Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: Domestic Power Struggles and War of National Survival in 2014–2022 by ibidem Press

Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society (SPPS)

Vol. 267

ISSN 1614-3515 General Editor: Andreas Umland,

Commissioning Editor: Max Jakob Horstmann,

Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, andreas.umland@ui.se

London, mjh@ibidem.eu

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE* DOMESTIC & COMPARATIVE POLITICS Prof. Ellen Bos, Andrássy University of Budapest Dr. Gergana Dimova, Florida State University Prof. Heiko Pleines, University of Bremen Dr. Sarah Whitmore, Oxford Brookes University Dr. Harald Wydra, University of Cambridge SOCIETY, CLASS & ETHNICITY Col. David Glantz, “Journal of Slavic Military Studies” Dr. Marlène Laruelle, George Washington University Dr. Stephen Shulman, Southern Illinois University Prof. Stefan Troebst, University of Leipzig POLITICAL ECONOMY & PUBLIC POLICY Prof. Andreas Goldthau, University of Erfurt Dr. Robert Kravchuk, University of North Carolina Dr. David Lane, University of Cambridge Dr. Carol Leonard, University of Oxford Dr. Maria Popova, McGill University, Montreal

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Bohdan Harasymiw

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE Domestic Power Struggles and War of National Survival in 2014–2022

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Contents Contents ................................................................................................. 5 List of Tables ......................................................................................... 8 Acknowledgements.............................................................................. 9 List of Abbreviations and Acronyms .............................................. 11 Introduction ......................................................................................... 15 Previous Studies of Ukraine .......................................................... 17 Conceptual Clarification of the Political ...................................... 25 What This Book is About ............................................................... 28 The Plan of the Book ....................................................................... 29 1.

Ukraine as a “Failed State” ....................................................... 31 A Review of the Literature ............................................................ 32 The Failed State’s Failure ............................................................... 35 The Failed State as Mission ........................................................... 37 Susan Woodward’s Critique ......................................................... 43 Post-Soviet State Failure ................................................................ 45

Ukraine through the Lens of Comparative Politics .............. 53 Comparative Politics: The Leading Approaches ........................ 53 Transitology ..................................................................................... 55 The End of Transitology ................................................................ 57 Electoral or Competitive Authoritarianism................................. 59 Henry Hale’s Patronalism ............................................................. 63 Informal Politics .............................................................................. 68

The Presidency of Petro Poroshenko 2014-19 ........................ 75 Appointments and Disappointments........................................... 84 5

Poroshenko’s Relations with Other Institutions ......................... 94 Poroshenko’s Institutional Changes ........................................... 107 The ACAs ....................................................................................... 107 The DBR/SBI ................................................................................. 117 The Anti-Corruption Court ......................................................... 119 The National Police....................................................................... 124 De-Oligarchization ....................................................................... 128 Conclusion—Poroshenko’s Reward ........................................... 134 4.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Presidency 2019-22 ....................... 137 Zelenskyy the Messenger ............................................................ 141 Zelenskyy as Patron ..................................................................... 143 Zelenskyy as Law-Maker ............................................................. 165 Relations with Other Institutions ............................................... 172 Judicial Reform.............................................................................. 172 The Prosecutor-General’s Office ................................................. 180 The SBU, the DBR/SBI, and Intelligence ................................... 183 The (Ir)replaceable Interior Minister and the National Police191 Curbing Informal Practices.......................................................... 195 Corruption and Anti-Corruption................................................ 195 Controlling Oligarchs ................................................................... 204 Conclusion ..................................................................................... 213

Russia’s Genocidal War of Aggression against Ukraine ... 217 Russia Intervenes in Crimea and the Donbas ........................... 220 Minsk Agreements and Disagreements ..................................... 221 Poroshenko as Diplomat- and Commander-in-Chief .............. 225 Volodymyr Zelenskyy—Diplomat and Defender .................... 233 Putin’s War .................................................................................... 244 When Will the War End? ............................................................. 260 Mearsheimer and the War ........................................................... 266 6

Anticipating an End to the War .................................................. 270 Ukraine and the War .................................................................... 274 Politics Never Sleeps .................................................................... 279 Conclusion ..................................................................................... 283 6.

Conclusion ................................................................................. 285 On Patronal Politics in Post-2014 Ukraine................................. 285 Poroshenko’s Presidency ............................................................. 287 Zelenskyy’s Presidency ................................................................ 288 On Putin’s War .............................................................................. 290 War’s Impact on Ukraine ............................................................. 292 Ukraine and the World ................................................................ 296

Bibliography ...................................................................................... 303 Books and book chapters ............................................................. 303 Websites ......................................................................................... 310 Newspapers, news sites, and newsmagazines ......................... 311 Miscellaneous ................................................................................ 312 Conference paper .......................................................................... 313 Index ................................................................................................... 315

List of Tables Table 4.1--Twelve Individuals Subjected to Short-Term Appointments Made by President Zelenskyy, 2020……………..157

Acknowledgements I want first of all to thank Andreas Umland for warmly welcoming me into his Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society (SPPS) series, offering encouragement, and improving the title of my study. I thank the three anonymous referees for their incisive assessments and valuable suggestions for improvement. I am also very grateful to several friends and colleagues for reading some or all of the manuscript and providing helpful comments. They include Yasmeen Abu-Laban, Luigi di Marzo, Brosi Nutting, Ihor Broda, Lubko Markevych, and Rob Normey. Special thanks to my wife, Elaine, for painstakingly going through the entire manuscript, prodding me to improve the way ideas are expressed in it, and raising questions that both broadened the horizons of my research as well as keeping the story on track. Twenty years in gestation and over two years in the writing, this book would not have been possible without the guidance of a great many scholars, some of whom I have never met but have been my teachers nevertheless. They are all acknowledged in the footnotes. I am also indebted to a series of Deans of Arts at the University of Alberta who have extended to me an affiliation over many years, as well as a part-time position at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, where I have been given an opportunity to develop my ideas. Needless to say, I alone am responsible for the book’s remaining shortcomings. A note on transliteration from Cyrillic to Latin. I have omitted the soft sign (ь), usually rendered as an apostrophe (‘). Readers familiar with Russian and Ukrainian should be able to interpolate as necessary.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ACA ATO BPP BTG CC CAR CEC CEO CSO DAI DBR DNR DRC EU FSB FSU GDP GRU HACC HQCJ IFI IMF KDAC KDB KGB KIIS KORD LNR MVS NABU NATO

Anti-Corruption Agency Anti-Terrorist Operation Blok Petra Poroshenka Battalion Tactical Group Constitutional Court Central African Republic Central Electoral Commission Chief Executive Officer Civil Society Organization Derzhavna avtomobilna inspektsiia Derzhavne biuro rozsliduvan (see SBI) Donteska narodna Respublika Democratic Republic of the Congo European Union Federalna sluzhba bezpeki Former Soviet Union Gross Domestic Product Glavnoe razvedyvatelnoe upravlenie Higher Anti-Corruption Court (see VAKS) High Qualification Commission of Judges (see VKKS) International Financial Institution International Monetary Fund Kyiv District Administrative Court Komitet derzhavnoi bezpeky Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti Kyiv Institute of International Sociology Korpus Operatyvno-Raptovoi Dii Luhanska narodna respublika Minsterstvo vnutrishnikh sprav Natsionalne antykoruptsiine biuro North Atlantic Treaty Organization 11

NAZK NBU NGO NPU NUNS ODIHR OP ORDLO

PA PF PGO PGU PM POTUS PR RF RNBOU ROC SAP SBI SBU SCJ SMD SMSP SOE TCG UAH UK UN UNGA UNSC

Natsionalne ahentstvo z pytan zapobihannia koruptsii National Bank of Ukraine Non-Governmental Organization National Police of Ukraine Nasha Ukraina—Narodna samooborona Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Office of the President Otdelnye raiony Donetskoi i Luganskoi oblastei (Russian term for temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine) Presidential Administration Popular Front Procurator General’s Office Prosecutor General of Ukraine Prime Minister President of the United States Proportional Representation Russian Federation Rada natsionalnoi bezpeky i oborony Ukrainy Russian Orthodox Church Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor State Bureau of Investigation (see DBR) Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrainy Supreme Council of Justice (see VRP) Single-Member District Single Member, Simple Plurality State-Owned Enterprise Trilateral Contact Group Ukrainian hryvnia (currency) United Kingdom United Nations United Nations General Assembly United Nations Security Council 12

US VAKS VKKS VNSA USSR

United States Vyshchyi anty-koruptsiinyi sud (see HACC) Vyshcha kvalifikatsiina komisiia suddiv (see HQCJ) Violent Non-State Actors Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Introduction Generalizing about post-communist Ukraine is a risky business.1 Which means either that the country, or more exactly its political system, is a total misfit from the perspective of comparative politics or that the tools being used to analyze it are less than adequate, perhaps totally inappropriate. We took the post-Soviet political leaders of Ukraine at their word when they committed themselves to transitioning to democracy and the market and to reorienting towards Europe, but this has not been accomplished fully even after the passage of more than thirty years. There have been three so-called revolutions (in 1991, 2004, and 2013-14), yet none resulted in a fundamental transformation of the way politics is conducted, the composition of the elite, or the relationship between elites and the public. It is a situation of “change without movement, movement without change,” as so well encapsulated by Marta Dyczok.2 Whereas the Baltic states, along with the formerly communist states of East Central Europe, have successfully transitioned to democracy and mostly joined the European Union (EU), and nearly all other exSoviet republics have reverted to authoritarianism, Ukraine has done neither. What is the explanation for this non-conformity? At the same time, the physical existence of Ukraine as a state has been continuously threatened—never more so than in 2022—by being at the center of a geopolitical tug-of-war between its neighbor, the Russian Federation, and the United States. Is Ukraine a viable political entity? What has prevented it becoming a stable democracy, and can it survive? This book sets out to answer these key questions using a novel approach to get at the fundamental nature of politics in post-Euromaidan Ukraine, to explain its anomalous character, and to assess its future viability. My initial impulse for offering another explanation of Ukrainian politics after 2014 was stimulated by recognizing 1 2

I attempted this previously in Post-Communist Ukraine (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2002). Marta Dyczok, Ukraine: Change Without Movement, Movement Without Change (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000).

INTRODUCTION

the obvious discrepancy between what was actually happening and what had been forecast as the standard pattern by the model of patronal politics as elaborated by Henry Hale.3 According to Hale, the institutionalization of genuine democracy in Ukraine and other post-communist states is prevented by a cyclical, self-perpetuating dynamic of patron-client relations at the top of the political system. This dynamic, however, did not appear to be operating under either President Petro Poroshenko or Volodymyr Zelenskyy, since neither had come to office with a string of clients and did not seem particularly engaged in cultivating one while in office. Had patronalism taken a holiday? To answer that question requires a detailed, dayby-day scrutiny of the behavior of these two presidents’ tenure, which is undertaken here. Incorporated into this analysis also is a conception of the political as a more narrowly focused tool than any of those prevailing in the discipline. This is borrowed from Stefano Bartolini.4 My approach, which I call the politics of the law, therefore centers on executive decision-making, legal structures and actors, and the challenges of reform. It is intended not as a replacement of other currently employed approaches, but as a supplement, a reminder that a basic feature—the struggle at the apex of power over control of the law—must be taken into account in any true and full explanation of Ukrainian politics post-2014. My methodology consists of indirect observation of political actions through the dayto-day examination of Ukrainian and foreign press reporting from 2014 to 2022. In addition to the obstacles it faces on the domestic front, Ukraine’s viability has been and continues to be tested in the international realm, particularly by first the threat and then the reality of war with Russia. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has made it a necessary part of the story of post-Euromaidan Ukraine’s survival insofar as it comprises a genuinely existential threat.

3 4

Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Stefano Bartolini, The Political (London and New York: ECPR Press and Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018).

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE

Previous Studies of Ukraine When the USSR collapsed in 1991, Ukraine became an unaccustomed object of study as a case of transition from communism to democracy. It was wonderful to see such a large contingent of scholars in the social sciences paying so much attention to Ukraine after a lifetime of neglect. Comparativists began to apply various theories and models of transition to democracy to the newly-independent country on the assumption that it truly was becoming transformed, as its leaders had declared, from a communist partystate into a Western liberal democracy. Western governments accordingly operated from the same assumption, providing material help with institution-building, public administration, financial accounting, and defence and security. But eventually it became clear that neither the Latin American, nor the Mediterranean, nor the Asian, nor the Eastern European models were being followed by the leaders of Ukraine. Transitology gave way to other paradigms: “stuck” or “hybrid” transition, electoral authoritarianism,5 competitive authoritarianism,6 patronal politics, and the primacy of informal politics. We now know a great deal about Ukraine’s post-communist politics—the literature is massive—but we still have not discovered its trajectory, if it has one. Perhaps the fundamental problem is the implicit image of politics we carry with us locked into the concepts we employ. Political science is by and large an Anglo-American enterprise. So our terms are actually context- and time-specific, despite our belief that they are objective and timeless; applying them in a context different than the British, Western European or American one we either misinterpret what is really going on or else in effect simply make normative judgments about the things we see. It could also be that our concepts are idealized or outdated or both and do not work even in explaining the workings of contemporary Western liberal 5 6

Andreas Schedler, ed., Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

INTRODUCTION

democracies; they were fashioned in the second half of the 20th century, and they take little or no account of such phenomena as the business-politics-organized crime nexus, the persistence of corruption, or the lawlessness of law enforcement. For example, Ukraine has a multitude of political parties, so-called, yet they are described as weak and neither they nor the party system correspond to the European model.7 Presumably such an alignment is necessary for the full transition to liberal democracy European-style. At the same time, however, European parties and party systems have evolved considerably beyond the classic depiction of them by Sartori in 1976, making this subject especially elusive.8 Which model, then, should Ukrainian political parties and their leaders be attempting to emulate—the twentieth-century one or the twenty-first? Perhaps the political science discipline needs a different vocabulary altogether. Many scholars have based their analyses simply and uncritically on terms popularly bandied about quite freely by the general public and the mass media when referring to contemporary Ukrainian politics. These are terms like “oligarch,” “mafia,” “old guard,” “technocrat,” “corruption,” “parliament,” “cabinet,” “nationalists,” “Ukrainian,” “Russian,” and “revolution.” The trouble with these terms is that they are often not, strictly speaking, concepts, just as dictionary definitions should never properly be considered or used as definitions for concepts. Dictionary definitions report usage, and usage is elastic. The terms commonly used to talk and write about and discuss politics in Ukraine today are treated as being implicitly understood and thus remain undefined. They should not be used indiscriminately for scientific work, as they usually are. Concepts need to be data containers capable of capturing entities accurately and to be the building-blocks of theory or 7

Serhij Vasylchenko, “The Negative Consequences of Proportional Representation in Ukraine,” Demokratizatsiya 21, no. 3 (Summer 2013): 430-40; Taras Kuzio, “Impediments to the Emergence of Political Parties in Ukraine,” Politics 34, no. 4 (December 2014: 309-23. Luciano Bardi, Stefano Bartolini, and Alexander Treschel, “Party Adaptation and Change and the Crisis of Democracy,” Party Politics 20, no. 2 (2014): 151-59; Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE

tentative explanations, assuming that theoretical explanation is the object of study. The tendency within political science attempting to present the discipline as more “scientific” would not consider using everyday terms in the analysis of politics. We all do it, but this is not social science at its best. Some scholars of post-communist Ukraine have taken the institutional approach. They examine entities such as political parties, elections, legislatures, law courts, constitutions, bureaucracies, the force ministries, and the Armed Forces (civil-military relations). This method assumes that such structures and their dynamics are basically similar to their Western counterparts, which is at best questionable. The lack of true symmetry becomes apparent when we discover that politics in Ukraine do not behave normally. We have long accepted, for example, Maurice Duverger’s theory of the interaction between electoral and party systems: proportional representation (PR) produces a multitude of political parties by encouraging them to participate; the single-member-simple-plurality (SMSP) system diminishes the number of parties dissuading all but the two strongest from participating (or two-and-a-half, in the case of Canada). But whenever Ukraine has utilized a mixed electoral system, allowing us to see simultaneously the effects of each type on the proliferation or restriction of parties, the results have been totally the opposite: the PR ballot has produced fewer parties in the legislature, single-member-districts (SMDs) producing more of them. Even after a quarter-century, Ukraine still did not have a recognizable party system.9 Formation of coalitions and caucuses in the national assembly, the Verkhovna Rada, has likewise not followed the usual pattern in other democracies. In Ukrainian presidential elections, where the system of runoff between the top two contenders in the first round ought automatically to discourage contestants, dozens of candidates enter the fray every time despite the odds and common sense. To top it off, in 2019, they elected a TV comedian president. Countless anti-corruption drives have been

Kostyantyn Fedorenko, Olena Rybiy, and Andreas Umland, "The Ukrainian Party System Before and After the 2013-2014 Euromaidan," Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 4 (June 2016): 609-30.

INTRODUCTION

launched since 1992, but without appreciable results. During the Petro Poroshenko presidency, 2014-19, new institutions to curb political corruption which are effective in other jurisdictions were established with foreign help and began operating in difficult circumstances; by 2020 his successor was allowing their dismantlement by entrenched interests.10 Then there were those three “revolutions” that failed to produce revolutionary results. If one is relying on the standard toolkit of comparative politics, it seems that practically every entity taken up as an object of study must be designated in quotation marks or the prefix “would-be” to properly capture Ukraine’s political virtuality.11 Other scholars, Taras Kuzio among them, have endeavored to combine the theoretical approaches of comparative politics with deep local knowledge of current affairs to produce more credible explanations for aspects of Ukrainian politics.12 Sometimes the theoretical is more like window-dressing so as to give the research greater credibility within the political science community. Sometimes it still comes across as good history or descriptive political science. Occasionally, recourse has even been had to concepts seemingly picked out of thin air, as with Lucan Way’s pioneering “rapacious individualism” (which recalls C. B. Macpherson’s “possessive individualism” of a now bygone era).13

11 12

Daryna Krasnolutska and Volodymyr Verbyany, “Ukraine’s Leader is Being Broken by the System He Vowed to Crush,” Bloomberg, 16 December 2020, on the Internet at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-17/Ukra ine-s. . ., accessed 18 December 2020. Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005). Kuzio, “Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards A New Framework,” Politics 20, no. 2 (May 2000): 77-86; idem, “Regime Type and Politics in Ukraine under Kuchma,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005): 167-90; idem, “Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 43 (2010): 285-96; and idem, “State-led Violence in Ukraine’s 2004 Elections and Orange Revolution,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 43 (2010): 383-95. Lucan A. Way, “Rapacious Individualism and Political Competition in Ukraine, 1992-2004,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005): 191-205. Cf. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE

A major contribution, however, to the melding of comparative politics and Ukrainian studies has been achieved by the contributors to a collective volume edited by Henry Hale and Robert Orttung.14 Focusing on the obstacles to and prospects for political reform, its authors closely examine what Ukraine has done in several key policy areas, rigorously comparing this with the experience of other countries in the same spheres. Drawing up the volume’s conclusions, the editors emphasize that a way forward requires: not assuming that institutions in Ukraine work as they do elsewhere; distinguishing between deeply embedded and contingent obstacles; concentrating reform efforts on fundamentals; and taking into account the interests of the actors.15 The “most fundamental reform challenges,” emerging from the analyses, therefore, are: the “communist legacy,” Ukraine’s identity divide, (neo)patrimonialism leading to corruption, and—until 2014—the absence of a foreign threat.16 None is considered by them as insurmountable. Also, “some of Ukraine’s problems arise from highly contingent choices that could have been made differently along the way,”17 which prompts the idea of critical turning points that could be used to explain Ukraine’s developmental path. Thus, the Hale and Orttung volume helps identify critical factors determining Ukrainian politics: choices; actual operation of institutions; actors’ interests; and fundamental (legacy, identity, corruption) as opposed to transient features of the political system. Their volume’s findings are therefore incorporated into the present study as a means of specifying the critical areas of public policy decision-making by Ukrainian presidents in the post-Euromaidan era that demand attention. Within the past decade, of course, there also has been a recognition of the importance of the informal side of Ukrainian politics as opposed to the formal. One might even say the predominance of the informal over the formal. This is no doubt an exaggeration, but 14 15 16 17

Hale and Robert W. Orttung, eds., Beyond the Euromaidan: Comparative Perspectives on Advancing Reform in Ukraine (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016). Hale and Orttung, “Conclusion: The Comparative Politics of Reform and Lessons for Ukraine,” in Beyond the Euromaidan, 267-8. Ibid., 268-9. Ibid., 268.

INTRODUCTION

widening of one’s field of vision is a needed corrective to the conventional approach of treating Ukraine’s political institutions as though they exemplified the same basic features and embodied the same activities as their Western counterparts. Exemplary of such work is Henry Hale’s on “patronal politics,” and Jessica Allina-Pisano’s on “Potemkin politics.”18 Hale in particular has made a very important advance in the study of post-Soviet politics.19 Addressing the puzzle of why most of the USSR’s successor states have not made the “transition to democracy,” he proposes they be examined under the heading of “patronal politics.”20 By this he means their politics should be understood as based on patron-clientelism with the president as chief patron. Usually all elites cluster under the president in a single pyramid of hierarchically arranged networks. Occasionally, when the president is weakened, other networks form under potential challengers. One of these latter following an election then becomes president-patron and proceeds to restore the single pyramid. This dynamic is facilitated by having a single-executive constitution, and conversely obstructed by a dual-executive constitution (president and prime minister). Challengers will be driven by their expectations about the incumbent’s chances of duration in office, which will determine their loyalty and the likelihood of their launching rival pyramids of patron-client ties.21 Such systems are thus not static, nor are they principally engaged in “transitioning to democracy.” They are rather involved in constant, but fluctuating, struggle for power that specifically involves

19 20

Hale, Patronal Politics, and Jessica Allina-Pisano, “Legitimizing Facades: Civil Society in Post-Orange Ukraine,” in Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilization, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine, ed. by Paul D’Anieri (Washington, D. C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 229-53. And which has been taken up by others, including the contributors to Hale and Orttung, eds., Beyond the Euromaidan, for example. “Patronal politics refers to politics in societies where individuals organize their . . . pursuits around the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and punishments through chains of actual acquaintance, and not primarily around abstract, impersonal principles such as ideological belief or categorizations like economic class that include many people one has not actually met in person.” Hale, Patronal Politics, 9-10. Emphasis in the original. Ibid., 34-36.

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patronage, patron-client networks, expectations, resources, elections, and a constitutional framework. There is a cyclical pattern to these interactions—from single-pyramid and more authoritarian to competing-pyramid and more open competition and back again— linked to a country’s electoral cycle. Hale has traced these processes in all twelve of the ex-Soviet states (excluding the Baltics) as well as four statelets (Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria), sixteen in all. There is little to disagree with in Hale’s massive and masterly study, as the processes he traces are empirically accurate. One might quibble, however, with some of the concepts and their operationalization. He justifies introducing a new term “patronalism” in place of such familiar ones as clientelism, (neo)patrimonialism, or informal politics, as being more comprehensive.22 His depiction of patron-clientelism is a one-way, top-down relationship, overlooking the important element of reciprocity emphasized in the classic works on the subject.23 The “logic of collective action” is invoked by him to explain patron-client relations as well as the emergence of expectations,24 but as mentioned in a later chapter I have reservations about such logic. “Expectations” have to be attributed to the actors concerned in this narrative, but there is no way to confirm their true existence. Hale’s study throughout deals with individuals—explicitly so in its theoretical expositions. Individuals are never treated as part of society, indeed, “society” is merely a label for the human population of a country. Hale specifically rejects using categories such as “clans” and “ethnic groups” in his analysis on the grounds that they are not unified blocs, and that interests are liable to prevail over the bonds within such entities. He seems almost to deny that bonds exist, or that they exist within society. Terms such as “machine politics” and “lame duck,” which

22 23

Ibid., 22-26. Hale specifically points out that “in characterizing the relationship between patrons and clients, if anything, it [patronalism] emphasizes the power of patrons more than that of the clients. . .. This is appropriate given that the inequalities these [patronalistic] societies feature tend to favor the patrons relative to clients.” Ibid., 27. Ibid., 22 and 34-36.

INTRODUCTION

originated in the US political system, are applied liberally in this study, as though America were the template for politics in the postSoviet world as well. Indeed, America as a model comes to mind when the author at one point sums up on presidential ousters with the unsurprising statement that “once a single-pyramid system was initially built in a post-Soviet presidentialist polity, patronal presidents have fallen primarily as they simultaneously encountered a lame-duck syndrome and low popular support.”25 Of all sixteen entities examined, Hale finds Ukraine exceptional in not following the general pattern.26 In the first place, it experienced a brief episode of genuine (or as close as possible to) democracy (2005-10) when lame-duck President Leonid Kuchma was succeeded by Viktor Yushchenko.27 Secondly, every president since has lost office after just a single term, regardless of constitutional order, instead of as a lame duck at the end of the second term. Thus the regular cycle of re-establishing a single pyramid has been unfulfilled, contrary to Hale’s theoretical expectations. Hale seems to have difficulty accommodating the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity, which he labels “irregular,” because it does not fit the elitedriven patronal politics scheme.28 From the latter perspective, Yanukovych fell because he was too hasty in building a single-pyramid system; he was brought down by unsympathetic expectations (not by the revolution). Hale’s analysis ends in 2014, at which point he concludes: Overall, as the logic of regime cycles would predict, Ukraine . . . was clearly experiencing political closure until the outbreak of the Euromaidan protests. . .. The logic . . . would lead us to expect this eventually to promote competing-pyramid politics in Ukraine, although it is far too early to tell as of 2014.29

Subsequent events invite further research into the Ukrainian anomaly, where there have now been three presidents in a row who have

25 26 27 28 29

Ibid., 241. Ibid., 325-50, and 370-71. Ibid., 13. Ibid., 234-38. Ibid., 350.

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failed to build a single-pyramid system. Neither Yushchenko, nor Yanukovych, nor Petro Poroshenko was a lame duck. Poroshenko was defeated by the novice Volodymyr Zelensky who brought no network of clients or other tangible political resources with him into office. Whether one agrees wholly with Henry Hale’s analysis of post-Soviet politics or not, the case of Ukraine certainly warrants investigation—either Ukraine is a permanent misfit, or the theory of patronal politics is lacking in some important aspect. The puzzle demands exploration: what kind of political system does Ukraine have? Does patronalism hold back democracy in post-Euromaidan Ukraine? Hale’s elaborate theory provides a springboard for the present study, for confirming or disconfirming the theory, and for proposing an alternative in the latter case.

Conceptual Clarification of the Political To avoid getting bogged down—which inevitably results from assuming that politics is everything and anything—as well as conceptual stretching,30 it is best to settle on a quite specific definition of the concept of politics to begin with. A novel such definition has been proposed and elaborated by Stefano Bartolini.31 It allows us to narrow down the political more accurately than is customarily possible, to identify the relevant actors, and to plot the dynamics of the political process more exactly. According to Bartolini, the political should be conceived of as a category of intentional action—distinct from interest, morality, and honor—which aims to secure compliance by others. In addition, political action needs to be seen not only as intentional, but also independent of goals, means, or consequences.32 Postulating that there are two fundamental conditions for political action— confinement and monopolization—each being either open or 30 31 32

Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” American Political Science Review 64, no. 4 (1970): 1033-53. Bartolini, The Political. Ibid., chap. 2. Specifically, “political action is that type of action whose aim is to achieve the obedience, the acquiescence or the acceptance of other actors.” And again, he offers what he calls “a minimal definition. Politics is the behavioral domain in which, unlike all other domains, people act with the explicit intention to achieving compliance by others.” Ibid., pp. 38 and 45.

INTRODUCTION

closed, he derives four types of fields of interaction: anarchic, authority, natural, and governmental. The governmental field is one where there is no opting out and a single center of command exists.33 In this conceptualization, “politics” is “understood as the production and distribution of ‘behavioural compliance,’ as opposed to the view of politics as a distribution of values, an aggregation of preferences or a solution to social dilemmas.”34 Following this reasoning, the decisions of government are obligations that act like guarantees of entitlements, of “political warranties” recognized by all.35 There is also a differentiation between activity directed at gaining a position of public authority and competing for allocation of goods and values. There is as well a stratification into: the political class, politically relevant actors, and ordinary subjects or citizens.36 The interplay amongst actors, commonly seen as a rather distasteful “struggle for power,” acquires more meaning and clarity under Bartolini’s scheme based as it is on the concept of politics as action, intention, and compliance, as well as the notion of fields of political action. It becomes understandable in terms of intent, conditions and command—rather than as a free-forall contest. There are observable patterns to this contestation which can help to define or to characterize the political system as such, provided we focus on the elements identified for us by Bartolini’s approach. As he puts it, “the political process is characterized by actors continually fighting to confine and de-confine other actors with the aim of achieving command of limiting the process of competing instigations.”37 Therefore, “the political scientist needs to analyze the entire political process with special attention to [1] the constant dynamics of command versus competing instigations, [2] the corresponding confinement/deconfinement of actors and [3] transformations of one type of field into another. This,” he emphasizes, “is the political meaning and what is crucially at stake in the

33 34 35 36 37

Ibid., chaps. 3 and 4. Ibid., ix. Ibid., 119-24. Ibid., 132. Ibid., 135.

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midst of the infinite number of goods, decisions and policies constantly produced and redefined by the political process.”38 By adopting this point of view it becomes immediately obvious that the conditions for political action in post-Euromaidan Ukraine have not yet been sufficiently consolidated within the governmental field: actors are not confined, nor has command been effectively monopolized. Ukraine’s is an unsettled political system. Most obviously, Kyiv since 2014 has been unable to secure compliance in Crimea and the self-declared “people’s republics” of Luhansk and Donetsk (LNR/DNR). The locus of decision-making is unclear, being contested by the president, legislature (Verkhovna Rada, or Supreme Council), and Constitutional Court, among others. Anticorruption policies implemented under Poroshenko were being challenged and dismantled by Zelenskyy. Police reform was initiated, but then aborted, with the same interior minister presiding throughout since 2014. The search for compliance, involving law, rule-making, and rule-application appears to be the key problem area. This is not to say that the dynamics of patronalism and electoral or competitive authoritarianism are of no account. But a focus on politics as search for compliance might help to complete the picture and to help us understand Ukraine’s exceptional status. Bartolini cautions that “the ‘governmental field’ is not the ‘government’ but a constellation of specific actors who are both confined and under a monopolistic provider of compliance.”39 This warning is especially applicable to any examination of Ukrainian politics, where it seems the actors are not confined and there is no monopolization of compliance. Instead, law-makers, law-enforcers, and law-courts operate at cross-purposes. Each actor uses his institution to advance his own or his patron’s interests. Each institution is like a personal fief. The search for compliance is not always universal, but targeted. Why and how is this happening? Presidents Kuchma and Yanukovych were notorious for using the law and law-related institutions for political purposes as a personal weapon. What about Kravchuk, Yushchenko, Poroshenko, and 38 39

Ibid., 136. Original emphasis. Ibid., 107.

INTRODUCTION

Zelensky? Resources are essential, regardless of their type. To quote Bartolini once more, “compliance eventually results from a credible threat to enforce. There is a general tendency, therefore, for the ruler to accumulate resources that guarantee the enforcement of his compliance requests.”40 Did the one-term presidents in Ukraine fail to accumulate adequate resources which would have ensured their re-election? Where exactly does patron-clientelism fit within the store of resources, and is it decisive?

What This Book is About Drawing upon and combining the themes outlined above—the notions of challenges and critical factors (Hale and Orttung), patronal politics (Hale), and politics as the search for compliance (Bartolini)—this book sets out to analyze the post-Euromaidan trajectory of Ukraine. It is addressed primarily to an academic audience, but general readers should find it informative as well. It focusses on leadership, choices, interests, and interactions among the principal and proximate actors as well as the general public. In particular, it examines how Poroshenko came to power and what happened thereafter. Were patronal politics at work before, during, and after his election? What were his chief political initiatives, and how did they turn out? We look at his record of: appointments; relations with the Verkhovna Rada, the oligarchs, and the electorate; and steps taken in the fields of law, the constitution, corruption, confinement of other actors, and monopolization of power. Why did he fail to be re-elected in 2019—was he abandoned by his clientele, or was he stymied by the interior minister’s use of the police? We then investigate Zelenskyy’s win and his subsequent performance in office in a parallel manner. Did he benefit from patronal politics? Did he build up a patronal network while in office? What were his interests and priorities on assuming the presidency? How and why did these change? What were his initiatives and how did they work out? What were his relationships with other actors? Why did he allow the return of the Yanukovych gang, and the dismantlement of 40

Ibid., 74.

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Poroshenko’s anti-corruption measures? How did the Verkhovna Rada operate and co-operate under Zelenskyy’s single-party majority, as compared to previous administrations? Were patronal politics still in operation during his term? Was the governmental field, as Bartolini calls it, broadened or narrowed under Ukraine’s post-Euromaidan presidents? I demonstrate that Ukraine’s political system has been rendered less consolidated by a combination of choices made by the country’s political class and its citizens, all working at cross purposes, and that this rather than patronalism has basically characterized post-Euromaidan Ukrainian politics. The book also deals with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine and its effects on the fundamental features of the country’s politics: the Soviet-Communist legacy, national identity, and patronalism and corruption. While some consolidation around the national idea has been observed in the population, loss of control of territory cannot be counted as successful politics. How did Poroshenko cope with this challenge, and how has Zelensky coped? Have there been differences in approach, and in results? Is Ukraine now to become simply a project of Russian instead of American foreign policy? In any case, the Ukrainian political system that existed under Poroshenko and Zelenskyy, in both its domestic political configuration and dynamics, as well as its relationship with Russia, will have to be transformed.

The Plan of the Book Chapter 1 makes a brief digression to address the question of whether Ukraine should be considered a “failed state.” In a climate where common discourse passes as analysis and false news as revealed truth, however, it is essential to dispose of this noxious canard. A close examination of the “failed state” literature reveals its own failure to deliver a satisfactory and genuinely convincing explanation for the condition of Ukrainian politics. Instead, the term is either a pejorative label, a practical recipe for either interference or non-interference by foreign policy-makers, sometimes a propaganda cudgel, but not a theoretically-relevant concept useful for analysis. For Russian trolls, it may be a hoped-for self-fulfilling

INTRODUCTION

prophecy. Indeed, Ukrainian politics may lack stability, but that is not state failure, any more than Italy’s political instability is indicative of a failed state. In chapter 2, I review some of the foremost literature characterizing post-communist Ukraine’s political system, pointing out its strengths and limitations. This literature seems to suggest that every president puts his own stamp on the political system, so that successive interpretations require constant revision. I advocate a redefinition of politics, following Bartolini’s lead, and its application to discern the dynamics of post-Euromaidan Ukrainian politics where earlier approaches appear to fall short. This requires taking a natural history approach, which I do here: observing, examining, classifying, and hypothesizing—basically looking for instances of action directed at control and identifying who has it. The general reader may wish to skip this chapter. Chapters 3 and 4 are the heart of the book, examining the Poroshenko and Zelenskyy presidencies in terms of the aforementioned questions, comparing them with their predecessors and delineating the patterns of politics in their respective terms of office. Putin’s war on Ukraine is the subject of chapter 5, and what it means for the viability of the Ukrainian polity. The conclusion in chapter 6 draws together the various predominant threads and summarizes the dynamic patterns within Ukrainian politics post2014. What to expect and what not to expect next, in light of the war with Russia, is outlined from this author’s perspective. My sources are drawn from a daily culling over the period 2014 to 2022 of the Ukrainian and foreign press, supplemented with the relevant secondary literature. Despite the critical observations made above, I am forced to make use of a great many everyday terms—such as “oligarch,” “parliamentarian,” and “political party”—in place of more accurate concepts. This is a descriptive study, looking for patterns in the empirical evidence of day-to-day politics, with only the most basic conceptual and theoretical guidance. It is interpretive, more like natural science in its primary stage of observation, classification, and clarification than like physics or economics. By its rudimentary nature it may contribute to more accurate, authentic (as opposed to abstract and superficial) knowledge of Ukrainian politics in its current manifestation and long-term path. I hope my story has some validity nonetheless.

1. Ukraine as a “Failed State” The term “failed state” has often been applied to Ukraine, even though its practical value in explaining or advancing the understanding of that country’s political development is questionable. Russian sources in particular have tended to employ it liberally. “Since the collapse of the Soviet Union,” writes one observer, “Russia has presented Ukraine as a sick, pseudo-state on the road to international isolation.”1 An émigré Russian academic living in New England published an illuminating book on his home province of Crimea. In it he describes post-communist Ukraine as a “failed state” unable or unwilling to defend itself and not in control of its own territory.2 Adrian Karatnycky and Alexander Motyl have defended Ukraine’s record on fighting corruption, asserting that in concentrating exclusively on that problem its critics had fallen victim to “the fictitious Russian talking point that Ukraine is a failing, if not failed, state.”3 A Ukrainian journalist, meanwhile, has warned that the depiction of Ukraine as a “failed state,” the work of Kremlin “political technologists” (specialists in PR) aimed at bringing the country again under Moscow’s control, is in danger of being fulfilled willy-nilly through the carelessness of the incoming administration of President Zelenskyy, contrary to the country’s best interests.4 It might, we now know, become a self-fulfilling prophecy, though not through Ukraine’s own doing. Is the idea of the “failed state” capable of answering any of our basic questions about the character and development of the 1

2 3

Grzegorz Gil, “Doubletake: Is Ukraine a Failed State?” New Eastern Europe, 19 August 2015, on the Internet at http://neweasterneurope.eu/old_site/articlesand-commentary/I . . ., accessed 1 February 2021. Konstantyn Pleshakov, The Crimean Nexus: Putin’s War and the Clash of Civilizations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 122 and 132ff. Adrian Karatnycky and Alexander J. Motyl, “Ukraine’s Promising Path to Reform: A Narrow Focus on Corruption Overlooks Remarkable Progress,” Foreign Affairs, 16 July 2018. Dmytro Krapyvenko, “Chy maie Ukraina oznaky failed state,” Tyzhden, 15 May 2018, on the Internet at http://tyzhden.ua/Politics/213645, accessed 15 May 2018; and Krapyvenko, “Mission: Failed state,” Tyzhden, 18 July 2019, on the Internet at https://tyzhden.ua/Politics/232713, accessed 1 August 2019.

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political system of Ukraine? Could it help to explain anything? Or does it serve merely as a label, a term of opprobrium? If there is indeed in the arsenal of political science such an entity as the “failed state” properly elaborated, then it should be distinguishable from ones that have not failed or are not failing. It should have clearly identifiable causes and consequences, it should have characteristic dynamics of internal operation, and it should be at least theoretically amenable to curative treatment—a rescue operation of sorts. A review of the literature will assist in determining whether the notion of a “failed state” is a potential aid to understanding in general and to explaining Ukraine’s predicament in particular, or whether it merely is more a term of abuse, an exercise in pigeon-holing or ostracizing in place of explaining.

A Review of the Literature A convenient a starting-point in the massive literature is William Zartman’s edited 1995 volume on collapsed states.5 In it Zartman summarized the ultimate signposts of state collapse as including: devolution of power to the peripheries; withering of central power; malfunctioning of government; incumbents playing defensive games; and loss of the central power’s control over its own agents.6 As one of his contributors pointed out, humanitarian disaster often accompanying state collapse calls for United Nations (UN) or other international intervention.7 Ideally, “an impending collapse, . . . unless arrested and resolved at the roots, threatens not only the peace and security of the country, but . . . ultimately international order itself.”8 Thus began the movement in succeeding decades for intervention and assistance, whether by collective security bodies or individual nation-states, to help those in obvious distress even in the absence of fundamentally thought-through diagnoses of the 5

6 7 8

I. William Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, SAIS African Studies Library, General Editor I. William Zartman (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995). Zartman, “Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse,” in ibid., 10. Francis Mading Deng, “State Collapse: The Humanitarian Challenge to the United Nations,” in Collapsed States, ed. Zartman, 207-19. Ibid., 218.

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presumed ailment. Basically, Zartman and his colleagues were pointing to the disorderly states of their time largely in Africa and prescribing action to relieve the suffering humanity. Writing in 2004, Robert Rotberg and his associates elaborated on the failure of states as a problem for world order.9 Failure is judged by performance: states provide goods for their people, the primary one being security. Failed states are marked by violent conflict, civil wars, loss of control of territory, and criminal violence.10 “A failed state is a polity that is no longer able or willing to perform the fundamental tasks of a nation-state in the modern world.”11 In this analysis there is some ambiguity as to whether symptoms are being read as causes, but regardless the prognosis is clear: “Reducing the global incidence of state failure and collapse is essential to the peace of the world, to saving . . . territories from havoc and misery, and to combating terrorism.”12 Equally clear for Rotberg is that “once stability and confidence have . . . returned, . . . [there should be] three primary and parallel goals: jump-starting battered economies, re-introducing the rule of law, and rejuvenating civil society.”13 It was a matter of urgency. “Reducing the global incidence of state failure and collapse is essential to the peace of the world, to saving . . . territories from havoc and misery, and to combating terrorism.”14 Returning to the topic a decade later, Rotberg was less sanguine about easy answers to the problem and less clear about the nature of the problem itself.15 He therefore invented a new category. “There is a class of nation-state,” he wrote, “that deserves to be classified as odious. . .. These outlaw nations, mostly near-failed,

9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Robert I. Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004). Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair,” in When States Fail, 2-6. Ibid., 6. Ibid., 30. Ibid., 33. Ibid., 30. Rotberg, “Odious and Failed States, Humanitarian Responses,” in Failed States and Fragile Societies: A New World Order? ed. by Ingo Trauschweizer and Steven M. Miner (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2014), 119-41.

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failed, or collapsed states, attack their own peoples, show little respect for the human rights of their subjects, deny civil liberties and essential freedoms, and at least pretend to be democratic.”16 Having reviewed the nature of the behavior of the leading exemplars domestically and internationally, as well as what had and had not been done by the outside world to help matters, including the United Nations’ Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, he concluded on a rather restrained note: The world order has still not managed to create consistent tools to curb dictators, to impose civilized methods on primitive and recalcitrant regimes, or to persuade its most odious members to embrace humanity and tread the democratic paths of tolerance and civility. Nor has the UN itself, or most of its members, ever found a voice with which to condemn and shame those who are the worst of the worst. Redress will therefore come episodically and painfully, primarily from within.17

It is not clear from this whether odiousness or failure of the state is the primary problem, and whether one causes the other, but Rotberg was right about the prognosis. One of Rotberg’s colleagues had earlier spelled out in detail the effects of a particularly troublesome contributor to state failure, namely what later research termed Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs): State failure usually results from the prolonged interaction of a number of powerful corrosive factors, including economic stagnation, political and ethnic factionalism, pervasive corruption, decaying national infrastructure, and environmental degradation. Typically, these factors operate over a long period of time, eroding civil institutions and undermining the authority of the state. . .. [Early on,] it is still possible for an effective leader or leadership group to reverse the process and avert full state collapse. . .. But a state’s capacity to resist failure can decline rapidly when armed militias emerge. . .. Once established, these . . . tend to compete . . . for control of territory,

Ibid., 119-20. “In 2007, a published designation of the worst of the worst listed (in descending order, from most grossly repressive to highly repressive) North Korea, Turkmenistan, Burma, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Equatorial Guinea, Togo, Uzbekistan, Syria, and Tunisia as the globe’s most odious regimes. Cuba, Iran, and Libya were other nation-states considered for inclusion in this list, but Egypt and Yemen—despite being known as states run by authoritarians, were not.” Ibid., 122. Ibid., 137.

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population, and resources—thereby subjecting the country to recurring bouts of violence and disorder. Under these circumstances, the transition from failing to failed state is usually irreversible.”18

Here again we encounter a blurring of lines between cause, concurrence, coincidence, and effect, which the contributor cited attempts to finesse by stating that the emergence of armed militias does not cause state failure but merely contributes to it.19 Along similar lines, and in an effort to clarify matters, Huseyn Aliyev, using quantitative data from 1995 to 2014 and regression analysis, finds “a weak association between civil war violence and state failure, and a much stronger, markedly vertical relationship between the presence of VNSAs and state failure.”20 His “findings suggest that although failed states are highly susceptible to armed conflict, the state failure does not occur exclusively, or predominantly, due to armed violence.”21 Thus a state can fail in the absence of civil war; the civil violence engulfs it only after it has failed. It is a different story, according to his research, Aliyev says, when VNSAs are present. “The presence of VNSAs in fragile states—even in countries unaffected by violence—emerges as particularly conducive to state failure.”22 Yet how can there be civil war without VNSAs, or how can VNSAs be present in the absence of civil war? And does association show cause and effect? For these early promoters of the “failed state” idea it was more a call to action rather than a political theory to be applied, tested, and confirmed or disconfirmed.

The Failed State’s Failure The deficiencies of the “failed state” concept impairing its usefulness were first identified by Charles Call.23 According to him, these 18 19 20 21 22 23

Michael T. Klare, “The Deadly Connection: Paramilitary Bands, Small Arms Diffusion, and State Failure,” in When States Fail, 116. Ibid., 117. Huseyn Aliyev, “Precipitating State Failure: Do Civil War and Violent NonState Actors Create Failed States?” Third World Quarterly 38, no. 9 (2017): 1984. Ibid. Ibid., 1985. Charles T. Call, “The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State,’” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 8 (2008): 1491-1507.

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include: combining of disparate states under a single rubric and prescribing the same remedy—stronger institutions and more order; avoiding issues of democracy and justice; and assessing states according to Weberian ideal-type standards or those of modern Western states. As alternative categories he suggested disaggregating the concept into collapsed, war-torn, weak, and authoritarian states. In the post-9/11 context within which the concept subsequently flourished, he observed that The rediscovery of the state has occurred in the context of the “war on terror,” as failing states are deemed dangerous for Western security interests. Its prominence derives mainly not from concern for the inability of some states to provide for their own population’s security, welfare and rights, but to deter and control threats to the populations and institutions of rich countries.24

Essentially his “argument is that the ‘failed state’ concept is largely useless and should be abandoned except insofar as it refers to wholly collapsed states—where no authority is recognisable either internally to a country’s inhabitants or externally to the international community.”25 In 2004, Call notes, the only country to which this applied was Somalia. Obviously, “imprecise concepts make for poor scholarship and bad policy.”26 Following Call, but taking a rather different tack, Branwen Gruffydd Jones has argued “that the discourse of good governance/state failure is irredeemably rooted in an imperial imagination.”27 Furthermore, she regards “the failed state discourse as a modern form of racialized thought.”28 Having reviewed the entire history of European and non-European relations history, she argues that the contemporary failed-state discourses are merely a continuation or reproduction of the same dialogue, except that races, civilizations, and tribes have been replaced by states.29 And 24 25 26 27 28 29

Ibid., 1504. Ibid., 1492. Ibid., 1505. Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “’Good Governance’ and ‘State Failure’? Genealogies of Imperial Discourse,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26, no. 1 (2013): 52. Ibid., 53. Ibid., 54-61. Russia’s intervention in Ukraine might also be put under this rubric, with Ukrainians seen as a tribe by the Russian invaders.

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we now also speak of modernization and development. “Since the 1990s,” she observes, “and especially following 11 September 2001, the discourse of failed states has been employed both in the legitimation of specific instances of intervention in non-Western regions, and in support of Western intervention more broadly.”30 As to the various indexes of state weakness, which appear objective and unbiased, these are nothing more than an excuse for the contemporary form of imperialism: Indexes of governance and state failure reproduce hierarchies of international judgement which continue to position the European at the top and the African at the bottom. And, with no reference to race but grounded in the authority of empirical fact, they continue to provide a discursive basis for legitimizing Western intervention in African and other states.31

Here, as with Susan Woodward’s critique below, is an example of a perspective which sees state failure very much as primarily an ideology.

The Failed State as Mission In spite of such reservations, scholars and policy analysts have tended to “press on regardless.” Examining data from 1946 to 1999, for example, Iqbal and Starr, building on their previous work, reported that while state failure is itself not contagious, collapsed states can transmit their various symptoms—“unrest, instability, interstate, and civil war”—to their neighbors.32 A team from the RAND Corporation in California, taking as given the “failed state” concept as well as the notion of the danger such states present, and relying on the Failed States Index to identify failed states, developed what they called a comprehensive approach to rescuing them from oblivion. These states are marked by “violence, economic breakdown, and unfit government.” In order “to emerge from failure requires,” according to these experts, “strategies to . . . bolster the 30 31 32

Ibid., 62. Ibid., 64. Zaryab Iqbal and Harvey Starr, “Bad Neighbors: Failed States and Their Consequences,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25 (2008): 315-31, quoted at 328.

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well-being and industry of the population.”33 These strategies include: dismantling the instruments of violence; building effective, legitimate state security structures; distributing assistance fairly and appropriately; building an inclusive and representative political system; securing the nation’s productive assets; and providing security for foreign direct investment.34 It was not clear who or what should shoulder this massive undertaking. Dan Halvorson, on the other hand, has proposed a reconceptualization of the “failed state” problem as a product of the international system, where the condition of the subject state is not so much defined or determined internally, but rather externally by great powers.35 In due course, “governance” as a solution to the problems of “areas of limited sovereignty” (instead of “failed” or “fragile” states) has been added to the list of remedies, partly in response to critiques of the “one size fits all” solution. For instance, Thomas Risse writes that, despite its problems, governance still provides a useful conceptual tool to study political issues and the provision of collective goods in areas of limited statehood. . . . [Essentially,] it removes the state-centric bias in the study of politics and focuses our attention on the contribution of nonstate actors as well as on nonhierarchical modes of steering.36

He concludes that “the international community should help to improve the capacity of states to enforce and implement decisions and to see to it that the preconditions of governance are enabled in areas of limited statehood.”37 A Romanian scholar has examined the part played by governance in the development of post-Soviet states, 33

34 35

Marla C. Hains, David C. Gompert, Gregory F. Treverton, and Brook K. Stearns, Breaking the Failed-State Cycle (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation Occasional Paper, 2008), 2 and 7. Original emphasis. Ibid., chap. 4. Dan Halvorson, “’Bringing International Politics Back In’: Reconceptualising State Failure for the Twenty-First Century,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 5 (November 2010): 583-600; and Halvorson, States of Disorder: Understanding State Failure and Intervention in the Periphery (London and New York: Routledge, 2013). Thomas Risse, “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction and Overview,” in Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood,” ed. Thomas Risse (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 28. Ibid., 29.

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contrasting the three Baltic states and Moldova. Whereas the Baltics have employed governance to advance democracy, she finds that Moldova—due to lack of political consensus and the presence of corruption—has failed on both counts. According to her reading of the evidence, “the overall transition successes or failures can be explained through the prism of governance and the comparison between the countries in question reveal the determining quality of governance quality and its impact on countries’ internal and external conditions.”38 In other words, “the higher is the level of consensual governance, the [more] stable and rapid is the transition.”39 One may question whether cause and effect have been mis-identified or transposed, but we are reassured that “good governance represents more than an antidote for failed states and it can be advanced as a key component of regional and international security.”40 Other scholars have focused on “fragile states.” One such study compares three unstable (Afghanistan, Haiti, Democratic Republic of the Congo) with two stable (Botswana, Costa Rica) entities and considers the efficacy of intervention. The authors conclude that the entire enterprise of “development” needs re-examination and innovation.41 Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, meanwhile, propose moving beyond state failure by focusing not on the state but rather its specific institutions. They “suggest narrowing the scope of inquiry from the strength of the state to the strength of state institutions.”42 To this end, they identify the key features in weak states for four important types of institutions—administrative, judicial, security, and political. How these “institutions affect political stability and economic performance,” they say, will give early warning of “failure.”43 Derick Brinkerhoff offers a unique 38 39 40 41 42 43

Cristina Buza, “The Role of Governance in the Evolution of Ex-Soviet States,” Cogito—Multidisciplinary Research Journal 11, no. 2 (June 2019): 112-13. Ibid., 113. Ibid. Lothar Brock, Hans-Henrik Holm, Georg Søresen, and Micael Stohl, Fragile States: Violence and the Failure of Intervention (Cambridge: Polity, 2013). Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, “Revisiting the Concept of the Failed State: Bringing the State Back In,” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 8 (2013): 1325. Ibid., 1335.

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perspective on the usefulness of the “failed state” phenomenon as conventionally conceived by classifying it as a “wicked problem.”44 Wicked problems are incapable of being clearly defined, consist of a multitude of causal and interdependent links, “have no clear solution,” are unique, and attempted solutions “produce unforeseen consequences.”45 This, he asserts, applies to fragile states, and should be taken into account by those implementing development policies. Such policies should be fashioned in collaboration with the given fragile state, not imposed from outside. Armed state building is a type of intervention meant to compel better government within collapsed or failed states.46 The historical record of success for such efforts is not particularly encouraging. Out of 40 such cases between 1989 and 2012 examined by Paul Miller, only six (15 per cent) were deemed successful; in the post-Cold War period, only two (El Salvador and Costa Rica) out of 28 (7 per cent), indicating a declining rate of achievement.47 Nonetheless, the author concludes that state building can be a just cause for concerted international efforts. It should remain a legitimate policy option for the international community, and learning to get it right should be a top priority for scholars and policymakers alike.48

Neither theoretical weaknesses in conceptualization, therefore, nor paucity of practical results, hampers the ardor of the advocates of armed state building from prescribing it for what ails the world’s “failed states.” Hanna Woolaver, a specialist in international law, has suggested a resolution to this paradox. As she puts it, “the failed state thesis alone does not justify the imposition of international administration on failed states, nor a general right to use force against 44 45 46

47 48

Derick W. Brinkerhoff, “State Fragility and Failure as Wicked Problems: Beyond Naming and Taming,” Third World Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2014): 333-44. Ibid., 334-35. Paul D. Miller, Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898-2012, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, ed. by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013). Ibid., 16. Ibid., 204.

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failed states.”49 In the absence of a consensus on what constitutes a failed state, intervention militarily or otherwise must of necessity be motivated by factors other than the subject state’s supposed failure. This is where the “failed state” as a danger to regional or world security makes its appearance.50 As Ingo Trauschweizer puts it, “from an international perspective, state failure poses a major threat not only to vulnerable people on the ground, but also to the world economy; . . . and to international security.”51 Hence, “great powers and nongovernmental actors within the global community have to integrate local, regional, and even global responses into coherent strategy that would allow for success in the ‘wars’ on drugs, terror, poverty, and crime. . . . [Thus] the best responses to state failure and resulting or concurrent upheavals can neither stop at installing new regimes nor be confined within national borders.”52 Interestingly enough, The Oxford Handbook of International Security does not have “failed state” either in its table of contents or index.53 In a volume of essays on weak states in the Middle East there is a notable disagreement between the editor and some of his contributors regarding the usefulness of the central concept of “failed state” and its equivalents.54 This is symptomatic of the problems associated with the concept, if it is one. The editor, Mehran Kamrava, while acknowledging that “the study of weak states . . . is a contested terrain,” nevertheless proceeds to discuss the problem using a definition that can only be described as tautological:

50 51 52 53

Hanna Woolaver, “State Failure, Sovereign Equality and Non-Intervention: Assessing Claimed Rights to Intervene in Failed States,” Wisconsin International Law Journal 32, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 619. See, for example, Mario Silva, State Legitimacy and Failure in International Law (Leiden: Brill, 2014). Ingo Trauschweizer, “Introduction,” in Failed States and Fragile Societies, x. Ibid., xv. Alexandra Gheciu and William C. Wohlforth, eds., The Oxford Handbook of International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). There is, however, a chapter on state failure in the Global South in another of the Oxford handbooks, namely, Sven Chojnacki and Anne Menzel, “State Failure and State Transformation,” in The Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the State, ed. by Stephen Leibfried et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 745-60. Mehran Kamrava, ed., Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East (London: Hurst & Company, 2016).

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“State weakness is a function of diminished state capacity.”55 But several of his colleagues—studying Yemen, Libya, and the region as a whole—take issue with the “failed state” literature for its lack of attention to political power, its Western biases, its simple-mindedness, and its ability to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.56 The geographical vantage-point from which state failure is being observed makes for a different perspective. It looks very different from Washington or London. A volume such as this, particularly in the divergence between the editor and his contributors, illustrates well many of the basic inadequacies of the “failed state” literature.57 The reader may want to know which states in particular are to be found under the “failed state” umbrella. There is no shortage of candidates. In the literature reviewed above, Woolaver, for instance, helpfully notes that “Somalia is often used as the paradigmatic example of the failed state in international discourse. Other States that have been routinely labeled as ‘failed’ include Sudan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Liberia, Yemen, the DRC, the Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, and, most recently, the Central African Republic (CAR).”58 Dan Halvorson’s study on interventions in the periphery examined three cases: the 1882 British intervention in Egypt; the US intervention in South Vietnam in 1965; and the French intervention in the Ivory Coast, 2002.59 Ezrow and Frantz cite no fewer than 55

58 59

Mehran Kamrava, “Weak States in the Middle East,” in ibid., 2 and 10. Later on (p. 16), he adds: “State weakness . . . is fundamentally a product of diminished capacity. It may be brought on endogenously; . . . or exogenously. . .. [Its] common catalysts . . . are wars; . . . international efforts; . . . or cross-border attacks. . .. [There is] no shortage of these . . . in the Middle East.” Charles Schmitz, “Yemen: Failing State or Failing Politics?” 29-51; Sarah Phillips, “Questioning Failure, Stability, and Risk in Yemen,” 53-80; Frederic Wehrey, “Libya After Qadafi: Fragmentation, Hybridity, and Informality,” 99118; and Laurie A. Brand, “Diasporas and State-(re) building in the MENA Region: Potentials and Constraints,” 249-74; all in Fragile Politics. On Yemen in particular, see also Sophia Dingli, “Is the Failed State Thesis Analytically Useful? The Case of Yemen,” Politics 33, no. 2 (2013): 91-100. Her argument is “that the failed state thesis’s analytical usefulness is limited because it is unable to account for the dynamics shaping the Yemeni state and it therefore cannot provide adequate remedies for them” (99). Those dynamics, crucially include tribal governance, patronage, and the manufacturing of crises by the regime and other strongmen for their own purposes. Woolaver, “State Failure, Sovereign Equality and Non-Intervention,” 603. Halvorson, States of Disorder.

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two dozen countries as evincing at least some of the characteristics of “weak states.”60 What in the twentieth century was known as the Failed States Index has, in the more sensitive twenty-first, become the Fragile States Index.61 In 2020, the FSI rated 179 countries. In terms of fragility the top five were: Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and Democratic Republic of Congo. Ukraine in 2020 was no. 93; Russia, no. 77, thus in no position to be labelling Ukraine as a “failed state,” being itself by this measure the greater failure.62

Susan Woodward’s Critique Weak intellectual foundations of the “failed state” literature (including all its variants), as well as disastrous outcomes of policies inspired by it, form the subject of a devastating critique by Susan Woodward.63 In her estimation, the term is tautological, makes no sense, and yet it is extremely popular with policy-makers, their advisors, as well as the general public. It has become “not just a label but an ideology.”64 In view of the nonsensical nature of the resulting situation—interventions to rectify state failure have themselves failed—she explains the paradox as motivated by the historical context and the responses of global intervenors. As an academic concept it cannot be used for analysis or policy.65 She chronicles how development assistance has been deformed by the overwhelming concern for security instead of aid, and the displacement of “democracy” promotion by “governance” (i.e., making the world safe for business and the World Bank, one could say).66 Looking into the implementation of state-building as the accepted solution, 60 61 62

63 64 65 66

Ezrow and Frantz, “Revisiting the Concept of the Failed State,” 1323-38. On the Internet at https://fragilestatesindex.org, accessed on 27 January 2021. For one of the many critiques of the Index, see Lionel Beehner and Joseph Young, “The Failure of the Failed State Index,” The Mantle: Smart Content for the Global Citizen, on the Internet at https://www.themantle.com/internation al-affairs/failed-st . . ., accessed 27 January 2021. Their article appeared originally in the World Policy Journal. Susan L. Woodward, The Ideology of Failed States: Why Intervention Fails (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). Ibid., 3. Ibid., chap. 2. Ibid., chap. 3.

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Woodward concludes that the prescriptions connected with it are offered as articles of faith, thus placing state-building on a par with the “failed state” idea itself—unexamined and simply taken for granted.67 Her further research then into the growing apparatus for state-building shows that what external actors are doing when engaged in state-building is actually building their own capacities. As she says, “their primary focus . . . is to build their own capacity to do state-building. . .. State-building has become ever more institutionalized . . . for and among these intervening actors.”68 Not that there are no problems of security and development in various parts of the world needing attention from those better off in those respects. But these, Woodward stresses, involve internal, not international security. They are real, and they are operational problems. The real problems faced by “failing states” are basically sovereign consent, political will, and capacity, to none of which are securitization and militarization appropriate solutions. Unfortunately, therefore, the would-be state-building effort does not work, but it does have consequences—and these are the opposite of statebuilding. The “failed state” becomes, thanks to the remedies imposed, a self-fulfilling prophecy, but this impact goes unnoticed and unassessed by the intervenors.69 According to Woodward, the “external actors . . . are not aiming at state-building.”70 Summarizing her book’s arguments, “the role of the ideology of failed states . . . has resulted in serious . . . threats to these countries.”71 Her conclusions are that: (1) the “failed state” is an ideology preventing change and improvement, a camouflage; and (2) overriding concern with security diverts attention from real problems, which results in destruction of state capacities and subversion of state-building.72

67 68 69 70 71 72

Ibid., chap. 4. Ibid., 124. Ibid., 165-66. Ibid., 218. Ibid., 224. Ibid., 250.

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Post-Soviet State Failure In a volume of essays looking specifically at post-Soviet states from the point of view of the doctrine of the “failure” or “weakness” of states, the existing treatments of “weak states” were found to be unsatisfactory. This was because of: (1) conceptual reductionism, i.e., that actual states under examination are not aberrations; (2) using an exogenous normative model; and (3) a tendency to de-historicize politics and the state.73 It did not, however, question or challenge the basic idea of the “failed state.” Rather, it started from the idea of the “weak state,” and then proposed to shift focus away from that to “state weakness,” so that the condition of stateness, not the state, was to be emphasized as the proper object in research.74 “State weakness exists when a state does not generally perform the tasks expected of it.”75 The volume’s aims were set out as follows: “we seek to probe whether durable state weakness is in fact a harbinger of a new kind of stateness . . . more performative and internationalized than Weber . . . imagined. . . . [Thus] does post-Soviet Eurasia give us a peek into the future of stateness?”76 With its legacy of state socialism, post-Soviet Eurasia is a natural laboratory to explore the durability of state weakness. Based on their contributors’ findings the editors posit three logics as accounting for the widely observed stability despite weakness: consolidation, internationalization, and performance.77 In conclusion, they observe that: the region’s idiosyncrasies offer . . . a clue to their endurance. . .. Eurasia’s weak states often work, against expectations to the contrary. . .. we suggest there is still such a thing as the postsocialist state which intertwines the informal with the formal, relying heavily on the performance of statehood at home and abroad. . .. The study of Eurasia has suffered . . . from misleading

74 75 76 77

John Heathershaw and Edward Schatz, “The Logics of State Weakness in Eurasia: An Introduction,” in Paradox of Power: The Logics of State Weakness in Eurasia, ed. by John Heathershaw and Edward Schatz (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017), 7-8. Ibid., 9. Ibid. Emphasis in the original. Ibid., 10. Ibid., 11-21.

UKRAINE AS A “FAILED STATE” security analysis of state failure and . . . ‘lessons’ about the postcolonial state. Both . . . suggest ignorance. . .. The antidote is . . . collaboration of scholars.78

This suggests that—whatever their apparent shortcomings in rule of law, democracy, or human rights--the “failed state” is an inappropriate analytical lens. None of the sixteen scholars represented between the covers of this book adopts or starts from the “failed state” perspective. In Mark Beissinger’s closing chapter aptly summing up the book, he notes that “what often gets referred to as the ‘weak’ state may simply be a differently organized state.”79 In his own contribution on Ukraine to the above volume, Paul D’Anieri eschews the “failed state” literature altogether drawing instead on that of protest, revolution, and state-society relations.80 The revolutions of 2004 and 2014, he writes, “pushed the Ukrainian state to the very brink of collapse,” yet there prevailed “a high overall level of order. This high level of order was possible, despite the state’s shortcomings, largely because of the strength of informal institutions, which both undermined the state and compensated for it weakness.”81 The illegitimacy of the state was challenged by the legitimacy of the protests, the state’s legitimacy having been weakened through its use by office-holders for private purposes and public repression. “How do we reconcile near-collapse at the top of the Ukrainian state with normalcy in day-to-day life?” asks D’Anieri. One answer lies in the dense networks on informal institutions that characterized Ukrainian state-society relations. Society was organized vertically in patron-client networks and horizontally along a whole range of relationships, through which people managed their lives apart from, or despite, the shortcomings of the state.82

“Informal institutions,” he emphasizes, “both help people to challenge the state and help them to manage when the state recedes.”83 78 79 80 81 82 83

Ibid., 21. Mark R. Beissinger, “Beyond the Neo-Weberian Yardstick? Thinking of the State in Multiple Registers,” in Paradox of Power, 238. Paul D’Anieri, “Anarchy, the State, and Ukraine,” in Paradox of Power, 200-215. Ibid., 201. Ibid., 213. Ibid.

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Among the “powerful nonstate forces” which inhibit disorder when the state’s “monopoly on coercion recedes,” D’Anieri argues, were “the same pyramidal patronage organizations that undermined faith in the state in Ukraine [which] provided their own sort of order.”84 Looking ahead, he writes that It will take additional research to better understand the dynamics of statesociety and intrastate relations in polities such as Ukraine, where oligarchic competition to control the state undermines the popular legitimacy of the state but also provides much of the order that the state elsewhere is expected to provide. Rather than the state playing a crucial mediating role as in the corporatist politics of postwar Western Europe, we find oligarchs competing over the state and mediating difference. Clearly, this was a much less stable arrangement, because without an effective and legitimate state, there is no safety net when oligarchic conflict cannot be resolved.85

That, precisely, is where the present study fits in hoping to make a substantial contribution, but for the time being we must simply note that D’Anieri’s chapter characterizes Ukraine as unstable, not a “failed state” as such. D’Anieri had addressed the problem of Ukraine as a “weak state” earlier, but from the standpoint of state-society relations rather than within the context of the “failed state” literature. As he argued, “Ukraine has a ‘weak state,’ where weak describes not the power of the state relative to other states but the ability of the government to adopt a policy and implement it in the society.”86 This was demonstrated by reference to the mixture of institutions left over from the communist era, the weakness of political parties and parliament, the vagueness of the division of powers, and the country’s economic vulnerability. “As long as Ukraine has a weak state and a divided society,” he concluded, “it will continue to find itself the passive victim of forces beyond its borders.”87 Summing up the volume’s contributions, D’Anieri raised the question “whether 84 85 86

Ibid., 214. Ibid., 214-15. Paul D’Anieri, “The Impact of Domestic Divisions on Ukrainian Foreign Policy: Ukraine as a ‘Weak State,’” in State and Institution Building in Ukraine, ed. Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D’Anieri (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 84. Ibid., 102.

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liberal democracy can take root in Ukraine, and if so, how much it will resemble the liberal democracy in the rest of Europe.”88 The relevance of that question arises from “the susceptibility of new democracies to violence and authoritarianism due to . . . their weak states”; the danger to Ukraine is less, he argued, because a weak state confronted a weak society.89 Rather than one being dominant, or the two locked in battle, what appears in Ukraine are a state and society that are impervious to one another, each being relatively autonomous and immune from pressure by the other but unable (or unwilling) to press its demands on the other.90

Whether the Ukrainian state could reform itself, or be reformed by society is an open question; perhaps they could reform themselves, although that, according to D’Anieri, was doubtful. As he said at the time, The grounds for believing that the Ukrainian state can become effective and democratic lie not in the chances for a rapid reordering of affairs but rather in the view that what we have witnessed since 1991 is the beginning of a very long story. The rest of the story remains to be written, but the significant point for policymakers and for political scientists to keep in mind is that the outcome has most likely not yet been determined.91

Two decades later, we are still wondering where Ukraine is headed, if anywhere at all. In sum, the notion of the “failed state” fails as credible political science, in fact from the very beginning of its coming into use. It fails as a concept because it does not distinguish clearly from its opposite, which is a basic requirement of a scientific concept. Its advocates and promoters in the policy analysis field do not distinguish between the various meanings of “the state”: is it the 88 89

90 91

D’Anieri, “Conclusion: Institutionalizing Democracy in a Divided State,” in State and Institution Building in Ukraine, 325. Ibid. To the extent that a weak society includes or implies a weak civil society, it should be noted that subsequent research has resulted in a qualified consensus as to the robustness of Ukraine’s civil society as compared to other postcommunist states. See, for example Bohdan Harasymiw, “Civil Society as an Anti-Corruption Actor in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 61, no. 3 (September 2019): 296-99. D’Anieri, “Conclusion: Institutionalizing Democracy in a Divided State,” 326. Ibid., 336.

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government of the day in the usual sense, the regime, the state as a whole including all of the institutions of government, or is it the nation-state, including all of society? Concepts are supposed to be data containers and building-blocks of theory. This one fails on both counts. It does not designate an object distinct from everything around it which can be observed empirically. In addition, it does not suggest, embody or fit into a theory of the failed or failing state which would tentatively explain the evolution, mechanics, and dynamics of such an entity and what to do about it. Symptoms are identified as causes, and remedies are prescribed and applied to the symptoms rather than the underlying sources of the problems. In our review of the literature, no scholar or advocate even hints at a theory as guide to action; without a theory there can be no explanation or sound policy. The notion of ”failed state” is not part of an explanatory framework or undertaking at all. It is merely a label which says “this state is troublesome or dangerous,” or serves as a pretext for intervention on humanitarian or security grounds, in which case it becomes, as Susan Woodward has said, an ideology. Otherwise, it remains merely a term of opprobrium or an epithet meaning “I do not like that country—and neither should you. It should be shunned.” But understanding is not advanced by likes and dislikes. Ukraine is not a “failed state” because that term is meaningless, and even if it were not meaningless its failure as a state has not been demonstrated empirically. If anything, the “failed state” narrative qualifies only as propaganda. The only merit of the “failed state” debate is in bringing to the attention of bigger and wealthier countries some of the problems facing poorer and smaller ones. Regardless of what happens in the academic arena around conceptual clarification and application, however, state-actors (e.g., US, EU, and Russia) will not be precluded from using the term to design and implement policies regarding Ukraine, whether that be intervention, non-interference, investment, or withholding of loans. Looking at this matter from an international relations perspective, Dan Halvorson has some worthwhile thoughts. “If . . . the international system moves towards multipolarity, . . . the number of failed states in the future will be fewer. . .. Weak states will be of greatest concern to policy

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makers if they are close to home or located in regions subject to strategic competition.”92 Furthermore, The pattern of past international systems suggests that national prestige will be a crucial factor in an emerging multipolar context, especially for declining status-quo powers, but also among rising and resurgent powers. Domestic political sensitivity in a multipolar system is likely to become acute, where state weakness attracts interference from strategic competitors. The recent [2008] Russian intervention in Georgia may already provide evidence for this.93

This suggests that it is still important to pay attention when Ukraine is being labelled as “failed” or “failing” as a state insofar as this signals its vulnerability to external interference, quite apart from any objective assessment of its robustness. Halvorson makes this point well: State failure is not primarily a failure of domestic institutions of governance. State failure is also a subjective condition defined by the great powers. Interpretations of state failure are based on the interplay of transnational threats with the distribution of capabilities in the international system, the pattern of order in the international society, and the sensitivity of the domestic politics of leading actors to risk.94

The invitation or susceptibility to intervention is not unambiguous. While the “weak” or “failed” state may be attractive as a candidate for intervention, as conventional thinking might have it, would it then also be a good candidate for investment or economic development? There are grounds for skepticism. Something like this kind of caution is even exhibited by the Russian public, quite apart from official policy of their government. For example, commenting on an opinion survey conducted in November 2014, which revealed in their opinion “a stunningly widespread Russian view that Ukraine as it has existed since 1991 is not legitimate as a state within its present borders and with its present government,” two American political scientists concluded that “even as most Russians tend to think that Russia should not interfere in Ukrainian affairs and

92 93 94

Halvorson, “’Bringing International Politics Back In’,” 596. Ibid. Ibid., 596-97.

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should not take more territory than Crimea, their view of Ukraine as a failed state arguably predisposes them to believe that most of the misfortunes befalling Ukraine (including ones initiated or promoted by the Kremlin) are Ukraine’s own fault.”95 While Ukraine as a “failed state” represents an open invitation for intervention, there are undoubtedly also risks involved, although President Putin, who once famously told US President George W. Bush that Ukraine is not even a state,96 let alone a failed one, is willing to face the risks. According to Nicolai Petro, unless Russian investment is renewed in place of Western bailouts and the government stops “fostering a sense of perpetual crisis,” Ukraine risks becoming a “failed state.”97 Yet it is difficult to understand how Ukraine’s dependence on Russia for investment can be satisfied while at the same time Russia is waging an endless destructive war of attrition against Ukraine—which makes no sense from either perspective, Russian or Ukrainian. (More about this in chapter 5, Russia’s Genocidal War of Aggression Against Ukraine.) Some forms of attention paid to the weak by the stronger are less benevolent than others. In the course of this work my intention is to ignore and discard altogether the notion of Ukraine as a “failed state” because the literature reviewed testifies it has neither conceptual clarity nor explanatory power. In international law, a state has territory, a population, sovereignty, and recognition. Ukraine has all of these, and has had since 1991. The only aspect in which it might be considered deficient is the control of its territory, but it is Russia which carries responsibility for that having willfully and illegally annexed, invaded, and waged war against it. Russia may wish to render 95

Mikhail Alexseev and Henry Hale, “Russians See Ukraine as an Illegitimate State,” Washington Post, 20 May 2015, on the Internet at https:// www.wasahin gtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/. . ., accessed 1 February 2021. “You realize, George, that Ukraine is not even a state! What is Ukraine? A part of its territory belongs to Eastern Europe, while another part, a significant one, was given over by us!” D’Anieri, Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 164. Nicolai Petro, “Why Ukraine Needs Russia More Than Ever,” Guardian, 9 March 2016, on the Internet at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/m ar/09/ukraine-needs . . ., accessed 1 February 2021.

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Ukraine a “failed state,” but that was not Ukraine’s pre-existing condition prior to the undeclared war begun in 2014 and accelerated in 2022. Ukraine as a ”failed state” is a Kremlin narrative; it has no meaning in political science terms.

2. Ukraine through the Lens of Comparative Politics This chapter sets the stage for the following analysis of post-Euromaidan politics in Ukraine. It entails a critical review of the landmark research in comparative politics which has striven to advance our knowledge of Ukrainian politics in the post-communist era. The validity of these interpretations has particularly to be scrutinized. Weighing the strengths and weaknesses of this literature equips us to draw up the specific research questions to be tested against the evidence of post-2014 Ukraine during the presidencies of Poroshenko and Zelenskyy.

Comparative Politics: The Leading Approaches Within political science, in this writer’s opinion, the leading approaches in comparative politics can be compared to the proverbial colossi with feet of clay. They rest on weak foundations and although dispensed with in the present study, it is useful to review briefly their strengths and weaknesses. The political economy approach, to begin with, is based on the assumption that all politics derive from economics and are fully understandable as a consequence of the latter, no matter what the context. It is sufficient to know the one to understand the other. In real life, as history shows, politics universally are more likely to determine the economic system, although there is reciprocity between the two. Political economy cannot account for Hitler’s Germany or for the difference between two liberal democracies such as the United States and Japan.1 The rational actor approach arbitrarily assigns values to the given individual and then explains his/her behavior as being a consequence of such preferences. But this is a wholly artificial exercise because the real-life preferences of the person involved have not been solicited or taken into account, and yet the values ascribed to 1

See also Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012).

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that individual supposedly “explain” their actions. Careers have been made on the basis of such artificial exercises, notwithstanding the faulty foundations of the research in question. The “collective action problem” is another highly respectable yet questionable approach. In that perspective, organizing a group of people to undertake political activity is, on account of self-centered human nature, well-nigh impossible. No one will be motivated to act for their interests when others will do it for them. “Let Jack do it,” could be their slogan. There is no benefit for the individual to join a political undertaking when free-riding will bring the same advantage or reward. It is not even in a person’s interest to engage in collective political action. Hence, to bring it about should generally be a problem. A wonderful theory, but faulty insofar as it is based on incorrect albeit plausible assumptions. Today the world is full of actors manifestly engaged in collective action for whom evidently this is not a problem: Boko Haram, Islamic State, Al Qaeda, to name a few prominent examples. Even in America, land of hyper-individualism where the theory of the “collective action problem” originated, there was in 2020, for instance, no shortage of collective action, whether of the Black Lives Matter variety, Second Amendment defenders, Occupy Wall Street, #MeToo, supporters and opponents of Donald Trump, anti-vaxers, or those for or against police brutality—not to mention America’s Epiphany on 6 January 2021 when the Capitol was stormed at the urging of President Donald J. Trump.2 So in the real world outside of academic publications and conferences collective action (without quotation marks) is not at all a “problem” that needs to be overcome. Quite the opposite—it is a phenomenon whose impact (or lack thereof, in the American case as revealed by simple everyday observation and without analysis) needs explanation.3 2 3

One might also mention the Freedom Convoy which invaded Capital Hill in Ottawa, paralyzing it for three weeks in February 2022. According to the Global Protest Tracker website, between 2017 and 2020, there were about 100 significant antigovernment protests around the world, and about 30 governments or leaders had fallen as a result. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Global Protest Tracker, at https://carnegieendowment. org/publications/interactive/protest-tracker . . ., accessed 18 December 2020. See also Benjamin Press and Thomas Carothers, “Worldwide Protests in 2020:

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The “prisoner’s dilemma” is yet another highly regarded device employed to explain difficult choices made by individuals in tight situations. Here the researcher (without conferring with the subjects) arbitrarily assigns motivations and payoffs that predict which of two prisoners—held incommunicado from one another— capitulates to the authorities. This works in theory as a purely analytical exercise, but not in practice, since the researcher takes no account of the subjects’ philosophical, ethical, or moral beliefs, but treats them as cost-benefit analysts or strictly economic rationalists. There is here a general expectation that each prisoner will be motivated to sell out the other for his/her own freedom, or reduced incarceration. Cynicism will win out over human values and bonding; no doubt it does sometimes, but it cannot be a general rule. Every approach summarized here builds on questionable assumptions which allow for a simplification of the analysis; each treats the individual as a solitary being; none regards the person as a social being. Consequently, published research using any of these approaches can be dazzlingly eloquent, elegant and sophisticated, but at the same time somewhat abstract and removed from reality, therefore not practically meaningful. Needless to say, none of these super-sophisticated approaches is featured in what follows.

Transitology When the USSR collapsed in 1991, becoming disaggregated into 15 successor states, the paradigm initially and universally applied by Western scholars (including this author) to track their subsequent development or evolution was transitology. This was based on the transitions to democracy previously undergone by countries in Latin America and, in the 1970s, Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, and Greece). Analysts and policymakers alike assumed that liberal democracy and a capitalist market economy were the sole and closely interconnected possible alternatives to the communist party-state with its accompanying command economy. The A Year in Review,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 December 2020, on the Internet at https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/12/21/worldw ide-protests-. . ., accessed 27 January 2021.

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development of democracy—from opening, through breakthrough, to consolidation—was considered a natural, sequential, and inevitable process. Very soon, however, it was apparent from everyday empirical reality that—apart from the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania)—ex-Soviet republics were misfits in the transitions paradigm.4 An early warning about the possibility of misalignment between the paradigm’s requirements and post-communist countries’ practical first steps was given by Sarah M. Terry.5 She asserted that the post-communist transitions, as they were called, were actually not comparable to the earlier ones in a number of fundamental respects, and that analysts should apply themselves to empirical research on those countries’ actual evolutionary paths rather than pressing them in Procrustean fashion onto theories and models or vice versa. According to her, the basic differences making comparison invalid lay in the post-communist countries’ distinctive features: (1) facing a dual transition, not merely political but also economic; (2) being more developed than the earlier transitioning states; (3) being ethnically and nationally complex; (4) having only embryonic civil societies; and (5) operating in an uncertain rather than encouraging international environment.6 In view of these obstacles, she argued, greater attention to facts on the ground—as opposed to models and theories—was warranted. An even sharper critique was voiced two years later by Valerie Bunce, who suggested that transitologists be grounded forthwith.7 She emphasized in particular that what is offered in transitions literature is not, in fact, a theory of democratization—a series of “if, then” claims that can be tested—but rather an approach to the analysis of democratization—that is, a statement about what should be analyzed and how. All that this literature gives us is advice: we 4

5 6 7

Harasymiw, “ In Search of Post-Communism: Stalking Russia’s Political Trajectory,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 53, nos. 2-3-4 (June-September-December 2011): 401-20. Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, “Thinking about Post-Communist Transitions: How Different Are They?” Slavic Review 52, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 333-37. Ibid., 334-36. Valerie Bunce, “Should Transitologists Be Grounded? Slavic Review 54, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 111-27.

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should look at strategic interactions among elites and treat democratization as a highly contingent process that is fraught with considerable uncertainty. What it does not give us is any explanation of why some authoritarian states democratize and others do not, why the process of democratization varies across cases, or why some democracies take root and others do not.8

The proper task for transitologists should be to add “new variables to the equation” so as to enrich the would-be theory instead of expecting the post-communist countries to comply with the paradigm. As well, conceptually the terms transition and consolidation are problematic in several respects: making too sharp a division between past authoritarianism and present-day change; leaving out of consideration any change except to democracy; assuming away any connection between political, economic, and social change; and not defining the end-point of consolidation.9 Comparisons are worthwhile endeavors, she contended, if they enrich the study of political change, but not if they use the southern (i.e., Latin American and Mediterranean) experience of transition to predict that of the east.10

The End of Transitology Demise of the transitions paradigm was officially announced by Thomas Carothers in 2002.11 Having outlived its usefulness, he wrote, it was time for a better analytical framework because many of the countries referred to as “transitional” were clearly not in transition to democracy at all. The core assumptions of the transition paradigm had been that: any move away from dictatorial rule had to be towards democracy; democratization entailed a sequence of steps, a quite natural process; regular elections accelerated progress towards democracy; initiatives by political elites would override the underlying conditions; and a functioning state could be taken for granted.12 Unfortunately, the record of the preceding decade 8 9 10 11 12

Ibid., 123. Ibid., 124. Ibid., 126-27. Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (January 2002): 5-21. Ibid., 6-9.

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showed that four-fifths of countries worldwide undergoing the “transition to democracy” had instead ended up in a grey zone where self-interested elites ruled or else a single leader dominated.13 Thus “the political trajectories of most third-wave countries call into serious doubt the transition paradigm,” and ought to be discarded.14 “Aid practitioners and policy makers,” he challenged, “looking at politics in a country that has recently moved away from authoritarianism should not start by asking, ‘How is its democratic transition going?’ They should instead formulate a more open-ended query, ‘What is happening politically?’”15 This was very good advice indeed. Other scholars likewise noted the shortcomings and imminent demise of the transition’s paradigm. In regard to Russia in particular, Peter Rutland observed how scholars were truly baffled about where the country was heading, while Stephen Hanson advocated as a substitute closer attention to the legacy of Soviet institutions on its further development.16 With reference to Ukraine, Taras Kuzio pointed out the difficulty of applying the transitions paradigm due to that country’s being faced with a quadruple transition: political (democracy); economic (market); state-building; and national identity and the nationalities question.17 In which case, there arose an additional problem of sequencing these components as opposed to simply pursuing them simultaneously. This, however, was more of an intellectual exercise for analysts observing from outside than a practical policy implementation issue for decision-makers inside Ukraine. Accordingly, Kuzio, D’Anieri, and their colleagues devoted their research efforts at that time to questions of state-

13 14 15 16

Ibid., 9-12. Ibid., 14 and 17. Ibid., 18. Peter Rutland, “Post-Sovietology Blues: Reflections on a Tumultuous Decade,” Demokratizatsiya 11, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 134-41; and Stephen E. Hanson, “Sovietology, Post-Sovietology, and the Study of Postcommunist Democratization, Demokratizatsiya 11, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 142-49. Kuzio, “Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?” Politics 21, no. 3 (2001): 168-77.

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building and state-led nation-building in Ukraine.18 These additional facets of the transition from communism to democracy required attention beyond the transition paradigm’s one-dimensionality. Observing the overall development of the ex-Soviet republics, Stephen White concluded that “the evidence . . . scarcely testifies to a ‘transition’, but rather to a variety of patterns of change, including movement away from Western-style democracy and no movement at all.”19 Or as Valerie Bunce, in her thorough review of the theoretical and methodological flaws involved in studies of democratization, put it: “the dominant tendency among new democracies seems to be neither democracy nor dictatorship but rather hybrid regimes.”20 The path was being cleared for newer approaches to augment or replace the transitions paradigm altogether.

Electoral or Competitive Authoritarianism Accordingly, in a volume edited by Andreas Schedler, he and his contributors attempted to bring some of the world’s would-be new democracies together under the umbrella of “electoral authoritarianism.”21 Noting how the optimism of the 1990s surrounding democratization had turned to pessimism, Schedler proposed a threeway classification of the decade’s unsuccessful candidates for democracy: defective democracies; hybrid regimes; and new authoritarianism, including electoral authoritarian regimes.22 The latter he defined as authoritarian regimes which allow limited forms of pluralism, universal suffrage for the selection of those in highest

19 20 21 22

Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D’Anieri, eds., State and Institution Building in Ukraine (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Kuzio and Paul D’Anieri, eds., Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine (Westport, Connecticut, and London: Praeger, 2002). Stephen White, “Rethinking Postcommunist Transition,” Government and Opposition 38, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 433. Bunce, “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations,” Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 6/7 (August/September 2000): 723. Andreas Schedler, ed., Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). Schedler, “The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism,” in Electoral Authoritarianism, ed. by Schedler, 2-5.

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offices, and circumscribed multiparty competition.23 As to operationalization, Schedler proposed that “we may (quite safely) classify as electoral authoritarian all those regimes that (1) hold multiparty elections to select the chief executive as well as a legislative assembly and (2) earn average Freedom Hose ratings between four and six.”24 One of his contributors proposed locating electoral authoritarian regimes on a matrix somewhere between the extremes on two scales—participation and contestation—but this treatment was highly abstract and difficult to envision as being applied practically except metaphorically.25 Of greater relevance for our purposes are two of the volume’s chapters, one of them by Lucan Way.26 Challenging the conventional idea that “a strong state . . . [is] essential for democracy,” he argues, based on the examples of Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine, where incumbent leaders had failed to build autocratic states and yet were ousted in competitive elections, that democracy was actually aided by state weakness. In the case of Ukraine, Way musters evidence that President Leonid Kravchuk “had only weak control over coercive agencies,” and “also faced significant problems controlling regional governments.”27 As a consequence, he lost the 1994 election to Leonid Kuchma. Hence, according to Way, all three cases show that “weak states have contributed to the emergence and persistence of hybrid rule in the post-Cold War era.”28 The other chapter in question explains degree of democracy in “competitive authoritarian” regimes (the change in terminology from “electoral” was unexplained) as being a function of the given country’s international connections.29 This international influence—by

23 24 25 26 27 28 29

Ibid., 5-6. Ibid., 11. Gerardo L. Munk, “Drawing Boundaries: How to Craft Intermediate Regime Categories,” in Electoral Authoritarianism, ed. by Schedler, 27-40. Way, “Authoritarian Failure: How Does State Weakness Strengthen Electoral Competition?” in Electoral Authoritarianism, ed. by Schedler, 167-80. Ibid., 178. Ibid., 179. Levitsky and Way, “Linkage and Leverage: How Do International Factors Change Domestic Balances of Power?” in Electoral Authoritarianism, ed. by Schedler, 199-216.

