisis that resulted from the invasion exacerbated the gap between developing and developed countries in their ability to attract capital. However, the impetus for change in response to the energy market disruptions had a positive impact in spurring EU investments in clean energy in spite of investment risks, which partially offset the decline in investment and direct assistance.

Impetus for Change in the EU

Indeed, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine gave renewable power a significant strategic and economic edge. While EU lawmakers were already discussing ambitious renewables targets under the Fit for 55 legislative package, the invasion increased the prices of fossil fuels, the incentives to divert from Russian gas, and the concern for energy security, providing strong motivation to accelerate renewable energy deployment. It increased the cost competitiveness of renewable energy, rendering it more affordable than fossil fuel-based electricity in a growing number of countries, with it now contributing to more than 50 percent of electricity generation in around 30 percent of countries.21 The European Commission established in May 2022 the REPowerEU plan, which aimed to accelerate the EU’s phasing out of Russian fuels through energy savings and diversification of energy supplies in addition to accelerating the roll-out of renewable ener-

21 IEA, IRENA & UN Climate Change High-Level Champions, “Breakthrough Agenda Report 2023”, Paris: IEA, 2023, https://www.iea.org/reports/breakthrough-agenda-report-2023.

gy to replace fossil fuels.22 The Global Gateway strategy was prioritized, and the EU has as such worked increasingly with international partners to diversify its energy sources, securing liquefied natural gas imports, increasing expenditure on wind and solar assets, and establishing strategic partnerships for the import of green hydrogen. This increased attention to the possible role of developing countries in the energy transition brought investment and opportunities.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine as such acted as an impetus to many governments around the world to put large amounts of money into the clean energy transition and made previously disregarded sources of energy, such as green hydrogen, worthwhile opportunities. It as such accelerated the transition to clean energy and sustainable solutions across many sectors, with unprecedented expansion in clean technologies, such as solar photovoltaic cells and electric cars. In spite of the increased risks of investing in the Global South due to the debt crisis, the search for new renewable energy opportunities brought new and renewed investments to developing countries as well.

Such investments can be an opportunity for LICs to address unemployment, enhance economic diversification, and increase industrial development as they create new industries, jobs, and opportunities. The Green Revolution is a possible trigger for a virtuous cycle of rising investment and economic growth, curbing climate change, improving countries’ balance of trade, and improving access to energy.23 For example, in Lüderitz, Namibia, which has extensive solar, wind, and water resources, a green hydrogen project is set to be based near the Khaeb National Park to ultimately produce around 300,000 22 European Commission, “REPowerEU: A plan to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition,” May 18, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131. 23 Schoenmaker and Volk, Scaling Up.

tonnes of green hydrogen per year. This project, a result of the EU’s strategic partnership with Namibia on sustainable raw materials and renewable hydrogen, would revolutionize this region, which is struggling with a 55 percent unemployment rate and aging infrastructure.24 The German firm to which the contract was awarded, Hyphen Hydrogen Energy, says the construction is likely to create 15,000 direct jobs and 3,000 more during full operations, with 90 percent of them filled by locals. The Namibian government hopes to create renewable electricity, fund its development, and to ultimately be seen as “a trading partner, and not a net recipient of development assistance.”25 Similarly, the Oyu Tolgoi copper mining project in Southern Mongolia, co-owned by the British-based Rio Tinto Group, the Canadian Turquoise Hill Resources, and the Government of Mongolia, is another example of how investment creates opportunities for developing countries. Hailed as an example of responsible mining, with a biodiversity program, investment in schools, health, and roads, and with no direct discharge of polluted water, the Oyu Tolgoi mine will account for more than 30 percent of Mongolia’s GDP, with 97 percent of its workforce being Mongolian. It as such establishes itself as the largest taxpayer and employer of Mongolia and supports indirect industries.26 Increasing interest in critical minerals and renewable resources can in some cases allow mineral-rich nations like Mongolia to increasingly demand better terms from global companies. It also allows them to not only export raw materials, but also to process them and integrate them into the supply chain, thereby reducing reliance on Western markets

24 Elna Schutz, “The African nation aiming to be a hydrogen superpower,” BBC, December 27, 2021, https://www. bbc.com/news/business-59722297.

