Chrysalis Spring 2019 Issue

Spring 2019

Chrysalis Spring 2019 | Vol. XI The Undergraduate Journal of International Development Studies

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To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode

Chrysalis is annually published by the International Development Studies Students’ Association (IDSSA) of McGill University in Montreal, Canada.

To view electronic copies of the journal, visit www.idssamcgill.com/ publications.

ISSN(Print) : 1198-6123 ISSN(Web) : 2369-8624 The opinions expressed in Chrysalis are those of the authors and contributors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial board, the peer review board or McGill University.

Chrysalis recognizes that McGill University is located on the traditional land of the Kanien’keha:ka, a place that has long served as a site of meeting and exchange amongst Indigenous peoples, including the Haudenosaunee and Anishinabeg nations.

Table of Contents | Table des matières Artist Statement | Déclaration de l’artiste

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Our Team | Notre équipe

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Editor’s Note | Note de l’éditrice by Charline Côté-Lessard

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Foreword | Avant-Propos by Professor Kazue Takamura

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Disasters as Opportunities: The Disaster Capitalism Pitfalls

by Weeam Ben Rejeb

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The Victims, the Villains, the Voiceless: An Examination of the British Media’s Shifting Representations of Refugees during the 2015 Refugee Crisis by Olivia Bizot

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China and the North Korean Refugee Crisis: State Sovereignty and the Dangers of ‘Strategic Ambivalence’ by Suzanne Bonfils

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Refugee Economies, Child Labour, and the State: Turkey’s Case by Dilse Kaygisiz

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Mothers of the World: The Politics of Transnational Female Childcare Provider Immigration by Marie Lemieux

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An Analysis of UNRWA’s Policy and Practice Concerning Palestinian Refugees by Naomi Santesteban

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Making America Afraid Again: The Criminalization and Securitization of Migration in Post-9/11 America by Alanna Sereboff

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Women’s Social Movements in West Africa: What Makes a Success Story? by Emma Sitland

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The Decline of Manufacturing as a Proportion of GDP in South Africa, Contextualized and Explained by Hilliard Wolfe

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Butterfly (2004) and Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Collective Movements by Xiying Xu

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Meet the Editors | Rencontre avec les éditeurs

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Submission & Review Process | Processus de soumission de textes et de révision

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Chrysalis Vol. XI

Artist Statement | Déclaration de l’artiste My name is Evgeny Patvakanov and the art piece presented is called “In my mind”. It was inspired by a very popular concept of surrealism - colliding one setting with another; in this case, being ocean and air. Also, the whole “whale in the sky” concept is especially dreamy, as one simply does not expect to see a whale floating around as they are driving to Vermont.

Being published on the cover of The Chrysalis feels also surreal in its own way. I feel quite humbled that my artwork is the first thing people see when holding the journal.

Mon nom est Evgeny Patvakanov et mon œuvre s’intitule « In my mind ». Elle est inspirée d’un concept populaire provenant du surréalisme, jumelant deux concepts ensemble. Dans le cas de mon œuvre je l’ai fait avec l’océan et l’air. Le concept global de « whale in the sky » est particulièrement rêveur car nous ne nous attendons pas à voir une baleine dans le ciel lorsque l’on est au volant d’une auto sillonnant les routes du Vermont.

La publication de mon œuvre sur la page couverture de Chrysalis me procure un sentiment quelque peu surréel. Le fait que c’est la première chose que les gens voient en prenant le journal m’inspire de l’humilité.

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Our Team | Notre Équipe Editor-in-Chief | Éditrice-en-chef Charline Côté-Lessard Editorial Board | Comité éditorial Zofi Hasan Megan Krasnodembski Jasmine Mezghani Alice Sécheresse Raagini Singh Panwar Robin Vochelet Peer Review Board | Comité éditeur-réviseur Peer Reviewers | Éditeur-réviseur Romain Bouan Emma Cornelius Shannon Greisman Lauren Jelinek Grace Liu Dhwani Mehna Maya Reid Max Shapiro Sophie Wirzba Tamara Yang Translators | Traducteurs Alice Sécheresse Robin Vochelet Charline Côté-Lessard

Layout Editors | Éditrices de mise en page Charline Côté-Lessard Ye Ji Kim Cover Artwork | Couverture Evgeny Patvakanov

Mentors | Mentors Dr. Manuel Bálan Dr. Daniel Douek Dr. Yann le Polain de Waroux Dr. Oliver T. Coomes Dr. Manuel Bálan Dr. Diana Keown Allan Dr. Khalid Medani Dr. Khalid Medani Dr. Paola Perez-Aleman Dr. Erik Martinez Kuhonta

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Editor’s Note Dear readers, During the 2018-2019 academic school year, issues of migration and refugees have dominated the global political climate. From the election of François Legault in Québec to Donald Trump’s commitment to building the US-Mexico border wall, it is an undeniably scary moment for migrants and refugees. The severity of the situation has been reflected in the majority of our articles tackling this very issue. In addition, the 2019 Spring Edition of Chrysalis takes on topics such as women’s movements, pro-democracy movements, economic development, and disaster relief. These articles provide insight to some of the most pressing issues of our time, and demonstrate the will this generation has to find solutions. Through the years, every edition of Chrysalis seeks to provide a space for students to share their research in the field of international development. As this marks the eleventh edition of Chrysalis, I am pleased to say that our journal contains more content and addresses a wider range of topics and regions across the globe than ever before.

I want to take this opportunity to formally thank everyone who has made this journal possible. Firstly, I would like to thank the editorial board and our layout editor for their impressive and continuous work throughout the year - without whom this journal would not have been possible. To my translators, I thank you for your help in making this year’s edition of Chrysalis more accessible to our French community at McGill. I would like to also thank the peer reviewers and the mentors, whose insights have been instrumental in the editing process. To all of the authors, I want to reiterate how incredible and unique your articles are. I also want to thank you for your cooperation and your dedicated work throughout the semester. Lastly, I want to thank the IDSSA for being the most supportive and amazing team of strong women I know, and for the huge role they played in enabling the realization of this project. It has been a true honour and privilege to serve as the Editor-in-chief of Chrysalis.

Kind regards, Charline Côté-Lessard, Editor-in-Chief

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Lettre de l’Éditrice Chers lecteurs, Au cours de l’année académique 2018-2019, les polémiques portant sur l’immigration et les réfugiés ont dominé le climat politique mondial. De l’élection de François Legault au Québec à l’engagement de Donald Trump de construire le mur à la frontière Américaine et Mexicaine, nous vivons dans une ère d’incertitude pour les immigrants et réfugiés. L’ampleur de la situation se reflète dans le nombre d’article portant à ce sujet dans notre édition. De plus, l’édition 2019 de Chrysalis aborde des sujets tels que les mouvements des femmes, les mouvements pro-démocratie, le développement économique, et le secours aux sinistrés suite à des catastrophes. Ces articles nous démontrent la détermination de notre génération à trouver des solutions. À chaque année, Chrysalis a pour but d’offrir l’opportunité aux étudiants de partager leur recherche portant sur le développement international. Cette édition marque la onzième édition de Chrysalis, et j’ai le plaisir d’annoncer que nous avons plus de sujets et régions dans nos articles qu’auparavant.

Je voudrais également remercier tous les individus qui ont fait partie de la réalisation de ce journal. Premièrement, le comité éditorial et l’éditrice de mise en page pour leur travail acharné tout au long de l’année, et sans qui ce journal n’aurais pas été possible, en second, mes traducteurs, pour votre aide afin d’assurer un contenu plus accessible auprès de notre communauté francophone à McGill, troisièmement, les éditeurs-réviseurs ainsi que les mentors pour vos commentaires qui votre rôle crucial lors du processus de révision. À tous les auteurs, je veux vous féliciter pour la qualité de vos articles. Je tiens à vous remercier pour votre coopération et votre travail soutenus au cours du trimestre. Finalement, je souhaite exprimer ma gratitude à l’IDSSA pour avoir été une source de support constant au cours de l’année. Ce fut un énorme plaisir et privilège d’avoir assumé le rôle d’Éditrice-en-chef de Chrysalis.

Cordialement, Charline Côté-Lessard, Éditrice-en-chef

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Foreword It is with great pleasure that I contribute some words to Chrysalis’ Spring 2019 Edition. Chrysalis is a student initiative organized by the McGill International Development Studies Students Association.

It serves as a thoughtful and inspiring platform for undergraduate students who seek to genuinely engage with development questions and problems beyond the classroom. As many of us witness, the field of international development is increasingly contested and debated. This contestation is largely rooted in the discrepancies between theory and actual development outcomes. The presence of such gaps is especially concerning as it masks the inherent heterogeneity of vulnerability and marginality on the ground.

The current issue embraces ten compelling papers that indicate the depth and the diversity of the contested field of international development. The topics include forced displacement, immigration policies, female labor migration, civil society, women’s movements, sexuality, media representation, disaster response, and economic policy. The contributors’ insightful and analytical papers will surely spark meaningful dialogue. Finally, I would like to congratulate the editor and the contributors for this successful Spring Edition!

Kazue Takamura Faculty Lecturer Institute for the Study of International Development McGill University

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Avant-Propos C’est avec un plaisir immense que je m’inscris avec ces quelques mots pour la parution du printemps 2019 de The Chrysalis. Le journal The Chrysalis est une initiative de l’association des étudiants du programme de développement international de l’Université McGill.

Le journal est un outil qui stimule la réflexion et sert d’inspiration pour les étudiants du premier cycle qui sont à la recherche d’un engagement véritable de par les questions et les problèmes de développement international auxquels ils sont confrontés. Ce journal leur permet d’approfondir ce que leur cheminement académique classique d’acquérir comme connaissance. Comme plusieurs peuvent le constater le champ du développement international est un lieu particulièrement propice aux débats et aux contestations de toutes parts. Elles proviennent principalement de l’écart entre la théorie et l’action sur le terrain. Cet écart masque l’hétérogénéité inhérente de la marginalité et de la vulnérabilité de ces interventions qui sont faites sur le terrain.

La présente édition contient dix analyses différentes qui nous indiquent la profondeur et la diversité de l’ampleur de ces contestations du développement international. Dans cette édition les sujets abordés traitent des déplacements forcés de population, des politiques d’immigration ou migratoires, des migrations de la main d’œuvre féminine, des sociétés civiles, des mouvements féministes, de la sexualité, de la représentativité des médias, des réponses aux différents désastres et des politiques économiques. Ces articles perspicaces et analytiques vont certainement alimentés de façon significative le dialogue sur ces différentes dimensions du développement international. Je voudrais féliciter l’éditeur ainsi que les auteurs des articles pour cette édition printanière très réussie.

Kazue Takamura Faculty Lecturer Institute for the Study of International Development McGill University

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Disasters as Opportunities: The Disaster Capitalism Pitfall

By Weeam Ben Rejeb

Ben Rejeb

15 Abstract

Abstrait

This paper aims to shed light on how disaster capitalism uses disaster recovery as a profit-generating enterprise, and that this phenomenon exacerbates vulnerabilities and risks for affected communities, leading to potential future disasters. The above is exemplified through cases drawn from both the 2005 Hurricane Katrina and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. This allows to establish a generalized association between disaster recovery and harmful profit-generating behaviours in both the developed and the developing world. The paper is divided into three sub-sections: 1) establishing the mechanisms behind disaster capitalism and its use in disaster recovery; 2) examining how this process is harmful to affected communities and whose interests are served by this recovery model; and 3) undertaking a holistic approach to understand how disaster capitalism processes perpetuate inequalities and reproduce risks that can lead to more destructive future disasters.

Cet article a pour but d’illustrer la manière dont le capitalisme du désastre fait usage du disaster recovery en tant qu’entreprise générant des profits, et que ce phénomène exacerbe la vulnérabilité et les risques pour les communautés touchées, menant ainsi à de potentiels futurs désastres. Le concept mentionné ci-haut est exemplifié à travers les cas de l’Ouragan Katrina en 2005 et du Tsunami de l’Océan Indien en 2004. Cela permet d’établir une association généralisée entre le rétablissement suite à un désastre et les comportements nocifs générateurs de profits, et ce, à la fois pour le monde développé et en voie-de-développement. Cet article est divisé en trois sous-sections : 1) soulever les mécanismes derrière le capitalisme du désastre ainsi que son usage durant le disaster recovery ; 2) examiner la façon dont ce processus est nocif aux communautés affectées ainsi que l’identité de ceux dont les intérêts sont servis à travers ce modèle de rétablissement ; et 3) adopter une approche holistique afin de comprendre comment le processus du capitalisme du désastre perpétue les inégalités déjà présentes et reproduit les risques existants qui peuvent ensuite mener à d’autres désastres destructifs dans le futur.

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16 Introduction The alleged father of neoliberalism, Milton Friedman, said “only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change”.1 The Chicago School of Economics has produced some of the most influential economists of the modern era which have a continued substantial impact on development policies today. This essay does not attempt to denounce or resist neoliberalism and global capitalism. Instead, it attempts to understand how and why Friedman’s idea of ‘crisis producing change’ has long-term negative repercussions for those most in need. The crisis in question has been exemplified in various cases: the military coup in Chile in the 1970s, the war in Iraq in 2003, and the Hurricane Katrina disaster in 2005. All of these events were followed by total or partial adoption of neoliberal tenets in what Naomi Klein, a renowned political analyst, describes as “shock therapy”.2 In other words, “orchestrated raid on the public sphere in the wake of catastrophic events, combined with the treatment of disasters as exciting market opportunities”.3

The ways in which new social and economic ideals can be imposed following wars and military coups is straightforward. What is more complex is understanding how a similar recipe can be followed in the aftermath of natural hazard-induced disasters. How does this process take place and what are the effects? This paper will argue that disaster capitalism uses disaster recovery as a profit-generating enterprise and that this phenomenon exacerbates vulnerabilities and risks for affected communities, leading to potential future disasters. The paper will first lay the foundation of the argument by exploring the mechanisms behind disaster capitalism and its use in disaster recovery. Then, it will examine why this enterprise is harmful to affected communities and whose interests are served by this recovery model.

Finally, a more holistic approach will be undertaken to understand how this disaster capitalism process perpetuates inequalities and reproduces risks that can lead to more destructive future disasters.

For the purposes of this short paper, examples will be drawn from the 2005 Hurricane Katrina and the

1 Naomi Klein, The shock doctrine : The rise of disaster capitalism, (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2009).

2 Klein, The shock doctrine.

3 Klein, The shock doctrine, 6.

Ben Rejeb 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.

The Disaster Recovery Enterprise Disaster capitalism is entrenched in disaster recovery processes and can be observed in various cases.

Although disaster risk reduction has moved beyond recovery and response towards preparedness and prevention, focusing on the ‘recovery and response’ is important as disasters continue to affect millions of people every year. Response and recovery “encompasses a range of measures aimed at protecting life and property and coping with the social disruption that disasters produce”.4 Whereas disaster recovery processes have existed for centuries, what is new today is “market-driven governance” whereby markets and firms are providing services previously provided by the state.5 This new form of governance is at the forefront of disaster recovery and response and aims to generate profit. The

17 underlying premise is that private firms can provide the adequate services for victims of disasters more efficiently. In other words, private firms become the intermediaries between government funds and disaster victims. This has been extensively documented in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina wherein private companies delivered virtually everything from water and critical supplies, to trailers and infrastructure by companies like Walmart, Home Depot, and Shaw.6 Ironically, this new market emerged not only as a way of pushing neoliberal principles, but to counter the problems inherent in those same principles. A key concern with neoliberalism amongst consumers was its lack of accountability. In response, the concept of ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) emerged. Suitably, private firms have merged interventions in disasters to the concept of CSR, creating a reality whereby businesses can continue making a profit

4 National Research Council, Facing Hazards and Disasters: Understanding Human Dimensions, (National Academies Press, 2006), 125.

5 Vincanne Adams, Markets of Sorrow, Labors of Faith: New Orleans in the Wake of Katrina, (Duke University Press, 2013).

6 Kevin Gotham, “Disaster, Inc.: Privatization and Post-Katrina Rebuilding in New Orleans,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 3(2012): 633-646.

18 under the guise of ‘corporate social responsibility’.7 For instance, Pfizer and Coca-Cola donated over $65 million in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami.8 We even see explicit arrangements between the humanitarian industry and various corporations – Pfizer and UNICEF, UPS and CARE, and Coca Cola and the UN development program.9 Correspondingly, a study found that there is a positive correlation between market reaction and announcements for corporate charitable contributions.10

Chrysalis Vol. XI ment to capitalize on poor people’s livelihoods in the name of ‘development’. In particular, the government established ‘buffer zones’ in coastal areas preventing people to return to their homes under pretexts of safety and ‘resilience policies’.12 In reality, it privatized the coastal areas as survivors fled the tsunami, and allowed for an expansion of the tourism industry on the Sri Lankan coast.13 Put bluntly, the “storm did such effective job of clearing the beach, a process of displacement and gentrification that would normally unfold over years took place in a matter of days or weeks”.14 In short, the government’s version of ‘build back better’ stripped poor people off their livelihoods and replaced it with a private profit-making tourism project.

Similarly, we see the same idea of private companies working for ‘the public good’ in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in Sri Lanka.

Notably, the Sri Lankan president explicitly delegated rehabilitation to powerful business executives.11 Not only that, the disaster provid- Nevertheless, the Sri Lankan goved the opportunity for the govern- ernment is not the main culprit 7 April Porteria, “Making Money Out of People’s Misery: Has Disaster Capitalism Taken Over Post-Haiyan Philippines?,” Philippines Sociological Review 63 (2015): 179206.

8 Stacey White, Corporate Engagements in Natural Disaster Response: Piecing together the Value Chain, (CSIS, 2012).

9 White, Corporate Engagements in Natural Disaster Response.

10 Dennis Patten, “Does the Market Value Corporate Philanthropy? Evidence from the Response to the 2004 Tsunami Relief Effort,” Journal of Business Ethics 81,no. 3 (2008): 599-607.

11 Klein, The shock doctrine.

12 Porteria, “Making Money Out of People’s Misery.”

13 Porteria, “Making Money Out of People’s Misery.”

14 Klein, The shock doctrine.

Ben Rejeb in this enterprise. Instead, the aid industry itself plays a key role in pushing for this disaster capitalism.

The ‘neoliberalization of aid’ is at the center of the disaster recovery enterprise and is straightforward: privatization, structural adjustments, and foreign investments are prerequisites for receiving aid.15 In other words, countries must adopt neoliberal policies and privatize their disaster response to be eligible for aid. This creates a situation where developing countries in particular, like Sri Lanka, veto social services and public institutions for the privatization and corporatization of public services into private profit-making entities.16

19 Vested Interests and Top-Down Approach

The disaster capitalism enterprise is harmful to affected communities because of a lack of accountability and operational framework. The enterprise is inherently flawed as private companies cannot be held accountable and often have no real interests in serving the communities affected.17 Private firms lack any incentive to truly ‘build back better’; most of these firms are contracted and receive funds regardless of the results. In fact, many claims of corruption and collusion surfaced in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. For example, the Federal Emergency ManageOverall, it is clear that disaster re- ment Agency is estimated to have covery has become a fully-func- profited from a total $30 million tioning profit-generating enter- in fraudulent payments.18 Fraud prise; both in direct recovery aid as and corruption permeated many seen in New Orleans or long-term bureaucratic levels; New Orleans plans as seen in Sri Lanka with the mayor Ray Nagin was sentenced to ten years in prison for corruption expanding tourism industry. and bribery in the aftermath of the

15 Jennifer Hyndman, “Acts of Aid: Neoliberalism in a War Zone,” Antipode 41, no. 5 (2009): 867-889.

16 Hyndman, “Acts of Aid” 17 Adams, Markets of Sorrow, Labors of Faith.

18 Vincanne Adams, Taslim van Hattum, and Diana English, “Chronic Disaster Syndrome: Displacement, Disaster Capitalism, and the Eviction of the Poor from New Orleans,” American Anthropological Association 36, no. 4 (2009): 615-636.

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hurricane.19 The New York Times claimed that Hurricane Katrina “produced one of the most extraordinary displays of scams, schemes and stupefying bureaucratic bungles in modern history”.20

World Bank has been at the forefront of the push towards privatization and corporatization following various disasters. This has been documented in various cases, such as in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami where the organiFurthermore, there are no binding sation was heavily involved in the international frameworks to regu- push for the expansion of the tourlate the private sector’s implication ism industry and suggested privatin disaster recovery.21 Although izing roads and schools.23 private-public sector collaboration is mentioned, and encouraged, in Most importantly, the disaster capframeworks such as the Sendai italism enterprise has not shown Framework; there are no rules and positive results and discourses regulations to oversee the part- of ‘failed recovery’ are common. nership. This adheres to the lais- Once again, failures recorded in sez-faire economic concept in di- the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina saster capitalism. Consequently, have been directly caused by this the problem of accountability is approach. The response in New inherent to the disaster capitalism Orleans has been coined by some apparatus. The lack of regulation is as a ‘chronic disaster syndrome’ obscured by the fact that post-di- wherein the recovery and response saster reconstruction is very lucra- process further perpetuated the tive. Indeed, 20-25% of the World ongoing state of ‘disaster’.24 FreBank’s total loans are towards quently, victims recounted that post-conflict countries – an 800% there was ‘no progress’ being increase from 1980.22 In fact, the made despite enormous amounts 19 Sarah Westwood, “10 years later, extent of Katrina fraud still unknown,” Washington Examiner, August 28, 2015, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/10-years-later-extent-of-katrina-fraud-still-unknown.

20 Westwood, “10 years later.”

21 Westwood, “10 years later.”

22 Stan Weeber, “Leveraged Responses to Neo-Liberal Policies on Disaster Reconstruction: Observations from Haiti, the United States, and The Indian Ocean Region,” International Review of Modern Sociology 37, no. 2 (2011), 190.

23 Weeber, “Leveraged Responses,” 190.

24 Adams, Hattum, and English, “Chronic Disaster Syndrome.”

Ben Rejeb of money provided by the government. The rebuilding process was experiencing ongoing failures. For instance, FEMA provided trailers for families which were meant to be temporary, though an estimated 18 000 families continued to live in the trailers four years after the hurricane.25 These trailers presented remoteness issues and health problems; for instance, there were toxic levels of formaldehyde found in many trailers examined.26 An enormous amount of money was made available by the US government for recovery – estimates varied from 17 billion, 11.5 billion, and 109 billion – and three years later, neighbourhoods were nowhere near recovered.27 Overall, there were clear discrepancies between funding and results.

Another problem with the disaster capitalism at play lies in the excessive profitability of the enterprise for private companies, at the expense of disaster victims. Private actors benefit from this approach as resources provided for disaster

21 relief by governments or aid agencies are often diluted because of the ‘contractor approach’. The government provides a number of funds to an organization like FEMA which then contracts private companies that will sub-contract other private companies creating a sequence of contractor profit (estimated between 10-15%).28 This inevitably reduces the quality and quantity of services and products provided to disaster-victims.29 Although subcontracting is generally forbidden, the practice was observed in New Orleans, Sri Lanka, Aceh, and others.30 In Aceh, it was estimated that the total damage bill was $4.5 billion and was extraordinarily offset by $8 billion provided, creating almost a 200% surplus. Yet, many victims were still left homeless due to coordination problems with aid agencies and local actors, but also contracting profits which significantly diluted funds allocated to the disaster.31 Privatization in ‘disaster capitalism’ creates a situation where quality and quantity of aid is weakened and where the

25 Adams, Hattum, and English, “Chronic Disaster Syndrome.”

26 Adams, Hattum, and English, “Chronic Disaster Syndrome.”

27 Adams, Hattum, and English, “Chronic Disaster Syndrome.”

28 Stephan Kitzbichler, “Built back better? Housing reconstruction after the Tsunami disaster of 2004 in Aceh,” Asian Journal of Social Science 39, no. 4 (2011): 534-552.

29 Kitzbichler, “Built back better?”

30 Kitzbichler, “Built back better?”

31 Kitzbichler, “Built back better?”

22 interests of private firms are above those struck by the disaster; it addresses victims as customers rather than victims, and obscures liability and accountability.32 The Perpetuation of Vulnerabilities and the Disaster-Making Apparatus Disasters are not natural; although they can be triggered by natural events – such as a hurricane or a tsunami – they are shaped by social, economic, and political conditions.33 Many factors such as poverty, population density, poor infrastructure, and lack of local markets can all lay the groundwork for massive destruction as observed in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and in the fourteen countries affected by the Indian Ocean Tsunami. The exact mechanisms under which each disaster occurred are beyond the scope of this paper. However, I want to advance that the dynamics at play in the privatization of disaster recovery as explained above, create and reproduce vulnerabilities and risks

Chrysalis Vol. XI that make future disasters more likely. It is important to note that although natural hazards, such as earthquakes or tsunamis, can occur outside of human-scope, it is the infrastructure, the access to information, proper urban planning, individuals’ socioeconomic capabilities, and overall resilience that can prevent a hazard to trigger a disaster. A recent study conducted in Sri Lanka indeed confirms a positive relationship between disaster damage, poverty, and vulnerability.34 The disaster response and recovery is crucial in reducing risks and preventing future disasters. However, with the privatization of disaster recovery and the disaster capitalism enterprise, ‘build back better’ has become ‘build back faster’ and ‘build back cheaper’. A clear example of this is manifested in Aceh, a province in Indonesia struck by the Indian Ocean Tsunami. The reconstruction project in Aceh had received a great amount of financial resources and high-level planning. As previously mentioned, the aid provided outweighed the damage bill by almost 200%; yet, the

32 Gotham, “Disaster, Inc.” 33 Ben Wisner, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis, “At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters,” (London: Routledge,2003).

34 M.M.G.T. De Silva, and Akiyuki Kawasaki, “Socioeconomic Vulnerability to Disaster Risk: A Case Study of Flood and Drought Impact in a Rural Sri Lankan Community,” Ecological Economy 152, (2018): 131-140.

Ben Rejeb

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reconstruction process was stained Sadly, this means that those living with poor coordination and grave in the new ‘modern’ houses might disparities.35 be at increased risk when another tsunami hits the coast.

For instance, some areas were over-supplied (with unused de- Another key vulnerability exploitcaying houses), whilst others were ed in the aftermath of a disaster gravely under-supplied. More- and perpetuated by disaster capover, the reconstruction planning italism is poverty. In Sri Lanka, ignored cultural designs meant to the tsunami gave the opportunity offset flooding and tsunami dam- for the government and the Asian ages (such as raising the floors and Development Bank to capitalize using flexible materials), instead, on a fundamental resource: water. it decided to ‘modernize’ Aceh by The Development Bank agreed to building more ‘advanced hous- fund the restoration of the water es’. These new ‘advanced’ houses infrastructure under the condition were made of concrete and did not that water be privatized and open respond to the cultural or physical to the private market.38 Accordingneeds of the victims; a one size fits ly, the $150 million project was all approach was used and hous- passed and about 1.2 million famies were literally standardized for lies in Sri Lanka are now possibly size, not taking into account fam- water-insecure.39 The inadequacy ily size.36 The houses were built in the response and recovery in Sri quickly and designed to be attrac- Lanka has been extensively docutive to Western donors; commu- mented; the privatization of recovnity engagement was completely ery, the push for generating profit, overlooked.37 Privatization often and the lack of community engagedisenfranchises people from tak- ment are all part of this harmful ening recovery into their own hands. terprise. Many even claim that the

35 Kitzbichler, “Built back better?”

36 Kitzbichler, “Built back better?”

37 Kitzbichler, “Built back better?”

38 Sarath Fernando, Another Disaster! Sri Lankan Government Using Tsunami to Privatize Water, (Oakland Institute, n.d.).

39 Fernando, Another Disaster!

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recovery was so incompetent, that crease in renting price.44 The onit caused the return to war.40 going displacement put a strain on many people’s’ lives and left them Poverty has also been exploited in exposed to homelessness, poverthe aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. ty, and without security. In other In Weeber’s words: “the receding words, the recovery was stained by flood waters in post-Katrina New private actors’ interests and beneOrleans exposed structural pover- fited only some members of socity and inequity deeply tied to race ety, leaving others at greater risk and class”.41 Indeed, those most of displacement and loss when the affected by the disaster were also next hurricane hits. those most marginalized, not by accident, but by design.42 Most imConclusion portantly for this discussion however, is how the recovery process The aftermath of a disaster often not only disadvantaged margin- brings optimistic discourse realized communities, but exposed garding ‘building back better’ and them to more risks and exploited launching development and growth their vulnerabilities. For instance, – an opportunity. What is observed the return-rate was higher in pre- however is that this opportunity dominantly White middle and often benefits powerful actors and upper-class neighborhoods than leaves disaster-victims at greatit was in lower-class Black neigh- er risk. The disaster recovery and borhoods like the Lower Ninth response enterprise is not harmful Ward; there, the return rate was because it allows for companies to only 11%.43 Furthermore, 80% of get richer, it is harmful because it those who had occupied afford- recreates vulnerabilities and risks able housing were left with no which can lead to more destruchomes; of those who were able to tive future disasters. Although it is return, they experienced a 46% in-

40 Peter Beaumont, Ben Doherty, Randeep Ramesh, and Dan Chung, “After the 2004 tsunami: rebuilding lives, salvaging communities,” The Guardian, December 23, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/23/2004-tsunami-five-years-on.

41 Weeber, “Leveraged Responses.”

42 D’Ann Penner, and Keith Ferdinand, Overcoming katrina : African american voices from the crescent city and beyond, (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

43 Adams, Hattum, and English, “Chronic Disaster Syndrome.”

44 Adams, Hattum, and English, “Chronic Disaster Syndrome,” 616.

Ben Rejeb important not to use a totalitarian approach and acknowledge that survivors are often those at the forefront of recovery and response; the privatization enterprise is too significant to ignore. The private sector could indeed have a positive role to play in disaster recovery, however, it cannot be under the mercy of laissez-faire economics which would inevitably harm disaster victims as observed in New Orleans, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia.

A multi-stakeholder approach could be ideal in disaster recovery whereby the government, the private sector, and most importantly the community are collaborating to serve the needs of disaster victims.

Disaster victims are survivors, but also agents for change, and must be in full-consultation in the disaster recovery process. We must not simply give lip-service to ‘community engagement’, but include community engagement at every level of decision-making. I suggest that governments collaborate with the private sector, maintaining full oversight, under the direction and leadership of affected communities.

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26 Bibliography

Adams, Vincanne. 2013. Markets of Sorrow, Labors of Faith : New Orleans in the Wake of Katrina. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Adams, Vincanne, Taslim van Hattum, and Diana English. 2009. “Chronic Disaster Syndrome: Displacement, Disaster Capitalism, and the Eviction of the Poor from New Orleans.” American Ethnologist36 (4): 615–36.

Beaumont, Peter, Ben Doherty, Randeep Ramesh, and Dan Chung. 2009. “After the 2004 Tsunami: Rebuilding Lives, Salvaging Communities.” The Guardian, December 23, 2009, sec. World news. https://www. theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/23/2004-tsunami-five-years-on.

Council, N.R., D.E.L. Studies, and C.D.R.S.S.F.C. Opportunities. 2006. Facing Hazards and Disasters: Understanding Human Dimensions. National Academies Press. https://books.google.ca/books?id=8gCcAgAAQBAJ. De Silva, M. M. G. T., and Akiyuki Kawasaki. 2018. “Socioeconomic Vulnerability to Disaster Risk: A Case Study of Flood and Drought Impact in a Rural Sri Lankan Community.” Ecological Economics152 (October): 131–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.05.010.

Fernando, Sarath. n.d. “Another Disaster! Sri Lankan Government Using Tsunami to Privatize Water.”

Movement for National Land and Agricultural Reform. n.d. https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/another-disaster-sri-lankan-government-using-tsunami-privatize-water-1.

Gotham, Kevin Fox. 2012. “Disaster, Inc.: Privatization and Post-Katrina Rebuilding in New Orleans.”

Perspectives on Politics10 (3): 633–46.

Hyndman, Jennifer. 2009. “Acts of Aid: Neoliberalism in a War Zone.” Antipode41 (5): 867–89. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2009.00700.x.

Kitzbichler, Stephan. 2011. “Built Back Better? Housing Reconstruction after the Tsunami Disaster of 2004 in Aceh.” Asian Journal of Social Science39 (4): 534–52.

Klein, Naomi. 2009. The Shock Doctrine : The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. 1 online resource vols. Toronto: Vintage Canada. https://www.overdrive.com/search?q=B48B8C20-3A1F-4DE5-B95B-26B1858C810A. Patten, Dennis M. 2008. “Does the Market Value Corporate Philanthropy? Evidence from the Response to the 2004 Tsunami Relief Effort.” Journal of Business Ethics81 (3): 599–607.

Penner, D’Ann., and Keith C. Ferdinand. 2009. Overcoming Katrina : African American Voices from the Crescent City and Beyond. 1st ed. Palgrave Studies in Oral History. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0838/2008035089-t.html.

Porteria, APRIL. 2015. “Making Money Out of People’s Misery: Has Disaster Capitalism Taken Over Post-Haiyan Philippines?” Philippine Sociological Review63: 179–206.

Weeber, Stan C. 2011. “LEVERAGED RESPONSES TO NEO-LIBERAL POLICIES ON DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION: Observations from Haiti, the United States, and The Indian Ocean Region.” International Review of Modern Sociology37 (2): 185–203.

Westwood, Sarah. 2015. “10 Years Later, Extent of Katrina Fraud Still Unknown.” Washington Examiner.

August 28, 2015. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/10-years-later-extent-of-katrina-fraud-still-unknown.

Ben Rejeb White, Stacey. 2012. “Corporate Engagement in Natural Disaster Response: Piecing Together the Value Chain,” 38.

Wisner, Ben., Piers. Blaikie, Terry. Cannon, and Ian. Davis. 2003. At Risk : Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters.2nd ed. London: Routledge. http://www.kcl.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord. aspx?p=182221.

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The Victims, the Villains, the Voiceless: An examination of the British media’s shifting representations of refugees during the 2015 Refugee Crisis

By Olivia Bizot

Bizot

29 Abstract

Abstrait

This paper is concerned with the British media’s portrayal of refugees during the 2015 refugee crisis.

In particular, it explores how media representations were conducted in a top-down manner that locked representations within two dehumanizing categories: that of the evil “other” of the victim “other”. A chronological analysis of refugee depictions throughout the 2015 crisis is provided, as British media oscillated between (a) an initial period of uncertainty, to (b) one of victimization instigated by the circulation of photos revealing Alan Kurdi’s dead body in September 2015 and finally to (c) a phase of securization following the November Paris Attacks. This paper concludes that these representations, erratically shifting from victim to villain, are inadequate, as they failed to take into account the diversity of refugees’ unique stories, voices, names and experiences. Hope for change may be found in new forms of media and communication technologies (such as blogs, YouTube and social media), that are increasingly being used by refugees to resist these dehumanizing depictions and to create powerful spaces of self-representation.

Cette analyse porte sur la représentation des réfugiés par les médias britanniques, en 2015, lors de la crise des réfugiés. Elle explore en particulier la manière déshumanisante dont ces représentations ont été menées, ce qui a véritablement réduit les réfugiés en deux catégories distincts : celle de « l’autre » dangereux ou de « l’autre » victime. Une analyse chronologique des représentations à travers la crise de 2015 est fournie, qui oscille entre (a) une période initiale d’incertitude, suivie par (b) une période de victimisation suscité par la circulation de la photo qui révèle le corps mort de Alan Kurdi en septembre 2015 et enfin par (c) une phase de titrisation après les attaques de Paris en novembre. Cet essai conclut que ces représentations, passant de victime à bandit de manière erratique, sont inadéquates, car elles ne tiennent pas compte de la diversité des histoires, des voix, des expériences et des récits uniques des réfugiés.