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the West—could be assessed in terms of two dimensions: leverage, defined as “governments’ vulnerability to external democratizing pressure”; and linkage to the West, defined as “the concentration of ties between a country and the EU, the United States, and Westerndominated multilateral organizations.”30 Having detailed the influence transmitted in these two ways, Levitsky and Way then tabulated the results for 38 regimes and concluded basically that there was less democracy in those cases where linkage and leverage were smaller.31 Whether such patterns associated with this characterization of competitive authoritarian regimes and their dynamics would persist into the future was, they admitted, unknown, making the whole exercise of questionable value. Levitsky and Way subsequently expanded their collaborative research into a massive volume under the title Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War.32 “Competitive authoritarianism,” they stated at the outset, “is a hybrid regime type, with important characteristics of both democracy and authoritarianism.” In their book they set out to examine “the trajectories of all 35 regimes that were or became competitive authoritarian between 1990 and 1995.”33 In brief, their theory states that: if Western linkages are high, then the outcomes will be democracy; if medium or low, then domestically-generated organizational power will come into play; if organizational power is high, then a stable authoritarian regime will result, but if medium or low, Western leverage will be triggered; and when Western leverage is high, unstable authoritarianism will be the outcome, but if medium or high, stable authoritarianism will appear.34 Measuring all the factors, then establishing from these their theoretical expectations, and comparing them with empirical reality, they conclude: “our theory correctly predicts

30 31 32

33 34

Ibid., 200 and 202. Ibid., 200-215. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). By massive I refer to the fact that of a total of 517 pages, it contains 364 pages of text and footnotes (chapter 4 alone has 563 notes); 16 of appendices; and 111 of bibliography. Ibid., 4-5. Ibid., 72.

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regime outcomes in 28 of 35 cases.”35 Interestingly, Ukraine was not one of them: their theory would have predicted an unstable authoritarian outcome, but (after the Orange Revolution) the actual outcome was democratic.36 Here, according to Levitsky and Way, authoritarianism was undermined by limited organizational power, especially a weak ruling party. That Ukraine could be classified as a democracy in 2005 was because “Ukraine is a case of low linkage and high leverage. . .. Although Ukraine benefitted from Russian energy subsidies, it nevertheless relied heavily on Western aid, which prevented Russia from achieving black knight status.”37 Unfortunately, they spoke too soon. After the 2010 presidential elections, democracy was curtailed by Yanukovych who adopted an obviously authoritarian approach to governing. After his ouster, authoritarianism was unquestionably replaced by democracy under Poroshenko. But when Poroshenko lost in 2019, what happened to democracy? It seems doubtful that the theory of Levitsky and Way, could have predicted the 2010-2020 decade for Ukraine. The analytical framework constructed by Levitsky and Way comprises three components, each assessed in a binary manner: yes/no; more/less. Two of them are external (linkage, leverage), one internal (ruling party or state strength). Assuming for the sake of argument that the external variables remained unchanged in 2010-2020, then the third variable would have been decisive. But was it? In 2014, a revolution ousted Yanukovych. Was this foreshadowed by a decline in power for the Party of Regions or the state, or did the ruling party actually begin to disaggregate in the wake of the popular revolt? In 2019, Poroshenko lost to Zelenskyy. Of course, Poroshenko’s party (Bloc Petra Poroshenka) declined in power, but Zelenskyy’s (Sluha narodu—Servant of the People) won a clear majority in the Verkhovna Rada. Less of one, more of the other. This should have ushered in a period of authoritarianism, according to the theory of competitive authoritarianism, but in fact what ensued was erratic, inept, amateur government—neither

35 36 37

Ibid., 340. Ibid., 234. Ibid., 213-14.

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democracy nor authoritarianism. Thus the theory of Levitsky and Way neither accounts well for the past nor does it anticipate the future; its basic flaw is it does not take domestic politics into account but assumes instead that hybrid regimes are influenced almost entirely from outside, which, except in the very most general sense, is debatable.

Henry Hale’s Patronalism A more promising candidate as guide to uncovering the real politics prevailing in post-Euromaidan Ukraine is Henry Hale’s Patronal Politics, published in 2015, but foreshadowed in countless journal articles.38 Hale decided to look behind the scenes of Ukrainian politics in a systematic and theoretically sophisticated manner. He deliberately avoids an exclusive focus on formal institutions as subscribers to the transitions paradigm might have done, and equally on the deus ex machina of all-powerful Western influence as presented in Levitsky and Way’s theory of “linkage and leverage.” “Patronal politics” is Henry Hale’s answer to the mystery of why, except for the Baltic states, democracy has failed to unfold in the other ex-Soviet republics. It is, in his words, akin to “the politics of the Potemkin village.”39 The key concepts are best rendered by the author himself: Patronal politics refers to politics in societies where individuals organize their . . . pursuits around the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and punishments through chains of actual acquaintance, and not primarily around abstract, impersonal principles such as ideological belief or categorizations like economic class that include many people one has not actually met in person. In this politics of reward and punishment, power goes to those who can mete these out, . . . patrons with a large and dependent base of clients.40

The principal collective actors in this scenario are the leaders of prominent and successful political machines, giant corporations, and branches of the state bureaucracy wielding assets or coercive power. The chief patron, defined by the constitution as president, 38 39 40

Hale, Patronal Politics. Ibid., 9. Ibid., 9-10. Emphasis in the original.

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controls these party bosses, “oligarchs,” and officials, and hence controls the country itself.41 Patronalism pervades the entire society. As Hale puts it, “Patronalism refers to a social equilibrium in which individuals organize their political and economic pursuits around the personal exchange of concrete rewards and punishments, and not primarily around abstract, impersonal principles. . .. Patronalism, then, involves collective action based far more on extended networks of actual acquaintance than on . . . ‘imagined communities’ such as nations, ethnic groups, ‘socialists,’ ‘Republicans,’ ‘teachers,’ ‘the rich and the poor,’ or ‘supporters of gun control.’”42 In terms of its politics, society consists, in this conceptualization, of a series of networks of patrons and clients, who in turn are patrons to their clients, and so on, and of exchanges between them. “Politics in patronalistic societies therefore revolves chiefly around personalized relationships joining extended networks of patrons and clients, and political struggle tends to take the form of competition among different patron-client networks.”43 In order to describe the dynamics of these relationships, the researcher identifies the expectations of clients that would motivate them to adhere to one or other patron or else to abandon loyalty to one and transfer it to another. In the case of post-Soviet Eurasian states, this means that the normally prevailing single-pyramid of power can be replaced by multiple pyramids as the proximate clients abandon the patron-inchief.44 They usually do so when the incumbent is a lame duck and is unpopular with the electorate. As predicted by his theory, and confirmed by the evidence presented, there is a cyclical pattern to this patronal politics, alternating between a more authoritarian phase where a single pyramid of patron-client relations exists at the apex of the political system, and a relatively more democratic interval when multiple pyramids are operating and interacting instead of one alone.45 Thus “the dynamism in patronal politics is non-linear. The conceptual framework developed . . . helps us see that this 41 42 43 44 45

Ibid., 10. Ibid., 20. Ibid., 21. Ibid., 82-94, 122-26, and 174-77. Ibid., 87-91.

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nonlinear dynamism often reflects (sometimes cyclic) patterns, not just ‘chaos’ or ‘instability.’”46 Regime cycles in patronal politics are regular and predictable, Hale asserts.47 A few critical comments are in order. Hale claims that his concept of patronalism is superior to earlier ones found in the literature going all the way back to Max Weber’s “patrimonialism” and “sultanism.”48 He gives short shrift to “clientelism,” emphasizing the inequality between patron and client as a power relationship, but overlooks the element of reciprocity which was an essential part of the old-fashioned definition of patron-clientelism.49 The mutuality of the relationship, the interdependence of the two parties, should be taken into account for a truer understanding as a social bond, but then Hale explicitly eschews paying any attention to social (including ethnic) bonds in favor of a view of rationally calculating individual actors bereft of social encumbrances altogether. Hale also fails to take note of scarcity as a basic condition in the environment which gives rise to, encourages, and sustains patron-clientelism, another point emphasized in the earlier literature. Hale’s insistence on the need for a new vocabulary is therefore not entirely convincing, in my opinion. Be that as it may, Hale’s treatment of Ukraine is of primary interest here.50 His account of Kuchma’s two terms of office followed by the Orange Revolution conforms to the theory: Kuchma successfully built a patronal presidential single-pyramid system in Ukraine, dominating politics and marginalizing opposition by 1999, when he handily manipulated his way to reelection. After this victory, however, he experienced two developments that ultimately undermined the elite coordination that underpinned his power pyramid: low popularity and a succession struggle brought about by the widespread expectation that he personally would not run for reelection. . .. The decision not to run combined with his low popularity to render him a classic lame-duck, prompting elites to jockey for position as the time drew near when Kuchma would no longer 46 47 48 49

Ibid., 82. Ibid., 88-94. Ibid., 22-26. See, for example, Steffen W. Schmidt, Laura Guasti, Carl H. Landé, and James C. Scott, eds., Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). Hale, Patronal Politics, 145-49, 182-90, and 234-40.

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During Yushchenko’s term, by contrast, “post-Orange revolution Ukraine presents . . . a clear move to open, competing-pyramid politics”52 in view of the change in the constitution and political infighting among the political elite. This is still in line with Hale’s theory. “Ukraine’s new divided-executive constitution complicated and ultimately undermined attempts by any one pyramid to emerge dominant by creating uncertainty as to who would dominate, promoting coordination among more than one patronalistic ‘pyramid,’ and incentivizing rivalry among these pyramids.”53 Yushchenko’s declining popularity, his inability to cooperate with or rein in his adversaries, and Yanukovych’s superior campaign resulted in the latter’s victory in the 2010 presidential elections. He immediately set about consolidating power through a return to the presidentialist constitution, jailing his opponents, seducing his rivals’ clients to defect, and in general constructing a single-pyramid system by all means available, and, of course, “also in line with what the patronal politics logic would lead us to anticipate: a significant though gradual closing of the political space as elite groups began to coordinate around Yanukovych as chief patron.”54 Despite this, when confronted by the protesters during the Euromaidan Revolution in the winter of 2013-14, Yanukovych abandoned office, contrary to the logic of Hale’s patronal politics. In the wake of that event, though, Hale writes, “the logic of regular patronalistic regime dynamics would expect . . . sustained competing-pyramid politics in Ukraine, which shifted back to a divided-executive constitution in 2014.”55 The continuity of Ukraine’s cyclical patronal politics pattern beyond the Euromaidan Revolution remains in question.

51 52 53 54 55

Ibid., 182-83. Ibid., 325. Ibid., 326. Ibid., 346. Ibid., 311.

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The Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity itself poses a difficulty for Hale’s analysis.56 He calls it “irregular,” because having been effectively a social revolution it does not fit the framework of patronal politics. That framework centers on individuals deliberately eschewing any notion of society as a real entity, i.e., characterized by intergenerational continuity and populated by human beings bonded together by ties of common interest, fate, interdependence, culture, emotional attachment, and affection. Secondly, Hale subscribes to the notion of the “collective action problem,” originated by Mancur Olson, the scholar who notoriously misled an entire generation of students in his lifetime and continues to do so from beyond the grave. Contrary to Olson and his followers, the hundreds of thousands of citizens—at one point a million—who assembled in the Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square in Kyiv) in the winter of 2013-14 were not an aggregate of discrete hypothetical individuals, but living social beings linked by a common cause, affect, and mutual concern. That the Euromaidan demonstration had elements of a genuine revolution (in spirit, at least, if not in outcome) cannot be explained by people’s overcoming a “collective action” dilemma, nor without reference to the phenomenon of social movements. Patronal politics would have no room for political engagement other than through networks of patron-client relationships. To be fair, this is not a matter of black and white. Hale does not claim that patronal politics exist to the exclusion of other forms; they merely predominate. In fact, it may be that the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity failed to result in a revolutionary outcome— involving a change in leadership, dominant idea, and regime-society relationship57—precisely because it did not conform to the norm of patronal politics. Practically the only politician to engage with the demonstrators was Poroshenko; others were not merely shunned, but denigrated by them. In any event, these quibbles about how he deals with the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity should not detract from the brilliance of Henry Hale’s paradigm-

56 57

Ibid., 234-38. Kamrava, “Revolution Revisited: The Structuralist-Voluntarist Debate,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 32, no. 2 (June 1999): 317-45.

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shattering discovery, which represents a monumental breakthrough in post-Soviet studies.58 In terms of patronal politics, as Hale would admit, Ukraine is an anomaly. It had by 2022 discarded three presidents in a row after only one term, before any of them could become a lame duck— Yushchenko, Yanukovych, and Poroshenko. Yushchenko destroyed his coalition, failed to consolidate his position, and lost the election. Yanukovych consolidated his position as patron-in-chief, but lost his nerve when confronted by a stubborn uprising. There is definitely no cycle here in terms of the dynamics of patronal politics. Does this mean that Ukraine is somehow exempt from the general rule, or that it constitutes the exception that proves the rule,59 or that the rule itself is not general? What about Poroshenko: did he fail to build through patronage a single-pyramid network of clients? Who were his rivals in competing pyramids? Did his supporters abandon him on the expectation of his forthcoming loss? And what of Zelenskyy: did elites flock to support him in the 2019 elections? Did he build, or had he already built before coming to office, a patronal network, a pyramid of power? Did Poroshenko’s backers defect to Zelenskyy? Did elites’ expectations shift on the eve of the 2019 elections? If not patronalism, what does account for Ukrainian politics? Is “sustained competing-pyramid politics” what we have been seeing in Ukraine since the Euromaidan Revolution? These are the key questions to be explored and answered in the next two chapters.

Informal Politics Another approach, somewhat complementary, one that investigates activity behind the façade of formal institutions—and will be useful in our inquiry—is the study of informal institutions. Its pioneering advocates had defined “informal institutions as socially 58

See also Hale, “25 Years After the USSR: What’s Gone Wrong?” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 3 (July 2016): 24-35; and Hale, “How Should We Now Conceptualize Protest, Diffusion, and Regime Change?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 10 (2019): 2402-15. Hale, Patronal Politics, 310.

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shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. By contrast, formal institutions are rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as official.”60 Their proposal was that such institutions—not to be confused with weak or irregular entities, or with informal organization—could be distinguished on the basis of whether their actions were complementary, accommodating, substitutive, or competing with formal institutions.61 The challenge for research, they conceded, was in identifying, measuring, and comparing the effects of informal institutions. Applying this approach to the study of post-Soviet politics, Huseyn Aliyev has addressed the problem of the interaction between formal and informal institutions in the process of political reform.62 “How do formal institutions,” he asks, “coexist with informal practices in the fSU [former Soviet Union]? Do democratic institutions reforms weaken informality? What happens to informal practices when institutional reforms succeed?”63 Focusing on Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, his study “defines informality as a sum of all relations, transaction, behaviors, and customs that occur in social, political, and economic spheres and that are unwritten and not legally binding.”64 Its major subjects are informal networks and informal practices, which in the hybrid regime cases at hand are largely a legacy of communism augmented by the experience of post-communism. With regard to Ukraine, Aliyev argues that political reforms have always been at odds with informal institutions, that these latter had grown in scope from the time of Kuchma’s “informal state” to Yanukovych’s term, but that the Poroshenko presidency was showing signs of the reform program promising to 60

61 62

63 64

Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda,” Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 4 (December 2004): 727. Original emphasis. Ibid., 727-30. Huseyn Aliyev, When Informal Institutions Change: Institutional Reforms and Informal Practices in the Former Soviet Union (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017). Ibid., 4. Ibid., 26. Original emphasis.

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overcome the dominance of informal institutions.65 Specific examples of informal institutions mentioned by Aliyev include: oligarchs, corruption, kumstvo (ritual kinship), lyubi druzi (favoritism), administrative resources, clans, blat (bribery), violence, quid pro quo, patronage, and krysha (“roof,” in the sense of mafia-style protection). Aliyev concludes his investigation by observing that comprehensive rather than piecemeal reforms are required to overcome the deleterious effects of informal institutions.66 Because it also looks behind the scenes, this literature on informal institutions and politics deserves attention as a complement to patronalism theory in the present inquiry were it not for the fact that its practitioners, to my mind, rely wholly on intuition for identifying and studying such institutions while at the same time conducting their research in an apparently arbitrary manner. The phenomenon would seem to be important, yet is simply too amorphous to be grasped and then analyzed systematically: there is no end to informal practices in the realm of politics, and there are no hard borders separating formal from informal. Perhaps the only recourse is to specify which behaviors by a specific actor at (for our purposes) the apex of the political system are relevant to examine as informal. Relevance can be determined by applying Bartolini’s definition of the political as action aimed at securing compliance. The task in chapters three and four, therefore, will be to focus on the actions of the two presidents in regard to the other branches of government—administration, legislature, courts—to assess the balance between formal institutionalization versus informal practices, and whether this balance is changing over time. It should then be possible to test the validity of Aliyev’s principal “observation that successful institutional changes affect the functioning and proliferation 65 66

Ibid., chap. 6. Ibid., 191-93. See also Kerstin Zimmer, “Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Ukraine,” in Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, ed. by Gerd Meyer, 2nd rev. ed. (Oplander and Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2008), 267-313. On China, see Lowell Dittmer, “Informal Politics Among the Chinese Communist Party Elite,” in Informal Politics in East Asia, ed. by Lowell Dittmer, Haruhiro Fukui, and Peter N. S. Lee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 106-40.

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of informal institutions. When challenged with formal constraints and implemented with elite and popular consensus through legal channels, informal institutions retreat from the public sphere.”67 Another task is to examine the record of the two post-Euromaidan presidencies with respect to dealing with political corruption, the informal institution par excellence in all such studies. Was formal institutionalization of anti-corruption practices implemented, and did it reduce the practice of corruption itself? The level of corruption in a given country can be measured by its degree of concern to the general public as revealed in public opinion surveys—it is basically an appeal for justice and impartiality.68 Continuing high levels of perceived political corruption can be damaging to legitimacy. Was corruption, one of the key reform challenges facing Ukraine identified earlier in this study, effectively managed by Poroshenko and Zelenskyy, and, if not, what are the implications? What are its repercussions in terms of legitimacy? What legislative initiatives did they introduce and pursue to remedy Ukraine’s other critical reform challenges—the communist legacy and the identity divide? Did any of these measures leave them better or worse off at the polls? At this point Bartolini’s conceptualization of the political can be called upon to provide a way to delineate somewhat more clearly (than through intuition alone) the distinction between formal and informal institutions. From the amorphous mass of informal practices and institutions it is necessary to separate out the ones more strictly relevant to the study of politics. As previously mentioned, Bartolini proposes two conditions for political action: confinement, which means no opting out; and monopolization of command, meaning a single center.69 For purposes of clarification, therefore, we may say that actors and actions engaged or implicated

67 68

Aliyev, When Informal Institutions Change, 177. See, in particular, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), chap. 1; and Bo Rothstein and Aiysha Varraich, Making Sense of Corruption (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). Bartolini, The Political, chap. 3.

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in “achieving compliance by others”70 (i.e., politics), but which are neither effectively confined nor subject to the monopolizer, can be considered as the “informal institutions” (or their instruments) of immediate relevance to our inquiry. Hence, only some aspects some of the time of the following activities would thus qualify as “informal politics”: corruption and bribery; “telephone justice” and judicial reform; patronage appointments; relations with oligarchs; use of “administrative resources”; and the political use of law enforcement and security agencies. To arrive at a clearer understanding of the dynamics of Ukrainian politics in the post-Euromaidan era, it will be necessary to extend the analyses offered by Henry Hale and Huseyn Aliyev. Three major questions need to be answered: Is the patronal model of politics still valid for Ukraine, post-2014? Is Ukraine’s instability tied to the predominance of informal over formal politics? Does the failure to address major reforms perpetuate the unpredictability of Ukrainian politics? To answer these questions, the next two chapters will examine the presidencies of Poroshenko and Zelenskyy in terms of the interplay of patronal, informal, and other factors, with a view to establishing a trend—stabilization, de-stabilization, or continuation of the status quo. Because the methodology used here is historical-interpretive rather than experimental, it is not possible to posit hypotheses for testing against the data. Nonetheless, on the basis of the preceding discussion a series of research questions suggests itself for examination in the next two chapters. The research questions prompted by the patronal politics literature are: 



Was Poroshenko’s failure to win re-election in 2019 because his clients had abandoned him and were supporting his challenger, Zelenskyy? Did Poroshenko’s failure to win re-election in 2019 result from his failure to address urgent reform issues during his term in office?

Ibid., 45.

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Was Poroshenko’s failure to win re-election in 2019 caused by his neglecting to build a strong, single-pyramid supporting network of clients?

From the informal institutions literature, we derive the following additional research question: 

When Poroshenko implemented effective changes strengthening formal institutions, were the informal practices and their influence on politics reduced?

As will become clear, as to the unpredictability of Ukrainian politics, the evidence presented here supports neither the patronal politics model nor the informal institutions literature. It indicates that the predominant pattern of action during the Poroshenko presidency was instead a deliberate politicization of the law by the chief executive, not a preoccupation with constructing a pyramid of patron-client relations while denying the opportunity to opponents. And the creation of informal institutions did not inhibit his resorting to familiar informal practices in any appreciable degree. Dealing with the presidency of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, chapter four addresses the following questions for investigation: 



Did Zelenskyy win the 2019 election due to the support of a network of clients who had primarily defected from Poroshenko’s entourage? Upon winning the 2019 election, did we observe Zelenskyy setting about creating a network of clients composed of politicians, oligarchs, and state officials, and consolidating it into a single pyramid of support? In his term of office did Zelenskyy work to subordinate other branches of government to his will in order to recreate an authoritarian system of rule as had been done by his predecessors? To win popular approval and to enhance his chances of reelection, did Zelenskyy make it a priority (a) to promote political reform, and (b) to bring negative informal political practices under control by strengthening formal institutions?

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Again, the expectations underlying these questions will be shown as unsupported by the empirical evidence on Ukraine’s day-to-day politics. I shall argue that neither patronalism nor informality is a key to understanding Ukrainian politics. My aim is to demonstrate that—even after thirty years of independence—Ukraine has an unconsolidated political system, one in which the actors are unconfined and the president has to struggle to obtain supremacy. This unformed or perhaps deformed political system is a threat to the survival of the Ukrainian state.

3. The Presidency of Petro Poroshenko 2014-19 Immediately after the deadly tumult of the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine appeared with a certain amount of trepidation on the part of its citizens once again on the cusp of transformative political changes—away from authoritarianism, kleptocracy, and corruption, now reaching towards democracy, rule of law, accountability, and transparency. Petro Poroshenko, the chocolate magnate, elected president in May 2014, defeating Yuliia Tymoshenko on the first ballot by 54 per cent to 13, inherited all of Ukraine’s preexisting domestic political problems to which were now added the loss of Crimea and war in the east. Given its experience of previously unfulfilled electoral promises, the public reacted with cautious optimism.1 In his inaugural address, Poroshenko, sharing the momentary euphoria, hailed a new era of positive changes pledging to provide the country its needed peace, security, and unity.2 Turning first to the war in the east, he promised a peace plan; in addition, he offered its Donbas citizens decentralization of power, Russian language guarantee, respect for regional identity, and not to provoke divisions. Instead he offered to promote employment, investment, and early elections. In terms of security, his number one priority would 1

David M. Herszenhorn, “Ukraine’s Next President Vows to Restore Order and Mend Russia Ties,” New York Times, 26 May 2014, on the Internet at http://ww w.nytimes.com/2014/05/27/world/europe/ukraine.html?ref=world, accessed 27 May 2014; Roman Malko, “Petrovska doba. Pro Poroshenka bez iliuzii,” Tyzhden, 29 May 2014, on the Internet at permanent URL http://tyzhden. us/Politics/111034, accessed 11 June 2014; Chrystia Freeland, “Ukraine’s Search for an Honest Thief,” POLITICO Magazine, 6 June 2014, on the Internet at http://www.politico.com/magazine; and David M. Herszenhorn, “Poroshenko Takes Ukraine Helm With Tough Words for Russia,” New York Times, 7 June 2014. “Promova prezydenta Ukrainy pid chas tseremonii inavhuratsii. Povnyi tekst,” Ukrainska pravda, 7 June 2014, on the Internet at permanent URL http://www.p ravda.com.ua/articles/2014/06/7/7028330/; and Mustafa Naiiem and Serhii Leshchenko, “Inavhuratsiia Petra Poroshenka. Za lashtunkamy sviata,” Ukrainska pravda, 8 June 2014, on the Internet at permanent URL http://www.pravda. com.ua/articles/2014/06/8/7028469/.

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be re-equipping the armed forces which in turn would spur re-industrialization of the economy. He rejected any compromise on Crimea, Ukraine’s European choice, or the unitary structure of the Ukrainian state. Holding European democracy as the ideal to be attained, Poroshenko pledged decentralization, early parliamentary elections, new elections to local councils, and free development of Russian and other languages. On the economy, he emphasized employment, innovation, social justice, and unfettered competition. With regard to the EU, Poroshenko identified as urgent priorities reinstatement of the Association Agreement, a visa-free regime, and eventual membership. Realization of these plans, he concluded, required consolidation of all like-minded forces, cooperation among state institutions, absorption of best practices from leading foreign countries, and all of Ukraine being now united around the ideas of “independence, freedom, dignity, rule of law, and European integration.” Not everything turned out as planned. Five years later, on the eve of the 2019 presidential elections, one journalist’s balance sheet of Poroshenko’s successes listed the creation of a capable, modern army as well as administrative decentralization, but judicial reform and information policy were total failures. Political corruption had been brought to the surface but was still unpunished; and there was modest success in the economy. In addition, also positive were the fact that Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts had not been captured entirely, there was a cultural revival, more Ukrainians had travelled to Europe, and more and better roads had been built.3 In the face of war and other domestic political exigencies, Petro Poroshenko in the end managed to hold the country together as well as advancing its European goals, but could not secure a second term as president despite having the incumbent’s advantage. The aim of this chapter is to trace carefully Poroshenko’s words, actions, and interactions with others during his term of office, so as to better understand Ukrainian politics in the post-

Bohdan Ben, “Five Years of Poroshenko’s Presidency: Main Achievements and Failures,” Euromaidan Press, 19 April 2019, on the Internet at http://euromaid an press.com/2019/04/19/five-years-of-ukraine-p . . ., accessed 22 March 2021.

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Euromaidan era. In particular, it is to test whether the pattern at the apex of Ukrainian politics conformed to the patronal politics model or deviated from it in significant respects, and if informal politics prevailed over formal institutions. In case of discrepancies, it will be necessary to identify the causal factors at work in addition to, or in place of, what have been commonly accepted as the motors driving Ukrainian politics. This will entail following the initiatives proposed by the president, the coalitions formed or relied upon to carry these forward, the consequences, the challenges, and the outcomes of such actions in terms of power alignments and popular satisfaction. It will also be necessary to compare these patterns of power struggles and policy making with the dynamics under Poroshenko’s successor, a task for the next chapter. The two presidents’ responses to the war in the east is dealt with in chapter five. In fact, the overall picture of Ukrainian politics along with their determinants, as well as their evolution or stability, will have to be modified accordingly—something that is dealt with in the final chapter. Yuriy Matsiyevsky has argued that the Euromaidan Revolution resulted mainly only in some personnel changes within the political elite, but that the hybrid regime along with its dynamics remained unchanged.4 In his view, the hybrid regime (combining the features of electoral democracy and authoritarianism) is itself a kind of “institutional trap” preventing fundamental change by reason of its reliance on informality and secrecy. Instead of positive change, during Poroshenko’s term Ukraine was moving in the direction of even greater hybridization. “Clientelism, nepotic ties and corruption” undergirded its elites’ political culture.5 In support of his argument, Matsiyevsky cites the informal quotas agreed by Ukraine’s political parties for allocation of ministerial posts in the government, a practice that is common in European politics where there are no “hybrid” regimes as such. He claims that “Poroshenko,

Yuriy Matsiyevsky, “Revolution Without Regime Change: The Evidence from the Post-Euromaidan Ukraine,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 51 (2018): 349-59. Ibid., 351-52.

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like his predecessors, is building a single-pyramid system, but internal and external pressure makes him . . . rely on ‘partners’.”6 This appears to be ambiguous, if not tautological. While he does provide some plausible examples of clientelistic appointments (such as Ihor Groisman, others from Poroshenko’s home oblast of Vinnytsia, and Yuriy Lutsenko), his suggestion that Poroshenko’s naming of heads of regional administrations should have been based on competition and competence instead of patronage flies in the face of common practice in most liberal democracies. There are no exams for patronage appointments. In the end, it is not clear whether Matsiyevsky considers Poroshenko successful in building the single-pyramid network of clients under him or not, and if not, why not. “Petro Poroshenko,” he concludes, “managed to extend his informal influence over virtually all branches of power. However, his . . . chances for reelection [were] rather dubious.”7 While the thesis is plausible, the evidence is not entirely convincing; nor does it help explain or anticipate how Poroshenko’s pyramid-building efforts might impact his longevity in office. Poroshenko arrived at the presidential building on Bank Street in Kyiv with an eclectic political background. This could have served either to assemble a broad array of allies, or conversely, if he had antagonized too many of them along the way, made cooperation difficult.8 A successful businessman, he was first elected to the Verkhovna Rada in 1998, sitting initially as a member of the “united” social democrats, in reality a party of oligarchs. In 2000, he became co-leader of the new party of regional rebirth, which next year he helped to found as the Party of Regions serving as deputy head. In late 2001, he created a new party called Solidarity, and joined Viktor Yushchenko’s electoral alliance Our Ukraine (Nasha Ukraina). Poroshenko and Yushchenko are kumy (godparents, considered a quasi-family relationship in Ukrainian culture). He won a single-member seat for Our Ukraine in the 2002 elections, but then 6 7 8

Ibid., 353. Ibid., 357. Sources for this paragraph are: Khto ye khto v Ukraini (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo “K.I.S.,” 2007), 785; Sergei Rudenko, Vsia prezidentskaia rat: Okruzhenie Viktora Yushchenka (Kiev: Sammit-Kniga, 2007), 154-167; and Hale, Patronal Politics, 330-33.

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served under President Kuchma as secretary of the national security and defence council (RNBOU). In the wake of the Orange Revolution, he vied with Tymoshenko for the premiership, but had to settle for chair of the RNBOU. There being no love lost between them, a feud broke out as Tymoshenko accused Poroshenko of attempting to turn the RNBOU into a rival Cabinet of Ministers. Yushchenko fired them both, replacing Tymoshenko with Yanukovych. Poroshenko went on to serve under Premier Yanukovych as foreign minister and under President Yanukovych as minister of economic development, even though he had joined the Tymoshenko camp in 2009 and been one of her principal financial backers along with several other oligarchs in the 2010 elections. “In 2012,” according to Henry Hale, “after less than a year as minister, he left the government to become an independent parliamentary deputy and gradually drifted into opposition.”9 Poroshenko’s tendency to drift into opposition may well have influenced his ability to succeed in the pyramid-building aspect of patronal politics by alienating rather than attracting potential allies (clients). In the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity he was a visible and moderating presence, helping with logistics and providing a voice for the protesters through his Channel Five television station.10 9 10

Hale, Patronal Politics, 346. Andrew Wilson, Ukraine Crisis: What it Means for the West (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014), 69. Other sources for this paragraph are: Colin Freeman, “Petro Poroshenko, the Billionaire Chocolate Baron Hoping to Become Ukraine’s Next President,” Daily Telegraph (London), 29 March 2014, on the Internet at Telegraph.co.uk; “Ukraine: Vitalii Klitschko Pulls Out of Presidential Race,” Daily Telegraph (London), 29 March 2014, on the Internet at Telegraph.co.uk; Bohdan Butkevych, “U komandi UDARu zamina. U prezydentskomu kutku rinhu—Petro Poroshenko,” Tyzhden, 29 March 2014, on the Internet at permanent URL http://tyzhden.ua/Politics/106263; INSIDE UKRAINE (International Centre for Policy Studies, Kyiv), 1 May, 8 May, and 22 May 2014; “Poroshenko Way Ahead of Rivals in Ukrainian Presidential Race,” Interfax-Ukraine, 20 May 2014, on the Internet at https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/press-conference/205720.html, accessed 28 March 2021; Luke Harding and Oksana Grytsenko, “Chocolate Tycoon Heads for Landslide Victory in Ukraine Presidential Election,” The Guardian (London), 23 May 2014, on the Internet at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/23/petro -porosh. . ., accessed 28 March 2021; Chrystia Freeland, “Ukrainian Election Marks End of One Struggle, New Phase of Another,” The Star (Toronto), 26 May 2014, on the Internet at http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2014/

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From the moment he declared himself a candidate for the presidency at the end of March 2014, Poroshenko was the front-runner and remained so throughout the campaign due to his role in the Euromaidan. There were 23 contenders, highlighting the irrationality of Ukrainian politics. His “commanding lead over his rivals” was explained by the pollsters “as reflecting the emotional state of the people of Ukraine, who were exhausted by the extended street protests, shocked by the number of victims, and eager to finally see some peace and quiet in the country. With his traditional image as a peacekeeper, diplomat and successful businessman, Poroshenko was positively perceived by respondents.”11 Carried along thus by personal popularity, he had no substantial political machine or influential and wealthy backers behind him. He managed, however, to strike an agreement with champion boxer Vitaliy Klychko (Klitschko), leader of the UDAR party, for the latter to run for mayor of Kyiv instead of contesting the presidency and to support Poroshenko instead. The only other notable politician to back Poroshenko was Yuriy Lutsenko, hitherto in Tymoshenko’s camp. Poroshenko’s Solidarity party existed mainly on paper. That Poroshenko won decisively meant either that on this occasion patronal politics was not the main driver of Ukrainian politics, or that Ukrainian voters by gravitating to a candidate who was not a patron were for the moment out of sync with the dynamics of patronalism. According to the patronalism paradigm, successful contestation of presidential office depends on a candidate’s ability to mobilize a supporting clientele, a machine of some sort, a network, and to arouse appropriate expectations in followers. At the same time as stimulating these sources of support, suppression of opponents’ backers must also be undertaken.12 In 1994, Leonid Kuchma

11 12

05/26/chrystia_freeland_ukrainian_election_marks_end_of_one_struggle_ne w_phase_of_another.html; and Marko Bojcun, “Petro Poroshenko: The Chocolate King Walks onto a Sticky Wicket,” Observer Ukraine, 27 May 2014, on the Internet at http://observerukraine.net/2014/05/27/petro-porosheno-the-cho colate-kingwalks-onto-a-sticky-wicket/. INSIDE UKRAINE, 22 May 2014. Hale, Patronal Politics, 71-76.

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defeated the incumbent, Leonid Kravchuk, as president despite the latter’s incumbent’s advantage. Kravchuk, as Hale tells us, had failed to establish a single-pyramid system under himself, which was due to Kravchuk’s actions, temperament, and mistakes later acknowledged as such.13 Hale accounts for Kuchma’s victory in 1994 by invoking Kuchma’s managerial reputation and patronal connections—a coalition of anti-economic reform and pro-Russia forces along with help from nascent oligarchs.14 Closer in time to the event, meanwhile, other scholars understandably working outside the framework of patronal politics had offered a variety of different explanations for Kuchma’s success in toppling Kravchuk. Employing regression analysis, Robert Kravchuk and Victor Chudowsky found that the decisive factor underlying the 1994 presidential election result was economic: votes for Kuchma were determined primarily by unemployment in state enterprises which suffered most from the economic collapse caused by Kravchuk’s (lack of) policies.15 Regional differences were of secondary importance. The conventionally invoked factors of ethnicity and language were of no significance. This was therefore a case of retrospective voting where those electors most adversely affected voted against Kravchuk, economic issues outweighing ethnicity. Sarah Birch mentioned that Kuchma was co-founder and leader of the Inter-Regional Bloc for Reforms, which “portrayed itself as a political force in favor of both market reforms and closer ties with Russia.”16 But in view of the bloc’s unimpressive performance in the spring 1994 Verkhovna Rada elections, it was unlikely to have catapulted Kuchma to power as president by itself. Instead, Birch emphasized his image as a pragmatic, tough-talking technocrat, his downplaying of economic reform in favor of reviving economic ties with Russia, and “of being able to attract both those who wanted genuine 13 14 15

Ibid., 130-32. Ibid. Robert S. Kravchuk and Victor Chudowsky, “Ukraine’s 1994 Elections as an Economic Event,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38, no. 2 (June 2005): 131-65. Sarah Birch, “Electoral Systems, Campaign Strategies, and Vote Choice in the Ukrainian Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 1994,” Political Studies 46, no. 1 (March 1998): 104.

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reform and those who wanted a return to the past,” as being responsible for Kuchma’s victory.17 “Relations with Russia and the fate of the economy were seen by these voters [in eastern and southern Ukraine] as two sides of the same coin,” she concluded, “and this was a message Kuchma conveyed loud and clear.”18 Taras Kuzio attributed Kuchma’s win not so much to his electoral platform, but rather to his leadership style which appeared to be more decisive than that of Kravchuk.19 In the 1999 presidential elections, when Kuchma managed easily to hold onto office against the candidate of the communist party, his ability to mobilize the forces of patronalism in his favor was on display more clearly. According to Hale’s account, Kuchma co-opted the western regions of Ukraine into his electoral base by adopting the western-oriented national-democratic parties’ agenda, eliminating credible opponents, and turning himself into a European-oriented candidate.20 Using the power of the patronal presidency, Kuchma had thus completely reversed his relationship to the country’s east-west divide, becoming a candidate of primarily western support as he easily two-stepped to reelection. Kuchma’s single pyramid reigned supreme and identity politics proved just as capable of succumbing to patronal presidential power as did other bases of opposition appeals.21

Labelled “a disgrace” by observers from the Council of Europe, the campaign was capped by outright electoral fraud in numerous guises: flouting of campaign finance limitations, gifts of state property to business elites in exchange for political support, disseminating erroneous opposition leaflets, paying off wage and pension arrears just before election day, and having media hostile to Kuchma closed down for “tax reasons.”22 Regarding its politicization of law 17 18 19 20 21 22

Ibid., 109. Ibid., 110. Kuzio, “Kravchuk to Kuchma: The Ukrainian Presidential Elections of 1994,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 12, no. 2 (June 1996): 117-44. Hale, Patronal Politics, 148. Ibid., 149. Birch, “The Presidential Election in Ukraine, October 1999,” Electoral Studies 21, no. 2 (June 2002): 342-43; and Paul Kubicek, “The Limits of Electoral Democracy in Ukraine,” Democratization 8, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 121-24.

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enforcement in particular, the Kuchma regime has been characterized as a “crooked police state,” which extends rather far beyond mere patronalism.23 Yanukovych and Yushchenko were both able to capitalize on their terms of service as Kuchma’s prime minister for patronal support in the presidential elections of 2004. In addition, Yushchenko had “formed a new coalition of elite networks to contest the 2002 parliamentary (Rada) elections,” and had the support of Tymoshenko. Yanukovych had the added backing of the Donetsk political clan. Oligarchs at the time hedged their bets. Poroshenko’s Channel Five television channel supported Yushchenko explicitly.24 After the voter fraud of the second round had been exposed and was cleared up by a cleaner rerun, Yushchenko was declared winner. Patronal politics were clearly in evidence during the 2010 campaign and election.25 Having long since had their falling out, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko vied with one another and with Yanukovych bestowing benefits on supporters as well as sowing obstacles for their rivals’ backers. Tymoshenko distributed small plots of land and apartments to people, gave out new ambulances to Khmelnytskyi oblast, raised teachers’ salaries, and diverted government funds to various regions. Yushchenko accused her of corruption and of having Russian financial backing; he bestowed honors on various constituencies. Oligarchs lined up behind both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko. The well-financed campaigns of the latter two bought favorable media coverage. So-called “technical candidates” were supported by the main candidates so as to damage their rivals. The courts were in the pockets of the three principal candidates. Yushchenko dropped out of the race after the first round; in the second, Yanukovych’s smoother campaign won out over Tymoshenko.26 23 24 25 26

Harasymiw, “Policing, Democratization and Political Leadership in Postcommunist Ukraine,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 36, no. 2 (June 2003): 319-40. Hale, Patronal Politics, 182-90. Hale, Patronal Politics, 331-42. For the aftermath of the 2010 elections, see, for instance, Serhiy Kudelia, “The House that Yanukovych Built,” Journal of Democracy 25, no. 3 (July 2014): 19-34;

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No similar processes of patronal pyramid-building or -shifting were apparent in the 2014 presidential elections. The sole event of such nature took place in April, when Poroshenko and Klychko met in Vienna with exiled oligarch Dmytro Firtash. Reportedly they agreed that in exchange for electoral support Poroshenko would not prosecute Firtash, and Firtash claims he convinced Klychko not to contest the presidency but to support Poroshenko instead. Poroshenko did not deny there was a meeting; he denies there was an agreement.27 The absurdly huge number of candidates in the race, when Poroshenko was already the front-runner from the beginning was just another indicator of the absence of patronal dynamics. Poroshenko neither dragged a personal political network with him to the presidency, nor bargained for or attracted any from other Ukrainian notables. Nor was Poroshenko himself backed by an established political party.

Appointments and Disappointments In staffing his office Poroshenko upon inauguration reached out to close personal friends and business associates rather than to highprofile members of the political elite.28 As chief of staff (Head of the Presidential Administration—PA) he appointed Borys Lozhkin, his business partner and a media mogul. Hennadiy Zubko, a lawmaker from Zhytomyr, was made first deputy, and Oleh Rafalskyi, deputy head. Sviatoslav Tseholko, a Channel Five journalist, became Poroshenko’s press secretary, and Yuriy Onyshchenko, ambassador to Norway, was recalled to serve as the president’s first assistant. Serhiy Gerezenko, from Poroshenko’s home oblast of Vinnytsia, and a former Kyiv city councilor, was named head of the State Administrative Department. Another native of Vinnytsia, Valeriy

27 28

Eric Pardo, “Yanukovych’s Ukraine After the Orange Revolution: Mere Parenthesis or on its Way Back to Normalcy?” UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 27 (October 2011); and Olexiy Haran, “From Viktor to Viktor: Democracy and Authoritarianism in Ukraine,” Demokratizatsiya 19, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 93-110. Oleg Sukhov, Oksana Grytsenko, and Alyona Zhuk, “All in the Family: The Sequel,” Kyiv Post, 7 October 2016. “Pershyi test,” Den, 10 June 2014, on the Internet at source URL http://www.da y.kiev.ua/node/422240, accessed 11 June 2014.

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Chaliy, was also appointed deputy head of the PA. Most recently he had been a deputy minister of foreign affairs (2009-10), and then an executive with the Razumkov Centre responsible for international programs.29 Earlier, in 1995-97, he had served as adviser to President Kuchma.30 This was a holding pattern, however, as Chaliy was in November proposed as ambassador to Washington, and appointed in July 2015, where he served to the rest of Poroshenko’s term until replaced as was customary by the new president, Zelenskyy, in July 2019. The only exception among these first PA appointments, perhaps indicative of Poroshenko’s tendency to compromise, was Rafalskyi, who had worked directly under Medvedchuk for President Kuchma, and under Lovochkin for PM Yanukovych, as well as serving as deputy head of the Party of Regions caucus in the Rada. The new president’s first ministerial nominations were likewise eclectic rather than transparently patronalistic. Former ambassador to Germany, Pavlo Klimkin, was put forward as foreign minister. Vitaliy Yarema, first vice-prime minister in the government of Arseniy Yatseniuk, was proposed as prosecutor-general; and Valeriia Hontareva, the banker for Poroshenko’s chocolate business, was nominated as—the first woman—Head of the National Bank (NBU). The Rada dutifully if reluctantly approved the appointments.31 Selection of Klimkin in particular, a person with absolutely no trace of ties to the Yanukovych family nor the oligarchic order, was endorsed by one of Ukraine’s most prominent political analysts as highly original (i.e., based on professional qualifications and not on the customary family or patronal ties).32 Poroshenko’s regard for Klimkin’s talents had its origins when the former was Yanukovych’s foreign minister and the latter a foreign office department head. On account of this, and their ensuing friendship, 29

30 31 32

“Poroshenko pryznachyv Chaloho druhoiu liudynoiu v AP,” Ukrainska pravda, 19 June 2014, on the Internet at permanent URL http://www.pravda.com.ua/n ews/2014/06/19/7029557. Khto ye khto v Ukraini (2007), 1038. Yuliia Luchyk, “Kart-blansh dlia Poroshenka,” Den, 19 June 2014. The expert was Viktor Nebozhenko. Dmytro Kryvtsun, “Umity skazaty ‘ni,’” Den, 19 June 2014, on the Internet at source URL http://www.day.kiev.ua/nod e/423847, accessed 19 June 2014.

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Poroshenko subsequently refrained from interfering in the operation of the foreign affairs portfolio under Klimkin.33 Poroshenko announced that the three displaced officials—foreign minister Andriy Deshchytsia, NBU head Stepan Kubiv, and PGU Oleh Makhnitskyi—would all be given posts on his team, or had already accepted them.34 This looked more like a form of musical chairs than patronal politics; the displaced were not sent packing as should have happened under patronalism. Indeed, it fit the more general pattern in which “Poroshenko has not moved to purge ex-Yanukovych allies from key government positions.”35 A few additional words about the president’s appointments to his staff reveal the nature of his team-building efforts and the team itself. Borys Lozhkin, his first chief of staff, volunteered for the position for just two years. Beginning in 1994, he was said to have built a small media company “into one of the largest multimedia businesses in Eastern Europe.”36 In April 2013, Lozhkin’s Ukrainian Media Holding (UMH) company bought 50 per cent of Poroshenko’s shares in Nashe Radio and KP Media, the latter of which they had jointly purchased two years earlier.37 Then, according to a later newspaper report, “Lozhkin sold his business, Ukrainian Media Holding, to Serhiy Kurchenko, an oligarch close to then-President Viktor Yanukovych, in 2013. The sides have never disclosed the price, but various analysts said the deal could be worth $500 million.”38 In June 2014, as mentioned, Lozhkin was appointed chief of 33

35 36 37

Roman Romaniuk, Roman Kravets, and Mariia Zhartovska, “Persha ‘triika’ Poroshenka: kryza upravlinnia ta viina v otochenni prezydenta,” Ukrainska pravda, 8 June 2017, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2017/06/8 /7146324/, accessed 8 June 2017. “Poroshenko rozpoviv pro maibutniie Deshchytsi, Kubiva i Makhnitskoho,” Ukrainska pravda, 19 June 2014, on the Internet at permanent URL http://www. pravda.com/ua/news/2014/05/19/7029533/. Sukhov, Grytsenko, and Zhuk, “All in the Family: The Sequel.” “Boris Lozhkin,” on the World Jewish Congress website at https://www.worlsj ewishcongress.org/en/bio/boris-lozhkin, accessed 28 April 2021. Interfax-Ukraine, “Lozhkin Buys Poroshenko’s Share in KP Media and Nashe Radio,” Kyiv Post, 25 April 2013, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com /article/content/business/lozhkin-buy . . ., accessed 28 April 2021. Zhuk, “Lozhkin Resigns, Ihor Rainin Takes Over as Poroshenko’s Chief of Staff,” Kyiv Post, 29 August 2016, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com /article/content/ukraine-politics/lozhk . . ., accessed 28 April 2021.

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staff to Poroshenko, but served only until August 2016, when he resigned to follow his other pursuits. He was retained by the president as an adviser and as head of the National Investment Council, a post he held on a pro bono basis for one year.39 In 2017, Lozhkin, together with Andriy Pyvovarsky, former minister of infrastructure (2014-16), launched an investment business focusing on asset management in the private sector.40 It was back to business for Poroshenko’s friend, briefly interrupted by his stint in the PA—not a truly dedicated public servant, in other words. In 2018, “Lozhkin was elected the president of the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine,” and concurrently Vice-President of the World Jewish Congress.41 Lozhkin’s sale of UMH to Kurchenko would later come back to haunt him. Lozhkin was replaced by Ihor Rainin, head of the Kharkiv Oblast State Administration since February 2015, and head of the Kharkiv branch of the president’s then political party, the BPP (Blok Petra Poroshenka, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc). Between November 2014 and February 2015, Rainin had served only briefly as a deputy head within the PA. A low-profile politician, Rainin had earlier belonged to Tymoshenko’s Fatherland faction.42 As 39

Ibid.; “Boris Lozhkin,” on the World Jewish Congress website; InterfaxUkraine, “Borys Lozhkin Appointed Head of Ukraine’s Presidential Administration,” Kyiv Post, 10 June 2014, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/borys . . ., accessed 28 April 2021; and Interfax-Ukraine, “Poroshenko Appoints Ex-chief of Staff Lozhkin as his Adviser, Head of Investment Council,” Kyiv Post, 29 August 2016, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/poro . . ., accessed 28 April 2021. Interfax-Ukraine, “Lozhkin, Pyvovarsky to Jointly Launch Investment Business,” Kyiv Post, 6 July 2017, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukr aine-politics/lozhkin-pyvovarsky- . . ., accessed 28 April 2021. “Boris Lozhkin,” on the World Jewish Congress website; and “Borys Lozhkin Became the President of the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine,” 112 Ukraine, 25 May 2018, on the Internet at https://112.international/society/borys-lozhkinbecame-the-pres . . ., accessed 28 April 2021. Interfax-Ukraine, “First Deputy Governor of Kharkiv Oblast Rainin Becomes Deputy Head of Poroshenko’s Administration,” Kyiv Post, 17 November 2014, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/first- . . ., accessed 28 April 2021; Interfax-Ukraine, “Poroshenko to Appoint Ihor Rainin as his Chief of Staff Later on August 29,” Kyiv Post, 29 August 2016, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politic s/poro . . ., accessed 28 April 2021; and Kateryna Kruk, “Kruk Report: New Appointments Herald Start of Ukraine’s Political Season,” BNE Intellinews, 7

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Poroshenko’s chief of staff, Rainin attempted to funnel all communication with the President through himself, but ultimately this plan fell apart and Poroshenko undertook coordination of executive decisions directly bypassing Rainin and dealing with the latter’s various subordinates.43 In the spring of 2019, the prosecutor-general’s office called in for interrogation and served notices of suspicion against several of Poroshenko’s assistants and allies. These included: Oleksiy Filatov, a deputy chief of staff since July 2014, charged with money laundering; Lozhkin, complicit with Filatov in laundering $440 million US through the sale of UMH to Kurchenko; Hontareva, ex-head of the NBU, and investment banker Kostyantyn Stetsenko, charged with embezzlement and abetting organized crime; and Hontareva charged additionally with money laundering together with Yanukovych’s ex-ecology and natural resources minister, Mykola Zlochevsky. All denied the charges, which were miraculously erased through the intervention of the Prosecutor-General of the day himself, Yuriy Lutsenko, Poroshenko’s man at the helm of the PGO ensuring the politically appropriate or necessary application of the law.44 To save herself further embarrassment, Hontareva resigned as NBU chief in May 2017.45 Filatov was also being investigated for failure to disclose his assets, specifically his wife’s company—created soon after his appointment—and its acquisition of favorable contracts, specifically those benefitting the interests of the

43 44

September 2016, on the Internet at https://www.intellinews.com/kruk-reportnew-appontments-her . . ., accessed 28 April 2021. Romaniuk, Kravets, and Zhartovska, “Persha ‘triika’ Poroshenka.” Interfax-Ukraine, “PGO Wants to Serve Suspicion Notices in ‘Kurchenko Case’ to Ex-head of Presidential Administration Lozhkin,” Kyiv Post, 22 April 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/pgo-wants-toserve- . . ., accessed 28 April 2021; and Toma Istomina, “Poroshenko Fires Deputy Chief of Staff Filatov Amid Money Laundering Allegations,” Kyiv Post, 12 May 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/por oshenko-fires-de . . ., accessed 28 April 2021. “Hontareva podala u vidstavku,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 10 April 2017, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/ECONOMICS/gontareva-podala-u-vidstavk . . ., accessed 19 April 2017.

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firm Naftohaz Ukrainy.46 Poroshenko called the charges a provocation arranged by oligarch Ihor Kolomoiskyi. Lutsenko took the unusual step of disbanding the unit within his office conducting these very investigations, but by August when Poroshenko was no longer president, he acknowledged the validity of the charges against Hontareva and Filatov.47 This episode illustrates not only the unbroken link between office-holding and business under Poroshenko,48 but more importantly an aspect of Ukrainian politics that deserves attention at least equal to, if not surpassing, the dynamics of patronal politics: the prevalence of political corruption, coupled with the political use of the law, which results in its enforcement for one’s competitors but exemption for one’s friends. Such entanglement of law and corruption, in which the former serves not as a tool of control over the latter but rather a means of its perpetuation, one might say its institutionalization, can be discerned in the succession of prosecutor-general appointments made by Poroshenko each in turn discredited. Vitaliy Yarema, until 2010 the chief of police in Kyiv when he resigned to enter politics,49 became Poroshenko’s first prosecutor-general in June 2014. By the fall, 46

“U NABU povidomyly pro rozsliduvannia shchodo zastupnyka holovy AP,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 13 June 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/P OLITICS/u-nabu-povidomili-pro-rozslidu . . ., accessed 13 June 2018. Sonia Lukashova, Roman Kravets, and Roman Romaniuk, “Kulyk vs otochennia Poroshenka. Khto i shcho stoiit za pidozramy Hontarevii, Lozhkinu ta Filatovu,” Ukrainska pravda, 23 April 2019, on the Internet at https://www.prav da.com.ua/articles/2019/04/23/7213263, accessed 6 August 2019; Oleg Sukhov, “Top Prosecutor Resigns After Scandal Over Charges Against Poroshenko Allies,” Kyiv Post, 25 April 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyiv post.com/ukraine-politics/top-prosecutor-resig . . ., accessed 26 April 2019; Oleg Sukhov, “Lutsenko Disbands Units that Charged Poroshenko Allies with Graft,” Kyiv Post, 30 April 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ ukraine-politics/lutsenko-disbands-un . . ., accessed 2 May 2019; and “U Lutsenka skhvalyly pidozry otochenniu Poroshenka, yaki ranishe vvazhaly nezakonnymy,” Ukrainska pravda, 6 August 2019, on the Internet at https://ww w.pravda.com.ua/news/2019/08/6/7222914/, accessed 6 August 2019. Oleksandr Moisieienko and Yanina Korniienko, “Try roky na Bankovii: shcho vidbuvaietsia z biznesom Poroshenka,” Ekonomichna pravda, 12 June 2017, on the Internet at http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2017/06/12/62586 5/, accessed 12 June 2017. Ukrainian News, “Kyiv’s Police Chief Yarema Resigns,” Kyiv Post, 12 March 2010, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukrainepolitics/kyivs . . ., accessed 4 May 2021.

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he was being criticized for nepotism, cronyism, patronage, mishandling or blocking of investigations, and, in particular, as one source put it, “dragging his feet on high-profile investigations into money laundering, embezzlement, tax evasion and abuse of power by Yanukovych’s entourage, known as The Family, that were opened after the EuroMaidan Revolution.”50 Following a recommendation from the Rada’s anti-corruption committee, Yarema resigned in February 2015, his resignation was accepted by Poroshenko, and he was replaced by Viktor Shokin, a career prosecutor described as a loyalist and protégé of Poroshenko.51 In fact, Shokin and Poroshenko are kumy; as deputy Prosecutor-General in 2002-5, Shokin worked to close down any and all criminal cases initiated by his institution against Poroshenko. He was reappointed as deputy to Yarema in June 2014. During his term as Prosecutor-General, Shokin’s performance sparked widespread criticism and calls for his resignation. Finally, in March 2016, under pressure from the United States, Shokin was relieved. A man apparently with no shame, Shokin then sued in court in 2019 to be restored as the country’s Prosecutor-General.52 While serving as Prosecutor-General, 50

Sukhov, “Yarema, Top Prosecutor Since June, Accused of Stalling Criminal Cases,” Kyiv Post, 14 October 2014, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.co m/article/content/reform-watch/yarema . . ., accessed 4 May 2021. Interfax-Ukraine, “Parliament’s Anti-Corruption Committee Initiates Dismissal of Prosecutor General Yarema,” Kyiv Post, 15 January 2015, on the Internet at https://kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/parli . . ., accessed 4 May 2021; Oleg Sukhov, “Yarema Dismissed as Top Prosecutor, Official Announcement Pending,” Kyiv Post, 9 February 2015, on the Internet at https://w ww.kyivpost.com/article/content/reform-watch/yarema . . ., accessed 4 May 2021; Interfax Ukraine, “Poroshenko Accepts Yarema’s Resignation,” Kyiv Post, 9 February 2015, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content /may-25-presidntial-e . . ., accessed 4 may 2021; Interfax-Ukraine, “Poroshenko Signs Decree on Yarema’s Dismissal, Shokin’s Appointment as Ukraine’s Prosecutor General,” Kyiv Post, 11 February 2015, on the Internet at https://www.k yivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/poro . . ., accessed 4 May 2021; and Sukhov et al., “All in the Family.” Yarema later resurfaced as deputy minister of youth and sports in the government of Prime Minister Volodymyr Groisman, and, in 2020, was appointed State Secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers. Interfax-Ukraine, “Cabinet Appoints Yarema as Government State Secretary,” Kyiv Post, 25 June 2020, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/uk rane-politics/cabinet-appoints-ya . . ., accessed 4 May 2021. “Poroshenko pryiniav vidstavku Yaremy i pryznachyv na mistse v.o. henprokurora svoho nablyzhenoho—ZMI,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 9 February 2015; “Rada

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Shokin has been described as having: declared war on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the EU’s promise of a visa-free regime, violated the principles of human rights, promoted only prosecutors appointed under Yanukovych’s fugitive ex-Prosecutor-General Viktor Pshonka, failed to implement reforms within the PGO, and blocked proceedings against prominent figures from the Yanukovych era.53 Shokin’s replacement, Yuriy Lutsenko, leader of Poroshenko’s BPP fraction in the Rada, was confirmed only in May 2016, after the small matter of his lacking the proper degree in law and experience in prosecution had with some arm-twisting been settled. This occurred once the law was modified to suit the candidate and a sufficient number of Rada deputies had willingly abandoned their consciences to vote 264 to 37 in favor of the appointment; former Party of Regions deputies, ostensibly Poroshenko’s opposition, voted in

pryznachyla Shokina novym henprokurorom,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 10 February 2015; Kryvtsun, “Chomu ‘strazhdaie’ Shokin?” Den, 28 October 2015; “Rada dala dobro na vidstavku Shokina,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 29 March 2016, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/rada-vidpravila-shokin-u-vids ta . . ., accessed 29 March 2016; and “Shokin znovu zabazhav povernutysia na posadu henprokurora,” UNIAN, 26 September 2019, on the Internet at https:// www.unian.ua/politics/10699464-shokin-znovu-zabazha . . ., accessed 26 September 2019. In November 2019, Shokin turned 77, already well beyond his “best before” date. Serhii Sydorenko, “Viktor Shokin rozpochav velyku viinu. Proty MZS ta bezvizovoho rezhymu,” Yevropeiska pravda, 27 October 2015, on the Internet at permanent URL http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2015/10/27/7039 965/; “Shokin otrymav antypremiiu ‘Budiak roku’ za bezdiialnist,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 10 December 2015, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/artcle/print/POLITI CS/shokin-otrimav-antipremiyu-budy . . ., accessed 10 December 2015; “Pryznachyvshy prokuroriv tilky z systemy, Shokin proiavyv nepovahu do suspilstva—ekspert,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 1 January 2016, on the Internet at http:// dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/priznachivshi-prokuroriv-tilki-z-si . . ., accessed 1 January 2016; “SShA pryviazaly nadannia kredytnykh harantii Ukraini do vidstavky Shokina,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 21 January 2016, on the Internet at http: //dt.ua/print/POLITICS/ssha-priv-yazali-nadanniya-kreditn . . ., accessed 21 January 2016; “Nezadovolenyi sabotazhem reform v HPU Paiett pryvitav vidstavku Shokina,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 18 February 2016, on the Internet at http://dt .ua/article/print/POLITICS/nezadovoleniy-sabotazhem-refor . . ., accessed 18 Febraury 2016; and Anastasia Rinhis, “Antyreforma. Yak henprokuror Shokin zatsmentuvav prokuraturu, i shcho z tsym robyty,” Ukrainska pravda, 22 February 2016, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/02/22/ 7099861/, accessed 22 February 2016.

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favor.54 Lutsenko undertook to prosecute ex-President Yanukovych as well as corrupt members of his entourage, also to prosecute all who had committed crimes during the Maidan, and to recover all funds stolen from the state by illegal means under the previous regime.55 In the course of his term of office, Lutsenko did announce in December 2016 that Yanukovych would imminently be brought to justice for treason,56 but his office also waged an open battle against the newly-established anticorruption agencies (ACAs) challenging their authority, interfering with their operation, laying charges against their executives and personnel, and thus generally nullifying the nominal anticorruption policies of President Poroshenko. In this, paradoxical though it may sound, he was acting on behalf of Poroshenko.57 On the first anniversary of his appointment, as he prepared to report to the Rada on his agency’s accomplishments, Lutsenko emphasized that the PGO had filed with the courts no fewer than 7,000 charges, had sent the case against

“Maidanno-oliharkhichnyi henprokuror Lutsenko,” Vysokyi zamok, 12 May 2016, on the Internet at http://wz.lviv.ua/ukraine/170921-maidanno-oliharkh ichyi-henprokur . . ., accessed 13 May 2016; “Ukrainian President’s Ally Approved For Top Prosecutor’s Post,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 May 2016, on the Internet at https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-prosecutor-generallutsenko-no- . . ., accessed 7 May 2021; “Rada pryznachyla Lutsenka novym Henprokurorom,” Vysokyi zamok, 12 May 2016, on the Internet at http://wz.lvi v.ua/ukraine/170852-rada-ukhvalyla-zakon-iakyi-dozvoly . . ., accessed 13 May 2016; Romaniuk and Kravets, “Prokurorskyi blitskrih. Yak Lutsenko stav heneralnym prokurorom,” Ukrainska pravda, 12 May 2016, on the Internet at htt p://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/05/12/7108281/, accessed 13 May 2016; and Kryvtsun, “Yak polityky obminialy sovist na Lutsenka,” Den, 13 May 2016, on the Internet at source URL http://day.kiev.us/uk/article/podrobyci/ yak-polityky-obminyaly-sovist-na-lucenka, accessed 13 May 2016. Ivan Farion, “Chy potiahne Lutsenko henprokurorskoho voza?” Vysokyi zamok, 17 May 2016, on the Internet at http://wz.lviv.ua/ukraine/171325-chy-potiahn e-lutsenko-henprokuror . . ., accessed 17 May 2016. “Lutsenko anonsuvav sud nad Yanukovychem za derzhzradu naiblyzhchym chasom,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 9 December 2016, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/arti cle/print/POLITICS/lucenko-anonsuvav-sud-nad-yanu . . ., accessed 9 December 2016, “Poroshenko pidtrymav pozytsiiu Lutsenka v operatsii proty NABU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 1 December 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLIT ICS/poroshenko-pidtrimav-poziciyu . . ., accessed 1 December 2017.

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Yanukovych to court as well, and had recovered for the state 52 billion UAH, including 39 billion from Yanukovych.58 Critics reviewing his record of achievements were less positive. They pointed out the many ways in which the demands of the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity were not being met by the PGO under his leadership. First of all, reform of the PGO itself had not gotten under way, which was unsurprising as its deferral had been a condition of Lutsenko’s appointment. Worse, the constitutional amendments introduced in June 2016 actually strengthened a flawed institution instead of reforming or streamlining it. As to personnel policy, Lutsenko had left in place the appointees of Shokin; there was no systematic renewal. And in attempting to speed up investigation into crimes connected with the Euromaidan, Lutsenko’s interference risked such hastily-prepared cases falling apart in court.59 Regarding the monies recovered from Yanukovych, there were more questions than answers: what role did the “honest broker” ICU bank, linked to Hontareva and Poroshenko, play in the money-laundering schemes, and why had not the various state officials implicated in facilitating these operations been prosecuted?60 In response, Lutsenko announced that thirty individuals were sentenced in connection to the theft and laundering activities associated with Yanukovych—but Poroshenko’s involvement went unmentioned.61 After Poroshenko’s failure to win re58

“Lutsenko pokazav svoi dosiahnennia za rik roboty henprokurorom: opublikovana infohrafika,” Obozrevatel, 12 May 2017, on the Internet at https://ww w.obozrevatel.com/ukr/politics/79351-lutsenko-pokazav-s . . ., accessed 12 May 2017. Oleksandr Banchuk and Tetiana Pechonchyk, “Rik u krisli henprokurora: visim holovnykh provaliv Lutsenka,” Ukrainska pravda, 15 May 2017, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2017/05/15/7143939/, accessed 15 May 2017. Daria Kaleniuk et al., “’Mylna bulbashka’ chy ‘Konfiskatsiia stolittia’ henprokurora Lutsenka,” Ukrainska pravda, 10 January 2018, on the Internet at http://ww w.pravda.com.ua/articles/2018/01/10/7167931/, accessed 10 January 2018. See also Yegor Firsov, “Makhinatsii z OPDV: shcho prykhovuiut Poroshenko i Hontareva?” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 17 February 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua /article/print/internal/mahinaciyi-z-ovdp-scho-prihovuyu . . ., accessed 19 February 2018. “U spravi pro rozkradannia i vidmyvannia ‘hroshei Yanukovycha’ ye 30 vyrokiv i 30 zasudzhenykh—Lutsenko,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 17 January 2018, on

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election in the 2019 race, Lutsenko reinstated the charges against his patron,62 hoping that his own appointment would be prolonged by the new president, Zelenskyy. As early as June, however, Zelenskyy had already expressed his preference for Lutsenko’s immediate departure, and the latter dutifully resigned on 29 August 2019, replaced by Ruslan Riaboshapka.63 By October 2019, Lutsenko was being investigated for abuse of power, an ignominious ending to the career of Poroshenko’s longest-serving Prosecutor-General.64 As was pointed out at the time of his resignation, it should not have been at all surprising to see Yuriy Lutsenko as Prosecutor-General—a position he was totally unqualified for—acting as the politician he had always been, bending the law to political ends.65

Poroshenko’s Relations with Other Institutions That Ukraine’s political elites were in no hurry to rally around Poroshenko into a single patronal pyramid could be seen in his troubled relationships with various other institutions, formal and informal, specifically the Verkhovna Rada and the oligarchs. A harbinger of disillusionment with Poroshenko’s Old Style politics was perhaps the early resignation of minister of economic development and trade Pavlo Sheremeta, who cited as reason for his departure disenchantment with “yesterday’s system” and a preference for

62 63

the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/u-spravi-pro-rozkradan nya-i-vi . . ., accessed 17 January 2018. “U Lutsenka skhvalyly pidozry otochenniu Poroshenka,” Ukrainska pravda, 6 August 2019. Interfax-Ukraine, “Lutsenko Signs Letter of Resignation from Post of Prosecutor-General,” Kyiv Post, 29 August 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpo st.com/ukraine-politics/lutsenko-signs-letter . . ., accessed 14 May 2021; and Sukhov, “Riaboshapka Replaces Lutsenko as Prosecutor-General,” Kyiv Post, 29 August 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/r iaboshapka-replaces . . ., accessed 14 May 2021. “Ukrainian Investigators Probing Ex-Prosecutor Lutsenko For Abuse Of Power,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16 October 2019, on the Internet at https://www.rferl.org/a/ukrainian-ex-prosecutor-lutsenko-probed . . ., accessed 7 May 2021. Andriy Holub, “Yurii Lutsenko ta yoho dementory,” Tyzhden, 21 August 2019, on the Internet at https://tyzhden.ua/Politics/234242, accessed 29 August 2019.

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working with “tomorrow’s people” instead.66 He also complained about the appointment without his knowledge or consent of a deputy minister. This was a common informal practice in postcommunist Ukraine of placing “smotriashchie” or “kuratory” (“overseers,” understood as political) at the apex of government bodies to monitor the flow of favors, personnel appointments, and access to public funds. Sheremeta had founded the Kyiv-Mohyla business school, and was president of the Kyiv school of economics; his entrepreneurial spirit evidently had little tolerance for the intermixing of business with politics, as commonly practiced in Ukraine. In August 2014, in preparation for the Verkhovna Rada elections, Poroshenko’s Solidarity party was renamed as the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (BPP, in its Ukrainian initials) with Yuriy Lutsenko as leader. In the 26 October elections, in which no fewer than 29 parties competed on the party list ballot (with no sign of a single pyramid forming under Poroshenko’s wing), BPP won 21.8 per cent of the vote. It was thus in second place behind the People’s Front (PF), which gained 22.1 per cent. This result impelled PF leader Arsenii Yatseniuk to insist on remaining as prime minister, against Poroshenko’s wishes. Poroshenko spent the next two years attempting to oust Yatseniuk in favor of his own client. When the newly-elected Rada assembled for the first session in November, the BPP had a total of 146 deputies, a plurality of 36.6 per cent. Together with four other factions—People’s Front, Samopomich, Liashko’s Radical Party, and Fatherland—the BPP mustered a ruling coalition of 302 deputies. The VR elected Yatseniuk as prime minister, sponsored by the coalition. Poroshenko’s preferred client, Volodymyr Groisman, was elected speaker of the assembly, cooling his heels while waiting to be installed as prime minister.67 The BPPled coalition suffered its first loss relatively early, on 1 September

“Ministr ekonomichnoho rozvytku Sheremeta podav u vidstavku,” BBC Ukrainian, 21 August 2014; and “Sheremeta zvilnenyi z posady ministra ekonomiky,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 3 September 2014. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “The First Session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the Eighth Convocation has Opened,” 27 November 2014, on the Internet at https://www.rada.gov.ua/en/news/News/News2/99190.html?se a . . ., accessed 17 May 2021.

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2015, when Liashko’s Radical Party defected with the aim of bringing together all oppositional factions into a single party.68 The BPP caucus itself suffered a slight impairment of its unity in November 2015, when fifteen deputies, including Mustafa Nayem, announced the formation of an ”anticorruption platform,” and another deputy, Serhii Leshchenko, accused Poroshenko of heading a corrupt “shadow government” composed of people from the president’s entourage, oligarchs, and the prime minister, Yatseniuk—which then created a scandal.69 The idea of Poroshenko and Yatseniuk joining forces behind the scenes was pure fantasy in light of what was transpiring onstage in Ukrainian politics at the time. While the two might have agreed on deferring pre-term elections to the Rada due to their parties’ weakness in the polls, they differed publicly on important issues such as privatization policy and amending the constitution.70 One BPP deputy described Yatseniuk as having “declared war on the president.”71 During the first two years of Poroshenko’s term,

Kravets, “Novyi front proty Poroshenka, Liashko, UKROP ta Svoboda ob’iednuiut zusyllia,” Ukrainska pravda, 20 October 2015, on the Internet at permanent URL http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2015/10/20/7085532/. “U Radi stvoreno deputatsku hrupu ‘Antykoruptsiina platforma’—Naiiem,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 24 November 2015, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/pri nt/POLITICS/u-radi-stvoreno-deputatsku-grupu- . . ., accessed 24 November 2015. Leshchenko’s theory of a “shadow government” had earlier been elaborated on in “Leshchenko rozpoviv, khto vkhodyt do ‘tinovoho uriadu’ Ukrainy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 22 September 2015. In the ephemeral style typical of Ukrainian party politics, Nayem and Leshchenko in June 2016 transformed their “platform” into the Democratic Alliance “party,” but withdrew from its leadership in November. “Leshchenko, Naiiem i Zalishchuk vyishly z kerivnytstva ‘Demaliansu,’” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 19 November 2016, on the Internet at http: //dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/leschenko-nayyem-i-zalischuk-viy . . ., accessed 19 November 2016. Oleksii Bratushchak, “Serpentarii odnodumtsiv: Yak Poroshenko, Tymoshenko ta Yatseniuk namahaiutsia perehraty odone odnoho,” Ukrainska pravda, 20 November 2015, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2015/11 /20/7089538/view_print/, accessed 20 November 2015; and Roman Kravets and Mariia Zhartovska, “Velyka hra. Za shcho rozhornuly borotbu Yatseniuk i Poroshenko,” Ukrainska pravda, 28 January 2016, on the Internet at http://www. pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/01/28/7097041/, accessed 28 January 2016. Bratushchak, “Mykola Tomenko: Yatseniiuk oholosyv viinu prezydentu,” Ukrainska pravda, 1 February 2016, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.u a/articles/2016/02/1/7097496/, accessed 1 February 2016.

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conflicts between him and Yatseniuk stalled the appointment of numerous governmental officials—an outcome surely deserving to be counted as the opposite of “pyramid building” if such was truly being pursued by the President.72 Yatseniuk had to suffer the indignity of being physically picked up and removed from the rostrum in the Rada by another BPP deputy, Oleh Barna.73 Poroshenko for his part did not hide his preference for Yatseniuk’s departure, in spite of which the latter did accidentally manage to survive a noconfidence vote on 16 February 2016.74 Meanwhile, the ruling coalition was reduced in size by the exit of the two caucuses Fatherland (19 seats) led by Tymoshenko and Samopomich (26 seats) led by Oleh Bereziuk, so that by 14 March 2016, it included only three parties with a total of just 237 seats between them. These were: BPP (136), People’s Front (81), and Liashko’s Radical Party (21), which had not formally left the coalition in spite of its leader’s previous announcement.75 Yielding to pressure, Yatseniuk finally resigned on 14 March 2016; a month later, he was replaced by Volodymyr Groisman, who identified the country’s three principal threats as being “corruption, ineffective governance and populism, which do 72

Inna Pukish-Yunko, “Bezkadrova polityka,” Vysokyi zamok, 15 June 2017, on the Internet at http://wz.lviv.ua/ukraine/201405-bezkadrova-polityka, accessed 15 June 2017. Dmytro Kryvtsun, “Rik druhoho uriadu Yatseniuka. I biika,” Den, 11 December 2015, on the Internet at http://www.day.kiev.ua/uk/print/512700, accessed 11 December 2015. Associated Press, “Ukrainian Government Survives No-Confidence Vote Amid Infighting,” Guardian, 16 February 2016, on the Internet at http://www.thegura dian.com/world/2016/feb/16/ukrainian-governmen . . ., accessed 17 February 2016; Zharotvskaia, “” Yakshcho idesh—idy. Yak v AP umovliaiut Yatseniuka podaty u vidstavku i khto stane nastupnym premierom,” Ukrainska pravda, 8 March 2016; Hennadii Stepanchuk, “Spravzhni problemy u Poroshenka tilky rozpochynaiutsia,” Ukrainska pravda, 26 January 2016, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/01/26/7096796/, accessed 26 January 2016; and “Poroshenko prosyt Shokina ta Yatseniuka pity u vidstavku,” Vysokyi zamok, 16 February 2016, on the Internet at http://wz.lviv.u a/ukraine/160387-poroshenko-prosyt-shokina-ta-yatse . . ., accessed 16 February 2016. “Hroisman oholosyv pro vykhid ‘Batkivshchyny’ z koalitsii,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 18 February 2016, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/article/print/POLITICS/gr oysman-ogolosiv-pro . . ., accessed 19 May 2021; “Hroisaman rozpoviv pro sklad novoi parlamentskoi koalitsii,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 3 March 2016; and “Hroisman narakhuvav v koalitsii 237 deputativ,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 14 March 2016.

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not pose less of a threat than the enemy in eastern Ukraine.”76 Groisman, a successful businessman and mayor of Vinnytsia, where he met Poroshenko and where the latter’s chocolate company grew from, was elected on Poroshenko’s Solidarity party list, and was described as “a close confidant of President Poroshenko.”77 An apparently unexceptional politician, Groisman proved to be a masterful backroom dealer, developing strong ties with Yatseniuk, and proving to be unmanageable for Poroshenko’s controlling impulses, contrary to expectations.78 He resigned in May 2019, in protest against Zelenskyy’s dissolution of the Rada, by which time he had drifted away from under his patron’s wing altogether aligning himself more openly with the People’s Front, led by Yatseniuk and interior minister Arsen Avakov.79 Having had Poroshenko as his patron, it was difficult to believe that Volodymyr Groisman would seriously undertake comprehensive reform, combatting corruption and reducing the political influence of oligarchs. He took particular exception to expressions of such skepticism.80 Yet he could not avoid suspicions of involvement in corrupt practices. For instance, he was accused of replacing the head of the customs service in Zakarpattia oblast as retrospective payback for the support of the new appointee’s party when the Rada voted Groisman in as PM.81 This oblast was a major 76

78 79

“Ukraine Parliament Approves Volodymyr Groysman as New PM,” Guardian, 14 April 2016; and “Yatsenyuk Resigns, Groysman Expected to Take Over as PM,” Euractiv, 16 April 2016, on the Internet at https://www.euractiv.com/sec tion/europe-s-east/news/yatsenyuk . . ., accessed 20 May 2021. Roman Goncharenko, “The Rapid Rise of Ukraine’s Volodymyr Groysman,” Deutsche Welle, 12 April 2016, on the Internet at https://www.dw/com/en/e nthe-rapid-rise-of-ukraines-volodymyr-g . . ., accessed 20 May 2021. Romaniuk, Kravets, and Zhartovska, “Persha ‘triika’ Poroshenka.” “Ukraine’s Prime Minister Resigns in Protest,” Al Jazeera, 20 May 2018, on the Internet at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/20/ukraines-prime-mi ni . . ., accessed 20 May 2021; and Bermet Talant, “Prime Minister Groysman Announces Resignation,” Kyiv Post, 20 May 2019, on the Internet at https://ww w.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/prime-minister-gro . . ., accessed 20 May 2021. “Hroisman ne rozumiie, chomu Zakhid sumnivaietsia u namirakh Ukrainy shchodo reform—Politico,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 28 October 2016, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/groysman-ne-rozumiye-chomu-zah . . ., accessed 28 October 2016. “Hroisman vidpoviv Moskaliu,” Vysokyi zamok online, 5 June 2016.

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portal for cigarette smuggling. It was also alleged that an attempt to reinstate unofficial posts of smotrashchie (overseers) in the local customs service had been foiled by citizen action. The head of the oblast administration offered to resign, but Groisman, denying the allegations, refused. It was precisely over this issue of the placement of agents of private interests to control the illicit flow of public monies into private pockets that the minister of economic development and trade, Aivaras Abramovicius, had tendered his resignation in February 2016, and thereby briefly unleashed a political storm.82 The immediate trigger was an attempt to install without the minister’s concurrence a deputy minister reporting to Poroshenko’s “grey cardinal” Ihor Kononenko and responsible for Naftohaz and other state-owned enterprises (SOEs). But the more chronic problem was the year-long pressure to continue this practice of installing politically-connected individuals into SOEs and government departments so as to control such corrupt flows and thereby hinder needed reforms in public administration. Following a vacation, Abramovicius returned to his post in March. The 82

Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, Official Web-Site, “Statement by the Minister of Economic Development and Trade Aivaras Abromavicius,” n.d., on the Internet at http://www.ma.gov.ua/News/Print?l ang=en-GB&id=f13fa574-3elb- . . ., accessed 25 March 2016; “Abromavichus ide u vidstavku cherez tysk i blokuvannia reform,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 3 February 2016, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/Abramovichusyde-u-vidstavku-ch . . ., accessed 3 February 2016; “Khto takyi Pinkas, chrez yakoho podav u vidstavku ministr Abromavichus,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 3 February 2016, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/hto-takiy-pi nkas-cherez-yakogo-p . . ., accessed 3 February 2016; “’Syly zla khochut vidmotaty vse nazad’. Naivazhlyvishe vid Abromavichusa,” Ekonomichna pravda, 3 February 2016, on the Internet at permanent URL http://www.epravda.com. ua/publications/2016/02/3/579719/view_print, accessed 3 February 2016; “Posly deviatokh zakhidnykh krain pidtrymaly Abromavichusa,” Vysokyi zamok, 3 February 2016, on the Internet at http://wz.lviv.ua/ukraine/158728ministr-abromavychus-vyrishyv pod . . ., accessed 3 February 2016; Alec Luhn, “Economic Minister’s Resignation Plunges Ukraine into New Crisis,” Guardian, 4 February 2016, on the Internet at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016 /feb/04/economic-minister-r . . ., accessed 4 February 2016; “Corruption in Ukraine: Dear Friends,” Economist, 13 February 2016, on the Internet at http:// www.economist.com/node/21692917/print, accessed 12 February 2016; and “Minister Abromavicius Back to Work After Vacation,” UKRINFORM, 16 March 2016, on the Internet at http://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-politics/198 3034-minister-abromavi . . ., accessed 28 March 2016.

100 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO problem was never addressed or fixed. Asked in a newspaper interview to name the smotrashchie within the ministries in his cabinet, Groisman replied that there would be no such personnel during his premiership, although he would not rule out such rogue individuals as might appear from time to time of their own accord. He did not intend to go hunting for them.83 Among Ukrainians public trust in their PM at the time stood at 14 per cent; distrust, 82 per cent.84 Groisman was again drawn into controversy when a plan spawned by him and interior minister Avakov to counter cigarette smuggling by means of more policing was criticized by Prosecutor-General Lutsenko as not having produced the expected breakthrough.85 Otherwise, as prime minister Groisman made statements endorsing decentralization as a means of combatting corruption and public discussion as prelude to establishing a market in land—which was reassuring to the IMF—but took actions such as dismissing the reformist minister of finance—which was not.86 Groisman turned out to be more independent-minded than expected; when Borys Lozhkin recommended Vitalii Kovalchuk to replace him as chief of staff, Groisman made clear to the president that he would not work with Kovalchuk with whom his relations had been frosty from the start.87 A not untypical example of Poroshenko’s relationship with the Verkhovna Rada could perhaps be seen in the president’s push

84 85 86

“Hroisman: Poky ya premier, nikhto ne bude ‘smotriashchym’ za Kabminom,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 26 June 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/P OLITICS/groysman-poki-ya-prem-yer-nih . . ., accessed 26 June 2017. Ibid. “Ukrainian Anti-Smuggling Plan Hits Political Snag,” Transitions Online, 10 September 2018. “Hroisman nazvav kliuchovu umovu dlia zapusku rynku zemli v Ukraini,” Den, 5 October 2016; “Hroisman: ‘Detsentralizatsiia daie mozhlyvist pidirvaty osnovy koruptsii,’” Vysokyi zamok, 1 January 2017; and “Ukrainian Lawmakers Approve Anti-Corruption Court,” Transitions Online, 18 June 2018. Kálmán Mizsei, “The New East European Patronal States and the Rule-of-Law,” in Stubborn Structures: Reconceptualizing Post-Communist Regimes, ed. Bálint Magyar (Budapest and New York: Central European University Paress, 2019), 599; Romaniuk, “Prezydent-‘konservator’. Chomu Poroshenko obrostaie konfliktamy,” Ukrainska pravda, 6 October 2016, on the Internet at http://www.pra vda.com.ua/articles/2016/10/6/7122806/, accessed 6 October 2016.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 101 for its approval of his judicial reform bill in early June 2016.88 As described by Ukrainska pravda, the measure obtained 335 votes, including 38 from the Opposition Bloc. All the resources of the Presidential Administration and the BPP were mobilized that day. A prayer breakfast in the morning for fraction leaders with Poroshenko provided an opportunity for them to speak directly with the president’s closest advisers: Borys Lozhkin, Vitalii Kovalchuk, and Oleksii Filatov. Within the Rada his representatives Serhii Berezenko and Ihor Kononenko scoured the halls for deputies’ votes. Even Arsenii Yatseniuk was brought in to help at the last minute. The president himself addressed the assembly, urging adoption. It all paid off, but the exercise showed Poroshenko as unable to take the support of the Verkhovna Rada for his projects for granted and yet willing to make deals with any quarter. In July, he signed the bill into law, claiming it would depoliticize the judicial system; others thought it preserved presidential influence over the courts.89 Otherwise, President Poroshenko seemed to have had a reasonable degree of influence on the Rada. In the course of his first two years in office, for example, he introduced 83 bills into the legislature, nine-tenths of which the Rada approved twice as quickly as others, and he vetoed 33 draft laws passed by the assembly.90 Grounds for most of the vetoes were that they violated international agreements; others encroached on the defence or foreign affairs ministries’ work or entailed unacceptable budgetary reductions. These vetoes went unchallenged in the Rada because the ruling majority lacked the necessary 300 votes at the time. Bills originating from the president’s own BPP fraction were more likely to

Romaniuk and Kravets, “Vyprobuvannia Konstytutsiieiu. Yak Poroshenko vmovyv Radu na sudovu reformu,” Ukrainska pradva, 2 June 2016, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/06/02/7110506, accessed 3 June 2016. “Prezydent pidpysav zakon pro sudoustrii i status suddiv,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 13 July 2016, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/artcle/print/POLITICS/prezident-p idpisav-zakon-pro-su . . ., accessed 13 July 2016. VoxUkraine, “Petro Poroshenko i yoho zakon. Z yakymy zakonoproiektamy voiuie prezydent, a yaki pidtrymuie,” Ukrainska pravda, 24 June 2016, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/06/24/7112823/, accessed 24 June 2016.

102 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO be vetoed than others’. Presidential vetoes were seen as somewhat of a restraint on legislators’ populist propensities. Unfortunately for him, however, the Rada managed to block his efforts to establish sole control over the composition of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), a standoff which lasted for four years.91 In an attempt to stack the CEC in his favor ahead of the 2019 elections, President Poroshenko in January 2018 put forward a slate of new candidates for membership in it. Taking advantage of the term expiry of nearly the whole body’s membership as an opportunity for its wholesale renewal (or rather partisan reorientation), he proposed that five representatives each from BPP and Popular Front be appointed, plus one each from three other fractions, excluding Tymoshenko’s Fatherland and the Opposition Bloc (formerly Yanukovych’s Party of Regions).92 In September, the Rada dismissed the thirteen out of fifteen CEC members whose terms had expired, and approved fourteen replacements: six from BPP; three from PF; plus one each from Rebirth, Fatherland, People’s Will, and the Radicals. It was also decided to increase the size of the CEC by one to seventeen; BPP and its PF coalition partner thus would have nine members, a

Romaniuk, “Poroshenko, Rak i Shchuka, abo Khto zaivyi u TsVK,” Ukrainska pravda, 5 July 2018, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/20 18/07/5/7185407/, accessed 6 July 2018; and Ivan Kapsamun, “Prostrochena TsVK,” Den, 5 July 2018, on the Internet at source URL https://day.kyiv.ua/uk /article/podrobyci/prostrochene-cvk, accessed 6 July 2018. “Poroshenko pidpysav podannia na pryznachennia novykh chleniv TsVK,” Den, 23 January 2019, on the Internet at Source URL https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/n ews/230118-poroshenko-pidpysav-podannya-na-pryznachennya-novyh-chlen iv-cvk, accessed 23 January 2018; Olena Roshchenko, “Poroshenko zaproponuvav pryznachyty novykh chleniv TsVK,” Ukrainska pravda, 23 January 2018, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2018/01/23/7169 304/, accessed 23 January 2018; “Nove ‘vyno’ u novi TsVKovski ‘mikhy’,” Vysokyi Zamok, 25 January 2018, on the Internet at https://wz.lviv.ua/article/364395-nove-vyno-u-novi-tsvkovski-mikhy, accessed 26 January 2019; Iryna Pavlova, “Koly onovytsia TsVK?” Den, 26 January 2018, on the Internet at Source URL https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/podrobyci/koly-onovytsyacvk, accessed 26 January 2018; and Viktor Trepak, “TsVK: zmina skladu z dalnim prytsilom,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 4 February 2018, on the Internet at https://dt. ua/article/print/internal/cvk-zmina-skladu-z-dalnim-pricil . . ., accessed 7 February 2018.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 103 majority.93 As we know now, this did not pay off for Poroshenko in the expected manner. Nevertheless, the story was always the same: a struggle for presidential control of other institutions, not commonly classifiable as elite pyramid-building in the style of Kuchma. As one journalist commented then on Poroshenko’s leadership style, he was “accustomed to controlling everything to [the smallest] details. . .. They say that he is ready to hear out any propositions and arguments, but the final word remains his.”94 Yet in attempting to control everything within reach, Poroshenko was in the process also creating many enemies—not a good strategy for pyramidbuilding. “Everything,” according to Roman Malko, “not submitted by him or his team is openly blocked. This is not right.”95 Another issue on which president and parliament collided, but eventually cooperated, was the question of parliamentary immunity, although this was finally resolved only in 2019 by Zelenskyy, Poroshenko’s successor. Parliamentary immunity is the judicial principle that a parliamentarian cannot be investigated, arrested, or charged with a criminal offence in connection with the performance of his or her duties, whether in speech or voting. It is a guarantee of freedom from political persecution. In Ukraine, this constitutionally enshrined guarantee could only be lifted by a vote of the parliamentarian’s Verkhovna Rada colleagues. It is, however, 93

94 95

“U Radi khochut zbilshyty kilkist chleniv TsVK,” Vysokyi zamok, 9 July 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/u-radi-hochut-zbilshitikilkist-c . . ., accessed 9 July 2018; “Rada zbilshyla sklad TsVK do 17 osib,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 14 September 2018, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/pri nt/POLITICS/rada-zbilshila-sklad-cvk-do . . ., accessed 14 September 2018; “Rada rozpustyla TsVK,” Den, 20 September 2018, on the Internet at https://da y.kyiv.ua/uk/print/668608, accessed 20 September 2018; Interfax-Ukraine, “Rada Appoints 14 New Members of Central Election Commission,” Kyiv Post, 20 September 2018, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-poli tics/rada-appoints-14-new . . ., accessed 16 September 2021; “Poroshenko Signs Law on Increasing Number of CEC Members,” Ukrinform, 20 September 2018, on the Internet at https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/2541721-poros henko-sign . . ., accessed 16 September 2021; and “Verkhovna Rada zatverdyla novyi sklad TsVK,” Den, 20 September 2018, on the Internet at Source URL https ://day.kyiv.ua/uk/news/200918-verhovna-rada-zatverdyla-novyy-sklad-cvk , accessed 20 September 2018. Malko, “Zberehty vladu,” Tyzhden, 27 December 2017, on the Internet at http:// tyzhden.ua/Politics/206696/PrintView, accessed 27 December 2017. Ibid.