25 Schutz, “The African nation aiming to be a hydrogen superpower”.

26 “Underground production celebrated at Oyu Tolgoi,” RioTinto, March 13, 2023, https://www.riotinto.com/en/ news/releases/2023/underground-production-celebrated-at-oyu-tolgoi.

and vulnerability to global disruptions. Namibia, for instance, has banned the export of raw lithium, and its strategic partnership with the EU signed in October 2023 involves the processing of critical minerals within Namibia. Though that is still only low-grade processing, it represents a positive step for the country in its development.

Investment in LICs is however not always positive. Many resource extraction projects in developing countries can have detrimental effects on local populations and disregard the actual development needs of the regions in favor of the resource demands of developed partners. As the Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent energy crisis in Europe put the EU’s urgent energy needs at odds with the necessity for developing countries to ensure their own energy security and address socio-economic issues, the projects that the EU invests in increasingly focus on EU interests. Indeed, LICs must maintain the necessary focus on basic goals such as improving energy access, providing safe and quality transport services, water, food security, and education, while the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the urgent need for energy pushed the EU to prioritize immediate energy solutions. There is a limited willingness to invest in development projects that do not involve energy or critical minerals exports.

Geostrategic Interests and the Global Gateways Strategy

EU geopolitical and geostrategic interests incentivise the prioritization of their needs, and an appeal to energy security and green development allows them to prioritize projects in developing countries that serve mainly to supply resources to Europe. By leveraging development aid and private investment to pursue European interests in securing energy and critical minerals supply, the EU can overcome reputation issues that stem from their colonial past. It frames such projects as ‘win-win’ situations for partners with equal

footing, legitimized by the appeal to green goals and the imperative to accelerate the clean energy transition, when they actually focus on geo strategic goals. Though in some cases infrastructure development projects are mutually beneficial for both the EU and developing partners, developing countries are mostly limited to exporting their natural resources or producing renewable energy solely for export purposes. Although it does help curb global emissions, it does not directly help achieve many of the LICs’ development goals. Furthermore, though official commitments from the EU claim to support the long-term development of developing countries and pledge new funding, much of the funds for the development of renewable energy production come from the reorganization of existing aid budgets under the Global Gateway initiative.27 Aid is therefore allocated to infrastructure development favoring natural resource exports, rather than health, education, or climate adaptation and mitigation. Indeed, the small amount of EU investment that is allocated to developing countries is on projects that directly benefit the EU and as such prioritize EU interests over those of developing countries.

The Global Gateways strategy launched 87 key projects in 2023, many of which were already under discussion.28 Though some projects directly contributed to the development of developing countries, such as the Bac Ai pumped hydro storage project in Vietnam, the mini-electrical grid implementation in Madagascar, or the Bio2Watt waste to value project in South Africa, Mozambique, and Uganda, the majority of projects have a narrow emphasis on the development of infrastructure projects and transportation corridors that serve to export raw materials and energy to Europe and allow the EU to take ownership structure or financial shares on transportation hubs

27 Ian Mitchell, “Climate and Development,” Center for Global Development Update, December 7, 2023, https:// www.cgdev.org/blog/what-look-out-cop28.

28 European Commission. “Global Gateway.”

such as ports.29 This emphasis on projects benefiting the EU shows the increasingly geostrategic approach to EU investment and development. Indeed, the flagship projects are clearly prioritized in the sectors of “climate and energy” with 34 projects, and transport, with 14 projects, while only five projects on health and nine on education have been announced. Prioritized projects, such as the creation of electricity corridors, a railway line, undersea electricity interconnections, energy transmission lines, and work on ports favor European economic and political needs as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, rather than prioritizing key areas of development.

Conversely, official statements from EU officials laud the inclusiveness and equal footing of their partners. For instance, official statements for the strategic partnership in Namibia for the production of hydrogen usually fail to mention the fact that most of this renewable energy will be exported to Europe and thus will hardly contribute to a climate-neutral power supply in the country producing it.30 The promoted equal status of these partners is as such debatable. The EU invokes the need for a green transition, and the impact of the Russian invasion to justify the prioritisation of such projects. Green goals and energy security also serve to legitimize the financialization of developmental policy and the compounding of development aid and strategic policy, as development commitments are reoriented around geopolitical priorities. The EU as such confounds development goals with the aim of ensuring the supply of energy and materials to fulfill their climate ambitions.

