A New Eastern Question? Great Powers and the Post-Yugoslav States

“A sweeping and incisive account of the international politics of the Balkans. This volume should be on the desk of any diplomat, scholar or journalist dealing with the region in these turbulent times.”—Dr Dimitar Bechev, University of Oxford

The analytical time frame covers the period 1991–2018. The changes in the foreign policies of great powers are explored as they relate to the institutional set-up of the region. For instance, do the changes affect the EU’s hegemony in the region? Do Russia, China, and Turkey actively contribute to changing the rules of the game in the region—be it the accession process or regional cooperation?

Dr Soeren Keil is the Academic Head of the International Research and Consulting Center at the Institute of Federalism, University of Fribourg, Switzerland.

Dr Bernhard Stahl is Professor for International Politics at the University of Passau, Germany.

A New Eastern Question?

This compilation of essays by scholars from the region, Western Europe, and the US, explores the intersection of international politics in the post-Yugoslav states with a focus on the influence and impact of the European Union, the United States, Russia, China, and Turkey. The implications of external actors’ policy in the region for its Euro-Atlantic integration, its security, and stability are examined and discussed. In assessing the importance of the post-Yugoslav states for the EU and US and the current trend of disengagement by these two democratic actors in the region, answers are revealed regarding the question whether we are seeing a new Eastern Question emerging in the post-Yugoslav states. Likewise, when looking at the role of Russia, China, and Turkey in the region—and in contrast to European and US policies,— it becomes obvious to what extent the region, once again, is becoming the playground of Great Power games and wider geopolitical strategic interests.

Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl (eds.)

“The Western Balkans have become a site of great power competition in recent years, while governments in the region are also using the renewed interest of external actors to maximize their own position and drive a hard bargain. This volume is thus a welcome addition to exploring the role of external actors and their engagement in the post-Yugoslav states. Bernhard Stahl and Soeren Keil are well positioned to bring together a comprehensive and systematic perspective on this topic.”—Professor Dr Florian Bieber, University of Graz

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Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl (eds.)

A NEW EASTERN QUESTION?

Great Powers and the Post-Yugoslav States

ISBN: 978-3-8382-1375-0

ibidem

ibidem

Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl (eds.)

A New Eastern Question?

Great Powers and the Post-Yugoslav States

BALKAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY Edited by Jelena Dzankic and Soeren Keil 2

James Riding The Geopolitics of Memory A Journey to Bosnia ISBN 978-3-8382-1311-8

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Ian Bancroft Dragon’s Teeth Tales from North Kosovo ISBN 978-3-8382-1364-4

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Viktoria Potapkina Nation Building in Contested States Comparative Insights from Kosovo, Transnistria, and Northern Cyprus ISBN 978-3-8382-1381-1

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Soeren Keil, Bernhard Stahl (eds.)

A New Eastern Question? Great Powers and the Post-Yugoslav States ISBN 978-3-8382-1375-0

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Senada Zatagic A Neglected Right Prospects for the Protection of the Right to Be Elected in Bosnia and Herzegovina ISBN 978-3-8382-1521-1

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Aarif Abraham A Constitution of the People and How to Achieve It What Bosnia and Britain Can Learn From Each Other ISBN 978-3-8382-1516-7

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Giustina Selvelli The Alphabet of Discord The Ideologization of Writing Systems on the Balkans since the Breakup of Multiethnic Empires ISBN 978-3-8382-1537-2

Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl (eds.)

A NEW EASTERN QUESTION? Great Powers and the Post-Yugoslav States

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

Cover graphic: Map: Balkans Region. © Peter Fitzgerald via Wikimedia Commons.

Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 (s. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en)

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Printed in the EU

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Working on a book about the Great Powers in the post-Yugoslav states is like studying a moving target. Throughout the research for this book, and the different revisions of the chapters, new issues emerged and changed the perspective. Most notably, the coronavirus pandemic resulted in a new pandemic diplomacy, which led to important changes across the region, for example in the relationship between Serbia and China. The authors, and we as the editors, tried to keep up with these developments as much as possible. The final chapters for this book were completed in early 2021, so any later developments will not have been considered.

We are grateful to our contributors for their hard work, their fantastic engagement with the topic and their willingness to listen to our feedback and further develop their papers. We believe that the result is a comprehensive book, which provides an important academic source of information about the role of the EU, the USA, Russia, Turkey and China in the post-Yugoslav states.

Two people deserve a special recognition for their contribution to this book. Elisabeth Neugebauer helped in designing the layout, writing the index and providing the final edits for all chapters.

Her eagle eyes made sure that all chapters follow the same standard and that the contents of the book are also presented in a professional, standardised and comprehensive format. Chloe Doherty provided some last-minute spell-checking, and we are really grateful for her support and willingness to read the whole manuscript in a short period of time. We would also like to thank Daan Smeekens for some final editorial support.

We are grateful to Valerie Lange and Jakob Horstmann at Ibidem publishers for their continued support for this project. This book took longer than we initially envisaged, but their faith in the project and their patience with us when we requested another extension is remarkable. We very much hope that the finished project lives up to their high standards.

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Soeren Keil would like to thank his co-editor for the joyful and interesting cooperation, and for many excellent discussions on the Balkans, German Politics and good beer. He would also like to thank his former colleagues at Canterbury Christ Church University (UK) for their support, in particular Professor David Bates, Dr Sarah Lieberman and Dr Paul Anderson. His new colleagues at the Institute of Federalism are a permanent inspiration, full of motivation, and remind him how much he enjoys working in academia.

He would like to thank in particular Thea Bächler, Bernhard Altermatt, Professor Eva Maria Belser and Yvonne Heiter-Steiner. In addition, he would like to thank a number of personal and academic friends that have contributed to his thoughts and ideas over the years. Dr Timofey Agarin, Dr Elisabeth Alber, Professor Jelena Džankić, and Professor Jens Woelk have been wonderful colleagues, sources of inspiration, fantastic co-authors and great friends. He is also eternally grateful to Claire Parker for all the support and love given throughout this project.

Bernhard Stahl would like to express his gratitude to his supportive and stimulating team at the University of Passau. Furthermore, he would like to pass the bouquet back to the co-editor recalling the fabulous common understanding, be it regarding innovative ideas or difficult management decisions. His thanks go to those conference hosts and panel organisers who liked the research idea and provided opportunities to meet and develop the book (e.g., the CEEISA Ljubljana 2016 and the CEEISA-ISA Conference in Belgrade 2019). In particular, we are grateful to Professor Ulf Brunnbauer from the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (IOS, University of Regensburg) for hosting our research group when the research project ‘took off’ at a workshop in December 2017. Moreover, our thanks go to the Bavarian Research Alliance (Bayerische Forschungsallianz) as well as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation Regensburg—first and foremost Harald Zintl— who funded the workshop. Jan von Schmettow helped us organise the workshop and collected the main ideas discussed during our two days in Regensburg.

Finishing a book like this is always very labour-intensive and timeconsuming. We would therefore like to thank our families for their 6

support of our work and for enabling us to dedicate the time needed to complete projects such as this one to a high standard.

This book is dedicated to our daughters, Malindi Parker and Charlotte Reinhardt.

Fribourg and Passau, August 2021

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CONTENTS Acknowledgements.............................................................................. 5 Notes on Contributors ....................................................................... 11 List of Illustration ............................................................................... 17 List of Abbreviations ......................................................................... 19 Introduction: A New Eastern Question?

Bernhard Stahl and Soeren Keil ......................................................... 23

Part I: Great Power Perspectives Yugoslavia—from Vardar to Triglav No More Jakob R. Avguštin ................................................................................ 55 The European Union and the Post-Yugoslav States—From Negligence to Dominance and Back?

Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl ........................................................ 83 The Reluctant, Intermittent Interventionist: US Foreign Policy in the Former Yugoslavia 1991—to Date Kurt Bassuener ................................................................................... 105 A Playfield of Distancing: Russia’s Policy Towards the PostYugoslav States Maxim Samorukov ............................................................................ 137 The Past is Important but the Future Matters—China And The Post-Yugoslav States Nina Pejič, Saša Istenič Kotar and Zlatko Šabič............................. 167 Turkey’s Foreign Policy Towards the Post-Yugoslav States: Regional Contender or Ally for the European Union?

Zeynep Arkan Tuncel ....................................................................... 199

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Part II: The Perspective of the Post-Yugoslav States From Integration to Plurilateralism? Slovenia and the Great Powers Ana Bojinović Fenko and Faris Kočan ............................................ 225 Croatia: Exploring Relations with Non-EU Powers From Comfort of EU-Membership Senada Šelo Šabić and Nikica Kolar................................................ 257 Rediscovering an Old Playbook: Serbia and the Great Powers Mladen Mladenov ............................................................................. 283 Dependence, Independence, Interdependence: Montenegro’s Foreign Policy from 1991 to 2020 Bojan Baća and Kenneth Morrison .................................................. 311 In Search of a Big Brother: Great Powers and Foreign Policy in North Macedonia Cvete Koneska.................................................................................... 339 When Internal Complexity Reflects External Challenges: The Great Powers and Bosnia and Herzegovina Adnan Huskić .................................................................................... 365 Kosovo: A Great Powers’ European and Balkan Projection Gëzim Krasniqi .................................................................................. 391 Concluding Remarks—The Potential and Pitfalls of a New Eastern Question Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl ...................................................... 419 Index ................................................................................................... 435

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS Ana Bojinović Fenko, PhD, is Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences and Researcher at the Centre of International Relations, Ljubljana.

Her research focus is comparative analysis of foreign policy, EU External Action and international (inter-)regionalism, whereby she studies regions of post-Yugoslav space/Western Balkans and the Mediterranean. Her recent publications include an article “Never let a good crisis go to waste”: strengthening EU actorness amid increased competition of external actors in the Western Balkans” (coauthored with Jure Požgan & Faris Kočan in Theory and practice, 2020) and a book chapter “Chips off the old block: Europeanisation of the foreign policies of Western Balkan states” (co-authored with Bernhard Stahl in the edited book The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans: a failure of EU conditionality? eds: Džankić, Keil & Kmezić with Springer Nature).

Adnan Huskić is the country representative of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in Bosnia, lecturer at the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology and the first Chair of Christian Schwarz Schilling Professorship. His most recent works includes contribution to Thirty Years of Political Campaigning in Central and Eastern Europe (Palgrave) 2020, The Western Balkans in the World (Routledge) 2019 and The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugoslav States: From Yugoslavia to Europe (Palgrave) 2014.

Bernhard Stahl has been Professor of International Politics at the University of Passau (GER) since 2010. He holds a Diploma in Economics and a master degree in European Studies. After having achieved his PhD and Habilitation from the University of Trier (GER)—the latter with a study on French foreign policy and the Kosovo war—he spent some years in Serbia on behalf of the German Economic Cooperation. His research interests cover comparative foreign policies in Europe, in particular with regard to South-Eastern Europe, and identity theory.

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Bojan Baća is a Re:constitution Research Fellow at the Max Weber Institute of Sociology at Heidelberg University and a Social Science Fellow at the Art, Science and Business Program at the Akademie Schloss Solitude. He received his PhD in Sociology from York University in 2018. His scholarly work on the post-socialist region was published in journals such as Antipode, International Political Sociology and Europe-Asia Studies, as well as in the edited volumes Activist Citizenship in Southeast Europe, Resistances: Between Theories and the Field, Changing Youth Values in Southeast Europe: Beyond Ethnicity, When Students Protest: Universities in the Global North, and The Democratic Potential of Emerging Social Movements in Southeastern Europe.

He is a recipient of the 2020 Danubius Young Scientist Award.

Cvete Koneska, DPhil is the Head of Analysis at S-RM Intelligence and Risk in London. She works with governments, businesses and investors, providing them with analysis and advice on geo-political, policy and security risks and trends across the world. Her academic research focuses on ethnopolitics and post-conflict reforms in the Balkans and European integration of the Western Balkans.

Her research has been published in several academic journals.

Faris Kočan, PhD, is a research fellow and Teaching Assistant at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences. In his PhD dissertation, he tackled questions regarding ontological security and securitisation of identities in the context of Europeanisation, focusing on the case of Republika Srpska. Before becoming Young Researcher, Faris Kočan worked in a H2020 project RePAST—Revisiting the Past, Anticipating the Future, where he was focusing on the troubled past of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the field of arts and culture, history, media, politics and European integration.

Gëzim Krasniqi, PhD, is Lecturer in Nationalism and Political Sociology at the University of Edinburgh in the UK. He has a broad interdisciplinary interest in nationalism, ethnic conflict, contested states and citizenship, often with empirical focus on South East Europe. He is co-editor of Uneven Citizenship: Minorities and Migrants

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in the Post-Yugoslav Space (Routledge, 2015) and author of several journal articles and book chapters.

Jakob R. Avguštin, PhD, works in the Academic Services Office at the University of East Anglia, UK where he recently also completed an MSc in Computing Sciences. He is Editor-at-Large at E-International Relations and his main research focuses on the use of military force in international relations, particularly when authorised by the UN Security Council. His publications include Realism in Practice: An Appraisal (co-editor), and articles in Sociology of Diplomacy: Initial Reading and Acta Diplomatica. He recently edited the collection The United Nations: Friend or Foe of Self-Determination? where he also contributed with an article The United Nations and Self-Determination in the Case of East Timor. Jakob is currently working on analysis of the Global Peace Index and on an examination of general debate speeches at the UN General Assembly.

Kenneth Morrison is Professor of Modern Southeast European History at De Montfort University, Leicester, UK. He is the author of five books focusing on the modern history of the Western Balkans, including Nationalism, Identity and Statehood in Post-Yugoslav Montenegro (Bloomsbury, 2018) and, with Elizabeth Roberts, The Sandžak: A History (Hurst & Co., 2013). Kenneth was the Specialist Adviser to the House of Lords International Relations Committee for their “UK and the Future of the Western Balkans” inquiry.

Kurt Bassuener, PhD recently received his Doctorate in International Relations at the University of St. Andrews for his dissertation, Peace Cartels: Internationally Brokered Power-Sharing and Perpetual Oligarchy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia. A policy analyst and advocate since 1997, he is co-founder and senior associate of the Democratization Policy Council, a Berlin-based thinktank. He also served as strategy analyst at the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Recent publications include Primed Receptors: Synergies between Western Balkan Political Elites and Chinese Economic Actors and State Media, in Sudosteuropa,

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2020 and Pushing on an Open Door: Foreign Authoritarian Influence in the Western Balkans (IFDS/NED Working Paper, 2019).

Maxim Samorukov is a fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center and deputy editor of Carnegie.ru. Before joining Carnegie in 2015, Samorukov worked for the independent news website Slon.ru for five years as an editor and international columnist, covering topics including Russian foreign policy, Central and Eastern Europe and its relations with Russia, Balkans, and the challenges of transitioning to democracy. His recent publications include: China’s Relations with Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova: Less Than Meets the Eye (co-authored with Temur Umarov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 2020), The Kremlin and the Protests in Belarus: What’s Russia’s Next Move? (Institut für Sicherheitspolitik, 2020), A Spoiler in the Balkans? Russia and the Final Resolution of the Kosovo Conflict (Carnegie Moscow Center, 2019).

Mladen Mladenov is a PhD student at the University of Passau.

His research is focused on Serbian foreign policy and Europeanisation in SEE countries.

Nikica Kolar is a Research Assistant at the Institute for Development and International Relations in Zagreb. He received his master’s degree in political science in 2018 at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb in the field of political theory and is currently a PhD candidate at the same Faculty. Nikica is engaged in the study of political theory, international relations, status of refugees and Croatian domestic and foreign policy.

Nina Pejič is a Junior Researcher at the Centre of International Relations, University of Ljubljana focused on studying the perspectives on the rise of China in political and economic realm. She is in function as the Head of the Research Unit at East Asia Resource Library (EARL), and a Secretary-General at the Slovene-Chinese Business Council at the Chamber of Commerce in Slovenia.

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Saša Istenič Kotar is an Assistant Professor of Sinology at the University of Ljubljana and also serves as the Director of the Taiwan Study Center and an Executive Board Member of the East Asia Resource Library (EARL). Her research interests include Chinese politics, Taiwan-China relations, EU-China relations, East Asian security and diplomacy. Her latest publication is one of the first books on Taiwan published in Slovene (TAJVAN: biser v neizprosni geopolitični realnosti, 2021).

Senada Šelo Šabić works as a Senior Scientific Associate in the Institute for Development and International Relations in Zagreb. Her research interests include Croatian foreign policy, Southeast Europe, EU affairs, and migration. She holds a PhD in political science from the European University Institute in Florence and two Masters degrees—in international relations from the University of Zagreb and in peace studies from the University of Notre Dame, USA. Senada Šelo Šabić is editor-in-chief of the Croatian International Relations Review.

Soeren Keil, PhD is the Academic Head of the International Research and Consulting Center of the Institute of Federalism, University of Fribourg, Switzerland. His research focuses on the use of territorial autonomy as a tool of conflict resolution, the political systems of the Western Balkan states and the process of EU enlargement. His recent publications include: The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans—A Failure of EU Conditionality? (Palgrave 2019, coedited with Jelena Dzankic and Marko Kmezic) and Power-Sharing in Europe—Past Practice, Present Cases and Future Directions with Palgrave, co-edited with Allison McCulloch (2021).

Zeynep Arkan Tuncel, PhD is Associate Professor of International Relations and the current director of Centre for Research on EU Studies at Hacettepe University, Turkey. She holds an MA in European Studies from the University of Exeter and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Kent at Canterbury. Her research focuses on EU foreign and security policy, hybrid threats, the role of identity in international politics, and discourse analysis.

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Zlatko Šabič is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Ljubljana, and the Director-General of the East Asia Resource Library (EARL), member of the University’s Network of Research and Infrastructural Center (MRIC). Recently his research projects have touched upon Europe–East Asia relations, the Western Balkans, Central Europe, and international parliamentary relations and diplomacy. Currently he works on a book project related to parliamentary diplomacy in East Asia.

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATION List of Maps       

Map 1: Post-Yugoslav Countries and Their Neighbor States ......................................................................... 23 Map 2: Yugoslavia and its Neighbor States ...................... 55 Map 3 The European Union Member States and NonMember States.......................................................... 83 Map 4 United States’ Geographical Position in the World ...................................................................... 105 Map 5 Russia and its European Neighbor States .......... 137 Map 6 China’s Geographical Position in the World ..... 167 Map 7 Turkey and its Post-Yugoslav Neighbor States ....................................................................... 199

List of Tables    



Table 1 Number of UNSC resolutions for all former Yugoslavia in the 1990s .......................................... 61 Table 2 UN Documents for Bosnia and Herzegovina: Security Council Resolutions ............................... 174 Table 3 UN Documents for Kosovo: Security Council Resolutions ............................................................. 176 Table 4 Comparison of reciprocity in diplomatic representation between Slovenia and the Great Powers..................................................................... 246 Table 5 Kosovo’s exports and imports to the EU, US, Turkey and China .................................................. 404

List of Figures 

Figure 1 The English School interstate societies model ....................................................................... 32

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AKK AKP ANP BAF BFSU BiH BISU BRI CASS CCP CEEC CFSP CGTN CICIR CIDCA CIIS COVID-19 CRI CSCE DPS DS EBRD EC ES EU EUFOR EULEX EUPM FDI

Alliance for the Future of Kosovo Justice and Development Party—Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Annual National Program Balkan Air Force Beijing Foreign Studies University Bosnia and Herzegovina Beijing University of International Studies Belt and Road Initiative Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Chinese Communist Party Central and Eastern European Countries Common Foreign and Security Policy China Global Television Network China’s Institute of Contemporary International Relations China International Development Cooperation Agency China’s Institute of International Studies Coronavirus disease SARS CoV-2 China Radio International Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Democratic Party of Socialists Democratic Party Serbia European Bank for Reconstruction and Development European Community English School European Union EU’s Operation Althea EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo Police Mission in Bosnia Foreign direct investment 19

FRG FRY FYROM HDZ HR ICJ ICTR ICTY IDPs IFIs IFOR IMF IPAP IR ISAF KAP KFOR KLA LDK LNG LSGs MAP MCC MFA MOFCOM NATO NIS NISMA NPC OBOR OHR OIC OSA OSCE PBSC

Federal Republic of Germany Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia Croatian Democratic Union High Representative International Court of Justice International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Internally displaced people International financial institutions NATO Implementation Force International Monetary Fund Individual Partnership Action Plan International Relations International Security Assistance Force Kombinat aluminijuma in Podgorica Kosovo Force Kosovo Liberation Army Democratic League of Kosovo Liquefied natural gas Leading small groups and commissions Membership Action Plan Millennium Challenge Corporation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Commerce North Atlantic Treaty Organization Naftna Industrija Srbije Social Democratic Initiative National People’s Congress One Belt One Road Office of the High Representative Organization of Islamic Countries Bosnian Intelligence Agency Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Politburo’s Standing Committee 20

PDK PfP PIC PKK PLA PRC R2P ROC RS RSCT RZD SAA SAP SDA SDSM SEE SFOR SFRY SKCG SNS SNSD SOE SPS TCM TİKA TRT UAE UK UN UNCRO UNMIBH UNMIK UNMOP UNPREDEP

Democratic Party of Kosovo Partnership for Peace Peace Implementation Council Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan State Council and the People’s Liberation Army People’s Republic of China Responsibility to protect Republic of China Republic Srpska Regional Security Complex Theory Russian Rail Monopoly Stabilization and Association Agreement Stabilization and Association Process Party of Democratic Action Social Democratic Union of Macedonia South and Eastern Europe NATO’s Stabilization Force Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia League of Communists of Montenegro Serbian Progressive Party Alliance of Independent Social Democrats British Special Operations Executive Socialist Party of Serbia Traditional Chinese medicine Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency Turkey’s state-run Radio and Television Corporation United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina UN Mission in Kosovo United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka UN’s Preventive Deployment Force 21

UNPROFOR UNPSG UNSC US USSR VC VMRO-DPMNE VV WEU WTO WWI WWII YNA YTB

United Nations Protection Force United Nations Civilian Police Support Group UN Security Council United States Soviet Union Venice Commission Centre-right party of Macedonia Self-Determination Movement Western European Union World Trade Organization World War I World War II Yugoslav People’s Army Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities

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INTRODUCTION: A NEW EASTERN QUESTION? Bernhard Stahl and Soeren Keil “I really believe the ‘Eastern Question’ that has haunted Europe for a century and which I thought the Crimean War had adjourned for half another will fall my lot to encounter—dare I say to settle.” (Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield)1

Map 1: Post-Yugoslav Countries and their Neighbor States Source: https://www.d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=69052&lang=de

1

Letter to Lady Bradford, 3 November 1875, cited in: Sicherman, Harvey (2002).

Disraeli’s Secret, The National Interest, Spring 2002, (67), p. 49.

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There is an increase in the scholarly literature arguing that we are observing the emergence of a new geopolitical battleground between different great powers in the post-Yugoslav states (Bieber and Tzifakis, 2020, AIES, 2020, van Meurs, 2014). For the countries of the former Yugoslavia, such an interaction is nothing new, after all, it is here that WWI started with the assassination of the AustroHungarian Arch-Duke in June 1914. Further, during WWII, resistance against the Nazi occupation of the territory was overshadowed by an internal conflict between Royalist-Western allied forces and Partisans, which received most of their support from the Soviet Union, thereby mirroring the growing global conflict that would characterize the Cold War period. The post-Yugoslav states, so the argument, has often been a miniature version of wider global developments and conflicts. This area with its historic diversity, its history of conflict and cooperation, has been engaging with regional, great and superpowers for a long time, so contemporary developments need to be seen in this context.

We argue that the newly emerging ‘Eastern Question’ in the post-Yugoslav states is characterized by a number of important developments. First, the dominance of the Euro-Atlantic alliance and the integration of the region’s countries into Euro-Atlantic structures has come to a halt, thereby substantially reducing the influence of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) in the post-Yugoslav states. Second, new actors have emerged and grown in importance. Some, such as Russia and Turkey, have been involved in the region for a while, but have recently become more prominent and more openly opposed (and sometimes hostile) towards EU and US interests in the region. Others, such as China or the Gulf countries, have recently emerged as important actors, focusing on trade and cultural exchange, but also promoting distinct political priorities in their engagement with the post-Yugoslav states. Third, the countries in the region are changing and have changed in the last 15 years. Democratization has been faltering in the majority of countries in the region (with the exception of North Macedonia), while renewed authoritarian tendencies are visible in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and even in Slovenia and Croatia,

INTRODUCTION

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which are already members of the EU (Bieber, 2020). These new internal dynamics in the countries of the former Yugoslavia affect their foreign policy—European integration is becoming harder to achieve, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership is becoming more contested in countries such as Bosnia, but also in Montenegro, which already joined the alliance in 2017.

This book, in line with our assumption about historical continuity and foreign policy analysis framework, utilizes the theoretical framework of the English School (ES) in International Relations. In doing so, we aim to provide a theoretical discussion that helps understand the most recent developments across the region as outlined above. The authors of the following chapters, country experts and the bringing together of multiple disciplines were all given guiding questions and a clear structure to follow to ensure internal coherence and opportunities for cross-country comparisons. We are aware that we are studying a ‘moving target’; in the process of finalizing this book, we have seen political change in a number of post-Yugoslav states, including the historical defeat of the Democratic Party of Socialist (DPS) in parliamentary elections in Montenegro and the coming to power of new political actors through Vetëvendosje and Prime Minister Albin Kurti in Kosovo. We have also observed democratic decline in Slovenia, which has been hailed as a success story in post-Communist transition in the past, as well as continued political crisis in Bosnia.

This chapter will continue by providing the analytical and theoretical framework of this extensive study. The ES allows us to focus on historical continuities and change, order and justice in the international system and a wider discussion on foreign policy change amongst great powers towards the post-Yugoslav states and amongst the post-Yugoslav states towards the great powers. In the first part, the theoretical framework of the English School in International Relations will be presented. This will provide a guide for the reader on how to assess and look at the region and its states’ engagement with the great powers. Due to the theory’s proneness to historical patterns, the chapter also comprises a reconstruction of historical patterns of great power intervention. What is more, the

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introduction will provide the theoretical and methodological guide for each chapter in this volume—a framework which all authors have been asked to follow. By outlining the reasoning behind this conceptual choice (and the important historical perspective in the English School literature), we will highlight how the engagement of the great powers with the post-Yugoslav states can be framed in a historical perspective, specifically assessing continuities and changes—and, most important for our purposes, current developments.

Theoretical Arguments Our book seeks to examine regional change. This change may have occurred over the last 30 years manifesting in changing foreign policies, changing power constellations and/or changing conflicts. All of these may originate—our first assumption—in the so-called second or third image of international relations (Waltz, 1959) i.e., change will be attributed to the international system as well as the respective societies (not so much to individual leaders). Hence, a flexible conception is needed to be able to grasp such trends and to assess the political outcomes. This is why we opt for the English School in this book. While we are aware of the weaknesses of the theory—acknowledging the so-called Second debate in IR2—we appreciate its strengths: historical arguments, normative claims of order and justice and indicators for historical change (i.e., “primary institutions”). In the following, we will sketch the ES’ dealing with regions before we present our conceptual framework.

The English School is a loose network of scholars from the Commonwealth with its heyday in the 1960s and 1970s but which has started to thrive again in recent years (cf. Suganami, 2011). In the first decades of ES research, regional aspects did not play any role because the theory’s progression focused on general and global

2

The ES belongs to the so-called “traditionalists” of international politics which contested the scientific turn in the 1960s (the “Second Debate of IR”). The basic text of the Second Debate from the then leading ES-scholar is Bull (1966). For details, see Kurki and Wight (2010).

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aspects such as the evolution of the international society, its features and its possible transformation (Stivachtis, 2015, p. 69). In recent years, however, many ES studies on specific world regions were published (e.g., Stivachtis and Habegger, 2011; Buzan, 2009; Pourchot, 2014; Quayle, 2013; Pella, 2014), while particular takes on EU conditionality and enlargement (Diez and Whitman, 2002; Diez et al., 2014) complemented the picture. The Balkans, though, still represent a research gap in this regard. It only occurs in the research on Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), which is close to the ES that one chapter is devoted to in “The Balkans and Turkey” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, pp. 377–396). We start our endeavour where this chapter ends and have asked for changes ever since. By doing so, we will dig into those characteristics of ES and RSCT which will be applied in our study.

A key feature of the ES is the centrality of the state: international relations is about “the politics of states with regard to their external aspects” (Devlen et al., 2005, p. 180). Of course, states are different in terms of power and influence (Buzan, 2004, pp. 63–66).

While “regional powers '“owe superior political and military means in relation to their neighbours, “great powers’” capabilities allow them to generate impact beyond their region. Great powers do not possess capabilities in all sectors or issue areas, but they are treated by others “on the basis of system level calculations about the present and future distribution of power” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 35). Only “super powers” act on a global scale owing “first class military-political capabilities” (ibid., p. 34). For our study, Turkey qualifies as a regional power while it looks debatable whether we treat Serbia and Croatia as possible regional powers. EU actorness is taken as given in our study (Niemann and Bretherton, 2013), considering its fit to well-established actorness criteria, be it authority, autonomy, recognition (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998), or presence and capability (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 24). Hence, the EU well qualifies for great power status together with Russia and China. The US should be regarded as the sole superpower.

The second characteristic of the ES is the importance of history for their arguments. Because political science stems from law and history studies, the ES subscribes to this tradition. The broad

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structural argument is that (political) history swings between three poles called “empire”, “hegemony” and “anarchy” (Buzan and Little, 2009). On a global scale, the system of states might be located somewhere between hegemony (Cold War, US) and anarchy with a recent trend to the latter. Regionally, the situation might look different. Admittedly, the regional aspect is not well elaborated in the ES’s writings (Buzan, 2014, p. 57f.) Yet, for our purpose, we borrow some insights from the complementary RSCT (Buzan and Waever, 2003). For RSCT, a region is a construct, not an essentialist entity, and it is shaped by the distribution of power and historical patterns of enmity/amity. Furthermore, there are security threats which are interdependent in the region (and not a mere extension of global threats such as terrorism, Covid etc). Two cores in the region stand out: One is the conflict constellation of Serbs, Croats and Bosnians, and a second one comprises North-Macedonia3, Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 382).

Buzan and Waever (2003, pp. 377–379, p. 391) make the argument that the Balkans were oscillating between being a proper regional security complex (in the 1990s, see below) or being a “sub-complex”, as part of the European security complex (1999–2007, see below). Following the insight that “security dynamics have a strong territoriality” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 29), we tend to treat the Balkans or Southeastern Europe (SEE) as comprising the Post-Yugoslav states4, and the “Western Balkans” as a security complex which is “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another” (Buzan, 2009, p. 160). By doing so, we already take a stance claiming that the West’s first attempt to make the region a ‘sub-complex’ of the EU has failed by admitting that no further enlargements will take place 3

4

In political speech, the name for North-Macedonia has been contested since the break-up of Yugoslavia. For practical reasons, we use “North-Macedonia” (due to the Greek-Macedonian settlement) throughout the book. Only if this is relevant for the contents the terms “Macedonia” or “FYRoM” are employed.

The term post-Yugoslav states refers to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and North-Macedonia. Throughout this proposal we use the term ‘Kosovo’ to refer to the respective country notwithstanding the contested nature of the independence of Kosovo.

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in the decade after Croatia’s. What the EU’s second serve will be like and what it will mean to the region is part of our elaboration to come.

In SEE, the EU’s position has been so dominant that we posit it between empire and hegemony, again with a recent trend to the latter. Our studies will be apt to demonstrate how change takes place in regional security complexes, i.e., how the EU’s impact as a benevolent empire transforms to a mere hegemonic status under the impression of external great powers becoming more active. This is the result of the EU’s growing scepticism towards further enlargement as a whole, as well as the growing hesitance in the postYugoslav states to engage in deep-rooted Europeanization reforms as the carrot of eventual EU membership moves further away.

A third feature of the ES is its devotion to institutions. Over time, the international system has become an international society, a key term of the theory: A society of states (or: international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in a sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions (Bull, 1977, p. 13).

The international society serves two functions. One is to maintain “order”, i.e., the pluralist argument to contribute to the states’ existence and survival while mitigating conflicts at the same time (Hurrell, 2007, pp. 3–4). The other function aims to foster justice, i.e., the solidarist argument to take care of the individuals in the international society (Joergensen, 2010, p. 111). Of course, the EU accession principles can be easily interpreted in this vein. Does the EU apply EU conditionality in a strict way contributing to humanitarian law and paying tribute to the rule of law (‘justice’)? Or does it ease the conditions—maybe even pervert them (Stahl, 2011a)—to go for quicker accessions aiming at stability (‘order’)?

The more content the states are with the world they live in, the more “legitimate” and stable the international society becomes (Watson, 2009, p. 315). Each state, though, faces the challenge to maintain a maximum of flexibility on the one hand (raison d’état)

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and to support the international society which tends to limit its freedom of foreign policy on the other. For our foreign policy perspective purpose, Watson’s analytical term “raison de système” (2009, p. 14) looks promising in this regard, as it alludes to “the belief that it pays to make the system work”, i.e., the extent to which the countries involved support or undermine the international society prevalent in the region. How far do the countries under study oppose or support the raison de système—the status quo—in the region? In other words, do they lend the EU legitimacy or rather seek to subvert its actions?

As a kind of dual structure with regard to the three-pole structure introduced above, some patterns have been evolving in the course of history, which are held legitimate by the states (Buzan, 2014, p. 16f.). Such “deep relatively durable social practices” (ibid.) are called “primary institutions”.

Primary institutions since the Westphalian treaties are—following Bull (1977, p. 74):     

war balance of power great power management international law diplomacy

Over time, ES scholars have put some more primary institutions on the table, also proposing a hierarchy of institutions (e.g., master institutions—derivatives—principles; Buzan, 2004, pp. 167–190). For practical reasons, we do not follow this road but add ‘nationalism’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territoriality’ to the above list because of its obvious relevance for the history of the region (cf. Buzan, 2014, p. 17f).

For sure, primary institutions undergo change, which make them useful indicators for the analysis of state constellations. This is evident in the case of the EU, which can be regarded as a regional international society comprising common institutions and sharing a common set of rules (Riemer and Stivachtis, 2002, p. 30). Inside the EU, some scholars argue, the primary institutions have been changing profoundly:

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Consequently, the five core institutions of international order identified by Bull (balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and great powers) have been modified or replaced. The new institutions of the European order are identified as the pooling of sovereignty, the acquis communautaire, multi-managerialism, pacific democracy, member state coalitions and multiperspectivity” (Diez et al., 2011, p. 134).

In this vein, enlargement can be conceived as a transformation of primary institutions from Bull’s primary institutions to Diez et al’s.

Admittedly, primary institutions are hard to separate from each other analytically because they cannot serve as separate variables explaining different policy outcomes. Rather, some institutions are intertwined—such as sovereignty, territoriality and international law. Yet primary institutions cannot be changed by one state alone—for instance, not even the most powerful state, the United States, would be able to ruin international law. States’ behaviour, though, contributes to the strength/weakness and importance of the primary institutions in the region: Is diplomacy and international law (primarily fostered and upheld by the EU) undermined by the states which increasingly prefer great power management (offered by Russia, the US, and Turkey)? Do we see changes within the setup of primary institutions? For instance, how is sovereignty and territoriality in the Kosovo question interlinked with the balance of power, great power management and diplomacy? It shall be noted, though, that changes may occur in and of primary institutions (Buzan, 2004, p. 182). For example, by the end of the Bosnian wars, the primary institution ‘war’ changed from asymmetrical to symmetrical warfare, while ‘diplomacy’ and ‘great power management’ increasingly supplanted ‘war’. Changes in and between primary institutions will enable us to evaluate the overall political situation in the Balkans, as ideal-types for a “political situation” may serve the ES’ interstate societies model (ibid., p. 190, p. 159) reaching from confederative over convergent, cooperative, coexistent to power political and even asocial relations.

Pluralist

Asocial

Power Political

Coexistence

BERNHARD STAHL AND SOEREN KEIL

Source: Buzan (2004, p. 159), simplified version.

Figure 1: The English School interstate societies model

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Interstate Societies

Solidarist

Confederative

Convergence

Cooperative

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In contrast to the primary ones, “secondary institutions” are those which are called “International Organisations” or “International Regimes” in common IR literature. The United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, but also the non-proliferation regime are famous examples. They are “statemade” and deliberately designed to serve specific purposes such as the “Stability Pact for SEE” or the “Stabilisation and Association Agreements” for the countries willing to accede to the EU. Our studies ask, which secondary institutions serve as the most preferred arena for the countries under study? Do we see changes here?

Before we enter a brief historical reconstruction to denote the historical patterns in play, let us formulate our working thesis for the book: Since 2006–7, great and regional powers beyond the US and the EU have been engaging more actively with the region. This corresponds to the weakness of the EU and overall foreign policy reorientations of the great and regional powers. As a result, the region is changing …   



moving from interstate relations of convergence to coexistence (see figure 1); becoming less solidarist (justice) but more pluralist (order); increasing the risk of becoming a great power regional security complex again (probably without becoming an “overlay” e.g., a battlefield of great powers as in WWI (Buzan and Waever, 2003, pp. 59–63) where security changes in the region are instrumental to great and regional power calculations; becoming less of a European sub-complex and more of a separate regional security complex again.

In short, the dynamics in the region highlight the importance of order (and increasing disorder) in the international system and also demonstrate wider global changes in international politics, particularly in the shift away from US dominance and a unipolar system to one characterized by multiple poles and competing conceptions of global order. Competition over economic and political influence

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in the post-Yugoslav states, therefore, also offers a unique perspective of wider trends in a territory which for decades has been seen to be deeply embedded within the Euro-Atlantic sphere of dominance.

Historical Patterns The politics of the Balkan international community reflects a pattern as follows5: Treated as a ‘playfield of the great powers’ (before 1947), the success of the Socialist Yugoslavia enabled a politics of neglect (1948–1991). The Yugoslavia wars drew the international community into the conflicts (1991–1998) before the international community committed massive resources to the region (1999– 2007). The (failed) Kosovo negotiations marked the change to the current stage, which is characterized by the dwindling impact of the US, the weakening pull of the EU, the turn in Russian foreign policy, the new Ottoman phase by Turkey, and the growing importance of China in the region.

The Balkans as a Playfield of Great Power Politics (before 1947) The Balkans as a playfield of great power politics was a very impactful and momentous period in history because important territorial decisions were made that would shape the problems of belonging and neighborhood for the following century. Between the 14th and 20th centuries, the region was the spoils of war and annexation by two empires, the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg monarchy. However, by the end of the 18th century at the latest, the Ottoman Empire was in a phase of decline, primarily resulting from the national uprisings of the 19th century, in which Greeks and Serbs, for example, fought for their independence or de facto autonomy. In terms of the ES, the primary institution ‘nationalism’ challenged the great power overlay. As much as the public in the

5

Inspired by Glenny (1999: pp. xxi–xxvi) as well as Buzan and Waever (2003, pp. 377–396).

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West welcomed the national uprisings, the elites worried about the region’s stability and possible gains influenced by the respective great power rivals. In the aftermath of the Crimean War, the major European powers sought to establish a lasting order in the Balkans at the Congress of Berlin (1878). However, the goal was not a permanent stabilisation regarding the potential for conflict on the ground; rather, the great power management meant that they were concerned that others should not profit from the decline of the Ottoman Empire. The positions of the German Empire, Great Britain and France were characterised more by disinterest in the region, while Italy and Russia were intent on gaining influence (Geiss, 1982, p. 37ff). Austria-Hungary even took advantage of the general indifference and annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was, as the events of 1914 were to show, a fatal move. When the Ottoman Empire was distracted militarily in North Africa, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece took advantage of the Empire’s weakness and overran the Ottoman troops in the First Balkan War (1912–13).

An important cornerstone—probably underestimated in the literature to this day—is the Great Power Conferences of 1912/13, which took place after the end of the Balkan Wars and were intended to distribute the bankruptcy assets of the Ottoman Empire. As is traditional at post-war conferences, there was a fundamental tension between “the reality on the ground”, i.e., the conquests of the antiOttoman alliance and the ideas of justice, self-determination and— still dominant at the time—zones of influence that prevailed among the great powers not involved in the war. Theoretically speaking, the primary institutions sovereignty, territoriality and diplomacy were interlinked characterizing great power management. At the Ambassadors’ Conference in London in 1912, Austria-Hungary succeeded in organizing the reorganization of the Balkans without involving the small and middle powers and the Ottoman Empire (Boeckh, 1996, pp. 40–45). It was not only during the war that the region remained a playfield of the great powers.

The foundation of the “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes” from the bankruptcy estate of the Danube monarchy after 1918 was ill-fated from the beginning. The disputes between Croats and Serbs over the structure and form of the new state could only

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be patched up in a makeshift way, and modernisation and democratization failed early (Banac, 1984, p. 414). WWII not only repeated the horrors of WWI, but it also surpassed them. It is commonly known that the Balkan region became an unfortunate victim of the great powers’ projections of power politics. Two aperçus from WWII illustrate this: Hitler’s attack on Yugoslavia in 1941 followed the sheer exuberance of the Italian attack on Greece and was owed to simple military-strategic considerations of denying Britain a critical bridgehead in Greece. Yugoslavia’s militarily ludicrous resistance to the Wehrmacht, in turn, stemmed from a coup in Belgrade coinitiated by the British intelligence service SIS, which was merely intended to buy more time for the British invasion forces for Greece (Hinsley, 1979, p. 368ff.). The secondary theatre of war, Yugoslavia, had to pay for this with a heavy toll of blood: More than one million inhabitants lost their lives because of the war (Calic, 2010, p. 169).

Both WWI and WWII had a devastating impact on the region in the truest sense of the word. First, this was due to the changing course of the war, for example, in WWI. Second, the World Wars promoted conflict dynamics in the region and deepened the rifts between the ethnic groups whose elites had aligned themselves with one or the other warring party. Each period of occupation thus created new conflicts and traumas between the ethnic groups. Third, the division into different occupation zones during WWII and the horrific occupation by the Axis powers contributed to the further fragmentation of the region and thus to the disparity of historical experience (‘divided past’). Moreover, the fierce Yugoslav civil war between Chetniks and Communist partisans during and after WWII added another cleavage to the region. Put simply, the World Wars increased the region’s identity complexes. Burdened with these complexes, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia emerged.

The Policy of Neglect (1947–91) Yugoslavia broke away from Moscow in 1947 and embarked on a “third way” between East and West. The system of states in the Balkans now seemed stabilized, the zones of influence defined by the Cold War. Since the Suez crisis in 1956, the ambitions of the great

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powers France and Great Britain in the region were also substantially reduced. Put theoretically, the region became an unstructured security complex. As fragile and “frozen” as Yugoslavia’s internal social situation remained, it managed its foreign policy with great success (Boeckh, 2014). Tito acted as the leader of the non-aligned movement and was a master at securing international recognition for his country. The visible result was lucrative credit arrangements and trade agreements with East and West, which allowed the economic experiment of Yugoslavia to live beyond its means for a long time. The growing number of tourists in the 1970s and 1980s further helped Yugoslavia’s perception as a thriving, peaceful society. The Yugoslav prosperity and freedom of travel concealed the fact that the democratization of society was still lacking and that the Tito regime cracked down on opposition members with unforgiving harshness (such as the contract killings abroad). At the same time, the ethnic conflicts in the country itself continued to smoulder. Belgrade’s policy towards Kosovo was that of a classic colonial power in occupied land: modern achievements such as infrastructure, medicine and educational institutions were supposed to provide sufficient incentives to bind non-Serbs to the state. At the same time, however, all important positions of power in the state were occupied by Serbs, which made the inequality of the ethnic groups obvious and, at the same time, cemented them. Nationalism turned out to be a powerful force. Not only had it driven the Serbs to rise against the Ottomans, but it also pushed the Kosovo Albanians against Serb rule. The 1981 riots in Kosovo showed the dissatisfaction with the prevailing conditions in Yugoslavia and the lack of identification with the federation, but the West did not take note of this. Thus, 20 years later, Western analysts and politicians were to advocate in unison for extensive autonomy for the province, regardless of the fact that such autonomy had already existed in 1981 but had been perceived as unsatisfactory by the Kosovar elites.

The West took little notice of the problematic developments of the 1980s (failure of the federation, increase in economic problems and nationalist tendencies, weakening of the Communist Party’s binding force, Milošević’s rise to power) and were happy to stick to the glorified image of Yugoslavia as a peaceful holiday paradise

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and successful multiculturalist project (Ramet, 1992; Silber and Little, 1996). The international community’s increased suffering from excessive demands in the aftermath of the epochal year 1989: German unification, the turmoil in Eastern Europe, the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, the Tiananmen Square massacre, the permanent crisis surrounding the world trade order and the attempted coup d’état in Moscow made the drifting apart of Yugoslavia’s constituent republics fade into the background. In theoretical terms, the region was meant to be “sealed off”, constructing a distinct region beyond Europe marked by “Balkanization” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 387; Todorova, 2009). It was only nolens volens that the international community was drawn into the conflicts surrounding the break-up of Yugoslavia.

Drawing in—Involvement (1991–98) As James Gow (1997) put it, the foreign policy behaviour of the Western powers in the run-up to the Yugoslav wars was marked by wishful thinking and pusillanimous realism. Intervention politics was risk-averse, based on containment, superseded by domestic politics and characterized by a short shadow of the future. Initially, the West stuck to a (unrealistic) status quo orientation hoping that the situation would not deteriorate: The Yugoslav federation was to be preserved (1990–91). Linked to this was the assumption of a neutral mediating position. The West developed proposals for ceasefires and peace agreements without actively taking sides. It was Germany’s withdrawal from the international community’s position of non-recognition of Slovenia and Croatia—one month after the fall of Vukovar—that changed international dynamics. Although the community was now forced to take a position in favor of the two northern republics, this had no consequences regarding the overall pattern. On the contrary, Germany regretted its advance and withdrew from active conflict resolution in the Bosnian wars (Maull and Stahl, 2002, p. 101). The third pattern of behavior established in the Yugoslav wars was humanitarian aid. As Lene Hansen (2006) has convincingly argued, humanitarian aid to the civilian population complemented the neutral mediator position as well as

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the status quo orientation which make up the “Balkanization discourse”. The West helped the civilian population without directly intervening or taking sides in the war itself. On the one hand, this policy had the facet of UN blue helmets on the ground (United Kingdom, France and The Netherlands), and on the other hand, it was characterised by Germany’s willingness to take in thousands of civil war refugees.

These three patterns of behavior—neutral mediation, active negotiation, humanitarian aid (and development cooperation)— failed in the Croatian war, the Bosnian wars and the Kosovo war.

However, they remain decisive for European policy in the Balkans because they are—identity-wise—consensual in the societies of the large member states (Harnisch and Stahl, 2009, p. 276). Analytically speaking, the perseverance of the Balkanization discourse corresponds to the idea of SEE being a separate regional security complex whose conflicts and patterns are not part of the European project. It was only the complete failure of this policy that forced the EU to change course, trying to export the European model to the region—and making it a sub-complex of Europe.

In the course of 1994, with the entry of the USA into the conflict, a new pattern of behaviour emerged that increasingly overlapped with the previous ones: Forced diplomacy. As early as 1992 and 1993, the G. H. Bush and Clinton administrations had announced a possible change in their foreign policy with their famous “Christmas-warnings”: any escalation of violence in Kosovo would be met with airstrikes against Serbian targets. But these warnings were bluffs in the sense that neither the Bush nor the Clinton administration ever intended to carry out their threat (Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000, pp. 29–30). After all, the threat and implementation of targeted airstrikes and the accompanying de facto partisanship in favor of the militarily inferior side of the Bosniaks and Croats had succeeded in ending the fighting in Bosnia. The successful intervention under US leadership in Bosnia laid the foundation for the “Kosovo intervention consensus” of the West in the Kosovo crisis. The predominantly non-violent resistance of the Albanians— personified by Ibrahim Rugova—had not brought about any improvement in their situation after several years, and so in the mid-

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1990s, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed, which drew attention to itself with terrorist attacks against the Serbian state authorities and civilian population (Sundhaussen, 2000, pp. 83–86).

Between 1995 and 1997, it seemed as if EU foreign policy was repeating its mistakes of 1990 to 1992. The conflict was perceived by the member states primarily as a conflict of interests, not of identity.

The wishful thinking for a quick end to the conflict and the selective perception of Milošević’s willingness to compromise continued to be features of Western policy (Maull and Stahl, 2002, pp. 99–102).

In Kosovo, however, violence intensified: From April to September 1998, Serb units destroyed more than 300 villages (Malcolm, 2006, p. 147). On 23 September 1998, the United Nations Security Council (thus including China and Russia) passed Resolution 1199, referring to Chapter VII, demanding an immediate cessation of all hostilities, the withdrawal of Serbian special forces and the start of constructive talks between the conflicted parties. The resolution named Serbia as the situation’s main perpetrator for the first time, and NATO threatened the Yugoslav leadership with airstrikes. Yugoslav President Milošević reacted to NATO’s increased threat potential and declared his willingness to make concessions in the socalled Holbrooke-Milošević Agreement on 13 October. However, Milošević was very slow in implementing some points of the agreement and failed to implement others at all. To make matters worse, the KLA did not feel bound by the agreement and took advantage of the passivity of the Serbian troops to launch attacks (Judah, 2002, p. 189). In December, both the KLA attacks and the repression and expulsions in Kosovo increased again. Then, in mid-January, the news startled the Western media that 45 Albanian civilians had been killed in Reçak/Račak—most probably by Serbian units. This massacre seemingly marks a turning point in the international assessment of the Kosovo conflict because from then on, even the previously hesitant states of France, Germany and Italy were ready to leave their neutral position. The last chance for a peaceful settlement was the Rambouillet Conference between the Serbian government and the negotiating delegation of the Kosovo Albanians, which began on February 6, 1999. Central problems in the negotiations were the future status of Kosovo, the military presence on the

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ground and its relationship to Yugoslav sovereignty, as well as the disagreement of the contact group, especially on the question of how much flexibility should be shown on the sensitive points (Joetze, 2001, p. 66).

However, the negotiations were overshadowed by neverending news about displacements and excessive violence in Kosovo.

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), about 230,000 Albanians had been expelled from their homes by mid-March 1999, 60,000 of them since December 1998, and another 30,000 after the end of the negotiations in Rambouillet (Krause, 2000, p. 410). But the very emotional opening speech of the French president, in which he recalled the overcoming of the Franco-German arch-enmity and urgently appealed to the parties in conflict to find “the courage to make peace”, went unheard (cited in Judah, 2002, p. 202). Under enormous Western pressure, only the Albanian delegation accepted the agreement on the political framework and the civilian and military implementation for the pacification of Kosovo on March 18. However, the discord that arose during the conference between the formal negotiators France and Great Britain on the one hand and the USA on the other, strengthened the Serbian government in its rejectionist stance (Swoboda and Stahl, 2009, p. 67f.). Thus, the Serbian delegation stuck to its dismissive attitude, demanded fundamental renegotiations on the political part and refused any discussion on implementation. The international community felt compelled to act, not least because of the increasingly urgent refugee problem. NATO—including Turkey—began bombing Serbia as well as Serbian units in Kosovo. Only after Milošević gave up—after assurances of a UN-led mission for Kosovo with Russian participation—did the Alliance stop the attacks after more than 70 days. NATO’s bombing campaign, however, led to a feeling of marginalisation in Moscow (Williams and Golenkova, 2001, pp. 217–8), which paved the way for Russia’s intransigence in the Kosovo negotiations a couple of years later. With the occupation of Kosovo by multinational peacekeeping forces, the region entered a new phase, and “the last American war in Europe” (Weymouth and Henig, 2001) ended.

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The Phase of Responsibility (1999–2007) The end of the Kosovo War marks the significant take-over of responsibility by Euro-Atlantic actors. The nolens volens involvement was now succeeded by a proactive policy. In theoretical terms, the region moved from being a separate regional security complex to a sub-complex within Europe (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 395). Kosovo was declared a UN protectorate administered by different international organizations (OSCE, EU, UN) and substantial troop deployments for NATOS’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) including Russia, Turkey, the US and European powers. Turkey, for instance, committed herself to the “friends of Kosovo” group and helped to initiate the Southeast-European brigade (Babuna, 2000, p. 311). The Turkish minority in Kosovo cheered the country’s engagement with KFOR 90 years after the Ottomans had left the region in the Balkan war (ibid., p. 316).

The international community’s proactive conflict resolution was demonstrated when riots started in North-Macedonia in 2001 (Ahlbrecht, 2003). The Albanian minority in North-Macedonia was another remnant of the great power conferences of London and Paris mentioned above. North-Macedonia was used by the KLA as a retreat, and many refugees from the Kosovo war found a safe haven in North-Macedonia. In January and February 2001, the Macedonian Liberation Army killed Macedonian soldiers and occupied the village of Tanusevci with some 100,000 people fleeing from the spreading Albanian violence—the country was on the brink of civil war. The EU intervened in the crisis by “speaking softly while carrying a big carrot”. Cooperation from the EU’s High Representative, Javier Solana, the Commission, the OSCE and NATO to pull together solved the problem (Stahl, 2011b, pp. 151–155). On August 13, 2001, all conflict parties signed the Ohrid Agreement, which foresaw a revision of the Macedonian constitution granting more rights to the Albanian minority—a perfect example of successful norm projection (Björkdahl, 2005, p. 212). That same month, NATO launched operation “Essential Harvest”, sending approximately 3,500 NATO troops to disarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy their weapons. As the fighting ebbed, the crisis was solved. The EU

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flanked the post-conflict management by setting up a military operation in North-Macedonia (Concordia) followed by an EU police Mission (Proxima). Regrettably, this very proactive and successful conflict resolution could not blossom due to Greece’s blockade of the enlargement process.6 The responsibility phase was characterized by the EU’s aim to make the transformation of the region a top-priority goal of its foreign policy. The Thessaloniki summit in 2003 defined the region as part of Europe’s fate and promised membership in the EU. Because this required enormous efforts from the ‘pre-ins’, the union offered a wide range of incentives and assistance.7 In a theoretical vein, order in the sub-complex should have prevailed by the mutual recognition of sovereignty, renouncing territorial claims and abstaining from violent means. With the help of the EU’s transformative power, diplomacy and justice should have gained ground by including principles of international law in the accession negotiations (cooperation with ICTY requirement). The Thessaloniki promise to the region was trustworthy as it was followed by the Big Bang in 2004 when ten Central and East European (CEE) states acceded to the union—among them, the former republic of Yugoslavia. At the same time, EU integration was paralleled by the offer to join NATO which was apt—on the one hand—to solve territorial security threats for the Balkan states and—on the other—extended the transatlantic alliance to SEE. Several countries joined NATO in this period, Slovenia already in 2004, Croatia in 2009, Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020. All in all, interstate relations were destined to leave the asocial state of war behind and to arrive at the confederate state of union membership by the end of the day. The growing importance of externally-incentivized but regionally managed initiatives such as the Stability Pact and its successor the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) also highlight this mix of integration—internally through regional cooperation and integration by initiatives such as the EU-sponsored Berlin-process, which focuses on economic cooperation and external integration through 6 7

See also Cvete Koneska’s contribution in this volume.

See also our contribution on the European Union in this volume.

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NATO and EU membership. The extensive network of European engagement is also visible through processes such as the visa liberalization procedure, which enables citizens of all post-Yugoslav states (with the exception of Kosovo) to travel to the Schengen area in the EU without an entry visa and to stay for up to 90 days.

Yet, this solidarist perspective came under severe strain in the Kosovo status negotiations (2004–2007) when the minimum conditions for maintaining order in the region could not be met. After the Kosovo war, the EU fell back to its consensual standard pattern, which led to the policy failures in the Yugoslav wars: neutral mediation, active negotiation and humanitarian aid (and development cooperation), complemented by pusillanimous realism and wishful thinking. To retard the Kosovo status question due to its proper disunity and the wishful thinking of Serbia’s future democratic development, the EU and the international community subscribed to a “Standards before Status” strategy. They invested in Kosovo’s statebuilding while denying the option of independence (Papadimitriou, Petrov and Greicevci, 2007). Yet, the Kosovar élite undermined this strategy from the start (Hajrullahu, 2007, p. 207) and initiated a pogrom against Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo. In the March 2004 riots, 19 people were killed, hundreds of Serbs expelled and dozens of churches burned. KFOR could neither prevent nor stop the violence. When the Serb government—now aware of the vulnerable Serb minority—proposed Kosovo’s division or ‘cantonisation’, the EU rejected the idea on the basis of the protectorate’s impartiality (Judah, 2004, pp. 20–22). Once more, the EU’s reactive wishful thinking had failed while the KLA’s strategy of violence paid off: The status negotiation started with the EU actors completely divided on the issue (Toschev/Cheikameghuyaz, 2005, p. 281). The negotiations were burdened by a biased chief negotiator (Ker-Lindsey, 2009, p. 27), the fallback option of unilateral independence prompted by the US—G.W. Bush’s Tirana speech in June 2007 (NYT 10.06.2007) being a late indicator—and the promised Russian veto for any unilateral independence in the Security Council. Against this backdrop, the international community’s incentives for Serbia (participating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace pro-

INTRODUCTION

45

gramme, visa liberalization, relaunching the negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement) all ran empty. So, the status negotiations eventually failed in December 2007. When Kosovo declared its independence the following year, the EU had to declare itself ‘status-neutral’ as five member states objected to recognizing Kosovo. In ES terms: Unrealistic claims of territoriality and sovereignty, bad diplomacy and dissonant great power management in combination with surging nationalism in Serbia, Kosovo but also in some EU member states resulted in a disastrous outcome of politics—the EU’s window of opportunity started to close.

The Weakening Pull of European Integration (after 2007) After Kosovo’s independence, the EU successes in enlargement policy became rare. Even Croatia’s accession did not go smoothly considering the unresolved conflict with Slovenia on the Piran Bay which was imported into the Union (Šelo Šabić , 2014, pp. 79–80).

Montenegro, which joined NATO in 2017, is a candidate country for EU integration together with Serbia (in 2012), but the negotiations have been slow. Bosnia also has applied for candidate status but looks unable to go for any necessary constitutional reform. Kosovo, meanwhile, signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU in 2014 (implemented in 2016) but remains a contested state.

The slow EU integration process of all post-Yugoslav states, except Slovenia and Croatia, and the palpable pre-occupation of the EU with other problems—Brexit, the refugee crisis, the rise of populist and anti-democratic governments in Poland and Hungary and the ongoing fallout from the Eurocrisis—have opened space for other external actors to seek influence in the region. At the same time, the US administration is perceived as scaling back engagement within the post-Yugoslav states, distracted by other international flashpoints (such as the Middle East and North Korea) and domestic divisions.

The progress toward Euro-Atlantic integration has clearly met resistance from Russia, which has sought to exploit political and

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ethnic divisions to prevent several post-Yugoslav states from joining NATO and the EU. Furthermore, Russia has taken advantage of the US and EU “retreat” from the region not only by becoming more active in its traditional allied countries such as Serbia, but also in supporting the government of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and allegedly, being involved in a coup-attempt in Montenegro (Bechev, 2017).

Turkey has turned to the Balkans with more ambition for influence than before, after suffering setbacks in its own EU integration and worsened relations with the US and other NATO members. While Turkey has become more involved in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, which have a Muslim majority, its economic interests have been pushed in Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, as Turkey works across the region to expand its own neo-Ottoman foreign policy vision (Somun, 2011).

Furthermore, China has started expanding investment and economic presence in SEE, particularly in the post-Yugoslav states.

China has become increasingly interested in the region, not only for economic, but also for political and strategic reasons (ECRF, 2017).

Structure of the Book Content-wise, the book is structured in two parts. The first one is devoted to “Great Power Perspectives” which provides an outsidein take. The five chapters will assess the historical links of the former Yugoslavia (by Jakob R. Avguštin) as well as the ones between the post-Yugoslav states and the EU (by Soeren Keil & Bernhard Stahl), the USA (by Kurt Bassuener), Russia (by Maxim Samorukov), China (by Nina Pejič, Saša Istenič Kotar and Zlatko Šabič) and Turkey (by Zeynep Arkan Tuncel), including historic alliances and each great power’s role during the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Moving to contemporary politics, the chapters will focus on any shift in these relations since the end of Socialist Yugoslavia, the great power’s strategic interests in the region, tools for achieving these goals, and to what extent the current system serves the great powers’ aims, as often believed. The authors will also look into how the great powers may use primary institutions to change the status

INTRODUCTION

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quo or utilize secondary institutions such as international and regional organizations to legitimize or delegitimize them for their own benefit. The authors will then analyze the foreign policy-making process in each of the great power’s capitals, the place of postYugoslav states in that power’s major strategic documents, and the way this policy is implemented—through security means, economic tools, energy, investment, using ethnic groups, resorting to propaganda, etc. Furthermore, the chapters will assess the relationship with each of the great powers in light of the Euro-Atlantic integration as a dominant narrative for the region.

The second part, “The Perspective of the Post-Yugoslav States”, entails an inside-out take. The seven chapters focus on each of the post-Yugoslav states and its foreign policy towards China, Russia, Turkey, the EU and the US. The chapters on Slovenia (by Ana Boijinovic Fenko), Croatia (by Senada Šelo Šabić ), Serbia (by Mladen Mladenov), Montenegro (by Bojan Baća and Kenneth Morrison), North-Macedonia (by Cvete Koneska), Bosnia and Herzegovina (by Adnan Huskić) and Kosovo (by Gezim Krasniqi) assess historic links and alliances, public sentiments and policy approached, including balancing foreign actor’s interests and influences in the country. Each chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the strategic goals of major foreign powers in a specific post-Yugoslav state and evaluates the impact of their policy on the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. What is more, each chapter outlines what role these different great powers play in the foreign policy objective, instruments and overall strategies of the post-Yugoslav state.

By doing so, a picture will emerge on historical changes and continuities, current political trends and developments, and the institutional and strategic role that these great powers play in each of the countries under examination. In light of the dominance of the EuroAtlantic integration discourse, it will be shown which rival perspectives have opened up in recent years, and to what extent these developments pose a serious threat not only to the Euro-Atlantic perspectives of the post-Yugoslav states, but to regional stability as a whole.