104 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO also commonly seen as a way for parliamentary deputies to shelter from prosecution for actual criminal offences involving corruption, bribery, and abuse of office. In view of the unusually large proportion of Rada deputies who have combined politics with business,96 this was a big problem and an enduring one.97 On 17 October 2017, President Poroshenko put forward his proposal for changes to the Constitution abolishing the provision whereby approval of the Verkhovna Rada was required to launch criminal proceedings against one of its deputies. The measure would have come into effect on 1 January 2020.98 This followed a stormy summer during which the Prosecutor-General’s Office sought to bring criminal charges against five deputies requiring the lifting of their immunity, while continuous public demonstrations outside the Rada were being held demanding that all

Oksana Huss, “The Perpetual Cycle of Political Corruption in Ukraine and PostRevolutionary Attempts to Break Through It,” in Revolution and War in Contemporary Ukraine, ed. Olga Bertelsen (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2016), 317-52. See also: Daryna Rohachuk, “TOP-10 naihroshovytishykh deputativ Verkhovnoi Rady,” Ukrainska pravda, 24 April 2018, on the Internet at http://vybory.pravda .com.ua/articles/2018/04/24/7149607/, accessed 24 April 2018; Rohachuk, “Ivan Zaiets: Poiava biznesu v Radi peretvoryla ideolohichne protystoiannia na bandytski rozborky,” Ukrainska pravda, 14 March 2018, on the Internet at http:// vybory.pravda.com.ua/articles/2018/03/14/7149579/, accessed 14 March 2018; Inna Borzylo and Daryna Rohachuk, “Oksana Syroid: Parlament—tse klub, yakyi zvyk hraty za oliharkhichnymy pravylamy,” Ukrainska pravda, 16 February 2018, on the Internet at http://vybory.pravda.com.ua/articles/2018/ 02/16/7149568/, accessed 19 February 2018; Oksana Stavniichuk, “Khto keruie biznesom nardepiv, poky ti vyrishuiut doliu krainy,” Ekonomichna pravda, 9 January 2018, on the Internet at https://epravda.com.ua/publications/2018/01/9 /632770/, accessed 10 January 2018; “Kysheni navyvorit. Naibahatshi deputaty Rady,” Ukrainska pravda, 12 September 2016, on the Internet at http://www.pra vda.com.ua/cdn/graphics/2016/09/naibagatshi-deputat . . ., accessed 14 September 2016; and Leshchenko, “Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada: An Oligarchs’ Club or a Real Parliament?” opendemocracy.net, 2 June 2016, on the Internet at www. opendemocracy.net/od-russia/sergii-leshchenko/ukraine-s-verkhovna-radaoligarchs-club-or-real-parliament, accessed 2 June 2016. Anton Marchuk and Vladyslava Smolinska, “17 rokiv obitsianok: FAQ pro deputatsku nedotorkannist,” Ukrainska pravda, 11 July 2017, on the Internet at http:/ /www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2017/07/11/7149275/, accessed 11 July 2017. “Poroshenko zaproponuvav Radi skasuvaty deputatsku nedotorkanist,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 17 October 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print /POLITICS/poroshenko-proponuye-skasuvat . . ., accessed 17 October 2017.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 105 parliamentarians’ immunity from prosecution be rescinded altogether.99 The manner in which legislators then responded to the PGO’s request coincidentally revealed an entrenched and significant informal practice used in deciding such questions in the form of kruhova poruka, a serious challenge to legality. Giving up any of the Rada’s own was in practice decided not on the basis of legal principles or the seriousness of the charges, but on personal loyalty and mutual obligation. This was commented upon in several newspaper reports at the time.100 As explained by one of its leading scholars, Alena Ledeneva, the phenomenon appears in English translation variously “as ‘solidarity,’ ‘surety,’ ‘collective responsibility,’ ‘circular control,’ or ‘cover-up.’” With its roots in Russian Imperial and Soviet times, it has remained relevant politically in “the post-Soviet era, when it came to designate ‘mutual cover-up in illicit affairs.’”101 She encapsulates the gist of the matter as follows, using of course the Russian terminology: The most important implications of the present-day forms of krugovaia poruka are for the workings of legal institutions. With krugovaia poruka in practice, no equality in the face of the law can be observed, laws are not enforced universally, and little respect is paid to the law. Krugovaia poruka practices help reproduce obstacles to the establishment of the rule of law

Kapsamun, “Sprava ‘nedotorkannykh,’” Den, 22 June 2017, on the Internet at Source URL http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/podrobyci/sprava-nedotorkanny h, accessed 22 June 2017. 100 “Zniattia imunitetu z nardepiv: u merezhi pokazaly dokaz kruhovoi poruky v Radi,” Obozrevatel, 10 July 2017, on the Internet at https://www.obozrevatel.co m/ukr/politics/35690-znyattya-imunitetu . . ., accessed 10 July 2017; “’Svoikh ne zdaiemo’: u Yatseniuka zastupylysia za pidozriuvanykh u koruptsii nardepiv,” Obozrevatel, 11 July 2017, on the Internet at https://www.obozrevat el.com/ukr/politica/45389-svoih-ne-zdaemo-u . . ., accessed 11 July 2017; Romaniuk and Kravets, “Nedorokanni ‘kamikadze’, abo Rada svoikh ne zdaie,” Ukrainska pravda, 12 July 2017, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.c om.ua/articles/2017/07/12/7149373/, accessed 12 July 2017; and Oksana Stavniichuk, Mykola Vyhovskyi, and Oleksii Vedrov, “Kruhova poruka ta try modeli povedinky: yak fraktsii holosovaly za zniattia nedotorkannosti,” Ukrainska pravda, 13 July 2017, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.ua/a rticles/2017/07/13/7149540, accessed 13 July 2017. 101 Alena V. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 91-2.

106 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO and reinforce traditional features of political culture that in turn impede the possibility for a radical change.102

Accordingly, lifting of immunity of Rada deputies in the summer of 2017 proceeded in harmony with the rule: immunity for our friends, criminal cases for opponents. As Ukrainska pravda put it, “they reward each other so as not to become the next victim of an investigation. Therefore, it is thought that every one of them has something to hide from law enforcement bodies.”103 The Constitutional Court ruled the Poroshenko proposal constitutional in June 2018,104 but the measure was left to the Zelenskyy administration in 2019 to adopt the necessary legislation, not before Rada deputies had made a last-ditch effort to gut the legislation.105 As of 1 January 2020, therefore, Ukrainian parliamentarians’ immunity was limited to actions in speech and voting; they were no longer immune from criminal prosecution for other reasons—a small, if belated, victory for Poroshenko.

102 Ibid., 114. 103 Stavniichuk et al., “Kruhova poruka ta try modeli povedinky.” The Samopomich fraction showed itself the most principled, by voting to suspend immunity for all five deputies in question; the Opposition Bloc boycotted the vote; the Rebirth fraction was almost completely absent; the Radicals defended only two of the deputies; Fatherland was unanimous in bringing three of the deputies to account; and the BPP and Popular Front exhibited no unanimity at all on any of those under consideration. Ibid. 104 “KS vyznav konstytutsiinym zakonoprekt Poroshenka pro zniattia deputatskoi nedotorkannosti,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 20 June 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.u a/article/print/POLITICS/ks-viznav-konstituciynim-zako . . ., accessed 20 June 2018. 105 “Zamist skasuvannia nedotorkannosti, komitet Rady vyrishyv ii posylyty,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 16 December 2019, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/pri nt/POLITICS/zamist-skasuvannya-nedot . . ., accessed 16 December 2019; “Rada zatverdyla zminy do zakonodavstva shchodo zniattia nedotorkannosti z narodnykh deputativ,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 18 December 2019, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/rada-zatverdila-zmini-do-k . . ., accessed 18 December 2019; and “Verkhovna Rada ostatochno skasuvala deputatsku nedotorkannist,” Vysokyi zamok, 18 December 2019, on the Internet at https://wz.lviv.ua/article/402858-verkhovna-rada-skasuvala-dep . . ., accessed 18 December 2018.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 107

Poroshenko’s Institutional Changes As part of our assessment of the main drivers, other than patronalism, at the apex of Ukrainian politics we move now to consider the key initiatives by President Poroshenko in regard to major institutional changes. Bearing in mind the definition of politics adopted from Bartolini, we limit our focus to law-related institutions primarily: anti-corruption agencies, law enforcement, the prosecution service, and the courts. The objective is to ascertain the degree to which such institutional changes as were introduced by Poroshenko effected a reduction in informal practices—corruption, kruhova poruka, bribery, decisions by understandings, telephone justice—bringing the political system closer to the rule of law than that which had prevailed hitherto. Unlike other analyses,106 I am not so much interested in plotting Ukraine’s progress on liberal democratic and market reforms as in mapping the distribution of and contestation for power through the principal institutions dealing with the law.

The ACAs Three completely new anticorruption agencies (ACAs) were introduced by the Poroshenko government in response to public pressure and, more importantly, IMF and European Commission requirements regarding the relaxation of visa restrictions between the EU and Ukraine. The first of these was the National Anticorruption Bureau (Natsionalne antykoruptsiine biuro Ukrainy—NABU), the investigative body for the overall operation of countering political corruption.107 Endowed with wide powers of search and seizure, its director was to be appointed by the president following competitive selection, and its independence was supposedly also guaranteed. Oversight of the NABU was to be effected by a Rada 106 For example, Hale and Orttung, eds. Beyond the Euromaidan. 107 Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, “Pro Natsionalne antykoruptsiine biuro,” 14 October 2014, on the Verkhovna Rada website at http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/169 8-18; and Vira Vallie, Koruptsiia: Rozdumy pislia Maidanu (Kyiv: Dukh i Litera, 2015), 228-33.

108 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO committee as well as a citizens’ council.108 In pursuit of its responsibilities specified in its own and other statutes, it was to cooperate with other anticorruption and law enforcement bodies, but these relationships were left to the vagaries of interdepartmental rivalry and conflict which soon made themselves manifest. Secondly, the National Agency for Corruption Prevention (Natsionalna ahentsiia z pytan zapobihannia koruptsii—NAZK), the policy-making arm, was responsible for policy analysis and formulation, strategic planning, and education. In addition, it would administer and maintain a register of electronic asset declarations (e-declarations) required annually of politicians and public officials, would also keep a record of persons convicted of corrupt crimes, and oversee political party finances and accounting.109 In sum, it would develop anticorruption policies, strategies, and expertise, and serve as official record-keeper. The third new body, the Specialized Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office (Spetsializovana antykoruptsiina prokuratura—SAP), would be the prosecutorial component taking up the function of prosecuting before the courts cases referred to it by NABU; it would be separate from the regular Prosecutor-General’s Office (PGO). Soon after being established, however, it became obvious that the independence and effectiveness of these bodies was in serious jeopardy. Dysfunctionality was perhaps inevitable, since these new agencies were inserted into an institutional field with no clear provision for articulation or coordination of their activities with those of the various pre-existing crime-fighting bodies (regular police, security service, prosecutors, tax police, border and customs service). Turf wars started up and accelerated, principally between the NABU and the PGO under Lutsenko. In view of the latter’s relationship to President Poroshenko, this turmoil was no doubt a useful part of the strategy of asserting presidential control over anticorruption policy and its implementation. Indeed, a series of amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, introduced by BPP

108 Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, “Pro zapobihannia koruptsii,” 14 October 2014, on the Verkhovna Rada website at http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/1700-18. 109 Vallie, Koruptsiia, 218-21; and NAZK website.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 109 parliamentarians, strengthened the role of the PGO vis-à-vis the NABU, ensuring that the latter would be a toothless tiger in the anticorruption battle.110 Poroshenko also attempted to gain control of the three-person panel of auditors of the NABU (one each proposed by the president, the prime minister, and the Rada) whose recommendation as to unsatisfactory work could result in the NABU director’s dismissal. The PA tried to pressure the Rada to appoint someone who would be in the president’s pocket, but the attempt failed.111 Another scandal erupted when Poroshenko appointed Pavlo Zhebrivskyi as his nominee as NBU auditor; the decision was appealed to the courts by the Ukrainian branch of Transparency International and others on grounds that the appointee clearly lacked the qualifications required by law. Formerly governor of Donetsk oblast and awarded the Order of Yaroslav the Wise by Poroshenko, Zhebrivskyi resigned as auditor six months later.112 Investigation 110 Olena Shcherban and Tetiana Peklun, “Proekt zmin do KPK, abo Vsiu vladu— henprokurorovi Lutsenku,” Ukrainska pravda, 26 October 2016, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/10/26/7124853/, accessed 13 May 2017. 111 “Rada ne zmohla obraty ‘audytora’ efektyvnosti NABU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 23 February 2017, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/radane-zmogla-obrati-auditora-ef . . ., accessed 23 February 2017; Romaniuk, “Viina z(a) NABU, abo Kyshenkovyi audytor Bankovoi,” Ukrainska pravda, 17 March 2017, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2017/03/17/713 8444/, accessed 17 March 2017; “Antykoruptsiinyi komitet provede povtornyi konkurs na audytora NABU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 22 March 2017; “Audyt u NABU: za shcho boriatsia storony konfliktu,” Tyzhden, 22 March 2017, on the Internet at permanent URL http://tyzhden.ua/Politics/188235, accessed 7 April 2017; “Antykoruptsiinyi komitet Rady oholosyv novyi kurs na posadu audytora NABU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 5 April 2017, on the Internet at http://dt.ua /article/print/POLITICS/antikorupciyniy-komitet-radi-og . . ., accessed 10 April 2017; and “Soboliev nazvav sylnykh kandydativ na konkursi v auditory NABU vid Rady,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 18 April 2017, on the Internet at http://dt.u a/article/print/POLITICS/sobolyev-nazvav-silnih-kandidat . . ., accessed 18 April 2017. 112 Interfax Ukraine, “Poroshenko Includes Zhebrivsky into NABU Audit Commission,” Kyiv Post, 20 June 2018, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com /ukraine-politics/poroshenko-inludes-zhe . . ., accessed 21 June 2018; Bermet Talant, “Anti-Graft Activists Question Zhebrivsky’s Appointment as NABU Auditor,” Kyiv Post, 20 June 2018, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com /ukraine-politics/anti-graft-activists-object . . ., accessed 21 June 2018; “Transparency International podala v sud na Poroshenka cherez pryznachennia Zhebrivskoho,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 27 June 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/

110 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO and prosecution of cases of corruption proceeded at a snail’s pace, due to lack of resources and experience on the part of NABU and its investigators, and the unreformed court system—as well as perhaps the lesser capabilities of the SAP prosecutors.113 In mid-2017, for example, in one-third of cases forwarded by NABU to the courts, trials had not yet begun.114 There were also reports that in 2017 both NABU and NAZK were regularly getting their marching orders clandestinely after dark from the PA on Bank Street in Kyiv.115 Meanwhile, President Poroshenko was criticizing the unsatisfactory results of the country’s anti-corruption efforts, calling on prosecutors to punish high-level bribe-takers, depicting himself

article/print/POLITICS/transparency-international-podala-v-sud-naporoshenka . . ., accessed 27 June 2018; and “Zhebrivskyi podav zaiavu pro zvilnennia z posady audytora NABU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 19 December 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/zhebrivskiy-podav-zay avu-. . ., accessed 19 December 2018. 113 National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, Report; August 2016-February 2017, 12-18, from the NABU website; “Sohodni NABU vypovniuietsia 2 roky vid pochatku diialnosti,” Vysokyi zamok, 16 April 2017, on the Internet at http:// wz.lviv.ua/news/197348-sohodni-nabu-vypoviuietsia-2-roky- . . ., accessed 18 April 2017; “U NABU prozvituvaly za dva roky diialnosti,” Vysokyi zamok, 18 April 2017, on the Internet at http://wz.lviv.ua/ukraine/197437-u-nabu-prozv ituvaly-za-dva-roky-d . . ., accessed 18 April 2017; “NABU: ‘Rynok koruptsii v Ukraini stanovyt 85 miliardiv,’” Vysokyi zamok, 24 April 2017, on the Internet at http://wz.lviv.ua/news/197790-nabu-rynok-koruptsii-v-ukraini-stano . . ., accessed 24 April 2017; and Maria Popova, “Ukraine’s Politicized Courts,” in Hale and Orttung, Beyond the Euromaidan, 143-61. 114 Natsionalne antykoruptsiine biuro Ukrainy, “In 26 of 86 NABU’s proceedings the trials have not started yet,” on the NABU website at https://nabu.gov.ua/e n/print/novyny/26-out-of-86-nabus-proceedings-tri . . ., accessed 26 September 2017; and “Maizhe tretyna skerovanykh do sudiv sprav NABU zalyshaiutsia bez sudovoho rozhliadu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 12 June 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/UKRAINE/mayzhe-tretina-skerovanih-do-s . . ., accessed 12 June 2017. 115 Irina Shevchenko, “NABU i borba s korruptsiei: dva goda bez vidimogo rezultata,” UNIAN, 13 April 2017, on the Internet at https://www.unian.net/pol itics/1875856-nabu-i-borba-s-korruptsiey . . ., accessed 13 April 2017; “NAZK otrymalo zavdannia vid Bankovoi sklasty protokol na Leshchenka—dzherelo,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 1 December 2016, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print /POLITICS/nazk-otrimalo-zavdannya-vid-ban . . ., accessed 1 December 2016; and “Zahrozhuie konfiskatsiia: NAZK znaishlo porushennia pry kupivli kvartyry Leshchenko,” Obozrevatel, 1 December 2016, on the Internet at http://ukr.o bozrevatel.com/crime/37602-chi-zagrozhue-konfiskatsiya- . . ., accessed 1 December 2016.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 111 as corruption-fighter-in-chief, and demanding an end to the ACAs’ internecine conflicts—although his involvement in the Panama Papers scandal seriously weakened his credibility.116 When results of its first wave were announced the e-declaration program overseen by NAZK sent a shock wave through Ukrainian society. Open to public scrutiny at public.nazk.gov.ua, the register of e-declarations for the year 2015 from 50,000 government officials and parliamentarians on behalf of themselves and their families harvested 114,244 documents by the reporting deadline of 30 October 2016.117 They revealed that, despite their modest official salaries, members of Ukraine’s political elite were extremely wealthy: there were UAH and US Dollar millionaires among them, while ordinary Ukrainians were earning a monthly wage 116 “Poroshenko rozkrytykuvav rezultaty borotby z koruptsiieiu v Ukraini,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 10 December 2015, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/prin t/POLITICS/poroshenko-rozkritikuvav-rezultat . . ., accessed 10 December 2015; “Poroshenko zaklykav Shokina, Sytnyka i Yatseniuka pokaraty vysokopostavlenykh khabarnykiv,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 12 February 2016, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/poroshenko-zaklikav-shokina-sitn . . ., accessed 12 February 2016; “Prezydent nazvav sebe holovnym bortsem u viini z koruptsiieiu i nakazav chynovnykam ‘vyvernuty kysheni,’” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 11 August 2016, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/presi dent-nazvav-sebe-golovnim- . . ., accessed 11 August 2016; “Poroshenko vymahaie prypynyty konflikt mizh antykoruptsiinymy orhanamy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 30 November 2016, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/p oroshenko-vimagaye-pripiniti-ko . . ., accessed 30 November 2016; and Romaniuk and Kravets, “Panama-mama. Khto z ukraintsiv zasvityvsia u ofshornomu skandali,” Ukrainska pravda 10 May 2016, on the Internet at http://www.pravda .com.ua/articles/2016/05/10/7108020/, accessed 10 May 2016. 117 Shaun Walker, “Ukraine Stunned as Vast Cash Reserves of Political Elite are Made Public,” Guardian, 31 October 2016, on the Internet at https://www.guar dian.com/world/2016/oct/31/ukraine-stunned-as . . ., accessed 31 October 2016; “Ukraina shokovana deklaratsiiamy chynovnykiv—Reuters,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 31 October 2016, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/POLITI CS/ukrayina-shokovana-deklaraciyam . . ., accessed 31 October 2016; Kapsamun, “’E-deklarovani ‘revoliutsionery,’” Den, 31 October 2016, on the Internet at permanent URL http://day.kiev.ua/uk/article/tema-dnya-podrobyc i/e-deklarovani-revolyucionery, accessed 2 November 2016; “’Opora’ pidrakhuvala miliardy ‘na rukakh’ u narodnykh deputativ,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 1 November 2016, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/oporapidrahuvala-milyardi-na-r . . ., accessed 1 November 2016; and Andrew E. Kramer, “In Ukraine, Not Even the Top Banker Trusts the Banks,” New York Times, 1 November 2016, on the Internet at http://nytimes.com/2016/11/02/world/ europe/ukraine-banks-co . . ., accessed 2 November 2016.

112 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO equivalent to US$200; they owned an impressive collection of real estate, works of art, expensive automobiles and watches; and they kept large amounts (hundreds of thousands, in some cases millions, each) in cash in USD, Euros, and UAH, a reflection of the fragility of the Ukrainian banking system. Reporting on this, newspapers focused especially on parliamentarians, whose salaries were a mere 75,000 UAH (or US$5,000 at 25 UAH per US dollar); some of them had failed to submit their e-declarations altogether.118 The glaring discrepancies between incomes and wealth called for closer scrutiny; it was up to the three ACAs to investigate, draw up charges, and prosecute where evidence or strong suspicion of corruption accounted for the gap. There were obstacles to doing so. The second wave (January-April 2017) became bogged down in technical difficulties, with calls for the NAZK director to be dismissed for incompetence.119 At the end of her two-year term in March 2018, Natalia Korchak was replaced by Oleksandr Manhula, a businessman and bureaucrat with BPP connections.120 Production of charges arising from the information in the e-declarations proceeded very slowly. At the beginning of April 2017, for example, NAZK reported that after going through 3,000 of them, ten were being passed to NABU for processing and seventeen charge sheets for misdemeanors had

118 “Festival zhadibnosti: pro shcho rozpovily ukraintsiam deklaratsii deputativ i chynovnykiv,” Obozrevatel, 31 October 2016, on the Internet at http://ukr.obozr evatel.com/finance/business-and-finance/59402-festiv . . ., accessed 1 November 2016; and “Liubyteli keshu: skilky hotivky u nardepiv ta yak vony ii zberihaiut,” Ukrainska pravda, 4 November 2016, on the Internet at http://www.prav da.com.ua/articles/2016/11/4/7140560/, accessed 4 November 2016. 119 “Druha khvylia: Chy ye vy deklarantom?” Ukrainska pravda, 26 January 2017; Dmytro Kotliar, “Druha khvylia. FAQ dlia novykh e-deklarantiv: shcho i yak deklaruvaty?” Ukrainska pravda, 31 January 2017, on the Internet at http://ww w.pravda.com.ua/articles/2017/01/31/7133648/, accessed 31 January 2017; Romaniuk and Kravets, “Hodivnychka dlia ministriv. Shcho zapysano v deklaratsiiakh chynovnykiv,” Ukrainska pravda, 7 April 2017, on the Internet at http://pravda.com.ua/articles/2017/04/7/7140500/, accessed 7 April 2017; and “NAZK vidmovylasia vidpravyty Korchak,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 7 April 2017. 120 Valentyna Romanenko, “NAZK obralo sobi novoho holovu,” Ukrainska pravda, 28 March 2018, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2018/03 /28/7176056/, accessed 28 March 2018; and “NAZK obralo novoho holovu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 28 March 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/ POLITICS/nazk-obralo-novogo-golovu-27 . . ., accessed 28 March 2018.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 113 been issued.121 This meant that the agency had found fault with fewer than one per cent of officials’ asset declarations, a proportion wildly at variance with Ukraine’s standing in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. Only in May 2017 did NABU obtain full and direct access to the database of e-declarations, thus eliminating an unnecessary extra filtering step in the process of uncovering, investigating, and prosecuting cases of corruption.122 And only in January 2018, did NABU send to the courts the first case arising from falsification of an e-declaration.123 Then under the guise of providing an exemption for military personnel, the Rada passed and Poroshenko signed into law in March 2018 amendments which “require all activists of anti-corruption nongovernmental organizations, their contractors, donors, investigative journalists and potentially even anti-corruption protesters to file publicly accessible electronic asset declarations, similar to those now required of state officials.”124 This would effectively have turned the tables on anti-corruption activists and civil society generally, making them the target rather than an auxiliary of the ACAs. Objections to this new legislation voiced by representatives of the EU were of no avail.125 The NAZK’s internal difficulties helped turn 121 “NAZK peredalo do NABU rezultaty perevirky 10 e-deklaratsii,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 3 April 2017, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/ nazk-peredalo-do-nabu-rezultati . . ., accessed 10 April 2017. 122 “NABU otrymalo povnyi dostup do reiestru deklaratsii,” Den. 11 May 2017, on the Internet at permanent URL http://day.kiev.ua/uk/news/110517-nabu-otr ymalo-povny-dostup-do-reyestru-deklaraciy, accessed 11 May 2017. 123 “NABU peredalo do sudu pershu spravu pro nevirni dani v e-deklaratsii,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 26 January 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print /UKRAINE/nabu-peredalo-do-sudu-pershu . . ., accessed 26 January 2018. 124 Sukhov, “Poroshenko’s Revenge,” Kyiv Post, 31 March 2017. 125 “Khan rozkrytykuvav proval skasuvannia e-deklaratsii dlia antykoruptsioneriv,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 28 March 2018, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/p rint/POLITICS/han-rozkritikuvav-proval-skasu . . ., accessed 28 March 2018; “YeK vymahaie vid Ukrainy skasuvaty deklaratsii dlia antykoruptsioneriv,” Den, 28 March 2018, on the Internet at Source URL https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/ne ws/280318-yek-vymagaye-vid-ukrainy-skasuvaty-deklaraciyi-dlya-antykorup cioneriv, accessed 28 March 2018; and Interfax-Ukraine, “EU-Ukraine Association Council Stresses Need to Abolish Mandatory Declaration for Anti-corruption Activists,” Kyiv Post, 17 December 2018, on the Internet at https://www.ky ivpost.com/ukraine-politics/eu-ukraine-associati . . ., accessed 18 December 2018.

114 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO it into a pliable tool of the executive instead of fighting corruption. Perhaps they were symptomatic of that transformational process.126 Its record of performance was dismal: as of November 2017, NAZK had reviewed a mere 113 e-declarations out of 1.5 million, and found violations in just seven; by the following spring, 193 out of 1.2 million had been examined; and by mid-2018, still fewer than 200 out of nearly two million submitted declarations.127 Its officers

126 For some examples of this dysfunctionality, see: “NAZK prykhovalo edeklaratsii pratsivnykiv HPU ta viiskovykh prokuratur,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 14 April 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/UKRAINE/nazk-pri hovalo-deklaraciyi-pra . . ., accessed 14 April 2017; “Ne proishly perevirky: stalo vidomo pro neliustrovanykh chleniv NAZK,” Obozrevatel, 24 April 2017, on the Internet at https://www.obozrevatel.com/politics/62540-ne-proshli-proverki -stalo-izvestno-o-nelyustrirovanyih-chlenah-napk.htm; Sukhov, “Agency Fails to Check Asset Declarations, Investigates Critics,” Kyiv Post, 19 May 2017, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/agency-fails-chec k-asset . . ., accessed 19 May 2017; “U NAZK pochaly znyshchuvaty dokazy falsifikatsii—ZMI,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 15 November 2017, on the Internet at https: //dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/u-zpochali-znischuvati-dokazi-fa . . ., accessed 15 November 2017; Oleksandr Liemienov, “Antykoruptsiinyi tsuhtsvanh Petra Poroshenka,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 8 December 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/internal/anticorupciyniy-cugcvang-perta-po . . ., accessed 8 December 2017; “Vid roboty koni dokhnut, a holova NAZK use bahatiie,” Vysokyi zamok, 27 December 2017, on the Internet at http://wz.lviv.u a/ukraine/212759-vid-roboty-koni-dokhnut-a-holova . . ., accessed 29 December 2017; Halyna Yanchenko, “Imitatsiia burkhlyvoi diialnosti. Yak NAZK ‘rozsliduie’ konflikt interesiv,” Ukrainska pravda, 21 February 2019, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2019/02/21/7207280/, accessed 21 February 2019; “Proval roboty NAZK: perevireno lyshe 331 deklaratsiiu, robota nad usima zaime 3600 rokiv,” UNIAN, 20 July 2018, on the Internet at https://www.unian.ua/politics/10193931-proval-roboti-nazk-pere vir . . ., accessed 20 July 2018; and Olena Shcherban, Yurii Nikolov, and Andrii Savin, “Kryve dzerkalo zapobihannia koruptsii: top-10 provalnykh rishen NAZK,” Ukrainska pravda, 17 January 2019, on the Internet at https://www.pra vda.com.ua/articles/2019/01/17/7203961/, accessed 17 January 2019. 127 “NAZK perevirylo 113 z 1,5 milioniv e-deklaratsii,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 28 November 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/ECONOMICS/na zk-perevirilo-113-z-1-5-m . . ., accessed 29 November 2017; Olena Prokopenko, “Why Ukraine’s Major Achievement in Government Transparency May fail,” Atlantic Council, 2 April 2018, on the Internet at http://www.atlanticcouncil.or g/blogs/ukrainealert/why-ukraine-s-maj . . ., accessed 24 April 2018; and Liemienov, “Druziam use, voroham zakon,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 1 June 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/internal/druzyam-use-vorogam-za kon-279 . . ., accessed 7 June 2018.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 115 became embroiled in corruption themselves.128 A whistleblower who came forward with accusations of impropriety was herself severely dealt with, further discrediting the agency.129 All of this was made moot in early 2019, when the Constitutional Court ruled that the section of the law on illicit enrichment was unconstitutional, which effectively closed down all cases related to the e-declaration system and foreclosed any future proceedings thereunder.130 128 Farion, “Antykoruptsiinyi orhan pohruz u . . . koruptsii? Vysokyi zamok, 15 November 2017, on the Internet at http://wz.lviv.ua/ukraine/210369-antykorupt siinyi-orhan-pohruz-u-k . . ., accessed 15 November 2017; and “U spravi proty NAZK fihuruie khabar na 1 mln hryven,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 23 November 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/u-spravi-proti-nazkfiguruye-ha . . ., accessed 23 November 2017 129 Bratushchak, “Vykryvalnytsia NAZK vs ‘kurator’ z Bankovoi,” Ukrainska pravda, 15 November 2017, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com,ua/artic les/2017/11/15/7162166/, accessed 15 November 2017; “Solomatina zaiavyla pro zaboronu Korchak vyvchaty dokumenty kandydativ do Verkhovnoho sudu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 15 November 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/art icle/print/POLITICS/solomatina-zayavila-pro-zaboro . . ., accessed 15 November 2017; “NAZK podalo v sud na Solomatinu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 15 November 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/napkpodalo-v-sud-na-solomati . . ., accessed 18 November 2017; “Kryminalne provadzhennia shchodo kerivnytstva NAZK peredaly Sluzhbi bezpeky,” Tyzhden, 17 November 2017, on the Internet at permanent site https://tyzhden. ua/News/204123, accessed 17 November 2017; and “Solomatina maie namir sudytysia z Lutsenkom cherez peredachu SBU spravy pro koruptsiiu u NAZK,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 18 November 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/a rticle/print/POLITICS/solomatina-maye-namir-suditis . . ., accessed 18 November 2017. 130 Grytsenko, “Media: Constitutional Court Abolishes Criminal Penalty for Illegal Enrichment,” Kyiv Post, 27 February 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyiv post.com/ukraine-politics/media-constitutional . . ., accessed 27 February 2019; Brian Bonner, “Transparency International: Constitutional Court Ruling ‘Undermines Anti-corruption Achievements in Ukraine,’” Kyiv Post, 2 March 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/transparency-interna . . ., accessed 4 March 2019; Interfax-Ukraine, “NABU on Constitutional Court’s Decision: Cases on Illicit Enrichment Will be Closed,” Kyiv Post, 27 February 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politi cs/nabu-on-constitution . . ., accessed 28 February 2019; Tsentr protydii koruptsii, “Zakryttia 65 sprav NABU i vtrata transhu MVF: naslidky rishennia Konstytutsiinoho sudu,” Ukrainska pravda, 27 February 2019, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2019/02/27/7207791/, accessed 27 February 2019; Transparency International Secretariat, “Constitutional Court Ruling Undermines Anti-Corruption Achievements in Ukraine,” 1 March 2019, on the Internet at https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/constitu tional- . . ., accessed 1 March 2019; and “Ukraine’s NABU Ends Multiple

116 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO In general, the record of effectiveness of the three ACAs during President Poroshenko’s watch was remarkably modest, if not dismal, yet understandable. For example, while the total number of charges drawn up, as recorded in the official register, rose from 2,870 in 2015, to 6,743 in 2019, the proportion that proceeded to trial annually actually fell from 60.7 per cent to 38.2 over the same period.131 NABU’s share of criminal cases prepared, meanwhile, rose only slightly from 714 in 2017, to 767 in 2019, as did its percentage of cases actually presented in court—from 12.7 per cent to 17.2 per cent.132 NABU thus showed itself to be much less aggressive in the pursuit of corruption, the very opposite of its intended role: instead of leading, it was following. By the end of his term of office, not only had Poroshenko not brought the informal practice of political corruption under control by establishing the new institutions for combatting it, but in the process of creating and operating these structures also introduced additional informal practices effectively undermining their proper operation. So much for the argument that building formal institutions can subsume or remove informal political practices exposing hidden political activity to the bright light of day. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Ukraine’s rating rose from 26 points in 2014 to 32 in 2018, but then slipped by two points in 2019 (ranking 126th out of 180 countries, in the company of Azerbaijan, Djibouti, and Kyrgyzstan), a regression attributable to the manifest weakening of the country’s anti-corruption agencies.133

Criminal Proceedings After Illicit Enrichment Legalization,” Hromadske TV, 20 March 2019, on the Internet at https://en.hromadske.ua/posts/ukraines-nabuends-multiple-cri . . ., accessed 21 March 2019. 131 Trepak, Protydiia koruptsii v Ukraini: teoretyko-prykladni problemy (Lviv: Vydavnytstvo LNU imeni Ivana Franka, 2020), 305-6. 132 Ibid., 306. 133 Transparency International, Ukraine, “Corruption Perception Index 2019,” on the Internet at https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/corruption-perceptions-ind ex-2019, accessed 29 September 2021.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 117

The DBR/SBI Viability of the three ACAs together with the struggle against corruption was further complicated by the Poroshenko regime’s introduction of another new institution, the State Bureau of Investigation (Derzhavne biuro rozsliduvan—DBR), another of the president’s initiatives. Created under a law passed in November 2015, it had a long period of gestation due to back-room political maneuvers. Its first director, Roman Truba, was finally selected two years later and the agency began operation only in 2018. Ironically, one of its first and most high-profile subjects for investigation became Poroshenko himself. According to the law under which it was established, the SBI was to investigate: crimes committed by organized crime groups; torture and inhumane treatment by law enforcement bodies; crimes (other than corruption) committed by high government officials; misdemeanors perpetrated by NABU and SAP officials; and cases involving military crimes and matters related to confiscation of property.134 It would thus take over the investigative function of the Prosecutor-General’s Office, limiting the latter to a prosecutorial and supervisory role. Hitherto, the PGO, a successor to the Sovietera procuracy (prokuratura), had been a kind of state-within-thestate, investigating, prosecuting, and supervising the legality of the court system and its own actions. The change would bring the prosecutor’s office into line with European counterparts. During the DBR/SBI’s gestation, there were many indications leading to suspicions about its political underpinnings and potential.135 Delay in the process of selecting a director was due to 134 Philipp Fluri and Valentyn Badrak, eds., Anti-Corruption Measures in Ukraine After the Revolution of Dignity: Key Legislative Aspects (Geneva and Kyiv: Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies, 2016), Appendix II, “Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Bureau of Investigation of Ukraine,’ 127-51. 135 This paragraph is based on: “Yak halmuietsia stvorennia DBR,” Tyzhden, 1 October 2016, on the Internet at permanent URL http://tyzhden.ua/Politics/1751 58, accessed 6 December 2016; Liemienov, “Derzhavne biuro rozsliduvan. Yak kuietsia peremoha prezydenta,” Ukrainska pravda, 12 December 2016, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/12/12/7129564/, accessed 12 December 2016; Liemienov, “DBR: nezalezhnomu orhanu—zalezhne kerivnytstvo,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 15 November 2017, on the Internet at https://dt

118 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO infighting between the BPP and PF factions represented on the appointment panel. When the president’s preferred candidate was eliminated (by reason of accusations brought forward by the same whistleblower mentioned earlier, Hanna Solomatina, that he was the PA’s smotriashchii within NAZK), Truba’s candidacy as replacement entailed vetting first by Poroshenko’s people and eventually the chief executive himself. It was commonly understood that the SBI would come under the president’s purview, with the expectation that it could be used politically to pursue his opponents and to protect his allies. It would also serve as a kind of Damocles’ Sword over the heads of the NABU and SAP, in the same manner. Regardless of the legislative provisions, the new body was bound to stimulate conflicts and competing efforts to control it on the part of other law enforcement bodies. In that connection, it may be relevant to mention that, while in 1992, there were only four bodies with operational-investigative powers, by 2020, with the addition of the SBI, there were ten. As has been pointed out, this may indicate the state’s commitment to fighting crime, but it also opens the way for duplication of efforts, working at cross-purposes, turf wars, and greater chances for human rights abuses—ever an Achilles’ Heel of

.ua/article/print/internal/dbr-nezalezhnomu-organu-zalezhn . . ., accessed 16 November 2017; “Kandydaturu Truby z Poroshenkom pohodzhuvav Turchynov z podachi Pashynskoho—ekspert,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 17 November 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/kandidaturu-tr ubi-z-poroshenk . . ., accessed 17 November 2017; Bratushchak, “’Fars.’ Yak Poroshenko z Tyrchynovym rozpysaly Biuro rozsliduvan,” Ukrainska pravda, 17 November 2017, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2017/ 11/17/7162408/, accessed 17 November 2017; “’Zlochyntsiv—do viaznyts’: Poroshenko dav pershi vkazivky novoobranomu holovi DBR,” Obozrevatel, 22 November 2017, on the Internet at https://www.obozrevatel.com/ukr/politics/zlochintsiv-do-vyaznits-p . . ., accessed 22 November 2017; Liemienov, “Zakulisni intryhy DBR: liustruvaty ne mozhe pomyluvaty,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 1 December 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/internal/zakul isni-intrigi-dbr-lyustruvati-n . . ., accessed 4 December 2017; Liemienov, “Kalamutna prozorist DBR,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 14 January 2018, on the Internet at htt ps://dt.ua/article/print/internal/kalamutna-prozorist-dbr-65981_.html, accessed 18 January 2018; and Oksana Kovalenko, “Mizh nezalezhnistiu i politykam. Chy pochne Derzhbiuro rozsliduvan sadzhaty chynovnykiv?” Ukrainska pravda, 2 February 2018, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/art icles/2018/02/2/7170338/, accessed 2 February 2018.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 119 law enforcement agencies.136 Creating the SBI, therefore, would likely make the struggle against corruption and crime more complicated, and hence less effective, than the reverse. Ultimately, the intent to utilize the SBI politically can be inferred from the fact that the president’s ability to appoint and dismiss its director and top leadership was clearly unconstitutional.137 This was an institutionalization of informal practice, not its attenuation or elimination. The actual operation of the SBI subsequently under Zelenskyy will be covered in the next chapter; for the time being we underline only its political origins under Poroshenko.

The Anti-Corruption Court On 22 December 2017, President Poroshenko presented to the Rada a draft bill on a totally new anti-corruption court which would deal exclusively with corruption cases. Ostensibly meant to bypass the regular court system, the proposal was not without its political aspects or antecedents. An early advocate of such institutional change was the NABU Director, Artem Sytnyk, who pointed out that in contested cases transmitted to the courts by his agency, as opposed to plea deals, proceedings were being dragged out inordinately and court dockets overloaded, with bad results in terms of combatting corruption.138 While European Union representatives as well as local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) encouraged the initiative, domestic political lobbies resisted it.139 In the Verkhovna Rada the first such bill was 136 Trepak, Protydiia koruptsii v Ukraini, 307-8. 137 Ibid., 355-56. 138 “Holova Antykoruptsiinoho biuro zaproponuvav stvoryty antykoruptsiini sudy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 12 August 2016. 139 “Yevrokomisar rekomendovav Ukraini stvoryty antykoruptsiini sudy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 16 September 2016; Sydorenko, “Prezydent Venetsianskoi komisii: V Ukraini antykorptsiinyi sud ye spravdi neobkhidnym,” Yevropeiska pravda, 13 October 2016, on the Internet at permanent URL http://www.euroint egration.com.ua/internview/2016/10/13/7055823 . . ., accessed 13 October 2016; “Systema antykoruptsiinykh sudiv Ukrainy mohla b vkliuchaty v sebe visim sudovykh palat—ekspert,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 3 December 2016, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/sistema-antikorupciynih-sudi v-ukr . . ., accessed 7 December 2016; “Vakarchuk peredav Poroshenku lysta pro neobkhidnist stvorennia povnotsinnoi systemy nezalezhnkh

120 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO introduced in February 2017, by way of response to the clamor over this issue.140 A second bill appeared later as well. It was not until October, however, that President Poroshenko, hitherto openly skeptical about such a project, joined the fray: if there had to be an anticorruption court, then it had to be his version of it.141 Ignoring the two parliamentary drafts, the presidential one, accordingly, tactically incorporated only some of the Venice Commission’s recommendations, elided others, and totally neglected the rest. It was a antykoruptsiinykh sudiv,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 14 December 2016, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/UKRAINE/vakarchuk-peredav-poroshenko-li . . ., accessed 14 December 2016; Sydorenko, “Hlava misii YeS: U vas nemaie chasu chekaty stvorennia antykoruptsiinoho sudu,” Yevropeiska pravda, 6 February 2017, on the Internet at http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/interview/2017/ 02/6/7061193/ . . ., accessed 6 February 2017; “Posol YeS zaproponuvav vladi Ukrainy pryskoryty stvorennia antykoruptsiinoho sudu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 13 February 2017; “Holova Verkhovnoho sudu proty stvorennia v Ukraini antykoruptsiinoho sudu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 27 February 2017; “Ukraini hostro potribna antykoruptsiina sudova systema—Atlantic Council,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 2 March 2017, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/UKRAINE/ukrayini -gostro-potribna-antikoru . . ., accessed 2 March 2017; “Vyshcha rada pravosuddia vystupyla proty antykoruptsiinykh sudiv,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 10 March 2017; “Zaiava Posolstva SShA ta Predstavnytstva Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu v Ukraini,” European Union in Ukraine, n.d., on the Internet at https://www.facebook.co m/EUDelegationUkraine/posts/1415372575 . . ., accessed 7 March 2017; Vadym Belianevuch, “Sudy ne povynni buty pidporiadkovani politychnym orhanam vlady,” Ukrainska pravda, 14 March 2017, on the Internet at http://ww w.pravda.com.ua/columns/2017/01/14/7138027/, accessed 14 March 2017; “YeS vysunuv Ukraini zhorstoku vymohu shchodo antykoruptsiinoho sudu,” Obozrevatel, 26 April 2017, on the Internet at https://www.obozrevatel.com/uk r/politics/76298-es-visunuv-ukraini . . ., accessed 26 April 2017; and “Ukraini neobkhidno stvoryty spetsialnyi antykoruptsiinyi sud—Linkiavichius,” Den, 29 August 2017, on the Internet at Source URL https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/news/290 817-ukrayini-neobhidno-stvoryty-specialnyy-antykorupciynyy-sud-linkyavic hyus, accessed 29 August 2017. 140 “U Radi zareiestruvaly zakonoproekt pro antykoruptsiini sudy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 1 February 2017. 141 Liemienov, “Antykorouptsiini sudy ‘po-novomu’: retsept Poroshenka,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 7 October 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/ internal/antikorupciyni-sudi-po-novomo-re . . ., accessed 13 October 2017; Anastasiia Krasnosilska, “Antykoruptsiinyi sud: yakykh manipuliatsii chekaty vid prezydenta,” Ukrainska pravda, 17 October 2017, on the Internet at http://www. pravda.com.ua/articles/2017/10/17/7158685/, accessed 17 October 2017; and “Poroshenko vvazhaie neobkhidnym novyi zakonoproekt pro Antykoruptsiinyi sud,” Den, 17 October 2017, on the Internet at Source URL https://day.kyiv .ua/uk/news/171017-poroshenko-prosut-napysaty-novyy-zakonoproekt-proantykorupciynyy-sud, accessed 17 October 2017.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 121 transparent effort to obtain both EU approval (together with the forthcoming IMF tranche) along with the executive’s maximum possible control over the new body. In ignoring the Venice Commission, the draft law specifically: gave the representatives of foreign donors an advisory, rather than a decisive, role in choosing judges; restricted the court’s jurisdiction regarding cases prepared by NABU, while expanding it to deal with matters unrelated to corruption; discriminated against international donors’ ability to nominate advisors; and established unrealistic eligibility requirements on candidates for judgeships.142 Critics saw the entire exercise as an attempt at nullifying the court’s independence so as to protect Poroshenko’s friends.143 Based on the president’s draft, the Verkhovna Rada in June 2018 finally passed the legislation on the anti-corruption court; it was signed into law by Poroshenko and came into effect. At the end of that month, the president then signed another, technical law, which actually established the Higher Anti-Corruption Court, HACC (Vyshchyi Antykoruptsiinyi Sud, VAKS).144 From the start 142 “President’s Draft Law on Anticorruption Court Neglects Venice Commission Recommendations,” Map of Anticorruption Conditionalities (Embassy of the Netherlands to Ukraine), 26 December 2017, on the Internet at https://map.ant ac.org.ua/news/presidents-draft-law-on-anaticorruption-court-neglects-venice-commission-recommendations, accessed 18 October 2021; Tsentr Protydii Koruptsii, “Antykoruptsiine halmo,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 27 December 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/articles/print/internal/antikorupciyne-halmo-abo-y ak-ko . . ., accessed 27 December 2017; and Sydorenko, Olena Halushka, and Anastasiia Krasnosilska, “Ihry dovkola Antykoruptsiinoho sudu: shcho zakhovano v zakonoproekti Poroshenka,” Yevropeiska pravda, 3 January 2018, on the Internet at permanent URL http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/article s/2018/01/3/7075659/, accessed 3 January 2018. 143 Krasnosilska, “Antykoruptsiinyi sud”; Evelina Kotliarova, “Chy bude Antykoruptsiinyi sud spravdi antykoruptsiinym?” Den, 12 January 2018, on the Internet at Source URL https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/polityka/chy-bude-anty korupciynyy-sud-spravdi-antykorupciynym, accessed 12 January 2018; and “U zakonoproekti pro antykoruptsiinyi sud ye normy dlia blokuvannia yoho roboty pislia pryiniattia—Sytnyk,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 29 January 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/u-zakonoproekti-pro-antikorup c . . ., accessed 29 January 2018. 144 “Ukraine Approves Anti-Corruption Court, Fires Finance Minister,” VOA News, 7 June 2018, on the Internet at https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-a pproves-anti-corruption-court- . . ., accessed 8 June 2018; Oleg Sukhov, “AntiCorruption Court Wins: Experts Still Assessing Law,” Kyiv Post, 7 June 2018, on

122 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO of the year, the IMF and World Bank had been exerting strong pressure on Kyiv to ensure the independence and effectiveness of this new court, while the Ukrainian authorities had been using all their wiles to ensure the opposite.145 Even after all the necessary legislation had been passed, IMF Director Christine Lagarde still demanded further changes.146 Specifically, the final legislation the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/unclear-whethernew-la . . ., accessed 8 June 2018; “Venetsianska komisiia vitaie ukhvalennia zakonu pro Antykoruptsiinyi sud,” Den, 7 June 2018, on the Internet at Source URL https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/news/070618-veneciyska-komisiya-vitaye-uhva lennya-zakonu-pro-antykorupciynyy-sud, accessed 8 June 2018; Andrew Higgins, “Ukraine Approves Anticorruption Court in Bid to Unblock Foreign Aid,” New York Times, 7 June 2018, on the Internet at https://www.nytimes.com/201 8/06/07/world/europe/ukraine-corrupt . . ., accessed 8 June 2018; Krasnosilska, “Antykoruptsiinyi sud: za shcho proholosuvav parlament,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 9 June 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/internal/ant ikorupciyniy-sud-za-scho-progo . . ., accessed 26 June 2018; “Poroshenko pidpysav zakon pro Vyshchyi antykoruptsiinyi sud,” Den, 11 June 2018, on the Internet at Source URL https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/news/110618-poroshenko-pi dpysav-zakon-pro-vyshchyy-antkorupciynyy-sud, accessed 11 June 2018; “Poroshenko pidpysav zakon pro Vyshchyi antykoruptsiinyi sud,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 11 June 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS /poroshenko-pidpisav-zakon-pro- accessed 11 June 2018; “Nabuv chynnosti zakon pro Vyshchyi antykoruptsiinyi sud,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 14 June 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/nabuv-chinnosti-zakonpro-visc . . ., accessed 14 June 2018; and “Poroshenko pidpysav zakon pro stvorennia Antykoruptsiinoho sudu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 26 June 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/artcile/print/POLITICS/poroshenko-pidpisav-zakonpro . . ., accessed 26 June 2018. 145 “Svitovyi bank tezh vysunuv vymohy shchodo Antkoruptsiinoho sudu,” Ukrainska pravda, 16 January 2018, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.u a/news/2018/01/16/7168548/, accessed 16 January 2018; “Vslid za MVF prezydentskyi zakon pro Antykoruptsiinyi sud rozkrytykuvav Svitovyi bank,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 16 January 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print /POLITICS/vslid-za-mvf-prezidentskiy-zak . . ., accessed 16 January 2018; “MVF nahadav Ukraini pro zoboviazannia shchodo Antykoruptsiinoho sudu,” Den, 18 January 2018, on the Internet at Source URL https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/n ews/180118-mvf-nagadav-ukrayini-pro-zobovyazannya-shchodo-antykorupci ynogo-sudu, accessed 18 January 2018; “U Poroshenka poobitsialy vrakhuvaty rekomendatsii MVF do zakonoproektu pro antykoruptsiinyi sud,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 18 January 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITI CS/u-poroshenka-poobicyali-vrahuv . . ., accessed 18 January 2018; and Romaniuk, “Strashnyi antykoruptsiinyi sud. Chomu Ukraina svarytsia z Zakhodom,” Ukrainska pravda, 23 January 2018, on the Internet at https://www .pravda.com.ua/articles/2018/01/23/7169243/, accessed 23 January 2018. 146 Bonner, “IMF Calls for Changes to Anti-Corruption Court Law, 2 Other Steps to Restart Lending in Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, 20 June 2018, on the Internet at https:/

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 123 provided for the backlog of appeals presently existing to be assigned not directly to the new anti-corruption court, but rather to the regular courts where presumably Poroshenko’s cronies would be dealt with less harshly according to accepted custom. It would also sideline the foreign experts’ council, giving predominance instead to Ukraine’s already discredited High Qualification Commission in the selection of judges.147 Obviously, Ukraine’s president believed he could make a show of combatting corruption and still receive the $17.5 billion loan from the IMF. The Higher Anti-Corruption Court began work in earnest only in 2019,148 too late to ensnare Poroshenko and his associates—luckily for them.

/www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/imf-calls-for-changes-to- . . ., accessed 21 June 2018; and Sukhov, “Activists Say Clause in Anti-Corruption Court Law Gives ‘Amnesty’ to Officials Facing Corruption Charges,” Kyiv Post, 13 June 2018, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/activistssay-clause-in-an . . ., accessed 14 June 2018. 147 Sukhov, “Ukrainian Government Accused of Fooling the West on Anti-Graft Court,” Kyiv Post, 24 May 2018, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ ukraine-politics/ukrainian-government-a . . ., accessed 25 May 2018. 148 “V Ukraini ofitsiino zapratsiuvav Vyshchyi antykoruptsiinyi sud,” Den, 11 April 2019, on the Internet at Source URL https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/news/1104 19-v-ukrayini-oficiyno-zapracyuvav-vyshchyy-antikorupciynyy-sud, accessed 11 April 2019; “Ukraine Launches Long-Awaited Anti-Corruption Court,” AlJazeera, 12 April 2019, on the Internet at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/20 19/04/ukraine-launches-lon . . ., accessed 12 April 2019; “Antykoruptsiinomu sudu obraly holovu,” Ukrainska pravda, 7 May 2019, on the Internet at https://w ww.pravda.com.ua/news/2019/05/7/7214430/, accessed 7 May 2019; “Antykoruptsiinomu sudu obraly holovu: shcho pro nei vidomo,” Vysokyi zamok, 7 May 2019, on the Internet at https://wz.lviv.ua/article/390030-antykoruptsiin omu-sudu-obral . . ., accessed 7 May 2019; Romaniuk and Lukashova, “Shcho vidomo pro nove kerivnytstvo Antykoruptsiinoho sudu i koly vin vreshti zapratsiuie,” Ukrainska pravda, 7 May 2019, on the Internet at https://www.pra vda.com.ua/articles/2019/05/7/7214443/, accessed 13 May 2019; “Dama, yaka maie skrutyty shyiu koruptsii,” Vysokyi zamok, 8 May 2019, on the Internet at https://wz.lviv.ua/article/390108-dama-iaka-maie-skrutyty-shyi . . ., accessed 9 May 2019; and Iryna Shyba and Anastasiia Krasnosilska, “Khto stane sirym kardynalom Antykoruptsiinoho sudu,” Ukrainska pravda, 13 May 2019, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2019/05/13/7214884 /, accessed 13 May 2019.

124 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO

The National Police As is evident from the preceding examples, the impulse for executive control over other institutions—particularly law-related ones—could be considered as an informal practice in itself. The one area in which this outreach (or over-reach, perhaps) was not possible to execute for Poroshenko was in regard to the principal lawenforcement body, the police (politsiia, formerly the militsiia). The main reason for the president’s inability in this instance was that the police were within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the well-fortified fiefdom of Minister Arsen Avakov. President Poroshenko did launch a reform of the militsiia in 2015, but the reform quickly became stalled as Avakov asserted his control over the institution effectively making it impossible for the president to do so. Immediately after the 2019 elections, Poroshenko explicitly lamented his loss at the polls attributing it to the actions of the police being outside his control.149 What he meant was that the police had prevented the administration’s use of election fraud, specifically “administrative resources,” another of the post-communist polity’s notorious informal practices. In the president’s mind, his control over the institutions of the law was the natural order of things, not to be disturbed but for baleful consequences. The story of the failed attempt at police reform in Ukraine under Poroshenko is probably familiar by now:150 how the reform was

149 Sevhil Musaieva, “Petro Poroshenko: Zelenskyi—ne Holoborodko, tse tochno,” Ukrainska pravda, 29 July 2019, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/ articles/2019/07/29/7222233/, accessed 1 August 2019. 150 For quick snapshots along the way, see: Neil MacFarquhar, “Ukraine Pins Hopes for Change on Fresh-Faced Police Recruits,” International New York Times, 6 November 2015, on the Internet at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11 /07/world/europe/ukraine-pins-hope . . ., accessed 6 November 2015; Olena Makarenko, “Ukraine’s Photogenic ‘New Cops’ Went Viral, but the Real Police Reform is Yet to Start,” Euromaidan Press, 13 June 2018, on the Internet at http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/06/13/ukraines-photogenic-n . . ., accessed 23 March 2020; Sukhov, “Ukraine’s Attempt to Reform Law Enforcement is Failing Miserably,” Kyiv Post, 21 September 2018, on the Internet at https ://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/ukraines-attempt-to- . . ., accessed 27 July 2019; and Ukrainian Liaison Office in Brussels, “Three Years of the National Police Law: The History of Success and Resistance of the System,” 19

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 125 begun optimistically, with the replacement of the notorious DAIshniki by a modern-looking Patrol Police; how in just one year the reformers retreated in defeat; how the failure to reform was made manifest in continual abuses, yet neither police nor the interior minister was held accountable; and how the latter remained apparently irreplaceable despite it all.151 In brief, the process unfolded as follows. As part of its Soviet inheritance, postcommunist Ukraine’s militsiia (a Leninist invention or myth of the “armed people”—as distinct from the bourgeois counterpart), i.e., its police service, was structurally part of the ministry of the interior (Ministerstvo vnutrishnikh sprav—MVS). A militarized bureaucracy, its principal function was to act as a shield for the communist party-state against its own subjects, in the manner of a police state. Efforts after independence to change towards a Western-style model of policing were insignificant.152 After the Euromaidan, Arsen Avakov, a businessman-politician from Kharkiv and member of Tymoshenko’s Fatherland party, was appointed interior minister. As a civilian, and only the second to hold the post, his appointment gave the appearance of being a harbinger of civilian control over, as well as of needed reform of, the militsiia. Encouraged by Ukraine’s international backers, President Poroshenko invited Eka Zguladze, overseer of the successful police reform in Georgia in 2004-12, to be first deputy interior minister and architect of an analogous reform for Ukraine. Zguladze began by replacing the notoriously corrupt State Highway Inspectorate (DAI) with a new Patrol Police recruited by openly competitive examination from among applicants with higher education and remunerated at higher salaries to discourage corruption. Laws were passed to change the name of the militsiia to November 2018, on the Internet at https://ukraineoffice.blogactiv.eu/2018/11 /19/three-years-of-the- . . ., accessed 23 March 2020. 151 See, for instance, Harasymiw, “Police Reform: Challenges and Prospects,” in Revolution and War in Contemporary Ukraine: The Challenge of Change, ed. Olga Bertelsen (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2016), 353-75; and Harasymiw, “Global and Domestic Factors Affecting the Failure of Police Reform in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine,” (Paper presented at the 10th World Congress of the International Council for Central and East European Studies, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada, 3-8 August 2021), on which this section is based. 152 Harasymiw, Post-Communist Ukraine, chap. 5.

126 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO politsiia, to restructure the interior department and police, and generally to bring the latter closer to democratic principles of policing: demilitarization, de-politicization, professionalism, accountability, and public service. This was to reorient the police away from protecting the state against its citizens towards safeguarding the latter against the state. To execute the reforms, as inaugural head of the National Police of Ukraine (NPU) Poroshenko appointed Zguladze’s fellowGeorgian, Khatia Dekanoidze. The statute on the new national police was signed by President Poroshenko in August 2015; Dekanoidze’s appointment, in November. Dekanoidze immediately set about making changes: the entire force of 115,000 personnel underwent reassessment; the patrol police (15,000 freshly recruited personnel with higher education, new uniforms, and fuel-efficient cars) was separated from the criminal police; and the notorious Berkut (“special forces police,” in Andrew Wilson’s shorthand description153) was transformed into the Korpus Operatyvno-Raptovoi Dii (KORD), a rapid-response force. Unfortunately, reassessment or recertification as actually carried out identified only seven per cent of personnel as unqualified and subject to dismissal. Furthermore, of those, half were reinstated upon appeal to the law courts. Competitive selection applies only to new entries into the patrol police; it is optional for further promotion and advancement. Thus renewal of personnel has been mostly limited to the patrol police; the great bulk of the establishment has been unaffected— hence the successful institutional pushback against reform. NGO and CSO activists have been excluded from the reform process and participation in the implementation of accountability, in favor of pro-police lobbies. A year after her appointment, therefore, Dekanoidze resigned, citing political interference—pushback from the police force itself, largely unattuned to reform, and, presumably, lack of support from the minister of interior. So police reform was stillborn in Ukraine—carried out only partially instead of comprehensively, and with the police still not politically neutral.

153 Wilson, Ukraine Crisis, 74.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 127 It is interesting that in this entire process, unlike that surrounding the ACAs, SBI, and HACC, President Poroshenko was very much in the background. He did not pronounce himself an opponent or a champion of police reform. He did not draft and advance alternative legislation, did he did react to the resignations of Dekanoidze, Zguladze, and other reformers. He was a passive observer while momentous changes were being launched and sabotaged. Why was he sitting on the fence? Why did he not intervene? Was it because he need not change what was not changing/working? Or perhaps he respected that the police were in Avakov’s bailiwick—to each his own. Could it be that the police did not have jurisdiction over political corruption, a subject close to the hearts of businessmen such as Poroshenko—thus no vital interest of the business-political elite was involved? Dekanoidze was replaced by Serhii Kniazev, a career police officer, who emphasized crime-fighting and public safety as opposed to reforms. In 2018, he announced that applicants who had failed the NPU entrance examination would be given a second chance, thus further undermining renewal as well as the principle of professionalism. A report on torture and excessive use of force by the NPU in 2015-17, went unacknowledged in the NPU Annual Report of 2018, as did exclusion of CSO activists from the civilian oversight commissions. A series of incidents reported in the media from 2016 through to 2019 of unsolved murders, instances of police brutality, mismanagement, and incompetence, led to repeated calls for the resignation of both the national police chief and the minister of interior but without effect. Accordingly, while public trust in the NPU increased between 2015 and 2018 generally, by February 2020, distrust of the “reformed” patrol police was several times as great as that for the “unreformed” NPU as a whole—a paradoxical result in terms of the legitimation of a supposedly renewed institution.154 154 Razumkov Tsentr, “Otsinka hromadianamy diialnosti vlady, riven doviry do sotsialnykh instytutiv ta politykiv, elektoralni oriientatsii hromadian (liutyi 2020r.),” on the Internet at http://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiolohichni -doslidzhennia/ . . ., accessed 20 April 2020. Net trust or distrust is the difference between the two, as the reporting of trust alone is less meaningful. Most institutions in Ukraine most of the time earn more distrust than trust from the

128 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO In spite of everything—the failure of police reform, the scandals involving the police, the public outcries for the minister’s resignation, and their mutual dislike for one another155—it was impossible for Poroshenko to replace Avakov. The most convincing reasons for the latter’s survival throughout the term of office of his nemesis appear to have been that: Poroshenko’s parliamentary bloc relied on the Popular Front of which Avakov was a prominent leader for maintaining its majority in the Rada. By not pushing police reform Avakov retained the full support of that element in his portfolio. He had besides significant other coercive resources under him (the National Guard, Border Guards, the “Azov” volunteer battalion, and several other volunteer militia battalions) at his disposal. Avakov also had formidable political connections and influence; he saw himself as a necessary counterweight to the presidential power—he was in a sense untouchable. Poroshenko was thus unable to extend his control over the ministry of interior or the central agency of law enforcement, the National Police.

De-Oligarchization In addition to corruption, Ukraine’s oligarchs have been the prime exemplars of an array of informal practices which rival the country’s formal institutions for power, influence, and outcomes. In the public’s perception, they have been exerting undue influence on public. As usual, this survey reported the percentage of respondents who answered “wholly distrust” and “somewhat distrust,” versus those who “somewhat trust” and “wholly trust,” the institution in question. For the NPU as a whole, the figures were: 14.9, and 29.4, versus 37.4, and 6.3, for an overall imbalance of -0.6 (net distrust). Reading the extremes only (14.9 minus 6.3), the net balance was -8.6. For the patrol police, the numbers were: 17.9, and 28.3, versus 36.8, and 2.9. Hence, the net distrust in the patrol police was -6.5, and -15.0, respectively. The ratios as between the two components of the NPU, therefore, were ten times overall, and twice at the extremes. 155 Kravets and Zhartovska, “Dualizm vlady. Yak Poroshenko i Avakov dotyskaiut odyn odnoho,” Ukrainska pravda, 25 September 2017, on the Internet at htt p://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2017/09/25/7156216/, accessed 25 September 2017. For his part, Avakov claimed he had friendly relations with Poroshenko. “Avakov rozpoviv pro druzhni stosunky z Poroshenkom,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 23 October 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITI CS/avakov-rozpoviv-pro-druzhni-s . . ., accessed 23 October 2017.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 129 political decisions for their own financial benefit and to the detriment of the common good. In the view of democratic theorists the oligarchs’ activities and presence have prevented the emergence of the rule of law, necessitating their curtailment or at least absorption into formal political roles if genuine democracy is to develop. In his landmark study, Heiko Pleines examined the political and business activities of twenty-nine Ukrainian oligarchs over the time period 2000-2015.156 Starting from a definition of “oligarch” as denoting “entrepreneurs who use their wealth to exert political influence” (105), Pleines used specific criteria to select his subjects. Briefly, these were: national-level political activity, business as their core activity, a minimum estimated wealth of $200-million USD, and no affiliation with another business empire (114-15). The forms of political activity were: informal networks, election to political office, and control of mass media outlets. During the period in question he discovered that the core body of oligarchs had remained quite stable, that the explanation for this stability was the oligarchs’ flexibility in their political alignments, and that their strategies of political influence had remained largely unchanged (125). Pleines thus concluded that “throughout the period under study, oligarchs created informal networks with political elites, held formally political positions (mainly in parliament), and owned major mass media. Also throughout the period under study they were able to exert considerable (though on their own not decisive) political influence” (125). “At the same time,” he noted, The oligarchs are not the major power brokers in Ukrainian politics. They have never initiated or substantially promoted a change in government. Instead they have always been trying to seek accommodation with those having or gaining political power. . .. Accordingly, the oligarchs do not determine who gains political power, but they more likely act as catalysts for an ongoing change by giving additional support to the supposedly winning side (126).

Following Henry Hale, Pleines sees the drift in oligarchs’ support from one political camp to another as simply confirming the 156 Heiko Pleines, “Oligarchs and Politics in Ukraine,” Demokratizatsiya, 24, no. 1 (Winter 2016): 105-27.

130 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO patronal pattern of Ukrainian politics, “fluctuating between single and multiple power pyramids” (127). This carefully nuanced and conceptually-based approach contrasts strikingly with the bulk of writing on Ukrainian oligarchs, which uncritically employs everyday language thus offering only impressionistic interpretation instead of empirically based explanation of the phenomenon.157 Of particular relevance for the purposes of this chapter is what Pleines says about the Poroshenko regime (although his article only covers its first two years). First, Poroshenko himself is excluded from the sample of oligarchs on grounds of his full-time engagement in politics, as opposed to business (114-15). Secondly, Pleines considers that “the ousting of Yanukovych did not so much change the composition of the group of oligarchs, but the configuration among them in the context of multiple pyramids of power” (119). The clash between Poroshenko and Kolomoiskyi, he says, was indicative of this. “After the sacking of Yanukovych, . . . Poroshenko, who turned into a full-fledged politician, and Kolomoiskyi were the only oligarchs who were able to form influential political networks, while the other oligarchs were mainly trying to defend their endangered business interests through low profile lobbying” (119). Thirdly, the total number of oligarchs in parliament, according to him, declined from twelve in 2014 to just five in 2015 (121). Fourthly, he observes that “since 2014, the oligarchs are now keeping a lower public profile by retreating from formal politics. While the current Ukrainian leadership speaks of ‘de-oligarchization,’ what is visible so far seems to be more an informalization of the political role of oligarchs” (125-26). Pleines indicates that not much change in the political role of oligarchs was to be expected in the remainder of Poroshenko’s term. This skepticism about Poroshenko’s inclination and ability to effect a de-oligarchization of Ukrainian politics has been echoed by Taras Kuzio.158

157 For biographies of the leading oligarchs identified in the latter manner as of the start of Poroshenko’s term see Leshchenko, “Ukraine’s Puppet Masters: A Typology of Oligarchs,” Eurozine, 15 May 2014. 158 Kuzio, “Oligarchs, the Partial Reform Equilibrium, and the Euromaidan Revolution,” in Hale and Orttung, Beyond the Euromaidan, 181-203.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 131 De-oligarchization, one of the “5 Ds” in Poroshenko’s election platform in 2014 (the others: deregulation, de-bureaucratization, decentralization, and de-occupation), began to be implemented shortly after his inauguration. The policy’s key demands of the oligarchs were that they pay their taxes, refrain from lobbying their business interests, stop trying to influence policy, and provide a balanced view of events through the media controlled by them.159 Perhaps the most dramatic clash occurred between the president and Ihor Kolomoiskyi, who lost control of two energy companies and was dismissed as governor of Dnipropetrovsk oblast.160 At the end of 2019, however, he was still seen as an influential player in Ukrainian politics.161 Other targets included Rinat Akhmetov and Dmitrii Firtash (who fled to Vienna and has avoided extradition ever since).162 Judging from subsequent events, oligarchic influence on politics, principally on government and through parliament, continued unabated.163 By 2018, when the policy of de159 Andrii Samofalov, “Operatsiia ‘deoliharkhizatsiia’. Yak Poroshenko vykonav naihuchnishu obitsianku 2015,” Ukrainska pravda, 24 December 2015, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2015/12/24/7093584/, accessed 24 December 2015. 160 Kramer and Herszenhorn, “Dispute Between Poroshenko and Billionaire Governor Threaten Ukraine Alliance,” International New York Times, 23 March 2015, on the Internet at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/24/world/europe/disp ute-between-poroshenko-and-billionaire- . . ., accessed 24 March 2015; and Herszenhorn, “Ukraine President Dismisses Billionaire Ally From Governor’s Role,” International New York Times, 24 March 2015, on the Internet at http://w ww.nytimes.com/2015/03/25/world/europe/ukraine-president-dismisses-bi llionaire-ally-f . . ., accessed 25 March 2015. 161 Romaniuk et al., “Chotyry viiny Kolomoiskoho. Yak oliharkh povertaie svii vplyv,” Ukrainska pravda, 4 December 2019, on the Internet at https://www.pra vda.com.ua/articles/2019/12/4/7233777/, accessed 5 December 2019. 162 Samofalov, “Operatsiia ‘deoliharkhizatsiia’,” and Zhartovska and MusaievaBorovyk, “Zamknene kolo. Prezydent, uriad ta oliharkhy,” Ukrainska pravda, 7 September 2015, on the Internet at permanent URL http://www.pravda.com.u a/articles/2015/09/7/7080396/. 163 Maxim Eristavi, “Now We Know Who Really Runs Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, 17 February 2016; Timothy Ash, “Ukraine’s Oligarchs Nervous Over Prospect of Jaresko as Prime Minister,” Kyiv Post, 9 March 2016, on the Internet at http://w ww.kyivpost.com/article/opinioin/op-ed/thimothy-ash-ukraines- . . ., accessed 10 march 2016; Ben Aris, “The Jaresko Manifesto for Ukraine,” BNE Intellinews, 23 March 2016, on the Internet at http://www.intellinews.com/thejaresko-manifesto-for-ukraine-93474/, accessed 24 March 2016; Grytsenko, “Rada Committee Blocks Prosecution of Oligarch Lawmaker Novinsky,” Kyiv

132 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO oligarchization was apparently running out of steam, experts were divided as to its efficacy: were the oligarchs still a threat to the existence of the Ukrainian state? Had there merely been a redistribution of assets from less-favored oligarchs to favored ones?164 In view of his successor’s launching of another de-oligarchization program, as well as legislation aimed specifically at curbing Kolomoiskyi’s activities in particular (about all of which more in the next chapter), it is probably safe to assume that Poroshenko’s campaign failed to achieve the desired goal. A Polish scholar has put forward an interpretation of Ukrainian politics at the outset of the Poroshenko era that effectively rules out progress in any future effort at de-oligarchization.165 According to him, it is all about oligarchy. Basing his analysis on the work of Polish historian Antoni Mączak, he writes that In an oligarchic system, an informal and limited group (or groups) operates whose members, the oligarchs, have created networks of interdependencies. Within those networks, they provide patronage and protection to their clients (politicians, communities, parties, etc.) in return for loyalty and for promoting their interests. As a result, whole pyramids of interdependencies form within a state (at both the central and the local levels), which resemble feudal relationships. The historical models described by Professor Mączak may be helpful today in understanding the oligarchic systems in Ukraine.166

Post, 18 November 2016, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukrain e-politics/rada-committee-blocks-p . . ., accessed 23 November 2016; and Yurii Radziievskyi, “Rishucha deoliharkhizatsiia: yak Podatkova riatuvala miliarderiv,” Ekonomichna pravda, 30 November 2018, on the Internet at https://w ww.epravda.com.ua/publications/2018/11/30/642861/, accessed 3 December 2018. 164 Kapsamun, “’Oliharkhichnyi stsenarii vycherpavsia? Shcho dali?’ Chotyry varianty perebihu podii—vid ekspertiv ‘Dnia’,” Den, 5 April 2018, on the Internet at Source URL https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/polityka-nota-bene/oligarhich nyy-scenariy-vycherpavsya-shcho-dali, accessed 6 April 2018; and Trepak, “Ukraina—zaruchnyk oliharkhiv,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 18 November 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/internal/ukrayina-zaruchnik-oligarhiv - . . ., accessed 23 November 2018. 165 Wojciech Konończuk, “Keystone of the System: Old and New Oligarchs in Ukraine,” Point of View (OSW—Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Warsaw), no. 59, August 2016. 166 Ibid., 8-9.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 133 This is remarkably similar to the patronal politics model of Henry Hale, of whose work the Polish author appears unaware. In any case, Konończuk goes on to identify the “old” oligarchs from before 2014, and the “new” ones since. Of the “old” groupings, those centered on Rinat Akhmetov and on Firtash had become weaker, while that around Yanukovych’s son, Oleksandr, had lost its significance altogether. The cluster around Kolomoiskyi, by contrast, had managed to expand its influence. The “new” oligarchic groupings as of 2016 were ultimately gathered around either President Poroshenko or Prime Minister Yatseniuk (including Akhmetov and Kolomoiskyi in the latter camp). Thus, two years after the Euromaidan this “bipolar arrangement” as he calls it was characteristic of “the balance of power” in Ukrainian politics at the time.167 Unfortunately, Konończuk’s rather bold interpretation of the essence of Ukrainian politics as reducible to the oligarchic system is simply asserted as existing without empirical data to support it, and so remains in the realm of the hypothetical. It is worth pointing out that the type of capitalism engaged in by individuals commonly identified as Ukrainian oligarchs differs fundamentally from capitalism as understood in Western practice and business school teaching. Specifically, the accumulation of capital is in the Ukrainian case not utilized for reinvestment and growth, but predominantly or notoriously for enhancing the personal wealth of the oligarch. This practice, which might be referred to as “predatory capitalism,” or, as Stanislav Markus calls it, “piranha capitalism,” cannot be expected to grow over naturally into classical-variety capitalism acting responsibly and investing in the future unless and until property rights are secured.168 In the meantime, Ukrainian capitalism will remain in the “warring clans” category where politics and business are intimately intertwined and interdependent, as they were during Poroshenko’s term, de-oligarchization notwithstanding.

167 Ibid., 36. 168 Stanislav Markus, Property, Predation, and Protection: Piranha Capitalism in Russia and Ukraine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), esp. chap. 6.

134 PRESIDENCY OF PETRO POROSHENKO

Conclusion—Poroshenko’s Reward In evaluating the performance of President Poroshenko, we can employ various yardsticks: as patron, lawmaker, or institutionbuilder. From the point of view of patronal politics, he does not appear to have succeeded in setting up a viable single-pyramid system of patron-client relations as might have been expected. Other members of the political elite did not join him in his tent, nor did he seem to exert significant efforts to draw them in. Lutsenko was the only loyal ally he had throughout his term. He alienated Yatseniuk, who remained independent, instead of winning him over to his side, even though he depended on Yatseniuk’s party’s support in the Rada. He replaced Yatseniuk with Groisman, who also tended towards independence. He may have wanted to oust Avakov as interior minister, or at least to subordinate him, but did not, thus reinforcing the impression that his rule was characterized as a multiple- or at least dual-pyramid system in terms of patronal politics. He did not play the patronal game very well. Poroshenko clearly did not make progress in eliminating the informal practices that were undermining Ukrainian politics, primarily corruption and the oligarchs. He seemed to do everything in his power to sustain the business-politics nexus of which he was part. Even his falling-out with Kolomoiskyi had little effect on the latter’s prominence and influence, as far as anyone could tell. In his role of lawmaker, Poroshenko will surely be remembered as a ruler whose maxim appeared to be one law for friends, another for everyone else. His interventions in the establishment of anticorruption agencies, the State Bureau of Investigation, and lawcourts attest to that. As does the alacrity with which he signed off on the law to make anti-corruption activists subject to the e-declaration system of disclosure of financial assets. Henry Hale was correct in his expectation that, in terms of the theory of patronal politics, the Euromaidan Revolution would be followed by an interval of competing pyramids, if that is what prevailed under Poroshenko. But the law of regime cycles, also posited by that same theory, seems to have gone into abeyance under

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 135 President Poroshenko.169 Cycling would have required the Ukrainian president to build a single-pyramid system of patron-client relations, which did not happen. What took place instead under Poroshenko and by his hand looked more like a struggle for power, for control over the law-related institutions, all the while unable to shake the suspicion of being mired in corruption. Throughout his presidency, public opinion was never generous towards Poroshenko, and it declined progressively as time went on. By April 2018, just a year before the presidential elections, according to a survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, President Poroshenko’s approval rating had dropped to 10.3 per cent, while 70.8 per cent of respondents had a negative disposition towards him.170 Volodymyr Zelenskyy, meanwhile, had the highest positive rating at that time among 27 public figures at 40.0 per cent, with only 11.0 per cent negative. Only six per cent of decided respondents would have voted for Poroshenko as of the time of the survey. In other studies undertaken that summer by the KIIS, Ukrainians considered the Verkhovna Rada, Cabinet of Ministers, and President with his administration—in that order—as the most corrupt governmental bodies; they also reported encountering bribery more often in 2018 than they had in 2015.171 The Ukrainian voting public’s verdict on the Poroshenko regime was unambiguous: in the first round, on 31 March 2019, with 22 contestants, 30.2 per cent voted for Zelenskyy, 16.0 for Poroshenko, and 13.4 for Tymoshenko; in the second round, on 21 April, 73.2 per cent voted for Zelenskyy, and 24.5 for Poroshenko. Whether the ouster of Poroshenko after serving just one term thus meant also the end of the system of corruption, or simply one politician’s replacement by another, remained to be seen.

169 Hale, Patronal Politics, 87-92, 174-77, 311, and 427. 170 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, “Social and Political Attitudes of the Residents of Ukraine: April 2018,” on the Internet at https://www.kiis.com.ua /?lang=eng&cat-reports&id=764&page=1, accessed 13 December 2018. 171 Interfax-Ukraine, “Ukrainians View Judiciary, Parliament as Most Corrupted Spheres,” Kyiv Post, 25 September 2018, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpo st.com/ukraine-politics/ukrainians-view-judi . . ., accessed 26 September 2018; and Grytsenko, “Poll: Ukrainians Say Bribe Problem Worse Now than in 2015,” Kyiv Post, 25 September 2018, on the Internet at https://kyivpost.com/ukrainepolitics/poll-ukrainians-say . . ., accessed 26 September 2018.

4. Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Presidency 2019-22 A political novice, Volodymyr Zelenskyy portrayed on television a secondary school history teacher whose talk on U-Tube about corruption propels him into the president’s office.1 His TV performance was so popular that, in December 2018, he registered as a candidate for president of Ukraine in real life. He was supported by a newly-created party named after the famous show, Sluha Narodu—Servant of the People; his entourage was said to have consisted of technocrats, “opportunists and spin doctors,” members of the old guard, as well as “friends from Kvartal 95 and the comedy industry.” There was a record number of presidential contenders, 39, including the incumbent, Petro Poroshenko, and his 1

This paragraph draws on the following sources: Cory Welt, “Ukraine’s Presidential Election: A Preview,” Congressional Research Service, In Focus, 14 February 2019; Kramer, “He Played a President on Ukrainian TV, Now He Wants the Real Thing,” New York Times, 16 March 2019, on the Internet at https://ww w.nytimes.com/2019/03/16/world/europe/ukraine-elec . . ., accessed 16 March 2019; Oleksandra Kusiva, “Partii chy tekhnichni proekty: na yaki politychni syly spyraiutsia kandydaty v prezydenty,” Ukrainska pravda, 27 March 2019, on the Internet at https://vybory.pravda.com.ua/articles/2019/03/27/1 49930/, accessed 27 March 2019; Talant and Oleksiy Sorokin, “Here Are All 39 Candidates for President of Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, 27 March 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/here-are-all-39-cand . . ., accessed 28 March 2019; Iuliia Mendel and Neil MacFarquhar, “In Ukraine Presidential Runoff, It’s Comic Versus Chocolate King,” New York Times, 1 April 2019, on the Internet at https://nytimes.com//2019/04/01/world/europe/uk raine-pre . . ., accessed 1 April 2019; Hanna Chabarai, “Portret vybortsia. Pershyi tur,” Tyzhden, 9 April 2019, on the Internet at https://tyzhden.ua/Politi cs/228898, accessed 19 November 2021; Daniel Szeligowski, “Who Is Really Advising Zelenskiy?” Atlantic Council, 4 April 2019, on the Internet at https:// www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/who-is-really . . ., accessed 6 April 2019; “The Difference Between Zelenskyi and Poroshenko: Piecing Together the Evidence,” Euromaidan Press, 11 April 2019, on the Internet at http:/ /euromaidanpress.com/2019/04/11/the-difference-between- . . ., accessed 12 April 2019; Higgins and Mendel, “Ukraine Election: Volodymyr Zelensky, TV Comedian, Trounces President,” New York Times, 21 April 2019, on the Internet at https://nytimes.com/2019/04/21/world/europe/Volodymyr . . ., accessed 22 April 2019; and Katya Gorchinskaya, “Ukraine’s 2019 Elections and the Rise of a New Political Guard,” UI Brief (Swedish Institute of International Affairs), no. 6 (2019).

137

138 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY nemesis, Yuliia Tymoshenko, which surely attested to the absence of a single pyramid of patron-client relations in Ukrainian politics at that time. Zelenskyy was also supported by the oligarch Ihor Kolomoiskyi, whose 1+1 TV channel offered him three times as much coverage as Poroshenko. There was little of substance in Zelenskyy’s election platform, except populist promises and a reenactment of his television character, the crusader against corruption and IMF interference. He crowdsourced his program, telling people what they wanted to hear. Public opinion polling at the time showed that “voters were most concerned about the state of the economy, political injustice, corruption and the war with Russia. The top five expectations . . . of the new presidency were to: (a) reduce utility tariffs, . . . (b) . . . remove immunity from prosecution for parliamentarians, judges and the president, . . . (c) begin/speed up . . . corruption investigations, . . . (d) start negotiations with Russia, . . . and (e) reduce the salaries of senior officials.”2 Poroshenko, inexplicably and by contrast, ran on a nationalist platform encapsulated in the slogan “Army, Language, Faith,” the latter an allusion to his managing to obtain from the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew a tomos for establishing an autonomous Orthodox Church of Ukraine.3 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Zelenskyy led in the first round by a wide margin and won the run-off with Poroshenko by a resounding 73.2 per cent of the vote. Young urban dwellers voted overwhelmingly for him, and he won majorities in all oblasts except one. As Shaun Walker of The Guardian put it, “this was because he offered so few specifics that his candidacy acted as a blank piece of paper on which people could fix their expectations.”4 Ukraine now had its first Jewish president, a fact which ought to have laid to rest (but did not) the notion that 2 3

Gorchinskaya, 3. Carlotta Gall, “Ukrainian Orthodox Christians Formally Break From Russia,” New York Times, 6 January 2019; and James Sherr, “A Tomos for Ukraine’s Orthodox Church: the Final Schism?” BLOG, International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonia, 10 January 2019. For the text of the tomos, see Vysokyi zamok, 5 January 2019. Shaun Walker, “Volodymyr Zelenskiy: Things Get Serious for Servant of the People,” Guardian, 22 April 2019, on the Internet at https://www.theguardian.c om/world/2019/apr/22/volodymyr-ze . . ., accessed 22 April 2019.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 139 Ukrainians were historically, if not genetically and permanently, predisposed to anti-Semitism. Of particular relevance to the present inquiry was the observation then that “Zelenskiy’s team has promised a new era in which corruption will not be tolerated, and political and business interests unable to interfere in the judicial system. ‘We need to cut the lines between the presidential administration and the courts and prosecutors,’ said Ruslan Stefanchuk, a member of the Zelenskiy team.”5 Of course, fulfilling the role of President of Ukraine would be different in real life than on television. Buoyed by his success in the presidential elections, Zelenskyy promptly—and contrary to constitutional provisions—dissolved the Verkhovna Rada calling for parliamentary elections on 21 July.6 The results, though, justified his optimism. Of the 423 seats in the Verkhovna Rada (reduced from 450 by the Russian occupation),7 Servant of the People captured 254, a clear majority unprecedented since independence in 1991. On the PR side of the ballot, Zelenskyy’s party won 43.2 per cent of the vote for 124 seats; in the SMDs, an additional 130. Other parties that crossed the five per cent threshold were: Opposition Bloc—For Life (formerly Party of Regions, linked to Yanukovych), 13.1 per cent and 44 total seats; Poroshenko’s European Solidarity, 8.1 and 27; Fatherland, led by Tymoshenko, 8.2 and 24; and entertainer Viacheslav Vakarchuk’s Holos (Voice) party, 5.8 and 20.8 Under the circumstances, continued operation of a patronal system of political dynamics under Zelenskyy’s leadership became moot, if not irrelevant because of the overwhelming presidential victory and his party’s Rada majority. Indeed, given the unusual results of both presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019, a series of intriguing questions 5 6

7 8

Ibid. “Ukraine’s Ruling Coalition Breaks Up In Blow For Zelenskiy,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 17 May 2019, on the Internet at https://www.rferl.org/a/u kraine-s-main-parliamentary-coalition-brea . . ., accessed 25 November 2021; and “Verkhovnu Radu rozpushcheno: Zelenskyi pidpysav ukaz,” Vysokyi zamok, 21 May 2019, on the Internet at https://wz.lviv.ua/article/390859-verkh ovnu-radu-rozpushcheno . . ., accessed 21 May 2019. Elections could not be conducted in Russian-occupied Donbas. Gorchinskaya, 6.