L’espoir d’un changement peut être trouvé dans les nouvelles formes des médias et de technologies de communications (tels que les blogs, YouTube et les médias sociaux), qui sont de plus en plus utilisées par les réfugiés pour résister à ces représentations déshumanisantes et pour créer des espaces d’auto-représentations puissantes.

Chrysalis Vol. XI

30 Introduction The phenomenon of refugees entering Europe is certainly not a recent one. However, the number of refugees that arrived on the continent in 2015 increased dramatically, as more than one million people fled war and poverty with a significant proportion arriving from Syria.1 The term “refugee” was defined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as:

“A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”.2 This essay will address the issue of the British media’s representations of refugees arriving in Europe. It will argue that the British news coverage of the 2015 European Refugee Crisis effectively reduced refugees either to pieces of a collective national threat, or to individual victims, both of which ultimately

prevented refugees’ voices from being heard. To illustrate its main argument, this paper will first briefly introduce the media’s role in the international refugee regime. It will then unpack British representations of refugees as victims and threats, which is effected through the use of three distinct phases: uncertainty, victimization, and securitization. The paper will conclude with a suggestion for how this harmful othering can be dismantled by giving refugees the power to control their own narratives.

The Media’s Role in the International Refugee Regime In this essay, “media” is understood as the main means of mass communication. The British media landscape is characterized by a strongly partisan and commercial national press, including more left wing publications such as the Guardian and more right wing publications such as the Telegraph, as well as a system of public service broadcasting led by the BBC, which is characterized by a strong tradition of political neutrality. Despite these differences in political orientation, left and right wing newspapers ul-

1 ”United Nations High Commission for Refugees, “Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,” https://www.unhcr.org/.

2 “Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.”

Bizot timately failed to voice the unique nature of refugee experiences and instead predominantly recounted them from a top-down perspective.

The first part of this essay will focus specifically on British press’s representations of refugees, before briefly exploring new media tools (blogs, YouTube, social media), that are increasingly being used by refugees as spaces of self-representation, in the final part of this paper.

The media plays a crucial role in informing citizens on what is going on in the world and in their respective countries. When the unprecedentedly large numbers of refugees first started to reach European borders in 2015, many British citizens depended exclusively on media narratives in order to understand what was happening. However, in order to attract mass audiences, news agencies not only introduce facts, but also offer angles on how to interpret them by emphasising

31 certain aspects of a story at the expense of others.3 As such, news media editors and writers have the power to choose which voices to empower, and which to silence.4 Chong and Druckman argue that media doesn’t merely reflect a universal reality, but instead constructs it in asymmetrical power relationships through the process of “framing”.5 Framing is best defined

by Goffman as creating the desired meaning to a speech or an action by “rending what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect to the scene into something that is meaningful, allowing its use to locate, perceive, identify and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms”.6 News outlets therefore play an essential role in the refugee regime, as they have the power to control “whether and how we respond to the suffering of others, how we formulate moral criticisms and how we articulate political analyses”.7

3 Helene Joffe and Georgian Haarhooff, “Representations of far-flung illnesses: The case of Ebola in Britain,” Social Science & Medicine 54, no. 6 (2002), 956.

4 Kjersti Thornbjornsrud and Tine Ustad Figenschou, “Do Marginalized Sources Matter?,” Journalism Studies 17, no. 3 (2014): 337-355.

5 Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, “Framing Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 10, (2007): 103-126.

6 Kim Woochul, “Boundary Work between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ Global News Agencies’ Double Standard on the Construction of Forced Migrants by Geographical Proximity,” (2015).

7 Lilie Chouliaraki, and Tijana Stolic, “Rethinking media responsibility in the refugee ‘crisis’: A visual typology of European news,” (2017), 6.

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has different connotations, that place them in one category or anPhase 1: Uncertainty, Should we other.8 Indeed, as Zetter states, “the help or should we fear? refugee label is no longer a right but a prized status”, while the “laThe first phase of the Refugee Cri- bel ‘asylum seeker’ (…) is demarsis was characterized by a period cated by the wholesale withdrawal of much uncertainty and debate or reduction of established rights”.9 among citizens, politicians and journalists alike. British media Whether media outlets labelled presented citizens with alternating forced migrants as “refugees” or views depending on the news out- “migrants”, a common characlets’ political stance, categorising terization among these two reprefugees as either ‘victims’ or ‘vil- resentations is the creation of the lains’. More left-wing publications foreign “other”. The history of such as the Guardian employed “othering” within European histohumanitarian depictions of “ref- ry is a lengthy one and relates to ugees” that were “genuine”, “de- the concept of “Fortress Europe”, a serving” and “bona fide”, where- notion that suggests that Europe’s as right wing publications, such rigid borders could successfully as The Telegraph and The Daily sustain an impenetrable “white” Mail, used terms such as “bogus”, Europe.10 The rising numbers of “fake”, “immigrants” and “asylum refugees that pierce this fortress seekers”. This polarization in the challenge the European notion of media reinforced the categoriza- homogeneity. Race is thus deeply tion of refugees within the groups rooted in the construction of the of villain or victim. Further, the “other”, who becomes excluded terminology that particular media and fetishized under asymmetrical outlets used to refer to forced mi- power relations.11 This is evident grants is significant, as each term when comparing the predominant-

8 Simon Goodman, Ala Sirriyeh & Simon McMahon, “The evolving (re)categorisations of refugees throughout the “refugee/migrant crisis””, Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 27, no. 2 (2017), 106.

9 Roger Zetter, “More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization,” Journal of Refugee Studies 20, no. 2 (2007), 181.

10 Nicoletta Enria, “Representation of refugees through moral panics: ‘Paris attacks’ and ‘Aylan Kurdi’ in the Italian press,” (2015), 11.

11 Stuart Hall, Jessica Evans, and Sean Nixon, Representation, (1997), 257.

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33

ly negative representations of Syrian refugees, for example, with the media’s heavily positive response to Albanian immigration on the grounds that the latter were Europeans.12 Edward Said coined the term “Orientalism” in 1979, which distinguishes a collective “us”— Europeans—against all “those” non-Europeans.13 This polarization successfully propagates a “western projection of the other for the mere purpose of identifying the self as superior, unified and unassailable”.14 Therefore, the creation of the “other” has a long history in Europe, and is essential in the continent’s sense of identity and supposed superiority.

ing on certain elements in particular stories.15 One of the ways in which British media constructed this “other”, especially during the first phase of the Refugee Crisis, was through their portrayal of the refugees as a single collective. This may be observed through the media’s rhetoric, which referred to the arrival of the refugees as a “flood”, “deluge”, “tide”, or “swamp”.16 The press photographs that accompanied this language often used spatial distance and expressionless faces to frame immigrants as “other”.17 Furthermore, there was a strong emphasis on the number of refugees arriving in the UK, with an effort to depict them as a “mute and faceless physical mass”.18 This Media reinforced this sense of “oth- is discernible from the following er” in order to increase the sense headlines: “30,000 Migrants Headof nationalism and unity amongst ing for UK are Held in Calais”; British people as opposed to the “Hundreds of migrants try to storm “enemies at the gate”, through ferries at Calais in a desperate dash framing and conveniently focus- for Britain” and “New Migrant In12 Enria, “Representation of refugees through moral panics.”

13 Edward Said, Orientalism, (2005), 57.

14 Said, Orientalism.

15 Victoria Esses, Stelian Medianu, and Andrea Lawson, “Uncertainty, threat, and the role of the media in promoting the dehumanization of immigrants and refugees,” Journal of Social Issues 69, no. 3 (2013), 519.

16 Goodman, Sirriyeh, and McMahon, “The evolving (re)categorisations,” 109.

17 Nicole Cathleen Aarssen, “Re-Orienting Refugee Representation? A Multimodal Analysis of Syrian Refugee Representation on the Social Media Platform,” Stream: Inspiring Critical Thought 9, no. 2 (2017), 4.

18 Prem Kumar Rajaram, “Humanitarianism and Representations of the Refugee,” Journal of Refugee Studies 15, no. 3 (2002), 247.

34 vasion of Britain bigger than the Vikings, Romans and Norman conquest”.19 In these examples, emphasis is placed on the “emergency” facing the UK in terms of the number of refugees arriving, without any focus on the refugees’ desperate flight from violent war and persecution.20 The British media’s framing thus reinforces a clear dichotomy between “us” and “them”, where non-Europeans are the problematic “them” compared to the European “us”.21 This framing also indirectly suggests the existence of a hierarchy, in which the refugees’ lives are considered less important than the well-being of Europeans.

Chrysalis Vol. XI on which Turkish photographer Nilüfer Demir concretized the horror of the Refugee Crisis by posting on Twitter the now infamous photo of three-year-old Alan Kurdi’s dead body washed up along Turkey’s shores. Within 24 hours, the photo had circulated across all major European media outlets and became the symbol of the Refugee Crisis. This image prompted a dramatic shift in the way that the media framed refugees. Indeed, as the Telegraph stated: “the lifeless body of Alan Kurdi has changed everything”.22

Contrary to the previous stereotypical images of refugees, composed Phase 2: Extreme Victimization essentially of boats full of faceless victims, the picture of Alan Kurdi The near universal negative por- was different; viewers were protrayal of refugees in the media vided with specific information dramatically shifted on Septem- about Alan’s story, individualising ber 2nd, 2015. This was the date him amongst the swarms of mi-

19 Ian Drury, “30,000 migrants heading for UK are held in Calais,” Daily Mail, February 10, 2015, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2948498/30-000-migrantsheading-UK-held-Calais-Record-numbers-stopped-borders-April-year.html; Mike Berry, Inaki Garcia-Blanco & Kerry Moore, “Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries,” (2015), 41; Helen Barnett, “New migrant ‘invasion’ of Britain bigger than the Vikings, Romans and Norman Conquest,” Express, May 30, 2016, https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/601177/ European-net-migration-Britain-largest-history.

20 Goodman, Sirriyeh, and McMahon, “The evolving (re)categorisations,” 10.

21Goodman, Sirriyeh, and McMahon, “The evolving (re)categorisations,” 10.

22 Bryony Gordon, “The lifeless body of Aylan Kurdi has changed everything,” The Telegraph, September 4, 2015, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11844086/Migrant-crisis-The-lifeless-body-of-Aylan-Kurdi-has-changed-everything.html.

Bizot grants. For instance, we know that the child’s name was Alan Kurdi, that he was three-years-old, that he and his family were attempting to enter Europe from Syria, and they had initially wanted to reach Vancouver where they had relatives, but their demand for Canadian asylum had been denied. These pieces of information are important because, as studies have illustrated, people become more sympathetic towards victims after being provided with a description of their plight.23 Thus, the media adopted a humanitarian and “cosmopolitan” framework following Alan’s death, highlighting the idea that this could have been any of “us”.

Indeed, as journalist Agha wrote in the Independent, “Just because he was a migrant doesn’t mean his life was worthless – geography was the only difference between us and him”.24 It can be argued that the fact that Alan’s face is turned away and that his skin appears to be almost white reinforces this idea that he could have been one of “our European” children. This raises an

35 important question: To what extent are distant others only deserving of compassion in their capacity to be assimilated to a European notion of “us”?

The tragic event also spurred media outlets to change the vocabulary that they had become accustomed to, which, in turn, altered society’s views on refugees. This emphasized the UNHCR’s claim that “words really do matter”.25 The terms “disembarking” and “reaching Europe” replaced “breaching it”, while the term “refugee” became more frequent among all journalists, replacing the common “migrants”, “illegal immigrants” or “bogus asylum seekers”.26 Furthermore, the term “child” was profoundly reinforced, highlighting the vulnerability and victimhood of refugees. Many authors have studied how this use of innocent figures, such as “womenandchildren”, has been used by media to humanize the discourse surrounding refugees.27 However, previously, these representations were predominantly reserved to

23 Aarssen, “Re-Orienting Refugee Representation?,” 11.

24 Nicola Langdon, “Empathy and Othering: Framing Syria’s Refugee Crisis in the British Press,” Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century, September 6, 2016, 91.

25 “Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.”

26 Goodman, Sirriyeh, and McMahon, “The evolving (re)categorisations.”

27 Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics, (2014).

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distant suffering in the place of conflict, whereas depictions of refugees arriving in Europe tended to instead portray threatening men arriving in masses. Thus, Alan Kurdi’s picture brought the suffering to Europe, which made people realize that this was not just a European crisis - but a humanitarian one too.

This transformation of the representation of refugees triggered worldwide sympathy and outrage at the crisis unfolding, and was arguably the tipping point at which citizens and state leaders began to take urgent action. As an article in the Independent read, the response to the image was extraordinary in the weeks after its circulation and “a third of those donating money, dropping off goods or volunteering their time to help refugees said that they were moved to act following the publication of images of (…)

Alan Kurdi”.28

orientalist and colonialist discourse of the superiority of the West and the need to “save” those in the Orient. Indeed, as Burman has argued, “the use of children in appeals (…) repeats the colonial paternalism where the adult-Northerner offers help and knowledge to the infantilized South”.29 This idea is reinforced by the absence of Alan’s mother in the picture, rupturing the common “Madonna and child” image, which accentuates the need for someone to look after desolate refugees such as Alan.30 Therefore, although the shift in discourse led to a more humane representation of refugees, giving them a face, a name, and a certain degree of dignity, this representation is still a simplified stereotype of the victimized refugee desperately in need of the ‘generous’ western help.

However, this discourse of the “generous us” needing to help “the poor victimized them” is problematic, as it only perpetuates Said’s

Two months later, on the November 13th 2015, another tragic event occurred. Paris was hit by a series of terrorist attacks that killed 130

Final Phase: Securitization

28 IndyVoices, “Alan Kurdi’s death did change the world, if only for an all-too-brief time, Independent,” September 1, 2015, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/ alan-kurdi-s-death-did-change-the-world-if-only-for-an-all-too-brief-time-a7220561. html.

29 Said, Orientalism, 241.

30 Caroline Lenette and Sienna Cleland, “Changing Faces: Visual Representations of Asylum Seekers in Times of Crisis,” Creative Approaches to Research 9, 1 (2016): 6883.

Bizot people and injured another 400.

The Islamic State In Syria (ISIS) claimed responsibility for the attacks, and all of the attackers are believed to have been European citizens that had fought in Syria.

Two of the attackers supposedly returned from Syria using refugee routes; an aspect of the story upon which the media placed particular emphasis.31 This crisis incited a swift shift in discourse once again, as terrorist “migrants” returned at the expense of vulnerable “refugees”. This shift can be detected in the following excerpts: “Paris terrorist ringleader bragged he entered France among a group of 90 jihadis and claimed the migrant [emphasis added] crisis had made it easy for them to travel freely across Europe”; “The flood of migrants [emphasis added] from precisely the region which is spawning this movement, must now be regarded as outrageously dangerous”.32 The media’s discourse thus called attention to the

37 link between the threat of terrorism and migration, which incited a fear within the nation for their own security. This extended the post-9/11 securitization discourse, that was first defined by the Copenhagen School as the “designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience”.

33 Said’s dichotomy thus reversed, as the “us Europeans” became victimized against the evil and terrorist “other”. This idea is emphasized by the images alongside media articles that featured injured, innocent, and distraught French citizens.

The orientalist dichotomy here is essential to creating a sense of national solidarity. Indeed, as Girard explains, the most terrifying is in fact the lack of difference between “us” and the “other” because this would suggest fragility of the homogenous “us” community and the promise of a lack of social order within that.34 The fear and panic that had been influential in political

31 Goodman, Sirriyeh, and McMahon, “The evolving (re)categorisations,” 5.

32 Gordon, “The lifeless body of Aylan”; Janet Daley, “Paris terror attacks: The West is at war with a death cult – we must join together to stamp it out,” The Telegraph, November 14, 2015, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11996143/ Paris-terror-attacks-The-West-is-at-war-with-a-death-cult-we-must-join-together-tostamp-it-out.html.

33 Fen Olser Hampson, Reviewed WorkL Security: A New Framework for Analysis, International Journal 53, no.4 (1998), 27.

34 Enria, “Representation of refugees through moral panics,” 26.

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discourses in the past thus returned al frames of journalism regulate to dominate media representations the possibility of who speaks and of refugees. about what.37 The media’s focus surrounding the refugee crisis is on the victim/villain notion, yet the The Voicelessness of Refugees West’s involvement in producing These representations of refugees the causes of the conflict and forced as either the “spectacle sufferer” migration is concealed. Couldry inand the “folk devil” are created fers that denying people the right of by the media in a top-down man- giving an account of themselves in ner, failing to take into account the media means treating them as the diversity of refugees’ stories, if they were not human at all, and voices, names and experiences.35 represents, according to Fraser, the A study conducted by Migrant most important form of inequality 38 Voice in 2014 found that the voices in the global public sphere. and experiences of migrants were quoted in only 12 percent of 557 In order to bridge this moral gap news items sampled between Jan- between audience and distant sufuary and April 2015.36 This is due ferer, it is essential that we start to the fact that interviews in media listening what refugees have to articles predominantly focus on the say, because, as Scott states, “ … voices of representatives, national what could be truer, after all, than governments, translators, and re- a subject’s own account of what he 39 porters, all at the expense of ref- or she has lived through?”. Many ugees themselves. This illustrates media organizations and NGOs the extent to which representation- have begun to take steps in the 35 Lilie Chouliaraki,Myria Georgiou, and Rafael Zaborowski, “The European “migration crisis” and the media: A cross-European press content analysis,” (2006); Stanley Cohen, “Moral Panics and Folk Concepts,” International Journal of the History of Education 35, 3 (1999): 585-591.

36 Heaven Crawley, Simon McMahon, and Katharine Jones, “Victims and Villains: Migrant voices in the British media,” 2015, 24.

37 Nick Couldry, Why Voice Matters: Culture and Politics after Neoliberalism, 2010, 41.

38 Couldry, Why Voice Matters, 41; Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World, (2010), 16.

39 Scott Watson, “Manufacturing Threats: Asylum Seekers as Threats or Refugees?,” Journal of Global Security Studies, (2007).

Bizot right direction, challenging traditional and stereotypical portrayals of refugees, opting instead for personal accounts of what the refugees themselves have to say. For example, Al Jazeera’s impressive interactive media project Life on Hold introduces viewers to ten Syrian refugees living in Lebanon. It provides each refugee with an audiovisual scrapbook, giving viewers an immersive glimpse into their daily lives through video profiles, photos, environmental sound, and maps of their journey. However, despite a will to listen, these voices still speak within boundaries that are ideologically framed and thus maintain the unequal power dynamics of “us” versus the “other”.40 This inequality is compounded by the very state of displacement, which places refugees at a social disadvantage.41 For example, refugees don’t always have language skills to express themselves, nor the ability to lobby the media in an attempt to improve their situation.42 This paper argues that the solution lies within modern forms of media

39 and communication technologies (such as blogs, YouTube and social media), which have the power to transform traditional media that has for so long silenced refugees.

Indeed, new forms of media have the capacity to create a powerful space of self-representation that produces agency, creates communities, and represents resistance to the traditional depiction of refugees as objects of knowledge and as mere representations of victim/ villain. The Congolese Action Youth Platform (CAYP) exemplifies this.

Indeed, this online platform was founded by a collective of activists and members of the Congolese community in the UK and the Congolese diaspora to denounce the ongoing media and political narrative that denies the existence of genocide in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.43 This project challenges “voices from above” (that include the voices of government representatives, the international community and western media) through the created, production and dissemination of

40 Marie Godin, and Giorgia Dona, ““Refugee Voices,” New Social Media and Politics of Representation: Young Congolese in the Diaspora and Beyond,” Refuge 32, 1 (2016).

41Terence Wright, “The Media and Representations of Refugees and Other Forced Migrants,” (2014), 4.

42Wright, “The Media and Representations.”

43 Godin, and Dona, “Refugee Voices,” 61.

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40 “voices from below”.44 The impact of this project has been immense and illustrates the importance of refugees taking the reins, in order for them to be able to construct their own identities and voices.

Conclusion To conclude, this essay argued that traditional forms of media are inadequate and harmful for representing the diversity and truth of refugee voices, as they tend to lock refugee representations within two categories: that of the evil “other” or the victim “other”. In order to illustrate this effective dehumanization, this paper explored how traditional British media represented refugees throughout the 2015 refugee crisis, which erratically shifted from “spectacle sufferer” to “folk devil”, but never as a human with a voice. The last section of this paper argued that challenging these reductive stereotypes is essential, and that solutions may lie in new forms of media, which have the capacity to create a powerful space for self-representation and “voices from below”.

44 Godin, and Dona, “Refugee Voices,” 65.

Bizot

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Retrieved from http://lifeonhold.aljazeera.com/#/en/loading Thorbjørnsrud, Kjersti., & Figenschou, Tine Ustad. Do Marginalized Sources Matter? Journalism Studies,17(3), (2014) 337-355. doi:10.1080/1461670x.2014.987549 United Nations. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Retrieved November 25, 2018, from https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10 United Nations. A million refugees and migrants flee to Europe in 2015. Retrieved November 25, 2018, from https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2015/12/567918556/million-refugees-migrants-flee-europe-2015. html Watson, Scott. Manufacturing Threats: Asylum Seekers as Threats or Refugees? Journal of Global Security Studies. (2007).

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44

China and the North Korean Refugee Crisis: State Sovereignty and the Dangers of ‘Strategic Ambivalence’

By Suzanne Bonfils

Bonfils

45 Abstract

Abstrait

In recent years, a veritable North Korean refugee crisis has emerged. Since 1990, the number of North Korean migrants escaping the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has soared. Despite the fact that North Koreans often express a preference for South Korea as a host country, almost all defectors hide at some point in China, where more than 50,000 are currently living. However, China has generally avoided taking them in; this paper aims to explain and evaluate the impact of China’s decision, as well as the key role the country has had in the perpetuation of the crisis.

It will explore 1) how the limitations of the international legal norms protecting North Korean defectors have allowed China to repeatedly deny them the status of “refugee”; 2) the various geo-political factors behind the country’s unwillingness to provide significant aid to North Korean refugees, including international norms, security concerns, and domestic pressures; and 3) the consequences of this decision in regards to both regional and international actors, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Au cours des dernières années, une véritable crise des réfugiés nordcoréens est apparue. Malgré le fait que les Nord-Coréens préfèrent souvent la Corée du Sud comme pays hôte, presque tous les transfuges se cachent à un moment donné en Chine, où plus de 50 000 d’entre eux vivent actuellement. Néanmoins, la Chine a dans l’ensemble évité de les accueillir; cet essai vise à expliquer et à évaluer l’impact de cette décision, ainsi que le rôle clé que le pays joue dans la perpétuation de la crise. Nous examinerons 1) de quelle manière les limites des normes juridiques internationales protégeant les transfuges nord-coréens ont permis à la Chine de leur refuser à répétition le statut de « réfugié »; 2) les divers facteurs géopolitiques qui expliquent le refus du pays de fournir une aide importante aux réfugiés nord-coréens, y compris les normes internationales, les préoccupations en matière de sécurité et les pressions internes; et 3) les conséquences de cette décision pour les acteurs régionaux et internationaux, tels que le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés.

Chrysalis Vol. XI

46 Introduction Since 1990, the number of North Korean migrants escaping the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has soared; estimates now range from tens to hundreds of thousands.1 Although North Koreans often express a preference for South Korea as a host country, almost all defectors at some point hide in China, the most accessible route.2 Currently there are more than 50,000 North Korean refugees living in China.3 This leads us to pose the question: In what way and for what reasons has China responded to the North Korean refugee crisis, and what have been the consequences of the country’s reaction? This paper will argue that due to both the narrowness of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees definition of refugee and the limitations of the

non-refoulement principle, China is thus able to “minimize [its] own obligations to accept [North Korean] refugees”.4 It will also argue that the country’s unwillingness to provide significant aid to North Korean refugees is due to various geopolitical factors and leads not only to the perpetuation of the crisis, but also limits the possibilities for other international actors to provide assistance.

This paper will begin by briefly describing the situation surrounding North Korean refugees and their status in international law and highlighting the limitations of the legal principles protecting them, before evaluating the restrictionist measures adopted by China in regards to the crisis. Subsequently, it will discuss the factors that motivate China to neglect its responsibilities towards North Korean

1 Woo-young Lee, and Yuri Kim, “North Korean Migrants: A Human Security Perspective,” Asian Perspective 35, no. 1 (2011: 59; Stephen Haggard, Marcus Noland, and Yoonok Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis: Human Rights and International Responses (2006): 73.

2 Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis: 11; Lili Song, “Refugee Protection in China: Recent Legal and Policy Developments,” Rights in Exile, 2014, http://rightsinexile.tumblr.com/post/96365498957/refugee-protection-in china-recent-legal-and 2014.

3 Kim Hyuk-Rae, “Transnational Network Dynamics of NGOs for North Korean Refugees and Human Rights,” Korea Observer; Seoul 37, n° 1 (2006), 57-92.

4 Phil Orchard, “Introduction – A right to flee,” A right to flee: Refugees, states and the construction of international cooperation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 9.

Bonfils refugees. Finally, it will explore the implications of these decisions in regard to other international actors, namely the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and non-governmental organizations, as well as major regional neighbours, and argue that China’s ambivalent response prevents them from providing adequate aid.

North Korean Refugees and International Law The North Korean refugee crisis has been brought about mainly as a result of “Pyongyang’s failure to feed its own people”, following a severe famine in the mid-1990s.5 The fall of the Soviet Union, which provided support to the DPRK, coupled with extreme weather conditions and decades of inefficient economic policies, have led to intense poverty and high mortality rates.6 As a result of the millions of North Koreans suffering from malnutrition, a large number of North Korean defectors have fled to near-

47 by countries.

The status of North Korean defectors at first seems consistent with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, “[which] provides for the protection of refugees who [have] fled from [their] countries of origin facing the danger to [their] safety or freedom”.7 Indeed, the DPRK is known for its human rights violations, “including summary execution without proper trial, torture and other inhuman treatment”.8 As such, North Koreans defecting for political reasons having tried to modify the regime and risking punishment because of this, are entitled to asylum and qualify as convention refugees.9 Similarly, North Koreans fleeing religious persecution under the Communist regime, for example, should, under the 1951 Convention, qualify for protection.10 In practice however, the majority of North Korean refugees flee their country because of “desperate economic conditions”.11 Due to the

5 Mikyoung Kim, Securitization of Human Rights : North Korean Refugees in East Asia (Praeger, 2012: 45.

6 Hyuk-Rae, “Transnational Network Dynamics.”

7 Whiejin Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees and their Protection in International Law,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs 30, no. 2 (2016): 54.

8 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 60.

9 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 48-56.

10 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 51.

11 Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis: 22

48 fact that the 1951 Convention excludes “the economic, humanitarian refugee”, countries have been able to refuse the status of refugee to North Koreans because they are not fleeing persecution, as the Convention suggests, but are “motivated strongly by economic deprivation”.12 The deeply flawed nature of the criteria for asylum eligibility, according to Price, can therefore be seen as excluding many North Korean defectors from the Convention’s refugee label.13 That being said, regardless of their reason(s) for leaving, North Korean defectors undeniably qualify for protection under the principle of non-refoulement found in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, which “prevent persons from being returned and subjected to serious violations of human rights”.14 Although the DPRK is a party to the 1966 International Covenant

Chrysalis Vol. XI on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which recognizes the right to leave, North Korean defectors face significant repercussions from the North Korean regime should they return to their country of origin.15 This has led the United Nations to regard North Korean defectors as individuals “who should be granted refugee status on the grounds of refoulement”.16 However, Lee highlights the fact that the nature of the non-refoulement principle as part of “customary international law” is “viewed [...] differently by scholars”.17 Pirjola, one such scholar, claims that because non-refoulement is an open concept, states are able to “promote their own, ‘correct’ interpretations” of when it applies.18 As a result, the power of the UNHCR to enforce states’ obligations in regards to North Korean refugees is “overruled by the sovereign power of states in deciding upon [their]

12 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 49; Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis: 7.

13 Matthew Price, “Persecution complex: Justifying asylum law’s preference for persecuted people,” Harvard International Law Journal 47, no. 2 (2006): 420.

14 Jari Pirjola,“Shadows in paradise: Exploring non-refoulement as an open concept,” International Journal of Refugee Law 19, no. 4 (2008): 654.

15 Jane McAdam, “An Intellectual History of Freedom of Movement in International Law: The Right to Leave as a Personal Liberty,” Melbourne Journal of International Law 12 (2011): 28; Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 45.

16 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 48.

17 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 57.

18 Pirjola,“Shadows in paradise,” 678.

Bonfils status”.19 This vulnerability in the eye of the law explains countries’ varied treatment of North Korean refugees.20 Consequently, the 1951 Convention’s narrow refugee definition excludes a number of North Korean defectors. Likewise, the non-refoulement principle, which in theory protects them from repatriation, is unable to properly do so because it is a “relatively limited [incursion] into states’ [...] sovereign power”.21 As sovereign states have the last say on the granting of asylum, the Beijing government has been able to breach its international obligations towards North Korean asylum-seekers via an ambivalent strategy.22

49 them the status of refugee and engages in their repatriation.23 At first glance, China seems to be generally sympathetic to the North Korean refugee cause. As a member of the 1951 Convention, China has allowed those seeking asylum for political reasons to reside in the country since 1986.24 China is also the second-largest provider of humanitarian aid to Pyongyang and has been “lenient about South Korean NGO’s provision of assistance across the border”.25 Moreover, the country has tolerated defectors who reach foreign diplomatic compounds; if they are not caught

by Chinese security in the process, they “have a good chance of being granted asylum to South Korea”, according to Kim.26

China’s Ambivalent Response

However, the fact that states have sovereignty over the legal princiIndeed, Kim regards China’s re- ples outlined above has allowed sponse as one of strategic ambiv- China to deny refugee status to alence; though the country pres- North Korean defectors. Their ents itself as being lenient towards permissive attitude towards asyNorth Korean defectors, it denies lum-seekers in general does not ex19 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 45.

20 Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis: 9.

21 McAdam, “An Intellectual History,” 29.

22 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 55; Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis: 11.

23 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights,52.

24 Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis: 11.

25 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 49-51.

26 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 50.

50 tend to North Korean refugees who are seen as illegal economic migrants.27 Although Lee claims we “cannot exclude other political, religious, humanitarian” reasons for North Koreans’ defection, China has chosen to generalize the economic motive of some defectors to all, thereby “evading any legal or political responsibility” for them.28 North Koreans in China often do not even have the opportunity to petition for asylum, which would allow them to remain in China until a formal decision is made.29

Chrysalis Vol. XI over its obligations to international treaties.31 Although it has “no legally binding obligation to return North Koreans to [the DPRK]”, China has adhered to a strict repatriation policy.32 Thus, “as the number of [North Korean refugees has] increased, so [has] the number of forced returnees”.33 In fact, the number of confirmed repatriations went from 580 in 1996 to 8,000 in 2003.34

Consequently, China has adopted an ambivalent strategy, breached its international obligations and On top of refusing refugee status to ignored the plight of North Korean defectors, Chinese authorities have refugees. also violated the non-refoulement principle and signed bilateral China’s Geopolitical agreements with Pyongyang, such Motivations as the Border Area Task Agreement of 1986 which calls for the return Three main geopolitical factors of North Koreans and has led to are behind China’s reluctance to tougher security measures at the extend aid to North Korean defecborder.30 The country has present- tors: international norms, security ed its border control agreement concerns, and domestic pressures. with North Korea as prevailing Firstly, the country’s relationship 27 Song, “Refugee Protection in China.”

28 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 64; Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 48.

29 Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis: 19; Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 55.

30 Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis: 21.

31 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 45.

32 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 58-61..

33 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 47.

34 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 47.

Bonfils to international norms explains its ambivalent response. Orchard underlines the fact that “the sets of norms that end up being internalized by states depend on the norms’ congruence with domestic [...] culture”.35 This is certainly the case for China, as its “traditional view” holds that it is “the state’s duty to take care of the people’s welfare”.36 As a result, despite the various international agreements they have signed, Chinese authorities do not necessarily consider North Korean people’s well-being as their responsibility, but rather as an issue pertaining to their neighbouring country’s sovereignty.37 Any relative leniency is mainly due to China’s pursuit of soft power and its desire to “prove [its] respect for human rights to the international community”, as ensuring the protection of refugees “at the international level [...] reflects [a] state’s role in the world”.38 Said leniency is limited by Beijing’s opposition to the “imposition of universal human

51 rights in non-Western contexts”.39 The country’s “Sino-centric view of human rights” therefore encourages the portrayal of North Korean refugees as economic migrants, unentitled to Chinese protection.40 China’s overall “desire for regional stability” has also prompted restrictionist policies vis-a-vis North Korean asylum-seekers.41 As Price argues, the act of granting individual asylum by a host state “interferes with [the state of origin]’s relationship to its citizen” by denying it “the opportunity to exercise authority over the individual”, thereby making a judgment on the state’s ability to rule.42 This has led China to construct the North Korean refugee question as a security concern. Kim states that granting North Korean defectors refugee status is a nonstarter for the country, given the message it would send to the Pyongyang government, that is to say the recognition that its regime is politically repres-

35 Orchard, “Introduction,” 7.

36 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 41.

37 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 56.

38 Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis: 50; Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 50; Orchard, “Introduction,” 9.

39 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights,51.

40 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights,12..

41 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 52.

42 Price, “Persecution complex,” 425.

52 sive.43 China therefore has legitimate interests in viewing defectors as illegal economic migrants, as it seeks to maintain friendly relations with North Korea.44 Furthermore, the collapse of North Korea that would likely be brought on by the “exodus of North Koreans” could “[expose] China directly to the United States forces stationed in South Korea”.45 Security concerns with respect to both North Korea and the US have therefore led China to prevent a flow of North Korean refugees by denying them refugee status and repatriating them to the DPRK. Thirdly, domestic pressures have further affected China’s response to the crisis. Orchard emphasizes the influence that “pressures [faced by governments] from their own citizens” have on refugee admittance policies.46 Gibney also describes pressures “[emanating] from the political realm” as contributing to restrictive measures on

Chrysalis Vol. XI asylum in the European Union.47 Although there exists relatively no negative conception of the North Korean “other” in the eyes of the Chinese people, the country faces similar pressures. Its economic reform having included the “redistribution of wealth away from the state to members of society”, the government’s control of Chinese society has declined, with approximately 160,00 public protests taking place in the year of 2010.48 The black-market activities brought on by cross-border smuggling also discourages China from accepting North Korean refugees given the Chinese population’s discontent with alleged corruption and crime.49 In the eyes of the Chinese authorities, the refugee influx “has led to an increase in illicit acts such as human trafficking and fraud”.50 Finally, in the event that the number of North Korean refugees in China were to rise, the Chinese government fears the possibility of a “national consciousness of eth-

43 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 50.

44 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 61.

45 Song, “Refugee Protection in China.”

46 Orchard, “Introduction,” 9.

47 Matthew Gibney, “The State of Asylum: Democratization, Judicialization and the Evolution of Refugee Policy,” in Susan Kneebone (ed.) The Refugee Convention 50 Years On: Globalization and International Law, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003): 41.

48 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 43.

49 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 43-48.