Conclusion

Combined with the detrimental effects of COVID-19, the Russian invasion of Ukraine

29 European Commission. “Global Gateway.”

30 Andreas Bohne, “The “Global Gateway” Deception,” RLS, September 26, 2023, https://www.rosalux.de/en/ news/id/51019/the-global-gateway-deception.

exacerbated debt crises in LICs with developing economies and thus discouraged investments. However, the invasion has also provided an impetus for change in the green transition and spurred investments, avoiding a drastic reduction in investment in developing countries.

The increase in commitments announced in 2023 demonstrates the desire to speed up the pace of implementation of renewable energy. These investments however resulted from a reorganization of development aid and infrastructure investment that favors financing projects that directly benefit the EU.

Strategic investment and development assistance funds are combined. This reorganization of funds allows the EU to use development initiatives to access energy and critical minerals to support its current consumption patterns, rather than to directly improve conditions in LICs. Security concerns and the need for the energy transition serve to justify and legitimize this prioritisation of EU interests. It can be argued that the current infrastructure development represents a first step in “creating an investment ecosystem that will advance investments in infrastructure, industry, and services”not only in Europe but also in partner countries.31 However, the fact remains that the development goals of developing countries are sidelined in the process, while development funds are used as a strategic investment and official discourse maintains a rhetoric of equal partnerships and win-win situations.

As a manifestation of heightened geopolitical competition, the Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the willingness of the EU to leverage development aid and investment ambitions to improve their energy security and attain their 31 Chloe Teevan, “Global Gateway as new approach, not simple funding pot,” Euractiv, April 3, 2023, https://www. euractiv.com/section/development-policy/opinion/globalgateway-as-new-approach-not-simple-funding-pot/.

green goals. Though the attention to value-driven, inclusive development remains central to official discourse and to official endeavours, the invasion has legitimized an increased focus on projects ultimately benefiting the EU. The EU’s response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine illustrates how international conflicts can influence the prioritization of development aid and investment initiatives, particularly in areas crucial for energy security and environmental sustainability. However, the perceived self-interest in these actions raises questions about the sincerity of value-driven and inclusive development rhetoric, highlighting the tension between geopolitical considerations and humanitarian principles.

References

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Bezzeccheri, Maurizio, Francesca Ciacca, and Marta Martinez. “Accelerating the green energy transition in emerging markets in times of crisis.” Development Matters. January 20, 2023. https://oecd-development-matters. org/2023/01/20/accelerating-the-green-energy-transition-in-emerging-markets-in-times-of-crisis/.

Bohne, Andreas. “The “Global Gateway” Deception.” RLS. September 26, 2023. https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/ id/51019/the-global-gateway-deception.

Debt Justice. “Global South Debt.” Debt Justice Campaign. Accessed December 5, 2023. https://debtjustice.org.uk/cam paigns/no-new-debt-trap

European Commission, “REPowerEU: A plan to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition,” May 18, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131.

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IEA. Financing Clean Energy in Africa. Paris: IEA, September 2023. https://www.iea.org/reports/financing-clean-ener gy-in-africa

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Kozul-Wright, Alex. “Year of war in Ukraine left developing nations picking up pieces.” Al-Jazeera. February 19, 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/2/19/a-year-of-war-in-ukraine-has-left-developing-countries-pickingup-pieces.

Madan, Sebnem Erol. “How can developing countries get to net zero in a financeable and affordable way?” World Bank Blogs. February 9, 2022. https://blogs.worldbank.org/ppps/how-can-developing-countries-get-net-zero-finance able-and-affordable-way.

Mitchell, Ian. “Climate and Development.” Center for Global Development Update. December 7, 2023. https://www. cgdev.org/blog/what-look-out-cop28.

Oqubay, Arkebe. “Achieving inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and the SDGs in the post-COVID-19 world.” Development Matters, October 26, 2020. https://oecd-development-matters.org/2020/10/26/achieving-inclusiveand-sustainable-industrialisation-and-the-sdgs-in-the-post-covid-19-world/ Parry-Davies, Laura. “The Energy Transition or Development – Will Developing Countries Need to Choose?” Develop ment Matters. October 22, 2022. https://oecd-development-matters.org/2022/12/13/the-energy-transition-or-de velopment-will-developing-countries-need-to-choose/.

RioTinto, “Underground production celebrated at Oyu Tolgoi,” RioTinto. March 13, 2023, https://www.riotinto.com/en/ news/releases/2023/underground-production-celebrated-at-oyu-tolgoi.