140 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY suggested themselves in terms of this study’s framework. In some semblance of order, they are: why did Poroshenko lose to Zelenskyy in the presidential elections when he had the incumbent’s advantage? How and why did Zelenskyy win over Poroshenko when he had no patronal assets? What were the Ukrainian public’s expectations? The political elites’ expectations? How was the electoral upset possible, if Zelenskyy had no patron-client ties to speak of among the political elite, or a recognized political party behind him? Once his party had won the Verkhovna Rada elections with a majority of seats and an unprecedented plurality of votes, would he then set about to build a pyramid of patron-client links, or could he in order to prevail or at least survive in the political arena dispense with that requirement? Would Zelenskyy follow his predecessor’s example and attempt to gain control of the country’s lawrelated institutions (Verkhovna Rada, Cabinet, PGO, courts, ACAs, DBR/SBI, security service, police, etc.)? Would we see him building a patron-client network, or would the single-pyramid structure emerge automatically as other elites flocked to him in expectation of his patronage? Would he pretend to the Director of the IMF that he was pursuing the struggle against corruption while allowing it to flourish? Would he lie to the IMF? How would he deal with his predecessor—magnanimously or vindictively? With his own legacy? Would the office of the president become a fiefdom, with one foot in politics and the other in corruption? As he was not an oligarch, would his rule be different than Poroshenko’s? Would he curtail informal practices, such as telephone justice, kruhova poruka, and decisions by mutual understandings? What would he do about the oligarchs? Our investigation of and search for answers to these questions will proceed under the rubrics of and in parallel to the preceding chapter, looking for similarities and differences, and using events, incidents, actions, and decisions as reported in the daily press as evidence. In brief, we shall want to know if the predominant dynamics of Ukrainian politics under its two most recent presidents are at all consistent with the patronal politics model posited as standard for post-communist states by Hale, or instead are characterized as a drive for money and power as the previous chapter revealed. Did

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 141 Zelenskyy then get swept up by the prevailing patronal dynamics, by the pattern set by Poroshenko, or was he able to resist them and establish a different pattern altogether? Obviously, James Sherr must have had something similar to this question of a third option in mind when at the time of Zelenskyy’s victory he commented that: Sistema in Ukraine is not founded upon “corruption,” but patron-client relationships, the competition and collision, but by all means dominance, of a small oligarchy and the subordination of law to money and power. This system, adaptive and tenacious, reinvented itself after the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity, and already there are signs that it might do so again. “Breaking” the system requires systematic effort, rather than drama, a cohesive team and a counter-elite with the means and ability to oppose the existing one. Does Zelenskiy possess the mettle and will to take on this challenge? Will he prefer showmanship to substance? Or will he become a fig leaf for some of the systemic forces his supporters revile?9

Zelenskyy apparently told Poroshenko, “I am just an ordinary person who has come to break the system.”10 Did Volodymyr Zelenskyy, hitherto untainted by politics, manage to prevail over the system, or was he effectively assimilated by it?

Zelenskyy the Messenger11 With fifteen years’ experience in the entertainment business, Volodymyr Zelenskyy was not only an actor, but a studio head and 9

10 11

Sherr, “What Lies Ahead for Ukraine?” Blog, International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonia, 23 April 2019, on the Internet at https://ieds.ee/what-lie s-ahead-for-ukraine//#disqus_thread, accessed 23 April 2019. Ibid. Sources for this section are: Alya Shandra, “Sociology of Ukrainian Elections: Who Votes for Zelenskyi/Poroshenko, and Why,” Euromaidan Press, 18 April 2019; Higgins and Mendel, “Ukraine Election”; Walker, “Volodymyr Zelenskiy”; Adrian Karatnycky, “The World Just Witnessed the First Entirely Virtual Presidential Campaign,” POLITICO, 24 April 2019, on the Internet at https://w ww.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/04/24ukraine-presid . . ., accessed 8 December 2021; Ben Smith, “Ukraine Elections: What Does Zelensky’s Landslide Victory Mean?” UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, Insight, 29 April 2019, on the Internet at https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/Ukrainia n-elections-what-does . . ., accessed 8 December 2021; Joanna Rohozinska and Vitaliy Shpak, “The Rise of an ‘Outsider’ President,” Journal of Democracy, 30, no. 3 (July 2019):33-42; and Gorchinskaya, 3-4.

142 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY producer; he and his associates were by reason of their work expert communicators. His election team therefore ran a practically virtual but highly effective campaign: using social media aimed at youthful voters; projecting an image of the absolute outsider; and eschewing face-to-face encounters, door-knocking, speeches, rallies, cross-country travel, press conferences, and interviews—the conventional methods of electioneering. Only at the end of the campaign was there, in a sports stadium, a debate between the two principal contenders described as more spectacle than discussion of political platforms. Analysts characterized Zelenskyy’s platform as a blank slate onto which voters projected their own expectations, and emphasized that he tapped into a deep vein of public dissatisfaction with the ruling elites which those same elites had failed to recognize. In spite of its vagueness, his platform generally pointed to policy initiatives in anti-corruption, curbing the oligarchs, working with the IMF, supporting Ukraine’s integration into the EuroAtlantic framework, and ending the war with Russia. As already mentioned, Poroshenko based his campaign on the trinity of “Army, Language, Faith,” and emphasized detaching Ukraine from Russia. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) reported on the absence of real discussion of public policy issues during the campaign, and the slanting of media coverage to deal with business rather than public interests, thus making it a campaign of image over substance. Public opinion polling conducted between the two rounds produced significant findings regarding voters’ perceptions and expectations. Zelenskyy was a lightning rod for protest. A plurality of electors voting for him were basically voting against Poroshenko and the old system. Zelenskyy’s image with voters was a positive one, seen as being above or beyond the politicians, and offering hope as well as trust that there would be change for the better. The average Zelenskyy voter was a student living in south-east Ukraine; Poroshenko’s, a senior citizen living in the west. Zelenskyy’s support base was in the central and southern oblasts, in the larger cities, and among younger people. Voters were poorly informed about what a president does, so that their top three expectations—to lower utility tariffs, cancel parliamentarians’ and

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 143 others’ immunity, and investigate corruption crimes—were actually matters over which the president has no direct control. Despite the misconceptions in their thinking, most Ukrainians were expecting that things would get better following the elections; one in ten thought they would get worse. Ever the optimist, Zelenskyy carried the day, promising a fresh start.

Zelenskyy as Patron It will be useful at the outset to list the positions which constitutionally can be appointed by the Ukrainian president. This can be a standard against which the incumbent’s actions are judged as to whether he might attempt to bend or violate the rules and whether in this respect he would be following or deviating from his predecessor’s practices. Did Zelenskyy interfere regularly beyond his formal powers, putting patronage and friendship ahead of competence? Did he succeed, or did he use his appointment powers to build the requisite single-pyramid of patron-client relations to keep himself in office? What was the net effect of Zelenskyy’s cadres policy in practice? The constitution in effect at the time, adopted in 2004, rejected in 2010, and re-instated in 2014, basically authorizes a parliamentary-presidential form of government requiring overall a cooperative relationship between the two bodies, with the legislative assembly dominant.12 Under this constitutional order, the president’s power over the cabinet of ministers is restricted to submitting for approval by the Verkhovna Rada candidates for two position—the ministers of defence and foreign affairs. He cannot appoint or propose for appointment any of the other ministers. The Verkhovna Rada itself nominates the prime minister, whose appointment the president must confirm within fifteen days. He cannot dismiss any of the ministers or the cabinet collectively. The president does, however, appoint the army command as well as the secretary of the 12

“Presidential Duties in Ukraine—Presidential Powers in Ukraine: What Candidates for Presidency Competed For?” 112 International, on the Internet at https: //112.international/article/presidential-powers-in-ukraine-for-w . . ., accessed 8 December 2021, and from which this entire paragraph is derived.

144 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY National Security and Defence Council (RNBOU, in its Ukrainian acronym). The head of the National Guard is outside his prerogative and in that of the interior minister. On the advice of the prime minister, he appoints the oblast and raion administrative heads (“governors,” as they are called). With the Rada’s assent, he appoints and dismisses the Prosecutor-General and the head of the SBU; he appoints the head of the State Border Service, but does so on the PM’s advice. Finally, he is empowered to: appoint/dismiss one-half of the boards of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), and of the National TV and Radio Company; appoint one-third of the Constitutional Court’s justices; and propose to the Rada appointing members of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). The leadership of both the State Property Fund and Anti-Monopoly Committee are outside his jurisdiction as president, but within that of the government (cabinet) and Rada. In sum, in most cases the president’s personnel decisions have to be coordinated with and agreed to by the Verkhovna Rada. These constitutional provisions, as noted in the preceding chapter, did not restrain his predecessor from interfering with the appointment of other governmental officials beyond his remit, but could they be equally flexible for Zelenskyy’s political purposes? Before considering President Zelenskyy’s personnel selection practices in the broader governmental context, it is necessary to begin with his initial cast of immediate assistants and advisers whose appointment and dismissal he was not obliged to coordinate with other institutions.13 Here arise questions of competence, experience, friendship, ties with previous regimes, oligarchic 13

This paragraph is drawn from: “Posady v AP otrymaly kinoprdiusery i yurysty: povnyi spysok prysnachen Zelenskoho,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 21 May 2019, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/posadi-v-ap-otrimali-kono p . . ., accessed 21 May 2019; “Ze?Bankova. Koho Zelenskyi pryznachyv v Administratsiiu prezydenta,” Ukrainska pravda, 22 May 2019, on the Internet at http s://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2019/05/22/7215729/, accessed 21 May 2019; Kapsamun, “Kadrovyi start Zelenskoho,” Den, 23 May 2019, on the Internet at Source URL https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/podrobyci/kadrovyy-start -zelenskogo, accessed 27 May 2019; and Romaniuk and Kravets, “Svoi i chuzhi. Na komu trymaietsia Administratsiia Zelenskoho,” Ukrainska pravda, 6 June 2019, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2019/06/6/721 7263/, accessed 7 June 2019.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 145 connections, and legal propriety underlying the given appointments, as well as the orientation of the new regime to Ukraine’s outstanding problems signaled by these first appointments. Between the two rounds of the presidential elections, Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced publicly that “there would be no kumstvo [close relatives]” in his appointments to governmental offices if he were to be elected.14 In naming his initial team of advisers, he seemed to have followed this rule, but relied heavily instead on his friends. This, however, did not extinguish doubts as to their abilities to guide competently his policy-making and political activities. There was much mockery in the press of the president’s staff being divided basically between media types from the “Kvartal 95” studio and pawns of oligarch Kolomoiskyi. In fact, five persons out of eight were associates of Zelenskyy in the entertainment business. Serhii Trofimov, first deputy chief of staff, responsible for regional and personnel policy, local self-government and decentralization, as well as cooperation with the Cabinet—was one of the president’s closest friends, a producer at “Kvartal 95,” having worked there since 2005. Serhii Shefir, first assistant to the president, responsible for strategy and operational response, as well as access to Zelenskyy—was a fellow-countryman and business partner of the president, one of his closest associates, and cofounder of the “Kvartal 95” studio. Yurii Kostiuk, deputy chief of staff, responsible for information and the media—was a scriptwriter and producer of “Sluga narodu.” Kyryl Tymoshenko, deputy chief of staff, responsible for information policy and technologies, protocol, and ceremonies—was a lawyer who found his calling in TV and movies, was rather closer to Andrii Bohdan, in 2015 a candidate for the Kyiv City Council from the UKROP party controlled by Kolomoiskyi, his 14

“Zelenskyi obitsiaie ne pryvodyty kumiv v polityku,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 5 April 2019, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelenskiyobicyaye-ne-priv . . ., accessed 16 November 2021. Near the end of 2021, however, it was revealed that by then Zelenskyy had appointed at least 30 members of his own and his TV associates’ families, plus donors to his campaign, to positions in government. “Blyzko 30 osobam, pov’iazanym iz Zelenskym chy ‘Kvartalon 95’ distaly vysoki derzhposady—Bihus.Info,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 16 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/pritn/POLITICS /blizko-30-osobam-povjaza . . ., accessed 16 November 2021.

146 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY film studio made a documentary on one of Poroshenko’s closest advisers, Ihor Kononenko. And Andrii Yermak, assistant to the president—was also a lawyer and media producer, assistant to a Party of Regions Rada deputy prior to 2014. Others included: Ruslan Stefanchuk, presidential adviser and representative in the Verkhovna Rada—law professor, Zelenskyy’s fellow student, ideologist for the presidential campaign, assistant to a NUNS (Yushchenko’s party) parliamentarian, and adviser to first vice-prime minister Stepan Kubiv; Ruslan Riaboshapka, deputy chief of staff— a lawyer who worked for PM Mykola Azarov in 2011-13, then Transparency International Ukraine, briefly deputy minister of justice, drafter of the law on NABU, served in NAZK in 2016-17, responsible for anti-corruption policy; and Mykhailo Fedorov, presidential adviser—a businessman who directed the social media campaign for Zelenskyy and had no plans to enter electoral politics. Of these eight assistants and advisers to the president within the first cohort of his personal staff, perhaps only the two Ruslans— Riaboshapka and Stefanchuk—had the obvious experience within government to prepare the new president for the crucial task of ruling the country. Many would be considered tainted by contact with the pre-Euromaidan regime. In the sphere of international relations, Vadym Prystaiko, Ambassador to NATO and formerly Ambassador to Canada, was brought in as adviser; and on economic matters, Oleksii Honcharuk, an absolute outsider except for a link to Andrii Bohdan. Many of these names will reappear later in this chapter as the story of Zelenskyy’s first term unfolds. None had ever been elected to the Verkhovna Rada or sat at the Cabinet table. None had been engaged in party politics as vocation, calling, or profession. In terms of patronal politics their careers present no evidence of their having been clients of any particular patron(s). The most controversial appointment, as the president’s chief of staff, was that of Andrii Bohdan.15 One of the closest associates 15

This paragraph is based on: “Yurysta Kolomoiskoho pryznacheno hlavoiu Administratsii prezydenta Zelenskoho,” Vysokyi zamok, 21 May 2019, on the Internet at https://wz.lviv.ua/article/390874-yurysta-kolomoiskoho-pryzna . . ., accessed 21 May 2019; “Hlavoiu Administratsii prezydenta Zelenskoho stav Andrii Bohdan,” Den, 21 May 2019, on the Internet at Source URL https://day.kyi

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 147 of Zelenskyy, a lawyer well-known in Kyiv, with Kolomoiskyi as a client, and claiming to have convinced Zelenskyy to run for president. They had been friends for five years. No stranger to Ukrainian politics, Bohdan ran unsuccessfully for parliament in 2007 on Yushchenko’s NUNS list headed by Lutsenko. In 2010-11, he was responsible for anti-corruption policy in the government of Mykola Azarov; in 2013, he returned to this position, which then resulted in his falling under the lustration law. The next year, he ran unsuccessfully again for parliament, this time for Poroshenko’s BPP. As someone subject to the law on lustration, Mr. Bohdan should not have been eligible for appointment as chief of staff to the president. His appointment was finessed by changing the rules so that presidential staff were formally no longer considered public servants, and by altering the name of the Presidential Administration into Office of the President, an innovation that evaded all existing relevant legislation. Apart from having to endure the cloud of impending lustration during his term of office, Andrii Bohdan was by far the person on Zelenskyy’s staff politically most qualified for government. Mr. Bohdan’s eclectic political background does not seem to indicate his involvement in the patronal system as characterized by Hale. With so many lawyers and individuals with legal training (including the president himself) in his entourage, one should have expected Zelenskyy’s term not to be marked by the instrumental use of law that so obviously took place under Poroshenko. Such was not to be the case. Displaying early on an unusually low level of tolerance for inconvenient laws, Zelenskyy removed the deputy justice minister from his post as head of Ukraine’s delegation to a diplomatic conference in the Hague because of his having publicly rejected the false claim that Bohdan’s appointment did not fall under the lustration ban.16 “This is, in fact, absurd,” commented Halya

v.ua/uk/news/210519-glavoyu-administraciyi-prezydenta-zelenskogo-stav-a ndriy-bogdan, accessed 21 May 2019; Gorchinskaya, 12-13; “Ze!Bankova”; and Romaniuk and Kravets, “Svoi i chuzhi.” Halya Coynash, “Zelensky Removes Top Official Who Opposed Illegal Appointment of Bohdan as Head of Presidential Administration,” Kharkiv Human

148 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY Coynash at the time, “since Article 2.5 of the Law begins with the post of Head of the Presidential Administration.”17 So much for a connection between lawyers and law-making, on the one hand, and the rule of law, on the other, in Ukraine. Controversy continued to dog Mr. Bohdan for the rest of his tenure. In September 2019, it was revealed that he had travelled to St. Petersburg, Russia, with PM Azarov in November 2013, after which the decision to sign the Association Agreement with the EU was suspended. This launched the Euromaidan protest and its attempted suppression, in which Bohdan was considered to have been implicated by remaining silent throughout. He was thus doubly tainted: by association with the discredited Yanukovych regime’s pro-Russian turn, and being on the wrong side in the Euromaidan Revolution. The lustration law should have banned him from public office for ten years. Yet here he was, head of the office of the president, a person whose loyalty to Ukraine and its Euromaidan ideals was clearly in question.18 At the same time, Oleksandr Danyliuk resigned as secretary of the RNBOU, where he had served alongside the president’s chief of staff. Zelenskyy accepted the resignation and promoted the assistant secretary, Oleksii Danilov, in his place. Danyliuk, appointed on 28 May, had served successively as economic adviser to PM Yurii Yekhanurov under President Yushchenko, unpaid adviser to President Yanukovych, presidential representative in PM Yatseniuk’s cabinet under Poroshenko, deputy chief of staff to Boris Lozhkin, and finally finance minister in PM Groisman’s government (2016-18).19 In 2016, he was

17 18

Rights Protection Group (hereafter KHPG), 13 June 2019, on the Internet at http: //khpg.org/en/index.php?do=print&id=1560376866, accessed 14 June 2019. Ibid. Emphasis in the original. Coynash, “Head of Zelensky Administration Linked to Negotiations with Russia that Prompted Euromaidan,” KHPG, 27 September 2019, on the Internet at http://khpg.org/en/index.php?do=print&id=1569541265, accessed 28 September 2019; and Melinda Haring, “Why Zelenskyy Needs a New Chief of Staff Now,” Atlantic Council, 27 September 2019, on the Internet at https://atlanticc ouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-zelensk . . ., accessed 28 September 2019. Having thus switched easily from Yushchenko to Yanukovych to Poroshenko as putative patrons, it would be difficult to count him as having consistent political views or as being a loyal client. Perhaps this is evidence of the patronal system’s fluidity. Otherwise, it does not make sense for a client to attach himself

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 149 involved in the nationalization of Kolomoiskyi’s Privatbank, which cost the national treasury 155 billion UAH. He explained his resignation as merely due to differences with Andrii Bohdan, but it was thought the latter was pressing for a generous compensation from the government for the oligarch. It appeared as though Bohdan’s presence in the Office of the President was meant to advance the interests of Kolomoiskyi, foremost the denationalization of Privatbank.20 The Danyliuk resignation was only the beginning of the unravelling of the Zelenskyy “team,”21 part of his limited success at or attention to pyramid-building. Another controversial episode involved a judge from Poltava who was the subject of an attempt to enlist her into opening a politically-motivated criminal case against Poroshenko. It appeared to have been coordinated between Andrii Bohdan, SBI director Roman Truba, and ex-President Yanukovych’s first deputy chief of staff, Andrii Portnov (also a long-time friend of Bohdan). Portnov

to a series of one-term presidents, since the theory holds that clients are likely in anticipation to abandon a “lame duck“ president, not gravitate towards him. Kramer, “Two Blows Are Dealt to Ukrainian Leader’s Clean-Government Image,” New York Times, 27 September 2019, on the Internet at https://www.nyti mes.com/2019/09/27/world/europe/ukraine-cor . . ., accessed 28 September 2019; “Pryvatbank, 4 prezydenty ta RNBO. Shcho zrobyv ta chomu ide Oleksandr Danyliuk,” Ukrainska pravda, 27 September 2019, on the Internet at h ttps://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2019/09/27/7227518/, accessed 3 October 2019; “Danyliuk rozkazav pro konflikt z Bohdanom,” Ukrainska pravda, 3 October 2019, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/2019/10/3/722 8049/, accessed 3 October 2019; “Novym sekretarem RNBO stav Oleksii Danilov,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 3 October 2019, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/arti cle/print/POLITICS/novim-sekretarem-rnbo-sta . . ., accessed 3 October 2019; “Danyliuk: U nas iz Bohdanom neprosti stosunky,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 3 October 2019, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/danikyuk-u-na s-iz-bogdan . . ., accessed 3 October 2019; and Alla Hurska, “The ‘Shadow Cardinal’ of Ukrainian Politics: Who Is Andriy Bohdan?” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 9 October 2019, on the Internet at https://jamestown.org/program/the-shadowcardinal-of-ukrainia . . ., accessed 11 October 2019. It emerged later that the real reason, revealed privately by Danyliuk, for his departure was discomfort at the new government’s courtship of Kolomoiskyi in regard to his Privatbank problem. The story of a personality clash between Danyliuk and Bohdan was one put forward by Zelenskyy as a cover. Romaniuk and Kravets, “’Kolyshni’ Zelenskoho. Chym zaimaiutsia Danyliuk, Bohdan, Honcharuk ta inshi,” Ukrainska pravda, 5 October 2010, on the Internet at https://ww w.pravda.com.ua/articles/2020/10/5/7268760/, accessed 15 December 2021.

150 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY had fled to Russia in the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity, returning to Ukraine just before Zelenskyy’s inauguration.22 The link between Bohdan and Portnov raised further questions about President Zelenskyy’s chief of staff and the president’s judgment in personnel matters. By the start of 2020, it was apparent to those closely following events at the apex of Ukrainian politics that there were now two antithetical poles of attraction within the president’s entourage. These were headed by Andrii Bohdan, on the one hand, responsible for the domestic sphere, and Andrii Yermak, for foreign relations, principally relations with Russia, on the other. It was also increasingly evident that Bohdan was losing influence with the president; Yermak, gaining. Having introduced the “turbo-regime” style of decision-making as compensation for Zelenskyy’s total lack of political experience, Bohdan was now losing favor by comparison with Yermak, the quietly restrained yet effective deal-maker.23 Although the conflict within the president’s staff might otherwise have been productively channeled, for Zelenskyy it was intolerable. Judging from their frequent appearances in public together it soon also became obvious that Bohdan wielded an extraordinary degree of influence over his boss—to the extent that some media were jokingly referring to there having been practically an exchange of roles between the two: Bohdan was seen as not just Zelenskyy’s brain—he was the president. No doubt being upstaged by his chief of staff could not have been entirely to the president’s liking. When Zelenskyy began to favor Yermak, Bohdan felt slighted and under-appreciated. His super-competence became his undoing. In February 2020, Bohdan submitted his resignation; it was 22

Wilson, Ukraine Crisis, 158-9; Coynash, “Whistle-blower Judge Exposes Sinister Role of Bohdan In Zelensky Administration,” Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, 9 October 2019, on the Internet at http://khpg.org/en/index.php? do=print&id=1570580061, accessed 11 October 2019; and Victoria A. Malko, “Russian (Dis)Information Warfare vis-à-vis the Holodomor-Genocide,” Russian Active Measures: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, ed. Olga Bertelsen (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2021), 248-9. “Prezydent u tumani. Zelenskyi mizh Bohdanom i Yermakom,” Ukrainska pravda, 22 January 2020, on the Internet at httpa://www.pravda.com.ua/article s/2020/01/22/7237996/, accessed 15 December 2021.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 151 accepted, and Yermak, his nemesis within the Office of the President, was named as replacement.24 Six months after his departure, at a press briefing, Andrii Bohdan stated emphatically that he would never return to work in President Zelenskyy’s team.25 Kurt Volker, the US State Department’s special representative, had previously recommended against Bohdan’s appointment in the first place on account of his close connection to oligarch Kolomoiskyi, but that advice was not taken at the time. While all of these activities were taking place in his office, Zelenskyy proceeded with other appointments he was authorized to make. On 21 May 2019, he relieved the chief of the general staff of the armed forces, Viktor Muzhenko, and replaced him with Ruslan Khomchak.26 Opinion was divided as to the wisdom of this appointment, but apparently the new president was intent on registering his displeasure with the prosecution of the war. In June, he named Vladyslav Bukharev, a parliamentarian from the Fatherland fraction, as head of foreign intelligence,27 and made several changes in the leadership of the National Guard following a scandal involving misappropriation of funds by its commander.28 He demanded and obtained the dismissal of the Dnipropetrovsk oblast police chief after a bodycam video exposed his attempt at abuse of office.29 At the end of August, President Zelenskyy dismissed Poroshenko’s appointee as general director of the notoriously corruption-prone 24

26 27

Kateryna Reshchuk and Yevhen Buderatskyi, “Turborezhym Bohdana. Yak uvirvavsia v komandu Zelenskoho ta pishov ekshlava OPU,” Ukrainska pravda, 11 February 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/202 0/02/11/7240133/, accessed 15 December 2021. “Bohdan: Nikoly ne povernusia v Ofis Zelenskoho,” Ukrainska pravda, 14 September 2020. On the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2020/09/ 14/7266295/, accessed 15 December 2021. “Posady v AP otrymaly kinoprdiusery i yurysty.” “Zelenskyi pryznachyv ochilnykom Sluzhby zovnishnoi rozvidky nardepa ‘Batkivshchyny,’” Ukrainska pravda, 11 June 2019, on the Internet at https://ww w.pravda.com.ua/news/2019/06/11/7217813/, accessed 27 July 2019. “Zelenskyi pryznachyv nove kerivnytstvo Natshvardii,” Ukrainska pravda, 14 June 2019, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2019/06/14/ 7218167/, accessed 27 July 2019. Artur Korniienko, “Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Police Chief Sacked After Abuse of Office Scandal,” Kyiv Post, 29 July 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpo st.com/ukraine-politics/dnipropetrovsk-oblas . . ., accessed 30 July 2019.

152 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY military-industrial complex, Ukroboronprom, replacing him with Aivaras Abromavicius, minister of the economy in 2014-16, noted for his public denunciation of the informal practice of placing “smotriashchie” (monitors) in government departments.30 Once the newly-elected Rada began sitting, it approved the president’s nominees for prime minister, head of the SBU, and prosecutor-general.31 Oleksii Honcharuk, the new PM, had been brought into the Zelenskyy team as specialist on the economy and was now being sponsored for the prime ministership by Andrii Bohdan.32 When the latter resigned as chief of staff to the president, Honcharuk also lost his position, going down in history as not only the youngest prime minister in independent Ukraine’s history, but also the one with the briefest tenure.33 A short meeting with the president a few days before the parliamentary vote forewarned of the dismissal. Addressing the Rada, Zelenskyy explained the change in government as due to Honcharuk’s not having been up 30

“Zelenskyi pryznachyv Abromavichusa hendyrektorom Ukroboronpromu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 30 August 2019, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/POLITICS/ze lenskiy-priznchiv-abromavichusa-ge . . ., accessed 30 August 2019. Crimea.Realities, “Ukraine’s Zelenskiy Inducts Politically Untested Government,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 30 August 2019, on the Internet at http s://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-zelenskiy-new-government-honchar . . ., accessed 18 December 2021. My information on Honcharuk is drawn from: “V otochenni Honcharuka kazhut, shcho yoho zvilnyly cherez rotatsii u ‘Tsentrenerho,’” Ukrainska pravda, 4 March 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2020/03/4 /7242526/, accessed 18 December 2021; “Honcharuk rozpoviv, yak Zelenskyi povidomyv yomu pro vidstavku,” Ukrainska pravda, 4 May 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2020/04/4/7246485/, accessed 18 Dec ember 2021; “Honcharuk: Zelenskoho pomistyly v informatsiinyi karantyn,” Ukrainska pravda, 14 May 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/ news/2020/05/14/7251694/, accessed 18 December 2021; “Kolyshnyi prem’ier Honcharuk perebravsia v Ameryku,” Ukrainska pravda, 29 September 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2020/09/29/7268058/, accessed 18 December 2021; and Romaniuk and Kravets, “’Kolyshni’ Zelenskoho.” In January 2020, Honcharuk had earlier offered his resignation when leaked audio recordings revealed that in a cabinet meeting he had cast doubt on the president’s knowledge of economics. The resignation, however, was not accepted at that time. Anton Troianovski, “Ukraine’s Premier Offers Resignation as Political Infighting Grows,” New York Times, 17 January 2020, on the Internet at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/17/world/europe/ukraine-pri . . ., accessed 17 January 2020.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 153 to the job. Although he denied it, Honcharuk’s downfall was thought to have been caused by his government’s change in the leadership of the state energy company which ran counter to the interests of oligarch Kolomoiskyi. After leaving office Honcharuk offered his impressions as to the make-up of the presidential staff. They consisted, he said, of a minority fighting for change, a small coterie of the president’s defenders shielding him from harm as well as from information, and the majority working on improving their own careers. In the fall of 2020, he travelled to the US, where he became a distinguished fellow at the Eurasia Center of the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC. He planned to return to Ukrainian politics in the future. Honcharuk was replaced as prime minister by Denys Shmyhal, a vice-premier in the previous government. In the Honcharuk cabinet formed in 2019, three out of four of the most important appointments came straight out of the president’s electoral “team” or office staff: Vadym Prystaiko as foreign minister in place of Pavlo Klimkin; Ruslan Riaboshapka as prosecutor-general, replacing Yurii Lutsenko; Ivan Bakanov as head of the SBU; and Mykhailo Federov as vice-prime minister for digital transformation. Only Andrii Zahorodniuk, the new defence minister, had among these key positions no previous association with President Zelenskyy, having been on the board of Ukroboronprom.34 It was “the youngest and least-experienced government in Ukraine’s post-independence history.”35 All but two out of eighteen were newcomers; the controversial Arsen Avakov remained as interior minister, and Oksana Markarova, finance minister.36 Dmytro Razumkov, head of the Servant of the People Party, was chosen 34

35 36

Crimea.Realities, “Ukraine’s Zelenskiy Inducts Politically Untested Government”; Oleksandr Liemienov, “Rozdorizhzhia zmin u kryminalnomu blotsi ZeKomandy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 31 August 2019, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/a rticle/print/internal/rozdorizhzhya-zmin-u-krimina . . ., accessed 2 September 2019; and Bermet Talant and Matthew Kupfer, “Presidential Front-Runner Zelenskiy Presents His Team 2 Days Before Election,” Kyiv Post, 18 April 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/presidentialfront-ru . . ., accessed19 April 2019. Crimea.Realities, “Ukraine’s Zelenskiy Inducts Politically Untested Government.” In February 2021, Markarova became Ukraine’s ambassador to the US. Her education included a master’s degree in public finance from Indiana University.

154 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY as speaker (chair) of the Verkhovna Rada. Razumkov, introduced in April as being in charge of domestic policy as part of Zelenskyy’s team of experts, began in politics as a youth leader in the Party of Regions, worked with the then governor of Dnipropetrovsk oblast, and represented economist Serhii Tihipko at the CEC in the 2014 presidential elections. He was considered pro-Russian in political orientation, or at the very least indifferent to matters of Ukrainian identity.37 Riaboshapka, unfortunately for him, was dismissed as prosecutor-general by the Verkhovna Rada in March 2020, following the unseating of Andrii Bohdan. The latter had arranged his appointment in August 2019, and the two had worked together in PM Azarov’s government.38 In addition to legitimate shortcomings as prosecutor-general, Riaboshapka’s firing was reportedly backed by allies of Kolomoiskyi and accounted for in part by his reluctance to lay charges against Poroshenko. Once again, in terms of patronalism it would not make sense for Razumkov to have supported Tihipko, nor for Riaboshapka if he were a loyal client of Zelenskyy to refuse to lay charges against Zelenskyy’s nemesis Poroshenko. Of course, the testing of this novice cabinet was cut short when, at Zelenskyy’s urging, the Verkhovna Rada voted to oust Prime Minister Honcharuk, since it meant the dismissal of the entire cabinet along with him. Very shortly after the confirmation of the new cabinet, the president appointed several of the key ministers to positions in the National Security and Defence Council (RNBOU): Honcharuk, Zahorodniuk, Razumkov, Bakanov, Prystaiko, and Riaboshapka. Having dismissed their predecessors, Zelenskyy would now have “his own” people dominating in the principal security and defence body.39 This might give him more control of the security and defence policy areas. Later on in his term, Zelenskyy’s reliance on the 37 38

Talant and Kupfer, “Presidential Front-Runner Zelenskiy Presents His Team”; and “The Difference Between Zelenskyi and Poroshenko.” Sukhov, “Parliament Dismisses Riaboshapka as Prosecutor General,” Kyiv Post, 5 March 2020, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/ parliament-dismisses . . ., accessed 6 March 2020. “Zelenskyi zminyv sklad RNBO,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 6 September 2019, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/zelenskiy-zminyv-sklad-rn b . . . accessed 6 September 2019.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 155 RNBOU was characterized by Andrew Wilson as “legally dubious and form[ing] part of an alarming trend towards the securitisation of political issues and the marginalisation of existing institutions and norms.”40 Shmyhal’s cabinet, by contrast with that of Honcharuk, was definitely more mature and experienced. Assembling it revealed a lack of systematic approach, a sign of last-minute haste, on Zelenskyy’s part which was not so reassuring despite the apparent prospect of greater stability.41 When the new cabinet was approved by the Rada it still had four vacancies: education, culture, energy, and a vice-premier for economic development. Of the five holdovers (Arsen Avakov among them) only one—Mykhailo Fedorov—was linked to the Zelenskyy “team”; none of the new ministers, most of them seasoned government officials, were. Zahorodniuk was replaced as defence minister by retired lieutenant-general Andrii Taran, on the recommendation of the president’s chief of staff, Andrii Yermak. In this second Zelenskyy cabinet, while the president’s office still had a major hand in selecting ministers, being an associate of the president had now become a handicap—a definite setback in terms of pyramid-building according to the patronal model of politics. The patronal politics model would have had Zelenskyy stacking the Shmyhal cabinet with more, not fewer, of the president’s associates. Shmyhal himself had been brought into Honcharuk’s cabinet as deputy premier for regional policy in early 2000, on the suggestion of Serhii Trofimov (the president’s first deputy chief of staff) and following an interview with both the president and prime minister.42 In effect, Honcharuk was picking his own successor. 40

Wilson, “Faltering Fightback: Zelensky’s Piecemeal Campaign Against Ukraine’s Oligarchs,” European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief (July 2021), 10. “Khto ye khto v uriadi Shmyhalia. Rozpovidaiemo tsikavi fakty pro novykh ministriv,” Ukrainska pravda, 4 March 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pra vda.com.ua/articles/2020/03/4/7242421/, accessed 18 December 2021. Kateryna Reshchuk and Yevhen Buderatskyi, “Khto takyi Denys Shmyhal, yakyi zaminyv Honcharuka,” Ukrainska pravda, 3 March 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2020/03/3/7242407/, accessed 21 December 2021; and Romaniuk and Kravets, “Shmyhal i ‘yoho’ komanda. Yak

156 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY Shmyhal was recommended on the basis of his work as governor of Ivano-Frankivsk oblast. He had previously been in government at the oblast level, and manager of large commercial enterprises including DTEK Zakhidenerho, part of oligarch Rinat Akhmetov’s business empire. Having run twice unsuccessfully for public office at the local level, Shmyhal was distinctly lacking in political experience and had no ties to the country’s political elite except for Zelenskyy, most recently his boss briefly as governor. His cabinet choices were mostly made for him—unlike his predecessor, who had hand-picked his team. If President Zelenskyy was set on building up a single pyramid beneath him of patron-client relations, he certainly employed a curious method. This can be illustrated by the example of twelve individuals appointed by him in 2020 who experienced the shortest recorded tenures. (See Table 4.1.) They included four ministers of the national government, four oblast governors, two heads of the national customs service, and two others. Vadym Prystaiko was given three postings in the course of the year. The acting energy minister, Olha Buslavets, was to have been replaced by Yurii Vitrenko, but the vote in the Verkhovna Rada failed.43 In consequence, Vitrenko was appointed acting energy minister by cabinet on 21 December, and served until 28 April, when he was appointed as CEO of Naftohaz. When the latter appointment was ruled invalid by NAZK due to breaching conflict of interest rules, the minister of justice took NAZK to court to have him reinstated.44 Vitold Fokin, last prime minister of Soviet Ukraine and first of independent Ukraine, was appointed to the Trilateral Contact Group, but was

pratsiuie druhyi uriad Zelenskoho,” Ukrainska pravda, 25 May 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2020/05/25/7252984/, accessed 18 December 2021. Lukashova, Olha Kyrylenko, and Dmytro Dienkov, “Ministry pid yolkoiu. Khto vcherhove popovnyv uriad Shmyhalia,” Ukrainska pravda, 17 December 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2020/12/17/72 77324/, accessed 23 December 2021. Max Hunder, “Justice Ministry Will Take NACP to Court Over Order to Cancel Vitrenko Appointment,” Kyiv Post, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.co m/business/justice-ministry-will-take-n . . ., accessed 15 June 2021. In early November 2022, Vitrenko resigned in order to encourage investors to help with the company’s debt restructuring. Kyiv Post, 1 November 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 157 Table 4.1—Twelve Individuals Subjected to Short-Term Appointments Made by President Zelenskyy, 2020 Name

Position

Roman Hryshchenko Oleksii Petrov

Governor, Sumy Oblast Governor, Transcarpathian Oblast

Vitalii Fedoriv

Governor, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast

Olha Buslavets

Acting Energy Minister

Ihor Muratov Andrii Pavlovskyi Serhii Serhiichuk

Head, Customs Service Head, Customs Service Governor, Cherkassy Oblast

Vadym Prystaiko

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Denys Pudryk

Vice-Premier, Eurointegration Ambassador to United Kingdom Permanent Representative to International Maritime Organization Head of Customs, Odesa Oblast

Vitold Fokin Ihor Umanskyi Illya Yemets

First Deputy Head, Trilateral Contact Group Finance Minister Minister of Health

Period of Tenure in 2020 5 March-5 November 22 May-7 December 24 May-5 December 16 May-20 November May-August August-22 October 28 August-30 December 31August 2019-4 March 2020 Mar-June June-Dec 30 December21 August-21 October 18 August-30 September 4-30 March 4-30 March

Source: Halyna Ostapovets, “Vid Fokina do Prystaika: 11 naibilsh korotkykh pryznachen Zelenskoho v 2020 rotsi,” Obozrevatel, 31 December 2020, on the Internet at https://news.obozrevatel.com/ukr/politics/top-najkorotshih-p . . ., accessed 1 January 2021. abruptly dropped after stating publicly that there was no war with Russia in eastern Ukraine—contradicting the very purpose of the TCG and once again casting serious doubt on the president’s judgment of people.45 It was unclear whether such capriciousness in 45

“Fokin Off,” Kyiv Post, 2 October 2020, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpos t.com/article/opinion/editorial/fokin-off.html, accessed 5 October 2020. As

158 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY personnel matters was to be explained by a desire for quick results (just as quickly extinguished) or by incompetence on the part of the would-be patron.46 None of the twelve cases in Table 4.1, interestingly from a patronage point of view, corresponds to the names of those in the “team of experts” whom candidate Zelenskyy had introduced to the press two days before the final vote in April 2019.47 It must be borne in mind, of course, that the connection between the president and the nominee for appointment is not necessarily a direct one, nor is there only one game of personnel selection being played at one time within the president’s office staff and inner circle. Traditionally, appointments at the top were considered and decided by the leading trio: Zelenskyy, Yermak, and Shefir. Since becoming chief of staff, however, Yermak had come to dominate the office, edging out the clients of Bohdan, and his influence may well have outweighed even that of the president in matters of appointment— or were thought to. For example, it was he who lobbied for the naming of Vitrenko as vice-premier and minister of energy.48 Within the Office of the President, Yermak’s relations from the outset with, among others, Serhii Trofimov were not good. When local elections in the fall of 2020 did not go well for the Servant of the People party, Trofimov’s position of responsibility for regional policy was in jeopardy. He was replaced by Kyrylo Tymoshenko and appointed

47 48

the newspaper commented, “Fokin was hired because his granddaughter, a pop singer, recommended him to Andriy Yermak, head of Zelensky’s office and her old friend.” See also Romaniuk and Kravets, “Viiny na Bankovii. Yak Yermak z’idaie druziv Zelenskoho,” Ukrainska pravda, 15 October 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2020/10/15/7269923/, accessed 23 December 2021. Ostapovets, “Vid Fokina do Prystaika.” In the diplomatic field, likewise, there have been rapid changes of personnel. As mentioned, Chaliy was dismissed by Zelenskyy immediately on coming to office in 2019, and replaced in December by Volodymyr Yelchenko. In February 2021, he was replaced by Oksana Markarova, an ex-finance minister brought into the Poroshenko administration by Natalia Jaresko. Alla Dubrovyk-Rokhova, “’Koruptsiia—ne problema,’ a symptom velykoi pomylky,” Den, 18 March 2021, on the Internet at https://day.kyiv.ua/ uk/article/den-planety/korupciya-ne-problem . . ., accessed 18 March 2021. Cf. Ibid., and Talant and Kupfer, “Presidential Front-Runner Zelenskiy Presents His Team 2 Days Before Election.” Lukashova et al., “Ministry pid yolkoiu.”

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 159 as unpaid adviser to Zelenskyy by way of compensation. In this and other ways Yermak managed to elbow aside associates of his predecessor—by taking over from Tymoshenko the media and information file, and by bringing in his own people like Oleh Tatarov and Mykhailo Podoliak.49 It thus became increasingly unclear whether presidential choices of appointments were authentically Zelenskyy’s or those of Yermak, his chief of staff. Whatever the balance of power within the Office of the President may have been, a persistent intent to broaden whenever possible the extent of political patronage continued unchecked. One area, for example, in which this became apparent was public administration, chronically in need of reform yet constantly deferred by successive Ukrainian presidents in favor of ruchne upravlinnia (“manual steering,”) hence maximum opportunities for political patronage, kumstvo, and corruption.50 In February 2021, President Zelenskyy vetoed a law passed by the Verkhovna Rada on the return of competitive selection for positions in the public service. Along with that, the practice of politically motivated dismissals of top-level officials, introduced by Zelenskyy in 2019, would remain in effect. Reasoning for the veto, it was surmised, must have been that not all positions in the bureaucracy had yet been filled by “svoi” (one’s own) people.51 Between May 2020 and February 2021, no fewer than 23,442 vacancies had been filled without competition, including 143 at the very top level.52 There would always, it 49

Romaniuk and Kravets, “Viiny na Bankovii”; “Zelenskyi zvilnyv Trofimova i dav yomu novu posadu,” Ukrainska pravda, 4 November 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2020/11/4/7272357/, accessed 23 December 2021; and “Tymoshenko teper kuruie ‘rehionalku’ v OPU zamist Trofimova,” Ukrainska pravda, 4 November 2020, on the Internet at https://www.p ravda.com.ua/news/2020/11/4/7272407/, accessed 23 December 2021. Serhii Soroka, “Instytutsii vs revoliutsii. Derzhsluzhba,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 18 January 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/internal/insti tutsiji-vs-revoljutsiji- . . ., accessed 2 February 2021; and Soroka, “Instytutsii vs revoliutsii. Vykonavcha vlada,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 1 February 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/internal/institutsiji-vs-revoljutsiji- . . ., accessed 2 February 2021. “Prezydent Zelenskyi vetuvav zakon pro povernennia konkursiv na derzhsluzhbu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 18 February 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr /article/print/POLITICS/prezident-zelenskij-ve . . ., accessed 18 February 2021. Ibid.

160 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY seemed, be room for more patronage under President Zelenskyy— but whether it would redound to his favor in terms of patronalism was another question. Zelenskyy himself explicitly ruled out reappointing former politicians as a pool from which to build up his clientelistic base, thus excluding the possibility of inviting such figures into his tent, as might have been expected according to the patronalism theory. Speaking at a press conference on 20 May 2021, “Zelenskyi noted that old politicians, in particular prime ministers Volodymyr Groisman and Arsenii Yatseniuk, or the leader of Fatherland, Yuliia Tymoshenko, would not be included in his team.”53 He noted also that at present Ukraine possessed a “very not bad” government coping not badly with the current military and economic crises, but implied (in response to criticism of ineptitude) that new rather than experienced personnel were now needed. Former prime minister Yatseniuk reciprocated, saying that he “had not been, and was not now, preparing to join the Zelenskyi team,”54 thus closing off empirically the operation of the patronalism mechanism between him and Zelenskyy. In the summer of 2021, a petition with 25,000 signatures was delivered to President Zelenskyy demanding that Oleh Tatarov, his deputy chief of staff, be fired.55 In addition to being suspected of bribery, Tatarov ought to have been subject to the lustration law’s ban on holding public office for ten years. “In 2011-14, he was a deputy head of the Interior Ministry’s main investigative department under then-President Viktor Yanukovych,”56 and thus 53

“Zelenskyi zaiavyv, shcho starykh politykiv v yoho komandi ne bude. Kazhe, v kraini ‘duzhe nepohanyi uriad’,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 20 May 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelenskij-zajaviv-shcho . . ., accessed 21 May 2021. “’Ne zbyravsia i ne zbyraiusia v komandu Zelenskoho’: Yatseniuk vidreahuvav na vypad prezudenta na svoiu adresu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 20 May 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/ne-zbiravsja-i-ne-zbir aj . . ., accessed 21 May 2021. Sukhov, “Petition to Fire Zelensky’s Deputy Chief of Staff Collects Enough Signatures, President Must Respond,” Kyiv Post, 20 June 2021, on the Internet at ht tps://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/petition-to-fire-zele . . ., accessed 22 June 2021. Ibid.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 161 implicated in the repression of demonstrators during the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity. But the president did not act on the petition,57 because Tatarov, a lawyer, had been brought into the OP by Yermak to strengthen its control over the coercive organs of government and specifically as counterweight to interior minister Avakov.58 On 13 July, Arsen Avakov submitted his resignation; he was replaced by Denys Monastyrskyi, part of Zelenskyy’s pre-election “team of experts” and at the time of appointment head of the Verkhovna Rada committee on legal affairs.59 Tatarov was then tasked with bringing the interior ministry under Zelenskyy’s direct, “manual steering” control,60 long a presidential objective. Further ministerial changes followed in the autumn. They were no longer being fired by the president (although this was indeed the case); they offered their resignations, as had by then become the customarily accepted practice under Zelenskyy, who had observed that the public was much more excited by news of departures than arrivals when it came to changing government officials. Resignations were offered and accepted at that time from: vicepremier and economy minister Oleksii Liubchenko; vice-premier and minister for strategic industries Oleh Uruskyi; defence minister Andrii Taran (a retired general who had, on the recommendation of his friend, Andrii Yermak, replaced Zahorodniuk in March 2020);61 ecology minister Roman Abramovskyi; and Oleksii Reznikov, minister of reintegration of the occupied territories. Their

60 61

Sukhov, “Zelensky Refuses to Fire Controversial Deputy Chief of Staff Despite Petition,” Kyiv Post, 6 July 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ ukraine-politics/zelensky-refuses-to-f . . ., accessed 6 July 2021. Kravets and Romaniuk, “Perestanovky v Ofisi prezydenta. Khto otochuie Zelenskoho,” Ukrainska pravda, 22 July 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pr avda.com.ua/articles/2021/07/22/7301305/, accessed 22 July 2021. “Zelenskyi zaproponuvav na post hlavy MVS Denysa Monastyrskoho,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 13 July 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/prin t/POLITICS/zelenskij-zaproponova . . ., accessed 13 July 2021. Kravets and Romaniuk, “Perestanovky v Ofisi prezydenta.” “Rada pryiniala vidstavku ministra oborony Tarana,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 3 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/ra da-prijnjala-vidstvku-mi . . ., accessed 3 November 2021.

162 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY replacements, nominated by Zelenskyy,62 became: Yuliia Svyrydenko, who had been Liubchenko’s deputy minister and then deputy chief of staff to the president;63 Pavlo Riabikin, formerly head of customs and ambassador to Denmark; Reznikov, as civilian defence minister, reversing a previous reversal of Zelenskyy’s; Abramovskyi was not immediately replaced; and Iryna Vereshchuk, a parliamentarian from the Servant of the People party who had contested the mayoralty of Kyiv in 2020 but obtained only 5.4 per cent of the vote, replaced Reznikov.64 Except for Reznikov, the

“Shmyhal vnis do Rady podannia na vidibranykh Zelenskym kandydativ u ministry: spysok,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 3 November 2021, on the Internet at https:/ /zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/sluha-narodu-zaproponuval . . ., accessed 3 November 2021; and Serhii Slipchenko, “Four New Ministers Appointed by Parliament,” Kyiv Post, 4 November 2021. Yuliia Svyrydenko received a total of 256 votes, but not a single one from four of the Rada’s opposition parties (“Holos,” Fatherland, European Solidarity, and OPZZh). Svyrydenko’s position as deputy chief of staff was taken by Rostyslav Shurma, an economist who since 2006 had been working for oligarch Rinat Akhmetov’s “Metinvest” group of companies, including CEO of the “Zaporizhstal” steel works. Between 2015 and 2020, he had headed the “Opposition Bloc” party in Zaporizhzhia oblast; in May 2021, he was appointed to the oversight board of Ukroboronprom. “Zelenskyi pryznachyv zastupnykom Yermaka chlena nahliadovoi rady ‘Ukoboronprom’,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 23 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelenskijpriznachiv-zasup . . ., accessed 23 November 2021; and “Rada pryznachyla novu ministerku ekonomiky,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 4 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/rada-priznachila-novohomi . . ., accessed 4 November 2021. Romaniuk and Kravets, “Po odnomu na vykhid. Novi vidstavky v Kabmini i Ofisi Zelenskoho,” Ukrainska pravda, 9 September 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2021/09/9/7306515/, accessed 9 September 2021; Illia Ponomarenko and Victoria Petryk, “Leadership Reshuffle to Affect Ministries of Defense, Strategic Industries, Reintegration of Occupied Territories,” Kyiv Post, 1 November 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-poilitics/leadership-reshuffle-to-af . . ., accessed 1 November 2021; Thaisa Semenova, “First Deputy Prime Minister Joins Wave of Cabinet Resignations, Kyiv Post, 2 November 2021; Kravets and Romaniuk, “Kabmin z kilkoma zminnymy. Koho Zelenskyi vyzhene z uriadu,” Ukrainska pravda, 2 November 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2021 /11/2/7312455/, accessed 2 November 2021; “Ministra ekolohii Abramovskoho vidpravyly u vidstavku,” Ekonomichna pravda, 3 November 2021, on the Internet at https://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2021/11/3/6793 64/, accessed 27 December 2021; “Novyny 4 lystopada: novi pryznachennia v Kabmini, Leros i Zelenskyi,” Ukrainska pravda, 4 November 2021, on the Internet at htps://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2021/11/4/7011870/, accessed 27

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 163 ousted ministers were either inefficient, corrupt, or both. The Servant of the People parliamentary caucus was heavily involved in selecting nominees for their replacements, including from its own ranks; the final decision was made by Zelenskyy himself. During his marathon press conference later that month, the president acknowledged there may have been mistakes in the selection of cabinet ministers and that their rapid rotation was having negative as well as positive implications.65 It was apparent that the Zelenskyy administration had no pool outside its own ranks to draw on and was compelled largely to shuffle personnel rather than bringing in new faces for cabinet renewal.66 At the same time as this cabinet shuffle, the Rada appointed as its head of administration Viacheslav Shtuchnyi, who previously had been employed by the president’s office as “smotriashchyi” (monitor) over former speaker Dmytro Razumkov.67 It was interesting that this informal practice continued unimpeded under Zelenskyy. Razumkov had meanwhile been replaced by Ruslan Stefanchuk, both prominent members of Zelenskyy’s original “team of experts” in the presidential election campaign.68 Why people on the same side had to spy on one another was a mystery to anyone observing from outside. There was, however, no mystery about the reasons for Razumkov’s removal, which came about over this issue of being spied on and insubordination. The

66 67

December 2021; and Illia Ponomarenko and Oleksiy Sorokin, “Zelensky’s Recent Government Reshuffle Shows no Strategy,” Kyiv Post, 5 November 2021. “Zelenskyi poiasnyv velyku kilkist rotatsii v Kabmini ta naviv pryklad ‘naikrashchoho ministra’,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 26 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelenskij-pojasniv-veliku-ki . . ., accessed 26 November 2021; and “Zelenskyi bachyt pomylky v deiakykh kadrovykh rishenniakh,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 26 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelenskij-bachit-pomilki-u- . . ., accessed 26 November 2021. “Rada pryiniala vidstavku ministra oborony Tarana.” “Holovoiu aparatu Rady pryznachyly kolyshnoho ‘smotriashchoho’za Razumkovym,” Ukrainska pravda, 4 November 2021, on the Internet at https:// www.pravda.com.ua/news/2021/11/4/7312810/, accessed 27 December 2021. As of 29 December 2021, Razumkov was leader of the Servant of the People party, yet not a member of its 242-member parliamentary caucus, according to the Verkhovna Rada website, consulted on 28 December 2021.

164 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY insubordination consisted of disagreeing with the president over a draft law to counter the influence of oligarchs, sending it to the Venice Commission for scrutiny, and criticizing Zelenskyy together with the party for abandoning their principles. “The principle of the rule of law has turned into the principle of political expediency,” the speaker said. “The principle of . . . freedom of speech became ‘whoever is not with us is against us.’ The principle of ‘the law is the same for everyone’ turned into ‘the law is for enemies; my friends can have everything.’”69

For good measure, Razumkov even mentioned publicly the Pandora Papers which had implicated the president’s concealment of offshore assets.70 Razumkov was replaced as speaker by his first deputy, Stefanchuk, who was replaced by Oleksandr Kornienko, who in turn was replaced as leader of the Servant of the People party by Olena Shuliak, previously its deputy leader. A businesswoman prior to being elected to the Rada, she had in 2014 contested for a position on the Kyiv city council.71 It was a major blow for Zelenskyy politically to lose one of his key election campaign members, but symptomatic of his impulsive leadership style. 69

70 71

Semenova and Kostyantyn Chernichkin, “Speaker Razumkov Dismissed with 284 Votes after Dispute with Zelensky,” Kyiv Post, 7 October 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/speaker-razumkov-dismi . . ., accessed 7 October 2021. Ibid. “Partiiu ‘Sluha narodu’ ocholyla nardepka Shuliak,” Ukrainska pravda, 15 November 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2021/11/ 15/7314083/, accessed 15 November 2021. For more on the Razumkov story, see also: “U ‘Sluzi narodu’ zaiavyly, shcho ne initsiiuiut vidstavku Razumkova,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 20 September 2021, on the Internet at https://zn. ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/u-sluhu-narodu-zajavili-shc . . ., accessed 20 September 2021; “Razumkov zvernetsia v antykoruptsiini orhanu cherez povidomlennia ZMI pro khabari ‘zaholos shchodo deiakykh vidstavok’,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 20 September 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/ POLITICS/razumkov-zvernetsja-v-anti . . ., accessed 20 September 2021; “Yak deputaty holosuvaly za vidstavku Razumkova: povnyi spysok,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 7 October 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/PO LITICS/jak-deputati-holosuvali-za- . . ., accessed 7 October 2021; and “U Radi oholosyly pro stvorennia Razumkovym ob’iednannia ‘Rozumna polityka’,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 16 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/articl e/print/POLITICS/u-radi-oholosili-pro-stvoen . . ., accessed 16 November 2021.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 165 Two points emerge clearly from this brief review of President Zelenskyy’s patronage role. Firstly, neither the Rada (which has the authority constitutionally to do so) nor the prime minister had any control over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers— nor did the Rada do so even over its own officers—it rested with the president and his office. Secondly, due to the limited scope of his network, Zelenskyy’s pattern of replacements involved not just specific individual changes as necessity required, but chains of replacements from within his restricted pool of loyalists. He had evidently not built up ties to other political elites’ networks, as far as can be ascertained to date.

Zelenskyy as Law-Maker It is worthwhile to determine whether Zelenskyy’s activities in relation to law-making conformed to the pattern exhibited by his predecessor—and hence were part of the unbreakable “system” of Ukrainian politics—or were idiosyncratic. More particularly, in view of the statement on the president’s website that he had completed a university degree in law,72 we shall want to see if he respected the law and its supremacy in running the affairs of state, as one would expect, or if he, like Poroshenko, used law as a tool of political engagement with friends and opponents. Did he respect the law and act within it, or did he try to gain control of the lawrelated institutions in Ukraine for personal-partisan-political purposes? At the outset, appointing as his chief of staff Andrii Bohdan, who ought to have been ineligible under the lustration law, was baffling from the point of view of legality at the very least. To observers, the reorganization and re-naming of the Administration of the President (AP) into the Office of the President (OP), and its physical relocation from Bank Street to the Ukrainian House (Ukrainskyi dim) exhibition hall on European Square was seen as an evasion of the law. To justify their action the Zelenskyy team 72

“Biography: Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine,” President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Official website, on the Internet at https://ww w.president.gov.ua/en/president/biografiya, accessed 28 December 2021.

166 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY claimed that the changeover had been announced before the second round of voting. Besides, the old premises had inferior wi-fi and old-fashioned curtained windows.73 This was not the first or only time the 2014 lustration law was to be sidelined by Zelenskyy, and—for a president from show business—the optics were terrible, but he somehow lived through them. Unlike Poroshenko, Zelenskyy’s law-making activity was not totally concentrated on gaining control over other law-related bodies, or on providing business opportunities for his friends, or on turning anti-corruption institutions into their opposites. Zelenskyy as ruler was soon recognized as impulsive, unsystematic, unfocussed, undisciplined, and lacking in strategic thinking. His lawmaking was chaotic.74 Despite its majority in the Verkhovna Rada, Zelenskyy could not count on the Servant of the People caucus as a whole to support consistently his legislative initiatives because of its own lack of cohesion. Instead of being unified and disciplined, it was fractured into clusters of followers behind leading personalities, some of them outside the Rada: most prominently, Kolomoiskyi, Pinchuk, Pavliuk,75 Bohdan, and Razumkov. When Zelenskyy needed their votes for his legislative initiatives, he would descend on the Rada, pleading and cajoling his party’s parliamentarians. But the more he resorted to this method, the fewer results it yielded—there was a law of diminishing returns from the practice

74 75

“Zelenskyi vydav ukaz reorhanizatsii AP v Ofis prezydenta,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 20 June 2019, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/zelensk iy-vidav-ukaz-pro-r . . ., accessed 20 June 2019; “U Zelesnkoho pokazaly proiekt perenesennia administratsii prezydenta v Ukrainskyi dim,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 20 June 2019, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/u-zelensk ogo-pokazali-pro . . ., accessed 20 June 2019; and “Zelenskyi zvilnyv kerivnytstvo Administratsii Prezydenta ta perepryznachyv ikh v Ofis,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 25 June 2019, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS /zelenskiy-zvilniv-kerivnict . . ., accessed 25 June 2019. Roman Malko, “Kraina bez pravyl,” Tyzhden, 25 December 2019, on the Internet at https://tyzhden.ua/Politics/239036, accessed 27 December 2019. On the “king of contraband” Pavliuk, and his influence in the Servant of the People party, see Romaniuk and Kravets,” Khmilnyi kardynal Illia Pavliuk: druzhba iz Zelenskym i vplyv na ‘Sluhu narodu’,” Ukrainska pravda, 18 February 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2021/02/18 /7283826/, accessed 18 February 2021.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 167 of haranguing.76 Zelenskyy did not, in contrast to Poroshenko, send his lieutenants to lobby the members of the opposition caucuses, seeking support wherever it could be found. His reliance on an unreliable fraction (albeit nominally a majority) within the Rada thus produced inconsistent and often long-delayed legislative results. President Zelenskyy’s unsteady relationship with the Verkhovna Rada can be illustrated by several examples. In the area of judicial reform, urgently required because, as was said, “Ukraine’s judiciary remains corrupt, dysfunctional and politicized,”77 an initial attempt launched in 2019 failed because president and parliament were unable to agree on replacing the top governing body for the judiciary. A second attempt would have given another such body a free hand to appoint judges without competition or integrity standards.78 When passed, however, the bill contained contradictory provisions which the Rada failed to reconcile or eliminate which then required a presidential veto; it was returned for revision. As finally passed in July 2021, the law incorporated an ethics council meant to remedy the endemic corruption within the judiciary, an innovation in which the president expressed admiration and pride.79 76

Romaniuk and Kravets, “Yak Zelenskyi vtrachaie kontrol nad fraktsiieiu ‘Sluha narodu’ v Radi,” Ukrainska pravda, 24 June 2020, on the Internet at https://www .pravda.com.ua/articles/2020/06/24/7256880/, accessed 25 June 2020. Sukhov, “Ukraine’s Judicial Reform, Explained,” Kyiv Independent, 29 November 2021, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent.com/politics/ukraines-ju dicial-reform-expla . . ., accessed 4 January 2022. Sukkhov, “Activists: Rada Gives Judicial Body Carte Blanche to Appoint Corrupt Judges,” Kyiv Post, 2 February 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivp ost.com/ukraine-politics/activists-rada-gives- . . ., accessed 4 February 2021; and “U Radi zareiestruvaly obitsiani Zelenskym zakonoproekty shchodo sudovoi reformy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 15 February 2021, on the Internet at https://z n.ua/ukr/artcile/print/POLITICS/u-radi-zarejestruvali-ob . . ., accessed 15 February 2021. Sukhov, “Judicial Reform Bill Undermined by Contradictory Amendments, May be Vetoed,” Kyiv Post, 6 July 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpos t.com/ukraine-politics/judicial-reform-bill- . . ., accessed 6 July 2021; Sukhov, “Zelensky Vetoes Judicial Reform Bill Over Foreign Experts’ Role,” Kyiv Post, 8 July 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/zele nsky-vetoes-judi . . ., accessed 8 July 2021; Sukhov, “Judicial Reform: Parliament Scraps Clause that Undermined Foreign Experts’ Role,” Kyiv Post, 13 July 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/judicial-refor

168 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY President Zelenskyy likewise attempted to alter the landscape in security and intelligence, motivated perhaps by the Russian threat. His bill on intelligence (pro rozvidku) was introduced in January 2020 and passed in the Rada in September. It specified the institutions charged with intelligence functions and subordinated them to the president.80 By its omission, this would implicitly deprive the SBU of its intelligence function, a point made explicit in the legislation reforming that body specifically. According to the bill introduced in the Rada in January 2021, the SBU would become a special (i.e., secret) service responsible for state security, stripped of its anticorruption, organized crime, and pre-trial investigation tasks, but with a strengthened counterintelligence and anti-terrorism capability. It would be subordinated to the president and answerable to parliament.81 But the Verkhovna Rada’s work on this bill, in the course of which over 2,000 amendments were introduced, made reform of the SBU a distant prospect, at least ten years in the offing.82 With the bill awaiting second reading, reform of the SBU was still on the legislative agenda for 2022.83

m-parl . . ., accessed 13 July 2021; Sukhov, “Parliament Passes Second Reform Bill Required by IMF,” Kyiv Post, 14 July 2021, on the Internet at https://www.k yivpost.com/ukraine-politics/parliament-passes-s . . ., accessed 14 July 2021; “Zelenskyi vetuvav zakon pro vidnovlennia roboty VKKS,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 8 July 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelen skij-vetuvav-zak . . ., accessed 8 July 2021; and “Zelenskyi bachyt serioznyi prohres u sudovii reformi cherez stvorennia Etychnoi rady,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 9 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS /zelenskij-bachit-serjoznij-p . . ., accessed 9 November 2021. “Rada ukhvalyla zakon pro rozvidku,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 17 September 2020, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/rada-ukhvalila-za kon-p . . ., accessed 21 May 2021. “Rada ukhvalyla za osnovu zakonoproekt shchodo reformy SBU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 28 January 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/P OLITICS/rada-ukhvalila-za-osno . . ., accessed 28 January 2021; and Olena Scherban and Olena Halushka, “Ukraine’s Security Service Reform Plans Under Threat,” UkraineAlert, 13 July 2021, on the Internet at https://www.atlanti ccouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-secu . . ., accessed 13 July 2021. Shcherban, “Polovynchasti zminy: yak Rada reformuie SBU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 15 July 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/internal/polo vinchasti-zmini-jak-r . . ., accessed 16 July 2021 “Reforma SBU ta zminy do pensiinoho zakonodavstva: Stefanchuk rozpoviv pro plany roboty Rady na 2022 rik,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 3 January 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/reforma-sbu-ta-zmini-do-pe . . .,

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 169 Zelenskyy was also hampered by the Verkhovna Rada in targeting government officials’ corruption and oligarchs’ interference in government. In February 2019, the Constitutional Court had ruled invalid the criminal code provision allowing prosecution of officials for having illegally acquired assets on the basis of their edeclaration disclosures. This basically nullified the work of the NAZK, and specifically the e-declaration system, with consequent criminal liability for excessive, unexplained wealth as evidence of corruption. On coming to office, President Zelenskyy immediately introduced a bill to restore imprisonment penalties for illegal enrichment by officials subject to scrutiny by the e-declaration system.84 Two years later, however, he had to veto a law passed by the Rada amended so as to eliminate jail time for non-compliance, and which allowed officials not to declare assets of relatives.85 “The controversial amendment on relatives was pushed by Verkhovna Rada speaker Dmytro Razumkov,”86 which may well have contributed to his dismissal later in the year. Earlier, Zelenskyy signed into law an act creating the Economic Security Bureau to “investigate economic and white-collar crimes other than those within the jurisdiction of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. These crimes include tax evasion.”87 Leadership of this new body would be chosen by a commission representing cabinet, RNBOU, and the Rada—all legally controlled by the president—meaning it might also be controlled politically by Zelenskyy, perhaps as intended. At the end of accessed 3 January 2022; and Oleksii Pivtorak and Oleh Savchuk, “Top-5 provaliv i dosiahnen Ukrainy u 2021 rotsi. I yak vony vplynut na nas u novomu rotsi,” Ukrainska pravda, 29 December 2021, on the Internet at https:// www.pravda.com. ua/articles/2021/12/29/7318914/, accessed 29 December 2021. 84 “Zelenskyi vnis u Radu zakonoproekt pro nezakonne zbahachennia,” Ukrainska pravda, 3 June 2019, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/201 9/06/3/7217009/, accessed 3 June 2019. 85 “Zelenskyi vetuie zakon pro uv’iaznennia za nepravdyve deklaruvannia— OPU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 3 June 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/articl e/print/POLITICS/zelenskij-vetuje-zakon . . ., accessed 3 June 2021. 86 Sukhov, “Zelensky Vetoes Bill Allowing Officials not to Declare Relatives’ Assets,” Kyiv Post, 15 June 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/uk raine-politics/zelensky-vetoes-bill- . . ., accessed 15 June 2021. 87 Sukhov, “Zelensky Signs Law Creating Agency to Investigate Economic Crimes,” Kyiv Post, 22 March 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.co m/ukraine-politics/zelensky-signs-law- . . ., accessed 22 March 2021.

170 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY 2021, the so-called anti-Akhmetov law was passed by the Rada,88 but not before its members had “submitted 10,902 amendments . . . in a last-minute attempt to stall it from passing.”89 The law in question raised rents (known as royalties in Canada) on iron ore mining and increased taxes on CO2 emissions, affecting the steelmaking business interests of Ukraine’s richest man, Rinat Akhmetov. Another bill introduced by President Zelenskyy would allow tax evaders to avoid punishment by voluntarily declaring their indebtedness and paying a fee; this tax amnesty law passed through parliament despite criticism from the IMF and international experience that such holidays do not increase state revenues as expected.90 In another instance, after President Zelenskyy had introduced his widely-publicized and anticipated “anti-oligarch” bill, an alternative version—drafted by the European Solidarity, Fatherland, and Voice fractions—was also registered as a competing piece of legislation.91 This was typical of the Rada’s uncooperative stance. The president’s inability to rein in his political opponents was becoming obvious. By the end of 2021, it was becoming more and more unlikely for Zelenskyy to be able to count on the whole Servant of the People caucus for support for his legislative program. Of the entire 242member fraction, for example, only 210 voted to uphold the antiAkhmetov bill, well short of the required 226; the balance had to be sought elsewhere.92 Earlier, the president’s office had, by way of

Hunder, “Parliament Passes ‘Anti-Akhmetov’ Tax Law that Raises Iron Ore Rents, triples Carbon Tax,” Kyiv Independent, 30 November 2021, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent.com/politics/parliament-passes-anti-akhmeto . . ., accessed 1 January 2022. Oleksii Chaharnyi, “Lawmakers Submit Thousands of Amendments to Stall Anti-Akhmetov, Oligarch Bills,” Kyiv Post, 20 July 2021, on the Internet at https: //www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/lawmakers-submit-t . . ., accessed 21 July 2021. Liza Semko, “Ukraine’s Parliament Passes Tax Law Despite IMF Criticism,” Kyiv Post, 15 June 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/business /ukraines-parliament-passes- . . ., accessed 15 June 2021. “U Radi zareiestruvaly zakonoproekt pro deoliharkhizatsiiu, alternatyvnyi prezydentskomu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 15 June 2021, on the Internet at https://zn. uz/ukr/ar ticle/print/POLITICS/u-radi-zarejestruvali-z . . ., accessed 15 June 2021. Pivtorak and Savchuk, “Top-5 provaliv i dosiahnen Ukrainy u 2021 rotsi.”

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 171 establishing a stable relationship with the caucus, instituted the practice of preparing summaries of proposed bills for quick reference by parliamentarians in the caucus, as well as talking points or notes (reminiscent of “Kuchma’s temnyky”), and designated spokespersons to ensure uniformity of messaging.93 The guidance provided in this way was eventually interpreted as pressure on the Rada, which was vehemently denied by President Zelenskyy who responded that his office had merely been engaging in discussions with fraction leaders, not in exerting pressure on the deputies.94 He also announced he would not be dismissing his chief of staff, Andrii Yermak, despite the criticism of him from Poroshenko.95 When the Rada in 2021 twice failed to approve Zelenskyy’s choice for energy minister (Yurii Vitrenko), his office attempted to have him appointed as acting minister but with full powers as minister—a move seen as bypassing the legislature. The parliamentarians then altered the relevant bill, which resulted in another presidential veto.96 Thus, much as during Poroshenko’s tenure, law-making under Zelenskyy involved more of a struggle for power between president and parliament as opposed to a co-operative executive-legislative relationship as foreseen in the Constitution.

This probably stemmed from the president’s crucial reliance on his chief of staff. In any case, he was not about to follow advice his predecessor in view of the long-simmering animosity between them. Kravets and Romaniuk, “Khto vyrishuie, shcho, yak i koly hovoryt Zelenskyi, Rada i Kabmin,” Ukrainska pravda, 26 November 2019, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/20 19/11/26/7233013/, accessed 27 November 2019. “Zelenskyi zaperechuie tysk OPU na Verkhovnu Radu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 26 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS /zelenskij-zaperechuje-tisk- . . ., accessed 26 November 2021. “Zelenskyi ne zbyraietsia zvilniaty Yermaka—ne khoche vtrachaty ‘potuzhnu liudynu’,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 26 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua /ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelenskij-ne-zbirajetsja-zvil . . ., accessed 26 November 2021. “Prezydent shantazhuie parlament, vymahaiuchy neobmezhenykh povnovazhen v.o. ministra—dokument,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 19 February 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/prezident-shantazhuje- . . ., accessed 19 February 2021.

172 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY

Relations with Other Institutions In the previous section, reference was made to Zelenskyy’s legislative initiatives with regard to reform of the judiciary, PGO, SBU, DBR/SBI, and intelligence services. In this section, we examine the substance of these new laws to ascertain if their intent was genuine reform (achieving accountability, transparency, and conformity with the rule of law) or the imposition of presidential control for personal use of these institutions under the guise of reform. Were vacancies to be filled by open competition by qualified applicants, or were appointments made so as to put loyalists in place enhancing political control? Would the new legislation assure removal of corrupt leadership, or would it be merely cosmetic allowing old habits of personalization of power to prevail? Would favoritism be replaced by professionalism?

Judicial Reform A useful starting-point for the background to Zelenskyy’s reform efforts is provided us by Gustav Gressel. “In October 2016,” he writes, Ukraine ratified a law entitled “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges,” which created a new supreme court and paved the way for the lustration and self-governance of the judiciary. The law followed the standard procedures suggested by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission. These included the reform of the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) to preside over appointees to the new supreme court and to oversee the appointment of judges to other courts. Under the system, the Supreme Council of Justice [SCJ] presides over decisions on judges’ careers and appoints them to high-level positions—with the aim of facilitating the self-governance of the judiciary and of reducing political influence over it.97

While the law was satisfactory from the standpoint of its European origins, in practice it led to countless disputes and failed to eliminate political influence on court decisions.98 On coming to office, 97

Gustav Gressel, “Guarding the Guardians: Ukraine’s Security and Judicial Reforms Under Zelensky,” European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief (August 2019), 4. Ibid., 5.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 173 Zelenskyy toyed with the idea, therefore, of relaunching judicial reform. “However,” as Gressel warned, “self-government of the judiciary is now written into the constitution, so the constitutional court and the old-style judiciary will find plenty of ways to fend off or delay further reform. This will be a very tricky process in the future.”99 Similarly, President Zelenskyy’s tasks in terms of judicial reform were at the outset well summed up by two Ukrainian civil society activists as consisting of the following: renewing the entire corps of judges; overhauling the composition of the HQCJ (Vyshcha kvalifikatsiina komisiia suddiv—VKKS, in Ukrainian) and SCJ (Vyshcha rada pravosuddia—VRP, in Ukrainian) to ensure their independence from politics; raising standards for judicial training; and instituting lay judgeships to encourage citizen involvement in the reform process.100 What has Zelenskyy attempted to do in this regard, and what has he succeeded in achieving—the status quo, reform, or partial reform? A brief word about the pre-existing judicial system in Ukraine is in order. Judges are appointed to the bench by the HQCJ(VKKS); they are assigned to the courts, promoted in their careers, and disciplined or dismissed by another body, the SCJ(VRP). The judiciary is notorious for its lack of independence, integrity, and adherence to standards. But it is protected against removal of its most corrupt and incompetent portions—of which there is ample evidence, according to civil society NGOs and investigative journalists—by networks of patron-client relations overseen and contained by its two erstwhile governing bodies. The need for reform—of courts to dispense justice—has been obvious for decades, and numerous previous efforts had been made, but the existing governing bodies could never be relied on to effect reforms. In 2019, President Zelenskyy attempted an overhaul of the HQCJ(VKKS) and SCJ(VRP); he disbanded the HQCJ(VKKS), and a commission created by the SCJ(VRP) was to form a new 99 Ibid., 6. 100 Mykhailo Zhernakov and Iryna Shyba, “Chomu Poroshenko provalyv sudovu reformu, i shcho maie zrobyty maibutnii prezydent,” Ukrainska pravda, 14 March 2019, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/article/2019/03/ 14/7209169/, accessed 14 March 2019.

174 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY HQCJ(VKKS). But the SCJ(VRP) declined to cooperate and the entire effort to reform the judiciary failed.101 In 2020, Ukrainian authorities signed memoranda with the IMF and EU, promising to incorporate their recommendations on judicial reform into new legislation. President Zelenskyy then submitted to the Rada a new version of the bill in June, which the Venice Commission criticized in October as inadequate, but which the Rada then modified so as to be totally at odds with international advice. This bill was never debated.102 Instead, Zelenskyy introduced, in February 2021, yet another bill meant to comply with IMF requirements, on which, of course, depended a 5-billion-US-dollar loan.103 This version (bill 5068) would establish for a period of six years a new body, the Ethics Council, composed of three Ukrainian judges and three international experts, which would assess the integrity of candidates for appointment to the SCJ(VRP). A second bill (3711-d) concerned the formation of a new HQCJ(VKKS)—a competition commission (hiring committee) made up likewise of three Ukrainian justices and three foreign experts would provide to the SCJ(VRP) a list of 32 names for the 16 vacancies, from which the SCJ(VRP) would select the successful candidates.104 Both laws were passed by the Rada in

101 Zhernakov, “Strashnyi sud prezydenta Zelenskoho: dva roky obitsianok i zhodnoho prohresu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 7 April 2021, on the Internet at https://z n.ua/ukr/article/print/internal/strashnij-sud-prezidenta-z . . ., accessed 14 April 2021; Makarenko, “How Ukraine Can Tame its ‘Judicial Mafia’,” Euromaidan Press, 9 February 2021, on the Internet at http://euromaidanpress.com /2021/02/09/no-end-to-corruption-i . . ., accessed 10 February 2021; and Mykola Khavroniuk, “Sudova reforma . . . shliakhom rehresu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 2 February 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.uz/ukr/article/print/LAW/sudo va-reforma-shljakhom-r . . ., accessed 4 February 2021. 102 Makarenko, “How Ukraine Can Tame its ‘Judicial Mafia’.” 103 Zhernakov, “Strashnyi sud prezydenta Zelenskoho”; and Oleg Sukhov, “Watchdogs Say Zelensky’s New Bill Doesn’t Lead to True Judicial Reform,” Kyiv Post, 17 February 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukr aine-politics/watchdogs-say-zele . . ., accessed 18 February 2021. 104 Sukhov, “Watchdogs Say Zelensky’s New Bill”; Halyna Chyzhyk, Mykhailo Zhernakov, and Kateryna Butko, ”Sudova reforma Zelenskoho: ochyshchennia sudiv ne bude,” Ukrainska pravda, 18 February 2021, on the Internet at https://w ww.pravda.com.ua/articles/2021/02/18/7283907/, accessed 18 February 2021; and Iryna Shyba and Mykhailo Zhernakov, “Sud ide: koly zapratsiiuie sudova reforma, i shcho mozhe pity ne tak,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 16 July 2021, on

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 175 July 2021; before, during, and after passage they had aroused controversy, particularly about the role—decisive or not—of foreign experts whom reformers regarded as a last bastion against perpetuation of the existing judicial system.105 Implementation was subsequently delayed or threatened, both by those institutions party to the reform and others outside it. The SCJ(VRP), for example, delayed the opening of the Ethics Council by refusing to name its representatives to that body, only conceding to public opinion on 23 October. The Ethics Council came into being automatically on 9 November.106 When, in February 2022, that body decided to begin its work by certifying the honesty and integrity of current members of the SCJ(VRP) before proceeding to fill vacancies with new members, ten SCJ(VRP) members submitted their resignations. This deprived the SCJ(VRP) of a quorum. Besides implicitly signaling the outcome of the Ethics Council’s inquiry, this move resulted in the suspension of the SCJ(VRP)’s work, which in turn threatened the collapse of the entire judicial system with its over two thousand vacancies. Otherwise, it might also result in a thorough overhaul of the whole system.107 Outside the immediate arena of conflict, meanwhile, the the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/LAW/sud-ide-koli-zapratsjuj e-sud . . ., accessed 21 July 2021. 105 Sukhov, “Venice Commission Chief Lambasts Ukraine’s Judicial Reform Bills,” Kyiv Post, 8 June 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukrainepolitics/venice-commission- . . ., accessed 9 June 2021; and Shyba and Zhernakov, “Sud ide.” 106 “Rada suddiv zablokuvala osnovnu chastynu sudovoi reformy v Ukraini,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 12 September 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/articl e/print/POLITICS/rada-suddiv-zablokuvala-o . . ., accessed 13 September 2021; Oleg Sukhov, “Despite Zelensky’s Pledges, Obstruction of Judicial Reform Continues,” Kyiv Post, 24 September 2021, on the Internet at https://w ww.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/despite-zelenskys-pledge . . ., accessed 3 October 2021; Sukhov, “Judicial Reform Makes Progress but May be Canceled.” Kyiv Post, 4 November 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/judicial-reform-makes-p . . ., accessed 4 November 2021; and “Maizhe dva desiatky hromadskykh orhanizatsii zaklykaly Zelenskoho ne pryznachaty suddiv, podanykh VRP,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 25 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/m ajzhe-dva-desjatki-hroma . . ., accessed 25 November 2021. 107 “Vyshcha rada pravosuddia prypynyla robotu—otriadu desiat chleniv podaly u vidstavku,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 22 February 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.u a/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/vishcha-rada-pravosuddja-p . . ., accessed 22 February 2022.

176 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY Supreme Court on 8 October 2021 had requested that the judicial reform laws be reviewed by the Constitutional Court, which might strike them down as it had the e-declaration system earlier.108 Judicial reform could also be undone by the powerful Kyiv District Administrative Court, presided over by Judge Pavlo Vovk, himself charged with various crimes yet living in impunity protected by his fellow judges.109 This court “became infamous for interfering in the work of government bodies, obstructing reforms, disrupting competition for state jobs and helping corrupt officials and oligarchs escape punishment.”110 Specifically, as Olena Makarenko explains, the Kyiv District Administrative Court (KDAC) is a sort of headquarters that produces decisions influencing the whole country. KDAC is the court that:     

considers appeals for the actions of state bodies and local self-governance bodies; makes decisions on public service; approves appointments and dismissals of its own members; examines cases concerning the election process; and oversees other important judicial matters. Only this court can consider cases regarding appeals of the governmental decisions, ministries, central bodies of the executive power, the National Bank, and other bodies.111

Its decisions have included ruling illegal the nationalization of Kolomoiskyi’s PrivatBank, and destroying the health care reforms of minister Ulana Suprun. To forestall such possibility in judicial 108 Sukhov, “Judicial Reform Makes Progress”; and Sukhov, “Ukraine’s Judicial Reform, Explained.” 109 Sukhov, “Reform Watch: Legal Reforms Facing Sabotage on Many Fronts Under Zelensky,” Kyiv Post, 10 September 2021, on the Internet at https://www.ky ivpost.com/ukraine-politics/reform-watch-legal-refo . . ., accessed 10 September 2021. On Judge Vovk, see, for example, Sukhov, “Tainted Judge Vovk Hides from NABU, Ignores Court Order to Attend Hearing,” Kyiv Post, 8 February 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/tainted-j udge-vovk- . . ., accessed 10 February 2021. 110 Anna Myroniuk, “Zelensky Moves to Strip Powers from Notorious Kyiv Court,” Kyiv Post, 13 February 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.c om/ukraine-politics/zelensky-moves-to-s . . ., accessed 15 February 2021. 111 Makarenko, “How Ukraine Can Tame its ‘Judicial Mafia’.”

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 177 reform, President Zelenskyy had attempted to eliminate that court, or at least to reduce its powers, but the effort was blocked by a parliamentary committee. He then tried to have the KDAC’s extraordinary powers transferred to the Supreme Court.112 At the end of 2021, therefore, President Zelenskyy’s judicial reform was in a parlous state, capable of being extinguished unexpectedly by a disruption from any one of several directions—and Ukrainians’ trust in its judiciary remained equally tenuous. Admittedly, President Zelenskyy was in a Catch-22 situation: he could not remove corrupt judges at the top of the judicial hierarchy without violating the principle of the independence of judges, but neither could he reform the judiciary relying on corrupt, compromised incumbent judges to do so. To illustrate the dilemma, in December 2020, the chair of the Constitutional Court, Oleksandr Tupytskyi, was charged with bribery. President Zelenskyy fired him along with fellow CC judge Oleksandr Kasminin. In July 2021, the Supreme Court cancelled as unlawful the two dismissals, since constitutionally only the CC can fire its members. Zelenskyy appealed and opened a competition to replace the two judges. In the fall, a selection committee brought forth several candidates whom Zelenskyy was expected to appoint, although some were considered deficient in integrity and political standards.113 When he decreed the appointment of two replacements, however, the Constitutional Court deferred their swearing-in explaining that there would be no vacancies until 2023 when Tupytskyi and Kasminin’s terms expire.114 Zelenskyy, in sum, had either been naïve about 112 Myroniuk, “Zelensky Moves to Strip Powers”; Sukhov, “Reform Watch”; and Sukhov, “Judicial Reform Makes Progress.” 113 Sukhov, “Judicial Reform Makes Progress”; Kvitka Perehinets, “Supreme Court Overturns Dismissal of Tupitsky from Constitutional Court,” Kyiv Post, 14 July 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/supreme -court-overt . . ., accessed 14 July 2021; and “ZN.UA publikuie rishennia Verkhovnoho Sudu stosovno Tupytskoho,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 14 July 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/znua-publikuje-ris henn . . ., accessed 14 July 2021. 114 “Zelenskyi pryznachyv dvokh suddiv KSU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 26 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelenskijpriznachiv-dvokh . . ., accessed 26 November 2021; and Oleg Sukhov, “Constitutional Court Delays Swearing in Judges Appointed by Zelensky,” Kyiv

178 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY reforming a judiciary in need of reform by asking it to reform itself, or had been purposefully deceitful towards the EU, IMF, G7, and international partners that he truly intended to reform the judiciary when in fact preserving the status quo was his way of maintaining his control of it.115 Perhaps what all Ukrainians ought to do as a preliminary step towards judicial reform is go back to school and enroll in an ethics course. The nub of Zelenskyy’s judicial reform problem was undoubtedly located in the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, the reform of which was unfortunately a classic problem without solution. The Court had created for itself a unique position atop the entire legal structure, one of limitless, unchallengeable, and arbitrary power.116 As commonly understood, the role of a constitutional court in a normal liberal-democratic context is to interpret the constitution, and to rule as unconstitutional laws that contravene it or were adopted in a manner contrary to it. In Ukraine, by contrast, the Constitutional Court has extended itself by ruling on laws that have no bearing on the constitution. There is, however, no mechanism for reining in or bring to account this renegade Constitutional Court. According to Ukraine’s Constitution, decisions of the Constitutional Court are final, obligatory, and not subject to appeal. They cannot be changed, halted, or remain unexecuted. In the cases on illegal enrichment and false e-declarations, for example, the justices reached decisions on questions they were not asked, yet these decisions were not appealable. These were in effect an amnesty for corrupt top-level officials.117 Nor does the Court recognize conflicts of Independent, 30 November 2021, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent.com/p olitics/constitutional-court-delays-swe . . ., accessed 4 January 2022. 115 Olena Prokopenko, “Ukraine’s Fragile Reform Prospects amid Ongoing Russian Aggression,” GMF (German Marshall Fund of the United States) Policy Brief, May 2021, 8-9. 116 Anna Maliar, “Konstytutsiinyi Tsuhtsvanh,” Ukrainska pravda, 5 January 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2021/01/5/7279108 /, accessed 5 January 2021. 117 Ibid.; “How to Solve Ukraine’s Constitutional Crisis—Blog,” Transparency International Ukraine, on the Internet at https://transparency.org/en/blog/how -to-solve-ukraines-co . . ., accessed 6 November 2020; Oleg Sukhov, “Constitutional Court Destroys Crucial Pillar of Ukraine’s Anti-Graft Infrastructure,”

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 179 interest—its own or others’.118 Thus Ukraine’s Constitutional Court has become firmly and comfortably entangled in the country’s allencompassing web of politics and corruption. Reform of the Court is practically impossible: its consent is required for constitutional amendment; only the court itself can remove its judges, even though many are or have been under investigation and/or charged with offences. Otherwise, one waits for expiration of the nine-year term—the first vacancies in 2022, the entire court, in 2028.119 The Venice Commission has recommended a competitive selection process which would involve foreign experts as well as domestic civil society representatives in the appointment of new judges to the Constitutional Court. Zelenskyy has followed this advice, but his own party in the Rada has eviscerated these changes from the draft law, thus attempting to preserve the status quo.120 This is a Sisyphean project, if ever there was one: attempting to lift the deadweight of the Constitutional Court, Zelenskyy cannot even count on his own parliamentary party to help him.