50 Lee, and Kim, “North Korean Migrants: 81.

Bonfils nic Koreans living in China”.51 As a result, the Beijing government is unable to “place the North Korean refugee problem at the center of its attention”.52 The Regional and International Consequences of China’s Strategy On top of politically supporting Pyongyang and consequently preventing any veritable change in North Korea’s repressive regime, China’s reluctance to accept North Korean refugees has led to limited possibilities for other governmental and non-governmental actors in the refugee regime to act. These actors include the UNHCR and NGOs, which “would gladly assist” North Korean refugees.53 International NGOs (INGOs) such as the International Red Cross have showed “their concerns for the North Korean refugees and human rights situation” since 1980.54 Some have provided direct humanitarian aid

53 to the DPRK; others, like Amnesty International, have “publicize[d] the plight of North Korean refugees [and] disseminate[d] policy recommendations” to governments.55 Likewise, the United Nations’ recognition of North Korean defectors’ refugee status has been accompanied by public criticism of China for its treatment of North Korean refugees, as was the case in February of 2014.56 The UNHCR has also stated that handing over North Korean asylum-seekers to Chinese authorities by foreign embassies would be equivalent to refoulement, discouraging these embassies from doing so.57 These efforts, however, could go further were it not for the actions of China.

Faced with a similar situation in the context of the Ethiopian famine in 1984 - with victims failing to qualify as convention refugees - the UNHCR was able to aid them by “[taking them] under [its] wing”.58 However, in the case of China, although the country has an obliga-

51 Lee, and Kim, “North Korean Migrants:75.

52 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 43.

53 Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis: 11.

54 Hyuk-Rae, “Transnational Network Dynamics.”

55 Lee, and Kim, “North Korean Migrants: 75; Hyuk-Rae, “Transnational Network Dynamics.”

56 Song, “Refugee Protection in China.”

57 Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis: 39.

58 Shin- wha Lee, “Preventing Refugee Crisis: A Challenge To Human Security,” Asian Perspective 23, no. 1 (1999): 150.

54 tion to provide facilities through which the UNHCR can carry out its “functions and role of protecting the refugee”, Haggard et al. underline the fact that “it is virtually impossible for North Koreans to access refugee-determination procedures through [the UNHCR]”.59 The Beijing government denies the UNHCR access to the North Korean border and the agency is thus unable to assess the status of North Korean asylum-seekers, let alone help them escape. China has also arrested and imprisoned NGO activists aiding North Koreans in China to reach South Korea.60 China’s response has also hindered other regional actors, such as Japan and South Korea, from providing aid to North Korean defectors. Japan has presented itself as sympathetic to the refugees’ plea in part by enacting the 2006 North Korean Human Rights Law, which provides protection to North Korean refugees. However, North Korean refugee acceptance in Japan ex-

Chrysalis Vol. XI ists mainly in clandestine nature, with Japanese NGOs helping Japan-born ethnic Koreans return to Tokyo.61 One of the reasons behind Japan’s clandestine refugee policy is because it does not wish to upset China, a key player on the regional stage.62 Similarly, the South Korean government has avoided encouraging North Korean defection due to the fear that it will fracture diplomatic relations with China.63 Furthermore, the South Korean constitution regards North Koreans “as entitled to South Korean nationality”.64 However, South Korea’s wish to extend diplomatic protection to North Korean defectors has also been limited

by China’s reluctance to recognize “the conversion of North Korean nationality into South Korean one”.65 Beijing’s position constitutes a significant obstacle to South Korean aid provided to defectors, particularly because, as previously mentioned, the large majority of defectors pass by China before landing in South Korea.66 As a re-

59 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 47; Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis:19.

60 Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis: 19 & 38.

61 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights,70.

62 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 70.

63 Hyuk-Rae, “Transnational Network Dynamics.”

64 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 45.

65 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 69.

66 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 45.

Bonfils

55

sult, similarly to Japan, South Korea has had to turn to clandestine dealings in order to provide refuge to North Korean defectors living in China.67 Consequently, we can claim, as Haggard et al. does, that “China has succeeded in preventing [...] a massive international response [by both governmental and non-governmental actors] in the form of assistance and protection”.68 Conclusion In conclusion, because states hold sovereignty in regard to granting asylum, China has been able to shrug off its responsibilities to North Korean refugees for a number of geopolitical reasons, all the while inhibiting other actors from providing significant aid. This leads to poorly securitized North Korean human rights for refugees in East Asia.69 For the foreseeable future, it looks like North Korean

migration will remain high as food shortages persist.70 China’s stance on North Korean defectors does not seem likely to change any time soon. In fact, according to Human Rights Watch, the government “apprehended at least 41 North Koreans between mid-January and March 2018”.71 Experience has shown that China’s willingness to support North Korea is not limitless, as demonstrated by its adherence to a crackdown on illicit North Korean financial transactions in the Chinese territory of Macau following outside pressure in 2006.72 As Orchard underlines, “interests are not fixed, [and] how states respond to refugees [and] how refugees are perceived [...] are affected by international society and are subject to change”.73 Perhaps future shifts in political relations will lead China to change its stance on the North Korean refugee crisis.74 In the meantime, INGOs could act as norm entrepreneurs and introduce new norms which favor refugee

67 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 69.

68 Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis: 11.

69 Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 8.

70 Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis:73; Kim, Securitization of Human Rights, 90.

71 Sophie Richardson, “China Detains 7 More North Korean Refugees,” Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/04/china-detains-7-more-north-korean.

72 Haggard, Noland, and Chang, The North Korean Refugee Crisis: 51.

73 Orchard, “Introduction,” 11.

74 Lee, “The Status of North Korean Refugees,” 72.

56

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protection by both convincing China to treat defectors in accordance with international law and exacting pressure on the country through petitions and appeals to UN bodies and governments.75 As for governmental members of the international community, Chan & Schloenhardt suggest that they encourage China to “grant temporary asylum or humanitarian status to North Koreans [...] entitled to international protection until the UNHCR can arrange for their resettlement”.76 Such a strategy would avoid recognizing defectors as “refugees” but allow them to be protected from refoulement, all the while respecting China’s loyalty to the DPRK.

75 Orchard, “Introduction,” 7; Hyuk-Rae, “Transnational Network Dynamics.”

76 Elim Chan, and Andreas Schloenhard, “North Korean Refugees and International Refugee Law,” International Journal of Refugee Law 19, no. 2 (2007): 240.

Bonfils

57 Bibliography

Chan, Elim, and Schloenhardt, Andreas. “North Korean Refugees and International Refugee Law.” International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 215–245. 2007.

Gibney, Matthew. “The State of Asylum: Democratization, Judicialization and the Evolution of Refugee Policy,” in Susan Kneebone (ed.) The Refugee Convention 50 Years On: Globalization and International Law, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 19-45. 2003.

Haggard, Stephan, et al. The North Korean Refugee Crisis : Human Rights and International Responses.

U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. 2006.

Hyuk-Rae, Kim. “Transnational Network Dynamics of NGOs for North Korean Refugees and Human Rights”. Korea Observer; Seoul Vol. 37, N° 1, 57-92. 2006.

Kim, Mikyoung. Securitization of Human Rights : North Korean Refugees in East Asia. Praeger. 2012.

Lee, Shin-wha. “Preventing Refugee Crisis: A Challenge To Human Security.” Asian Perspective, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 133–154. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/42704198. 1999.

Lee, Whiejin. “The Status of North Korean Refugees and their Protection in International Law.” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 43–82., JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/44160974. 2016.

Lee, Woo-young, and Kim, Yuri. “North Korean Migrants: A Human Security Perspective.” Asian Perspective, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 59–87. 2011.

McAdam, Jane. “An Intellectual History of Freedom of Movement in International Law: The Right to Leave as a Personal Liberty,” Melbourne Journal of International Law 12: 27-56. 2011.

Orchard, Phil. “Introduction – A right to flee,”. A right to flee: Refugees, states and the construction of international cooperation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-17. 2014.

Pirjola, Jari. “Shadows in paradise: Exploring non-refoulement as an open concept, International Journal of Refugee Law 19(4): 639-660. 2008.

Price, Matthew. “Persecution complex: Justifying asylum law’s preference for persecuted people.” Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 47, no. 2: 413. 2006.

Richardson, Sophie. “China Detains 7 More North Korean Refugees”. Human Rights Watch, 2018. https:// www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/04/china-detains-7-more-north-korean refugees. Accessed 25 Nov. 2018.

Song, Lili. Refugee Protection in China: Recent Legal and Policy Developments, Rights in Exile. 2014. http://rightsinexile.tumblr.com/post/96365498957/refugee-protection-in china-recent-legal-and, archived at https://perma.cc/9LEE-JJ98

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58

Refugee Economies, Child Labour, and the State: Turkey’s Case

By Dilse Kaygisiz

Kaygisiz

59 Abstract

Abstrait

Turkey has a majority of Syrian urban refugees as well as a high number of children workers. Granting the right to work to its refugee population has been beneficial for refugee economies as it has been impactful for the long-term achievements of providing sustainable livelihood means. This research paper provides an explanation of the process with which granting work permits in the host country to the refugee population will decrease the overall level of child labour. However, this research paper also argues that the freedom to work will not lead to the decrease in child labour if the education system provided to the refugee population is not built towards incentivizing the enrollment in school.

This research paper first treats refugee economies and child labour in Turkey separately to later combine the two predominant points that a host country should focus on. The case study is based on research done in urban cities in Turkey; therefore, refugee economies and education in camps have not been taken into consideration.

La Turquie possède une majorité de réfugiés Syriens ainsi qu’un nombre accrue d’enfants ouvriers. Le pays a donné le droit à ces réfugiés de travailler ce qui leurs a permis de renforcer leurs économies puisque ce droit a engendré des résultats positifs sur le long terme en matière de développement d’outils pour une existence durable.

Cette dissertation fournit une analyse du processus par lequel l’octroi de permis de travail dans le pays d’accueil à la population réfugiée a permis de réduire le niveau global de travailleurs en bas âges. Cependant, ce document démontre également que cette liberté de travail n’atteindra pas les résultats espérés si celle-ci n’est pas couplé avec un système d’éducation pour les populations réfugiés conçu pour encourager l’inscription à l’école. Tout d’abord, cette dissertation traite le cas des économies de réfugiés et le travail des enfants en Turquie séparément.

Par la suite, celle-ci combinera ces deux aspects afin d’en faire la principale préoccupation des pays d’accueil.

L’étude de cas est basée sur des recherches effectuées dans des villes urbaines en Turquie ; par conséquent, les économies des réfugiés et l’éducation dans les camps n’ont pas été prises en considération.

Chrysalis Vol. XI

60 Introduction The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as “any person who is outside their country of origin and unable or unwilling to return there or to avail themselves of its protection, on account of a well-founded fear of persecution”.1 Out of the five million Syrian refugees around the world, more than three million are in Turkey, and the number keeps increasing since the first Syrian asylum-seekers arrived in the spring of 2011. Other neighbouring countries such as Lebanon and Jordan also have a high number of refugees proportionate to their population; however, Turkey’s case is especially interesting to study because, unlike Lebanon and Jordan, the majority of refugees in Turkey live in urban cities.2 Universally, refugees in urban cities are starting to be recognized as economic actors that can benefit the host country’s economy. Nevertheless, when it comes to refugee children, who are quite vulnerable in the future without a proper education, the policy-makers and United Nations organizations may face challenges

in securing their integration to the host country. It is important, hence, to see the links between education, its absence leading to child labor, and refugee economies in Turkey.

Indeed, the country not only has a high number of refugees but also faces challenges in child labour that neither Turkish children nor refugee children stay exempt of.

Furthermore, while in Jordan and Lebanon, UN organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations [NGOs] seem to be playing a larger role in the refugee situation, in Turkey, it is clearly visible that most of the decision-making comes from the government itself. The latter situation could have positive impacts by giving a reliable center of reference or negative impacts if the political aspect of refugees is more earnestly considered than the humanitarian aspect of the refugee crisis .

I will be focusing on answering the question “In which ways do the refugee economies in the host country intersect with child labor?

What role do the state’s policies play in it?”

1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” 1951, 3.

2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Turkey Fact Sheet,” 2017, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/60548.

Kaygisiz

61

This paper will argue that longterm achievements on providing livelihood means to refugees by giving the freedom to work have limited impacts on the decrease of child labour if the education system is not built towards giving incentives to enroll in school. Before starting the development of this paper, I would like to highlight that, while Turkey has a long history of refugee welcoming, it has never seen an inflow as big as the Syrian refugees. Furthermore, I am aware of other refugee populations, such as Iraqis, Afghans, Iranians, and Somalis present in Turkey. In order to give details about the situation, I am going to nonetheless focus on Syrian refugees because of their specific status of temporary protection.

take refuge in another country. An asylum-seeker is someone whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed. Written after the Second World War, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees initially only included populations fleeing Europe; however, its Protocol, ratified in 1967, removed its geographical and temporal limits.3 Turkey’s situation and its position in this refugee protection system are particularly interesting to study.

As a matter of fact, while Turkey is considered as an important host country, its Syrian refugee population is not identified as being a refugee group because Turkey did not sign the 1967 Protocol. Having not signed the Protocol means that the refugee status can only be given to those fleeing as a consequence of “events occurring in Theoretical Framework Europe”, which brings up the question of the legal status that Syrian The term ‘refugee’ does not give a refugees have in Turkey under the legal status to stay in a country, but 1951 Convention.4 Therefore, the considers the person called ‘ref- Turkish government welcomed ugee’ as someone who cannot go Syrians fleeing from the events in back to his/her country of origin; Syria as “guests” in 2011, which thereby, as someone who has to later became a contestable term as

3 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” 2.

4 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2.

62 the duration of the conflict in Syria lasted longer than expected.5 Their status has been changed to “under temporary protection” in 2014 with the official implementation of the Regulation on Temporary Protection no.6883 after the Law on Foreigners and International Protection no.28615 has been enacted in 2013.6 This has put Turkey as the first country to give this status to a refugee population.

Moreover, the management of the Syrian refugees has changed hands since it first started. In fact, first under the responsibility of only the Turkish Prime Ministry Disaster and Management Presidency [AFAD], the refugee issue became the responsibility of other relevant ministries as the Syrian refugee question shifted from the emergency phase to a long-term necessity.

The long-term aspect became the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior [MoI] and the Ministry of La-

Chrysalis Vol. XI bor and Social Security [MoLSS].

A new Directorate under the MoI was later on established in 2013 called the Directorate General for Migration Management [DGMM].

Refugee Economies The comprehension of refugees as being a humanitarian issue led to various literature comprising of topics such as the aid emergency , and mental health.7 This literature, especially the one on aid emergency, nonetheless considerably undermined the self-sufficiency that refugees could have acquired if only they had more economic freedom. By putting refugees in the humanitarian assistance field, the literature has not taken into account their plausible contributions to society as economic agents. The latter is remarkably pertinent when we know that there have only been two papers published by authors with an economic background in

5 Müzeyyen Pandır, İbrahim Efe, and Alaaddin F. Paksoy, “Türk basınında Suriyeli sığınmacı temsili üzerine bir içerik analizi,” 2015, 14, http://dspace.marmara.edu.tr/ handle/11424/5343.

6 Pandır, Efe, and Paksoy, 14.

7 Barbara E. Harrell-Bond, Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), https://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/view/21138.; Carolyn L. Williams, An Annotated Bibliography on Refugee Mental Health, An Annotated Bibliography on Refugee Mental Health (Rockville, MD, US: National Institute of Mental Health, 1987).

Kaygisiz the journal of refugee studies.8 It is relatively recent that refugees have been considered as an economic subject with the works of the pioneers Karen Jacobsen and Eric Werker.9 Both Jacobsen and Werker focused on Uganda’s case, however, Jacobsen analyzed refugee economies in cities, and Werker evaluated those in camps. Jacobsen’s pioneer approach on refugee economies in urban cities is more relevant considering the scope of this paper. Jacobsen argues that refugees are often seen as vulnerable people fleeing violence and seeking the help of international organizations when it comes to health, food, and education, while they actually are the major economic actors in their pursuit of livelihoods.10 Livelihoods are defined as an individual or household’s capabilities,

63 assets and activities required for a means of living.11 Therefore, in order to understand analyze the economic life of refugees, we need to research refugee livelihoods as this will allow us to identify the assets they are aiming to build once they seek asylum in another country.

Promoting refugee economies is important not only because “refugees are people with marketable skills and abilities, and a strong motivation to build their own livelihoods” but also because the aid provided by international organizations tends to decrease after the emergency phase as the media attention to the crisis decreases as well.12 According to the UNHCR, earning a living is the most effective way people can rebuild their lives without relying on individuals or organizations.13 This solves

8 Richard Black, “Fifty Years of Refugee Studies: From Theory to Policy,” The International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 62.

9 Karen Jacobsen, “Livelihoods in Conflict: The Pursuit of Livelihoods by Refugees and the Impact on the Human Security of Host Communities,” International Migration 40, no. 5 (2002): 95–123, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2435.00213.; Eric D. Werker, “Refugee Camp Economies,” September 1, 2007, https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/ item.aspx?num=23252.

10 Karen Jacobsen, The Economic Life of Refugees (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2005).

11 Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway, “Sustainable Rural Livelihoods - Practical Concepts for the 21st Century,” IDS Discussion Paper 296 (Brighton, 1991).

12 Nadja Nutz, “A Guide to Market-Based Livelihood Interventions for Refugees,” Instructional material (International Labour Organization & United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017), 1, http://www.ilo.org/empent/areas/value-chain-development-vcd/WCMS_550036/lang--en/index.htm.

13 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Turkey Fact Sheet.”

64 the basic needs aid problem where emergency relief organizations provide food and shelter that is not applicable in the long-term. In Turkey, UNHCR’s work is centered on four pillars with different sectors: cooperation with the Turkish government, cooperation with the private sector, vocational training and skill-building programs, and entrepreneurship programs.14 The most important one in the Turkish context is its cooperation with the Government of Turkey [GoT].

During my internship at UNHCR Ankara, I was surprised to see the diverse joint programs that the office was doing with the MoLSS, the Ministry of National Education [MoNE], the Turkish Labor Agency [TLA], and the Ministry of Customs and Trade [MoCT], notwithstanding the limitations that these programs see, which I am going to expand on later in this paper.

Chrysalis Vol. XI refugee legislation where the right to work and the freedom of movement are stated. According to Jacobsen, “a key problem in developing countries is that many host countries do not have specific laws pertaining to refugees, nor a clearly articulated refugee policy”.15 While it is true that most of the countries that have signed the Convention do not have a national refugee legislation where notably the right to work is granted, Jacobsen’s argument can be debatable in the sense that developed countries enter this category as much as developing countries. Furthermore, knowing that countries such as Uganda and Turkey have granted refugees the right to work while other developed countries have not, has brought me to think whether this division between developing and developed countries’ refugee policies is relevant.

Since Jacobsen, other scholars have taken the lead of studying refugees and their contribution to the The ways in which the host coun- host country’s economy, such as try government can help and im- Alexander Betts, who, taking Japact refugee economies is first and cobsen’s work into consideration, foremost by establishing a national stated that it was missing a “clear Government’s Role in Refugee Economies

14 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (last, “Türkiye’de UNHCR,” 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/tr/turkiyede-unhcr.

15 Jacobsen, The Economic Life of Refugees, 15.

Kaygisiz theoretical framework”.16 His research states that understanding the different place that refugee economies occupy in the market and elaborating a theory about it will have “value for policymakers by highlighting the levers through which policy can (...) create a positive environment for markets to support refugees more sustainability”.17 Nevertheless, his research lacks a theoretical framework as well since differences between refugee and domestic economies are shown. The importance of institutions are highlighted, but concrete solutions and theoretical understandings of these subjects are lacking. While his old and new research present flaws in the refugee system and its literature, some of the arguments presented make accusations without improving the field with constructive solutions. For instance, in his book Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System, Betts announced that Europe is spending much more money on the refugee cause than developing countries.18 He adds that UNHCR has too often ended up supporting

65 arbitrarily selected income-generating activities, from beekeeping to tailoring, that may not be based on a data-driven understanding of the economies into which they are superimposed.19 While I agree that some methods need to be changed in order to address the problem efficiently, I do not agree on the way that the considerable responsibility of addressing refugees’ needs is put on the shoulders of United Nations organizations and NGOs by taking the weight off of developed countries. Their conclusion seems to be that governments that keep evading their responsibilities under the Convention are already doing a lot by consecrating a part of their budget to aid towards refugees, whereas lawyers and workers for NGOs are the ones who should change their methods. The fact that refugee policies depend on multiple facets that the refugee economy literature often missed to show will be explained throughout this paper as well.

Refugee economies can be pursued in camps as well as in cities;

16Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p.8 17 Alexander Betts et al., Refugee Economies: Forced Displacement and Development (Oxford University Press, 2017), 48.

18 Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System 19 Betts and Collier.

66 however, most refugees who left the camps to come to cities did it to pursue better livelihoods. Refugee camps are, for most cases, not suitable for economic activities because they are situated at the host country’s borders, in unpopulated areas (in the Jordanian desert for example) and the only economic activities that refugees can pursue are inside the camps with other refugees, like in Uganda. This is not the case for Turkey where economic activities are not present in refugee camps. Economic activities being limited, most of the refugees who would like to pursue their livelihoods move to urban cities. This is especially true in Turkey where 141,627 or 4% of refugees live in camps and the other 96% (3,501,111 people) are spread all around the country.20 The connections that refugees have in cities with other people of their nationality or their relatives help them to find employment, housing, and sources of credit. Some others find employment, with the help of UNHCR. However, usually, these employments do not correspond to

Chrysalis Vol. XI their capacities and level of education, especially when it comes to Syrians who have graduated from post-secondary education. According to Betts, refugee economies lie between the state and the international community, and the formal and the informal spheres, which make them “analytically distinct from the wider national economy”.21 They exert their rights according to international treaties and benefit of international aid but also are dependent on the host country’s laws and policies. For example, even though the Convention states that refugees have the freedom of movement, host countries often ignore the statement by keeping their refugee populations in segregated areas such as camps.22 The latter drives another institutional distinction in refugee economies that makes their economic activities uncommon, which is the interaction of the formal and informal economies. Indeed, refugees can practice economic activities in a formal environment if the host country has granted them with the right to work or if the absence of a work permit

20 Ministry Of Interior Directorate General Of Migration Management, “Statistics of Sheltered and Unsheltered Syrian Refugees,” 2019, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_915_1024_4748_icerik.

21 Betts et al., Refugee Economies, 42.

22 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.”

Kaygisiz can place them in the informal economic sphere. For Betts, these different institutional contexts are creating market distortions, which can then become opportunities or constraints for refugees and their economic activities.23 Refugee economies being different from domestic economies for the reasons we have stated above, the state can and should have an impact on ameliorating refugees’ livelihood means. “Governments play a critical role in creating and enabling an environment, by allowing freedom of movement and the right to work, giving access to markets and public services, and ensuring financial inclusion”.24 Urban refugees will find a job whether they have a work permit or not because aid organizations are hard to reach and they receive aid from outside the camps. Hence, the state can move refugee economies from the informal to the formal sector in order to prevent unfair competition, low wages for refugees, and child labor. By giving the work permit to Syrians refugees, the Turkish gov-

67 ernment has, in fact, enabled all the Syrian refugees that were already working in urban cities without legal authorization to work under proper conditions enforced by the law.25 Another important aspect that the state needs to concentrate on is the creation of a cohesion between the refugee and the local populations. Especially in Turkey’s case where Syrians seem to settle and plan on staying for a long time in the country, it is important to generate a peaceful coexistence between the two populations. One way the UNHCR in Turkey is dealing with this issue is by organizing specific training programs in areas where there is a need of manpower; for example, nationals in Turkey are migrating from rural to urban cities leaving their agricultural jobs behind.26 Thus, training future farmers is seen by UNHCR as being an option that will not create any conflict in the host country because refugees are not perceived as stealing the jobs from the locals but rather as contributing to the economy in sectors that need them.

However, it is also important to be

23 Betts et al., Refugee Economies.

24 Nutz, “A Guide to Market-Based Livelihood Interventions for Refugees.”

25 Official Gazette, “Regulation on Work Permit for Foreigners under Temporary Protection No.8375,” 2016, http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/01/20160115-23. pdf.

26 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Turkey Fact Sheet.”

68 able to use refugees’ capabilities in an adequate way, especially in the case of entrepreneurs who could contribute to innovative projects in the country. Jacobsen highlights that the state could give credit to refugees who would like to start a business, so that the credit, perceived as aid, could entail a longterm impact on having self-reliant refugees in the country.27 UNHCR and the governments working with it have concentrated for a few years on the idea of self-reliance, which is “the focus on improving the refugee’s own capacity to meet their needs and solve their own problems”.28 Turkey has enabled its Syrian population to start being self-reliant by first cutting some of their expenses through the provision of free health care systems and free public education. Turkey has taken a big step by providing the work permit to its Syrian refugee population. Yet, Syrians in Turkey still face challenges, that I am going to elaborate

Chrysalis Vol. XI below, visible through the reality of child labour, as being a major distortion that unregulated refugee economies can present.

Child Labour According to a Turkish national organization based in Istanbul called Support to Life [STL], “Hayata Destek” in Turkish, more than one million children have to work in Turkey.29 Among these children, 400,000 are working in migratory seasonal agriculture, which, according to the International Labor Organization [ILO] is defined as one of the worst forms of child labor. Child labour is legally prohibited in Turkey with a fee for the employer of 1,560TL (515.52 CAD) per child worker.30 Yet, due to many interrelated factors, children in Turkey, whether they are locals or refugees, find themselves in the labor market at an early age.

The MoLSS states that the multiple types of research made to find the causes of child labor in Turkey have

27 Jacobsen, The Economic Life of Refugees.

28 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.”

29 Hayata Destek, “CHILD PROTECTION IN SEASONAL AGRICULTURE,” Hayata Destek (blog), accessed March 15, 2019, http://www.hayatadestek.org/child-protection-in-seasonal-agriculture/?lang=en.

30 Turkish Labor Law, “4857 Labor Law,” accessed March 15, 2019, http://turkishlaborlaw.com/turkish-labor-law-no-4857/19-4857-labor-law-english-by-article#2.

Kaygisiz shown the factor of poverty as the primary cause.31 In order to pay the rent and to have enough economic resources for basic needs, families have to rely on their child’s contribution to the budget by working.

Indeed, 41.4% of children between the ages of 6 and 17 who work full-time have stated the reason as being to “contribute to their family’s income”.32 Thus, policies to decrease and eradicate child labour in Turkey should provide means to get families out of poverty if the goal is to have a long-term decrease, rather than a seasonal one.

Another important cause of child labor is the rural-urban migration.

Since the 1950s, the rural-urban migration has kept increasing.33 Agricultural jobs have been abandoned, the field lacking a labor supply, which has led to limited urban employment opportunities for the ex-rural inhabitants. With an unemployment rate at around 11.26% in March 2017 in Turkey,

69 families who have migrated recently to urban settings struggle to find jobs, forcing them to take their children out of school and make them work.34 Finding jobs for children is often easier than finding jobs for people at the legal age to work because of multiple benefits that employers can get out of them.

As a matter of fact, employers in small and medium businesses can get more benefits and have fewer costs by employing children who are usually willing to work at a lower wage than adults. This issue is furthermore implemented in a vicious cycle where working children decrease the labor demand, which increases the unemployment rate for legal-aged job-seekers.

Whether it is through rural-urban migrations or international migrations, the arrival of a population can increase the unemployment rate and decrease the school enrollment level if the influx is not organized through regulations. The MoLSS states that disorganized

31 Ministry of Labor and Social Security, “National Program of the Struggle with Child Labor,” 2017, https://www.csgb.gov.tr/media/4755/cocuk_isciligi_rev_23032017.pdf.

32 Turkish Statistical Institute, “Survey on Child Labor,” 2013, http://www.tuik.gov.tr/ PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=13659.

33 Ayse Gedik, “Internal Migration in Turkey, 1965-1985: Test of Conflicting Findings in the Literature,” ResearchGate, 2007, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229979341_Internal_migration_in_Turkey_1965-1985_test_of_conflicting_findings_in_the_literature.

34 Statista, “Turkey - Unemployment Rate 2017,” Statista, accessed March 15, 2019, https://www.statista.com/statistics/263708/unemployment-rate-in-turkey/.

70 migration is another important factor that has been increasing the child labor rate in Turkey, referring to the Syrian refugee crisis.35 The term “disorganized migration” (translated from Turkish “düzensiz göç”) refers to the lack of an effective refugee system after the arrival of a significant refugee population.36 The shortage of infrastructures that refugees have found themselves in when they first came to Turkey, can be one example.

Among the three million Syrian refugees in Turkey, 1,500,000 are children and 976,000 of them are at the age where they can attend school. However, only 325,000 are registered at school.37 While this gap can be explained by the entry of children in the informal labor market at an early age, it can also be explained by the reality of

Chrysalis Vol. XI child marriages. Any situation in which someone under the age of eighteen gets married is considered as a child marriage. This practice occurs in some villages in the South-East of Turkey among Turkish families but also among Syrian families.38 According to Şenol, girls are often seen as a labor force in the house in these areas and both the groom’s and the bride’s family can benefit from their marriage.39 The groom’s family has to pay a lump sum amount of money to the bride’s side when marrying their daughter, which makes marrying a girl at a young age a source of revenue. Hence, poverty, which is often the cause of early marriages, could lead to children and girls in particular, to be left without an education and stuck in the domestic sphere of labor.

35 Ministry of Labor and Social Security, “National Program of the Struggle with Child Labor.”

36 İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, “Türkiye’nin Düzensiz Göçle Mücadelesi,” 2015, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/turkiyenin-duzensiz-gocle-mucadelesi_409_422_424.

37 United Nations Children’s Fund, “Curriculum, Accreditation, and Certification for Syrian Children in Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt,” 2015, http://www. oosci-mena.org/uploads/1/wysiwyg/150527_CAC_for_Syrian_children_report_final. pdf.

38 Dolunay Şenol and Aybike Dinç, “TÜRKİYE’NİN SURİYELİ ÇOCUK GELİNLERİ: SOSYOLOJİK BİR DEĞERLENDİRME,” 2016, 8, https://www.academia. edu/30073025/T%C3%9CRK%C4%B0YEN%C4%B0N_SUR%C4%B0YEL%C4%B0_%C3%87OCUK_GEL%C4%B0NLER%C4%B0_SOSYOLOJ%C4%B0K_B%C4%B0R_DE%C4%9EERLEND%C4%B0RME. 39 Şenol and Dinç, “TÜRKİYE’NİN SURİYELİ ÇOCUK GELİNLERİ.”

Kaygisiz The state regulation has an impact in the case of child marriages. The Turkish Civil Law prohibits marriages under the age of seventeen and the Turkish Child Protection Code sees any person getting married under the age of eighteen as children in need of protection.40 Nevertheless, the Turkish Civil Law states that in exceptional cases with the parents’ approval, a person of sixteen years old can get legally married.41 This gap in the law can sometimes be used for the wrong reasons. Bearing in mind that most child marriages occur without the consent of the child, child marriage also occurs in unofficial ways, which makes its assessment more difficult. In the various causes of child labour stated above, the aforementioned children do not go to school, which shows the correlation between the low rate of enrollment in schools and child labor in Turkey. For the purpose of this paper, I am going

71 to discuss Syrian children’s situation in the education system, but it is important to know, as I have shown above, that Turkish children face the same problems as well, which makes the establishment of policies more urgent and difficult.

The Education System and Its Impacts on Child Labour The most prevalent and crucial reason why many refugee children are working and not going to school in Turkey today is due to limitations in the education system offered to them. The primary school enrollment rate in Syria before the conflict began was 99%, and the secondary school enrollment was 82% with a difference between girls and boys.42 In the 2015-2016 school year, the schooling ratio was at 37% and according to the Turkish Ministry of National Education, the schooling ratio has increased to 63% in the first months of the

40 TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ, “Turkish Civil Law,” sec. 124, accessed March 15, 2019, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k4721.html.

41 Bianet, “Yeni Türk Medeni Kanununda Evlenme,” Bianet, accessed March 15, 2019, https://www.bianet.org/kadin/siyaset/47663-yeni-turk-medeni-kanununda-evlenme.

42 Human Rights Watch, “‘When I Picture My Future, I See Nothing’ | Barriers to Education for Syrian Refugee Children in Turkey,” 2015, https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/11/08/when-i-picture-my-future-i-see-nothing/barriers-education-syrian-refugee-children.

72 2017-2018 school year.43 While the increasing number of school enrollment shows the effects of willing to create incentives for students to attend school can have, we cannot take these numbers as facts.

Indeed, the schooling ratio changes in practice after the first few months of school has started. Additionally, governments tend to round up the numbers to better show the positive effects of their campaigns.

While Syrian refugees have access to public education in Turkey, the enrollment and attendance rates are low.44 According to the Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) for Turkey, “over 40% of Syrian refugee school-aged children remain out of school”.45 First of all,

Chrysalis Vol. XI there is a problem of overcrowding in TECs and Turkish schools especially in cities like Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa, with 24,543 and 79,576 refugees respectively.46 There is a high demand compared to schools’ capacities and not enough infrastructure established, an issue that was present even before the arrival of Syrian refugees in Turkey.47 Due to a lack of funding, this issue is still prevalent today.48 Some families also cannot afford to pay the additional costs that come by enrolling their children in schools.

Many TECs charge relatively low tuition fees such as 440TL (158 USD) that some families are unable to pay, and when the cost of transportation is added, many chil-

43 Turkish Ministry of National Education, “T.C. Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı,” 2015, http:// www.meb.gov.tr/meb_index_dil.php?dil=tr; Turkish Ministry of National Education, “T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı’ndan,” T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2017, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ turkiye_de-duzensiz-goc.tr.mfa.

44 Shelly Culbertson and Louay Constant, Education of Syrian Refugee Children: Managing the Crisis in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan (Santa Monica, UNITED STATES: RAND Corporation, The, 2015), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/mcgill/detail.action?docID=4353525.

45 Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan, “In Response to the Syria Crisis,” 2017, 30, http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/the-3rp/strategic-overview/.

46 Turkish Prime Ministry Disaster and Management Presidency, “Temporary Housing Centers’ Data,” 2017, https://www.afad.gov.tr/upload/Node/2374/files/22_11_2017_ Suriye_GBM_Bilgi_Notu.pdf.

47 Human Rights Watch, “‘When I Picture My Future, I See Nothing’ | Barriers to Education for Syrian Refugee Children in Turkey.”

48 Turkish Prime Ministry Disaster and Management Presidency, “Temporary Housing Centers’ Data.”

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dren find themselves incapable to projects where their interviews attend school. 49 with children have shown the lack of motivation.52 The lack of edMoreover, Syrians come from an ucational programs did not give education system with a different incentives for these children to be curriculum and most importantly a in schools, which can be seen by distinct language, which are a ma- the fact that the enrollment rate is jor source of demotivation when higher in primary school compared it comes to refugees.50 The differ- to secondary school among Syrian ent language taught in schools is refugee children in Turkey.53 Inparticularly an issue for refugee deed, learning a language in primachildren who have been in Tur- ry school, at a younger age, is often key since the war in Syria broke less problematic than doing so and out. These children’s families ex- changing curriculum when in secpected to go back to Syria and did ondary school. not anticipate the war to last that long; hence, integration into the One may wonder how the lack of Turkish society was not a priority a proper education system for reffor them.51 Furthermore, enrolling ugees could increase child labour. their children in public schools in According to the Turkish Labour Turkey was not a priority either. Law no.4857, the mandatory edConsequently, these children have ucation everyone has to receive is missed several years of school- until the age of fifteen. Thus, it is ing, are behind the grade that they legally permitted to students to be should be in, and are not motivated physically absent in school beginenough to go back to school and ning from age fifteen. This leads start from a lower grade. This topic students to work part-time in orhas been at the center of UNICEF der to contribute to their family’s 49 Human Rights Watch, “‘When I Picture My Future, I See Nothing’ | Barriers to Education for Syrian Refugee Children in Turkey.”