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Finally, the conclusion (by Soeren Keil & Bernhard Stahl) will draw numerous comparative insights from the discussion in the individual chapters. It starts with an assessment of the great powers and their foreign policy frameworks towards the post-Yugoslav states. By addressing the importance that the region plays in each of the five powers discussed, it will show how the region has once again become a tool and a playground for great power politics—in other words, whether another Eastern question emerges in new clothes. In addition, the conclusion will highlight how each of the post-Yugoslav states engages with the great powers discussed, and to what extent there is evidence of shifting alternative alliances and serious competition for the dominance of the Euro-Atlantic integration perspective of the region and individual post-Yugoslav states.

By comparing their engagement with the great powers, a mixed picture will emerge, demonstrating that while non-Western powers have become more influential in the region, overall, the dominance of the Euro-Atlantic perspective prevails, not least because it is linked to concrete and substantial incentives. However, the EuroAtlantic discourse is increasingly challenged in the post-Yugoslav states, mirroring wider global challenges to the dominance of Liberal Internationalism in the international system.

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Boeckh, K. (2014). “Allies Are Forever (Until They Are No More): Yugoslavia’s Multivectoral Foreign Policy During Titoism”. In: S. Keil and B. Stahl, eds., The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugoslav-States. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 18–43.

Boeckh, K. (1996). “Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg.

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Buzan, B. and Waever, O. (2003). “Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, B. (2004). “From international to world society? English School Theory and the social structure of globalisation”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Hajrullahu, A. (2007). “Langfristiger Frieden am Westbalkan durch EU-Integration. Der EU-Integrationsprozess als Chance für die Überwindung des serbisch-kosovarischen Konfliktes”. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

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Joetze, G. (2001). “Der letzte Krieg in Europa? Das Kosovo und die deutsche Politik”. Stuttgart and München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.

Judah, T. (2001). “Kosovo and its status”. In: Allin, D. H. et al., eds., What status for Kosovo?, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, Challiot Paper 50, pp. 55–68.

Judah, T. (2002). “Kosovo. War and Revenge”. New Haven/New York: Yale Nota Bene.

Judah, T. (2004). “Serbia’s Kosovo policy”. In: Altmann, F. L. and Whitlock, E., eds., European and US Policies in the Balkans, SWP Paper, Berlin, pp.

19–24.

Ker-Lindsey, J. (2009). “Kosovo. The path to contested state-hood in the Balkans”. London and New York: I.B. Tauris.

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München: Bayerische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildungsarbeit, pp. 395–416.

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MacMillan, M. (2003). “Paris 1919. Six months that changed the world”.

New York: Random House.

Malcolm, N. (1998). “Kosovo. A short history”. London: Panbooks.

Malcolm, N. (2006). “The War over Kosovo”. In: Blitz, B., ed., War and Change in the Balkans. Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 143–155.

Maull, H. W. and Stahl, B. (2002). “Durch den Balkan nach Europa?

Deutschland und Frankreich in den Jugoslawienkriegen”, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 43(1), pp. 82–111.

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Papadimitriou, D., Petrov, P. and Greicevci, L. (2007). “To Build a State: Europeanization, EU Actorness and State-Building in Kosovo”, European Foreign Affairs Review, 12(2), pp. 219–238.

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Riemer, A. and Stivachtis, Y. (2002). “European Union’s Enlargement, the English School of International Relations and the Expansion of Regional International Societies”. In: A.Riemer and Y. Stivachtis, eds., Understanding EU’s Mediterranean Enlargement. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, pp. 19–40. Šelo Šabić , S. (2014). “Croatia’s Fast-Forward Foreign Policy: From Yugoslavia to the EU”. In: S. Keil and B. Stahl, eds., The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugolslav States, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 69–93.

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Stahl, B. (2011b): “Perverted conditionality—the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and Serbia”, European Foreign Affairs Review, 16(4), pp. 465–487.

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PART I GREAT POWER PERSPECTIVES

YUGOSLAVIA— FROM VARDAR TO TRIGLAV NO MORE1 Jakob R. Avguštin

Map 2: Yugoslavia and its Neighbor States Source: © 2021 Mapsland https://www.mapsland.com/europe/yugoslavia/largedetailed-political-map-of-yugoslavia-with-roads-railroads-and-major-cities-1981), licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 (s. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/).

1

Paraphrased from the lyrics of a popular Yugoslavian song Jugoslavijo created

by Danilo Živković and Milutin Popović—Zahar in 1974; the song was interpreted by various artists and was known as ‘the other’ unofficial hymn of the country.

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JAKOB R. AVGUŠTIN

Introduction In January 2020 we marked 30 years since the last congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; the Slovenian delegation famously walked out and the rest was as they say, history—first, the party and then the famous “ethnofederal” (Petersen, 2011) country disintegrated.

While this chapter will not seek to discuss or determine the reasons for Yugoslavia’s demise, it is cognizant of the interplay between the great powers at the time, the seismic shifts in the international system in the 1980s and 1990s, the impacts of historic alliances and alignments, and the manifest and latent effects of various interests following Tito’s death. The role and influence of great powers, and the West in particular, in the Balkans and in Yugoslavia of any incarnation has been complex. This chapter will review that role generally from two perspectives: Yugoslavia and the United Nations (UN), and Yugoslavia and the European Community (EC). This chapter aims to present an overview of the story of Yugoslavia in the 1990s as it was transformed from an important international player to an agenda item to be dealt with by the great powers in the fora of the two institutions.

While “few in the West were ready to play an intrusive role” (Petersen, 2011, p. 115), the role of the West and its involvement in the region has nonetheless increased rapidly—literally and ideologically. Peoples of Yugoslavia indeed looked especially to the European Community to help them transition away from communism (Wachtel and Bennet, 2009). US foreign policy sent some mixed signals with the last US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann (1995), stating that “the United States (US) could only support unity in the context of democracy; it would strongly oppose unity imposed or preserved by force”, while the US Secretary of State James A. Baker III explained that unilateral actions would not be rewarded, thereby attempting to warn the secessionist states off their ideas (Hoffman, 1991). However, Slovenia, emboldened by

YUGOSLAVIA—FROM VARDAR TO TRIGLAV NO MORE

57

Berlin, Vienna and Washington, spearheaded2 the movement towards pluralization of the political sphere, some would even claim too rapidly,3 particularly in adopting a new slogan of Europe Now! in December 1989 and an accompanying manifesto no Western country would be ashamed of. In fact, a pro-Europe orientation and not the continuation of non-aligned foreign policy was evident on the federal level as well; following the Ninth summit of the NonAligned Movement in Belgrade in 1989, the Yugoslavian Presidency adopted a special declaration which set Yugoslavia towards the European way, particularly the European Community and the Council of Europe, and in April 1991, the Yugoslav Assembly also adopted a Declaration on European integration4 (Đukanović, 2019).

For a moment it seemed that Yugoslavia might fall apart relatively peacefully toward the West as it was even “on the verge of joining the European Community” (Baskin and Pickering, 2018, p.

277), however, further developments took the country on a much more violent course as “due to the culmination of the crisis and the beginning of the war in Yugoslavia, all the agreements on cooperation between the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the European Community were soon suspended” (Bazić, 2019, p.

306). It seemed as if the whole country was suspended in time, waiting for outside forces to decide its destiny while internal developments split it asunder. The delayed and sometimes confusing responses, or even the lack thereof, allowed for the violence stirring up in the 1980s to become a reality in the 1990s. In a relatively short period of time during great changes in geopolitics, the great powers went from protecting Yugoslavia from non-Western influence and even possible military aggression to figuring out how to save the country from itself. It might be that their biggest failure lay mainly in the “reluctance to accept the prospect of disintegration” (Wachtel 2

3

4

Higgins (1993, p. 468) also points out that “[M]atters were greatly exacerbated by the different pace of democratization in the various component republics of Yugoslavia”.

The long-term president of the Slovenian League of Communists France Popit left the party in protest as he was certain the party was relinquishing power too fast (Svenšek, 2020).

This was a “fundamental shift” from non-alignment and towards European integration (Bazić, 2019, p. 306).

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JAKOB R. AVGUŠTIN

and Bennett, 2009, p. 43). This chapter seeks to find opportunities to reconsider this rather widely accepted understanding.

Yugoslavia and the UN Even though Yugoslavia as a political state-like entity,5 separate to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, did not quite exist at that time,6 Yugoslav Foreign Minister Stanoje Simić was able to participate in the creation of the post-World-War-II world order by signing the UN Charter that made Yugoslavia an original member. Yugoslavia retained a prominent position in this new world on the so-called “third side of the Cold War” (Jakovina, 2011) within the UN and its bodies in its own right and as one of the leaders in the Non-Aligned Movement. For example, Yugoslavia served as a member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) four times,7 the last time in the years just before its demise. As such, Yugoslavia discussed and voted on UNSC resolutions addressing some of the major questions of international peace and security, such as the conflict between India and Pakistan, the Korean War, the Palestine question with several conflicts in the Middle East, the Suez question, the 1956 situation in Hungary, apartheid in South Africa, the Cyprus question, conflicts between Portugal and its former African territories, the Iraq-Iran war, self-determination for Western Sahara as well as elections of members of the International Court of Justice, admissions of new members, and the regulation and general reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.

As one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, Yugoslavia with its “wedge strategy” (Eskridge-Kosmach, 2009) and a “diplomacy of global reach” (Jakovina, 2011) was respected on both

5

6

7

Discounting the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia formed in 1943 which was recognized by the Allies at the Tehran Conference, but was nonetheless only a provisional state.

When the UN Charter was signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 and even after its coming into force on 24 October 1945, Yugoslavia as a republic had still been in the process of being established with its first incarnation as the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia coming into existence on 29 November 1945.

Yugoslavia was elected a non-permanent member of the UNSC four times; 1950-51, 1956, 1972-73, and 1988-89.

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59

sides of the Berlin Wall. Even more, after the Non-Aligned Movement took shape in the 1960s, it very “soon became a significant force in world politics, particularly at the United Nations” (Bosco, 2009, p. 112). Despite its non-aligned foreign policy, its voting behavior in the UNSC was often aligned with the Western powers.

Looking closer at Yugoslavia’s voting during its first membership of the UNSC and in the light of the 1948 split with the Soviet Union, it is interesting, however, to find that in 1950 when the Soviet Union (USSR) boycotted the UNSC, Yugoslavia either abstained, did not vote or voted against half of the eleven adopted UNSC resolutions.

In 1951 on the other hand, Yugoslavia voted almost exclusively in alignment with the US and for example, supported resolutions on the Palestine question and on the India-Pakistan question, whereas the USSR abstained from voting on these resolutions. During its UNSC membership in the 1970s, Yugoslavia voted slightly more aligned with the USSR votes than those of the US, however, it exhibited some independence as well; in 1973 two resolutions were adopted where both the USSR and the US voted against or abstained, but Yugoslavia voted in favor.8 During Yugoslavia’s UNSC membership in the 1980s, the three countries voted in favor of most resolutions—18 out of 20 in both years, showcasing the imminent thawing of the Cold War. However, the US abstained from voting on two resolutions in 1988 and 1989 each (three on Territories Occupied by Israel and one on South Africa) where the USSR and Yugoslavia voted in favor. While these actions may have seemed small in terms of Yugoslavia’s broad foreign policy, they did, however, signal that Yugoslavia had its own voice on some of the defining issues of international peace and security during the Cold War. With this in mind, it is plausible to say that Yugoslavia was not merely living, or even thriving, off the East-West antagonization, but instead was an active actor on its own even at the greatest tables. Tito’s death triggered visible changes, and soon after, Yugoslavia itself became a frequent topic

8

They are S/RES/332 (1973) on the Situation in the Middle East (on military attacks conducted by Israel against Lebanon) and S/RES/344 (1973) on the Peace Conference in the Middle East.

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JAKOB R. AVGUŠTIN

of UNSC discussions and documents, appearing in 1991 for the first time with three UNSC resolutions.9 Yugoslavia as a Matter of the UN Security Council During the 1990s, the UNSC adopted 124 resolutions on various issues regarding the former Yugoslavia and a further 12 resolutions on the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY); see the table below for a breakdown of topics/issues. To provide context, the UNSC adopted 638 resolutions altogether in that decade, which would mean that about a fifth were addressing the situation in former Yugoslavia. Considering that the 1990s were plagued with so many threats to international peace and security all over the world, it would be fair to state that former Yugoslavia kept the UN and the UNSC in particular busy. In fact, the UNSC still keeps a close watch on the region.10 The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be addressed by at least one resolution every year, where the UNSC determines the situation in the region as a threat to international peace and security, and continues to act under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN; the last such resolution was S/RES/2549, adopted unanimously on November 5, 2020.

9 10

They are S/RES/713, S/RES/721 and S/RES/724, all adopted unanimously.

From 2000 onwards, the UN SC has adopted 37 further resolutions addressing in effect the former Yugoslavia, albeit the majority of those involve only Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some 30 resolutions had also been adopted addressing the ICTY from 2000 to its dissolution in 2017.

3

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

7

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Total

23

0

0

0

1

9

4

5

4

0

0

Former YU

10

0

0

0

0

4

2

2

2

0

0

FRY

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

Slovenia

26

2

2

4

6

6

1

3

2

0

0

Croatia

38

2

3

4

1

4

4

8

12

0

0

Bosnia and Herzeg.

Table 1: Number of UNSC resolutions for all former Yugoslavia in the 1990

* The table includes resolutions on accession of new members but excludes resolutions on ICTY. ** Resolutions on UNPROFOR in 1994 and 1995 counted under Former YU.

0

1990

SFRY

14

0

1

4

3

2

0

3

1

0

0

FYROM

5

2

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Kosovo

124

6

9

12

11

25

11

21

26

3

0

Total

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In 1992, the UNSC adopted four resolutions on the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and then with accession of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the UN, resolutions began addressing situations and issues in specific (new) countries, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), or if more general, in former Yugoslavia. It must be pointed out that at this stage the UNSC convention of naming and archiving its resolutions as per annual index (United Nations, 2020) is highly inconsistent and at times incorrect, i.e. with the name of the resolution not correctly reflecting its contents—and not just when it comes to the complexity such as is the case of Yugoslavia in that period.11 For example, resolution S/RES/992 (1995) named Freedom of Navigation on the Danube River could easily be missed as relevant to the Yugoslav Wars or as relevant to the embargo sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in that period. Similarly, S/RES/1160 (1998) titled On the letters from the United Kingdom (S/1998/223) and the United States (S/1998/272) could be dismissed even though it is in fact the first one dealing with the issue of Kosovo. Furthermore, the title of resolutions in the UNSC voting records is usually different than the one in the index; S/RES/1160 (1998) for example, the title is recorded as On the imposition of an arms embargo against Yugoslavia (Digital Library, 2020). This caveat is therefore not only relevant to any transparent and credible research on this topic, but it also demonstrates the importance of nuances and political detail, or the lack thereof, in complicated and intricate situations such as breaches of and threats to international peace and security.

The UNSC authorized several different peace operations for former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, each with its own set of issues; United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR, 1992–1995), United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO, 1994–1996), United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH, 11

For example, UNSC resolutions regarding the issue of Palestine can be found under at least the following five names, depending on the year/decade of adoption: Palestine, Middle East, Territories Occupied by Israel, Occupied Arab Territories, or Middle East, including the Palestinian Question. Furthermore, resolutions with these same names sometimes also do not involve Palestine at all, but other nations in the region.

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1995-2002), United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP, 1995–1999), United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP, 1996–2002), and United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG, 1998). The last one, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has been deployed since 1999. UNPROFOR particularly has been heavily criticized as there was in fact no ceasefire in place for this peacekeeping operation (Higgins, 1993) to fulfil its ever-increasing mandate (from patrolling functions to supporting safe movement and the delivery of humanitarian aid, protection of convoys with released detainees and monitoring compliance with the ban on military flights).

The UNSC also authorized a series of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations, involving naval blockades, nofly zone enforcement, air campaigns, and peacekeeping: Operation Maritime Monitor (1992), Operation Sky Monitor (1992–1993), Operation Maritime Guard (1992–1993), Operation Deny Flight (1993– 1995), Operation Sharp Guard (1993–1996), Operation Deliberate Force (1995), Operation Joint Endeavour (IFOR, 1995–1996), Operation Joint Guard (SFOR, 1996–1998), Operation Joint Forge (SFOR, 1998–2004), Operation Allied Force (1999), and the still deployed Kosovo Force (KFOR, 1999).

Great Powers and Voting in the UNSC While the majority of the UNSC resolutions on the former Yugoslavia have been adopted unanimously or without a vote,12 a fifth of them were adopted with abstentions and one even with some votes against.13 While some non-permanent members, i.e., India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Venezuela and Zimbabwe, abstained in some cases, it was China and the Russian Federation in terms of the great 12

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Four UNSC resolutions were adopted without a vote, all in 1992; S/RES/752, S/RES/753, and S/RES/754 on accession to the UN of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively, and S/RES/758 on the enlargement of the mandate and the strength of the UN Protection Force and humanitarian assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Djibouti and Pakistan voted against S/RES/943 (1994) on the closure of the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs.

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powers that often abstained from voting on UNSC resolutions addressing former Yugoslavia. China abstained on 17 UNSC resolutions while the Russian Federation abstained 11 times, sometimes on the same resolutions, covering a variety of issues over the decade, e.g., sanctions against Yugoslavia, establishment of a rapid-reaction force within the UN Protection Force, the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the strengthening of the measures imposed by the earlier resolutions, and even on the non-participation of Yugoslavia in the work of the Economic and Social Council. Although the observed sample is small, it could be argued that China and Russia abstained regularly when it came to issues of what might be deemed as interference in domestic affairs, e.g., a ban on military flights, sanctions and arms embargo, and extending or strengthening of UN forces.

China abstained with all five UNSC resolutions on Kosovo, adopted in 1998 and 1999. With the very first UNSC resolution on Kosovo (S/RES/1160), the Chinese representative stated at the meeting of the UNSC that “The question of Kosovo is, in its essence, an internal matter of the Federal Republic. It should be resolved properly through negotiations between both parties concerned on the basis of the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (Undocs, 2020e).

However, while the draft resolution did not conform with their principles, it is worthwhile noting that China chose to abstain and not vote against such draft resolutions.

Taking a closer look at the UNSC meeting records, for example, in 1994 (Undocs, 2020a), reveals that the Chinese would often declare that China would vote in favor of draft resolutions on condemnation of the violations of international humanitarian law and on the suspension of sanctions, as that reflects in principle China’s basic position in this regard”. However, China will abstain from voting on draft resolutions on the tightening of sanctions as China is “not in favor of using sanctions or mandatory measures to resolve the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, because experience has proved that this will not help solve the problem (ibid.).

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While China clearly argued that sanctions were not the right answer to the situation nor an efficient one, the Russian Federation had a slightly more mixed approach. It voted in favor of sanctions in 1992, but in 1993 it abstained from voting on the resolution to strengthen the measures imposed by the earlier resolutions. The following year, the Russian Federation again voted in favor of the resolution on the reinforcement and extension of measures imposed, and then in 1995 it abstained from voting on resolutions extending the suspension of certain sanctions as well as on the termination of the weapons and military embargo.

The Russian representative stated that the draft resolutions were “not consistent with the principle of positive and negative incentives previously agreed upon in the Contact Group and in the Security Council,” (Undocs, 2020b) or that “draft resolution’s contents can hardly be considered an appropriate way of encouraging a constructive policy on the part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the matter of a peaceful settlement” (Undocs, 2020c). Furthermore, in the case of S/RES/1021 (1995) on the termination of the embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment imposed by resolution 713 (1991), the Russian explanation was that “neither the spirit nor the letter of the text follow the logic of the political process, which is aimed at ending military confrontation in the region”, suggesting that the Balkans as a region should be subject to a general “restriction and reduction of arms” as it “should never again pose a threat to international security and stability” (Undocs, 2020d).

In 1998, the Russian Federation voted in favor of resolutions on the situation in Kosovo and the imposition of an arms embargo against Yugoslavia, but abstained on S/RES/1203 on agreements for the verification of compliance with the provisions of resolution 1199. Stating that Russia had played an active role in creating the possibility of stabilizing the situation in Kosovo, but feeling that the draft resolutions had been rushed and not taken into account all concerns, the Russian representative abstained from voting. Supporting the resolution on the deployment of international civil and security presences in Kosovo in 1999, the Russian Federation abstained from voting on S/RES/1239 on relief assistance to Kosovo

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refugees and internally displaced persons in Kosovo, the Republic of Montenegro and other parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, citing the “principled nature” of their position; the Russian representative stated that unless the illegal military action by NATO ceased immediately, the narrow national interests would continue to hinder a peaceful settlement of the crisis (Undocs, 2020f). Similar to China’s position, the Russian Federation also opted to abstain from voting instead of voting against draft resolutions, even when in strong and principled disagreement.

China did, however, veto the draft resolution S/1999/201 on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which extended the mandate of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) until August 31, 1999 and was also requested by the FYROM Minister of Foreign Affairs in his letter to the UN Secretary-General.

The draft resolution was put forward by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US. The Chinese representative explained their vote against was based on three arguments: UN peacekeeping operations should not be open-ended, the original goal of the mission had been met as per the report from the Secretary-General, and that an extension for UNPREDEP was unfair to other ongoing conflicts and financially irresponsible. In subsequent statements from other representatives, China’s veto was subject to criticism to which the Chinese representative responded that the accusations made were groundless and that “deciding one’s own position on the merits of a matter is the right of every sovereign State” (Undocs, 2020f).

While it could be argued that the statement from the Chinese representative was clear and very matter-of-fact, it must be noted that in comparison to explanations of previous Chinese abstentions, it is not shrouded in political statements on principles, interests and policies. However, most authors have found political reasons for this Chinese veto; Ziring et al. argue that the “veto was used because Macedonia had diplomatically and formally recognized the Republic of China (Taiwan) in return for its economic assistance” (2005). Similarly, He notes that “Beijing was enraged and vetoed the UNSC draft resolutions” (He, 2019) while Bellamy et al. state

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that “China exacted retribution” for the same reason (2010). Dunbabin (2008) agrees and reminds that China had used the veto for the same reason once before in 1997 when it voted against the dispatch of UN observers to Guatemala. Alike, Bosco mentions the same two examples stating China “wanted to punish them” for establishing relations with Taiwan (2009, p. 208).

The Russian Federation abstained in that vote, stating that the amendments proposed by them, mainly that monitoring compliance with the arms embargo should become the main component of UNPREDEP and therefore be more pronounced in the text of the draft resolution, have largely not been included. Notably, the Russian representative did not state that the Russian Federation would have to abstain from voting on this draft resolution, but “[would] not be able to support the draft resolution”, which could also have meant voting against it (Undocs, 2020f).

A month later, Belarus, India and the Russian Federation put forward the draft resolution S/1999/328 which determined that the use of force by NATO against the FRY constituted a threat to international peace and security and demanded an immediate cessation of NATO activities. Voting resulted in China, Namibia and the Russian Federation favoring and all other members dissenting with no abstentions. In the speeches made before the vote, the voices against were explained with “[t]hose who would support this draft resolution place themselves outside the international consensus” (Canada), or “[t]he text represents, in our opinion, an inadequate attempt to address the situation concerning Kosovo. It takes a selective political view of the situation and lacks the objectivity necessary in a resolution of the Security Council” (Slovenia), or even “at every critical juncture Russia has somehow succeeded in making the pressure less credible, so that in the end NATO had no choice but to make good on its threat” (the Netherlands). Most notably, the US representative stated that “NATO’s actions are completely justified” (Undocs, 2020g). While the debate on legality and legitimacy of NATO operations in Kosovo in 199914 contributed to 14

In military terms, the whole operation was misguided—announcing from the beginning that the campaign will be limited only to air operations, the threat of land

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the understanding of the balance between the great powers15 in the Balkans, it is much too wide for the scope of this chapter. It must be noted, however, that the justification used by the Alliance and its supporters, i.e., military enforcement action on the basis of previous UNSC resolutions, has been judged illegal by much subsequent analysis (Welsh 2008).16

Yugoslavia and the European Community The interaction between Yugoslavia and the European Community was usually somewhat unbalanced as Yugoslavia was seen to be “ideologically pulled to the East and economically tied to the West” (Artisien and Holt, 1980),17 and their relationship was predominantly economic in nature. To some degree, Yugoslavia was not really interested in and therefore not really engaged with the EC such as it was in those times, but was in direct contact with Paris, London, Rome and Bonn. For example, following the end of the Bretton-Woods system and the skyrocketing Yugoslav debt in the 1970s, at which the “post-Tito leadership failed seriously” (Meier, 1995) later on,18 Tito negotiated and secured a loan with the Federal Republic of Germany directly.19 On a very practical level, one of the

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invasion or possible realization thereof was a trump card the Serbian forces could have used to their success while waiting for “internal NATO policy disagreements would put an end to the campaign” (Snow and Drew, 2000, p. 292).

Former US Secretary of State James A. Baker III stated in 2000 that “Kosovo has cost America tremendously in our relationships with other countries around the world. On balance, it has been a negative instead of a positive in the United States' relationships with other countries -- Russia, China, India. And our use of force in Kosovo with no international legal authority to bomb downtown Belgrade is resented and feared by many countries around the world” (as cited in Synovitz, 2000).

For example, even the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000) found that the intervention was illegal even if legitimate.

Or in rather realism-colored Zimmermann’s (1999) words, “Successive U.S. governments chose to humor Yugoslavia when it ignored Western concerns rather than risk an increase in Soviet influence over Tito”.

Similarly, Beštić-Bronza (2019, p. 308) states that “[T]he new Yugoslav political leadership (i.e. the collective Presidency) dramatically missed the chances of its more efficient external positioning as well as its internal transformation, which would instantly make it a much more desirable partner for Western positions”.

This agreement was almost unattainable due to the so-called Berlin question (Balantič, 2019).

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incentives for the EC to sign trade agreements with Yugoslavia was in that regard ‘only’ in the promise of Belgrade to “provide firms in the Community with a trading base for expansion in the less developed countries” (Artisien and Holt, 1980, pp. 357–358). Yugoslavia’s ‘game’ was global, situated between Washington and Moscow with Brussels being relatively unimportant; as we might be tempted to understand the role of the EC in terms of the EU we know today, it is also crucial to understand that the importance of the European Community generally and in terms of former Yugoslavia and its dissolution simply did not exist at that point in time (Jović, 2013). Meier (1995) agrees, it was “individual countries” acting on the basis of their interests using international organizations as the instruments of their politics. As Petersen (2011, p. 119) puts it, “there were no “Europeans” at this point, just individual states”.

When the newly declared sovereign states of former Yugoslavia began seeking international support and recognition, they were talking to Austria, Germany and the Vatican, pursuing the (Western) European values that pre-date the EU as such.

That said, it is important to understand that the EC on the other hand was very interested in a relationship with Yugoslavia.

For example, the Council for Cooperation between the European Economic Community and SFRY at the ministerial level met nine times between 1975 and 1990 (Bazić, 2019, p. 306). Understanding that the best defense of Yugoslavia’s position against non-Western ambitions was economic in nature, Beštić-Bronza (2019, p. 303) states that “there was a conscious intention to make Yugoslavia even more dependent on increasing dependence on the West”.

Even as Tito’s end was nearing, the European Economic Community announced that “without an independent and stable Yugoslavia, the hope for cooperation and security in Europe would be just an illusion” (Yugoslavia and the EEC, 1979). Yugoslavia was a crucial supporter of many liberation movements and therefore a key stakeholder for peace and stability also beyond Europe, due to significant aid in weapons and finances to post-colonial territories. The scope, magnitude and diversity of Yugoslav technical assistance to the so-called Third World countries highlights the extraordinary role that the only European member of the Non-Aligned Movement

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played in shaping North-South cooperation and official development assistance as we know them today. Namely, due to its unique position, Yugoslavia successfully diverted some of the Western international development assistance it received into her own direct assistance to Third World countries. For example, from 1949 to 1969 Yugoslavia extended almost 60% of the technical aid she had received. This included educating and financing students at Yugoslav universities, which became a constituent part of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy (Bondžić 2014). Thousands of Yugoslav experts worked in developing countries, with many staying thereon. From 1955 to 1969, Yugoslav aid to individual countries increased by tens of millions of dinars (Bogavac 1970); this ‘technical assistance’ was a constituent part of Yugoslavia’s overall relations with developing countries (ibid.).

In the years when the EC was indeed becoming further and more deeply integrated, Yugoslavia had quite visibly started falling apart, “losing ground rapidly in economic terms even during the last years of Tito’s life” (Beštić-Bronza, 2019, p. 308). However, even in the late 1980s, the EC was very much looking to continuing and deepening its relationship with Yugoslavia; “[T]he visit made by the President of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors, to Yugoslavia in July 1987 and the subsequent Co-operation Council’s decision of 3 November 1987 to enlarge the provisions of the 1980 Agreement confirmed the EC’s interest in developing relations with Belgrade” may serve as one example (Zaccaria, 2014, p. 278).

The “European” Problem Nonetheless, the first notion of the engagement of the European Community and its later incarnation, the European Union (EU), with Yugoslavia in the 1990s is predominantly one of failure. Some suggest that the West may have been disappointed—and is therefore to be blamed for its passive approach20—that Yugoslavia did

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For example, Bieber and Galijaš (2015, p. 173) state that “the countries of Western Europe and the United States were hapless bystanders whose primary role in the dissolution of the country and its flawed transition to democracy was their passivity”.

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not formally approach NATO or actively pursue “becoming a part of Western socio-economic circle” (Beštić-Bronza, 2019, p. 307) following Tito’s death.21 In fact, as Wallensteen and Johansson (2004), would suggest for example, it was exactly because the EC/EU failed to deal with the Yugoslav crisis sooner that it became an issue first for the UNSC and then for NATO. In other words, an economic motive for further steps towards EC membership and thereby democratization was not sufficient to keep the “series of incomplete economic and political reforms that left Yugoslavia without the institutional resilience to overcome increasing interregional differences” (Baskin and Pickering 2018, p. 277) at bay. As far as the great powers were concerned, Yugoslavia was not meant to fall apart at all; it was meant to have transitioned towards democracy and capitalism, leading the way for the rest of Eastern Europe.22 However, warning flags started appearing after Tito’s death; while a disintegration was more and more expected, it also became clear that “economic reform will not stave off the breakup”, and that while a “full-scale, interrepublic war [was] unlikely”,' there would be “intractable and bitter” violence accompanying “serious intercommunal conflict” and continuing afterward (Yugoslavia Transformed 1990). Likewise, the same National Intelligence Estimate report concludes that “[t]here is little the United States and its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav unity. Yugoslavs will see such efforts as contradictory to advocacy of democracy and selfdetermination” (ibid.). New archival research shows that the relationship between the EC and Yugoslavia did not shift from predominantly economic until late in 1989; the collapse of communism

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There is some contrary evidence however—at the Cooperation Council’s meeting of 27 November 1989 the Yugoslav representatives openly requested future association and even improvement of the institutional framework (Zaccaria, 2014, p. 280).

Wachtel and Bennett (2009) claim however that by the time Yugoslavia lost its strategic importance, the Eastern European emerging democracies had already overtaken Yugoslavia and became the focus of Western diplomatic activity and foreign investment. Bieber and Galijaš (2015, p. 172) similarly explain that “[W]ith the end of the Cold War in 1989 Yugoslavia lost its strategic position, and the attention of the United States and the European Community focused on other countries of Eastern Europe”.

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in East-Central European countries apparently took the EC and Yugoslavia somewhat by surprise, and suddenly, “neither Yugoslav nor EC representatives mentioned Yugoslavia’s non-aligned stance as a factor of stability and détente in Europe and the Mediterranean'' (Zaccaria, 2014, p. 280). The former President of the European Council Jacques Poos23 proclaimed, “[t]he Hour of Europe has dawned” (Bosco, 2009, p. 174), signaling Europe’s lead in this newest crisis of the 1990s.24 However, the European leadership was overshadowed soon, not least due to the series of unsuccessful conferences, negotiations and peace plans25 proposed.

In early September 1991, the then European Commission President Jacques Delors spelled out three possible paths of influence on the Yugoslav situation to the European Parliament—public opinion, the threat to recognize Slovenia and Croatia and economic sanctions (Salmon, 1992, p. 248). By September 25, 1991, when the first UNSC resolution was adopted, the former Socialist Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia had declared independence, and the EC focused more on peaceful settlement26 with the Brioni Agreement27 moratorium nearing its completion. The Slovenian Ten-Day War of Independence was long finished while the Croatian War of Independence was just beginning, with war looming in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. While former Macedonia was not

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The then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali apparently viewed this European attitude as if “Europe wanted to handle important issues and use UN peace-keepers as hired labor” (Bosco, 2009, p. 174).

Pavlowitch (1994, p. 219) points out that “[A]t the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, the powers still had great prestige and influence, but the EU rushed in to handle it, not because it had a solution or the necessary means, but because it hoped to acquire both”.

Carrington-Cutliero (or Lisbon) plan in February 1992, Vance-Owen plan in January 1993, and the Owen-Stoltenberg plan in August 1993. It could be claimed that the EC-sponsored Brioni Accord was the only successful EC contribution.

Even this conference was subject to disagreements between the members with some (the Dutch and the British) advocating it should be delayed considering the absence of a ceasefire and other members (the French, Germans and Italians) prioritising it exactly to prevent further escalation of conflict (Salmon, 1992).

A declaration on further negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia which was signed in July 1991 by representatives of Slovenia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia, following a conference facilitated by the European Community.

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involved in a conflict with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it was not spared the violence accompanying the break-up of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and its aftermath.

It was not until 1992 and weeks after European countries recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent countries that the US Ambassador to Belgrade Warren Zimmermann stated that the US was aiming for a peaceful dissolution of Yugoslavia into independent states. More specifically, it was not until the “controversial”28 and “much misunderstood” (Simms, 2003) recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by Germany at the end of 1991 followed by the recognition of the European Community at the beginning of 1992 and the understanding that US recognition of newly independent states would in fact not play any role in constraining the violence that led the US towards that step (Zupančič, 2016). At that point we can also find traces of a narrative change in parts of the region and particularly from Slobodan Milošević, who suggested the West aimed to destroy Yugoslavia all along.29 Conspiracy theories aside, it is interesting and important to observe the logic of the US perspective: at first warning and working against self-determination of former Yugoslav republics citing fear of violence, knowing fully well conflict in some form was highly probable, yet supporting self-determination after violence did break out while criticizing other countries and actors for recognizing the newly independent states before them.

Even with the advent of the European Union in 1993, when the Yugoslav conflict was well inflamed, the European Community 28

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In comparison, the “French and British foreign policy traditions were more consistent with the joint decision to preserve Yugoslavia” (Crawford, 1996, p. 519).

Some authors blame the West also for the “violent nature of the breakup” (Klemenčič, 2013). For example, Papadopoulos (2018) argues similarly that “breaking up Yugoslavia was not enough for the West; it wanted to ensure that the successor states would become its client states hence it began providing weapons to the illegally armed groups in Croatia and Bosnia to bring about their victories on the battlefield”. Some may dismiss such views as neorealist conspiracies, however, this negative stance of Serbian politics towards the US and its involvement in the Western Balkans continues to be somewhat reflected in Serbian foreign policy, particularly as it often sets Serbia apart from its neighbors who have been putting the bilateral relationship and strategic partnership with the US to the top of their priority lists (Đukanović, 2019).

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still “did not possess a recognizable foreign policy or the ability to intervene in conflicts” (Petersen, 2011, p. 20), although the European Parliament was passing resolutions advocating for the right of self-determination for Yugoslav republics (Klemenčič, 2013). As Jović (2013) correctly questions this ‘accusation’ of inefficiency or incompetency, it is important to ask, what exactly is meant by the European Community when we are discussing its alleged failure?

It was in fact the Western European Union (WEU) which led (military) operations in former Yugoslavia30 and elsewhere until the Treaty of Lisbon (EEAS, 2020). EU missions as such have begun in the former Yugoslavia only since the 2000s.31 In February 1994, the Contact Group composed of the US, Russia, France, Great Britain, and Germany was established, and as violence escalated it started making “steady progress toward an agreement” (Peterson, 2011). However, it took further violence, snipers shooting at civilians at Sarajevo market in TV news everywhere, genocide and European shame translated into the ICTY, and a NATO engagement (Operation Deliberate Force) to achieve the Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace32 that was signed in November 1995. In fact, Woodward (2008, p. 441) claims that while the US and European actors share the blame for failures and errors, it is really the UNSC that “bears the larger moral responsibility, for never having sought to craft a policy of its own, independent of the action of its members”.

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A joint naval operation with NATO in the Adriatic Sea (Operation Sharp Guard, 1993-1996), a police and customs operation with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on the Danube (1993–1996), a police contingent in Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina (1994–1996), a Demining Assistance–Mission to Croatia (WEUDAM, 1999–2001), and a general security surveillance mission in Kosovo (1998–1999) (ibid.).

European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH, 2003– 2012), European Union Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUFOR Concordia, 2003), European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL FYROM, 2003–2005), and European Union Police Advisory Team in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT, 2005–2006). Still deployed are the European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR BiH, 2004) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX, 2008).

The signing of this agreement was also witnessed by the EU Special Negotiator/Envoy, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt.

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Concluding Thoughts There are many evolving views, perspectives and stories on the breakup of Yugoslavia and the “strangest war of our century [that] has come to an end, without victory and defeat” (Medvedev, 1999).

However, they all seem to have at least one thing in common: the lion’s share of the blame could most probably be attributed to the timing. Almost overnight, even though one could claim the balance began shifting with Tito’s death, the importance of Yugoslavia not only became obsolete, but also a hindrance; it’s very raison d’être became pointless. The country domestic elites had all pledged to keep safe from non-Western influence was disintegrating, and most effort—even from the Soviet Union33—aimed at keeping Yugoslavia together.

Compared to some other international peace and security catastrophes of the 1990s, the issue of Yugoslavia received a disproportionately large and varied response from the international community on all sorts of levels. Even though much of the story is told through institutional frameworks or the great powers and their policies, including this chapter, it is also plausible that many decisive actions were in the hands of smaller actors and unilateral efforts.

Frustration with UNSC workings (Western powers consulting on a draft resolution, then discussing it within the permanent five, and only then with other members) and observed ignorance34 on the (political) history of the Balkans often led some non-permanent members to act more forcefully; Austria and Hungary for example played a rather crucial role in providing insight (Bosco, 2009). Meier (1995) describes the view of Western diplomats as a “colossal jumble of political error, lazy thinking, and superficiality” and attributes the share of the responsibility for the “catastrophic errors of the West’s policy” to them. Even Holbrooke admitted at some point that the failure of the international community to deal with the situation in Bosnia was 33

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The Soviet Union supplied Yugoslavia with weapons and oil, which the West did not oppose (Klemenčič, 2013, p. 161).

It is indeed quite difficult to understand the great powers’ attitudes towards Yugoslavia in any of its forms “without marking the longevity of western stereotypes and preconceptions dating from the early 20th century” (Evans, 2008).

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very much due to “a misreading of Balkan history” (as cited in Klemenčič, 2013, p. 191).

Germany’s unilateral recognition, which really was not unilateral as Germany was not the first and was also rather quickly followed by the EC, is usually blamed for transforming an essentially internal dispute into a matter of international security in an attempt to provide the republics with the legal protection of the UN Charter, however, thereby effectively ended efforts to keep Yugoslavia together. Nevertheless, the UNSC adopted its first resolution on Yugoslavia three months earlier, which was based on a draft submitted by Austria, Belgium, France, the Soviet Union, and the UK— there were no communications from Germany to the UN on the matter at that point. The second UNSC resolution on Yugoslavia, adopted on November 27, 1991, already noted that the “continuation and aggravation of this situation constitute[d] a threat to international peace and security”, thereby defining the situation in Yugoslavia as a matter of international security well before Germany’s act.

Yugoslavia went from an important member of the UN with its own voice in the world order to an agenda item almost overnight. The first UNSC resolutions on the situation in Yugoslavia in 1991 reflected a quiet consensus among the great powers that Yugoslavia was to be kept alive. Soon enough, however, the situation on the ground deteriorated to the point where that was not an option anymore. Subsequent differences in voting on UNSC resolutions on the former Yugoslavia clearly demonstrated how differently the permanent members interpreted how this particular threat to international peace and security was to be dealt with. All the usual dilemmas of the workings of the UNSC—on the use of sanctions, the use of military force, what is deemed internal affairs, humanitarian grounds to intervene—took place in discussions on former Yugoslavia. Inevitably, as years passed there have been fewer resolutions on ‘Yugoslavia’ and increasingly more on the entities emerging from it. With resolution 777, adopted in September 1992, the UNSC considered that the SFRY had ceased to exist and recommended to the UN General Assembly that it decided FRY should apply for membership. As much as the Federal Republic of

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Yugoslavia wanted to inherit the SFRY, it had to rejoin the UN as a new member state; in November 2000 Yugoslavia was indeed and finally no more.

The great powers to find an answer to the situation at just about any stage of Yugoslavia’s secession. Some of those issues stemmed from institutional unpreparedness, e.g., the European Community not seeing beyond an economic policy for too long and then not really having a common security and defense policy when involved knee-deep. At the same time the UNSC was riding on the optimism from the success of the Gulf War, while being plunged into an era of unprecedented demands on maintenance of international peace and security. The conflict in Yugoslavia had not even been over yet when there were already talks of institutional fatigue.

The reasons for failure can usually be divided into internal and external factors, and while some theories and approaches may favor one over the others, it is important to understand that a wholesome explanation or attempt at understanding inevitably requires both.

As time passes, new evidence is found in archives, strongly suggesting that this perceived neglect of the EC might need to be reconsidered. The role of the UNSC, and sometimes of the same great powers as in the EC, is yet to be subject to the same possible reconsiderations.

As much as the usual narrative starts with a European failure followed by the US (and the UN) to the rescue, it is important to note that not just European, but ‘Western’ involvement in “this period was marked by hesitation, ambivalence, and incoherence” (Petersen, 2011, p. 123). Berdal (2004) also describes the response of the international community as “divided, hesitant, and largely reactive”. Woodward (2008, p. 406) goes even further and states that “[t]he role of the Security Council in response to the violent breakup of former Yugoslavia, beginning in 1991, tarnished the reputation of the United Nations so deeply that many feared it might not recover”. Similarly, Higgins (1993, p. 483) believes that the early 1990s and events in Yugoslavia caused irreparable harm as the opportunity “to implement important institutional changes for the promotion of peace” was missed. However, according to Bosco

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(2009, p. 215), this “clumsy, often unprincipled and dangerous effort” to deal with and resolve the issue of Yugoslavia’s collapse was at least “a peaceful one among the great powers”.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES— FROM NEGLIGENCE TO DOMINANCE AND BACK? Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl

Map 3: The European Union Member States and Non-Member States Source: https://www.d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=260684&lang=de

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Introduction “The Balkans can easily become one of the chessboards where the big power game can be played” (European Western Balkans, 2017)—these were the words of the then European Union (EU) Foreign Policy High Representative Federica Mogherini when asked to assess the current political and regional situation in the Western Balkan region in 2017. Indeed, as the other contributions in this volume demonstrate, the countries of the former Yugoslavia find themselves in a position where they are once again at the center of numerous geopolitical engagements (AIES, 2020; van Meurs, 2014; Alexandrova-Arbatova, 2012).

This influence of different foreign actors, and powers from Russia to China, the United States (US) and Turkey is nevertheless surprising for anyone who has been following Western Balkan1 affairs in the last 30 years. After 1995 and at the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)2, and especially after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization´s (NATO’s) intervention in Kosovo in 1999, it seemed inevitable that the Western Balkans would follow the example set by most Central and Eastern European (CEEC) states, namely acceding NATO and the EU. Certainly, in the years between 1999 to 2009, the EU became the most important actor in the region—together with NATO, and up until 2013, when Croatia as the 28th member state joined the EU, it still seemed unquestionable that the future of all other post-Yugoslav states would be in Euro-Atlantic structures. Yet, since then much has changed. The EU has undergone a series of crises, starting with the financial crisis in 2007/8 and culminating in the most recent COVID-19 pandemic and the departure of the United Kingdom (UK) as the first member state to officially disassociate itself from the EU in 2020. This has

1

2

We use the terms Western Balkans and post-Yugoslav states interchangeably.

Admittedly, the EU refers to the Western Balkan states as Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Albania. For the purposes of this publication, however, we focus on the postYugoslav states, so exclude Albania from our discussion but include Slovenia.

We use the terms Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnia and BiH interchangeably and always refer to the whole country.

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contributed to a rise of Euroscepticism not only in many EU member states, but also in the Western Balkans, where European integration is increasingly challenged and the future in Euro-Atlantic structures seems to be withering away (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2018; Damjanovski, Lvric and Naterer, 2020).

This contribution will look at the role of the EU as an important actor in the post-Yugoslav states. We will explore at how the EU failed to deal with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (Glaurdić, 2011), and how this failure has set it on a path to engage in what the EU considers it can do best—support countries in their democratic consolidation, regional reconciliation and connected integration into European structures. The EU, by the early 2000s, was not only the most important actor in the Western Balkans, but it was also incredibly influential in political, societal and economic change across the post-Yugoslav states. Considering the EU’s successes in Eastern Europe, this period saw the EU engage and evolve as a credible foreign policy actor and as a key factor for change in all of the post-Yugoslav states (Anastasakis, 2005).

Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, it is fair to characterize the EU’s influence and dominance in the region as a benevolent hegemonic position, following the framework of the English School (ES) (Buzan and Little, 2009).

We argue, however, that after 2009 this changed—the financial crisis combined with the sober recognition that the membership of Romania and Bulgaria in the EU came too early, the EU split regarding Kosovo’s independence, all of this contributed to a shifting discourse. Ongoing political and regional disagreements across the former Yugoslav states, as well as a general rise in Euroscepticism across the EU (and later also in the region) further strengthened this discursive and policy change (Keil and Arkan, 2015; Vachudova, 2019). The Western Balkans became less of an opportunity for positive EU foreign policy and its transformative power, and more of a problem for the stability of the EU (Dzankic, Keil and Kmezic, 2019). Instead of refocusing its efforts on the EU integration of the countries in the post-Yugoslav space, the EU shifted to status-quo management, or what the Balkans in Europe Policy Group referred

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to as a policy mode of ‘stabilocracy’—putting stability above political reforms and thereby enabling local state capture and authoritarianism (BIEPAG, 2017; Bieber, 2020). These dynamics, in which EU engagement was reduced and the US shifted away from the Balkans by prioritizing the Middle East and Asia in its foreign policy, opened the door for new, non-Western actors to become increasingly influential. While these actors have always been present in one way or another, EU disengagement and US disinterest motivated countries such as Russia, Turkey, China and the Gulf states to make their own mark on the region—albeit with different motivations and policy agendas (Bieber and Tzifakis, 2020). Hence, what we see today in the region is activities from a multitude of actors and an increasing clash of interests and priorities of different regional, great and superpowers’ interests that is once again played out in Southeastern Europe—indeed, a new Eastern Question is emerging.

This contribution will specifically focus on the EU, its evolving role in the region and its more recent decline as the key driver of political, societal and economic change across the post-Yugoslav states. In order to analyze the EU as a dominant foreign policy actor in the region, we progress in three steps. In the first part, we provide a historical overview of the role of the EU from the early 1990s up to 2020. We demonstrate how failure in the early 1990s to stop the Yugoslav wars has resulted in the evolution of a comprehensive policy framework for the region—the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). In the second part, we look more closely at the institutional mechanisms that the EU uses to engage with the countries in the region. In addition to the SAP, we also look at the importance of different EU foreign policy instruments, including civilian and military missions, as well as the provision of extensive financial assets in the process of preparing the countries of the region for membership in the EU. Finally, we look at the current quagmire in EUpost-Yugoslav states relations by discussing the limits of EU actorness in foreign and enlargement policy, as well as its inability to engage with local resistance to implement far-reaching reforms required for further progress in the integration process.

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A Rocky Relationship from the Start— Historical Links The EU’s engagement in the post-Yugoslav states begins as a story of failure. While the EU had economic and political ties to Socialist Yugoslavia, it was unable to provide an economic and political alternative and therefore, prevent the violent dissolution of the state in the early 1990s. This was particularly problematic, as the EU, and its predecessor the European Community (until 1993), had become the main negotiation and mediation actor during the Yugoslav crisis (Silber and Little, 1996). In 1991, when it became obvious that the Yugoslav state was falling apart and Slovenia and Croatia were pushing for independence, the Chairman of the European Council of Ministers famously stated ‘This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans’—thereby rhetorically claiming that the Europeans would be able to handle the emerging crisis at its door (Glaurdić, 2011). It could, however, be argued that the European commitment to engage with Yugoslavia was borne out of necessity rather than ability—i.e., in the absence of any US interest, the awaiting dissolution of the Soviet Union and China’s isolation after the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Europeans were forced into engaging with the different parties in what many considered to be Europe’s neighbourhood or ‘backyard’. Nevertheless, the EU’s diplomacy and conflict resolution mechanisms are generally considered as a failure, as out of touch and inadequate, because the Union was neither able nor willing to enforce its ultimatums and underline its policy proposals with hard power and the threat of military intervention (Holbrooke, 1999; Glenny, 1996; Baker, 2015).3 The war in Croatia and later in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) ended as a result of US intervention—direct military intervention through NATO in the case of Bosnia, and indirect intervention through the supply of military equipment to the Croatian army in the case of Croatia. The Dayton Peace Conference and the subsequent Peace Accords did not only enforce Pax Americana and the dominance of the US as the sole superpower in the post-Cold War 3

For the EU’s pattern of behaviour, see our introduction.

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period, but it also provided a framework for a settlement of the post-Yugoslav space that would follow the guidelines of international law, the respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the new states, and a renewed focus on democracy promotion and economic reform in the newly emerging post-Yugoslav countries (Daalder, 2000). The EU, however, found itself in a position where it needed to rethink its foreign policy structures and its wider ability to engage with conflicts in its near neighborhood. As Ana Juncos (2013) has impressively demonstrated, what followed after 1995 was the evolution of important foreign and security mechanisms in the EU, as well as a new framework for engagement with the Western Balkan countries—which emerged in the context of wider enlargement euphoria in Europe, as the countries in Central and Eastern Europe were preparing for their membership in the EU. At the time, the discourse of a “Return to Europe” or a “Unification of the European continent” played an important role in the development of policy and enlargement frameworks in Brussels, despite ongoing issues with continued semi-authoritarian regimes in Croatia and Serbia, as well as continued instability in Bosnia and a newly emerging crisis in Kosovo.

The war in Kosovo substantially influenced the evolving relationship between the EU and the post-Yugoslav states. This is for at least three reasons. First, the quick involvement of NATO and the US demonstrated an important lesson learned for the EU in its engagement in the region—any political and diplomatic efforts to uphold international law needed to be backed by a credible threat to use force if necessary. It is therefore interesting how NATO’s intervention in Kosovo resulted de facto in a breach of international law (as it was not authorized by the United Nations Security Council), while simultaneously stopping and preventing further mass atrocities were at the heart of the justification for NATO’s intervention (Weymouth and Henig 2001, p.29). In terms of the ES, the international community sacrificed ‘order’ for ‘justice’ (Wheeler, 2000).

Second, the Kosovo war finalized the link between European and Atlantic integration and involvement in the region—NATO and the US would become the main security providers (as was the case after 1995 in Bosnia), while the EU would become the main driver for

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political and economic reforms—i.e., democratization in the countries. Third, the war in Kosovo shifted discourses in the EU; it became obvious that a simple application of previous enlargement frameworks, including the policies used in the CEEC states, would not be enough to deal with the ongoing conflicts and legacies that can be found in the post-Yugoslav states. As a consequence, EU Head of States and Governments extended the ‘great promise’ of membership at the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit to South Eastern Europe (SEE).

The EU reiterates its unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries. The future of the Balkans is within the European Union. The ongoing enlargement and the signing of the Treaty of Athens in April 2003 inspire and encourage the countries of the Western Balkans to follow the same successful path. Preparation for integration into European structures and ultimate membership into the European Union, through adoption of European standards, is now the big challenge ahead […] The speed of movement ahead lies in the hands of the countries of the region.

The countries of the region fully share the objectives of economic and political union and look forward to joining a EU that is stronger in the pursuit of its essential objectives and more present in the world (European Commission 2003).

Categorizing all post-Yugoslav countries as future EU member states and the EU’s commitment to their integration occurred as a result of democratic changes in Croatia and Serbia in 2000, as well as more intensive international, and in particular European, engagement in Bosnia. The EU shifted its policy from simply promoting enlargement through its enlargement policy to developing a more comprehensive strategy for the region, one which focused on a variety of aspects, including political, social and economic reforms (linked to EU enlargement and the EU’s own acquis communautaire) as well as security sector reform, refugee return, economic recovery after conflict and extensive state-building operations in countries that were severely affected by the conflicts between 1991 and 2000 (Keil, 2013; Belloni, 2020). This European engagement was equally supported by all the major domestic elites in the countries of the post-Yugoslav states—EU membership became their main foreign policy objective, and in all states with the exception of the

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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and later Serbia, it was also connected to security integration into NATO structures (Keil and Stahl, 2015). As Rupnik (2011) points out, this was indeed the period that can be considered as ‘The Hour of Europe’—as the EU was able to engage with the countries through a comprehensive set of policies, while at the same time inciting reforms through its conditionality and the promise of EU membership.

The EU’s Enlargement Framework and Foreign Policy Structures The EU engaged the countries in the region beyond its formalized enlargement and foreign policy framework. As discussed below, enlargement policy is distinctly different from traditional foreign policy, as it aims to turn ‘foreign policy’ into ‘domestic affairs’ through the process of enlargement and association. Hence, the EU expanded its policy portfolio for the region. At times there were three EU Special Representatives (for Bosnia, North Macedonia and Kosovo), a police mission in Bosnia (EUPM), an ongoing military mission in Bosnia (EUFOR), as well as a previous military mission in Macedonia, and the EU’s largest civilian mission, the ongoing EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). The EU’s engagement in the region expanded further after 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon strengthened the EU’s foreign policy capabilities and the newly created European External Action Service took over many of the representations of the EU in the region.

When looking at the EU’s enlargement framework, it is important to keep in mind that the Union is a special actor in foreign policy—that is, it does not portray the coherence of a single state, while at the same time remaining an important actor in the postYugoslav states and beyond. Indeed, much scholarly ink has been spilled on the question of EU foreign policy actorness and coherence (see for example Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Edwards, 2011; Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014), as well as the complications, contradictions and complexity of the Union’s multifaceted international interactions that have been widely highlighted. The EU’s enlargement policy, like its foreign policy more generally, is characterized

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by a diversity of frameworks, actors and priorities shifting over time. The framework for enlargement has evolved throughout the years from a more ad hoc approach for the first rounds of enlargement in the 1970s to a more complex and coordinated approach after the Treaty of Maastricht and the evolving enlargement framework in the context of the Copenhagen criteria for membership in the EU.4 The first proper enlargement framework was developed in the context of CEEC enlargement in the 1990s, resulting in the membership of 10 CEEC countries in 2004, in addition to Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Crucial elements of this framework are the asymmetrical character of the negotiations, the gate-keeper function of the Commission, the Regatta-principle, and conditionality.

For the Western Balkans, the EU developed additional tools after 1999 in the Stabilization and Association Process as a result of a new Enlargement Strategy (European Commission 2014). This is defined by the EU as: The Stabilisation and Association Process is the European Union's policy towards the Western Balkans, established with the aim of eventual EU membership. Western Balkan countries are involved in a progressive partnership with a view of stabilising the region and establishing a free-trade area. The SAP sets out common political and economic goals although progress evaluation is based on countries' own merits.

The SAP was launched in June 1999 and strengthened at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003 taking over elements of the accession process (European Commission 2016).

The SAP builds on the EU’s previous experience with enlargement and combines two main elements—stabilization through engagement and post-war recovery of the region and association through the support for democratization and Europeanization (Keil, 2013).

4

The Copenhagen criteria define what conditions future member states of the EU must meet, before they will be able to join. These are: political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; economic criteria: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces; administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the acquis and ability to take on the obligations of membership.

For more information, see: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargem ent/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en (last accessed 1 July 2021).

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While the process is similar to previous enlargement frameworks, it nevertheless includes a number of new elements, such a stronger focus on regional cooperation and post-conflict reconciliation.

Moreover, the SAP framework has become more complex and focused, going beyond simple rule adaptation while also focusing on rule implementation to ensure a lasting impact of Europeanization.

It links financial incentives, trade preferences and closer political cooperation with conditionality around the EU’s own legal framework (the acquis communautaire), as well as additional conditionality in the areas of regional reconciliation, rule of law implementation and the commitment to international law and justice (Gordon, 2009). The EU’s motivation for enlargement is therefore also clearly articulated in the SAP—it links its own desire for a safe and secure neighbourhood with its foreign policy focus on stabilization and regional integration in the post-Yugoslav states, thereby portraying its own integration success story as a positive example for the wider region of SEE (Sjursen, 2003).

The SAP treats each country in the region differently, and progress has indeed been mixed. While Croatia was able to join in July 2013, Serbia and Montenegro are currently candidate countries negotiating their membership with the EU. North Macedonia and Albania are also candidate countries and have recently been given the green light for membership negotiations, although no official start for negotiations has been determined (as of July 2021). Bosnia and Kosovo are the only countries of the region which are not official candidate countries, however, both have signed Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) with the EU—a first legally binding partnership agreement, which does not only regulate certain questions in trade and financial assistance, but also provides a political framework for accession, including preparing countries for candidate status and eventual membership negotiations.

The European Union has delegations in all post-Yugoslav states: in Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, these are delegations of the European External Action Service, while in Slovenia and Croatia, they are representations of the EU in two member states. In addition, there are also European Parliament

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delegations to the different post-Yugoslav states, while the Directorate-General for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations coordinates the formal enlargement policy of the Union in Brussels. Moreover, there have been several EU missions in the post-Yugoslav states. These include the still ongoing EU Military Mission in Bosnia (EUFOR) and the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), as well as a previous police mission in Bosnia (EUPM) and the EU’s first ever military mission in North Macedonia in 2001. A lot of the wider foreign policy tools that the EU has developed since the Treaty on European Union (1993) have evolved as a result of European action and intervention in the Balkans. The post-Yugoslav states have, therefore, been a key driver of EU foreign policy instruments in a variety of areas, including in security cooperation, military missions and extensive civilian missions with a clear state-building mandate (Blockmans, 2007; Keil and Stahl, 2015). These missions have all had different results, ranging from failures (for example the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and EULEX in Kosovo) to success stories (EUFOR in North Macedonia).

All post-Yugoslav states also have representations to the EU in Brussels, and membership in the EU is defined as their key foreign policy priority—many countries can find this in key foreign policy documents (in Serbia, Bosnia and North Macedonia) and even in constitutional frameworks (such as in Montenegro and Kosovo).

The EU’s SAP framework was initially seen as a useful policy guide to engage with a region that was characterized by state failure and violent conflict in the 1990s. The combination of stabilizing fragile states (and democracies) and integrating them at the same time into the European Union was seen as the solution to the ongoing tensions and conflicts in the region. Yet, after 2009 more criticism of the Union’s approach emerged as the EU’s enlargement framework was countered by the policies of individual EU member states. The negotiations on the future of Kosovo in 2007 already demonstrated a split amongst EU member states, and the complex accession of Croatia in 2013 as well as ongoing negotiations since then have demonstrated that the EU, despite its coherent and detailed framework, is often unable to speak with one voice. Euro-

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pean policy in the post-Yugoslav states has instead been characterized by internal divisions and the Europeanization of bilateral problems. Greece’s name dispute with Macedonia, which hindered the country’s progress towards EU membership after 2013, as well as Croatia’s current stance on Serbia, and the fact that five EU member states have not recognized Kosovo as an independent country are all examples for the divisions within the EU over its approach in the region. The different interests of EU member states (both the large and influential ones such as Germany and France, as well as smaller ones like Croatia and Slovenia) are additionally problematic because they allow different elites in the post-Yugoslav states to exploit European disunity. For example, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic has been criticized by the European Parliament for his authoritarian style of government, but has consistently received support from certain EU member states, particularly from the Visegrad countries. Likewise, the leaders of the Bosnian Croats have in recent years prevented any major progress in the country, yet their support from Croatia has given them a degree of protection that has made them immune to any criticism. Even when European countries show a degree of unity, other actors, such as Russia, exploit the most recent European disengagement with the region to the fullest (Bechev 2020; Entina, 2019).

European disunity has also resulted in growing tensions between EU policy and that of previous allies. The Trump administration, for example, completely undermined the EU’s efforts for the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo by launching its own bilateral negotiation framework.5 Likewise, while Turkey never openly countered the European approach in the post-Yugoslav states, its approach, too, has been seen as a result of European disengagement and division. In particular its closer engagement with certain political elites in Bosnia and Kosovo has been a result of European inability to find solutions to the ongoing problems in these two countries (Öztürk and Akgönül, 2020; Rasidagic and Hesova, 2020).

5

See Kurt Bassuener’s chapter in this volume on this issue.

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The EU—Still Trying …

Already before the last obvious success, i.e., Croatia’s accession, a deterioration of the EU’s impact on the region had become visible (Chandler, 2007; Börzel, 2013). The Financial Crisis of 2007/8, which brought the Eurozone close to a collapse, as well as democratic backsliding in Romania, Bulgaria and later in Hungary have raised questions about the absorption capacity of the EU (which is a key criterion for membership). Increased calls for internal reforms of European structures before any future expansion followed suit (Woelk, 2013). Moreover, regional disputes, such as the ongoing Serbia-Kosovo dispute, the constitutional quagmire in Bosnia, political instability in Albania, authoritarianism in Montenegro and the name dispute between Greece and Macedonia also affected the EU’s transformative power in the region and limited its ability to act as a key driver of change after 2007. Furthermore, questions emerged over the EU’s ability to push for long-term and sustainable change, rather than ‘fake compliance’, which had limited impact on lasting policy change and democratization (Noutcheva, 2009; Grimm, 2019). The EU, so the argument of academics and think tanks alike, shifted its policy from promoting change and pushing for the integration of the region into European structures to a mode of managing the status quo—prioritizing stability over democratization and thereby enabling local elites to abstain from Europeanization-reforms and even undo previous achievements in core areas such as the rule of law, media freedom and democratic accountability (Kmezic, 2019; BIEPAG, 2017; Stahl, 2013; Keil, 2018).