Kyiv Post, 29 October 2020, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukrai ne-politics/constitutional-court- . . ., accessed 10 November 2020; and Kateryna Busol, “Ukraine’s Constitutional Court is Revisiting its Relationship to Rule of Law,” Kyiv Post, 26 December 2020, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.co m/article/opinion/op-ed/kateryna-busol . . ., accessed 16 January 2021. 118 Maliar, “Konstytutsiinyi Tsuhtsvanh”; and Oleg Sukhov, “New Evidence Emerges for Conflicts of Interest, Nepotism at Constitutional Court,” Kyiv Post, 20 March 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics /new-evidence-emerg . . ., accessed 22 March 2021. 119 Maliar, “Konstytutsiinyi Tsuhtsvanh.” 120 “Venetsianska komisiia podilylasia vysnovkamy shchodo dvokh zakonoproektiv po KSU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 22 march 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/u kr/article/print/POLITICS/venetsianska-komisija . . ., accessed 23 Marcg 2021; Sukhov, “Venice Commission Urges Appointment of Constitutional Court Judges with Foreigners’ Help,” Kyiv Post, 23 March 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/venice-commission- . . ., accessed 25 March 2021; “Zelenskyi pidpysav ukaz pro pryznachennia konkursu dlia vidboru suddiv KSU: sklad komisii,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 17 August 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelenskij-pidpisav -ukaz-pro . . ., accessed 17 August 2021; Zhernakov, “Yak ‘Sluhy narodu’ zakhyshchaiut ostannii bastion suddivskoi mafii,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 7 September 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/internal/jak-sluhi -narodu-zakhishchajut . . ., accessed 8 September 2021; Sukhov, “Reform Watch”; and Sukhov, “Judicial Reform Makes Progress.“

180 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY

The Prosecutor-General’s Office When at the end of August 2019, Ruslan Riaboshapka was appointed Prosecutor General to replace Yurii Lutsenko, he vowed to overhaul the institution then still known by its Soviet-era designation as the “prokuratura” and to bring to justice regularly high-level officials in an intense crackdown on white-collar crime and corruption.121 Shortly thereafter, the Rada passed a law on the reform of the prosecution service, changing the name from procurator general to Prosecutor General’s Office, cutting the number of employees from 15,000 to 10,000, “reassessing the currently employed prosecutors, . . . firing bad prosecutors and hiring new ones, cutting the military prosecution branch, as well as opening access to the profession of prosecutor for all citizens of Ukraine with legal education and sufficient experience.”122 On 5 March 2020, however, following a vote of non-confidence in the Verkhovna Rada, Riaboshapka was dismissed, ostensibly for not effectively executing his function and failing to investigate prominent criminal cases.123 The real reason was his failure to pursue political prosecutions, including proceeding against ex-president Poroshenko; it was believed that Kolomoiskyi, Medvedchuk, and Portnov were behind the dismissal. This was a surprising development, in view of the fact that Riaboshapka, brought into the Zelenskyy team by Andrii Bohdan, apparently had had the president’s confidence, and by December

121 “Riaboshapka nazvav osnovnyi priorytet Henprokuratory na naiblyzhchi roky,” UNIAN, 30 August 2019, on the Internet at https://www.unian.ua/polit ics/10668333-ryboshapka-nazvav-o . . ., accessed 4 September 2019. 122 Vyacheslav Hnatyuk, “Parliament Launches Reform of Prosecution System in Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, 21 September 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpo st.com/ukraine-politics/parliament-launches- . . ., accessed 23 September 2019. See also Tetiana Khutor, “Reforma prokuratury: shcho skhovane za stattiamy prezudentskoho zakonoproektu?” Ukrainska pravda, 2 September 2019, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2019/09/2/7225031/, accessed 19 January 2022. 123 “Ukraine Prosecutor Gets Sacked, Raising European Concerns,” EURACTIV, 6 March 2020, on the Internet at https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-e ast/news/ukraine-p . . ., accessed 6 March 2020.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 181 2019 had effected a reassessment of the top level of the procuracy whereby only 610 of 1339 prosecutors had passed the test.124 Riaboshapka was replaced as head of the PGO by Iryna Venediktova, formerly a professor of civil law at Kharkiv University, and in 2019 elected to the Verkhovna Rada as no. 3 on the Servant of the People party list.125 With no experience in prosecutions, Venediktova had in 2016 applied unsuccessfully for a position on the bench of the Supreme Court of Ukraine; in 2018, she was introduced to the Zelenskyy team by Ruslan Stefanchuk in the role of legal advisor. When Zelenskyy fired the head of the DBR/SBI, Roman Truba, in December 2019, he named Venediktova as its acting head, a position she continued to hold—with questionable competence and independence—as prosecutor general pending a permanent replacement.126 Introduced to the Verkhovna Rada by President Zelenskyy, Venediktova’s appointment was approved by 269 votes; Opposition Platform—For Life and Fatherland voted against, European Solidarity and Voice abstained. Accepting the appointment, Venediktova promised not to sell, sabotage, or reverse cases, and to renew the institution so that prosecutors “would feel themselves independent, secure, and needed by the state.” Her first step would

124 Lukashova, Reshchuk, and Yevhen Buderatskyi, “Yak Kolomoiskyi, Medvedchuk i Portnov rukamy ‘sluh’ vlashtuvaly rozpravu nad Riaboshapkoiu,” Ukrainska pravda, 5 March 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravd a.com.ua/articles/2020/03/5/7242667/, accessed 19 January 2022. 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid.; and Lukashova and Reshchuk, “Trubu zirvalo. Yak i za shcho Zelenskyi i Rada rozihnaly DBR,” Ukrainska pravda, 3 December 2019, on the Internet at ht tps://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2019/12/3/7233744/, accessed 3 December 2019. For Ryaboshapka’s assessment of his successor and her role in his dismissal, see “Riaboshapka pro novoho henprokurora: Ne naikrashchyi vybir,” Ukrainska pravda, 25 March 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.u a/news/2020/03/25/7245095/, accessed 19 January 2022; “Riaboshapka: Zelenskyi rukamy Venediktovoi povertaie zvilnenykh prokuroriv,” Ukrainska pravda, 6 May 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/202 0/05/6/7250627/; and “Riaboshapka vvazhaie, shcho Venediktova prychetna do yoho vidstavky,” Ukrainska pravda, 14 May 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2020/05/14/7251552/, accessed 19 January 2022.

182 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY be an audit of cases and personnel within the procuracy.127 For her immediate subordinates and advisors Venediktova chose seasoned prosecutors, many with questionable backgrounds due to liability to lustration and accumulation of assets, none renowned for their reform credentials. Among them was the veteran ex-prosecutor general Sviatoslav Piskun, whose inclusion she justified on grounds of his valued experience.128 Venediktova managed to retain the backing of the president,129 in spite of a storm of negative reports on her first year of work. These dealt with the lack of progress on reforms within the procuracy, as well as the obvious politicization of cases. It was noted, for example, that while 55 per cent of toplevel prosecutors had been eliminated in the first round of reassessments of qualifications, in the second round under her watch this had dropped to 34 per cent of middle-level officers.130 Selection committees were being made up of a majority of serving prosecutors (as opposed to experts and representatives of the lay public), so that prosecutors would be choosing prosecutors, contrary to the spirit of reform.131 Very soon discredited prosecutors were returning to work; cases clearly touching the interests of oligarchs and of Zelenskyy’s sponsors were being deferred, delayed, or detoured to bodies such as the SBU more attuned to executing political

127 “Rada pryznachyla Venediktovu henprokurorom,” Ukrainska pravda, 17 March 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2020/03/17/7243 919/, accessed 19 January 2022. 128 Lukashova, “Komanda Venediktovoi: vichni prokurory, pryvydy mynuloho i Piskun,” Ukrainska pravda, 18 August 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pra vda.com.ua/articles/2020/08/18/7263267/, accessed 18 August 2020. 129 “Yermak: Venediktova povnistiu vidpovidaie pryntsypam Zelenskoho,” Ukrainska pravda, 4 May 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/ news/2020/05/4/7250436/, accessed 19 January 2022; and “Zelenskyi vyrishuvatyme, chy lyshaty Venediktovu, pislia zvitu. Ale uspikhy vzhe bachyt,” Ukrainska pravda, 22 December 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.co m.ua/news/2020/12/22/7277790/, accessed 19 January 2022. 130 Liemienov, “Reforma imeni Venediktovoi,” Ukrainska pravda, 1 August 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2020/08/1/7261420/, accessed 19 January 2022. 131 “Venediktova vidmovliaietsia vid ochyshchennia prokuratury—TsPK,” Ukrainska pravda, 5 May 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/ news/2020/05/5/7250537/, accessed 19 January 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 183 prosecutions.132 By summer 2021, Venediktova was claiming that reform of the prosecution service had been almost completed, but a civil society NGO spokesman was of the opinion that under her watch there had actually been a rollback of reform.133 Thus, even though Zelenskyy appears not to have attempted to gain control directly over the PGO or to interfere in its operation, he does seem to have been satisfied to allow it under the pliant Iryna Venediktova to relapse naturally into its accustomed role of one of the chief executive’s political instruments—as opposed to functioning independently and lawfully.

The SBU, the DBR/SBI, and Intelligence A bill to reform the SBU, the Security Service of Ukraine, successor to the Committee for State Security (Komitet derzhavnoi bezpeky— KDB in Ukrainian, KGB in Russian), was introduced by President Zelenskyy into the Verkhovna Rada in March 2020, and approved in first reading in January 2021, after being worked on by the

132 Liemienov, “Rik na troni: henprokurorka i rezultaty,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 17 March 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/LAW/rik-na-t roni-henprokurorka-i . . ., accessed 22 March 2021. See also “Venediktova zablokuvala rozsliduvannia u spravi holovy OASK Vovka—ZMI,” Ukrainska pravda, 27 July 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/202 0/07/27/7260800/, accessed 19 January 2022; Tsentr protydii koruptsii, “’De rezultaty?’ abo 5 naibilshykh provaliv Venediktovoi na posadi henprokurora,” Ukrainska pravda, 10 October 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com. ua/articles/2020/10/10/7269448/, accessed 19 January 2022; “Venediktova vidmovyla NABU u ponovlenni spravy Rotterdam+,” Ukrainska pravda, 15 October 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2020/10/15 /7269994/, accessed 19 January 2022; “Zastupnyku Yermaka pidhotovyly pidozru, ale Venediktova zupynyla ii vruchennia,” Ukrainska pravda, 2 December 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2020/12/2/72 73644/, accessed 19 January 2022; “Ya ne mozhu braty Vovka i volokty yoho do sudu—Venediktova,” Ukrainska pravda, 17 March 2021, on the Internet at htt ps://www.pravda.com.ua/nws/2021/03/17/7286975/, accessed 19 January 2022; and Andrii Borovyk, “Slukhniane ‘oko hosudareve’: chym zapam’iataietsia pershyi rik Venediktovoi u Henprokuraturi,” Ukrainska pravda, 17 March 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2021 /03/17/7286916/, accessed 19 January 2022. 133 “Rada zminyla zakon pro reformu prokuratury,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 15 June 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/rada-zminila-z akon-pro . . ., accessed 15 June 2021.

184 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY parliamentary committee. The SBU would under this bill surrender altogether its investigative role by 2024, and be reduced in size as well as being demilitarized, but would have its counterintelligence and anti-terrorism functions strengthened.134 After prolonged consideration, including over 3,800 amendments, the law was scheduled to be approved in second reading sometime in 2022. In the meantime, it became obvious that genuine reform of the SBU was not in prospect. The drawn-out legislative process, in which the SBU with backing from the President’s Office took an active part in shaping the law according to its own preferences, worked to Zelenskyy’s advantage. Thus it emerged with its investigative and anticorruption powers practically intact, with no parliamentary oversight, and with the agency at the disposal of the president to use against his political opponents, or in favor of his supporters, as appropriate, and to put pressure on businessmen and oligarchs, much as Poroshenko would have done.135 In contrast to his hands-off approach to the PGO, Zelenskyy was noticeably active in shuffling top-level personnel in the SBU.136 In July 2021, for example, he 134 Shabunin and Shcherban, “Reforma SBU: ni vashym, ni nashym,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 16 October 2020, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/int ernal/reforma-sbu-ni-vashim-ni-nas . . ., accessed 13 December 2021; and “Rada ukhvalyla za osnovu zakonoproekt shchodo reformy SBU.” 135 “Stefanchuk sprohnozuvav termin ukhvalennia zakonu pro reformu SBU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 13 December 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/articl e/print/POLITICS/stefanchuk-sprohnozuvav- . . ., accessed 13 December 2021; Vitalii Tsokur, “2021: yak i chomu ZeKomanda druhyi rik ukhyliaietsia vid reformy SBU,” Ukrainska pravda, 27 December 2021, on the Internet at https: //pravda.com.ua/columns/2021/12/27/7318585/, accessed 27 December 2021; “Zakon pro reformu SBU ne zminyt roboty spetssluzhby—Shabunin,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 1 January 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/p rint/POLITICS/zakon-pro-reformu-sbu-ne . . ., accessed 26 January 2022; “Reforma SBU ta zminy do pensiinoho zakonodavstva”; and “Stefanchuk rozpoviv, koly u Radi rozhlianut zakonoproiekt pro reformu SBU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 24 January 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/P OLITICS/stefanchuk-rozpoviv-koli-u . . ., accessed 26 January 2022. 136 My examples are taken from: “Zelenskyi zvilnyv dvokh zastupnykiv Bakanova i zminyv nachalnyka antyterorystychnoho tsentru SBU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 26 July 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelen skij-zvilniv-dvok . . ., accessed 27 July 2021; “Zelenskyi zvilnyv nachalnyka Departmentu zakhystu natsderzhavnosti SBU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 5 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelenskijzvilniv-nachalnik . . ., accessed 5 November 2021; “Zelenskyi pidpysav ukaz

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 185 signed eight decrees—seven dismissals, one promotion. In November, he fired the SBU’s national security department head who had been in office fewer than ten months, as well as its head of counterintelligence. The new counterintelligence chief’s appointment was met with some skepticism by serving SBU officers, while his predecessor only learned from the mass media of being replaced. It did not, therefore, appear as though the president was being very effective at building a client base in the intelligence service. He explained these replacements as being necessary to reform the institution and strengthen the battle against contraband trafficking,137 although this latter was not a responsibility of the security service. It may rather have been that Zelenskyy was afraid of the SBU and its agents. The discovery of a coup plot in November 2021 might help explain Zelenskyy’s nervous relationship with the SBU, despite its being led by his friend, Ivan Bakanov.138 A small reminder that the SBU has to be included in the allpervasive net of political corruption enveloping the government of Ukraine emerged from a case made public in early 2022.139 According to a Bihus.info investigation, one of the deputy heads of the SBU

pro zvilnennia nachalnyka kontrrozvidky SBU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 29 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelenskijpidpisav-ukaz-pr . . ., accessed 29 November 2021; “Zelenskyi zvilnyv ochilnyka kontrrozvidky SBU,” Ukrainska pravda, 29 November 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2021/11/29/7315660/, accessed 29 November 2021; and “Pryznachennia ‘dyvne ta nebezpechne’—ofitsery SBU pro novoho nachalnyka kontrrozvidky,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 30 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelenskij-prizn chiv-novoh . . ., accessed 30 November 2021. 137 “Zelenskyi ozvuchyv dvi prychyny kadrovykh perestanovok u SBU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 26 July 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLIT ICS/zelenskij-ozvuchiv-dvi . . ., accessed 27 July 2021. 138 Patrick Wintour, “Ukraine Has Uncovered Russian-Linked Coup Plot, Says President,” Guardian, 26 November 2021, on the Internet at https://www.guar dian.com/world.2021/nov/26/ukrainian-intellig . . ., accessed 26 November 2021. In the midst of war, in July 2022, both Bakanov and Venediktova were dismissed due to the presence of traitors in their ranks, about which more in chapter six. 139 “Sim’ia zastupnyka hlavy SBU Horbenka volodiie mainom na milion dolariv— Bihus.Info,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 18 January 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ ukr/article/print/POLITICS/simja-zastupnika-hlavi-sbu . . ., accessed 26 January 2022.

186 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY and his family had assets worth over one million US dollars, including real estate (one suburban home, a villa, apartments in Kyiv and Odesa, and two parking stalls), automobiles, and bank accounts. The investigative journalists were doubtful the SBU officer’s salary matched his declared wealth. No wonder the agency was fighting reform. Another such instance from 2020 involved the head of internal security in the SBU, who had acquired an apartment in an elite quarter of Kyiv for one-quarter of its market value.140 At the start of his term, Western observers saw Zelenskyy as facing an impossible task in “reforming the country’s chronically corrupt domestic spy service,” the SBU, because of its being so “closely intertwined with both Ukraine’s powerful oligarchs and its political class.” Described as being “nearly impervious to reform,” yet inexplicably so given “that corruption in the service is an open secret.”141 In line with this diagnosis, in October 2019, a criminal case was launched against the SBU’s former head, Vasyl Hrytsak, on charges including embezzlement and misappropriation.142 Even Zelenskyy’s appointee, Bakanov, was suspected of illegally engaging in business while head of the SBU by virtue of being the sole manager of a real estate company in Spain, which he denied.143 Zelenskyy defended his friend, saying “there has never been a more honest SBU chief,”144 which in an odd sense may well have been the truth, considering the reputation of the institution—it is all relative.

140 “’Skhemy’ pokazaly elitne rodynne maino hlavy vnutrishnoi bezpeky SBU,” Ukrainska pravda, 29 October 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com. ua/news/2020/10/29/7271729/, accessed 19 November 2020. 141 Matthew Karnitschnig, “Corrupt Spy Agency Tests Ukraine’s New President,” POLITICO, 25 July 2019, on the Internet at https://www.politico.eu/article/vo lodymyr-zelenskiy-legacy-of-s . . ., accessed 23 November 2020. 142 “Treason Probe Against SBU Ex-Chief Hrytsak Under Way in Ukraine,” Interfax-Ukraine, 22 November 2019, on the Internet at https://en.interfax.com.ua/ news/general/626190.html, accessed 27 November 2020. 143 “Report: Ukrainian Security Service Chief Runs Company In Spain, Illegally,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 22 May 2020, on the Internet at https://www. rferl.org/a/ukrainian-security-service-chief-reported . . ., accessed 27 November 2020. 144 “Zelensky About Bakanov: ‘There Has Never Been a More Honest SBU Chief’,” Interfax-Ukraine, 20 May 2020, on the Internet at https://en.interfax.com.ua/n ews/general/663557.html, accessed 27 November 2020.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 187 Zelenskyy was also actively selecting and discarding his heads of foreign intelligence, acting more the card player as opposed to patron. In June 2019, he appointed to this position Vladislav Bukhariev, who in 2014 had been first deputy chief of the SBU in charge of fighting corruption and organized crime. That same year he was elected to the Verkhovna Rada representing the Fatherland party.145 One year later, Bukhariev was replaced by Valerii Kondratiuk, only to be replaced in July 2021 by Oleksandr Lytvynenko, director of the national institute for strategic research. Then in January 2022, Zelenskyy named Oleksandr Tarasovskyi as deputy head of foreign intelligence, making this the fourth highlevel change in the leadership of the agency during the president’s term to date. Tarasovskyi had been in charge of human resources in the SBU until being fired by President Yanukovych in February 2012. Coincidentally, a former first deputy head of foreign intelligence was at this same time reinstated, thanks to a lawsuit before the notoriously corrupt Kyiv District Administrative Court which fully exonerated him.146 As if Ukraine did not have enough legal investigative bodies, another one akin to the FBI had to be introduced. The DBR/SBI (Derzhavne biuro rozsliduvannia/State Bureau of Investigation) was created in November 2015 to investigate criminal cases involving high-level officials (excepting most of those dealing with corruption, assigned to the NABU). On the recommendation of Oleksandr Turchynov, President Poroshenko on 22 November appointed Roman Truba as its initial director. Work of this new agency under his leadership did not produce great results: in 2018, for example, it initiated just 229 cases involving corruption, of which none proceeded to court; in 2019, of 3,056 such cases, only 276, or 9 per cent.147 Assessing its own performance, the DBR/SBI had to acknowledge that it “did not cope with the top priority tasks

145 “Zelenskyi pryznachyv ochilnykom Sluzhby zovnishnoi rozvidky.” 146 “Zelenskyi pryznachyv zastupnyka holovy Sluzhby zovnishnoi rozvidky,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 22 January 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/ print/UKRAINE/zelenskij-priznachiv-zastup . . ., accessed 26 January 2022. 147 Trepak, Protydii koruptsii v Ukraini, 306.

188 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY and challenges of modern times in 2019.”148 Not long after Zelenskyy took over the presidency, the process of installing his own person in charge of the agency began. A case against its director was opened in June by the prosecutor general’s office accusing him of failing to comply with a court order, misuse of office, and negligence.149 The president then introduced a bill to reorganize the DBR/SBI, which was passed by the Verkhovna Rada in December. When signed by Zelenskyy, this amendment entailed the automatic dismissal of the current director, replaced collegial with one-man leadership within the agency, placed the body under the president (executive) instead of the cabinet of ministers (government), and gave the president the power to determine its structure as well as its public monitoring council.150 In spite of the Constitutional Court’s ruling that the president’s right to appoint the head of the DBR/SBI was unconstitutional, Zelenskyy signed the bill on 24 December.151 Truba’s undoing was a set of compromising recordings which revealed that he had had conversations regarding closing a criminal case against oligarch Kolomoiskyi and the investigation of ex-president Poroshenko, and including direct contact with the president’s chief of staff, Andrii Bohdan.152 For a supposedly independent law enforcement agency such discussions were improper, because they were evidence of political interference with the

148 Interfax-Ukraine, “SBI Says Failed to Cope with Priority Tasks and Challenges in 2019,” Kyiv Post, 2 January 2020. 149 “Henprokuratura vidkryla spravu proty dyrektora DBR,” Vysokyi zamok, 3 June 2019, on the Internet at https://wz.lviv.ua/article/391651-henprokuratura-vid kryla-sprav . . ., accessed 3 June 2019. 150 Lukashova and Reshchuk, “Trubu zirvalo”; and “Ukraine’s Ruling Party Announces Probe Into SBU Head,” UNIAN, 4 December 2019, on the Internet at h ttps://www.unian.info/politics/10780076-ukraine-s-ruling-party-an . . ., accessed 30 September 2021. 151 “Bill on President’s Appointment of SBI, NABU Heads Ruled Unconsitutional—Source,” UNIAN, 17 December 2019, on the Internet at https:// www.unian.info/politics/10797743-bill-on-president-s-appoi . . ., accessed 30 September 2019; and Interfax-Ukraine, “Zelensky Appoints Iryna Venediktova as Acting SBI Director,” Kyiv Post, 27 December 2019. 152 Lukashova and Reshchuk, “Trubu zirvalo.”

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 189 director among other things reporting to the president’s office on cases under investigation.153 The search for Roman Truba’s replacement took two years. At first, Iryna Venediktova served as acting director until her appointment as PGO, then deputy director Oleksandr Sokolov took her place, being replaced with his immediate subordinate, Oleksii Sukhanov.154 Sukhanov began his career in the SBU, then worked as a department head in the PGO from 2017 until being fired during Riaboshapka’s housecleaning of that body in 2019, and spent the next year sheltered in foreign intelligence. He has a law degree from Kharkiv University.155 Evidently steered by the president’s office, the selection body was trimmed from nine to six, of whom five could be counted on to select the government’s preferred candidate. As predicted by activist Oleksandr Liemienov, this turned out to be Sukhanov, whose qualification for the office was questionable in view of his having failed an earlier examination to remain in the PGO, his previous employer.156 Conveniently for the soon-to-be-installed director, he had appealed to the notorious Kyiv District Administrative Court and had his qualification as prosecutor restored.157 On 31 December 2021, therefore, President Zelenskyy appointed Oleksii Sukhanov as director of DBR/SBI for a five-year

153 “Ukrainian Prosecutors Open Pretrial Probe Into Ex-Chief of SBI Truba—Lawmaker,” UNIAN, 13 January 2020, on the Internet at https://www.unian.info/ politics/10828142-ukrainian-prosecutors-op . . ., accessed 30 September 2021. 154 Interfax-Ukraine, “Zelensky Appoints Iryna Venediktova”; and “Konkurs na posadu holovy DBR provedut tak, shchob vuhrav chynnyi v.o. kerivnyka biuro—Liemienov,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 28 October 2021, on the Internet at https:/ /zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/konkurs-na-posadu-holovi- . . ., accessed 28 October 2021. 155 Interfax-Ukraine, “Sukhanov Appointed as SBI Acting Director,” Kyiv Post, 22 September 2020. 156 “Konkurs na posadu holovy DBR”; and Oleksandr Liemienov, “Feikovyi konkurs hirshyi za Tatarova: yak uzhe obraly holovu DBR,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 3 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/internal/f ejkovij-konkurs-hirshij-za-tat . . ., accessed 3 November 2021. 157 Liemienov, “’Vidmyty’ neriadovoho Sukhanova: yak Bankova riatuie svoikh cherez OASK,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 16 November 2021, on the Internet at https://z n.ua/ukr/article/print/internal/vidmiti-nerjadovoho-sukhacho . . ., accessed 31 December 2021.

190 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY term.158 The appointment process was steered by Oleh Tatarov— himself suspected in a bribery case—deputy chief of staff in the president’s office. Foreign representatives refused to participate so as not to legitimize a false competition. Besides, four of six panelists had an apparent conflict of interest since they served on the board of a learned journal with the successful candidate. All of this was dismissed as fake by anti-corruption activists, but had no effect on the predetermined outcome.159 In the meantime, no sooner had Zelenskyy assumed office than the DBR/SBI began calling in for questioning, opening investigations into, levelling criminal charges against, and otherwise intimidating prominent members of the previous administration (or those recently fallen out of favor with the new president). These included: ex-prosecutor general Lutsenko; ex-president Poroshenko; ex-speaker of the Verkhovna Rada Andrii Parubii; ex-chief of staff to the current president, Andrii Bohdan; NABU chief Artem Sytnyk; the head of the Constitutional Court; and former RNBOU secretary Oleksandr Turchynov.160 Others who crossed Zelenskyy 158 “Pryznacheno novoho dyrektora DBR,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 31 December 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/priznacheno-novo ho-direkt . . ., accessed 31 December 2021. 159 Sukhov, “AntiCorruption Activists Say Head of Ukraine’s ‘FBI’ Appointed After Fake Contest,” Kyiv Independent, 1 January 2022. 160 Interfax-Ukraine, “SBI Investigating Case on Sytnyk’s Receiving Unlawful Benefit From Ex-MP Kriuchkov,” Kyiv Post, 17 April 2019; Interfax-Ukraine, “SBI Starts Investigation Into the Seizure of State Power by Poroshenko,” Kyiv Post, 2 June 2019; Interfax-Ukraine, “Ukraine’s SBI Summons Ex-President Poroshenko for Questioning,” Kyiv Post, 11 July 2019; Interfax-Ukraine, “Court Orders SBI to Open Case on Parliament Speaker Parubiy,” Kyiv Post, 4 August 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/court-orders-sbi-to-open- . . ., accessed 30 September 2021; “Ukraine’s SBI Opens Case Against Ex-Parliament Speaker Over Odesa Event of May 2,” UNIAN, 23 September 2019, on the Internet at https://www.unian.info/society/10695003-ukr aine-s-sbi-opens-case- . . ., accessed 30 September 2021; Interfax-Ukraine, “SBI Opens Proceedings on Lutsenko’s Possible Abuse of Power,” Kyiv Post, 1 October 2019; “Lutsenko prokomentuvav spravu DBR, vidkrytu za zaiavoiu Arakhamii,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 1 October 2019, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/a rticle/print/POLITICS/lucenko-prokomentuvav-sp . . ., accessed 1 October 2019; “SBI Questions Ex-Chief of Presidential Office Andriy Bohdan,” UNIAN, 14 September 2020, on the Internet at https://www.unian.info/politics/sbi-qu estions-ex-chief-of-presidentia . . ., accessed 30 September 2021; “Court Compels SBI to Investigate Sytnyk for Usurpation of Power (DOCUMENTS),

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 191 likewise suffered the attentions of the agency: the five judges of the Supreme Court who cancelled the president’s decree dismissing Oleksandr Tupytskyi as chief justice; the journalist who exposed a clandestine operation involving the Vagner group; another journalist, who quarreled with Zelenskyy on TV; and the leader of the Voice party, ostensibly for irregularities in the party’s books.161 These actions were consistent with the argument presented here about the political use of legal instruments as the new normal practice in post-Euromaidan Ukraine; thus the sole practical reason for Truba’s replacement had to have been so as to turn the DBR/SBI’s guns onto their previous owners.

The (Ir)replaceable Interior Minister and the National Police In July 2021, after more than seven years in office, Interior Minister Arsen Avakov submitted his resignation, thus offering President Zelenskyy an opportunity denied to President Poroshenko—control of the police, the principal organ of law enforcement. Avakov’s longevity was remarkable. His failure to reform the police was manifested in a series of shocking exhibits of the force’s brutality UNIAN, 8 October 2020, on the Internet at https://www.unian.info/politics/c ourt-compels-sbi-to-investigate-syt . . ., accessed 30 September 2021; InterfaxUkraine, “SBI Initiates Investigation on High Treason of Constitutional Court’s Head,” Kyiv Post, 30 October 2020, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.co m/ukraine-politics/sbi-initiates-investigatio . . ., accessed 30 September 2021; and Interfax-Ukraine, “Turchynov Summoned for Questioning at SBI,” Kyiv Post, 3 November 2020. 161 “DBR vidkrylo spravu proty suddiv Verkhovnoho sudu, yaki skasuvaly ukaz Zelenskoho shchodo Tupytskoho,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 19 July 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/UKRAINE/dbr-vidkrilo-spravu-pro . . ., accessed 19 July 2021; “DBR vidkrylo spravu cherz publikatsii Sokolovoi,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 19 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/UKRAINE/dbr-vidkrilo-spravu-cherez . . ., accessed 19 November 2021; Sergiy Slipchenko, “State Investigation Bureau Opens Probe Into Famous Journalist Days After he Argues with Zelensky on TV,” Kyiv Independent, 28 November 2021, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent.com/politics/stat e-investigation-bureau-open . . ., accessed 4 January 2022; and “Holovu partii ‘Holos’ vyklykaly na dopyt v DBR,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 2 February 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/holovu-partiji-holos-v iklika . . ., accessed 2 February 2022.

192 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY and incompetence which resulted in public demands for his ouster, which never came. He was also implicated in numerous scandals, including his son’s involvement in the “backpacks” affair. He was engaged profitably in business while in office. He successfully resisted Zelenskyy’s efforts to take control of the National Guard away from him162 and to replace his subordinates. Yet despite his troubles, he appeared imperturbable and immovable. His command over a sizeable number of parliamentarians in the Rada, along with that of the 60,000-strong National Guard in addition to dozens of volunteer battalions, made him a formidable power-broker.163 Avakov’s very strength, however, provided motive for President Zelenskyy and his closest advisers in the presidential office to desire his removal.164 Avakov was replaced by Zelenskyy’s nominee, Denys Monastyrskyi, head of the parliamentary committee on law enforcement, 162 Mykhailo Kameniev and Stepan Zolotar, “Zhandarmeriia Zelenskoho,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 8 September 2019, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/pri nt/internal/zhandarmeriya-zelenskogo-32 . . ., accessed 9 April 2020. 163 In fact, a parliamentary committee recommended in April 2020 that the National Guard’s powers of arrest and prevention of crime be expanded. “Komitet Rady pidtrymav rozshyrennia povnovazhen Natshvardii,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 9 April 2020, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/komitetradi-pidtrimav-rozs . . ., accessed 9 April 2020. 164 Kravets and Romaniuk, “Idealna vidstavka: zvilnyty Shmyhalia, shchob pozbutysia Avakova,” Ukrainska pravda, 17 June 2021, on the Internet at https:// www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2021/06/17/7297511/, accessed 17 June 2021; “Na Bankoviy obhovoriuiut mozhlyvist zniattia Avakova z posady holovy MVS—NV,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 15 June 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr /print/POLITICS/na-bankovij-obhovorjuju . . ., accessed 15 June 2021; “Avakov napysav zaiavu pro vidstavku—ZN.UA diznalosia prychynu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 13 July 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLIT ICS/avakov-napisav-zajavu . . ., accessed 13 July 2021; Rudenko and Sukhov, “Arsen Avakov Resigns as Interior Minister,” Kyiv Post, 13 July 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/arsen-avakov-resign . . ., accessed 13 June 2021; “Kinets epokhy Avakova. Yak Zelenskyi vmovyv ministra pity u vidstavku,” Ukrainska pravda, 14 July 2021, on the Internet at http s://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2021/07/14/7300436/, accessed 14 July 2021; Sorokin, “’Almighty’ Arsen Avakov Leaves Interior Ministry After 7.5 Years,” Kyiv Post, 15 July 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/u kraine-politics/almighty-arsen-avak . . ., accessed 22 July 2021; and Rudenko, “Parliament Supports Avakov’s Resignation,” Kyiv Post, 15 July 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/parliament-supports . . ., accessed 15 July 2021.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 193 previously a lawyer in the firm representing Kvartal 95, and in the 2019 Rada elections number 19 on the Servant of the People PR list.165 Whether he would continue along the same track as Avakov in terms of police reform in view of his apparent ties to his predecessor (which he denied having), was a question raised and speculated upon at the time of his appointment.166 The answer was unclear.167 There was no doubt about the president’s newly-acquired influence on the supposedly independent interior ministry under Monastyrskyi when the latter admitted in a subsequent newspaper interview, “I get approval personally from the president for key issues.”168 It turned out to be an appointment in defence of the status quo. Following the replacement of Avakov by Monastyrskyi nothing spectacular happened in law enforcement in Ukraine, either by way of resuscitating police reform169 or major scandals—there were only ordinary ones. Two incidents in particular appeared indicative of Zelenskyy and company’s acquiescence in the hitherto prevailing norm of “one law for our friends, another for everyone else,” that had characterized the Poroshenko era. In one, the deputy interior minister, Oleksandr Hohilashvili, on a visit to the Donetsk region, apparently took umbrage at being asked to show his documents at the demarcation line. He was publicly reprimanded by

165 A party’s list on the PR ballot for the rada elections consists of a maximum of 225 names. The order is set by party notables and is an indicator of the candidate’s standing within the party. Number 19 is fairly high by comparison with number 170, say. 166 Sukhov, “Avakov’s Dubious Legacy to Remain Intact Under His Proposed Successor,” Kyiv Post, 15 July 2021; and Rudenko, “Parliament Appoints New Interior Minister,” Kyiv Post, 16 July 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost. com/ukraine-politics/parliament-appoints . . ., accessed 16 July 2021. 167 Serhii Bahlai, “Pislia Avakova. Yakoiu bude nastupna reforma politsii?” Ukrainska pravda, 17 July 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/colum ns/2021/07/17/7300844/, accessed 19 July 2021. 168 Sukhov, “Interior Minister Says he Gets Approval for Key Decisions from Zelensky,” Kyiv Post, 6 September 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpo st.com/ukraine-politics/interior-minister-says-he- . . ., accessed 7 September 2021. 169 Denys Kobzin, “Tochkove pravosuddia, abo Patrulna politsiia perekhodyt rubizh,” Ukrainska pravda, 5 February 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravd a.com.ua/columns/2022/02/5/7322949/, accessed 5 February 2022.

194 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY President Zelenskyy, who called for his dismissal on grounds that all are equal before the law—or should be. As further embarrassment for the government, it was then revealed that Hohilashvili had Russian citizenship and had been convicted in Russia of forging documents. Hohilashvili dutifully submitted his resignation and was dismissed by the cabinet of ministers.170 In an odd coincidence, a few days later this official’s spouse, Mariia Levchenko, a long-time assistant to President Zelenskyy working on a voluntary basis but on the Kvartal 95 payroll, was hired on as a full-time paid employee within the president’s office.171 This appeared to be a way of providing the husband a soft landing, compensation for loss of job and salary. The second incident involved Oleksandr Trukhin, a Servant of the People parliamentarian, involved as the party at fault in a traffic accident in August, who not only claimed falsely that he had not been behind the wheel (and convinced Monastyrskyi and Zelenskyy to repeat the falsehood), but attempted to bribe police on the spot. Only several months later, when the bodycam video finally emerged following a journalistic investigation, was Trukhin expelled from the party. Monastyrskyi as minister had been aware of the video, having seen it days after the event, but had not

170 “Skandal na blokposti: Zelenskyi vymahaie zvilnennia Hohilashvili,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 12 December 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/ POLITICS/zelenskij-vimahaje-zvilnenn . . ., accessed 13 December 2021; “U zastupnyka holovy MVS Hohilashvili znaishly rosiiske hromadianstvo— rozsliduvannia,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 12 December 2021, on the Internet at https:// zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/u-zastupnika-holovi-mvs-ho . . ., accessed 13 December 2021; “Zastupnyk holovy MVS Hohilashvili napysav zaiavu na zvilnennia,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 13 December 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.u a/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zastupnika-holovi-mvs-hohi . . ., accessed 13 December 2021; “Hohilashvili buv sudymyi v Rosii za kryminalnoiu statteiu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 13 December 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/articl e/print/POLITICS/hohilashvili-buv-sudimij-v- . . ., accessed 13 December 2021; and “Kabmin zvilnyv zastupnyka holovy MVS Hohilashvili—ZMI,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 13 December 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/articl e/print/POLITICS/kabmin-zvilniv-zastupnika- . . ., accessed 13 December 2021. 171 “Mariiu Levchenko ofitsiino vzialy na robotu v Ofis prezydenta,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 13 January 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/P OLITICS/mariju-levchenko-ofitsijno- accessed 13 January 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 195 forwarded it to the DBR/SBI.172 Again, Zelenskyy’s whole purpose in taking advantage of the opportunity to change interior ministers was not to make law enforcement work independently of politics, but to have it operating to protect his own supporters while punishing opponents.

Curbing Informal Practices Corruption and Anti-Corruption In 2019, Ukraine’s Corruption Perception Index score, as measured by Transparency International, was 30, down two points, placing it at 126th out of 180 countries, in the company of Azerbaijan, Djibouti, and Kazakhstan.173 With the election of Volodymyr Zelenskyy as president, it was expected that Ukraine might renew its struggle against political corruption and improve its standing in the world.174 In line with such expectations, Zelenskyy reconstituted the national anti-corruption council, placing himself at its head with his own chief-of-staff, Andrii Yermak, as deputy head.175 172 Myroniuk, “Zelensky’s MP Expelled from Party After Video Showed Him Try to Bribe Police,” Kyiv Independent, 2 February 2022, on the Internet at https://ky ivindependent.com/politics/zelenskys-party-member-expel . . ., accessed 9 February 2022; Mykhailo Tkach, “Pro Turkhina, MVS i ministra Monastyrskoho, yakyi ‘vse, ale ne vse, peredav v DBR’,” Ukrainska pravda, 3 February 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2022/02/3/73 22713/, accessed 13 February 2022; Artem Kartashov, “Natspolitsiia: ‘italiiskyi straik’ na foni ‘syndromu Trukhina’,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 3 February 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/internal/natspolitsija-italijskij-str ajk-na . . ., accessed 9 February 2022; and “Sluhy keshu: naihuchnishi koruptsiini skandaly epokhy Zelenskoho,” Ukrainska pravda, 10 February 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/colmns/2022/02/10/7323479/, accessed 11 February 2022. 173 Transparency International, Ukraine, Corruption Perception Index 2019, on the Internet at https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/corruption-perceptions-index . . ., accessed 24 January 2020. 174 As, for instance, did Diane Francis, “With Election of 41-Year-Old Political Newcomer, Ukraine May Finally Get Chance to Drive Out Corruption,” Financial Post, 29 April 2019, on the Internet at https://business.financialpost. com/d iane-francies/with-election-o . . ., accessed 2 May 2019. 175 “Zelenskyi uviv do skladu Natsrady z pytan antykoruptsiinoi polityky Danyliuka i Verlanova,” UNIAN, 31 July 2019, on the Internet at https://www.unian. ua/politics/10636425-zelenskiy-uviv-do-skla . . ., accessed 3 August 2019; and

196 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY Nothing was heard of that body thereafter, but by way of reward, the IMF approved a loan of $5 billion US to Ukraine over 18 months in recognition of Zelenskyy’s anti-corruption efforts.176 A new anticorruption strategy for 2020-24 was launched.177 As of December 2021, however, at its half-way point, the strategy had not yet been officially adopted.178 A public opinion poll was then showing that 57.6 per cent of city-dwellers in Ukraine considered President Zelenskyy primarily responsible for the battle against corruption, and 81.6 per cent, that he had not carried out his promises in that regard.179 Perhaps the IMF was too hasty in handing out its rewards. In 2021, Ukraine was rated as having improved modestly on the CPI Index, to a score of 32 points,180 supposedly due to the Zelenskyy administration’s equally modest efforts. The apparent discrepancy between, on the one hand, Transparency International’s optimistic indicator of improvement in combatting corruption under Zelenskyy, and, on the other, the Ukrainian public’s overwhelmingly negative assessment, can perhaps be resolved by looking more closely at the evidence of the regime’s performance as opposed to its promises. A critical examination of the report by Prosecutor General Venediktova on her first hundred days in office—in particular in the battle against

“Zelenskyi ocholyv antykoruptsiinu natsradu i vviv tudy Avakova,” Ukrainska pravda, 1 June 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/202 0/06/1/7254032/, accessed 1 June 2020. 176 Kramer, “I.M.F. Approves Critical Loan for Ukraine,” New York Times, 10 June 2020, on the Internet at https://www.nytime.com/2020/06/10/world/europe /imf-ukraine . . ., accessed 11 June 2020. 177 Oleksandr Novikov, “Nova Antykoruptsiina stratehiia: shcho vona zminyt dlia Ukrainy?” Ukrainska pravda, 25 June 2020, on the Internet at https://www.prav da.com.ua/columns/2020/06/25/7257140/, accessed 25 June 2020. 178 “Posol YeS zaklykaie Ukrainu posylyty borotbu z koruptsiieiu ta zakinchyty sudovu reform,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 9 December 2021, on the Internet at https://z n.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/posol-jes-zaklikaje-ukrajin . . ., accessed 9 December 2021. 179 “Prezydent ne vykonav vlasnykh zobov’iazan shchodo borotby z koruptsiieiu: opytuvannia ukraintsiv,” Vysokyi zamok, 3 December 2021, on the Internet at htt ps://wz,lviv.ua/ukraine/447766-za-borotbu-z-koruptsiieiu-vidpovi . . ., accessed 6 December 2021. 180 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 (Berlin: Transparency International Secretariat, 2022), 3.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 197 corruption—revealed rather less in terms of success than was claimed.181 In those hundred days her office managed to bring to justice only 28 persons for corrupt offenses. Further, her 10,000 prosecutors in that period of time had forwarded to the courts 30,000 cases—or about one case per prosecutor per month. Less than 100 million hryvni were recovered by way of corruption prosecutions, a microscopic rate of recovery considering that the state was spending 54 billion UAH annually on maintaining the PGO, National Police, and courts. These were not impressive achievements. Another review, of the government’s overall anti-corruption activity for the whole of 2021, reported that the Higher Anti-Corruption Court (VAKS) had passed 34 sentences, 27 of them guilty, on an unspecified number of judges, prosecutors, SBUshnyky, and government officials.182 Twenty-seven convictions for political corruption in the course of an entire year seems counterintuitive considering Ukraine’s CPI standing—behind Algeria, and just ahead of Mexico. The same source’s month-by-month enumeration of outstanding cases revealed that most of them involved relatively small amounts of bribery or embezzlement, suggesting only the “small fry,” not the “big fish,” were ending up in court in Ukraine. At year’s end, prominent cases with links to the apex of political power, such as “Rotterdam+” and the one involving Oleh Tatarov, had still not made their way into the halls of justice, but were instead being shielded, if not finally entombed, by the judicial system.183 “Rotterdam+” refers to a scheme for selling coal from Dnipropetrovsk oblast and occupied Donbas to Ukraine’s thermal power stations at the price for the commodity as set in Rotterdam

181 Vasyl Biletskyi, “Yak prezydent Volodymyr Zelenskyi i heneralna prokurorka Iryna Venediktova imituiut ‘borotbu z korputsiieiu’,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 2 July 2020, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/internal/jak-preziden t-volodimir-z . . ., accessed 7 July 2020. 182 Vadym Valko, “Antykoruptsiini peremohy 2021 roku: khto siv ta khto nastupnyi,” Ukrainska pravda, 31 December 2021, on the Internet at https://www. pravda.com.ua/columns/2021/12/31/7319089/, accessed 31 December 2021. 183 Ibid.

198 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY plus shipping costs from there as well.184 The scheme operated from 2016 to 2019, and involved the DTEK energy company owned by oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. It was investigated by the NABU, which in 2019 estimated the loss to electricity consumers at 18.8 billion hryvni ($748 million at the time). The same anti-corruption prosecutor consequently closed down the case three times in a row (August 2020; January and April 2021); a second prosecutor closed it down a fourth time in May 2021. In October 2021, an investigating judge of the Higher Anti-Corruption Court refused to reopen the “Rotterdam+” case, which anti-corruption activists claimed was unjustified. The case illustrated well how Ukraine’s judges and prosecutors are just as much for sale as dubious coal schemes. As a footnote, it might be mentioned that a NABU report on the “Rotterdam+” case was to have been on the agenda of the RNBOU for its December 2021 meeting, but somehow disappeared from it on the

184 The scheme was illegal insofar as it infringed the embargo on trade with occupied Donbas and corrupt in selling at an artificially inflated price, which all meant that the Ukrainian government was subsidizing the occupation and an oligarch was profiting. Except as noted, sources for this paragraph are: Natalia Datskevych, “Six Suspects Announced, One Detained Over Rotterdam+ Coal Pricing Scheme,” Kyiv Post, 9 August 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/business/six-suspects-announced-one-det . . ., accessed 22 February 2022; “The Rotterdam+ Formula and Corruption in Ukraine’s Energy Market,” Hromadske International, 13 March 2020, on the Internet at https://en.hro madske.ua/posts/the-rotterdam-formula-and-corruption . . ., accessed 22 February 2022; Sukhov, “NABU Slams Prosecutors for Closing Rotterdam+ Graft Case for Fourth Time,” Kyiv Post, 24 May 2021, on the Internet at https://www. kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/nabu-slams-prosecutors-f . . ., accessed 22 February 2022; Myroniuk and Igor Kossov, “Detectives Accuse Prosecutors of Sabotaging High-Profile Rotterdam+ Case,” Kyiv Post, 10 June 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/detectives-accuse-prosec . . ., accessed 22 February 2022; Valko, “Sprava Roterdam+. Rishennia suddi Vaks, yake mozhe koshtuvaty ukraintsiam 40 mlrd hrn,” Ukrainska pravda, 10 November 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2021/11/1 0/7313413/, accessed 11 November 2021; and Shabunin, Yermakov, and Khrystyna Ivasiuk, “” Rotterdam+: Yak pid dudku oliharkha Akhmetova zlyvaiut istorychne rozsliduvannia,” Ukrainska pravda, 30 November 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2021/11/30/7315662/, accessed 30 November 2021.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 199 appointed day.185 No one at the apex of political power in Ukraine wants to hear about it. Tatarov, a deputy chief of staff to President Zelenskyy, about whom we spoke earlier, was charged with bribery in December 2020, but, as the Kyiv Post reported, “Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova blocked the charges against Tatarov . . . by replacing the group of prosecutors in the Tatarov case twice. She then transferred the case from the NABU to the politically controllable Security Service of Ukraine.”186 Despite a petition to do so with the required 25,000 signatures, President Zelenskyy refused in face of this scandal to fire his deputy chief of staff. Shortly thereafter, extension of the Tatarov investigation was refused by a court, and it was effectively buried when prosecutors missed the deadline by which to send it to trial.187 A year later, a court ordered the PGO to close the case altogether due to the expiry of deadlines. As investigative journalists covering the story pointed out, all these maneuvers to protect Tatarov were strictly illegal since the prosecution of such cases was within the NABU’s purview exclusively, and only the High Anti-Corruption Court could hear jurisdictional disputes—not the PGO or other courts.188 “I’m not paying attention to this,” said the president in characteristic fashion.189 Lawful, unlawful, or simply awful—it’s all the same in Zelenskyy’s Ukraine. To his credit, Zelenskyy did strengthen the powers of the NAZK as well as guaranteeing its independence—at least on 185 “RNBOU zaslukhaie dopovid NABU u spravi ‘Rotterdam+’,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 10 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITI CS/rnbou-zaslukhaje-dopovid-n . . ., accessed 10 November 2021; and “V plani roboty RNBOU nemaie zvitu NABU po spravi ‘Rotterdam+’,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 13 December 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITI CS/v-plani-roboti-rnbou-nemaje . . ., accessed 13 December 2021. 186 Sukhov, “Zelensky Refuses to Fire Controversial Deputy Chief of Staff.” 187 Ibid. 188 Sukhov, “Court Orders Closure of Bribery Case Against Top Member of Zelensky’s Administration,” Kyiv Independent, 12 January 2022, on the Internet at http s://kyivindependent.com/hot-topic/court-orders/closure-of-brive . . ., accessed 13 January 2022; and “Spravu proty Tatarova znovu namahaiutsia ‘pokhovaty’ u sudi—Shabunin,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 12 January 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/spravu-proti-tatarova-zno v . . ., accessed 12 January 2022. 189 Sukhov, “Court Orders Closure of Bribery Case.”

200 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY paper.190 The national register of persons convicted of corruption and related offences was restored to the NAZK; it had been transferred to the justice ministry in February 2019.191 But empowering its 5,000 agents situated throughout the governmental bureaucracy had still not been done by 2021.192 Nor had a system of monitoring the lifestyles of officials who were being required to complete the e-declarations, so as to justify investigating their incommensurate wealth in the presence of moderate state incomes.193 In November 2021, the NAZK requested President Zelenskyy to veto a new version of the law on party financing passed by the Verkhovna Rada which had been amended so as to allow political parties to hide their true expenses.194 Also in November, the Ukrainian government announced its appointees to the commission auditing the activities of NAZK; the three foreign experts were from the USA, Latvia, and Romania.195 There were no reports of the president’s office attempting to interfere with the selection of the NAZK auditing commission. Zelenskyy’s relationships with NABU and SAP were more complicated, evidently from a desire by the president to gain

190 “Prezydent pidpysav zakon pro zabezpechennia efektyvnosti NAZK,” Den, 16 October 2019, on the Internet at Source URL https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/news /161019-prezydent-pidpysav-zakon-pro-zabezpechennya-efektyvnosti-nazk, accessed 16 October 2019. 191 “NAZK onovylo Reiestr koruptsioneriv,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 11 March 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/napka-onovilorejestr- . . ., accessed 12 March 2021. 192 Andrii Smaha, “Antykoruptsiini upovnovazhenni. Okozamyliuvannia chy nevykorystanyi shans?” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 13 April 2021, on the Internet at https: //zn.ua/ukr/article/print/internal/antikoruptsijni-upovnova . . ., accessed 14 April 2021. 193 Anatolii Pashynskyi, “Monitorinh sposobu zhyttia deklarantiv. Ne taiemni rekomendatsii,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 2 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.u a/ukr/article/print/internal/monitorinh-sposobu-zhittja-dek . . ., accessed 4 November 2021. 194 “NAZK zaklykalo Zelenskoho vetuvaty zakon pro finansuvannia partii,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 9 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article /print/POLITICS/nazk-zaklikalo-zelenskoho- . . ., accessed 9 November 2021. 195 “Uriad vyznachyvsia z audytoramy Natsahentstva z pytan zapobihannia koruptsii,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 10 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua /ukr/article/print/POLITICS/urjad-viznachivsja-z-audit . . ., accessed 10 November 2021.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 201 greater political control over them. According to anti-corruption activist Oleksandr Liemienov, when President Poroshenko appointed Artem Sytnyk as NABU director, he knowingly violated the constitution in an attempt to gather all power in his own hands.196 Following an appeal by 51 anti-anti-corruption parliamentarians, the Constitutional Court in August 2020 ruled the appointment of Sytnyk unconstitutional; opponents of anti-corruption and of the NABU had been maneuvering for his ouster from the beginning. The court pointed out that the position was not specifically listed as within the president’s powers of appointment; violating this rule would affect the separation of powers. The power to appoint the NABU director rightfully belongs to the government, i.e., cabinet of ministers. This ruling upset several applecarts, including anti-corruption activists who saw it as a strike against their cause, and the president who wanted to get rid of Sytnyk (who was pursuing Tatarov) but could not: if the president cannot appoint, he cannot dismiss. In February and March 2021, the cabinet attempted unsuccessfully to introduce a bill to fire Sytnyk before the expiration of his term in March 2022.197 By October 2021, under pressure from the IMF, the Rada finally passed a bill placing the NABU under the cabinet of ministers, strengthening its independence of both cabinet and president, and prescribing an open, competitive process for

196 Liemienov, “Antykoruptsiinyi tsuhtsvanh Zelenskoho,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 29 August 2020, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/internal/anti koruptsijnij-tsuhtsvan . . ., accessed 2 September 2020. 197 Sukhov, “Sources: Zelensky May be Behind Cabinet Bill to Fire NABU Head,” Kyiv Post, 15 February 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukr aine-politics/sources-zelensky-m . . ., accessed 15 February 2021; “Uriad Shmyhalia proholosyv zakonoproiekt, yakym zvilniaie dyrektora NABU-Shabunin,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 15 February 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ ukr/article/print/POLITICS/urjad-shmihalja-proho . . ., accessed 15 February 2021; “ZN.UA publikuie tekst zakonoproiektu pro zvilnennia dyrektora NABU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 16 February 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/uk r/article/print/POLITICS/znua-publikuje-tekst-z . . ., accessed 16 February 2021; and Sukhov, “Cabinet Resumes Efforts to Fire NABU Chief, Give Zelensky Control Over Bureau,” Kyiv Post, 16 March 2021, on the Internet at https:// www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/cabinet-resumes-effo . . ., accessed 18 March 2021.

202 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY selecting its director.198 President Zelenskyy signed the bill into law on 8 November 2021, and the search for a new NABU director was launched.199 The selection committee consisted of three persons nominated by the government and three experts.200 Abruptly, however, one of the foreign experts—who also sat on the commission to select a new SAP head and had blocked the falsification of that contest—was de-selected for the NABU board on orders from above. This was viewed as an attempt by the president and his office to sabotage the selection process, if not also the restoration of NABU as an independent and effective anti-corruption institution, by simply running out the clock—no commission, no director.201 There seemed to be no limit to the tactics the president and his office could resort to in blocking an appointment to an anti-corruption body so as to control it.

198 “Rada zminyla status NABU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 19 October 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/rada-zminila-status-nabu-htm l, . . ., accessed 19 October 2021; Reuters, “Ukraine Approves Bill to Boost Independence of Anti-Corruption Bureau,” 19 October 2021, on the Internet at https: //www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-approves-bill-boost- . . ., accessed 19 October 2021; RFE/RL Ukrainian Service, “Ukrainian Lawmakers Approve Bill to Strengthen National Anti-Corruption Bureau’s Independence,” 19 October 2021, on the Internet at https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-nabu-ind eppendence-vote-corruption . . ., accessed 26 October 2021; and Anastasia Radina, “Ukraine Strengthens Independence of Key Anti-Corruption Agency,” UkraineAlert, 21 October 2021, on the Internet at https://www.atlanticcouncil. org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-strenthe . . ., accessed 21 October 2021. 199 “Zelenskyi pidpysav zakon pro NABU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 8 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelenskij-pidpisav -zakon-p . . ., accessed 8 November 2021; and “U NABU prokomentuvaly zminu statusu antykorptsiinoho orhanu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 10 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/u-nabu-proko mentuvali-zm . . ., accessed 10 November 2021. 200 “Uriad vyznachyv kandydativ do komisii z obrannia holovy NABU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 9 February 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/P OLITICS/urjad-viznachiv-kandidativ . . ., accessed 9 February 2022. 201 “Shabunin rozkryv imovirnu skhemu zryvu konkursu na dyrektora NABU,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 9 February 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/ print/POLITICS/shabunin-rozkriv-jmovirnu . . ., accessed 9 February 2022: and “Uriad za vkazivkoiu ‘zhory’ pidirvav konkurs na dyrektora NABU— Shabunin,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 15 February 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ ukr/article/print/POLITICS/urjad-za-vkazivkoju-zhori-p . . ., accessed 15 February 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 203 The story with SAP, the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor, was similar, a search for its new head having been launched officially on 25 January 2021.202 An eleven-member commission—four from international organizations, seven selected by the Rada but vetted by the president’s office—was to make the selection based on open competition free of politics. But when the commission failed to choose the administration’s favorite the Rada’s contingent in the commission resorted to various procedural tactics to stall or sabotage the selection process. Unfortunately for him, the winninglosing candidate had been a NABU detective in vigorous pursuit of Tatarov among others, which did not endear him to the presidential circle. The result was that by the November 2021 deadline set by the IMF to appoint the head of the SAP Ukraine had not done so.203 Zelenskyy was not so much engaged in fighting corruption, which the evidence on his relationships with Ukraine’s ACAs has shown, as he was fighting anti-corruption much like his predecessor—a sad

202 Liemienov, “Hlava SAP bude novyi, ale ryzykiv ne pomenshalo,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 9 February 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/int ernal/hlava-sap-bude-novij-ale-r . . ., accessed 17 February 2021. 203 Sorokin, “Ukraine’s Western Partners Are Not Happy With Corruption Fight,” Kyiv Post, 13 October 2021; Sukhov, “Selection of Anti-Graft Prosecutor Disrupted After Pro-Government Candidate Vetoed,” Kyiv Post, 17 June 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/selection-of-antigraf . . ., accessed 17 June 2021; “Na Bankovii nedovoleni liderom konkursu na kerivnyka SAP, vidbir postavyly na pauzu—Shabunin,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 2 August 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/nabankovij-nedovole . . ., accessed 3 August 2021; Tetiana Shevchuk, “Weekly Anti-Corruption Update in Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, 3 November 2021; “Zasidannia komisii z obrannia kerivnyka SAP znovu zirvalosia cherez ii chleniv, kontrolovanykh Bankovoiu—Shabunin,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 25 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zasidannja-komisiji-zobra . . ., accessed 25 November 202; “Komisiia taky zirvala obrannia kerivnyka SAP,” Ukrainska pravda, 21 December 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pra vda.com.ua/news/2021/12/21/7318188/, accessed 21 December 2021; “U Venediktovoi zrobyly krok do pryznachennia ‘pravylnoho’ antykoruptsiinoho prokurora—TsPK,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 29 December 2021, on the Internet at https: //zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/u-venediktovji-znovu-pere . . ., accessed 29 December 2021; and Lukashova, “Oleksandr Klymenko, yakyi peremih u konkursi na kerivnyka SAP, pro zatiahuvannia vidboru, spravu Tatarova i svoi plany pereviryty prokuroriv,” Ukrainska pravda, 10 January 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/01/10/7319833 /, accessed 10 January 2022..

204 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY commentary on the promise of his presidency, but a testament to the vitality of corruption in Ukrainian politics.

Controlling Oligarchs President Zelenskyy’s encounters with oligarchs began with Ihor Kolomoiskyi. After the oligarch’s PrivatBank was nationalized at the end of 2016, he first emigrated to Switzerland, then to Israel. In the following years he came to the attention of the FBI over money laundering which had resulted in a company of his becoming the largest owner of commercial real estate in Cleveland, Ohio, the money having been stolen from PrivatBank while he was owner. The only country from which he could not be extradited was Ukraine, to which he therefore returned in 2019, just in time to become involved in the presidential election campaign.204 The oligarch openly campaigned for Yuliia Tymoshenko as president, but also supported Zelenskyy through his primary media outlet TV 1+1. He and Zelenskyy had become well-acquainted by then— Zelenskyy having visited him in Geneva at least eleven times in 2017-18. When it became clear that Poroshenko’s chances of re-election had vanished, the oligarch threw his weight behind Zelenskyy’s candidacy. This made it possible for Kolomoiskyi to claim a share of credit in Zelenskyy’s victory, and to expect a quid pro quo.205 He also sponsored his own people within the Servant of the People party list in the parliamentary elections in July 2019, and was said to have control over 40 to 60 deputies (members of parliament) of the caucus in the Verkhovna Rada. But the Honcharuk cabinet’s composition (young reformers) and pro-European orientation was not to his liking. Irritated by its pro-IMF stance, Kolomoiskyi engineered the downfall of Honcharuk’s cabinet as well as the ouster of Andrii Bohdan, Zelenskyy’s chief of staff. The IMF was seen by Kolomoiskyi as an enemy intent on interfering with his modus 204 Romaniuk, et al., “Chotyry viiny Kolomoiskoho.” 205 Ibid.; and Kravets, Romaniuk, and Mykola Topalov, “Toksychna druzhba. Yak Kolomoiskyi stav nezruchnym dlia Zelenskoho,” Ukrainska pravda, 15 April 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2021/04/15/72 90237/, accessed 15 April 2021.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 205 operandi as businessman; he attacked the Ukrainian government, correspondingly, for being spineless before the IMF.206 Hence also the oligarch’s attacks on the National Bank of Ukraine, its ex-head Valeriia Hontareva, NABU’s Artem Sytnyk, and the new owners of PrivatBank. Using Ukraine’s corrupt courts, Kolomoiskyi attempted to regain control of PrivatBank or at least to get compensation for its nationalization. This led to the Zelenskyy government’s introduction of a law preventing the re-privatization of banks, also known as the “antiKolomoiskyi” law. The law was passed in first reading on 30 March 2020, but a handful of parliamentarians subordinate to Kolomoiskyi introduced 16,335 amendments, which would have taken years to clear. Another bill, therefore, to process amendments in an accelerated fashion, had to be passed.207 The “anti-Kolomoiskyi” law was finally passed by the Rada on 13 May 2020.208 Preventing insolvent and nationalized banks from being returned to their former owners, it would avoid economically painful consequences for Ukraine, and was a requirement demanded by the IMF. Due to the delay, the IMF altered its promised three-year $8 billion program to $5 billion over 18 months.209 In March 2021, the United States— where he faced numerous criminal investigations and civil lawsuits for money laundering—announced sanctions against Kolomoiskyi 206 Romaniuk, et al., “Chotyry viiny Kolomoiskoho”; and Kravets, et al., “Toksychna druzhba.” 207 “MPs Search For Ways to Pass ‘Anti-Kolomoisky Law’ Amidst Internal Disagreement,” Hromadske, 13 April 2020, on the Internet at https://en.hromadske .ua/posts/mps-search-for-ways-to-pass-anti . . ., accessed 29 June 2020; “Ukrainian MPs Protract Amendments to Pass ‘Anti-Kolomoisky’ Bank Law,” Hromadske, 16 April 2020, on the Internet at https://en.hromadske.ua/posts/ ukrainian-mps-protract-amendme . . ., accessed 29 June 2020; and Leshchenko, “Ihor Kolomoisky Makes Himself No. 1 Enemy of the State,” Kyiv Post, 17 April 2020, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/se rgii-leshchen . . ., accessed 29 June 2020. 208 “Parliament Passes ‘Anti-Kolomoisky’ Bank Law,” Kyiv Post, 13 May 2020, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/parliament-passe s-anti-k . . ., accessed 1 March 2022; and “What Ukraine’s ‘Anti-Kolomoisky’ Law Is and What It Does,” Hromadske, 14 May 2020, on the Internet at https:// en.hromadske.ua/posts/what-the-anti-kolomoisky-law-change . . ., accessed 1 March 2022. 209 “Parliament Passes ‘Anti-Kolomoisky’ Bank Law”; and “What Ukraine’s ‘AntiKolomoisky’ Law Is.”

206 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY and his family for his involvement in corruption. Thus nudged by the Americans, Zelenskyy thanked them for helping with the deoligarchization of Ukraine, and began proceedings against Kolomoiskyi for embezzlement. For his part, the oligarch continued his maneuvers in the Verkhovna Rada to gain control by weakening the Servant of the People caucus, reducing it from majority to minority, and thus taking hold of the government to act in his favor, as part of his fight against a $5.5 billion embezzlement case in London.210 Zelenskyy’s struggle with Ihor Kolomoiskyi developed into a full-scale battle with all of Ukraine’s oligarchs to try to bring them under control. Conventional wisdom has it that he needed to do so, because through the oligarchs’ hold on a significant portion of the deputies in the Verkhovna Rada they influenced policy in their own favor, retarded political reform, and encouraged corruption. “Their near-complete control of the Ukrainian media has made it possible to marginalize and discredit democratic forces. Their pervasive influence through the civil service, law enforcement, business, and especially the judiciary has allowed them to sabotage, block, stifle, and ultimately reverse reform after reform.”211 It was also on account of Zelenskyy’s election pledge of giving Ukrainians “a life without corruption, without bribes.”212 According to a former State Tax Service head, “Ukraine’s fate is still ultimately in the hands of an all-powerful oligarchic class which is actively opposed to the

210 Bonner, “US Sanctions Kolomoisky for ‘Significant Corruption’,” Kyiv Post, 5 March 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/u s-sanctions-kolomoisky . . ., accessed 1 March 2022; Sorokin, “As Zelensky Vows to Take Down Oligarchs, Attention Turns to Kolomoisky,” Kyiv Post, 19 March 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/as -zelensky-vows-to-tak . . ., accessed 1 March 2022; and Sergii Leshchenko, “Inside Kolomoisky’s Grand Scheme to Take Power,” Kyiv Post, 8 October 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/sergii-lesh chenko-in . . ., accessed 1 March 2022. 211 Serhii Verlamov, “Ukraine Will Never Reform Until Oligarchs Lose Power,” UkraineAlert, 9 November 2020, on the Internet at https://www. Atlanticcoun cil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-will . . ., accessed 11 November 2020. 212 David Clark, “Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky Cannot be a Servant of the People and of Oligarchy,” New Statesman, 29 July 2019, on the Internet at https://www.new statesman.com/world/europe/2019/07/ukraine- . . ., accessed 30 July 2019.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 207 rule of law and more than ready to make terms with the Kremlin. Until the national discussion focuses specifically on ways to solve this problem, Ukraine’s future will remain hostage to the interests of the oligarchs.”213 At the start of 2021, nearly 70 parliamentarians were said to be subordinated to Kolomoiskyi, another hundred to Akhmetov. Their tasks were: drafting favorable laws, voting accordingly, sabotaging unfavorable votes, introducing amendments to slow the legislative process, referring matters to the courts, participating in investigative committees, and waging informational battles on behalf of their sponsors.214 The IMF, along with other international financial institutions (IFIs), have worked to lessen the oligarchs’ influence, but the latter have been able to circumvent such efforts by recourse to the courts who customarily give them a satisfactory interpretation of the letter of the law.215 This weakness of international influence is unfortunate, because, as economic research has shown, the oligarchic system reproduces itself despite periodic political upheavals and therefore has broader impact on government and society. In the words of David Dalton, “the Ukrainian oligarchy is able to keep going, even across phases of serious political instability, through continuation and adaptation of its habitual political and economic practices. . .. Key economic ‘side effects’ of these practices include extreme wealth inequality, a high degree of wealth ‘offshorisation’, low levels of investment and recurrent losses to the public finances. This . . . is a key part of the explanation of Ukraine’s low average standard of living, but also [shows] that the persistent weakness of the Ukrainian state and the strength of the oligarchs’ political-business networks may be

213 Verlamov, “Ukraine Will Never Reform.” 214 “Maizhe 70 nardepiv pratsiuiut na Kolomoiskoho, shche 100 na Akhmetova— Bihus.Info,” Ukrainska pravda, 11 January 2021, on the Internet at https://www. pravda.com.ua/news/2021/01/11/7279593/, accessed 11 January 2021; and Sukhov, “Investigative Show Exposes Influence of Kolomoisky, Akhmetov on Lawmakers,” Kyiv Post, 14 January 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivp ost.com/ukraine-politics/investigative-show- . . ., accessed 16 January 2021. 215 Ben Aris, “Long Read: The Oligarch Problem,” BNE Intellinews, 17 January 2021, on the Internet at https://www.intellinews.com/long-read-the-oligarchproblem-2 . . ., accessed 20 January 2021.

208 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY inversely related.”216 Zelenskyy’s dilemma in bringing the oligarchs under control could be summed up as being a series of choices: confrontation or cohabitation? Friendship or war? Patron or client?217 Zelenskyy’s second one-on-one oligarchic encounter was with Viktor Medvedchuk, this time resorting to law enforcement bodies—PGO, SBI, and NAZK—rather than to legislation to take the individual out of circulation. In February 2021, the president unexpectedly imposed sanctions on Medvedchuk and his business partner, Taras Kozak, effectively closing down operation of three TV channels that were disseminating Russian propaganda. “The three channels—ZIK, 112, and NewsOne—were noted for programs which discredited the Euromaidan Revolution, denigrated democracy in the United States, poured scorn on ‘western vaccines’ in the struggle against COVID-19, and accused George Soros of controlling Ukraine through civic activist puppets who were recipients of his foundation’s grants.”218 Medvedchuk had long served as Putin’s emissary in Ukraine; the two men were not just friends, but kumy.219 While Medvedchuk contested the sanctions in court, further charges of treason and assisting in terrorism were brought against him, principally over an illegal scheme to sell coal from the occupied Donbas to Ukrainian power stations whereby the state would be financing its occupation by Russia.220 NAZK was also in pursuit: 216 David Dalton, “How Did the Ukrainian Oligarchy Keep Going After Euromaidan?” Kyiv Post, 22 February 2021, on the Internet at https://voxukraine.or g/en/how-did-the-ukrainian-oligarchy-keep . . ., accessed 22 February 2021. Emphasis in the original. 217 Romaniuk and Kravets, “Vid liubovi do impichmentu. Yak vidbuvaietsia deoliharkhizatsiia vid Zelenskoho,” Ukrainska pravda, 18 March 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2021/03/18/7287002/, accessed 18 March 2021. 218 Harasymiw, “Confronting Russian Disinformation in Ukraine: A Tangled Skein,” Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 22, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2021): 50. 219 Ibid., 49-50. 220 Interfax-Ukraine, “SBI Opens Criminal Proceedings on High Treason of Medvedchuk, Kozak,” Kyiv Post, 3 April 2021, on the Internet https://www. kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/sbi-opens-criminal-proce . . ., accessed 30 September 2021; Sorokin, “Pro-Kremlin MP Medvedchuk Charged with Terrorism, Treason—Again,” Kyiv Post, 8 October 2021, on the Internet at https://www.ky

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 209 he had neglected in 2020 to declare ownership of real estate and automobiles with a value of over 73 million UAH, for which charges would presumably be pending.221 At the end of 2021, Zelenskyy again sanctioned Medvedchuk for having revived the TV channels which had earlier been proscribed.222 During all this time, Medvedchuk was being held under house arrest, but he somehow disappeared just as soon as Putin launched his “special military operation” against Ukraine on 24 February 2022.223 Zelenskyy

ivpost.com/ukraine-politics/pro-kremlin-mp-medved . . ., accessed 10 March 2022; and “New Treason and Aiding Terrorism Charges Brought Against Medvedchuk,” Ukrinform, 9 October 2021, on the Internet at https://www.ukr inform.net/rubric-polytics/3330113-new-treason-and . . ., accessed 10 March 2022. 221 “U Medvedchuka znaishly nezadeklarovane maino na 73 miliony—NAZK,” Ukrainska pravda, 8 December 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda. com.ua/news/2021/12/8/7316719/, accessed 8 December 2021. 222 Lea Reaney, “Media Whack-a-Mole: Zelensky Smacks Medvedchuk’s New Channels,” Kyiv Post, 29 December 2021, on the Internet at https://www. kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/media-whack-a-mole-zel . . ., accessed 10 March 2022. 223 Violetta Orlova, “Medvedchuk vtik z-pid domashnoho areshtu—ZMI,” UNIAN, 27 February 2022, on the Internet at https://www.unian.ua/politics/ medvedchuk-vtik-z-pid-domashnogo- . . ., accessed 10 March 2022; and Mykhailo Tkach, “Vtikach No. 1. V poshukakh Medvedchuka,” Ukrainska pravda, 16 March 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles /2022/03/16/7331732/, accessed 16 March 2022. In April, Medvedchuk was arrested while trying to flee to Moldova, and ordered held without bail. “SBU Provides Additional Details of Medvedchuk’s Capture,” Kyiv Post, 13 April 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/sbu-provides-additional . . ., accessed 4 September 2022; and “Sud areshtuvav Medvedchuka bez prava zastavy,” Ukrainska pravda, 16 April 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/04/16/7340092/, accessed 4 September 2022. In late September, however, Medvedchuk and 55 Russian prisoners held by Ukraine were exchanged for 215 Ukrainian and other fighters held by the Russian forces, including defenders of Azovstal. “Dvi sotni ukrainskykh zakhysnykiv, yaki buly u poloni, obminialy na kuma putina,” Vysokyi zamok, 22 September 2022, on the Internet at https://wz.lviv.ua/news/ 473125-dvi-sotni-ukrainskykh-zakhysnykiv . . ., accessed 22 September 2022; “Dosudove rozsliduvannia shchodo Medvedchuka zaversheno—Kostin,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 22 September 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/articl e/print/POLITICS/dosudove-rozsliduvannja- . . ., accessed 22 September 2022; and Volodymyr Fesenko, “How Medvedchuk’s Return to Russia will Affect Ukrainian Politics,” Kyiv Post, 22 September 2022, on the Internet at https:/ /www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/how-medvedchuks . . ., accessed 22 September 2022.

210 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY had thus come to realize that oligarchs were not only a menace for domestic politics, but could also be acting as a Fifth Column within the country for Russia’s advantage. On the president’s initiative, the RNBOU, which he himself chairs, was directed to draft a law on de-oligarchization as a matter of national security. As explained by RNBOU’s secretary, Oleksii Danilov, it was motivated not only by the toxic influence of oligarchs on the domestic economy (monopolization, corruption, and elimination of competition), but also their constituting that everlasting fifth column for Russian interests. This had to be curbed.224 Introduced in June 2021, under the inelegant title, “On Preventing Dangers to National Security Connected to the Excessive Influence of Persons Having Significant Economic and Political Weight in the Life of Society (Oligarchs),” was passed by the Verkhovna Rada in September and signed into law by President Zelenskyy in November. It was to go into effect in May 2022.225 Under this law, to be administered by the RNBOU, persons identified as oligarchs would have their names entered into a register, were forbidden from certain political activities, and had to have their interactions with government officials monitored and reported. An oligarch was defined as someone meeting at least three criteria: (1) activity in political life; (2) significant influence on the mass media through ownership; 224 Valentyn Torba, “Stara khvoroba—oliharkhat,” Den, 12 May 2021, on the Internet at https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/odrobyci/stara-hvoroba-oligarhat . . ., accessed 12 May 2021. 225 This, and the rest of the paragraph, is based on: “Zakon pro oliharkhiv chy populistychna shyrma dlia ruchnoho upravlinnia krainoiu,” Ukrainska pravda, 23 September 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/202 1/09/23/7308205/, accessed 23 September 2021; Sorokin, “Parliament Passes Law to Curtail Oligarchs’ Influence,” Kyiv Post, 23 September 2021; Yuliia Samaieva, “Zakon pro oliharkhiv pryiniato. Pro shcho vin hovoryt, a pro shcho movchyt,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 23 September 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua /ukr/article/print/internal/zakon-pro-oliharkhiv-prijnjato . . ., accessed 23 September 2021; “Rada ukhvalyla zakon pro oliharkhiv,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 23 September 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS /rada-ukhvalila-zakon-pro-o . . ., accessed 23 September 2021; InterfaxUkraine, “Rada Approves Law on De-Oligarchization with 279 Votes,” Kyiv Post, 23 September 2021; Romaniuk, “’Dobryi den, Ya—oliharkh’. Yak pratsiuvatyme deoliharkhizatsiia Zelenskoho,” Ukrainska pravda, 18 November 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2021/11/18/73 14374/, accessed 18 November 2021; and Wilson, “Faltering Fightback,” 16-19.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 211 (3) being a beneficiary owner of a monopoly; and (4) having wealth valued at 2.4 billion UAH (US $81 million) at the time of the law’s passage. Registered oligarchs would be forbidden from contributing to or financing political parties, as well as participating in major privatizations of state assets. Government officials in contact with an oligarch must report such encounters; and the oligarch, in turn, must identify himself as such, presumably with an introduction like: “Good day. I am an oligarch.” The law bore more resemblance to a Kvartal 95 comedy sketch than to a credible brake on oligarchic influence. Such oligarchic influence being itself an informal practice in any case was unlikely to be susceptible to effective regulation by legislative means.226 David Clark, a former advisor to the UK Foreign Office, has said that the anti-oligarch law “looks ominously like a mechanism of executive power aimed primarily at settling scores with selected rivals, especially former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.”227 Indeed, the legal pursuit of its ex-president by the government of Ukraine began immediately after the presidential election of 2019 and continued uninterruptedly thereafter. He was accused of money-laundering, tax evasion, and abuse of power.228 In early 2020, by which time there were sixteen criminal charges against him which he vehemently denied describing them as politically motivated, he was being threatened with arrest if he failed to appear for

226 My argument here runs counter to that of Aliyev presented earlier (chap. 2). 227 Clark, “Ukraine’s Anti-Oligarch Law Could Make President Zelenskyy too Powerful,” UkraineAlert, 6 November 2021. 228 “Portnov podav u DBR tretiu zaiavu na Poroshenka,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 24 May 2019, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/portnov-podav -u-dbr-tretyu . . ., accessed 24 May 2019; “DBR vidkrylo proty Poroshenka shche odnu kryminalnu spravu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 19 June 2019, on the Internet at http s://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/dbr-vidkrilo-proti-poroshen . . ., accessed 19 June 2019; Lukashova, “Dopyt bez cherhy. Chomy Poroshenko raptovo nahranuv u DBR,” Ukrainska pravda, 24 July 2019, on the Internet at https://ww w.pravda.com.ua/articles/2019/07/24/7221841/, accessed 26 July 2019; and Natalia Datskevych, “Investigators, Ex-Official Launch Two New Investigations Against Poroshenko,” Kyiv Post, 6 August 2019, on the Internet at https:// www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/investigators-ex-offic . . ., accessed 7 August 2019.

212 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY questioning.229 In the fall, responding to the anti-oligarch law, Poroshenko immediately disposed of two TV channels so as to lessen the chances of being entered into the register of oligarchs against whom the RNBOU might take action.230 He was thanked for his civic-mindedness by Zelenskyy,231 but the vendetta continued nonetheless. Ultimately, in December 2021, Poroshenko was charged with high treason over his alleged involvement in Medvedchuk’s illegal coal scheme.232 He evaded arrest by going on holiday (to Turkey and then to Brussels), but in his absence leading members of his “European Solidarity” political party had their homes raided for evidence, Poroshenko’s Roshen confectionery business was fined for monopolism, and all of his property was impounded.233 On returning to Ukraine, a court released him on his 229 Kramer, “Ukraine Is Threatening to Arrest Its Former President,” New York Times, 28 February 2020, on the Internet at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02 /28/world/europe/ukraine-pet . . ., accessed 28 February 2020. 230 “Ne khoche v spysok oliharkhiv: Poroshenko prodav prava na ‘5 kanal’ i ‘Priamyi’ svoim mediinykam,” Ukrainska pravda, 8 November 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2021/11/8/7313266/, accessed 8 November 2021; and “Poroshenko pozbuvsia dvokh svoikh telekanaliv, ne bazhaiiuchy potrapyty do reiestru oliharkhiv,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 8 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/poroshen ko-pozbuvsja-dvo . . ., accessed 8 November 2021. 231 “Zelenskyi podiakuvav Poroshenku, yakyi ‘doviv, shcho zakon pro oliharkhiv pratsiuie’,” Ukrainska pravda, 10 November 2021, on the Internet at https://ww w.pravda.com.ua/news/2021/11/10/7313557/, accessed 11 November 2021. 232 Lukashova, Romaniuk, and Kravets, “’Poikhaly, . . . tvoiu mat!’ Istoriia ‘derzhavnoi zrady’ Poroshenka,” Ukrainska pravda, 20 December 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/201/12/20/7318066/, accessed 21 December 2021; “Ukraine Accuses Ex-President Poroshenko of Treason,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 20 December 2021, on the Internet at h ttps://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-president-poroshenko-treason/3161 . . ., accessed 21 December 2021; and Sorokin, “BREAKING: Ex-President Poroshenko Charged With High Treason,” Kyiv Independent, 20 December 2021, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent.com/national/ex-president-poroshenko-ch ar . . ., accessed 21 December 2021. 233 “Roshen Poroshenka oshtrafuvaly na 280 milioniv za monopolizm,” Ekonomichna pravda, 21 December 2021, on the Internet at https://www.epravd a.com.ua/news/2021/12/21/680868/, accessed 21 December 2021; Sukhov, “Prosecutors Reportedly Seek to Arrest Ex-President Poroshenko with $37 Million Bail,” Kyiv Independent, 24 December 2021, on the Internet at https://kyivin dependent.com/hot-topic/prosecutors-reportedly-seek-t . . ., accessed 4 January 2022; “Sud dozvolyv zatrymaty Poroshenka, v OHP khochut yoho areshtu—dzherelo,” Ukrainska pravda, 24 December 2021, on the Internet at http

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 213 own recognizance; Zelenskyy would have continued the feud had he not been dissuaded by Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his deputy PM, Chrystia Freeland.234 Launching the practice of political destruction of one’s predecessor as head of state—typical of a Central American banana republic—could become an entrenched customary habit of political revenge. It would be no way to institute democracy and the rule of law; doing so in the face of the country’s existential crisis in 2022 would have been madness on Zelenskyy’s part.

Conclusion If the dynamics of patronal politics were in operation during the first three years of his first presidential term, Volodymyr Zelenskyy seemed to be unaware of them. Nor could this researcher uncover any such evidence. Perhaps they were there deep in the background. Judging by his outward behavior in office as reported in the Ukrainian mass media, however, Zelenskyy was much more preoccupied with getting control of the various components of the legal apparatus of the state by subordinating them to himself directly whether this was constitutional or not. He placed his clients in leading positions, protected his allies from prosecution, prosecuted his opponents, and promised the IMF to clamp down on political corruption as well as the undue influence of the oligarchs on politics and the economy. All the while he was basically going with s://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2021/12/24/7318529/, accessed 24 December 2021; “U chleniv ‘Yevrosolidarnosti’ provely obshuky u spravi proty Poroshenka,” Ukrainska pravda, 29 December 2021, on the Internet at https://www .pravda.com.ua/news/2021/12/29/7318946/, accessed 29 December 2021; “U predstavnykiv ‘YeS’ obshuky: u partii vvazhaiut, shcho tse nablyzhaie kinets ‘zelenoi vlady’,” Vysokyi zamok, 29 December 2021, on the Internet at https://w z.lviv.ua/ukraine/449444-u-predstavnykiv-yes-obshuky-u-pa . . ., accessed 29 December 2021; “Sud areshtuvav use maino Poroshenka,” Ukrainska pravda, 6 January 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/01/ 6/7319630/, accessed 6 January 2022; and “U Venediktovoi rozpovily, de shukaly maino Poroshenka, shchob areshtuvaty,” Ukrainska pravda, 6 Janaury 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/01/6/73196 35/, accessed 6 January 2022. 234 Robert Fife and Mark MacKinnon, “Canada Moved to Stop Arrest of Poroshenko,” Globe and Mail (Alberta Edition), 4 February 2022.

214 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY the flow in the face of the implacable inertia of the country’s notorious sistema of patronage, bribery, favors, collusion, and impunity. It was a struggle for compliance that required his going beyond the powers of the presidency, yet which yielded modest results for his own authority. It was more an attempt at rule by law than rule of law, unfortunately, assuming that rule of law is preferrable for Ukraine’s ongoing development. Zelenskyy’s term conformed largely to the pattern set by Poroshenko, a major anomaly in the annals of patronal politics, perhaps, but apparently the present-day norm in Ukrainian everyday politics. When Henry Hale refers to the Euromaidan Revolution of 2014 as “irregular” in terms of his theory of patronal politics—insofar as “there was no question of term limits or elections involving succession”—he has surely overlooked its true significance.235 Rather than an anomaly, it was in fact an iteration of the unachieved revolutions of 1991 and 2004, driven by societal rather than elite expectations, and basically counter to the model of patronal politics which Hale presented as normal in post-Soviet politics. He fully expected regular cycling of the regime from single- to multiple-pyramid patterns to resume in due course—which it did not. Patronal politics may well have featured prominently in Ukraine up to 2014,236 but it was obviously sidelined by a long-simmering revolutionary urge feeding on popular discontent which toppled both presidents Yanukovych and Poroshenko. Whether Poroshenko was part of the “patronalist” political system and practices or not, what he offered was not what Ukrainians wanted— accountability, justice, fairness, curbing corruption, and an end to impunity. Consider the ratings at the beginning and end of his term: expectations were low to start with, and they declined thereafter. On his first hundred days in office, Poroshenko was given a lower assessment (4.7 on a ten-point scale) than either Yushchenko (5.6) or Yanukovych (5.1) at the same juncture. As of August 2014,

235 Hale, Patronal Politics, 237. 236 Katerina Malygina, “Ukraine as a Neo-Patrimonial State: Understanding Political Change in Ukraine in 2005-2010,” SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, 13, no. 1 (2010): 7-27.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 215 trust in the new president stood at 34 per cent, distrust 35 per cent, for a net deficit of -1 per cent.237 By April 2017, trust in the president had fallen to 22 per cent, and the deficit was nearly 50 percentage points; a mere 4.4 per cent approved of his actions.238 In May 2019, only 10.3 per cent of respondents were positively disposed to Poroshenko as president, and just 6 per cent would have voted for him.239 The revolutions’ unfulfilled promises were threatening to unseat his successor, Zelenskyy, as well, until he was saved by Putin’s war. Looking at his ratings, in summer 2019, when 63 per cent of respondents identified anticorruption reform as the country’s top priority, newly-elected President Zelenskyy was trusted by 70 per cent of citizens surveyed.240 By January 2021, fewer than 20 per cent would have voted for him; in February, another poll showed 38 per cent trust, 58 per cent distrust, in Zelenskyy, for a deficit of 20 points.241 In May 2021, only 43 per cent would have voted for him;

237 “Ukraintsi nezadovoleni pershymy sta dniamy prezydenta Poroshenka,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 16 September 2014. 238 “Prezydentu Ukrainy doviriaiut 22% hromadian, uriadu—13%, Radi—9%,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 18 May 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/POLITICS/prezi dentu-ukraini-doviryayut-22-gromady . . ., accessed 18 May 2017; “Dii prezydenta Ukrainy povnistiu pidtrymuiut 4.4% hromadian,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 18 May 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/POLITICS/diyi-prezidenta-ukrayin i-povnistyu-pidtrimu . . ., accessed 18 May 2017; and “Stalo vidomo, komu naibilshe viriat ukraintsi,” Obozrevatel, 18 May 2017, on the Internet at https://ww w.obozrevatel.com/ukr/politics/32467-stalo-vidomo-kom . . ., accessed 18 May 2017. 239 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, “Social and Political Attitudes of the Residents of Ukraine: April 2018.” 240 Fond Demokratychni initsiatyvy imeni Ilka Kucheriva, “Na yaki pershocherhovi reformy chekaiut hromadiany,” 3 July 2019, on the Internet at https://dif.org.ua/ article/na-yaki-pershochergovi-reformi-chekay . . ., accessed 4 July 2018; Daria Shulzhenko, “Latest Survey Reveals Ukrainians’ Reform Priorities Before Election,” Kyiv Post, 3 July 2018, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/Ukrai ne-politics/latest-survey-reveals . . ., accessed 4 July 2018; and “Dvi tretyny ukraintsiv doviriaiut Zelenskomu—opytuvannia,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 28 August 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/dvi-tretini-ukr ayiciv-dovi . . ., accessed 28 August 2019. 241 “KMIS: Reitinh Zelenskoho vpav nyzhche 20%,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 26 January 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/kmis-rejti nh-zelenskoh . . ., accessed 26 January 2021; and “Zelenskyi ocholiuie reitinh doviry do politykiv—opytuvannia ‘Reintinhu’,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 10 February

216 VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY’S PRESIDENCY in August, 19.2 per cent were positively disposed, 33.7 per cent negatively, to Zelenskyy for a net deficit of 14.5 points.242 By the autumn of 2021, only 18.7 per cent of respondents would have voted for Zelenskyy in presidential elections; the level of trust in him was down to 38 per cent, counterbalanced by 59 per cent distrust.243 It was popular discontent—primarily the perceived failure of the country’s leadership to deal with high-level corruption— and not the mechanics of patronal politics, which threatened presidents Poroshenko and Zelenskyy during their terms of office, as indicated by the evidence presented in this study.