50 United Nations Children’s Fund, “Curriculum, Accreditation, and Certification for Syrian Children in Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt.”

51 Humanitarian Practice Network, “Schooling in a Crisis: The Case of Syrian Refugees in Turkey,” ODI HPN, 2013, https://odihpn.org/magazine/schooling-in-a-crisisthe-case-of-syrian-refugees-in-turkey/.

52 United Nations Children’s Fund, “Curriculum, Accreditation, and Certification for Syrian Children in Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt.”

53 Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan, “In Response to the Syria Crisis.”

74 income, which is still permitted under the condition that they work as trainees.54 However, the reality is that a lot of children and particularly refugees under the age of eighteen are working, as eighteen is the legal age to work full-time.

The latter puts them in the informal sector which affects refugee economies in the country as well as the domestic economy in general. As mentioned above, even if child labour is a crime in Turkey and employers involved in it can be prosecuted, they do not prevent it. Being illegally employed makes children vulnerable because of the absence of a social insurance as well as a contract showing the obligations that the employer has towards them. The government has taken some steps to make education accessible to every Syrian child by lifting legal barriers for Syrian refugees to access education. Indeed, it has removed the requirement of having a residency permit to enroll in schools, and has opened Temporary Education Centers (TECs) in camps and outside camps since 2014 where Syrians can be taught

Chrysalis Vol. XI with an Arabic-curriculum.55 Situated in cities that host large Syrian populations, TECs outside refugee camps, as well as the ones inside, use a curriculum largely similar to the one Syrians were using in their country, with parts about Bashar al-Assad removed.56 While these steps can be considered as a progress compared to the beginning of the refugee crisis where even these institutions and regulations were absent, there is still a long road ahead. Improving these institutions should be centered around fighting poverty, improving the education system, decreasing the benefits of employing children.

Policy Solutions / What Kinds of Solutions Would be Conceivable?

By taking into consideration the fact that refugees might be staying in the host country for a long period of time and even that they might have new generations settled in it, we need to find solutions that will integrate them into the country. We need to establish a peaceful coex-

54 Turkish Labor Law. “4857 Labor Law.” http://turkishlaborlaw.com/turkish-laborlaw-no-4857/19-4857-labor-law-english-by-article#2.

55 Human Rights Watch, “‘When I Picture My Future, I See Nothing’ | Barriers to Education for Syrian Refugee Children in Turkey.”

56 United Nations Children’s Fund, “Curriculum, Accreditation, and Certification for Syrian Children in Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt.”

Kaygisiz istence with the locals, to decrease poverty among refugees and integrate them into the labour market in order to prevent children entering the labour market at an early age.

As mentioned in the introduction, people fleeing conflict usually go to neighbouring countries. As most of the conflicts are situated today in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to put in place a project relevant to the region it will help. The 3RP I have talked about in the prior developments focuses on a “strong national leadership in the humanitarian response, strengthened accountability, expanded livelihoods and economic opportunities, educational opportunities for children and young people, common regional approaches to protecting the rights, dignity and safety of refugees”.57 This is an adequate solution primarily because of its regional aspect giving major host countries and its refugee populations specific plans that would increase livelihood and education opportunities. One of their projects concerns giving financial incentives to education personnel and teachers who participate in train-

75 ings tailored to Syrian students’ needs. These trainings lead to two outcomes, the first one being the support of refugee self-reliance by giving them the appropriate skills to work in the education field, and the second outcome being to fight the lack of infrastructure that prevents children from going to TECs.58 Based on the meetings I have attended during my internship that were focused on the 3RP plan in Turkey, I have seen that projects focused specifically on school enrollment were pilot projects and were in the early stages of efficiency-testing before being implementing all around the country. Their education projects focus on motivating students to attend school by giving scholarships; in 2017, for example, 16,000 high school graduates have received a scholarship.

Furthermore, it also gave 13,000 out-of-school children informal education programs.59 However, the 3RP plan is at an early stage today as evident by the small number of children that benefited from its education projects. It is therefore rather early to decide whether or not it is an efficient solution to the problem, at least for the case of Turkey. The 2017 3RP stated

57 Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan, “In Response to the Syria Crisis,” 7.

58 Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan, “In Response to the Syria Crisis.”

59 Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan.

76 that “operational challenges on the ground have forced 3RP partners to scale-down these activities” which resulted in the failure to reach their original target.60 Other projects under the 3RP with the cooperation of UN organizations (mainly UNHCR and UNICEF) have been effective in increasing the enrollment rate in schools.61 The ones that have seen the best long-term consequences are the various language programs provided not only to refugee children but also adults.62 These language courses have two main goals in mind: helping children who have missed school to regain the grade level they are supposed to be in, as well as helping them integrate to their local community by teaching them Turkish. Another way increasing school enrollment and giving incentives to families to register their children in schools has been found by the implementation of a project, first created in 2003, aiming to give credit to families that register their chil-

Chrysalis Vol. XI dren in schools. The project called the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education [CCTE] has been used since its creation to specific populations that have had low rates of school enrollment.63 It has been re-implemented to Syrian refugees; the UNICEF and the Turkish Red Crescent are working together to transfer cash to Syrian families whose children are regularly attending school and is funded through the European Union [EU].

The CCTE is working through the same debit card used for another credit-based program called the Emergency Social Safety Net [ESSN], the organization that most thoroughly works on providing credit to Syrian refugee families in need in Turkey. Credit is an effective way to help families in need to cover their basic-needs without them resorting into dependence on their child’s income. The program came to life with a partnership between the European Union and the Turkish government and is implemented in Turkey by the European Union Civil Protection and

60 Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan.

61 Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan.

62 Asylum Information Database, “Access to Education - Turkey,” accessed March 15, 2019, https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/access-education-1.

63 European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations - European Commission, “Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) Programme for Refugee Children in Turkey,” Text, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/echo/field-blogs/videos/conditional-cash-transfer-education-ccte-programme-refugee-children-turkey_en.

Kaygisiz Humanitarian Aid [ECHO], the World Food Programme [WFO], and the Turkish Red Crescent.64 Every month, a fixed amount is transferred to vulnerable families’ debit cards which they can use to meet their essential needs. While this program is considered as the “biggest humanitarian project that the European Union has ever funded”, the fixed amount provided is way lesser than the amount needed for a family to subsist in a month.65 Indeed, ESSN provides 120TL (16 euros) per family member every month, which is not enough for a family to buy food, medicines, or to pay rent, which all go under the basic-needs category.66 We have seen that in order to eliminate child labour and prevent the loss of a generation, it is important to give employment opportunities to parents so that their situation

77 of unemployment and poverty do not make their children obliged to support their families by working. The freedom to work given to Syrian refugees under Temporary Protection has also been considered as a big step by the UNHCR in Turkey and around the world as a sustainable move in the refugee problem. The status of Temporary Protection has been granted to Syrian refugees on October 22nd, 2014, and the right to work was given on January 15th, 2016 for the beneficiaries of temporary protection.67 According to the regulation published by the Turkish government, refugees under the status of temporary protection are able to request a work permit six months after having been in Turkey.68 UNHCR Turkey has considered this as a big step towards a dignified life that refugees usually do not experience in a host country.69 Moreover,

64 ESSN, “Power of Partnerships,” ESSN (blog), 2017, https://www.essncard.com/ powerofpartnerships/.

65 ESSN, “The ESSN Card,” ESSN (blog), 2017, https://www.essncard.com/aboutcard/.

66 ESSN. 67 İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, “General Information on Temporary Protection,” 2015, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/genel-bilgi_409_558_1094; Turkish Labor Law, “Turkey Grants Work Permit for Syrian Refugees,” 2016, http:// turkishlaborlaw.com/news/legal-news/362-turkey-grants-work-permit-for-syrian-refugees.

68 Turkish Labor Law. 69 Daily Sabah, “Turkey Grants Work Permits to Refugees,” Daily Sabah, 2016, https:// www.dailysabah.com/economy/2016/04/27/turkey-grants-work-permits-to-refugees.

78 we have talked about the positive outcomes of employing Syrian refugees in the agricultural and textile industries where a labor supply is needed. By contributing to the host country’s economy without giving the impression of taking the jobs from the locals, this seems like a good long-term solution to prevent tensions between the locals and refugees that could unleash conflicts later. However, this solution is limited to refugees who do not have a post-secondary degree diploma. The issue of the high unemployment rate in Turkey that came around often in this paper is specifically a problem for university graduates who find themselves unemployed after their studies. Similar to Turkish job-seekers, Syrians with secondary education degrees struggle in finding jobs that correspond to the level of their diplomas, and neither NGOs nor UN organizations have found a solution to the lack of job opportunities in the tertiary sector.

This brings us to the central lim-

Chrysalis Vol. XI itation that projects in Turkey concerning refugees encounter: the lack of funding. Solutions and projects are easier to theoretically formulate than to apply in practice, and the main reason behind the some pilot projects that do not see the light is that of the lack of funding available to them. According to the UNHCR, Turkey has received and possesses 49% of the funding required to finance projects related to health, education, and livelihoods for its refugee population.70 The amount of funds has partially increased as a result of the Turkey-EU deal reached on 18 March 2016 in order to completely stem the massive influx of migrants into the EU from the Aegean Sea. The EU has sped up the disbursement of the initially allocated €3 billion to address the immediate humanitarian and development needs of refugees in Turkey. The EU also committed to mobilize additional funding up to €3 billion by the end of 2018.71 As of November 2017, 55 projects have been contracted worth more than €1.78 bil-

70 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Turkey Fact Sheet.”

71 Preben Aamann, “EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016 - Consilium” (European Council, 2016), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/ eu-turkey-statement/.

Kaygisiz lion, out of which €908 million has been disbursed.72 Most of the projects are related to education and healthcare. The EU has provided financial aid not only to the Turkish government but also to various UN institutions and NGOs dealing with the refugee crisis in the country. Coordination between institutions is established through the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT), which became operational in February 2016. The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, managing a total of €3 billion for 2016 and 2017, provides for a joint coordination mechanism, designed to ensure that the needs of refugees and host communities in Turkey are addressed in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. The Facility focuses on humanitarian assistance, education, migration management, health, municipal infrastructure, and socio-economic support.73 Yet, I have seen during my internship that funding from the European Commission takes time to reach the UNHCR, which reduces the efficiency of the project implementa-

79 tion process. The latter can be seen with the small amount of credit that the ESSN can give to vulnerable families, for example.

While this research paper has been based on an economic and rather case-study approach on Turkey so far, it is important to highlight the political aspect that comes with welcoming refugees. Some articles and points of view different from the government argue that welcoming Syrians is also providing the government in power with more support. As various debates are centered around this subject, I can say that even a humanitarian response could turn into political objectives, which should be mentioned in this paper. Turkey’s latest referendum, that resulted in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan having more political power, had very split results with 51% of the voters having agreed to the constitutional change and 49% who have not.74 Since then, discussions and hints have been pointed out evoking the plausible citizenships that

72 European Commission, “Progress Report on the European Agenda on Migration” (Brussels, 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017669-F1-EN-ANNEX-3-PART-1.PDF. 73 Aamann, “EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016 - Consilium.”

74 Kareem Shaheen, “Erdoğan Clinches Victory in Turkish Constitutional Referendum,” The Guardian, April 16, 2017, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2017/apr/16/erdogan-claims-victory-in-turkish-constitutional-referendum.

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80 could be attributed to Syrians in Turkey. The latter would increase the support for the government in power. Another limitation concerning the solutions cited above is the fact that still many Syrians are not registered as under temporary protection, which makes us wonder if the goal of the work permit to eradicate informal employment has been achieved. Indeed, there is still the problem of information passing when it concerns Syrian refugees’ rights in Turkey. Employers do not know their right to employ one Syrian every nine Turkish employee, which shows the lack of information that they get.

Conclusion Refugee economies have started to be taken into account in host countries’ dealing with refugees. Turkey has given the right to work and the freedom of movement to its Syrian refugee population which has settled long-term improvement in their pursuit of livelihoods. However, this paper argued that longterm achievements on providing livelihood means to refugees by giving the freedom to work have limited impacts on the decrease of child labor if the education system is not built towards giving incen-

tives to enroll in school.

The influx of Syrian refugees in Turkey and the lack of regulation and institutions implemented in the country when they first came, led to the situation called disorganized migration explained in this paper.

The majority of Syrian refugees started to live in urban cities outside refugee camps. Being hard to track by UN organization such as UNHCR, they have been deprived of assistance. Expectations of going back to Syria soon and the lack of incentives for education have contributed to the low enrollment and attendance rates in schools.

The multiple issues that Turkish children still encounter today have shown that problems in the education system have been present in Turkey even before the arrival of Syrians. Solutions have been proposed by the government, national and international organizations as well as by the EU that have managed to increase the enrollment rate in schools and decrease the unemployment rate. However, these solutions have been deficient in their large-scale implementations due to a shortage of funding.

Finally, in spite of centralizing the link of refugees and child labour around their economies and liveli-

Kaygisiz hoods, it is important to remember that refugeehood could be used for political means in certain contexts and that there is no white or black picture in understanding the issues around the will to integrate them to the Turkish society. Passing by a difficult period with social and political divisions in the country, Turkey’s government, its NGOs and UN organizations, as well as its local population should find ways to include their refugee populations economically and socially without incorporating them to the present political disputes in the country.

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Statista. “Turkey - Unemployment Rate 2017.” Statista. Accessed March 15, 2019. https://www.statista.com/statistics/263708/unemployment-rate-in-turkey/.

“Turkey Inter-Agency Information Hub.” Accessed March 15, 2019. http://www.refugeeinfoturkey.org/.

Turkish Labor Law. “4857 Labor Law.” Accessed March 15, 2019. http://turkishlaborlaw.com/turkish-labor-law-no-4857/19-4857-labor-law-english-by-article#2.

———. “Turkey Grants Work Permit for Syrian Refugees,” 2016. http://turkishlaborlaw.com/news/legal-news/362-turkey-grants-work-permit-for-syrian-refugees.

Turkish Ministry of National Education. “T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı’ndan.” T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2017. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_de-duzensiz-goc.tr.mfa.

———. “T.C. Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı,” 2015. http://www.meb.gov.tr/meb_index_dil.php?dil=tr.

Turkish Prime Ministry Disaster and Management Presidency. “Temporary Housing Centers’ Data,” 2017. https://www.afad.gov.tr/upload/Node/2374/files/22_11_2017_Suriye_GBM_Bilgi_Notu.pdf.

Turkish Statistical Institute. “Official Statistics Portal,” 2017. http://www.officialstatistics.gov.tr/?q=en.

———. “Survey on Child Labor,” 2013. http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=13659.

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TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ. “Turkish Civil Law.” Accessed March 15, 2019. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k4721.html.

United Nations Children’s Fund. “Curriculum, Accreditation, and Certification for Syrian Children in Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt,” 2015. http://www.oosci-mena.org/uploads/1/wysiwyg/150527_CAC_for_Syrian_children_report_final. pdf.

———. “Under Siege: The Devastating Impact on Children of Three Years of Conflict in Syria,” 2014. https://www.unicef.org/publications/index_72815.html.

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———. “UNHCR Turkey Fact Sheet,” 2017. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/60548.

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Werker, Eric D. “Refugee Camp Economies,” September 1, 2007. https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item. aspx?num=23252.

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Yeginsu, Ceylan. “In Turkey, a Syrian Child ‘Has to Work to Survive.’” The New York Times, December 21, 2017, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/05/world/europe/in-turkey-a-syrian-child-has-to-work-to-surv ive.html.

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Mothers of the World: The Politics of Transnational Female Childcare Provider Immigration

By Marie Lemieux

Lemieux

87 Abstract

Abstrait

Using qualitative evidence, this paper examines the politics of transnational female childcare provider immigration to argue that these migrants should not only be perceived as disempowered actors but also as empowered actors.

To do so, the paper is separated in three sections. The first section provides a summary and critical analysis of terms relevant to the discussion outlined above to ground the essay in scholarship. Through the “global care chain” theory, the second section discusses the dual status of the female childcare providers as disempowered actors and, and as well as perpetrators of disempowerment. The third section concludes with the argument that female childcare workers are also empowered in their migration through their ability to achieve increased economic security, to challenge gender norms and to re-define motherhood.

À l’aide de données qualitatives, cet article examine les politiques en matière d’immigration des gardiennes d’enfants à domicile pour faire valoir que la migration de ces femmes, les subjugue dans leur pays d’hôte, tout en les forçant à rester asservi dans leur pays d’origine. Pour ce faire, l’article, divisé en trois sections, fournit un résumé et une analyse critique des termes pertinents pour la discussion décrite ci-dessus. De plus, grâce à la théorie de «global care chain», cette dissertation traite du double statut des femmes de ce milieu, qui sont à la fois «servantes» et «maîtresses». La dernière section se termine par l’argument selon lequel les travailleuses des services de garde d’enfants sont également habilitées dans leur migration grâce à leur capacité d’atteindre une sécurité économique accrue, de contester les normes sexospécifiques et de redéfinir la maternité.

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88 “When performed by mothers, we call this mothering […] when performed by hired hands, we call it unskilled.”1 Introduction

tics of transnational female childcare provider immigration, arguing that these migrants should not only be perceived as disempowered actors but also as empowered actors.

To do so, I will first examine terms relevant to the discussion outlined above to ground the essay in scholarship; I will then examine how the international care chain theory posits that through migration, women migrant childcare providers should be perceived as disempowered actors and as perpetrators of disempowerment; finally, I will explore how female domestic workers become empowered in their migration through their ability to achieve increased economic security, to challenge gender norms of the sending state and to re-define motherhood.

In the early 1900s, social scientists predicted that domestic service would disappear due to people’s unwillingness to partake into the mistress-servant model; while terms for these roles have since changed, this model is ever-present in society and has not only survived but thrived with globalization. However, a prediction that has held true is that the work of serving others continues to be undertaken by migrants and members of ethnic groups.2 Indeed, transnational migration from low-income countries towards high-income countries to Definitions provide domestic service workers has blossomed. Accompanying this Domestic and Childcare phenomenon are a host of dynamWorkers ics regarding the relationships between the workers, their employers While the field of domestic work and their employees. is vast and diverse, in this essay I This essay will examine the poli- solely focus on female childcare

1 Barbara Katz Rothman, Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society (New York: Norton, 1989), 43.

2 Mary Romero, Valerie Preston and Wenona Giles, “Care Work in a Globalizing World,” in When Care Work Goes Global: Locating the Social Relations of Domestic Work, eds. Mary Romero, Valerie Preston and Wenona Giles (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 5.

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providers in an attempt to provide a full picture of their lived experiences. Nonetheless, it is important to understand the meaning of domestic workers. According to United Nations (UN) Women Executive Director Michelle Bachelet, domestic workers are employees hired “by private households to carry out housework and care for children, and elderly or sick family members”.3 On the other hand, childcare providers, constituting a subset of domestic workers, are primarily responsible for the care of underage charges. However, they may be assigned other responsibilities at the discretion of their employers.

ny” as they perceive it as a class signal used by their employers to demonstrate that they can “claim upper middle-class status” due to their ability to afford hired help.4 On the other hand, some childcare providers do not mind the use of the term “nanny”. This leads to the conclusion that self-definition is important, as each childcare provider defines her work and the title associated to it differently. Some childcare providers self-define according to “how they reflected the employer’s status, others did so according to the amount of responsibilities one had during a workday” while others childcare providers made no distinction.5 In this essay, I will use the term “childcare proThe terms used to refer to childcare vider(s)” when discussing domesproviders are contested. According tic workers working in childcare, to Tamara Brown, author of Rais- unless an account uses a specific ing Brooklyn, a book focusing on title. the lived experiences of Caribbean childcare providers in BrookWomen Migrants lyn, some childcare providers use “nanny”, “babysitter”, “sitter” Women migrants represent a large and “caregiver” interchangeably, segment of the migrating populawhile others reject the term “nan- tion. Contrary to popular belief, 3 Michelle Bachelet, “Gender and Migration: Care Workers at the Interface of Migration and Development,” UN Women, 11 May 2011, http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2011/5/gender-and-migration-care-workers-at-the-interface-of-migration-and-development.

4 Tamara M. Brown, Raising Brooklyn: Nannies, Childcare, and Caribbeans Creating Community (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 15.

5 Brown, Raising Brooklyn, 14-15.

90 they are often highly educated and possess significant financial means. While women are traditionally depicted as “non-migrants” or as companions to male family members, women migrants have constituted 47 percent of migrants since 1960.6 Moreover, women who migrate to perform care work, a term defined below, constitute the “single largest female occupational group migrating globally”.7 Their experiences “are shaped profoundly by the type of work they perform”.8 Indeed, female migrants typically leave their home countries in search of female-dominated jobs that are often situated in the lowest strata of the receiving state’s economy, regardless of the women’s training or education.9 Rhacel Parreñas, author of Servants of Globalization: Migrants and Globalization, claims that female migrant domestic workers struggle to accept the status associated with their work, as “low labour-mar-

Chrysalis Vol. XI ket status”, while also struggling to reconcile their employment and their education, as many have obtained degrees in their home countries.10 In the case of Filipina women, regardless of their education, they still earn higher wages in the receiving country as domestic workers than in their home country, where they often worked in a professional field.11 Thus, these migrant women’s professional background suggests that their migration to high-income countries is an option primarily available to women with the financial means to do so.12 Reproductive Labour According to Rhacel Parreñas, reproductive labour refers to “the labour needed to sustain the [...] labour force”.13 This work has traditionally been performed by low-income women of color, and purchased by class-privileged

6 Jill Borak, Women Migrant Workers: Embracing Empowerment Over Victimization (Central Virginia Legal Aid Society Inc, June 2005), 4.

7 Romero, et al., “Care Work in a Globalizing World,” 1.

8 Borak, Women Migrant Workers, 5.

9 Borak, Women Migrant Workers, 5.

10 Rhacel S. Parreñas, Servants of Globalization: Migration and Domestic Work (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 117.

11 Rhacel Salazar Parreñas,”Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers and the International Division of Reproductive Labour,” Gender & Society 14, no. 4 (2000): 566.

12 Parreñas,”Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers,” 573.

13 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 29.

Lemieux women. Mary Romero refers to this situation as class-privileged women’s opportunity “to hire a wife”, which permits them to be freed from domestic work.14 This leads to a “racial division of reproductive labour”, which establishes a hierarchical division between ethnic groups.15 With globalization, this division has internationalized, where this labour is performed by imported women of low-income countries and is purchased by women of high-income countries, often from the global North. This phenomenon is known as the “international division of reproductive labour”.16 This work includes household work such as chores, elderly care, childcare, among other tasks.17 Care work, a significant part of reproductive labour, carries normative implications.18 As it is traditionally “carried out in the private domestic sphere, be-

91 cause it carries the low value of a woman’s unpaid household workseen as part of women’s nature and requiring no special work”.19 Moreover, this work is viewed as “an extension of a woman’s role in the home”.20 Thus, migrant women performing care work are often underpaid and under-valued, as their work is perceived to necessitate no special skills.

Disempowerment “I found out about the job in a newspaper ad and I called them and they asked me to come in for an interview. I was accepted after that. They just asked me if I knew how to take care of a child and I told them that I did because I had five children of my own. But come to think of it, I was not the one watching them because I had a maid to do that.”21

14 Salazar Parreñas, “Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers,” 562; Mary Romero, Maid in the U.S.A. (New York: Routledge, 1992), 129-130.

15 Evelyn N. Glenn, “From Servitude to Service Work: Historical Continuities in the Racial Division of Paid Reproductive Labour,” Signs 18, no. 1 (1992): 3.

16 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 29.

17 Salazar Parreñas, “Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers,” 561.

18 Nicola Yeates, “Global Care Chains: A State-of-the-Art Review and Future Directions in Care Transnationalization Research,” Global Networks 12, no. 2 (2012): 136.

19 Bachelet, “Gender and Migration: Care Workers at the Interface of Migration and Development.”

20 Borak, Women Migrant Workers, 6.

21 Arlie Russell Hochschild, “Global Care Chains and Emotional Surplus Value,” in Global Capitalism, eds. Will Hutton and Anthony Giddens (New York: New Press, 2000), 131.

92 -Vicky Diaz, a Filipina childcare provider

Global Care Chain The disempowerment endured by female childcare providers is best represented by the international division of caretaking, known as “the global care chain”, a term invented

by Hochschild. In this model, female migrant childcare providers are disempowered while perpetuating “trans-border” disempowerment, through the subjugation of women in their sending country.

At its most simple, “the global care chain” refers to “personal links between people across the globe based on the paid or unpaid work of caring” and are traditionally made up of women.22 This chain is constituted of “sets of caretakers”, where a female migrant childcare provider takes care of class-privileged children in the host state while a female childcare provider takes care of the female migrant childcare provider’s children in the sending state and so on.23 I focus on the female actors within “the global care chain” not to “reinforce 22 Hochschild, “Global Care Chains,” 131.

23 Hochschild, “Global Care Chains,” 136.

24 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 49.

25 Yeates, “Global Care Chains,” 138.

Chrysalis Vol. XI the notion that care is inherently a woman’s responsibility” but rather to highlight that women are still responsible for most of care work and men still provide so little of care.24 Female Migrant Childcare Providers As female migrant childcare providers have the available means to leave their home state, the biggest burden they face is the emotional stress associated with their departure, their new work and the phenomenon of reverse class mobility, which all lead to disempowerment. First, the unburdening of care by class-privileged women in the receiving state onto the migrant childcare provider is associated with emotional costs for the women migrants. They must overcome loss associated with the longterm separation with their families and communities.25 Moreover, the emotional vulnerability is seen with the transference of care from their child onto their young charge, a phenomenon known as displaced mothering. Women also manifest their emotional vulnerability by

Lemieux referring to their charges as their child; it is also manifested in the behavior they adopt towards the children they are responsible for, as they may start to treat them as their own children.26 As they are unable to take care of their children, the migrant women emotionally adopt other people’s children to palliate the loss.27 These emotional coping mechanisms are sometimes exploited by employers, leading to women’s disempowerment. Employers take advantage of their employees’ emotional vulnerability to cross boundaries: They talk of their childcare provider as “part of the family” to convince her to work longer, often for the same salary.28 This leads to childcare workers’ disempowerment, as their emotions are exploited and they lose part of their agency regarding the creation of boundaries with their employers due to the emotional bonds created between the women and their charges.

Female migrant childcare providers experience contradictory class 26 Brown, Raising Brooklyn, 13.

27 Brown, Raising Brooklyn, 13.

28 Brown, Raising Brooklyn, 13.

29 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 117.

30 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 117.

31 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 118.

32 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 26.

93 mobility when they arrive in the host state, as they go through both a “decline in occupational status and increase in financial status”.29 This feeling is also experienced by the migrant childcare workers as “the contradiction of both having a maid and being one”.30 This descent in class status is associated with a large stigma and a sense of loss, as migrant women speak of their work as “a process that makes one stupid”.31 Moreover, reverse class mobility is associated with a high level of isolation, which in turn reminds migrant women even more of their new lower-class status. According to Parreñas, Filipina domestic workers have been systematically excluded of their host society, regardless of the country.32 While the emotional disadvantages are palliated by financial advantages, reverse class mobility is disempowering for migrant women as the process of being reminded of their lower-class status as well as the inherent power relations with their employers heightens their vulnerability and thus leads them to take a

Chrysalis Vol. XI

94 meek and deferent position.33 Evidence of the effect of reverse class mobility is that women actively seek to escape feelings associated with it, by imagining themselves returning to their home state and by emphasizing the imagined racial hierarchy between different ethnicities of childcare providers to justify that they are “better” than other kinds of providers.34 Local Female Childcare Providers The unburdening of care by female migrant childcare providers onto local women is associated with low income and no benefits for the local women, and build-in inequalities among women in low-income countries. First, women in the sending state that are employed by migrant workers abroad earn a salary of around USD $40 per month, and do not earn benefits. This illustrates the drastic salary disparity between local women and migrant women, as domestic workers, including childcare workers can earn around USD $1000 a month in Italy, a primary destination for Filipina women.35 While this drastic income disparity does not capture the lived

experiences of all female migrant childcare providers, it serves to illustrate how migrant childcare providers perpetuate the disempowerment of local women, as they will most likely be unable to leave the home state to seek a higher-paying job abroad due to lack of financial resources, as earning as little as USD $40 a month will most likely prevent women from being able to leave their home country. Rhacel Parreñas stresses the latter point as she states that women performing childcare in the sending state should not be equated to their employers, women performing childcare in the receiving state. This is the case as women who can leave their home state are often educated and belong to the middle-class; thus, they can afford to leave. On the other hand, female childcare providers in the sending state belong to lower social strata, and are treated as such. This dynamic is reproduced within families in the sending state, where non-egalitarian relations are indulged in regardless of blood relations. A hierarchy develops between the women who can leave and those who do not; those who cannot are treated as paid caretakers for children of the

33 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 130.

34 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 120.

35 Salazar Parreñas, “Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers,” 570.

Lemieux women who left.36 This hierarchy disempowers women in the sending state as it takes away their opportunity to leave their home state as they have no means to do so and thus takes away their opportunity to seek a better life abroad.

The situation of local female childcare providers, described above, can be best understood through the Marxist feminist view of the global care chain, as it accurately explains how reproductive labour “is at the center of women’s oppression”.37 As such, as class-privileged women unload their reproductive labour responsibilities onto their female childcare providers, these providers perpetuate the disempowerment of women in their home state, as they unload their reproductive labour responsibilities onto female family members or female hired staff.38 The women in the sending state are most often poorer than the migrant women, as they are unable to leave their home country to seek better economic conditions due to low salaries.39

95 Empowerment “Working abroad and supporting my family makes me feel good. […]

I’m not just the one who takes care of people […] now I’m the one who sends money and who cares […]

I’m both the ‘father’ and the ‘mother’.”40 -Filipina migrant woman (name withheld) Gaining Financial Security By gaining financial security, female childcare providers can become more empowered in their lives. Filipina middle-class women, even with a high level of education, face economic difficulties in sustaining themselves and their family in their home state even if they have access to enough resources to be able to leave the Philippines.41 As explained above, women migrants often labour in female-dominated jobs that are situated in the lowest rung of the receiving state’s

36 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 46.

37 Glenn, “From Servitude to Service Work,” 2.

38 Ethel Tungohan, “Reconceptualizing Motherhood, Reconceptualizing Resistance,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 15, no. 1 (2013): 43.

39 Salazar Parreñas, “Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers,” 574.

40 Tungohan, “Reconceptualizing Motherhood,” 47.

41 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 29.

96 economy. Thus, in the receiving state, they face income inequality compared to men, as they work in lower-paying jobs, which are associated with lower to no benefits and no opportunity for advancement.42 Nonetheless, by migrating abroad, these females can become the breadwinners for their family. According to Ethel Tungohan, “earning money and being their families’ primary providers heightened feelings of independence and self-worth”, which thus empowers female childcare workers as they feel more in control of their lives.43 Moreover, female childcare providers sometimes use their increased financial security as a strategic mean to build towards a better future. In “Value Plus Plus: Housewifization and History in Philippine Care Migration”, Pauline Gardiner Barber and Catherine Bryan present the story of Maria, a Filipina childcare provider who used her employment as an opportunity to secure permanent residency in Canada and to seek education

Chrysalis Vol. XI to work as a nurse. After securing both opportunities, she could help her sister migrate by obtaining her a job with Maria’s initial employers.44 Migrants often consider their aspirations when choosing where to migrate for work; while some destinations are better known for securing permanent residency and furthering one’s education, such as Europe and North America, others are known as temporary destinations to raise funds for an eventually return to the sending state.45 This empowers female migrant childcare providers as they can find personal meaning in their work and isolation from their families. As explained above, female providers experience shame due to the stigmatized nature of their work; by infusing personal goals into their work, such as raising a certain amount of money, or working for a certain number of years to obtain permanent residency or citizenship, they can find personal meaning and renewed agency in their lives.

42 Borak, Women Migrant Workers, 6.

43 Tungohan, “Reconceptualizing Motherhood,” 44.

44 Pauline Gardiner Barber and Catherine Bryan, “Value Plus Plus: Housewifization and History in the Philippine Care Migration,” in When Care Work Goes Global: Locating the Social Relations of Domestic Work, eds. Mary Romero, Valerie Preston and Wenona Giles (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 39.

45 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 5.

Lemieux Challenging Gender Norms By challenging gender norms through migration, female childcare providers can become more empowered in their lives. First, migration challenges socio-cultural expectations tied to their gender in the sending state, where women are supposed to be caring, present creatures. Furthermore, departure from the sending state liberates women from the immediate constraints of the socio-cultural expectations, as they can no longer physically care for their household.46 However, it does not liberate women from the emotional expectations that they hold towards themselves, as most, if not all, stay involved in their families’ lives. Second, it permits migrant women “to negotiate gender constraints”.47 In Servants of Globalization: Migration and Domestic Work, Filipina migrants shared that they embraced the opportunity to leave their home state to escape their husbands for several reasons, such as domestic abuse, infidelity or fear of ostracization if they sought a divorce.48 This analysis does not only apply to women 46 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 32.

47 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 34.

48 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 37.

49 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization, 33.

97 in relationships; single and childless women also sought to leave the Philippines to escape the narrow gender roles imposed by their families and society, where they had to take on the upkeep of the household. One of the migrant women said that she “felt suffocated by the duties [her family] expected her to perform”.49 Thus, challenging gender of the norms of the sending state permits women to achieve agency in their lives by choosing to reject socio-cultural expectations and instead embracing the role of provider by raising money abroad, which they do through care work.

Challenging Maternity By meeting their maternal obligations through unconventional means and re-defining motherhood, female migrant childcare providers can become empowered in their lives. Female migrants with children challenge the “socio-constructed expectations of maternal behavior” of their home state, where they are expected to be a caring, physical and active presence in their family’s house-

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98 hold.50 After their departure, they are caught in a web of expectations; where they must send remittances to their family while being criticized for not rising to the expectations of typical maternal behavior. Furthermore, gendered expectations befall female migrants, as the social reproduction responsibilities associated with their families, lead to an expectation than women will stay in close touch with their families.51 This can be contrasted with the migrant men’s “breadwinner” responsibilities, which have no such emotional expectations. Thus, seeking to fulfill all the obligations laid out above, these women resort to “transnational hyper-maternalism”, where they demonstrate their maternity through financial support and surveillance that permit cross-border communication with their transnational family.52 In some instances, “the mother-child ties are reduced to commodity-based relations with love shown through material goods”.53 This can be compared to the class-privileged mother-child relationship, where the mother, or

parents, purchase the best commodity they can afford to take care of their child, a childcare provider. However, Tungohan stresses that financial support is far from enough to sustain the mother-child relationship. Female childcare providers sustain their familial relationships through technology. This challenges the expectation that the maternal presence must be physical; indeed, some childcare providers say that they became better caregivers for their families while abroad. While transnational hyper-maternalism may not be ideal “it has made migrant women feel empowered because they have surpassed traditional ‘female’ ways of ‘caring’ by assuming breadwinning roles and by caring transnationally, ensuring that productive and reproductive roles are met”.54 Conclusion “Domestic work is the work that makes all other work possible.”55 In this essay, I discussed the politics of transnational female child-

50 Tungohan, “Reconceptualizing Motherhood,” 40.

51 Tungohan, “Reconceptualizing Motherhood,” 43.

52 Tungohan, “Reconceptualizing Motherhood,” 41.

53 Tungohan, “Reconceptualizing Motherhood,” 44.

54 Tungohan, “Reconceptualizing Motherhood,” 47.

55 “About the National Domestic Workers Alliance.”