Ritchie, Euan. “New DAC data reveals the impact of the Ukraine invasion on aid.” Development Initiatives. April 17, 2023. https://devinit.org/blog/new-dac-data-reveals-impact-of-ukraine-invasion-on-aid/.

Rizzi, Alberto and Arturo Varvelli. “Opening the Global Gateway: Why the EU should invest more in the southern neighbourhood.” ECFR Policy Brief. March 14, 2023. https://ecfr.eu/publication/opening-the-global-gatewaywhy-the-eu-should-invest-more-in-the-southern-neighbourhood/.

Schoenmaker, Dirk and Ulrich Volz. Scaling Up Sustainable Finance and Investment in the Global South. Paris and Lon don: CEPR Press, 2022. https://cepr.org/publications/books-and-reports/scaling-sustainable-finance-and-invest ment-global-south

Schutz, Elna. “The African nation aiming to be a hydrogen superpower.” BBC. December 27, 2021. https://www.bbc. com/news/business-59722297.

Teevan, Chloe. “Global Gateway as new approach, not simple funding pot.” Euractiv. April 3, 2023. https://www.eurac tiv.com/section/development-policy/opinion/global-gateway-as-new-approach-not-simple-funding-pot/.

Transformative Masculinities: Engaging Men in Gender and Development Programs

by: Jasmin Rodriguez

Abstract

There is a focus in Gender and Development (GAD) programs to focus exclusively on women, which reinforces a false narrative that women are the sole bearers of gender-related challenges. In the absence of men’s active participation in GAD initiatives, the opportunity to challenge harmful dynamics shaped by hegemonic masculinity is overlooked. To foster genuine equality and challenge entrenched stereotypes, it is imperative to recognize and involve men in dismantling existing norms, particularly hegemonic masculinity. Through the promotion of positive masculinities, GAD programs have the potential to encourage men to embrace diverse expressions of masculinity, untethered from aggression, dominance, and restrictive roles. This paper examines the effectiveness of engaging men in the prevention of violence against women, and demonstrates that GAD programs must actively include men by fostering positive masculinities and raising awareness of the shared responsibility for gender equity to achieve sustainable and transformative change. This approach has the potential not only to benefit men, but also to play a significant role in dismantling harmful power dynamics that negatively impact women.

Résumé

Les normes de genre affectent les individus de tous genres y compris les hommes, ainsi se concentrer exclusivement sur les femmes dans le genre et le développement (GED) renforce le récit faussé selon lequel seules les femmes font face aux défis liés au genre. Sans la participation active des hommes dans les initiatives du GED, la possibilité de contester les dynamiques néfastes façonnées par la masculinité hégémonique est négligée. Pour favoriser une véritable égalité et contester les stéréotypes tenaces, il est primordial de reconnaître et d’impliquer les hommes dans le démantèlement de normes existantes, tout particulièrement de masculinité hégémonique. À travers la promotion d’une masculinité positive, les programmes du GED ont le potentiel d’encourager les hommes à adopter diverses expressions de leur masculinité, sans lien avec l’agression, la dominance et d’autres rôles restrictifs. Cet article examine l’efficacité de l’implication des hommes dans la prévention de la violence à l’égard des femmes et démontre que les programmes GED doivent activement impliquer les hommes en favorisant les masculinités positives et en sensibilisant à la responsabilité commune de l’équité entre les sexes pour atteindre un changement durable et transformateur. Cette approche peut non seulement être bénéfique pour les hommes, mais peut aussi jouer un rôle dans le démantèlement de dynamiques de pouvoir néfastes qui impactent les femmes.

Introduction

The shift from the term “Women and Development” to “Gender and Development” (GAD) is intended to signify a shift from exclusively focusing on women to focusing on gender relations. However, without the involvement of men in GAD programs, GAD fails to address gender-based issues comprehensively. Gender norms, the expected behaviours and attitudes of people based on their sex, affect individuals of all genders including men. Hence, exclusively focusing on women in GAD, without the involvement of men, reinforces a false narrative that women are the sole bearers of gender-related challenges. To foster genuine equality and challenge entrenched stereotypes, it is imperative to recognize and involve men in dismantling existing norms, particularly hegemonic masculinity.