This is where we are today—officially, the EU remains committed to the enlargement and membership of all countries of the post-Yugoslav space. However, since Croatia in July 2013, no other country has been able to join, and even those countries which are currently in membership negotiations with the EU (Montenegro and Serbia), as well as those which are awaiting the start of membership negotiations (Macedonia and Albania), are unlikely to join anytime soon. At a time of the COVID-19 pandemic, the fallout from Brexit, and continuous questions over the democratic qualities of several EU member states (including Hungary, Poland and post-

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Yugoslav Slovenia), there is little appetite in Brussels and major European capitals to push for further expansion of the Union. While the French President Emmanuel Macron has been urging for deeper internal reforms within the EU (DW, 2018), German, BENELUX and Northern elites have been reluctant to embrace far-reaching reforms of EU structures, while Southern European member states have been focused on economic recovery and changes to the Eurozone that would benefit them. While formally still identified as a priority, no major European member state is currently openly prioritizing enlargement, and a general lethargy has set in, together with a recognition that developments in the region have also reduced the likelihood of further enlargement anytime soon. In Schimmelfennig’s (2001) terminology, the ‘drivers’ of enlargement have been increasingly replaced by the ‘brakemen’—and hence— the ‘great promise’ of Thessaloniki has run empty. Yet, the EU, as identified by the quote from Federica Mogherini at the beginning of this contribution, is also recognizing that its own inability to engage with the region has opened the space for other actors to play a more active and influential role, to push the countries into a different direction and, at times, away from Euro-Atlantic structures.6 The EU, so it seems, does want to engage with the region and integrate it, not least because there are direct security and economic interests for the wellbeing of the Union, but it is currently not a priority for its elites, and it is clueless in the face of more traditional power politics employed by countries such as Russia, China and to a lesser extent Turkey as well.

Conclusion: EU Policy between Enlargement and Failure The EU’s approach towards the post-Yugoslav states combines a number of vital EU interests. The most recent refugee crisis in 2015 and the emergence of the Balkan route have once again highlighted that core security interests of European member states are linked to the political development in the post-Yugoslav countries (Bojinović

6

See for example the chapter on Russia in this volume, as well as the chapters on Bosnia and Serbia.

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Fenko and Stahl, 2019). This lesson was already learned in the early 1990s, when the violent breakup of Yugoslavia not only resulted in a substantial refugee flow towards certain EU member states, but also risked to spill over into neighbouring countries. In addition to its security interests, there is also a normative dimension to the EU’s engagement with the region. As highlighted in the Thessaloniki Council Conclusions, the post-Yugoslav states are not only geographically a part of Europe, but they are also part of a wider European cultural heritage, so their integration into the EU seems only natural and without any feasible alternative. Furthermore, there are several economic arguments for the integration of the region—not only the exploration of new markets in a region covering more than 20 million people, but also access to the Adriatic Sea and important trade routes to Turkey, the Mediterranean and North Africa.

Its geographic proximity and its strong historic, economic, security and political interconnection with the EU as a whole and several EU member state in particular, therefore, explains why the EU has invested a large number of resources to support the stabilization, democratization and ultimate Europeanization of the post-Yugoslav states. While the EU, as one of the world’s largest single markets and a normative power in world affairs (Manners, 2002), initially appealed to elites and people in the region alike, more recently support for EU integration has cooled down amongst political leaders and the general population virtually across all the postYugoslav states.7 As highlighted in the other contributions in this volume, in countries such as Serbia, Russian and Chinese elites are becoming more and more recognized as important international players with people developing more faith in these actors than they have in the EU. Whilst we use the English School framework for this discussion—a zero-sum logic seems obvious: As the EU influence across the region decreases, we can observe an increase in activity and perception of other international actors. This is not just 7

In an opinion poll across the region organized by the Center for Insights in Survey Research (2020) in the first half of 2020, only 50% of Serb participants supported EU membership, compared to 63% in Montenegro, 74% in North Macedonia, 93% in Kosovo and 76% in Bosnia. With the exception of Kosovo, all data are a decrease compared to similar opinion polls in previous polls.

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the case in Serbia but can also be observed in the Serbian part of Bosnia (Republika Srpska), in Montenegro and in Kosovo as well, where Turkey and the USA have begun to provide alternative support for local elites.

EU policy in the region is at a crossroads. While born out of the inability of the EU to deal with the emerging crisis in Yugoslavia when the country broke apart, it then developed a comprehensive and coherent enlargement framework in the late 1990s. However, internal divisions within the EU, for example, in relation to Kosovo’s status or the future of enlargement more generally, or the Europeanization of bilateral issues (such as between Greece and North Macedonia), have all had a negative impact on the EU’s perception in the region and its ability to act as a driver of change. In this regard, EU enlargement policy is different from the foreign policy of other actors discussed in this book, as the EU’s enlargement framework aims to turn what is initially foreign policy into domestic policy through the accession of new member states to the Union. The EU has been able to contribute to the democratization and stabilization of the post-Yugoslav states initially, very much promoting what the English School would refer to as ‘order’ and ‘justice’ in the regional security complex.8 In ES terms, the EU has been learning since 1999 that the primary institutions of war, balance of power politics, great power management and sovereignty have to be transformed. It tried new forms of diplomacy (such as the SAP) and emphasized international law (EULEX, and through the cooperation with the ICTY), but the results were meager. What is more, the EU found no effective means to handle two other classical primary institutions, i.e., nationalism and territoriality. The unresolved territoriality and constitutional problems from Kosovo, the name dispute and Bosnia to the Piran Bay could be easily exploited by nationalist élites which are increasingly supported by external powers in this endeavour. Meanwhile, in the EU the unfinished and defect incorporation of the acquis—which became evident in Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Poland—spurred nationalist and populist sentiments in the old member states, casting a shadow on the future enlargement process. Hence, the EU gradually changed course by de 8

For elaborations on the English School, see our introduction.

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facto giving up democratization and human rights (‘justice’) while managing the status quo and de-speeding any future enlargement.

Thus, today, its focus on stability and peace in the region is much closer to an emphasis on ‘order’.

Yet, as Mogherini pointed out in the opening quote to this contribution—the Western Balkan region runs the risk of becoming a global power politics chessboard again. It is up to the EU, then, to prevent this and give its enlargement policy new credibility. The alternative to integrating the region is a serious risk of deterioration—we are already seeing new tensions in North Kosovo, increased societal conflict in Montenegro and political tensions in Bosnia, which may erupt violently again in the future. This is not to say that we are pessimistic or even deterministic about the future and the developments in the region. But it is obvious that the EU needs to be reminded about a core lesson it has learned since the 1990s multiple times—what happens in the region will affect and deeply impact on the EU—in one way or another.

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THE RELUCTANT, INTERMITTENT INTERVENTIONIST: US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1991—TO DATE Kurt Bassuener

Map 4: United States` Geographical Position in the World Source: https://www.d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=126800&lang=en

106 KURT BASSUENER

Introduction The United States (US) has been the external policy actor with the greatest gravity in the Western Balkans in the three decades covered in this volume. But the gravity of American policy has varied—as with the force of gravity itself—with the US’ proximity to the issues at hand; its relative absence itself has had a concrete, discernible effect of developments in the region, figuring in the calculations of the endogenous and external political powers, great and small.

This chapter aims to provide a comparative template which, in combination with and comparison to the others included in this book, will allow readers to contextualize and understand the course of developments in the Western Balkans from the beginning of the post-Yugoslav wars through to the current day. For the United States has not always been the predominant external actor in the post-Yugoslav space. But through the period in question, its equities and the credibility which flowed therefrom gave it a unique leverage—primary institutions backed by hard power—which could be applied directly, lent, or implied, in the service of a number of policy goals. When American attention shifted elsewhere— and when its partnership with the European Union (EU) (to the extent its policies have been coherent) has been more fraught or attenuated—its relative gravity to other actors, internal and external, has dissipated.

While through the three decades under investigation there have been numerous peaks and troughs in US engagement with the post-Yugoslav region, several periods emerge with clarity. At the time of writing (Spring 2020), the US is in a clear phase of overall disengagement and increased friction with its European allies, with direct implications in the region. But it also bears note that President Donald Trump is the second non-Atlanticist president, following Barack Obama—whose less confrontational disconnection with the transatlantic effort to foster and promote liberal democratic transformation in the post-Yugoslav space was no less profound for its lack of pugilistic theatricality. Furthermore, it bears note that this outward orbit began earlier. The George W. Bush administration’s

US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 107 brand of Atlanticism was particularly instrumental after 9/11 (to seek support and forces, particularly in “New Europe”; Rumsfeld, 2003) for the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the protracted wars in that country and Afghanistan.

The shift in America’s engagement in the region was to some degree camouflaged by the prominence of the (belated) US role in achieving a power-sharing peace in Macedonia in 2001 and the strong backing given to the state-building process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, (BiH) which reached its apogee under High Representative Paddy Ashdown (2002–2006). But an honest appraisal of the reduction in the US’s gravitational power in the region can be dated to that period, if reviewing developments with sufficient acuity and granularity. This post-Iraq window was the time that the European Union’s self-confidence was at an all-time high, as the 2004 “big bang” enlargement approached, and as frictions between Washington and continental Europe, particularly France and Germany, were widest over the Iraq invasion. US engagement and influence over events, therefore, did not vary in lockstep with changes of administration.

This chapter will assess Washington’s engagement through each of its phases, from the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation to the Trump administration. A common thread throughout the period in question has been the search for a common agenda with the allies in Europe in addressing the region—an achievement rarely fully met in actuality, as opposed to declaratively. This friction has been inherent across the entire threedecade period—and itself has been a factor in the calculus of postYugoslav actors and non-Western external actors in pursuit of their respective agendas. The extent to which there is actual strategic common cause between the US and the EU has been—and remains—a determining variable in the ability to gain traction of illiberal agendas, domestic and foreign. The fundamental truth to relate is that the “return of geopolitics” (Bieber and Tzafakis, 2019) to the post-Yugoslav space owes at least as much to the incoherence of the West in the region as it does to new economic and political forces from the outside.

108 KURT BASSUENER This chapter’s structure relates chronologically the trajectory of American engagement. Based on what turned out to be a catastrophic miscalculation of the risk posed to US primary and secondary instruments, the initial years effectively amounted to a policy of malign neglect, encapsulated in Secretary of State James Baker’s quip in June 1991 that “we got no dog in this fight” (Glaurdić, 2011).

This was followed with the stifled hope of much of President Bill Clinton’s first term. The brokering of the Washington Agreement between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and BiH Croats in 1994, as well as tacit support for external infusions of weapons to the embattled Armija (Risen and McManus, 1996), was finally followed by serious political and military intervention in Bosnia in late 1995 (resulting in the Dayton Peace Accords) as a lowest common denominator. This was accompanied by a self-delusion in terms of the duration of commitment required. By late 1997, recognition of the long-haul began to appear in policy—just as a long-feared war in Kosovo began in earnest and wishful thinking lingered that Slobodan Milošević would be a peacemaker, as he was (under duress) in Dayton. This illusion was only fully shattered in early 1999, when Washington led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to intervene against Serbia’s depopulating crackdown in Kosovo. A more expansive understanding of the sort of commitment required took hold in the last two years of the Clinton period, best articulated

by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in his Chicago speech in 1999 (Freedman, 2017). While a strategic outlook and even doctrines (such as the Responsibility to Protect) began to coalesce, the contested 2000 election brought a much more avowedly realpolitik George W. Bush administration to power, committed to great power competition and reducing American liabilities like peace enforcement in Bosnia and Kosovo. Initially, this meant a policy of what amounted to continuity without strategy: belated diplomatic intervention in Macedonia’s ethnic conflict in August 2001 and strong support for High Representative Paddy Ashdown.

But the tidal force of US withdrawal became evident in this period. The phases which followed from early 2006 forward made US policy shift attention elsewhere, which was already ongoing and increasingly apparent. Washington’s frustrations with the EU’s

US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 109 approach became evident in the Bush administration’s latter years.

The Obama administration, loaded with veterans of the 1990s learning curve under Clinton, was welcomed by many as a potential return to form for the US. But when transatlantic frictions became increasingly evident, almost all of the high-level bandwidth the USEU relationship was devoted to crises outside Europe; the effective subcontracting to Brussels in the post-Yugoslav space continued across the Bush and Obama administrations. Finally, this chapter will look at a new phase—still unopened at the time this book was devised: President Trump’s shift—turning the United States from a guarantor to a disruptor of the post-Yugoslav peace, actively exploited (in multiple ways) by local and external illiberal players alike.

Historical Links The United States’ links to the former Yugoslavia prior to WWII, which birthed Socialist Yugoslavia, were initially forged by waves of emigration, specifically from the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires (Hockenos, 2003). When the US entered WWI, the Entente’s alliance to the Kingdom of Serbia applied—but the US’ troop deployment was to the Western Front. US President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points were embraced by those in what became the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later renamed Yugoslavia) as support for their self-determination—as was the case for advocates of independent Czechoslovakia, for example. Support for the Yugoslav partisans as the most effective and reliable local combatants against Axis occupation forces in WWII forged an alignment which was strongly challenged in the immediate aftermath of the war and the opening of the Cold War. This affected both the territorial dispute with Italy over Trieste (Churchill, 1946) and in the Greek Civil War, which spawned the Truman Doctrine in 1947 with support for both Greece and Turkey. But Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 and the vitriol directed by Stalin against Tito paved the way for what became a mutually useful pragmatic relationship through the remainder of the Cold War. Yugoslavia received vital food, financial and armaments assistance

110 KURT BASSUENER from the US beginning soon after (Glass, 2013). And while Yugoslavia was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, the threat of Warsaw Pact invasion was never far from Yugoslav minds; no comparable threat to the country’s integrity or independence was seen emanating from the US or NATO.1 In the US, Yugoslavia was a curiosity: a relatively open “communist” country, which was accessible in the second half of the Cold War. Diaspora politics were a factor that became more of an issue as Yugoslavia slid further toward dissolution than they had during most of the Cold War (Hockenos, 2003).

This history, as well as fears of a demonstration effect with the multinational, ostensibly multistate Soviet Union, and a basic inertia, explain the US posture of resisting the dissolution of Yugoslavia until it was already well—and violently—underway, then leaving Europe to contend with it (Glaurdi, 2011). This posture fits with Watson’s raison de systéme—an essentially conservative, preservationist notion. Critics of American intervention later often seem to project backward, implying American advocacy for Yugoslavia’s dissolution and support for independence by Slovenia and Croatia.

But the record runs contrary (ibid.). In fact, the US exerted itself to caution against moves toward independence, well after Serbia’s Slobodan Milošević began his process of subverting the autonomous regions and attempting to dominate the collective presidency (ibid.). This inertia, in many scholars’ view, emboldened Milošević (Mujanović, 2018; Ramet, 2002; Silber and Little, 1995). At the same time, Yugoslav Premier Ante Marković, who sought financial assistance in advance of the first multiparty elections in Yugoslavia, received scant backing from the US and the international financial institutions (IFIs) in which the US had a strong stake (ibid.). George

1

In fact, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 sparked a panic in Yugoslavia—and also led to the development of a new defense doctrine the following year, including elements later encapsulated in the final 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia. The great level of decentralization to the six republics (and two autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo) was coupled with a territorial defense system predicated on the likely occupation of the capital and the need for resistance at the republic level (Johnson, 1971).

US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 111 Bush’s policy toward the unfolding carnage in dissolving Yugoslavia, until nearly the end of his term, was one of vacillation, aloofness and weakness—in contrast to the leadership which he had demonstrated on both the reunification of Germany and the expulsion of invading Iraqi forces from Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf War. The rationale for this policy was based on a cold realist calculation that the risks to US interests of conflict in Croatia, and later Bosnia and Herzegovina, did not rise to the level that warranted US military intervention. The cessation of Cold War Manichaeism with the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 did not seem to affect this calculus. But fears of a violent conflict erupting in Kosovo led President Bush to issue his “Christmas warning” to Milošević, threatening US military response (read air strikes) in the event of a crackdown in then peaceful, but severely repressed, Albanian-majority Kosovo (Lewis, 1998). The rationale for this, in addition to recognizing that war in former Yugoslavia could be protracted, horrific and generate increasing calls for US intervention from within society, was that it could trigger a wider regional conflict. It was for these reasons that the US soon after also supported the preventative deployment of the UN in Macedonia, whose independence, sovereignty, and identity was subject to multiple claims and threats (Clinton, 1994).

A common thread in American engagement across the Bush and Clinton administrations was to be involved to the extent required to protect other equities, to forestall deeper engagement in the future. One could question the foresight of the timing of these interventions; I believe they consistently came too late into the second Bush administration, even for these more utilitarian purposes.

Yet, this theme was consistent through the post-Yugoslav wars and across parties, despite manifold differences. The US may have in cases been more assertive and aggressive than its allies, and even at odds with them—most visibly through most of the war in Bosnia (Holbrooke, 1998; Packer, 2019). But American presidents never champed at the bit to expend political capital to lead a charge to intervene—in Bosnia, Kosovo or Macedonia. However, to quote Madeleine Albright when she served as Clinton’s Secretary of State, the US was “the indispensable nation” (Albright, 1998) in achieving

112 KURT BASSUENER Western unity and leading these charges—both militarily and diplomatically—when a decision to engage decisively was made. Most famously, the decisive point for President Clinton in deciding to support an assertive diplomatic effort to achieve a peace in Bosnia was the recognition that the US was on the hook to evacuate European allies engaged in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) if the mission were deemed hopeless, as it came increasingly to be seen by mid-1995 (Daalder, 1998).

The US did apply its primary institutions to champion deterrence against aggression or opportunistic conflict entrepreneurialism in many cases when it was feasible—having missed a pivotal opportunity to do so with Secretary of State Baker’s visit to Yugoslavia in 1991. The December 1992 Christmas warning was the first such example. The logic of the 1994 Washington Agreement, which created the “Muslim-Croat Federation”—the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to end conflict between the Republic of BiH and the separatist Croat “Herceg-Bosna,”opportunistically created with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman’s backing—was one of counterforce deterrence (and balance of power) (Pardew, 2018).

As a corollary to the Dayton Peace Accords, the Train and Equip Program, to ensure that the Federation Army was capable of deterring the Army of the Republika Srpska, was highly controversial with European allies, but deemed essential by Washington (Pardew, 2018). American troops’ participation in the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia was seen as essential to deterring Serbian adventurism, as well as having fringe benefits—even before the US recognized the country as “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (Clinton, 1994).

Moreover, the failure to maintain the deterrent policy in Kosovo by upholding the Christmas warning, which was embraced early on

by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and Secretary of State Warren Christopher, emboldened Milošević’s crackdown in Kosovo against the Kosovo Liberation Army (and the civilian population) in early 1998 (Daalder and O’ Hanlon, 2004). This policy failure both deepened the conflict and ultimately required Americanled NATO intervention the following year. The fact that elements of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) launched an insurgency in

US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 113 Macedonia (from whence numerous KLA fighters hailed) in early 2001 constituted another deterrence failure—or at the very minimum, a slow response to the challenge—which could have ended far worse and required diplomatic engagement later that year (Palmer et. al., 2001).

Contrary to later complaints from EU quarters (often post hoc)2 that the US was precipitous in its policies, a great deal of concern was voiced through 1995 about US unwillingness to assert leadership and its effect on the alliance leadership (Packer, 2019; Abe, 2019). Furthermore, the US exhibited a preference for collaborative, multilateral engagement—much to the chagrin of many of those who argued for stronger American engagement. However, often this posture masked a will at the top to avoid deeper involvement.

When presidents determined that American interests were at stake or best served by assertive policies, the US had a decisive role in events.

In sum, the American posture over the course of its engagement with socialist Yugoslavia, its dissolution and the resulting wars could be described as conditionally institutionalist, but not dogmatically so. Washington expressed a pronounced tendency to support maintenance of status quo and stability sometimes (as in 1990–1991; and again in 1997–1998) well beyond the point where it was salvageable. Nonetheless, when US engagement—including use of force—was deemed necessary, it was able to align the West for effective multilateralism. In the cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, Washington’s weighing-in enabled transatlantic unity of purpose through established relationships (NATO in particular, but also the diplomatic duo with the EU which negotiated and ended Macedonia’s 2001 conflict), as well as new mechanisms to purpose (Berlin plus provisions for EU-led military operations).

2

This was later-of-heard regarding Kosovo in particular, especially when it came to the question of Kosovo independence. The subtext often amounted to a gripe that the Americans got Europe into this.

114 KURT BASSUENER

Contemporary Policies The trajectory of US engagement in the post-Yugoslav space was not defined by historical alignments with Yugoslavia’s component republics and peoples. The antagonism which developed vis-à-vis Serbia (in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia period with Montenegro) emerged situationally—as did situational alignment with Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia in the early 1990s. While direct military intervention of a decisive nature only came about in 1995 with American tacit backing of Croatia’s Operation Storm and the Federation’s offensives in Bosnia, US backing of the NATO Reaction Force in Bosnia and conduct of air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions, the groundwork for these was politically evident with the Washington Agreement. By signing Dayton, Milošević s became seen as part of the necessary architecture of maintaining stability (and reducing risk) to US equities in peace implementation, nearly 20,000 US troops in the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) (Pardew, 2018). In addition, the verbal coolness of US diplomat Richard Holbrooke towards the Serbian opposition coalition in the run-up to the 1997 elections—after large nationwide protests in 1996–1997—were viewed in this light (Sell, 2003). At the same time, the escalation of Serbia’s crackdown in Kosovo against the nascent Kosovo Liberation Army was accelerated

by Milošević’s sense of indispensability—and this worked for some time with a Clinton administration fearful of upsetting what was touted as a foreign policy success in Bosnia (Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2004). Montenegro’s Milo Đukanović, breaking with Milošević (and fellow Montenegrin Pavle Bulatović), devoted considerable effort to forging a relationship with the US, as the Kosovo war escalated and US-led NATO intervention became more likely.3 Besides that,Washington’s support was seen as crucial to insulate the republic from NATO intervention, as well as support a clear gravitation toward de facto independence.

3

The author, while policy analyst at the Balkan Institute, attended one such Washington DC roundtable with senior Montenegrin officials in 1998. Soon after, a Montenegrin trade mission was established in Washington.

US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 115 As US diplomatic efforts deepened to end the Serbian campaign in Kosovo (and the KLA grew from a relatively fringe group into a popular resistance movement), the pursuit of state-building in Bosnia deepened as well. 1999 proved to be a pivotal year for US, NATO, and EU engagement in the former Yugoslavia. The definitive breach with Milošević and the 78-day air campaign, leading to Serbian forces’ withdrawal and the deployment of NATO forces into Kosovo, followed at the end of the year by the death of Tuđman in December 1999, helped fundamentally change the equation on peace implementation in BiH (Bassuener, 2017). In addition—and pivotally—the door to NATO and EU membership opened with the announcement of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe in July 1999 (Seymour, 2000).

Soon after, President Bush’s post–1989 call for “a Europe whole and free” was expanded to “a Europe whole, free, and at peace” in US diplomatic talking points (Hamilton and Dębski, 2019).4 The prospect of former Yugoslav states re-entering the European (and Euro-Atlantic) mainstream and joining a strategy of democratic enlargement (Packer, 2019) gained momentum with the entry of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO in March 1999. The drift in ambition from containment to transformation was transatlantic, not solely American. And with the peaceful ouster of Milošević on October 5, 2000, after his attempt to steal early elections, which he had over confidently called, Serbia had the opportunity to join in as well.5 The period from 1999–2005, in retrospect, marked the apogee of US (and Western) policy ambition and creativity in the post-Yugoslav space—and not just there, but in terms of liberal multilateralism in a global sense. The concept of responsibility to protect (R2P) developed largely due to recognized policy failure toward 4

5

The author first heard this phrasing at a Washington lunch event, spoken by then-NSC official Greg Schulte in 2001 or 2002.

Serbia’s lack of full cooperation with the ICTY remained a lingering sore point with the US—but the US de-emphasized this conditionality prior to several EU member states. It is the author’s view that the insistence by the Netherlands that Serbia fully comply—and “find” high-profile indictees Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan Karadžić and military commander Ratko Mladić, was the ultimate reason they were arrested and transferred to the Hague for trial.

116 KURT BASSUENER gross violations of international humanitarian law in conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo and Sierra Leone—and the learning curve began to be applied in real time with Indonesia’s effort to sabotage East Timor’s independence plebiscite in 1999 (Aglionby and Black, 1999). A succession of President Clinton by Vice President Al Gore, a notable Bosnia hawk, would likely have signified continuity of this learning curve. However, the George W. Bush administration entered in 2001 with substantially different default settings, including a deep distaste for US participation in “peacekeeping” missions.6 While the radical breach feared by analysts such as myself with the Clinton policy in the Balkans did not materialize, the shift in emphasis and posture was immediately palpable—as was manifest in the later reaction to an unfolding conflict in Macedonia, which had been touted (with reason, but also no shortage of wishful thinking) as a Balkan success story: the one post-Yugoslav state which had avoided violent conflict through the whole Milošević era (Bassuener, 2001). While US diplomatic engagement ended up being decisive in bringing peace, and the conflict did not metastasize into a full-blown civil war, the marching orders given to Ambassador James Pardew were to achieve peace while preventing deeper US engagement and leaving Europe (and Europeans in NATO) the lead (Pardew, 2018). This posture preceded 9/11 by less than a month.

Enter the Subcontracting Era Al Qaeda’s attack on September 11, 2001 did not signify a breach in the US approach toward the former Yugoslav space. Rather, it accelerated a drift in emphasis already evident in the reaction to the Macedonia conflict. While it is easily forgotten, particularly given

6

The quotes signify the terminology employed by “Vulcans” Paul Wolfowitz (Bush’s Deputy Secretary of Defense) and Condoleezza Rice (National Security Advisor, later Secretary of State). US forces in Bosnia and Kosovo, however, were authorized under the more muscular Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, permitting use of force to maintain international peace and security—as opposed to traditional, Cold War-era peacekeeping missions, which were typically interposing forces.

US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 117 the events which followed and the transatlantic friction that attended them, Western—even global—solidarity with the United States was unprecedented in the days and months which followed 9/11—as it almost immediately became known. NATO’s Article 5 provision for mutual defense was invoked for the first time (NATO, 2001). European NATO allies (and non-NATO members as well) participated in US-led operations in Afghanistan, which commenced in October. However, the Bush administration’s penchant for unilateral decision making with expected multilateral buy-in post hoc was evident then—and drove a major wedge between the US and much of the EU as preparations to invade Iraq gathered steam. The post-Yugoslav space was no exception to manifestations of international solidarity; these were particularly pronounced in Kosovo (Global Ties US, 2017). But efforts to cast 9/11 as a clash of civilization by regimes hostile to Muslim minorities or neighbors were also notable.

US support for the former leader of the British Liberal Democratic Party, Paddy Ashdown, to become international High Representative in Bosnia/EU Special Representative, was essential to his appointment.7 The latter’s ambitious state-building agenda demonstrated Washington’s increasingly evident penchant for subcontracting—while devoting high-level backing where needed—to Europe for peace enforcement and helping steer Western activities in the post-Yugoslav space. Ashdown’s assertiveness helped camouflage the distancing which was already becoming evident at the time of his arrival (May 2002). By the time of his departure in January 2006, this was far more widely recognized in the region.

The frictions over the invasion of Iraq, both between the US and much of the EU and within the EU itself, actually acted as an accelerant rather than an impediment to the EU’s (at that time) effectively uncontested leading role in the Balkans as the EU prepared for and achieved its 2004 “big bang” enlargement to Central

7

The author participated in a Washington roundtable in late 2001 held for Ashdown with Balkan specialists; with colleague Eric A. Witte wrote An Agenda for Bosnia’s Next High Representative (Bassuener and Witte, 2002), and later worked as strategy analyst at OHR in 2005–2006.

118 KURT BASSUENER and Eastern Europe (in addition to Cyprus and Malta).8 The formalized commitment to the Western Balkans (the rest of post-Yugoslav states plus Albania) in Thessaloniki in 2003, followed by the 2004 big bang, imbued the EU and its member states with a confidence that its enlargement approach could be applied to the same effect in the region9—and that hard power enforcement tools (effectively underwritten by the US) were superfluous, even counterproductive toward demonstrating the EU’s normative power (Knaus and Martin, 2003). The US did not deter or impede this logic, though it did not subscribe to it. Rather, Washington agreed with the EU to develop a mechanism by which the EU could utilize NATO assets for its own military missions—the so-called Berlin-plus arrangements (Azinović, Bassuener, and Weber, 2011). This was first applied in Bosnia, where the EU’s Operation Althea (EUFOR) succeeded NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December 2004.

For a decade and a half, the logic that the EU should lead in its own backyard with American backing effectively defined US policy posture toward the post-Yugoslav space. Despite frictions manifested in divergent threat assessment in Bosnia and frustration at the lack of a common EU position on Kosovo’s independence, this framework remained consistent. America’s bilateral relationships with the countries of the region had specificities, but the integration of these countries into the EU and NATO (with Serbia being the only country vocally opposing joining the Alliance) served as a constant and transatlantic binding agent.

In addition to direct engagement bilaterally (and in regional capitals), the US participated in several ad hoc fora with leading EU member states, such as the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)10 in Bosnia and regionally the so-called

8

9

10

The countries joining on May 1, 2004 were Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. All but Cyprus and Malta were NATO members by 2004 as well. See https:// europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/2000-2009_en.

See also the contribution on the role of the European Union in the post-Yugoslav States in this volume on this issue.

The PIC Steering Board, in its current broadened incarnation, includes Canada, the European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands (non-

US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 119 “Quint”—the Western members of the Contact Group formed in 1994 to arrive at a common international position on ending the war in Bosnia—France, Germany, Italy (joining after Dayton), the UK and the US. Until well into the term of President Donald Trump, the density of US connection with the EU in engagement with outside powers was highest in the Western Balkans—as was the collective leverage of this alignment. Only with Trump’s endorsement of the concept of a “land swap” agreement between Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Kosovo President Hashim Thaçi from summer 2018 has this framework come into doubt—and both sides sought to paper over the rift at senior professional levels (Bassuener and Weber, 2020). This tension amplified over the course of 2020, culminating in a choreographed signing ceremony of separate agreements between the US, Serbia and Kosovo (Stojanović and Bami, 2020). The agreements aimed to facilitate economic relations while Serbia’s commitment to curtail its international campaign aimed to convince countries which recognize Kosovo’s independence to rescind it (ibid). However, the headline “deliverable” for Trump was Serbia’s agreeing to move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, as well as Israel’s recognition of Kosovo. Frictions with the EU were amplified by these moves; that may have influenced part of the “sale” made by special envoy and former US Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell (Bassuener and Weber, 2020). Serbia’s deviation from the common EU stance on Jerusalem created a new friction point. The durability of these agreements, with the new Kosovo government of Prime Minister Albin Kurti (whose first government fell due to US diplomatic machinations to achieve an agreement) now in place, as well as the end of the Trump presidency, is questionable.

In short, the US has employed its primary institutions toward ensuring the peace achieved after its military and diplomatic interventions—conducted collectively with European allies—and anchoring it in the secondary institutions of the EU and NATO. While

voting), Russia, Spain (nonvoting) Turkey (representing the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), the United Kingdom and the United States. See http:// www.ohr.int/international-community-in-bih/peace-implementation-council/.

120 KURT BASSUENER the Kosovo status dispute with Serbia, resulting in Kosovo independence in 2008 after failure of the Ahtisaari Plan to gain Serbia’s support (or that of Russia and China), created frictions in these relationships—and between international bodies (most notably the United Nations), for the past two decades since the course for “a Europe whole, free, and at peace” was set, the US and EU (along with Turkey) were in step through a panoply of linkages. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 can be used as a rough proxy for the recognition of the return of geopolitics to the post-Yugoslav space—though the ground had been prepared for external challengers to EU hegemony (with implied US backing) by years of bureaucratic autopilot without course adjustment. While numerous factors were of course at play, from 1999 onward, no serious alternative to Euro-Atlantic enlargement was envisioned as having any potential until Russia’s upshift from opportunistic spoiler to aggressive disruptor in the post-Yugoslav space with the aim of preventing NATO, but also EU, consolidation (Reuters, 2014; Bassuener, 2016).11 Subsequently—and quite rapidly—the challenge of Chinese engagement became a concern for the West in the Balkans as well.

Foreign Policy Structures From 1991, the post-Yugoslav space rose rapidly up the US policy agenda from being a lower-order concern. While it rose and fell in relative importance for US leaders over the course of the following decade, it consumed a considerable amount of policy bandwidth across three presidencies—and generated bottom-up pressures on politicians as well (Abe, 2019). Views diverged within both major political parties; coalitions developed to advocate intervention brought together numerous erstwhile adversaries from recent memory. Presidents ultimately determined policies, but high-profile individuals in successive administrations had important roles 11

Even after Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s warning to several postYugoslav countries that joining NATO would be a “provocation” in 2014, EU officials persisted in using the shopworn talking point that the EU was “the only game in town.”

US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 121 in framing the issues and steering American engagement. Members of Congress and committees played critical roles as well as drove the debate. A consistent dynamic of legislative policy scrutiny, critique, and advocacy continued through the 1990s and into the early years of the 2000s (Glaurdić, 2011; Abe, 2019). It would be fair to say that legislators helped force a more cautious executive branch to be more responsive and assertive, particularly during the war in Bosnia—and later on in Kosovo. As outlined above, the prominence of the post-Yugoslav space in US policy diminished considerably in the aftermath of 9/11 and particularly with the launch of the invasion of Iraq in early 2003.

While the US framed its policies as being regional in scope, these did not always cross-pollinate enough—particularly among US embassies and diplomatic missions. A country-by-country approach was reflected in NATO enlargement, often leading to counterproductive outcomes. One such example was the entry of Croatia into NATO (and later the EU) without having fully resolved its outstanding disputes with neighbors (such as Slovenia and BiH)— ostensibly a requirement (NATO, 1995). On more than one occasion, the author was presented with policy views by US diplomats which seemed to reflect those of the host government—often referred to in diplomatic circles as “clientitis”: A bureaucratic culture of wishing to produce “deliverables” to demonstrate efficacy affects in US—and EU—foreign policy alike. In this way, broad strategic parameters for policies can be bent to serve contradictory ends. This tends to be magnified when policy attention at senior levels, where incoherence becomes visible, dissipates.

In US policy toward the region, a few documents were particularly important in the 1990s. These include the “Christmas warning” letter by President George H. W. Bush in 1992, threatening Belgrade with air strikes in the event of a Kosovo crackdown; President Bill Clinton’s commitment to assist in any required extraction of allied NATO armies serving in UNPROFOR in BiH (Daalder, 1998); the Dayton Peace Accords—an international peace treaty engineered by a team led by US diplomat Richard Holbrooke in 1995 and giving Washington massive regional leverage; UN Security Council Resolution 1244 in 1999; the Stability Pact for Southeastern

122 KURT BASSUENER Europe in 1999, immediately following NATO’s air campaign against Serbia over Kosovo; the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001; and the Ahtisaari Plan, which failed to gain Serbian approval, but largely defined how Kosovo became independent in 2008 (Pardew, 2018). All of these were reflected in other documents and legislation. In addition, legislation in Congress, both passed and tabled, had an important role in driving the policy (Packer, 2019).

Dayton and UN Security Council Resolution 1244 both provided anchors to American presence and leverage in the post-Yugoslav space, particularly in BiH and Kosovo, but not solely. But in terms of broad strategic outlook and posture toward the region as a whole, the Stability Pact—or rather, the principles embodied in it for a “Europe whole, free, and at peace” has had the most durable long-term impact on US policy. Even now, more than two decades later, it still forms the boilerplate for diplomatic talking points in the region. However, US support for a “land swap” between Kosovo and Serbia runs contrary to these principles, which until summer 2018 included maintenance of Socialist Yugoslavia’s internal borders (Pardew, 2018). Biden’s campaign indicated the impending return to the prior standard (Biden-Harris Campaign, 2020).

Personalities Matter Each successive administration since the dissolution of Yugoslavia had several personalities who had significant roles in shaping the policy, in addition to the president. Moreover, individuals involved on the ground also wielded considerable leverage—and at times had wide latitude—to define policy in the region.

In the first Bush administration, Secretary of State James Baker infamously set a tone of American aloofness, at a time when all the local actors in Yugoslavia were waiting for the US policy to be defined (and if possible, support their own agendas). While Baker set the tone, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger (later to serve as Secretary), both of whom had served in Belgrade, also had significant roles in shaping the policy with President Bush. Finally, General

US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 123 Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joined these already intervention-averse ranks with his “Powell Doctrine” for US military engagement (Kalb, 2013). The doctrine, informed by Powell’s Vietnam experience, set a very high bar for intervention, calling for overwhelming force to be employed when the US committed to action, only when vital national interests were deemed at stake, followed by a plan for withdrawal. He repeatedly asserted that intervention in Bosnia would constitute a very heavy lift and should be avoided (Gordon, 1992). Yet, by the end of the administration, after defeat in the 1992 presidential election by Bill Clinton, Bush issued his “Christmas warning” to Milošević to deter a Kosovo crackdown.

Bill Clinton ran for president decrying US inaction in Bosnia.

But upon arrival in office, deferential to a military security establishment which he feared and deterred by the prospect of incurring casualties, Clinton demurred from actively pressing for intervention (Packer, 2019). Public and Congressional attention grew as the war in Bosnia garnered media attention—and was seen to tarnish the US “victory” in the Cold War (Abe, 2019). A diverse cast of personalities defined the policy prior to Dayton: Powell, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Defense Secretaries Les Aspin and later William Perry, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright, and Vice President Al Gore.

These figures defined the spectrum from being against intervention to favoring it (Packer, 2019). Former Vietnam friends and rivals Lake and Holbrooke helped define the way forward for Clinton, with the former advocating American engagement to end the war inside the administration and Holbrooke brought in to diplomatically engineer a deal with high-level backup (Packer, 2019). This policy alignment led to the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. It is worthy of note that while neither the EU nor Russia were major players in the diplomatic efforts to get to Dayton, in the “sale” of what Dayton signified, the fact that this was a multinational effort with European allies (helping salve the bruised relationships particularly with Britain and France) and Russian participation was regularly touted (Pardew, 2018). Participation in IFOR included nu-

124 KURT BASSUENER merous countries aspiring to NATO membership, those in the Partnership for Peace, and even those further afield (such as Chile and Morocco). So American engagement was seen as an engine useful for additional relationship-building. This signified that US engagement in the Balkans was always connected to wider policy concerns—not merely determined by the factors on the ground.

Avoiding casualties and risk remained Clinton default settings, however, as reflected in his initial desire for US troops to leave BiH in a year and refusal to actively seek arrest of war crimes indictees (Sudetic, 2000). This began to change in 1997/1998, after Britain, soon after Prime Minister Tony Blair took office, began forcible arrests (Borger, 2016). By the end of 1997, President Clinton visited BiH and stated that the American troop commitment was open-ended; also in December 1997, the Peace Implementation Council’s meeting in Bonn adopted the “Bonn Powers”, empowering the international High Representative to employ executive authority to ensure implementation of Dayton. By 1998–1999, when war in Kosovo escalated, a new alignment of “principals” (cabinet secretaries) was in place. These included Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Defense Secretary William Cohen, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hugh Shelton, in addition to Gore. Albright and Gore defined the more hawkish end; NATO Commander General Wesley Clark also played a key and highly visible role in defining the options in the 78-day NATO air campaign—including (in alliance with British PM Blair) advocating preparedness for use of ground troops, which Clinton, Cohen, and Shelton were against (Halberstam, 2002). Once Yugoslav Army and Serbian Interior Ministry forces withdrew under the terms of the Military-Technical Agreement signed in Kumanovo in June 1999, different wheels went into motion in terms of defining the international engagement in Kosovo—still recognized as part of Serbia, but under UN management and NATO security under the terms of UNSCR 1244. The US deployed a sizable troop contingent to NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) (Pardew, 2018).

In the 18 months between American troops entering Kosovo and the end of the Clinton administration, the outlines of US policy to the present day came into focus. The presumption—on both

US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 125 sides of the Atlantic—became that the countries of the former Yugoslavia would ultimately join the EU and NATO, under their own power as new democracies, but with appropriate incentives, drawn by the unparalleled prosperity and security on offer. The only question seemed to be the speed of travel. However, at the end of the Clinton administration, there was a recognition that continued hands-on involvement on the ground, with hard power tools, would be required to create a favorable environment for this transformation. American diplomats deployed to the region were frequently highly visible and assertive—with backing in Washington, including in Congress.

As noted earlier, the incoming George W. Bush administration had a significantly different outlook on the world than the one the Clinton team had developed: much more committed to great power competition and explicitly devoted to US international primacy.

This was a wide consensus view among most of the national security and foreign policy team: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, as well as Vice President Dick Cheney and the president himself. The depth of American engagement in the Balkans was seen as incongruent with this posture, as members of this group publicly stated. Secretary of State Colin Powell was the most committed multilateralist in the cabinet, observing that the US would not unilaterally withdraw its forces from SFOR and KFOR (Bonnart, 2001). But the majority outlook helps explain why the US was late to devoting efforts to prevent a wider fifth postYugoslav war in Macedonia—and what came to be known as a “light footprint” in terms of US assets devoted to ensuring the resulting Ohrid Framework Agreement was implemented.

The 9/11 attacks led to a recalibration of US security and foreign policy priorities; the invasion of Iraq and the war that erupted thereafter began absorbing ever greater resources from the US (and its allies), as did resurgence of violence in Afghanistan. The overarching policy goals in the post-Yugoslav space did not change. But the US became increasingly a background player to an EU, which confidently wanted to demonstrate it could lead, particularly after the humiliation of the 1990s. US engagement with European allies

126 KURT BASSUENER from the 2002 Prague NATO summit onward became more instrumental—a “toolbox” from which to extract capabilities needed for US-led military action “out of area,” as well as diplomatic support (Schweiger, 2016). Rumsfeld memorably captured this in his statement that while much of “old Europe” opposed the Iraq invasion, “new Europe” was more game. This became applicable to the countries of the post-Yugoslav space as well, who like the Central Europeans ahead of them, saw deployment to US-led multinational missions abroad (such as Bosnian troops in Afghanistan) as an accelerant to NATO membership ambitions.

The US weighed in heavily only twice in this period, to consolidate gains already achieved. On the first occasion, Washington pressed Bosnian party leaders to adopt a package of constitutional reforms to lock-in the results of the state-building process to date, as well as clarify divisions of competences—all with the goal of enabling BiH to enter the EU and NATO (Perry, 2015). What became known as “the April package” failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority for numerous reasons, including self-serving political calculations. But given that the parties often blamed exclusively for its failure, Haris Siljadžić’s Party for BiH and the then-new HDZ 1990, had insufficient votes (9) between them to stop it, its failure was due in part because some—including one SDA MP, Mehmed Žilić, who broke ranks with his party—feared it would accelerate US disengagement (ibid.). Washington also supported Montenegro’s right to seek independence, which it did in 2006. Soon after the US became a vocal champion of Kosovo independence, the administration first aimed for a diplomatic deal which would gain the support of Belgrade, but ultimately made do without it (Pardew, 2018). But attention to the post-Yugoslav space waned as the Bush administration continued. The US policy was to let the EU hold the tiller on what it thought of as a commonly agreed policy.

Barack Obama ran for president having memorably argued that the US should not engage in “dumb wars” of choice, such as Iraq (Obama, 2002). His foreign policy and national security team included several seasoned veterans of the Clinton era, including previous bitter rival for the Democratic nomination Hillary Rodham Clinton herself as Secretary of State. Vice President Joe Biden

US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 127 had been a vocal advocate of intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Senior advisor in the campaign—and later US Ambassador to the UN—Samantha Power had written her A Problem from Hell motivated by what she saw as a young journalist during the war in Bosnia (Power, 2003). Based on these personnel, much hope was projected onto the incoming Obama administration by those frustrated by the listlessness of the West’s policy (Traynor, 2009). The resentment from many in the EU was immediately palpable. Biden made a Balkan tour soon after the administration took office in 2009.

But no major shift was to follow this initial frisson—the EU strongly resisted an US re-engagement that might challenge its primacy; the Obama posture toward the region was largely one of continuity with Bush’s. One exertion on Bosnia in late 2009, joint EUUS talks co-chaired by Swedish Foreign Minister (and former High Representative) Carl Bildt and US Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg to achieve some minimal constitutional amendment (of a lower grade than pursued in the April package), came to naught (Bassuener, 2009). While the region stayed on the agenda, it only rarely reached the principal’s level. The Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia unnerved many in the region (as in Europe); Obama personally never was an instinctively committed Atlanticist (as opposed to Clinton and Biden, for example) (Goldberg, 2016). The relationship with the EU was deployed not to issues where the US had differences with the EU-led approach within Europe, but rather toward matters of concern outside it, such as the Iran nuclear issue.

However, the American diplomatic footprint in all the countries of the Western Balkans was prominent.

America, the Disruptor The Trump administration’s breach with what had been a bipartisan approach toward the region did not begin immediately, despite the president’s own anti-NATO, anti-EU messages and general disruptive tendencies. Through 2017 and into 2018, the American policy on the ground remained consistent. Indeed, it appeared that the lack of high-level attention from the president and his cabinet proved an asset to the upper-middle layer of the State Department

128 KURT BASSUENER bureaucracy, some of whom became more vocal—and in the case of Macedonia, perhaps decisively assertive in catalyzing an end to a dangerous and destabilizing political stalemate (Marušić, 2017).

Yet, the danger was always evident—and those pursuing incomplete nationalist agendas all saw the potential in an avowedly nationalist US president (Bassuener and Perry, 2017). This tendency became clearer with the sidelining of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hoyt Yee in early 2018 by then-Assistant Secretary Wess Mitchell, who pursued improving relations with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s nationalist “illiberal democracy,” as well as supporting the idea of a territorial “land swap” between Serbia and Kosovo, which was first announced in July 2018 (Pancevski and Hinshaw, 2018). But it had been in the works for some time.12 National Security Advisor John Bolton announced the US would not oppose such an arrangement if it were agreed between Belgrade and Prishtina in August 2018. And in early 2019, with the appointment of Trump publicist Richard Grenell as US Ambassador in Germany, the shift in US policy became much more public. The resignation or dismissal of the “adults” alleged to have some influence and policy leverage, was complete with the December 2018 resignation of Defense Secretary James Mattis, the administration’s sole committed Atlanticist, following Trump’s announcement of US forces’ withdrawal from Syria after a call with President Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan of Turkey (BBC, 2018). By early 2020, US policy had shifted so dramatically that Grenell, appointed special envoy for Serbia and Kosovo in October 2019, actively promoting the undoing of Kosovo’s new ruling coalition under Prime Minister Albin Kurti, who opposed his efforts to achieve a “land swap” deal with Serbia (Bassuener and Weber, 2020). If there was ever a clearer case of the maxim “personnel is policy,” it is hard to imagine.

12

The author first heard of it on the sidelines of an Atlantic Council conference on the Balkans in November 2017, in which Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić was said to have definitely asserted it was coming. See https://www.at lanticcouncil.org/category/content-series/balkans-forward-content-series/ .

US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 129

Outlook and Summary The United States played a pivotal role in the post-Yugoslav space throughout the post-Cold War period, both through affirmative acts and—particularly from 1991–1995—through their absence. The US was reluctant to initially intervene—a default setting which remained, to varying degrees, across administrations and parties. But once fully committed with a regional view, forged in the immediate aftermath of the NATO campaign against Serbia from March–June 1999, US power was widely seen—correctly—as the foundation of regional stabilization, providing an overarching security guarantee (explicit in Dayton BiH and postwar Kosovo; implied beyond), which provided reassurance with which to pursue Euro-Atlantic integration for the post-Yugoslav states. The apogee of American strategic vision was locked-in in 1999 with the Stability Pact co-produced with the EU, which opened the door to membership in the Union and NATO to the countries of the region. So Washington’s primary institutions according to this volume’s typology—particularly its hard power tools such as ability to wage war, defense of sovereignty and territoriality, balance of power (all devoted to deterrence), but also its diplomatic heft and defense of international law (embodied in Dayton, war crimes accountability, etc)—were devoted to achieving the anchoring of the post-Yugoslav states in the secondary institutions of the EU, NATO, Council of Europe, Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the standards they ostensibly represent and uphold. In Kosovo’s case after 2008, UN membership was also a US policy goal. While in the latter case, the EU’s five non-recognizers (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) complicated the issue for Washington (and indeed also the four major EU powers represented in the Quint), this strategy set in 1999 was a transatlantic one. It still is the baseline of declared policy for the US and EU; there has never been a thorough strategic review, let alone a recalibration, undertaken by either (DPC, 2019).

However, beginning in the “Bush 43” administration, American policy attention began its long shift away from the region, despite maintaining a large diplomatic and aid footprint. US troops

130 KURT BASSUENER departed BiH with the advent of EUFOR; the American contingent in KFOR, while significant, has diminished. There was a conscious decision to support EU leadership in the post-Yugoslav space—as the stick behind a European carrot; this also generated evident frustration in Washington as the realities on the ground diverged ever further from the proclaimed goals. By 2014, geopolitical challenges from Russia, China, an increasingly authoritarian Turkey, and increasing visibility and influence from autocratic Gulf state monarchies, had become a prevalent concern on both sides of the Atlantic.

These illiberal powers relied on relations with local elites—the same who had to be “partners” according to the post-1999 strategy of enlargement (Bassuener, 2019). The vulnerability of a policy on bureaucratic autopilot for almost a decade was finally incurring visible costs, to the benefit of local elites (as well as the external illiberal powers) and the detriment of the US and EU. The ’post’-post-Cold War period had its way paved beginning in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq, developing through the Bush and Obama administrations. But it came into full bloom with Trump’s questioning of all the US’ standing relationships—and the secondary institutions in which they had been pursued. While elements of realpolitik were present in Trump statements and officials’ talking points, the “policy” was far too erratic to fit that schema. No coherent challenge to other great powers’ policies are durably served by the US approach since 2018; it often seems that disruption itself is the goal. Contrary to a raison d’ état rationale, US strategic interests—in the region and in the wider world—have been weakened, particularly in demonstrating to a majority of Kosovars (perhaps the world’s most pro-US population) that the Americans can no longer be trusted. This message has been received throughout the region and the wider world. Nor has this portlatch of US predictability and credibility assisted its erstwhile partners, the EU, for while the Union has even greater latitude, its distraction and disunity has eroded its credibility in the region as well. The goals of the common 1999 strategy remain on the books, but with precious little credibility in the eyes of Balkan populations—or leaders.

The erosion of US commitment to the post-Yugoslav space over a decade, followed by an ongoing active effort in the Trump

US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 131 era to destroy these relationships and structures which undergird them, has damaged the host of secondary institutions upon which a democratic peace was to be built in the region—inflicting damage perceptible beyond it. This subverts all of the US’ institutions as well: its ability to maintain balance of power (or rather, preserve a favorable imbalance in its own and the EU’s favor—now being challenged), to uphold sovereignty and territoriality of states where it is legally committed to defend them (BiH and Kosovo), uphold international law (as embodied in international treaties such as Dayton), and as a result has increased the likelihood of political adventurism leading to violent conflict in the Balkans. The latter was the main value-added of the US role over two decades. So now, unfulfilled political agendas of both local elites and foreign illiberal powers can be pursued without impediment. For the former, these are to consolidate power without democratic or legal accountability and pursue ethno territorial goals. For the latter, this is to impede further NATO enlargement for Moscow and generally disrupt the West, as well as develop local constituencies; for Beijing, this is to gain clientelistic footholds in the political economies of the region.

Both constitute “forward defense” of the Putin and Xi regimes. A more counterproductive policy for a country led under a slogan of “America First” could hardly be conceived.

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A PLAYFIELD OF DISTANCING: RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES Maxim Samorukov

Map 5: Russia and its European Neighbor States Source: https://www.d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=30086&lang=en

138 MAXIM SAMORUKOV

Introduction The Russian state in its various reincarnations has never bordered any of the post-Yugoslav states—even at peaks of its imperial expansion. Yet, the distant northern power has loomed large over the Balkan region for over three hundred years. Some locals have viewed Russia as a benevolent patron of Orthodox Christians and a mighty defender of smaller Slavic nations. For others, Russian influence has always been and remains a source of trouble, an obstacle to the Balkans strive to join the developed West. Russia’s own approach to the Balkans has evolved over centuries but stayed unchanged in its core premise. Notwithstanding the switches of rhetoric from Orthodox to Socialist brotherhood and back, Russia has consistently viewed its position in the Balkans as one of the key factors in the country’s complex relations with the West.

The deep transformation that Russia underwent after the end of the Cold War changed surprisingly little in this respect. The very same Balkan leaders faced Moscow’s harsh criticism only to be praised to the skies a few years later following the ebbs and flows of Russia’s relations with Western powers. Russia flooded the region with investments when its partnership with the European Union (EU) flourished, but cut economic cooperation abruptly as its ties with Europe went sour. Moscow appeared amenable and cooperative in settling post-Yugoslav conflicts when it expected the West to do the same in the post-Soviet ones, but switched to backing radical nationalists when incensed by some Western steps in Ukraine or Georgia. Up to these days, the Russian leadership frequently mentions Yugoslavia’s collapse and the Kosovo conflict in its public pronouncements (President of Russia, 2014). However, it does so not out of special interest to or caring about the Balkans, but to berate the West and justify its own controversial policies in the post-Soviet space.

The dire state of the Russia-West relationship in recent years took its toll on Moscow’s policies in the Balkans. The country acquired an image of a spoiler, which is eager to team up with the most sinister forces in the region in shared resentment of the West.

Nowadays, Russia is widely seen as a destructive force ready to

RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 139 push the post-Yugoslav states into turmoil for the sake of its selfish geopolitical interests (Galeotti, 2018). Although the scale and significance of Moscow’s actions is often exaggerated by local politicians to boost their standing at home and in the West (Filipovic, 2017), many of its steps were indeed not helpful in fostering stability in the region. Over the past decade, Russia’s obstinate fixation on opposing the enlargement of Euro-Atlantic institutions in the Balkans made it few friends in the post-Yugoslav states. Still, this obstructive behavior has little to do with the Balkan realities; its roots reside in the wilderness of Moscow’s dealings with Washington and Brussels.

The central objective of this contribution is to demonstrate that Russia’s relations with the Balkans have always been decorated with the slogans of ideological affinity—pan-Slavic, Socialist, rightwing populist. But these lofty proclamations have had little impact on the decision-making process in Moscow. The real driving force behind Russia’s strategy in the region has been the country's bumpy centuries-long pursuit of respect and recognition from leading Western powers.

The first part of the paper follows key patterns that emerged over the three centuries of Russia’s interactions with the Balkans.

The main emphasis is on the controversies dating back to the 19th century but still plaguing the country’s relations with the region.

The second part describes the highs and lows of Russia’s cooperation with the post-Yugoslav states after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Yugoslavia. It discerns pivotal points in the relationship and clarifies the reasons why confrontation supplanted cooperation and vice versa. The third part deals with the contemporary state of affairs. It settles on how Russia sees the role of the postYugoslav states in its foreign policy and how the decisions concerning the region are taken. The concluding chapter summarizes the balance of the past 30 years of Moscow’s dealings with the Balkans and offers an outlook for the relations in the next decade.

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Empire, Brethren, and Warm Seas For centuries, the Balkans have been deeply embedded in the Russian understanding of what it is to be a great power. A vast country scattered over uninviting forests and marshes of north-eastern Europe; Russia deemed it indispensable to gain an access to ‘warm seas’ to put itself on equal footing with leading states of the West.

Thus, there is little wonder that Balkan polities came to the attention of Russian foreign policy as soon as the country shed its isolation and started westernizing reforms at the beginning of the 18th century.

Russia’s first major venture into the region—the Pruth River Campaign of 1710–11—became a showcase of the merits and flaws of its Balkan strategy for ages to come. Encouraged by the appeals for help coming from local Orthodox Christian elites, ambitious Russian czar Peter I challenged the Ottoman Empire over the Danubian Principalities of Moldova and Wallachia. Russia eagerly embarked on establishing direct ties with Balkan rulers in the hope of playing the Orthodox brotherhood card and fomenting pro-Russian rebellions against Muslim domination (Artamonov, 2019, pp.

51–55).

This forged one of the most enduring relationships between Russia and a part of future Yugoslavia. Montenegrin Metropolitan Bishop Danilo Petrovic Negos aligned his polity with Peter I against the Ottomans in return for Russian subsidies. His personal visit to the new imperial capital of Saint Petersburg sealed the deal (Andrijasevic, Rastoder, 2010, pp. 74–75). The stream of Russian money to Montenegrin rulers as well as Montenegro’s alliance with Russia against the Ottoman Empire held for the next two centuries.

Notwithstanding the local assistance, the Pruth Campaign proved a disaster for Russia. Encircled by a superior Ottoman army, Russia pleaded for peace and had to concede some of its past conquests on the Azov Sea coast. The defeat made the Russian Empire more realistic in its dealings with the Ottomans for the remainder of the 18th century. Faithful to the objective of acquiring a ‘warm sea outlet’, it concentrated on conquering the northern littoral of the Black Sea ceding the Balkan front to its Austrian allies.

RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 141 The long 19th century became a veritable age of the Balkans for Russian foreign policy. The Empire was securely entrenched on the shores of the Black Sea but still felt strangled by the bottleneck of the Bosporus strait remaining in Ottoman hands. Meanwhile, Slavic and Orthodox Christian peoples of the Balkans, which turned increasingly rebellious in the dawning era of nationalisms, came across as Russia’s natural allies and a convenient shortcut to the much-coveted Mediterranean.

Barbara Jelavich (1991, p.ix) calculated that out of six wars Russia fought between 1806 and 1914 as many as five either in part or in whole concerned the Balkans. Moreover, the disastrous defeat in the only war waged in another part of the world—the Russo-Japanese one—made Russia reorient its foreign policy priorities back to the Balkan issues.

The Russian Empire and its ruling elite perished in the flames of WWI and the following revolution, both fateful events provoked by what initially seemed to be just another Balkan adventure of a limited scale. Still, many patterns in Russia’s relations with the region forged back in the 19th century remain salient until today. This continuity goes far beyond the well-known narratives of Slavic and Orthodox brotherhood between Russia and Balkan nations, which came to the fore during numerous Russo-Ottoman wars.

An absolute and centralized monarchy, the Russian Empire was obliged to support revolutionary movements and fledgling local nationalisms in the Balkans—the very same phenomena it refused to tolerate at home. This paradox was not without consequences. Notwithstanding its significant military contribution to the independence of the Balkan states, Russia kept failing to capitalize on its victories on the battlefield. Despotic in domestic politics and retarded in economy, it had little to offer to the Balkan nations it presumably liberated from the Ottoman yoke. The new states looked at Western powers as models for their development, making Russia berate them for ingratitude and kowtowing to the West.

Russia’s patronizing and meddlesome manner in dealings with Balkan elites further exacerbated this divergence.

Russia's penchant for an all-or-nothing approach made it spend the long 19th century in search of the closest and most reliable

142 MAXIM SAMORUKOV ally in the region. It started with the “Greek Project”—the idea to restore the Byzantine Empire subservient to Russian interests (Arsh, 2013, p.44). However, when the real Greek state wrested its independence from the Ottomans, it proved to be more interested in a rapprochement with Great Britain, the dominant power of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Russia's once warm relations with the Danubian Principalities, which later merged into Romania, soured in the second half of the 19th century due to territorial disputes over Moldova and the Danube delta (Cusco, Taki, 2012, pp. 245–258). The Empire’s clumsy attempts to turn Bulgaria into a dependable satellite alienated local ruling elites. Bulgarian rulers would from now on remain wary that a too close cooperation with Russia may undermine the country’s sovereignty (Crampton, 2007, p. 113).

As a result, by the early 20th century, Serbia emerged as the key Russian ally in the Balkans. In 1903, the violent coup d’etat replaced a pro-Austrian Obrenovic dynasty with the pro-Russian Karadjordjevics on the Serbian throne. The switch was welcomed

by Russia, who was tired of futile tinkering with other Balkan states. The myth of eternal and unfailing Russo-Serbian friendship was born, though Russians had similar and even stronger religious, cultural and historical ties with other nations in the region.

With the Ottoman Empire in irreversible recess, the Balkans turned into an object of Russia’s rivalry with leading European states. The Russian leadership increasingly perceived the assertion of its influence in the region as an essential element of the country’s great power status and disregarded the associated costs. When in 1908, Austria-Hungary formally annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina after 30 years of de-facto occupation, Russia felt sidelined and humiliated as it was neither consulted nor compensated for the Austrian move (Vishnyakov, 2011). The Russian leadership was determined not to let the Austrians off next time around.

The opportunity for a payback presented itself just six years later, when Austria-Hungary issued Serbia an ultimatum in connection to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914. The Russian Empire stood steadfast by its newly acquired Balkan ally and was resolute to confirm its great power

RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 143 status and preclude what it deemed to be further humiliation. Russia responded to Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war on Serbia with an order of general mobilization contributing to the outbreak of WWI, which proved fatal for the Empire.

After the upheavals of the war and revolution, the Balkans never again regained their erstwhile significance for Russian foreign policy. The concepts of Orthodox and Slavic brotherhood became things of the past as the new Soviet leadership in Moscow switched its attention to the global issues of a world revolution and survival of the first communist state in a hostile capitalist environment. Belgrade, meanwhile, turned into a capital of the extended state of Yugoslavia and saw its core interest in an alliance with Western democracies to counteract the claims of revisionist powers, like Germany, Hungary and Soviet Russia. Royal Yugoslavia's welcoming of leading anti-Bolshevik émigrés further strained the relations between the two states.

Even the common threat of revanchist Nazi Germany failed to bring the former allies closer together. Yugoslavia was the last country in Eastern Europe to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (USSR). It was done only in June 1940, just months before the Nazi forces invaded the two countries in rapid succession, rendering their renewed contacts irrelevant (Gibianskiy, 2011, p. 316).

The success of the anti-German partisan resistance in Yugoslavia brought back the cooperation with Russians for a while. The fledgling communist regime in Belgrade diligently modeled itself on the Stalinist Soviet Union. Their honeymoon, however, was cut short by the Tito-Stalin split of 1948. Irritated by Yugoslavia’s claims for autonomy, the Soviet leader excommunicated the country from transnational communist structures, stopping short of a military invasion against the ‘Tito clique’ (Lampe, 2000, p. 247).