Lemieux care provider immigration. The essay started with a review of important terms, such as domestic worker, childcare worker, female migrant and reproductive labour, which served to ground the essay.

Then, I argued that female childcare providers are both disempowered actors and perpetrators of disempowerment towards the local women they employ in their home country. I concluded by discussing how these women are also empowered actors as they can gain financial security, challenge gender norms and challenge the meaning of motherhood.

Thus, female childcare provider migration point to a much larger problem: women facing a life without gender equality, where some rely on the privilege they have, brought on by class or race, to subjugate other women that do not have such privilege. With globalization, this problem has only grown exponentially and will continue to exist until gender-sensitive policies are implemented, permitting class-privileged women, migrant women and women from sending states to achieve gender equality.

99

100

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Bibliography “About the National Domestic Workers Alliance.” National Domestic Workers Alliance. N.d., https://www. domesticworkers.org/about-us.

Bachelet, Michelle. “Gender and Migration: Care Workers at the Interface of Migration and Development.” UN Women. 11 May 2011, http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2011/5/gender-and-migration-care-workers-at-the-interface-of-migration-and-development.

Barber, Pauline Gardiner and Catherine Bryan. “Value Plus Plus: Housewifization and History in the Philippine Care Migration.” Edited by Mary Romero, Valerie Preston and Wenona Giles. When Care Work Goes Global: Locating the Social Relations of Domestic Work. Farnham: Ashgate, 2014. Print.

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“Hochschild, Arlie Russell. “Global Care Chains and Emotional Surplus Value.” Edited by Will Hutton and Anthony Giddens. Global Capitalism. New York: New Press, 2000. Print.

Katz Rothman, Barbara. Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society. New York: Norton, 1989. Print.

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102

An Analysis Of UNRWA’s Policy and Practice Concerning Palestinian Refugees

By Naomi Santesteban

Santesteban

103 Abstract

Abstrait

This paper analyses the policy and practices applied by UNRWA, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. UNRWA works as a human development agency in 5 main regions: the Gaza Strip, West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Since its’ creation, UNRWA has continuously received much criticism pertaining to its mandate and provision of aid as well as services. As such, this essay seeks to investigate some of these criticisms and potential solutions to issues that UNRWA faces as a UN Agency. First, this paper provides a discussion of UNRWA’s application of definitions that have influenced their mandate and jurisdiction.

Second, it discusses how UNRWA has adopted the participatory approach towards their administration and service provisions. Finally, it discusses how UNRWA’s funding has posed a significant challenge, especially in recent years and potential solutions to this issue.

L’analyse présentée ci-dessous porte sur les politiques ainsi que les pratiques de l’UNRWA, l’Office de Secours et de Travaux des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés de Palestine dans le Proche Orient. UNRWA est une agence de développement humain.

Celle-ci travaille dans 5 régions dont la Bande de Gaza, la Cisjordanie, la Jordanie, le Liban et la Syrie. Depuis sa création, l’UNRWA a reçu de nombreuses critiques portant notamment sur son mandat et ses provisions d’aides et de services. À cet égard, cette dissertation cherche à mettre de l’avant ces critiques ainsi que de potentiels solutions pour cette agence des Nations Unies. Tout d’abord, le document examine l’application par l’UNRWA des définitions qui ont influencé son mandat et sa compétence.

Deuxièmement, il constate comment l’UNRWA a adopté une approche participative en matière d’administration et de prestation de services. Enfin, il démontre comment le financement de l’UNRWA a posé un défi de taille, en particulier ces dernières années, et les solutions possibles à ce problème.

104 The Emergence of UNRWA The 1948 Arab-Israeli war, also known as the War of Independence for Israelis and the Nakba1 for Palestinians, was fought between the new state of Israel and the combined Arab armies of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Saudi Arabia.2 By the end of 1948, the war had culminated to an overwhelming victory for the Israeli forces as they controlled much of the historic land of Palestine.3 As a result, approximately 700,000 Palestinians were forced to flee their homes and seek refuge in camps located in Jordan, Gaza, Syria and Lebanon.4 The end of the 1948 war marked the start of the Palestinian refugee problem that persists until today. With the failure of peaceful negotiations between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states in 1949, the United Nations Relief and

Chrysalis Vol. XI Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to provide assistance to the Palestinian refugees that were dispossessed by the 1948 war.5 UNRWA works as a relief and human development agency in 5 main regions: the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (both of which were occupied by Israel following the 1967 war), as well as the neighbouring states of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.6 Since its creation, UNRWA has continuously received much criticism pertaining to their mandate and provision of aid. As such, many have called for reforms of the United Nations (UN) agency or in some instances, recommended that UNRWA be terminated and all responsibilities be passed over to its parent organization, the Office of the United Nations High Commission-

1 An Arabic term that translates to “catastrophe” or “disaster” in English 2 Ricardo Bocco, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees: A History Within History,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 28 no. 2-3 (2010): 239, https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article-abstract/28/2-3/229/1584825 (accessed November 29, 2018).

3 Julie Peteet, Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), viii.

4 Ibid.

5 UNRWA, “Who We Are,” UNRWA, https://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are (accessed November 28, 2018).

6 Jalal Al Husseini and Ricardo Bocco, “The Status of the Palestinian Refugees in the Near East: The Right of Return and UNRWA In Perspective,” Refugee Suvery Quarterly 28, 2-3 (2010): 260, https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdp036 (accessed November 30, 2018).

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UNRWA’s Mandate and er for Refugees (UNHCR).7 ThereApplication of Definitional fore, it becomes significant to anDistinctions alyze UNRWA in depth including the difficulties they face and evaluUNRWA’s use of definitions has ation of potential solutions. distinguished and determined who This essay will discuss UNRWA’s receives refugee recognition and policy approach and practices con- aid. UNRWA defines a Palestinian cerning Palestinian refugees that refugee as a person “whose norreside within their operating areas mal residence was Palestine for a in the Middle East, including spe- minimum of two years preceding cific challenges that have emerged the outbreak of the conflict in 1948 concerning UNRWA’s financial re- and who, because of this conflict, strictions and subsequent provision has lost both his home and means of services. First, it will discuss of livelihood”.8 UNRWA has also UNRWA’s use of definitions and adopted specific circumstances how this impacts their mandate and for Palestinian refugees, including scope of operations. Second, it will the passing of refugee status down discuss UNRWA’s use of the par- generations.9 Thus, children and ticipatory approach that is applied grandchildren of Palestinians born towards their administration and after 1948 in the occupied territoservices. Third, it will discuss the ries or neighbouring states are also funding of UNRWA as a significant considered Palestinian refugees challenge, and provide an analysis and are also eligible for UNRWA’s of potential solutions to the issue, assistance.10 Since these circumsuch as NGO partnerships that al- stances do not apply for other refuleviate some of UNRWA’s fiscal gees under the UNHCR, UNRWA’s unique use of definitions has invitlimitations. ed criticisms in the past and posed 7 James Lindsay, “Fixing UNRWA: Repairing the UN”s Troubled System of Aid to Palestinian Refugees,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 91 (2009): 6, https:// www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus91.pdf (accessed December 1, 2018).

8 Ilana Feldman, “The Challenge of Categories: UNRWA and the Definition of a ‘Palestine Refugee,” Journal of Refugee Studies 25 no. 3 (2012): 388-389, https://doi. org/10.1093/jrs/fes004 (accessed November 28, 2018).

9 Feldman, “The Challenge of Categories.”

10 Feldman, “The Challenge of Categories,” 389.

106 unique challenges for UNRWA. For instance, UNRWA’s definition of a Palestinian refugee is thought by some, such as Trump’s senior advisor, Jared Kushner, to perpetuate the Palestinian refugee crisis as it increases the number of people who are dependent on UNRWA. 11 However, this criticism wrongfully places the onus of the conflict on UNRWA and ignores the impact that other factors, such as the failed Palestinian-Israeli negotiations or the Israeli blockade on Gaza, have had on the livelihoods of Palestinian refugees. Today, UNRWA continues to administer aid to approximately 5 million Palestinian refugees.12 While the number of refugees supported by UNRWA has substantially increased since the creation of the organization, the availability of resources has not augmented at the same capacity.13 Hence, UNRWA’s definitional distinction has required a greater level of financial assistance for the orga-

Chrysalis Vol. XI nization to effectively provide aid to its recipients.

UNRWA’s Provision of Services and Participatory Approach The aid provisions established by UNRWA for Palestinian refugees have grown to be extensive. Today, UNRWA operates within 5 jurisdictions: education, healthcare, relief and social services, microfinance/microenterprises, and infrastructure as well as camp improvement.14 UNRWA functions as a large organization with nearly 30,000 staff in a very complex and unstable region of the world, which brings its own set of challenges pertaining to political, social, religious and financial constraints.15 In terms of the organization’s ability to provide services in its regions, UNRWA’s staff are continuously put at risk or unable to perform their jobs due to outbreaks of violence. This

11 Adam Eliyahu Berkowitz, “Report: Kushner Seeking to End UNRWA and Multi-Generation PA Refugee Status,” Breaking Israel News, August 5, 2018. https://www. breakingisraelnews.com/111755/report-kushner-seeking-to-end-unrwa-and-multi-generation-pa-refugee-status/ (accessed December 2, 2018).

12 UNRWA, “Who We Are.” 13 MOPAN, “MOPAN 2011 Assessment of UNRWA,” Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), (2011): vii, http://www.mopanonline.org/ assessments/unrwa2011/MOPAN_Common_Approach_-_UNRWA_Report_2011_ Part_1.pdf (accessed November 28, 2018).

14 Lindsay, “Fixing UNRWA,” 5.

15 MOPAN, “MOPAN 2011,” vii.

Santesteban has historically included instances such as the Lebanese Civil War, Syrian Civil War, and the Gaza Wars. The 1967 Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and West Bank brought further economic challenges for UNRWA. In 2007, Israel imposed an economic blockade in the Gaza Strip that continued today to restrict imports and exports that have consequently “decimated the economy and severely reduced the jobs and goods available.”16 In cutting the population from resources, employment and local amenities, the occupation places a heavier financial strain on UNRWA to make up for the lack of essential services that are being otherwise halted by the Israeli blockade.

UNRWA has adopted a participatory approach to its administration and provision of services that places refugee participation at the centre of their programs. Refugees are hired as staff to work on projects of varied scales and types, such as project implementation, service

107 delivery, and active involvement in the planning, monitoring, and evaluation of UNRWA programmes.17 The participatory approach is valuable in giving Palestinian refugees autonomy over their own services as well as welcoming local consultations for their programs. Additionally, the economic benefits of the participatory approach enable the creation of a positive cycle that retains financial gains within Palestinian communities. This approach is especially significant for UNRWA as an international body to bridge the gap that often exists in humanitarianism between exterior international organizations and local community grassroots efforts. The Neirab Rehabilitation Project in Syria is one example of a grassroots project that became one of the first successful attempts at systematically involving refugees in all stages of a project cycle. This initiative has aims of generating sustainable improvement for the living conditions and financial capabilities of Palestinians in refugee

16 Anoushka Canagaretna, “The World cannot stand idly by while Israel’s blockade on Gaza Continues to Disrupt Countless Innocent Lives,” The Independent, September 9, 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/gaza-blockade-israel-idf-wall-palestinian-west-bank-razan-al-najjar-a8525796.html (accessed December 3, 2018).

17 Terry Rempel, “UNRWA and the Palestine Refugees: A Genealogy of “Participatory” Development,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 28 no 2-3 (2009): 415, https://doi. org/10.1093/rsq/hdp040 (accessed November 30, 2018).

108 camps.18 While the participatory approach adopted by UNRWA has caused beneficiaries to question its effectiveness, such an approach remains crucial in empowering individuals and promoting rights-based community practices. As stated by McGill’s International Community Action Network, it is crucial to promote the belief that “people within their own community are the best placed to know exactly what their community needs and how best to serve them.”19 Thus, UNRWA benefits from having refugees control and manage their own allocation of budgets, resources and provisions to serve their own communities.

UNRWA’s Financial Challenge: Analysis and Potential Solutions One of the most significant and crit-

Chrysalis Vol. XI ical challenges faced by UNRWA is its funding. The UNGA made the decision in 1949 to establish UNRWA as a “temporary” organizational body that would be dismantled once the Palestinian Refugee Crisis was over.20 At the time of its’ creation, the UN hoped that the provision of aid would end shortly after with a peaceful solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.21 However, it later became evident that the refugee crisis and possibilities of either integration into host countries or the re-establishment of Palestine would be a more complicated and lengthy process. Since UNRWA was created as a temporary agency, its mandate is renewed periodically by the UNGA.22 The UN budget for permanent agencies includes “assessed contributions” that are compulsory and shared among UN Member states to pay

18 Nell Gabiam, “Implementing the Neirab Rehabilitation Project: UNRWA’s Approach to Development in Syria’s Palestinian Refugee Camps” in UNRWA and Palestinian Refugees: From Relief and Works to Human Development (New York: Routledge, 2014), 235.

19 International Community Action Network, “Rights-Based Community Practice: Empowering the Community to Effect Change,” McGill University, https://www.mcgill.ca/ ican/ (accessed December 2, 2018).

20 Sari Hanafi, Leila Hilal and Lex Takkenberg, “Introduction” in UNRWA and Palestinian Refugees: From Relief and Works to Human Development (New York: Routledge, 2014), 2.

21 Christine Cervenak, “Promoting Inequality: Gender Based Discrimination and Refugee Status,” Human Rights Quarterly 16, 2 (1994): 307, https://www.jstor.org/stable/762449 (accessed November 29, 2018).

22 Cervenak, “Promoting Inequality,” 307.

Santesteban for the organization’s expenses.23 However, due to UNRWA’s lack of this permanent status, the nature of their funding is precarious and unstable. UNRWA donations are not guaranteed nor required by any state and solely depend on the voluntary contributions of donors.24 The instability of UNRWA’s funding system is heavily linked to the notion that the organization was only expected to provide immediate emergency relief and be dissolved within a few years of its establishment.25 As such, UNRWA’s funding suffers from constant fluctuations and runs a yearly deficit.26 Bocco states that this “has historically set limits to UNRWA’s initiatives, activities, and autonomy from donor countries’ political interests.”27 Due to UNRWA’s constant deficit, some critics believe that UNRWA should be abolished and their duties be transferred to the UNHCR as the UN organization that is responsible for all other

109 refugees around the world. However, Rex Brynen has stated that a termination of UNRWA would result in a loss of $250-300 million per year of resources given to Palestinian refugees.28 While a termination of UNRWA would only exacerbate the Palestinian refugee crisis, it is equally unrealistic and unsustainable to assume that donors will continuously finance the deficits run by UNRWA in providing services and aid to Palestinians.

UNRWA’s programs have been successful in many capacities including increasing average life expectancies, producing high literacy rates and lowering infant mortality rates.29 However, this presents the pressure of UNRWA to relocate its finances to more needy areas of the world. More recently, the issue of UNRWA funding has been exacerbated by the United States’ decision to halt their donations to UNRWA. While the US contributed over $364 million to UNRWA

23 Congressional Research Service, “US Funding to the United Nations System: Overview and Selected Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service, April 25, 2018, 1, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45206.pdf (accessed February 13, 2018).

24 Hanafi, Hilal and Takkenberg, “Introduction,” 5.

25 Bocco, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees,” 233.

26 Bocco, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees,” 233.

27 Bocco, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees,” 233.

28 Rex Brynen, “The Future of UNRWA: An Agenda for Policy Research,” Palestinian Refugee Research Net, April 14, 2000, http://prrn.mcgill.ca/prrn/papers/future.html (accessed December 1, 2018).

29 Brynen, “The Future of UNRWA.”

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in 2017, they announced in August 2018 that they would be eliminating all of its’ funding to UNRWA.30 This decision is already seen to have further destabilized the Palestinian refugee situation, with protests breaking out and forcing the removal of UNRWA personnel in certain areas such as the Gaza Strip due to security reasons.31

involve granting UNRWA permanent status under the UN, which would allow them to secure periodic funding while also playing a greater role in long-term development initiatives.32 However, this solution creates issues of political sensitivity and public perception.

If UNRWA becomes a permanent body, this may be perceived as an indication that there is no viable Rather than suggesting that UNR- solution to the Palestinian refuWA be disbanded altogether, more gee crisis or that Palestinians will sustainable solutions for the chal- always be dependent on UNRWA lenge of funding involve securing and will never be able to establish a reliable international agreement, a sovereign state. holding donor countries accountable, reforming UNRWA pro- Tangible reforms that utilize UNgrammes on the ground and real- RWA’s participatory approach locating UNRWA’s budget. On an should further be applied to their international scale, the establish- programmes as well as services ment of UNRWA as a non-perma- that allocate the budget in a more nent body has heavily impacted efficient and sustainable fashion. its funding mechanism, making As a durable solution in practice it overly reliant on donor support and policy, UNRWA should comwith minimal credibility. Conse- mit a greater proportion of funds to quently, an international agreement programs that generate greater remust be reached that enables do- turns for Palestinian refugees while nors to not bear the burden of re- promoting a model for self-relicurrent program costs. This could ance, economic growth and local 30 Peter Beaumont and Oliver Holmes, “US Confirms End to Funding for UN Palestinian Refugees,” The Guardian, August 31, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2018/aug/31/trump-to-cut-all-us-funding-for-uns-main-palestinian-refugee-programme (accessed December 1, 2018).

31 Oren Liebermann, “UNRWA Pulls Some Staff from Gaza Amid Threats,” CNN, October 3, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/02/middleeast/unrwa-gaza-intl/index. html (accessed December 1, 2018).

32 Brynen, “The Future of UNRWA.”

Santesteban community development. For instance, the expansion of the pre-existing microfinance program for local entrepreneurs would work to promote development from a bottom-up approach. Microfinance is described by Pollock as “a sustainable – operationally and financially self-sufficient - market-based approach.”33 Microfinance can be used as a tool to stimulate local economies and promote financial self-sufficiency among Palestinian individuals. Moreover, this can develop into one of UNRWA’s most sustainable social service programs as it has the capability of reaching full “operational self-sufficiency and profitability.”34 Nonetheless, UNRWA’s microfinance program must still overcome several difficulties brought on by its situational circumstances. In general, achieving a high rate of return from microfinance lending is contingent upon the success of individuals that accept the loans and their ability to pay it back through their own profits. UNRWA’s microfinance programs further face the difficulty

111 of generating a profit under conflict conditions and the dire economic situations that Palestine’s neighbouring states and occupied areas currently suffer from.

UNRWA’s Partnership with Non-Governmental Organizations UNRWA’s participatory approach also involves collaborating with organizations that work within or nearby Palestine in the realm of humanitarianism. While the absence of a Palestinian state has made it difficult for grassroots groups to gain traction, UNRWA has still managed to establish meaningful partnerships with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). UNRWA can alleviate some of its financial constraints through additional donations received by NGOs that support similar causes and assist in the provision of services. Since 2012, UNRWA has established a continual relationship with Human Appeal International, an NGO based in the United Arab Emirates.35 Human

33 Alex Pollock, “Can the Subaltern pay? Realizing Self-Reliance Through Microfinance” in UNRWA and Palestinian Refugees: From Relief and Works to Human Development (New York: Routledge, 2014), 18, 36.

34 Pollock, “Can the Subaltern pay?,” 36.

35 UNRWA, “Human Appeal International and UNRWA Launch Education Project in Gaza,” UNRWA, June 29, 2012, https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/human-appeal-international-and-unrwa-launch-education-project-gaza (accessed December 2, 2018).

112 Appeal International has strived to aid in implementing projects with various UN bodies including UNRWA, UNHCR and the World Health Organization (WHO).36 Similar to UNRWA, Human Appeal International has goals that include “the relief of poverty and sickness and the protection of good health and advancement of education.”37 Together, they have coordinated various projects since their first joint education project in 2012 that involved the construction of additional classrooms in the existing Al Durj Primary School in Gaza City.38 Considering the severe overcrowding that occurs in UNRWA’s education system, this contribution has had a considerable impact in alleviating some of the excess in capacity. Furthermore, Gaza’s rapid population growth rates have resulted in an increased demand for UNRWA to provide primary education to over 200,000 children, which Human Appeal International was able to assist with.39 Later in 2013, UNRWA and Human Appeal International signed a memoran-

Chrysalis Vol. XI dum of understanding that included the additional provision of services for Palestinian refugees that were also forced to flee Syria into Jordan because of the war.40 This agreement was significant in establishing a committing and durable partnership between UNRWA and a locally-based NGO that secures a supplementary source of funding for UNRWA. Final Remarks This essay has provided an analysis of UNRWA and its operating structures, including their fiscal organisation and provision of services.

In analyzing the development of UNRWA’s mandate in addition to their participatory approach and challenges of acquiring funding, the interconnected nature of these aspects is revealed as they create a structure that requires some reconsideration and reform. Rather than terminating UNRWA, restructuring can be applied to policies and practices so that the agency can better fulfill their mandate. The issue of

36 Human Appeal International, “About Us,” Human Appeal International, https:// www.hai.ae/en/about-hai/about-us.aspx (accessed December 2, 2018).

37 Human Appeal International.

38 UNRWA, 2012.

39 UNRWA, 2012.

40 UNRWA, “Human Appeal International Supports UNRWA,” UNRWA, January 9, 2014, https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/human-appeal-international-supports-unrwa (accessed December 4, 2018).

Santesteban Palestinian refugees is one that necessitates international attention and an adequate commitment of funding towards individuals that have long lived as stateless peoples. From a micro-level approach, UNRWA should continue to expand its participatory approach that sees Palestinian refugees as both agents and beneficiaries. The international community should also play a greater role in holding states accountable for their actions, such as the removal of financial contributions, that can have detrimental impacts on the livelihoods of millions of Palestinians.

113

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Bibliography Al Husseini, Jalal and Ricardo Bocco. “The Status of the Palestinian Refugees in the Near East: The Right of Return and UNRWA In Perspective.” Refugee Suvery Quarterly 28, 2-3 (2010): 260-285. Accessed November 30, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdp036.

Beaumont, Peter and Oliver Holmes. “US Confirms End to Funding for UN Palestinian Refugees.” The Guardian. August 31, 2018. Accessed December 1, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/31/ trump-to-cut-all-us-funding-for-uns-main-palestinian-refugee-programme.

Bocco, Ricardo. “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees: A History Within History.” Refugee Survey Quarterly 28 no. 2-3 (2010): 229-252. Accessed November 29, 2018. https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article-abstract/28/2-3/229/1584825.

Brynen, Rex. “The Future of UNRWA: An Agenda for Policy Research.” Palestinian Refugee Research Net. April 14, 2000. Accessed December 1, 2018. http://prrn.mcgill.ca/prrn/papers/future.html.

Cervenak, Christine. “Promoting Inequality: Gender Based Discrimination and Refugee Status.” Human Rights Quarterly 16, 2 (1994): 300-374. Accessed November 29, 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/762449.

Congressional Research Service. “US Funding to the United Nations System: Overview and Selected Policy Issue.” Congressional Research Service. April 25, 2018. 1. Accessed February 13, 2018. https://fas.org/sgp/ crs/row/R45206.pdf.

Feldman, Ilana. “The Challenge of Categories: UNRWA and the Definition of a ‘Palestine Refugee.” Journal of Refugee Studies 25 no. 3 (2012): 387-406. Accessed November 28, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/ fes004.

Gabiam, Nell. “Implementing the Neirab Rehabilitation Project: UNRWA’s Approach to Development in Syria’s Palestinian Refugee Camps” in UNRWA and Palestinian Refugees: From Relief and Works to Human Development. New York: Routledge, 2014. 221-239.

Hanafi, Sari, Leila Hilal and Lex Takkenberg. “Introduction” in UNRWA and Palestinian Refugees: From Relief and Works to Human Development. New York: Routledge, 2014. 1-14.

Human Appeal International. “About Us.” Human Appeal International. Accessed December 2, 2018. https://www.hai.ae/en/about-hai/about-us.aspx.

International Community Action Network. “Rights-Based Community Practice: Empowering the Community to Effect Change.” McGill University. Accessed December 2, 2018. https://www.mcgill.ca/ican/.

Liebermann, Oren. “UNRWA Pulls Some Staff from Gaza Amid Threats.” CNN. October 3, 2018. Accessed December 1, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/02/middleeast/unrwa-gaza-intl/index.html.

Lindsay, James. “Fixing UNRWA: Repairing the UN”s Troubled System of Aid to Palestinian Refugees.”

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 91 (2009): 1-68. Accessed December 1, 2018. https://www. washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus91.pdf%20.

MOPAN. “MOPAN 2011 Assessment of UNRWA.” Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN). (2011): 1-56. Accessed November 28, 2018. http://www.mopanonline.org/assessments/ unrwa2011/MOPAN_Common_Approach_-_UNRWA_Report_2011_Part_1.pdf.

Peteet, Julie. Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps. Philadelphia, Univeristy of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.

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Pollock, Alex. “Can the Subaltern pay? Realizing Self-Reliance Through Microfinance” in UNRWA and Palestinian Refugees: From Relief and Works to Human Development. New York: Routledge, 2014. 17-45.

Rempel, Terry. “UNRWA and the Palestine Refugees: A Genealogy of “Participatory” Development.” Refugee Survey Quarterly 28 no 2-3 (2009): 412-437. Accessed November 30, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/ hdp040.

UNRWA. “Human Appeal International and UNRWA Launch Education Project in Gaza.” UNRWA. June 29, 2012. Accessed December 2, 2018. https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/human-appeal-international-and-unrwa-launch-education-project-gaza.

UNRWA, “Human Appeal International Supports UNRWA.” UNRWA. January 9, 2014. Accessed December 4, 2018. https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/human-appeal-international-supports-unrwa.

UNRWA. “Who We Are.” UNRWA. Accessed November 28, 2018. https://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are.

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Making America Afraid Again: The Criminalization and Securitization of Migration in Post-9/11 America

By Alanna Sereboff

Sereboff

117 Abstract

Abstrait

This paper traces the evolution of restrictionist refugee and asylum policy in the United States from the post 9/11 era to the Trump administration, with a specific emphasis on how this process has influenced reactions towards asylum seekers from Central America. It shall argue that the seemingly unprecedented policies and attitudes of the Trump administration are not isolated occurrences; rather, they are indicative of a culmination of nearly two decades of securitization and criminalization in migration policy and rhetoric. This paper first examines and explains the framework of securitization. It then applies this framework to Bush-era migration policy and political rhetoric directly in the wake of 9-11, as well as to Obama era policy.

Finally, it explores the implications of the process of securitization in the age of Trump, with a special focus on the administration’s response to the migrant “caravan” from Central America in October and November of 2018.

Ce papier trace l’évolution des pratiques restrictives d’accueil des réfugiés et demandeurs d’asile aux Etats-Unis, de l’après 11 septembre à l’administration de Trump, avec une attention particulière portée sur la manière dont ce processus a influencé les réactions envers les demandeurs d’asile d’Amérique Centrale. Il défend que les politiques et attitudes de l’administration Trump ne sont pas des phénomènes isolées, bien qu’elles paraissent sans précédent; à la place, celles-ci indiquent une culmination de presque deux décennies de titrisation et de criminalisation des politiques et rhétoriques migratoires.

En premier lieu, ce papier examine et explique le cadre de la titrisation. Il applique ensuite cette structure aux politiques migratoires de l’époque de Bush et la rhétorique politique directement au lendemain du 11 septembre, ainsi que la politique de l’époque d’Obama. Finalement, il explore les implications du processus de titrisation à l’âge de Trump, en s’appuyant spécialement sur la réponse de l’administration aux “caravanes” de migrants d’Amérique Centrale en octobre et novembre 2018.

Chrysalis Vol. XI

118 Introduction

Rather, they are indicative of a culmination of nearly two decades of securitization and criminalization in migration policy and rhetoric.

To do so, this paper will examine the broad trends of securitization and restrictionism of United States refugee policy in the post 9-11 era.

It will first explain the framework of securitization, as presented by the Copenhagen School. It will then examine both the legislative and deterrent provisions taken by the U.S. government in the wake of 9-11, as well as the manner in which political actors portrayed asylum seekers in their discourse.

Finally, this paper will assess the implications of these processes in the age of Trump, with a special focus on the rhetoric and policy in response to the migrant caravan in October and November of 2018, to illuminate both continuity and change in the U.S refugee regime.

In October of 2018, the Trump administration provoked both national and international outrage for deploying U.S. troops to the southern border in anticipation of the arrival of a “caravan” of Central American asylum seekers.1 To many observers in politics and the media, this seemed exceptionally restrictive even for an administration whose tenure had thus far been defined by immigration policies like family separation, self-described “Muslim bans”, and the 4-month suspension of all asylum admissions. But how did a large group of Hondurans, Guatemalans, and Salvadorans fleeing gang violence, trafficking, and persecution with the internationally recognized right to seek asylum come to be characterized as an existential threat to national security? Is it merely product of the Trump administration’s populist and nationalist character? Or is this Defining Securitization narrative indicative of something more?

An understanding of the concept of security and the process of securiThis paper will argue that the seem- tization, along with their relation to ingly unprecedented policies and norms and laws surrounding asyattitudes of the Trump administra- lum, is a necessary starting point. tion are not isolated occurrences. Contemporary notions of security 1 Kirk Semple, “Dozens From Migrant Caravan Line Up at Border, Seeking Asylum Interviews,” New York Times, November 12th, 2018. https://www.nytimes. com/2018/11/15/world/americas/caravan-mexico-honduras-

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have shifted from a focus on military threats to states to a focus on threats to societies. In this context, non-military actors, as well as global processes such as climate change, can be presented and understood as threats to national and global security. A product of the Copenhagen School, securitization refers to the process in which “an issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure”.2 Securitization focuses on the interplay between discourse (in both the media and the political sphere) and political actions, and how these processes shape the way people think.3 The success of this process depends on the credibility of the issue and the legitimacy of the actor.4

national and transnational wellbeing, thus validating restrictive migration and immigration measures that seem at odds with international norms and laws. Migration may represent a credible security issue for a variety of reasons, including its potential effects on state capacity and economic stability. Perhaps a more compelling reason is that migration may threaten the ethnic and racial composition of the state, thus threatening to decompose pre-existing national identity.5 Securitization can thus be understood as an inherently racialized discourse.6 The construction and reconstruction of both state and refugee identity is another key aspect of securitization. Watson (2007) argues that as securitizing states reconstruct the identities of asylum seekers from being in danger to being dangerous, so too do they reThe securitization of migration, construct the relationship between then, refers to process by which the state and the claimant; if one is asylum seekers and immigrants not a refugee, the state is no longer have been portrayed as threats to obligated to uphold the norms and 2 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1998).

3 Anne Hammerstad, “UNHCR and the Securitization of Forced Migration” in Refugees in International Relations, eds. Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 346.

4 Scott Watson, “Manufacturing threats: Asylum seekers as threats or refugees?” Journal of International Law and International Relations 3 (2007), 97-8.

5 Watson, “Manufacturing Threats”, 98 6 Maggie Ibrahim, “The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse,” International Migration 43, no. 5, 2005, 170.

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laws that govern the relationship degree of vagueness surrounds between refugees and states. the definition of who a refugee is, and that what exactly constitutes a Defining refugeehood and what threat to a country’s security, is left rights refugees have is similarly open to interpretation has undoubtcomplex. The 1951 Convention edly sown the seeds for restrictionRelated to the Status of Refugees ism to blossom. dictates that any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of per9/11 Attacks and the secution due to religion, race, Bush Era nationality, or membership of a specific social group, is a refugee.7 It is important to note that the SepAn asylum seeker is one who has tember 11th attacks on the United asked for international protection, States did not usher in an era of but who has not yet been officially unseen restrictionism in asylum recognized as a refugee. All people policy; the United States has imhave the legal right to seek asylum plemented restrictive measures rein any country and may not be re- garding asylum and immigration turned, or “refouled” to any coun- since its inception. The passage try in which his “life or freedom of the Illegal Immigration Reform would be threatened”.8 However, and Immigrant Responsibility Act this ban on refoulement is not ap- (IIRIRA) in 1996, which created an plicable in the case of a refugee expedited removal process of any for “whom there are reasonable migrant caught at sea or at a port of grounds for regarding as a danger entry without legal documents who to the security of the country in did not immediately request asywhich he is, or who, having been lum, for example, foreshadowed convicted by a final judgement of the isolationism to come in the 21st a particularly serious crime, con- century.10 What distinguishes prestitutes a danger”.9 That a certain 9/11 from post-9/11 measures is 7 UN General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” United Nations, July 1951, 152 8 UN General Assembly, 176.

9 UN General Assembly, 176.

10 Donald Kerwin, “US Refugee Protection Policy Ten Years After 9/11” in The 9/11 Effect and its Legacy on U.S. Immigration Laws: Essays, Remarks, and Photographs, Center for Immigrants’ Rights Clinic Publications 9, 2011, 16.

Sereboff not restrictionism itself, but the underlying normative shifts that they represent. For example, the U.S. Patriot Act, passed 45 days after the 9/11 attacks, dramatically widened the power of law enforcement agencies in their ability to surveil, monitor, interrogate, and detain, and deport those, both foreign and national, suspected of having ties to terrorist groups.11 When signing the Patriot Act in 2001, President George Bush remarked “the changes, effective today, will help counter a threat like no other our nation has ever faced.”12 In so doing, Bush embodied the model of securitization, wherein he explicitly presented an issue as a threat to national security, thus necessitating emergency measures beyond the scope of normal political behavior. Bush presented explicitly, foreign-born terrorism, and implicitly, foreign-born people as threatening, thus requiring the provisions of the Patriot Act. Although aspects of this law were at at odds with constitutional norms regarding privacy, surveillance, detention, and

121 deportation, they were justified as a solution to the danger the country faced.

Though the Patriot Act is the most obvious within the framework of securitization, many other post9/11 actions also reflect the process of securitization. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002 as a cabinet-level agency charged both with “preventing terrorism and minimizing the impact of terrorist attacks within the United States” and with all matters related to refugee and asylum claims provides another striking example.13 That asylum claims and terrorism prevention have been lumped together under the mandate of homeland security is indicative of a normative understanding of those two issues as conjunct, signaling that terrorism and migration represent equally existential threats to American security. The year 2002 also saw the initiation of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), which required all

11 Kerwin, “US Refugee Protection,” 18.

12 George W. Bush, “Speech on Signing the USA Patriot Act of 2001” October 6th, 2001 13 American Bar Association, “9/11 and the Transformation of U.S. Immigration Law and Policy,” Human Rights Magazine, Winter 2011, https://www.americanbar.org/ groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol38_2011/ human_rights_winter2011/9-11_transformation_of_us_immigration_law_policy/

122 male non-citizens over the age of 16 from 25 countries (almost all of which were Muslim-majority) to register with the US government.