This prevalent construct, highlighted by Cornell,1 reinforces male dominance and perpetuates gender inequality. In the absence of men’s active participation in GAD initiatives, the opportunity to challenge harmful dynamics shaped by hegemonic masculinity is overlooked. GAD programs, through the promotion of positive masculinities, have the potential to encourage men to embrace diverse expressions of masculinity, untethered from aggression, dominance, and restrictive roles. Thus, through examining the effectiveness of engaging men in the prevention of violence against women, I argue that GAD programs must actively engage men by fostering positive masculinities and raising awareness of the shared responsibility for gender equity, in order to achieve sustainable and transformative change. This approach has the potential to not only benefit men but also play a significant role in dismantling harmful power dynamics that impact women. Otherwise, in the absence of male involvement in GAD, the onus of responsibility for achieving

1 Raewyn Connell, Masculinities, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 37.

gender equity falls disproportionately on women.

Hegemonic Verse Positive Masculinities

The impact of hegemonic masculinity on gender equity is profound. Hegemonic masculinity refers to a dominant and socially accepted form of masculinity within a given cultural context.2 It represents a set of norms, behaviours, and expectations associated with being a man that are considered ideal, shaping the way men are expected to express their gender identity.3 These expectations are considered ideal, and shape the way men are expected to express their gender identity, thus limiting the range of permissible behaviours for men and discouraging expressions of vulnerability or emotional sensitivity. Moreover, the pressure to conform to hegemonic masculinity can contribute to harmful practices such as toxic masculinity, where men may feel compelled to assert dominance, suppress emotions, and engage in aggressive behaviour to conform to societal expectations. 4

Conversely, the concept of positive masculinity presents an alternative framework that encourages men to challenge and transcend the constraints of hegemonic masculinity. Positive masculinity advocates for the normalization of healthy communication, emotional intelligence, and the expression of vulnerability among men. Through embracing these behaviours and attitudes, which promote empathy, cooperation, and mutual respect, men can cultivate more authentic and fulfilling lives, and can foster deeper connections with others and nurture healthier relationships within their intimate circles and communities.

Dismantling hegemonic masculinity is essential for gender equity because the prioritization and normalization of activities associated with tra-

2 Connell, 37.

3 Connell, 37.

4 Connell, 110–11.

ditional masculinity inadvertently reinforces the hierarchy that places these traits in a position of perceived superiority over traditionally feminine traits. As bell hooks maintains, to enable and normalize girls to participate in male-gendered activities without reciprocally doing the reverse is to continue to establish masculinity as the normative higher status.5 She contends that true equality should also involve granting boys the freedom to make choices equivalent to those available to girls.6 This freedom includes the right to opt out of aggressive or violent play, and the right to engage in activities and norms traditionally associated with girls, such as playing with dolls, expressing their emotions, and wearing costumes of either gender.7 Thus, if girls are consistently encouraged to adopt or participate in activities traditionally associated with masculinity, while boys are discouraged from engaging in traditionally feminine activities, it not only reinforces gender stereotypes but also maintains existing power dynamics and further entrenches patriarchal structures.8

Dismantling Hegemonic Masculinity: Men in GAD

By including men in gender and development programs, there is an opportunity to deconstruct hegemonic masculinity and reshape societal perceptions of gender roles. In Colpitts’ article on the perspectives of people working to prevent gender-based violence, she conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with people working in various capacities to prevent and address gender-based violence over three months in 2013 in South Africa. She found that there was a consensus that early intervention with young boys, aimed at deconstructing normative masculinities and challenging gendered power relations, is integral to effective anti-violence ini-

5 bell hooks, The Will to Change: Men, Masculinity, and Love (New York: Washington Square Press, 2005), 104.

6 hooks, 104.

7 hooks 104.

8 hooks, 105.

tiatives.9 Her article underscores the importance of shifting the focus from instructing women to avoid violence to placing the violence-prevention onus on the perpetrator.10 Through early intervention, GAD initiatives can challenge ingrained societal norms that have perpetuated victim-blaming. By redirecting the onus of violence prevention onto perpetrators, the narrative is reframed to address the root causes and behaviours that contribute to gender-based violence. Furthermore, this rationale is supported by Jewkes et al., in their international study on the effectiveness of efforts to engage men and boys in GAD, which found that interventions that address hegemonic masculine norms were among the most effective in the prevention of violence against women and girls.11 The study highlights how men’s use and experiences of violence are upheld by hegemonic masculinity and hence, violence against women and girls is most common where men themselves encounter high levels of violence.12 One of the effective interventions the study examines is the Stepping Stones project in South Africa.13 Stepping Stones is a 50-hour workshop-based intervention that aims to improve sexual health by changing the ideas and behaviours that men adopt in the course of showing that they are men.14 They use participatory learning approaches to build knowledge, risk awareness, and communication skills to stimulate critical reflec-

9 Emily Colpitts, “Engaging Men and Boys to Prevent Gender-Based Violence in South Africa: Possibilities, Tensions and Debates,” Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue Canadienne D’études Du Développement 40, no. 3, (2019): 429, https://doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2 018.1491393.