2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelenskijocholjuje-rejt . . ., accessed 10 February 2021. 242 “Opytuvannia: Zelenskyi vtratyv bilshe polovyny elektoratu, Poroshenko— menshe tretyny,” Ukrainska pravda, 17 May 2021, on the Internet at https://ww w.pravda.com.ua/news/2021/05/17/7293847/, accessed 17 May 2021; and “Bilshist ukraintsiv vvazhaiut, shcho osobysti yakosti Zelenskoho ne vidpovidaiut posadi prezydenta—opytuvannia,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 17 August 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/bilshist-u krajintsiv-vvazhak . . ., accessed 17 August 2021. 243 Razumkov Tsentr, “Elekoralni orientatsii hromadian Ukrainy ta yikh stavlennia do rezonansnykh podii ostannoho chasu (zhovten 2021r.),” 1 November 2021, on the Internet at https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-d osslidzhennia/ele . . ., accessed 1 November 2021; and “Reitinh doviry do politykiv ocholyv Zelenskyi—opytuvannia,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 16 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/rejtinh-doviri-d o-politikiv- . . ., accessed 16 November 2021.

5. Russia’s Genocidal War of Aggression against Ukraine At 0400 on Thursday, 24 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, launched an unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine calling it a “Special Military Operation” intended apparently as a Final Solution of the Ukrainian Problem.1 In a television address broadcast an hour later, he explained to his fellow-countrymen the reasons for his action.2 He said that the source of the problem which his action was intended to solve resided in the US-led NATO alliance, which had broken its promise not to expand eastward after the fall of the USSR, and which had created in Ukraine an “anti-Russia” that now posed a vital threat to the Russian fatherland. The Western-sponsored Ukrainian government in Kyiv made up of neo-Nazis was engaged in a genocide of the people residing in the occupied territories of the Donbas. They were going to kill the Crimean and ORDLO (Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics) populations, had their eye on other Russian territories, and were hoping to acquire nuclear weapons for these purposes. This was a severe security threat to Russia which made conflict inevitable. Since the ORDLOs had asked for Moscow’s help, and in accordance with article 7, chapter 51, of the UN Charter, there was no other means to defend Russia than by taking this action. Its aims were to protect people from the Kyiv regime’s genocidal policies, to de-militarize and de-Nazify Ukraine, and to bring to justice the perpetrators of these crimes against peaceful citizens. There was no plan to occupy Ukrainian territory; we are not trying to suppress the interests of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, he asserted, only to defend Russia. He called on Ukrainian soldiers to disobey their commanders’ illegal orders 1

“Putin Declares War on Ukraine,” Kyiv Independent, 24 February 2022, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent.com/national/putin-declares-war-on-uk raine/, accessed 28 March 2022. Anatolii Komarkov, “Obrashchenie prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 24 February 2022, on the Internet at https://www.ng.ru/politics/2 022-02-24/1_8379_president.html, accessed 28 March 2022.

217

218 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR and lay down their arms. Any outside interference with the operation, Putin warned, would be met with terrible consequences never yet seen. He avoided declaring war or even calling the operation a war—very soon thereafter it was forbidden for Russian citizens to use the terms “war” or “invasion” publicly, at pain of fifteen years’ imprisonment—because doing so would obligate him to respect the rules of war and of international humanitarian law. He thus gave himself a free hand. Russian forces attacked from the north, east, and south (out of Crimea), using armored columns, missiles, naval and artillery bombardment, and aircraft bombing. After a month of fighting, one-quarter of Ukraine’s population had been displaced from their domiciles, over three million people had sought refuge in neighboring countries, thirteen million were trapped in ruined battle zones, and hundreds of schools, educational institutions, hospitals, and medical facilities had been damaged or destroyed.3 “According to a . . . United Nations estimate, [in that first month] since the RF’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine, at least 1,119 civilians have died and 1,790 have been injured from war-related causes.”4 The casualties included children. Had Ukraine lost its right to exist? Was this the physical end of post-Euromaidan Ukraine? The war of Russia against Ukraine, however, had actually begun in 2014, with Putin’s first direct assault on its sovereignty and territorial integrity.5 Largely unnoticed at the time this was also the beginning of the unravelling of the post-1945 world order, the relevance of international law to the conduct of international relations, the operation of the laws of war and international humanitarian 3

“Za misiats vid pochatku viiny peremishcheno maizhe chvert naselennia Ukrainy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 25 March 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr /article/print/UKRAINE/za-misjats-vid-pochatku-vij . . ., accessed 25 March 2022; and “Cherez zbroinu ahresiiu RF v Ukraini zahynulo 135 ditei—Ofis henprokurora,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 25 March 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/u kr/article/print/UKRAINE/cherez-zbrojnu-ahresiju-rf- . . ., accessed 29 March 2022. “New Wave of Russian Missile Strikes Across Ukraine, Casualties From Kremlin Bombardment Mount,” Kyiv Post, 28 March 2022, on the Internet at https:// www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/new-wave-of-russian-mis . . ., accessed 30 March 2022. A concise account is available in Serhy Yekelchyk, Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), chaps. 6 and 7.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 219 law in governing conflicts, and the pertinence of the United Nations along with its Charter which are intended to regulate international peace and collective security.6 Putin’s violation of international law by invading and annexing Crimea called forth condemnation, sanctions, and outrage, but this did not deter him from immediately fomenting armed rebellion in the Donbas, yet another violation of international law. While Russia assisted the rebels by organizing and supplying them with weapons and soldiers, Moscow at the same time acted as arbitrator imposing on Ukraine the Minsk Accords. The confrontation between Ukrainian forces and Russian proxies in eastern Ukraine continued along a cease-fire line without interruption to 2022. This static armed conflict confirmed the start of an end to the rule-based global order. In this chapter we move from the domestic arena of Ukrainian politics to the external one, the realm of geopolitics. We shift our primary attention away from the question of whether patronal politics was still the predominant pattern after the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity and whether informal practices were still prevailing over formal institutions. My supposition is that patronal politics loses its relevance in the field of international relations, foreign policy, and war, because considerations of patron-client relations, and of employing the law as a political instrument, a tool of political infighting, are inapplicable outside of domestic politics. The choices and actions of the Ukrainian president are basically different in the externally-oriented realm, where pyramid-building or using the law for political purposes is irrelevant. The following questions are addressed in this chapter. How did Poroshenko and Zelenskyy deal with the annexation and the war in Donbas, by diplomatic or by military means? Were these effective? How did they negotiate between Washington, Brussels, and Moscow? What did the presidents do to try to end the war? Were they and their country indeed, as Moscow claimed, simply a project of the United States, totally reliant and compliant? What were Poroshenko’s and Zelenskyy’s successes and failures as chief diplomat and commander-in-chief? 6

Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer, Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the PostCold War Order (Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 2015).

220 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR Could the invasion of 2022 have been avoided? Can Ukraine survive this ultimate test?

Russia Intervenes in Crimea and the Donbas Almost immediately after President Viktor Yanukovych’s departure from Ukraine, armed “Little Green Men” in military gear without identification but speaking Russian arrived in and took over Crimea; they took control of Ukrainian military bases, raised the Russian flag over the Supreme Council building, and installed a new regional prime minister.7 They then supervised a parliamentary vote on secession and on holding a referendum, as well as on 16 March 2014 the referendum itself. The referendum, held without voters’ lists or impartial international monitoring, reportedly resulted in 96.77 per cent voting in favor of joining Russia. The following day the Crimean parliament declared independence and asked to be admitted to the Russian Federation. The accession agreement was signed on 18 March in Moscow, where before a rapturous audience in Red Square President Putin gave a speech venting his personal grievances against the West and the United States. Contrary to Mr. Putin’s repeated assurances of its scrupulous legality, all of this was entirely in violation of international law, the Budapest Memorandum, the UN Charter, various treaties of RussiaUkraine friendship and cooperation, and the constitution of Ukraine. As a result, the US and EU imposed sanctions on Russia, but Putin laughed them off, including in May 2015 while hosting the St. Petersburg Economic Summit along with the G8 Summit. Only after the fact did Putin admit that the excision of the peninsula from Ukraine had been planned in advance; it had been indeed foretold in 2008 when Putin expressed the notion that “Ukraine will join NATO without Crimea and the east.”8

This paragraph is based on: Catherine Belton, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West (London: William Collins, 2020), 383-90; Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 115-18; and Mikhail Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin (New York: Public Affairs, 2016), 274-302. Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men, 283.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 221 The Russian leaders and troops involved in the Crimean secession then moved to eastern Ukraine where they expected to execute a similar scenario.9 Taking advantage of local anti-Maidan rallies and the collapse of local authority in some places, they gained control and announced the formation of “peoples’ republics” in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Referenda on separation were held, but not acted upon since Putin was apparently undecided about the rebellion’s purpose, and the Crimean scenario went unrealized. As the rebels began to be pushed back in armed clashes with the Ukrainian Army, they were reinforced by Russian regular servicemen “on vacation” (so as to mask Russia’s involvement in the conflict) and were able to mount a counteroffensive. Russia repeatedly denied involvement, calling the conflict a “civil war” in which Kyiv was depicted as violently suppressing the legitimate rights of the Russophone inhabitants of the Donbas. Despite ceasefires negotiated in September 2014 (Minsk I) and February 2015 (Minsk II), the war continued across the line of contact as a “frozen” or “low-intensity” conflict in which Russia’s participation became simply undeniable.

Minsk Agreements and Disagreements The Minsk I Agreement was the result of negotiations within the four-sided Normandy Format involving the heads of state of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine. In addition to a ceasefire, as Serhy Yekelchyk writes, “the agreement also called for the release of all hostages, a prisoner of war exchange, an amnesty for arrested separatists, and the removal of heavy artillery from a 30-kilometerwide zone between the sides. Ukraine also promised to pass a law on self-government in some districts of the Donbas, which it later repealed when the ceasefire failed.”10 Minsk II did not replace Minsk I but built upon it—perhaps a fatal flaw. Emerging from fourteen hours (or seventeen, according to Yekelchyk) of talks, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President François 9 10

This paragraph is drawn from: Belton, Putin’s People, 390-92, and chap. 14; Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 128-37; and Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men, 283-92. Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 142-43.

222 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR Hollande, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko agreed on—but did not sign—a draft document titled “Set of Measures Aimed at Implementing the Minsk Agreements.”11 Its principal provisions were: “an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire,” but delayed for three days allowing rebels to take Debaltseve; withdrawal of heavy weapons from a ceasefire line; beginning of talks on elections and special status for the disputed territory; an amnesty for all involved; exchange of hostages and prisoners; humanitarian aid to the stricken area; Ukraine to regain control of its external border, subject to making constitutional changes; withdrawal of foreign forces and disbandment of illegal armed formations; and Ukraine to conduct local elections in the disputed areas. As a ceasefire, Minsk II worked sporadically, which was an improvement over not working at all. As a roadmap to peace, it was littered with obstacles preventing its implementation: agreement was impossible on the sequence of steps to be taken; Russian troops were never withdrawn; and Ukraine refused to take any measures implying legitimacy for the “peoples’ republics” or constitutional changes giving them a veto over its foreign policy.12 In an effort to reanimate the process, Germany’s foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, offered a plan according to which OSCE-supervised elections would take place in the Russianoccupied territories, following which the area would be given special status by the Ukrainian government.13 The Steinmeier Formula remained unimplemented because it basically encapsulated the Russian position, unacceptable to Kyiv: “Exonerating Russia of the aggressor’s responsibility, forcing Kyiv to deal with DonetskLuhansk, and using Western hands to pressure Kyiv into conferring democratic legitimacy on Russia’s proxies in Ukraine’s east.”14 11

12 13 14

“Kompleks mer po vypolnenniiu Minskikh soglashenii” (n.p., n.d.), electronic copy in the author’s possession, signed by the five members of the Trilateral Contact Group. Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 144-46. Ibid. “Berlin, Paris Side With Moscow Against Kyiv In Normandy Group’s Meeting—Jamestown,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 11 March 2016, on the Internet at http s://jamestown.org/program/berlin-paris-side-with-moscow-again . . ., accessed 5 April 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 223 Considering that one of its architects was Viktor Medvedchuk, it was no wonder that Minsk II served merely as a cynical exercise in which the generator of the conflict, Russia, could act as arbiter of its settlement, giving it “permanent leverage over Ukraine, while maintaining complete control of the DNR.”15 Western sanctions over its annexation of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Ukraine were imposed on Russia repeatedly and with increasing severity—in March, April, July, and September of 2014, and February 2015. These included visa bans, asset freezes held in Western banks, companies linked to the Kremlin, sanctions against individuals, whole sectors of Russia’s economy, stateowned energy companies as well as banks, and cutting off access to debt markets and technology. They had some negative impact on the Russian economy, but none at all on policy.16 In her thorough study of the much-overlooked regeneration of Russia as a global power during this period of time, Katherine Stoner concludes that the Russian “economy was still growing even under the most severe sanctions ever imposed on Russia by the West, and this was outside the context of high global oil prices.”17 With good advice from his experts, Putin was meantime managing to make Russia’s economy to a remarkable degree sanctions-proof—a point that becomes relevant later on in the present work. This—what some have called “hybrid”—war continued for eight years. In the course of it 14,000 people were killed and nearly two million internally displaced. At the end of 2021, it was estimated that 26,000 Russian servicemen were fighting on the rebels’ side, although officially it was denied that they were there at all.18 An alternative conceptualization would have it encapsulated under the term “new wars of the twenty-first century,” referring to the non-standard composition of the armed forces engaged (including 15 16 17 18

Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men, 291. Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 140-41. Katherine E. Stoner, Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 153. Original emphasis. Coynash, “Court in Russia Inadvertently Reveals the Huge Number of Russian Military Forces Deployed in Donbas,” Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, 17 December 2021, on the Internet at https:// khpg.org/en/1608809871, accessed 17 December 2021.

224 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR militias, mercenaries, deserters, criminal gangs, and regular soldiers) and their mode of warfare (a combination of guerilla, conventional, and counter-insurgency). In practice, this kind of warfare is difficult to control and coordinate, hence its unreliability—unless that in itself is an objective.19 Perhaps the most useful definition is that of Alexander Motyl, who says that hybrid war “is Russia’s new way of war-making in southeastern Ukraine, one that employs a variety of means—propaganda, subversion, outright aggression, support for proxies, and the like—while remaining undeclared or denied.”20 Whatever the terminology or classification, that it dragged on so long without resolution—neither peace nor victory—meant that its instigator could have had no specific political objective in mind except to play cat-and-mouse with Ukraine at will and indefinitely. In no case was this a civil war, despite being labelled as such by the Kremlin. In the first place, it was not an “internal war,” as an earlier generation of political scientists had conceived of in analyzing cases of civil war in their time.21 Russia’s role was obvious throughout: the rebels openly acknowledged and made frequent appeals for Russia’s support despite official denials. Russia replaced the rebel leadership at will with its own substitutes who were Russian citizens. There had been no widespread dissent in Donetsk and Luhansk beforehand to which Kyiv had supposedly responded with repression. On the contrary, these oblasts had elected Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions, were his home base, and had been rewarded with subsidies. There were no antecedents to rebellion prior to 2014 in the form of an incipient insurgency; the rebels appeared instantly, as though on cue, right after Russia’s capture of Crimea, denouncing the Poroshenko government as illegitimate. Their weapons—including Russian T-72 tanks,

19 20

Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars, 2nd ed. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007), passim. Alexander J. Motyl, “Time for a Hybrid War Against Russia?” World Affairs Journal, 25 November 2014, on the Internet at Source URL: http://www.worlda ffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/time-hybrid-war-against-russia. Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1964).

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 225 artillery, armored vehicles, and Grad rocket launchers—could not have been stored in preparation in people’s car garages, but were supplied by Russia. Ethnicity played no part in this war, either, unlike in Bosnia, a parallel used misleadingly by Moscow during the conflict. “Civil war” was merely an element of the Russian propaganda narrative by which it was attempting to justify its interference in Ukraine, and to obscure its own role, but having no correspondence to reality.

Poroshenko as Diplomat- and Commander-in-Chief President Poroshenko’s initiatives and actions in dealing with the war in Donbas, as well as the annexation of Crimea, in his capacities of diplomat- and commander-in-chief had limited success insofar as restoring the previous status quo. Immediately after his election, by which time the two incursions were accomplished facts, according to the International New York Times, he “vowed . . . to restore order in the country’s east, . . . but said he would not negotiate with armed rebels and instead would demand swifter results from a military campaign that has achieved only limited success.” He “also promised to mend ties with the Kremlin, citing his business connections to Russia as well as his personal relationship with President Vladimir V. Putin. . . . He added: ‘Because Mr. Putin and I know each other quite well, and I think this will lead to very important results.’”22 At his inauguration, Poroshenko described the war in Donbas as an obstacle to Ukraine’s modernization.23 He offered a peace plan consisting of a call to rebels to lay down arms in exchange for a guarantee of non-prosecution, a corridor for Russian fighters to exit, and dialogue. For the residents of Donbas he promised: peace, decentralization, a guarantee of the Russian language, no division of Ukrainians into good and bad; respect for regional identity; employment and investment; and early local elections. At the same time, he would not talk with the bandits, and the territorial integrity of Ukraine would not be open to discussion. Since 22 23

Herszenhorn, “Ukraine’s Next President Vows to Restore Order.” Herszenhorn, “Poroshenko Takes Ukraine Helm,” and “Promova prezydenta Ukrainy pid chas tseremonii inavhuratsii.”

226 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR peace requires security, that means being permanently battleready; the top priority thus must be re-equipping the army, which in turn will spur reindustrialization. Poroshenko said he would use his diplomatic skills to achieve an international security agreement as replacement for the Budapest Memorandum. Russia’s occupation of Crimea was unacceptable and Poroshenko made a point of mentioning in his inaugural address that “Yesterday, in the course of the meeting in Normandy, I told this to President Putin: Crimea is Ukraine soil. Period. There can be no compromise on the issue of Crimea, European choice and state structure.”24 On entering office he had strong words for Russia, but words were not enough to secure peace and security for Ukraine. That Ukraine would need outside help for its security was pointed out early on (June 2014) by American political scientist Paul Gregory, who urged his government to provide the necessary lethal military assistance.25 He offered five reasons why it should do so: Putin’s violation of international norms and treaties; Russia’s narrative of the US as its “enemy number one” which left no room for avoiding the alienation of the Russian public; international consensus on Russia as aggressor, Ukraine as victim; the falseness of Putin’s claim that the Donbas conflict was an internal civil war; and the impossibility of diplomacy where the aggressor dishonestly poses as peacemaker and is not to be trusted. (The continuing relevance of these same arguments for the West’s provision of lethal military aid to Ukraine again in 2022 was truly remarkable.) Instead, Gregory noted, the US President has so far “denied Ukraine meaningful military assistance. . . . After months of stalling, Barack Obama announced on June 4 in Warsaw a $5 million (not billion) package of non-lethal military aid to Ukraine to supplement his earlier grant of military box lunches.”26 It would take some time

24 25

Herszenhorn, “Poroshenko Takes Ukraine Helm.” Paul Roderick Gregory, “Five Compelling Reasons For The U.S. To Offer Lethal Military Assistance to Ukraine,” Forbes, 16 June 2014, on the Internet at http:// www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2014/06/16/five-compelling-re asons-fo . . ., accessed 17 June 2014. Ibid.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 227 thereafter for the US and its allies to begin to treat seriously Ukraine’s security needs as a practical, and not merely diplomatic, matter. Initially, Poroshenko proposed a unilateral ceasefire as a way to begin implementing his peace plan.27 This was to provide the rebels with an opportunity to disarm, a corridor for the exit of Russian fighters, an exchange of prisoners, and restoration of normal order. It was summarily dismissed by the rebel leadership, Denys Pushilin of the Donetsk People’s Republic calling it “meaningless.” Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov was critical of the ceasefire because it was temporary, not permanent. In the event, this preliminary step was not implemented. Coincidentally, the Russian government-controlled energy giant Gazprom cut off supplies of natural gas to Ukraine, ostensibly over an unpaid debt, but in fact to underline the often-denied connection between Moscow and the Donbas rebels.28 A British specialist on peace processes has, on the basis of his study of numerous internal conflicts such as the Troubles in Northern Ireland, offered a basic model of these processes as well as a possible solution. Specifically, Jonathan Tonge has written that: 27

Carol Morello, “Ukraine Proposes Peace Plan With Separatists,” Washington Post, 16 June 2014, on the Internet at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world /europe/ukraine-proposes-peace-with-separatists/2 . . ., accessed 17 June 2014; “Poroshenko: myrnyi plan pochnetsia z prypynennia vohniu,” BBC Ukrainian, 18 June 2014, on the Internet at http://www.bbc.co.ua/ukrainian/p olitics/2014/06/140618_poroshenko_plan_peace_dk.sht . . ., accessed 18 June 2014;. Herszenhorn, “Ukrainian Leader Proposes a Unilateral Cease-Fire in the East,” International New York Times, 18 June 2014, on the Internet at http://www .nytimes.com/2014/06/19/world/europe/putin-and-poroshenko-ukraine.ht ml?ref=worl . . ., accessed 18 June 2014; and “Ukraina v odnostoronnomu poriadku prypynyt vohon na skhodi—Poroshenko,” Ukrainska pravda, 18 June 2014, on the Internet at http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/06/18/7029403/vi ew_print/, accessed 18 June 2014. MacFarquhar, “Gazprom Cuts Russia’s Natural Gas Supply to Ukraine,” International New York Times, 16 June 2014, on the Internet at http://www.nytimes.c om/2014/06/17/world/europe/russia-gazprom-increases-pressure-on-ukrai n . . ., accessed 17 June 2014; and Michael Birnbaum and Carol Morello, “Russia’s Gazprom Cuts Gas to Ukraine in a New Phase of the Nations’ Conflict,” Washington Post, 16 June 2014, on the Internet at http://www.washingtonpost.c om/world/russias-gazprom-cuts-gas-to-ukraine-in-a-new-ph . . ., accessed 17 June 2014.

228 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR studies of peace processes indicate a reasonably clear sequencing, beginning with secret exploratory dialogue, followed by the public emergence of discussions and negotiations, brokered increasingly by external mediators. Amid much grandstanding over formal peace deals, there has been a welcome shift towards dealing with vexed problems of implementing and sustaining peace, maintaining political institutions and managing post-conflict issues such as moving combatants into civil society. The achievement of a peace deal is merely one step towards managing a conflict. Resolution of the conditions or divisions which yielded violence requires a much longer term effort. Peace processes are thus sustained, non-linear constructions, beset by regular reversals, given that, at their most comprehensive, they cover decades of shifts from violence to constitutional politics; the management of division and, ultimately, the resolution of the underlying problems which precipitated violence.29

Thereafter, he proposes consociationalism as a solution which has been modestly successful, notably in Northern Ireland and Bosnia & Herzegovina, although not in Iraq or Afghanistan.30 These suggestions might have offered Ukraine some hope for a path towards reconciliation, except for the fact that the Donbas war was a threeway conflict directed by Moscow as puppet-master rather than a purely two-sided internal one. This conflict is not a dispute over territory by two neighboring states; it is an undeclared war of aggression by Russia against a sovereign Ukrainian state, hence the Good Friday Agreement cannot serve as a template for ending it. By the autumn of 2015, when the daily cost of the Donbas conflict was $5 million US, and Ukraine had lost nearly one-fifth of its economic potential, Poroshenko was giving himself credit for pausing the war.31 His visits to Brussels, Berlin, New York, and Paris, he reckoned, had resulted in a pause in the conflict and he hoped the ceasefire would grow into a stable peace. Poroshenko was still convinced that the occupied portions of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts could be recovered by diplomatic and political means. Also in 2015, the American policy think-tank RAND Corporation was tasked with creating a step-by-step reform of the entirety 29 30 31

Jonathan Tonge, Comparative Peace Processes (Cambridge, UK, and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2014), 29. Ibid., 192-4. “Poroshenko: Den viiny na Donbasi koshtuie nam blyzko $5 milioniv,” Ukrainska pravda, 27 September 2015; and “Poroshenko viryt, shcho Donbas mozhna povernuty dyplomatychno,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 14 October 2015.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 229 of Ukraine’s defence and security sector, to be executed over two years.32 A major obstacle developed, however, when President Poroshenko insisted on subordinating to himself the chief of staff of the armed forces. Another was typical bureaucratic inertia on the part of the general staff. This was only resolved, and the project resumed, after a visit to Kyiv by Vice-President Joe Biden. As his top foreign policy priorities for 2016, President Poroshenko announced the goal of returning the occupied Donbas territories and Crimea to Ukrainian sovereignty.33 His plan for Crimea would involve creation of an international body for the peninsula’s de-occupation, using the Geneva Plus format: EU , US, and, perhaps, signatories of the Budapest Memorandum. Poroshenko remained determined to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity and national security through diplomatic means and to do so by strict adherence of all parties to the Minsk Agreements.34 Later in the year, he deferred amending the constitution to provide special status for the contested territories until the Minsk Accords had been implemented, meaning that he placed the country’s security ahead of decentralization or federalization as demanded by Russia.35 In his 2016 annual address to the Verkhovna Rada, “Poroshenko devoted a great deal of attention to reforms in the Ukrainian army and its future plans, and announced that his priority for

“Reforma oboronnoho sektoru halmuietsia cherez boiazn Poroshenka vtratyty kontrol nad Henshtabom—Butusov,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 29 December 2015, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/artcile/print/UKRAINE/reforma-oboronnogo-se ktoru-gal . . ., accessed 29 December 2015. “U 2016 rotsi maie buty vidnovleno suverenitet Ukrainy na Donbasi—Prezydent,” Den, 14 January 2016, on the Internet at Source URL: http://www.day.ki ev.ua/news/140116-u-2016-roci-maye-buty-vidnovleno-suverenitet-ukrayinyna-donbasi-prezydent, accessed 14 January 2016. “Poroshenko ozvuchyv prioritety na 2016 rik,” Vysokyi zamok, 14 January 2016, on the Internet at http://wz.lviv.ua/ukraine/156190-poroshenko-ozvuchyv-p riorytety-na . . ., accessed 14 January 2016. “Poroshenko vidklav ‘osoblyvyi status’ i vybory v Donbasi do povnoho vykonannia umov Minskykh uhod,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 28 June 2016, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/poroshenko-vidklav-osoblyviy-sta . . ., accessed 28 June 2016; and “Poroshenko: Ukraine Will Not Amend Constitution Until Ceasefire is Fully Implemented,” UAWire, 7 September 2016, on the Internet at http://www.uawire.org/news/poroshenko-ukraine-will-not-ame nd-constitututi . . ., accessed 8 September 2016.

230 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR the next year will be the modernization of the army, including greater professionalism among soldiers.”36 His rhetoric on Crimea was also much stronger than in the previous year’s address, indicating he would “not trade territories for peace.”37 Poroshenko’s emphasis on strengthening the armed forces was followed up a month later by the announcement that the army would become a fully volunteer (kontraktna) force.38 And in the fall in New York he was able, in speaking to the United Nations General Assembly, to boast about Ukraine’s transition from a conscript to a professional army, perhaps not equipped with the last word in technology, but adequate to hold back Russia.39 Poroshenko appeared then to be moving away from reliance on diplomacy to the military solution as the tool for attaining security and peace for Ukraine. And well he might, considering how other countries’ representatives and their concerns, for example, had ignored and isolated him at the 2017 Munich Security Conference.40 The world’s attention was no longer centered on Ukraine. In April, Poroshenko declared that the Donbas conflict was no longer a frozen one, but a genuine hot war, noting that the occupied territories contained “over 700 Russian tanks, more than 1,250 artillery systems, and over 300 multiple-fire rocket systems.”41 On the anniversary of his third year in office, journalists’ assessments

37 38

Kruk, “What Poroshenko Said and Didn’t Say,” Atlantic Council, 8 September 2016, on the Internet at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist /what-poroshenk . . ., accessed 12 September 2016. Ibid. “Poroshenko: Z kintsia zhovtnia armiia staie kontraktnoiu,” Den, 15 October 2016, on the Internet at Source URL: http://day.kiev.ua/news/151016-poroshe nko-z-kincya-zhovtnya-armiya-staye-kontraktnoyu, accessed 15 October 2016. “Per aspera ad astra: Poroshenko vidzvituvav pro try roky pislia Yevromaidanu,” Obozrevatel, 20 November 2016, on the Internet at http:// ukr.obozre vatel.com/politics/32091-per-aspera-ad-astra-poros . . ., accessed 1 December 2016. Sydorenko, “Miunkhenska pomylka Poroshenka: yak bezpekova konferentsiia stala kholodnym dushem,” Yevropeiska pravda, 18 February 2017, on the Internet at http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/2017/02/18/7061851/vi . . ., accessed 20 February 2017. “Poroshenko nazvav sytuatsiiu v Donbasi spravzhnoiu hariachoiu viinoiu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 20 April 2017, on the Internet at http://dt.ua/article/print/P OLITICS/poroshenko-nazvav-situaciyu-v- . . ., accessed 20 April 2017.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 231 highlighted modernization of the army as Poroshenko’s major achievement. His diplomatic skills were praised as well, but these were oriented towards Europe; he had made no headway towards peace with Putin, but this went unmentioned.42 Following along with the president’s redefinition of the Donbas conflict as being a real war, what had hitherto been called the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) was reorganized as a military campaign and a new law on reintegration of the occupied territories was to be drafted.43 This meant a change of posture on his part towards the rebels away from accommodation and toleration—a kind of declaration of war without declaring it—but a signal as well to Russia of a tougher stance.44 In a search for US support, Poroshenko travelled to Washington in June 2017 to meet President Donald J. Trump. While he managed however briefly to gain the American president’s attention, it was difficult to assess the meeting’s achievements from the Ukrainian point of view.45 Trump was less interested in foreign affairs than Obama, the US at that time had no Ukraine policy to speak of, and Trump was meanwhile enamored of Vladimir Putin. Significantly, the visit did not include a state dinner, a gesture usually accorded 42

“Prezydent u buremni chasy: choho dosiah Poroshenko za try roky,” Obozrevatel, 7 June 2017, on the Internet at https://www.obozrevatel.com/ukr/news /56439-prezident-u-buremni- . . ., accessed 7 June 2017; Vasyl Saf’ianiuk, “Try roky prezydentstva Poroshenka: strymannyi optymizm,” Vysokyi zamok, 8 June 2017, on the Internet at http://wz.lviv.ua/ukraine/201045-try-roky-prezydent stva-poroshenka . . ., accessed 8 June 2017; and Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 155. “Poroshenko prokomentuvav ideiu Turchynova skasuvaty ATO,” UNIAN, 14 June 2017, on the Internet at https://www.unian.ua/war/1975809-poroshenko -prokomentuvav-ide . . ., accessed 14 June 2017; and “Poroshenko prokomentuvav zaminy rezhymu ATO na voiennyi stan,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 14 June 2017, accessed 14 June 2017. Romaniuk and Kravets, “Myrna viina. Yak Poroshenko i Turchynov khochut povertaty Donbas,” Ukrainska pravda, 21 June 2017, on the Internet at http://w ww.pravda.com.ua/articles/2017/06/21/7147504/, accessed 22 June 2017. I have not explored political influences other than the Donbas situation on Poroshenko’s policy shift as perhaps should have been done here, but my initial focus was on observable actions rather than backstage interactions. Sydorenko, “Bytva za Vashington: zdobutky ta problemy vizytu Poroshenka do SShA,” Yevropeiska pravda, 21 June 2017, on the Internet at http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2017/06/21/7067497/vi . . ., accessed 21 June 2017; and Anna Korbut, “Poroshenko u Vashingtoni: vyprobuvannia na pryiazn,” Tyzhden, 22 June 2017, on the Internet at permanent URL: http://tyzhden .ua/Politics/195085, accessed 22 June 2017.

232 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR heads of state, but at least sanctions against Russia were not rescinded. Ukrainian media reports were on balance positive in their assessments. They also noted that Poroshenko’s meetings with US Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and Vice-President Mike Pence were of more substance. In August, Mattis’s visit to Kyiv was a more important signal of US support for Ukraine in its war with Russia, in that he stated publicly that the US would never recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea, although still no agreement had been reached for America to supply Ukraine with lethal weapons.46 Continuing to shift his focus from diplomacy to defence, Poroshenko announced as a priority of his government integration into the Euro-Atlantic security space, meaning eventual membership of NATO.47 As NATO’s former assistant secretary-general pointed out at the time, accession could be only a distant prospect, but Ukraine had every right to apply.48 Alexander Vershbow also urged the US to lift its ban on lethal weapons to Ukraine, which he said would strengthen the country’s diplomatic hand. Poroshenko, for his part, also called for a referendum on Ukrainian membership in NATO and the EU, as well as for UN peacekeepers for the occupied territories in Donbas, but neither event materialized.49 At the 46

Mykola Siruk, “’SShA poruch z Ukrainoiu’,” Den, 24 August 2017, on the Internet at Source URL: https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/den-planety/ssha-poruchz-ukrayinoyu, accessed 25 August 2017; and “SShA ne pryimaiut i nikoly ne pryimut aneksiiu Krymu—hlava Pentahonu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 24 August 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/ssha-ne-priymayut-i -nikoli-ne-p . . ., accessed 25 August 2017. “Priorytetom Ukrainy ye intehratsiia v NATO—Poroshenko,” Den, 10 July 2017, on the Internet at Source URL: https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/news/100717-pri orytetom-ukrayiny-ye-integraciya-v-nato-poroshenko, accessed 10 July 2017. “Eks-zastupnyk henseka NATO ne sumnivaietsia u pravi Ukrainy na chlenstvo v aliansi,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 25 August 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/arti cle/print/UKRAINE/eks-zastupnik-genseka-nato-ne . . ., accessed 25 August 2017; and “Zbroia SShA v rukakh Ukrainy mozhe dopomohty dyplomatii— eks-zastupnyk henseka NATO,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 25 August 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/UKRAINE/zbroya-ssha-v-rukah-ukrayini . . ., accessed 25 August 2017. “Poslannia Poroshenka: Myrotvortsi OON na vsii terytorii ORDLO, pryiniattia pensiinoi reformy i skasuvannia nedotorkannosti,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 7 September 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/print/POLITICS/poslannyaporoshenka-mirotvor . . ., accessed 7 September 2017; “Poroshenko zaklykav

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 233 military parade to mark Independence Day the following year, President Poroshenko’s speech was full of praise for the Ukrainian army—“one of the best armies on the continent”—as well as reiterating his determination to join NATO and the European Union.50 The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation was allowed to lapse in 2018, and was suspended altogether on 1 April 2019.51 According to the émigré Russian political scientist Aleksandr Morozov, in his determined defence of Ukraine Poroshenko had thus earned the lasting enmity of Putin, becoming a permanent thorn in the side, or as the Russian saying goes, ustoichivym gvozdem v botinke u Putina.52 During Poroshenko’s presidency there was no evidence of American eagerness to support Ukraine militarily in its war with Russia—quite the contrary. Nor did the US press for Ukraine’s membership in NATO.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy—Diplomat and Defender To say that there were differences of opinion among astute observers on the scene and abroad about the qualities of candidate Zelenskyy when he unexpectedly won the presidency in 2019, particularly in matters of foreign policy, would be an understatement.53

Radbez OON rozmistyty myrotvortsiv v Donbasi v naikorotshi terminy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 20 September 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/pri nt/POLITICS/poroshenko-zaklikav-rabez-oo . . ., accessed 20 September 2017; and “Poroshenko anonsuvav referendumy pro vstup Ukrainy v NATO i YeS,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 1 December 2017, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/article/prin t/POLITICS/porosheno-anonsuvav-refere . . ., accessed 1 December 2017. “Vystup Prezydenta na urochystomu Paradi viisk ‘Marsh novoi armii’ z nahody 27-oi richnytsi Nezalezhnosti Ukrainy,” President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko Official Website, 24 August 2018, on the Internet at https://www.president.gov.u a/news/vistup-prezidenta-na-urochistom . . ., accessed 26 August 2018. “Poroshenko pidpysav zakon pro prypynennia dii Dohovoru pro druzhbu z Rosiieiu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 10 December 2018, on the Internet at https://dt.ua/ article/print/POLITICS/poroshenko-pidpisav-zakon . . ., accessed 11 December 2018. Yevhen Rudenko, “Rosiiskyi politoloh Morozov: Poroshenko buv tsviakhom u cherevyku v Putina,” Ukrainska pravda, 21 October 2019, on the Internet at https:// www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2019/10/21/7229435/, accessed 22 October 2019. See, for example, Bohdan Nahaylo, “Reality Check,” UkraineAlert, 8 May 2019, on the Internet at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/reality

234 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR That he did not consider himself a specialist in foreign affairs, together with the lack of trust in him by diplomats (who voted overwhelmingly for Poroshenko) as well as within the foreign ministry, did not bode well, either.54 By making his first official state visits, however, to Brussels, where he met representatives of the EU and NATO, then to Paris and Berlin, whose partnership in the Minsk agreements was needed to manage the war in Donbas, Zelenskyy appeared to signal his pro-European orientation as a priority.55 As to the war itself, he ought quickly to have been disabused of his campaign promises of ending it early by “meeting somewhere halfway” in reaching agreement with Russia, and in “talking to the devil himself” to negotiate an end to the conflict.56 This disabusal should have happened, as two Chatham House experts explained at the time, because “Vladimir Putin has given him no room for maneuver, issuing Russian passports to residents of the occupied territories, instituting an oil blockade, celebrating ‘statehood’ for the occupied territories and continuing to violations of the ceasefire. This gives Zelenskyi little chance to implement his policy on conflict settlement unilaterally.”57 Furthermore, as another think tank

-chec . . ., accessed 9 May 2019; and Myroniuk, “Vitaly Portnikov on Zelenskiy: ‘It’s Like an Orient Express Without a Driver’,” Kyiv Post, 15 may 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/vitaly-portnikov-on. . ., accessed 17 May 2019. Sydorenko, “Ze-dyplomatiia: khto ta yak keruvatyme zovnishnoiu politykoiu za novoho prezydenta,” Yevropeiska pravda, 21 May 2019, on the Internet at https ://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2019/05/21/7096437/, accessed 21 May 2019. Mathieu Boulègue and Leo Litra, “Understanding Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s Foreign Policy Priorities for Ukraine,” Chatham House, 25 June 2019, on the Internet at https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/understanding- . . ., accessed 27 June 2019. Romaniuk, “Try viiny, na yaki pryrechenyi Zelenskyi,” Ukrainska pravda, 8 August 2019, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2019/08/8 /7223024/, accessed 8 August 2019. At this point, I believe Zelenskyy was motivated to distinguish his approach from that of Poroshenko, whose poisition was more nationalistic. Boulègue and Litra, “Understanding Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s Foreign Policy.” On the passports issue, see Alan Yuhas, “A Kremlin Offer of Expedited Citizenship Challenges Ukraine,” New York Times, 24 April 2019, on the Internet at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/world/europe/russia-ukrai . . ., accessed 25 April 2019; Andrew Roth, “Russia Eases Passport Process for Ukrainians in Breakaway Regions,” Guardian, 24 April 2019, on the Internet at

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 235 report noted, “Russia is not interested in untangling the contradictions of the Minsk Agreements or in strengthening Zelensky.” And “Zelensky’s plan to revive the Normandy Format discussions were stymied by Russia in September 2019.”58 Zelenskyy then announced Ukraine would sign on to the Steinmeier Formula, agreeing to hold elections in the occupied territories. This was done despite criticism that it would legitimize the rebels and absolve Russia of liability, because otherwise Putin would not meet the Ukrainian president in the Normandy Format.59 At the six-month point of his term Zelenskyy was described as lacking in vision and appearing to believe that “all complex issues have simple solutions.”60 In an interview with Time magazine on the eve of his first summit meeting where he expressed his low expectations from the peace talks, Zelenskyy also asserted that he “will not agree to go to war in the Donbass” and admitted, in response to a question on his trust in Mr. Putin, that in general he did not “trust anyone at all,” perhaps an acknowledgment of his own naiveté in matters of foreign policy and diplomacy.61 It was therefore remarkable that Zelenskyy emerged unbowed and unscathed from the Normandy group’s summit in Paris on 9

60 61

https://theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/24/russia-passpor . . ., accessed 24 April 2019; and “Putin sprostyv vydachu pasportiv RF dlia zhyteliv usoho Donbasu,” Den, 17 July 2019, on the Internet at Source URL: https://day.kyiv.ua/u k/news/170719-putin-sprostyv-vydachu-pasportiv-rf-dlya-zhyteliv-usogo-do nbasu, accessed 17 July 2019. Joanna Hosa and Andrew Wilson, “Zelensky Unchained: What Ukraine’s New Political Order Means for its Future,” European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief (September 2019), 18. Christopher Miller, “Explainer: What Is The Steinmeier Formula—And Did Zelenskiy Just Capitulate to Moscow?” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 2 October 2019, on the Internet at https://www.rferl.org/a/what-is-the-steinmeierformula-and-did- . . ., accessed 8 October 2019; and Alya Shandra, “The Real Problem With ‘Steinmeier’s Formula’ and the Russo-Ukrainian War,” Euromaidan Press, 8 October 2019, on the Internet at https://euromaidanpress.com /2019/10/08/the-real-problem-with-s . . ., accessed 8 October 2019. Oleksiy Goncharenko, “Assessing Zelenskyy’s First Six Months,” Atlantic Council, 28 October 2019. Simon Shuster, “’I Don’t Trust Anyone At All.’ Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky Speaks Out on Trump, Putin and a Divided Europe,” Time, 2 December 2019.

236 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR December 2019.62 The meeting did not achieve a political settlement of the Donbas war. Its final communiqué, not legally binding, resolved none of the underlying issues in the conflict (disengagement, elections, and the international border); there was agreement only on prisoner exchanges and observance of a ceasefire. Thus the result was a draw: Putin would continue to occupy the Donbas territory seized in 2014, Zelenskyy would not be pressured into surrendering it. This turned out to be the first and last face-to-face meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy.63 The follow-up Normandy meeting in April 2020 did take place, but it did so virtually and owing to deadlock no progress was made.64 Perhaps Zelenskyy was motivated by a desire to differentiate himself from Poroshenko in advocating peace rather than war, but the impossibility of his policy was soon revealed: ending the war meant sacrificing sovereignty; salvaging sovereignty required continuing to fight.65 Putin’s relaunch of attacks in Donbas in February 62

64 65

Michael Bociurkiw, “Ukraine’s President Hasn’t Played a Role This Difficult Since He Starred on Reality TV,” CNN Opinion, 8 December 2019; Andreas Umland, “Putin’s Quest for Instability in Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, 9 December 2019, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/articleopinion/op-ed/andreasumlan . . ., accessed 10 December 2019; Oliver Carroll, “Politeness Prevails as Putin and Zelensky Hold Inaugural Meeting,” Independent, 10 December 2019; Vladimir Socor, “Normandy Summit: Limited Success for Zelensky, Temporary Setback for Ukraine,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 11 December 2019; Leon Aron and Lance Kokonos, “”Why Nothing Happened for Ukraine: How Putin Kept a Meeting of the Leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine From Moving Closer to an End of a Calamitous Five-Year War,” New York Times, 12 December 2019; and Nolan Peterson, “In Round I of Ukraine Peace Talks, Zelenskyy Holds His Own With Putin,” The Daily Signal, 13 December 2019. Later, Zelenskyy signed a law extending for a year the special status of the ORDLOs, and the prisoner exchange took place albeit with some irregularities. “Prezydent pidpysav zakon pro prodovzhennia na rik osoblyvoho poriadku mitsevoho samovriaduvannia v ORDLO,” Den, 18 December 2019, on the Internet at Source URL: https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/news/181219-prezydent-pidpysa v-zakon-pro-prodovzhennya-na-rik-osoblyvogo-poryadku-miscevogo . . ., accessed 18 December 2019; and Kramer, “With Prisoner Swap, Ukraine’s President Inches Toward Peace With Separatists,” New York Times, 29 December 2019, on the Internet at https:// www.nytimes.com/2019/12/29/world/Euro pe/ukraine-russ . . ., accessed 29 December 2019. Bloomberg, 30 April 2020. Kataryna Wolczuk and Hanna Shelest, “Could Zelenskyy’s Strategy for Donbas Lead Ukraine Into a Kremlin Trap?” Chatham House, 14 February 2020, on the Internet at https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/could-zelensk

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 237 2020, as a kind of calling card, should have changed Zelenskyy’s mind.66 Meanwhile, the Ukrainian president was also worrying about when his invitation to the White House would arrive. He had already met with President Donald J. Trump on the sidelines of the UNGA in September 2019, but at the time POTUS was only interested in Ukraine because it could help build a legal case against Hunter Biden, son of then ex-Vice President Joe Biden.67 Zelenskyy’s office announced a ceasefire in July 2020, but it was broken by the Russian side within minutes.68 From the sidelines Taras Kuzio observed that Zelenskyy had “little to show for his efforts” in ending the Donbas war—no clear strategy, a “haphazard approach to the peace process”, attempting “to avoid antagonizing the Kremlin,” not “naming Russia as the aggressor”, and creating confusion with “mixed messages and disjointed efforts to end the war with Russia.”69 Exemplary of Zelenskyy’s efforts was his stillborn attempt to create an advisory council, including separatist representatives with Russia as observer, to pave the way to peace. “If Zelenskyy wants peace,” advised Kuzio, “he must convince the Kremlin he is prepared for war.”70 The year 2021 recorded an apparent evolution in Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s orientation regarding Russia’s war on Ukraine away from an emphasis on diplomacy towards one of readiness for

68 69

y . . ., accessed 15 February 2020; and Thomas Graham and Joseph Haberman, “The Price of Peace in the Donbas: Ukraine Can’t Keep Both Territory and Sovereignty,” Foreign Affairs, 25 February 2020, on the Internet at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/1125651, accessed 26 February 2020. Svitlana Hudkova, “RF pishla v nastup na Donbasi: yak Putin vidpravyv ‘pryvit’ Zelenskomu,” Obozrevatel, 18 February 2020, on the Internet at https:// www.obozrevatel.com/ukr/society/rf-pishla-u-nastup-na . . ., accessed 18 February 2020. Walker and Roth, “Volodymyr Zelenskiy: ‘My White House Invitation? I Was Told It’s Being Prepared’,” Guardian, 7 March 2020, on the Internet at https://w ww.theguardian.com/world/2020mar/07/volodymyr-ze . . ., accessed 9 March 2020. The Hunter Biden episode, which involved Trump trying to make a deal withholding military aid to Ukraine unless a probe were launched into Joe Biden’s son, is covered in Yekelchyk, Ukraine, 168-81. Ukrainian Canadian Congress, UCC Weekly Bulletin on Ukraine, July 25-31, 2020. Kuzio, “Russo-Ukrainian War: Time for Zelenskyy to Turn from Populism to Pragmatism,” UkraineAlert, 13 October 2020, on the Internet at https://www.atla nticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russo-ukraini . . ., accessed 13 October 2020. Ibid.

238 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR military resistance. Several events should and were expected to have contributed to such a reorientation. One was the failure of the Minsk peace agreements to halt the fighting in Donbas. Putin’s open disdain for his Ukrainian counterpart, which precluded any face-to-face meeting that Zelenskyy held as key to a settlement was another. Then there was the lukewarm support from US President Biden in Washington. Finally, Russia’s issuance of passports in the occupied territories as well as its stationing of 100,000 troops along Ukraine’s borders continuously from spring 2021 on ought to have served as warnings.71 Not much change, however, was detected in the contents of several of President Zelenskyy’s speeches. In his address on 12 March 2021, he announced a strategy formulated by the RNBOU under his chairmanship to reintegrate Crimea, and defended his clamp-down on Viktor Medvedchuk’s business operations as necessary in Ukraine’s interests.72 Medvedchuk had earlier been accused by the head of Ukraine’s Minsk delegation of working in Russia’s interests.73 At his press conference in May, Zelenskyy

Harding and Roth, “Standing Up to Putin: How Russian Threat has Toughened up Ukraine’s Zelenskyy,” Guardian, 20 December 2021, on the Internet at https:/ /wwwtheguardian.com/world/2021/dec/20/standing-up-to-put . . ., accessed 21 December 2021; Michael Crowley and Julian E. Barnes, “How Far Would Biden Go to Defend Ukraine Against Russia?” New York Times, 25 November 2021, on the Internet at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/25/us/p olitics/biden-putin-russia- . . ., accessed 25 November 2021; and Kapsamun, “Prymus do vidpovidalnosti,” Den, 15 February 2021, on the Internet at Source URL: https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/podrobyci/prymus-do-vidpovidalnosti ?aybotid=46412ed759947c619a8d, accessed 16 February 2021. Prezydent Ukrainy Volodymr Zelenskyi, “Address by the President of Ukraine on the Latest Decisions of the National Security and Defense Council,” 12 March 2021, on the Internet at https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zver nennya-prezidenta-u . . ., accessed 18 March 2021; and “RNBOU zatverdyla Stratehiiu deokupatsiiu Krymu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 11 March 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/rnbo-zatverdila-stratehi . . ., accessed 12 March 2021. Sorokin, “Kravchuk: Medvedchuk Helps Russia Dodge Responsibility for War in Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, 17 January 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpo st.com/ukraine-politics/kravchuk-medvedch . . ., accessed 18 January 2021. The Medvedchuk case is the sole instance of patronal politics in this cahpter, except that it has an international relations aspect instead of exisint in the usual domestic context. Medvedev is the client of Russian president Putin, and Putin is his patron. No doubt there may be other such relationships in Ukrainian

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 239 repeated his hope of meeting Putin so as to “end the war,” but seemed more preoccupied with his personal-political vendetta against Poroshenko, whom he threatened to send to prison.74 In July, Zelenskyy replaced the chief of staff of the armed forces, which was interpreted as a victory for the defense department with which the outgoing COS had for months been in fierce conflict.75 There was, though, a noticeable emphasis on the Russian threat as well as the urgency of Ukraine’s acceptance into NATO in Zelenskyy’s media interview in advance of his first meeting with President Biden. As a Moscow analyst speculated at the time, The Ukrainian president’s new rhetoric conclusively precludes any chance for dialogue with Russia on the Donbas, and draws a line under his campaign promise to bring peace to the region. But Zelensky has become disillusioned by his original pacifist platform, and has switched tracks to embracing statism and national patriotism, consolidated by striving to join the EU and NATO: an ambition that was enshrined in the Ukrainian constitution back under his predecessor Petro Poroshenko.76

It may have been the venue for the anticipated meeting having an influence. There may have been electoral motivation to the tougher stance on Russia as well, perhaps, as Zelenskyy was contemplating

politics, but they need to be researched and their influence on Ukraine’s foreign policy determined—a potential dissertaion topic. Socor, “Zelenskyy Ready to Frame Poroshenko on Criminal Charges,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20 May 2021, on the Internet at https://jamestown.org/progra m/zelenskyy-ready-to-frame-poros, accessed 24 May 2021; and Mykhailo Minakov, “Zelensky’s Presidency at the Two-Year Mark.” Focus Ukraine, 3 June 2021, on the Internet at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/zelens kys-presidency-t . . ., accessed 6 June 2021. Illia Ponomarenko, “Zelensky Replaces Top Armed Forces Commander,” Kyiv Post, 27 July 2021, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/Ukraine-polit ics/zelensky-replaces-to . . ., accessed 27 July 2021; and “Holovnokomanduvach ZSU Khomchak ide z posady: khto bude zamist noho,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 27 July 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/ho lvnokomanduvach- . . ., accessed 27 July 2021. Konstantin Skorkin, “Tough Talk Abroad Proves a Hit at Home for Ukraine’s Zelensky,” Carnegie Moscow Center, 13 September 2021, on the Internet at http s://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/85322?mkt_tok=MDk1L . . ., accessed 16 September 2021. In fact, “striving to join the EU and NATO” is not “enshrined in the Ukrainian constitution.” In the constitution’s preamble, there is an indirect reference to “the irreversibility of the European and Euro-Atlantic course of Ukraine,” but neither EU nor NATO is mentioned anywhere in the constitution.

240 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR the prospect of a second term.77 Discovery of a Russian spy within the Ukrainian armed forces undoubtedly added to the increasing tension between Russia and Ukraine.78 Dire warnings of a Russian invasion shared by Washington still left the Ukrainian government apparently unperturbed, as Zelenskyy either failed to understand fully the situation or felt that Ukraine was merely being used in a game of geopolitics between Russia and the US which the two powers, not he, would have to resolve.79 Confusion regarding President Zelenskyy’s understanding of the country’s precarious situation was further sown in the course of the president’s five-hour press conference at the end of November.80 He warned of an overthrow of the government coming within 77

Kravets, “Vin vam ne Vova. Yak Zelenskyi hotuietsia vdruhe balotuvatysia v prezydenty,” Ukrainska pravda, 20 September 2021, on the Internet at https://w ww.pravda.com.ua/articles/2021/09/20/7307698/, accessed 20 September 2021. “Rosiiskoho shpyhuna z naivyshchym dostupom do sekretnykh failiv Ukrainy vykryla kontrrozvidka,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 5 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/UKRAINE/rosijskij-shpihun-u-ranzip . . ., accessed 29 November 2021. Volodymyr Kravchenko, “Ukraina—epizod u seriali, stsenarii yakoho pyshemo ne my?” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 24 November 2021, on the Internet at https:/ /zn.ua/ukr/article/print/international/ukrajina-epizod-u-seriali-s . . ., accessed 25 November 2021. “’Vahnerivtsi’, ahresiia RF, derzhperevorot i ne lyshe: holovne iz presmarafonu Zelenskoho,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 26 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn. ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/vahnerivtsi-ahresija-rf-derz . . ., accessed 26 November 2021; “Perevorot v Ukraini hotuvaly rosiiany ta zradnyky z MVS Ukrainy. Uchast Akhmetova ne dovedeno—Buzzfeed News,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 26 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITI CS/perevorot-v-ukrajini-hotuval . . ., accessed 26 November 2021; “Zelenskyi pro media viinu z Akhmetovym, ta mozhlyvu kooperatsiiu z Kolomoiskym,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 26 November 2021; “Akhmetov vidpoviv Zelenskomu na slova pro vtiahuvannia oliharkha v perevorot,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 26 November 2021, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/Akhmeto v-vidpoviv-zelen . . ., accessed 26 November 2021; Kyrylenko and Lukashova, “’Ya ne Yanukovych—bihty nikudy ne budu’. Holovne z preskonferentsii Zelenskoho na ekvatori prezydentstva,” Ukrainska pravda, 26 November 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2021/11/26/7315393 /, accessed 27 November 2021; Valentyn Torba, “Na koho opyratys Zelenskomu?” Den, 26 November 2021, on the Internet at https://day.kyiv.ua/ uk/article/polityka/na-koho-opyratys-zelenskomu . . ., accessed 27 November 2021; and Farion, “’Korobyt vid toho, shcho liudyna, yaka ocholiuie derzhavu, vdaietsia do politychnykh spekuliatsii . . .,’” Vysokyi zamok, 26 November 2021,

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 241 days in which he implicated the oligarch Renat Akhmetov,81 downplayed the Russian threat as merely scare tactics not wishing to create panic, while acknowledging the risks were now greater even though the number of troops on Ukraine’s border was less than in the spring. He made an unfavorable impression on journalists who were present, appearing hostile to the media and poorly informed on issues. But a few days later, in his annual address to the Verkhovna Rada,82 Zelenskyy made no mention of the overthrow of government that had been expected on 1 December, nor of Akhmetov. As to the Russian war on Ukraine, he said only that it could effectively be halted by direct talks in which he was willing to engage, that his Crimean Platform summit had been a success, that the Platform itself would be incorporated into a UNGA resolution, and that a strategy for the de-occupation and reintegration of Crimea had been adopted. There was no reference to using armed force to end the occupation of Donbas and Crimea, or to prepare to defend against a new Russian invasion. President Zelenskyy may not have wanted to go to war, but war would come to him.83 With the benefit of hindsight, the signs were there all along. In 2014, just months after the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity, in a telephone conversation with the outgoing president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, Putin

on the Internet at https://wz.lviv.ua/ukraine/447320-korobyt-vid-toho-shcho -liudy-na-i . . ., accessed 27 November 2021. Here again, as with Medvedchuk, the suggestion arises of a Ukrainian oligarch as conduit for Russian influence on Ukraine’s policies, but this possibility has not been explored here. “Borotys za terytorii, hovoryty z Rosieiu, chekaty reform i viryty u ‘Velyke budivnytstvo’. Pro shcho hovoryv Zelenskyi u Radi,” Ukrainska pravda, 1 December 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2021/12 /1/7315859/, accessed 1 December 2021. See, for instance, the warnings in Stephen Blank, “Ukraine: No Need for a Munich Sell Out,” Center for European Policy Analysis, 22 November 2021, on the Internet at https://cepa.org/ukraine-no-need-for-a-munich-sell-out/, accessed 23 November 2021; Alexander Baunov, “Are Russia and Ukraine Once Again on the Brink of War?” Carnegie Moscow Center, 1 December 2021, on the Internet at https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/85892/mkt_tok=M DkIL . . ., accessed 2 December 2021; and Amerkia Cheatham, Claire Felter, and Zachary Laub, “Defusing the Russia-Ukraine Crisis,” CFR, 15 December 2021, on the Internet at https://www. cfr.org/article/defusing-russia-ukraine-crisis, accessed 15 December 2021.

242 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR said “if I want I’ll take Kiev in two weeks,” according to the Italian newspaper La repubblica’s account.84 The following year, he accused NATO of attempting to destabilize Russia and promised a forceful response.85 Yet at the same time, when asked about whether the Donbas standoff could develop into a full-scale war between Ukraine and Russia, President Putin replied: “I think that such an apocalyptic scenario is unlikely and I hope that it will never happen. If the Minsk accords [agreeing a ceasefire] are complied with, then I am sure that the situation will gradually get back to normal.”86 Later on, at a meeting in Kaliningrad in 2018, Putin called the USSR’s collapse the “event in his nation’s history he would have liked to change,” reiterating his previous (2005) lament of it as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”87 During an event a year later to honor Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), Putin said in reference to believers in Ukraine that “we reserve the right to react and will do everything to defend human rights, including freedom of religion.” Kirill, an advocate of the “Russian World,” supports Putin’s narrative on Donbas and Ukraine. In Ukraine itself, according to Halya Coynash, Putin’s invocation “felt more like a threat than a promise.”88 In similar vein, in the wake of the Paris summit, Putin insisted that there had to be an amnesty for occupied Donbas residents in place before Ukraine

Ian Traynor, “Putin Claims Russian Forces ‘Could Conquer Ukraine Capital in Two Weeks’,” Guardian, 2 September 2014, on the Internet at http://www.theg uradian.com/world/2014/sep/02/putin-russian-forces-could-conquer-ukrai . . ., accessed 2 September 2014. Andrew Rettman, “Putin Speech Bodes Ill for Ukraine Ceasefire,” EUObserver, 27 March 2015, on the Internet at https://euobserver.com/foreign/128173?, accessed 31 march 2015. AFP, “Vladimir Putin: War Between Ukraine and Russia ‘Unlikely’ as Rebels Mass Outside Mariupol,” Telegraph (London), 24 February 2015, on the Internet at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/11431274 /Vladimir-Putin-W . . ., accessed 24 February 2015. Adam Taylor, “Putin Says He Wishes the Soviet Union Had Not Collapsed. Many Russians Agree,” Washington Post, 3 March 2018, on the Internet at https: //www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/03/03/ . . ., accessed 3 March 2018. Coynash, “Ukraine Shudders as Putin Promised to ‘Defend’ Ukrainian Believers,” Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, 4 February 2019, on the Internet at http:/ /khpg.org/en/index.php?do=print&id=1549132816, accessed 2 March 2019.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 243 ould be given control of its border in the absence of which, according to him, “there would be Srebrenica, it’s as simple as that.” While giving no evidence for his hyperbolic remark, but setting the stage nicely for the bloodshed that was to come, its very expression could, an observer noted, only “deepen doubts in Kyiv and the West about the Kremlin’s commitment to seeking peace, as opposed to maintaining as much influence as possible over Ukraine and its future course.”89 Putin’s words were accompanied by threatening actions. Allowing the Donbas rebels to attack Debaltseve in violation of the just-concluded Minsk 2 ceasefire was one. Refusing to respond to a gesture of goodwill on Zelenskyy’s part was another. Issuing Russian passports to occupied Donbas residents was one more. Launching military exercises in southwestern Russia abutting Ukraine, attacking Ukrainian naval vessels in the Kerch Strait at the entrance to the Sea of Azov, building a bridge across the Kerch Strait linking Russia to Crimea, and stationing up to 100,000 troops along Ukraine’s northern, eastern, and southern borders beginning in spring 2021 completed the list.90 Europeans in 2015 began to fear 89

Steve Gutterman, “The Week in Russia: Putin’s Bloodshed Bugbear and Srebrenica In The Donbas,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 13 December 2019, on the Internet at https://www.rferl.org/a/week-in-russia-putin-donbas-bloo dshed- . . ., accessed 18 December 2019. Timothy Heritage, “Putin Called the West’s Bluff Over Ukraine,” Business Insider, 18 February 2015, on the Internet at http://www.businessinsider.com/p utin-called-the-wests-bluff-over-ukraine-2015-2 . . ., accessed 24 February 2015; Associated Press, “Russia Launches Military Drills in the Southwest,” Washington Post, 5 March 2015, on the Internet at http://www. Washingtonpost.com/w orld/europe/russia-launches-military-drills-in-the-sout . . ., accessed 5 March 2015; MacFarquhar, “Putin Opens Bridge to Crimea, Cementing Russia’s Hold on Neighbor,” New York Times, 15 May 2018, on the Internet at https://www.ny times.com/2018/05/15/world/europe/putin-russia-cri . . ., accessed 16 May 2015; Blank, “Russia’s Attack on Ukraine is an Act of War,” The Hill, 3 December 2018, on the Internet at https://thehill.com/opinion/international/419534russias-attack- . . ., accessed 4 December 2018; Peter Dickinson, “Vladimir Putin Does Not Want Peace With Ukraine,” UkraineAlert, 18 March 2021, on the Internet at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/Ukrainealert/vladimir-puti . . ., accessed 18 March 2021; Eugene Rumer and Andrew S. Weiss, “Ukraine: Putin’s Unfinished Business,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 November 2021, on the Internet at https://Carnegieendowm ent.org/2021/11/12/ukraine-putin-s-unfinish . . ., accessed 17 November 2021; Dmitri Trenin, “Russian Foreign Policy: Shifting Gears,” Carnegie Moscow

244 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR a widening of the Donbas war, particularly if they were to provide arms to Ukraine thus provoking Putin.91 While Zelenskyy was credited with having “belatedly recognized the futility of seeking common ground with the Kremlin,”92 others did not view an acceleration of the war as inevitable.93 One military analyst wrote that: A Russian full-scale invasion is not likely. Besides the huge costs, Russia doesn’t need a full-scale invasion because the hybrid war works and little by little, is bringing Russia closer to a victory. Neither Ukraine, the EU nor NATO have yet come up with an efficient counter strategy.94

As President Putin himself reassuringly but misleadingly expressed it, “we do not need a new conflict.”95

Putin’s War The build-up to Putin’s 2022 invasion was in gestation for a long time; its underlying rationale being an elaborate conspiracy theory itself, turned the assault from a military operation in the strict sense into an elaborate KGB game of intimidation, deception, disruption, denial, and duplicity with no clear aim or end. The rationalization began immediately after the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity, which Putin labelled an “anti-constitutional coup,” when the new Ukrainian government was said to have resumed the persecution of “Russian speakers in Ukraine’s southeast, . . . [and] sending

92 93 94

Center, 19 November 2021, on the Internet at https://carnegiemoscow.org/co mmentary/85827? mkt_tok-MDkIL . . ., accessed 2 December 2021; and Jen Kirby, “Russia-Ukraine Tensions: Why Russia is Putting Tens of Thousands of Troops on the Ukraine Border,” Vox, 8 December 2021, on the Internet at https:/ /www.vox.com/2021/12/8/22824015/russia-ukraine-troops-te . . ., accessed 9 December 2021. Traynor, “Fear of Vladimir Putin Grows in EU Capitals Amid Spectre of ‘Total War’,” Guardian, 6 February 2015, on the Internet at http://www. theguardian. com/world/2015/feb/06/vladimir-putin-west-divisions-war-ukraine, accessed 6 February 2015. Dickinson, “Vladimir Putin Does Not Want Peace.” Kirby, “Russia-Ukraine Tensions.” Hans Petter Midttun, “The Possible Invasion is Not the Real Issue. Russia’s New Wave of Destabilization Needs a Three-Dimensional Approach,” Euromaidan Press, 6 December 2021, on the Internet at http:// euromaidanpress.co m/2021/12/06/the-possible-invasion-is-not . . ., accessed 7 December 2021. Trenin, “Russian Foreign Policy.”

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 245 armed fascist bandits to Donetsk and Sevastopol, Kharkov and Odessa to sow bloodshed, he said.”96 This was, according to Putin, all being orchestrated by America. At the beginning of 2015, Putin claimed that the Ukrainian Army as such did not exist, but rather was made up of nationalist volunteer battalions, a kind of foreign legion under NATO’s direction aimed at containing Russia and working against Ukraine’s national interests.97 It was already apparent to some that Mr. Putin was at the same time working not only to delegitimize NATO, but also to undermine the EU, to break up the Euro-Atlantic alliance, and ultimately to undo the entire postwar security order—his ultimate target in the war against Ukraine.98 As to the possibility of war with Ukraine, Putin himself reassured Russian TV viewers that such an apocalyptic scenario was “highly unlikely”; all that was required was for Ukraine to adhere to the Minsk agreements.99 Putin’s threat to the post-World War Two collective security and prosperity order, of course, was furthered by President Donald J. Trump during his term of office, when he went out of his way to be on friendly terms with the Russian president.100 An ominous warning that “Ukraine may no longer be a country soon” came at the beginning of 2019 from Nikolai Patrushev, Putin’s crony and secretary of the Russian security council. According to Newsweek, citing Patrushev, 96

Max Seddon, “Inside Vladimir Putin’s Paranoid Vision,” BuzzFeed News, 4 March 2014, on the Internet at https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/insid e-vladimir-putins-paran . . ., accessed 20 July 2017. 97 “Putin: V Ukraini voiuie ‘natovskyi lehion’,” Ukrainska pravda, 26 January 2015, on the Internet at permanent URL: http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/0 1/26/7056414/, accessed 26 January 2015. 98 Anne Applebaum, “How Vladimir Putin is Waging War on the West—And Winning,” Spectator, 21 February 2015, on the Internet at http:// www.spectato r.co.uk/features/9447782/how-vladimir-putin-is-waging-war-on-the- . . ., accessed 24 February 2015; “The View From the Kremlin,” Economist, 14 February 2015; Andrew S. Weiss, “Putin the Improviser,” Wall Street Journal, 20 February 2015; and Janusz Bugajski and Margarita Assenova, Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2016), chap. 1. 99 “Interview with VGTRK,” Kremlin.ru, 23 February 2015, on Johnson’s Russia List, 2015-#36, 24 February 2015. 100 Peter S. Goodman, “The Post-World War II Order Is Under Assault From the Powers That Built It,” New York Times, 26 March 2018, on the Internet at https:// www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/business/nato-european-union . . ., accessed 27 March 2018.

246 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR “The Kiev authorities are doing everything to split Ukraine, implementing the West’s scenario for separating Ukraine from Russia, while ignoring the interests of their own people. In the end, the country was effectively split,” he added. “The continuation of such a policy by the Kiev authorities may contribute to Ukraine’s loss of statehood.” 101

Meanwhile, under Putin’s direction Russia was undertaking a foreign policy of cultivating good relations with respectable as well as rogue states, building up a support base in the international arena.102 Undoubtedly, Putin’s most fully-developed justification for invading Ukraine outright was expressed in his essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” penned by him in July 2021.103 It recounted a thousand years of history which, despite its perturbations, nevertheless forged a commonality between Russians and Ukrainians based on language, religion, and lived experience. The artificial creation by the Bolsheviks of a Ukrainian state, however, in the early twentieth century disrupted this millennial bond and entailed robbing Russia of its ancestral land. But the Russians are a tolerant and forgiving people. When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the “Russian Federation . . . not only recognized, but, indeed, did a lot for Ukraine to establish itself as an independent 101 Tom O’Connor, “Russia Says Ukraine May No Longer be a Country Soon,” Newsweek, 15 January 2019, on the Internet at https://www.newsweek,com/ru ssia-says-ukraine-no-longer-coun . . ., accessed 16 January 2019. 102 Simon Shuster, “How Putin Built a Ragtag Empire of Tyrants and Failing States,” Time, 4 April 2019, on the Internet at http://time.com/5564173/how-p utin-built-russian-empire/, accessed 8 April 2019; and Stoner, Russia Resurrected, chap. 3. 103 “Article by Vladimir Putin ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’,” 12 July 2021, from the website of the President of Russia, on the Internet at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181, accessed 12 July 2021. For Western commentary, see, for example: A. N., ed., “Timothy Snyder: Putin’s Essay on Ukraine Creates Mythical History to Cover Foreign Policy Failures,” Euromaidan Press, 8 December 2021, on the Internet at https://euromai danpress.com/2021/12/08/timothy-snyder-putins-ess . . ., accessed 27 December 2021; Wilson, “Russia and Ukraine: ‘One People’ as Putin Claims?” Royal United Services Institute: Explore Our Research, 23 December 2021, on the Internet at https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/putblications/comment ary/russia . . ., accessed 29 December 2021; and Troianovski, “What’s Driving Putin’s Brinkmanship?” New York Times, 5 December 2021, on the Internet at htt ps://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/05/world/europe/putin-russia-ukr . . ., accessed 5 December 2021.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 247 country.” Ungrateful leaders of modern Ukraine and their sponsors, on the other hand, were determined to turn the country into an instrument for weakening Russia. They have denied the common past, rewritten history, and called the Soviet era an occupation. “Radicals and neo-Nazis” have been indulged and encouraged; “Ukraine was dragged into a dangerous geopolitical game” engineered from outside; and an “anti-Russian project” has been launched. It reached a frenzy in February 2014. The coup was supported by Western countries. Russophobic radical nationalists’ ideology was incorporated into state policy and the Russian language came under attack. Today, Russians in Ukraine are being forcibly assimilated; this “is comparable . . . to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us.” War criminals like Bandera, along with Mazepa and Petliura, are being celebrated. Military force was used against the people of Crimea, as well as the threat of ethnic cleansing; “Ukrainian neo-Nazis burned people alive” in Odesa; “the followers of Bandera” were ready to do even more. In sum, there was supposedly in Ukraine in 2021 a climate of fear, aggressive antiRussian rhetoric, a tolerance of neo-Nazis, militarization of the country, and a capture of the entire security and defence establishment by NATO. Opponents of the anti-Russia, i.e., Ukraine for Ukrainians, project were being murdered. Thus Ukraine must be saved from itself, and Russia was open to dialogue and partnership so as to help bring that about. “For we are one people,” Putin concluded, which everyone assumed meant they should live together in harmony. What he really intended, as it turned out, was completely different—there are no Ukrainians, in his view, nor should there ever be any. Of course, his vision extended well beyond the Ukrainian question. Mr. Putin subsequently submitted to the West two draft treaties meant to provide Russia with security guarantees, failing which he threatened to invade Ukraine. His demands included: an end to the enlargement of NATO, specifically to include Georgia and Ukraine, but potentially Sweden and Finland; no deployment of NATO forces in former Soviet states or those joining the alliance since 1997; no re-arming of Ukraine, placing it firmly in Russia’s sphere of influence; pulling US nuclear weapons out of Europe; and

248 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR retracting NATO nuclear missiles beyond striking range of Moscow.104 A peace conference was quickly convened, but the demands were rejected; the only agreement was for Russia and the West’s leader, the US, to keep talking. By the end of January 2022, Russia had in place between 56 and 70 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) along Ukraine’s borders, each consisting of 800 or so troops together with their military equipment.105 All the while, the Russian government insisted there were no plans for an invasion of Ukraine. As an insurance policy, Putin travelled to China where he and Xi Jinping signed a long document pledging eternal cooperation and mutual support between the two countries, as well as expressing complete harmony in their understanding of the global political situation, i.e., that the greatest threat to peace and security was posed by the United States of America.106 On behalf of the West, French President Emmanuel Macron, seated at the far end of a very long table, attempted in person to convince Putin to de-escalate, but the latter was blisteringly defiant. Macron, like other Western leaders before him, departed with nothing to show for his

104 Kramer, “Left Out of High-Level Talks, Ukraine Tries Other Diplomatic Channels,” New York Times, 9 January 2022, on the Internet at https://www.nytimes. com/2022/01/09/world/europe/ukraine-russia- . . ., accessed 9 January 2022; Rumer, “Putin’s Ambition May Have Outstripped His Options,’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Commentary, 25 January 2022, on the Internet at https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/01/25/putin-s-ambition-may-ha . . ., accessed 26 January 2022; Timothy Ash, “Putin Is Preparing for War,” Kyiv Independent, 12 January 2022, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent.com/op inion/timothy-ash-putin-is-preparing . . ., accessed 13 January 2022; and Serhii Plokhy, “The Empire Returns: Russia, Ukraine and the Long Shadow of the Soviet Union,” New York Ledger, 3 February 2022, reprinted from the Financial Times, on the Internet at https://thenyledger.com/lifestyle/the-empire-returns -russia-ukraine-a . . ., accessed 6 February 2022. 105 “What are Vladimir Putin’s Military Intentions in Ukraine?” Economist, 29 January 2022, on the Internet at https://www.economist.com/briefing/2022/01/ 29/what-are-vladimir- . . ., accessed 31 January 2022; and “Stiahuvannia viisk RF do kordoniv z Ukrainoiu ye elementom bilshoi heopolitychnoi hry— Danilov,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 13 January 2022. 106 “Sovmestnoe zaiavlenie Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki o mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniiakh, vstupaiushchikh v novoiu epokhu, i globalnom ustoichivom razvitii,” 4 February 2022, on the President of Russia website, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5770, accessed 6 February 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 249 efforts,107 except to repeat that Minsk 2 offered the best chance for peace. Yet a meeting of the Normandy group in Berlin soon after intended as a revival of Minsk broke up inconclusively after nine hours of discussion.108 President Zelenskyy then made an impassioned appeal for Western help for his country at the Munich Security Conference on 19 February, calling for “new, effective security guarantees” to be elaborated at a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) summit, but to no avail.109 On the eve of the invasion, by which time there were between 50,000 and 190,000 Russian troops on Ukraine’s borders, Putin decided the RF would—in contravention of international law—recognize the breakaway republics of the Donbas, thus nullifying the Minsk Agreements and absolving Russia of responsibility for the consequences.110 On 24 February 2022, Russian Federation forces attacked Ukraine on three fronts. They did so without provocation, invitation, or reasonable cause. Ostensibly, they were to de-Nazify, demilitarize, and occupy all of Ukraine, beginning with the major cities—Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv in the north; Mariupol in the east; and Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson in the south. The

107 Herszenhorn and Giorgio Leali, “Defiant Putin Mauls Macron in Moscow,” Politico, 8 February 2022, on the Internet at https://www.politico.eu/article/vlad imir-putin-russia-welcomes-em . . ., accessed 8 February 2022; and Alexander Query, “Macron: Minsk Agreements Only Way to Stop the War,” Kyiv Independent, 8 February 2022, on the Internet at https:// kyivindependent.com/national /macron-minsk-agreements-on . . ., accessed 8 February 2022. 108 Duncan Allan and Kataryna Wolchuk, “Why Minsk-2 Cannot Solve the Ukraine Crisis,” Chatham House, 10 February 2022, on the Internet at https:// www.chathamhouse.org/2022/02/why-minsk-2-cannot-solve- . . ., accessed 5 April 2022. 109 “Ukrainian President Makes Historic Speech in Munich (English Translation),” Kyiv Post, 19 February 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/east ern-europe/ukrainian-president-makes . . ., accessed 19 February 2022. 110 Tsentr oboronnykh stratehii, “Ukraina ta svit pislia 21 liutoho. Yak vyznannia Putinym ‘donbaskykh respublik’ zminylo realnist,” Ukrainska pravda, 22 February 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/02/22 /7324958/, accessed 22 February 2022; “Teatr kremlivskykh marionetok. Yak Putin vyznav feikovi respubliky Donbasu,” Ukrainska pravda, 22 February 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/02/22/7324891 /, accessed 22 February 2022; and Valentyn Torba, “Kreml pishov v va-bank,” Den, 22 February 2022, on the Internet at https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/podr obnyci/kreml-pishov-v-va-bank, accessed 22 February 2022.

250 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR campaign was launched and carried out in open violation of the rules of war, the Geneva Conventions, and international humanitarian law, from compliance with which Putin had exempted himself and his forces by not formally making a declaration of war. Hence, civilians, residential buildings and neighborhoods, hospitals, educational and cultural establishments, as well as a whole host of other non-military targets were subjected to arbitrary bombing and shelling and being reduced to rubble. The Ukrainian forces, outnumbered and outgunned, fought valiantly and effectively, to everyone’s surprise. After a month of fighting, Russia announced it would be redeploying its forces, away from the north where they had been beaten back, so as to concentrate in the east on a more limited objective, the “liberation” of the Donbas,111 making a virtue of necessity. The ill-fated defenders of the Azovstal steelworks in Mariupol finally surrendered beginning on 19 May, day 85 of the war. The war then settled into an intense artillery duel in Sievierodonetsk-Lysychansk, conquering which would give Russia control of the entirety of Luhansk oblast. Ukrainian forces withdrew from Sievierodonetsk on the weekend of 24 June. By the beginning of July, when Ukrainian forces had withdrawn from Lysychansk as well, Russia had practically full control of Luhansk oblast, but it had taken four months to do so. It would then turn its attention to Donetsk oblast.112 Despite this or any other redeployment, Russian forces continued to bombard targets in the interior, particularly those of a civilian nature in order to terrorize the population. Russian losses as of 13 June were approximately 32,300 personnel, 1,432 tanks, 3,492 armored personnel carriers (APCs), 718 pieces of artillery, 226 multiple rocket launchers, 97 anti-aircraft 111 Roman Petrenko, “Rosiia znovu zminyla ‘tsili spetsoperatsii’, pohrozhyie shturmom obltsentriv,” Ukrainska pravda, 25 march 2022, on the Internet at https ://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/25/7334499/, accessed 25 March 2022; and Valentyna Romanenko,”Shoihu vyrishyv, shcho armii Ukrainy ‘zavdano suttievoi shkody’, i mozhna znovu ‘zvilniaty Donbas’,” Ukrainska pravda, 29 March 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2 022/03/29/7335485/, accessed 29 March 2022. 112 Anna Neplii, “Putin Insists on Grabbing More ‘As Planned’,” Kyiv Post, 5 July 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/russias-war/putin-insistson-grabbing-m . . ., accessed 5 July 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 251 warfare systems, 213 aircraft, 178 helicopters, 585 unmanned air vehicles, 125 missiles, 13 naval vessels, 2,460 vehicles and fuel tankers, and 54 pieces of special equipment.113 Ukrainian losses were undisclosed at the time, but estimated at 100 to 200 personnel daily, up from 50 to 100 in early days. In June, it was revealed that up to 10,000 combatants had been lost.114 On 23 September, it was officially disclosed that Ukraine’s losses amounted to 9,000, while Ukrainian sources put Russia’s at 56,060; according to Zelenskyy, his forces were losing “nearly 50” a day.115 The war came with an unusually heavy human and material cost. In September, the Ukrainian armed forces executed a successful counterattack in the Kharkiv region, driving out the Russian forces and regaining control of the entire oblast. The response from the Kremlin was two-pronged: mobilization and referendums. Its military efficacy and significance were questionable. Speaking on TV, Putin announced a “partial mobilization” of 300,000 men to defend against the NATO-Western peril to Russia’s very existence. The call-up would apply to reservists up to 50 years of age, 65 for senior officers. According to a secret provision of the actual decree as opposed to the televised announcement, a million Russians would be eligible for mobilization. Failure to report for duty was punishable by ten years’ imprisonment. The measure was reminiscent of World War One when the authorities’ standard response to

113 Ukraine Armed Forces General Staff Facebook page on the Internet at https:// www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/338850245094727, accessed 13 June 2022. 114 “Zahalni vtraty Ukrainy stanovliat do 10 tys. osib—Arestovych,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 10 June 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/UKR AINE/zahalni-vtrati-ukrajini-stano . . ., accessed 14 June 2022; and “Zelenskyi poiasnyv, dlia choho vlada nazvala spravzhnii riven vtrat Ukrainy na fronti,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 14 June 2022. 115 Ukrinform, “Ukraine Lost 9,000 Defenders in War with Russia—Defense Ministry,” Kyiv Post, 23 September 2022, on the Internet at https:// www.kyivpost.c om/ukraine-politics/ukraine-lost-9000-defen . . ., accessed 23 September 2022; and “Zelenskyy rozpoviv, skilky viiskovykh shchodnia vtrachaie Ukraina,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 23 September 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/articl e/print/UKRAINE/zelenskij-rozpoviv-skilki-v . . ., accessed 23 September 2022.

252 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR battlefield losses was to call for more “cannon fodder.”116 For good measure, Putin threatened the West with nuclear weapons and warned that this time he was “not bluffing.”117 On hearing of the decree, hundreds of thousands of potentially eligible Russian men voted immediately with their feet by escaping to adjacent countries like Finland, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. At the end of September hastily-organized referendums were held in the Russian-occupied parts of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts. Under the gun barrels of the occupiers, unknown numbers of inhabitants turned out (the rate of turnout was not reported) to vote in favor of incorporating their regions into the Russian Federation reportedly by margins of between 87 and 99 per cent. It was speculated that this exercise would allow proxies and armed forces in these areas to recruit Ukrainian residents as soldiers to fight against the Ukrainian armed forces, thus facilitating destruction of the Ukrainian nation by its own hand—a diabolical scheme of genocide, if ever there was one. It was also mooted that, having been incorporated into Russia, attacks on these territories would be interpreted by Moscow as attacks on Russia itself with the expected consequences. (This was of doubtful validity, since the same principle had never been invoked by the Kremlin when the Ukrainians had bombarded Russian bases in Crimea in the preceding seven months.) At a magnificent ceremony in 116 Lawrence Freedman, “Cannon Fodder,” Kyiv Post, 29 September 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/cannon-fodde r.html, accessed 29 September 2022. 117 Lukashova and Kyrylenko, “Dlia choho Rosii nova krov. Rozbir ‘chastkovoi mobilizatsii’ Putina ta ii znachennia dlia Ukrainy,” Ukrainska pravda, 21 September 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/09/21 /7368518/, accessed 22 September 2022; Kravchenko, “’Veselo i strashno’: navishcho Putin oholosyv mobilizatsiiu v Rosii,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 21 September 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/international/veseloi-strashno-navish . . ., accessed 22 September 2022; Keir Giles, “Putin is Admitting his Previous Threats Were Hollow by Saying ‘This is not a Bluff’,” Guardian, 21 September 2022, on the Internet at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/sep/21/vladimir- . . ., accessed 21 September 2022; and Stanislav Pohorilov, “Taiemnyi punkt ukazu Putina dozvoliaie mobilizuvaty 1 mln rosiian—ZMI,” Ukrainska pravda, 22 September 2022, on the Internet at https:// www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/09/22/7368607/, accessed 22 September 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 253 Moscow, Putin signed a treaty to effect the annexation, about 15 per cent of Ukraine’s territory, which he said would be “forever,” even though his forces did not control it completely, and the UN Secretary-General condemned the action as having no legal validity.118 In response, Zelenskyy announced an accelerated application by Ukraine to join NATO. Following the “annexation” of the four Ukrainian oblasts which Russian forces were not yet fully in control of, Mr. Putin declared martial law in the self-same territories, an act of equally questionable logic. Apart from giving “far-reaching emergency powers to the Russian-installed heads of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson provinces,”119 the practical implications of this action for the progress of the war were uncertain. It may have been to reaffirm control in its absence, or to facilitate the mobilization or seizure of resources and property for the war effort seen as failing.120 As Ukrainian forces advanced on Kherson, civilians were being advised by the Russian president himself as well as by the local occupying authorities to evacuate, and indeed some 60,000 were deported to Russia and Russian-controlled areas.121 At the same time, apparently in response to a lack of progress by Russian forces on the ground, a comprehensive campaign of bombardment using kamikaze drones was launched against civilian targets and 118 Roth and Koshiw, “Putin to Sign Treaty Annexing Territories in Ukraine, Kremlin Says,” Guardian, 29 September 2022, on the Internet at https://www.theguar dian.com/world/2022/sep/29/putin-to-sign-trea . . ., accessed 29 September 2022; and Pjotr Sauer, “Putin Annexes Four Regions of Ukraine in Major Escalation of Russia’s War,” Guardian, 30 September 2022, on the Internet at https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/30/putin-russia-war- . . ., accessed 30 September 2022. 119 Roth, “Putin Declares Martial Law in Annexed Areas as Ukraine Pushes Offensive,” Guardian, 19 October 2022, on the Internet at https://www.theguardian.c om/world/2022/oct/19/russia-planning-e . . ., accessed 20 October 2022. 120 Fesenko, “Putin’s Martial Law: What’s the Main Reason Behind It?” Kyiv Post, 20 October 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opini onnn/op-ed/putins-martial-la . . ., accessed 20 October 2022. 121 AFP, “Putin Says Civilians ‘Need to be Removed’ from Kherson,” Kyiv Post, 4 November 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/russias-war/putinsays-civilians-need-to- . . ., accessed 4 November 2022; and Peter Beaumont, “Vladimir Putin Says Civilians Must be Evacuated from Kherson War Zone,” Guardian, 4 November 2022, on the Internet at https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2022/nov/04/vladimir-putin-sa . . ., accessed 4 November 2022.

254 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR the energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine causing serious damage, depriving the population of light, heat, and water.122 On 11 November 2022, Russian forces withdrew from Kherson, giving up the only provincial capital they had managed to capture, a severe humiliation. President Putin, quoted in October as saying that he “did not set out to destroy Ukraine,”123 nevertheless was by that time making a fine job of exactly that. Then speaking later at the Valdai Discussion Club he explained that the war was necessary to counter Western domination, that “the unipolar world is becoming a thing of the past,” and that “Russia is just trying to defend its right to exist.”124 This apparently required that Ukraine cease to exist. But if anyone expected the population of Ukraine to accept that proposition and willingly to succumb to the Russian president’s reign of terror, they would have been mistaken. Despite the destruction of civilian lives, homes, and infrastructure, an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians responding to a survey at that time still wanted “to continue the armed struggle and resist Russian aggression."125 The scale and brutality, not to mention its rationale, of the Russian Federation’s act of aggression inevitably called up parallels with World War Two: Nazi Germany’s Anschluss with Austria, annexation of the Sudetenland, artificially provoked attack on Poland; its wanton destruction; and its total nature, not being limited to military targets. Millions of Ukrainians fled west across the borders to neighboring countries. Millions of others were internally displaced. Over a million civilians were forcibly deported to Russia, where they were held in filtration camps and sent into exile in the interior.