Stalin’s death somewhat improved the relations, though they remained a far cry from the affinity of the imperial era. Despite socialist rhetoric and policies, Yugoslavia stayed aloof from the Moscow-led Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Belgrade took pride in its ability to capitalize on the USSRUnited States rivalry and even dared to challenge Moscow in the

144 MAXIM SAMORUKOV third world, offering new post-colonial states the alternative of the Non-Aligned Movement instead of joining the Soviet or Western camps.

Over the course of the Cold War, several attempts at a rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR were unable to mend the relationship, which remained dependent on numerous non-related issues, ranging from wider geopolitics to personal whims of the leaders (Matonin, 2012, p. 288). Soviet military and political interventions in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1981) kept reminding the Yugoslav leadership about its vulnerability to Russian tanks. The Soviet Union in turn was too consumed by the worldwide standoff with the US to afford concentrating on the ties with the intractable and relatively small Balkan country.

When Yugoslavia lurched to its collapse in the early 1990s, the Soviet Union also was at the nadir of its international influence. Besieged by numerous economic and political problems at home, it played almost no role in the West’s attempts to forestall the impending outbreak of ethnic violence in the Balkans. The USSR’s impact on the unfolding Yugoslav crisis was rather indirect: the West feared that the breakup of Yugoslavia might trigger a similar or even more chaotic process in the Soviet Union, a nuclear superpower. As a result, Western leaders played into the hands of Serbian strongman Slobodan Milošević, insisting on Yugoslavia’s unity even when it clearly became untenable (Glaurdić, 2011, p.

157). By the end of 1991, this misguided approach had prevented neither the collapse of the USSR, nor the explosion of ethnic violence in Yugoslavia.

From Geopolitics to Business and Back The end of the Cold War brought extensive changes to Russia. Its borders shrank as former Soviet republics gained independence; its economy was shattered by a painful transition from central planning to free market; and its political system underwent a chaotic switch from a single party dictatorship to a nascent even if imperfect democracy. Yet, the relations of the newly proclaimed Russian

RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 145 Federation with the Balkans displayed a surprising degree of continuity not only with the Soviet, but also with the seemingly bygone Imperial times. As in past centuries, Russia’s policies towards the emerging post-Yugoslav states largely remained a by-product of Moscow’s dealings with the West and were dependent on the personal chemistry between Russian and post-Yugoslav leaders.

These two factors outweighed all the others, including historical and cultural affinity, if they happened to be odds. Russia’s initially sour relations with Milošević’s rump Yugoslavia was a case in point. The ‘eternal Russo-Serbian friendship’ was nowhere around in the first half of the 1990s, when new Russian President Boris Yeltsin detested Milošević who was a role model for Russia's diehard communist opposition (Zorin, Lukyanova, 1999).

Moscow’s strive to become a close ally of the West also pushed it to treat post-Yugoslav conflicts as an opportunity to develop a new, more cooperative relationship with Western capitals. Russia promptly recognized the independence of the new post-Yugoslav states and supported the imposition of international sanctions against the Milošević regime and the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Lewis, 1992).

Moscow even voted for a United Nation (UN) Resolution 816 which effectively empowered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina (United Nations, 1993). The Russian military took part in the Bosnian peacekeeping mission along with NATO troops with relatively little friction (Okunev, 2021). This was the first instance of such close cooperation between the Russian and US army since WWII. However, tensions were piling up in the background and soon found their way to the Balkans. NATO’s enlargement in the East developed into the main bone of contention in the Russia-West relations and has remained one ever since. In the mid-1990s, Moscow was increasingly apprehensive that the West was using the postYugoslav settlement to boost NATO’s credibility and confirm the alliance’s relevance in post-Cold War Europe. The old clichés of Slavic and Orthodox brotherhood reappeared in Russia’s foreign policy statements, betraying how uneasy the Kremlin was about

146 MAXIM SAMORUKOV NATO’s military actions against Bosnian Serbs. The goodwill prevailed at that point as Russia and the West managed to keep their cooperation in Bosnia-Herzegovina effective, but clouds were already gathering on the horizon.

The matters came to a head in March 1999, when at the Rambouillet talks, Moscow failed to persuade Belgrade to accept an agreement with the Kosovo Liberation Army, and NATO embarked on bombing Serbia to stop the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in the province. The operation took off without prior approval from the UN Security Council as the alliance saw Russia’s veto coming on the issue. Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was on his way to Washington for an official visit but turned his plane back when he learned of the bombings (Gazeta.ru, 1999). Moscow minced no words in support of the Milošević regime, while Russian streets saw mass genuine protests against ‘the U.S. aggression’.

Once again, however, Russia’s outrage had little to do with the affinity with Serbs, but rather with the country’s infuriation at its inability to influence the West's military intervention in Eastern Europe.

The crisis escalated further in June 1999, when Moscow unilaterally moved some of its troops from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Kosovo hoping to set up a Russian peacekeeping sector in the province’s municipalities with Serbian majority (Odnokolenko, 2019).

The arriving Russians were blocked at the Prishtina airport by NATO forces bringing the two sides to the brink of a direct military confrontation. Only after this fraught standoff and the approval of the UN Security Council resolution 1244, which inter alia upheld the territorial integrity of the rump Yugoslavia, Russia backtracked and agreed to join the NATO-led mission. Nowadays, the clash over Kosovo (not Vladimir Putin’s coming to power a year later) is widely seen as a pivotal point in the post-Cold War Russia-West relations, which forebode future tension between the two in the Balkans and beyond.

The crisis also predetermined Russia’s relations with the postYugoslav states for coming decades. A shared grudge against the West brought ever closer together not only the Serbian and Russian leadership of the day but also the two countries’ wider ruling elites

RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 147 and even societies. Similar experience bred a similar world outlook in the two nations, while the old myth of unfailing Russo-Serbian friendship was eagerly restored and gained unprecedentedly wide currency, especially among Serbs (National Democratic Institute, 2018). They started viewing Russia as the only world power caring about Serbia and capable of protecting it from potential humiliations on the part of the West. The impact of the crisis was the opposite for those Yugoslav nations who were in conflict with Serbs.

Since then, Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albanians have mistrusted Russia as a Serbian and exclusively Serbian ally with limited reliability due to its intrinsic bias in favor of Belgrade.

Nevertheless, this reality did not look set in stone at the beginning of the 21st century. The new rejuvenated Russian leadership composed of pragmatic siloviki and pro-market reformers shed the early illusions of Russia becoming a part of the West, but still hoped to elaborate a mutually beneficial partnership with leading Western powers. There was no shortage of developments boding well for such an undertaking. The Russian economy burgeoned thanks to growing oil and gas prices, the country’s ties with Europe flourished, and the relations with the US improved significantly thanks to counterterrorism cooperation after the 9/11 attacks.

The post-Yugoslav states had a role to play in Russia’s new rapprochement with the West. Moscow viewed them as soon-to-be members of the EU and assumed that their accession would tilt the overall balance in the Union in Russia’s favor, counterweighting the traditionally anti-Russian stance of such new members as Poland and the Baltics. Russian companies, especially those in the energy sector, believed that a strong position in the Balkan economies would later help them tap the lucrative market of the EU (Samorukov, 2017). They rushed to invest in the post-Yugoslav states before Brussels could impose stricter European legislation on its future members.

The 2000s in the Russia-Balkans relations was the decade of economy-driven pragmatism with Russian corporate giants taking the central stage and temporarily putting history, geopolitics and ethnic issues on a back burner. After the neglect of the chaotic 1990s, Russia took stock of its ties with the new post-Yugoslav states and

148 MAXIM SAMORUKOV expanded the cooperation by emphasizing a few big state-supported projects. Little attention was paid to past acrimonies and all the former Yugoslav republics received some attention from Russian business.

The oil giant Lukoil took advantage of its refinery in Bulgaria to enter gasoline retail markets of Serbia (2003), Macedonia (2005), Montenegro (2006), and Croatia (2007). Various Russian oil companies contemplated (eventually in vain) the acquisition of the Croatian oil champion INA and the construction of an interconnector between ‘Druzba’ and ‘Adria’ pipelines to export Russian oil through the Croatian port of Omisalj (Milovanov, 2015). In 2007–09, state oil company Zarubezhneft acquired oil refineries Brod and Modrica in autonomous Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The company also intended to purchase a majority stake in Energopetrol, which dominated the energy market of the other part of the country—the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Milankovic, 2009). In 2008, Gazprom bought Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), Serbia’s former state oil monopoly with a vast network of subsidiaries around the region. Gazprom also offered all the postYugoslav states from Slovenia to Macedonia to take part in its grand project of ‘South Stream’—a massive pipeline, which was supposed to deliver Russian gas through the Black Sea and the Balkans to the markets of Western Europe bypassing Ukraine.

The cooperation was not limited to oil and gas industries, however. In 2003, Russian metal company Mechel acquired Croatian pipe producer Zeljezara Sisak (Metal Bulletin, 2003). In 2005, the Montenegrin government privatized the country’s largest enterprise, aluminum smelter kombinat aluminijuma in Podgorica (KAP) to the companies of Russian aluminum magnate Oleg Deripaska (Hooper, 2008). In the same year, a group of Russian origin Solway entered Macedonia buying Sasa and Bucim mines. In 2007, another Russian metal enterprise KOKS acquired Slovenian steel manufacturer SIJ (Cherkasova, Dudareva, 2007).

Russian companies eagerly took part in the modernization of Balkan thermal power stations. Russian tourists flocked to the resorts of Croatia, Montenegro, and Slovenia. In 2013, Russia’s largest bank Sberbank tapped the markets of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,

RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 149 Serbia, and Slovenia by acquiring Volksbank International (Mauldin and Lundeen, 2011). Russia was one of the top markets for the Croatian shipbuilding industry, Montenegrin vineries and Slovenian pharmaceuticals. In certain years of the 2000s, Russia was the largest foreign investor in Montenegro and Serbia, the number one importer to Macedonia and one of the top three trade partners of Croatia (Orlik, 2016).

Geopolitical considerations and ethnic stereotypes played little role in this spectacular expansion of economic ties. As early as 2003, Moscow withdrew its peacekeepers from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo (Lenta.ru, 2003). The gesture was supposed to send a clear signal that Russia was ready to recognize that the postYugoslav states fell within the West’s security sphere. The new wave of NATO enlargement in the region was met in Moscow with uncharacteristic restraint when Albania and Croatia joined the alliance in 2009.

Notwithstanding all the ire of 1999, Russia did not even exclude Kosovo as a potential partner. In 2005, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Prishtina to open what effectively was a Russian embassy, though formally labeled as merely the local branch of the Russian embassy in Serbia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2005). In 2006, the Kosovo leadership returned the visit: the province’s Prime Minister Agim Ceku went to Moscow to hold talks at the Russian Foreign Ministry and State Duma (Sysoyev, 2006). Speaking at the Balkan Energy Summit in 2007, President Putin emphatically mentioned Kosovo among other possible participants in the expansion of gas networks Russia wanted to carry out in the Balkans (President of Russia, 2007).

Things started to change in 2008 when the combination of the global financial crisis and mounting tensions in the relations with the West compelled Moscow to reconsider its approach to the region. The collapse of the financial markets pulled down the price of oil, undermined Russia's export income, and precipitated a prolonged stagnation in both Russian and Balkan economies. Many joint projects turned unviable with partners divesting their money, others frozen and others cancelled altogether. The trade also suffered a sharp downturn: many Balkan and Russian exporters went

150 MAXIM SAMORUKOV bankrupt; the domestic markets shrank and profit margins were in a free fall. The EU prospects of the majority of the post-Yugoslav states faded, further undercutting their economic appeal.

The crisis also curtailed the financial standing of Russian corporations, making them more dependent on the state’s assistance and favorable treatment (Gaaze, 2017). Their role in the policy making process was reduced, ceding ground to the security apparatus.

This shift gradually altered Russia’s policies in the Balkans with security concerns coming to the fore at the expense of the business calculus.

Kosovo’s unilateral proclamation of independence in February 2008 caused new tensions in Russia’s relations with the West.

Moscow felt humiliated by the West ignoring its stance on the issue and responded in kind. Citing the ‘Kosovo precedent’, Russia recognized the independence of the two breakaway provinces of Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) after waging a short war with this traditionally pro-Western country in August 2008 (President of Russia, 2008).

In the Balkans the Kosovo issue again drove Serbia and Russia closer together. Unable to forestall the West’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence, Belgrade reached out to other world powers for assistance. Moscow, with its own grudge against the West, was eager to oblige. Russia leveraged its global clout including the veto power in the UN Security Council to preclude the uncontested recognition of Serbia’s former province and bar it from entering the United Nations and many other international fora.

Moscow’s support came with strings attached. In return, Serbia facilitated Russian investments and acquisitions in the energy sector (Shchedrov, 2008). Besides, the country’s ruling elite redoubled its efforts in bolstering the cult of Russia in Serbian society. The more Serbian politicians touted cooperation with Russia, the more popular the country became in Serbia, the easier it was for Serbian politicians to boost their own support ratings by touting Russia (Vuksanovic, 2020). This closed cycle of praising everything Russian eventually led the majority of Serbs to erroneously believe that Russia was the biggest donor and closest military ally of Serbia,

RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 151 while Vladimir Putin became the most trusted foreign leader in the country (Novosti.rs, 2019).

The change of the top leadership of the two countries in 2012 strengthened the alignment. In Serbia, a nationalist Serbian Progressive Party won presidential and parliamentary elections. One of the party’s leaders, young and ambitious Aleksander Vucic, set out to concentrate as much power as possible in his hands. He started with the post of deputy prime-minister, followed by the head of the government a couple of years later, and finally, the president of Serbia, squashing any opposition on the way to his ascent.

In Russia, Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency after a short interregnum of a more moderate Dmitri Medvedev. Putin’s return to the Kremlin was met by mass pro-democracy protests, to which he responded with a greater emphasis on conservative and nationalist policies. This illiberal shift soon transcended from Russia’s domestic politics to the line the country took in the international arena. Conservative anti-Western ideology became an important driver of Russian foreign policy. Moscow increasingly preferred to deal with ‘strong leaders’, who ran their countries along similar lines with the Kremlin (Schulmann, 2016).

In its dealings with the post-Yugoslav states, Russia started to take into account the ideological affinity of local politicians. Besides Vucic, Moscow appreciated the anti-Western militancy of Milorad Dodik, who entrenched himself as an undisputed leader of Bosnian Serbs. It also courted Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski— he came to power in 2006 with a reformist agenda but later resorted to nationalist and authoritarian methods to stay in power. For several years, economic difficulties, a renewed rivalry with the West and a new political reality at home and in the region slowly but steadily pushed the focus of Russian policy in the Balkans from business to security. The pivot was sealed in 2014, when the crisis in Ukraine rocked Russia’s relations with the rest of the world.

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Security above the Rest Many features of Russia’s post-2014 policies in the Balkans had been in the making for quite a while; still, the crisis in Ukraine became a watershed for Moscow’s strategy in the region. The ouster of Ukrainian pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and a violent conflict in Donbass brought Moscow’s relations with the West to a new level of confrontation, which involved extensive mutual sanctions and a military build-up in Eastern Europe.

As a result, Russia thoroughly reviewed the key objectives of its presence in the post-Yugoslav states and the means to achieve them. The economic agenda shrank to a few projects mostly inherited from the pre-2014 times, while preventing the further enlargement of NATO in the region that eclipsed all other issues. Russia started to treat the Balkans as a vulnerable neighborhood of the West, where Moscow could take revenge for what it viewed as the West’s unacceptable meddling in the post-Soviet space (Bechev, 2017).

The events in Ukraine presented the post-Yugoslav states with a number of unpleasant dilemmas: whether to join anti-Russian sanctions of the West, whether to support resolutions condemning Russia in the United Nations, how to react to Moscow’s promises to defend what it vaguely defined as its ‘traditional sphere of influence’, which might or might not include certain Balkan states. Their choices were often determined by the similarities between the postYugoslav conflicts of the 1990s and the Russia-Ukraine conflict of 2014.

Slovenes, Croats and Albanians condemned Russian actions and joined the Western sanctions, while Macedonia and Serbia preferred to remain neutral with many Serbian politicians and a vast part of society favoring the Russian side. As usual, internal infighting prevented Bosnia-Herzegovina from taking a clear stance: Bosnian Muslims supported Ukraine, but Bosnian Serbs stuck to their pro-Russian sentiment. Montenegro found itself in the most precarious position as the Ukrainian crisis had turned the country

RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 153 into one of the focal points in the new Russia-West standoff in the Balkans.

Milo Djukanović, who had run Montenegro occupying various positions since the 1990s, restored the traditional affinity the country enjoyed with Russia. The Montenegrin coast became one of the favorite destinations of Russian tourists; Russia was the largest investor in the Montenegrin economy for many years; and Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska acquired majority stake in the country’s largest enterprise, aluminum smelter KAP (though the project soon failed) (Morrison, 2009, p. 228). ’s ties within the Russian ruling elite were so extensive that Moscow even welcomed the proclamation of Montenegro’s independence in 2006, notwithstanding the opposition of its traditional ally Serbia.

However, the course on economic cooperation with Russia increasingly diverged with the country’s aspiration to become a member of the EU and NATO. With the balancing act growing untenable, made a choice: in 2014 he joined anti-Russian sanctions and proclaimed the intent to accelerate the country’s accession to NATO. Moscow treated this step not only as a betrayal of an erstwhile ally, but also as a threat of the renewal of NATO’s enlargement after a long hiatus.

In an attempt to prevent Montenegro’s accession to the alliance, Russia resorted to its new ‘hybrid’ toolkit it had developed during the Ukrainian crisis. It established close ties with Montenegrin anti-Western opposition, courted the conservative leadership of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro and was even accused of fomenting disturbances and attempting to overthrow on the election day in 2016 (Bajrovic, Garcevic, Kraemer, 2018).

Some of the accusations appear to be exaggerated by the Montenegrin authorities in their strive to speed up the country’s entry to NATO, which happened in 2017 (Samorukov, 2019). Nevertheless, the affair reflected the new quality of the Russian activism in the Balkans—the one of backdoor political deals, non-transparent ties with local nationalists and machinations of foreign policy entrepreneurs close to but formally independent of the Kremlin.

154 MAXIM SAMORUKOV The Ukrainian crisis engendered a new type of actor in Russian foreign policy. Well-connected businessmen with murky reputations were eager to invest in activities beneficial for Moscow’s interests abroad, hoping to strike lucrative deals with the Russian state in return. Such an outsourcing allowed the Kremlin to hedge risks and deny its meddling in domestic politics of other states (Reynolds, 2019).

The Balkans with their rich tradition of similar military and political entrepreneurship offered fertile ground for this kind of foreign policy undertaking, which soon started to spring up here and there over the region. Shady Russia-connected structures helped Dodik in Republika Srpska to establish loyal paramilitaries, organizing Cossack regiments in Montenegro, cozying up with Serbian and Macedonian radical nationalists and attempting to acquire local media (Mironova, Zawadewicz, 2018). The promoted agenda was not necessarily pro-Russian. It was rather anti-Western with an emphasis on opposing the final resolution of the post-Yugoslav conflicts along the lines proposed by the West.

The Russian Orthodox Church also became more prominent in Russia’s Balkan strategy. It refrained from direct interference in political affairs, but intensified the cooperation with the Serbian Orthodox Church (also influential in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia) under the shared ideology of opposing malign Western influence portrayed as a threat to Orthodox Slavic identity (Calija, 2019). It would be an oversimplification to treat the complex institution of the Russian Orthodox Church as a mere appendage of the Russian regime, but the latter skillfully takes advantage of the Church’s agenda to promote the Kremlin’s brand of anti-Western liberalism both at home and abroad. Rising demands for granting autocephaly to the Churches in Macedonia, Montenegro and Ukraine facilitated the rapprochement between Russian and Serbian clergy—the patriarchates both in Moscow and Belgrade were united in criticizing national movements for autonomy as misguided and West-inspired.

Moscow’s switch from promoting the Balkans’ cooperation with Russia to undermining the region’s cooperation with the West reflected the new role of the post-Yugoslav states in Russian foreign

RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 155 policy. A tense confrontation with the US and growing alienation with the EU shattered Moscow’s hopes that at some point the Balkans may become a part of the Euro-Atlantic structures influential enough to shift their overall policy in Russia’s favor. Rather, things were developing in the opposite direction with Western institutions imposing anti-Russian policies on their new member-states. Additionally, a protracted economic stagnation engulfing both Russia and the Balkans promised few benefits in business cooperation. The refusal of some post-Yugoslav states to join anti-Russian sanctions brought little change to the sluggish trade and meager mutual investments.

This reality left Russia in an unenviable position when it had little to gain and much to lose in case the Balkan nations sorted out their disputes, sped up reforms and advanced on the path of integration into the Western institutions. NATO’s enlargement remained the most irritating development for Moscow. The Russian leadership was not afraid that the accession of small post-Yugoslav states would significantly boost the alliance’s military capabilities, but rather feared that once resumed the expansion of NATO would be difficult to stop. After the Balkans the expansionist inertia may have driven the alliance further afield with membership offered to Georgia and Ukraine situated right on the Russian borders.

Moscow saw numerous unresolved conflicts in the Balkans as the best available guarantee of the region’s non-accession to NATO. All over the region Russia called for a relaxed pace in negotiations, urged not to rush in search for solutions, and even counteracted Western efforts to push for the final settlement of the conflicts. In Bosnia-Herzegovina Moscow offered its support to the intransigent Dodik and the nationalist leader of Bosnian Croats Dragan Covic, as both opposed centralizing reforms aimed at turning the country into a functioning state. In Macedonia, Russia forged an alliance with Macedonian nationalists in an attempt to undermine the resolution of the country’s name dispute with Greece. In Serbia, it courted anti-Albanian radicals and conservative church dignitaries pressuring Belgrade to avoid concessions to Prishtina (Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies, 2019).

156 MAXIM SAMORUKOV Russian efforts to thwart the resolution of the Balkan conflicts were frequently blown out of proportion by local politicians who wanted to shift the blame on Moscow for their own intransigence.

Still, Russia did enough to be labeled a ‘spoiler in the Balkans’, which preferred to have the region mired in perennial ethnic disputes and stuck in a geopolitical limbo. The image of a spoiler was reinforced by Moscow’s newly found opposition to the EU enlargement. In official statements, Russia still stressed the difference in its attitude to NATO and the EU reserving warmer words for the latter (TASS, 2020), but its actions betrayed a different picture.

After the Ukrainian crisis was ignited partially by the county’s desire to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, Moscow adopted a more hostile vision of the Union as an anti-Russian structure subservient to US interests. Russia also came to believe that the accession of the Balkan states to the EU would bring it nothing but humiliation. Under the Union’s common policies, the new Balkan members would have to scrap free trade deals with Russia (Serbia and Montenegro), introduce entry visas for Russian nationals and enforce European standards hardly favorable for the Russian business working in the region. Thus, Moscow mobilized its propaganda capabilities in the post-Yugoslav states to supplement its traditional anti-NATO narrative with the new anti-European one.

Taken together, the two synthesized a comprehensive anti-Western ideology, which portrayed the West as the source of all evil ranging from economic exploitation to moral decay (European Parliament, 2021).

The aforesaid shift in Russia’s Balkan policies was facilitated by changes inside the Russian ruling regime. The new round of confrontation with the West sealed the dominance of the conservative security apparatus in the decision-making process in Moscow.

Preaching about grave external threats and subversive Western activities, siloviki pushed aside Russian big business emasculated by its dependence on the state (Baunov, 2018). The Foreign Ministry was also reduced to a largely administrative role despite its extensive diplomatic presence in the region with embassies in all postYugoslav states including a chancellery in Kosovo. Russian ambas-

RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 157 sadors actively intermingled with local politicians, featured prominently in the media and eagerly commented on Russia-related issues, but the impact of the diplomatic corps on shaping policies was at best questionable with the security apparatus tending to have an upper hand. This firmly fixed the focus of Russia’s strategy in the Balkans on a few geopolitical and security issues like NATO’s expansion and conflict non-resolution. Most of the rest was considered negligible and dispensable, sending the Balkans down the list of Russia’s foreign policy priorities.

Drifting Apart The concentration on a few security-related issues at the expense of all others failed to forestall the gradual weakening of Russia’s influence in the Balkans. The application of ‘hybrid’ tactics and secret services’ techniques did not help either. After the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, hardly a year passed without Russia suffering a major setback in the region. The retreat concerned all spheres of Moscow’s presence in the post-Yugoslav states: economy, security and domestic politics.

At the end of 2014, Gazprom had to cancel the “South Stream” project as it was incompatible with the EU’s energy legislation. The cancellation crowned the long list of called off and abandoned joint undertakings that had been littering the Russia-Balkan relations since the 2000s. Moscow soon replaced the “South Stream” with the “Turkish Stream”, which also routed across the Black Sea by-passing Ukraine (Bauomy, 2020). But the new pipeline was far less ambitious with smaller capacity and involved only Serbia among the post-Yugoslav states.

The Balkan segment of the “Turkish Stream'' was completed in January 2021. In a couple of years, the Russian rail monopoly (RZD) plans to finalize its decade-long modernization of several railroads in Serbia. Other than that, there are no new significant Russian projects underway in the post-Yugoslav states and no other signs that this state of affairs is likely to change any time soon.

158 MAXIM SAMORUKOV Russia’s special status in the post-Yugoslav energy market is also unraveling. There is little doubt that it will remain the key provider of oil and gas for the region for years to come. In 2011–12, Croatia’s failed attempt to get rid of Russian gas imports confirmed that such efforts were not economically viable. But Russian deliveries have become easier to replace if needed thanks to new interconnectors between the states, stricter European regulations, new liquefied natural gas (LNG) ports constructed in Croatia and Greece, and the growing use of renewable energy in Europe (Afanasiev, 2021). Even in Serbia, one of the most loyal clients of Gazprom, the new government inaugurated in September 2020 preaches the diversification of the country’s gas imports (N1Info, 2021). These developments have curtailed Russia’s ability to leverage the sales of its oil and gas in foreign and domestic politics of the post-Yugoslav states. Russian energy giants, therefore, have become regular market players—potent and resourceful, but having to abide by common rules.

In the security sphere, Russia’s obsession with preventing NATO’s enlargement backfired badly. Moscow failed to thwart the accession of Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020. On the contrary, Russian vociferous opposition only reinforced the West’s determination to accept the two states to the alliance. Furthermore, the unscrupulous methods Russia applied to stop NATO’s expansion severely damaged the country’s reputation in the region. Now it is widely viewed as a patron of the most radical and destructive forces in the Balkans (Shedd, Strander, 2020). This sidelined Moscow in the settlement of the post-Yugoslav conflicts.

Even Serbia displays little enthusiasm about inviting Russia as another mediator in the talks with Kosovo.

Russia achieved meager results in its efforts to turn at least some of the post-Yugoslav states into a neutral zone with significant security ties to Moscow (Sysoyev, 2016). Russian criticism and meddling in Montenegro and North Macedonia conversely drove the two countries closer to NATO. Moscow refuses to consider establishing even informal communication channels with Kosovo.

RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 159 Bosnia-Herzegovina’s neutrality is largely hinged on the anti-Western stance of Dodik and may crumble in case his grip on power weakens.

The neutrality of Serbia is also increasingly problematic. The country is unlikely to become a formal member of NATO due to strong domestic opposition to such a move. But Belgrade keeps deepening the security ties with the alliance. It signed the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO and adopted its second cycle in 2019 (Government of Serbia, 2019). When Moscow tried to offset such cooperation at least by token face-saving gestures, it met a lukewarm response in Belgrade. Serbia refused to grant diplomatic status to the Russian Humanitarian Center in Niš opened in 2012 and took advantage of the pandemic to suspend joint military drills with Russia (Danas, 2020). New procurements of Russian arms are also in doubt (Zivanovic, 2019).

On the whole, Russia is quickly ceding its status of Serbia’s main non-Western ally to China. During the pandemic, Russian assistance to Serbia could rival the Chinese one neither in real terms nor in the amount of favorable media coverage. As a result, in 2020 the majority of Serbs for the first time named not Russia, but China, when being polled for which country they believed to be the largest donor to Serbia (Institute for European Affairs, 2020).

The main reason behind Russia’s recent failures in the Balkans is easy to notice. Russia never bothered to commit substantial resources to the region, but at the same time never mustered enough restraint to steer clear from Balkan bustle. Moscow’s spoiler tactics of the second half of the 2010s was a compromise between its reluctance to invest much in the presence in the region and its unwillingness to cede these states to the West without a fight. The compromise proved deficient and created more problems than it solved, strengthening Moscow’s doubts whether it needs a special relationship at all with the Balkans.

In 2020, Russia displayed uncharacteristic moderation and thriftiness in the face of numerous crises in the post-Soviet space, ranging from a political turmoil in Belarus to the Second Karabakh War in the South Caucasus to the coup d’état in Kyrgyzstan (Trenin, 2020). Under the pressure of the deepening confrontation

160 MAXIM SAMORUKOV with the West and growing socio-economic problems at home, Moscow is increasingly concerned with the costs of its foreign policy steps and their relevance to the country’s own domestic needs.

This tendency does not preclude Russia from rushing back to the Balkans with flags flying in order to oppose, for example, BosniaHerzegovina’s accession to NATO (Latal, 2021). But it does imply that Russia would hardly commit enough resources to such an undertaking to have it succeed.

For three hundred years, Russia viewed its presence in the Balkans as a means to get closer to the West. In the 19th century it was about a geographical access to the Mediterranean trade routes in the early 21st—about a legal one to the European markets. The 2020s are likely to see the Russia-West relations hit new lows with mutual alienation becoming constant and pervasive. Russia will drift to a more isolationist course resorting not to Western, but Chinese assistance on issues it cannot handle on its own. As Russia’s path diverges from the West, it will have little need for the Balkans, which once hoped to join Europe.

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Available at: https://carnegie.ru/commentary/83208 [Accessed: 07.05.2021].

166 MAXIM SAMORUKOV United Nations Digital Library. (1993). “Security Council Resolution 816 (1993). On extension of the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, UN Nations Digital Library, [online]. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/282929 [Accessed: 07.05.2021].

Vishnyakov, Y. (2011). “Bonsiyskiy krizis 1908–1909 i slavyanskiy vopros [Bosnian Crisis and Slavic Question]”, Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta, 1, pp. 103–111.

Vuksanovic, V. (2020). “Russia Remains the Trump Card of Serbian Politics”, Carnegie Moscow Center, [online]. Available at: https://car negie.ru/commentary/82090 [Accessed: 07.05.2021].

Zivanovic, M. (2019). “Serbia to Stop Buying Weapons, President Says”, Balkan Insight, [online]. Available at: https://balkaninsight.com /2019/12/03/serbia-to-stop-buying-weapons-president-says/ [Accessed: 07.05.2021].

THE PAST IS IMPORTANT BUT THE FUTURE MATTERS— CHINA AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES Nina Pejič, Saša Istenič Kotar and Zlatko Šabič

Map 6: China's Geographical Position in the World Source: https://www.d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=126826&lang=de

168 NINA PEJIČ, SAŠA ISTENIČ KOTAR AND ZLATKO ŠABIČ

Introduction The post-Yugoslav space1 is moving past the horizons of the EuroAtlantic integration process. In light of a rather slow process of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and particularly European Union (EU) enlargement, the calculus of partners and their benefits for former Yugoslav states have seen changes. Gone are the times when the EU was at its peak as a normative power. Socialization, which dominated International Relations (IR) literature of the 1990s and early 2000s, does not have much relevance today (Checkel, 2006). Some countries from the former Eastern bloc, now members of the EU such as Hungary and Poland, have openly challenged the vision of future Europe as a beacon of democracy. Ongoing challenges, which include the handling of the migration crisis and the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, give even less cause for optimism that Europe is on a path of integration as projected in the 1950s (Haas, 1958). We may well see the return to a concert of nation-states, bound by basic common institutions and interests, without searching for common values. It is possible we may have to admit that ‘upgrading of norms’ after the recognition of “each other’s right to survival to the normative prohibition against, and empirical decline of, war” (Adler and Barnett, 1998, p. 11–12) will continue to be a work in progress for some time to come. Such circumstances leave the gates of Europe wide open for all the players that do not necessarily conform to the European idea that we know today. The limited socioeconomic progress, the temptation of nationalism and populism, old and new forms of corruption, disinformation and migration movements from and through the region provide an environment that welcomes many other players in the territory, offering new opportunities for Western Balkan and postYugoslav countries.

Amongst the great powers that influence the post-Yugoslav space, the People’s Republic of China (PRC, also China) is regarded 1

The post-Yugoslav space is defined as the sum of all entities (republics and autonomous provinces) that used to form the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Depending on the context, we occasionally put former Yugoslav entities within the territory of the Western Balkans, or the Balkan region.

CHINA AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 169 as a kind of new player in the Western Balkans. The Chinese influence in the region has increased significantly as the countries have seen an increase in Chinese investments and political activity connected to several new (not Balkan-specific) initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and 17+1 Cooperation, encompassing political, economic and societal dimensions and filled with real actions and substance concerning China. While these trends have an impact on the traditional status quo following the Yugoslav wars, the relations between former Yugoslavia (and its successors) are not new. Some features of the current policies (such as inter-party diplomacy) can be seen as deriving from the time when Yugoslavia and China connected ideologically in the early 1960s. The Cultural Revolution caused China to drift away from the international community entirely, but Chinese foreign policy paid special attention to Yugoslavia in its aftermath. With the bloodshed during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, China found a double role: as a bystander to the conflicts in the first Yugoslav wars during the early 1990s and as a player with interests and even a target in the bombing during the second Yugoslav war (the Kosovo war) in the 1998–1999 period.

Looking at the post-Yugoslav and Chinese policies after the Yugoslav wars reveals a clear economic and even societal turn that this chapter plans to explore further; what is the nature of the relationship between China and the former Yugoslav countries? Is China changing the rules of the game in the predominantly EuroAtlantic posture of the post-Yugoslav space? How is China changing regional integration and cooperation? What do these developments mean for the future of the region?

China may seem like a new player in the region, but we argue, first, that this is not true at all, and, second, that this is of little relevance. History is important but the future matters. The post-Yugoslav space should be aware of the dynamics of its relations with the PRC. China’s post-1949 foreign policy seemed rather unstructured, from a somewhat naïve attempt to break the bipolar world order, to the Cultural Revolution which isolated China from the rest of the world, to China’s ‘second revolution’ under the Deng leadership from 1978, which marked the beginning of China’s opening to the world. In that process, the PRC, one of the biggest countries on the

170 NINA PEJIČ, SAŠA ISTENIČ KOTAR AND ZLATKO ŠABIČ planet, was not dominating but learning from former Yugoslavia.

It even opened up to Yugoslavia culturally. Nowadays, the situation is dramatically different. China is on its way to consolidate as a regional power and become a global power.2 As such, it is bound to show interest in all parts of the world. Because of the particular geostrategic location, countries from the post-Yugoslav space have attracted China’s attention. They fit well into China’s Belt and Road Initiative. We recognize the (many) concerns about the Chinese presence in the region, seen by some as both an economic and political challenge (Chrzová et al., 2019; Doehler, 2019; Poulain, 2011).

However, we argue that if the ‘big picture’ on the role of big powers in the region, notably that of the European Union, is understood, China’s presence should be seen much more as an opportunity than a threat.

The structure of the chapter goes as follows. The first part outlines the historical ties connecting China to the post-Yugoslav space until the end of the Cold War. This is followed by an analysis of developments that took place after the fall of Yugoslavia until the launch of the BRI. To better understand the logic and the plan of implementing the BRI, and evaluate China’s capacity to carry out this plan, we take a closer look into China’s organizational structure. Armed with this knowledge, we are then ready to analyze the substance and implications of China’s presence in the post-Yugoslav region, concluding with observations for further discussion.

Early History Assuming the Croatian nationality of Marco Polo, it is conceivable that the first links between the peoples in the region that later belonged to Yugoslavia and the Chinese people existed as early as the 13th century (Baković, 2005). In any case, historical records from the

2

This pathway is clearly set in the recently adopted blueprint for the development of the PRC in the next fifteen years. See, for example, “Sixty key points for formulating China's 14th FYP and future targets for 2035”, CGTN, 4 November 2020, available at https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-11-04/60-key-points-for-formulating-the-14th-FYP-and-future-targets-for-2035-V8P0wahOog/index.html.

CHINA AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 171 18th century provide solid evidence of important cultural connections between the (former) Yugoslav region and China via Catholic missionaries. Among them, the most renowned is Ferdinand Avguštin Hallerstein (1703–1774), a Slovene Jesuit missionary, astronomer, mathematician and cartographer who held a remarkable position at the imperial court of the Qianlong Emperor acting as the Head of the Imperial Astronomical Bureau and Board of Mathematics for almost 30 years. Hallerstein significantly contributed to the development of science and astronomy in 18th century China as well as played an important role in connecting European and Asian cultures (Saje, 2014). Apart from missionaries, a number of Yugoslav sailors also entered China in the early 19th century. They were aboard Austro-Hungarian ships, which in 1900 brought coalition troops to the Chinese ports to put down the Boxer Rebellion (Baković, 2005).

After the creation of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1912, several powers recognized the new country, including the United States (US). Among minor powers in Europe, a few countries recognized it, e.g., Czechoslovakia in 1931. The first Yugoslavia (the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) was not among them.

Thus, modern relations between Yugoslavia and China begin after 1945, but not in a way that is commonly understood—namely, the relations between the two states were established in 1949 after the revolution in China in which the Chinese Communist Party prevailed (Čavoški, 2011, p. 571). Recently discovered documents show that in 1947, Yugoslavia recognized the ROC, the only socialist country to do so after the end of WWII (Čavoški, 2011, p. 558).

After the Chinese Communist Party won the civil war, and the ROC’s government, led by Chiang Kai-shek, relocated to Taiwan, Yugoslavia sought to recognize China under the new, Communist leadership. However, the PRC did not immediately respond to the initiative, mostly because of the Soviet pressure, mobilized by the rift between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1948. In 1955, the PRC accepted the recognition, although relations between the two

172 NINA PEJIČ, SAŠA ISTENIČ KOTAR AND ZLATKO ŠABIČ countries had been uneasy until 19693 and completely stalled during the Chinese ‘Great Cultural Revolution’. It was only in the aftermath of the Revolution in the late 1970s that Sino-Yugoslav relations eventually normalized. Symbolically, this was demonstrated by the visit of the then Yugoslav President Tito to China in 1977 (more than a year after Mao Zedong’s death) and the return visit to Yugoslavia by the Chinese President Hua Guofeng in 1978 (Xie, 1994).4 As far as that period is concerned, there was less influence of China on Yugoslavia; if anything, the situation was the other way around. Due to tensions in the late 1970s and the early 1980s between China and the Soviet Union (and, consequently, with all the Central and East European states dominated by the Soviet Union), the PRC needed good relations with Yugoslavia. After all, Yugoslavia was not only a fellow Communist state but also an influential member of the Non-Aligned Movement, an impressive actor in international relations during the Cold War era. When Chinese relations with Albanian President Enver Hoxha (a communist and leader of the most isolated European country during the Cold War) started to deteriorate as well, China further strengthened relations with Yugoslavia. The good relations continued after Tito’s death in 1980. This also occurred during Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the 1980s, which shaped the reorientation of China’s foreign policy in support of fundamental economic development (Yahuda, 1993).

Yugoslavia’s influence on China did not only stop at bringing countries closer ideologically. In the eyes of the PRC, Yugoslavia was considered the most developed country in the Balkans. The Chinese leadership nurtured close ties with the Yugoslav republics and actively promoted economic and cultural cooperation. It is worth mentioning that in 1979 a delegation from the Chinese Acad-

3

4

Beijing’s criticism of Belgrade’s “revisionism” is well captured in the Chinese press. See for instance, 現代修正主義必須批判 (Present Revisionism Needs to be Criticized), 人民日報, (1958/06/05); 南斯拉夫是社會主義國家嗎 (Is Yugoslavia a Socialist State?), 人民日報, (1963/09/26).

See also 高尚杲, 中共對外關係之發展 (The Development of Chinese Communist Foreign Relations) (臺北: 正中, 1978, pp. 84–5).

CHINA AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 173 emy for Social Sciences visited Ljubljana to learn about the Yugoslav self-management system.5 Culturally, hundreds of millions of Chinese have watched the Bosnian movie Valter brani Sarajevo (Walter defends Sarajevo), first screened in 1976 and the first foreign movie ever shown in the PRC (Hui, 2019). The situation shifted when the context changed in the 1990s. The Cold War was over, Yugoslavia fell apart and China accelerated its growth as a global economic and political power.

Change of Fortunes: From the Fall of Yugoslavia to the Belt and Road Initiative When Yugoslavia’s disintegration became inevitable in 1991, China seemed hesitant to take a stance regarding this process (Xinbo, 2001). This was consistent with the usual behavior of Chinese politicians as far as the course of international relations outside East Asia was concerned. However, things changed quickly as China realized that with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Western Balkans was up for grabs. Given the geo-economic importance of the Western Balkans (proximity to Western Europe, access to the sea, no ties with the Soviet Empire, networking with non-aligned states), it was not difficult to imagine that China would take an interest. Indeed, when conflicts in Yugoslavia escalated, China did not resort to its usual Cold War tactics of abstaining; like all other powers, it wanted to stabilize the region. Hence, the PRC supported the proposed United Nations (UN) Security Council’s (SC) actions as the wars in former Yugoslavia escalated. The list of China’s voting record on resolutions, adopted by the UN Security Council during the Bosnian war, serves as a case in point.

5

The system has attracted a lot of attention among scholars world-wide, including Asia (Li, 1986).

174 NINA PEJIČ, SAŠA ISTENIČ KOTAR AND ZLATKO ŠABIČ Year 1991

Resolution S/RES/713

1992

S/RES/743

1992

S/RES/755

1993

S/RES/819

1993

S/RES/824

1993

S/RES/827

1993

S/RES/844

1995

S/RES/1004

1995

S/RES/1019

1995

S/RES/1031

1995

S/RES/1035

1995

S/RES/1034

Action This resolution marked the start of the UN's involvement in the former Yugoslavia. It imposed sanctions and their enforcement in the context of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This resolution established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

This resolution recommended Bosnia and Herzegovina for UN membership.

This resolution established safe areas in Bosnia and related UNPROFOR responsibilities.

This resolution established safe areas in Bosnia and related UNPROFOR responsibilities This resolution established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

This resolution authorized the reinforcement of UNPROFOR. This resolution demanded that Bosnian Serb forces cease their offensive and withdraw from Srebrenica.

The Council expressed its grave concern at reports of grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in and around Srebrenica, and in the areas of Banja Luka and Sanski Most, including reports of mass murder, unlawful detention and forced labor, rape, and deportation of civilians.

This resolution was on the implementation of the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina and transfer of authority from the UN Protection Force to the multinational implementation force (IFOR).

This resolution established the UN International Police Task Force.

This resolution condemned the violations of humanitarian law and human

Chinese vote Support

Support

No voting resolution Support

Support

Support

Support Support

Support

Support

Support Support

CHINA AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 175 rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina and stated the need to investigate these violations of rights.

1996 S/RES/1088 This resolution contained the authoriSupport zation of the establishment of a multinational stabilization force (SFOR).

1998 S/RES/1168 This resolution was on strengthening Support the International Police Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Support 2003 S/RES/1503 This resolution called on the ICTY and The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to complete all trial activities in the first instance by the end of 2008 and to complete all work in 2010.

2004 S/RES/1575 This resolution established the EU's Support Operation Althea (EUFOR).

Table 2: UN Documents for Bosnia and Herzegovina: Security Council Resolutions Source: UN Security Council (2020).

Regarding the recognition of new states, the PRC understood new realities and began to recognize the first new countries in 1992, even though it did not support the disintegration (Li, p. 2000). However, it paid attention to those developments in the post-Yugoslav space that could compromise its foreign policy preferences over certain issues sensitive to China. The Chinese foreign policy is inherently linked to the one-China policy vis-à-vis Taiwan and Hong Kong, and its Western regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. It was easy to assume that, for example, China was anything but enthusiastic about the independence of Kosovo, a territory that the Serbs have always considered as being part of Serbia. Hence, it does not come as a surprise that in 1997 the then Serbian leader, at that time still in the role of President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević, was one of the first officials from the region to visit Beijing, hoping for support. He did receive it, but not to the extent he might have wished. Namely, after the outbreak of the Kosovo war in 1998–1999, China wanted the cessation of hostilities but was unwilling to invest much more than diplomatic pressure into the stabilization of the region. It took a position first, that force should not be used and internal affairs of the country should be respected; and second, that the rights of all ethnic groups in Kosovo

176 NINA PEJIČ, SAŠA ISTENIČ KOTAR AND ZLATKO ŠABIČ should be respected and preserved (Xinbo, 2001). When NATO bombing operations in 1999 gained the upper hand and contributed to the downfall of Milošević, Beijing condemned them but remained passive.

It abstained from all key resolutions at the time. Not even the NATO bombing of Belgrade and of the Chinese embassy there in May 1999 could change that position (Zhu, 2002).

Year 1998

Resolution S/RES/1160

1998

S/RES/1199

1998

S/RES/1203

1999

S/RES/1239

1999

S/RES/1244

Action This resolution called upon the parties to take steps to achieve a peaceful solution and referred to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Contact Group readiness to facilitate dialogue. Arms embargo on Kosovo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was imposed under Chapter VII. This resolution expressed deep concern about the excessive use of force

by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav army and called for a ceasefire by both parties to the conflict.

This resolution demanded that Yugoslavia cooperate fully with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo and the NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo.

This resolution called for access for humanitarian relief operations to aid refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs)

This resolution authorized NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces from Kosovo and established the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Table 3: UN Documents for Kosovo: Security Council Resolutions Source: UN Security Council (2020).

Chinese vote Abstention (internal matter)

Abstention (internal matter, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is acting within its rights) Abstention (internal matter)

Abstention (bombing without authorization of UNSC has contributed to the crisis) Abstention (opposing external intervention)

CHINA AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 177 In the same period, China had to deal with a major diplomatic blow as January 1999 saw North Macedonia establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The decision taken by North Macedonian authorities had a direct impact on China’s role and prestige in East Asia. The Chinese government reacted swiftly and with determination. For starters, it vetoed the prolongation of the United Nations peacekeeping operation on February 25 of the same year. At that time, the operation called UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force)6 was critical for the security of North Macedonia.

Consequently, the government in Skopje reversed its position; it severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and in June 2001 re-established ties with Beijing (Istenič, 2009). The UNPREDEP did not return, but another change of heart from North Macedonia had arguably positive effects for strengthening its stability, as opposed to Kosovo, which declared independence in February 2008 but remains the only unrecognized former Yugoslav entity by the PRC. In sum, therefore, China gradually took more interest in the region as demonstrated through China’s position on the Yugoslav wars. China was not a passive observer. Its interest was to stabilize the region. While the bombing of Belgrade and the Chinese embassy did trigger anger, there was no major political counter-action

by China; to paraphrase James Baker, China ‘did not have a dog in this fight’. When North Macedonia established diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the PRC’s response was rather different: the matter was at the core of its domestic and foreign policy interests. In any event, the Chinese presence became a reality, making it even more important to know China better from the inside out. We contribute to the accumulation of this knowledge by explaining how China functions as a state, especially as far as its foreign policy apparatus is concerned. This will be the subject of the discussion in the next section.

6

More information about the operation at https://peacekeeping.un.org/mis sion/past/unpred_p.htm.

178 NINA PEJIČ, SAŠA ISTENIČ KOTAR AND ZLATKO ŠABIČ

Foreign Policy Structures and Decision-Making There are three key actors in China’s official foreign policy making: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the State Council and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Nominally, the National People’s Congress (NPC) is China’s supreme organ of state power. In reality, foreign policy decision-making power lies in the hands of the CCP’s Politburo, and in particular the now seven-man Politburo’s Standing Committee (PBSC). The final responsibility for foreign policy decision-making rests with the President of the PRC – Xi Jinping, whose central role in foreign policymaking has been recently strengthened even further.7 The party leadership is in charge of the key strategic guidelines, whereas more specific policy measures are implemented by a wide range of other party and state bodies. The military may also be involved in the process.

The so-called leading small groups and commissions (LSGs), which convene on an ad hoc basis to deliberate on major issues, report directly to the PBSC and provide key advice on how China should proceed on any given issue of interest.8 The State Council, headed by a premier, controls the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which is responsible for government-to-government relations with states around the world. The newly inaugurated China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) is tasked with the coordination of policies for foreign aid between the MFA and Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM).9 In addition to central ministries and agencies, a range of intelligence organs also influence foreign policymaking.

One of the most authoritative strategic documents that help to understand the PRC’s objectives is the party congress report, which

7

8

9

His greater role is reflected in changes to the foreign policy leadership team at the CCP’s National Congress in November 2017 and the National People’s Congress session in March 2018, which allowed him to rule indefinitely.

Four leading small groups, including the Central Leading Small Group on Foreign Affairs were in March 2018 upgraded to Commissions in order to strengthen the authority of the CCP and improve policy coordination across departments (Legarda, 2018).

Formerly the Department of Foreign Aid of the MOFCOM.

CHINA AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 179 is issued every five years (the last one, the 19th, was issued in October 2017).10 The congress reports and top leaderships’ speeches best indicate the official party line and present general guidelines for international affairs. China’s foreign policy is commonly expressed in terms of different principles and slogans, such as the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” (和平共处五项原则), which has been underpinning the policy for more than six decades.11 A more recently coined official formulation is the Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy (习近平外交思想), which now presents “the fundamental basis and guide for China’s diplomatic efforts in the new era” (Yang, 2018). “Major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” (中 国特色大国外交) would enable China to fulfil the mission of realizing “national rejuvenation” (中华民族伟大复兴) and building a “community with a shared future for mankind” (人类命运共同体).12 This party rhetoric that has become central in Xi’s foreign policy framework clearly reveals that the CCP tries to enable China’s rise to great power capability and status (Tobin, 2018). The 17+1 initiative, launched within the context of the wider Belt and Road Initiative (Chatzky and McBride, 2020),13 is in the center of China’s effort to reach that status.14 10

11

12

13

14

Full text of Xi Jinping's report at 19th CPC National Congress, 2017-11-06, http: //www.china.org.cn/chinese/2017-11/06/content_41852215.htm.

China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are: 1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, 2) mutual non-aggression, 3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 4) equality and mutual benefit, and 5) peaceful co-existence.

“Xi urges breaking new ground in major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics,” Xinhua, 24 June 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/ 2018-06/24/c_137276269.htm.

See also “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative”. Council on Foreign Relations, 20 January, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-beltand-road-initiative.This ambitious multibillion-dollar plan was launched by Xi in 2012. Its high importance has been recently underscored in Party's (2017) and State's (2018) constitutions.

The 16+1 format, now 17+1 due to accession of Greece, also called the ChinaCEEC (Central and Eastern European Countries) summit, is a Chinese initiatedplatform to expand cooperation between Beijing and a group of 12 EU member states and 5 Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia (Lithuania is not participating anymore). All post-Yugoslav states except Kosovo have become China’s essential partners in facilitating the construction of its flagship BRI project.

180 NINA PEJIČ, SAŠA ISTENIČ KOTAR AND ZLATKO ŠABIČ The BRI is Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy vision, which he drafted with a small group of close advisers. Tasks are distributed and responsibilities set. For example, Premier Li Keqiang is responsible for the economy and serves as the key senior leader in charge of relations with Europe. Below the top party leadership are a number of important agencies. The central ministries and a leading small group consisting of the most senior policymakers, set up in 2015 specifically for providing key advice and judgements on BRI, present the vital BRI policy-makers.15 Furthermore, BRI leading small groups within relevant Chinese ministries and respective local replicas of the central BRI group all contribute to the policy planning with their feedback and local assessment.

The key decision-making instrument within the 17+1 format is formed by the annual summits of heads of respective governments, which result in a long list of announcements on infrastructure and investment projects. However, the key policies are developed in Beijing while the 17 countries remain more or less passive recipients (Hála and Lulu, 2019). Stationed in Beijing’s MFA, a special Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is in charge of drafting policies and projects for the entire CEE region. The Chinese deputy minister of foreign affairs chairs the Secretariat and coordinates its multiple Party-State agencies.16 The 17 national coordinators appointed by the individual CEE countries, typically vice-ministerial level government officials, are responsible for coordination with the Secretariat and implementation of selected projects. Accordingly, the 17+1 grouping serves China primarily as an effective platform for pursuing its proactive diplomatic initiatives (Song, 2018, p. 4). Firstly, the collective treatment of a group of geographically proximate countries brings stronger efficiency and regional unity. Secondly, robust economic 15

16

Since March 2018, the LSG is led by Vice-Premier and PBSC member Han Zheng and four deputy chairs (https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/国家推进 “一带 一路” 建设工作领导小组).

The current secretary general is deputy minister of foreign affairs Wang Cha. The first 16+1 secretary, deputy foreign minister Song Tao, later became head of the CCP's International Liaison Department (ILD). Staff are routinely rotated between the ILD and the MFA. See, http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/msc_1/ mscjj/t1411097.htm.

CHINA AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 181 diplomacy (as witnessed in Chinese government-sponsored loans for infrastructure, joint investment funds, promotion of trade and investment, etc.) serves as a major instrument for acquiring influence, especially in the less developed post-Yugoslav countries.17 Thirdly, selective partnership diplomacy and inter-party diplomacy, evidenced by Serbia as China’s major partner in the region, contribute to Beijing’s chosen strategies towards the region.18 In response to foreign criticisms of its highly ambitious BRI policies, the PRC has invested enormous efforts into enhancing its public diplomacy. With the purpose of promoting China’s image and improving the perceptions of China from former Yugoslav countries’ audiences, various government agencies, as well as Chinese companies, media and think tanks, have much more vigorously promoted public diplomacy activities over the last years. Discernibly, high-level exchanges have significantly increased, and during their visits to the region, Chinese leaders have visibly endeavored to maximize their attendance at local cultural activities to promote China. The PRC has invested in international news outlets, attempting to reach out to the audience in the Balkan region. For example, China Radio International (CRI) has launched new channels in Serbian and Croatian languages, while daily news on China can also be read in Bosnian in the online edition of China Today.19 China Global Television Network (CGTN), which is available through cable operators, has frequently reported from the former Yugoslav capital. Chinese entrepreneurs have even sought to acquire a Slovenian TV station, despite their failures in doing so (Peršak, 2018). Chinese official Xinhua news agency reporters, who are now stationed in almost all post-Yugoslav states in addition to correspondents of Guang Ming Daily in Serbia, generate content for 17

18

19

Thus far, the main carriers of the launched US$10 billion credit line, China Exim Bank and China Development Bank, have signed agreements with Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro (all non-EU countries).

Serbia became China’s first strategic partner in CEE in 2009, and the relationship was upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2016, which in Chinese terms presents the highest level of diplomatic relations. Beside political relevance, Serbia is also the main recipient and beneficiary of Chinese-funded projects in the entire former Yugoslav region.

The website’s link is: http://www.kina-danas.com/.

182 NINA PEJIČ, SAŠA ISTENIČ KOTAR AND ZLATKO ŠABIČ Chinese and English language audiences, striving to communicate China’s practices better to the locals. What is more, they serve as an important source of information to foreign policy-makers in Beijing. To strengthen media exchanges, the CCP’s International Liaison Department has organized several trips to China for a large group of local journalists, while several other official organizations have been increasingly engaged in the region to cultivate individual relationships and better promote Chinese official views.

Chinese embassies play an important role in the diplomatic machinery that helps the government perform certain functions and tasks, such as information gathering, lobbying and policy advice. They are located in all former Yugoslav entities, except Kosovo, which, as already mentioned, the Chinese government does not recognize as an independent state. China’s embassies are all well-staffed, containing both political and economic counsellors as well as military attachés, whereas local students who speak Chinese fluently are hired to assist with various administrative and translating tasks. Among the embassies, the one in Serbia is by far the largest in terms of space and staff numbers, whereas the newest one with some added facilities will open soon in Montenegro.20 The embassies regularly release news in local languages on their websites, while the ambassadors and senior diplomats occasionally publish articles or advertise official standpoints in the influential local newspapers.21 Beijing also supports academic exchanges and think tank diplomacy within the entire CEE region. In December 2015, the China-CEE think tank network launched in Beijing, aiming at enhancing contacts and communication and advancing high-level ex-

20

21

“Počinje izgradnja nove zgrade kineske Ambasade u Podgorici, CDM, 14/09/2018, https://www.cdm.me/drustvo/pocinje-izgradnja-nove-zgradekineske-ambasade-u-podgorici/.

On April 9, 2019, the Croatian Jutarnji List and Večernji List published a signed article by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, titled “A Colorful Nation, A Bright Outlook”; on April 29, 2019, Chinese Ambassador to Slovenia published an article in Slovene daily Dnevnik, titled “Pobuda En pas, ena pot priložnost za krepitev sodelovanja med Kitajsko in Slovenijo”, etc.

CHINA AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 183 changes. Think tanks, which are predominantly affiliated with either State or Party organs, play a significant role in Chinese politics because they provide much-needed research and advice.

Therefore, think tanks play a leading role in advancing the international goals of BRI, serving as “advisers and assistants for the government” in planning policies and designing appropriate mechanisms and as “bridges” between the political level and the public opinion (Li, 2017). There are still very few Chinese experts who closely follow the former Yugoslav region. The most notable institution is the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), of which the Institute of European Studies includes a Department of Central and Eastern European Studies. Its experts hold leading positions in the China-CEE Institute, which was launched in April 2017 and is China’s first think tank independently registered in Europe.22 Its main objective is to build ties and strengthen partnerships with academic institutions and think tanks in the CEE region. Two other influential think tanks, which contain research centers for BRI Studies, are first, China’s Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), which is affiliated with China’s top intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security, and second, China’s Institute of International Studies (CIIS), which serves the MFA. Promoting the study of Chinese language and culture is very important for the PRC. In addition to universities’ departments of sinology, there are now Confucius Institutes in all former Yugoslav republics; this was accomplished by 2015, just two years after the launch of the BRI.23 Goethe Institutes in Germany claim that Confucius Institutes represent one of the key elements of China’s people-to-people (public) diplomacy. Besides the general promotion of China, these institutes represent a platform for education. For instance, in mid-2019, about 2,000 Serbian children were learning the Chinese language in as many as 34 elementary and 30 secondary schools (Jokić-Stamenković, 2019). Dozens of qualified Chinese teachers sponsored by the Chinese Ministry of Education now con-

22 23

China-CEE Institute, 2019, https://china-cee.eu/.

Before China launched the BRI in 2013, it had only one Confucius institute in the region, opened in 2006 in Belgrade.

184 NINA PEJIČ, SAŠA ISTENIČ KOTAR AND ZLATKO ŠABIČ duct teaching throughout the former Yugoslav region. Several universities in China offer Serbian, Croatian and Slovene language courses to Chinese students.24 Youth cooperation is also on the rise, with increased numbers of Chinese government scholarships issued to students deriving from the post-Yugoslav region. In this large complex of Chinese diplomacy, which stretches well beyond official contacts, even traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) has a role to play.25

Contemporary Policies of China in the Post-Yugoslav Countries According to Holslag (2012), China is in the process of establishing a ‘Great Neighborhood Diplomacy’ that geographically extends throughout Eurasia to the European territory, moving toward Europe's doorstep in the Western Balkans and post-Yugoslavia space, respectively. The largest shift in previously semi-developed (but warm) relations with individual countries happened with Xi Jinping’s global announcement of two multilateral cooperation frameworks (secondary institutions): the 17+1 Initiative in 2019 and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 as a result of the Chinese ‘going out’ strategy following its economic growth since the late 1980s.

The latter initiative, which has a primarily economic but also political impact on the region, seeks to (re)connect international trade routes following the ancient Silk Road. The BRI aims to fulfil an ambitious international investment strategy in which the postYugoslav space plays an important geostrategic role, as the region 24

25

The students of Beijing University of International Studies (BISU) and Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU) can study the Croatian, Serbian or Slovene languages as a major.

Nowadays, TCM enjoys widespread popularity, all the more so because it is officially recognized as complementary to conventional medicine (https://ap ps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Jh2943e/9.3.html). However, its relevance in the Balkan region predates the global growth of China. For example, before the political and economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s acupuncture was routinely offered in hospitals in Bulgaria, which was also one of the first countries to send official medical delegations of doctors to study TCM in China in the 1960s (Todorova, 2017).

CHINA AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 185 represents a gateway to European markets as a land bridge between its newly acquired ports and Central Europe. The acquisition of Port Piraeus as the entrance to the Western Balkans region and further on to Central and Western Europe was one of the first strategic moves in the framework of the BRI that gained international attention. China transformed the port into one of the leading container traffic ports in the Mediterranean. The southern parts of former Yugoslavia represent a natural connection between Piraeus and Europe, while other Adriatic ports (in Croatia and Montenegro) have also attracted interest from China. However, a lot of work is still required. Namely, that area has a rather underdeveloped logistical and transport infrastructure. Part of China’s presence in the region, in fact, is to invest in the improvement of that infrastructure (Motoh et al., 2019; Carli et al., 2019).

Besides infrastructure, China is involved in several major construction projects, as well as in the energy sector, concentrated on hydro and thermal power plants. Its investments are spread all around the region; as already mentioned, only Kosovo is excluded from the list of investments that China has in the region, currently estimated at 86 (Pejič, 2020). Currently, a lower state of engagement is visible in North Macedonia because of the large infrastructure corruption scandal. Montenegro, too, is below the radar. It has been scrutinized as a case of a ‘debt trap’ due to the economic havoc caused by a BRI loan intended for building highways across the country to connect port city Bar with Belgrade, worth almost a fifth of its economy (Financial Times, 2019).

As indicated above, one important feature of Chinese investments in the former Yugoslavia is their potential multiplication effect. Specifically, it is highly unlikely that China would wish to be involved in a ‘stand-alone’ project. Rather, it is conceivable that because of the attractive location of the region, China sees investments in the post-Yugoslav space as a single whole, as part of a grand strategy to remain present in the region indefinitely. Croatia and Serbia stand as examples of that strategy. Croatia has attracted a lot of attention because it entrusted the building of the Pelješac Bridge to a Chinese company. This is the first-ever EU-funded project that

186 NINA PEJIČ, SAŠA ISTENIČ KOTAR AND ZLATKO ŠABIČ is being carried out by a company from a third country.26 Yet, China’s presence in Croatia is unlikely to end after the bridge is built. The relations between Croatia and China have strengthened.