The penalty for failing to register was immediate deportation.14 Herein lies an explicit example of the way in which securitization can be understood as a racial discourse, as the program clearly targeted brown, Muslim men for deportation. The duration of this program was short-lived, but its impact was pronounced: 85,000 men registered under NSEERS, 13,000 of whom were later deported.15 Though was clearly outside of the normal acceptable behavior for countries, the looming threat of another attack from within was understood to justify these extreme measures. Finally, the REAL ID Act of 2005, which tightened restrictions on drivers’ licenses and necessitated legal documentation in asylum proceedings, also allowed judges to require corroborative evidence in asylum hearings.16

Chrysalis Vol. XI This increased onus of proof meant that credible testimonies were no longer substantive grounds for asylum, thus taking the all-important step of deconstructing the relationship between the state and the asylum seeker. It should come as no surprise, then, that as a result of these policies, asylum admissions to the U.S. fell dramatically after 9/11: in 2002 and 2003, admissions fell to less than 29,000, as compared to the rate of 70,000 in the years before the attacks.17 The Obama Era The post 9/11 era saw increased focus on securing the southern border shared with Mexico, which had long served as entry points for asylees and migrants from Central America. During the Bush presidency, this securitization was due to the perceived ability of terrorist groups to gain access to the U.S. via this border. Bush’s successor, Barack Obama, continued along

14 Brett Story, Politics as Usual: The Criminalization of Asylum Seekers in the United States, working paper no. 26, Department of International Development, Oxford University (Oxford, UK: Refugee Studies Centre, 2005), https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/ files-1/wp26-politics-as-usual-2005.pdf., 16.

15 Ibid., 16-18 16 Maria Cristina Garcia, “The New Asylum Seekers” in The Refugee Challenge in Post-Cold War America (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2017, 169.

17 María Cristina Garcia, Seeking Refuge : Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 125, ProQuest Ebook Library

Sereboff this path of restrictionism in the name of security, but for very different reasons. In the last decade, but especially since 2012, migration from the Northern Triangle of Central America (NCTA), comprised of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, has spiked significantly.18 This is attributable to widespread gang violence, drug trafficking, and intimidation perpetrated by gangs, such as MS-13.19 The 1990s saw the deportation of many Central Americans convicted of gang activities in the United States. Recent scholarship suggests that these deportations played a significant role in exacerbating gang activity in Central America, as those deported had no connections to their respective countries which facilitated their decisions to join local gangs.s. Further, a lack of faith in the asylum system as a result of increased restrictionism led to a massive influx of undocumented immigrants from Central America, who felt it was safer to live in the shadows than risk being denied asylum and returned

123 to their countries of origin.20 This was hardly unjustified, as between 2012-2017, the U.S rejected 79.2% of claims from El Salvador, 78.1% of claims from Honduras, and 74.7% of claims from Guatemala.21 Thus, fear of the spread of the very gang violence from which Central Americans were fleeing, as well as a reckoning with this influx of undocumented immigrants, drove Obama-era migration policy.

It should be noted that in many ways, Obama was much more liberal in his asylum policy than his predecessors. This is evidenced by the Deferred Action for Children (DACA) program and comparatively high refugee admission numbers. Nevertheless, although the process of securitization was less explicit in the Obama era, the underlying trend of restrictionism was coexistent with this openness.

Within the first year of his presidency, Obama expanded law enforcement’s role in identifying and deporting undocumented immigrants, with an emphasis on those

18 Center for Migration Studies and Cristosal, “Point of No Return: The Fear And Criminalization of Central American Refugees,” (Center for Migration Studies: 2017), 8, https://doi.org/10.14240/cmsrpt0617n2.

19 Garcia, “The New Asylum Seekers”, 170.

20 Center for Migration Studies and Cristosal, Seeking Refuge, 10.

21 Holly Yan, “Which nationalities get rejected the most for US asylum?”, CNN, May 3, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/03/world/us-asylum-denial-rates-by-nationality/index.html

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who had committed crimes. One such example was the initiation of the Criminal Alien Program (CAP), which stationed Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers in prisons to identify undocumented immigrants for deportation. This program was presented with the intention of curbing gang violence from foreign-born nationals. However, research indicates that 98% of those deported by CAP officers had committed misdemeanors.22 It would perhaps be a stretch to characterize this as overt securitization, but in its blindness to the differences between misdemeanors and felonies, this program reflects the underlying normative association of migrants with substantial threats towards American society.

to other potential asylum seekers that crossing the border irregularly would not be permitted.23 These detention centers garnered much attention both due to their questionable conditions and in terms of their legality. However, the use of detention to deter asylum seekers is illegal under international law under the auspice that, if a person faces persecution at home but detention in the case that they seek asylum, their freedom of movement is fundamentally non-existent.24 It also represents a new topic for securitization theory to explore: the psycho-social impact of this process upon asylum seekers. The language of criminality and crime that was (and is) so often used in political discourse surrounding asylum in order to justify violaOne of the most notable aspects of tions of international law has left Obama-era migration policy was asylum seekers who are well withthe use of detention for those ap- in their legal rights under the imprehended crossing the border ir- pression that they have committed regularly. The main function of this a crime. For example, one study of system was deterrence: in detain- Central American asylees who had ing families together, the admin- been returned to their countries of istration sought to send a message origin reported that “as a result of 22 David Manuel Hernández.“‘My Fellow Citizens’: Barack Obama and Immigration Policy,” (UCLA: 2014), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/my-fellow-citizens.pdf , 33.

23 Marcia Zug, “The Mirage of Immigration Reform: The Devastating Consequences of Obama’s Immigration Policy,” Kansas Law Review 64, no. 4 (April 01, 2015): doi:10.17161/1808.20298, 964 24 Center for Migration Studies and Cristosal, Seeking Refuge, 16.

Sereboff degrading rhetoric used against them by elected leaders and others, all the interviewees expressed a belief that they were doing something illegal when traveling irregularly and in conditions of vulnerability.”25 Although this does not fall under the traditional framework of securitization, perpetrating fear within asylum seekers themselves is nonetheless a powerful concept worthy of further scholarship.

The Trump Administration: Turning Point or Typical?

The election of Donald Trump reflects a significant landmark in the long process of securitization.

Trump’s campaign was notorious for its overtly anti-immigrant stance and nationalist overtones, which catalyzed support from those who understood migration as a threat. One notably extreme policy included that of family separation, which saw asylum seekers who “illegally” crossed the border separated from their young children and detained in inhumane conditions.26 While Trump’s asylum policy is undoubtedly more extreme than that of his predecessors, much

125 of it is either reminiscent of previous policies or an extrapolation of them. For example, while Trump’s call for a system to document and track Muslims in the United States provoked shock, there were few fundamental differences between his proposal and NSEERS. His proposed ban on nationals coming from specific Muslim-majority countries is not unlike the restrictions on entry during the Bush era.

Similarly, his notorious promise to build a wall along the southern border of the United States can be understood as an extension of efforts under both Bush and Obama to strengthen the border and to deter migration. This is not to imply that Trump’s actions are to be legally or morally equated with those of previous administrations, but that his actions do not exist in a void.

While securitized rhetoric is not new to American political discourse surrounding asylum, it has proved to be particularly prominent, as well as particularly racialized, in the Trump age. Trump’s securitized rhetoric is omnipresent in his social media platforms, which he utilizes frequently as channel of

25 Center for Migration Studies and Cristosal, Seeking Refuge, 14.

26 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, and Michael D. Shear. 2018, “How Trump Came to Enforce a Practice of Separating Migrant Families,” The New York Times, October 3, 2018, sec.

U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/16/us/politics/family-separation-trump.html.

126 uncensored communication. Twitter has proven to be a particularly powerful tool in Trump’s response to the caravan of migrants from Central America who, as of the writing of this paper, approaches the southern border. As the caravan approached Mexico, Trump tweeted:

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is a racialized process: implying that “Middle Easterners” make up a part of a Latin American body makes the caravan (and asylees from the Middle East) doubly foreign, and thus, doubly threatening.

Moreover, the suggestion that a wave of asylum seekers constitutes a national emergency and thus justifies the use of the military Sadly, it looks like Mexico’s Police as a means of deterrence reflects a and Military are unable to stop the derogation from typically acceptCaravan heading to the Southern able political behavior. In another Border of the United States. Crim- instance, as the migrant caravan inals and unknown Middle East- reached Tijuana, Trump tweeted: erners are mixed in. I have alerted Border Patrol and Military that The Mayor of Tijuana, Mexico, just this is a National Emergy [sic]. stated that “the City is ill-prepared Must change laws! to handle this many migrants, the backlog could last 6 months.”

-(@realDonaldTrump, October 22, Likewise, the U.S. is ill-prepared 2018) for this invasion, and will not stand for it. They are causing crime and The notion that “Middle Eastern- big problems in Mexico. Go home! ers” make up any population of the caravan is, first and foremost, -(@realDonaldTrump, November false.27 Its linkage of the threat 18th, 2018). of crime from Central American gangs with the threat of terrorism The presentation of the caravan as from the Middle East serves as an an “invasion” reflects a fundamenexample of the manner in which tal characterization of the asylum terrorism, and thus security, have seekers as an existential threat to been linked with south-to-north national security, which further migration. It is also microcosmic justifies extraordinary measures. of the way in which securitization These representations are as cru27 Semple, “Dozens From Migrant Caravan”, 2018.

Sereboff cial to Trump’s rhetoric as his misrepresentations. For instance, his claim that asylum seekers should apply for status the “legal way” disregards the legality of seeking asylum at a port of entry or after being apprehended. Moreover, the suggestion that Central American asylum seekers do not qualify for protection ignores UNHCR protocol regarding gang violence.28 In doing so, Trump reconstructs the public’s conception of refugeehood and the rights associated with it, which fundamentally justifies any inhumane actions to come.

Conservative pundits have often encouraged those who criticize Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric to pay attention to what Trump does rather than what Trump says. But in the context of securitization and migration policy, what Trump says and what Trump does are crucially intertwined. If the administration is both willing and able to justify deploying troops in the name of security, thus creating the possibility of mass violence against the desperate families seeking asylum, the question of just how far it is willing to deviate from acceptable political behavior must be raised.

127 Concluding Remarks It remains true that restrictionism has been characteristic of U.S migration policy for decades. Pointing to policies such as the internment of Japanese Americans during WWII, one might argue that little distinguishes post-9/11 restrictionism and securitization from pre9/11 restrictionism and securitization. Such an argument, however, fails to consider both the changes in international law and the proliferation of norms regarding asylum since the signing of the 1951 Convention. Although the salience of these laws and norms is debatable, what constitutes “normal political behavior” has undoubtedly changed.

This paper has argued that the restrictive asylum policy under the Trump administration is a highly precedented product of the securitization of migration in the post-9/11 era. While restrictionism was in no way new to U.S. migration policy, Bush-era policies after the 9/11 attacks initiated a new era of overt securitization. The Obama administration shifted its focus towards the southern border as it sought to combat drug trafficking by curbing

28 Ion Grillo, “Why Central American Refugees Will Keep Coming to the U.S.” Time Magazine, June 21st, 2018. http://time.com/5318718/central-american-refugees-crisis/.

128 irregular migration. Despite the internationally recognized right to seek asylum, the criminalization of this process as it pertains to the southern border has had lasting impacts on both American perceptions of asylum and upon the perceptions of asylum seekers themselves. To characterize Trump’s migration policy as exactly the same as Bush or Obama era policy would be a false equivalency.

Rather, Trump-era policy can best be understood as an amalgamation of pre-existing concern regarding migration from the Middle East, irregular migration from the southern border, and Trump’s own nationalist and racialized discourse.

Ultimately, the continuity of securitization and securitized discourse in the U.S. cannot be attributed to security concerns specifically in relation to the 9/11 attacks alone.

Instead, it must be understood as a process that combines these concerns, state preferences and domestic politics, interests, and identities.

Only in understanding securitization as a process -- not merely as something that occurs in a vacuum when a dramatic attack occurs or when a president of a particular leaning gains power -- can this process be interrupted.

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Sereboff

129 Bibliography

American Bar Association. “9/11 and the Transformation of U.S. Immigration Law and Policy”, Human Rights Magazine, Winter 2011, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol38_2011/human_rights_winter2011/9-11_transformation_of_us_immigration_law_policy/ Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Pub. Center for Migration Studies, and Cristosal. 2017. “Point of No Return: The Fear And Criminalization of Central American Refugees.” Center for Migration Studies. https://doi.org/10.14240/cmsrpt0617n2.

CNN, Story by Holly Yan, CNN Graphic by Sean O’Key. n.d. “Which Nationalities Get Rejected the Most for US Asylum?” CNN. Accessed November 11, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/03/world/us-asylum-denial-rates-by-nationality/index.html Davis, Julie Hirschfeld, and Michael D. Shear. 2018. “How Trump Came to Enforce a Practice of Separating Migrant Families.” The New York Times, October 3, 2018, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/16/ us/politics/family-separation-trump.html.

Garcia, Maria Cristina. 2017. “The New Asylum Seekers” in The Refugee Challenge in Post-Cold War America. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190655303.001.0001.

García María Cristina. 2006. Seeking Refuge : Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada. Berkeley: University of California Press. ProQuest Ebook Central.

“George W. Bush - Speech on Signing the USA Patriot Act of 2001.” October 6th, 2001. Accessed November 20, 2018. https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbushusapatriotact2001.htm.

Grillo, Ion. 2018. “Why Central American Refugees Will Keep Coming to the U.S.” Time, June 21st, 2018. http://time.com/5318718/central-american-refugees-crisis/.

Hammerstad, Anne. 2011. “UNHCR and the Securitization of Forced Migration” n: Betts, Alex and Loescher, Gil, eds. Refugees in International Relations. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 237-260.

ISBN 978-0-19-958074-3.

Hernández, David Manuel. 2014 “‘My Fellow Citizens’1: Barack Obama and Immigration Policy,” UCLA. https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/my-fellow-citizens.pdf Ibrahim, Maggie. 2005. “The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse.” International Migration 43 (5): 163–87. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2005.00345.x.

Kerwin, Donald, “US Refugee Protection Policy Ten Years After 9/11” in “The 9/11 Effect and its Legacy on U.S. Immigration Laws: Essays, Remarks, and Photographs” (2011). Penn State Law Immigrants’ Rights Clinic and Penn State School of International Affairs,Center for Immigrants’ Rights Clinic Publications. 9. https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/irc_pubs/9 Semple, Kirk. 2018. “Dozens From Migrant Caravan Line Up at Border, Seeking Asylum Interviews.” New York Times, November 12th, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/world/americas/ caravan-mexico-honduras-

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Story, Brett. September 2005. ‘Politics as Usual: The Criminalisation of Asylum Seekers in the United States.” RSC Working Paper No 26, Oxford University Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford, UK. https://www. rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/wp26-politics-as-usual-2005.pdf UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html [accessed 28 November 2018] Watson, Scott. 2007. “Manufacturing threats: Asylum seekers as threats or refugees?” Journal of International Law and International Relations 3.

Zug, Marcia. “The Mirage of Immigration Reform: The Devastating Consequences of Obama’s Immigration Policy.” Kansas Law Review 64, no. 4 (April 01, 2015): 953-80. doi:10.17161/1808.20298.

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132

Women’s Social Movements in West Africa: What Makes a Success Story?

By Emma Sitland

Sitland

133 Abstract

Abstrait

This paper examines two important grassroots women’s movements - The Women of Liberia’s Mass Action for Peace (WLMAP) and the Sierra Leone Women's Movement for Peace’s (SLMWP) – that emerged in Liberia and Sierra Leone following particularly brutal civil wars in each country in the late 1990s-early 2000s. The conflict’s devastating targets on civilians disproportionately affected women and engendered the rise of women-led popular mobilizations. In Liberia, the WLMAP was able to play a crucial role in ending the civil war in Liberia by 1) invoking traditional female power, 2) mobilizing supporters from across religious and ethnic divides, 3) bringing women into political spaces generally reserved for men. By contrast, the SLMWP was unable to gain traction, which then contributed to the temporal delay for a peace agreement and democratic elections, and comparatively far fewer women in post-conflict politics. This paper argues that the existence of the dual-sex system in Liberia and tremendous amounts of international support allowed the WLMAP to achieve comparatively more success.

Cet article examine deux mouvements sociaux menés par des femmes - “The Women of Liberia’s Mass Action for Peace (WLMAP) “et le “Sierra Leone Women’s Movement for Peace (SLMWP)” - qui ont émergé au Libéria et en Sierra Leone durant des guerres civiles particulièrement brutales à la fin des années 1990 et au début des années 2000. Les attaques dévastatrices du conflit sur les civils ont affecté de manière disproportionnée les femmes et ont, par le même moyen, engendré la montée de mobilisations populaires dirigées par des femmes. Au Libéria, le WLMAP a joué un rôle crucial pour mettre fin à la guerre civile dans le pays en invoquant le pouvoir féminin traditionnel, mobilisant des partisans de toutes religions et ethnies, permettant l’entrée des femmes dans des espaces politiques généralement réservés aux hommes.

En revanche, le SLMWP n’a pas réussi à gagner du terrain, ce qui a ensuite contribué à un retard quant à un possible accord de paix ainsi que des élections démocratiques. Ceci a également mené à une représentation disproportionnée des femmes dans la politique après le conflit. Cette dissertation soutient que l’existence d’un système reconnaissant les deux sexes au Libéria ainsi que l’énorme soutien international, ont permis au WLMAP d’obtenir plus de succès en comparaison au SLMWP.

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134 Introduction In her biography, “Mighty be Our Powers,” one of the leaders of the The Women of Liberia’s Mass Action for Peace (WLMAP), Nobel Peace Prize winner Leymah Gbowee asks “Why were women, who bore the brunt of war, expected to remain quiet while men debated how to make peace?”.1 After years of violence and exclusion from peace negotiations, Gbowee, along with thousands of other women, tired of the constant violence and humanitarian crises, decided to take action. The woman of Liberia came together and gathered across ethnic, religious and regional lines to voice their frustration and desire for peace.2 This became known as the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace.

ments and peace-building effort in Africa. This paper will compare the tactics used by women’s social movements in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. It will also discuss the post-conflict implications of each movement to determine how these social movements shaped women’s sociopolitical status more broadly. The goal of this paper, then, is to assess what is distinctive about successful social movements led by women and how women’s positions have shifted even after the movements have ended.

The neighbouring countries were afflicted by similar civil wars during the same time frame and both witnessed the rise of powerful women’s social movements.

However, women’s movements that emerged in Sierra Leone at the time were unable to affect change The WLMAP is a grassroots orga- comparable to the WLMAP in Linization that played a crucial role beria. This paper will focus mainly as peacemaker during Liberia’s on three aspects of the WLMAP’s 2nd civil war (1999-2003) by ini- and Sierra Leone Women’s Movetiating the signing of the Compre- ment for Peace’s (SLMWP) mobihensive Peace Agreement (CPA). lization: the manner in which the The movement has since come women invoked traditional power, to prominence as one of the most the mobilization of supporters from successful women’s social move- across religious and ethnic divides, 1 Leymah Gbowee, Mighty Be Our Powers (Beast Books, 2011), 85, iBook.

2 Veronika Fuest, “Liberia’s Women Acting for Peace: Collective Action in a War-Affected Country,” in Movers and Shakers: Social Movements in Africa, eds. Stephen Ellis and Ineke Van Kessel (Brill, 2009), 115.

Sitland and the women’s incursion into political spaces generally reserved for men. While both the WLMAP and the SLMWP were able to evoke traditional power, the WLMAP were able to be remarkably socially inclusive and to open up new spaces in the political sphere for women in ways that the SLMWP were not - which led to the greater overall success of the WLMAP. Furthermore, this paper will argue that despite the similarity of the civil wars and the emergence of women’s movements that employed similar tools, the existence of the dual-sex system - a traditional sexual organization system that views sexes as playing complementary roles, as opposed to hierarchal - and tremendous amounts of international support in Liberia allowed the WLMAP to have a more lasting impact on post-conflict politics and gender-roles in Liberia. Furthermore, the absence of these two elements in Sierra Leone along with the SLMWP’s inability to gain traction contributed to the temporal delay for a peace agreement and democratic elections, and comparatively far fewer women in post-conflict

135 politics.

Background Liberia’s first civil war began in 1989 when Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) invaded Nimba county in an effort to unseat the incumbent President Samuel Doe.3 This led to mass violence and increasing flows of refugees into surrounding countries. In an effort to broaden their international support base, the NPFL provided financial and military support for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) so that they could invade Sierra Leone in 1991.4 This series of events led to brutal violence in Liberia and Sierra Leone that would not be resolved for over a decade.

Years after the initiation of the first conflict, elections were held in Liberia and Charles Taylor, now head of the National Patriotic Party (NPP), was voted President in 1997.5 Sierra Leone, on the other hand, continued its brutal civil war even after the deposition of the ty-

3 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, “Gender and Civil War: The Cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone,” Civil Wars 1, no. 4 (20 September 2007): 3.

4 Aning, “Gender and Civil War,” 4.

5 Aning, “Gender and Civil War,” 3.

136 rannical military dictatorship that came to power in a coup in 1992.6 The Sierra Leone’s People Party (SLPP) came to power, but a coalition between the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the RUF, backed by Charles Taylor, continued to incite violence throughout the country in an effort to secure political power and control over economic resources.

Moreover, civil war resumed in Liberia in 1999, when two new insurgent groups emerged to challenge Taylor’s despotic regime.7 The Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), supported by Guinea and composed primarily of members of the Mandingo ethnic group, and primarily Krahn Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) supported by Côte d’Ivoire. These groups began to recruit mostly young men and became the main actors in the second civil war in Liberia.8 It is significant that in both of these cases, fighting was not limited to rebel actions opposing the incumbent government. There was also tremen-

Chrysalis Vol. XI dous violence between and within belligerent groups. This resulted in an atmosphere of brutality and chaos that made it difficult to identify a single perpetrator, therefore complicating expeditious conflict resolution.9 Other than ethnic and regional cleavages, there was little ideological difference between the two groups. The incumbent wanted to retain power and the belligerent groups struggled to gain political capital and control over natural resources. As a result, groups of armed forces terrorized the population with no semblance of law and order and no established goal or end result. The brutality of this conflict was driven by the zero-sum mentality of the rebel factions; they knew that a loss meant that they would be politically and physically eliminated. Furthermore, the potential economic opportunities available, notably control over natural resources like diamonds and minerals, provided an irresistible incentive for competing factions.10

6 Alfred Zack-Williams, “Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991-98.”

Third World Quarterly 20, no. 1 (22 Sept. 2010): 149, doi:10.1080/01436599913965.

7 Aning, “Gender and Civil War,” 4.

8 Thomas Kamara, “Liberia: Civil War and Regional Conflict.” UNHCR Emergency & Security Service, May 2003, 13, www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/030501-liberia.pdf.

9 Aning, “Gender and Civil War,” 3.

10 Aning, “Gender and Civil War,” 5.

Sitland Additionally, a notable aspect of the two conflicts was the direct targeting of civilians. In the documentary ‘Pray the Devil Back to Hell’, female survivors recount soldiers who tore through villages, plundering their homes and raping the women, with no objective other than to terrorize the population.11 Moreover in Sierra Leone, two the AFRC/RUF launched two missions targeting civilians. ‘Operation No Living Thing’ was designed to slaughter civilians during an invasion of Freetown and ‘Operation Pay Yourself’ encouraged insurgents to loot homes during a university protest.12 Rebel groups in both wars used violence and mass atrocities as military tactics in order to gain international attention and guarantee material resources provided by humanitarian interventions. In these contexts, human lives were often used as bargaining chips.13 This is important when considering the roles of the WLMAP and SLMWP because the dismal quality of everyday life

137 - the constant violence, the lack of food and water and the constant uncertainty - is what drove women in Liberia and Sierra Leone to mobilize and challenge the government as well as rebel forces.

Furthermore, though the conflicts were very similar, the women’s groups and social movements that arose in reaction to them were quite distinct. However, before describing each social movement, the term must first be defined. ‘Social movement’ is a broad category that encompasses “collective, organized, sustained, and noninstitutional challenge to authorities, powerholders, or cultural beliefs and practices.”14 Social movements are generally reacting to an issue or grievance by attempting to promote societal and political change through non-institutionalized strategies.15 In this essay, the term ‘women’s social movements’ is used to refer to social movements initiated and led by women in order to improve the lives and

11 Pray the Devil Back to Hell, dir. Gini Reticker, 2008.

12 Aning, “Gender and Civil War,” 5.

13 Danny Hoffman, “The Civilian Target in Sierra Leone and Liberia: Political Power, Military Strategy, and Humanitarian Intervention,” African Affairs (2004): 212, www.who.int/hac/techguidance/training/analysing_health_systems/liberia_civilian_ target_sierra_leone_lib ria.pdf.

14 Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper, eds., The Social Movement Reader: Cases and Concepts (Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 3.

15 Goodwin and Jasper, The Social Movement Reader, 3.

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138 status of women through either gender-based reform, or through peace-building in times of conflict.

This essay will first discuss the social movement that emerged in Liberia, the WLMAP, and then introduce the case of the SLMWP in Sierra Leone as a comparison.

The Women of Liberia’s Mass Action for Peace The WLMAP is an umbrella group comprised of a number of different groups, the two main ones being: the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET), made up primarily of Christian women, and the Liberian Muslim Women’s Organization (LMWO). Leymah Gbowee, Comfort Freeman (WIPNET) and Asatu Bah Kenneth (LMWO) were key actors that brought these organizations together, bridging religious divides and creating the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace.16 These groups comprise a number of subgroups and smaller organizations which work to meet the needs of all women, from all ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds in an effort to maximize inclusivity, representation and sup-

port base. 17 During the civil war, the WLMAP used a number of different tactics to spread their message and achieve their goals. They formed associations, held public meetings and organized public rallies expressing their concerns and objectives. The WLMAP used spaces that were traditionally reserved for women, such as fish markets, to gather huge numbers of protestors. The protestors wore white as a symbol for peace, an important resource during the civil conflict. The women in white became an emblem for peace in Liberia during the conflict and continue to be today.18 The WLMAP’s mobilization was also significant because it demonstrates the way that relatively powerless groups who are marginalized in politics (such as women in pre-conflict Liberia) can use social movements as a means to challenge dominant political forces.19 Even though at first, Charles Taylor was able to ignore the groups of women who gathered, they eventually garnered enough national and international attention that he was forced to formally recognize their demands. The WLMAP were able

16 Pray the Devil Back to Hell, dir. Gini Reticker.

17 Pray the Devil Back to Hell, dir. Gini Reticker.

18 Fuest, “Liberia’s Women Acting for Peace,” 120.

19 Fuest, “Liberia’s Women Acting for Peace,” 118.

Sitland to force Taylor, as well as representatives from the LURD and MODEL groups to initiate peace talks.20 Additionally, the WLMAP did not dissolve after signing of the peace agreement. The organization played an important role in the demobilization process after the failure of the UN by localizing and providing invaluable local knowledge to the process. The UN mission envisioned all fighters returning their weapons in return for money, but overlooked the consequences of gathering thousands of armed former soldiers in one area.

After days of chaos and riots, the UN employed WIPNET, a subgroup of the WLMAP, to take over the process. WIPNET altered the process and chose to go around villages to allow individuals to surrender their arms without all collecting in a centralized setting.21 This demonstrates the importance of incorporating local knowledge into peace processes. It also exhibits how throughout the course of the civil war, women transitioned from a relatively marginal position in political to virtually uncontested leaders in the peace process.

139 Furthermore, during the 2005 elections the WLMAP played an important role in encouraging voter registration and though they did not explicitly endorse a candidate, they are largely credited for the election of Africa’s first female head of state, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.22 Women’s organizations also utilized the momentum from the WLMAP social movement in post-conflict politics to advocate for legislative reforms that implement gender-based quotas, equalpay reforms, educational opportunities specifically for girls, and support for the female entrepreneurs who emerged during the entrepreneurial vacuum of the war.23 These gains were able to be made due to the legitimacy and political capital that Liberian women were able to accumulate during the conflict in their roles as peace-makers.

Sierra Leone Women’s Movement for Peace By contrast, initial women’s movements in Sierra Leone were actually a part of the dominant forces, not a challenge to it. The RUF had

20 Colin M. Waugh, Charles Taylor and Liberia (Zed Books, 2011), 324-325.

21 Gbowee, Mighty Be Our Powers, 139-141.

22 Fuest, “Liberia’s Women Acting for Peace,” 116.

23 Fuest, “Liberia’s Women Acting for Peace,” 120.

140 an entire branch devoted to female fighters, however this division was dedicated to pursuing the RUF’s agenda - not the promotion of the interests of Sierra Leonean women.24 It was only later in the civil war that an independent women’s movement began to progress: the Sierra Leone Women’s Movement for Peace (SLWMP). The SLWMP fought for sustainable peace, as well as social justice and economic empowerment for women.25 The women marched for peace even when they were being shot at by rebel forces, and held rallies to further their cause. However, though the “women’s role in Sierra Leone was particularly successful in the sense that they were a driving force behind the military government’s decision to hold election,” they were not able to enter the political sphere the same way that the WLMAP did.26 The SLWMP was never formally recognized by the government and were therefore not given a platform to express their objectives, which drastically hindered their movement. Exclu-

Chrysalis Vol. XI sion from peace negotiation and marginalization from the political sphere also diminished any lasting consequences that the movement may have had.

Woman as Peacemakers The women of role in peace-building is not limited to the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) assessed that “conflicts brutally reveal the discrimination suffered by women and girls during peacetime, since the different types of abuse and violence against women in conflict situations simply reproduce and amplify what they experience in their communities.”27 The resolution also acknowledged how this exacerbated vulnerability entitled women to undertake roles in maintaining social cohesion and peace-building. Essentially, although women, due to institutional discrimination and vulnerabilities, often face the harshest challenges and conditions during war, they

24 Aning, “Gender and Civil War,” 16.

25 Isabel Casimiro, et al. African Women’s Movements: Changing Political Landscapes (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 205-206.

26 Aning, “Gender and Civil War,” 16.

27 Françoise Nduwimana, “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security,” United Nations, 2000, 17, www.un.org/womenwatch/ osagi/cdrom/documents/Background_Paper_Africa.pdf.

Sitland are also empowered in the role that they are capable of taking on as peace-builders and conflict resolvers.28 In fact, the exploitation that women suffer is commonly the source of their grievances, and therefore what compels them to form social movements. For example, based on 2016 OHCHR report, the WHO discovered that up to 77.4% of women and girls in Liberia were raped during the civil war, while the Human Rights Watch discovered similarly high figures in Sierra Leone, where rape was systematically used as a weapon of war.29 Furthermore, the civil war resulted in more than 215,000 refugees, with 50% to 80% of those refugees being women. This leads to a number of security and health risks, especially for women.30 It is logical then, that sexual assault and forced displacement were central to the grievances expressed by both the WLMAP and the SLWMP.

141 en played in peace-making, there were three key aspects that led to the success of the WLMAP during the second civil war in Liberia: the invocation of traditional power, exceptional social inclusiveness and the involvement of women in the political sphere. The importance of these characteristics will be demonstrated by comparing their role during the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts, as well as the post-conflict consequences.

First, women were able to use traditional power by creating an imagery of ‘mothers of the nation’ that awarded them both with respect and with legitimacy. Here, traditional power refers to the power that women have that has been derived from their traditional roles as women. Political motherhood, for instance, is often used by women in politics as a form of traditional power. An example of this political motherhood is in Liberia, where Returning to the original argument, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf is often reconcerning the role that wom- ferred to as the “mother of the na28 Nduwimana, “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325,” 17.

29 “UN Report Urges Liberia to Act on Rape,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 14 Oct. 2016, www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20680&LangID=E. ; “Sierra Leone: Sexual Violence Widespread in War,” Human Rights Watch, January 16, 2003, www.hrw.org/news/2003/01/16/ sierra-leone-sexual-violence-widespread-war.

30 Trude Bennett, et al, “Refugees, Forced Displacement, and War,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 10, no. 11 (Nov. 2004): 2034-2035, https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/ eid1011.040624_03.

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142 tion” who is healing the people.31 Two specific examples of the employment of traditional power are during the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra and during the subsequent demobilization process. During the peace negotiations in Accra, the men involved in the negotiation process were treated to upscale hotels, cars and food, and therefore had very little incentive to accelerate the process. Therefore, after weeks of negotiations, the WLMAP - who were not formally involved in the negotiation process, but were present at the talks in Accra – gathered outside the room and threatened to hold the men hos tage until they signed a treaty. In most cases, this would result in arrest, however when the men tried to move the women, Leymah Gbowee stood up and began to remove her clothes.

In doing so, “[she] had summoned up a traditional power. In Africa, it’s a terrible curse to see a married or elderly woman deliberately bare herself.”32 By exposing herself, she brought humiliation and shame on the men who were failing to bring peace to Liberia.33 In this case, the

invocation of traditional power not only provided the women with immunity, but sent a message to the men involved in negotiations.

Gbowee’s actions led to the signing of an agreement less than an hour later and subsequently the end of the war within weeks. Moreover, during the demobilization process previously discussed, one of the reasons that WIPNET was so successful when collecting arms was that they had the trust of the former soldiers.34 In this instance, their traditional power stemmed from their sociocultural legitimacy as ‘mothers of the nation’.35 This imagery works in a broader sense beyond the one example. Much of the legitimacy of the WLMAP came from the emphasis on their particular values as women and mothers that guided their political goals. Using the term ‘mother of the nation’ is a reference to traditional African matriarchal philosophy. Though conceptualizing “women’s power [as] being based on the logic of motherhood has proved offensive to many Western feminists,” in the African system of matriarchy, ‘motherhood’ symbolizes women’s

31 Casimiro, et al. African Women’s Movements, 25-27.

32 Gbowee, Mighty Be Our Powers, 134.

33 Gbowee, Mighty Be Our Powers, 134.

34 Pray the Devil Back to Hell, dir. Gini Reticker.

35 Gbowee, Mighty Be Our Powers, 118.

Sitland empowerment.36 The invocation of traditional power operated similarly in the Sierra Leonean case. Women were seen as the natural peace-builders, both due to their legitimacy as mothers and because in the context of an incredibly repressive military, they were less likely to face violent repercussions when speaking out.37 Therefore, the use of traditional power is relevant in both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean cases, and continues to provide legitimacy to women’s organizations in both countries today.

Second, one of the distinct characteristics of women’s mobilization is its ability to bypass ethnic and religious lines by mobilizing the population around shared gender-based objectives.38 Women are able to draw on a history of creating and maintaining social networks to unite fragmented societies and rally towards a common goal.39 These efforts to build community orga-

143 nizations around non-sectarian interests denotes an important break with the longstanding propensity of African voters to rally along ethnic lines.40 It is widely understood that “formal politics in Africa is to a large extent underwritten and controlled by informal patronage arrangements,” however women tend to operate on the margins of these clientelistic networks and are therefore not incentivized to vote on the basis of kinship or ethnic ties.41 Independent women’s organizations have a history of breaking past traditional political concerns, such as religion and ethnicity, and focusing more on issues such as human rights, women’s causes and education.42 The causes of women’s organizations tend to unite women (and increasingly men) from diverse backgrounds leading to more broad-based movements.

One of the most important legacies of the inclusiveness of the WLMAP was that the 2005 elections in Liberia were the first since inde-

36 Aning, “Gender and Civil War,” 15.

37 Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, “Sierra Leonean Women and the Peace Process,” Accord, no.