10 Colpitts, 429.

11 Rachel Jewkes, Michael Flood, and James Lang, “From Work with Men and Boys to Changes of Social Norms and Reduction of Inequities in Gender Relations: A Conceptual Shift in Prevention of Violence against Women and Girls,” Lancet 385, no. 9977, (2015): 1580.

12 Jewkes et al., 1580.

13 Jewkes et al., 1582.

14 Jewkes et al., 1582.

tion.15 As a result of this approach, the project has significantly improved reported risk behaviours in men, with a lower proportion of men reporting violent perpetration of an intimate partner across a two-years follow-up study, and less transactional sex and problem drinking at 12 months.16

Consistent with hooks’ and Cornell’s perspectives, the studies by Colpitts17 and Jewkes et al. 18highlight the importance of challenging not only overt manifestations of misogyny, but also the subtle ways in which societal expectations and norms shape and sustain unequal power dynamics and violence against women. The success of programs like Stepping Stones underscores the potential for transformative change when men actively engage in redefining their roles and challenging hegemonic masculinity. By transforming the ideas and behaviours associated with being a man, this intervention not only addresses immediate risk behaviours, but also contributes to broader societal shifts by encouraging men to embrace positive masculinities while rejecting harmful power dynamics, which aligns with hooks’ call for men to engage in self-reflection and transformation. This approach lifts the burden of responsibility from women by fostering a collective commitment to societal change, and ultimately supports the idea that through promoting positive masculinities, GAD can directly dismantle hegemonic masculinity.

Conclusion

This essay demonstrates that without the active participation of men in GAD programs, the potential for sustainable and transformative change is limited. GAD cannot address gender-based is-

15 Rachel Jewkes et al., “Impact of Stepping Stones on Incidence of Hiv and Hsv-2 and Sexual Behaviour in Rural South Africa: Cluster Randomised Controlled Trial,” Bmj, clinical Research Ed. 337, (2008): 2.

16 Jewkes et al., 6–7.

17 Colpitts, “Engaging Men and Boys.”

18 Jewkes et al., “From Work with Men and Boys.”

sues comprehensively without addressing hegemonic masculinity, which requires fostering positive masculinities in men. Furthermore, without the engagement of men in GAD, the burden of responsibility for gender equity weighs heavily on women. By encouraging men to embrace positive masculinities and promoting awareness of the shared responsibility of gender equity, GAD programs can not only benefit men but also contribute to dismantling harmful power dynamics that affect women. This inclusive approach holds the key to fostering a more equitable and just society, where the collective responsibility for gender equity and its benefits is shared by all.

References

Connell, Raewyn. Masculinities. 2nd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.

Colpitts, Emily. “Engaging Men and Boys to Prevent Gender-Based Violence in South Africa: Possibilities, Tensions and Debates.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue Canadienne D’études Du Développement 40, no. 3 (2019): 423–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2018.1491393.

hooks, bell. The Will to Change: Men, Masculinity, and Love. New York: Washington Square Press, 2005.

Jewkes, Rachel, M. Nduna, J. Levin, N. Jama, K. Dunkle, A. Puren, and N. Duvvury. “Impact of Stepping Stones on Incidence of Hiv and Hsv-2 and Sexual Behaviour in Rural South Africa: Cluster Randomised Controlled Tri al.” Bmj (clinical Research Ed.) 337, (2008): 506. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.a506.

Jewkes, Rachel, Michael Flood, and James Lang. “From Work with Men and Boys to Changes of Social Norms and Reduction of Inequities in Gender Relations: A Conceptual Shift in Prevention of Violence against Wom en and Girls.” Violence Against Women and Girls 385, no. 9977 (2015): 1580–89. https://doi.org/10.1016/ S0140-6736(14)61683-4.