China demonstrated its appreciation for Croatia in March 2019, when Croatia hosted the 17+1 meeting. The Chinese media further reported about other projects aimed at enhancing relations between the two countries. For example, in 2018 and 2019, joint patrols between Chinese police officers and their Croatian counterparts were held in the worldwide renowned resort Dubrovnik,27 and both sides expressed a willingness to improve cooperation in law enforcement.28 Some major investments such as in the Croatian port of Rijeka are a possibility, too.29 Serbia’s location is particularly attractive for China’s effort to connect to the European Union via the Mediterranean, hence the importance of constructing the Belgrade-Budapest railway, which was agreed upon in July 2019.30 Serbia is also an example of ‘strategic’ investment with no promise of quick returns but with tangible geo-economic as well as political implications. The case in point is the acquisition of the Smederevo steel mill, the biggest equity investment in the region. US Steel bought the plant in 2003 for 33 million USD, only to sell it back to the Serbian government for 1 USD ten years later. The plant, which was the major employer in the town of Smederevo, was on the verge of collapse. In 2016, the Chinese company HBIS Group bought the plant for 52 million USD,

26

27

28

29

30

The EU approved the contribution of 357 million EUR, which is 85 % of the projected investment. “Commission approves EU financing of the Pelješac bridge in Croatia”, https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/newsroom/ news/2017/06/06-07-2017-commission-approves-eu-financing-of-the-peljesac -bridge-in-croatia.

“China sends police officers for joint patrol in Croatia”, XinhuaNet, 10 July 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/10/c_138215467.htm.

“Croatia, China vow to enhance law enforcement, security cooperation”, XinhuaNet, 17 May 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/17/c_ 138066714.htm.

“Rijeka port stays open to potential Chinese investments”, PortsEurope, 19 April 2019, https://www.portseurope.com/rijeka-port-stays-open-to-potent ial-chinese-investments/.

“Chinese consortium signs contract for Budapest—Belgrade upgrade”, International Railway Journal, 21 July 2019.

CHINA AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 187 thus saving 5,000 jobs. Smederevo even welcomed Chinese President Xi at the end of his three-day visit to Serbia in 2016.31 This investment generated a rather positive attitude towards China in Serbia. Warm relations are reflected also in other features of ChineseSerbian cooperation: Serbia is the leader among Central and Eastern European states in implementing joint infrastructure and energy projects with China (Pejič, 2020). Serbia and China also abolished mutual visa requirements in 2017.

More recently, the Ministers of Interior signed a Memorandum of Understanding, establishing joint exercises of special police units patrolling the streets of Belgrade (ibid.). Finally, the two countries strengthened technological cooperation. Serbia’s partnership with Huawei caused wide discussion because Belgrade invited the company to build its national 5G network. Surveillance techniques seem to be a source of concern.32 Several states, especially the US, hesitate to use Huawei’s technology in the development of 5G networks. To some extent, European hesitation seems to be waning,33 but several countries, including those in former Yugoslavia such as Serbia and Slovenia have joined the US ‘anti-Huawei’ initiative.34 Furthermore, the usage of surveillance technology from China predates Serbian cooperation with Huawei. According to Statista, “many countries are combining Chinese tech with U.S.-made surveillance tech, among them the U.S. and China themselves, but also India, Australia, Brazil and several European countries” (Buchholz, 2020). Besides Serbia, other countries participating in the BRI rely solely on Chinese technology, such as Japan, who is currently “the only developed country to do so” (ibid.) Serbia participates in 31

32

33

34

“All eyes on China in Serbian steel town”, Balkan Insight, 20 June 2016, https://balkaninsight.com/2016/06/20/all-eyes-on-china-in-serbian-steel-mi ll-town-06-20-2016/.

Some authors note that Huawei has “installed 1,000 Huawei-made facial recognition cameras in 800 locations all over Belgrade as part of China's ‘Safe City’ project” (Seiwert, 2019).

“Huawei Is Winning the Argument in Europe, as the U.S. Fumbles to Develop Alternatives”, The New York Times, 17 February 2020, https://www.ny times.com/2020/02/17/us/politics/us-huawei-5g.html.

See, for example, “Pompeo says 5G declaration protects Slovenia against authoritarian threats”, Reuters, 13 August 2020, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-slovenia-usa-pompeo-idUSKCN2591SL.

188 NINA PEJIČ, SAŠA ISTENIČ KOTAR AND ZLATKO ŠABIČ Huawei’s Smart City project, too, with the city of Niš projected to be the first Smart City in Serbia.35 Again, the idea of a Smart City itself is not new. Almost ten years ago Huawei discussed the concept at international conferences, mentioning smart city solutions, such as “smarter transportation, smarter public safety, and smarter government and administration” (Pentikousis, Dongming and Wang, 2011, p. 110). Since then, the concept has been introduced in several cities around the world, including Spain and Germany.36 However, regarding Serbia, it is doubtful whether Serbia’s partnership with Huawei will have consequences in its efforts to join the EU (Karásková et al., 2020). These doubts are likely to be proven wrong as the European Commission estimates that “Serbia is one of the biggest recipients of EU funds in the world” and certainly in the Western Balkans.37 The region itself continues to be considered by the European Commission “as a geostrategic investment”.38 Furthermore, as shown above, technological changes and challenges are global, not regional. Serbia’s future to join the EU will primarily depend on its ability to absorb and implement the acquis communautaire. Because of its geo-political attractiveness, Serbia is important for the European Union, but that does not mean that it will escape from fulfilling membership requirements. Last but not least, unlike the United States in the last years and the Russian Federation, China is quite unequivocal about its preference for the countries from the Western Balkans to become members of the EU. The PRC is pro-accession for two reasons. First, a destabilized Balkans is not in its economic and strategic interest (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2018, p. 6). Second, if these countries become EU members, they could serve as springboards for the entrance of Chinese-owned companies in the region to the wide and lucrative EU market. In this regard, China promotes the 17+1 Initiative as a tool

35

36 37 38

“Niš to become the first Smart City in Serbia”, Serbian Monitor, 3 May 2019, https://www.serbianmonitor.com/en/nis-to-become-the-first-smart-city-inserbia/. https://e.huawei.com/en/case-studies?industry=Smart-city.

“EU Assistance to Serbia”, https://europa.rs/eu-assistance-to-serbia/?lang=en.

European Commission: “EU-Western Balkans”, https://ec.europa.eu/com mission/sites/beta-political/files/economic-relations_en.pdf.

CHINA AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 189 to ensure the success of the continued EU integration process (Carli et al., 2019).

Discussion and Outlook In 2017, Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, was quoted as saying that “the Balkans can easily become one of the chess boards where a big power game can be played.”39 This statement demonstrates fears about the growing influence of these powers, China being among them. It also demonstrates European leaders’ attempts to use China as a bargaining power versus the EU (Pejič, 2020). Analysts from the European Investment Bank recognize those fears but conclude that “at least in an economic sense, we see these concerns as being often overplayed” (EIB, 2018, p. 15). The figures about foreign direct investment and trade show rather clearly that, while important for the region, the investment and trade with other powers pale in comparison to the EU presence (EIB, 2018, p. 15–16). That being said, the report issues a note of caution as far as the Chinese involvement of the region is concerned. For example, the authors of the report fear that “Chinese money will exclusively arrive in the form of loans, creating risks of unsustainable debt burdens for some countries”, and that ”there is a chance that Chinese activities in the region will not help to reduce the already existing problem of corruption.” Additionally, the report has noted “concerns about greater dependency and political influence” (EIB, 2018, p. 16). Arguably, the emergence and growth of a new power are accompanied by fears and suspicions. Besides, China is anything but a country with a spotless democracy and human rights record, values which are the foundations of post-war Europe. Nevertheless, the Chinese are in Europe. They are present in the region of former Yugoslavia; hence they need to be analyzed in a comprehensive way, and our study is a contribution to this effort.

39

European Western Balkans, 7 March 2017, https://europeanwesternbalkans. com/2017/03/07/mogherini-balkans-can-easily-become-one-of-chessboardswhere-big-power-game-can-be-played/.

190 NINA PEJIČ, SAŠA ISTENIČ KOTAR AND ZLATKO ŠABIČ First, the starting point of any such analysis must be that, for the first time in its long history, China has a vision of how to carry out its foreign policy preferences globally, and it means to follow this vision. Previously, China existed as a large state but with little relevance in the world of international politics. As summarized by Cheng and Zhang (1999, p. 91) after the 1949 revolution, China entered the international community as “a weak, economically backward country”. In that period, all that the then leader Mao Zedong wanted was to “break the bipolar system and make China an independent and important strategic power” (ibid.), but with no success. It was the reform initiated by Deng Xiaoping in late 1978 [that] laid the foundation for China’s spectacular economic growth and enabled it to become an effective actor in the international system” (ibid.). Now, as shown in this contribution, China has developed robust foreign policy machinery to implement that vision. A range of institutions, stretching from ministries, universities, companies to specialized institutions stationed abroad (such as Confucius centers), mean that Chinese diplomacy is conducted on different levels.

It responds to the increasing importance of market competitiveness by building secondary institutions, such as the BRI and especially the 17+1 Initiative, which is relevant for the post-Yugoslav space.

The latter is in the process of integration in the European Union, but the accession dynamics in the region are not evenly distributed.

Croatia is a member of the EU while Serbia, Montenegro and North Macedonia enjoy the status of candidates for membership. For others, currently, the prospect of EU membership appears to be a distant one (Bosnia and Herzegovina) or does not exist at all (Kosovo).

In such circumstances, the 17+1 presents itself as a complementary regional mechanism with multiple benefits (which would not be without precedent as the 17+1 is often compared with the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation).40 It also helps to boost China’s desire to construct an image of it being a factor of stability (Šabič and Pejič, 2019).

40

Although Jakóbowski (2018) argues that 17+1 is, in fact, a bilateral mechanism that presents itself as nominally multilateral.

CHINA AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 191 Second, although the focus here is on the post-Yugoslav space, it is vital to analyze the dynamics of China-Europe relations. Our analysis has already indicated that a comparative perspective is important if we are to make sense of the role of great powers such as China in the post-Yugoslav region. We have found that China’s presence in post-Yugoslav space has increased. Its exports to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia more than doubled between 2004 and 2014, while imports increased more than sevenfold over the same period (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2018). That being said, if we look at the map of the Chinese economic presence in the region in a wider European geographical context, we get a rather different picture. That picture demonstrates that the post-Yugoslav space is but a tiny spot on the European map of investments and trade with the PRC. China’s trade is heavily tilted towards the Western members of the EU (the UK included).

They represent almost 80% of the total population, but they attracted 96% of all the Chinese investments between 2000 and 2017 (Hanemann and Houtari, 2018). So far, countries from the Balkan region in general and former Yugoslav republics in particular have only received crumbs from China, so to speak, despite the fact that some of them are EU members and others potential candidates. Romania, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria are the top recipients as they host 80% of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in the Balkans. But this is still just one-quarter of Chinese FDI stock in the Visegrád region. Based on Chinese statistics, countries such as Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina seem not to attract any significant Chinese FDI at all (both data are below 10 million USD), while North Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia and Croatia also host less than 100 million USD Chinese FDI combined (Karásková et al., 2020).

In terms of trade and investment, the EU is far more important for the Western Balkans than China. Notwithstanding assurances from Beijing, the increased presence of China in the post-Yugoslav region creates unease in the EU, but it would seem that at least for now, those fears have weak foundations. We have noted some of the difficulties in investment practices in the region, for example, potential risks of trade imbalance and financial dependency, as is

192 NINA PEJIČ, SAŠA ISTENIČ KOTAR AND ZLATKO ŠABIČ the case with Montenegro. Political ramifications of Chinese presence in the region must be studied closely, but not in isolation from European politics in general. Take Serbia for example. As we have seen, Serbia is the most important partner for China in the post-Yugoslav space. It was noted that Serbia declared itself against the joint letter of a group of 22 states issued at the 41st session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on July 8, 2019, which condemned China’s mass detention of Uyghurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang region of northwest China, the only EU candidate to do so. Such support can be explained by the fact that China stands by Serbia on the issue of Kosovo. However, looking from a broader, European perspective, one cannot ignore the fact that at the same time, only 15 of the EU member states supported the joint letter; the others decided to ‘sit this one out’. This is a telling demonstration of the European Union’s inability to muster and implement a common foreign policy.41 In conclusion, we see China as a power that will take its place in the post-Yugoslav space. China’s resources and sophisticated diplomacy apparatus are more than able to handle this region. Economic interest and public diplomacy are at the core of the Chinese approach to the former Yugoslav republic. Just how large the scope of Chinese presence in the region will be does not depend on China.

It does not depend on Russia, Turkey, or the United States either.

In fact, everything depends on the European Union and the states in the post-Yugoslav space. The EU is currently by far the largest investor and trade partner in the Western Balkan region and the post-Yugoslav space respectively. The role of the European Union is likely to become even more important, not only economically, but also politically and militarily. We live in a world where alliances seem to be losing relevance. As NATO has welcomed North Macedonia as a new member state, the alliance is now composed of 30 countries. While NATO does provide a sense of security for its

41

“The “22 vs. 50” Diplomatic Split Between the West and China Over Xinjiang and Human Rights“, China Brief Volume Vol. 19, Issue 22, https://jamestown. org/program/the-22-vs-50-diplomatic-split-between-the-west-and-china-over -xinjiang-and-human-rights/.

CHINA AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES 193 members, especially the weaker ones, it has no particular significance for China. It does not come as a surprise to realize during our research that in discourses between China and its partners in Europe, NATO is barely mentioned, if at all. From the politico-military standpoint, Chinese preferences are where they have always been—in East Asia. From the geo-economic perspective, former Yugoslavia is but a chapter in the BRI story. Yet, the BRI is not the ‘only’ game in town. So long as European states stay committed to EU integration, post-Yugoslav states are likely to opt for more intensive cooperation with the nearest investor, rather than the one from afar. At the same time, a lot depends on states in the region, in terms of policies and the capacity to deal with Chinese preferences and absorb their potential to invest, alongside other countries, including other great powers. Diversity in investments and trade is an opportunity not to be missed. Exploring how to best use China’s presence in the region, while keeping up the economic dominance of the EU, benefits everyone. In this respect, none of the former Yugoslav republics would do well if they tried to use China as a bargaining chip against the EU, e.g., in an attempt to speed up the enlargement process, or if it fails to diversify the investors, as the case of Montenegro has demonstrated. Both scenarios—blackmailing the EU or opening up indiscriminately to China—would primarily hurt the countries in the region.

China is a new, big player in the post-Yugoslav region. It may be seen as a challenge to the interplay of relations between EuroAtlantic partners and Russia. We believe that this challenge is slightly overrated. China has many problems, but it is not a threat to European political stability. If its approach to Europe-related foreign policy preferences has something to tell, China has no interest in interfering with European politics unless it has a direct impact on its foreign policy priorities. As has been seen in our study, China did not enter into the war between NATO and former Yugoslavia when the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was hit during the NATO bombing campaign in 1999. But it did not waste any time acting when North Macedonia established diplomatic links with Taiwan.

This is where it ends. China is more than willing to invest in Croatia, Slovenia or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet China has no intention to

194 NINA PEJIČ, SAŠA ISTENIČ KOTAR AND ZLATKO ŠABIČ resolve issues which disrupt relations between these countries; borders, for example. The European Union will not interfere either. It is up to the countries in the region to resolve those issues and divert the focus on where it really matters: economic prosperity and political stability. That, in turn, would make these countries stronger players with anyone, not just the PRC.

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TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES: REGIONAL CONTENDER OR ALLY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION? Zeynep Arkan Tuncel

Map 7: Turkey and its Post-Yugoslav Neighbor States Source: https://www.d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=73922&lang=en

200 ZEYNEP ARKAN TUNCEL

Introduction As a region whose history, characteristics and composition have been heavily influenced by great power presence and involvement, the Balkan peninsula has in turn impacted the fate and foreign policy priorities of these great powers, among them the late Ottoman Empire and its heir apparent, the Turkish Republic. The Balkan region has in fact occupied a special place in Turkish foreign policy since the early days of the Republic. The existing state of relations between Turkey and the countries in the region illustrate that the links between them are multidimensional and complex, and are still influenced by history, particularly on issues of culture, religion and identity. The demographical features of both the countries in the region and Turkey—the Muslim and Turkish peoples in the wider Balkan geography as well as the Balkan population in Turkey—add to the already complex nature of the relations.

In Turkish political and popular discourse, the term ‘Southeast Europe’ is rarely used as geographic reference. The term ‘Balkans’ is preferred instead to refer to a region that often includes, in addition to the post-Yugoslav states, Greece, Bulgaria and Albania, as well as Turkey itself. The portrayal of Turkey as a Balkan country and, parallel to this, references to the close ties that exist between the latter and the other Balkan states are common in Turkish political discourse, particularly with respect to the foreign policy priorities of the Turkish state. As noted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “[b]eing a Balkan country itself, Turkey attaches great importance to its bilateral relations with the Balkan countries and maintains good relations with all of them” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). This representation of Turkey as a key actor in the wider Balkan geography and its high level of involvement in the region is best summarized by the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu (2019): We are an inseparable part of the Balkans. We will continue our contributions to overcome the fragile situation in the Balkans and to ensure stability and development in the region.We will continue our contributions towards ending the conflicts in this region. Starting with Bosnia and Herzegovina,

TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY 201 our support to the countries critical to the future of the region, will never be withheld.

Çavuşoğlu’s comments not only illustrate the prominence of the Balkan region (and of Bosnia and Herzegovina) in Turkish foreign policy, but also explain why Turkey chose to take part in different alliances and establish close relations with a number of countries in the region over the years.

Taking into consideration the complex history of relations, the overall aim of this chapter is to analyze the foreign policies of successive Turkish governments towards the Balkan region from a historical perspective, focusing particularly on continuities and ruptures. Building on the assumption that “the history of the Balkans is an inseparable part of Turkish history” (İnalcık, 2016, p. 9), the first part of the chapter focuses on the history of the relations between the countries in the wider Balkan region and Turkey to uncover the impact of the past. In the following part, the foreign policy of Turkey towards the states in the region since the end of the Cold War is analyzed with a view to exploring the fractures and continuities that exist. The chapter then turns its attention to the current state of relations between the states in the post-Yugoslav geography and Turkey under the AKP government to explore the economic, social and political ties between them and the actors that contribute to the formulation and implementation of foreign policy on the Turkish side. The last part of the chapter proceeds to explore the level of Turkey’s involvement and penetration in the post-Yugoslav states to assess whether Turkey is an actor on par with, or capable of challenging the normative diffusion of the EU and its interpretation of a European international society in the region.

‘Turks in Europe’: The Balkan Experience The Balkan peninsula has been at the crossroads of many different cultures, civilizations, religions and even ideologies that contributed to the multihued constitution of the region and its peoples.

Particular legacies have made a lasting impact on the existing structures in the region. Maria Todorova argued that two historical legacies in particular have shaped the peninsula: “the millennium of

202 ZEYNEP ARKAN TUNCEL Byzantium with its profound political, institutional, legal, religious, and cultural impact” and “the half millennium of Ottoman rule that gave the peninsula its name and established the longest period of political unity it had experienced” (Todorova, 2009, p. 12). According to her, the Ottoman period had a particularly lasting impression leading her to conclude that it would be “preposterous to look for an Ottoman legacy in the Balkans” because of the simple reason that “[t]he Balkans are the Ottoman legacy” (Todorova, 1995, p. 55).

The period of Ottoman rule not only bestowed the region with a name—the Balkans—it also reified existing divisions along ethnic, religious and linguistic lines within the politically united but socially fragmented Ottoman society.

The early Ottoman interest in the Balkans was one dictated by geography and religion. During the early days of the Ottoman state, the Balkans had been the first major zone of expansion. The rapid enlargement of the young Ottoman state towards the West was carried out in line with the ideals of ‘gazâ’—holy war against the infidels, and the “continuous expansion of the Dârülislâm—the realms of Islam” (İnalcık, 1973, p. 6). The Ottoman expansion towards the West through Southeast Europe and then towards the East and South of Anatolia resulted in the gradual formation of a cosmopolitan empire that brought together Muslims in Anatolia and beyond and the fragmented Christian Balkans. The years under Ottoman control witnessed a “deliberate policy of repopulation” of the region by the central state (Mazower, 2000, p. 33). It was the Muslim Turks of peasant Anatolia, though often slighted by the Ottoman elite, that were regarded “as the most reliable of the sultan’s subjects” and were therefore sent, among other places, to the Balkan territories of the empire to “form a nucleus of loyal Ottoman subjects” (Imber, 2002, p. 3).

The Ottoman society was organized along the lines of the millet system from the 15th century onwards, which was based on an arrangement between different religious communities under Ottoman control and the state. This system included three millets (peoples/religious communities)—the Greek, the Jewish and the Armenian—over which the Ottoman state relinquished its control in return for a tax burden. Each of these millets were seen as “culturally

TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY 203 autonomous and self-regulating communities with religious leaders acting as intermediaries between the state and community” (Barkey and Gavrilis, 2016, p. 26). In comparison to the dispersed Jewish and the ethnically homogenous Armenian millets, the Greek community was composed of ethnically and linguistically diverse groups of people under the authority of the Greek Orthodox Church, which included the Balkan populations, Arabs, Syrians and Georgians. Within this diverse community, various smaller communities managed to retain some of their cultural and linguistic features. As a result, despite the rulers’ desire to manage them as members of distinct religious groups, towards the end of the Ottoman reign in the region, certain ethnic identities started to mature and blossom into fully-fledged national identities, with a strong emphasis on pre-Ottoman qualities and histories as well as the othering of the Ottoman past.1 The rivalry between the declining Ottoman Empire and Russia, particularly after the latter’s defeat in the Crimean War and Russia’s pan-Slavist policies, incited the waves of nationalism that swept the Balkans in the 19th century and eventually led to the formation of states which were based on the idea of a shared ethnic identity. The expulsion of the Ottomans following the First Balkan War of 1912 went hand in hand with a de-Ottomanization or de-Islamization of the Balkan territories and societies (Mazower, 2000, pp. 12–13). The negative attitudes of the Balkan elite regarding Turkey and the Turkish or Muslim population in their borders arguably “made cooperation between Turkey and some of the Balkan states difficult in the succeeding decades” (Demirtaş, 2013, p. 167) and added to the heavy historical baggage of their mutual relations. In this respect, it can be concluded that the most important legacies of the Ottoman past in the region have been the three main remaining Muslim groups—Turks, Albanians and Muslims of Slavic origin—and a certain interpretation of the Ottoman past that constructed an Other against which nationalist movements were solidified not only towards the end of Ottoman

1

Interestingly enough, this emphasis on pre-Ottoman features and history, as well as the othering/blurring of the Ottoman past was also prominent in the national identity formation process of modern Turkey.

204 ZEYNEP ARKAN TUNCEL control but also in the 1990s when nationalism was once again on the rise (Uzgel, 2012a). The end of the Ottoman rule also resulted in waves of voluntary or involuntary migration of Muslims from the Balkans to Ottoman heartlands affecting the demographic structure. In the last days of the empire, the Balkan region contributed to the future form and direction that the young Turkish state would take, and, according to some scholars, served as a model for state and national identity formation as well as the breeding ground for the future leaders of the Turkish modernization process and the War of Independence (Karpat, 2015; Uzgel, 2012a; Bora, 1995).

The Republic of Turkey was formally established in 1923. In its early days, the leaders of the young state, despite bitter memories of Allied occupation and the Greek advance towards the Anatolian heartland during the War of Independence, followed a balanced and status quo policy towards the world. The foreign policy of the young Turkish state was shaped by the ultimate goal of securing the nation state in a volatile neighborhood, taking into consideration the structural constraints of the international system and the “severe limitations on the national sources available for foreign policy goals” (Özcan, 1995, p. 281). In this period, Turkish foreign policy had a Western orientation that went hand in hand with a reform process to modernize the domestic political, economic, social and legal structures. Security and the maintenance of national borders were high on the foreign policy agenda, and the young Turkish state signed bilateral treaties and participated in various alliances to materialize these goals. In a similar vein, the Turkish political elite also sought membership in international organizations and, upon gaining membership to the UN (1945), the Council of Europe (1949) and NATO (1952), came to see Turkey as part of the European order.

In this period, the Balkan geography was seen as the gateway that connected Anatolia to Europe, not only in economic and political terms but also from the perspective of security, defense and ultimately stability. Accordingly, Turkey’s foreign policy towards the region (and its neighboring countries in general) was devoid of any religious or cultural references, focusing instead on building alli-

TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY 205 ances. While only a small percentage of Turkey’s territories are considered to be in what is called the Thrace/Rumelia region which Turkey shares with Greece and Bulgaria, the political elite considered Turkey to be part of the Balkan geography. This ultimately implied that the region came to acquire great importance for Turkey, in terms of not only of the human dimension of its foreign policy, but also its security and stability as Turkey chose to distance itself from another key neighboring region—the Middle East—during this period. In Turkey’s search for stability and security in its immediate neighborhood, a constant feature of its policies towards the Balkan region has been their status quo quality.

In the period that followed the founding of the Republic, the level of Turkish interest and involvement in the Balkan peninsula, which it viewed as a precarious region, was heavily influenced by the structural changes that took place in the world system. The ties that were broken since the Balkan Wars were first reinstated in the mid-1920s with a series of bilateral agreements of friendship with countries like Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to lay the foundations of future cooperation (Gönlübolet al., 1996). As noted, these attempts to establish closer ties with the Balkan states had an ulterior motive: “As Europe moved towards war in the 1930s, the main focus of Turkey’s security concerns lay in the Balkans—the traditional zone of danger for the Ottoman Empire” (Hale, 2013, p. 44).

In this period, Italy emerged as a common threat for the countries of the Balkan region including Turkey, and following the rapprochement with Greece, the two countries signed in 1933 an Entente Cordiale to secure their common borders in the Thrace region.

Turkey also signed non-aggression pacts with Romania and Yugoslavia (Hale, 2013). These eventually paved the way to the conclusion in 1934 of a Balkan Pact between Turkey, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia to guarantee the security of their mutual Balkan borders against threats from other Balkan states, primarily Bulgaria. To this aim, the contracting parties agreed to form a Council of Ministers that continued to meet on a regular basis until 1940 and provided a forum for these states to discuss matters of common interest. The Balkan Pact was an effort by the contracting parties to cooperate in the field of security in the face of the common threat of revisionist

206 ZEYNEP ARKAN TUNCEL states in a multipolar order (Fırat, 2001). With WWII in full swing, however, the Pact proved to be an insufficient security guarantee as its members were one by one invaded by the Axis powers.

During the WWII years, Turkey was the only member of the Pact that did not experience German or Italian invasion, partly as a result of the cautious policy led by President İsmet İnönü. During this period, Turkey’s political elite, who had first-hand experience of the Great War, tried their utmost to keep Turkey with its already weak military, economy and infrastructure outside of the war by keeping a de facto neutral stance. They also relied on the Tripartite Alliance with Britain and France, which was signed in 1939, and Turkey’s ties with the Soviet Union and the German Reich—a former ally and trade partner. Turkey finally severed its ties with the German Reich in 1944 and declared war on the latter only in 1945 towards the very end of the war.

In the period that followed the WWII, it was great power politics and the bipolar world order that shaped the relations between Turkey and the Balkan states. Turkey’s foreign policy towards the region in this period was dictated by its position within the Western camp and the part it played in the containment of the Soviet Union.

A key step forward for Turkey in its relations with the Balkan states was the result of a second rapprochement with Greece. In an effort to “extend western defence structures to the Balkans” and (after Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948) with United States’ support, Turkey and Greece signed an Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation with Yugoslavia in 1953, which “obliged the signatories to consult with one another on matters of common interest and to engage in military discussions” (Hale, 2013, p. 90). This was transformed into a formal alliance with the signing of the Balkan Pact in 1954, according to which an attack on one of these three states would be considered as an attack on all of them, a response to which they would take all necessary measures for their common defense. Hale argued that “[i]f it had been carried through, the pact would have had the effect of bringing Yugoslavia under the NATO umbrella, without making it a full member of the alliance”; yet the very following year as “Khrushchev made his peace with Tito, and thus

TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY 207 removed the pact’s main raison d’être”, it became a dead letter (Hale, 2013, p. 91).

Yugoslavia’s thawing relations with the Soviet Union following Stalin’s death and Tito’s leadership position in the Non-Aligned Movement led to a more distant association with Turkey, particularly because Turkey chose to align itself very closely with Western powers. This became obvious during the 1955 Bandung Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement during which Turkey took on the role of the Western bloc’s representative. In addition to Tito, another important leader in the movement was Archbishop Makarios, the de facto leader of Greek Cypriots and later the first president of Cyprus. Declining relations with Greece as a result of the Cyrus issue and Makarios’ position in the Non-Aligned Movement, which chose to support him regarding the Cyprus issue and objected to the intervention of outside forces in Cyprus’s internal affairs, brought the relations almost to a halt.

The 1960s were a decade during which Turkey revised its foreign policy vision and goals as solidarity with NATO allies, particularly the United States, lost their privileged position in the Turkish foreign policy outlook following a number of crises. From the mid1960s onward, Turkey began to look for alternative alliances and pursue a more multidimensional foreign policy that focused on different geographies including Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the Warsaw Pact members and the Balkan countries, with the exception of Greece. While these efforts still took place within the boundaries of Turkey’s NATO membership, they aimed at alleviating the country’s isolation as a result of its direct military intervention in Cyprus. Turkey sought to diversify its foreign policy not only towards the Warsaw Pact members but also towards West and North European countries to complement its reliance on the United States and NATO for security. The arms embargo imposed on Turkey by the United States after its Cyprus intervention and the conditions of the Détente period added to this, forcing Turkey to revise its national security policy and shift its main threat perception from the Soviet Union towards Greece and the domestic elements of Kurdish separatism. In this vein, Turkey attempted to break the Greek influence in the Balkans by establishing closer ties with the Balkan states. The

208 ZEYNEP ARKAN TUNCEL first ally it had in this period was Albania, which supported Turkey in the UN with respect to the Cyprus issue in 1965 (Uzgel, 2012a).

In this period, Turkey’s relations with Yugoslavia were, all in all, close and focused on stability (Özcan, 1995).

New Openings in Turkish Foreign Policy The end of the Cold War provided opportunities for new openings in Turkey’s relations with the Balkan states as well as with other states in its neighborhood and beyond. During the Cold War years, Turkey’s foreign policy was mainly shaped by its strategic role and geopolitical position as the southern bastion of NATO and its traditional Western orientation. This static posture has gradually evolved into a proactive and multidimensional foreign policy since the mid-1980s, starting with the Özal administration. This era was marked with an increased emphasis on the cultural, historic and religious ties of Turkey with the outside world—the overtures to a neo-Ottoman direction in Turkey’s foreign policy. With such references, Turkey was signaling a new opening in its foreign policy that went beyond its traditional Western orientation.

This period’s dynamic and multidirectional foreign policy outlook went hand in hand with a new reading of Turkey’s position, cultural affinities, role and responsibilities in the world, yet did not imply the complete abandoning of its European and EuroAtlantic vocation. In fact, this opening was supported by the Western powers, primarily the United States, which now regarded Turkey’s status as more than a function of its strategic geopolitical location, focusing instead on its capacity to serve as a model of Western democracy in the Middle East and Central Asia (Sönmezoğlu, 2016).

As a result of the regime changes that took place, and in line with Turkey’s search for a new role and position for itself in the post-Cold War order, Turkey’s relations with and involvement in the Balkans intensified. Bechev argued that at the end of the Cold War, with the removal of the Soviet threat and instability in its neighborhood, Turkey was expected to play an assertive role in the

TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY 209 region “determined not only by a sheer geopolitical weight and security calculus, but also by more intangible factors, like common history and multiple migratory waves from the Balkans” (2009, pp.

211–212). Yet, initially it was caught slightly unprepared and remained politically as “a reluctant actor in the region”, a status quo power “fully committed to the protection of unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia” (Robins 2003, p. 354). In this period, the main foreign policy goal pursued in the region was filling the power vacuum left by the Soviet Union by pursuing cooperation in political and economic matters. The visits made by the political leaders of the post-Yugoslav geography to Ankara in this period illustrated the increasing prominence of Turkey in the region as a political and economic partner. However, as waves of nationalism, instability, and eventually fragmentation hit the Balkans, Turkey had to adapt its foreign policy vision and tools towards the former Yugoslav territories and, following the lead of Western powers, recognized Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on February 6, 1992. To avoid accusations by European and Balkan states of having ulterior motives, Turkey was careful to formulate its policy responses to the ongoing conflicts and fragmentation in the Balkans parallel to those of international organizations, mainly NATO and the UN (Sönmezoğlu, 2016).

The role that Turkey had the potential to play was “that of a patron of up to 9 million Balkan Muslims” (Bechev, 2009, p. 212). In fact, public opinion in Turkey strongly supported the Muslim groups in the Balkan conflict, particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo, and perceived the (lack of) response of the international community as a failure. To this end, the Turkish public urged the government to take on a leadership role in the international efforts to bring an end to violence. Yet, political elites was aware of the limitations of Turkey. As a result, the Turkish government’s official policy line was limited to supporting multilateral solutions to the problems and “drawing international attention to the plight of the Bosnian Muslims and pressing their allies to intervene on their behalf” (Hale, 2013, p. 202). As Bosnia became a top foreign policy priority for Turkey, it provided military support for NATO activities and continued to urge first the Western and then Muslim countries to

210 ZEYNEP ARKAN TUNCEL intervene in the situation. Turkey also contributed UNPROFOR. Moreover, it played an active role in “brokering an entente between the Croats and Bosnian Muslims, resulting in the establishment of a Muslim-Croat Federation under the Washington Agreement of March 1994” (Hale, 2013, p. 203). In this respect, the burgeoning relationship between Croatia and Turkey, which had its roots in their shared hostility towards Serbia, illustrated that Turkey’s involvement went beyond its support to Muslim groups in the region. Following the founding of Bosnia-Herzegovina in its current form, Turkey maintained close ties with the country and added a strong military dimension to these, not only as part of IFOR, but also through programs for military training. Turkish officers also took part in repairing and restoring structures such as schools and bridges in Bosnia, which garnered the support of the public (Uzgel, 2012b). Rapidly growing political and military ties between the two sides trumped economic ties, which developed slowly with the help of Turkish Eximbank credits and the involvement of large- and medium-sized Turkish firms.

In this period, Turkey’s political, economic and military relations with Albania and Macedonia also grew, and Turkey supported their membership in various international organizations.

The conflict in Kosovo, however, proved to be a tough nut for Ankara to crack, not least because of its nature and similarities with the Kurdish case in Turkey. In a period when Turkey was trying to repair its relations with Yugoslavia, the breakout of violence in Kosovo put Turkey in a difficult position. The eventual decision to support the Kosovo Albanians was based not only on the negative images associated with Serbs, particularly after the war in Bosnia, but also the Turkish desire to maintain its burgeoning friendship with Albania and support the Muslim populations in the wider region in the face of potential instability (Uzgel, 2012b). As was the case during the Bosnian war, Turkey acted in tandem with Western powers, particularly the United States—its NATO ally, and contributed militarily to the operations and KFOR, while trying to persuade the international community that the present case was in no way similar to the situation in Turkey.

TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY 211 All in all, Turkey emerged as an important and active political, economic and military power in the Balkans during the course of the 1990s. Sometimes perceived (partly as a result of references in the form of ‘the Turkish world from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China’ by political leaders) as pursuing an Islamist or neo-Ottomanist search for influence in the region, the Turkish presence in countries like Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia increased over time and put Turkey in a competitive position, particularly vis-à-vis Greece. In this respect, this period was marked by increased activism on the part of Turkey to play a greater role in the region and contribute to the international efforts for stabilization, while also demonstrating to the West that it was still a useful ally to have in the new world order (Demirtaş, 2017). One of the main obstacles on the path to an even more active foreign policy, however, proved to be the structural changes taking place in the postCold War order: despite the relatively successful diplomatic record of Turkey in the region and its existing economic and political ties with the Balkan countries, Turkey also had to carve itself a key role in a completely different geography, namely Central Asia and the Caucasus, stretching its limited resources and capabilities. It also had to strengthen its military muscle and show its willingness to engage in military action against the PKK, both domestically and in Northern Iraq as a response to changing threat perceptions (Sönmezoğlu, 2016).

The AKP Period: Activism with a New Vision Turkish foreign policy has been going through a period of profound transformation since the AKP came to power in 2002, which also had its reflections on Turkey’s relations with the Balkan countries.

The chief architect of this transformation was Ahmet Davutoğlu, who first held the post of chief advisor to the Prime Minister in 2002 and then the Foreign Affairs Minister in 2009. He later served as the Prime Minister of Turkey between 2014 and 2016, until he resigned as a result of deteriorating relations with President Tayyip Erdoğan. Under his intellectual and political leadership, Turkey

212 ZEYNEP ARKAN TUNCEL started to move away from its traditional and balanced foreign policy as well as the role it had ascribed to itself as a ‘bridge’ between the East and the West and between different civilizations and religions. Through frequent explicit or implicit references to Turkey’s past, particularly the glory days of the Ottoman Empire, the country now took on a more active, dynamic and assertive role in its neighborhood and beyond.

In its attempts to transform the country into a strong regional, even possibly global, power, the Turkish government relied on the conceptual map provided by Davutoğlu founded upon the twin pillars of Turkey’s so-called strategic depth (or strengths)—the historical depth and geographical depth—and the responsibilities derived from these. These strengths and responsibilities, it was argued, required Turkey to take on a more active role, particularly in the former Ottoman territories. This desire for a more active role went hand in hand with the representation of Turkey as a hierarchically superior international actor with respect to the states located in the former Ottoman territories, based on its previous ‘experiences and knowledge’ of these geographies and their peoples.

In this framework, the Balkans was assigned a special place as part of Turkey’s ‘heart and soul geography’ (gönül coğrafyası), which, according to Davutoğlu, extended from the Balkans to Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and with whom Turkey shared a common history, culture and civilization (Davutoğlu, 2015).

These fellow partners in history, particularly in the Balkans, he argued, relied on Turkey “because they knew that if the state in Anatolia is mighty, they too would feel safe where they were” (Davutoğlu, 2013a).

In keeping with Davutoğlu’s foreign policy vision, Turkey pursued an active diplomacy towards the Balkan countries, upgraded its economic relations with them, and at times took on the role of mediator in the framework of an all-encompassing vision based on the principles of security for all, high level political dialogue, economic interdependence, inclusiveness and regional custodianship. The AKP’s vision regarding the country’s strengths and responsibilities in the Balkan region led to active engagement with all the actors in the region, particularly those closely connected to

TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY 213 Turkey ‘through history and by heart’, and to increased diplomatic leverage as part of the efforts to create a zone of order, peace and stability in Turkey’s broader neighborhood.

In this period, one of the strongest themes in AKP’s foreign policy was the leadership role ascribed to Turkey with respect to communities that are under-privileged and under-represented in world politics, among them Muslims. This role, which went hand in hand with the portrayal of Turkey as a moral actor in search for a new, more legitimate and just world order,2 was an attempt by the political elite to portray Turkey as an alternative power center and the ultimate representative of a distinctive civilization (or religion) in different geographies. The reflection of this in the Balkans was Turkey’s strong engagement with the Muslim populations including those in Bosnia, Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo. In this period, many state and non-state actors in the form of religious and cultural institutions, centers and educational establishments started to play an active role in the Balkans “reviving demographic and cultural linkages” (Vračić, 2016, p. 6). The fact that all these efforts had a strong ‘civilizational’ (i.e., Islamic) tone and implied the strengthening of religious identity in these communities illustrated that the theme of all-inclusiveness in Turkey’s Balkan policy was in fact an illusion.

At the same time, however, Turkey also attempted to establish closer ties with other states in the region, particularly Serbia, whose key role in the stability of the region was recognized by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite all the wrong references to their common Ottoman past by Turkish politicians on many different occasions, relations grew politically and economically since the early 2000s (Uzgel, 2013). In this vein, Turkey played an active role in the trilateral consultation mechanisms established among Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (and prior to its accession to the EU, Croatia) and attempted to play the role of mediator at times in resolving conflicts and promoting dialogue (see, also Mulalic 2019).

2

In fact, Davutoğlu even appointed himself as what he termed “the interior minister of humanity” who, on certain issues that affected its shared destiny, had “to speak in the name of all humanity” (Davutoğlu, 2013b).

214 ZEYNEP ARKAN TUNCEL Turkey’s new foreign policy approach in the Balkans aimed to lay the foundations of peace and stability in the region, which required the participation of all, including Serbia. To materialize this goal, Turkey set out “to assume the role of a regional mediator and emphasize regional cooperation, which—in the case of the Western Balkans—was of utmost importance” (Vračić, 2016, p. 27). In line with this vision, Turkey also supported Macedonia’s unity and provided political and military support to the country, while recognizing Kosovo’s independence but still strongly emphasizing the importance of the country’s “integration with the European and EuroAtlantic structures and consolidation of friendly and constructive relations with her neighbours in the region” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.)

Economically and militarily, Turkey has been an active actor in the region. The military role it played, which initially focused on peacekeeping and reconstruction, soon included defense cooperation and training military personnel, in the execution of which Turkey acted in concert with the United States and the EU. In terms of economic relations, due to the limited nature of opportunities, Turkey’s economic involvement and investment in the region remained limited. In fact, while Turkey’s trade and investment relations with all the countries in the region developed in this period, its economic engagement was not on par with other strong actors such as the EU, Germany, Austria or Italy and the neighboring states, particularly as the steady growth rates that Turkey recorded since the early 2000s started to drop. In this respect, while Turkey remained a strong actor, its political influence surpassed its economic power in the region.

As noted above, the actors involved in Turkey’s relations with the Balkan states also started to differ during the AKP period. Traditionally, the primary actors in Turkey’s foreign policy had been the cabinet under the leadership of the Prime Minister and the socalled “high priests of Kemalism” (Robins, 2003, p. 69) in the form of senior officers of the Turkish Army and top diplomats in the oldschool Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributing to Turkey’s ‘state policy’ (instead of government policy). This implied that Turkey’s more on-paper president, whose position had been more titular

TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY 215 (until Erdoğan), often played a limited role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Even when presidents with strong personalities such as Turgut Özal and Ahmet Necdet Sezer occupied the position, their priority had not been external relations.

The process of foreign policy formulation and implementation has experienced a considerable shift under the AKP government.

Since the 2000s, Turkey has witnessed an increase in the number of unconventional foreign policy actors that operate in tandem with the foreign policy objectives of the government, particularly towards geographies such as the Balkans. Today, a number of actors in the form of the Yunus Emre Institute (promoting Turkish culture, language and art), various universities, TİKA, YTB, Presidency for Religious Affairs (Diyanet), TRT, and various Islamic brotherhoods (which at some point included the Gülen movement until the government broke ties with them) complement the Turkish government’s foreign policy towards the Balkan states by developing social, cultural, religious and educational ties. These actors focus on a wide variety of themes including the restoration or rebuilding of various Ottoman monuments and structures, teaching Turkish language and culture, scholarships and the broadcasting of Turkish soap operas, diffusing what some label as the soft power of Turkey in the Balkans (Bošković et. al., 2015).

Following the resignation of Davutoğlu, Turkey started to pursue a more pragmatic foreign policy in the Western Balkans that focused on developing economic relations and the protection of Muslims, particularly in Bosnia and Albania. While not totally devoid of nostalgic Ottoman references, this selective foreign policy relied on direct personal engagement by President Erdoğan with the region’s political leaders such as Aleksandar Vučić, Bakir Izetbegović and Edi Rama, and involved developing close ties of friendship with those in power (Büyük and Öztürk, 2019). Aydıntaşbaş (2019, pp. 16–17) argues that such ties allow “Balkans leaders to show other great powers, such as Europe, that the Western Balkans is not without alternatives when it comes to alliances “which serves to further underline Erdoğan’s position as a regional leader”. Yet, despite Turkey’s support for Muslims in the region, growing economic relations in the form of trade and investment by

216 ZEYNEP ARKAN TUNCEL Turkish firms and banks, particularly in Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia, and the limited development aid provided by TİKA, Turkey is politically or economically not capable of replacing the EU as a center of attraction, a fact all sides are well aware of.

It is possible to conclude that the AKP government’s policies elevated Turkey’s role and presence in the Balkan peninsula. In many respects, these policies were a continuation of the multidimensional foreign policy pursued by the Turkish political elite since the end of the Cold War, which had three main dimensions: a diplomatic dimension that relied on “mediation and good neighbourly services”; an economic dimension that “operated through the use of economic diplomacy and direct investment”; and a grassroots and civil society dimension that relied on “growing soft power presence and/or Muslim solidarity” (Anastasakis, 2009, p.

206). What was new about the AKP government’s approach was its ambitious discourse infused with nostalgic Ottoman and religious references, as well as its “new mode of engagement” through various state and non-state actors that went beyond the confines of traditional diplomacy and “significantly widened the scope of the country’s regional influence” (Öktem, 2012, p. 31).

At the same time, Turkish foreign policy towards the Balkan states suffered from four main limitations in this period according to Demirtaş (2017, p. 143): “too much emphasis on religion and the Ottoman past; ignoring the perceptions and misconceptions of local actors; exaggeration of own power; and its [Turkey’s] own de-Europeanising tendencies in domestic politics”. Moreover, while Turkey is perceived as an alternative power center by a number of local political leaders, it has to be kept in mind that it often vocally supported the European and Euro-Atlantic vocation of the Balkan countries and, in terms of its reach and capabilities, is not in a position to offer an alternative path for them, bar some nostalgic neoOttoman vision of regional order. Furthermore, Turkey’s drift towards authoritarianism, especially since 2011, and its human rights and the rule of law record led to a loss of credibility in the region in recent years, particularly as an alternative to the strong normative

TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY 217 influence of the EU. These domestic developments and its slackened European vocation also affected Turkey’s assumed role as a mediator between different states or communities.

A Regional Contender or Ally to the EU? Since the Cold War ended, Turkey has followed an active and multidimensional foreign policy in a number of different geographies including the Balkans, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. While the goals it has pursued in these regions differed and at times competed with one another in terms of their priority and scope, Turkey’s ultimate goal in its immediate neighborhood has always been stability and security. Beyond this overarching objective, successive governments have attempted to broaden Turkey’s zone of influence in its neighborhood and beyond through political, economic and military means since the end of the Cold War. As Barrinha argued, “Turkey sits at the margins of three regional security complexes”, which are “the European (which includes the Balkans subcomplex); the Middle Eastern (including the sub-complexes of the Levant, Gulf and Maghreb); and the ex-Soviet (including the Baltic; Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova; the Caucasus; and Central Asia)” (2014, p. 166). In the aftermath of the Cold War, as an actor whose cultural and religious interest in the Balkans often went hand in hand with hard security concerns, the role that Turkey chose to play was not one that was fully independent of its Western allies and the international organizations active in the Balkan region. Taking into consideration the dominant position the EU came to occupy in the European security sub-complex which includes the Balkans, Turkey, as a country that was committed to achieving full EU membership, did not directly challenge the Union’s vision of a distinctly European international society. In fact, this international society, which at the very least rests on commonly agreed rules of coexistence that “set out the minimum behavioral conditions for society” or at the maximum a shared ‘we-feeling’ or culture (Buzan, 2006, p. 79), also influenced Turkey’s foreign policy choices, even when Turkey seemed isolated, stuck between great powers, or saw its EU membership prospects dwindling. In this

218 ZEYNEP ARKAN TUNCEL vein, by following the lead of other international actors, Turkey relied on a multilateral outlook in its foreign policy towards the Balkan states which remained “firmly anchored in Western institutions”, among them the EU (Bechev, 2009, p. 213).

The late 1990s and the early to mid-2000s was a unique period for both Turkey and the Balkan states in terms of their relations with the EU. The 1999 Helsinki Summit at which Turkey achieved candidate status and the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit that gave the Western Balkan states a membership prospect unified all actors in their ultimate goal of achieving EU membership in a “truly unipolar moment” that rendered the Union as the only dominant power (ibid., p. 216). Initially, when the ultimate goal of the countries in the region was accession to the EU and NATO, Turkey supported these states in this endeavor. Yet, as the integration process started to lose its initial vigor both with respect to Turkey and the Balkan states, the power vacuum that emerged in the region was partly filled by alternative actors, i.e., Russia and China. It is argued here that it is difficult to categorize Turkey as one of these alternative power centers that has the vision and capabilities to offer a path independent of the one the EU has put forward. This is simply because of the fact that, despite the strong rhetoric and attempts at power play, Turkey lacks the power, resources and domestic strength and stability to offer a viable alternative. Turkey’s political, economic and social influence and attraction, which it disperses directly or indirectly through state and non-state actors in the Balkan peninsula, remains selective and limited to particular groups and kin communities. As such, Turkey is not, and in the near future will not be, in a position to offer a realistic alternative to replace the EU’s dominance in the region and the European order based on the EU’s conceptualization of a European international society.

If, however, Turkey decides to move away from its Western partners and the alliances it is part of, and closer to Russia, this would have considerable implications in its foreign policy. Such a move, which might result from disappointments in its relations with the United States and the EU, would imply a shift in the country’s foreign policy direction and priorities in the Balkans. Yet, despite strategic moves by the Turkish government to force the EU’s

TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY 219 hand in relation to the ongoing refugee crisis and its actions in Syria, Turkey appears to have noticed that its customary Western and NATO allies are still very much needed and useful when push comes to shove.

It is clear that though Turkey is a key regional power, it is not the global dynamo it claims to be. In this respect, the ambitious rhetoric that the AKP government employs in relation to the Ottoman past and Muslim communities of the region is often targeting the domestic audience and used as a domestic mobilizing strategy instead of an international one. Consequently, while Turkey is currently not a regular and well-behaved member of the European order, it is still part of the wider family. If Turkey breaks further away from Europe and moves closer to alternative power centers, this move would be detrimental to all sides and harmful to the credibility of the EU as a global actor and center of attraction.

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PART II THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES

FROM INTEGRATION TO PLURILATERALISM? SLOVENIA AND THE GREAT POWERS Ana Bojinović Fenko and Faris Kočan

Introduction Many scholars have (tacitly) established that the disengagement of the European Union (EU) and United States (US) from the post-Yugoslav space coincides with the manifestation of greater interest of other external powers, such as Russia, China and Turkey, in the region (Radeljić, 2016; Bechev, 2017; Bieber, 2018; Jakimow, 2019; Bieber and Tzifakis, 2019). The latter have intensified their regional presence in the economic, political and cultural fields of individual states in practically the entire post-Yugoslav space. However, Slovenia notably stands out against this trend. It hosts almost none of the abovementioned new external actors’ economic investments, which elsewhere in the region (especially in large-scale infrastructure) avoid attachment to EU-law strings and are often characterized as non-transparent or clientelism-inclined (Makocki, 2017; Makocki and Nechev, 2017). Additionally, the respective external powers’ political support for post-Yugoslav states’ governments and national parties through direct or indirect media engagement is not noticeable in Slovenia. Also not taking place in Slovenia is the trendy rivalry against EU initiatives present elsewhere in the region.1 Appreciation of Turkish cultural presence by those who would like to see Islam playing a greater role in the area (Bosniak part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak in Serbia, Kosovo and

1

Some examples are Russian and Chinese support for Serbia against Kosovo’s recognition, a Russian coup-attempt in Montenegro (Gadzo, 2019), Turkish initiative in light of failed Butmir process in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Vračić, 2016), and high concentration of Russian investments in the Croatian economy bypassing EU anti-corruption standards (Karasik, 2019).

226 ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO AND FARIS KOČAN Montenegro) is also entirely absent in Slovenia (Kočan and Arbeiter, 2019). Russian and Chinese culture in Slovenian domestic society are understood as legitimate in terms of their historical regional roots (Russian Slavism) and global outreach (expansion of Chinese civilization via economic globalization) but display very limited influence in daily political life.

It would be incorrect to attribute the non-characteristic presence and limited influence of the mentioned external powers in Slovenia solely to the latter’s longest standing in the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or simply to its earlier entry into transition due to no large-scale armed conflict compared to other post-Yugoslav states. Slovenia’s international dissimilarity vis-à-vis the other Yugoslav successor states derives from a political and historical reality of a much more longue durée. The latter, in short, reveals the irrelevance of Slovenian people and territory for the Russian, Turkish, Chinese and American geopolitical chessboard. As a small people, positioned at the intersection of European nations and cultures, Slovenians throughout history represented an object of an intra-European fight for power rather than a subject of balkanization at the European periphery (Todorova, 2001, p. 25). As Slovenia has been the predominantly Western European powers’ playfield, European integration with its peace project of an evercloser Union of European peoples has, since independence in 1991, represented an idea of a Slovenian “natural home”. Nevertheless, Slovenia not only escaped the geopolitical relevance of non-continental external powers, but also, on the other hand, did not manage to develop one single European big power state preference/dependency. This non-existence of a protector state is a crucial factor of Slovenian foreign policy’s “external environment”, which propels the country’s strong preference for secondary institutions in the international society.2 Slovenia depends upon and thus strongly upholds the EU’s foreign policy stance towards responsibility of great powers to support the stability of the international system and

2

Slovenia declared membership in the European Economic Community as its foreign policy priority three months prior to even declaring independence (Bojinović Fenko and Šabič, 2017).

SLOVENIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 227 to respect the rule of international law. In terms of domestic values and society-organization, democratization and respect for human rights are the crucial constitutional values of the state stemming from its very independence, which again corresponds highly to common EU values. For this reason, Slovenia in its foreign policy holds a relatively reserved if not negative stance towards states that contradict these values. During the last five years, that was the record of essentially all above four states engaged in the post-Yugoslav space. It has therefore been a paradox that in order to assure stability of the primary institutions such as sovereignty, territoriality, great power management, prevalence of international law and diplomacy, Slovenia has always sought and counted on secondary institutions, mostly the EU. The objective of this chapter is to determine whether Slovenia, being the most atypical post-Yugoslav state and irrelevant for external powers, represents a test case for boundary conditions of the region’s primary institutions’ functioning as promoted and assured by the EU. As Slovenia is at the outskirt of the other four external powers’ influence, the increase of their influence would most definitely indicate a competitiveness to and therefore weakening of the well settled EU’s influence. Such a shake to established EU-lead international institutions, e.g., peaceful settlement of disputes, supranational policy-making, and leadership of great powers underpinned by legitimacy and responsibility, would negatively affect Slovenia. Moreover, the weakening of the EU within Slovenian polity would definitely represent a marginal condition for the indication of a change in the effect of external powers’ influence in the entire post-Yugoslav region. The chapter is organized as follows.

The first section examines historical links between Slovenia and China, Russia, US, Turkey and the EU by determining both their importance for Slovenian independence and the consequences of their at-the-time policies in Slovenia for the regional (post-Yugoslav) order. The second section introduces the analysis of contemporary foreign policy priorities and interests outlined in Slovenian foreign policy strategy from 2015. The third section is devoted to the structures of Slovenian foreign policy making towards the re-

228 ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO AND FARIS KOČAN spective great powers, coupled with the empirical findings by communication with senior officials from the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs specialized for bilateral sectors, respectively. We determine the role of China, Russia, the US, Turkey and the EU for Slovenia, the framing of relations with them and decision-making procedures, including the diplomatic organization of foreign policy implementation. The conclusion offers a reflection on the findings and summarizes the arguments to support the thesis of Slovenia being a test case of the strength of EU influence in post-Yugoslav region.

Crossroad for Europe, Contact Point for Big Powers “Multitudes of different external political flows historically permeating the territory of the Slovenian people, always as a part of larger and more powerful foreign states have […] represented a strong external influence, shaping Slovenian values of peaceful coexistence” (Bojinović Fenko and Svetličič, 2017, p. 3). The “multi-civilizational rivalry and influence” (ibid.), however, always came from Europe; from Romanic, Germanic, Hungarian, and Balkan Slavic ethnicities and polities. The position of Slovenian people on the very outskirts of Turkish and Russian spheres of influence contributed to its firm inclusion into the Habsburg and Austro-Hungarian Empires’ Central European realm. These empires were not based on ‘mothercountry’s rule overseas’ but rather on rule over contiguous land masses inhabited by diverse ethnic groupings (Dunbain, 2014, p. 3).

After the disintegration of European Empires, Slovenia again became part of larger political entities (Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—SFRY), which insinuates the logic of national self-determination through larger multinational (South-)Slavic frameworks. The latter was particularly vivid in the period between the WWI and WWII, when the Slavic economic, cultural and social ‘achievements’—as a direct consequence of the October Revolution in 1917—became admired by the Slovenian communist political elites (Deželak Barič, 2018, p. 99). It is important to underline that

SLOVENIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 229 Slovenian people have never been attacked or threatened by Russian rulers. This admiration did not end here; the ideological attractiveness (socialism) coupled with the hard power capabilities of the Soviet Union (USSR) during WWII (e.g., Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army) became a part and parcel of the future (positive) relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR. However, this relationship came to an end only three years after the end of WWII, when the conflict between the states’ leaders Josip Broz Tito and Joseph Stalin resulted in Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Communist Information Bureau and marked the Informbiro period that came to an end in 1955 when Tito and Khrushchev made peace (Perovic, 2007).

Relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR were never completely reassembled as the first continued a non-aligned path in world politics, resulting in the Non-Aligned Movement, in which it was a leading force (West, 1994). In line with this, Slovenian independence efforts never sought to strengthen relations with Russia as the USSR successor beyond the question of recognition (on 14 February 1992) and economic cooperation. This can be further traced on the strategic level where Russia has been identified as an economic power; economic diplomacy has functioned as a cornerstone of bilateral relations between the states since the Declaration on Slovenian Foreign Policy, endorsed in 1999.

Contrary to the positive (Slavic) undertone with Russia, relations with Turkey, when put in the historical perspective, always carried a negative connotation cartridge. This compromising stance, which builds on almost 200 years of Ottoman presence3 through invasive attempts to conquer the territory of contemporary Slovenia, generated a narrative of the Ottomans as “arsonists who kidnapped, robbed, enslaved and killed Slovenes”, as outlined in Slovenian tales (Kunaver, 1999). While the narrative on the Ottomans is ‘sticky’ enough to ensure its continuity,4 the approach of independent Slovenia towards contemporary Turkey lost its direct 3

4

In a wider perspective, this still represents a minor influence compared to the 600 years of Ottoman presence throughout Southeastern Europe.

This continuity is assured (institutionalized) via school curriculums for the 5th grade pupils. For more on the transmission of knowledge on Ottoman raids through the perspective of national “mythical stories”, see Špela Kalčić (2007).

230 ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO AND FARIS KOČAN parallels with the Ottomans due to a West-inclined Turkish foreign policy stance during the Cold War.5 Former Slovenian Ambassador in Ankara, Milan Jazbec (2012), assessed that those bilateral relations between the countries have been on the rise since Turkey’s recognition of Slovenia’s independence in early February 1992. But in recent years, they started to be challenged by a negative perception of Turkish regime change, freezing of EU accession-conditioned reforms and record of disrespecting human rights.

Unlike Russia and Turkey, the EU in general and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (as an EU member state) specifically were the most important actors during the process of gaining international recognition. If the role of the EC in this process was limited to the mediation in achieving a ceasefire with Yugoslav National Army (YNA) during the 10-day independence war, the role of the FRG was decisive. The FRG recognized Slovenia on December 19, 1991 (Pristavec Đogić, 2016), which was at the time understood as a ‘solo action’ that went contrary to the position of the EC. The FRG was particularly targeted by advocacy for international recognition by the Slovenian government but also by civil society actors. Slovenian minorities, migrant workers and diaspora in Central and Western Europe, Slovenian transnational companies, city-to-city contacts and academia performed para-diplomacy via agreements, visits, declarations, publications, mixed commissions (e.g., with Bavaria and Carinthia) and student exchange programmes (Bojinović Fenko and Šabič, 2017, p. 46). The FRG’s recognition was not only important for the eventual recognition by the EC as a whole but also for the US’s foreign policy position towards Slovenia. The US was not only reluctant to recognize Slovenia (and other post-Yugoslav states), but was also one of the main advocates of non-recognition in the period between June 25, 1991 and January 15, 1992 when the EC recognized Slovenia.

5

Turkey was understood as a Western power due to: a Kemalist ideology that guaranteed national consolidation through the foreign policy of isolationism after WW1 (Kösebalaban, 2011), Turkish WWII entry on the side of the Allies and Charter membership of the United Nations (Huston, 1988) and Turkey’s inclusion into Euro-Atlantic integration via 1952 membership in NATO and in 1963 signature of the Ankara Agreement with the European Community (EC).

SLOVENIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 231 The US foreign policy approach towards Slovenia in the context of Yugoslav dissolution was determined by individual (mis)perceptions of the highest at the time US diplomats such as Lawrence Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft and Warren Zimmermann,6 who were able to convince the Administration that Yugoslavia should stay united at all costs.7 In line with that, the decision to recognize Slovenia on April 7, 1992 was, as argued by Zupančič (2016, p. 336), “a collateral product of the events in both Southeast Europe and other parts of the world that led towards the US foreign policy change in order to avoid their isolation in international community.” The Slovenian diaspora8 was united in its advocacy towards the recognition and was (relatively) important in that part (Zupančič, 2016, p. 336). Their endeavours could only be translated into political reality through the Congress with the help of four congressional representatives of Slovene ancestry (Dennis E. Eckart, Tom Harkin, Jim Oberstar and George Voinovich) (ibid.).

Slovenia did not have any visible high-level political issues with the US prior to 1996. A crucial role that the US plays for most post-conflict post-Yugoslav states for peace assurance is not relevant for Slovenia as the Slovenian independence war was finished under mediation of EU players at that time. Also, the Washington consensus designed for Central and Eastern European states in the 1990s was applied in Slovenia comparatively slower than in other transition countries, especially the opening to foreign investments and market reforms (Rojec et al., 2004). What is more, contrary to some other states in the post-Yugoslav space (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hasić and Karabegović, 2020)), the Slovenian diaspora in the US—the largest Slovenian expatriate community (about 9% in 6

7

8

This was only possible due to the fact that President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State and White House Chief of Staff James Baker did not know much about what was happening in Yugoslavia (Zupančič, 2016, p.335). Furthermore, the 'ignorance' of the Yugoslav question by both actors was a result of their at-the-time focus on the Soviet Union, Gulf War, the unification of Germany and the post-Soviet bloc.