9 (2000): 46-49, www.c-r.org/accord-article/sierra-leonean-women-and-peace-process.

38 Casimiro, et al. African Women’s Movements, 86.

39 Aili Mari Tripp, “The New Political Activism in Africa,” Journal of Democracy 12, no. 3 (July 2001): 144.

40 Tripp, “The New Political Activism in Africa,” 151.

41 Tripp, “The New Political Activism in Africa,” 145.

42 Tripp, “The New Political Activism in Africa,” 148.

144

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pendence to not be defined by ethnic, religious or kinship loyalties.43 Furthermore, once voting patterns shifted to reflect party lines rather than clientelistic ethnic ties, the MODEL and LURD rebels groups, who depended largely on ethnic allegiances, were forced to exit the political sphere. This, combined with the absence of an incumbent due to Charles Taylor’s exile, left an open political space and allowed civilian elections to take place on a relatively even playing field.44

been transformed from either ethno-regional or patron-client political logic,” the country remained entrenched in competition between ethnic groups.46 The incumbent military government and the RUF were very active during the elections by trying to restrict voting by terrorizing the population, which left very little space in the political sphere for an entirely new political party.47 Electoral competition was therefore confined to the two existing parties, the All People’s Congress (APC) and Sierra Leone By contrast, Sierra Leone did not People’s Party (SLPP), which are experience the same unification based on ethnic ties and remain the nor post-conflict political open- only two credible political parties ness. Despite the attempts of the in Sierra Leone today.48 Sierra Leone Women’s Movement for Peace’s (SLWMP) to bridge Third, after devastating conflicts ethnic and religious divides, most such as the ones in Liberia and Siof the sub-groups within the SLW- erra Leone, there is often a need MP were affiliated with a political for varying levels of social and/or party and despite the collective political reconstruction. Women’s goal of achieving peace, party loy- organizations have increasingly alties (which were based on eth- seized this opportunity to enter the nicity) remained more important.45 political sphere and demand repreAs a result, “Sierra Leone had not sentation, as well as gender-based 43 David Harris, Civil War and Democracy in West Africa, (I.B. Tauris, 2012), 183.

44 Harris, Civil War and Democracy in West Africa, 161.

45 Casimiro, et al. African Women’s Movements, 205.

46 Harris, Civil War and Democracy in West Africa, 129.

47 Casimiro, et al. African Women’s Movements, 206.

48 Jimmy Kandeh, “Rogue Incumbents, Donor Assistance, and Sierra Leone’s Second Post Conflict Elections of 2007,” Journal of Modern African Studies 4, no. 46 (2008): 614-615.

Sitland reform.49 This process is aided by the role that women have played in the peacemaking process during a number of civil conflict, not only in Liberia, but across Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, members of the WLMAP were able to use their role in initiating peace negotiations and in the implementation of the resulting peace agreements to establish their presence in the political sphere.50 Moreover, women are generally incentivized to form their own political parties due to the fact that existing parties rarely adequately address the concerns of women.51 The WLMAP were particularly successful at integrating women into the process of political reconstruction; post-conflict Liberia saw the first African female head of state and increasing numbers of women in parliament.52 In Sierra Leone, women had a more difficult time establishing themselves in the political sphere. First, this was due the fact that the largest women’s movement in Sierra Leone came from the RUF itself; an

145 entire division of the rebel group was comprised of and led by Sierra Leonean women. This organization resembled more the party-led women’s associations that were the norm in African prior to democratization in the 1990s, as opposed the independent women’s organizations formed in Liberia, which was actually able to challenge the incumbent government.53 Women’s groups co-opted by existing political parties (or rebel groups) are often restricted to specific issues, generally resist the empowerment of women and are unable to pursue any goals that conflict with the priorities of the dominant party.54 This therefore prohibited the women from entering the political sphere with their own agendas.

However, even with the progression of independent organizations such as the SLWMP, women’s organizations in Sierra Leone were not able to break into the political sphere the same way that the WLMAP did. Despite the fact that the women’s protests contributed to

49 Casimiro, et al. African Women’s Movements, 196.

50 Casimiro, et al. African Women’s Movements, 196.

51 Tripp, “The New Political Activism in Africa,” 143.

52 Veronika Fuest, “‘This Is the Time to Get in Front’: Changing Roles and Opportunities for Women in Liberia,” African Affairs 107, no. 427 (2008): 203.

53 Tripp, “The New Political Activism in Africa,” 143.

54 Tripp, “The New Political Activism in Africa,” 146.

146 the government’s decision to hold civilian elections, the organization had focused more on pressuring the government to hold the elections rather than how they could use those elections to gain political power and instigate, for example, gender-based reform.55 By way of illustration, despite the SLWMP’s crucial role in initiating the peace process, women were not explicitly mentioned or designated a role in the Lomé Peace Agreement that ended the civil war and were therefore not an official part of the peace and restoration process.

One of the reasons for this is that they were ignored by both the RUF and NRPC and without the platform that the WLMAP had, they were unable to make their message heard by those with power both at the national and international levels. This was chiefly due to the lack of support. Sierra Leonean women had been politically marginalized since the colonial period due to cultural and economic factors and this drastically affected their willingness and ability to fully commit to entering the political sphere (Ju-

Chrysalis Vol. XI su-Sheriff). Male Sierra Leonean politicians also played a role in this political marginalization by actively preventing women from dominating the political sphere, as the SLWMP’s idealism threatened male-dominated politics and therefore men’s access to power.56 By contrast, the WLMAP, to a certain extent, were granted a seat at the table when President Charles Taylor agreed to hear their demands in 2003 - granted, President Taylor was under immense pressure from civil society to do so.57 The Legacies of Women’s Movements Long-lasting post-conflict implications can be used as a marker of the success of women’s social movements. Notably, in countries with successful social movements led by women, women have become more independent and have increasingly assumed positions of influence and leadership, a phenomena which some scholars are calling ‘remarkable emancipation’ from their pre-war positions.58

55 Aning, “Gender and Civil War,” 16.

56 Filomina Steady, Women and Collective Action in Africa: Development, Democratization, and Empowerment, with Special Focus on Sierra Leone, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 53.

57 Pray the Devil Back to Hell, dir. Gini Reticker.

58 Fuest, “‘This Is the Time to Get in Front,’” 202.

Sitland Therefore the significance of women’s mobilization is not only in the role that they play during the conflict or crisis, but the way that they alter gender roles and create new opportunities for women. It could even be argued that the success of a women’s social movement could be based not only by the achievement of peace (when peace-building is the goal), but also on the degree to which women are able to guarantee legal, political and economic rights that last beyond the end of the conflict. For example, it could be argued that the WLMAP in Liberia was not only a successful social movement because it led to the signing of the CPA, but also because since the election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Liberia has seen astounding gender reforms. For instance, Liberia recently passed legislation that would increase the enforcement of gender-based violence (including rape and domestic abuse) laws. This legislation is part of an effort to achieve gender-equality that is directly due to the WLMAP. So although the WLMAP and the SLWMP both led to the signing of the peace agreements, the enduring political, legislative and sociocultural changes regarding gender in Liberia are far

147 more significant outcomes.59 In essence, there are two necessary (however, insufficient) overarching conditions that contributed to a more receptive political atmosphere with respect to women’s involvement in Liberia, but were absent in Sierra Leone. These two elements are the underlying causes for the varying outcomes between the two conflicts. The first was the dual-sex system that exists in Liberia and the second was the enormous amount of international support from the international women’s movement that propped up the WLMAP financially, politically and ideologically.

First, women in Liberia were successfully able to establish themselves due to the political atmosphere described above, but also due to historical factors such as the ‘dual-sex system.’ This is a major factor that differentiates gendered political involvement between Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Liberia, the traditional dual-sex organization conceptualizes the sexes not as hierarchal, but as complementary. Men and women are perceived as entirely different and therefore unable to represent each other’s

59 Peace Medie, “Fighting Gender-Based Violence: The Women’s Movement and the Enforcement of Rape Law in Liberia,” African Affairs 112, no. 448 (2013): 378.

148 interests.60 This does not mean that men and women have historically been equal in Liberia, however it has allowed powerful female leaders to emerge throughout history. “Female power in local public realms has, therefore, been a traditional feature in Liberia” and women’s social movements, such as the WLMAP, were able to build on that history and use historical precedents for female collective action, as well as the unique dual-sex system to advocate for the right to represent their own interests.61

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ceived financial aid, the WLMAP in Liberia received considerably more international attention, and therefore foreign aid and NGO assistance. Veronika Fuest suggests that without this external support, the women in Liberia likely would not have been mobilized to such an extent.64 There is no consensus on why the Liberian women’s movement received more funding and attention than the movement in Sierra Leone, but it could be argued that foreign donors were more receptive to the women’s movements in Liberia because the prospect of Second, both of these social move- Africa’s first female head of state ments were supported by interna- was appealing, and Liberia had Eltional norms and financial aid. For- len Johnson-Sirleaf, a politically eign donors’ monetary support and experienced and Harvard-educated focus on ‘women’s empowerment’ woman, who made the perfect canhas provided both an ideologi- didate.65 cal and financial support-base for women’s movements in Africa, and Before concluding, there are two globally.62 Furthermore, the UN specifications regarding the case Resolution 1325 explicitly aims to studies that need to be mentioned. “provide women with a greater role First, while this paper will primarin conflict prevention and resolu- ily focused on the role of women tion” and often provides funding as peace-builders, the heterogenefor organizations that intend to do ity of women’s roles during these this.63 Though both movements re- conflicts should not be understat60 Fuest, “Liberia’s Women Acting for Peace,” 118.

61 Fuest, “Liberia’s Women Acting for Peace,” 122.

62 Casimiro, et al. African Women’s Movements, 197.

63 Casimiro, et al. African Women’s Movements, 201.

64 Fuest, “Liberia’s Women Acting for Peace,” 128.

65 Fuest, “This Is the Time to Get in Front,” 202.

Sitland

149

ed. Though dominant narratives generally construe women as victims and/or outside observers to the men’s conflict, in reality many women held positions of leadership in both the NPFL in Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone. In both organizations, women held appointments in high-level positions where they were responsible for decision-making, mobilizing war assets and diplomatic negotiations.66 Moreover, women were also direct perpetrators of violence, in that they took up arms for rebel groups on both sides of the border.67

because they perceived men to be stronger than women, despite the fact that Weah was a footballer and Johnson-Sirleaf was highly educated and had far more political experience.68 Moreover, women who enter the political sphere often face social stigma because of traditional views that women who travel due to campaigns or spend time in meetings with men are “loose women” or “unfit mothers.”69 Politically active women are also often the target of harassment, stereotypes and derogatory remarks.

Despite this, African women have made unprecedented gains in the political sphere since the 1990s, Furthermore, though this paper with Liberia just being one exampresents a rather positive outlook ple.70 concerning women’s involvement in politics (particularly in Liberia) Conclusion it is essential to note that, in reality, cultural attitudes still present In conclusion, this paper argued a barrier to women’s involvement that despite similar civil wars, the in many areas of the public sphere. women’s movements that emerged Even in the Liberian elections, sur- in Liberia and Sierra Leone resultveys found that many women and ed in very different outcomes. Ultimen who voted for George Weah mately, the WLMAP thrived due to over Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf did so the pre-existing dual-sex system in 66 Isiaka Alani Badmus, “Explaining Women’s Roles in the West African Tragic Triplet: Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote D’ivoire in Comparative Perspective,” Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences 1, no. 3 (2009): 821.

67 Badmus, “Explaining Women’s Roles in the West African Tragic Triplet,” 833.

68 Harris, Civil War and Democracy in West Africa, 178.

69 Tripp, “The New Political Activism in Africa,” 153.

70 Tripp, “The New Political Activism in Africa,” 153.

150 Liberia and the significant amounts of international aid that the movement received. The success of the WLMAP altered post-conflict politics and gender-roles in Liberia, while the SLMWP’s inability to gain momentum resulted in the continued marginalization of women in Sierra Leonean politics.

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Sitland

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154

The Decline of Manufacturing as a Proportion of GDP in South Africa, Contextualized and Explained

By Hilliard Wolfe

Wolfe

155 Abstract

Abstrait

The purpose of this article is to examine the circumstances driving the relative decline of the manufacturing sector as a contributor to South Africa’s gross domestic product. In doing so, this article will demonstrate that manufacturing in South Africa is declining due to factors both endogenous and exogenous to the South African economy, which are undermining the growth potential of the sector. This is opposed to mere relative shifts in sectoral output and importance, which are a related result (and not the primary cause) of the manufacturing sector’s decline. The recent relative contraction of manufacturing is contextualized in terms of causal links to international trade imbalances, domestic industrial policymaking, labor availability, and exchange rates. With these factors established and their connections to the decrease of manufacturing as a proportion of GDP explained, this article ultimately discusses the ramifications of a decline in South African manufacturing in both the present and in the future, and how future political and economic changes may arise as a result of this shift.

Le but de cet article est d’examiner les circonstances dirigeant le déclin relatif du secteur manufacturier en tant que contributeur au produit intérieur brut de l’Afrique du Sud. Pour cela, cet article démontrera que le déclin de la manufacture en Afrique du Sud est dû à des facteurs endogènes et exogènes à l’économie sud-africaine, qui ébranlent la potentielle croissance du secteur. Ceci s’oppose aux simples changements relatifs à l’importance et la production sectorielles, qui sont un résultat lié, et non la cause primaire, du déclin du secteur manufacturier. La récente relative contraction de la manufacture est contextualisée en termes de liens de causalité aux déséquilibres du commerce international, à l’élaboration des politiques industrielles domestiques, à la disponibilité de la main d’oeuvre, ainsi qu’aux taux de change. Une fois ces facteurs établies and leur connexions au déclin de la manufacture en tant que proportion du PIB expliquées, cet article débattra en ultime point les ramifications du déclin de la manufacture sud-africaine dans le présent et dans le future, et comment de futurs transformations économiques et politiques peuvent résulter de ce changement.

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156 Introduction The ability of a developing economy to grow not only by means of increasing gross output, but also in terms of diversifying industries and fostering their development, is paramount to its long-term success and stability. This is especially pertinent in the case of manufacturing, an industry whose development brings along industrial expansion and increasing focus on the production of secondary goods. In the case of South Africa, the past twenty years of economic change have resulted in a healthy increase in gross domestic product from 1997 to 2017 by US$196.833 billion and a total output over these 20 years of US$5.386896 trillion.1 Gross domestic product, or GDP, is defined as the total value added by domestic producers, plus product taxes and minus subsidies2. Meanwhile, these years of change have also resulted in a shrinking manufacturing market as a proportion of

GDP. Manufacturing specifically has not grown in importance in the South African economy, and as a main industry for unskilled labour, this has had repercussions on employment and has resulted in ongoing inequality in the country. After the recession in 2008, the industry has struggled to return to pre-recession levels of importance to GDP, which were already in decline, despite government programs tailored specifically to encourage manufacturing sector economic and employment growth, such as the Manufacturing Enhancement Programme.3 Manufacturing value added, which once made up almost a fifth of the total GDP in 1997, has decreased significantly, such that it made up only slightly more than a tenth of the total GDP as of 2017.4 Furthermore, with the decreasing proportion of manufactured goods as a part of GDP, the annual growth rate of manufacturing value added follows a similar trend to that of GDP, though slightly lower.5 With

1 “South Africa GDP (Current US$).” World Bank Data.

2 “GDP Indicator.,” World Bank Metadata,. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/ Metadata/MetadataWidget.aspx?Name=GDP%20(current%20US$)&Code=NY. GDP.MKTP.CD&Type=S&ReqType=Metadata&ddlSelectedValue=IND&ReportID=62603&ReportType=Table.

3 Haroon Bhorat, and Christopher Rooney. “State of Manufacturing in South Africa.”

March 2017, http://www.dpru.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/36/Publications/Working_Papers/DPRU%20WP201702.pdf.

4 See Figure 4: “Manufactures Value Added as a % of GDP.” 5 See Figure 2: “Annual Growth of GDP and Manufacturing.”

Wolfe respect to manufactured goods, this relative decrease in importance can be attributed to factors both external and internal to the economy, such as poor organization of the manufacturing sector, volatile exchange rates, and increasing foreign competition, among others.

Ultimately, within the broad context of the South African economy as a whole, and in the context of manufacturing output, various socioeconomic factors driven by international factors and by factors within South Africa have greatly constrained growth in the domestic manufacturing industry, resulting in much uncertainty within South Africa about the future of manufacturing.

Background and Context In order to better understand the role of manufacturing in the South African economy, one must investigate the historical contexts and changes that have impacted the industry’s growth. One of the most impactful and significant policies in South Africa was apartheid, the

157 policies of discrimination and segregation implemented by a minority white government.6 On the heels of the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa liberalized the economy and was no longer constrained by sanctions from the international community.7 Thus, one would expect for these changes to translate into increases in employment and a related increased relevance of sectors that South Africa was already focusing on expanding - namely manufacturing and mining. These two sectors had seen sustained growth and increasingly consolidated control, wherein uneducated and impoverished non-white workers made up the bulk of the workforce.8 However, with a large proportion of the population left undereducated and without equal access to resources as a result of generations of subjugation under apartheid, the legacy of political and economic inequality is palpable. In that sense, it is undeniably linked with a variety of development issues in South Africa, including the struggling manufacturing sector. With the 2008 financial

6 “Apartheid.” Encyclopædia Britannica. July 20, 1998.

7 Pádraig Carmody, “Between Globalisation and (Post) Apartheid: The Political Economy of Restructuring in South Africa,” Journal of Southern African Studies 28, no. 2 (June 2002): 255-75.

8 John Iliffe, “The South African Economy, 1652–1997,” The Economic History Review 52, no. 1 (February 1999): 87–103.

158 crisis, South Africa’s whole economy was weakened even more, and the manufacturing industry continued to decline.9 The impact of the systemic inequality of apartheid, coupled with the international economic shock of the recession in 2008, set the stage for the decline of manufacturing.

External Constraints on Manufacturing Growth: Exchange Rates, Trade, and Investment The South African economic and political frameworks also face external issues, many of which have diminished the growth and fortitude of manufacturing in South Africa. The highly volatile exchange rate of the South African rand is one of those majors issues. Indeed, over the course of twenty years it has fluctuated from valuations of 5 rands per US dollar to over 14 rands per US dollar.10 As a result of exchange rate volatility, foreign investment in the manufacturing sec-

Chrysalis Vol. XI tor has diminished, due to the fact that this volatility can undermine the value of investments. Furthermore, this implies that firms are affected differently depending on their import and export reliance when the rand depreciates, which is the recent trend. More specifically, manufacturers who rely on foreign imports intensively in production will suffer as these foreign imports increase in price relative to domestic currency. Manufacturers who export their products internationally would typically benefit from depreciation, as this makes their goods’ prices more attractive.11 In parallel, annual inflation in South Africa has amounted to approximately 5% over the past 7 years, which is generally higher than the world average.12 Consequently, the cost of living for employees calls for higher wages and therefore increased costs incurred by manufacturing firms. Therefore, the added benefit of favourable exchange rates may be offset by the increased cost of living for labour-

9 Ravinder Rena, and Malindi Msoni, “Global Financial Crises and Its Impact on the South African Economy: A Further Update,” Journal of Economics 5, no. 1 (October 2, 2017): 17–25.

10 “South Africa Official Exchange Rate (LCU per US$, Period Average).” World Bank Data, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.FCRF?locations=ZA. 11 Chipanda, Blessing. “South Africa’s Super-Exporters.” August 2014.

12 “South Africa and World Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual %),” World Bank Data, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=ZA-1W.

Wolfe ers due to inflation.13 Regarding international markets and exports, another challenge for manufacturing in South Africa is the increase in international competition from areas where manufactured goods can be produced with cheaper labour. Within East Asia, for example, export-oriented industrialization has resulted in a massive increase in exports of manufactured goods, presenting a direct challenge to the growth of South Africa’s exporting manufacturers.14 Especially when coupled with inflationary increases in costs for South African manufacturing, the increased prevalence of international manufacturing export competition has significantly undercut South Africa’s manufacturing industry with respect to revenue from manufacturing exports.

In 1997, manufacturing exports from South Africa were valued at US$17.927 billion, whereas manufacturing imports into South Africa were valued at US$22.979 billion.

Over the course of 20 years, this gap between manufacturing exports

159 and imports has widened, where exports increased to US$41.981 billion by 2017, but imports increased to US$66.681 billion, an increase in the difference between manufacturing imports and exports by 388.915%.15 This signifies that many manufactured goods are cheaper to import into South Africa than to export from South Africa, further bolstering the fact that South African manufactured goods are costlier and therefore less demanded than foreign manufactured goods.

Beyond exports and imports, however, the exchange rate volatility also impacts investment into nearly all industries, although manufacturing as a struggling sector is therefore more vulnerable to decreased investment. When exchange rates are volatile, as they are in South Africa, investments may be adversely impacted by fluctuations, making them riskier. Volatility is also characteristic of South Africa’s broader economic struggles, which may deter foreign investors from buying into industries that are even

13 “South African Manufacturing Production and the Rand (an Update),” Economic Growth, September 14, 2016, http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=8260.

14 “Export Dynamics in East Asia,” Asian Development Outlook 2007 Update, 2007, 53–86.

15 See Figure 1: “Manufacturing Exports and Imports.”

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more vulnerable to volatility, such as manufacturing.16 Overall, trade imbalances, exchange rate volatility, and greater inflation relative to the world average have resulted in an inability on the part of South African manufacturers to keep up with international competition, and have resulted in increased inefficiency and expenses in domestic manufacturing production.

manufacturers are less attractive employers than exporting manufacturers. Those who export, while having superior output and wages, are nonetheless struggling due to the aforementioned trade issues facing South Africa’s manufacturing sector. This difference between exporters and non-exporters is unique to manufacturing in South Africa due to the relatively intensive reliance on capital, and the Internal Constraints on fact that the government is actively Manufacturing Growth: Labour trying to encourage manufacturing Markets, Policies, and Legacies exports to help keep the industry of Inequality internationally competitive and maintain its relevance in the counThere are a variety of economic try’s economy. and social issues driving the decreasing importance and efficient Beyond issues of wage and output output of manufacturers in South between different manufacturers, Africa. The main issue, wage in- there is also the issue of jumbled equality, arises between exporting and varied government policies and non-exporting manufacturing to aid the industry, which have in firms, where output and capital many cases been either ineffective per worker are far greater among or detrimental to the performance South African exporters of man- of the manufacturing sector. For ufactured goods than solely do- example, the government implemestic producers.17 This difference mented the Industrial Policy Action in productivity, wage, and overall Plans and the National Industrial output means that non-exporting Policy Framework, which focused 16 Martha Wentzel, and Maxi Steyn, “Investment Promotion in the South African Manufacturing Industry: Incentive Comparisons with Malaysia and Singapore,” South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 17, no. 3 (May 29, 2014): 319–35.

17 Carli Bezuidenhout, Marianne Matthee, and Neil Rankin, “Inclusive Growth and Wage Inequality: The Case of South African Manufacturing Exporters,” https://www. wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/south_africa_wcp.pdf.

Wolfe on trying to make domestic manufactured goods exporters more competitive in the global economy, while simultaneously trying to encourage exportation of manufactured goods by smaller, inwardly-focused manufacturing firms.18 However, these policies were flawed because they focused on encouraging manufacturing exporters in spite of the aforementioned preference for other manufacturing exporters outside South Africa. Indeed, these policies did not stimulate increased investment in manufacturing, which means that South African manufacturing exports are still uncompetitive in the context of the global market. Also, due to the fact that South African manufacturing exporters on the whole have more employees and utilize capital more intensively, encouraging smaller manufacturers to export was equally ineffective.19 This was because they were not able to maintain a competitive presence in the export market, not only relative to foreign manufactured goods

161 exporters, but also relative to the South African conglomerate manufacturers who dominate South Africa’s manufacturing exports.20 Therefore, industrial policy within South Africa failed to encourage export growth at all levels within the manufacturing sector. At the same time, other industries such as the mining and service sectors saw far greater increases in value added over a 20 year period, due to more competitiveness, as opposed to the continued inefficiency and underperformance rife within the manufacturing sector.21 Another issue impacting the manufacturing sector is the fact that manufacturers are becoming more capital-intensive and more focused on complex manufactured goods as a result of the aforementioned industrial policies, such that they require more skilled labour and capital, and less unskilled labour.22 Due to this shift, the ability of manufacturers to efficiently increase output and source labour and cap-

18 Asanda Fotoyi, Siphosethu Tetani, Mbofholowo Tsedu, and Christopher Wood, “Analysis of Existing Industrial Policies and the State of Implementation in South Africa,” December 2016, https://www.fes-southafrica.org/fileadmin/user_upload/TIPS_IP_ REVIEW_FES-Revised_Final_Dec_2016_edit.pdf.

19 Bezuidenhout, Matthee, and Rankin, “Inclusive Growth.”

20 Carmody, “Between Globalisation.”

21 See Figure 3: “Change in Value Added by Sector” 22 Blessing Chipanda, “South Africa’s Super-Exporters,” August 2014, http://www. tips.org.za/files/policy_brief_-_south_african_super-exporters.pdf.

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ital for these more advanced products has been hindered, given the underwhelming investment in the sector and the fact that only 15.196% of the population above 25 in South Africa had attained at least a post-secondary education as of 2015.23 Therefore, the supply of skilled labour remains low despite increasing demand within the manufacturing industry. The pool of unskilled labour, meanwhile, remains high due to the inability of the majority of South Africans to attain equal education up until the recent end of apartheid.24 Unskilled labour is defined as labourers who have attained a secondary education at most, while skilled labour is defined as labourers who have attained at least a post-secondary education.25 As a result, manufacturers cannot keep up with the increasing technological complexity of their products as encouraged by the government, and therefore can’t become more competitive or increase their productive output.

between manufacturing and other sectors in terms of ability to sustain and expand. While the mining industry continues with a similar structure of reliance on unskilled labourers as it had during apartheid, manufacturing is constrained in terms of technical improvements and growth due to a lack of skilled labour availability, as evidenced by the stark difference in the two sectors’ recent growth.26 This is rooted in concentrated wealth among a white minority and unequal access to education among poor, nonwhite communities as a result of apartheid, which cause a vicious cycle of low income and lack of education.27 It is apparent that a combination of factors, many relating to flawed government industrial policies, and others rooted in the concentrated manufacturing structure and pervasive inequality of apartheid, have also undercut the manufacturing sector’s relevance as a part of GDP. Meanwhile, the industry struggles to recover from the recession while simultaneously Consequently, a disparity exists integrating a wide variety of chang23 “South Africa Educational Attainment, at Least Completed Post-Secondary, Population 25+, Total (%) (Cumulative),” World Bank Data, World Bank Data. https://data. worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.CUAT.PO.ZS?locations=ZA 24 Iliffe, “The South African Economy,” 25 “Unskilled Labor.” Investopedia.

26 See Figure 3: “Change in Value Added by Sector” 27 Miriam Altman, “Low Wage Work in South Africa,” May 2006.

Wolfe es encouraged by the government.

Implications for the South African Economy and Other Sectors As a result of the struggling manufacturing sector, the economy and GDP structure of South Africa are changing, as is demand for labour within the country. For example, because manufacturers are encouraged to rely more on skilled labour in the production of capital-intensive, high-technology goods, many unskilled labourers who could be used in the manufacturing of goods of less technological complexity are instead unemployed or being hired within sectors that have performed relatively well in recent years.28 Indeed, South Africa boasts an astoundingly high unemployment rate of 27.33% as of 2017, an alltime high over the past 20 years.29 Meanwhile, those labourers who were able to find employment have taken up jobs in the comparatively burgeoning service and mining sectors, where the service sec-

163 tor value added has increased by 143.5% over the past 20 years and the mining sector value added has increased by 307.757% from 1997 to 2011.30 This vast increase, when compared to the 20-year increase of 47.53% in manufacturing value added, undoubtedly correlates to the decline of the manufacturing sector and subsequent redistribution of labour among sectors. Furthermore, this lessened importance of manufacturing has implications for government policymaking, as new frameworks must be drafted to balance the government’s goal of making the manufacturing sector technologically advanced with the necessity for unskilled labour employment and competitive exports.

Thus, many funds that have been used so far to encourage growth in the manufacturing industry have not yielded sufficient positive results. Because of this, government has simultaneously pushed flawed manufacturing development plans while unnecessarily spending money in the process.31 This shows that the South African manufacturing sector’s decline has implications for the economy as a whole, espe-

28 Altman, “Low Wage Work in South Africa.”

29 “South Africa Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (Modeled ILO Estimate).” World Bank Data.

30 See Figure 3: “Change in Value Added by Sector” 31 Fotoyi, Tetani, Tsedu, and Wood, “Analysis of Existing Industrial Policies.”

164 cially for the allocation of labour across industries, and for government planning both in the present and the future with respect to social policy, unemployment, industrialization, and trade. Without a sturdy and diversified manufacturing sector, South Africa could become dependent on informal markets or remain dependent on exporting extractives, which would not necessarily yield to innovation or social change.32 Future of South African Manufacturing In the future, changes to the annual Industrial Policy Action Plans are likely to occur, such that incremental steps can be taken in revitalizing the industry, and the development of a robust, high-technology manufacturing sector will be scaled back to allow for increased opportunities for unemployed unskilled labourers. It is also plausible that future implementations of these IPAPs will bifurcate their treatment of the ills of the manufacturing industry.

With this perspective, they can encourage increased global competitiveness among conglomerated exporters while fostering the growth of domestic manufacturers who are

Chrysalis Vol. XI not yet large enough or capital-intensive enough to sustain a competitive export regime. Indeed, in the 2019 - 2020 IPAP breakdown, the Department of Trade and Industry more clearly emphasizes the need to tackle social inequalities while increasing labour-intensive production and integrating high-performing extractive industries into manufacturing.33 This most recent iteration acknowledges the need to counteract legacies of systemic inequality holding back the industry, while also attempting to open more manufacturing positions to lowskill workers. Should such changes not occur, and the government continue to pursue its previous manufacturing development objectives, it is possible that the manufacturing industry will continue to decrease in importance, and that unskilled labour could instead end up mainly in the expanding mining sector. What the future holds for manufacturing in South Africa, and its importance as a main contributor to GDP and force for employment and industrialization, will be determined by how the government chooses to formulate industrial and social policy, and whether the industry can effectively reconcile the rift between exporting and non-ex-

32 Altman, “Low Wage Work in South Africa.”

33 “Industrial Policy Action Plan 2017/18 - 2019/20,” 13 June 2017.

Wolfe

165

porting firms.

Conclusion Manufacturing in South Africa has suffered from stunted growth opportunities, especially due to the impact apartheid had on the quantity of unskilled labour and the market concentration of exporting manufacturers, and the subsequent impact that the 2008 recession had in diminishing manufacturing output and further reducing its importance, despite government efforts to revitalise the industry and bring it to the forefront of the South African economy. This has resulted in a lack of competitiveness among manufactured goods exporters in the global economy, and a shift in labour distribution among industries. The decline is due to a variety of factors both endogenous and exogenous which have made the recovery and sustained growth of the manufacturing sector difficult to attain. The government is becoming increasingly focused on expanding the manufacturing industry as a cornerstone of their development goals, noting in the most recent IPAP that manufacturing growth is conducive to the growth of other domestic industries and tech-

nological innovation. If South Africa can successfully counteract the structural inequalities, trade imbalances, and jumbled development goals hindering growth of the manufacturing sector, a strong performance of the industry can create new opportunities for international trade, reduce reliance on the export of primary products, and open up a variety of employment opportunities that could reduce the unemployment rife in the country.

34 “Industrial Policy Action Plan 2017/18 - 2019/20,� 13 June 2017.

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166 Appendix Figure 1: “Manufacturing Exports and Imports”

Sources: “South Africa Manufactures Exports (% of Merchandise Exports).” World Bank Data.

“South Africa Manufactures Imports (% of Merchandise Imports).” World Bank Data.

“South Africa Merchandise Exports (Current US$).” World Bank Data.

“South Africa Merchandise Imports (Current US$).” World Bank Data.

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Figure 2: “Annual Growth of GDP and Manufacturing”

Sources: “South Africa GDP Growth (Annual %).” World Bank Data.

“South Africa Manufacturing, Value Added (Annual % Growth).” World Bank Data.

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Figure 3: “Change in Value Added by Sector”

Sources: “South Africa Manufacturing, Value Added (Current US$).” World Bank Data.

“South Africa Mining and Quarrying, Value Added (Current US$).” DataBank.

“South Africa Services, Value Added (Current US$).” World Bank Data.

Figure 4: “Manufactures Value Added as a % of GDP”

Sources: “South Africa Manufacturing, Value Added (% of GDP).” World Bank Data.

Wolfe

169 Bibliography

Altman, Miriam. “Low Wage Work in South Africa.” May 2006. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242687205_Low_wage_work_in_South_Africa “Apartheid.” Encyclopædia Britannica. July 20, 1998. https://www.britannica.com/topic/apartheid.

Bezuidenhout, Carli, Marianne Matthee, and Neil Rankin. “Inclusive Growth and Wage Inequality: The Case of South African Manufacturing Exporters.” https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/south_africa_wcp.pdf.

Bhorat, Haroon, and Christopher Rooney. “State of Manufacturing in South Africa.” March 2017, http:// www.dpru.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/36/Publications/Working_Papers/DPRU%20 WP201702.pdf Carmody, Pádraig. “Between Globalisation and (Post) Apartheid: The Political Economy of Restructuring in South Africa.” Journal of Southern African Studies 28, no. 2 (June 2002): 255-75. doi:10.1080/03057070220140694.

Chipanda, Blessing. “South Africa’s Super-Exporters.” August 2014, http://www.tips.org.za/files/policy_ brief_-_south_african_super-exporters.pdf “Export Dynamics in East Asia.” Asian Development Outlook 2007 Update, 2007, 53–86. https://www.adb. org/sites/default/files/publication/27708/part2.pdf Fotoyi, Asanda, Siphosethu Tetani, Mbofholowo Tsedu, and Christopher Wood. “Analysis of Existing Industrial Policies and the State of Implementation in South Africa.” December 2016. https://www.fes-southafrica.org/fileadmin/user_upload/TIPS_IP_REVIEW_FES-Revised_Final_Dec_2016_edit.pdf.

“GDP Indicator.” World Bank Metadata. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/Metadata/MetadataWidget.aspx?Name=GDP%20(current%20US$)&Code=NY.GDP.MKTP.CD&Type=S&ReqType=Metadata&ddlSelectedValue=IND&ReportID=62603&ReportType=Table Iliffe, John. “The South African Economy, 1652–1997.” The Economic History Review 52, no. 1 (February 1999): 87–103. doi:10.1111/1468-0289.00120.

“Industrial Policy Action Plan 2017/18 - 2019/20.” 13 June 2017. www.thedti.gov.za/parliament/2017/IPAP_13June2017.pdf Rena, Ravinder, and Malindi Msoni. “Global Financial Crises and Its Impact on the South African Economy: A Further Update.” Journal of Economics 5, no. 1 (October 2, 2017): 17–25. doi:10.1080/09765239.20 14.11884980.