MEET THE AUTHORS

Strategic Apoliticism and Interpersonal Ties

by Aliya Frendo and Sarah Ella Shijia Feng

Aliya is a U3 student majoring in International Development Studies and minoring in Social Entrepreneurship. She is interested in writing and reading about abolition, reparations, and LandBack. Outside of school, Aliya is part of a Street Solidarity Circle with unhoused Indigenous members of her community. She loves popping into random restaurants around the city and keeps a ranking of her favourite ones.

Sarah (she/her) is a second-year student majoring in Honours International Development Studies and minoring in Philosophy. She is particularly interested in human rights, migration, and education reform. On campus, she serves as the Vice President Internal of the McGill International Development Studies Students’ Association and the Vice President External of McGill Students for the Open Door Montréal. Outside of school, she coaches water polo for a club dedicated to the LGBTQ2IA+ community and its allies. She also enjoys rock climbing, playing the piano, and creative writing.

Sumak Kawsay and Neoliberalism

by Zoë Wilson-Potter

Zoë is a recent Fall 2023 graduate with an honours degree in International Development and a minor in History. During her time at McGill, her research interests focused primarily on human rights violations against Indigenous peoples throughout North and South America. Outside of her studies, Zoe enjoys exploring her home of Vancouver Island, and spends her summers working at a remote wilderness lodge.

Operation Serval: Addressing Security Dilemmas

by Emma Dutu

Emma is a U3 student pursuing a major in International Development with a minor in Psychology. Her research interest revolves around international security and she wishes to pursue a Master’s in International Relations and Global Security to further her curiosity on the topic. Outside of her academic work, she loves going on adventures with her roommates and discovering new coffee shops around town.

Entrenched Exploitation: Debt-Bondage in Pakistan’s Brick Kilns

by Mahnoor Zaman

Mahnoor is a U2 student pursuing an Honours degree in International Development. Her research interests include the gaps between international versus domestic law, with a regional focus on South Asia and MENA. Outside of academics, she has worked in the field of immigration and diplomacy, she serves as the VP Finance of the International Development Studies Students’ Association, as editor for Catalyst, and is a tutor for INTD 200 and ECON 313. Aside from university, she enjoys reading historical fiction novels and baking.

Unravelling the Exploitation of Migrant Child Labour

by Jasmin Rodriguez AND

Transformative Masculinities

Jasmin is a U3 first generation student pursuing a double major in International Development Studies and Philosophy. Her research interests include social justice, immigration and other human rights issues. She is also very passionate about bridging the gap between theoretical and applied perspectives, namely through critically engaging with different cultural ontologies and epistemologies. During her free time, Jasmin serves as the executive of education at the School of Music Montreal which provides free music education to underprivileged youth. Outside of McGill, she works at IM Policy and Planning at Agriculture and Agri-Foods Canada.

Human Rights Violations Against Female Ethiopian Migrant Domestic Workers

by Jenna Hicks

Jenna is a U3, fourth-year International Development student with a minor in Political Science. Her academic interests lie in public policy and human rights, which she approaches through a feminist perspective. On campus, Jenna has contributed articles to Catalyst, McGill’s student-run International Development publication. She also enjoys participating in the SSMU Ski and Snowboard Club trips and events, as well as volunteering at philanthropy events with her sorority, Kappa Alpha Theta. Outside of McGill, she actively volunteers in CISV, a global organization focused on fostering peace through intercultural friendships and education. Furthermore, her love for exploration led her to participate in an exchange to the University of Melbourne last year, reflecting her passion for travel.

Energy Crisis and Infrastructure Financing Under Global Gateways

by Aida Roy van Mierlo

Aida Roy van Mierlo is a U3 student pursuing a joint honours degree in economics and international development. She is especially interested in international security, law, and renewable energy policy making. Aside from school, she plays guitar, basketball and is on the national karate team.

MEET THE EDITORS

Editor-in-Chief

Trang Do

Trang is in her final year at McGill University, majoring in International Development Studies with a minor in Economics and Political Science. First serving as an editor in 2023, this is her second year as a member of the Chrysalis team. She is particularly interested in economic development and sustainable urbanism and hopes to continue her studies in these fields as a postgraduate.

Editorial Board

Amina Kudrati-Plummer

Amina is in their final year at McGill University, dual majoring in International Development Studies and Geography (Urban Studies). This is their first year as a member of the Chrysalis team. She is particularly interested in grassroots organizing and community development, and hopes to continue her pursuit of these interests in her future career.