122 John R. Bryson, “Kamikaze Drones and Putin’s Special Operation as an Unjust War,” Kyiv Post, 20 October 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com /article/opinion/op-ed/kamikaze-drones- . . ., accessed 20 October 2022. 123 Sabra Ayers, “Putin Calls his Actions in Ukraine ‘Correct and Timely’,” Associated Press, 14 October 2022. 124 AFP, “Putin: Russia Battling ‘Western Domination’ as Ukraine War Grinds On,” Kyiv Post, 28 October 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ russias-war/putin-russia-battling-wester . . ., accessed 3 November 2022. 125 Kyiv Post, “86 Percent of Ukrainians Want to Resist Russia Despite Bombardments,” Kyiv Post, 24 October 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.co m/ukraine-politics/86-percent-of-ukrainia . . ., accessed 3 November 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 255 Children were abducted to Russia and illegally adopted to become Russians. Retreating Russian forces left in their wake evidence of war crimes: indiscriminate bombing of cities and towns, obliteration of entire villages; rapes of women and children; torture and summary execution of civilians; and ransacking and looting of residential and commercial properties.126 Thousands of civilians died; countless others were left to die under the rubble of destroyed buildings. Hundreds of children were killed and hundreds more injured. The Russian soldiers even failed to collect their comrades’ bodies, a sign of their disrespect for human life, or perhaps to artificially reduce the body count by reporting them as “missing.” By 26 June, at least eleven Russian generals had perished at the front,127 indicative of problems of command and control on the Russian side. Russian war crimes have been noted both by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry and the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; creation of an international tribunal for the prosecution of such crime is understandably a top priority for Ukraine’s prosecutor general.128 There is more than enough trauma for future 126 For some examples, see Isaac Stanley-Becker, “Germany Intercepts Russian Conversations on Indiscriminate Killings in Ukraine,” Washington Post, 7 April 2022; Rory Sullivan, “Russia Has Committed War Crimes in Kharkiv Through Indiscriminate Shelling, Claims Amnesty,” Independent, 13 June 2022, on the Internet at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russian-shell ing- . . ., accessed 13 June 2022; “Holova Natspolitsii: 1200 til zahyblykh ukraintsiv shche ne identyfikovani,” Interfax-Ukraine, 13 June 2022, on the Internet at https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/838766.html, accessed 13 June 2022; Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, “Yuvenalni prokurory: 288 ditei zahynuly vnaslidok zbroinoi ahresii RF v Ukraini,” on Telegram, at ht tps://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/4439, accessed 13 June 2022; Lorenzo Tondo, Emma Graham-Harrison, and Isobel Koshiw, “Crimes Against Civilians: Documenting the Scale of Abuse in Ukraine,” Guardian, 20 June 2022, on the Internet at htt ps://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/20/crimes-against-civi . . ., accessed 20 June 2022; and Coynash, “Russia Removes Last Doctors After Destroying Mariupol and Causing Humanitarian Disaster,” Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, 5 July 2022, on the Internet at https://khpg.org/en/1 608810829, accessed 5 July 2022. For the full report referred to by Sullivan, see Amnesty International, “Anyone Can Die At Any Time”: Indiscriminate Attacks by Russian Forces in Kharkiv, Ukraine (London: Amnesty International Ltd, 2022). 127 Mail on Sunday, 26 June 2022. 128 AFP, “’War Crimes’ Committed In Ukraine: UN Investigators,” Kyiv Post, 23 September 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/russias-war/w ar-crimes-committed-in-uk . . ., accessed 23 September 2022; and “Creating

256 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR generations here, yet in an age of social media there will be no dearth of evidence for future prosecutions—even if in absentia. Ukrainian forces were able to hold off the Russian assault for as long they did due to help received from friendly countries. Of these, the most generous (in descending order) have been: US, EU, UK, Germany, and Poland, in terms of total (financial, humanitarian, and military) bilateral aid;129 US, Poland, UK, Canada, and Norway, in in-kind military aid.130 Interestingly, the rank-order for bilateral aid as a percentage of GDP revealed the Baltic states as Ukraine’s best friends in terms of that measure: the top providers were Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Lithuania, and the US.131 Countries such as Germany, compromised by heavy reliance on Russian natural gas and long-term appeasement of Putin, promised more but delivered less. NATO as an organization did not assist, although individual member-states contributed weapons, ammunition, and training. But this was still not enough to assure victory, if defined as pushing Russian forces out of Ukrainian territory altogether. At its summit in Madrid at the end of June, NATO unveiled its new strategic vision which reiterated the organization’s support for Ukraine and approved a new aid package. This consisted of nonlethal weapons, improvement of Ukraine’s cyber defenses, and help with modernizing its defence sector as well as reinforcing longer-term efforts of post-war reforms and reconstruction; supply of lethal weaponry was left to bilateral arrangement with individual member states.132 Ukraine would continue to strive for

International Tribunal to Prosecute War Crimes ‘Top Priority for Ukraine’,” Kyiv Post, 8 September 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/russias-war/creating-an-international-tri . . ., accessed 3 October 2022. 129 Statista Research Department, “Total Bilateral Aid Commitments to Ukraine 2022, by Country and Type,” 17 June 2022, on the Internet at https://www.statista.com /statistics/1303432/total-bilateral-aid-to-ukr . . ., accessed 28 June 2022. 130 Kaja Kallas @kajakallas, on Twitter, 16 June 2022. Kaja Kallas is the Prime Minister of Estonia. 131 Olivia Kortas on Twitter @OliviaKortas, 23 June 2022. 132 Anastasiia Lapatina, “NATO Pledges to Increase Its Support for Ukraine,” Kyiv Independent, 29 June 2022, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent.com/hottopic/nato-pledges-to-increase-its . . ., accessed 1 July 2022; Kravchenko, “Chomu NATO ne daie Ukraini zbroiu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 30 June 2022, on the

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 257 membership in NATO,133 but in the meantime the American-led strategy for the alliance’s assistance to Ukraine in its war with Russia was a measured balance so that neither side could clearly win or lose. The extraordinary performance of Volodymyr Zelenskyy as wartime leader was an unexpected product of Russia’s aggression. Using his skill at communicating, the president set an example by staying in place and ordering those around him to do the same, visibly leading the defence of his country and rallying the citizens’ support for resistance against the unwarranted Russian attack.134 He appeared by video daily to encourage fellow-citizens and to thank them for their efforts. He addressed by video link a great many foreign audiences—the United Nations General Assembly, the parliaments of the UK and Canada, the European Parliament and national assemblies of its member-states—to acknowledge their assistance and to appeal for more. He initiated applications for Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO. The EU application for candidate status was approved by the European Commission in June, but awaited approval of all member-states before coming into effect. Zelenskyy’s example was followed by others in the Ukrainian political leadership, such as foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba and defence minister Oleskii Reznikov among others, who spoke out clearly for their country’s interests in various international fora. Negotiations between Russia and Ukraine to halt the war have not gone well. There were a few breakthroughs on the military side

Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/international/chomu-nato-ne-daj e-ukra . . ., accessed 4 July 2022; and Oleksii Izhak, “Nova Stratehichna kontseptsiia NATO: shcho zminylosia i yak tse poznachytsia na Ukraini,” Gazeta.ua, 30 June 2022, on the Internet at https://gazeta.ua/article/poglyad/ _nova-strategichna-koncepciya-na . . ., accessed 2 July 2022. 133 “Ukraina zberihaie kurs na intehratsiiu do NATO—zaiava pislia samitu,” Yevropeiska pravda, 29 June 2022, on the Internet at https:// www.eurointegratio n.com.ua/news/2022/06/29/7142280/, accessed 1 July 2022. 134 Kramer, “How Zelensky Ended Political Discord and Put Ukraine on a War Footing,” New York Times, 25 April 2022, on the Internet at https:// www.nytim es.com/2022/04/25/world/europe/ukraine-zelenks . . ., accessed 25 April 2022; and Dyczok and Yerin Chung, “Zelenskyi Uses His Communication Skills as a Weapon of War,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 64, nos. 2-3 (June-September 2022): 146-61.

258 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR when prisoners exchanges were agreed and implemented, but humanitarian corridors were difficult to arrange. More often than not, local Russian units would destroy or block humanitarian convoys and routes, exposing a break in the chain of command from the negotiating table on the Russian side to the Kremlin to the fighting forces on the ground, as well as perhaps the latter’s lack of discipline and humanity, if not intentional brutality. On the political side, nothing could be negotiated in view of the Russian demand for total surrender by the Ukrainians and the Ukrainian demand that Russia not only cease the war but also withdraw to 2014 lines, something out of the question for Moscow.135 Zelenskyy had often expressed his willingness to meet Putin, but Putin was never ready to do so. By September, the Ukrainian position was that no meeting of the presidents or negotiations could take place before the withdrawal of Russian forces, and that talks must focus on reparations, compensation, and surrender of criminals for prosecution.136 When a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council can launch, in open contravention of the UN Charter, a fullscale military attack against a neighboring country, itself a founding member of the UN, and the organization is unable to restrain or punish that member, our sad world is in very serious trouble from the point of view of international relations. As the principal body for global peace and security, the UN’s Charter specifically directs that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (Chap. 1, Art. 2, Sec. 4). Permanent members are not exempt; nor does the precedent of numerous invasions of other countries (e.g., Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan) by the US excuse Russia’s action. The Security Council is supposed

135 “Zelenskyi pro perehovory z RF: ‘Zhodnykh kompromisov shchodo nashoi terytrialnoi tsilisnosti ta suverenitetu’,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 20 March 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/zelenskij-pro-perehov ori-z- . . ., accessed 25 March 2022. 136 “Narazi nemaie zhodnoho sensu u zustrichi Zelenskoho ta putina,--OP,” Vysokyi zamok, 18 September 2022, on the Internet at https://wz.lviv.ua/news/ 472839-zaraz-nemaie-zhodnoho0sensu-u-zu . . ., accessed 19 September 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 259 to be able to make binding decisions on its members, order sanctions, call for cease-fires, set up peacekeeping forces, and take military action on behalf of the UN when there is a threat to peace. In the present instance, it has implemented only one of these options, imposing several rounds of sanctions on Russia and its leaders. But these would take a long time to take effect and were not certain to act as deterrents. Otherwise, apart from its humanitarian operations, the United Nations has implemented nothing but rhetoric to end the Russia-Ukraine war. More specifically, the UNGA has: passed a resolution (141 in favor, 5 against, 35 abstained) to demand that Russia immediately stop its military assault on Ukraine (2 March 2022);137 and voted to suspend Russia (93 in favor, 24 against) from the Human Rights Council (7 April). Russia withdrew on the same day. The UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, repeatedly called for global unity, for an “immediate humanitarian ceasefire,” for “an immediate halt to violence” in regards to the war, which he termed “evil,” and as an assault on the world’s vulnerable (March through June 2022). He was still calling for “an immediate halt to violence” at the 100-day mark of the war (3 June).138 In the wake of Russia’s missile attack on the shopping mall in Kremenchuk, six UNSC member countries condemned Russia’s targeting of civilian residential areas and infrastructure there and elsewhere, and called for Russia to halt all such attacks, to cease hostilities, and to withdraw its forces from Ukraine.139 Nothing

137 On 25 February, Russia vetoed in the Security Council a resolution that would have expressed regret over Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Iurii Paniev, “Rossiia zablokirovala v Sovbeze OON rezoliutsiiu po Ukraiine,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 27 February 2022, on the Internet at https://www.ng.ru/week/2022-0227/8_8380_week1.html, accessed 28 March 2022. 138 United Nations, UN News, 2 March-3 June 2022, on the Internet at https://news.un.org/en/story . . ., accessed 14 June 2022. In addition, the UN International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague ordered Russia to “immediately suspend military operations in Ukraine” on 16 March. “International Court Orders Russia to ‘Immediately Suspend’ Military Operations in Ukraine,” UN News, 16 March 2022, on the Internet at https://news.un.org/en /story/2022/03/1114052, accessed 14 June 2022. 139 “UNSC Countries strongly condemn Russian Missile Strikes on Ukraine’s Peaceful Cities,” Kyiv Post, 29 June 2022, on the Internet at https:// www.kyivp ost.com/world/unsc-countries-strongly-condemn . . ., accessed 1 July 2022.

260 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR changed as a result of these resolutions and pleas. In his address to the Security Council, President Zelenskyy was blunt: either the Russian Federation’s veto power must be removed, or the Security Council should dissolve itself as being unable to provide security, its primary purpose (5 April).140 A war of aggression is a war crime, yet the United Nations has taken no steps to call Putin’s Russia to account.141

When Will the War End? No one knows when this war will end or how. There are some basic reasons for this, but they ultimately add up to one thing: Russia’s war on Ukraine, renewed in 2022, intentionally or not, defies rationality.142 In the first place, its initiator and principal director is not an armed forces general, schooled in strategy, modern military technology, personnel management, and leadership, but a secret police operative skilled in deception, entrapment, manipulation, assassination (“mokrye dela”— “damp deeds”), blackmail, and diversion. “The important thing to keep in mind,” writes Lawrence Freedman, “about Vladimir Putin is that he is a spy and not a soldier. . . . He has an instinct for the covert, the fabricated and the dishonest, for gaining advantage through manipulating perceptions, leaving his opponents disoriented and motivating his supporters by warning

140 “Speech by the President of Ukraine at Meeting of UN Security Council, 5 April 2022,” Kyiv Post, 6 April 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/w orld/speech-by-the-president-of-ukraine . . ., accessed 6 April 2022. 141 For a positive suggestion on reforming the UN, see Simon Tisdall, “The United Nations Has the Power to Punish Putin. This is How it Can be Done,” Guardian, 6 April 2022, on the Internet at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree /2022/apr/06/united-nat . . ., accessed 6 April 2022. Short of the institution’s total reform, there are available effective means for the UN to exert the needed pressure on Russia according to former UN employee Dmytro Dovgopoly, “When the UN had Teeth: Relevance of GA Resolution 1761,” Kyiv Post, 4 September 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinionn/ op-ed/punishing-culprits- . . ., accessed 6 September 2022. 142 Along these lines, see Anders Aslund, “What Is Really Going on in the Kremlin?” Kyiv Post, 24 May 2022, on the Internet at https:// www.kyivpost.com/art icle/opinion/op-ed/what-is-really-goin . . ., accessed 24 May 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 261 of dark threats.”143 Conventional military-strategic thinking cannot comprehend Putin’s strategy. A military officer would not have his battalions of men and equipment standing bored and rusting all winter long waiting for deployment; Putin, however, did so to make a show of his threat. Thus the element of surprise, a standard feature of successful warfare, was sacrificed, although Putin repeatedly assured everyone that there were “no plans to invade Ukraine.” In an odd way, this turned out to be true, because the first weeks of the war unfolded in a disastrous fashion for the Russian forces in terms of losses and ability to hold captured territory— clearly they had not anticipated or prepared for Ukrainian resistance and defence. In fact, the decision to invade was apparently taken by Putin with only a small group of his closest advisers, including Sergii Shoigu, Valerii Gerasimov, and Nikolai Patrushev,144 which likely ensured its being a product of “groupthink.” If so, this would add to the opaqueness of the reasoning behind this mad adventure. In fact, in May, Putin turned over responsibility for the planning of the war from the FSB to the GRU,145 thus confirming that it was and would remain principally an intelligence operation and not a military one—the Russian military in this instance was to be merely the instrument of the chekisty (secret police men). Putin also ignored another traditional maxim of war: that the defenders always have the advantage, since they know the terrain and what they are fighting for. No wonder Western experts in military strategy and warfare were unable to make sense of the rationale of the war and predict its possible end-point. Furthermore, Putin’s goals in launching this war have been extremely vague and changeable, making assessment of the 143 Freedman, “Giving Peace a Chance,” Comment is Freed, 9 March 2022, on the Internet at https://samf.substack.com/p/giving-peace-a-chance?s=r, accessed 10 March 2022. 144 Olena Roshchina, “Putin pryimav rishennia pro viinu zi zhmenkoiu liudei, vin vse bilshe izoliovannyi i nedostuplyvyi—ZMI,” Ukrainska pravda, 20 April 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/04/20/7340958/, accessed 20 April 2022. 145 “Putin peredav planuvannia viiny vid FSB do HRU—rozsliduvachi,” Ukrainska pravda, 10 May 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/20 22/05/10/7345345/, accessed 21 June 2022.

262 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR mission’s accomplishment practically impossible either from the Kremlin’s or an outsider’s point of view. On launching the attack, the Russian president stated that its primary aim was the defence of the people in occupied Donbas facing genocide.146 This would require de-militarization and de-Nazification of Ukraine, and then bringing to trial the bloody transgressors of citizens’ rights, but Russia did not plan to occupy Ukraine. He did not define or clarify what he meant by de-militarization and de-Nazification, however, which allowed for broad interpretation and application. If by demilitarization he meant neutrality, then Russia’s policy was difficult to understand—indeed, it was incomprehensible—since it had invaded Ukraine eight years earlier when Ukraine was technically neutral or non-aligned. If neutrality in 2014 did not deter invasion, then what would be the point of de-militarization in 2022? How neutralization of Ukraine would add to Russian security was unknown.147 As to de-Nazification, it was baffling that the whole of Ukraine was in need of this treatment, and who exactly the Nazis in it were, when the country had by an overwhelming majority in 2019 elected as president someone who was Jewish. Was Zelenskyy himself a Nazi? This was absurd. After five months of war and occupation, the Russian invaders had not found, killed, or captured even a single Nazi. It appeared rather that the actual objectives initially were the capture of Kyiv, overthrow of Zelenskyy, and transformation of the Ukrainian state into one friendly to Russia.148 In March, Putin said his main objective was still to rescue the people of Donbas and Ukraine, specifically Russian-speakers, from a (nonexistent) genocide.149 This was an odd statement to make when the armed forces of the Russian Federation were at the same time 146 Komarkov, “Obrashchenie prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii.” 147 Komarkov, “Putin khochet pereuchredit ne tolko Ukrainu, no i mezhdunarodno-pravovoi poriadok,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 27 February 2022, on the Internet at https://www.ng.ru/editorial/2022-02-27/2_8380_editorial.html, accessed 28 March 2022. 148 Ibid. 149 Ivan Rodin, “Putin vystupil po motivam spetsoperatsii, vlasti Rossii ne vidiat budushchego Ukrainy,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 20 March 2022, on the Internet at h ttps://www.ng.ru/week/2022-03-20/7_8395_week2.html, accessed 28 March 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 263 inflicting irreparable damage on the lives, homes, and livelihoods of millions of Russian-speakers in eastern and southern Ukraine.150 In fact, Russia was practicing genocide. In April, the Russian president revealed that the invasion was necessitated by the threat of an attack on Russia, to which Ukraine was being provoked from outside, but that the war’s original aims would be fulfilled (however nebulous they may have been); he warned that any foreign interference would be met with a swift and fiery response with never before seen Russian super-weapons.151 In May, Putin defended the war as a “uniquely correct decision” required in order to repel NATO aggression, which was responsible for the proliferation of neo-Nazis and banderivtsi (followers of the World War Two nationalist leader Stepan Bandera, demonized in Russian political narratives) in Ukraine; all of this was the fault of the USA.152 According to this conspiracy theory reasoning, the war could only end not with the pacification of Ukraine, but would require changes to NATO and US foreign policy. In June, citing the Russian tsar Peter I, Mr. Putin declared himself to be following in his footsteps, returning Russian lands to their proper custodian. This meant that the invasion was no longer simply a matter of straightening out what was amiss within Ukraine, but of bringing the entire country back under Russian imperial control.153 And in an address to the

150 In countless BBC World News TV interviews shown in the West with the distressed victims of Russia’s relentless bombardment of Ukrainian territory the unfortunates were predominantly speaking Russian. So much for the Kremlin’s protection of fellow-nationals. 151 “Putin nazvav shche odnu prychynu viiny v Ukraini ta pryhrozyv nevidmoiu nikomu zbroieiu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 27 April 2022, on the Internet at https://zn. ua/ukr/article/print/WORLD/putin-nazvav-shche-odnu-pri . . ., accessed 28 April 2022. 152 “Putin na parade nazvav viinu ‘yedyno pravylnym rishenniam’, mobilizatsiiu ne oholosyv,” Ukrainska pravda, 9 May 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pra vda.com.ua/news/2022/05/09/7345011/, accessed 21 June 2022. 153 Peter Dickinson, “Putin Admits Ukraine Invasion is an Imperial War to ‘Return Russian Lands’,” Kyiv Post, 12 June 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/putin-admits-ukrain . . ., accessed 13 June 2022; and Roth and agencies, “Putin Compares Himself to Peter the Great in Quest to Take Back Russian Lands,” Guardian, 10 June 2022, on the Internet at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/10/putin-compares-hi . . ., accessed 10 June 2022.

264 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR Petersburg International Economic Forum (Russia’s answer to Davos), Putin assured the audience that his “special military operation” was fully in accordance with international law: the “people’s republics” of the Donbas did not have to ask Kyiv’s permission to separate from Ukraine, Russia recognized them, and Russia was now providing them with military aid—all in accordance with the UN Charter.154 Thus there were no legal inhibitions to restrain the Russian aggression. Apparently, though, not even the Kremlin itself knew how to end this war and at the same time win the battle for the Russian public’s continued high ratings of President Putin.155 Certainly, at no point was any empirically verifiable political objective identified, without which no one contemplating launching a war should ever do so, or rather, as history has shown, anyone launching war without a clear political objective does so at their peril. War, is, after all, the conduct of politics by other means, or so we thought. Thus the 2022 Russo-Ukraine war was open-ended and indeterminate. Many scholars and political analysts have been attempting to mine Putin’s thinking for clues to anticipate his future actions.156 A decade ago, Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy co-authored a careful study of the various aspects of Mr. Putin’s personality and character.157 They analyzed their subject under a combination of “six individual identities” which they termed “the Statist, the History Man, the Survivalist, the Outsider, the Free Marketeer, and the

154 “St Petersburg International Economic Forum Plenary Session,” 17 June 2022, from the President of Russia website at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president /news/68669, accessed 17 June 2022; and Kateryna Tyshchenko, “Putin zapevniaie, shcho viina proty Ukrainy vidpovidaie mizhnarodnomu pravu,” Ukrainska pravda, 17 June 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/ news/2022/06/17/7353144/, accessed 17 June 2022. 155 “Khoroshykh piar-stsenariiv vykhodu z viiny nemaie. Kreml ne znaie, yak ii zakinchyty—ZMI,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 22 April 2022, on the Internet at https://zn .ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/khoroshikh-piar-stsenarijiv . . ., accessed 22 April 2022. 156 Anyone who has been following the war through the Internet will know what I mean. 157 Fiona Hill and Clifford J. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 265 Case Officer.”158 Of these, they said, Putin shares the first three with other Russians; the latter three are particular to him. Essentially, it means he is patriotic, concerned with survival, and an outsider in the political establishment; at the same time, his KGB and free market experience leads him to behave like a dictatorial CEO or mafioso, which means that he cannot be held accountable or criticized—it is either him or chaos.159 More recently, the British analyst Mark Galeotti, concerned that the West has failed to understand Putin, set out in condensed fashion and based on a lifetime’s study and observation to tackle the chief myths about the man.160 His portrait is of a leader who is: not a philosopher, but simply a patriot for whom security and respect are earned by strength; pragmatic and utilitarian, in fact, “Putin has no ideological commitment to anything;”161 riskaverse, not an adventurer—“he is a rational actor, and even a cautious one,”162 but he hides from decisions and disasters.163 Of particular relevance here was Galeotti’s characterization of Putin as being “a judoka, not a chess player.” He explains: A judoka may well have prepared for a rival’s usual moves and worked out countermoves in advance, but much of the art is in using the opponent’s strength against him to seize the moment when it appears. In this respect, in geopolitics as in judo, Putin is an opportunist. He has a sense of what constitutes a win, but no predetermined path towards it. He relies on quickly seizing any advantage he sees, rather than on a careful strategy.164

More recently, in the wake of the 2022 invasion, Fiona Hill was interviewed and offered her present-day assessments of Vladimir Putin’s mentality and end-game. According to her, “Putin remains a strategic thinker,” “he sees himself as infallible,” has been

158 Ibid., 8. 159 Ibid., passim. 160 Mark Galeotti, We Need to Talk About Putin: How the West Gets Him Wrong (London: Penguin Random House UK, 2019). 161 Ibid., 73. 162 Ibid., 89. 163 Ibid., 83. 164 Ibid., 15.

266 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR “working himself into more of a state of paranoia,” and is determined to punish Ukraine severely.165 As to an end game, He also doesn’t really know what the end game will be beyond the end game that he already had in mind. He’s sticking to the plan. . . . Because he believes that the plan is right because he set it. And he’s become so wrapped up in that that he is going to now throw everything that he’s got at it to make sure that he succeeds in subjugating Ukraine.166

In the end, “he cannot lose,” and the West and the US “must find some kind of mechanism to make Putin feel like he’s got something out of this.”167 In this writer’s opinion, however, Putin is not a strategic thinker, and does not act on the basis of strategic considerations; he acts, and then watches the consequences unfold. His strategy is war. At some arbitrary point he declares his objectives have been met. But there is no premeditation involved. In the present circumstances, Putin is, to use Galeotti’s characterization, like that cornered rat he encountered as a child in Leningrad.168 Russia’s war against Ukraine, therefore, will last as long as Putin wants it to last, presumably until Ukraine and everything in it has been ground down into a fine powder, and when he can look victorious. As the former Secretary-General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has explained, a prolonged war plays into the hands of Putin by encumbering Ukraine’s efforts at integration into the European structures like the EU and NATO.169

Mearsheimer and the War Could this war have been avoided? According to John Mearsheimer, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, it could have—and the United States is responsible for 165 “Putin’s Endgame: A Conversation With Fiona Hill,” New York Times, 11 March 2022. 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid. 168 Galeotti, We Need to Talk About Putin, 142. 169 “Zatiazhna viina v Ukraini hraie na ruku Putinu—ekshensek NATO,” Gazeta.ua, 2 July 2022, on the Internet at https://gazeta.ua/articles/politics/_z atyzhna-vijna-v-ukrajini-graye . . ., accessed 2 July 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 267 starting it. Mearsheimer’s argument is that Russia’s intrusion into Ukraine in 2014 could have been averted if the US had respected Russian security concerns. Russia saw Ukraine’s movement towards the West—specifically to NATO and the EU—as existential threats to itself. Perversely, according to him, the US encouraged democracy, civil society, and a westward orientation in Ukraine. Putin therefore had no option, naturally, but to invade and annex Crimea, and then to foment the “civil war” in the Donbas. The solution should have been to make Ukraine “a neutral buffer between NATO and Russia,” to “rule out NATO’s expansion into both Georgia and Ukraine,” and to “help fashion an economic rescue plan for Ukraine funded jointly by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, Russia, and the United States.”170 In his view, Ukraine was merely a pawn in the great power struggles between Russia and the US with no agency of its own. But Mearsheimer’s argument was faulty from the start because Ukraine was in fact neutral in 2014, and had no prospect practically of becoming a member of NATO, as has been repeatedly pointed out. Mearsheimer also dismissed the likelihood of irrationality on Putin’s part as well as Russia’s ambition to take over Ukraine. Putin, he wrote, “is a first-class strategist who should be feared and respected” (like Stalin, perhaps?), and “Russia lacks the capability to easily conquer . . . Ukraine,” since “Russia is a declining power, and it will only get weaker with time.”171 Ukraine should have complied with Russia’s wishes, according to Mearsheimer. After the invasion of 24 February 2022, Mearsheimer continued to place the blame for the war on the West in general and the US in particular. If only they had not promised NATO membership to Ukraine, had not as he put it “pushed forward to make Ukraine a Western Bulwark on Russia’s border,” if Trump had not sold “defensive weapons” to Ukraine, and if Biden had not signed a

170 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs, 93, no. 5 (September-October 2014): 77-89. 171 Ibid.

268 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR strategic partnership with Ukraine—this would not have happened.172 Then when the war was already in its fourth month, Mearsheimer continued to blame the West for what he called “this calamity,” “a multi-dimensional disaster,” and a “terrible situation.” Regarding the possibility “that Putin was lying about his motives, that he was attempting to disguise his imperial ambitions,” Mearsheimer’s response was: “I have written a book about lying in international politics . . . and it is clear to me that Putin was not lying. . . . He has never once hinted that he wants to make Ukraine part of Russia.” 173 The war, he warned, would not send soon, however, because the Ukrainian ultra-nationalists egged on by the Biden administration would not accept neutrality and Russia would not accept defeat in the face of an existential threat. The world was thus doomed because it had not paid attention to Professor Mearsheimer’s lectures. Mearsheimer is an advocate of “offensive realism,” an approach to the interpretation of international relations based on the assumptions that great powers owe their status chiefly to military power, that they struggle against each other to ensure survival by gaining ever more power, and that they are constantly concerned with the balance of power by trying to make it work in their favor.174 There is no place in this theory for international law or institutions—nor for ideas, culture, or human agency, either; the great powers are like billiard balls crashing into each other mechanically without consciousness; and leaders do not matter since a great power acts according to its objective status or place in the system, within the structure of great power relationships. We are asked to believe that a war on Ukraine by Russia could as easily have been launched by Boris Yeltsin as by Vladimir Putin. In his magnum opus, the nebulous notion of power forever eludes capture; the means by

172 “John Mearsheimer on Why the West is Principally Responsible for the Ukrainian Crisis,” Economist. 11 march 2022. 173 Mearsheimer, “The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis,” The National Interest, 23 June 2022, on the Internet at https://nationalinterest.org/print /feature/causes-and-consequences-uk . . ., accessed 27 June 2022. 174 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), chap. 1.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 269 which and by whom the “balance of power” can or has been measured historically remains a mystery; the formation and growth of the European Union should have been impossible (and is hence treated in silence, except for a quoted quip from Jacques Chirac); and familiarity with Soviet and Russian foreign policy is superficial despite references to Stalin for reinforcement of the author’s argument. In spite of his claim that the offensive realist “theory treats all states alike,”175 Mearsheimer’s treatment of Russia in his commentaries on the war against Ukraine actually runs counter to the theory’s fundamentals, effectively nullifying it. Russia in his telling becomes an animate being: it has fears; it becomes angry; it feels threatened. Russia should not be “provoked” by the US, yet Russia is justified in invading Ukraine militarily. Somehow in his telling no other state’s security matters except Russia’s. In the theory, great powers are naturally inclined to impose their will on other great powers, but the US ought not to antagonize Russia. Mearsheimer subscribes openly to conspiracy theories such as the plot to make Ukraine into a Western bulwark against Russia; he often sets up a straw man, e.g., “conventional wisdom,” against which to show the superiority of his argument; he treats Putin’s selected utterances as gospel truth, oblivious to the long Russian tradition of propaganda and disinformation; and he makes assumptions about Putin’s thinking that conveniently align with his theory. Unfortunately for the theory and its author, Mr. Putin himself has already rendered them redundant: he has vowed to reclaim as part of Russia much of Ukraine and other post-Soviet states and territories; he has accepted (at least initially) the membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO as non-threatening to Russia; he has also accepted Ukraine’s candidate membership of the EU; and he has lied, not only about re-incorporating Ukraine into Russia, but also about Russian war crimes in Ukraine, presenting medals to some of the presumed malefactors. While Professor Mearsheimer is adamant that Russia’s foreign policy fully embodies and accords with his theory of “offensive realism,” it would appear that he and Mr. Putin are merely singing 175 Ibid., 54.

270 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR from the same hymnal. Blaming the West and repeating the Kremlin narrative does not help end this unjust war; it discredits to IR theory, which should be an aid to resolving crises.176

Anticipating an End to the War European leaders attempted early on in this war to persuade Putin to pause or halt the invasion, often in in-person meetings, but always to no avail. One such attempt was French president Macron’s telephone conversation with Mr. Putin, following which he advised the international community that it would be unwise to “humiliate” the Russian president on account of the war. For this Macron was deservedly ridiculed,177 as the idea of mollifying the dictator who had launched a war of genocidal intent against his neighbor was patently ludicrous.178 European leaders have also met frequently with Zelenskyy to show solidarity, but at the same time to encourage concessions to Russia. The Ukrainian president has managed to persuade them that supporting Ukraine in the war effort and obtaining candidate status for membership in the EU is more important than appeasing Putin. How wars of the past have ended may shed some light on the prospects for ending Russia’s war against Ukraine. For example, Dan Reiter’s study, based on bargaining theory, explains the termination of war as resulting from a balance between information and commitment. That is, a belligerent will weigh combat costs against the likelihood of the opponent’s trustworthiness in deciding to sue for peace. War is liable to be resorted to or continued when the belligerent has little or no faith that the opponent will agree to the end of war bargain. But as his study of the termination of the American 176 For a respite from Mearsheimer, readers might peruse Daniel W. Drezner, “The Perils of Pessimism: Why Anxious Nations Are Dangerous Nations,” Foreign Affairs, 101, no. 4 (July/August 2022): 34-43. I am grateful to Lyubomyr Markevych for alerting me to this article. 177 Gary Mason, “Humiliate Russia? Quelle Farce,” Globe and Mail (Alberta edition), 10 June 2022. 178 Alona Mazurenko, “Reznikov: ‘zberihaty oblychchia’ Putinu vzhe pizno,” Ukrainska pravda, 1 July 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/n ews/2022/07/1/7355860/, accessed 1 July 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 271 Civil War, World Wars One and Two, and the Korean War shows, this usually does not end well. His advice, therefore, is that: war to solve commitment problems has not been and would not be a panacea. American foreign-policy makers in the twenty-first century need to recognize the limits and costs of using wars in this manner. Other foreign policy tools such as diplomacy and deterrence may be less costly and more effective.179

Gideon Rose’s historical examination of US engagement in twentieth-century wars, plus Iraq and Afghanistan in the twenty-first, says the challenge is a proper balancing of war’s components: fighting and politics.180 For successful war outcomes, the lessons from the past are basically: planning, defining goals, and anticipating problems in implementation. These lessons have never been fully applied, but should be. Rose concludes: Military officers, with their varying degrees of courage and talent and perception, work the odds on the battlefield. But it is the role of political leaders to be the voice of reason, seeing to it that wars are designed and prosecuted effectively so as to achieve some sensible political outcome. In the past, our leaders have not always done this. Maybe the next time they will.181

And in an edited volume, subtitled “How America Ends Its Wars,” Roger Spiller offers six propositions drawn from that theme’s history, but notes “that every one of America’s major conflicts has been fought in ignorance—or defiance—of one or more of them.”182 The propositions deal with war’s limitations, the necessity of constantly adjusting aims and methods, the belligerents’ common need to stop fighting, aims being decided by influences beyond the battlefield, war being cosmopolitan, not quarantined from the rest of the world, and the decisive campaign as being an illusion.183 Taking these into account, “every war should be designed so that the 179 Dan Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), 230. 180 Gideon Rose, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010). 181 Ibid., 287. 182 Roger J. Spiller, “Six Propositions,” in Between War and Peace: How America Ends Its Wars, ed. Matthew Moten (New York: Free Press, 2011), 20. 183 Ibid., 4.

272 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR strategic effect it produces contributes to the nature of the peace that will inevitably follow, and on no other basis.”184 For various reasons, this is almost never possible. The foregoing review, therefore, suggests that the Russian Federation’s launching of a war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022—without proper planning, precise political objectives, or observance of key considerations in warfare—means it cannot but have an exceptionally messy ending. Since 1945 America could claim victory in only one of its many wars—that against Grenada— not a very outstanding record for a reputed superpower. Perhaps there could be a lesson here for that erstwhile and earnest student of military history, leader of a supposed great power, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, except that he writes his own history to suit his ends. The problem is that the Russian president does not draw lessons from history written by someone else. In his study over the past 350 years of some one hundred wars initiated by great or rising powers, of which Russia claims to be one today, Ned Lebow provides some clues to understand the historical significance of Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine launched in 2022.185 He sets out to determine the motives of the initiators of these past wars and the reasons for their resorting to force. In line with his more general theory of international relations,186 he posits four basic drives which translate into corresponding motives for war: security, interest, standing, and revenge. The historical data, in part, reveal that: wars among great powers have been declining in frequency; interest or conquest of territory, as well as security, has been a weak motive; standing is now lessened by waging war, a reversal of the past pattern; and revenge has declined as a motive over time. Thus we see that by invading Ukraine Putin has very much gone against the tide of history—his adventure is an attempt to gain territory by means which previous initiators of such wars have found extraordinarily expensive (hence their decline); his act 184 Ibid., 19. Original emphasis. 185 Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 186 Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 273 of revenge against Ukraine has been found in the past to be a losing proposition; and his indirect war against the US via Ukraine exemplifies the pathological behavior of a weak and declining power starting a senseless war indirectly against a great power.187 While in comparison with the American experience as well as the general historical record Mr. Putin’s war appears clearly to have been a misadventure, the prospects for its termination may be better gauged from a theory put forward by the Dutch scholar, H.E. Goemans. In his War and Punishment,188 Goemans says that information gathered on the battlefield influences leaders to alter their war aims, but that their decisions to fight on or to negotiate also depends on their prospects of punishment on the domestic front. Different regimes respond differently; some gamble on victory even when it is improbable; others settle when they see defeat coming. Using both qualitative and quantitative data, Goemans maintains that even though based on World War One his “argument . . . holds for war termination in general.”189 Basically, “nonrepressive, nonexclusionary regimes,” or democracies, according to Goemans, will lower their war aims when they receive unfavorable new information. On the other hand, “semirepressive, moderately exclusionary regimes face the same likelihood of severe punishment— exile, imprisonment, or even death—when they settle on moderately losing terms as when they lose disastrously. . . . [They] have nothing to lose by continuing a losing war.”190 If we can agree that Zelenskyy’ regime fits the first type, and Putin’s the second, then Zelenskyy should be less likely to be punished for settling on losing terms, while Putin should be more likely to continue a losing war. By the end of its ninth month, Russia appeared to be losing the war; Ukraine, perhaps not winning, but at least not losing. Since wars by “semirepressive, moderately exclusionary regimes as losers [have] lasted twice as long as other wars,” then according to Goemans’s analysis this war is liable to be a prolonged one; such regimes, 187 Lebow, Why Nations Fight, 96. 188 H.E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000). 189 Ibid., 316. 190 Ibid., 310.

274 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR furthermore, “should be particularly susceptible to revolution because even a moderate loss suffices to coordinate the expectations and actions of the domestic opposition.”191

Ukraine and the War To all intents and purposes, Russia has already lost this war, regardless of its final outcome.192 And even if Ukraine loses, it will have already won—by withstanding an assault on its sovereignty and territorial integrity by the world’s second-largest army, by exposing the hypocrisy of Russia’s endless complaint about the danger of Ukrainian nationalism while cultivating its own lethal version, by winning the world’s respect for its steadfast bravery, and by earning the support of most of the world’s nations for its principled stand. Ukraine should emerge from this trauma with a more consolidated society and a stronger state. The war’s cohesive effects on Ukrainian society were captured in the results of a series of public opinion surveys. In one of them, conducted on 1 March 2022: 90 per cent of respondents expressed hope regarding the country’s situation, as against 30 per cent in November 2021; 88 per cent were sure of the army’s ability to repel Russia, as opposed to 56 per cent in January; 80 per cent supported the president’s actions, and an additional 13 per cent partially supported them; fully 80 per cent said they were ready to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity with weapons in hand, as compared to 59 per cent in October 2020; and entry into the EU and NATO was supported by 86 and 76 per cent, respectively.193 The other, conducted 2-11 May, revealed that: 94 per cent (up from 76 per cent in December 2021) of respondents considered it important for Ukraine to become a fully-functioning democracy; 52 per cent were actually very optimistic about Ukraine’s future, as opposed to 9 per cent in December 2021; 78 per cent were using the Ukrainian language 191 Ibid., 321. 192 See the fine essay by Freedman, “Why War Fails: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Limits of Military Power,” Foreign Affairs, 101, no. 4 (July/August 2022): 10-23. 193 Sotsialna hrupa Reitinh, “Zahalnonatsionalne opytuvannia: Ukraina v umovakh viiny,” 1 March 2022, 4-16.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 275 more for communicating and were donating more to the armed forces, while about 50 per cent were joining volunteer efforts and helping displaced persons more since the start of full-scale war; 88 per cent said they liked Zelenskyy, while 57 per cent rated the president’s actions as very good and 31 per cent, good; and 63 per cent expressed full, 34 per cent moderate, trust in the armed forces.194 Furthermore, an overwhelming majority, 73 per cent, would welcome a restoration of Ukraine to its borders of 2014 including Crimea and the Donbas to achieve peace; 42 per cent would not welcome a return to the borders of 2022, meaning the exclusion of Crimea and Donbas; and fully 65 per cent would not welcome retention only of the present lines of demarcation. By 2030, 90 per cent of respondents expected Ukraine to be a member of the EU, 73 per cent, of NATO.195 In a telephone survey conducted by the KIIS in August, 95 per cent of respondents thought it was important for Ukraine to become a fully-fledged functioning democracy.196 The actions of President Zelenskyy were rated very good by 48 per cent, and good by 34 per cent, for a total of 82 per cent; 87 per cent registered a liking for the president, 9 per cent, dislike. That Ukraine should retake control of its pre-2014 territory, including Donbas and Crimea, was approved by 77 per cent; while 92 per cent wanted Ukraine to become a member-state of the EU, and 79 per cent, of NATO; one-quarter of respondents preferred neutrality. This shows the significantly high public support for the Western orientation of the country and for defence against the Russian aggression, both strengthened in the course of the war. One of the most remarkable aspects of the war has been the mobilization of civil society in aid of the war effort, but this society actually organized itself—it did not require direction from a vozhd (supreme leader, as, e.g., Stalin) on high—to sew bulletproof vests and camouflage netting for the army, to make homemade bombs 194 National Democratic Institute, “Mozhlyvosti ta pereshkody na shliakhu demokratychnoho perekhodu Ukrainy: Zalahlnonatsionalne telefonichne opytuvannia, 2-11 travnia, 2022,” 4-19. 195 Ibid., 24-6. 196 National Democratic Institute, Mozhlyvosti ta pereshkody na shliakhu demokratychnoho perekhodu Ukrainy (n.p., n.d.).

276 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR against the enemy, and to ferry people, medicine, and supplies across the lines. There was no “collective action problem” here. People simply knew what to do and did it.197 The high level of vitality, morale, and vibrancy of its citizenry will stand Ukraine in good stead in rebuilding,198 if it survives the war. If the examples of Germany and Japan following the end of the Second World War are valid, then the significant destruction to its industrial base will be a blessing in disguise as with it will go outdated technology to be replaced by contemporary technology—does Ukraine really need those Soviet-era steelworks, anyway? In the meantime, Prime Minister Shmyhal, appearing at the international conference in Lugano on the subject of Ukraine’s postwar rehabilitation, has estimated the cost of renewal at three-quarters of a trillion (750 billion) US dollars.199 Over 40 countries and 20 international organizations in attendance approved a set of principles which would underly the effort to resurrect Ukraine’s economy and wellbeing, but significantly (in view of its track record on corruption and legal looseness) Ukraine would have to abide by them as well. The seven principles of the Lugano Declaration were: partnership; a focus on reform; transparency, accountability, and the rule of law; democratic participation; engaging multiple

197 See, for instance, Koshiw, “The Informal Volunteer Groups Leading Ukraine’s Aid Effort,” Guardian, 1 July 2022, on the Internet at https://www.theguardian.com /world/2022/jul/01/the-informal-volun . . ., accessed 1 July 2022; and Igor Kossov and Anna Yakutenko, “Volunteers Keep Donbas Running Through Its Darkest Hours,” Kyiv Independent, 1 July 2022, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent.co m/national/volunteers-keep-donbas-runni . . ., accessed 1 July 2022. 198 Zhernakov, “Hromadianske suspilstvo—zhytievo neobkhidnyi element uspishnoi transformatsii Ukrainy,” Ukrainska pravda, 5 July 2022, on the Internet at https://ww w.pravda.com.ua/columns/2022/07/5/7356426/, accessed 5 July 2022. 199 “Plan vidnovlennia Ukrainy vzhe otsiniuietsia u $750 mlrd, vazhlyve dzherelo—konfiskatsiia koshtiv ahresora,--Shmyhal,” Den, 4 July 2022, on the Internet at https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/news/040722-plan-vidnovlennya-ukrainy . . ., accessed 4 July 2022; Dana Hordiichuk, “Ukraina predstavyla plan vidnovlennia na $750 miliardiv: yak vyhliadatyme povoienna vidbudova,” Ekonomichna pravda, 4 July 2022, on the Internet at https://www.epravda.com.u a/nes/2022/07/4/688833/, accessed 4 July 2022; and Yaroslav Vinokurov, “Plan Marshalla z poliv Luhano: yak budut vidbudovuvaty Ukrainu za 750 miliardiv dolariv,” Ekonomichna pravda, 5 July 2022, on the Internet at https://ww w.epravda.com.ua/publications/2022/07/5/688861/, accessed 5 July 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 277 stakeholders; gender equity and inclusion; and sustainability.200 The Lugano principles for the reconstruction of Ukraine correspond exactly to the issues in political development that are holding Ukraine back from democratic normality identified here in previous chapters which means that the country must not only be rebuilt economically but must fundamentally transform itself at the same time politically. Shmyhal expected the costs of his ten-year Marshall Plan for Ukraine should be borne by Russia as the aggressor, but this was highly unlikely—giving a totally new meaning to the phrase, “crime does not pay.” By his decree No. 266/2022 in April, President Zelenskyy set up a National Council for Ukraine’s Recovery from the Consequences of the War.201 The task of the council, co-chaired by Prime Minister Shmyhal and the head of the President’s Office, Andrii Yermak, was to take an inventory of war damage and develop a plan for the rebuilding of the country’s economy. It was to consist of two dozen working groups made up of government officials and parliamentarians which would prepare proposals for the president’s approval. As others pointed out, planning the reconstruction of Ukraine had to entail envisioning an economy of high valueadded industrial production rather than replicating the hitherto-existing model of agricultural powerhouse.202 It should also mean the 200 “V Luhano zatverdyly sim pryntsypiv protsesu vidnovlennia Ukrainy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 5 July 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print /POLITICS/v-luhano-zatverdili-sim-pri . . ., accessed 5 July 2022. For some of the Western nations’ responses to the question of rebuilding Ukraine, see Steven Erlanger, “How Will Ukraine Rebuild (and Who Should Pay)?” New York Times, 7 September 2022, on the Internet at https://www. nytime.com/2022/09 /07/world/europe/how-wil-ukraine-rebuild-and-who-should-pay.html, accessed 7 September 2022. Mercifully, one of the authors of the German Marshall Fund report on the matter was quoted as saying that “No one wants Ukraine to be a failed state.” 201 “Prezydent stvoryv Natsionalnu radu z vidnovlennia Ukrainy vid naslidkiv viiny,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 22 April 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/arti cle/print/POLITICS/prezident-stvoriv-natsional . . ., accessed 22 April 2022. 202 Iryna Pidorycheva, “Kliuchovi zavdannia povoiennoho vidnovlennia Ukrainy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 16 June 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/a rticle/printmacrolevel/kljuchovi-zavdannja-povoj . . . ., accessed 20 June 2022. Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector, employing “200,000 computer engineers and code writers” and bringing in “US 3.1-billion in revenue from thousands of customers” even in the midst of war, would be an essential element in rebuilding a

278 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR concurrent transformation of the country’s big tycoons (oligarchs) into big businessmen, shorn of their extraordinary political influence.203 In July, as mentioned, the council’s plan for Ukraine’s renewal was presented to an international conference in Lugano, Italy, for approval by foreign governments and investors.204 The plan, envisaged as being implemented in stages over a ten-year period, was estimated to cost US$750 billion, made up of grants, loans or credits, and private investment. Ukraine had to promise also to enact more real reforms, including democratization, decentralization, and anti-corruption. Much will hinge on the response of current and post-war Ukrainian elites to the challenges before them. Success would be indicated by growth in GDP of seven per cent per annum.205 Ukraine’s renewal plan received a somewhat lukewarm reception in Lugano due to a lack of specifics and of financial transparency, and the conference replied by approving a declaration incorporating the principles by which the process of reconstruction would be governed and to which Ukraine was expected to adhere.206 As of 1 June, according to a World Bank-EC study, total physical damage from the war was estimated at nearly US $100 modern economy. David Segal, “Ukrainian Tech Powers Through Conflict,” Globe and Mail (Alberta edition), 25 July 2022. This article appeared originally in the New York Times. 203 Ihor Popov, “Peremoha plius deoliharkhizatsii vsiiei krainy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 16 June 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/internal/pere moha-pljus-deoliharkhizats . . ., accessed 16 June 2022. Coincidentally, it was reported that oligarchs have lost their political influence in the course of the war, but whether this was going to be permanent is unknown. Koshiw, “How the War Has Robbed Ukraine’s Oligarchs of Political Influence,” Guardian, 23 July 2022, on the Internet at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/ 23/ukraine-oligarchs- . . ., accessed 23 July 2022. 204 Hordiichuk, “Ukraina predstavyla plan vidnovlennia na $750 miliardiv”; and Vinokurov, “Plan Marshalla z poliv Luhano.” 205 Mariia Levonova, “Pro yakyi svit mriialy v Luhano i yak tse peretvoryty na diiu,” Ukrainska pravda, 8 July 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.co m.ua/columns/2022/07/8/73569984/, accessed 8 July 2022; and Yuliia Svyrydenko, “Yaku ekonomiku my buduiemo?” Ukrainska pravda, 8 July 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2022/07/8/7357131 /, accessed 9 July 2022. 206 “V Luhano zatverdyly sim pryntsypiv”; and Andrii Dlihach, “Ukraine Recovery Conference: trykutnyk vidnovlennia,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 9 July 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/macrolevel/ukraine-recovery-co nferen . . ., accessed 11 July 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 279 billion; the cost of reconstruction and recovery, approximately $350 billion.207

Politics Never Sleeps In the background to the war, meantime, domestic politics in Ukraine was following its customary pattern. The SBU called in for questioning three former leading politicians—Yatseniuk, Turchynov, and Avakov—in connection with the state’s case against Viktor Medvedchuk and Petro Poroshenko involving coal purchased from the L/DPR.208 Thus it appeared that Zelenskyy’s pursuit of his political foes was continuing. The president was also asked how the minister of education could remain in office despite being accused of plagiarism, but brushed the issue aside as a very small problem.209 The head of the NABU at the end of his term of office claimed that his agency had broken up what he called the “caste of untouchables,” but cautioned that after the war’s end the political class would resume its efforts to dismantle or render harmless the entire anti-corruption structure.210 This would, of course, go against the EU’s expectations regarding postwar development of Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court was unable to select as its head a replacement for the disgraced Justice Oleksandr Tupytskyi, subject of an international search.211 And in the quest for 207 World Bank, Government of Ukraine, and European Commission, Ukraine: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (August 2022). 208 “SBU vyklykala na dopyt Yatseniuka, Turchynova ta Avakova,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 25 May 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLI TICS/sbu-viklikala-na-dopit-jatse . . ., accessed 25 May 2022; and Valentyna Romanenko, “SBU vyklykaie na dopyt Yatseniuka, Turchynova, Avakova u spravi ‘Medvedchuk-Poroshenko’,” Ukrainska pravda, 25 May 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/25/7/7348419/, accessed 25 May 2022. 209 Iryna Yehorchenko, “Plahiat Shkarleta: chomu tse vazhlyvo navit pid chas viiny,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 21 May 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/arti cle/print/science/plhiat-shkarleta-chomu-tse-va . . ., accessed 25 May 2022. 210 “NABU zruinuvalo kastu nedotorkanykh—Sytnyk,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 22 April 2022, on the internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/nabu-zruj nuvalo-kastu-nedo . . ., accessed 22 April 2022. 211 “Konstytutsiinyi sud ne zmih obraty novoho holovu,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 14 June 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/konstituts ijnij-sud-ne-zmih . . ., accessed 14 June 2022.

280 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR a new head of SAP, the PA was promoting the candidacy of an “avatar” of Tatarov, the latter still under a cloud of suspected corruption.212 Thus the president’s office was continuing to interfere with the operation of the legal system as well as in politics more broadly. The delay in choosing the SAP director was clearly playing into the hands of the corruptioneers, notably those involved in the illegally closed-down Rotterdam+ case.213 The qualified candidate, Oleksandr Klymenko, was eventually selected and appointed SAP director in July 2022.214 This appeared to provide a window of opportunity for turning Ukraine’s anticorruption policy in the right direction, to stifle the drain on the country’s resources. As a sign perhaps of the war’s sobering effect on the Ukrainian political class, one of the new SAP director’s first decisions was to cancel the closure of the Rotterdam+ case, thus reopening it, and to replace the prosecutors involved. Of course, that 212 Shabunin, “Pryznachennia kerivnyka SAP: Bankova pidhotuvalasia, doruchyvshy Ofis henprokuratora prysluzi Tatarova,” Ukrainska pravda, 29 June 2022, on the Internet at https://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/shabunin/62d5 1e763e6f8/, accessed 18 July 2022. Eventually, an ex-detective of the NAZK, Oleksandr Klymenko, was officially appointed head of SAP, the office having been vacant since August 2020. “Komisiia oholosyla pro pryznachennia kerivnyka SAP,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 19 July 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua /ukr/POLITICS/komisija-oholosila-pro-priznachennja- . . ., accessed 19 July 2022; and Sorokin, “Selection Panel Declares Winner Set to Lead Special AntiCorruption Prosecutor’s Office,” Kyiv Independent, 19 July 2022, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent. com/national/selection-panel-declares-winn . . ., accessed 19 July 2022. 213 Shabunin, “Sprava Rotterdam+: yak vidsutnist kerivnyka SAP hraie na ruku koruptsioneram,” Ukrainska pravda, 5 July 2022, on the Internet at https://www .pravda.com.ua/columns/2022/07/5/7356419/, accessed 5 July 2022. 214 This paragraph draws from: Sukhov, “Who is Oleksandr Klymenko, Ukraine’s New Top Anti-Corruption Prosecutor?” Kyiv Independent, 29 July 2002, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent.com/hot-topic/explainer-whos-ukrainesne . . ., accessed 4 August 2022; Inna Vedernikova, “Uvimknennia SAP. V Ukraini vidkryvaietsia antykoruptsiinyi front,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 11 August 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/internal/uvimknennj a-sap-v-ukrajini-v . . ., accessed 11 August 2022; “Kerivnyk SAP skasuvav rishennia prokurora pro zakryttia spravy ‘Rotterdam+’,” Den, 22 September 2022, on the Internet at https:// day.kyiv.ua/uk/news/220922-kerivnyk-sap-s kasuvav-rishenn . . ., accessed 22 September 2022; and Shabunin, “Sprava ‘Rotterdam+’; yak novopryznachenyi holova SAP zminyv pravyla hry,” Ukrainska pravda, 23 September 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com/ua/col umns/2022/09/23/7368731/, accessed 23 September 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 281 was not the end of the story by any means as oligarchs and the government were expected to go on the counterattack. For its part, the Verkhovna Rada had a considerable load of “homework” to bring itself into alignment with EU standards if Ukraine was to become a member, yet it managed instead to amend the anticorruption legislation to allow parliamentarians and government officials to exempt gifts, in cash form in particular, from their declaratory obligations.215 There was a ban on political parties with ties to the Russian Federation, which could be seen as incidentally helping to deal with or dispose of some of Zelenskyy’s opponents. The Opposition Platform—For Life caucus in the Rada was disbanded, a rump group of 25 of its members re-branding themselves as the Platform for Life and Peace.216 The president’s office meanwhile was working on coopting the Poroshenko camp, on plans for possible early elections to capitalize on Zelenskyy’s wartime popularity, and on measures that would reduce the popularity of the chief of the army seen as a potential presidential competitor.217 The president’s office was also involved in the suspension and dismissal of the prosecutor general, a clear case of political 215 Stanislav Ivasyk, “’Yevrointehratsiia’ Verkhovnoi rady: shcho maie zminytysia u parlamenti cherez status kandydata v YeS,” Yevropeiska pravda, 6 July 2022, on the Internet at https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2022/07/6/714 2680/, accessed 7 July 2022; and Olena Kordoba, “U Radi skasuvaly obmezhennia na podarunkiv dlia deputativ,” Vysokyi zamok, 9 July 2022, on the Internet at https://wz.lviv.ua/news/464747-rada-skasuvala-obmezhennya-na-p . . ., accessed 13 July 2022. The deputies also increased their salaries by 20,000 UAH, or 72 per cent, thus restoring an earlier pay cut. Yuliia Lishchenko, “Nardepy pidnialy sobi zarplaty azh na 20 tysiach!” Vysokyi zamok, 26 July 2022, on the Internet at https://wz.lviv.ua/ukraine/467322-nardepy-pidnialy-sobi-zarplat y-a . . ., accessed 26 July 2022. 216 Kateryna Tyshchenko, “VR ostatochno zaboronyla diialnist prorosiiskykh partii,” Ukrainska pravda, 3 May 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.co m.ua/news/2022/05/3/7343743/, accessed 3 May 2022. 217 Romaniuk and Kravets, “Polityka pid chas viiny: yak Zelenskyi znyshchuie konkurentiv,” Ukrainska pravda, 21 April 2022, on the Internet at https://www. pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/04/21/7341035/, accessed 21 April 2022; and Anna Myroniuk, “Serhiy Prytula: ‘Flawed Political System Has Not Vanished, It Has Laid Low Until War Ends’,” Kyiv Independent, 19 June 2022, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent.com/national/serhiy-prytula-flawed-political . . ., accessed 20 June 2022.

282 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR interference with the legal system.218 The Rada, however, voted for her removal without raising a single question, as mechanically as it had her initial appointment, blandly following presidential direction.219 Venediktova was replaced by another Zelenskyy loyalist, Andriy Kostin. As head of the corresponding parliamentary committee, Kostin had been effective in blocking judicial reform on Zelenskyy’s behalf. He had been the administration’s preferred candidate for Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor in 2021. Unsuccessful in that competition, he was now being promoted to becoming the latter’s supervisor. Hence, most probably the continuing political effectiveness of the prosecutor-general’s office rather than its reform and depoliticization, was being assured.220 Judicial reform was a condition of Ukraine’s acceptance into the EU, but the ongoing machinations involving the VRP, the Ethics Council, and the Office of the President, conveniently overshadowed by the war, put into doubt that 3,000 new justices of unquestionable integrity and independence would ever be found.221 The situation with reform of

218 Lapatina, Sorokin, and Olga Rudenko, “Zelensky Fires Prosecutor General Venediktova, Security Chief Bakanov,” Kyiv Independent, 17 July 2022, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent.com/national/zelensky-fires-prosecutorgen . . ., accessed 17 July 2022; and Roman Romaniuk, “Chomu usunuly Bakanova i Venediktovu. Sylova vertykal Zelenskoho,” Ukrainska pravda, 18 July 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/07/18/73 58848/, accessed 19 July 2022. 219 Iryna Balachuk, “Rada zvilnyla Venediktovu,” Ukrainska pravda, 19 July 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/07/19/7358934/, accessed 19 July 2022. Venediktova was named ambassador to Switzerland in November 2022. 220 Liemienov, “Khto takyi i chy bude nezalezhnym novyi henprokuror Andrii Kostin,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 27 July 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/art icle/print/internal/khto-takij-i-chi-bude-nezalez . . ., accessed 4 August 2022; Sukhov, “Andriy Kostin Appointed Prosecutor General. Here’s What We Know About Him,” Kyiv Independent, 27 July 2022, on the Internet at https://kyivinde pendent.com/politics/parliament-appoints-mp-andri . . ., accessed 4 August 2022; and Sukhov, “Who is Oleksandr Klymenko, Ukraine’s New Top AntiCorruption Prosecutor?” Kyiv Independent, 29 July 2022, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent,com/hot-topic/explainer-whos-ukraines-ne . . ., accessed 4 August 2022. 221 Zhernakov and Samira Abbasova, “Sudova reforma. Z yakymy ryzykamy ide protses formuvannia VRP,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 18 August 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/internal/sudova-reforma-z-jakimi-rizi . . ., accessed 18 August 2022.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 283 the Constitutional Court was similar. In Ukrainian political circles the path to assuring an honorable institution was well-known, but the Zelenskyy team seemed determined (to tell from its actions) to keep it under presidential control.222 These and other familiar practices would have to change, otherwise they could bring down the entire renewal project for Ukraine. As to patronalism, there was scant evidence of it in 2022.

Conclusion As this chapter has shown, neither diplomatic nor military means have worked to secure Ukraine’s independent existence from Russia, nor to restore its original, pre-2014 territorial integrity, either under President Poroshenko or Zelenskyy. It is a no-win situation that in the end is going to be determined by force of arms, and Russia simply has more arms than Ukraine. International norms having been discarded, the balance is in favor of Russia and against Ukraine so long as Putin remains as president of Russia. Ukrainian sovereignty cannot be assured by law or defensive military action. President Putin is in thrall to the ideology of Eurasianism, geopolitics, and passionarity, which entirely supersedes international norms along with any practical or moral considerations, as he pursues his mission of restoring Russia to its Great Power status.223 Nothing Ukraine has been able to say or do since 2014 has diverted the Russian president from his imperial project; if anything, reinforced it. In the absence of international law and organization— which Russia has willfully destroyed—the existence of an independent Ukraine depends not on diplomacy but on the whim of its larger neighbor for whom it is historically unnecessary. Short of a third World War, so long as the Russian president and his 222 Yaroslav Yurchyshyn, “Konstytutsiinyi sud: Ukrainy chy Ofisu prezydenta?” Ukrainska pravda, 4 August 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.u a/columns/2022/08/4/7361868/, accessed 4 August 2022; and Denys Maslov, “Dobir suddiv KSU: shcho peredbachaiut novi pravyla konkursu,” Ukrainska pravda, 6 September 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/colu mns/2022/09/6/7366293/, accessed 6 September 2022. 223 Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016).

284 RUSSIA’S GENOCIDAL WAR government subscribes to the “dream of empire,” there cannot be a sovereign Ukrainian state, and the idea of Ukraine as a “failed state” becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. At the same time, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has emerged as a genuinely heroic wartime leader, the Ukrainian armed forces have defended the country pushing back the aggressor in equally heroic fashion, and the Ukrainian public has become consolidated as never before. Furthermore, despite all the undeserved punishment it has suffered, that public’s support for the aggressor’s expulsion from all of Ukraine’s territory—including Crimea—has reached an all-time high level. This remarkable and historically unprecedented transformation was the opposite of Putin’s war aims, unwittingly forging the Ukrainian civic nation in an attempt to destroy it. Russia will have to reckon with this in the future, and Ukraine will have to build on it not squandering an historic opportunity. The war has clarified for all concerned which camp Ukraine belongs to, Russian or Western. The major question relevant for this study is whether the shock of war has finally persuaded Ukraine’s political leadership of the vital need to eliminate politics and corruption from the legal establishment for the sake of the country’s revival.

6. Conclusion This book began from a simple observation: a major dynamic characteristic of post-communist countries—patronal politics, a theory elaborated by Henry Hale—had apparently bypassed Ukraine, beginning in 2014. Neither President Poroshenko nor his successor, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, appeared to have acted in conformity with the theory, either by coming to office through the help of a significant patron-client network or by building a single pyramid of such ties while in office. It meant that the theory would have to be reconsidered, that perhaps another dynamic was at work underlying Ukrainian politics in the post-Euromaidan era, and that an investigation was in order.

On Patronal Politics in Post-2014 Ukraine The objective of the present work was to determine if patronal politics had been at work from 2014 on through a careful scrutiny of the activities of the two presidents, focusing narrowly on a concept of the political as a search for compliance. This examination found scant evidence for the operation of patronal politics in the exercise of presidential power in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. Instead it was discovered that both of Ukraine’s last two presidents engaged in an unconstitutional, unrestrained scramble for power, and employed the law as a political weapon, revealing the unconsolidated nature of the Ukrainian political system. Furthermore, I argue, this evident lack of consolidation and coherence constitutes a threat to Ukraine’s existence as an independent state: domestically, by alienating its own public in terms of electoral support and trust in institutions; externally, by alienating Western support for realizing its Euro-Atlantic aspirations; and externally as well, by inviting Russian military intervention in addition to its long-term political interference. It is in Ukraine’s interest to repair this basic problem identified by the present research as a prevalent pattern at the apex of power; patronal politics, meantime, would seem to have receded into the background. 285

286 CONCLUSION While showing Ukraine as having an unconsolidated political system, I categorically dismiss characterizing it as a “failed state.” Probing deeply into the literature on the topic reveals the troublesome nature of the term. This it turns out is essentially a label applied to what are considered to be dangerous states, but it is not altogether clear if by employing such a label one can avoid confusing causes with symptoms or vice versa. It has been shown to be an ideology that justifies outside intervention in such arbitrarily labelled states and their securitization, which actually merely aggravates the “problem” of their condition. Hence, although intervenors resort to it on a regular basis, the term is not useful for political analysis because of its lack of conceptual clarity and inability to distinguish the thing from its opposite. As Paul D’Anieri has said, Ukraine may be politically unstable, but it is by no means a “failed state.” After all, Italy, too, is notoriously unstable, yet no one refers to it as a “failed state.” Of the various approaches to the study of post-communist politics applied to Ukraine in the past thirty years—transitology, electoral authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism, hybrid regime—Henry Hale’s patronal politics stands out. He demonstrates that the fundamental dynamic of such polities consists of a cycle that appears chaotic but is in fact regular. In it, the reigning president builds up a pyramid of patron-client supporters under him with whose help he keeps down his opponents (and their attempts to build competing such pyramids) thereby holding onto office for a second term. At the end of that term, when he is effectively a “lame duck,” his clients defect to a new patron who becomes the president’s successor and the cycle begins over again. Thus little progress towards open competition along democratic lines is evident, but nor is there a collapse of the system—it is not anarchy. Since in Ukraine following the 2014 Revolution of Dignity this pattern of patronal politics—formation of single and multiple pyramids of patron-client ties, a “lame duck” incumbent—was not apparent, I set out to uncover what really had been happening in the surroundings of the presidency under Poroshenko and Zelenskyy. In addition to looking for evidence of patronal behavior, the focus was restricted for reasons explained earlier to the law-related

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 287 institutions of the state, and to informal practices which previous literature suggested should be being replaced over the course of time by formal institutions. This approach of mine was not intended to advocate a wholesale reorientation of the study of postcommunist Ukrainian politics and government, nor as a replacement for the existing approaches, but as an additional, microlevel perspective. Occasionally, as here, it may be possible to gain a better understanding of Ukrainian elite politics through the detailed tracing of day-to-day activity, formal and informal, within the president’s circle in relation specifically to law-related institutions. But it all depends on what the researcher is looking for to start with—a general explanation at the macro level, or a case-specific one at the micro level.

Poroshenko’s Presidency Examining Poroshenko’s presidency confirmed initial skepticism regarding the continued validity of the patronal theory as applied to his term of office. It suggested from the empirical record a rather different dynamic altogether as having been in operation at the apex of Ukrainian politics in 2014-19 than what should have been expected if the theory was correct. Poroshenko arrived in office without a network of clientelistic supporters, an established political party, or an endorsement from other prominent members of the political elite. No one flocked to his side thereafter. He appointed business associates and friends to political office, many of whom became suspects in cases of corruption but remarkably had charges against them quashed by the prosecutor-general, a presidential loyalist. Poroshenko posed before the IMF and international sponsors as a fighter against corruption, but in fact acted to suppress the anticorruption agencies and their work. In part, this was done by the creation of new institutions, but the pattern of the law and political corruption operating hand-in-glove continued. He made every effort to subordinate all legal and anti-corruption bodies to himself, and to ensure their working in favor of political associates while prosecuting political opponents. The sole institution he was not able to bring under his control was the National Police, responsible

288 CONCLUSION for law enforcement, which remained in the fiefdom of the interior minister. Poroshenko does not appear to have eliminated or reduced the prevalence of informal political practices—such as kumstvo, corruption, and kruhova poruka—nor was his campaign against the oligarchs successful. Of course, it might be argued that he failed to win re-election precisely because he had neglected to build that necessary single pyramid of patron-client relations, but how had he been victorious in the first place without one? Instead of concentrating on patronal politics, Poroshenko acted to control as much as possible of the legal field so as to protect himself and his cronies in the politics-business arena from prosecution. It was as though under President Poroshenko government had become a protection racket; perhaps it had always been so since Kuchma’s time.

Zelenskyy’s Presidency Poroshenko’s successor, Zelenskyy, behaved in office in remarkably similar fashion, despite their being different personalities with different backgrounds between whom no love was lost, indicating some common underlying dynamic associated with the office of president in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. Patronalism played no discernible part in Zelenskyy’s election victory over Poroshenko in 2019, and thereafter the new president never paid serious attention to it in terms of building up his own pyramid of patron-client relations and undermining the efforts of rivals or opponents to do so. Like Poroshenko, he maneuvered to get control of the major lawrelated institutions, fending off prosecutions of his associates, pursuing his political opponents, and deflecting the anti-corruption campaign instead of facilitating or reinforcing it. He even managed to secure control of the National Police from the grasp of the longserving interior minister whom he replaced with his own appointee. He attempted to gain control of the courts, which were in need of reform, but unable to reform them was satisfied to leave them operating in their customary politicized manner. They could be politically useful, even in their unreformed condition. The president’s office became the hub of government, intruding into questions of appointments including those outside the president’s remit,

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 289 legislation (giving direction to the Verkhovna Rada), and policy (displacing the cabinet of ministers, the government itself). Zelenskyy was unable to count on his party’s parliamentary majority in the Verkhovna Rada to support his agenda, hence his intrusion into the Rada’s business. His struggle with the oligarch Kolomoiskyi, whose influence on the Rada deputies continued to be substantial, was unsuccessful. The anti-oligarch legislation initiated by the president turned out to be yet another means for him to settle scores with political opponents rather than bringing the oligarchs to heel. Dissatisfied with his experience interacting with other institutions, Zelenskyy retreated to his security and defense council (RNBOU), beginning a pattern of securitization of policy-making—a kind of attempted rule-by-decree, bypassing the administration and legislature, inimical to democratic decision-making. President Zelenskyy came to office promising to terminate political corruption, kumstvo, and other informal practices eroding public trust in the institutions of government, but found himself transgressing constitutional norms by attempting to control all aspects of the law and instrumentalizing it for his own purposes much like his predecessor. All of this attests to the unconsolidated nature of the Ukrainian political system, and the inability of the president to confine his competitors or to compel them to accept his monopoly of power. This unconsolidated condition is a serious problem for Ukraine in terms of its political development, both for domestic stability as well as for external security. The undefined character of the governmental field, the unconfined players within the political arena, the elusiveness of a monopoly of power at the apex and its recognition by the relevant actors, the predominance of informal practices over legal structures, and the non-observance of boundaries between the political and everything else—what Ukrainians and others refer to overall as the systema—erodes trust in the formal institutions of government and undermines stability. Hence the one-term presidencies of those captive to this “system.” What Ukraine needs to overcome this chronic problem is multifold: programmatic political parties that compete for public favor on the basis of policies rather than personalities; an impartial civil service immune to corruption; an independent judiciary untainted by

290 CONCLUSION corruption; a president who observes the law instead of using it as a political weapon, and who stops pretending to be implementing political reforms; and an effective decoupling of the politics-business-government nexus. It will be impossible to achieve this, unless and until someone realizes the corrosive effect politics-as-usual (of the kind prevailing under presidents Poroshenko and Zelenskyy) is having and resolves to do something about it. Until such time as there is this fundamental change the Ukrainian electorate will continue to toss out the rascals, independently of where the presidential contenders might find themselves in the patronal cycle of politics. Another Maidan Revolution is not out of the realm of possibility in the absence of political reforms as outlined here. In the field of foreign policy and international relations, a prolongation of Ukraine’s unconsolidated domestic politics leaves the country vulnerable from East and West. Western governments, businesses, and international organizations expect transparency, accountability, and the rule of law in their dealings with the Ukrainian government. When these are found to be lacking, assistance is held back and confidence in Ukraine’s future prospects is impaired. On the other side, Russia’s bullying of the Ukrainian government is facilitated by the ease with which its politicians and businessmen can be bought off—as confirmed when numerous such individuals fled to Russia in the wake of the 2022 invasion. It is thus easier for Russian propaganda to sell the image of Ukraine as “failed” or “failing state” to the rest of the world.

On Putin’s War The war with Russia constitutes a threat to the very physical survival of Ukraine on the world map and in world history. President Poroshenko had only limited success in dealing with it, due in large part to Russia’s adoption of the combined role of aggressor as well as self-appointed arbitrator and peacemaker. He found that neither diplomacy nor military force was effective in restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty over its territory or in quelling the rebellion. On coming to office, Poroshenko promised to bring order to the Donbas and to restore ties with Moscow. He called on the rebels

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 291 to lay down their arms, but would not negotiate with them; he also called on all foreign fighters to leave the area; and he offered some concessions on regional issues. He told President Putin bluntly that “Crimea is Ukraine soil.” At the same time, he wanted to modernize the army, to continue the campaign in the east, and to encourage the country’s reindustrialization. Poroshenko’s peace plan was dismissed by the rebel leadership in Donbas and criticized by the Russian foreign minister. He persisted with a new plan involving international participation and adherence to the Minsk Accords. Once more, he turned his attention to modernization of the armed forces and their transformation into a professional body. This was necessitated by the indifferent attitude of Western allies to Ukraine’s perilous security situation. That perilousness was acknowledged by abandoning the term “Anti-Terrorist Operation” (ATO) as applied to the Donbas conflict. Poroshenko had difficulty drawing the attention of US President Donald Trump to Ukraine’s predicament. Unable either to convince Trump to supply lethal weaponry, or Putin to desist from fueling the Donbas rebellion, Poroshenko announced his government’s foreign policy priority as integration into the Euro-Atlantic community, placing his trust for national survival meanwhile in the armed forces of Ukraine. A novice in politics and foreign policy, President Zelenskyy sought to differentiate himself from his predecessor by opting initially for diplomacy over military strategy to end the war with Russia. Stymied in this approach, Zelenskyy turned to the United States, but like Poroshenko was unable to engage President Trump’s attention. His haphazard, amateurish approach drew scorn and criticism. In May 2021, he still hoped to meet President Putin so as to end the war. As the year 2021 drew to a close, it was unclear if Zelenskyy had a proper understanding of Ukraine’s precarious situation; he was still saying direct talks could halt the war. He even ignored warnings from the Biden administration on the eve of the invasion that war was imminent. In light of which his subsequent performance as wartime leader was truly extraordinary and much applauded.

292 CONCLUSION

War’s Impact on Ukraine Long in gestation, all the while masked by consistent denials, Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, caught Zelenskyy and many others by surprise. As well it might, given its blatant illegality, absence of justification, and historical anachronism. More a terrorist operation intended for intimidation rather than a conventional military campaign, the invasion failed to achieve it principal objectives of decapitating the Ukrainian government in Kyiv and capturing the major cities; it thus dragged on inconclusively for the invaders. The “annexation” of four oblasts which Russia did not fully control turned out to be a propaganda exercise with no practical effect on the war’s outcome. Having failed on the battlefield, the Russians resorted to heavy bombardment of civilian targets and infrastructure hoping to induce terror in the population which would bring Zelenskyy to the negotiating table. This strategy has never worked in the past, not even with the firebombing of Dresden in World War Two, but that fact has not inhibited its use including in the present instance by the Russian invaders. Nearly a year into the conflict, the Ukrainian public’s resolve to resist remained firm.1 As the war continued, Putin’s aims drifted away from conquering Ukraine as a discrete target to countering the overarching and for him unbearable dominance of the United States in the world. Ukraine thus became, in the Russian narrative, the unfortunate victim of collateral damage in an historic confrontation between great powers. In the process, Russia’s losses after nine months of fighting were approaching 100,000 personnel killed and a proportionate amount of equipment destroyed,

Andrii Sukharyna and Petro Burkovskyi, “Shchodo prymusu do myru. Pro shcho dumaiut ukraintsi pry svichkakh. Slidamy sotsopytuvannia ‘Deminitsiatyv’,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 21 November 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/u kr/article/print/internal/shchodo-primusu-do-miru-pr . . ., accessed 21 November 2022; “Ponad 90% hromadian viriat u peremohu Ukrainy u viini proty RF—opytuvannia,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 29 December 2022; and Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, “Dynamics of Readiness for Territorial Concessions for the Earliest Possible End of the War: Results of a Telephone Survey Conducted on December 4-27, 2022,” on the Internet at https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&ca t=reports&id-1167&page=1, accessed 7 January 2023.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 293 although the supply of Russian missiles and artillery shells aimed or misaimed at civilian targets in Ukraine appeared to be inexhaustible. These losses represented one half of the original forces assigned to the invasion, and forty per cent of Russia’s inventory of tanks.2 Towards the end of the year, the chief Kremlin spokesman stated that the replacement of Zelenskyy was not after all an objective of Russia’s “special operation,” which otherwise was going according to plan.3 The course of this war proved more surprising than its initiation, when most experts expected a quick win for Russia over Ukraine. Unsuccessful in its land war, the Russian Federation retaliated by destroying Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, exposing the civilian population to winter’s hazards.4 Its takeover of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant constituted a clear violation international nuclear security rules about which the international community could do nothing.5 Russia has interfered with the agreement by which grain can be exported from southern Ukrainian ports, a vital part of Ukraine’s economy, and had threatened to cut off gas to Europe transiting Ukrainian territory. Ukrainian civilians, including children, have been forcibly deported to Russia and areas it controls in order to be re-educated into patriotic Russians. Hospitals and schools, as well as universities, have been shelled and destroyed. Museums and private homes have been ruined and looted by Russian troops. The litany of Russia’s war crimes,

Timothy Ash, “It’s Costing Peanuts for the US to Defeat Russia,” Kyiv Post, 20 November 2022, on the Internet at https://kyivpost.com/article/opinion/oped/its-costing-peanuts . . ., accessed 20 November 2022; and Stefan Korshak, “Massed Russian Tank Attacks a Thing of Past, Hundreds Destroyed,” Kyiv Post, 21 November 2022, on the Internet at https://kyivpost.com/russia-war/ massed-russian-tank-attacks . . ., accessed 21 November 2022. Tetiana Lozovenko, “Kreml zaiavyv, shcho ne proty Zelenskoho na posadi prezydenta,” Ukrainska pravda, 21 November 2022, on the Internet at https://www.prav da.com.ua/news/2022/11/21/7377251/, accessed 21 November 2022. Alisa Orlova, “WHO: Winter Threatens Millions of Ukrainians,” Kyiv Post, 22 November 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politic s/who-winter-threatens-mi . . ., accessed 22 November 2022. Anastasiya Ringis, “Russia is Playing With Nuclear Fire in Zaporizhzhia,” Globe and Mail (Alberta edition), 22 November 2022.

294 CONCLUSION blackmail, and crimes against humanity perpetrated in this unjust war was as endless as the war itself. A peace deal presented to the Kremlin by the United States involving the surrender of Crimea to Russia was rejected by both sides.6 A ceasefire would not be in Ukraine’s interests: Russian forces must leave Ukrainian territory. At the G20 summit in Bali, President Zelenskyy presented a ten-point peace plan, but it was summarily dismissed as “unrealistic” by the Russian foreign minister who blamed the Ukrainian side for deliberately avoiding negotiations.7 From Ukraine’s perspective, negotiations cannot begin before a Russian withdrawal; Russia was never intending to withdraw, hence the stalemate. No peace is possible without Russia’s recognition that its invasion and occupation of Ukraine were illegal; no peace can be imposed on Ukraine by Russia in the meantime. Immeasurable damage has been inflicted on Ukraine’s economy,8 which will take a monumental effort to repair. Western governments are willing to assist, but on condition that the chaotic political practices so characteristic of post-communist Ukraine, and so contrary to the country’s best interests, are meaningfully curbed. Judging from the pattern of political behavior that has been going on in the background to the war, however, this will be difficult to achieve if not impossible. The president’s office has continued to

MacKinnon, “Top Ukraine Official Says Peace Deal With Russia Not an Option,” and Justin Ling, “What a Ceasefire in Ukraine Today Will Mean,” Globe and Mail (Alberta edition), 23 November 2022. President of Ukraine, Official Website, “Ukraine Has Always Been a Leader in Peacemaking Efforts; If Russia Wants to End this War, Let It Prove it With Actions—Speech by the President of Ukraine at the G20 Summit,” 15 November 2022, on the Internet at https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-za vzhdi-bula-lide . . ., accessed 18 November 2022; AFP, “Lavrov Says Ukraine’s Terms for Negotiations ‘Unrealistic’,” Kyiv Post, 15 November 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/russias-war/russias-lavrov-says-ukrain es . . ., accessed 18 November 2022; and Freedman, “Is Russia Losing?” Comment is Freed, 23 November 2022, on the Internet at https://samf.sustack.com/ p/is-russia-losing?utm_mediom=email, accessed 23 November 2022. “Ministry: Ukraine’s GDP Fell by 30.4% in 2022,” Kyiv Independent, 5 January 2023, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/ministry-uk raines-gdp-fell- . . ., accessed 7 January 2023. This is comparable to the Great Depression in North America in the 1930s.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 295 interfere with the operation of other branches of government.9 The war has ameliorated Zelenskyy’s oligarch problem by destroying a large part of their wealth and hence political influence.10 Otherwise, the Verkhovna Rada has pursued the amelioration of its own members’ well-being ahead of that of the broader Ukrainian public. The prosecutor-general was abruptly dismissed on the initiative of the president’s office and replaced by a known loyalist. Keeping the constitutional court under presidential control appears to have been the intention behind recent machinations. Practicing “politics as usual,” Kyiv may let slip its opportunity for early admission into the European Union.11 It was hoped that the war might concentrate the minds of members of the Ukrainian political elite on the need for fundamental change, but as of this writing that does not seem to have happened yet. In addition to their obligation of meeting the expectations of foreign governments, institutions, and investors, Ukraine’s politicians will also have to adjust themselves to an electorate that has

See, for instance, “Znaiomi Yermaka zaimaiut vysoki posady v Ukrnafti, Minoborony ta Oshchadbanku: detali,” Vysokyi zamok, 22 November 2022, on the Internet at https://wz.lviv.ua/news/477825-znaiomi-yermaka-ocholiuiut-vysok . . ., accessed 22 November 2022; and “Liudy z otochennia Yermaka za pivroku otrymaly shist vysokykh derzhposad—rozsliduvannia Bihus.Info,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 22 November 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/ POLITICS/ljudi-z-otochennja-jermak . . ., accessed 22 November 2022. Kevin Sullivan, David L. Stern, and Kostiantyn Khudov, “War Has Tamed Ukraine’s Oligarchs, Creating Space for Democratic Change,“ Washington Post, 8 December 2022; Frank Hofmann, “Ukraine: Pro-Russian Oligarchs Flee to French Riviera,“ Deutsche Welle, 8 December 2022; Dana Hordiichuk, “Dvadtsiatka naimozhnishykh ukraintsiv z liutoho vtratyla $20 miliardiv—reiting Forbes,” Ekonomichna pravda, 27 December 2022, on the Internet at https://ww w.epravda.com.ua/news/2022/12/27/695495/, accessed 27 December 2022; and Romaniuk and Kravets, “Pidsumky voiennoho roku: ukrainskyi sprotyv, pererodzhennia Zelenskoho, znyshchennia oliharkhiv,” Ukrainska pravda, 27 December 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022 /12/27/7382476/, accessed 27 December 2022. Sydorenko, “Kandydat na minimalkakh : Ukraina provaliuie vlasni plany shchodo vykonannia kriteriiv YeS,” Yevropeiska pravda, 14 November 2022, on the Internet at https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2022/11/14/71 50585/, accessed 14 November 2022; and Sukhov, “Zelensky Signs Judicial Bill that may Block European Integration, Undermine Western Support,“ Kyiv Independent, 21 December 2022, on the Internet at https://kyivindependent.com/na tional/zelensky-signs-judicial-bill-t . . ., accessed 21 December 2022.

296 CONCLUSION been significantly transformed by the war. Sociologists have reported that a new breed of citizenry was emerging, a public with different expectations about its role in politics and the role of politics in their own lives, as compared to the pre-2022 situation.12 This new public will demand a resumption of genuine social reforms, changes in the socioeconomic realm, more spending on social programs, an approximation to a European lifestyle, and in general a better standard of living. Politicians would be wise to respond to this fundamental change instead of returning to politics as usual— high-level corruption, self-dealing, lack of accountability, state capture, clientelism, informal practices, and impunity. Equally important in the regeneration of Ukraine would be the state and its international partners contributing to an expansion of the civil society network on a larger scale so as to assure the transformation’s success.13 Many have commented on the need for the Ukrainian political elite to transform itself into a genuine leadership force before it can begin to change the country, but Ukraine is still waiting for its generation of truly transformative leaders.14

Ukraine and the World The Russo-Ukrainian war has definitively demonstrated the impotence of the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, in 12

13 14

Oleksandr Kitral, “Viina formuie z ukraintsiv ‘novykh liudei’,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 27 April 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/SOCIIUM/vi jna-formuje-z-ukrajintsiv- . . ., accessed 28 April 2022. Zhernakov, “Hromadianske suspilstvo—zhyttievo neobkhidnyi element uspishnoi transformatsii Ukrainy.” See, for example, Kyrylenko, “Shcho ne tak z natsionalnoiu elitoiu Ukrainy. Dyskutuiut Yuliia Mostova, Oleksandr Roitburd ta Andrii Baumeister,” Ukrainska pravda, 6 September 2020, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/a rticles/2020/09/6/7265416/, accessed 7 September 2020; “Where Are the Transformational Leaders of Ukraine’s Maidan Generation?” New Europe, 22 October 2020, on the Internet at https://www.neweurope.eu/article/whereare-the-transformationa . . ., accessed 22 October 2020; Andrii Holub, “Sproby pidvyshchenia u klasi,” Tyzhden, 23 December 2020, on the Internet at https://tyzhden.ua/Politics/251088, accessed 14 January 2021; and Eldar Sarakhman and Nazarii Mazyliuk, “Sotsioloh Yevhen Holovakha: Ukraina Zelenskoho—tse 96-i kvartal,” Ukrainska pravda, 26 July 2021, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2021/07/26/7301554/, accessed 27 December 2021.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 297 fulfilling its vital task of assuring peace and security in the world. It has reawakened calls to reform or replace the UN, but as of this writing no initiatives in either direction have been started. Reform could involve a special resolution of the General Assembly to remove or suspend Russia from the Security Council or to deprive it of its veto, or both, and to institute simple majority voting in the Council without the power of veto for permanent members. The Security Council could be expanded to include other states now prominent on the world scene. UN Secretary General Guterres could convene a conference to relaunch and renew the UN, adapting it to twenty-first century conditions. Otherwise, it faces the same fate as the League of Nations which failed to act on Mussolini’s attack on Ethiopia.15 A proposal has been put forward to replace the UN with a union of democratic countries to confront dictatorships and mete out swift punishment for crimes committed. It would be modeled on NATO, but would also supersede the UN principle of “collective security” replacing it with what appears to be a self-appointed “democratic posse,” although its proponent does not call it that.16 To its credit, the General Assembly of the United Nations did pass a resolution to make Russia pay for its destruction of lives and property in the war on Ukraine, but it did so with a smaller majority than a similar resolution condemning Russia for its “illegal annexation” of Ukrainian territory a month earlier.17 The Russo-Ukraine war constitutes a gross crime and its perpetrators deserve to be brought to account. How can this be done? Agreeing that the UN is broken and incapable of restoration insofar as collective security is concerned, Philippe Sands believes that a special UN tribunal for Russia is impossible because none of the other permanent Security Council members wants to set a

15 16 17

Tisdall, “The United Nations Has the Power to Punish Putin. This is How it Can be Done.” Pavlo Zhovnirenko, “OON pomerla,” Den, 5 July 2022, on the Internet at https:/ /day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/polityka/oon-pomerla, accessed 7 July 2022. AFP, “UN Adopts Call for Russia to Pay Ukraine War Reparations,” Kyiv Post, 15 November 2022, on the Internet at https://www.kyivpost.com/world/unadopts-call-for-russia-to-pay-u . . ., accessed 15 November 2022.