For more on the positions and communication between the US and Slovenian diplomatic delegations, see Šuligoj (2015).

The last available figures regarding the number of Slovenes in the US are from the last census in 1990, when there were 124,437 people of Slovene ancestry (Velikonja, 1997).

232 ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO AND FARIS KOČAN 2000; Government of Slovenia, 2020)—is not a Slovenian foreign policy actor. The US’s influence on Slovenia increased when the superpower directly conditioned Slovenian reengagement into Southeast European post-conflict multilateral fora from 1996 to 1998 in order to receive NATO membership, which Slovenia did not achieve in 1997. In this context, a positive international imagebuilding event was organized in 2002 when Slovenia hosted a highlevel state meeting of the US and Russia (Bush-Putin meeting) (Bojinović Fenko and Požgan, 2014). Additionally, in 2003 Slovenia adhered to Vilnius letter signatures9 supporting the US global leadership, which consequently spurred the Old vs. New Europe debate (Gherghisan, 2003) but assured its NATO membership in 2004. The foreign policy decision to support the US invasion of Iraq, however, reflected negatively in the Slovenian public sphere (Špehar, 2014, p.

49) as it saw Slovenian core foreign policy links with Europe via Germany and France being damaged. Similarly, in November 2012, the US influenced Slovenia on its abstention from the voting on a Palestinian observer seat in the United Nations General Assembly—where Slovenia has a track record of utmost Palestinian support—in exchange to buy Slovenian state bonds and save the state from bankruptcy (Bojinović Fenko and Lovec, 2015, pp. 122–125).

This intervention left in the Slovenian public sphere yet another bitter taste of superpower extortion against a Lilliputian. According to international surveys of public opinion, Slovenia was in 2013 among nine countries in the world with the weakest support for US global leadership and in 2017 among four NATO members that would choose Russia over the US should their country be under attack (Cerar, 2018).10 9

10

Vilnius letter is a statement co-signed by 10 CEE countries (so called Vilnius group: Slovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia and North Macedonia) supporting the US stance on UN resolutions having been violated by Iraq—effectively supporting the US invasion of the country (Gherghisan, 2003).

First survey was conducted in 2013 by Meridan International Center and Gallup, and the second was conducted in 2017 by WIN Gallup International (RTV, 2014; Cigler, 2017). Slovenia was the only non-Muslim country among the list of nine countries where a majority of their citizens did not support American global leadership. Other non-supporters were: Tunisia, Iran, Egypt, Iraq,

SLOVENIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 233 Finally, China was, similarly to the US, one of the states that recognized Slovenia rather late (on 27 April 1992). Čeplak Mencin (2012, pp. 170–180) shows that the bulk of post-independent relations between Slovenia and China was based on the pre-existing ones between Yugoslavia and China. The latter were, however, rather incoherent. For example, China did not recognize Yugoslavia until 1955 (only after the end of the Informbiro), and bilateral diplomatic relations were frozen in the period between 1958 and 1969.

Political relations between the states were at their lowest point after the Ljubljana demonstrations against suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 (Čeplak Mencin, 2012, p. 181). Cultural and scientific relations were a bit more tangible and institutionalized. That was enabled in 1978 with an agreement between the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts and Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Social Sciences (Čeplak Mencin, 2012, p.

173).

As we have shown above, Slovenia has been at the crossroads of European powers and only a contact point at the outskirts of external great powers. Therefore, its foreign policy since—and even before declaring—independence has been centripetally oriented towards the EU. This secondary institution has—to the contrary of above, presented US short-term instrumental influence—represented a long-term and value-based orientation of Slovenian domestic self-understanding and foreign policy positioning. When the EU itself conditioned Slovenia to abandon its “away from the Balkans” foreign policy, the state did so immediately and defined its new self-perception through geographical proximity and historical ties to Southeastern Europe while still underlining its own image of being part of Central and Western Europe (Declaration on Slovenian Foreign Policy, 1999). Since 2004, with the achieved EU and NATO membership, the ‘no-alternative to the Euro-Atlantic environment’ doxa prevailed and became a referential framework for all future Slovenian (foreign) policy endeavors. Finally, the latest Foreign Policy Strategy from 2015 further utilized the ideational Yemen, Lebanon, Pakistan and Palestine (RTV, 2014). The other three NATO members favoring Russia were: Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey (Cerar, 2018).

234 ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO AND FARIS KOČAN and normative commitment to the Western world order. It illustrates through a concept of concentric circles, that the EU is the primary circle, the US enters the second circle due to security-assurance and NATO leadership, whereas great powers such as China, Turkey and Russia are relevant to Slovenia as (economic) interestbased third circle states (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy, 2015).

EU-Centric, Pro-Russian and Anti-American?

Slovenian Contemporary Foreign Policy Towards the Great Powers In the 2015-endorsed foreign policy strategy titled “Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected”, the primacy of the EU’s socio-political framework for Slovenia is clearly set. Not only is the EU understood as the “family of nations” (Slovenian foreign policy strategy, 2015, p. 13), but Slovenia, also due to its Eurozone and the Schengen Area membership, identifies itself as a core EU member state and works towards its positive international image in this respect (ibid., pp. 13–16). This strategic and value-based orientation corresponds to economic relations as approximately 76% of Slovenia’s economic activity is based on the EU common market (Miković, 2019). In Slovenian foreign policy as well, all of its five priority issues, i.e., peace and security, human rights, international law, development cooperation and environmental diplomacy, correspond directly with its EU membership obligations and are also pursued through the EU foreign policy framework (Slovenian foreign policy strategy, 2015, pp. 28–32). The only time Slovenia has diverged slightly from multilateralism towards plurilateralism was in 2015 when it joined the Three Seas Initiative, a flexible political platform of 12 EU member states at the presidential level (Three Seas Initiative, 2020).11 It is also relevant to expose that Slovenia plans to use the EU foreign policy framework when dealing with other big powers, especially regarding the challenge to EU societal 11

The initiative includes 12 EU member states located between the Adriatic, Baltic and Black Seas: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (Three Seas Initiative, 2020).

SLOVENIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 235 values and liberal democracy represented by China and Russia (Slovenian foreign policy strategy, 2015, pp. 3–7). Slovenia has added Turkey to this challenge since its 2015 constitutional and foreign policy changes. The one Slovenian foreign policy priority issue where the EU is not the only referential framework is peace and security, where the role of the US through the NATO alliance is acknowledged, and Russia is defined as a destabilizing state (ibid., p. 28).

The Slovenian perception of the US is based on its security assurance role; the strategic document from 2015 states that the US “remains the most powerful world power” (ibid., p. 8). The idea of NATO representing a pillar of both national and transatlantic security for Slovenia was already recognized in the previous strategic document (Slovenian Foreign Policy Declaration, 1999, p. 3). The key strategic role of the US in assuring European security originates in Slovenian perception that “the role and meaning of NATO is based on the protection of common values” (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy, 2015, p. 15). Slovenia also supports strong Euro-Atlantic trade and investment partnership. Bilaterally, Slovenia and the US are linked via “Slovenian diaspora and successful cooperation in the field of defense and nuclear energy” (ibid, p. 16). In this respect, Slovenia’s interest is to increase potential in the field of science and technology and to enhance “fresh and close political dialogue” with the US (ibid.). The US diplomatic representation in Slovenia is in diplomatic circles understood as a “reward destination for US ambassadors” (Sajovic, 2013). In line with this, the past three US ambassadors to the state range from eccentric (Joseph Adamo Mussomeli) to pragmatic (Brent Hartley) and inexperienced (Lynda C. Blanchard). A common stance that signals the US’s foreign policy approach towards Slovenia could be summarized as advocacy through public means of reconciliation, privatization and opposition to Slovenian modus operandi towards Russia.12 Looking at the 12

Reconciliation on WWII Allied Partisan and Nazi-collaboration forces was advocated by both former ambassadors (Mussomeli and Hartley) (Utenkar, 2014).

Mussomeli went even further and said that “it was too easy for Slovenia as just 10 people died during the war for independence (24 ur, 2014). Similar to Mussomeli and Hartley, current ambassador to Slovenia Blanchard emphasized at

236 ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO AND FARIS KOČAN Slovenian interests outside the security archetype emphasizes the economic cooperation between Slovenia and the US, further observed in the statistical data issued by the Public Agency for Entrepreneurship, Internationalization, Foreign Investments and Technology13 (Izvozno okno, 2020). Economic relations between the states were constantly rising in the period between 2015 and 2018, when exports from Slovenia reached 560 million EUR (ibid.). However, in 2019,14 both exports and imports fell severely, and represented around 2% of total Slovenian exports (Miković, 2019). Slovenia also highly cherishes scientific cooperation with the US, evidenced in the two states’ having a Memorandum of Understanding that Fulbright scholarship is a revenue tax exemption in Slovenia.

Slovenia is one of the few US-NATO allies known for having non-problematic relations with Russia. As argued by Benedejčič (2016, p. 1160), this was something that the Slovenian side tried to present as one of its ‘comparative advantages’ when pursuing NATO membership already in 1997. This friendly pragmatism—as labeled by the European Council on Foreign Relations in 200715—is also observed on a strategic level. Russia is identified as an “important market for Slovenia”, a European state for which Slovenia will “make long-term endeavors” to have Russia join the circle of shared European values (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy, 2015, p. 16). Furthermore, Slovenia’s interests are grounded in its efforts

13

14

15

her first hearing in front of the Council on Foreign Affairs in the US Senate that she will advocate for further privatization and deregulation (Brstovšek, 2019).

While Mussomeli argued that the Slovenian public sphere is well disposed towards Russia (Vovk and Žužek, 2014), Hartley emphasized on many occasions that Slovenia is an “independent state” that has to decide whether it wants to be a part of the “democratic West” or “Russian societal model” (Bratož, 2015; Kos, 2018).

Orig. Javna agencija Republike Slovenije za spodbujanje podjetništva, internacionalizacije, tujih investicij in tehnologije—SPIRIT. On 18 October 2019, the US implemented 25% tariffs following a long-running dispute over subsidies given to Airbus over rival US aviation company Boeing (Millar, 2019).

In the policy paper issued by the European Council on Foreign Relations entitled “A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations”, Slovenia was placed in the middle group of ‘Friendly Pragmatists’, together with Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and Slovakia (Leonard and Popescu, 2007, p.2).

SLOVENIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 237 to contribute to a long-term EU-Russia partnership (ibid.). Based on this, potential rival interests between the EU and Russia are illustrated through an attempt of potential Slovenian ‘mediation’ between the EU’s value system and Russia’s (ideational) approach to global affairs. The first concrete steps towards building relations with Russia began already in September 2002,16 when Slovenia and Russia signed a Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooperation (Benedejčič, 2016, p. 1157). Since then, bilateral relations sparked, exceeding the mere political levels and penetrating the cultural sphere.17 The intensification of bilateral relations also have affected Slovenia’s foreign policy stance in crisis situations, such as in the case of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, where Slovenia was in favor of reengaging with Moscow (Türk, 2010). Another example of such a position occurred in September 2013, at the peak of the Syrian crisis, when the Slovenian Foreign Minister rejected suggestions that relations with Russia could be affected by the divergent views on the Damascus regime. Another example was visible at the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in February 2014, when Slovenia emphasized the importance of the continued political dialogue with Russia (Benedejčič, 2016, p. 1160–1661). Finally, during the Skripal March 2018 affair, Slovenia decided not to follow the other 16 EU member states and the US that deported Russian diplomats from their countries due to alleged Russian involvement in the affair (RTV, 2018).18 Outside the strategic domain, the Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy (2015, p. 16) emphasizes the economic cooperation opportunities in tourism, agriculture, culture, language and education. Here, we should not forget to mention the so-called Nord Stream 2 project, 16

17

18

When the document was signed, Slovenian Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel said: “Thus, the traditional friendship, common to both Slavic nations, will also be confirmed on a symbolic level (Benedejčič, 2016, p.1157).

Here, we can mention a joint Slovenian-Russian contemporary exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in 2004, an opening of a Russian Centre for Science and Culture and commemoration at an Orthodox chapel for Russian soldiers who fell during WW1 with the presence of Vladimir Putin in 2016 (Benedejčič, 2016, p.1158–1159).

Slovenia gave a statement that further investigations to determine the culprit were necessary (Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia, 2018) and claimed it had called its own ambassador in Moscow for consultations while the latter had been in Slovenia during the diplomatic crisis anyway (Delo, 29 March 2018).

238 ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO AND FARIS KOČAN where Slovenia tried to stay out of the intensive discussions and offered a ‘loose stance’ by arguing that as long as Gazprom will follow the EU acquis, Slovenia would find the project ‘admissible’ (Esih, 2019). In terms of energy cooperation with Russia, “[o]nly one company, Geoplin, Slovenia’s largest natural gas trader, has signed a mid-term contract for the supply of natural gas to Slovenia with […] Gazprom, valid from 1 January 2018 to 1 January 2023 (Crnčec, Sučić and Merše, 2020, p. 262). This contract assures only about 3% of national annual energy needs and makes Slovenia among the least exposed to Russian malversations in natural gas export among EU member states. Economic cooperation between Russia and Slovenia is visible; Russia is among the 10 biggest trade partners of Slovenia (Miković, 2019), but it is also the only Great Power to which Slovenian exports in goods supersedes imports (for about 61%) (Izvozno okno, 2020).

Similar to the case of Russia, where both relations and perceptions of the great power’s role have changed since independence, relations with Turkey have also undergone a recontextualization.

While Slovenia shaped its first two foreign policy documents during 1991–2015, Turkey was a marginal actor on the strategic level, with the new Foreign Policy Strategy (2015) recognizing its importance within the Euro-Atlantic environment (p. 9). March 2011 marked an important step in this direction with the signing of a Strategic Partnership with Turkey (Jazbec, 2012). The enhanced partnership, which derives directly from this instrument, enabled three important platforms for strengthening bilateral relations, namely increased dynamics of high political visits,19 meetings and visits among business people and public and cultural activities (ibid.).20

19

20

After the signature of the Strategic Partnership, Erdogan visited Slovenia, which was the first visit of a Prime Minister to the at-the-time new Slovene Government and of a Turkish PM ever (Jazbec, 2012).

Such examples are: two Turkish companies invested in Lesna Slovenj Gradec and Farba Prebold; Izother Ljubljana and Izober Kayseri started to cooperate with higher intensity; A Memorandum of Understanding in the field of energy was prepared right after signing the Strategic Partnership (Jazbec, 2012). A special issue of Diplo Atlas Magazine was published in Turkish, in 7.000 copies;

SLOVENIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 239 This change in the intensity of relations should be predominantly understood through economic interests; not only does Slovenia want to cooperate with Turkey in third markets, but it also advocates modernization of the EU-Turkey Customs Union (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy, 2015, p. 16). This economic interest remained an underlying context in which Slovenia handled the migrant and refugee crisis of 2015, which became its most important foreign policy issue towards Turkey (Lovec, 2017). Slovenian media overshadowed the economic priorities with normative critical evaluation. Turkey was presented as a country run by undemocratic elites, taking advantage of its geopolitical position being the only barrier standing between the EU and the “flood of migrants” and as a country with a “weapon of mass migrations”, which can “push the relations with the EU in the waters of securitization, nationalism and xenophobia” (Lovec, 2017). Being highly affected by the Western Balkans migration route, however, Slovenia’s foreign policy stance was to the contrary much more instrumental. Even though Slovenia showed deep Europeanization in managing this issue within the EU structures (Bojinović Fenko and Stahl, 2019, pp. 52– 53), the state avoided commenting on how Turkey handled the challenge from the humanitarian aspect to maintain good bilateral relations. Moreover, in the period following the failed coup d’état (July 2016) and Turkish Constitutional Reform (April 2017), Slovenia not only looked away from the reports on mass violations of human rights but also became the first EU member state to arrange a high-level visit to Turkey (RTV, 2016).21 On February 10, 2020,

21

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, when visiting Slovenia, received the “World Personality of the Decade” Award by the International Institute for Middle East and Balkans Studies (IFIMES) seated in Ljubljana. This was broadcasted live on three main TV Turkish channels (ibid.).

The non-critical government stance towards Turkey persists. It can be illustrated through personal experience of one of this chapter’s authors in December 2019. Upon co-participation in a national radio expert program regarding the role of Turkey in the Western Balkans, a participant—one of the highest officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—said that they should not be using the term “Erdogan's regime”, as it has a “really strong negative connotation”.

240 ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO AND FARIS KOČAN Foreign Minister Miro Cerar visited Ankara and stressed that Slovenia “[would] help Turkey by all means” on their path towards EU membership (RTV, 2020).

Contrary to keeping good bilateral relations regardless of the worrisome trend of ‘executive aggrandizement’ in Turkey, Slovenian foreign policy towards China does not hold back on normative criticism. At the strategic level, Slovenia notes the dichotomy between the EU as a responsible global actor and China’s limited preparedness to take their “global responsibility proportionate to their power” (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy, 2015, p. 8). Also, Slovenia adds that the ambivalent relation of some of the fast-growing economies towards liberal democracy challenges the Slovenian and EU value system (ibid., p. 7). China is perceived as an Asian state and the biggest world economy (ibid). The latter insinuates that Chinese presence in Slovenia is welcome as long as the cooperation between states is of economic nature, i.e., business opportunities for Slovenian firms (acquisition of important companies such as Outfit7, Gorenje and increased activities through the Port of Koper).

The most outstanding case with regards to Chinese influence superseding only the economic sphere is the 17+1 initiative. Outside the economic paradigm, one of the main goals of the Initiative is to support growing ties in the areas of culture, education, tourism, cultural exchanges, think tanks and NGOs (China—Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC), 2018). The Initiative also drives a Chinese symbolic ‘domination’ vis-à-vis Slovenian geographic imagination. This domination manifests itself in the disruption of old taxonomies and classifications of both countries and ‘their respective regions’, as Slovenia and Estonia for example, which are usually not ‘thought of’ within the same regional context, are (re)imagined and approached as CEEC. By doing that, China is “inevitably touching upon intra-EU power relations and challenging the EU and its own projection of power that defines the political development of the CEE today” (Vangelli, 2018, p. 682). China is becoming visible also in the scientific and cultural field. Such examples are the Confucius Institute at the Faculty of Economics and East Asia Resource Library at the Faculty of Social Sciences, both at

SLOVENIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 241 the University of Ljubljana and Chinese cultural evenings, and Slovenian delegations in the Shandong Cultural Industries Fair (EF, 2020; FDV, 2020; GZS, 2020).

Foreign Policy Structures In the period between 1991 and 2020, the Republic of Slovenia adopted three foreign policy strategies, which marked three important phases of Slovenian endeavors to position itself in the international sphere. The period between 1991 and 1998, when Slovenia first outlined but never endorsed its foreign policy strategy, should be understood through the prism of the ‘nation-building’ and independence struggles (Basis of the Slovenian foreign policy strategy, 1991, p. 1). In this context, the role of big powers was limited to the independence efforts and, in the sociopolitical and sociocultural milieu, outshined by the importance of becoming a part of the European family of nations (p. 2–3). In 1991, the wannabe independent Slovenia identified the following great powers from Europe: the FRG, Russia (Soviet Union), the United Kingdom (UK) and France, as well as the US, China and Japan as great powers outside the European continent. A very important factor on the side of big powers at the time was the UN Security Council (UNSC) permanent seat (p. 3), international recognition and “already existing technical, scientific, cultural and economic cooperation” (p. 3–4). As exposed above, the EU had the most dominant role in Slovenian foreign policy framing as its membership represented a foreign policy goal formulated prior to the declaration of independence and remained crucial in steering Slovenia’s “away from the Balkans” strategy “back to the Balkans” in 1998 (Bojinović Fenko and Šabič, 2017, p. 55).

The second period between 1999 and 2015, when Slovenia endorsed its first official foreign policy strategic document, was arguably the most important one for foreign policy consolidation. The foreign policy declaration from December 1999 portrayed the importance of the Euro-Atlantic space (Foreign Policy Declaration, 1999, p. 2–3). The central role of Western European countries and

242 ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO AND FARIS KOČAN the US was embedded into two core Slovenian foreign policy priorities, i.e., ensuring the security and welfare of both the state and its citizens (ibid, p. 2). In order to achieve that, while “maintaining Slovenian national identity”, membership of the EU and NATO became the only referential framework towards which Slovenia aspired (ibid, pp. 2–3). In line with this, the US was identified within the chapter entitled “European countries and the US” and then further framed as the “biggest world power” and the most important ally in the context of the Euro-Atlantic environment (ibid, p. 4). Slovenia recognized that security was the most notable US foreign policy priority towards Southeast Europe (ibid.). During this intensive Europeanization period, the relevance of other great powers such as Russia and China was very scarce. The role of Russia was recognized via “continued development of good relations with an emphasis on economic dimension” (ibid, p. 6), whereas relations with China were simply framed within the chapter “out-of-Europe”— reproducing from a previous period the relevance of China only in the context of its (permanent) seat in the UNSC (ibid, p. 7).

The period of foreign policy consolidation, confirmed by Slovenia’s membership in the EU and NATO (2004), Eurozone (2007) and Schengen Area (2007), recognized the Parliamentary Assembly as the ‘pillar’ of Slovenian foreign policy (Foreign Policy Declaration, 1999). The parliament was acknowledged as the medium of Slovenian foreign policy in accordance with the “broader consensus of civil society, which functions in the area of international relations” (ibid, p. 1). This was further emphasized by one of the interviewees, underlining that the Parliament’s role as the pillar of Slovenian foreign policy was never put in question (Interview 2, 2020).

The last foreign policy strategy, which marks a period from 2015, is symptomatic in at least two ways. First, Slovenia had already achieved its most important foreign policy goals (membership in the EU and NATO, including membership in OECD in 2010), which enabled the policy-makers to ‘frame’ the priorities in correspondence with its obligations of being an EU member state (Slovenian foreign policy strategy, 2015, pp. 28–32). This was also confirmed by one of the interviewees who argued that Slovenia’s

SLOVENIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 243 role in international relations is to “uphold the core values of the UN and the EU through their foreign policy actions” (Interview 2, 2020). Second, the nature of international politics has drastically changed since the financial crisis, which in turn affected the notion of reliance or ‘trust’ in multilateralism. The latter was also mentioned by two of our interviews, who alluded that in recent years, emerging global (super)powers relied more habitually on classical bilateral relations (Interview 1 and 2, 2020). The Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy (2015) does not neglect this trend, rather, it adjusts to it, especially with regards to great powers. The EU, Russia, Turkey, US and China are for the first time all present in the strategic document but framed differently and conceptualized through “concentric circles” (ibid.). In this regard, the EU is understood as the main political organization, the US as the biggest world power, Russia and Turkey as European states, and China as an Asian state.

Interestingly, the EU is Slovenia’s primary circle, the US enters the second circle due to security-assurance and NATO leadership, whereas China, Turkey and Russia are relevant to Slovenia as third circle states. The operationalization of this logic—through concentric circles—has, as argued by two of our interviewees, concrete results in practice (Interview 1 and 2, 2020). In the case of China for example, the only Slovenian priority is economic diplomacy, where ambassadors are functioning as “door-openers” for the Slovenian business community (Interview 2, 2020). Besides the above policy outlined in the strategic document, we should notice that Slovenia has a strategic partnership agreement in force with Germany, France and Turkey all signed in 2011 under the conditions of faster management of effects of European economic and financial crises on its national economy.

Contrary to the exclusivity of the economic paradigm in the Chinese case, current foreign policy towards the US includes many other issue areas. The level of involvement of other ministries in (foreign) policy activities is rather intense, but is “hidden to the public” as the collaboration mainly evolves on the working level via working meetings (Interview 1, 2020). In other words—the political level of bilateral relations with the US is rather non-existent.

This is due to the US’s understanding that in the Balkans, Slovenia has been, similarly to Croatia, always understood as “part of the

244 ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO AND FARIS KOČAN solution, not the problem, due to its membership in the EU and NATO” (ibid.). The biggest change in “space allocated” to great powers is noticed for Turkey and Russia. An evident change of intensity in relations occurred in 2015 due to both strategic (foreign policy document) and operational levels (migrant crisis). Also, the foreign policy approach towards Turkey is not only left to foreign ministers, as the last years have shown that the prime minister and presidents also get involved.22 If one observes the content of those political visits, it is clear that they stay rather consistent and focused on the relations between Turkey and the EU, economic matters and the importance of dialogue when raising a voice regarding Turkish domestic dilemmas (democracy, human rights violations and the rule of law) (24ur, 2015; Dnevnik, 2016; RTV, 2020). A similar pattern of balancing between a common EU approach on the one hand and its own national interests on the other can be observed in the case of Russia. The so-called ‘two-track approach’, which in practice means “both dialogue with and deterrence from Russia” (Interview 3, 2020), is in line with the five guiding principles laid down by the EU Foreign Affairs Council on March 14, 2016 (Council of the EU, 2020). Those principles, of which the notion of selective engagement is both possible and even encouraged, is particularly seen in high-level bilateral visits,23 where topics are not only limited to politics and the economy, but also include technology, energy, culture and security (Dnevnik, 2011; Delo, 2015; RTV, 2019). Here, we should not marginalize the (foreign) policy pursuance affected

by Zoran Janković, mayor of Ljubljana, who in 2019, for example, visited Moscow and signed an Agreement on cooperation by the Government of Moscow and the municipality of Ljubljana for the period between 2019 and 2021 (24ur, 2019).

22

23

Such examples can be traced back to 2015, when Prime Minister Miro Cerar hosted Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in 2016, when President Borut Pahor hosted Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and in 2020, when Miro Cerar again hosted Recep Tayyip Erdogan, but this time as Minister for Foreign Affairs (24ur, 2015; Gaube, 2016; RTV, 2020).

Unlike Turkey, the level of relations with Russia is not limited to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. One striking example is the case of Anja Kopač Mrak (Minister of Labour) and Zoran Janković (mayor of Ljubljana) who received the Order of Friendship for their efforts in strengthening peace and mutual understanding between peoples (Kremlin, 2017).

SLOVENIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 245 Slovenia effectuates its diplomatic presence in the great powers in line with the outlined foreign policy contours. The biggest representation in that regard is within the EU framework, where besides the permanent representation to the EU, Slovenia has residential Embassies in 16 EU member states, and additionally holds ten non-residential embassies (MFA, 2020). Many of the latter were downgraded from residential as a measure after the European economic and financial crisis. Apart from that, the most numerous points of representation are guaranteed in the US through the Embassy in Washington, 14 general Consulates and 14 honorary consuls (ibid). The second most important country after the US is Turkey with one general Consulate and eight Consulates, nine Turkish honorary consuls and an Embassy in Ankara (ibid.). In Russia, Slovenia has three general Consulates, three honorary consuls and an Embassy in Moscow. Out of four great powers, Russia is the one holding the highest presence in Slovenia with an Embassy in Ljubljana and five general Consulates including five honorary consuls. The smallest representation by Slovenia is assured in China by two Consulates, one honorary consul and an Embassy in Beijing (ibid.). These accounts are summarized in Table 1 below.

1 general Consulate, 8 Consulates 9 Honorary Consuls

14 general Consulates 14 Honorary Consuls 29 institutions

40 Honorary Consuls26

72 institutions

2 institutions

12 institutions

21 institutions

1 institution

1 institution

Embassy in Ljubljana

Confucius Institute

Embassy in Ljubljana

Centre for promotion of Russian Culture

EU Parliament and Commission office

10 Consulates, 2 Consuls General, 8 Honorary Consuls27

27

26

25

Slovenia has residential embassies in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Spain: and non-residentially covers Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and Sweden (MFA, 2020).

Slovenia holds Consulates in Italy (2), Austria (1), Germany (1) and Hungary (1). No Consulate (separate to Embassy premises) or Honorary Consul is present in Czech Republic, Ireland, Latvia and Slovakia (MFA, 2020).

Slovenian Honorary Consuls are present in Austria (6), Germany (5), Poland (3), Sweden (3), Denmark (3), Italy (2), Belgium (2), Portugal (2), Spain (3), and (1) in Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands and Romania.

Sending states for Consulates in Slovenia are (1 per state): Austria, Croatia (2 consulates), Cyprus, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Latvia and Lithuania.

Consuls General represents neighboring Hungary and Italy (MFA, 2020) with national minorities present in Slovenia.

Source: MFA (2020).

24

4 institutions

1 Honorary Consuls

2 Consulates

Embassy in Beijing

5. CHINA

Embassy in Ljubljana

7 institutions

3 Honorary Consuls

3 general Consulates

Embassy in Moscow

4. RUSSIA

Embassy in LJ, 5 Consulates, 5 Honorary Consuls

19 institutions

Embassy in Ankara

Embassy in Washington

3. TURKEY

Permanent representation to the EU 26 Embassies in EU MSs (only 16 residential)24 5 Consulates25

2. USA

Table 4: Comparison of reciprocity in diplomatic representation between Slovenia and the Great Powers

SLOVENIA as receiving state

SLOVENIA as sending state

1. EU

246 ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO AND FARIS KOČAN

SLOVENIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 247 In Table 4 we compare the sum of sending and receiving diplomatic institutions between Slovenia in great powers as an indicator of presence. The strongest presence of Slovenia in great powers is obviously in the EU and its member states,28 followed by the US, Turkey, Russia and China. Vice versa, the great powers in Slovenia according to their presence are the EU member states, Russia, China, the US and Turkey. We can, however, notice an imbalance in the following cases:    

Slovenian presence in the US strongly outweighs American presence in Slovenia (29 vs. 1); Slovenian presence in Turkey strongly outweighs Turkish presence in Slovenia (19 vs. 1); Russian presence in Slovenia strongly outweighs Slovenian presence in Russia (12 vs. 7); Chinese presence in Slovenia slightly outweighs Slovenian presence in China (4 vs. 2).

Conclusion This chapter aimed to confront arguments that Slovenia represents a test case for boundary conditions of the functioning of primary and secondary institutions as promoted and assured by the EU in the post-Yugoslav area. We have listed several arguments to support such a thesis. First, we see that a historic focus of Slovenia on Europe as its collective identity remains strong and drives Slovenian high promotion and advocacy of EU values. The state was ready to give away sovereignty to common EU institutions even before declaring independence and today identifies itself as a member state of the core of EU integration. Furthermore, the state strongly promotes EU membership not only in the case of the Western Balkans but also in Turkey. The only diminishment of Slovenian bilateral relations within the EU was the closure of several residential embassies in EU member states as an austerity measure in the context of the European economic and financial crisis. Nevertheless, as part of the solution to boost the national economy, Slovenia 28

This is logical due to the method of counting applied.

248 ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO AND FARIS KOČAN resorted to the primary institution of bilateral diplomacy and signed strategic partnerships with France and Germany as lead EU states. Because Slovenia is a small but highly open economy, economic cooperation is also the main explanatory factor of changing Slovenian foreign policy reference points towards great powers.

Turkey, since the aforementioned crisis, gained relevance via highlevel visits and a strategic partnership. Turkey, Russia and China are put in the same concentric circle of importance to Slovenia with a prevailing economic interest. Normatively, Slovenia often has to smartly balance its EU-values inclined stance against potential damage of economic opportunities in these states. We have shown direct evidence of that for the case of Turkey and Russia; Slovenia wants to keep/pull both of them towards the EU normative framework. These traditional and new economic partners, despite their cultural presence (e.g., Russia and recently China), do not exert influence on Slovenian politics outside business interests. The US has represented a stable secondary circle reference for Slovenian foreign policy, immediately after the EU, due to its security assurance role via NATO alliance. Slovenia effectuates much more visible relations with US society compared to other great powers via scientific, societal, diaspora and university cooperation. We conclude that several recent challenges to the traditional limited interest and influence of great powers in Slovenia, such as the European economic and financial crisis, Russian assertiveness and disrespect of international law, Turkish decline of democracy and rule of law and Chinese penetrating economic strategy in Europe, show effect in traditional diplomatic presence (Table 1), but have not yet accumulated as boundary conditions to shift the Slovenian foreign policy anchor away from the EU as the closest identity and interest-based power. A valuable observation, however, is that within the EU as a secondary institution, Slovenia has laid ground for two strategic foreign policy options, namely siding with the lead powers via the strategic partnership (France-Germany) and engaging in plurilateralism on Central European geopolitical and historical grounds.

Whether the state can use both complementarily or not is becoming a prominent dilemma in light of internal EU disputes on its future

SLOVENIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 249 development including foreign policy stance of individual EU member states toward Great Powers.

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CROATIA: EXPLORING RELATIONS WITH NON-EU POWERS FROM COMFORT OF EU-MEMBERSHIP Senada Šelo Šabić and Nikica Kolar

Introduction Croatia's foreign policy has been predominantly a manifestation of Realpolitik in an effort to realize its interests, more or less consistently. There is nothing controversial about a country maximizing its national goals as this applies to probably all countries in the world, however, there are two caveats here. The first looks at what constitutes a country’s national interests and what is the process of their selection, and the second describes how they are implemented. In this chapter we discuss how Croatia has gone through several stages first, in identifying, and then, executing its foreign policy goals.

From 1991 to 2013, Croatia focused on attaining three consecutive foreign policy goals: obtaining international recognition of a newly created state; mobilizing international support for liberation and unification of its territory; and acceding to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) (Jović, 2011; Šelo Šabić, 2014). Having completed accession to NATO in 2009 and to the EU in 2013, Croatia has been attempting to expand its foreign policy outreach as a country firmly set in the Western political, economic and security sphere, but with interests and ambitions in forging relationships beyond the Euro-Atlantic framework.

In 2013, Croatia’s foreign minister, who saw the country join the EU, announced that Croatia would have a proper foreign policy for the first time (Šelo Šabić, 2013). With a sense of accomplishment and success in achieving the three earlier foreign policy goals, Croatia pledged to expand its foreign policy horizon to maximize its

258 SENADA ŠELO ŠABIĆ AND NIKICA KOLAR interest by building relations with countries outside the EU and outside Europe to complement traditional relations with Western partners. Croatia also intended to focus on its neighborhood and to cooperate with friendly states in stabilizing the Balkans and assisting its Balkan neighbors in implementing reforms that would help them advance on the EU and NATO accession path.

Foreign policy making takes place in a complex world. The nature of such a challenge is not the same for big or small states as resources and instruments at their disposal are different. Small states, in particular, need to develop sophisticated skills of navigating the rough waters of international politics. They need to either form alliances, be silent on certain issues (politics of quietism), keep a low profile, or seek protection from a powerful partner (Hill, 2003). In other words, small state actors have to be more careful than the more powerful because they can more swiftly lose their position in the international order.

To secure its position in the world, Croatia's foreign policy priority has been to achieve political, economic and mutual defense agreements with Western powers. In addition, Croatia has sought relations with other countries to maximize realization of its other interests, primarily economic. For the purpose of this chapter, apart from analyzing relations with Croatia’s traditional partners—the EU and the United States (US)—we also assess its relations with Russia, Turkey and China as countries whose political and economic presence affect developments in Croatia and the Balkans.

The structure of the chapter is organized as follows. First, the international legal and political circumstances in which Croatia was formed (the Yugoslav wars, nationalism, international isolation) are explained. Following this initial historical account, the structure of Croatia's contemporary foreign policy is presented. This is followed by an explanation of the structure of relations between the government and the president as co-creators of the foreign policy and their different approaches to the five powers. Two subsequent sections analyze both Croatia’s relations with the EU and the US and its relations with Russia, Turkey and China. The conclusion draws on the preceding analysis to show the trajectory of foreign policy development in Croatia, its relations with the powers under

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analysis, their interests of these actors and their impact on Croatia.

Finally, we indicate trends of future foreign policy development in Croatia and its relations with these great powers.

Historical Links with Great Powers The fall of the Berlin Wall, and its many chain reactions, affected the situation in the former Yugoslavia where turbulence, after the peaceful ending of the Cold War, was certainly not what the European Union1, the United States or the Soviet Union wanted. These powers sought to preserve peace in Europe and were not in favor of the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Jović, 2006; Glaurdić, 2011). Nonetheless, the drive for self-determination among Yugoslav peoples was stronger. In Croatia, the beginning of its way to independence is linked to the ethno-nationalist political party the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and its leader Franjo Tuđman who strived for Croatia’s full independence from Yugoslavia. The victory of HDZ at the first free and fair elections in 1990 meant that Croatia would be designed in opposition and negation to the Yugoslav federation2: Croatia would become a capitalist nation-state oriented towards the West3, intentionally different from Yugoslavia, which was an international socialist state oriented to and embedded in the nonaligned movement.

Ethno-national and anti-liberal political processes in Yugoslavia created confusion in the EU, which understood the end of the Cold War as a historical moment where democracy, protection of human rights and peace on the European continent could be achieved. The outbreak of violence on a tremendous and escalating scale in Yugoslavia perplexed the EU. Croatia’s leadership interpreted this as the EU being a naïve and an indecisive actor.

1 2

3

European Community at the time.

The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia contains several articles which state this claim (Historical Foundations, Article 1, Article 6, Article 135 (The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia 2014).

The Constitution after the constitutional changes in 2012 states explicitly Croatia's alliance with the West (ibid.).

260 SENADA ŠELO ŠABIĆ AND NIKICA KOLAR The first years of Croatian foreign policy focused on international recognition of military defense and diplomatic efforts. The EU was the first to recognize Croatia (specifically, 14 leading EC member states on January 15, 1992). Other recognitions followed, among them Turkey (February 6, 1992), Russia (February 17, 1992), followed by the US (April 7, 1992) and China (April 27, 1992) (MVEP, Date of Recognition and Establishment of Diplomatic Relations). At the time, the Croatian political leadership proclaimed a historic return to the community of European states, while in domestic politics it was increasingly abolishing liberal human rights standards, and in foreign affairs, pursuing the goals of territorial expansion in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina (Jović, 2006).

European messages of peace and its insistence on negotiations when Croatia was fending off Serb aggression, which witnessed the bombing of the historical city of Dubrovnik and the raising to the ground a town of Vukovar, confirmed Tuđman’s suspicions that the EU was a weak power (Tuđman, 1996). Due to the EU’s incoherent response to the asymmetric war in which Croatia found itself, Croatia shifted its reliance to the US. With American diplomatic and military technical assistance, Croatia, in the spring and summer of 1995, ended the war on its territory through several military operations that liberated territories controlled by Serbian paramilitary forces and the Yugoslav People’s Army.4 Through this cooperation, Croatia and the US established a formidable military-political alliance that lasts to this day.

On the diplomatic front, Croatia has maintained active representation offices. As a member state, Croatia has a permanent mission to the EU in Brussels and embassies in nearly all EU member states. In the US, apart from the embassy in Washington D.C., Croatia has consulates in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Seattle, Kansas City, New Orleans, Pittsburgh, Houston and Anchorage.In China, Croatia has an embassy in Beijing and a consulate in Hong Kong; in Russia, there is embassy in Moscow and consulates in Kaliningrad, Novosibirsk and Sochi while in Turkey, in addition to the 4

Subsequently, the remaining part of Eastern Slavonia was reintegrated into Croatia proper in the period 1996–1998 (UNSC Resolution 1037 (1996).

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embassy in Ankara, there are consulates in Istanbul, Antalya and İzmir.

Contemporary Policies With the victory of a broad center-left coalition in the January 2000 parliamentary elections and a liberal candidate in the presidential elections three weeks later, the space for liberalization of the political system opened up, reorienting Croatian foreign policy towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Given the overwhelming victory of liberal values in the society, HDZ was also forced to emancipate itself from a radical right-wing to a Christian democratic party with a Euro-Atlantic political agenda. Ivo Sanader’s arrival as HDZ’s president, and from the end of 2003 as Croatia's prime minister, led to a consensus among relevant parliamentary political parties and the president of the Republic on Croatia's membership in NATO and the European Union. The foreign policy consensus became known as the Alliance for Europe (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2005). To achieve these goals and accede to NATO and the EU, Croatia had to prove that it was able to turn a new page, self-critically assess its role in the wars in the 1990s, prosecute suspects for war crimes at domestic courts, and extradite to The Hague persons indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Skoko, 2006). Because HDZ had the aura of war victory and Croatian nationalism, it was the only political force that could cooperate with the ICTY without causing major ruptures in society.

On the other side of the executive branch, the president of the Republic and the last president of the Yugoslav Presidency, Stjepan Mesić (2000–2010), sought to broaden the horizons of Croatia's foreign policy. Mesić set out to develop stronger bilateral relations with China, Russia and countries of the former non-aligned movement in Africa and Asia as a way to strengthen economic ties and increase foreign direct investment (FDI) in Croatia (Plevnik, Mesić andJurčić, 2013). His policies contributed to improving bilateral relations with some countries (China, for example), but the global economic recession in 2008 slowed down the FDI (Bakota, 2020) and

262 SENADA ŠELO ŠABIĆ AND NIKICA KOLAR left Croatia in a deep economic recession from which it managed to exit only in 2015.

After Croatia acceded to NATO (2009), the country’s foreign policy switched its focus solely on the accession negotiations with the EU. During this period, Croatia ignored almost all other major powers (China, Turkey and Russia) for the benefit of the EU, with the exception of the US, which, for example, intervened to persuade Slovenia to lift a blockade of Croatia’s accession negotiations over a bilateral territorial dispute (Bajruši, 2009). The US, which strongly supported Croatia's accession to NATO and the EU as a way to stabilize the Balkans, proved once again to be Croatia’s strategic partner.

With the official entry into the EU in 2013, the Alliance for Europe ceased to exist as the strategic goal was achieved, opening space for a ‘multidirectional foreign policy’ (Jović, 2011). A new center-left coalition government with a pro-EU stance came to power in 2011 and intensified efforts to build bilateral relations with non-EU countries to advance its economic interests. Regardless of which political party was in power, Croatian businesses persistently pressured the government to improve bilateral relations with Russia. In 2015, foreign minister Vesna Pusić organized an official visit of Croatian businessmen to a Russian-Croatian economic forum (HRT Vijesti, 2015). However, the prime minister Zoran Milanović was not swayed by pragmatic considerations to improve relations with Russia and insisted exclusively on good relations with the leading EU member states and the European Commission (Mrvoš, Pavić andCiglenečki, 2013). Milanović’s strong orientation towards Europe and the West meant that his government (2011– 2015) made no major attempts to create better bilateral relations with Russia, Turkey and China (N1 Hrvatska, 2014).5 From 2013 onwards, ideological differences between foreign policy programs of political parties began to crystalize. Aforementioned liberal foreign minister Pusić (2011–2015), promoted ideas of gender equality, female literacy, pro-choice birth policies, and, in 5

For example, Milanović as a prime minister did not attend summits of a newly established Chinese initiative 16+1 (today 17+1) of which Croatia was a member.

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general, policies of supporting education and human rights. With interest in multilateral politics and as a strong believer in common solutions to global problems, Pusić also ran as a candidate for the UN secretary-general in 2016.6 Pusić’s successor as a foreign minister, Davor Ivo Stier (HDZ), imposed a different foreign policy agenda. His personal ideological position, for example, strongly impacted Croatia’s three-year mandate (2017–2019) as a member of the UN Human Rights Council (Rešković, 2017). He changed Croatia’s position, claiming for example, that Croatia could not vote to support pro-choice policies in Africa because this conflicts with his personal beliefs (Human Rights House, 2017). Furthermore, Stier promoted an ultraconservative organization U ime obitelji (In the Name of the Family) whose programmatic actions— against same-sex marriages, pro-choice policy and migration—aimed to deconstruct liberal values and, in effect, reposition Croatia among illiberal EU member states such as contemporary Hungary and Poland. Ultraconservative politicians and activists, united behind a common agenda, called for a referendum in 2018 on non-ratification of the so-called Istanbul Declaration (The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence). In 2018, ultraconservatives also strongly protested against Croatia signing the so-called Marrakesh Declaration (The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration), whose goal was to cover all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner (Refugees and Migrants, 2017). The ultra conservatives succeeded in neither case—Stier resigned, the parliament ratified the Istanbul Convention and the government signed the Marrakesh Declaration. The above examples, however, demonstrate that individuals as actors in foreign policy influence a country’s position on a number of issues.

6

At that time, Pusić intensified politics of human rights towards protection of minorities, underlining gender equality in politics (where women are underrepresented), protection against domestic violence and raising literacy rate of women and girls in Third World countries (Hina, 2015; Pusić in Frlan Gašparović 2015; Malo, 2016).

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Co-creators of Foreign Policy Following the center-left coalition that was in power from 2011 to 2015, the government was in the hands of HDZ, first, in 2016, as a coalition of conservative and ultraconservative forces, despite losing confidence after only six months in power. New elections in the fall of 2016 brought HDZ again to power, but this time under the premiership of Andrej Plenković, a pro-European politician. His political agenda, concluding from a number of his policy decisions and statements, has largely been to reform HDZ into a genuine center-right, Christian democratic party. In the mandate 2016–2020, his government managed to survive a series of crises and has retained a course, more or less successfully, of Croatia’s adherence to the EU agenda.

Social-democratic president Ivo Josipović (2010–2015) attempted to build better relations with neighboring countries in the Balkans. His policies were welcomed abroad and at home, despite the opposition from nationalist circles. After one mandate, he was replaced by Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović (2015–2020), whose election strengthened the conservative agenda. Grabar-Kitarović's professional career has been closely linked to HDZ, and before serving as the president, she was a Croatian ambassador in the US (2008–2011) and a NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy (2011–2015). Her arrival marked a partial reorientation of Croatia's foreign policy from the EU to the US and had an impact on the foreign policy decision-making process. Before her mandate, Croatian presidents had an unofficial agreement with the government on how to cooperate in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, seeing as under the Constitution, the president and government co-create foreign policy (Croatian Constitution, Article 99).

The government would dominantly coordinate bilateral relations with the EU member states and EU institutions while presidents would dominantly manage bilateral relations with non-EU countries. That is why president Mesić travelled to countries such as Russia and China to build economic ties, and president Josipović to Bosnia and Israel to strengthen bilateral relations with a message that Croatia regretted some of its past actions.

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This ‘division of labor’ is not clear-cut and has caused friction in the past, but Grabar-Kitarović’s mandate was exceptional in this regard. She called for special government sessions, extraordinary meetings of the National Security Council (Romić, 2015), and made statements that implied she, as a president, could make executive decisions which, formally speaking, she could not. On several occasions, analysts and legal experts suggested that the president should read the Constitution, because she apparently did not know what her powers were (Brkulj, 2019).

Grabar-Kitarović, nonetheless, continued to carve out more space for her role. In 2016, with Polish president Andrzej Duda, she launched a Three Seas Initiative, aimed at increasing economic cooperation among EU member states that border the Adriatic, the Baltic and the Black Sea.7 The Croatian government never earnestly supported the Initiative beyond a few formal statements. The EU reluctantly and then formally offered its support, as the Initiative had been understood to create default dividing lines within the EU between the East and the West, designed to serve as a buffer against stronger Russian influence and, thus, favored by the US (Janulewicz, 2017; Vondra, 2018). The US President Trump’s presence at the second meeting of the Initiative in Warsaw in 2017 only confirmed the speculation of its US sponsorship.

According to the Constitution, the president is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces, therefore, the president plays a significant role in relations with NATO. As a rule, presidents visit locations where Croatian soldiers participate in NATO peacekeeping missions (such as Afghanistan). The prime minister and government ministers participate in EU meetings, including those related to security and foreign policy.

Fairly assessing the role of the president requires understanding of the constitutionally built-in dichotomy. Even though the president is popularly elected, unlike other state officials, her or his powers are limited to the realm of foreign and security policy and only in coordination with a prime minister. In practice, this 7

Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

266 SENADA ŠELO ŠABIĆ AND NIKICA KOLAR amounts to agreements on nomination of ambassadors8 or a declaration of war. Being elected by popular vote, but with almost no executive power, is bound to create frustrations of presidents and tensions in their relationship with the government. Calls for changes in the Constitution that would further limit powers of the president, making her or his role purely symbolic, limited to protocol duties, and elected in a parliament (Sokol, 2018), have been repeatedly made, but not yet initiated in practice.

Relations with Western Powers European Union The relationship with the EU is strategic both politically and economically. Because the Croatian political establishment made an unequivocal commitment to join the EU, its political life revolved around accession until 2013 and, since then, around its ability to successfully operate within the EU. Orientation towards the EU is driven by a sense of belonging to Central European civilizational space, in contrast to the Balkans and the ‘Balkan mentality’ (Horvat, 2011). A struggle to not only disassociate, but to de-identify itself from Yugoslavia and the Balkans has permanently inspired Croatian political imagination. EU membership is understood as proof that Croatia does not belong to a circle of economically underdeveloped and historically unstable Balkan states. In the political discourse, membership is a source of differentiation vis-à-vis neighbors which are not EU members but would like to be in the future.

There is no doubt that Croatia’s national interest is to support the EU enlargement in the Western Balkans in order to secure peace, stability and progress in its neighborhood (MVEP Foreign Policy Aims). For example, a democratic, prosperous and friendly

8

Filling diplomatic posts is usually done through a balanced procedure where one ambassador is nominated by the prime minister and another by the president (Jutarnji.hr, 2020).

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Serbia positively impacts Croatia. The other way round, an authoritarian, poor and hostile Serbia negatively impacts Croatia. In that sense, Croatia’s goal is well placed—to assist neighboring countries in carrying out reforms that support their political democratization and economic development. However, this long-term goal conflicts with the day-to-day political interests on both sides of the border.

Unresolved issues from the past continue to burden relations. A prospect of achieving a far-fetched goal in the future takes second place in a battle of day-to-day political survival. The easiest way in a relationship based on little trust is to accuse the other side of wrongdoing and score points on the domestic front by bashing the neighbor.

Neighborly squabbles aside, Croatia remains among a minority of EU member states that support further EU enlargement. During the Croatian presidency of the EU Council (January–June 2020), Croatia tried to put enlargement on the agenda, but it failed. A COVID-crisis that peaked in Europe during the Croatian presidency sidelined any discussion on further EU enlargement. Croatia, nonetheless, organized a summit of EU and Western Balkans leaders in May 2020, but the adopted declaration notably does not mention enlargement (Zagreb Declaration, 2020).

United States The US does not have strategic economic interests in Croatia and its neighborhood. However, the US is in favor of securitizing the Balkans through NATO and, hand-in-hand, EU enlargement, to protect peace in Europe, which is essential for the US’s geopolitical and macroeconomic interests (Stoltenberg, 2019).

A strategic partnership with the US, as explained earlier in this chapter, had been sealed during the early 1990s. Accession to NATO was Croatia’s key strategic interest until it was achieved in 2009. Yet, unequivocal support for the US among Croatian politicians is not a carte blanche. In 2003, Croatian president Stjepan Mesić rejected a possibility of Croatia joining the US-led ‘Coalition of the

268 SENADA ŠELO ŠABIĆ AND NIKICA KOLAR Willing’, a multinational force against Iraq. On the other hand, Croatia had a peacekeeping force in Afghanistan from 2003 until September 2020 (Croatia Week, 2020).

Nonetheless, a strategic partnership between the US and Croatia is largely unquestioned. The US sees the manifestation of this partnership by Croatia being an active and constructive member of NATO and the EU. For the US, this also means a limitation of Russian influence in Croatia. It is largely believed that to keep Russian banks at bay, in 2018–2019 a US hedge fund, Knighthead Capital, became involved in resolving a financial crisis that erupted in Croatia’s largest company Agrokor (Šunjerga, Veljković, 2018). President Grabar-Kitarović made efforts from her side to present herself as an American player in Croatian politics. She spoke about the US being Croatia’s primary ally in foreign affairs, reminding the public of America’s aid and European undecidedness during the war. An undisputed alliance with the US also meant promoting NATO's goals. More than once, Grabar-Kitarović said that Croatia defended itself yesterday at home and today in Afghanistan (Croatia Week, 2018).

Stronger reliance on the US also implied diversifying Croatia’s energy supply and its relative independence from Russia’s natural gas supply. The US supports a long-planned project of building a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal on the island of Krk9 where gas purchased from non-Russian sources would be stored and further distributed.

The LNG Krk project faced a number of delays due to considerations of the liquefied gas market price, limited demand and the overall economic viability of the project, but proclamation of its strategic relevance expedited its finalization in 2020.

Relations with Non-Western Powers in Croatia Although Croatia's foreign policy has, in principle, been conducted in light of a strong preference for the European project and NATO

9

When in 2019 the government finally started realizing the project for building the LNG terminal on the island of Krk, the US embassy congratulated the Croatian government for making this decision (US Embassy, 2019).

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military alliance, its development shows that this Euro-Atlantic foreign policy orientation was influenced also by pragmatic concerns, not necessarily only strong ideological beliefs. From time to time, Croatian foreign policy actors will demonstrate an open-door policy towards non-Western great powers (Russia, China and Turkey).

This pragmatically-driven political behavior was further strengthened after Croatia’s accession to NATO and the EU. Russia Russia’s historical links with the Balkans are manifold; they rely on the Orthodoxy, legacy of the two World Wars (and Balkan wars) in the 20th century, communist ideology, and cultural influence through Russian writers and poets. A post-Cold War Russia, with a self-image of a global power, seeks to expand its influence. The complex relationship and ups and downs between the West and Russia are reflected in the Balkans.

Given the traditional Russian-Serbian political and cultural ties, Croatia’s relations with Russia would remain relatively low, although during the reign of Franjo Tuđman (1990–1999), they were not on negative terms. On the contrary, Croatia at the time secretly received firearms from Russia, although this military assistance was less than it received from Germany or especially the United States, for example (Bandić and Aralica, 2013). Furthermore, Tuđman himself did not support NATO's 1999 bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which had a major effect on the course of Russian foreign policy in the Balkans (Jutarnji list, 2008).

Russia, perceived as a spoiler in the Balkans, wanted destabilization if the West wanted stabilization (Bechev, 2017); it sought to maximize the effects of its policy with resources at its disposal, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, through links with Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik (Dempsey, 2014). Russia aimed to prevent further expansion of NATO, although, considering the completed accession of Croatia, Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia, it has not been successful so far.

Even when unable to steer Balkan countries away from political and security alliances with the West, Russia built relations

270 SENADA ŠELO ŠABIĆ AND NIKICA KOLAR through other available means. In some cases, this was religion, culture, common traditional or anti-fascist legacy, but in the majority of cases it was the economy. Croatia remains particularly interesting in this regard. Officially, and as a member of NATO and the EU, Croatia first espoused little connections with Russia, but economically it was considerably connected and exposed to Russian influence. Supply of Russian gas, investment in tourism and a bailout of the Agrokor company resulted in Croatia becoming more dependent on Russia than a superficial observation would indicate. On top of offering cheap natural gas and accessible credit financing, Russia was suspected of bribing politicians and businessmen in Croatia (Vidov and Prkut, 2019).

Russia’s role in the Croatian economy is clearly seen through the example of Agrokor. In 2017, a financial crisis broke out in Croatia's biggest consumer-goods company, and the largest in Southeast Europe, Agrokor. The company over-borrowed money from Russian banks (VTB and Sberbank), causing a crisis in the private company that, because of its size, turned into a major economic, political and social problem for the government (Klepo, Bićanić and Ivanković, 2017). Refinancing of Agrokor’s debt ended with a 2019 bankruptcy settlement in which the Russian Sberbank became the largest share owner of the newly-named company Fortenova Group. Through this deal Russia came into possession of 32.839 hectares of agricultural land in eastern parts of Croatia, which was 12,8% of all state rented agricultural land in Croatia (Galić, 2019).

Russia’s role as a creditor of Agrokor, which required government involvement, further led to Croatia weighing its words more carefully when criticizing Russia for its foreign policy actions.10 10

For example, soon after taking office as prime minister, Andrej Plenković offered the Croatian experience of post-war reintegration as a model for post-war Ukraine. Plenković’s comment was immediately criticized by the Russian foreign ministry, but he was also criticized at home. Domestic criticism implied that Croatia has no business in meddling in international affairs that it has no capacity to resolve. By doing so, it can only endanger its own economic interests. Since that incident, Croatia has largely remained silent, although it does participate in EU sanctions against Russia. The Croatian silence after the Agrokor affair can be ascribed to the fact that Russian banks own a large part of the new company, but are also just a continuation of a policy position that Croatia,

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With the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury (England), for which the UK and Western governments held Russia responsible, a number of states expelled Russian diplomats from their territory. Croatia followed suit by expelling one Russian diplomat (Jutarnji.hr, 2018), leading to Russia expelling one low-ranking Croatian diplomat in response (Pavlić, 2018).

Recent events on the international scene have revealed Russia’s role in spreading fake news and co-financing political parties and NGOs against the West, particularly the US. Croatia is not an exemption in this regard. Russia is believed to be linked to politically and religiously conservative groups in Croatia, commonality with which is a scorn of liberal values (Vidov and Prkut, 2019). At the same time, Russia has pursued active cultural diplomacy in Croatia by financing various local cultural projects, such as Russian language courses, monuments dedicated to great Russian artists and scientists, and student exchange programs, all aimed at creating stronger ties with the Croatian public (Međugorac, 2016; Poslovni.hr, 2018).

Turkey Although during the war in BiH, Turkey principally sided with the Bosniaks, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel maintained close relations with the Croatian President Franjo Tuđman in the 1990s.11 Turkey wanted good relations with all countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia, not least as a basis for pursuing its economic interests (Rašidagić and Hesova, 2020). Turkey also strongly supported Croatia’s NATO membership as a way to further stabilize the Balkans (Jakovina, 2015).

Politically, Turkey has had limited influence in Croatia. It has done so mainly through policies directed at BiH. During the mandate of Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who designed

11

for its own sake, is better off if it remains silent on issues that only ‘big players’ can solve.

Suleyman Demirel was the only foreign dignitary, except for officials from neighboring countries, who attended Tuđman’s funeral in December 1999.

272 SENADA ŠELO ŠABIĆ AND NIKICA KOLAR the policy of Neo-Ottomanism,12 Turkey, in 2009, established a trilateral forum—Ankara-Zagreb-Sarajevo—to discuss issues of common interest.13 Although ambitiously planned, the trilateral forum’s two meetings had no significant outcome.

For a brief period in the 2000s, Turkey successfully pursued soft power policies in the Balkans, including Croatia. Tourism boomed and Turkish language courses spiked as a result of the popularity of Turkish soap operas. Turkey was among the first to react to floods in Croatia, BiH and Serbia in 2014. The positive public perception of its donations led Turkey to open the office of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) in Zagreb. Although international donors closed their offices in Croatia when Croatia was about to enter the EU, Turkey decided to open a development cooperation office in 2016. Beside humanitarian aid, TIKA implemented a number of projects, including cross-border sport events for children and research trips in Turkey for Croatian scientists, public servants, doctors, artists, students and school groups (Biogradlija, 2019). To further invest in relations between the two peoples, Turkey opened a cultural center—the Yunus Emre Institute—in Zagreb in 2016 as a place for organizing events and activities that promote Turkish language learning and strengthening links between Croatia and Turkey in the fields of culture, education and science (Tportal.hr, 2016).

There are, of course, investments that Turkey has pursued in Croatia. Until 2018, Turkey invested over 600 million USD in Croatia, largely in tourism, banking and renewable energy sources, and apparently has cooperation in the field of defense (Jazbinšek, 2020).

Despite almost a century-old tradition of Ataturk's secular Turkey, contemporary Turkey came to Croatia with a strong flavor of the Islamic culture. This religious element resonated well with Croatia’s president Grabar-Kitarović. On the 100th anniversary of recognition of Islam in Croatia in April 2016 (although Islam was 12

13

The doctrine explicitly pursues expansion of Turkey’s influence over the former Ottoman territories; it was mostly expressed during a mandate of the foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (2009–2014). See also Zeynep Arkan’s chapter on Turkey in this volume.

Turkey also established another trilateral—Ankara-Belgrade-Sarajevo.

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recognized in the Austro-Hungarian empire and thus not per se in Croatia), Grabar-Kitarović hosted Turkish president Recep Taayip Erdogan in Zagreb where the Turkish delegation was received with pomp and circumstance. Kilims were brought into the Croatian National Theatre to, presumably, make the scenery more welcoming.

The visit included several high-profile Turkish businessmen to discuss investment opportunities (Anadolu Agency, 2016). The friendly atmosphere of this high-level official visit was to be followed by future meetings, one of them being a visit to the town of Sisak to lay a foundation for a future Islamic center and a mosque (Diab, 2016). Yet, following the attempted coup d’état in the summer of 2016 in Turkey and events that followed it, the Sisak visit did not take place (Ma, 2016). Both projects, however, stand to be built (Biogradlija, 2019). The migration crisis, broader EU-Turkey relations, political changes in Turkey, and a change of president in Croatia in 2020, suggest that a brief phase of friendly relations will not be soon revived.

China In the 1990s, among the powers discussed in this chapter, China was not only geographically and culturally but also politically the most distant from Croatia. Focused on economic and social reforms at home14 and, traditionally, not pursuing an internationalist foreign policy, China was not visible in Croatia. Shortly after China's recognition of Croatia, Tuđman visited the People's Republic hoping to accelerate and foster bilateral relations, but found little success (Bakota, 2020).

However, in the course of a few years, China became Croatia’s important economic partner. When invited to join a newly established Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2012, Croatia accepted (Stopić, 2020), but with little enthusiasm on the part of the centerleft government. With the government of Andrej Plenković (2016– 14

“The break-up of Yugoslavia happened during a specific period in the history of Chinese foreign relations. China was more oriented towards the preservation of internal stability, and its unassuming foreign policy started to disengage it from active participation in global affairs” (Bakota, 2020).

274 SENADA ŠELO ŠABIĆ AND NIKICA KOLAR 2020), the attitude changed. When European funds were approved in 2017 for the construction of a Pelješac bridge in the south of Croatia, Plenković’s government opted for a Chinese construction company. From that point onwards, cooperation took on a whole new life to such an extent that the Chinese prime minister described the status of Sino-Croatian bilateral relations as a “diamond stage” (Bakota, 2020).

In a relatively short time, Croatia created exceptionally good relations with China by establishing exports of agricultural goods to China; welcoming Chinese tourists; pursuing cultural and educational cooperation programs; and opting for Chinese construction companies in infrastructure projects, such as the Pelješac bridge, railway reconstructions, Huawei telecommunication development, and 5G network development (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2019). e. Despite the EU’s misgivings about China’s role in the Balkans, unequal treatment of European companies on the Chinese market, and criticism that the Pelješac bridge was the first infrastructure project in the EU to be built by a Chinese company with European funds, Plenković, who nurtured an image of a genuine European, opened the door to Chinese presence in Croatia.