“South Africa and World Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual %).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank. org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=ZA-1W “South Africa Educational Attainment, at Least Completed Post-Secondary, Population 25+, Total (%) (Cumulative).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.CUAT.PO.ZS?locations=ZA “South Africa GDP (Current US$).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP. CD?locations=ZA “South Africa GDP Growth (Annual %).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=ZA

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“South Africa and World Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual %).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank. org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=ZA-1W “South Africa Educational Attainment, at Least Completed Post-Secondary, Population 25+, Total (%) (Cumulative).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.CUAT.PO.ZS?locations=ZA “South Africa GDP (Current US$).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP. CD?locations=ZA “South Africa GDP Growth (Annual %).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=ZA “South Africa Manufactures Exports (% of Merchandise Exports).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.MANF.ZS.UN?locations=ZA “South Africa Manufactures Imports (% of Merchandise Imports).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TM.VAL.MANF.ZS.UN?locations=ZA “South African Manufacturing Production and the Rand (an Update).” Economic Growth. September 14, 2016. http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=8260 “South Africa Manufacturing, Value Added (Annual % Growth).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank. org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.KD.ZG?locations=ZA “South Africa Manufacturing, Value Added (Current US$).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD?locations=ZA “South Africa Manufacturing, Value Added (% of GDP).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NV.IND.MANF.ZS?locations=ZA “South Africa Merchandise Exports (Current US$).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ TX.VAL.MRCH.CD.WT?locations=ZA “South Africa Merchandise Imports (Current US$).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ TM.VAL.MRCH.CD.WT?locations=ZA “South Africa Mining and Quarrying, Value Added (Current US$).” DataBank. http://databank.worldbank. org/data/reports.aspx?source=1147&series=NV.IND.MINQ.CD “South Africa Official Exchange Rate (LCU per US$, Period Average).” World Bank Data. https://data. worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.FCRF?locations=ZA “South Africa Services, Value Added (Current US$).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.SRV.TOTL.CD?locations=ZA “South Africa Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (Modeled ILO Estimate).” World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=ZA “Unskilled Labor.” Investopedia. www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unskilled-labor.asp.

Wentzel, Martha, and Maxi Steyn. “Investment Promotion in the South African Manufacturing Industry: Incentive Comparisons with Malaysia and Singapore.” South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 17, no. 3 (May 29, 2014): 319–35. doi:10.4102/sajems.v17i3.528.

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172

Butterfly (2004) and Hong Kong’s ProDemocracy Collective Movements

By Xiying Xu

Xu

173 Abstract

Abstrait

As the opening film at Venice Film Festival Critics Week in 2005, Butterfly (2004) is a Hong Kong lesbian art film made by Hong Kong female filmmaker Yan Yan Mark. By a textual-based analysis of Butterfly (2004) and a socio-cultural investigation on its historical background, this paper intends to present the political and social significances of the film towards the collective memories of Hong Kong pro-democracy movements throughout its recent history (1980s-2018).

This paper also examines the parallel relationship between the lesbian identity in the film with the political identity of Hong Kong, and presents the political implications of this relationship on Hong Kong people’s further pursuit of democracy, social justice, and independence in the future.

En tant que film d’ouverture au Festival International du Film de Venise (Mostra de Venise) en 2005, Butterfly (2004) est un film artistique lesbien hongkongais de la réalisatrice hongkongaise Yan Yan Mark. Basé sur une analyse textuelle de Butterfly (2004) et une investigation socio-culturelle sur son contexte historique, ce papier entend présenter les significations politiques et sociales du film envers les mémoires collectives des mouvements pro-démocratie dans l’histoire moderne de Hong Kong (années 19802018). Ce papier examine également les relations parallèles entre l’identité lesbienne dans le film et l’identité politique de Hong Kong, et présente les implications politiques de cette relation sur la subséquente poursuite de la démocratie, de la justice sociale, et d’indépendance future par les militants hongkongais.

Chrysalis Vol. XI

174 Introduction As the opening film at the Venice Film Festival Critics Week in 2005, Butterfly (2004) received worldwide attention for its unique visual aesthetics and storytelling methods.1 Set in Hong Kong, the film shows how a married high school teacher, Flavia, rediscovers her identity as a lesbian after her encounter with a young and energetic bar singer named Yip. Director Yan Yan Mark adapted the Taiwanese novel The Mark of Butterfly by setting the story in recent day Hong Kong (1980s-2003).2 By contrasting the lesbian identity with the political identity of Hong Kong, Butterfly evokes and reshapes collective memories of significant political and social movements in Hong Kong, such as the 1989 student movements and the 2003 July 1st marches. Embodying the same spirit as seen in these movements, Hong Kong people will continue to pursue democracy, social justice, and independence, in order to change society and discover Hong

Kong’s identity.

Butterfly and its allusions to Hong Kong ProDemocracy Social Movements in the 1980s In 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed by both the President of the People’s Republic of China and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Colonized by the British over a century prior to this, Hong Kong would eventually be returned to China in 1997 under the Chinese government’s principle of “one country, two systems.” Thereafter, Hong Kong would retain its capitalist political and economic system for 50 years.

Even though the Joint Declaration granted election rights to Hong Kong citizens, authorities from the PRC government declined direct elections for the legislature of the Hong Kong government in the 1980s.3 The handover only brought about fear and anxiety towards their future for the citizens of Hong Kong as they had already

1 Andrea Bachner, “Queer affiliations: Mak Yan Yan’s Butterfly as Sinophone romance,” Queer Sinophone Cultures. Routledge Contemporary China Series, 107, ed.

Howard Chiang, and Ari Larissa Heinrich (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), 207.

2 Bachner, Queer affiliations,” 215.

3 Nury Vittachi, “Hong Kong, City of Broken Promises,” Asian Sentinel, Sep. 5, 2014, www.asiasentinel.com/politics/hong-kong-city-broken-promises/.

Xu witnessed the Cultural Revolution and its catastrophic consequences on the mainland. As the promise for democratization was broken by the Chinese government and facing the coming authoritarian politics of the communist party, local Hong Kong students began to participate into pro-democracy social movements in the 1980s.4 Born in the 1970s, as a member of the first local Hong Kong generation, Yan Yan Mark actively participated in student-led demonstrations during her adolescence.5 Despite the burgeoning pro-democracy movements occuring in mainland China starting in the 1970s, they were first repressed and finally prohibited by Deng Xiaoping’s government in the late 1980s.

In the spring of 1989, student-led pro-democracy movements on the mainland erupted after the Chinese government declined the demands of students to release political activists from jail. May 1989 brought about massive pro-democracy protests and demonstrations all over

175 the country as students, workers and other citizens marched on city streets and occupied city squares.6 Following the social movements on the mainland, Hong Kong activists also held local pro-democracy demonstrations. Hong Kong students and socialist groups even raised funds and sent groups of representatives to support the pro-democracy movements happening on the mainland.7 In Butterfly, character Jin, a cool and rebellious girl and the former lover of Flavia, is one of the student activists who organizes and takes part in the student movements against the Beijing government. Using her handheld super 8 mm film camera, Jin records activities held at student protests and speeches of social activists. There are also several scenes in the film where non-political personal life and student pro-democracy movements are interwoven, for example Jin’s attempts to reach Flavia by a payphone in the university.

These scenes highlight the political and social background of film, which is the tumultuous 80s era in

4 Yan Yan Mark, interview with Pierre Lam, “CIA Symposium- Butterfly (2004), ” Hong Kong Film Critics Society, Nov. 1, 2004, www.filmcritics.org.hk/node/424.

5 Mark “CIA Symposium.”

6 Wilson Wai Ho Wong, Percy Luen-tim Lui, and Wai-man Lam, Contemporary Hong Kong Government and Politics (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), expanded Second ed. , 58.

7 Wong, Lui, and Lam, Contemporary Hong Kong, 64.

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Hong Kong, the peak of pro-democracy student movements. The soundtracks of these scenes are embedded with live news broadcasts pro-democracy student movements happening in Hong Kong and in Beijing, which increases the historical authenticity of the film.

ger and depression from the failure of pro-democracy movements on the mainland. There were both individual rituals and collective activities to mourn the dead and the victims of the Tiananmen Square Massacre in Hong Kong shortly after the tragic event. However, controlled by government institutions However, the surge of pro-democ- and intimidated by mainstream racy student movements in China media coverage, Hong Kong’s is halted as the Beijing govern- pro-democracy student movements ment decided to clear Tiananmen receded quickly after the TiananSquare and expel demonstrators in men Square Massacre.9 June of 1989. On the night of June 3rd and 4th, troops advanced into Director Mark tries to use her camTiananmen Square with guns and era to restage the remaining pro-detanks. Thousands of unarmed stu- mocracy movements in Hong dents and citizens were killed and Kong after 1989. In the confrontawounded during this military mas- tion scene in Butterfly, Jin particsacre.8 Butterfly contains newsreel ipates in a student demonstration footage of the Tiananmen Square against the Beijing government’s Massacre in the sequence where massive arrests of the 1989 student Jin watches news coverage of the movement’s leaders and confronts incident on television. The camera Hong Kong’s police brutality in the intercuts between her desperate re- process. Violent physical confronactions towards the incident and tations between student activists the documentary footage shown and Hong Kong police are directly on the television. Like Jin, Hong and overwhelmingly shown using Kong students were shocked and close-ups and long-shots. Mirrorappalled when they saw the Tian- ing the documentary footage of the anmen Square Massacre on the Tiananmen Square Massacre on news. Left stunned and defeated, television, this scene can also be they experienced pain, sorrow, an- considered an allegory of the harsh 8 Dingxin Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen : State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 164-182.

9 Wong, Lui, and Lam, Contemporary Hong Kong, 74-77.

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repression imposed by the Chinese government on Chinese pro-democracy activists when they resisted its authoritarian governance and advocated for democracy and human rights.

journey to achieve democracy and social justice. It is also depicted in the “missed opportunities, alienation, anxiety, suspension, and the disjunction of time” from the loss of Hong Kong’s identity.12

Mark restages Hong Kong’s pro-democracy student movements in late 1980s in Butterfly, whose narrative is composed by “histories of violence and trauma as well as framed within a very specific and localized interpretation of sexual identity”.10 Trauma is “the response to an unexpected or overwhelming violent event or events that are not fully grasped as they occur, but return later in repeated flashbacks, nightmares, and other repetitive phenomena”.11 The repetition of trauma creates a haunting and incomprehensible feeling that is beyond one’s consciousness. In the film, trauma at the personal level is represented by Flavia’s repressed lesbian history and lesbian identity, while at a broader level, for Hong Kong, it is represented by the obstacles and the setbacks faced on its

Like other Hong Kong youths in their generation, Jin and Flavia experience unexpected confusion, anxiety and pain from the downwards political and social circumstances that Hong Kong confronted after the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Facing opposition from family towards their relationship, Flavia chooses to abandon her lesbian identity and make concessions to the patriarchal society by adhering to heteronormative norms and engaging in relationships with male partners. Deeply hurt by Flavia’s betrayal, Jin loses both herself and direction in her life and as a result starts wandering across in Europe.

These negative emotions are finally alleviated through practicing Buddhism, as Jin becomes a monk in Macau. Years later, Flavia in her early 30s becomes a middle school

10 Helen Hok-Sze Leung, Undercurrents: Queer Culture and Postcolonial Hong Kong (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 58.

11 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 91.

12 Flannery Wilson, “Viewing Sinophone Cinema through a French Theoretical Lens: Wong Kar-Wai’s ‘in the Mood for Love’ and 2046 and Deleuze’s ‘Cinema,’” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 21, no. 1 (2009): 144.

178 teacher. Her life is both affluent and stable when she marries Ming, a male designer. They live together with their baby daughter in a spacious modern home. However, after Flavia meets Yip, her repressed lesbian sexuality is awakened. Flavia’s previous memories with Jin, her past struggles against authorities for her freedom and sexuality, the guilt towards her betrayal of Jin, and the collective memories about Hong Kong’s pro-democracy student movements in the 1980s suddenly return.13 The Parallel of Repressed Lesbian Identity and Hong Kong’s Identity in the PostHandover Present In a discussion about Butterfly with the members of the Hong Kong Film Critics Society, Mark states that “sometimes we just lied to ourselves, we thought we had forgotten what we experienced. However, sometimes an unexpected accident will easily stir up those repressed emotions.”14 In the film, there are plenty of flashbacks of memories intruding on the present moment.

The haunting homosexual past constantly bombards Flavia and

Chrysalis Vol. XI continually influences her present.

Some of the flashbacks, shot by 8 mm camera, correspond to Jin’s usage of the 8 mm camera during the 1980s Hong Kong pro-democracy student movements. At the beginning of the film, the grainy flashbacks to the intimacy and love between Jin and Flavia intercut with Flavia presenting an essay about the Chinese Cultural Revolution in one of her lectures. Flavia, as a high school teacher, is obliged to guide students to obey social norms and rules and deter them from socially constructed notions of deviant behavior. The parallel of a high school lesbian love in the past with Flavia’s position as a teacher who defends heterosexual norms, creates an ambivalence towards Flavia’s identity. On Flavia and Yip’s first coffee date, there is also a sudden intrusion of a closeup of Yip’s face using a 8 mm camera as Flavia is watching her from the other side of the table. This is a striking moment in which the boundary between past and present is blurred. Yip arouses Flavia’s repressed homosexual desire in the same way Jin did in her adolescence. With her emotions reignited and yearning for Jin, Flavia confuses the past with the present as

13 Butterfly (Los Angeles: Paramount Pictures, 2004), directed by Yan Yan Mark.

14 Butterfly, dir. by Yan Yan Mark

Xu memories suddenly intrude on her mind. Despite the fact that Flavia attempts to hide her homosexuality and denies the traumatic feelings resulting from her failed affair with Jin, after encountering Yip, she is forced to directly confront her past, her homosexual desire and her real identity.

Recurring memories from the past repeatedly intrude into the present.

These flashbacks reveal Flavia’s troubled and confused soul, while inexplicable internal changes continually destabilize her family life and her career. In a love scene between Flavia and Jin, the girls’ intimacy and love are constructed and reinforced by the natural lighting and soft whispering music. Accompanied by the same whispering music, a love scene between Flavia and Ming conveys ambiguity towards the source of Flavia’s sexual pleasure. The blue neon light flickering on Flavia’s face during their intercourse can be considered an allusion to the mysterious light in the living room in Jeanne Dielman (1975).15 Like Jeanne Dielman, this special lighting effect in Butterfly indicates female sexuality and guilt. However, we are not sure about the temporality

179 of female sexual pleasure, as the past and the present are mingled in these dreamlike scenarios. Later in the film, Flavia recalls the past moment when she submitted to family pressure to separate from Jin. Although she feels pain regarding to her forced separation from her lover Jin resulting from restrictive social norms, due to her duty as a teacher and the believed notion of social responsibility, she does not assist her lesbian students in eloping in Hong Kong. When Flavia goes to the hospital to pay a visit to one of the students who is injured in the student’s suicide attempt, she feels ambivalence and guilt about their separation, while still unable to find any comforting words to speak. This moment can be also considered as a mirroring process in which Flavia reexperiences and rethinks her personal trauma and her submission to heterosexual norms in this patriarchal system. As in the film, flashbacks of Flavia’s past and memories of Jin increasingly relate to political and social student movements in Hong Kong in the 1980s, Flavia’s “personal struggle to come to terms with her sexuality” is implicitly connected to “Hong Kong’s larger, continuous struggles” to pursue so-

15 Jeanne Dielman (New York: Criterion Collection,2009), directed by Chantal Akerman.

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cial justice and democracy and to it along with other provinces to discover its own identity.16 achieve the harmonious “One China.” Besides the multitude of conAfter a painful period of self-dis- verging ideologies at war in the pocovery and struggles, Flavia litical, social and cultural spheres, chooses to get a divorce from Hong Kong lacks its own identity Ming and lives with Yip. Although in the present, as it is always movshe still needs to fight for custody ing towards a future which is out of her baby, she finally rediscov- of its own hands. At the same time, ers her lesbian identity and starts a it cannot get rid of deeply negative new life. For post-handover Hong influences from its past. “Déjà DisKong, the journey of self-discov- paru,” “the feeling of what is new ery is more difficult, as its identi- and unique about the situation is ty is always complex, conflicted, always already gone,” expresses and unattainable. Victor Fan puts the failure to capture the fleeting, forward the concept “extraterrito- fragmented subjectivity of Hong riality” as a substitute for the term Kong in the ever-changing histor“post-colonialism” to describe ical background.18 Even if Hong the complex relationship between Kong could remove itself from the mainland China and Hong Kong trauma inflicted by colonialism, its after the handover. “Extraterrito- future is not self-determined but riality” is “the right to exercise predestined by “extraterritorial” one’s law outside a nation state’s communism, as is implied by the sovereign terrain,” which leads to words “scripted” and “pre-meditathe co-existence and the rivalry of tive” in Jin and Flavia’s dialogues. different ideological and political A stable perception of the “presconsciousnesses in one place.17 The ent” has been lost between Hong identity of Hong Kong becomes Kong’s pain and oppression resultambiguous and contradictory when ing from memories of the past and people are shuttled back and forth, fear and pessimism toward changaccepting and resisting the Chinese es in the future. government’s attempts to integrate 16 Leung, Undercurrents, 60.

17 Victor Fan, “Cultural Extraterritoriality: Intra-regional Politics in contemporary Hong Kong cinema,” East Asian Journal of Popular Culture 1, no. 3 (2015): 390.

18 Ackbar Abbas, “The New Hong Kong Cinema and the ‘déjà Disparu,’” Discourse 16, no. 3 (1994): 67.

Xu In order to rewrite the collective history of Hong Kong and discover its identity, in the post-handover period, the citizens of Hong Kong applied different political, social and cultural strategies to “reindividuate” themselves and to “redefine” the boundary between “the real Hong Kong” and the “other,” an imaginary “Hong Kong” under socialist ideology.19 Although traumatized by the Tiananmen Square Massacre and facing increasing oppression and control from Beijing government, many Hong Kong activists have continued their pro-democracy campaigns and have spread the seeds of democracy and independence to the Hong Kong people. However, the political situation of Hong Kong still deteriorated as the Chinese government further prevented the democratization in Hong Kong in the 1990s. After the handover, in order to restrict the number of seats for pro-democracy candidates in the Hong Kong Legislative Council, Beijing government limited the number of directly elected seats and instead, designated candidates for key government positions including the Chief Executive.20 As the independence of Hong Kong gave way to compromises and submissions to

181 the Chinese government, the pursuit of freedom and democracy was left unfinished. Struggling in the unsettled political and social atmosphere of the late 1990s, under the influence of the Asian Financial Crisis, many citizens of Hong Kong were pessimistic about Hong Kong’s future.

In the late 1990s, many Hong Kong activists withdrew from political movements and devoted themselves to their personal lives, families, and careers. Witnessing Hong Kong’s tumultuous political and social situation and having participated in local pro-democracy movements in her adolescence, Flavia can be considered as a previous student activist who chose to submit to the social norms and bury memories of these movements along side her lesbian identity. At the beginning of the new millennium, it seems like nothing has changed when she lives peacefully in her middle-class nuclear family life. However, there is always an invisible wave underneath the peaceful surface. Just like a hidden lesbian identity could change a family’s future, repressed political activism could change a society.

19 Fan, “Cultural Extraterritoriality,” 393.

20 Vittachi, “Hong Kong, City of Broken Promises.”

182 Surging Hong Kong ProDemocracy Movements in the New Millennium in Butterfly In Butterfly, although there is no explicit political discourse in Flavia’s heterosexual present, the scene in which she comes out to her husband Ming is still imbedded with implicit political messages.

In the background during this conversation, documentary clips about the band Blackbird are shown on the television. In the 1980s, Blackbird was a famous Hong Kong rock band with politically charged activist songs.21 Following the introduction of the band, there are scenes of a protest in which people are shouting slogans and holding banners.

As the camera moves away from the television to focus on Flavia and Ming, the words of the founder of Blackbird can be heard: “I’m old and penniless, but why can’t I do?

There must be something I can still do.”22 Experiencing a lull of social movements in the late 1990s, although some Hong Kong activ-

Chrysalis Vol. XI ists continued their pursuit for the independence and democracy of Hong Kong in the new millennium.

After Ming turns down the volume on the television, the speeches of people in the documentary can still be heard when he starts to talk to Flavia. Like the weak but ongoing soundtrack of the documentary, Hong Kong pro-democracy movements faded in the late 1990s while its message still unnoticeably influenced people’s lives. When an appropriate time comes, pro-democracy movements will resurrect and transform society.

2003, the year before Butterfly was released, marked a milestone for Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movements. In that year, the July 1st marches took place in Hong Kong with more than five hundred thousand participants. After the 1989 student movements, this is another essential political event that promoted civil rights and democracy.23 The trigger of the social movement is the Chinese government’s proposal of the implemen-

21 Yaowei Zhu, Hong Kong Cantopop : A Concise History (Baltimore, Maryland: Project Muse, 2017), 90-91.

22 Butterfly (Los Angeles: Paramount Pictures, 2004), directed by Yan Yan Mark.

23 Alvin Y So, “Social Conflict in Hong Kong after 1997: The Emergence of a Post-modern Mode of Social Movements? ,” China’s Hong Kong Transformed : Retrospect and Prospects Beyond the First Decade, ed. Ming K.Chan (Hong Kong : City University of Hong Kong Press, 2008), 240-244.

Xu tation of the Basic Law Article 23.

This article states about the Hong Kong government’s legal enactment of the prohibition of any subversion against the PRC government and the exclusion of any foreign political activities from Hong Kong. Fear for the loss of free speech and other basic human rights coupled with the disapproval of imposed policies by the Chinese government lead to a massive protests and demonstrations against the implementation of the Basic Law Article 23. After the July 1st marches, the proposal was withdrawn and shelved.24

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cial and political movements in different periods and anticipates Hong Kong’s future. The film’s title Butterfly reflects that after breaking free from her heterosexual nuclear family, the “cocoon,” Flavia frees herself and embraces her lesbian identity and new life like a butterfly. For Hong Kong, its identity remains to be discovered and constructed in the gestation period as it is still controlled and oppressed by the Chinese government. Collective social power will assist Hong Kong to break free from its cocoon and bloom out. Eventually, Hong Kong will get rid of its traumatic past and face its future firmly and Even though it is ambiguous as fearlessly. to whether the background of the Blackbird documentary depicts Re-Examination of Butterfly the 2003 July 1st marches, I argue and Its Significance to that by using documentary footContemporary Proage, Mark still tries to remind us Democracy Movements about the significance of the surgAfter 2010 ing Hong Kong pro-democracy movements in the new millennium. As tumultuous changes have ocFurthermore, to parallel the turning cured in Hong Kong in the last depoint in Flavia’s life and this mile- cade, a new perspective is needed to stone for Hong Kong democracy in re-examine Butterfly and its signifiButterfly, Mark opens discussions cance to contemporary Hong Kong. on the search and rewriting of Hong In order to resist the decision of the Kong’s identity with the power of Chinese Government which precollective spirit and humanism. scribed a selective pre-screening of The film restages Hong Kong so- candidates for the 2017 election of 24 So, “Social Conflict in Hong Kong,” 248.

184 Hong Kong’s chief executive, tens of thousands of Hong Kong people participated in the “Umbrella Revolution” in 2014 in a 79-day occupation of the main city streets and public squares demanding a democratic election. Even though Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movements entered a new era during the “Umbrella Revolution”, demonstrators still experienced police brutality and repression by the Chinese government. In 2017, the Chinese government rejected the implementation of the universal suffrage in the Hong Kong Chief Executive election. Prominent student leaders of the Umbrella Revolution were also arrested and sentenced. The arrest of the student leaders discouraged Hong Kong activists and Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement in 2018 has since been significantly weakened.25 The Chinese government has also implemented national plans to improve political, economical, social and cultural connectivity between Hong Kong and the mainland in order to further construct the Great Bay Area (composed of Hong Kong, Macau, and Guangdong province). While projects of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge and

Chrysalis Vol. XI the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link were accomplished in 2018, the influx of the mainland tourists and immigrants have caused new social conflicts among mainland tourists and the local population.26 How to fight against the imposed integration of Hong Kong into “One China” and continue the pursuit of democracy, social justice, and human rights are still unfulfilled dilemmas left for future generations in Hong Kong.

Conclusion Butterfly is not only a story about lesbian identity and rediscovery, but also an important archive of the collective memories of the pursuit of freedom and democracy and its self-discovery in Hong Kong’s recent history (1980s-2018). The film demonstrates that even though memories may be repressed, the collective pro-democracy spirits and power never disappear. Like the hidden lesbian identity, it waits to be reactivated, recollected, and reborn. With the collective pro-democracy spirits and power, Hong Kong will reconstruct its history, gain independence and democracy, and discover its identity.

25 “Hong Kong Pro-Democracy Protests Draw Lower Turnout,” BBC News, Jul. 1, 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-44674982.

26 BBC News, “Hong Kong Pro-Democracy.”

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186 Bibliography

Abbas, Ackbar. “The New Hong Kong Cinema and the ‘déjà Disparu.’” Discourse 16, no. 3 (1994): 65-77.

Butterfly. Directed by Yan Yan Mark. Los Angeles: Paramount Pictures, 2004.

Bachner, Andrea. “Queer affiliations: Mak Yan Yan’s Butterfly as Sinophone romance.” Queer Sinophone Cultures. Routledge Contemporary China Series, 107. Edited by Howard Chiang, and Ari Larissa Heinrich .

Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

Caruth, Cathy. Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Fan, Victor. “Cultural Extraterritoriality: Intra-regional Politics in contemporary Hong Kong cinema.” East Asian Journal of Popular Culture 1, no. 3 (2015): 389-402.

“Hong Kong Pro-Democracy Protests Draw Lower Turnout.” BBC News, Jul. 1, 2018, www.bbc.com/news/ world-asia-china-44674982.

Jeanne Dielman. Directed by Chantal Akerman. New York: Criterion Collection,2009.

Leung, Helen Hok-Sze. Undercurrents: Queer Culture and Postcolonial Hong Kong. Sexuality Studies Series. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008.

Mark, Yan Yan. Interview with Pierre Lam. “CIA Symposium- Butterfly (2004).” Hong Kong Film Critics Society, Nov. 1, 2004, www.filmcritics.org.hk/node/424.

So, Alvin Y. “Social Conflict in Hong Kong after 1997: The Emergence of a Post-modern Mode of Social Movements? ” China’s Hong Kong Transformed : Retrospect and Prospects Beyond the First Decade. Edited by Ming K.Chan. Hong Kong : City University of Hong Kong Press, 2008.

Vittachi, Nury. “Hong Kong, City of Broken Promises.” Asian Sentinel, Sep. 5, 2014, www.asiasentinel. com/politics/hong-kong-city-broken-promises/.

Wilson, Flannery. “Viewing Sinophone Cinema through a French Theoretical Lens: Wong Kar-Wai’s ‘in the Mood for Love’ and 2046 and Deleuze’s ‘Cinema.’” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 21, no. 1 (2009): 141–173.

Wong, Wilson Wai Ho, Percy Luen-tim Lui, and Wai-man Lam. Contemporary Hong Kong Government and Politics. Expanded Second ed. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012.

Zhao, Dingxin. The Power of Tiananmen : State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.

Zhu, Yaowei. Hong Kong Cantopop : A Concise History. Baltimore, Maryland: Project Muse, 2017.

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Meet the Editors Charline Côté-Lessard is in her third year at McGill majoring in International Development Studies with a double minor in Political Science and Sociology. She has been very involved on campus, mainly with the IDSSA, Students for Oxfam Quebec, AUS Environment Council, and the F Word.

Charline is particularly interested in gender and development and she hopes to pursue a career in human rights or international law. She will be starting her LL.B in the fall 2019 at Université de Montréal.

Robin Vochelet is in his second year at McGill. Originally from Strasbourg, France, he is currently pursuing a B.A. in International Development with a double minor in Political Science & History. He has a particular interest in Chinese history, as well as politics in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

He is also passionate about languages, currently speaking 5 and hoping to study more in the future. He hopes to work in international organizations relating to human rights and international humanitarian law.

Jasmine Mezghani is a U3 student double majoring in Political Science and International Development with a minor in Social Entrepreneurship.

She is especially interested in international security, peace and conflict studies, and Middle East politics. Jasmine has been involved in various organizations on campus, including McGill Journal of Political Science, McGill Women in Leadership, and Borderless World Volunteers. This summer Jasmine will be doing NGO work in Tunisia where she hopes to improve her Arabic, and she aspires to pursue her MA shortly thereafter.

Raagini Singh Panwar is in her final year of studies (Fourth Year) pursuing a joint Economics and International Development degree. She is interested in the developmental aspect of labour migration, specifically the economic implications in developing nations. She aims to further study International Political Economy and Public Policy.

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Megan Krasnodembski is in her third year at McGill University (U2), pursuing a degree in International Development Studies, Political Science and East Asian Studies. She is passionate about issues pertaining to transnational justice, the role of civil society in managing ethnic conflict, and the intersection between identity and inequality specifically as it relates to minority groups. Megan aspires to pursue legal studies to further interrogate these issues and attempt to develop solutions for them.

Alice SĂŠcheresse is a U3 student completing a major in International Development and a double minor in African Studies and Environment.

Fascinated by the interconnection of her three areas of study, she is very involved on her university campus and within the larger Montreal community. In fact, she is the president of the student organization of Greenpeace McGill. She is also involved in Women in House as well as McGill Women in Leadership, where she had the chance to witness first hand the implications of gender within politics in Canada. She aspires to continue studying within the field of gender and development, a subject that motivated her to join Chrysalis.

Zofi Hasan is a third-year undergraduate student, majoring in Political Science with a double minor in International Development Studies and French Language. This is her second year working for the Chrysalis journal as a Copy Editor. Zofi’s research interests include the effects of political and legal systems on current affairs in various regions around the globe.

She is also very passionate about South Asian history and culture. Outside of university, Zofi has worked with non-profit organizations in the Greater Toronto Area, focusing on policy implementation within social services.

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Rencontre avec les éditeurs Charline Côté-Lessard est en troisième année à McGill en majeur Développement International, avec une mineure double en Sciences Politiques et Sociologie. Elle a été très impliquée sur le campus principalement avec l’association étudiante en développement international (IDSSA), les étudiants pour Oxfam Québec, le conseil d’environnement et le F Word.

Charline est particulièrement intéressé par les genres et le développement international et elle espère faire une carrière au niveau des droits humains ou le droit international. Elle débutera une licence en droit à l’automne 2019 à l’Université de Montréal.

Robin Vochelet est étudiant en deuxième année à McGill. Il est originaire de Strasbourg, France, il est inscrit au baccalauréat en Développement International avec une mineure double en Sciences Politiques et Histoire.

L’histoire de la Chine l’intéresse particulièrement, ainsi que la politique de l’Asie du Sud-Ouest et du Moyen-Orient. Il est passionné par les langues, en parle couramment cinq et espère en apprendre d’autre. Il espère travailler dans des organisations internationales qui œuvrent au niveau des droits de la personnes et du droit humanitaire international.

Jasmine Mezghani est étudiante en troisième année majeure double en Sciences Politiques et Développement International avec une mineure en Entreprenariat Social. Elle s’intéresse particulièrement à la sécurité internationale, la paix et l’étude des conflits et les politiques touchants le Moyen-Orient. Jasmine est impliquée dans plusieurs organisations sur le campus, incluant le journal de McGill de Sciences Politiques, McGill Women for Leadership et Volontaires sans frontières (Borderless Worl Volonteers). Cet été elle se joindra à une organisation non-gouvernementale en Tunisie ou elle espère améliorer sa connaissance de la langue arabe, elle compte poursuivre une maitrise par la suite.

Raagini Singh Panwar est dans sa dernière année d’étude (quatrième) en Économie et en Développement International. Elle s’intéresse à la migration de la main d’œuvre, plus particulièrement aux impacts économiques dans les pays en développement. Elle pense poursuivre ses études en Politique Économique Internationale et en Politique Publique.

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Megan Krasnodembski est étudiante en troisième année à McGill (U2), en Développement International, Sciences Politiques et en études SudEst Asiatique. Elle se passionne pour tout ce touche à la justice transnationale, le rôle des sociétés civiles dans la gestion de conflit ethnique et particulièrement l’intersection entre l’identité et les inégalités plus spécifiquement celles des groupes minoritaires. Megan espère poursuivre des études en droit afin de poursuivre son questionnement sur ces sujets tout en participant à les solutionner.

Alice Sécheresse est étudiante en troisième année, elle termine une majeure en Développement International et deux mineures en Études Africaines et Environnement. Elle est fascinée par l’interconnexion des trois sphères d’études, elle est très impliquée sur le campus et dans la communauté montréalaise. Elle est présidente de l’organisation étudiante de Greenpeace à McGill. Elle s’est engagé également dans la Women in House tout comme McGill Women in Leadership, et a été une témoin de première instance dans la sphère des genres et du développement au Canada. Elle voudrait continuer à étudier ces sujets, sujets qui l’ont emmené à se joindre à l’équipe de The Chrysalis. Elle a beaucoup appris à partir des articles publiés sur des sujets qui la passionne.

Zofi Hasan est étudiante en troisième année, une majeure en Sciences Politiques avec deux mineures en Développement International et en Langue Française. C’est sa deuxième année de participation à la publication de The Chrysalis à titre d’éditeur-réviseur. Ses sujets de recherches de prédilection sont les effets des systèmes politiques et légaux sur les affaires courantes dans différentes régions du monde. Elle a travaillé dans des organisations à but non-lucratifs dans la grande région de Toronto impliquées dans l’implantation de politique dans les services sociaux.

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Submission & Review Process Chrysalis accepts manuscripts in either English or French from undergraduates belonging to any faculty or major, provided they offer original insight into international development, which includes topics pertaining to indigenous issues in Canada. While eligible manuscripts are required to be from a class at the 300-level or above, we occasionally publish exceptional 200-level submissions.

Manuscripts are accepted in two rounds through December and January, after each round the Editorial Board convenes to select manuscripts for publication. The selection process is done in anonymity.

All identification markers are removed from the submissions by the Editor-in-Chief, who does not have voting power during the selection process to ensure a fair and equitable selection.

Selected manuscripts are then sent to selected advanced undergraduates who conduct official peer reviews under the guidance of Faculty members. Once the peer reviews are submitted, the authors are expected to incorporate their feedback into the manuscripts before the editing process. Each submission is assigned to a copy-editor who liaises with the author to prepare the manuscript for publication.

Chrysalis Vol. XI

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Processus de soumission de textes et de révision Les étudiants de premier cycle provenant de toutes les facultés peuvent soumettre des textes en Anglais ou en Français au journal Chrysalis, qui accepte des articles touchant le développement international incluant des sujets relatifs aux questions autochtones au Canada. Bien que les textes soumis doivent provenir des cours de niveau 300, Chrysalis peut exceptionnellement en accepter des articles écrit au niveau 200.

Les articles passent par deux tris de sélections qui ont lieu en décembre et en janvier, après chacune d’eux le comité éditorial fait le choix de celles qui seront publiées. Ce processus est anonyme.

Afin d’assurer un processus équitable et juste par le comité de sélection l’identification des articles est enlevée par l’éditrice en chef, qui n’a pas droit de vote lors de la sélection des articles par le comité éditorial Les articles choisis sont acheminés à un comité d’étudiants en fin de premier cycle, qui lui s’assure que ces articles vont être en accord avec une ligne éditoriale. Lorsque cette révision est soumise les autrices et auteurs peuvent espérer recevoir une rétroaction à propos de leurs textes avant d’être édités. Chacun des textes qui sera édité se verra assigné un éditeur-réviseur qui fera le lien avec les auteurs pour préparer la publication.