298 CONCLUSION precedent for its own future arraignment.18 Nonetheless, he sees that international courts and jurists have proceeded with cases against Russian authorities on charges of war crimes. He foresees two models for dealing with such crimes: Nurnberg after 1945, and Serbia in 1993. In both cases, there followed a change of government in which the old regime was considered culpable; in neither case was it even imagined ahead of time that the culprits would face justice—but they did. Even though we do not know what will transpire in Russia in the future, Sands says, this should not justify inaction. Even if Putin himself never faces justice, the moral case against Russia will forestall absolution (on the pattern of Germany and Japan) indefinitely into the future.19 One of the lessons of this war is that a nuclear power enjoys absolute impunity and non-nuclear states have to endure it.20 Surprisingly or not, the war has had little practical effect on the EU’s long search for a more assertive geopolitical role—which ought to have been energized by the life-and-death struggle on its eastern doorstep.21 While reviving their debate about a more ambitious foreign policy, the EU member states have baulked at supplying certain kinds of weapons to Ukraine, at phasing out the import of natural gas from Russia, and have primarily acted to augment their own defenses rather than coming to the aid of Ukraine. “The larger member states remain reluctant to provide direct security guarantees to Ukraine and would prefer some kind of negotiated deal with Russia.”22 In sum, according to one critic, “the EU’s main

19 20

Lukashova and Musaieva, “’Mizhnarodna systema polamana’. Brytanskyi yuryst Filip Sends pro te, yak pokaraty Putina za viinu v Ukraini,” Ukrainska pravda, 12 April 2022, on the Internet at https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/ 2022/04/12/7338924/, accessed 13 April 2022. Lawrence Herman, “Putin May Never Face Justice for War Crimes,” Globe and Mail (Alberta edition), 25 July 2022. Umland and Hugo von Essen, “Choho Moskva navchyla derzhavy, yaki ne maiiut yadernoi zbroi,” Ukrainska pravda, 11 July 2022, on the Internet at https:/ /www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2022/07/11/7357498/, accessed 11 July 2022. Richard Youngs, “The Awakening of Geopolitical Europe?” Carnegie Europe, 25 July 2022, on the Internet at https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/07/28/awake ning-of-geopolitical-eu . . ., accessed 28 July 2022. Ibid.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 299 policy decisions have been guided by a desire not to get directly involved, not to have the responsibility of quickly integrating Ukraine, and not to have to manage deeply entwined international interdependencies.”23 Meanwhile, as President Zelenskyy has observed, Russia has through Gazprom effectively declared war on Europe.24 The war’s effect on NATO has been similar to the EU—a circling of the wagons, greater efforts at collective self-defense, as opposed to active measures to rebuff Russian aggression and to defend Ukraine. Extension of the war to the grain front has raised a threat of food shortages in less-developed countries of the Middle East and North Africa, which are especially dependent on Ukrainian wheat for bread-making. In general, the war has exacerbated the North-South divide globally, with many countries in South America, Africa, and Asia siding directly or indirectly with Russia. Putin’s actions will embolden other authoritarian leaders to assert themselves, for authoritarianism is easier to manage than democracy which is obviously too messy. It will encourage other states to settle disputes with neighbors by force, as the world lacks a settlement process now with the demise of the United Nations as such a body. Ukraine, along with the rest of the world, is at a critical juncture. There is no going back to their prior relationship with Russia, or their manner of conducting politics and business. But there is no clear way forward, either, because of the paralysis of the international system. Post-Euromaidan Ukraine is thus finished—there is no prospect of restoring its domestic politics or foreign relations to pre-2022, in my estimation. For it to survive, the country must be fundamentally transformed, largely by the efforts of Ukrainians themselves, and not continue as the plaything of East-West contestation. Ukraine’s politicians must get serious about reform and stop playing games with the IMF and EU whose help they need. The

23 24

Ibid. Emphasis in the original. “Rosiia oholosyla viinu Yevropi—Zelenskyi nazvav format,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 25 July 2022, on the Internet at https://zn.ua/ukr/article/print/POLITICS/ro sija-oholosila-vijnu-jevr . . ., accessed 26 July 2022.

300 CONCLUSION search for autonomy and recognition of its right to an independent existence is now going to be prolonged indefinitely. As we wait for the future to happen, we should acknowledge Russian President Putin’s contribution to moving the story of Ukraine dramatically along. It has been said that wars are started by someone dissatisfied with the outcome of the previous one. Putin was dissatisfied with the outcome of World War II, where Ukraine was invaded and conquered, but now he has Russia taking on the role of the German Nazis. (Russian propaganda always accuses others of exactly what they themselves are doing or going to do.) In the twentieth century an Austrian corporal who had served in the German Army in World War One was so furious about its outcome that he started a Second. This ended with a suicide in the Fuehrer’s bunker, the Nurnberg war crimes trials, and a new world order. Putin, however, is in no danger of experiencing Hitler’s fate although following in his footsteps by openly launching his genocidal war. If the use of force is to be the decisive element in the conduct of international relations from now on, then the principle of self-determination for the Ukrainian or other lesser-power nations must remain an unrealizable ideal. If Ukraine is to become truly independent, not a colony, province, or proxy of some other power, it must win the respect and support of the rest of the world. To date this support has been largely conditional rather than wholehearted—and with good reason. It means Ukraine must in the end rely primarily on itself in the last resort; it must keep on fighting to achieve security and sovereignty, since no one else in fact will guarantee that on its behalf. In the meantime, given their aspiration to a European style of life and politics, Ukrainians and their political leaders will have to work actively for that status, to strive to achieve their aspirations, to be autonomous citizens in thought and action, and to act within the law. Unlike parental love for one’s own child which is unconditional, the West’s support will continue to depend on Ukraine’s living up to the Western values it claims to be subscribing to rather than merely pretending to do so while awaiting the next financial bailout.

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 301 States make war, and war makes states—this aphorism, attributed to Charles Tilly, if true offers a final faint hope that Ukraine might actually emerge stronger as a nation-state from the total war unleashed against it in 2022.25 But if this rule works simultaneously for Russia, then Ukraine in its post-Euromaidan manifestation is truly doomed. A recently published quantitative study, though, casts doubt on the efficacy of the Tillean aphorism altogether in the contemporary world, arguing instead that it is “better to see nation building as a matter of political alliances between rulers and ruled and to identify the historical forces that encourage these alliances to reach across ethnic divides.”26 In consciously reaching across the divides of Ukrainian society, as Jessica Pisano has so persuasively argued, and demonstrating political leadership, Zelenskyy may yet have managed to forge a stronger nation than before.27 One other variable that might tip the balance in Ukraine’s favor ultimately is the fact that Russia’s war is based on a lie, and lies—as we learned in the twentieth century from the fate of the USSR and the communist states of Eastern Europe—are an insecure foundation upon which to build a strong and durable state. An apt historical analogy for Russia today might be February 1917, when a popular revolution toppled the regime of tsar Nicholas II over the price of bread and the pursuit of an unpopular war—except that this time there are no Kerenskys, Trotskys, or Lenins waiting in the wings to take the place of the tsar. Putin has incapacitated any such possible rivals. Should a revolution follow, then paradoxically the Russo-Ukraine War might dismantle the Russian Federation while consolidating Ukraine as a state.28 To help at long last to liberate Ukraine it would take an improbable alliance of the people of Russia working in combination with the West, an unlikely prospect.

26 27 28

Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169-91.. Andreas Wimmer, Nation Building: Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018), 208. Jessica Pisano, “How Zelensky Has Changed Ukraine,” Journal of Democracy, 33, no. 3 (July 2022): 5-13. On the impending disintegration of the Russian Federation, see Janusz Bugajski, Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture (Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 2022).

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Websites Kyiv International Institute of Sociology Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine/ Natsionalne antykoruptsiine biuro Ukrainy President of Russia President of Ukraine President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy Razumkov Tsentr

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 311 Sotsialna hrupa Reitinh Transparency International Transparency International, Ukraine Ukraine Armed Forces Facebook page Ukrainian Liaison Office in Brussels United Nations. UN News, 2 March-3 June 2022 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine/ Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy

Newspapers, news sites, and newsmagazines 112 International Al-Jazeera Associated Press Bloomberg BNE Intellinews BuzzFeed News CNN Opinion Daily Telegraph (London) Den Deutsche Welle Dzerkalo tyzhnia Economist Ekonomichna pravda EUObserver Eurasia Daily Monitor Eurozine Financial Post Forbes Gazeta.ua Globe and Mail (Alberta edition) Guardian The Hill Hromadske Independent International New York Times Interfax-Ukraine Kyiv Independent

Kyiv Post New Eastern Europe New Europe New Statesman Newsweek New York Times Nezavisimaia gazeta Obozrevatel Observer Ukraine POLITICO Magazine RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty Reuters Spectator The Star (Toronto) Time Transitions Online Tyzhden UAWire UKRINFORM UNIAN Wall Street Journal Washington Post Ukrainska pravda VOA News Vox Vysokyi zamok Yevropeiska pravda

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Miscellaneous Atlantic Council BBC Ukrainian Business Insider Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Carnegie Moscow Center Center for European Policy Analysis CFR Chatham House Comment is Freed European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief Focus Ukraine (Wilson Center, Washington) Fond Demokratychni initsiatyvy imeni Ilka Kucheriva Fragile States Index 2020 GMF (German Marshall Fund of the United States) Policy Brief, May 2021 INSIDE UKRAINE (International Centre for Policy Studies, Kyiv) International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonia Johnson’s Russia List, 2015-#36, 24 February 2015. Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group Map of Anticorruption Conditionalities (Embassy of the Netherlands to Ukraine), 26 December 2017. opendemocracy.net Point of View (Warsaw) Royal United Services Institute: Explore Our Research, 23 December 2021 Telegram The Daily Signal Ukrainian Canadian Congress, UCC Weekly Bulletin on Ukraine, July 2531, 2020 UI Brief (Swedish Institute of International Affairs) UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, Insight, 29 April 2019 UNISCI Discussion Papers US Congressional Research Service, In Focus, 14 February 2019

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 313

Conference paper Harasymiw, Bohdan. “Global and Domestic Factors Affecting the Failure of Police Reform in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine. Paper presented at the 10th World Congress of the International Council for Central and East European Studies, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada, 3-8 August 2021.

Index Abramovicius, Aivaras 99, 102 appointed head of Ukroboronprom, 156

Bohdan, Andrii 145, 166 and lustration law, 147-48 linked to BPP, 147 rise and fall of, 146-51

Abramovskyi, Roman 166-67 Akhmetov, Rinat 131, 133, 134, 156, 170, 175, 198, 204, 207, 241

BPP (Blok Petra Poroshenka) 102, 112, 118 caucus, 96, 108 representation in CEC, 102 ruling coalition in VR, 95-97

Aliyev, Huseyn 35, 69-70, 72 Allina-Pisano, Jessica. See Pisano, Jessica

Brinkerhoff, Derick 39

Anti-Corruption Court establishment of, 119-23 See also Higher Anti-Corruption Court

Budapest Memorandum 220, 226, 229

Avakov, Arsen 279 a leader in People’s Front Party, 98, 128 and Groisman, 100 and Poroshenko, 134 appointed interior minister, 125 fiefdom in interior ministry, 127 in Honcharuk cabinet, 153 in Shmyhal cabinet, 155 resignation of, 161, 191-93 untouchability of, 124

Buslavets, Olha 156-57

Bukharev, Vladyslav 151 Bunce, Valerie 56, 59 Call, Charles 35-36 Capitalism, Ukrainian 133 Carothers, Thomas 57 CEC (Central Electoral Commission) 102, 144, 154 Chaliy, Valeriy 85 Chudowsky, Victor 81 Comparative politics approaches 53-55 collective action problem, 54-55 competitive authoritarianism, 61-63 informal politics 68-70 political economy, 53 prisoner’s dilemma, 55 rational actor, 53-54

Azarov, Mykola 146-48, 154 Bakanov, Ivan 153-54, 185-6 Barna, Oleh 97 Bartolini, Stefano 16, 70-71, 107 Political, The, 25-30 Beissinger, Mark 46

concepts 17-18

Berezenko, Serhii 101 Bereziuk, Oleh 97 Biden, Joe 229, 237-39, 267, 291 Birch, Sarah 81-82

315

316 INDEX Constitutional Court 27, 190 and reform, 176, 179, 283 appointment of judges, 144, 177, 179 rulings of, 106, 115, 169, 178, 188, 201 selection of head of, 279

Donbas 75, 197, 208, 217, 219, 225, 229-32, 234-39, 241-42, 290-91 “civil war” in, 221, 226, 267 Russia supports rebels in, 221, 227, 228, 242-43, 249, 264

corruption, political and ACAs, 20, 116 as informal practice, 70, 72 Poroshenko and, 287 prevalence of, 89, 179, 185, 195, 197 public opinion on, 213 Zelenskyy’s promise to deal with, 138, 289

DTEK 156, 198

Coynash, Halya 148, 242 Crimea 75-76, 219, 226, 229 annexation not recognized by US, 232 as price for peace, 294 invasion and annexation of, 220-21 public opinion on, 275, 284 Russian bases bombarded in, 252 Western sanctions related to, 223 DAI. See State Highway Inspectorate Dalton, David 207 D’Anieri, Paul 46-48, 58, 286

Duverger, Maurice 19 Dyczok, Marta 15 e-declaration program 108, 11115, 134, 169, 176, 178, 200 Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity 24, 66-67, 77, 79, 93, 134, 150, 161, 214, 219, 241, 244 European Solidarity party 76, 139, 170, 181, 212 European Union (EU) 15, 49, 61, 91, 107, 113, 298 and Ukraine war, 230, 24445, 256, 267, 274-5, 298-9 Association Agreement, 76, 148 membership standards, 281-82 Poroshenko on, 121, 229, 232, 239 Zelenskyy’s relations with, 174, 178, 234, 257, 270 Ezrow, Natasha 39, 42

DBR/SBI 187-90 as Poroshenko’s tool, 117-19

“failed state” 29, 31-32 applied to post-Soviet states, 45-46 deficient as a concept, 35-44 Ukraine as, 46-52, 286

Dekanoidze, Khatia 126-27

Failed States Index 37, 43

Deshchytsia, Andriy 86

Fatherland Party 87, 95, 97, 102, 125, 139, 151, 160, 170, 181, 187

Danilov, Oleksii 148, 210 Danyliuk, Oleksandr 151

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 317 Fedorov, Mykhailo 146, 155 Filatov, Oleksii 88-89, 101 Firtash, Dmytro 84, 133 Fokin, Vitold 156-57 Frantz, Erica 39, 42 Freedman, Lawrence on Putin, 260

Honcharuk, Oleksii 146, 155 appointed PM, 152 appointed to RNBOU, 154 dismissed as PM, 153 his cabinet, 153-54 linked to Bohdan, 146 travels to US, 153

,Gaddy, Clifford, 264

Hontareva, Valeriia 85, 88-89, 93, 205

Galeotti, Mark 265-56

Holos (Voice) party 139

Gazprom 227, 299 Gerezenko, Serhiy 84

HQCJ (High Qualification Commission of Judges) 173-74

Goemans, H.E. 273

IMF

Gregory, Paul 226 Gressel, Gustav 172-73 Groisman, Ihor 78 Groisman, Volodymyr 134, 148 and Solidarity party, 98 appointed PM, 97-98 as PM, 98-100 client of Poroshenko, 95 linked to Yatseniuk, 98, 160 resigns as PM 98 Gruffydd Jones, Branwen 36 Guardian, The 138 Hale, Henry 16, 28, 72, 129, 13334 on Poroshenko, 79 on Ukraine, 24-25, 65-68, 8085 Patronal Politics, 21-25 patronalism theory, 63-68, 140, 147, 214, 285-86

demands on Ukraine, 100, 107, 122, 170, 201, 203, 207 Kolomoiskyi’s attitude towards, 204-5 loans to Ukraine, 121, 123, 196, 205 Zelenskyy’s relationship with, 140, 142, 174, 178, 213 informal practices 70, 219, 287, 289, 296 under Poroshenko, 116, 124, 134, 140 See also under Comparative Politics approaches Kamrava, Mehran 41 Kasminin, Oleksandr 177 Kerch Strait 243 Khomchak, Ruslan 151 Klimkin, Pavlo 85-86, 153 Klychko, Vitaliy 80, 84

Halvorson, Dan 38, 42, 50

Klymenko, Oleksandr 280

Hanson, Stephen 58

Kniazev, Serhii 127

High Qualification Commission 121, 123, 172 Higher Anti-Corruption Court 123-25, 201 Hill, Fiona 274

318 INDEX Kolomoiskyi, Ihor 89, 133, 145, 151, 188, 205-6 and PM Honcharuk, 153 and Privatbank, 176, 205 and anti-Kolomoiskyi law, 132, 205 clashes with Poroshenko, 130-31, 134 influence on Zelenskyy’s staff, 145, 147, 149 influence on Verkhovna Rada, 166, 207, 289 influences Riaboshapka’s firing, 154, 180 supports Zelenskyy, 138, 204 Konończuk, Wojciech 133 Kononenko, Ihor 99, 101, 146 Korchak, Natalia 112 KORD 126 Kornienko, Oleksandr 164 Kostin, Andriy 282 Kostiuk, Yurii 145

Kyiv District Administrative Court 176, 187, 189 Lagarde, Christine 122 Lavrov, Sergei 227 Lebow, Ned 272 Ledeneva, Alena 105 Leshchenko, Serhii 96 Levitsky, Steven 61-63 Liubchenko, Oleksii 161-62 Lozhkin, Borys 84, 86-88, 100101 Lutsenko, Yuriy 78, 80, 88, 108, 134, 147, 190 as BPP leader, 89, 91-94, 100 as PGO, 92-95 relieved as PGO, 153, 180 Macron, Emmanuel 248, 270 Mączak, Antoni 132 Makhnitskyi, Oleh 86 Malko, Roman 103 Makarenko, Olena 176

Kovalchuk, Vitalii 100-101

Manhula, Oleksandr BPP connections, 112

Kravchuk, Leonid 27, 60, 81-82

Markarova, Oksana 153

Kravchuk, Robert 81

Markus, Stanislav 133

kruhova poruka 105

Matsiyevsky, Yuriy 77-78

Kubiv, Stepan 86, 146

Mearsheimer, John blames NATO and West for war, 266-68 theory of “offensive realism,” 268-69

Kuchma, Leonid 24, 27, 60, 65, 69, 79, 85, 103, 171, 288 and patronalism, 80-83 kumy, kumstvo 70, 145,159, 208, 288-9 Poroshenko’s, 78, 90

Medvedchuk, Viktor 85, 180, 208, 201, 212, 223, 238, 279

Kurchenko, Serhiy 86-88

Methodology 16, 72

Kuzio, Taras 20, 58, 82, 130, 237

Miller, Paul 40

Kvartal 95 TV studio 137, 194, 211

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 319 Minsk Accords 291 and Zelenskyy’s plans, 234 end of, 249 failure of, 238 implementation of, 229 Minsk I and Minsk II, 22122, 234, 243 Putin’s faith in, 242, 245 Russia’s sponsorship of, 219, 223, 235, 238

NAZK and e-declarations system, 111-12, 114, 169 in pursuit of Medvedchuk, 208-209 politicization of, 110, 118, 156 responsibilities of, 108 Zelenskyy and,199-200

Monastyrskyi, Denys 161 as interior minister, 192-94

Obama, Barack 226, 231

Muzhenko, Viktor 151

oligarchs 128-34, 206-13, 278, 288-89

NABU 107-19, 121, 146, 187, 190, 198-203, 205, 279 Naftohaz Ukrainy 89, 99, 156 National Guard 128, 144, 151, 192 National Police 126, 288 Patrol Police, 127 public trust in, 127 NATO and Ukraine, 232-34, 253, 256-57, 267 lacking strategy against Russia, 244 Poroshenko’s priority, 2323, 239 public opinion in Ukraine on, 274-75 Putin’s views of, 217, 220, 242, 245, 247-48, 251, 263, 266, 269 response to Ukraine war, 299 Nayem, Mustafa 96

Northern Ireland 227-28 ODIHR 142

Onyshchenko, Yuriy 84 Opposition Bloc 102 Opposition Platform—For Life party 181, 281 Orttung, Robert 21, 28 parliamentary immunity 103-6 Party of Regions 62, 78, 91 Patronal politics in Ukraine 214, 219, 285 in 2010 election, 83 under Poroshenko, 79-80, 134 under Zelenskyy, 146, 155, 213 People’s (Popular) Front (PF) Party 85, 95, 97, 102, 118

320 INDEX PGO (Prosecutor-General’s Office) and NABU, 109 and parliamentary immunity, 104-5 and SAP, 108 and SBI, 117 reform efforts, 180-83 Tatarov case, 199 under Lutsenko, 88, 92-93, 108 under Lutsenko’s predecessors, 89-91 Zelenskyy and, 183, 199 See also Riaboshapka; Venediktova Pisano, Jessica 22, 301 Piskun, Sviatoslav 182 Pleines, Heiko 129-30 Podoliak, Mykhailo 159

Poroshenko, Petro 67-68 and ACAs, 107-15 and Anti-Corruption Court, 119-23 and CEC, 102 and DBR/SBI, 117-19, 187 and Panama Papers, 111 and patronalism, 84, 214, 285, 287-88 and PGOs 89-94 and Verkhovna Rada 95, 101, 103 and Yatseniuk 95 background 78-80 contestant in 2019 election, 137-8. 142 criminal cases against, 149, 154, 180, 188, 190, 212, 239, 279 deals with Crimea and Donbas, 221-33, 290-91 de-oligarchization policy, 128-33 elected president, 75-76, 80 evades anti-oligarch law, 211-12 European Solidarity party, 95 failed police reform of, 12427 judicial reform bill of, 102 leadership style of, 103 linked to Hontareva, 86, 94 modernization of armed forces, 231 on Crimea, 229-30 performance as president evaluated, 77-78, 116, 134 political appointments by, 84-94 public opinion on, 135, 21415

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 321 Portnov, Andrii 180 linked to Bohdan, 149-50 President of Ukraine appointive powers, 143-44

Razumkov, Dmytro 154, 163-64, 166, 169 heads Servant of the People party, 156

Prystaiko, Vadym 153-54, 15657 ambassador to NATO, 146

Reiter, Dan 270

Pshonka, Viktor 91

Riaboshapka, Ruslan appointed to RNBOU, 154 dismissed as PGO, 154, 18081 linked to Bohdan, 180 replaces Lutsenko as PGO, 94, 153, 189 served in NAZK, 146

Putin, Vladimir and fate of Ukraine, 292, 300 admired by Trump, 231, 245 and Medvedchuk, 208-9 announces war on Ukraine, 217-19 as war strategist, 260-61 attitude to Poroshenko, 233 attitude to Zelenskyy, 23435, 258 defends war as defensive requirement, 263-64, 273-74 invokes UN Charter for war, 217 on Crimea, 220 oversees Ukraine war, 25155 pens history essay on Ukraine, 246-47 prepares for full-scale war, 248 relaunches attack on Donbas, 236-37 threatens Ukraine, 242-45 war aims, 249, 254, 262-64, 284, 292 Western analysts’ views of, 2264-66, 270-74, 297-98 Pyvovarsky, Andriy 87 Radical Party 96, 97 Rafalskyi, Oleh 84-85 Rainin, Ihor 87-88

Reznikov, Oleksii 161-62 Riabikin, Pavlo 165

Risse, Thomas 38 RNBOU 144, 148 and Rotterdam+ case, 198 in charge of de-oligarchization, 210, 212 Poroshenko as secretary, 79 role in securitizing policymaking, 155, 289 Rose, Gideon 271 Rotberg, Robert 33-34 Rotterdam+ case 197-99, 280

322 INDEX Russia and Ukraine’s politicians, 81, 148, 150, 157, 194, 20810,225, 290 as threat to Ukraine, 51-52, 299, 301 at United Nations, 258-60, 297 intervenes in Crimea and Donbas, 220-25 launches war against Ukraine, 217-20 Mearsheimer on, 266-70 Poroshenko’s policies to, 225-33, 290-91 Ukraine’s relations with, 8182, 227-28, 286-87, 299 war against Ukraine, 24955, 257-58, 270-74, 277, 28384, 292-94, 297-98 Zelenskyy’s policies to, 138, 142, 234-41, 291

Servant of the People party caucus, 163, 166, 170 changes in leadership, 153, 164 in 2020 local elections, 158 Kolomoiskyi’s role in, 204, 206 Trukhin‘s expulsion from, 194 wins majority in VR, 139

Russian Federation (RF). See Russia

sistema (“System” of Ukrainian politics) 141, 214

Rutland, Peter 58

Sluha narodu. See Servant of the People party

Samopomich 95, 97

Shefir, Serhii 145, 158 Sheremeta, Pavlo 94-95 Sherr, James 141 Shmyhal, Denys appointed PM, 153 at Lugano recontruction conference, 276-77 his cabinet, 155-56 Shokin, Viktor 90-93 Shtuchnyi, Viacheslav 163 Shuliak, Olena 164

sanctions 205, 208, 219-20, 223, 232, 259

smotriashchie 95, 99, 118, 152

Sands, Philippe 297-98

Solidarity party created by Poroshenko, 78, 80 Groisman runs on party list, 98 renamed as BPP, 95 See also European Solidarity party

SAP 108, 110, 117-18, 202-3, 280 Sartori, Giovanni 18 SBU 144, 152-53, 168, 182-86, 279 Schedler, Andreas 59-60 SCJ 173-75

smuggling, cigarette 99-100

Solomatina, Hanna 118 Spiller, Roger 271 State Highway Inspectorate (DAI) 125

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 323 Stefanchuk, Ruslan 139, 146, 163-64, 181 Steinmeier Formula 225, 235 Stetsenko, Kostyantyn 88 Suprun, Ulana 176 Svyrydenko, Yuliia 162 Sytnyk, Artem 119, 190, 201, 205 Taran, Andrii 155, 161 Tatarov, Oleh 159-61, 190, 197, 199, 201, 203, 280 Terry, Sarah M. 56 Tihipko, Serhii 154 Tilly, Charles 301 Transitology 17, 55-59 Transparency International 109, 146 CPI, 113, 116, 196-97 Trauschweizer, Ingo 41 Trofimov, Serhii 145, 155, 158 Truba, Roman 117-18, 149, 181, 187-89, 191 Trump, Donald J. 54, 231, 237, 245, 267, 291

Ukraine as imagined by Putin, 24447 effects of war upon, 274-79, 283-84, 290-95 foreign assistance in war, 256 patronal politics in, 288 politics in wartime, 279-83 recovery plans, 278-79 transformation required, 296, 300 unconsolidated political system 27, 74, 285-86, 28990 US policy towards, 231-32, 257 weakness as a state, 2 Ukroboronprom 152-53 United Nations 32, 218, 230, 255, 257-60, 297, 299 Charter, 217, 219-20, 258, 264 Security Council, 249, 258 Uruskyi, Oleh 161

Tseholko, Sviatoslav 84

Vakarchuk, Viacheslav 139

Tupytskyi, Oleksandr 177, 191, 279

VAKS. See Higher Anti-Corruption Court

Tymoshenko, Kyrylo 145, 159

Venediktova, Iryna 189 appointed PGO, 181 performance as PGO, 18283, 196-97, 199 removed as PGO, 282

Tymoshenko, Yuliia antipathy to Poroshenko, 79 defeated in three presidential runs, 75, 83, 135, 138 falling out with Yushchenko, 83 leader of Fatherland party, 97, 102, 139 rejected by Zelenskyy, 160 replaced as PM by Yanukovych, 79

Venice Commission 120-21, 164, 172, 174, 177 Vereshchuk, Iryna replaces Reznikov, 162

324 INDEX Verkhovna Rada 19, 27, 62, 81, 154, 167-69 2019 elections to, 139-40 appointive powers, 143-44 See also under Poroshenko Vinnytsia oblast 78, 84, 98 Vitrenko, Yurii 156, 158, 171 Volker, Kurt 151 Vovk, Pavlo 176 Walker, Shaun 138 war crimes 255, 260, 269, 293, 298, 300 warfare how wars end, 260-64 hybrid war, 223-24, 244 Way, Lucan 20, 60-63 Weber, Max 36, 45, 65 White, Stephen 59 Woodward, Susan 37, 43-44, 49 Woolaver, Hanna 40, 42 World Bank 122, 278 Yanukovych, Viktor 24-25, 27, 62, 66, 68, 85-86, 90-93,214, 220, 224 Yarema, Vitaliy 85, 89-90 Yatseniuk, Arseniy 85, 133, 279 and Poroshenko 95-96, 101, 134 and Zelenskyy, 160 ousted as PM 97 Yekelchyk, Serhy 221 Yekhanurov, Yurii 148 Yermak, Andrii 146, 150-51, 155, 158-59, 161, 171, 195, 277 Yushchenko, Viktor 24-25, 66, 68, 78-79, 83 Zahorodniuk, Andrii 153-55, 161 Zartman, William 32-33

POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE 325 Zelenskyy, Volodymyr 16, 27, 31, 103, 106, 137, 191-95, 249 and ACAs, 195-204 and his “team,” 158, 163-64, 180-81 and patronalism theory, 139, 141, 145, 156-60, 165, 213-14, 285, 288-89 and Russian threat, 233-35, 237-40 appoints advisors, 145-51, 160-61 appoints government officials, 151-56, 161-62, 281-83 anti-corruption efforts, 169, 195-204 anti-oligarchic efforts, 204-13, 295 as communicator, 141-43 as wartime leader, 257, 273, 277, 284, 294, 301 deals with Crimea and Donbas, 238-41 dissolves Verkhovna Rada, 98, 139 election campaign in 2019, 138, 142 faces questions at start of term, 142 fights anti-corruption, 199, 202-3 judicial reform efforts, 172-79 lawmaking activity, 165-71 leadership style of, 166-67, 240-41, 291 meets with Putin, 236 on United Nations’ inaction, 260 public opinion on, 135, 21516, 275 pursues Poroshenko, 190. 279 reforming DBR/SBI, 187-90

326 INDEX reform of SBU, 183-91 voters’ response to, 135, 142 Zguladze, Eka 125-27 Zhebrivskyi, Pavlo 109 Zlochevsky, Mykola 88 Zubko, Hennadiy 84

SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Edited by Dr. Andreas Umland |ISSN 1614-3515 1

Андреас Умланд (ред.) | Воплощение Европейской конвенции по правам человека в России. Философские, юридические и эмпирические исследования | ISBN 3-89821-387-0

Christian Wipperfürth | Russland – ein vertrauenswürdiger Partner? Grundlagen, Hintergründe und Praxis gegenwärtiger russischer Außenpolitik | Mit einem Vorwort von Heinz Timmermann | ISBN 3-89821-401-X

Manja Hussner | Die Übernahme internationalen Rechts in die russische und deutsche Rechtsordnung. Eine vergleichende Analyse zur Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit der Verfassungen der Russländischen Föderation und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland | Mit einem Vorwort von Rainer Arnold | ISBN 3-89821-438-9

4 5

Matthew Tejada | Bulgaria's Democratic Consolidation and the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP). The Unattainability of Closure | With a foreword by Richard J. Crampton | ISBN 3-89821-439-7 Марк Григорьевич Меерович | Квадратные метры, определяющие сознание. Государственная жилищная политика в СССР. 1921 – 1941 гг | ISBN 3-89821-474-5

Andrei P. Tsygankov, Pavel A.Tsygankov (Eds.) | New Directions in Russian International Studies | ISBN 3-89821-422-2

Марк Григорьевич Меерович | Как власть народ к труду приучала. Жилище в СССР – средство управления людьми. 1917 – 1941 гг. | С предисловием Елены Осокиной | ISBN 3-89821-495-8

David J. Galbreath | Nation-Building and Minority Politics in Post-Socialist States. Interests, Influence and Identities in Estonia and Latvia | With a foreword by David J. Smith | ISBN 3-89821-467-2

Алексей Юрьевич Безугольный | Народы Кавказа в Вооруженных силах СССР в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1941-1945 гг. | С предисловием Николая Бугая | ISBN 3-89821-475-3

10 Вячеслав Лихачев и Владимир Прибыловский (ред.) | Русское Национальное Единство, 1990-2000. В 2-х томах | ISBN 3-89821-523-7 11 Николай Бугай (ред.) | Народы стран Балтии в условиях сталинизма (1940-е – 1950-e годы). Документированная история | ISBN 3-89821-525-3 12 Ingmar Bredies (Hrsg.) | Zur Anatomie der Orange Revolution in der Ukraine. Wechsel des Elitenregimes oder Triumph des Parlamentarismus? | ISBN 3-89821-524-5

13 Anastasia V. Mitrofanova | The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy. Actors and Ideas | With a foreword by William C. Gay | ISBN 3-89821-481-8

14 Nathan D. Larson | Alexander Solzhenitsyn and the Russo-Jewish Question | ISBN 3-89821-483-4 15 Guido Houben | Kulturpolitik und Ethnizität. Staatliche Kunstförderung im Russland der neunziger Jahre | Mit einem Vorwort von Gert Weisskirchen | ISBN 3-89821-542-3

16 Leonid Luks | Der russische „Sonderweg“? Aufsätze zur neuesten Geschichte Russlands im europäischen Kontext | ISBN 3-89821-496-6

17 Евгений Мороз | История «Мёртвой воды» – от страшной сказки к большой политике. Политическое неоязычество в постсоветской России | ISBN 3-89821-551-2

18 Александр Верховский и Галина Кожевникова (peд.) | Этническая и религиозная интолерантность в российских СМИ. Результаты мониторинга 2001-2004 гг. | ISBN 3-89821-569-5 19 Christian Ganzer | Sowjetisches Erbe und ukrainische Nation. Das Museum der Geschichte des Zaporoger Kosakentums auf der Insel Chortycja | Mit einem Vorwort von Frank Golczewski | ISBN 3-89821-504-0

20 Эльза-Баир Гучинова | Помнить нельзя забыть. Антропология депортационной травмы калмыков | С предисловием Кэролайн Хамфри | ISBN 3-89821-506-7

21 Юлия Лидерман | Мотивы «проверки» и «испытания» в постсоветской культуре. Советское прошлое в российском кинематографе 1990-х годов | С предисловием Евгения Марголита | ISBN 3-89821-511-3

22 Tanya Lokshina, Ray Thomas, Mary Mayer (Eds.) | The Imposition of a Fake Political Settlement in the Northern Caucasus. The 2003 Chechen Presidential Election | ISBN 3-89821-436-2 23 Timothy McCajor Hall, Rosie Read (Eds.) | Changes in the Heart of Europe. Recent Ethnographies of Czechs, Slovaks, Roma, and Sorbs | With an afterword by Zdeněk Salzmann | ISBN 3-89821-606-3

24 Christian Autengruber | Die politischen Parteien in Bulgarien und Rumänien. Eine vergleichende Analyse seit Beginn der 90er Jahre | Mit einem Vorwort von Dorothée de Nève | ISBN 3-89821-476-1

25 Annette Freyberg-Inan with Radu Cristescu | The Ghosts in Our Classrooms, or: John Dewey Meets Ceauşescu. The Promise and the Failures of Civic Education in Romania | ISBN 3-89821-416-8 26 John B. Dunlop | The 2002 Dubrovka and 2004 Beslan Hostage Crises. A Critique of Russian CounterTerrorism | With a foreword by Donald N. Jensen | ISBN 3-89821-608-X

27 Peter Koller | Das touristische Potenzial von Kam’’janec’–Podil’s’kyj. Eine fremdenverkehrsgeographische Untersuchung der Zukunftsperspektiven und Maßnahmenplanung zur Destinationsentwicklung des „ukrainischen Rothenburg“ | Mit einem Vorwort von Kristiane Klemm | ISBN 3-89821-640-3

28 Françoise Daucé, Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski (Eds.) | Dedovshchina in the Post-Soviet Military. Hazing of Russian Army Conscripts in a Comparative Perspective | With a foreword by Dale Herspring | ISBN 3-89821-616-0

29 Florian Strasser | Zivilgesellschaftliche Einflüsse auf die Orange Revolution. Die gewaltlose Massenbewegung und die ukrainische Wahlkrise 2004 | Mit einem Vorwort von Egbert Jahn | ISBN 3-89821-648-9

30 Rebecca S. Katz | The Georgian Regime Crisis of 2003-2004. A Case Study in Post-Soviet Media Representation of Politics, Crime and Corruption | ISBN 3-89821-413-3

31 Vladimir Kantor | Willkür oder Freiheit. Beiträge zur russischen Geschichtsphilosophie | Ediert von Dagmar Herrmann sowie mit einem Vorwort versehen von Leonid Luks | ISBN 3-89821-589-X

32 Laura A. Victoir | The Russian Land Estate Today. A Case Study of Cultural Politics in Post-Soviet Russia | With a foreword by Priscilla Roosevelt | ISBN 3-89821-426-5

33 Ivan Katchanovski | Cleft Countries. Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova | With a foreword by Francis Fukuyama | ISBN 3-89821-558-X

34 Florian Mühlfried | Postsowjetische Feiern. Das Georgische Bankett im Wandel | Mit einem Vorwort von Kevin Tuite | ISBN 3-89821-601-2

35 Roger Griffin, Werner Loh, Andreas Umland (Eds.) | Fascism Past and Present, West and East. An International Debate on Concepts and Cases in the Comparative Study of the Extreme Right | With an afterword by Walter Laqueur | ISBN 3-89821-674-8

36 Sebastian Schlegel | Der „Weiße Archipel“. Sowjetische Atomstädte 1945-1991 | Mit einem Geleitwort von Thomas Bohn | ISBN 3-89821-679-9

37 Vyacheslav Likhachev | Political Anti-Semitism in Post-Soviet Russia. Actors and Ideas in 1991-2003 | Edited and translated from Russian by Eugene Veklerov | ISBN 3-89821-529-6

38 Josette Baer (Ed.) | Preparing Liberty in Central Europe. Political Texts from the Spring of Nations 1848 to the Spring of Prague 1968 | With a foreword by Zdeněk V. David | ISBN 3-89821-546-6

39 Михаил Лукьянов | Российский консерватизм и реформа, 1907-1914 | С предисловием Марка Д. Стейнберга | ISBN 3-89821-503-2

40 Nicola Melloni | Market Without Economy. The 1998 Russian Financial Crisis | With a foreword by Eiji Furukawa | ISBN 3-89821-407-9

42 Katja Yafimava | Post-Soviet Russian-Belarussian Relationships. The Role of Gas Transit Pipelines | With a foreword by Jonathan P. Stern | ISBN 3-89821-655-1

43 Boris Chavkin | Verflechtungen der deutschen und russischen Zeitgeschichte. Aufsätze und Archivfunde zu den Beziehungen Deutschlands und der Sowjetunion von 1917 bis 1991 | Ediert von Markus Edlinger sowie mit einem Vorwort versehen von Leonid Luks | ISBN 3-89821-756-6

44 Anastasija Grynenko in Zusammenarbeit mit Claudia Dathe | Die Terminologie des Gerichtswesens der Ukraine und Deutschlands im Vergleich. Eine übersetzungswissenschaftliche Analyse juristischer Fachbegriffe im Deutschen, Ukrainischen und Russischen | Mit einem Vorwort von Ulrich Hartmann | ISBN 3-89821-691-8

45 Anton Burkov | The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Russian Law. Legislation and Application in 1996-2006 | With a foreword by Françoise Hampson | ISBN 978-3-89821-639-5

46 Stina Torjesen, Indra Overland (Eds.) | International Election Observers in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Geopolitical Pawns or Agents of Change? | ISBN 978-3-89821-743-9 47 Taras Kuzio | Ukraine – Crimea – Russia. Triangle of Conflict | ISBN 978-3-89821-761-3 48 Claudia Šabić | „Ich erinnere mich nicht, aber L'viv!“ Zur Funktion kultureller Faktoren für die Institutionalisierung und Entwicklung einer ukrainischen Region | Mit einem Vorwort von Melanie Tatur | ISBN 978-3-89821-752-1

49 Marlies Bilz | Tatarstan in der Transformation. Nationaler Diskurs und Politische Praxis 1988-1994 | Mit einem Vorwort von Frank Golczewski | ISBN 978-3-89821-722-4

50 Марлен Ларюэль (ред.) | Современные интерпретации русского национализма | ISBN 978-3-89821-795-8

51 Sonja Schüler | Die ethnische Dimension der Armut. Roma im postsozialistischen Rumänien | Mit einem Vorwort von Anton Sterbling | ISBN 978-3-89821-776-7

52 Галина Кожевникова | Радикальный национализм в России и противодействие ему. Сборник докладов Центра «Сова» за 2004-2007 гг. | С предисловием Александра Верховского | ISBN 978-3-89821-721-7

53 Галина Кожевникова и Владимир Прибыловский | Российская власть в биографиях I. Высшие должностные лица РФ в 2004 г. | ISBN 978-3-89821-796-5

54 Галина Кожевникова и Владимир Прибыловский | Российская власть в биографиях II. Члены Правительства РФ в 2004 г. | ISBN 978-3-89821-797-2

55 Галина Кожевникова и Владимир Прибыловский | Российская власть в биографиях III. Руководители федеральных служб и агентств РФ в 2004 г.| ISBN 978-3-89821-798-9

56 Ileana Petroniu | Privatisierung in Transformationsökonomien. Determinanten der RestrukturierungsBereitschaft am Beispiel Polens, Rumäniens und der Ukraine | Mit einem Vorwort von Rainer W. Schäfer | ISBN 978-3-89821790-3

57 Christian Wipperfürth | Russland und seine GUS-Nachbarn. Hintergründe, aktuelle Entwicklungen und Konflikte in einer ressourcenreichen Region| ISBN 978-3-89821-801-6

58 Togzhan Kassenova | From Antagonism to Partnership. The Uneasy Path of the U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction | With a foreword by Christoph Bluth | ISBN 978-3-89821-707-1

59 Alexander Höllwerth | Das sakrale eurasische Imperium des Aleksandr Dugin. Eine Diskursanalyse zum postsowjetischen russischen Rechtsextremismus | Mit einem Vorwort von Dirk Uffelmann | ISBN 978-3-89821-813-9

60 Олег Рябов | «Россия-Матушка». Национализм, гендер и война в России XX века | С предисловием Елены Гощило | ISBN 978-3-89821-487-2

61 Ivan Maistrenko | Borot'bism. A Chapter in the History of the Ukrainian Revolution | With a new Introduction by Chris Ford | Translated by George S. N. Luckyj with the assistance of Ivan L. Rudnytsky | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition ISBN 978-3-8382-1107-7

62 Maryna Romanets | Anamorphosic Texts and Reconfigured Visions. Improvised Traditions in Contemporary Ukrainian and Irish Literature | ISBN 978-3-89821-576-3

63 Paul D'Anieri and Taras Kuzio (Eds.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolution I. Democratization and Elections in Post-Communist Ukraine | ISBN 978-3-89821-698-2

64 Bohdan Harasymiw in collaboration with Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj (Eds.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolution II. Information and Manipulation Strategies in the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections | ISBN 978-3-89821-699-9 65 Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland and Valentin Yakushik (Eds.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolution III. The Context and Dynamics of the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections | ISBN 978-3-89821-803-0 66 Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland and Valentin Yakushik (Eds.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolution IV. Foreign Assistance and Civic Action in the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections | ISBN 978-3-89821-808-5 67 Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland and Valentin Yakushik (Eds.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolution V. Institutional Observation Reports on the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections | ISBN 978-3-89821-809-2 68 Taras Kuzio (Ed.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolution VI. Post-Communist Democratic Revolutions in Comparative Perspective | ISBN 978-3-89821-820-7

69 Tim Bohse | Autoritarismus statt Selbstverwaltung. Die Transformation der kommunalen Politik in der Stadt Kaliningrad 1990-2005 | Mit einem Geleitwort von Stefan Troebst | ISBN 978-3-89821-782-8

70 David Rupp | Die Rußländische Föderation und die russischsprachige Minderheit in Lettland. Eine Fallstudie zur Anwaltspolitik Moskaus gegenüber den russophonen Minderheiten im „Nahen Ausland“ von 1991 bis 2002 | Mit einem Vorwort von Helmut Wagner | ISBN 978-3-89821-778-1

71 Taras Kuzio | Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Nationalism. New Directions in CrossCultural and Post-Communist Studies | With a foreword by Paul Robert Magocsi | ISBN 978-3-89821-815-3

72 Christine Teichmann | Die Hochschultransformation im heutigen Osteuropa. Kontinuität und Wandel bei der Entwicklung des postkommunistischen Universitätswesens | Mit einem Vorwort von Oskar Anweiler | ISBN 978-3-89821-842-9

73 Julia Kusznir | Der politische Einfluss von Wirtschaftseliten in russischen Regionen. Eine Analyse am Beispiel der Erdöl- und Erdgasindustrie, 1992-2005 | Mit einem Vorwort von Wolfgang Eichwede | ISBN 978-3-89821-821-4

74 Alena Vysotskaya | Russland, Belarus und die EU-Osterweiterung. Zur Minderheitenfrage und zum Problem der Freizügigkeit des Personenverkehrs | Mit einem Vorwort von Katlijn Malfliet | ISBN 978-3-89821-822-1

75 Heiko Pleines (Hrsg.) | Corporate Governance in post-sozialistischen Volkswirtschaften | ISBN 978-3-89821-766-8

76 Stefan Ihrig | Wer sind die Moldawier? Rumänismus versus Moldowanismus in Historiographie und Schulbüchern der Republik Moldova, 1991-2006 | Mit einem Vorwort von Holm Sundhaussen | ISBN 978-3-89821-466-7

77 Galina Kozhevnikova in collaboration with Alexander Verkhovsky and Eugene Veklerov | UltraNationalism and Hate Crimes in Contemporary Russia. The 2004-2006 Annual Reports of Moscow’s SOVA Center | With a foreword by Stephen D. Shenfield | ISBN 978-3-89821-868-9

78 Florian Küchler | The Role of the European Union in Moldova’s Transnistria Conflict | With a foreword by Christopher Hill | ISBN 978-3-89821-850-4

79 Bernd Rechel | The Long Way Back to Europe. Minority Protection in Bulgaria | With a foreword by Richard Crampton | ISBN 978-3-89821-863-4

80 Peter W. Rodgers | Nation, Region and History in Post-Communist Transitions. Identity Politics in Ukraine, 1991-2006 | With a foreword by Vera Tolz | ISBN 978-3-89821-903-7

81 Stephanie Solywoda | The Life and Work of Semen L. Frank. A Study of Russian Religious Philosophy | With a foreword by Philip Walters | ISBN 978-3-89821-457-5

82 Vera Sokolova | Cultural Politics of Ethnicity. Discourses on Roma in Communist Czechoslovakia | ISBN 978-3-89821-864-1

83 Natalya Shevchik Ketenci | Kazakhstani Enterprises in Transition. The Role of Historical Regional Development in Kazakhstan’s Post-Soviet Economic Transformation | ISBN 978-3-89821-831-3

84 Martin Malek, Anna Schor-Tschudnowskaja (Hgg.) | Europa im Tschetschenienkrieg. Zwischen politischer Ohnmacht und Gleichgültigkeit | Mit einem Vorwort von Lipchan Basajewa | ISBN 978-3-89821-676-0

85 Stefan Meister | Das postsowjetische Universitätswesen zwischen nationalem und internationalem Wandel. Die Entwicklung der regionalen Hochschule in Russland als Gradmesser der Systemtransformation | Mit einem Vorwort von Joan DeBardeleben | ISBN 978-3-89821-891-7

86 Konstantin Sheiko in collaboration with Stephen Brown | Nationalist Imaginings of the Russian Past. Anatolii Fomenko and the Rise of Alternative History in Post-Communist Russia | With a foreword by Donald Ostrowski | ISBN 978-3-89821-915-0

87 Sabine Jenni | Wie stark ist das „Einige Russland“? Zur Parteibindung der Eliten und zum Wahlerfolg der Machtpartei im Dezember 2007 | Mit einem Vorwort von Klaus Armingeon | ISBN 978-3-89821-961-7

88 Thomas Borén | Meeting-Places of Transformation. Urban Identity, Spatial Representations and Local Politics in Post-Soviet St Petersburg | ISBN 978-3-89821-739-2

89 Aygul Ashirova | Stalinismus und Stalin-Kult in Zentralasien. Turkmenistan 1924-1953 | Mit einem Vorwort von Leonid Luks | ISBN 978-3-89821-987-7

90 Leonid Luks | Freiheit oder imperiale Größe? Essays zu einem russischen Dilemma | ISBN 978-3-8382-0011-8 91 Christopher Gilley | The ‘Change of Signposts’ in the Ukrainian Emigration. A Contribution to the History of Sovietophilism in the 1920s | With a foreword by Frank Golczewski | ISBN 978-3-89821-965-5

92 Philipp Casula, Jeronim Perovic (Eds.) | Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency. The Discursive Foundations of Russia's Stability | With a foreword by Heiko Haumann | ISBN 978-3-8382-0015-6

93 Marcel Viëtor | Europa und die Frage nach seinen Grenzen im Osten. Zur Konstruktion ‚europäischer Identität’ in Geschichte und Gegenwart | Mit einem Vorwort von Albrecht Lehmann | ISBN 978-3-8382-0045-3

94 Ben Hellman, Andrei Rogachevskii | Filming the Unfilmable. Casper Wrede's 'One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich' | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition | ISBN 978-3-8382-0044-6

95 Eva Fuchslocher | Vaterland, Sprache, Glaube. Orthodoxie und Nationenbildung am Beispiel Georgiens | Mit einem Vorwort von Christina von Braun | ISBN 978-3-89821-884-9

96 Vladimir Kantor | Das Westlertum und der Weg Russlands. Zur Entwicklung der russischen Literatur und Philosophie | Ediert von Dagmar Herrmann | Mit einem Beitrag von Nikolaus Lobkowicz | ISBN 978-3-8382-0102-3

97 Kamran Musayev | Die postsowjetische Transformation im Baltikum und Südkaukasus. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung der politischen Entwicklung Lettlands und Aserbaidschans 1985-2009 | Mit einem Vorwort von Leonid Luks | Ediert von Sandro Henschel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0103-0

98 Tatiana Zhurzhenko | Borderlands into Bordered Lands. Geopolitics of Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine | With a foreword by Dieter Segert | ISBN 978-3-8382-0042-2

99 Кирилл Галушко, Лидия Смола (ред.) | Пределы падения – варианты украинского будущего. Аналитико-прогностические исследования | ISBN 978-3-8382-0148-1 100 Michael Minkenberg (Ed.) | Historical Legacies and the Radical Right in Post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe | With an afterword by Sabrina P. Ramet | ISBN 978-3-8382-0124-5 101 David-Emil Wickström | Rocking St. Petersburg. Transcultural Flows and Identity Politics in the St. Petersburg Popular Music Scene | With a foreword by Yngvar B. Steinholt | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition | ISBN 978-3-8382-0100-9

102 Eva Zabka | Eine neue „Zeit der Wirren“? Der spät- und postsowjetische Systemwandel 1985-2000 im Spiegel russischer gesellschaftspolitischer Diskurse | Mit einem Vorwort von Margareta Mommsen | ISBN 978-3-8382-0161-0

103 Ulrike Ziemer | Ethnic Belonging, Gender and Cultural Practices. Youth Identitites in Contemporary Russia | With a foreword by Anoop Nayak | ISBN 978-3-8382-0152-8

104 Ksenia Chepikova | ‚Einiges Russland’ - eine zweite KPdSU? Aspekte der Identitätskonstruktion einer postsowjetischen „Partei der Macht“ | Mit einem Vorwort von Torsten Oppelland | ISBN 978-3-8382-0311-9

105 Леонид Люкс | Западничество или евразийство? Демократия или идеократия? Сборник статей об исторических дилеммах России | С предисловием Владимира Кантора | ISBN 978-3-8382-0211-2

106 Anna Dost | Das russische Verfassungsrecht auf dem Weg zum Föderalismus und zurück. Zum Konflikt von Rechtsnormen und -wirklichkeit in der Russländischen Föderation von 1991 bis 2009 | Mit einem Vorwort von Alexander Blankenagel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0292-1

107 Philipp Herzog | Sozialistische Völkerfreundschaft, nationaler Widerstand oder harmloser Zeitvertreib? Zur politischen Funktion der Volkskunst im sowjetischen Estland | Mit einem Vorwort von Andreas Kappeler | ISBN 978-3-8382-0216-7

108 Marlène Laruelle (Ed.) | Russian Nationalism, Foreign Policy, and Identity Debates in Putin's Russia. New Ideological Patterns after the Orange Revolution | ISBN 978-3-8382-0325-6 109 Michail Logvinov | Russlands Kampf gegen den internationalen Terrorismus. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme des Bekämpfungsansatzes | Mit einem Geleitwort von Hans-Henning Schröder und einem Vorwort von Eckhard Jesse | ISBN 978-3-8382-0329-4

110 John B. Dunlop | The Moscow Bombings of September 1999. Examinations of Russian Terrorist Attacks at the Onset of Vladimir Putin's Rule | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition | ISBN 978-3-8382-0388-1

111 Андрей А. Ковалёв | Свидетельство из-за кулис российской политики I. Можно ли делать добрo из зла? (Воспоминания и размышления о последних советских и первых послесоветских годах) | With a foreword by Peter Reddaway | ISBN 978-3-8382-0302-7

112 Андрей А. Ковалёв | Свидетельство из-за кулис российской политики II. Угроза для себя и окружающих (Наблюдения и предостережения относительно происходящего после 2000 г.) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0303-4 113 Bernd Kappenberg | Zeichen setzen für Europa. Der Gebrauch europäischer lateinischer Sonderzeichen in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit | Mit einem Vorwort von Peter Schlobinski | ISBN 978-3-89821-749-1

114 Ivo Mijnssen | The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia I. Back to Our Future! History, Modernity, and Patriotism according to Nashi, 2005-2013 | With a foreword by Jeronim Perović | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition | ISBN 978-3-8382-0368-3

115 Jussi Lassila | The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia II. The Search for Distinctive Conformism in the Political Communication of Nashi, 2005-2009 | With a foreword by Kirill Postoutenko | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition | ISBN 978-3-8382-0415-4

116 Valerio Trabandt | Neue Nachbarn, gute Nachbarschaft? Die EU als internationaler Akteur am Beispiel ihrer Demokratieförderung in Belarus und der Ukraine 2004-2009 | Mit einem Vorwort von Jutta Joachim | ISBN 978-3-8382-0437-6

117 Fabian Pfeiffer | Estlands Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik I. Der estnische Atlantizismus nach der wiedererlangten Unabhängigkeit 1991-2004 | Mit einem Vorwort von Helmut Hubel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0127-6

118 Jana Podßuweit | Estlands Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik II. Handlungsoptionen eines Kleinstaates im Rahmen seiner EU-Mitgliedschaft (2004-2008) | Mit einem Vorwort von Helmut Hubel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0440-6

119 Karin Pointner | Estlands Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik III. Eine gedächtnispolitische Analyse estnischer Entwicklungskooperation 2006-2010 | Mit einem Vorwort von Karin Liebhart | ISBN 978-3-8382-0435-2

120 Ruslana Vovk | Die Offenheit der ukrainischen Verfassung für das Völkerrecht und die europäische Integration | Mit einem Vorwort von Alexander Blankenagel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0481-9

121 Mykhaylo Banakh | Die Relevanz der Zivilgesellschaft bei den postkommunistischen Transformationsprozessen in mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern. Das Beispiel der spät- und postsowjetischen Ukraine 1986-2009 | Mit einem Vorwort von Gerhard Simon | ISBN 978-3-8382-0499-4

122 Michael Moser | Language Policy and the Discourse on Languages in Ukraine under President Viktor Yanukovych (25 February 2010–28 October 2012) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0497-0 (Paperback edition) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0507-6 (Hardcover edition)

123 Nicole Krome | Russischer Netzwerkkapitalismus Restrukturierungsprozesse in der Russischen Föderation am Beispiel des Luftfahrtunternehmens „Aviastar“ | Mit einem Vorwort von Petra Stykow | ISBN 978-3-8382-0534-2

124 David R. Marples | 'Our Glorious Past'. Lukashenka‘s Belarus and the Great Patriotic War | ISBN 978-3-8382-0574-8 (Paperback edition) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0675-2 (Hardcover edition)

125 Ulf Walther | Russlands „neuer Adel“. Die Macht des Geheimdienstes von Gorbatschow bis Putin | Mit einem Vorwort von Hans-Georg Wieck | ISBN 978-3-8382-0584-7

126 Simon Geissbühler (Hrsg.) | Kiew – Revolution 3.0. Der Euromaidan 2013/14 und die Zukunftsperspektiven der Ukraine | ISBN 978-3-8382-0581-6 (Paperback edition) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0681-3 (Hardcover edition)

127 Andrey Makarychev | Russia and the EU in a Multipolar World. Discourses, Identities, Norms | With a foreword by Klaus Segbers | ISBN 978-3-8382-0629-5

128 Roland Scharff | Kasachstan als postsowjetischer Wohlfahrtsstaat. Die Transformation des sozialen Schutzsystems | Mit einem Vorwort von Joachim Ahrens | ISBN 978-3-8382-0622-6

129 Katja Grupp | Bild Lücke Deutschland. Kaliningrader Studierende sprechen über Deutschland | Mit einem Vorwort von Martin Schulz | ISBN 978-3-8382-0552-6

130 Konstantin Sheiko, Stephen Brown | History as Therapy. Alternative History and Nationalist Imaginings in Russia, 1991-2014 | ISBN 978-3-8382-0665-3

131 Elisa Kriza | Alexander Solzhenitsyn: Cold War Icon, Gulag Author, Russian Nationalist? A Study of the Western Reception of his Literary Writings, Historical Interpretations, and Political Ideas | With a foreword by Andrei Rogatchevski | ISBN 978-3-8382-0589-2 (Paperback edition) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0690-5 (Hardcover edition)

132 Serghei Golunov | The Elephant in the Room. Corruption and Cheating in Russian Universities | ISBN 978-3-8382-0570-0

133 Manja Hussner, Rainer Arnold (Hgg.) | Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Zentralasien I. Sammlung von Verfassungstexten | ISBN 978-3-8382-0595-3

134 Nikolay Mitrokhin | Die „Russische Partei“. Die Bewegung der russischen Nationalisten in der UdSSR 1953-1985 | Aus dem Russischen übertragen von einem Übersetzerteam unter der Leitung von Larisa Schippel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0024-8

135 Manja Hussner, Rainer Arnold (Hgg.) | Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Zentralasien II. Sammlung von Verfassungstexten | ISBN 978-3-8382-0597-7

136 Manfred Zeller | Das sowjetische Fieber. Fußballfans im poststalinistischen Vielvölkerreich | Mit einem Vorwort von Nikolaus Katzer | ISBN 978-3-8382-0757-5

137 Kristin Schreiter | Stellung und Entwicklungspotential zivilgesellschaftlicher Gruppen in Russland. Menschenrechtsorganisationen im Vergleich | ISBN 978-3-8382-0673-8 138 David R. Marples, Frederick V. Mills (Eds.) | Ukraine’s Euromaidan. Analyses of a Civil Revolution | ISBN 978-3-8382-0660-8

139 Bernd Kappenberg | Setting Signs for Europe. Why Diacritics Matter for European Integration | With a foreword by Peter Schlobinski | ISBN 978-3-8382-0663-9

140 René Lenz | Internationalisierung, Kooperation und Transfer. Externe bildungspolitische Akteure in der Russischen Föderation | Mit einem Vorwort von Frank Ettrich | ISBN 978-3-8382-0751-3

141 Juri Plusnin, Yana Zausaeva, Natalia Zhidkevich, Artemy Pozanenko | Wandering Workers. Mores, Behavior, Way of Life, and Political Status of Domestic Russian Labor Migrants | Translated by Julia Kazantseva | ISBN 978-3-8382-0653-0

142 David J. Smith (Eds.) | Latvia – A Work in Progress? 100 Years of State- and Nation-Building | ISBN 978-3-8382-0648-6

143 Инна Чувычкина (ред.) | Экспортные нефте- и газопроводы на постсоветском пространстве. Aнализ трубопроводной политики в свете теории международных отношений | ISBN 978-3-8382-0822-0

144 Johann Zajaczkowski | Russland – eine pragmatische Großmacht? Eine rollentheoretische Untersuchung russischer Außenpolitik am Beispiel der Zusammenarbeit mit den USA nach 9/11 und des Georgienkrieges von 2008 | Mit einem Vorwort von Siegfried Schieder | ISBN 978-3-8382-0837-4

145 Boris Popivanov | Changing Images of the Left in Bulgaria. The Challenge of Post-Communism in the Early 21st Century | ISBN 978-3-8382-0667-7

146 Lenka Krátká | A History of the Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping Company 1948-1989. How a Small, Landlocked Country Ran Maritime Business During the Cold War | ISBN 978-3-8382-0666-0

147 Alexander Sergunin | Explaining Russian Foreign Policy Behavior. Theory and Practice | ISBN 978-3-8382-0752-0

148 Darya Malyutina | Migrant Friendships in a Super-Diverse City. Russian-Speakers and their Social Relationships in London in the 21st Century | With a foreword by Claire Dwyer | ISBN 978-3-8382-0652-3

149 Alexander Sergunin, Valery Konyshev | Russia in the Arctic. Hard or Soft Power? | ISBN 978-3-8382-0753-7 150 John J. Maresca | Helsinki Revisited. A Key U.S. Negotiator’s Memoirs on the Development of the CSCE into the OSCE | With a foreword by Hafiz Pashayev | ISBN 978-3-8382-0852-7

151 Jardar Østbø | The New Third Rome. Readings of a Russian Nationalist Myth | With a foreword by Pål Kolstø | ISBN 978-3-8382-0870-1

152 Simon Kordonsky | Socio-Economic Foundations of the Russian Post-Soviet Regime. The Resource-Based Economy and Estate-Based Social Structure of Contemporary Russia | With a foreword by Svetlana Barsukova | ISBN 978-3-8382-0775-9

153 Duncan Leitch | Assisting Reform in Post-Communist Ukraine 2000–2012. The Illusions of Donors and the Disillusion of Beneficiaries | With a foreword by Kataryna Wolczuk | ISBN 978-3-8382-0844-2

154 Abel Polese | Limits of a Post-Soviet State. How Informality Replaces, Renegotiates, and Reshapes Governance in Contemporary Ukraine | With a foreword by Colin Williams | ISBN 978-3-8382-0845-9

155 Mikhail Suslov (Ed.) | Digital Orthodoxy in the Post-Soviet World. The Russian Orthodox Church and Web 2.0 | With a foreword by Father Cyril Hovorun | ISBN 978-3-8382-0871-8

156 Leonid Luks | Zwei „Sonderwege“? Russisch-deutsche Parallelen und Kontraste (1917-2014). Vergleichende Essays | ISBN 978-3-8382-0823-7

157 Vladimir V. Karacharovskiy, Ovsey I. Shkaratan, Gordey A. Yastrebov | Towards a New Russian Work Culture. Can Western Companies and Expatriates Change Russian Society? | With a foreword by Elena N. Danilova | Translated by Julia Kazantseva | ISBN 978-3-8382-0902-9

158 Edmund Griffiths | Aleksandr Prokhanov and Post-Soviet Esotericism | ISBN 978-3-8382-0963-0 159 Timm Beichelt, Susann Worschech (Eds.) | Transnational Ukraine? Networks and Ties that Influence(d) Contemporary Ukraine | ISBN 978-3-8382-0944-9

160 Mieste Hotopp-Riecke | Die Tataren der Krim zwischen Assimilation und Selbstbehauptung. Der Aufbau des krimtatarischen Bildungswesens nach Deportation und Heimkehr (1990-2005) | Mit einem Vorwort von Swetlana Czerwonnaja | ISBN 978-3-89821-940-2

161 Olga Bertelsen (Ed.) | Revolution and War in Contemporary Ukraine. The Challenge of Change | ISBN 978-3-8382-1016-2

162 Natalya Ryabinska | Ukraine's Post-Communist Mass Media. Between Capture and Commercialization | With a foreword by Marta Dyczok | ISBN 978-3-8382-1011-7

163 Alexandra Cotofana, James M. Nyce (Eds.) | Religion and Magic in Socialist and Post-Socialist Contexts. Historic and Ethnographic Case Studies of Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy, and Alternative Spirituality | With a foreword by Patrick L. Michelson | ISBN 978-3-8382-0989-0

164 Nozima Akhrarkhodjaeva | The Instrumentalisation of Mass Media in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes. Evidence from Russia’s Presidential Election Campaigns of 2000 and 2008 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1013-1 165 Yulia Krasheninnikova | Informal Healthcare in Contemporary Russia. Sociographic Essays on the PostSoviet Infrastructure for Alternative Healing Practices | ISBN 978-3-8382-0970-8

166 Peter Kaiser | Das Schachbrett der Macht. Die Handlungsspielräume eines sowjetischen Funktionärs unter Stalin am Beispiel des Generalsekretärs des Komsomol Aleksandr Kosarev (1929-1938) | Mit einem Vorwort von Dietmar Neutatz | ISBN 978-3-8382-1052-0

167 Oksana Kim | The Effects and Implications of Kazakhstan’s Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards. A Resource Dependence Perspective | With a foreword by Svetlana Vlady | ISBN 978-3-8382-0987-6

168 Anna Sanina | Patriotic Education in Contemporary Russia. Sociological Studies in the Making of the PostSoviet Citizen | With a foreword by Anna Oldfield | ISBN 978-3-8382-0993-7

169 Rudolf Wolters | Spezialist in Sibirien Faksimile der 1933 erschienenen ersten Ausgabe | Mit einem Vorwort von Dmitrij Chmelnizki | ISBN 978-3-8382-0515-1

170 Michal Vít, Magdalena M. Baran (Eds.) | Transregional versus National Perspectives on Contemporary Central European History. Studies on the Building of Nation-States and Their Cooperation in the 20th and 21st Century | With a foreword by Petr Vágner | ISBN 978-3-8382-1015-5

171 Philip Gamaghelyan | Conflict Resolution Beyond the International Relations Paradigm. Evolving Designs as a Transformative Practice in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria | With a foreword by Susan Allen | ISBN 978-3-8382-1057-5

172 Maria Shagina | Joining a Prestigious Club. Cooperation with Europarties and Its Impact on Party Development in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine 2004–2015 | With a foreword by Kataryna Wolczuk | ISBN 978-3-8382-1084-1

173 Alexandra Cotofana, James M. Nyce (Eds.) | Religion and Magic in Socialist and Post-Socialist Contexts II. Baltic, Eastern European, and Post-USSR Case Studies | With a foreword by Anita Stasulane | ISBN 978-3-8382-0990-6

174 Barbara Kunz | Kind Words, Cruise Missiles, and Everything in Between. The Use of Power Resources in U.S. Policies towards Poland, Ukraine, and Belarus 1989–2008 | With a foreword by William Hill | ISBN 978-3-8382-1065-0

175 Eduard Klein | Bildungskorruption in Russland und der Ukraine. Eine komparative Analyse der Performanz staatlicher Antikorruptionsmaßnahmen im Hochschulsektor am Beispiel universitärer Aufnahmeprüfungen | Mit einem Vorwort von Heiko Pleines | ISBN 978-3-8382-0995-1

176 Markus Soldner | Politischer Kapitalismus im postsowjetischen Russland. Die politische, wirtschaftliche und mediale Transformation in den 1990er Jahren | Mit einem Vorwort von Wolfgang Ismayr | ISBN 978-3-8382-1222-7

177 Anton Oleinik | Building Ukraine from Within. A Sociological, Institutional, and Economic Analysis of a NationState in the Making | ISBN 978-3-8382-1150-3

178 Peter Rollberg, Marlene Laruelle (Eds.) | Mass Media in the Post-Soviet World. Market Forces, State Actors, and Political Manipulation in the Informational Environment after Communism | ISBN 978-3-8382-1116-9

179 Mikhail Minakov | Development and Dystopia. Studies in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Eastern Europe | With a foreword by Alexander Etkind | ISBN 978-3-8382-1112-1

180 Aijan Sharshenova | The European Union’s Democracy Promotion in Central Asia. A Study of Political Interests, Influence, and Development in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 2007–2013 | With a foreword by Gordon Crawford | ISBN 978-3-8382-1151-0

181 Andrey Makarychev, Alexandra Yatsyk (Eds.) | Boris Nemtsov and Russian Politics. Power and Resistance | With a foreword by Zhanna Nemtsova | ISBN 978-3-8382-1122-0

182 Sophie Falsini | The Euromaidan’s Effect on Civil Society. Why and How Ukrainian Social Capital Increased after the Revolution of Dignity | With a foreword by Susann Worschech | ISBN 978-3-8382-1131-2

183 Valentyna Romanova, Andreas Umland (Eds.) | Ukraine’s Decentralization. Challenges and Implications of the Local Governance Reform after the Euromaidan Revolution | ISBN 978-3-8382-1162-6

184 Leonid Luks | A Fateful Triangle. Essays on Contemporary Russian, German and Polish History | ISBN 978-3-8382-1143-5

185 John B. Dunlop | The February 2015 Assassination of Boris Nemtsov and the Flawed Trial of his Alleged Killers. An Exploration of Russia’s “Crime of the 21st Century” | ISBN 978-3-8382-1188-6 186 Vasile Rotaru | Russia, the EU, and the Eastern Partnership. Building Bridges or Digging Trenches? | ISBN 978-3-8382-1134-3

187 Marina Lebedeva | Russian Studies of International Relations. From the Soviet Past to the Post-Cold-War Present | With a foreword by Andrei P. Tsygankov | ISBN 978-3-8382-0851-0

188 Tomasz Stępniewski, George Soroka (Eds.) | Ukraine after Maidan. Revisiting Domestic and Regional Security | ISBN 978-3-8382-1075-9

189 Petar Cholakov | Ethnic Entrepreneurs Unmasked. Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflicts in Contemporary Bulgaria | ISBN 978-3-8382-1189-3

190 A. Salem, G. Hazeldine, D. Morgan (Eds.) | Higher Education in Post-Communist States. Comparative and Sociological Perspectives | ISBN 978-3-8382-1183-1

191 Igor Torbakov | After Empire. Nationalist Imagination and Symbolic Politics in Russia and Eurasia in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Century | With a foreword by Serhii Plokhy | ISBN 978-3-8382-1217-3

192 Aleksandr Burakovskiy | Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Late and Post-Soviet Ukraine. Articles, Lectures and Essays from 1986 to 2016 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1210-4

193 Natalia Shapovalova, Olga Burlyuk (Eds.) | Civil Society in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine. From Revolution to Consolidation | With a foreword by Richard Youngs | ISBN 978-3-8382-1216-6

194 Franz Preissler | Positionsverteidigung, Imperialismus oder Irredentismus? Russland und die „Russischsprachigen“, 1991–2015 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1262-3

195 Marian Madeła | Der Reformprozess in der Ukraine 2014-2017. Eine Fallstudie zur Reform der öffentlichen Verwaltung | Mit einem Vorwort von Martin Malek | ISBN 978-3-8382-1266-1

196 Anke Giesen | „Wie kann denn der Sieger ein Verbrecher sein?“ Eine diskursanalytische Untersuchung der russlandweiten Debatte über Konzept und Verstaatlichungsprozess der Lagergedenkstätte „Perm’-36“ im Ural | ISBN 978-3-8382-1284-5

197 Victoria Leukavets | The Integration Policies of Belarus and Ukraine vis-à-vis the EU and Russia. A Comparative Analysis Through the Prism of a Two-Level Game Approach | ISBN 978-3-8382-1247-0

198 Oksana Kim | The Development and Challenges of Russian Corporate Governance I. The Roles and Functions of Boards of Directors | With a foreword by Sheila M. Puffer | ISBN 978-3-8382-1287-6

199 Thomas D. Grant | International Law and the Post-Soviet Space I. Essays on Chechnya and the Baltic States | With a foreword by Stephen M. Schwebel | ISBN 978-3-8382-1279-1

200 Thomas D. Grant | International Law and the Post-Soviet Space II. Essays on Ukraine, Intervention, and Non-Proliferation | ISBN 978-3-8382-1280-7

201 Slavomír Michálek, Michal Štefansky | The Age of Fear. The Cold War and Its Influence on Czechoslovakia 1945–1968 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1285-2

202 Iulia-Sabina Joja | Romania’s Strategic Culture 1990–2014. Continuity and Change in a Post-Communist Country’s Evolution of National Interests and Security Policies | With a foreword by Heiko Biehl | ISBN 978-3-8382-1286-9

203 Andrei Rogatchevski, Yngvar B. Steinholt, Arve Hansen, David-Emil Wickström | War of Songs. Popular Music and Recent Russia-Ukraine Relations | With a foreword by Artemy Troitsky | ISBN 978-3-8382-1173-2

204 Maria Lipman (Ed.) | Russian Voices on Post-Crimea Russia. An Almanac of Counterpoint Essays from 2015–2018 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1251-7

205 Ksenia Maksimovtsova | Language Conflicts in Contemporary Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine. A Comparative Exploration of Discourses in Post-Soviet Russian-Language Digital Media | With a foreword by Ammon Cheskin | ISBN 978-3-8382-1282-1

206 Michal Vít | The EU’s Impact on Identity Formation in East-Central Europe between 2004 and 2013. Perceptions of the Nation and Europe in Political Parties of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia | With a foreword by Andrea Petö | ISBN 978-3-8382-1275-3

207 Per A. Rudling | Tarnished Heroes. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the Memory Politics of Post-Soviet Ukraine | ISBN 978-3-8382-0999-9

208 Kaja Gadowska, Peter Solomon (Eds.) | Legal Change in Post-Communist States. Progress, Reversions, Explanations | ISBN 978-3-8382-1312-5

209 Pawel Kowal, Georges Mink, Iwona Reichardt (Eds.) | Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine I. Theoretical Aspects and Analyses on Religion, Memory, and Identity | ISBN 9783-8382-1321-7

210 Pawel Kowal, Georges Mink, Adam Reichardt, Iwona Reichardt (Eds.) | Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine II. An Oral History of the Revolution on Granite, Orange Revolution, and Revolution of Dignity | ISBN 978-3-8382-1323-1

211 Li Bennich-Björkman, Sergiy Kurbatov (Eds.) | When the Future Came. The Collapse of the USSR and the Emergence of National Memory in Post-Soviet History Textbooks | ISBN 978-3-8382-1335-4

212 Olga R. Gulina | Migration as a (Geo-)Political Challenge in the Post-Soviet Space. Border Regimes, Policy Choices, Visa Agendas | With a foreword by Nils Muižnieks | ISBN 978-3-8382-1338-5

213 Sanna Turoma, Kaarina Aitamurto, Slobodanka Vladiv-Glover (Eds.) | Religion, Expression, and Patriotism in Russia. Essays on Post-Soviet Society and the State. ISBN 978-3-8382-1346-0 214 Vasif Huseynov | Geopolitical Rivalries in the “Common Neighborhood”. Russia's Conflict with the West, Soft Power, and Neoclassical Realism | With a foreword by Nicholas Ross Smith | ISBN 978-3-8382-1277-7

215 Mikhail Suslov | Geopolitical Imagination. Ideology and Utopia in Post-Soviet Russia | With a foreword by Mark Bassin | ISBN 978-3-8382-1361-3

216 Alexander Etkind, Mikhail Minakov (Eds.) | Ideology after Union. Political Doctrines, Discourses, and Debates in Post-Soviet Societies | ISBN 978-3-8382-1388-0

217 Jakob Mischke, Oleksandr Zabirko (Hgg.) | Protestbewegungen im langen Schatten des Kreml. Aufbruch und Resignation in Russland und der Ukraine | ISBN 978-3-8382-0926-5

218 Oksana Huss | How Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policies Sustain Hybrid Regimes. Strategies of Political Domination under Ukraine’s Presidents in 1994-2014 | With a foreword by Tobias Debiel and Andrea Gawrich | ISBN 978-3-8382-1430-6

219 Dmitry Travin, Vladimir Gel'man, Otar Marganiya | The Russian Path. Ideas, Interests, Institutions, Illusions | With a foreword by Vladimir Ryzhkov | ISBN 978-3-8382-1421-4

220 Gergana Dimova | Political Uncertainty. A Comparative Exploration | With a foreword by Todor Yalamov and Rumena Filipova | ISBN 978-3-8382-1385-9

221 Torben Waschke | Russland in Transition. Geopolitik zwischen Raum, Identität und Machtinteressen | Mit einem Vorwort von Andreas Dittmann | ISBN 978-3-8382-1480-1

222 Steven Jobbitt, Zsolt Bottlik, Marton Berki (Eds.) | Power and Identity in the Post-Soviet Realm. Geographies of Ethnicity and Nationality after 1991 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1399-6 223 Daria Buteiko | Erinnerungsort. Ort des Gedenkens, der Erholung oder der Einkehr? Kommunismus-Erinnerung am Beispiel der Gedenkstätte Berliner Mauer sowie des Soloveckij-Klosters und -Museumsparks | ISBN 978-3-8382-1367-5

224 Olga Bertelsen (Ed.) | Russian Active Measures. Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow | With a foreword by Jan Goldman | ISBN 978-3-8382-1529-7

225 David Mandel | “Optimizing” Higher Education in Russia. University Teachers and their Union “Universitetskaya solidarnost’” | ISBN 978-3-8382-1519-8

226 Mikhail Minakov, Gwendolyn Sasse, Daria Isachenko (Eds.) | Post-Soviet Secessionism. Nation-Building and State-Failure after Communism | ISBN 978-3-8382-1538-9

227 Jakob Hauter (Ed.) | Civil War? Interstate War? Hybrid War? Dimensions and Interpretations of the Donbas Conflict in 2014–2020 | With a foreword by Andrew Wilson | ISBN 978-3-8382-1383-5

228 Tima T. Moldogaziev, Gene A. Brewer, J. Edward Kellough (Eds.) | Public Policy and Politics in Georgia. Lessons from Post-Soviet Transition | With a foreword by Dan Durning | ISBN 978-3-8382-1535-8 229 Oxana Schmies (Ed.) | NATO’s Enlargement and Russia. A Strategic Challenge in the Past and Future | With a foreword by Vladimir Kara-Murza | ISBN 978-3-8382-1478-8

230 Christopher Ford | Ukapisme – Une Gauche perdue. Le marxisme anti-colonial dans la révolution ukrainienne 1917-1925 | Avec une préface de Vincent Présumey | ISBN 978-3-8382-0899-2

231 Anna Kutkina | Between Lenin and Bandera. Decommunization and Multivocality in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine | With a foreword by Juri Mykkänen | ISBN 978-3-8382-1506-8

232 Lincoln E. Flake | Defending the Faith. The Russian Orthodox Church and the Demise of Religious Pluralism | With a foreword by Peter Martland | ISBN 978-3-8382-1378-1

233 Nikoloz Samkharadze | Russia’s Recognition of the Independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Analysis of a Deviant Case in Moscow’s Foreign Policy | With a foreword by Neil MacFarlane | ISBN 978-38382-1414-6

234 Arve Hansen | Urban Protest. A Spatial Perspective on Kyiv, Minsk, and Moscow | With a foreword by Julie Wilhelmsen | ISBN 978-3-8382-1495-5

235 Eleonora Narvselius, Julie Fedor (Eds.) | Diversity in the East-Central European Borderlands. Memories, Cityscapes, People | ISBN 978-3-8382-1523-5

236 Regina Elsner | The Russian Orthodox Church and Modernity. A Historical and Theological Investigation into Eastern Christianity between Unity and Plurality | With a foreword by Mikhail Suslov | ISBN 978-3-8382-1568-6

237 Bo Petersson | The Putin Predicament. Problems of Legitimacy and Succession in Russia | With a foreword by J. Paul Goode | ISBN 978-3-8382-1050-6

238 Jonathan Otto Pohl | The Years of Great Silence. The Deportation, Special Settlement, and Mobilization into the Labor Army of Ethnic Germans in the USSR, 1941–1955 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1630-0

239 Mikhail Minakov (Ed.) | Inventing Majorities. Ideological Creativity in Post-Soviet Societies | ISBN 978-3-83821641-6

240 Robert M. Cutler | Soviet and Post-Soviet Foreign Policies I. East-South Relations and the Political Economy of the Communist Bloc, 1971–1991 | With a foreword by Roger E. Kanet | ISBN 978-3-8382-1654-6

241 Izabella Agardi | On the Verge of History. Life Stories of Rural Women from Serbia, Romania, and Hungary, 1920–2020 | With a foreword by Andrea Pető | ISBN 978-3-8382-1602-7

242 Sebastian Schäffer (Ed.) | Ukraine in Central and Eastern Europe. Kyiv's Foreign Affairs and the In-

ternational Relations of the Post-Communist Region | With a foreword by Pavlo Klimkin and Andreas Umland| ISBN 978-38382-1615-7

243 Volodymyr Dubrovskyi, Kalman Mizsei, Mychailo Wynnyckyj (Eds.) | Eight Years after the Revolution of Dignity. What Has Changed in Ukraine during 2013–2021? | With a foreword by Yaroslav Hrytsak | ISBN 978-3-8382-1560-0

244 Rumena Filipova | Constructing the Limits of Europe Identity and Foreign Policy in Poland, Bulgaria, and Russia since 1989 | With forewords by Harald Wydra and Gergana Yankova-Dimova | ISBN 978-3-8382-1649-2

245 Oleksandra Keudel | How Patronal Networks Shape Opportunities for Local Citizen Participation in a Hybrid Regime A Comparative Analysis of Five Cities in Ukraine | With a foreword by Sabine Kropp | ISBN 978-3-8382-1671-3

246 Jan Claas Behrends, Thomas Lindenberger, Pavel Kolar (Eds.) | Violence after Stalin Institutions, Practices, and Everyday Life in the Soviet Bloc 1953–1989 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1637-9

247 Leonid Luks | Macht und Ohnmacht der Utopien Essays zur Geschichte Russlands im 20. und 21. Jahrhundert | ISBN 978-3-8382-1677-5

248 Iuliia Barshadska | Brüssel zwischen Kyjiw und Moskau Das auswärtige Handeln der Europäischen Union im ukrainisch-russischen Konflikt 2014-2019 | Mit einem Vorwort von Olaf Leiße | ISBN 978-3-8382-1667-6

249 Valentyna Romanova | Decentralisation and Multilevel Elections in Ukraine Reform Dynamics and Party Politics in 2010–2021 | With a foreword by Kimitaka Matsuzato | ISBN 978-3-8382-1700-0

250 Alexander Motyl | National Questions. Theoretical Reflections on Nations and Nationalism in Eastern Europe | ISBN 978-3-8382-1675-1

251 Marc Dietrich | A Cosmopolitan Model for Peacebuilding. The Ukrainian Cases of Crimea and the Donbas | With a foreword by Rémi Baudouï | ISBN 978-3-8382-1687-4

252 Eduard Baidaus | An Unsettled Nation. Moldova in the Geopolitics of Russia, Romania, and Ukraine | With forewords by John-Paul Himka and David R. Marples | ISBN 978-3-8382-1582-2

253 Igor Okunev, Petr Oskolkov (Eds.) | Transforming the Administrative Matryoshka. The Reform of Autonomous Okrugs in the Russian Federation, 2003–2008 | With a foreword by Vladimir Zorin | ISBN 978-3-8382-1721-5

254 Winfried Schneider-Deters | Ukraine’s Fateful Years 2013–2019. Vol. I: The Popular Uprising in Winter 2013/2014 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1725-3

255 Winfried Schneider-Deters | Ukraine’s Fateful Years 2013–2019. Vol. II: The Annexation of Crimea and the War in Donbas | ISBN 978-3-8382-1726-0

256 Robert M. Cutler | Soviet and Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policies II. East-West Relations in Europe and the Political Economy of the Communist Bloc, 1971–1991 | With a foreword by Roger E. Kanet | ISBN 978-3-83821727-7

257 Robert M. Cutler | Soviet and Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policies III. East-West Relations in Europe and Eurasia in the Post-Cold War Transition, 1991–2001 | With a foreword by Roger E. Kanet | ISBN 978-3-8382-1728-4

258 Paweł Kowal, Iwona Reichardt, Kateryna Pryshchepa (Eds.) | Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine III. Archival Records and Historical Sources on the 1990 Revolution on Granite | ISBN 978-3-8382-1376-7

259 Mikhail Minakov (Ed.) | Philosophy Unchained. Developments in Post-Soviet Philosophical Thought. | With a foreword by Christopher Donohue | ISBN 978-3-8382-1768-0

260 David Dalton | The Ukrainian Oligarchy After the Euromaidan. How Ukraine’s Political Economy Regime Survived the Crisis | With a foreword by Andrew Wilson | ISBN 978-3-8382-1740-6

261 Andreas Heinemann-Grüder (Ed.) | Who are the Fighters? Irregular Armed Groups in the RussianUkrainian War in 2014–2015 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1777-2

262 Taras Kuzio (Ed.) | Russian Disinformation and Western Scholarship. Bias and Prejudice in Journalistic, Expert, and Academic Analyses of East European, Russian and Eurasian Affairs | ISBN 978-3-8382-1685-0

263 Darius Furmonavicius | LithuaniaTransforms the West. Lithuania’s Liberation from Soviet Occupation and the Enlargement of NATO (1988–2022) | With a foreword by Vytautas Landsbergis | ISBN 978-3-8382-1779-6

264 Dirk Dalberg | Politisches Denken im tschechoslowakischen Dissens. Egon Bondy, Miroslav Kusý, Milan Šimečka und Petr Uhl (1968-1989) | ISBN 978-3-8382-1318-7

265 Леонид Люкс | К столетию «философского парохода». Мыслители «первой» русской эмиграции о русской революции и о тоталитарных соблазнах ХХ века | ISBN 978-3-8382-1775-8

266 Daviti Mtchedlishvili | The EU and the South Caucasus. European Neighborhood Policies between Eclecticism and Pragmatism, 1991-2021 | With a foreword by Nicholas Ross Smith | ISBN 978-3-8382-1735-2

267 Bohdan Harasymiw | Post-Euromaidan Ukraine. Domestic Power Struggles and War of National Survival in 2014–2022 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1798-7

268 Nadiia Koval, Denys Tereshchenko (Eds.) | Russian Cultural Diplomacy under Putin. Rossotrudnichestvo, the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation, and the Gorchakov Fund in 2007–2022 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1801-4

269 Izabela Kazejak | Jews in Post-War Wrocław and L’viv. Official Policies and Local Responses in Comparative Perspective, 1945-1970s | ISBN 978-3-8382-1802-1

270 Jakob Hauter | Russia‘s Overlooked Invasion. The Causes of the 2014 Outbreak of War in Ukraine’s Donbas | With a foreword by Hiroaki Kuromiya | ISBN 978-3-8382-1803-8

271 Anton Shekhovtsov | Russian Political Warfare. Essays on Kremlin Propaganda in Europe and the Neighbourhood, 2020-2023 | With a foreword by Nathalie Loiseau | ISBN 978-3-8382-1821-2

272 Андреа Пето | Насилие и Молчание. Красная армия в Венгрии во Второй Мировой войне | ISBN 978-3-83821636-2

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