Why this is so is not quite clear.

China showed interest in Croatian shipyards, but decided not to invest due to shipyard conditions, despite Plenković’s assurances that talks were going well (Hina, 2019). However, China invested in health tourism (HrTurizam, 2019) and electric automobiles. With cultural and educational exchanges picking up, today, there are a number of possibilities that China offers Croatia scholars, students, business persons, state officials, journalists and others to take a sponsored trip to China. Although there is only one Confucius institute and one Sinology university program in the country, the potential for strengthening ‘people-to-people’ links is growing (Stopić, 2020). A diamond stage of bilateral relations seems set to continue in the near future.

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Conclusion Croatia, in effect, relies on foreign policy strategies at the disposal of small state actors. These occur in forming alliances, being silent on certain issues, keeping a low profile, or seeking protection from a powerful partner (Hill, 2003). Croatia’s quest for independence and international recognition went through a war whose wounds are not yet healed, but which also is a core element in the official narrative that Croatian nationalist political actors exploit for narrow political goals. Genuine Europeanization and adherence to the values of liberal democracy are still waiting to be internalized and fully endorsed.

Internationalization of liberal values, as well as economic development and social cohesion, remain key policy challenges on the domestic front. In the foreign policy realm, Croatia continues to strive for strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic integration processes in its neighborhood, leading to full membership of Western Balkan countries in NATO15 and the EU. It is, therefore, all the more surprising that Croatia sometimes undermines these goals, as well as the interests of the EU and NATO, by choosing to pursue specific, one could say, self-serving interests in its relations with its Balkan neighbors. Such self-serving behaviour at the expense of collective interests might be explained by incomplete learning processes in the secondary institutions it has joined.

Making or pretending to make little changes regarding the rule of law or protection of human rights to enter into liberal and powerful alliances is a small price to pay for a self-serving actor.

Such an actor recognizes that once it officially becomes an equal partner with other alliance members, it is better able to fend off criticism or resist pressure to promote liberal and democratic values.

However, if this actor genuinely wants an alliance to be successful, it should strive to converge its interests with those of the alliance, actively participating in their design and fully committing to their implementation. Formal membership without genuine contribution is an empty shell. Croatia may have needed some time to adjust 15

With the exception of Serbia which has declared itself as a military neutral state.

276 SENADA ŠELO ŠABIĆ AND NIKICA KOLAR to the EU, but with a longer membership experience and greater benefits from this membership, Croatia’s honest commitment and active contribution to a resilient EU are expected to grow.

Relations with non-Western powers, discussed in this chapter—Russia, Turkey and China—are on a significantly lower scale, although they are dynamic and reflect activities that Russia, Turkey and China pursue in the Balkans and in Croatia. The extent of which these bilateral relations with these powers will continue to develop depends on each side’s interests. In addition, Croatia’s position vis-à-vis these powers will remain strongly affected by Croatian membership in the EU and NATO and how members of these two organizations, collectively, approach relations with Russia, Turkey16 and China.

Croatian strategic relationship, despite occasional tones of Euroscepticism, is with the EU. The second arm of this strategic foreign policy ax is extended towards the US. It is in this Euro-Atlantic, Western connection that Croatia sets the framework for its existence.

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REDISCOVERING AN OLD PLAYBOOK: SERBIA AND THE GREAT POWERS Mladen Mladenov

Introduction The apparent ambiguity of contemporary Serbian foreign policy has presented a challenge to understanding the foreign relations of this Balkan country. In particular, the European Union (EU), in spite of clear commitments from Serbia to pursue membership, has concerns about Belgrade’s true foreign policy intentions. When Aleksandar Vučić was sworn in as President of Serbia in May 2017, in his inaugural speech, he emphasized the importance of Serbian sovereignty and neutrality, and announced that Serbia wanted to strengthen relations with Europe, as well as with Russia, China, Japan and the United States (US), while a focus on regional stability called for an open attitude towards dialogue with Prishtina (Danas, 2017). Such statements by the main foreign policy decision-maker who in his first address failed to directly mention the EU, but referred more generally to relations with Europe and a European path while equally declaring a desire to increase cooperation with other powers and stressing the importance of sovereignty were not completely consistent with the long-term self-proclaimed priority of Serbia to join the European Union (Mladenov and Stahl, 2015).

Actual foreign-policy decision-making has been largely in line with this messaging since the early 2000s and in particular since the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) came to power in 2012. Already since the overthrow of the regime Serbia has pursued good relations with the West on the one hand and Russia on the other while also strengthening ties with other powers across the world such as China and Turkey being the two most visible examples. Relations between Serbia and these countries are on the rise. Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the associated 17 + 1 format

284 MLADEN MLADENOV in Central and Eastern European countries in 2012, Serbia has become a primary partner for China in the region. The relationship between Serbia and Turkey also promises and confirms the self-image of both countries as important regional powers, confirmed by Turkish attention on Serbia and as a great power, with a strong cultural affinity and influence in the Balkans.

Such wavering raises questions about the way Serbian foreign policy views the international society, its own role and the role of great powers in it, as well as the significance of the balance of power. If Serbia does not embrace EU hegemony, does it prefer a more anarchical system marked to a bigger extent by great power management? How about the principles of international law and the role of global institutions such as the United Nations (UN)? In the Kosovo issue Serbia has used both international law and the UN as important tools to pursue its interests, but how strict does it oppose the undermining of those in conflicting situations with an implication on the balance of power?

The quest to address these questions begins with the examination of historical relations which will be discussed in the next section. Historically, Serbia has had ample experience in dealing with great powers in its history from Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire to the Austrian and the Russian empires (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2006, p. 234). Taking into account this experience helps explain historically founded attitudes and will later reveal changes and continuities while providing insights into current political trends and developments that motivate Serbian foreign policy towards the great powers. The common thesis that historical legacies continue to play a significant role in framing Serbian foreign policy can be tested in this way. Having identified the main historical determinants of Serbian foreign policy, the paper will then turn to the contemporary relations of Serbia with the great powers. Relations with the EU and the US will be reviewed together with a main focus on European integration, before turning the attention to Russia and China and to a lesser extent to Turkey. This will be followed by a more detailed examination of Serbian foreign policy structures and framing in order to allow for an overall assessment and outlook of Serbia’s relations with the great powers in the last section.

SERBIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 285

Historical Links between Serbia and the Great Powers Great powers have been traditionally central to the external relations of modern Serbia. To illustrate Serbia’s links with the great powers throughout its history, in contemporary politics and for the purpose of structuring the study of these relations, this section starts by discussing three characteristics of Serbian foreign policy, which it finds recurrent in relations with the great powers. In order to illustrate Serbia's links with the great powers throughout its history and in contemporary politics, and to structure the study of these relations, this section discusses three features of Serbian foreign policy which are recurrent in its relations with the great powers.

(First, Serbs realized already before the official recognition of their modern state that foreign powers beyond Serbia’s immediate neighbourhood had a strong impact on their destiny). First, even before the official recognition of their modern state, the Serbs recognized that foreign powers beyond Serbia's immediate neighbourhood had a strong impact on their destiny. Thus, already before international recognition of the independence from the Ottoman Empire was achieved, foreign policy considerations began to play a role in building the future state. A brief examination of Nacertanije—a document produced in 1844 and attributed to the Serbian minister of internal affairs under Duke Aleksandar Karađorđević Ilija Garašanin’s—serves as an early illustration of this connection.

Nacertanije is considered the first authoritative statement regarding the national interests of Serbia (Dimitrijević, 2009, pp. 144–145). As such it outlined the country’s future foreign policy goals. Çeku (2017, p. 2) believes that it served as the foundation of Serbian foreign policy not only in the nineteenth but also in the twentieth century. Assuming that the Ottoman Empire would ultimately break up, Garašanin aimed to predict how the division of its territory on the Balkans would evolve. He identified two possible scenarios according to which of these territories would be either occupied by the two foreign powers that had the most interest in the Balkans, i.e., Austria and Russia or by new Balkan states. Thus, while Serbia

286 MLADEN MLADENOV would have to expand at the expense of the Ottoman Empire by cleansing towns of Turks, gaining territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and northern Albania, Garašanin saw Austria as the main opponent to the realization of the second scenario and predicted a later conflict. Regarding Russia, he concluded that the preferred option would be an agreement whereby Russia would not interfere in Serbian internal matters. Garašanin expected that other Western powers—namely France and Great Britain, which he saw as natural allies—would be supportive of Serbia as they would object to an increasing Austrian and Russian influence in the region.

Indeed, in the period between the independence of Serbia from the Ottoman Empire and WWI, the Serbian Question came to the center of the Austro-Russian struggle for influence in the Balkans as Serbia was projecting strong attraction to Serb minorities in Austria-Hungary. Similarly, the Serb minorities in the Ottoman Empire were eager to join their kin-state (Djordjević, 1967, p. 56). For Serbia to realize its ambitions of establishing a South Slav state it was necessary not only to predict possible scenarios, but also to devise a plan of dealing with the great powers that were competing for influence on the Balkans. With the Ottoman Empire firmly in decline, the path to uniting South Slavs led through managing relations with Austria and Russia. Garašanin assumed that in the case of a division of the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire between Austria and Russia, Serbs would likely entirely fall under Austrian rule which meant that Austria had to remain an enemy under any circumstances. As Russia, in spite of the shared language and religion, was also believed to pursue exclusively its own goals, Garašanin believed that it was Serbia’s task to outmaneuver the great powers.

Second, Serbia became aware in the nineteenth century that unity with other South Slavs significantly expanded and improved their options for managing relations with the great powers. Therefore, the great powers significantly influenced Serbs’ understanding of their role in the Balkans. In Serbia’s struggle for independence, Garašanin saw relations with other South Slavs as paramount.

He believed that great powers’ ambitions in the Balkans could be tamed by Serbia assuming a leadership role among the South Slavs and leading them to unification (Sundhausen, 2007, p. 116). Long

SERBIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 287 after Nacertanije was written, unity among South Slavs proved to be the central element in achieving foreign policy goals. After the end of WWI, divisions—in particular between Serbs and Croats— became obvious with the Serbs favoring a unitary state over the Croats’ preference for a confederation (Bakić, 2018, p. 164). On several occasions the Serb leadership under Nikola Pašić had to make concessions in this regard for the sake of maintaining the appearance of South Slav unity in the perception of the great powers. This was achieved, as was—due to military success—the assertion of the Serb vision for the new South Slav state, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Bakić, 2018, pp. 165–166).

Yugoslav unity under Serb leadership continued to prove its importance during Socialist Yugoslavia when the country managed to be a subject rather than an object in international relations. Tito’s famous break with Stalin in 1948 made the US rapidly invest over 1.5 billion USD in the military and the economy, and further, it was Tito—not the US—who later decided to halt US military funding (Lees, 2010, p. 227). Yugoslavia was able to use its leverage also in relations with Western European countries such as Italy with which it developed good neighbourly relations during the Cold War. This was both an unlikely and a remarkable success considering both countries’ preceding territorial disagreements (Ruzicic-Kessler, 2014). In a similar vein, the Balkan Pact from 1953 between Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece represented a demonstration of the importance of a unified Yugoslavia. Even though it became ineffective soon after its establishment because of different bilateral issues (Vukman, 2013), the Balkan Pact managed to briefly bring together three states with difficult historical relations and in particular it became a link between Yugoslavia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

During the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Serbia in particular enjoyed some initial leeway from foreign powers in trying to hold Yugoslavia together. Hence, allegedly, US diplomats in Belgrade during the 1980s had an at least partly positive assessment of Milošević and his centralism as they believed that this was the best option for Yugoslavia at the time. According to Meier (1999, p. 39), the US diplomatic support for Milošević ended only in 1987 when

288 MLADEN MLADENOV the ambassador in Belgrade, John Scanlan was replaced by Warren Zimmermann who had been previously instructed to be more critical towards Milošević. Nevertheless, the United States adopted a cautious attitude and preferred to act observantly when Yugoslavia started to disintegrate. While some historians such as Holm Sundhausen (2007, p. 418) attribute this behavior to the relative decrease in importance of Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War— which meant that no strategic US interests were expected to be affected—it is obvious that international actors were initially reluctant to let Socialist Yugoslavia break up.

A final important aspect of Serbian relations with the great powers is the notion of victimization. This has been a dominant narrative of the Serbian state as it has had to defend itself against foreign powers in order to survive. Such struggles have often been presented as tragic, unfortunate and undeserved from a moral perspective. Historical memories are central to the construction of this narrative, with the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 particularly constituting the Serbian martyrdom. Jelena Subotić (2016) points out that this was followed by Serbian downfall at the hands of the Habsburgs and then the Germans in WWII1. Serbs’ own portrayal as victims of the great powers has served as a motive for foreign policy decisions. Admittedly, not only foreign powers have been blamed for catastrophes. In particular neighbours have also been put at the center of Serb misfortune.2 However, also in these cases great powers have often been made responsible as the intellectual perpetrators or at least enablers. It is important to note that the discourse presenting Serbia as a victim has also been used internally to justify foreign policy and—in combination with conspiracy theories—to shift responsibility for Serb wrongdoings to great powers.

1

2

Great powers are perceived to interfere heavily in Serbian internal affairs. Cases such as the 1941 Coup d'État in Serbia which was significantly influenced by the British Special Operations Executive (Stafford, 1977) have motivated such perceptions.

An example is the role of Bulgarians and Albanians in the Serbian retreat during WWI which is also known as Albanian Golgotha and led to almost 250 000 dead, wounded, captured or missing Serbs (Afflerbach, 2015, p. 90).

SERBIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 289

Contemporary Policies In the previous section historic relations between Serbia and the great powers were discussed against the background of some characteristics of Serbian foreign policy behavior, which has been identified as useful in explaining and structuring links between Serbia and the great powers. Focusing on contemporary policies, this section will use these findings to examine contemporary relations between Serbia and the great powers with the goal to establish which are the driving forces behind Serbian foreign policy towards the latter and why. This will also serve to establish Serbian preferences for the international system.

Serbian foreign policy focused on striving for unity in the early years after the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia. As pointed out above it had emerged as a core lesson from the past that South Slav unity or at least the appearance of it could be a key asset in relations with the great powers. However, during the disintegration of Socialist Yugoslavia, Serbia had to find out that championing such unity for purposes that were obviously selfish and contrary to the desires of the other participating nations in the perception of great powers very soon wiped out Serbia’s leverage. As a result, the country became known as an oppressor (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2006, p. 243) which made it vulnerable and weaker vis-àvis great powers, none of which were ready or able to lend significant support to Serbia during the wars in the 1990s (Mladenov, 2014).

When unity and—with it—Serbia’s claim to champion unity disappeared in the 1990s, Serbian foreign policy, perhaps instinctively, turned its efforts to portraying the country as a victim of the great powers. In particular, since the 1999 intervention, the United States, NATO and other members of the Alliance were often perceived as unfriendly. As Subotić (2016, p. 623) notes, the Kosovo problem was attributed to great power politics, with media and politicians alike constantly trying to present evidence that the world was ultimately ruled by force not law. Even today, portraying Serbia as a victim of the great powers in relation to foreign policy on Kosovo still has an important albeit subordinate function. By

290 MLADEN MLADENOV creating a sense of inevitability regarding Kosovo’s independence—because of the involvement of the great powers—Serbian leaders managed to achieve several goals. First, domestically, they continued to appear firm in their rejection of concessions regarding the status of the former province. Considerable efforts such as a persistent de-recognition campaign (Ker-Lindsay, 2012) were invested in making this firmness of Serbian foreign policy look genuine. Second, as a result of that, Serbian foreign policy maintained additional leverage vis-à-vis the great powers. They had to accept that the Serbian position remained strong and had public support.

Third, however, this did not prevent Serbia from being able to negotiate on Kosovo. In fact, it seems to have increased the room for negotiations, making it easier to sell compromises and, by extension, concessions domestically. However, this paper argues that contemporary Serbian foreign policy is best explained by striving to anticipate and have an influence on great power politics in the region. It is this particular characteristic of Serbian foreign policy that has become salient in recent years. Individual relations of Serbia with foreign powers, which will be reviewed in the following, demonstrate that.

In the 1990s, suspicion and skepticism towards Europe and the West in general were a characteristic of Serbian foreign policy.

This was fueled by the US employing several coercive approaches in its foreign policy towards Serbia including forced diplomacy and intervention (Stahl, 2013a). Serbian attitudes changed at least partly after 2000 when the political scene in Serbia experienced a fundamental transformation converting EU-membership to the major foreign policy goal of Serbia. The EU itself also became much more involved in Serbia as soon as the Milošević regime was overthrown.

Already three days into the term of Vojslav Koštunica as the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) he was invited to the EU summit in Biarritz and on the same date the FRY officially joined the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). This was followed by steady, if slow, progress towards EU integration including the entry into force of a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), receiving candidate status, starting accession negotiations and the opening of several negotiation chapters. It was

SERBIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 291 also accompanied by some disappointments such as temporary suspensions of the integration process due to deficiencies in Serbia’s cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

In the late 2010s, the EU reconfirmed its commitment towards enlargement with an emphasis that accession should be preceded by compliance on key issues, such as media freedom, fighting corruption, and safeguarding the rule of law (Vachudova, 2019, p. 81).

On another positive note, Serbia was referred to as a frontrunner in EU integration in the European Commission’s Western Balkans Strategy (European Commission, 2018). Whereas NATO membership was not pursued by Serbia as a result of NATO’s air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999, Serbia’s cooperation, pushed by the US, with the Alliance gradually improved. Moreover, the US has played an instrumental role in the context of the efforts of the international community in post-war reconciliation and state-building (Radeljić, 2013, p. 116), stepping up once again with its involvement under the Trump administration (BalkanInsight, 2019).

In spite of the achieved progress on Serbia’s EU integration path, membership remains a distant prospect. For all its positive messages, already the European Commission’s Western Balkans Strategy refers openly to all Western Balkan countries as suffering from state capture (European Commission, 2018, p. 3) and Serbia certainly can feel personally addressed (Radeljić, 2019). In 2020, after painful internal disagreements between the EU Member States as well as failure to find a compromise on starting accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania, the Commission proposed a new enlargement methodology even though negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro were already ongoing (European Commission, 2020a). This did not seem particularly noteworthy for Serbia as both President Vučić and Prime Minister Ana Brnabić had signaled their endorsement for the EU’s proposal (EWB, 2020).

Since the opening of Serbia’s accession negotiations in January 2014, 18 out of 35 chapters have been opened, two of which were provisionally closed. According to the 2020 European Commission report, the pace of negotiations will depend on rule of law reforms

292 MLADEN MLADENOV and on the normalization of Serbia’s relations with Kosovo (European Commission, 2020b). Even so, Serbia already benefits from its relations with the EU which is simultaneously the main trade partner, the main investor and the main donor in Serbia (Nelaeva and Semenov, 2016, p. 62). In spite of the EU commitment that this demonstrates, it has become increasingly clear that the experience from previous enlargements has led to a lack of consensus among Member States regarding the previously tolerated strategic accessions (Stahl, 2013b). As already mentioned, anti-corruption, fighting organized crime and judicial reform are the main areas where candidates have to prove themselves.

The case of Serbia comes with two other critical issues: relations with Kosovo and alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Alignment with EU foreign policy positions—where these exist—has proven to be challenging, perhaps best exemplified by Serbia not joining EU sanctions against Russia following the latter’s annexation of the Crimea. This split between East and West is a source of concern for the EU and for the US, but it also means that Belgrade needs to react. While a candidate country only formally needs to comply with EU policy at the time of accession, already in 2014, the Serbian government was aware of the importance of being perceived as loyal by its EU partners. In an attempt to demonstrate such loyalty then Prime Minister Vučić used every opportunity to confirm Serbia’s EU orientation, exemplified by Serbia’s cooperative behavior during the extraordinarily high influx of migrants in Europe in 2015 (Bojinović Fenko and Stahl, 2019).

Perhaps even more important for the EU is the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, whose talks have been facilitated by the EU since early 2010. A breakthrough on the all-important status issue is still out of sight. Talks have stalled in general, which is a reason for nervousness in Brussels as exemplified by the EU High Representative’s hearing in the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2019). In October 2019, Josep Borrell made it clear that finding a working solution in the dispute would prove the EU’s status as a global actor. The Union has urged Serbia and Kosovo to contribute to establishing an environment conducive to

SERBIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 293 a full resumption of the talks, but both sides have been struggling with that. In the summer of 2017, Serbia’s President Vučić started an internal dialogue on Kosovo which had mixed results at best, but could give legitimacy to a future compromise. To reach such a compromise, Serbia and Kosovo have discussed an exchange of territories between the two countries in which Serb-populated parts of northern Kosovo would go to Serbia and Albanian populated parts of southern Serbia would join Kosovo. Whereas the US and EU institutions in general claim to be open to it, the EU lacks unity on this issue with some Member States and most notably Germany being opposed (Euobserver, 2020).

Just as the EU appears to become less strategic regarding the full integration of Serbia (and the rest of the Western Balkans) and the US lacks assertiveness, other great powers have intensified their ties with the country. Historical and cultural links are obvious facilitators of close relations and are often referred to as the main reason for them together with targeted public diplomacy efforts (Szpala, 2014). This applies primarily, although not exclusively, to Russia. Close relations with Russia are regularly demonstrated by high-profile visits3 and remarkably positive media reporting. However, as Dimitar Bechev (2017) argues, Russia behaves as a rational actor in the Balkans and so does Serbia in its relations with Moscow.

Russia has used its influence in the UN where it has prevented Kosovo’s membership as well as the adoption of a Srebrenica genocide resolution. Serbia has honored such efforts publicly (BalkanInsight, 2018b) and has in turn failed to support UN resolutions which are critical of Russia even though this has meant aligning against the EU and against principles of international law. An example of this shows in the case of the December 2019 UN resolution that urged the Russian Federation to withdraw its armed forces from Crimea (UN, 2019). As mentioned above, Serbia has refrained from joining

3

Most recently, Putin visited Serbia in 2019. He also attended Serbia’s military parade in 2014 which was followed by Vučić visiting Moscow for the Victory Day Parade in 2018. In 2018 and 2019 respectively, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov and Prime Minister Medvedev visited Belgrade. All bilateral visits have received significant public and media attention in Serbia.

294 MLADEN MLADENOV EU sanctions against Russia since their entry into force in 2014 insisting on Serbian neutrality. Such a position entails a threat to the coherence of Serbia’s claim over the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. To avoid that—contrary to Russia’s position—Serbia has declared early on that it respects the territorial integrity of every UN member state including Ukraine (BalkanInsight, 2018c).

Intensive economic, military and cultural cooperation underpins the political ties between Serbia and Russia. In spite of the EU’s dominant role as an investment and trade partner of Serbia—which even the signing of a free trade agreement between Serbia and the Eurasian Union is unlikely to change (Vuksanovic, 2019)—Russia has succeeded in focusing on key sectors with an effect on the whole economy including banking and in particular energy. Thus, approximately 65% of natural gas and 70% of oil is imported from Russia (CSD, 2018, p. 2). Russia’s Gazprom also took a controlling stake in the Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS) oil and gas company in 2008. The deal drew criticism because of widespread allegations that the price was below market value and critics claim that this was used as a way to repay Russia for its diplomatic support in the Kosovo issue (Socor, 2009). However, another scenario appears much more plausible. The sale of NIS was a part of a broader energy agreement between Serbia and Russia (Štiplija & Novaković, 2018, p. 207). Serbian leaders had high hopes in the South Stream project and promised their voters considerable profits once it was ready.

These expectations were temporarily dashed by Russia’s withdrawal from South Stream when the project became untenable amid pressure from the EU and the US. It seemed that Serbia had miscalculated the risk which left the country without an oil industry and with a 30 million EUR investment loss in the South Stream project. That Serbia was not ready to bear all the negatives from this development became visible when the Serbian government started considering reviewing the deal for NIS (B92, 2014), before the situation changed again and Turk Stream replaced South Stream allowing Gazprom to build ca. 450 km of the European branch of the new gas pipeline through Serbia.

SERBIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 295 Defense cooperation follows a similar pattern, i.e., projects are implemented when they are mutually beneficial. An increase in procurement and maintenance programs is at the center of these. In January 2016, Serbia's Ministry of Defense announced an agreement with Russia to establish a facility in Serbia for helicopter maintenance and repair. This was followed by an agreement for Serbia to buy two Mi8 helicopters. In 2017, the two countries reached an agreement for the delivery of six MiG29 fighter jets to Serbia. As the Serbian armed forces are almost exclusively dependent on Soviet made equipment and weaponry, Serbian policy makers pointed out that it was more efficient to meet the country’s military requirements by seeking deals with Russia. Consequently, this led to a spillover in the form of joint military exercises not least because of the existing interoperability of the Serbian and Russian armed forces. During the course of 2013, Serbia also received an observer status in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. However, joint exercises with NATO, the EU and the US outnumber those with Russia and its closer partners. Another Russian project on Serbian soil with military implications is the joint Humanitarian Centre in Niš which remains a point of concern for the EU. Officially, the Centre has no formal military mission, but it is suspected to at least have an additional intelligence role (Dolapčev, 2018). Yet, despite Moscow’s constant requests, Serbia has still not granted diplomatic immunity to the Russian staff of the Centre.

Russia is not the only foreign power that has rekindled its interest in Serbia as the same applies to China and Turkey. Notwithstanding the relatively small size of its economy, Serbia has emerged as one of the main partners of China and Europe. The positive cooperation has prompted Vučić to describe the relationship as a ‘friendship made of steel’ (B92, 2018a). As with Russia, political ties are being reinforced by regular bilateral meetings at the highest level with Vučić and Xi Jinping meeting in person seven times between 2015 and 2019 whereby in multilateral settings Vučić has enjoyed a privileged treatment in China (Xinhua, 2019b). One of the traditional pillars of political relations between the two countries has been Chinese support for the Serbian position on Kosovo, converting China—alongside Russia—to a key ally in the UN Security

296 MLADEN MLADENOV Council. The NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo war in 19994, leading to the death of three Chinese diplomats, has made it also an emotional affair for China which—similarly to Serbia—has seen itself as a victim of imperialism in the past (Gries, 2001). Consequently, in 2009, China categorically rejected the separation of Kosovo from Serbia (Governmentof-China, 2009). Serbian leaders have used China’s support on Kosovo also to indirectly criticize the EU with Vučić claiming that “unlike others, China does not pressure Serbia” (B92, 2019). Serbia has reciprocated by supporting China on issues such as the South China Sea, Xinjiang and Tibet (The-Diplomat, 2016).

Regarding economic ties, Serbia’s involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has attracted significant Chinese loans and investments, which have been highly necessary for improving the Serbian economy (Dimitrijević, 2017). In 2018, the total trade volume between Serbia and China had grown 15 times compared to 2008, making China the third biggest importer in Serbia. China’s interests are focused on infrastructure aiming—for the purposes of BRI—to connect the ports of Piraeus (Greece) and Bar (Montenegro) to Central Europe through Serbia. Several supporting infrastructure projects such as new bridges in Belgrade (Mardell, 2019) or the modernization of one of Serbia’s largest power plants, as well as the opening of a regional office of China’s Exim Bank in Belgrade in 2017 (The-Diplomat, 2017) further underline China’s ambitions.

The symbiosis in the economic domain works both ways. China’s economic muscle has proven useful for the Serbian government not only for the purposes of economic growth, but also in emergencies as with the acquisition of the struggling Smederevo steel mill and mining and smelting complex RTB Bor by Chinese giants Hestil and Zijin who accepted a no lay-off clause. In turn, Serbia is seemingly granting Chinese companies a more favorable treatment compared to their European or North American competitors (B92, 2018b). Eco-

4

The US maintains that the bombing was an accident. The reason for which was the use of an outdated CIA map, for which U.S. President Bill Clinton apologized.

SERBIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 297 nomic cooperation finds further spillovers in the defense and security domain with Serbia becoming the first European country to buy Chinese reconnaissance drones and agreeing to host part of their production (Politika, 2019). In spite of US concerns over Huawei’s involvement in partner countries, the Serbian government has boldly stated that cooperation with the Chinese company is expected to intensify (Xinhua, 2019a).

Despite the significant benefits, Serbia’s relations with China also entail some risks for Belgrade in particular in the long run. As a result of the loans, it is expected that China will own a significant share of Serbia’s external public debt. In addition, China is also often willing to fund projects even though their economic viability has not been studied sufficiently. The involvement of Chinese companies does not always enjoy popular support in Serbia as evidenced by local companies showing discontent with the lack of transparency and the fact that Chinese workers are brought to Serbia Serbian unemployment (Pleschová, 2015, p. 21). The political conditions for China’s support to Serbia are also unclear. While Russia views EU integration of the Western Balkans with a great deal of concern, China views Serbia’s possible future accession to the EU as a potential opportunity to influence EU decision making.

Another pragmatic foreign power with more than a symbolic presence in Serbia—albeit far less visible than Russia and China— is Turkey. After clear political divisions during the wars in the 1990s and following Ankara’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence in 2008, pragmatism on both sides has prevailed. The improvement of bilateral relations started as early as 2009 when the Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited Belgrade and the two governments concluded a Free Trade Agreement (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2016, p. 36) leading to almost tripling the trade volume over the course of the following decade. The relationship continued to be friendly when Serbia’s government changed in 2012 and even marked a steady improvement following the pattern of regular personal meetings between the two presidents, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Aleksander Vučić whose alleged mutual sympathy for each other further smoothed relations (Aydıntaşbaş, 2019). In 2019, the Serbian-

298 MLADEN MLADENOV Turkish Free Trade Agreement expanded and a joint Business Forum was established. Both countries are also part of the TurkStream project. Unlike Russian and Chinese investments, the ones made by Turkish companies in principle do not overlap with the political interests of Turkey. Instead, most of the investments are concentrated on politically fewer sensitive sectors such as agriculture and textiles. Additionally, Turkish activities in the Sandžak region where the Serbian Muslim population is concentrated are politically relevant Turkey further supported the renovation of Ottoman era buildings, mosques and the reconstruction of the Novi Pazar— Tutin road in this region, increasing tolerance from the Serbian authorities—as demonstrated by the joint visit of Vučić and Erdoğan in Novi Pazar in 2017. In looking toward the future, Serbia has hopes that in potential forthcoming tensions in the Sandžak Turkey could play a restraining and moderating role.

Foreign Policy Structures in Serbia After reviewing Serbia’s contemporary foreign policy towards the great powers, it is appropriate to focus on how Serbia puts its policies into effect. This leads to the examination of foreign policy structures and framing. Foreign policy structures in Serbia significantly favor great power politics. Perhaps the most recognizable characteristic of Serbian foreign policy structures is the exceptional role of the most powerful member of the executive. Aleksander Vučić’s confession, which he has personally attended the opening of almost every negotiation chapter with the EU in Brussels—a mostly administrative act—is an innocent demonstration of this approach (B92, 2020). More telling are the often very personal connections with leaders of other great powers such as Erdogan and Vladimir Putin. as mentioned above.

In contemporary Serbia, decision-making in foreign policy has been dominated by the power center of the executive. This has not always been attached to a concrete position. Instead, depending on the respective government constellation, it has differed considerably. In the 2000s, Vojislav Koštunica as Prime Minister and Boris Tadić as President of Serbia led foreign policy together before

SERBIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 299 Tadić’s Democratic Party (DS) won an absolute majority in the 2008 parliamentary elections. Tadić remained President of Serbia, but could as a result assume almost full responsibility for foreign policy with Prime Minister Mirko Cvetković focusing more on economic issues. When the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) won both the parliamentary and the presidential elections in 2012 it was unable to form a government without a coalition partner for which only the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) came into question. To make the deal possible—in spite of its much larger share of the vote—the SNS decided to offer the post of Prime Minister to the leader of the SPS, Ivica Dačić. SNS’s Tomislav Nikolić became president after beating Tadić in a run-off. This result seemed to leave the strongest figure in the SNS—after Nikolić had renounced his party membership following his inauguration as President—Aleksandar Vučić out of the foreign policy decision-making process. Vučić became Minister of Defense and Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, but even in that position he was able to be at least Dačić’s equal in the conduct of foreign policy being an ever-present figure at negotiations with Kosovo during this time. When the SNS sensed that polls were favorable the party triggered an early election in 2014 winning a crushing victory which catapulted Vučić into the post of Prime Minister. As such he strengthened his grip on foreign policy with Nikolić assuming mostly a representative function. This continued until the expiration of Nikolić’s term, whom Vučić followed as President. Unlike Nikolić, Vučić remained SNS party leader after his election, leading to an effective power shift again from the Prime Minister to the President with foreign policy decision-making concentrating even further in Vučić. As a result, the government lost influence on foreign policy with Prime Minister Ana Brnabić mostly supporting the President’s messages but refraining from having a personal contribution. Perhaps more influential on foreign policy—not least because of his already established position—was the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Dačić who enjoyed some limited decision-making competences. A reshuffle following the June 2020 parliamentary elections, however, saw Dačić elected as parliamentary speaker and an SNS politician, Nikola Selaković, promoted as Minister of Foreign Affairs which is likely to strengthen Vučić's role in

300 MLADEN MLADENOV foreign policy even more. This assumption was supported by the record at the Ministry of Defense of Serbia which has long been in the hands of SNS and has only focused on concrete projects with former Minister of Defense Aleksandar Vulin reiterating himself the President’s primacy in foreign policy decision-making (BalkanInsight, 2018a).

Such a centralized decision-making structure has proven useful in Serbia’s relations with great powers. Foreign policy in Russia, Turkey and to a degree also in China is decided upon in a similar way. Serbia’s ability to make swift decisions marked by reliability because of a lack of an internal contest as well as the possibility of reaching personal agreements with Vučić increase the relative value of cooperation with Serbia. While the European Union’s own decision-making has a radically different form, European leaders have also become aware of the advantages of dealing with Vučić’s Serbia. This was demonstrated during the migration crisis of 2015 when Serbia’s reliability and predictability were highly valued (Bundesregierung, 2017). While Serbia has a common and internally virtually uncontested negotiation position on normalization talks with Kosovo, the same is not true for its former province where internal disagreements add an additional obstacle to the conduct of negotiations.5 To further increase the room for negotiations, the framing of foreign policy has also been adjusted under Vučić. The uncompromising stance of the DS government in Serbia has been replaced by a strive to leave fewer limits and taboos, which increases the room for maneuver and the possibilities of attaining priority goals. This approach is publicly justified by the claim to pursue the best possible outcomes for Serbia. President Vučić’s inaugural speech (DanasOnline, 2017) provides a good example for both. He opened his speech with a “Serbia first” promise. To achieve that he explicitly stated that regional stability needed to be strengthened, which also meant the continuation of the dialogue with Prishtina. Vučić called for open-mindedness and for abandoning the "mythical" approach.

5

For further information on Kosovo, see also Gezim Krasniqi’s chapter in this volume.

SERBIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 301 The balancing act that characterized Vučić as Prime Minister resounded in his first speech as president: Serbia would strive for neutrality, did not plan to join military alliances, and therefore needed to strengthen its own defense capabilities. While EU membership remained the undisputed foreign policy priority, Vučić stated that he wanted friendship with the Russian people and its leadership to grow. The Serbian President also confirmed his aspiration to further foster ties with China, as well as Japan, South Korea and African countries. In his speech, Vučić used quotes from John Quincy Adams, Thomas Edison, Albert Einstein and Thomas Jefferson and fittingly promised to invest more in the relationship with the United States. He underlined that the internal reform agenda was not imposed by Brussels, but was prompted by Serbia's desire to modernize.

Vučić’s speech demonstrated a consolidation of foreign policy positions and in particular an increased confidence in Serbia’s ability to engage with great powers from a position of strength. Strategic documents were further proof for this. In December 2019, Serbia adopted a new National Security Strategy (Government-of-Serbia, 2019a) and a new Defense Strategy (Government-of-Serbia, 2019b), which replaced their two predecessor documents from 2009. The comparison between the two sets of documents is telling. In addition to offering considerably more room for international cooperation, the 2019 strategies were characterized by a stronger tone and noticeably more self-confidence. Belgrade remained resolute when it referred to its own military neutrality, but at the same time put more emphasis on international cooperation and cooperation with different security organizations. A much stronger commitment to participate in maintaining regional and international security visibly intended to send the message that military neutrality did not translate into an isolationist policy without an eye for international developments. The 2009 strategies’ clear reference to neutrality, which was proclaimed in 2007 and was at the center of public debate and media attention by 2009, was inexplicably completely missing in both documents (Ejdus, 2014), thus creating confusion.

Regarding official representations responsible for bilateral relations, all larger EU Member States, the United States, Russia,

302 MLADEN MLADENOV China and Turkey have embassies in Serbia and vice versa. Serbia has 13 consulates across the EU, two in the United States, one in Turkey and one in China, but other than the embassy in Moscow, Serbia only has one honorary consul in Russia. The EU has a Delegation to Serbia while Serbia also has a dedicated Ambassador to the EU. In addition, the government of Serbia transformed its European Integration Office into a Ministry of European Integration in June 2017. With respect to Russia and China, also in 2017, the Government of Serbia created a National Council for Coordination of Cooperation with these two countries headed by former President Tomislav Nikolić. Furthermore, NATO has a Military Liaison Office in Belgrade to serve as a contact point between NATO and the Serbian authorities and Russia is a party to the aforementioned joint Humanitarian Center in Niš.

In addition to the diplomatic representations, the presence of cultural offices is also worth noting. Several EU Member States have cultural institutes in Serbia, while Russia has a Centre for Science and Culture in Belgrade, and Turkey opened a cultural center there in 2015. Serbia is one of a few countries to host two Confucius Institutes and a large modern China Cultural Centre in Belgrade which is under construction. Remarkably, Serbia boasts its own government cultural center in Beijing, which was opened in 2018. It is only the second such center after the one in Paris which was founded in 1973 (Trifunović, 2010).

Conclusion Due to its long relations with great powers Serbia has been able to adopt and try the effectiveness of a number of different foreign policy approaches throughout its history. Some of them such as the struggle for leadership among South Slavs have been largely abandoned in contemporary foreign policy as a result of the wars of the 1990s. Others, such as the tendency of Serbia to portray itself as a victim of great power politics, have not disappeared completely, but are employed less frequently and in a more targeted way than in the past. In turn, this paper has established a greater degree of continuity regarding the Serbian for-

SERBIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 303 eign policy approach which looks beyond the immediate neighbourhood and strives to negotiate with the great powers a special role for Serbia.

Several factors have contributed to Serbia being able to reapply this approach in its contemporary foreign policy. Most importantly, the EU integration process has stalled because of internal disagreements within the EU and simultaneously Serbia’s willingness to reforming key areas such as the rule of law, which has been insufficient in turning the tides and convincing skeptical EU Member States. As the case of North Macedonia’s name dispute shows, even solving the Kosovo issue would likely not be enough on its own to allow for a fast-track to EU membership. The improbability of a swift EU accession has led to a relative shift from a more hegemonial system dominated by the West and in particular by the EU to a more anarchical one with several great powers showing an increased interest in the Balkans and a greater competition for influence. This has suited Serbian foreign policy well so far as Serbia has enjoyed a significant degree of flexibility in dealing with those powers. The stagnation in the EU integration process allows the country room to negotiate and enter in mutually beneficial agreements, which would not be possible to the same extent once the strict requirement of aligning Serbia’s foreign—and economic—policy with EU policies is in place.

At the same time, Serbia has been declared a frontrunner in EU integration among other non-EU member states in the Western Balkans, which gives it an advantage in the event that enlargement again becomes part of the EU’s agenda. In any case, being in the mix alone already guarantees pre-accession funds, positive public relations and an increased leverage vis-à-vis other great powers. Hence, Serbia seems to be comfortable with the current international dynamics which allow for more great power management and has accordingly adapted foreign policy structures by concentrating decision-making, intensifying direct personal connections with great power leaders and demonstrating a larger degree of self-confidence in the framing of its official positions.

This strategy, however, also poses several important risks. First, a preference for great power management means that Serbia has to partially align its policy with several great powers while still defending its

304 MLADEN MLADENOV own interests. Inevitably, this has led to inconsistencies and even contradictions.

Russia’s and China’s political support is a luxury that comes at a price. Serbia, therefore, needed to abandon its insistence on a strict adherence to international law—something it used to underline extensively to prevent Kosovo’s independence (Bieber, 2008)—and silently accept the precedence of the balance of power. Having to effectively support Russia in the UN on the issue of the annexation of the Crimea, Serbia undermined its own position regarding the independence of Kosovo. Second, despite being relatively advanced in its EU integration process compared to most other aspirants, Serbia in fact is moving away from the goal of EU membership. As the previous sections have demonstrated, Serbian foreign policy has accommodated for the development of both political and economic relations with Russia and China in particular. This often opposes alignment with EU foreign and economic policy at a time—in the middle of accession negotiations—when Serbia should be converging with the EU. It is unclear how many of the commitments made by Serbia to these two countries would need to be revised and whether that is possible if Serbia wants to become a member. Finally, by adopting great power management and adapting its foreign policy structures to it, Serbia is shaping its own state in a way that makes rule of law reforms, transparency and accountability of decision-makers increasingly unlikely. This is because there is non-transparent collusion between leaders, no incentives to improve the judiciary to attract investment and a domestic political system tending towards authoritarianism. Serbia wants to be an active player with the great powers, in line with its Yugoslav heritage. Yet, while it is trying to become an active participant in great power politics, it risks becoming less of an active and participating subject, and once again, more an object of great power politics.

SERBIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 305

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DEPENDENCE, INDEPENDENCE, INTERDEPENDENCE: MONTENEGRO’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1991 TO 2020 Bojan Baća and Kenneth Morrison

Introduction This chapter discusses Montenegro’s relations with key foreign powers during the period between 1991 and 2020. While it briefly reconstructs historical links between Montenegro and, most notably, Russia, Turkey and Italy, the chapter’s analytical timeframe covers the period from the first government elected at the multiparty elections in the post-socialist period to its eventual demise after three decades of uninterrupted reign. The chapter will demonstrate that Montenegro’s recent political history is characterized by changes, continuity and significant flux, during which a distinct foreign policy and strong bilateral relations have developed. Given that the country did not regain its independence until 2006 and did not per se possess the ability to do so, it is important to pay specific attention to Montenegro’s unique situation and, therein, three specific phases: Montenegro as a “state” (republic) and how it functioned and behaved as a non-sovereign state (1991–1997); as a de facto sovereign state (1998–2005); and as a de jure sovereign state (2006–2020). In other words, to understand Montenegro’s relationship with the great powers, it is necessary to address both its relationship with the regional hegemon, Serbia, and how it developed a foreign policy within the parameters—or, more precisely, confines—of the first, collapsing Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), then, the structure of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and later, the “Joint State” of Serbia and Montenegro.

With the pivotal turn against the regime of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia in 1997 and the subsequent election victory of Milo Đukanović’s “faction” of the previously monolithic Democratic

312 BOJAN BAĆA AND KENNETH MORRISON Party of Socialists (DPS), Montenegro, as a republic within the FRY, began to develop its own, somewhat ad hoc foreign policy. Thus, from 1998, Montenegro began to forge an independent foreign policy and put diplomatic structures in place before it regained its independence in 2006 (Džankić, 2014). Its government’s declaration of neutrality during the bombing campaign of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against the FRY in 1999 and Montenegro’s separate diplomatic maneuvers were further evidence of the bifurcation of foreign policy goals between Serbia and Montenegro. These were part of a broader process in which Montenegro began to incrementally separate from Serbia, a process that culminated during the May 2006 independence referendum. Thereafter, Montenegro joined key international organizations and embarked upon attaining the government’s key foreign policy objective: European Union (EU) and NATO membership (or so-called “Euro-Atlantic integration”).

Instead of merely focusing on the development of foreign policy and related structures, however, this chapter focuses on the content and framing of foreign policy through the period analyzed. The chapter thus provides an in-depth investigation of Montenegro’s strategic goals in relation to major foreign powers, the role these powers played in Montenegro’s foreign policy objectives, as well as their policies’ impact on the country’s European and Euro-Atlantic integrations. The chapter begins with an historical overview of Montenegro’s relations with the great powers and then provides a detailed analysis of the period from 1991 to 2020 and the three aforementioned phases before examining Montenegro’s contemporary foreign relations. The chapter concludes by assessing the country’s current foreign policy priorities, their membership of NATO, the bilateral relationship with some of its member-states, Montenegro’s ongoing efforts to join the EU, and the future prospects for Montenegro’s bilateral relations with China, Russia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This chapter, therefore, provides an overview of how one party shaped foreign policy within four different states.

MONTENEGRO’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1991 TO 2020 313

Montenegro’s Historical Links with the Great Powers Following an independence referendum held on May 21, 2006, Montenegro regained the statehood it had lost in 1918. The small and mountainous country had been de facto, if not de jure, a semiindependent entity throughout much of the period of Ottoman rule in the Balkans before it was formally recognized by the great powers in 1878. Though Prince (later King) Nikola I Petrović had ambitions to forge Montenegro as the “Piedmont” of possible Serb and South Slav unification, it was never a regional power in the Balkans and was challenged both by its size and by its more powerful neighbors. The story of attaining independence in the 19th century, the loss of statehood in the early 20th century and the re-establishment of independence in the early 21st century is both long and complex.

After Montenegro became an internationally-recognized state in 1878, it developed its diplomatic practice and forged strong bilateral relations with the great powers, particularly with Russia.

Conversely, foreign embassies—including British, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, French and Serbian—soon opened in the capital, Cetinje. Though small, Montenegro’s strategic importance dictated that Nikola was in a relatively strong position in his dyads with AustriaHungary, Serbia, Russia, Great Britain and France (Treadway, 1983). Historically, Montenegro’s relations with Russia were close. demonstrated by their shared Orthodox religion, their countries’ courts’ frequent visits and exchanges, and Russian aid and Montenegrin military participation in the Russo-Turkish War in 1710– 1711 and in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905 (Vukanović, 2018). King Nikola, known as “the Father-in-Law of Europe” married his daughters into various European courts; Princesses Milica and Anastasija were married, respectively, to the Russian Grand Dukes, Peter Nikolaevich and Nikola Nikolaevich (Roberts, 2007).

It was not merely dynastic relations that gave Russia a strong foothold in Montenegro; shared Slavic roots, notions of Pan-Slavism and Orthodoxy were also significant factors in creating and consolidating bonds between the two countries.

However, despite Montenegro’s development as an independent state and well-established relations with the great powers,

314 BOJAN BAĆA AND KENNETH MORRISON challenges to Nikola’s rule came not from them but from Serbia and from Montenegrins who advocated unification of the “two Serb lands” (Morrison, 2018). Proponents of unification finally achieved their objective at the end of WWI, and following the Assembly of Podgorica in December 1918, Montenegro was absorbed by Serbia before both became incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which was renamed “The Kingdom of Yugoslavia” in 1929 (Pavlović, 2007). Thus, from 1918, Montenegro was incorporated into the Yugoslav state, a status that remained until the Axis invasion and partition of Yugoslavia in April 1941. During Montenegro’s occupation by Italy (until September 1943) and by Nazi Germany, the Italians attempted to emphasize the important dynastic links between Montenegro and Italy. King Nikola’s daughter, Elena, was the wife of the Italian King Victor Emmanuel III, and the Italians utilized this as a justification, hoping that such sentiments would be well received in Cetinje and its environs, where the loss of statehood in 1918 and the death in exile of King Nikola were bitterly lamented by many. Therefore, the Italian strategy promised Montenegrins that their independence would be reinstated under the tutelage of Queen Elena. However, the attempts to foster the notion of Montenegro being closely linked to Italy were not received so positively elsewhere (Morrison, 2009, pp. 50–66).

Moreover, even those Montenegrins who tacitly supported the Italians soon found reason to be dissatisfied, largely because, in spite of Italian promises, many Montenegrins knew that this Italiansponsored “independence” amounted to little more than a vassal status.

Resistance to Italian rule was perhaps best characterized by the popular uprising against the Italians on July 13, 1941 which, though relatively short-lived, demonstrated that Italian aspirations were ultimately only that. By the time of the uprising, the communist-led Partisans gained a significant foothold in Montenegro, where they enjoyed significant support. The first British Special Operations Executive (SOE) liaison mission to the Partisans took place at Black Lake in May 1943 (Deakin, 1971; Williams, 2003). The mission would ultimately prove hugely influential in Winston Churchill’s decision to switch his support from the Royalist Chetniks to the

MONTENEGRO’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1991 TO 2020 315 Partisans. In the wake of this decision, the Balkan Air Force (BAF), a multinational Allied air force that included British, Polish and Russian pilots, was created to provide air and logistical support to the Partisans.

At the end of WWII, Montenegro became one of six republics in the People’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—later the SFRY. The country’s first major foreign policy crisis came in 1948, as a consequence of the Tito-Stalin split and the break between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (USSR). Montenegro had, per capita, the largest percentage of pro-Stalinists—known as ibeovci—in Yugoslavia and thus became one of the republics where conflicts between the ibeovci and the Titoists were most acute (Banac, 1988). Montenegro’s foreign relations were thereafter entirely channelled through the Yugoslav state and was thus part of a county that not only forged the “Yugoslav Third Way” but also one that played a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement.

As Yugoslavia’s smallest republic, Montenegro benefited significantly from federal funds, and Montenegrins were disproportionately represented in the senior ranks of the Yugoslav People’s Army (YNA). With significant revisions to the Yugoslav constitution in 1974, however, Montenegro became increasingly autonomous, and a number of specific Montenegrin institutions were established thereafter (Papović, 2015). Less than a decade and a half later, Montenegro became central to the Serbian President, Slobodan Milošević’s attempts to revise the 1974 constitution and recentralize the Yugoslav state. In 1989, after a protracted economic crisis in which many Montenegrin enterprises failed, the so-called “Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution”—in reality an internal coup within the ruling Montenegrin League of Communists (Savez komunista Crne Gore, (SKCG))—brought to power younger political elites loyal to Milošević (Vladisavljević, 2008).

Under the slogan “Mi znamo kako!” (“We know how!”), the “young, handsome and intelligent” troika of Momir Bulatović, Milo Đukanović and Svetozar Marović cast themselves as a new generation with novel ideas (Koprivica and Vojičić, 1994). In Montenegro’s first multi-party elections held in December 1990, that were any-

316 BOJAN BAĆA AND KENNETH MORRISON thing but free and fair, the SKCG won 83 of the 125 seats in parliament, and in February 1991, Milo Đukanović formed his first government. The party then officially changed its name to the Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokrastska partija socijalista—(DPS)), a largely cosmetic change (Baća, 2017). The structure of the party remained largely intact, with the offices, personnel, assets and funds of the old SKCG transferring smoothly to the DPS (Morrison, 2009, pp. 75–102). Thus, the events that took place between 1988 and 1990 set Montenegro on a course within which it tied its fate to Serbia as the Yugoslav state violently disintegrated.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Road to Independence (1991–1997) Due to Montenegro becoming an independent state in 2006, its foreign policy and relationship with great powers can only be understood through a diachronic perspective that covers the period from 1991 to the present, and in relation to Serbia, that is—the federal government and other power centers in Belgrade. The party youth that would in 1991 form the DPS rather quickly came under the patronage of Milošević, as they were politically and economically dependent on his regime in Belgrade. Accordingly, the (ethno-)nationalist revival in Montenegro “expressed” itself as a Serbian nationalism rather than as a distinct Montenegrin nationalism”, thus serving as an ideological support to the country’s ventures in the Yugoslav wars (Bieber 2003, p. 12; see also Baća, 2018a, pp. 128– 131). With total control over state organs and its resources, the DPS consolidated a semi-authoritarian regime in which the opposition never stood a chance of challenging its decisions, let alone winning (rigged) elections (Darmanović, 2003; Vujović and Komar, 2008).

With a compliant regime in Podgorica that was strongly supported by its people, Milošević could easily incorporate Montenegro into his wars—most notably, in Croatia (Andrijašević, 1999; Morrison, 2018). This would eventually lead to a long period of international isolation compounded by the imposition of United Nations (UN) sanctions, which effectively tied the low-capacity Montenegrin government even closer to the power center in Belgrade.

MONTENEGRO’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1991 TO 2020 317 As armed conflict intensified in Croatia throughout the spring and summer of 1991, the Montenegrin government frequently warned of the need for its border with Croatia to be defended. With the beleaguered Croats already in retreat in Eastern Slavonia, a strong second front would put them under further pressure; a thrust from Montenegrin units on Croatia’s southern border could, it was argued, hasten Croatia’s capitulation. Framed as a defensive war, Montenegrins were encouraged to think of themselves not as aggressors but as defenders of Yugoslavia, fighters against resurgent fascism, even liberators of Dubrovnik (Andrijašević, 1999; Baća 2018, pp. 104–126). But the subsequent military campaign was a public relations disaster not only for Serbia, but also for Montenegro. Television images of the “Pearl of the Adriatic'' being shelled by the YNA were broadcast across the world, creating controversy and revulsion. The Montenegrin leadership, shaken by the course of events, sought to distance itself from the Dubrovnik campaign; and it was within this context that Bulatović took a significant political gamble. During the “Hague Conference '', organized by the European Community (EC) and chaired by Lord Peter Carrington, Bulatović boldly took a decision that would strain the consensus between Podgorica (then Titograd) and Belgrade. The “Carrington Plan '' envisaged the SFRY becoming a loose association of independent states that would have the status of subjects under international law. Electing to accept the plan, Bulatović announced that Montenegro would sign (Bulatović, 2004, pp. 62–86). Italy had played a key role in his decision, with the “carrot” of a significant aid package to Montenegro. The Italian proposal was not only a way for Montenegro to secure its own interests, but also its way into the EC (from 1993, the EU). Bulatović’s unilateral decision to support Lord Carrington’s plan, and thus de facto opting for independence, was nothing short of treachery for many in Montenegro.

Popular opinion turned sharply against him, and Belgrade applied political and economic pressure on him to reverse the decision, as this move endangered Milošević’s plan of creating a new Yugoslavia. With no support from the international community, the Montenegrin regime had to reverse the decision (Morrison, 2009, pp. 89– 102). The debates over the ultimately failed Carrington Plan

318 BOJAN BAĆA AND KENNETH MORRISON demonstrated that Montenegro was not strong enough to oppose its neighboring hegemon, becoming progressively less sovereign in the process.

In October 1991, Serbia and Montenegro proposed an amendment to the Carrington Plan, which allowed those states that did not wish to secede from Yugoslavia to establish a successor federal state. Thus, plans were made by elites in Serbia and Montenegro to establish the “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (Vučetić, 2003). Despite protests coming from the pro-independence opposition, these plans were made public only two months before their realization; constitutional experts took only five days to write the new constitution—the so-called “Žabljak Constitution” (named after the Montenegrin town where the nomenklatura had met in order to create the state), as Podgorica passively watched Belgrade drafting the constitution (Bieber, 2003). Montenegro’s opposition parties (who had not been consulted) argued that it was an unequal construction, and that the FRY was dysfunctional in that it comprised two federal units of disproportionate scale, population and economic interests.1 The power asymmetries in the new federation became evident early on, with the pro-independence opposition regarding it as a betrayal of Montenegro’s interests and a relinquishment of its sovereignty to Belgrade (Bieber, 2003; Morrison, 2009, pp. 103–127).

Quickly after its formation, the FRY was placed under UN imposed economic sanctions, cutting Montenegro off from “Western financial institutions and much needed international credit” (Calhoun 2000a, p. 68), plunging it into a spiraling socio-economic crisis that significantly changed the role of the state.

Montenegro’s relationship with Italy continued, but largely with non-state actors, as the government of Montenegro sought to mitigate against the economic impact of United Nations sanctions by engaging in the smuggling of oil and cigarettes in order to ensure basic functioning of its institutions (Bulatović, 2004, pp. 117– 1

On 1 March 1992, in a seemingly comprehensive outcome, an overwhelming number of Montenegrins voted to preserve union with Serbia. 95.7 per cent of those who voted chose to remain in federation with Serbia. The legitimacy of the referendum was brought into question, however, by the relatively low turnout of 66 per cent.

MONTENEGRO’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1991 TO 2020 319 154). Coupled with the loss of the single Yugoslav market and the progressive stagnation of industrial output, as well as subsequent hyperinflation, the government’s attempts to restructure the economy under international isolation led to enterprises declaring bankruptcy throughout the country and a gigantic pool of laid-off workers (Đurić, 2003; Uvalić, 1997). Faced with economic collapse and mass pauperization, the state did not only turn its blind eye to the unprecedented escalation of the informal, “grey” economy among its citizens, but this criminalization of everyday life was also accompanied by systemic corruption at the highest levels, where the party officials and their cronies used the opportunity to enrich themselves through corruption and machinations, further plunging the state into criminal activities (Đurić, 1999; Lazić and Sekelj, 1997; Uzelac, 2003). This situation created competition between elites in Serbia and Montenegro over the distribution of profits earned from these illegal activities, which quickly assumed a political dynamic, eventually leading to confrontation between Podgorica and Belgrade.

The economic hardships caused by Milošević’s isolationist policies at the federal level ultimately resulted in a political schism that divided the DPS. A split within the party’s ranks emerged with Bulatović leading the pro-Milošević bloc and Đukanović and Marović at the forefront of the anti-Milošević coalition (Baća, 2017; Bieber, 2003). Bulatović calculated that Milošević would overcome the crisis, while Đukanović and Marović gambled on the contrary.

After a series of party meetings and internal elite-clashes, Đukanović’s fraction was supported by the party majority, but severely lacked support in the electoral base, so he needed help of its former political opponents and the international community to create a wide anti-Milošević coalition (Baća, 2018b, pp. 127–146; Morrison, 2018, pp. 69–81). This alliance-building eventually led to Đukanović’s election for president and the newly formed coalition’s victory in 1998 (Darmanović, 2003; Calhoun, 2000a). The West showed its support: the “presence of ambassadors from the leading Western nations were a sign that the newly elected president would enjoy support from the world community” (Darmanović, 2003, p. 149).

This aid was not only political and logistical from the United States

320 BOJAN BAĆA AND KENNETH MORRISON (US) and the EU, but also financial.2As Đurić (2003, p. 155) illustrates, the “scope of this aid is sufficiently illustrated by the statistic that, in 1999–2000, Montenegro received the highest aid per capita granted by the US government to a foreign country with the exception only of Israel”. As an act of retaliation, Milošević did not officially recognize Đukanović as president nor allow his appointees in the organs of federal power working behind the scenes to crush the regime in Podgorica (Calhoun, 2000a, 2000b). This situation led to Podgorica adopting a political strategy that came to be known as the “Montenegro First” policy, which underlined the idea that the federation could not be supported at any cost, especially not at the expense of Montenegrin interests (Gallagher, 2003, p. 55). Podgorica was strongly committed to “protect Montenegro’s economic development through democratization and the normalization of relations with the West” (Macek-Macková, 2011, p. 620), ultimately taking Montenegro towards a path of “creeping independence” (Roberts, 2002, p. 6). With support from the Western powers, Montenegro could now enter the international scene, albeit with limited capacity and within equally limited parameters.

Montenegro as a De Facto Sovereign State (1998–2005) The key strategic goals of the reformist coalition government were outlined in September 1997, when its constituents signed the Agreement on Minimum Principles for the Development of Democratic Infrastructure in Montenegro, a document that enabled basic guarantees for free and fair elections (Morrison, 2018, p. 74). Moreover, the victorious coalition was based on a platform promising economic and political reforms, minority rights, regional cooperation, and an end to international isolation, as well as a free, multi-ethnic, democratic society, with stronger ties to the affluent Western democracies (Bieber, 2003; Gallagher, 2003; Kovačević, 2007). With the implicit, sometimes explicit, support from Washington and Brussels, the 2

During this period, other great and regional powers did not play any important role in Montenegro’s foreign policy.

MONTENEGRO’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1991 TO 2020 321 new government began to pursue economic and political reforms (Darmanović, 2003). This strengthened Montenegro’s pro-Western trajectory, underpinned by the argument that “Europe is [Montenegro’s] only possible choice”. This implied that “European civilization”—political liberalism, cultural diversity, and market economy—was Montenegro’s natural habitat (Calhoun, 2000a, p. 71), with EU integration becoming the country’s key strategic priority.

Montenegro thus entered into the phase of being a de facto sovereign state but without the legal basis for developing its own foreign policy.

In that regard, Montenegro faced its first significant challenge in the conflict between Serbia (and thus the FRY) and armed insurgents in Kosovo. The Montenegrin government sought to distance itself, declaring neutrality and advocating dialogue with Kosovo Albanians in conjunction with the EU. But continued military actions by Serb forces and retaliations by the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës, (UÇK/KLA)) drove the FRY into an inexorable conflict with NATO. The Montenegrin authorities were acutely aware that despite their self-proclaimed neutrality, Montenegro was home to strategic military sites that would be targeted as part of any NATO bombing campaign. While the subsequent NATO bombing of the FRY had significantly less impact in Montenegro than in Serbia, the internal situation in Montenegro steadily worsened as a result. A continuing flow of refugees, numbering 80,000, put a considerable strain on the government, and as NATO bombs fell on Montenegro, Đukanović’s government was placed under significant pressure by both Milošević, his supporters in Montenegro and the Seventh Battalion of the Yugoslav Army (Calhoun 2000a, 2000b). The 78-day NATO bombings of FRY was the first “critical test for Montenegro—and it passed with exceptional merit”, as Đukanović “negotiated that crisis and survived”, with Montenegrin territory suffering minimal casualties; the attacks “contained an implicit message to Belgrade: follow the Đukanović path and you won’t get bombed” (Gow, 1999, p. 287). Moreover, NATO bombings were a “demonstration of the advantages a state can obtain, even if it is a part of a larger state involved in a war, under the conditions of a supermodern war—if it respects the ‘rule

322 BOJAN BAĆA AND KENNETH MORRISON of the game’ of the international community and its fundamental values” (Darmanović, 1999, p. 66). Simultaneously, Podgorica became a safe haven for Milošević’s opposition in Serbia, serving also as a point of liaison between them and Western powers.

Milošević’s capitulation after 78 days of bombing meant that Montenegro survived the war, despite the many risks and potential for open conflict between opposing groups in Montenegro (Darmanović, 1999). However, this event, among other political and economic reforms implemented through cooperation with the international community, brought about disassociation from Belgradecontrolled federal institutions, making Montenegro a de facto independent state in the process. At the time, Montenegro “conducted its foreign affairs differently from both Serbia and the FRY”, abandoning their isolationism and reaching out to “democratic countries, thus overriding the federal foreign policy” (Džankić 2014, p.