Anya Husiqin Zaretsky

Majoring in International Development Studies and minoring in Environmental Sciences, Anya Zaretsky is in her final year at McGill University. She began as a peer reviewer at the McGill International Relations Review, Flux, before joining the Chrysalis editorial board in 2023. She has a broad range of interests from conflict resolution and public policy to statistical analysis and science-based solutions. After graduation, Anya hopes to pursue multiple internships and gain experience in the industry.

Aviva Futornick

Aviva (she/her) is in her final year at McGill University, pursuing an honours degree in International Development Studies with a minor in Russian Culture. This is her second year serving as an editor for Chrysalis and she is a staff writer for the McGill International Review. She is particularly interested in food sovereignty, food policy, and media. She currently works with the International Fund for Agricultural Development supporting their Canadian organizational and academic partnerships.

MEET THE EDITORS

Bassem Sandeela

Bassem is a fourth year student in the Faculty of Arts & Science. He is majoring in International Development and Biology. Bassem is also minoring in Computer Science and History. Following graduation, he is interested in pursuing law or business.

Camille Auger

Camille is in her final year at McGill University, doing an Honours in International Development Studies and a Minor in Social Entrepreneurship. This is her first year working as an editor for the Chrysalis team, and she is proud to be a part of such a great editorial board. She is very interested in women’s rights issues and is eager to continue her studies as a postgraduate student in this field in the upcoming years!

Katherine Squitieri

Katherine is in her third year, pursuing a double major in International Development Studies and Art History. This is her second year as a member of the Chrysalis editorial team. After finishing her degree, Katherine hopes to pursue her interests in historic preservation and cultural development in graduate school.

Kayla Shulman

Kayla is in her final year at McGill University, majoring in International Development Studies and Psychology, with a minor in Social Entrepreneurship. This is her first year as a member of the Chrysalis Editorial Board. She is especially interested in social determinants of health equity, especially of mental health, and hopes to continue her studies in Public Health after taking a year to work and travel after undergrad.

Layout Editor

Mia Advensky

Mia is in her final year at McGill University, majoring in Economics with a minor concentration in English Literature. This is her third and final year as the Layout Designer for Chrysalis. Thank you for an amazing 3 years Chrysalis!

Submission & Review Process

Chrysalis accepts manuscripts in either English or French from undergraduate students belonging to any faculty or major at McGill University, provided they offer original insight into topics of international development, which includes topics pertaining to Indigenous issues in Canada. Eligible manuscripts must have received a minimum grade of A- and be from a class at the 300-level or above.

Manuscripts are accepted in two rounds through November and January. After each round, the Editorial Board convenes to select manuscripts for publication. The selection process is done anonymously: all identification markers are removed from the submissions by the Editor-in-Chief, who does not have voting power during the selection process to ensure a fair and equitable selection.

Selected manuscripts are then sent to selected undergraduates who conduct official peer reviews under the guidance of faculty members. Once the peer reviews are submitted, the authors incorporate their feedback into the manuscripts before editing. Each submission is assigned to two or three editors who liaise with the author to prepare the manuscript for publication through two successive rounds of edits.

Processus de soumission des textes et de révision

Chrysalis accepte des manuscrits en anglais ou en français d’étudiant.es de premier cycle appartenant à n’importe quelle faculté ou discipline de l’Université McGill, à condition qu’ils offrent un point de vue original sur des sujets liés au développement international, y compris des sujets relatifs aux questions autochtones au Canada. Les manuscrits éligibles doivent avoir reçu une note minimale de A- et provenir d’un cours de niveau 300 ou supérieur.

Les manuscrits sont acceptés en deux séries, en novembre et en janvier. Après chaque cycle, le comité de rédaction se réunit pour sélectionner les manuscrits à publier. Le processus de sélection est anonyme : tous les marqueurs d’identification sont retirés des manuscrits par le rédacteur en chef, qui n’a pas le droit de vote pendant le processus de sélection afin de garantir une sélection juste et équitable.

Les manuscrits sélectionnés sont ensuite envoyés à des étudiant. es de premier cycle qui procèdent à des évaluations officielles par les pairs sous la direction de membres du corps enseignant. Une fois les évaluations par les pairs soumises, les auteur.rices intègrent leurs commentaires dans les manuscrits avant de les éditer. Chaque soumission est confiée à deux ou trois éditeur.rices qui travaillent en lien avec l’auteur.rice pour préparer le manuscrit à la publication par le biais de deux séries d’éditions successives.