174). During this period, the US and the EU played a key role in Montenegro’s establishment of a separate government, state budget, police, customs, central banks, currencies, with FRY enjoying continued presence only through the army and air-traffic control (Calhoun, 2000a, p. 63; Gallagher, 2003, p. 58). Many of the decisions that made Montenegro progressively sovereign came out as a protection from Milošević’s politics. For instance, knowing that Belgrade’s central bank policy “could be used to undermine Montenegro’s economy, [Montenegro] adopted the German Mark (and subsequently the Euro) as the official currency” in 1999 (Whyte, 2006, p. 26). Accordingly, this unilateral move of monetary separation and growing economic independence from Belgrade pushed Podgorica to assume control of customs and its borders and the collection of duties and taxes within them. Moreover, aware of Milošević’s tendency to resolve problems through armed conflicts, Podgorica “built up a 20,000-strong force of loyal, motivated, and reasonably well-armed police personnel” (Gallagher, 2003, p. 58), which served as a de facto army that would eventually engage in the stand-offs with the Milošević-controlled Yugoslav Army.

During this period, Montenegro entered the realm of international relations with the establishment of the embryonic foreign service in early 1998 that eventually became a full foreign ministry in

MONTENEGRO’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1991 TO 2020 323 January 2000. Because borders were sealed in Montenegro, it operated from Ljubljana where it established contacts with the international community to raise the international profile of Montenegro.

By mid-2000, Podgorica was clear that the FRY no longer had any right to represent its interests, so despite the lack of international sovereignty, Podgorica established “missions” in London, Rome, Ljubljana, Sarajevo and Berlin (Morrison 2009, pp. 177–178). The international community “viewed Montenegro as having distinct legal personality separate from the FRY”, so in the summer of 2000, Montenegro “created a mission to UN that has been informally recognized by some Western members of the Security Council” (Gallagher 2003, p. 58), thus emerging as an actor on the international stage.

In such a context, the Montenegrin government tried twice to redefine the relationship between the two Yugoslav member-states on confederal principles. The first time, in August 1999, a proposal entitled the Bases of New Relations between Montenegro and Serbia was offered to the government of Serbia, in which the Montenegrin government wanted to ensure Yugoslavia’s return to the international scene, pursuit of pro-Western foreign policy and promotion of foreign investments (Calhoun, 2000a, pp. 75–76), as well as the transformation of the FRY into a “loose union or commonwealth” (Gallagher, 2003, p. 58).

In June 2000, Milošević responded through constitutional amendments that made the federal presidency one that was directly elected rather than appointed by the federal parliament, thus eliminating “any meaningful input by Montenegrin citizens as they represented less than 5% of the population of the FRY” (Gallagher, 2003, p. 58). This, in the eyes of the Montenegrin government, effectively delegitimized the FRY, as Montenegro lost its constitutionally granted equality within the federation. Consequently, Podgorica was pushed to declare a “boycott of all policies and directives decided upon either by the federal government or the federal parliament”, especially the September 2000 elections in Serbia (Kovačević, 2007, p. 80). However, “one of the ironic side-effects of the boycott of federal elections'' was that with the fall of Milošević, “the governing party in Montenegro had no representation federally”,

324 BOJAN BAĆA AND KENNETH MORRISON which only made relationships between two states more contentious (Fraser, 2003, p. 383). The fall of Milošević, therefore, “did not bring with it a resolution of the Serbian-Montenegrin conflict: the dynamics of the conflict had changed, the process had gained its own momentum, the population in Montenegro was polarised, and important political elites had interests in the continued separation of the two republics'' (Caspersen, 2003, p. 113). This brought Podgorica into conflict with the international community, which until then encouraged and supported dissent with Belgrade, but ensured that Podgorica did not take steps towards independence.3 The revised platform was issued immediately after the fall of Milošević, in December 2000, which once again envisaged a very loose confederation between Serbia and Montenegro. Compared to the previous document, however, the proposed confederation “had even fewer links between the two republics: it was a union of two fully independent and internationally recognized states” (Caspersen, 2003, p. 112). Yet, at this point Montenegro stopped being a priority for the international community. Namely, with the fall of Milošević, the unwavering support of the US and the EU ended and Montenegrin independence became an internationally contentious issue (Džankić, 2014; Fraser, 2003; Hockenos and Winterhagen, 2007). Western support for Podgorica was “partly predicated on the judgement that, in the absence of credible opposition in Serbia, [the Montenegrin regime] constituted the only serious opposition to Milošević in the Yugoslav context” (Gow, 1999, p. 287). But the political changes in Serbia, the primary argument for Montenegrin independence—that it could not wait for Serbia to become democratic— had disappeared. As the dynamics of the region changed overnight, Serbia, being the largest state in the region, once again became the focus of the international community, with Montenegro’s strategic significance being reduced. With the US withdrawing from the region, the EU also wanted Montenegro’s future in a federation with Serbia and did not take any action unilaterally. Namely, “the EU

3

During this period, with the exception of the US and the EU, other great or regional powers did not play any important role in Montenegro’s foreign policy.

MONTENEGRO’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1991 TO 2020 325 was afraid it would encourage separatist movements in nearby territories”, seeing as “Montenegro’s state-building agenda [collided] with the intentions of the great powers for the region Montenegro belongs to, such as in 1918” (Gallagher, 2003, p. 69), so Western powers “held the view that the region would be best served by maintaining a union” (Cross and Komnenich, 2005, p. 22). In a word, the international community was “inherently conservative: recognition of border changes and the official acknowledgement of new states comes reluctantly and as a last resort” (Fawn, 2008, p.

269), which caused problems for Montenegrin strategic goals.

Moreover, many European policymakers “were anxious to prevent further instability in a region where the international community had just taken on responsibility for Kosovo”, thus no Western European officials were prepared to support Montenegro’s secession (Whyte, 2006, p. 27). With no clear strategy for dealing with the situation, the US and the EU were clear that Podgorica should follow the wishes of the international community for a continued union of Serbia and Montenegro, especially because all political parties in Montenegro had set European integration as their strategic goal (Vujović and Komar, 2008, p. 240). While independence was not a desirable outcome for the US or the EU, Podgorica could no longer “rely on their unswerving support” (Morrison, 2009, p.

184) By then, however, the process had gained its own momentum, and backtracking proved difficult because the Montenegrin regime had “tasted some of the fruits of de facto independence” (Roberts, 2002, p. 6). This process had also fostered a political, business, and intellectual elite with strong interest in continued separation from Serbia (Simić, 2002, p. 203), as it had shifted public opinion toward favoring independence from Serbia (Cross and Komnenich, 2005, p.

3).

With Serbia and Montenegro being close to approving a Montenegrin referendum on independence in late 2001, the EU and the US fears over the stability of the region made them intervene to prevent such a development. Furthermore, because “both sides [were] heavily dependent on financial aid from international donors and especially Đukanović” (Caspersen, 2003, p. 113), Đukanović had

326 BOJAN BAĆA AND KENNETH MORRISON “little room to maneuver” (Roberts, 2002, p. 7).4 In early 2002, under pressure from the EU, Serbia and Montenegro agreed to establish the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro to preserve a loose alliance in what had constituted the FRY for at least the next three years. In March 2002, with stick-and-carrot mediation from the EU, Podgorica and Belgrade signed the so-called Belgrade Agreement, setting up a very loose federation with the new name Union of Serbia and Montenegro, which nevertheless specified that after three years, either republic could hold a referendum on independence (Caspersen, 2003, pp. 113–114). Under the agreement, Serbia and Montenegro shared a “common defense and foreign policy, but would maintain separate economies, currencies and customs services at least for the short term” (Cross and Komenich, 2005, p. 22).

Yet, with Montenegro’s request for a separate seat in the UN being denied, “Serbia and Montenegro would remain a single sovereign nation-state in the eyes of the international community” (ibid.). It also changed the “nature of Montenegro’s foreign policy and induced a greater orientation towards the EU, as opposed to the US orientation that marked the previous period” (Džankić, 2014, p.

175). This loose state union, whose first and only president was Svetozar Marović, was quickly recognized by other powers.

However, the state union was doomed to fail, as neither side was committed, so that it could never develop into a functioning state entity. Within the union, there were constant disagreements between Podgorica and Belgrade, including the constitution, symbols and national anthem among other things, which made the union dysfunctional from the onset. Overall, “the EU decision to engage a twin-track process had serious political implications for the union: it strengthened the perception that an independent Montenegro was viable” (Macek-Macková, 2011, p. 627). Consequently,

4

For instance, for 2001, “foreign aid (mainly from the USA and the European Union) was planned at a level of DM 60 million, although less than half this amount was actually disbursed” (Đurić, 2003, p. 155). After that, the US gave rather vague security guarantees for Montenegro, while the EU provided concrete economic assistance, especially through infrastructure projects (Gallagher, 2003, pp. 58–60).

MONTENEGRO’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1991 TO 2020 327 “by recognizing the legitimacy of separate negotiations and abandoning the harmonization idea, the EU contributed to the segmentation of Serbia and Montenegro”, a fact nowhere more evident than in “Serbia’s deferral and Montenegro’s admission to the WTO”, which “underlined even more sharply the economic discrepancies between republics and the union’s dysfunction” (ibid.).

Ultimately, the role of the international community in the separation of Serbia and Montenegro—through the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe (COE) that tasked the Venice Commission (VC) with providing expert recommendations on the referendum process—was completed in December 2005.

The referendum itself was a pivotal moment in Montenegro’s modern history and its trajectory since has been shaped by it. Held on May 21, 2006, the referendum sought to determine whether the republic would remain a partner within the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, created as a consequence of the Belgrade Agreement, or become an independent state. With the unprecedented threshold, demonstrating EU’s preference for a maintenance of the state union, set at 55%, a narrow majority of 55.5% of the republic’s citizens opted for the latter, heralding Montenegro’s re-emergence as an internationally recognized independent state. On June 3, 2006, independence was formally declared, and Montenegro thereafter made notable progress, becoming a member of the UN and other international institutions while making strides toward achieving the government’s core foreign policy objective: Euro-Atlantic integration.

Independent Montenegro and Relations with the Great Powers (2006–2020) As a de jure sovereign state, Montenegro could now embark upon a genuinely independent foreign policy. In the immediate period following the independence referendum, the Montenegrin government declared that “Euro-Atlantic integration” (EU and NATO membership) was its main foreign policy goal (Morrison, 2018). The country immediately joined both the COE and UN, and in June 2006, the EU formally established relations with Montenegro. Just

328 BOJAN BAĆA AND KENNETH MORRISON over a year later, in October 2007, Montenegro signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. A formal application was submitted in December 2008, and the country’s endeavors were rewarded in December 2009 when Montenegrin citizens were granted visa-free travel within the Schengen zone: an important development as it provided tangible evidence that the government’s endeavors were bearing fruit. In November 2010, the European Commission published its avis (opinion) on the country’s bid to become a candidate for membership, and in December 2010, Montenegro was formally awarded candidate status. In December 2011, the European Commission began the accession process, and membership negotiations began on June 29, 2012 (Džankić, 2014). By 2014 two chapters had been provisionally closed: those focusing on “education and culture” (Chapter 26) and “science and research” (Chapter 25).

Montenegro also made progress toward NATO membership, despite the significant opposition to the participation (from March 2010) of Montenegrin troops in an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in northern Afghanistan (a commitment undertaken to bolster their chances of membership). The country became a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in December 2006 and engaged in “membership dialogue” with NATO from April 2008. In December 2009, Montenegro joined the Membership Action Plan (MAP), the first objective of which was to submit their first Annual National Program (ANP), which they duly did in September 2010 (Dudley, 2020). Montenegro received an invitation to join NATO in December 2015—despite the lack of public consensus on the issue—formally becoming part of the military alliance in June 2017. The country continues on a positive trajectory towards EU membership (Đurović and Lajh, 2020), probably the most likely member drawn from the “Western Balkan Six” (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia).

The issue of Montenegro’s NATO accession was, however, the driver for a deterioration in relations between Montenegro and Russia, as well as significant domestic strife (Bešić and Spasojević, 2018). In 2006, the relationship between Podgorica and Moscow had

MONTENEGRO’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1991 TO 2020 329 been excellent (Morrison, 2018, pp. 133–150). Russian businessmen (such as Oleg Deripaska, who purchased the Kombinat aluminijuma in Podgorica (KAP), an Aluminum Plant in Podgorica) and citizens began to invest significantly, the latter primarily in real estate on the Montenegrin coast. The KAP deal later turned sour, and bilateral relations soon deteriorated as it became evident that Montenegro would indeed join NATO (Bechev, 2017). The situation was compounded by the Montenegrin government’s support of EU sanctions against Russia in July 2014. This generated sharp criticism not only from the Russian Ambassador in Montenegro, Andrei Nesterenko, but also from his counterpart in Serbia, Alexander Chepurin, who commented that the Montenegrin government’s attempts to join NATO were akin to “monkeys chasing a banana” (Kosić, 2014). Thereafter, a number of anti-Russian billboards appeared in Podgorica emblazoned with messages such as “[b]etter a banana in the hand than a Russian boot in the neck”, and one that drew on a quote from the Montenegrin communist, writer, and then dissident, Milovan Đilas: “Russians have never been friends to Montenegrins; we have always been bargaining chips to them” (Komnenić, 2014).

From then on, the narrative began to shift away from Russia as a key investor and ally to a country that endangered Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic orientation, as well as a country that was channeling support to pro-Serb and pro-Russian political parties in Montenegro that were opposed to NATO membership (Zečević, 2021, pp. 186–192). The Montenegrin government claims that Russia had been behind the October 2015 opposition protests—which government media often referred to as “pro-Russian” and “antiNATO”—fuelled a further deterioration of bilateral relations (Morrison, 2018, pp. 157–159). Yet while little concrete evidence was provided to prove that Russia had to do with anything other than rhetorically supporting the protests, the Montenegrin government has not deviated from the narrative linking the two. Đukanović argued that Russia continued to interfere in the political life of Montenegro, while stating that Montenegro’s damaged relations with Moscow was primarily a “collateral effect” caused by current geopolitics and a reflection more of Russia’s own deteriorating relationship with

330 BOJAN BAĆA AND KENNETH MORRISON NATO (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2015). Nevertheless, Montenegro’s formal invitation to join the NATO alliance to become its twentyninth member was received on December 2, 2015.

Relations between Montenegro and Russia took a dramatic turn for the worse during the October 2016 parliamentary elections.

On polling day, Montenegrin police began to reveal details of what they claimed was an attempted “state coup”. Just two days before the election, a former policeman, Mirko Velimirović, entered a police station in Podgorica and revealed that a plot to install a “proRussian” government had been prepared. The night before the election scheduled for Sunday, October 16, 2016, Bratislav Dikić, a former member of the Serbian Gendarmerie, was arrested for his alleged involvement in the plot. Nineteen other Serbian citizens were also detained under suspicion of involvement and of forming a “criminal organization” (Garčević, 2019, p. 78). The Montenegrin government claimed this group, led by Dikić, planned to stage a coup d’état during which Đukanović would be the target of an assassination attempt; they immediately cited Russian involvement and alleged that the attempted coup represented part of a Russian hybrid operation in Montenegro (Morrison, 2018, pp. 162–167). In any event, the controversy surrounding the “state coup”, the alleged involvement of Serbian citizens and Russian agents and the subsequent trial of the accused served only to further sour Montenegro’s relations with Russia.

Montenegro’s relationship with China is far less combative but not without controversy. The Chinese objective is to forge “friendly relations” with Western Balkan states and have a foothold, through the mechanism of indebtedness, in countries that are not currently EU member states but are likely to be in the future (Conley et al., 2020). Chinese investment, albeit through loans, in the Western Balkans has a clear economic rationale, and perhaps a political one. The countries of the region are part of the “16+1” group of countries, with which China has sought to improve relations. Chinese investment does not come with specific political conditions—they do not oppose, for example, NATO or EU membership—but there may be a price to pay. Their offer to invest in the

MONTENEGRO’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1991 TO 2020 331 region—in the form of loans—is tempting to the potential recipients, as the Chinese investment comes with relatively low interest rates, favorable repayment terms and less rigorous conditions and due diligence that accompany loans from, say, the European Union or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

It is the Chinese government who are funding, through loans and as part of the wider “One Belt, One Road” project, the BarBoljare highway, dubbed by the Montenegrin government as “The Project of the Century”, an ambitious and vital strategic infrastructure project that will link the port of Bar to Montenegro’s border with Serbia (Barkin and Vasović, 2018). It is, they claim, key to the country’s future economic growth. They believe so strongly in the project that they are quick to dismiss those who have reservations about the viability of the project as merely lacking ambition and vision. Ambitious as it certainly is, the economic risks for Montenegro are real. Critics of the project claim it is simply unrealistic, will never be completed and, moreover, that the implications of pursuing it may be serious (Grgić, 2019). In short, the Bar-Boljare project is definitely ambitious, but it could extract a high economic and political price.

The loan for the project, provided by the Chinese government (via the Export-Import Bank of China), was established in US dollars, meaning that with exchange rates taken into account, the immediate cost of the loan rose by a staggering 25%. With Montenegro already highly indebted, its debt to GDP ratio is now dangerously high, and it is not well positioned to absorb future economic shocks.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has already warned that Montenegro’s level of debt is too high and that it risks being weighed down with further debt to complete the project (Pepermans 2018, pp. 192–193). However, the Chinese loan only covered the first 25%of the costs of building the highway—meaning that the Montenegrin government is faced with an unenviable choice: increase debt levels further to fund the building of the highway or shelve the project for an unspecified time. Thus, the Bar-Boljare highway project could be the trigger for a more serious economic

332 BOJAN BAĆA AND KENNETH MORRISON crisis that could have equally serious social and political consequences. More Chinese loans mean that Podgorica will rely more heavily on Beijing in the future. This may give the Chinese greater political influence in the region and, with six Western Balkan countries friendly to China (who may be inclined to lobby for Chinese economic interests), eventually within the EU (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2018).

Conclusion The Montenegrin government has achieved many of the foreign policy objectives that had been identified as of importance since 1998. Following the re-establishment of full sovereignty in 2006, the country has become a member of NATO and is, albeit incrementally, moving toward EU membership. Throughout this period, Montenegro incrementally developed its own distinct foreign policy, forging strong relations and, particularly after 2006, with the US, the EU, China, Turkey, and (post-Brexit) bilateral relations with the United Kingdom. Yet, Montenegro’s relations with Russia remain cool, though Podgorica and Moscow officially have made some efforts to improve these since the nadir in 2016. EU membership remains Podgorica’s official primary foreign policy objective, though full accession to the EU may not be achieved as quickly as they would like.

What characterized Montenegro during the post-socialist transition and its subsequent democratic backsliding is a relative weakness of the state institutions when compared to the power of the ruling DPS and, in particular, the authority of Đukanović, who did not only become its undisputed leader but also the central “institution” in independent Montenegro. That is to say, as much as the country’s foreign policy was articulated by Đukanović, the institutions themselves became weakened, which is progressively becoming an issue for the country’s international outlook as the party has increased its grip over the state institutions in recent years. Ever since the split with Milošević, Podgorica worked to cut much of its ties with its historical heritage—viewing now Montenegro as a part of the Mediterranean rather than the Balkans, a country whose

MONTENEGRO’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1991 TO 2020 333 home is the West rather than the East —, but because its foreign policy is formed to fit the interests of the ruling party rather than the country as a whole, potential shift in its strategic course from European integration towards more authoritarian international circles was always a possibility, as long as it served the interests of Đukanović, the DPS and their apparatchiks.

The change of government in Montenegro, as a consequence of the August 31, 2020 parliamentary elections, has led many to speculate that the new government, among whose ranks include parties that have openly opposed NATO membership and have closed links to Russia, may be inclined to embark upon a shift in foreign policy orientation. However, Montenegro’s new foreign minister, Đorđe Radulović, has made it clear that Montenegro will not deviate from its Euro-Atlantic path and will continue to support EU sanctions against Russia (though relations with Russia may improve nevertheless). NATO has stated that it expects no change in Montenegro’s foreign policy, but it has expressed concern about certain individuals within the new Montenegrin government having access to sensitive information. After three decades of DPS rule, during which there was little ambiguity in terms of foreign policy objectives, it remains to be seen how the current Montenegrin government will make, if at all, even the smallest adjustments in this regard. Nevertheless, the foreign policy direction that Montenegro has pursued in the two decades may be subject to change, a change that may be entirely determined by which of the parties within the government emerge as dominant.

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IN SEARCH OF A BIG BROTHER: GREAT POWERS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH MACEDONIA Cvete Koneska

Introduction This chapter looks at Macedonian foreign policy through the prism of great powers and their impact on the development and successes and failures in Macedonian foreign policy since independence. The main argument concerns Macedonia’s limited success in building strong relationships with the major global powers, which has adversely affected it in achieving its foreign policy goals over the past three decades. As a result of no historical relationships and traditional alliances with great powers prior to independence, Macedonian politicians have struggled to build these partnerships after independence, given the country’s small size and economy and its limited influence beyond the immediate region.

Without powerful supporters in the international arena, Macedonia has relied on compliance with regional and international norms and regulations to support its foreign policy interests. This strategy has not always been effective, despite the growing endorsement of a value-based international order by most international actors, as more powerful states are more often able to bend or disregard norms and rule than less powerful ones. That not allpowerful states choose to do that—and some are enthusiastic supporters of existing international norms—does not reduce their ability to flaunt international norms. Macedonian political elites, who have witnessed this through the failure to secure membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2008 and to start accession negotiations with the European Union (EU) since 2009, tend to prefer an international system that is less driven by great power dominance and allows small, less powerful states such as Macedonia to thrive despite the lack of powerful supporters.

340 CVETE KONESKA This chapter examines Macedonia’s foreign policy towards the great powers in the global and regional arena—the EU, the United States (US), Russia, China and Turkey. It sets out how Macedonia’s policy toward each of these has been established and evolved over the past thirty years, reflecting on the key events and junctures in its relations with them. It further looks at the key foreign policy structures that underpin how foreign policy towards great powers is created and implemented, outlining the main documents, tools and actors in that process. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief outlook for future trajectories of Macedonia’s foreign policy, depending on how the regional and international dynamics evolve.

History of the ‘Great Powers’ Idea in the Balkans The concept of the great powers as the most powerful states in the international system, which use their power (however loosely or restrictively defined) to shape the behavior of other actors in the international arena, is not new. It has been explicitly, or implicitly, recognized to be driving the foreign policy behavior of small states, including those in the Balkans, such as North Macedonia (Waltz, 2010; Cladi and Locatelli, 2012; Gnedina, 2015). The Balkans, which has historically been a region at the borders between three large European empires (Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian), has a long history seeing and experiencing the wider world in terms of great powers and power politics. For a long time, borders in the region shifted according to the compromises and agreements reached in peace conferences and summits attended by representatives of the most powerful European states, with minimal input from local populations and limited regard for their preferences. From the Vienna and Berlin congresses in the XIX century to the Versailles peace conference in 1919, it seemed that great powers were making key decisions that shaped the region’s destiny for decades to come (Glenny, 2000; Miller and Kagan, 1997).

Consequently, Balkan states’ relations with great powers were crucial—the powerful states of Europe could and did decide the borders and even the continued existence of states in the region. For

GREAT POWERS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH MACEDONIA 341 example, Russian support for Serbian or Bulgarian interests helped these two states establish their borders and sovereignty during the final decades of the Ottoman Empire. More recently, during the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990’s, US support for Kosovo Albanians helped drive international intervention in 1999 and paved the way for Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 (Kim and Woerhel, 2008). Similarly, the European Community (EC), spurred by German leadership, recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, during the breakup of the former Yugoslav federation (Jakobsen, 1995; Lukarelli, 1994).

However, great powers’ influence was not limited only to existential matters of state sovereignty or survival. In economic and policy issues, they continued to influence the domestic and foreign policies of states in the region. From building alliances during wars and foreign interventions throughout the last century, to supporting certain regional infrastructure and energy projects over others, powerful global players acted to ensure their interests were promoted and protected in the Balkans, including in Macedonia.

Nonetheless, Macedonia has never had a clear attachment— symbolic or material—to any major power, in Europe or globally.

Given its recent statehood (it declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991), Macedonia has only had an independent foreign policy since the early 1990s. With such a relative late start in the international arena, the scope for developing a strong bilateral relationship with a major power, such as the US, Russia or China, has been limited. This is further compounded by Macedonia’s relatively small size and economy, which make it difficult to secure preferential treatment by any major economic or political power.

As a result, Macedonia’s early foreign policy relied on the logic of ‘equidistance’, which predicates foreign policy on maintaining good relations with all major powers, but not aligning too closely with any of them. This idea, most clearly articulated by Macedonia’s first president, Kiro Gligorov (1992–1999), derives from the logic behind the Non-Aligned Movement, in which Yugoslavia was a founding and influential member (Gligorov, 2000). Such ideas were therefore close and familiar to Gligorov and the political elite at the time. Gligorov had served as a high-ranking official in

342 CVETE KONESKA several Yugoslav agencies and government bodies during the 1970s and the 1980s and had been directly involved in discussions about Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and position in the world. Therefore, in the initial months of (geo-)political uncertainty, the familiar ideas of ‘equidistance’ and not pursuing close alliances might have seemed the most reasonable foreign policy course to pursue. This was also due to the fact that there was no obvious powerful state to align to, given the lack of historical links. While other states in the region, and across Central and Eastern Europe, after the fall of communism sought to reinstate historical alliances and friendships across the Iron Curtain, this was not an immediate priority for Macedonia.

The idea of ‘equidistance’ in foreign policy is not agnostic to the existence of great powers. Indeed, it is predicated on it, as the equal distance it implies assumes the existence of powerful actors from whom distance is kept. However, its appeal in the increasingly uncertain post-1989 world order was rapidly decreasing (Morphet, 1993). With the demise of the Soviet Union, and the instant re-orientation of most former Communist states towards NATO and EU membership as key foreign policy priorities, the value of not seeking alliances substantially decreased. The former bipolar world had changed to a unipolar one, so most of the former communist states in the east of the continent sought to align closer to the West. Keeping distance from the West was unlikely to produce any dividends in foreign policy any longer. Rather, the opposite was the case.

Against this context, Macedonia embarked on the path to independent statehood and started laying the foundations of an independent foreign policy. However, the adverse impact of the lack of historically strong relations with powerful states was immediately felt. Without strong allies to support its independence claim, Macedonia struggled to secure international recognition in the initial months after the independence referendum in September 1991 (Sioussiouras, 2004). In contrast to Slovenia and Croatia, the other former Yugoslav republics which declared independence in the summer of 1991, Macedonia could not rely on strong German sup-

GREAT POWERS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH MACEDONIA 343 port within the EC (after 1993 becoming the EU. Slovenia and Croatia were for historical (and geographic) reasons closer to Germany and the EC, which worked to their advantage (Bearce, 2002; Jovic, 2006).

The EC’s decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, despite its own special commission’s recommendations that only Slovenia and Macedonia fulfilled the conditions for independent statehood, was one of the early shocks and failures of Macedonian foreign policy.1 It illustrated in no uncertain terms the limits of foreign policy based solely on international norms and law, without the support of a powerful global or regional actor. Macedonia had drafted and amended its new constitution and state institutions to meet the requirements set by the Badinter Commission (Radan, 2000). However, in what would become a recurring theme in Macedonian foreign policy, the rewards failed to materialize.

One potential exception from this occurred in Macedonia’s relations with Turkey. The latter emerged as a strong supporter of Macedonia in the early days of its statehood as Turkey was among the first states to recognize Macedonia as an independent state. For historical and cultural reasons (Macedonia’s history within the Ottoman Empire and its substantial Turkish minority), the two states had solid foundations to build good bilateral relations. Turkey’s initial actions after Macedonia’s secession from Yugoslavia signaled its willingness to do so, providing Macedonia with a valuable supporter in times of uncertainty and growing insecurity in the Balkans (Gangloff, 2001).

1

The foreign ministers of the EC in 1991 established the Arbitration commission of the peace conference on Yugoslavia (popularly known as the ‘Badinter Commission’ after its chair, French lawyer Robert Badinter). Among other issues, the commission issued a set of conditions that each of the Yugoslav republics was expected to comply with to be recognised as a sovereign state by EC members. In the opinions issued in January 1992, the Badinter Commission ruled that Slovenia and Macedonia had fulfilled the EC criteria for independent statehood, but Croatia had not. Yet at the next EC summit, it was Slovenia and Croatia that were recognised as independent states. Greece vetoed the recognition of Macedonia.

344 CVETE KONESKA This was the context in 1991, when Macedonia became an independent state with its own claim to sovereignty in the international arena. Since then, political elites have promoted and implemented foreign policy goals with varying success. The initial lack of great power allies put the country in a disadvantaged position, however, today Macedonia is a member of the United Nations (UN) and NATO, as well as part of various regional and international organizations and initiatives. However, membership in the EU remains elusive, and building strong relationships with powerful states is a skill that Macedonian leaders are yet to fully master.

Contemporary Foreign Policy In the past thirty years, Macedonia’s relations with powerful global and regional actors have evolved and developed. Partly as a result of the country’s own change of preferences and goals (their desire to join regional organizations such as the EU and NATO) and partly in response to the changing international context (the growing importance of China in international politics), Macedonian political elites have invested scarce resources to build and strengthen relations with important global actors and secondary institutional structures.

European Union (And Major Member States) At present, the European Union is by far the most important foreign policy actor for Macedonia. Over the past two decades Macedonia has sought to join the EU—indeed, EU membership is the top foreign policy priority for Macedonia, over which a broad political consensus has been agreed upon across the whole political spectrum. As a result, for the past twenty years, the leadership in Macedonia has prioritized relations with the EU ahead of those with other global actors.

Like most other former Yugoslav states, Macedonia was relatively late in formally joining the EU’s enlargement policy and tools. With the exception of Slovenia, the rest of the former Yugoslav states were not included in the large so-called Eastern Enlarge-

GREAT POWERS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH MACEDONIA 345 ment wave of 2004–07, when most former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe joined the bloc. Although not directly involved in the wars elsewhere in the post-Yugoslav space, Macedonia did not have direct diplomatic relations with the EU until 1996, when the enlargement agenda was already advanced. This was because of Macedonia’s dispute with neighboring Greece, an EU member, which used its status and powers as a member of the bloc to shape Macedonia’s relations with the EU. Greece did not support any formal diplomatic relations between Macedonia and the EU (although Macedonia had already established bilateral relations with most EU members) until the two countries reached a tentative agreement over the name of Macedonia. Only after the UN-negotiated 1995 Interim Accords were signed by both Greece and Macedonia, was it possible for the latter to establish a formal relationship with the EU, under the provisional reference of ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, as stipulated in the Accords.

Indeed, Macedonia’s relationship with the EU since independence has been mediated by Greece, who has acted as the main gatekeeper and obstacle to Macedonia deepening its integration and ultimately becoming a member of the EU (Azizi, 2012; Vangeli, 2011).

Not only did Greece’s objections delay Macedonia’s diplomatic relations with the bloc, but, between 2009 and 2018, it also repeatedly vetoed the start of accession negotiations between Macedonia and the union, despite the European Commission’s recommendations to start the talks. For almost a decade, the unresolved dispute with Greece paralyzed and frustrated Macedonia’s foreign policy towards the EU. The dispute with Greece demonstrated further insights about power in foreign policy. Although by no means a global power, or even a significant regional one, by virtue of its membership in the EU, Greece was in a position to shape the EU’s stance towards Macedonia. Being a member of a powerful and desirable bloc gave Greece a disproportionately greater power in relation to Macedonia (Ivanovski, 2013). This power gap was exacerbated by the asymmetric positions of the two states, with Macedonia openly and actively seeking to join the EU, which increased Greece’s leverage

346 CVETE KONESKA over it. Had Macedonia not sought to join the EU, Greece’s membership would have had less of an impact on the dispute resolution and negotiating powers of the two states.

Furthermore, Greece’s repeated vetoes against Macedonia reinforced the implicit message about power and alliances being more important than compliance with international and regional norms and values. Although the EU enlargement process is couched in terms of European values of democracy, rule of law, open markets and human rights, it appeared that in practice, power calculations were the key driver to decisions over extending invitations to start accession talks. Despite having demonstrated its readiness to start membership talks through a rigorous monitoring process with the European Commission, Macedonia failed to secure the reward of opening negotiations with the bloc every year between 2009 and 2018 (EC, 2009–2019). That this was driven by Greece, which in a different geopolitical context in 1981 had joined the Community against the EC’s recommendation and without absorbing the acquis, was even more poignant. Then, as well as now, the formal membership criteria seem to matter less than global or regional power struggles. The repeated rejections by the EU, while other states in the region, such as Montenegro and Serbia, were proceeding ahead with EU accession talks, did not weaken the domestic consensus over pursuing EU membership. If anything, with each consecutive veto it became clearer to domestic politicians how important membership in powerful regional organizations and alliances was, especially for a small and relatively poor state. The prospect of being surrounded by EU members, while remaining outside the bloc, was not an appealing one, and despite the continued frustration and humiliation of failing to start accession talks, Macedonian politicians persisted with their commitment to join the EU one day.

Of course, Macedonia has clear incentives when seeking to join the EU. The political and economic benefits of EU membership make a compelling argument in favor of this. Pre-accession assistance for key economic sectors and political institutions, as well as increasing access to the large single market of the EU and membership in many flagship programs (from education and science to

GREAT POWERS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH MACEDONIA 347 business regulations and industry standards), give Macedonia a taste of what it is like to belong to the EU. While for political elites EU oversight of the work of key political and state institutions may not be as welcome as economic benefits, it provides a welcome additional check over democratic governance and prevents outright abuses of political power. Beyond interests and material incentives, the cultural level of the EU is the closest and most attractive powerful player for Macedonians. Over the past thirty years, the popular level of the EU, specifically the Western European member states, have been the most culturally appealing societies for Macedonian citizens, regardless of ethnic and social background.

Whether for education, travel or permanent immigration, Western European states are the destination Macedonians choose, signaling the direction they wish their own society to take. In particular since 2010, when visa restrictions for short-stay to Schengen states were removed, many Macedonians have started to regularly travel to the EU, boosting the popular-level relationships and expanding the exposure to the EU. As a result, domestic political elites face increasing pressure to both pursue domestic reforms and to continue to seek EU membership, despite the continuing external obstacles to achieve the latter.

Thus, the EU remains by far the most important ‘Great Power’ in Macedonian foreign policy. Although Macedonia has not been as successful in building and strengthening its relationship with the EU as other post-Yugoslav states, the overwhelming incentives and growing cultural appeal of the EU ensure membership in the bloc remains a key priority for the domestic political elites, regardless of party or ethnic affiliation (Belloni, 2009). Macedonia’s relationship with the EU has been dominated by Greece, as a key stakeholder who shaped the bloc’s policy towards Macedonia. Against Greek vetoes, Macedonian politicians have failed to build sufficiently strong bilateral relations with any of the most influential member states, such as Germany, France or the United Kingdom (UK) (until 2020). While the Greek position was often criticized by the EU or single EU member states as ‘irrational’, such criticisms were not sufficiently costly for Greece to abandon its vetoes. As a result, the

348 CVETE KONESKA EU’s policy towards Macedonia was shaped largely by Greek preferences, and for a short period around 2001 (when Macedonia went through domestic ethnic conflict), by regional security concerns (Ragaru, 2008).

The United States of America Along with the EU, the US has been a critical player in the Balkans and the former Yugoslav states. However, throughout the past thirty years Macedonia has not been a high priority in US policy towards the region. During the 1990s, when the US was involved in resolving the ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the priority was to keep Macedonia stable (Peterson, 2003). However, similar to the EU, the US was late in recognizing Macedonia’s independence.

It was not until after Macedonia was admitted as a member of the United Nations in 1993, under the provisional reference Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), that the US formally recognized Macedonia in 1994. Until then Macedonia’s formal relations with the US were limited, and given the other priorities in the region, there was limited opportunity for Macedonian politicians to build relations with the US (Kim, 2005).

However, US efforts to boost support for different NATO and US-led military interventions in the region and across the globe over the past three decades have given Macedonia an opportunity to align itself closer to the US. Indeed, the US focus on strengthening and expanding NATO in the East and South East of Europe— as a means of containing potential Russian aggressive action—has been the key US initiative in the Balkans. While Macedonia’s elites and population have never seen a credible security threat in Russia, the opportunity to engage with the US in NATO has been an attractive prospect. Therefore, Macedonia has pursued NATO membership as a high foreign policy priority since the late 1990s (Dimitrov, 2006).

While NATO membership was subject to the same obstacles as EU membership, with Greece blocking accession in the 2007 NATO summit when Macedonia was set to receive an invitation, there were additional factors that shaped Macedonia’s relations

GREAT POWERS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH MACEDONIA 349 with the US. Although culturally not dissimilar to other states in the West, the perception of the US is slightly more ambivalent than that of West European states. This is largely a result of the strong US support for Albanians in the Balkans, which was not always seen as compatible with Macedonian interests. Macedonian politicians, especially those among the ethnic Macedonian part of the population, tend to fear that US support for ethnic Albanians will lead to renewed conflict between the two ethnic communities, because ethnic Albanians can rely on US support for potential secession from Macedonia. This is rarely explicitly articulated, but these fears are evident in the decisions and reactions of the Macedonian political elite over the past two decades, with only cautious assent to support NATO and US initiatives in Kosovo (by hosting NATO troops and opening Macedonian airspace for NATO planes) and the initial reluctance to host Kosovo refugees.

Despite such concerns, no Macedonian politician has had any doubts that US support for Macedonia is crucial for its survival. The US played a key role in settling the ethnic conflict in Macedonia, along with the EU, and helped secure the commitment of the ethnic Albanian rebel leaders to the provisions agreed in the Ohrid Framework Agreement which ended the 2001 conflict. While various domestic actors disagreed over how advantageous this deal was for Macedonia as opposed to the ethnic Albanian community, it was clear that the US remained the key power in the region, and one with which Macedonia needed to maintain a very strong relationship (Hislope, 2003).

After 2001, relations with the US were almost fully shaped through the prism of NATO membership. As the US reduced its direct focus on the Balkans from the early 2000s, its key policy in the Balkans was NATO expansion. This was the main channel Macedonian elites used to build and maintain relations with the US. Because geographic distance and small market size meant that the country would not become a significant economic interest for the US, Macedonian-US relations were predicated on the need to maintain security and stability in the Balkans. Therefore, the US supported Macedonia in pursuing NATO and EU membership.

350 CVETE KONESKA Relations with the US were arguably the strongest during the two George W. Bush administrations (2000–2008). It was during this presidency in 2004 that the US suddenly decided to recognize Macedonia under its constitutional name at the time (“Republic of Macedonia”). The impact was largely symbolic, as this did not lead to any change in the dispute between Greece and Macedonia (which remained unresolved until 2018). Whether this was a success for Macedonian foreign policy is difficult to judge, as there is limited evidence of Macedonian politicians actively working towards this objective.

Similarly, despite the explicit US support for Macedonian NATO membership in 2007, the US was not able to prevent a Greek veto or secure an invitation until Macedonia and Greece had resolved the name dispute (Boese, 2008). Even against, arguably, the most powerful global player, it was the interest of Greece that prevailed thanks to NATO rules of unanimous decision making. This was met with shock and dismay among the politicians and population in Macedonia, many of whom believed that US support for Macedonia in NATO would be sufficient to discourage Greece from using its veto. Despite the failure to secure NATO membership, the continued US support strengthened Macedonia’s relations with the US and substantially improved the perception of the US as a supporter for Macedonia in the international arena.

After the failure of the 2007 NATO summit, the two states signed an agreement concerning special security support for Macedonia by the US. Again, the importance of this was largely symbolic, seeing as, unlike other states with such agreements (such as Georgia), Macedonia was not facing any direct external security threat, from Russia or elsewhere. Nonetheless, for the first time since independence, Macedonia had a relationship with the US that set it apart from the rest of the region, a first step in building a strong bilateral relationship with one of the most powerful global players, even if this mostly focused on regional security, while economic and societal relations remained as weak as before.

GREAT POWERS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH MACEDONIA 351 Russia When Macedonia embarked upon independent statehood and democratization in 1990–91, its relations with Russia were not a major factor in domestic or foreign policy. Unlike other former communist states across Eastern Europe, which sought to fully distance themselves from the legacy of Soviet rule or Warsaw Pact membership, Macedonia, as part of Yugoslavia, had no similar legacy to process or put behind. Since the early 1950s Yugoslavia had pursued an independent course in the international arena, so in 1990 independence for Macedonia was not about escaping Soviet (and by extension Russian) influence.

As Russia became more involved in the Balkans during the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, Macedonia’s generally good but not particularly close relations with Russia remained relatively stable. Unlike Serbia, which rekindled historically close relations with Russia, there was no significant history of Russian-Macedonian support to go back to. Despite Macedonia sharing the same cultural and religious markers (Cyrillic alphabet, Orthodox Christianity, Slavic language) that brought Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria closer to Russia, in foreign policy Macedonia did not align too closely to Russia (Smirnova, 1999). This was partly because historically, Russia’s support for its Balkan allies (Serbia and Bulgaria), such as during the Balkan Wars (1912–14), was not seen as particularly advantageous to Macedonian interests. It also was in part due to Russia being unlikely to be able to help Macedonia resolve its key domestic issues (tense relations with the ethnic Albanian community) or its foreign policy problems (the name dispute with Greece and EU/NATO integration). Furthermore, Macedonia had limited economic incentives to pursue a closer relationship with Russia. Unlike other states in the region, Macedonia did not depend on Russian energy imports. Until very recently, Macedonia had almost no gas infrastructure, thereby, it did not import any Russian gas. While Macedonia is dependent on energy imports, they came from neighboring countries, particularly Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. Beyond oil and gas, Russian businesses were not very likely to invest in the Balkans, including Macedonia.

352 CVETE KONESKA As Russia’s relations with the EU and the West in general gradually deteriorated over the past decade, Russia’s policy towards post-Yugoslav states also changed (Bechev, 2017). In particular, Russia’s relations with NATO candidate states, such as Macedonia until 2020, evolved to differentiate between domestic political actors, increasing support for those more likely to oppose NATO membership. In Macedonia, over the past decade has included directly or indirectly supporting the center-right, socially conservative Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization— Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRODPMNE) and its former leader and prime minister Nikola Gruevski (2006–2017). As Gruevski’s governments’ relations with the EU and the US deteriorated after the Greek vetoes of 2008–09, relations with Russia improved.

As a result, among domestic political elites, there is at present no clear consensus over the nature and intensity of relations with Russia. On one hand, the ethnic Albanian politicians firmly oppose any further strengthening of Russian influence in the country, while the ethnic Macedonian center-right is seeking in Russia an alternative to the EU, which is seen to have betrayed Macedonian hopes for becoming a full member of the bloc. Therefore, foreign policy towards Russia, which is becoming increasingly active in the Balkans through direct diplomatic and indirect media influence, is contested among the domestic Macedonian elites.

Turkey Since independence, Turkey has been one of Macedonia’s most consistent allies in foreign policy. It was also one of the few consistent supporters of Macedonia in the name dispute with Greece. Because it recognized Macedonia as an independent state in 1991, Turkey persisted in using its constitutional name at the time (Republic of Macedonia) in all communications, including in NATO (where a footnote was included in all documents referring to the country as “FYROM” to indicate that Turkey recognized it as the Republic of Macedonia). Inevitably, this was partly in response to Turkey’s own problematic relations with Greece, which meant that Turkey

GREAT POWERS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH MACEDONIA 353 was less inclined to comply with Greece’s pressures to use the provisional reference when referring to Macedonia.

Nonetheless, good relations with Turkey were not based only on joint frustrations with Greece’s foreign and domestic policies.

Turkey was one of the early investors in Macedonia, with Turkish businesses coming to Macedonia in the early 1990s before Western investors felt comfortable investing in this corner of Europe (Bilic and Durmishi, 2018). With Turkey’s own economic boom in the early 2000s, economic cooperation increased further. Turkey remains one of the main trade partners for Macedonia, and these economic links are likely to ensure that bilateral relations remain good, even after Macedonia resolved the name dispute with Greece.

In addition, at the societal level, along with the EU, Turkey has been one of the most active foreign actors in Macedonia. Turkey has provided support for schools, universities and restoration of historical buildings, monuments and publications. The population’s general perception is positive, aided by Turkey’s generally neutral stance during the 2001 internal ethnic conflict in Macedonia (Koksal, 2014). The fact that the government in Turkey obviously did not support the ethnic Albanian party to the conflict (which was also majority Muslim) significantly contributed to its credibility as Macedonian ally.

With Turkey’s gradual shift away from Europe and its increasing focus on the Middle East, since the early 2010s the Balkans seem to play a less important role in its foreign policy (Davutoglu, 2008; Somun, 2011). In addition, with Macedonia joining NATO in 2020 and resolving the dispute with Greece in 2018, the strategic importance of Turkey to Macedonian foreign policy may decline in the future. As Macedonia focuses more on becoming a full EU member, while Turkey appears to have at least temporarily abandoned its ambitions for EU membership, the two countries’ interests in the international arena could diverge further.

China Building strong relations with China was not a foreign policy priority for Macedonia in the early 1990s. Most of Macedonia’s scarce

354 CVETE KONESKA foreign policy resources were focused on Europe and the US. In the battle for international recognition, the EU was a key actor, while China—although a United Nations Security Council permanent member—was not prioritized by Macedonian political elites. Macedonia historically had not possessed any meaningful diplomatic or commercial relations with China, while geographic and cultural distance meant that at the popular, grassroot level there were not many bilateral links.

While China’s attitude to Macedonia was generally benevolent (it recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name), this status quo was temporarily destabilized in the late 1990s, when the center-right government of Ljubcho Georgievski (1998–2002) took office and proceeded to recognize Taiwan as an independent state in 1998. Whatever the motivation for this unexpected foreign policy move was (it was not subject to open debate within Macedonian institutions), it led to an inevitable deterioration of relations with China. China retaliated by withdrawing support for the renewal of the UN preventive force in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) in the UN Security Council (Koiwai, 1999). UNPREDEP had, since 1992, been deployed to help Macedonia patrol its borders and to prevent a potential deterioration of regional security. In the early months after independence and the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People’s Army (YNA), Macedonia had no army or border police that could protect its borders, so UNPREDEP was crucial in helping the government maintain territorial control over the newly independent state (Vankovska, 1999). By the late 1990s Macedonia’s borders were not as vulnerable and were already accepted as legitimate by all of Macedonia’s neighbors, so the withdrawal of UNPREDEP did not have an immediate adverse impact on domestic or regional security.

In 2000, once Georgievski reshuffled the government, and the main proponent of the Taiwan recognition foreign minister Vasil Tupurkovski was not in office anymore, Macedonia withdrew the controversial decision to recognize Taiwan. Relations with China improved but did not go beyond formal diplomatic representation with limited economic, political and cultural interactions. Since then, China’s economic power has exponentially increased, and it

GREAT POWERS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH MACEDONIA 355 has become more active in the Balkans through investment. In particular, after the 2008 global financial crisis and the decline of Western investment in the emerging markets of South East Europe, China has become an increasingly important global actor for countries in the region, including for Macedonia (Habova,2015). As one of the countries along the route of China’s planned link between the port of Piraeus to Budapest, Macedonia has taken part in the infrastructure development activities funded by Chinese loans in the region. Parts of the new motorways in Macedonia have been built by China (and its state supported companies and banks).

Inevitably, the expanding economic footprint in the region can lead to growing political and diplomatic importance for China. The so-called 16+1 summits of Central Eastern European countries and China have become one of the most important diplomatic events in the region, where countries are represented at the highest state and government levels. This has not yet prompted Macedonia to increase the diplomatic resources it devotes to building a stronger relationship with China, but this may be a reasonable future direction for the country’s foreign policy. While Macedonia’s status in the international system is such that it is unlikely to be a significant actor beyond the immediate region, relations with China may become an exception, thanks to its increasing economic and political power globally.

Systemic Concerns Given Macedonia’s experience as an independent actor in the international arena over the past three decades, its political elites do not embrace the existing state of the international system with unmitigated enthusiasm. As a small and economically weak country on the periphery of Europe, Macedonia has limited leverage in regional and international relations. Given the country’s limited power and the minimal pool of supporters among the global and regional powers, the logic of power-driven international relations does not tend to resonate well with political elites. Instead, Macedonian political elites consistently advocate for a global order based exclusively on international norms and law.

356 CVETE KONESKA In most cases of bilateral (name dispute with Greece) or multilateral issues (international recognition or EU accession), when laws and norms were not upheld, Macedonia had not benefited.

When decisions consider state power and influence, Macedonia tends to lose out because of its limited power (both soft and hard).

As a result, appeals to international laws, institutions and values are common in the rhetoric of domestic politicians. For example, accusations of ‘double standards’ were frequently used by VMRODPMNE politicians between 2009 and 2017 when referring to the EU’s decision not to open accession talks with Macedonia despite the European Commission’s positive recommendation. Similarly, when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 2010 ruling stated that Greece had violated the 1995 Interim Accords by vetoing Macedonia’s NATO accession (including under the provisional reference ‘FYROM’), its decision had no impact on the dispute (Shterbani, 2018; Deskoski, 2016). Apart from providing moral satisfaction, the ICJ ruling was of no use for the Macedonian party in the negotiations, seeing as there were no means of enforcing it, which meant that Greece could disregard it. Greece did fully disregard the ICJ decision.

Therefore, for Macedonia, the existing international system tends to excessively favor the powerful. Despite the rhetoric about an international community united around universal values and international institutional structures, from a Macedonian perspective the world often resembles a playground for the powerful, where weaker states need to comply with rules, while the powerful (and those with powerful allies) can afford to bend them when needed.

Against this context, Macedonia tends to support any multilateral and regional institutions (UN and World Trade Organization (WTO) bodies, as well as regional ones such as Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and others), given their potential to curb the power of stronger states. In addition, regional bodies, primarily NATO and the EU, are attractive to Macedonian elites as membership in them will help the political elites to better protect their country’s interest in the global arena. Being a NATO and EU member is a substantial boost to a small country’s status in international affairs, while at the same

GREAT POWERS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH MACEDONIA 357 time serving as a protection against being forced to accommodate more powerful actors.

Foreign Policy Structures There is general political and societal consensus in Macedonia on the broad foreign policy direction of the country. Most of the population and virtually all mainstream political actors agree on membership in the EU as the key foreign policy priority for Macedonia.

Over the past 20 years, this priority has remained not only unchanged but also unchallenged. As a result, most strategic and policy documents tend to reflect this broad agreement (Koneska, 2014).

However, below the general consensus, political actors differ in their preferences. Not every political actor in Macedonia supported the change of the country’s constitutional name in order to remove the Greek veto to the start of accession negotiations. While the center-left Social Democratic Union (SDSM) and most ethnic Albanian political parties were willing to compromise in the name dispute with Greece, the center-right VMRO-DPMNE and the right-wing parties were not, despite the fact that all nominally favored EU accession and all argued that their positions best protected Macedonian national interests. While the SDSM claimed that Macedonian interest would be best protected within the EU and NATO, regardless of the name of the country, VMRO-DPMNE advanced a less consequentialist logic, arguing that Macedonian interest cannot be protected by actors who demand the country to change its name. This has been the key cleavage in Macedonian politics between 2008 and 2017, shaping not only how foreign policy was made, but also many of the domestic policies and decisions.

Political parties are the key generators of foreign policy ideas, and once in government they tend to implement them, largely through the Prime Minister and Foreign Ministers’ offices. Although the president has a limited foreign policy role in the Constitution, in practice, after Kiro Gligorov, presidents have not played any significant role in foreign policy beyond representing the state at selected international and regional forums.

358 CVETE KONESKA The key foreign policy player is the Foreign Affairs Ministry, one of the most influential government institutions in the country.

Its internal structure reflects the country’s foreign policy scope of the past three decades: there are two main geographical divisions within the ministry (in addition to other thematic ones): Directorate for bilateral relations with European states and Directorate for bilateral relations with non-European states. This illustrates a Eurocentric worldview in which the world is divided between Europe and everyone else, highlighting the preeminence of Europe, and the EU by extension, in Macedonian foreign policy.

This approach is further reflected in Macedonia’s consular and diplomatic footprint globally. There are 27 Macedonian embassies/diplomatic representations in Europe and only nine in Asia, Africa and South America combined. The same is true for foreign diplomatic representation in Macedonia; most European states and the US have embassies in the country, as do Russia, Turkey and China.

Great Powers in Foreign Policy Structures The existing strategic documents reflect the foreign policy priorities discussed above. The Foreign Ministry’s Strategic Plan 2019–21 overwhelmingly focuses on two key priorities: NATO and EU membership (Strategic Plan, 2019–21). Beyond that, relations with neighboring states and multilateral institutions (the UN) get secondary focus. However, there is no discussion of priorities in relation to other global powers, the US, Russia and China in particular.

This reflects the dominant views among the current political elite in the country, which are pursuing a single-goal foreign policy, focusing almost all available political and diplomatic resources on the EU and NATO. Of course, given Macedonia’s limited overall diplomatic resources, this seems a rational policy if the country is to achieve its top foreign policy priority. However, given its repeated failure to progress with EU integration, Macedonia’s current political and diplomatic capacities may simply not be able to achieve this goal, which might require a re-thinking and restructuring of its foreign policy. What alternatives might be considered, and

GREAT POWERS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH MACEDONIA 359 how those would be framed is unclear, as no mainstream political actor in Macedonia has openly dissented from the EU/NATO membership consensus.

Therefore, while Macedonia has diplomatic representation with all major global powers discussed here, including China, Russia, the US and Turkey (as well as some not discussed, such as India and Brazil), meaningful diplomatic attention is devoted only to the EU (and its member states) and NATO. Because the country’s foreign policy is framed in terms of integration and being a valued member of a regional and international community of peaceful and democratic norms, there is limited scope to discuss relations with major powers, despite the potential need for that. If Macedonian political elites consider relations with Russia, China and the US, or Turkey, their deliberations and attitudes are not reflected in official documents.

Outlook and Conclusions A key factor in future developments, and potential changes in Macedonian foreign policy, will be its success with the claim for EU membership. The prospects for further enlargements of the EU are looking ever slimmer, not only because of unresolved bilateral disputes between candidates and member states, but because of the EU’s growing reluctance to admit new members. Having resolved the ‘name dispute’ with Greece in 2017, Macedonia is now facing a Bulgarian veto in the EU over contentious history and language issues. Moreover, the EU in 2020, was a fundamentally different organization to that in 1990, when the initial relations were established with the former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. There is almost no support for further enlargement at a popular or political level, and despite the EU’s explicit commitment to the remaining candidates in the Balkans, Macedonia may not become a full EU member for a long time.

Whether enlargement will continue, and whether accession prospects will remain credible, will determine if Macedonian political elites continue to devote disproportionate amounts of political and diplomatic efforts to EU membership, while disregarding other

360 CVETE KONESKA potentially more powerful allies in the global arena. Should the EU terminate or freeze enlargement plans for the foreseeable future, Macedonian political elites may be forced to seek alternatives in foreign policy, and given their stance over the past thirty years, they might struggle to successfully re-shape the country’s foreign policy position. At present there are limited alternatives to the current foreign policy focus. Potential future avenues could include renewed focus on Turkey as a key regional ally or a stronger relationship with Russia through a future VMRO-DPMNE-led government.

In conclusion, over the past thirty years, since independence, Macedonia has struggled to develop strong relations with a diverse set of global powers. Beyond membership of the EU and NATO, Macedonian politicians have struggled to articulate additional layers of the country’s foreign policy, including in relation to existing and emerging global and regional powers. This exclusive focus on NATO and the EU has not served Macedonia’s interests very well, seeing as within the EU and NATO, Macedonia does not have strong support among the most powerful member states. No major EU member state has been a strong advocate for Macedonia’s membership within the EU, and with the exception of Turkey and George W. Bush’s administration, neither was there a similar advocate in NATO. This is partly a conscious decision of consecutive Macedonian governments to focus on a small set of foreign policy goals, but also partly a result of the lack of historical relationships with major powers that Macedonian elites could have used and developed after independence. As a young, small and relatively poor state in Southeastern Europe, over the past thirty years Macedonia has struggled to adapt to or benefit from the continued influence of global powers in the Balkans. Should, in coming years, world politics assume a more explicit focus on state power, while arguments for a normbased international order continue to lose appeal for the leaders of the most powerful states, the influence of the great powers in the Balkans will continue to increase. If key supporters of the normbased international system, such as the EU and the US, continue to undermine it through their behavior in regional affairs in Southeast

GREAT POWERS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH MACEDONIA 361 Europe, the appeal of aligning to the Western political and economic organizations will decline for Macedonian elites, ultimately pushing the country closer to other powerful states such as Russia, China and Turkey.

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WHEN INTERNAL COMPLEXITY REFLECTS EXTERNAL CHALLENGES: THE GREAT POWERS AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Adnan Huskić

Introduction The whole of former Yugoslavia is the part of the Balkan Peninsula, a region that was said to produce more history than it can consume, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter referred to as Bosnia or BiH) that sits geographically and symbolically in its center. Historically, it has stood at the crossroads of civilizations, before more recently becoming the center of competing ideologies and national projects. Its strategic geopolitical position is complemented by its complex setup dominated by ethnic identities who testify to movements of peoples throughout history. This intricate, domestic setup, which reflects a complex regional environment, makes Bosnia extremely susceptible to outside influences and its domestic political dynamics resonant with changes in the regional and global environment. Bosnia interacts with its immediate and broader environment as a communicating vessel reacting to even the smallest changes. It therefore acts as a weathervane of changing regional and global relations, pointing accurately to the direction of change.

Bosnia’s fortunes were always closely linked with those of the region and beyond, and the role great powers played and continue to play was always crucial. Closer examination of the role of the five selected actors (the European Union (EU), the United States (US), Russia, China and Turkey) during the past thirty years reveals that great power politics never truly left the Balkans. What did change are their interests and policies, identities, mutual relations and power relative to one another. The shifting relative balance of power and the interaction between dominant powers resulted in

366 ADNAN HUSKIĆ changing discourses and ideational frameworks. While this perspective at first seems to completely neglect domestic agency, it does not entirely dismiss it. I argue that Bosnia, a country where WWI started and European diplomacy of the early 1990s failed, does not possess some mystical and still unidentified power to influence global events. Rather, its complex internal setup, virtually unshielded from the external environment, makes Bosnia often act as an early warning system that indicates changes in the global configurations.

This chapter consists of three temporal segments divided according to the dominant international actor at that time, which occurs in the first two cases and is absent in the final segment. The first segment covers the period 1990–1994, when the European Community (EC)/EU and its member states had a leading role in trying to prevent and later stop the war in Bosnia during the time of Yugoslav dissolution. The second segment encompasses the years 1994–2006, which is characterized by the dominant role of the US and a heavy-handed interventionism. During this period, the EU and its member states played a secondary, albeit constructive, role, supportive of US efforts. The final stage begins in 2006, observing the withdrawal of major Western actors and the increasing normative disorientation on the ground. This period witnessed the emergence (or return) of non-Western actors, particularly Russia, Turkey and China, which to some extent challenged the dominant Western paradigm and orientation. Each section will try to analyze the impact of dominant ideas and actors and their relative positions at the time. It will further seek to analyze the interplay of various external actors and their influence on the political dynamics in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Hour of Europe (1990–1994) Following the first multiparty elections in Croatia of April 1990 won by nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Serb majority areas in Croatia self-organized into Serb Autonomous Area Krajina (SAO Krajina—Srpska autonomna oblast Krajina) in Sep-

THE GREAT POWERS AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 367 tember 1990, declaring independence in May 1991, followed by unification with Serbia after a Croatian referendum and declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. The referenda were held in 1991 in the Socialist Republics of Slovenia and Croatia, marking the formal beginning of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) with both republics declaring their independence on June 25, 1991. They found the legal basis for their independence bid in the 1974 SFRY Constitution, but it was equally, if not more, important to ensure the backing of major powers. Five foreign actors subject to this analysis occupied markedly different roles compared to today. Since the Cold War ended, the US wanted to develop a new approach to a rapidly changing global security situation, particularly with regard to the European continent. With the absence of the Soviet threat, the peace dividend meant that with the changing environment, the Europeans should assume responsibility for the security of the continent so that the US could focus on strengthening its economic potential back home. At the time, the US was in the process of finding a new role for themselves and their military in a unipolar world. Gradually, the dogma that security interests and humanitarian considerations could be clearly delimited was dismissed, whereas the notion that military involvement followed only national security interests was complemented by humanitarian concerns (Berth, 1997, pp. 9, 63). Yugoslavia precisely matched the profile of crisis where Europeans should assume a leading role. The country was geographically placed on the European continent, and except for the European Community (after 1993 the European Union) and its member states, other major actors were neither interested (as was the case with the US) nor had the capacity to get involved at the time. The United Nations (UN) deemed the problem to be Yugoslav internal affairs, which left the EC as the sole and preeminent actor during this period. EC’s hand was forced, and although divided, unprepared and burdened by historical legacies which prevented a unified response (Glaurdić, 2011), it had to tackle the Yugoslav crisis.1 1

See also the chapter on the European Union in the post-Yugoslav states in this volume.

368 ADNAN HUSKIĆ The European character of the crisis was further underlined

by The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (CSCE, later Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE) active involvement alongside the EC in trying to resolve the rapidly deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia (Anderson, 1995). Shortly after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, the EC dispatched its Troika, consisting of the preceding, current and succeeding chairs of the rotating EC Council presidency, for a meeting in the Yugoslav capital of Belgrade. Before leaving for Belgrade, Luxembourg’s foreign minister Jacques Poos famously declared that “(t)his is the hour of Europe, it is not the hour of the Americans” (Ridding, 1991, p. 4), oblivious to the fact that European unity had already shattered at this time. The initial approach by the Europeans, which aimed at preserving the Yugoslav federal structure, was lagging behind developments on the ground.

The EC’s approach was two-pronged. It sought to find a legal resolution to the problem alongside diplomatic efforts working to stop the hostilities. On August 27, 1991 the EC and its member states decided to convene at a peace conference on Yugoslavia, which would bring together the SFRY Presidency and Government, Presidents of six Yugoslav republics and the EC Council, Commission and member states. As part of the Conference on Yugoslavia, the EC established the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia which was tasked with providing legal advice to the Conference (Ragazzi, 1992, p. 1). The legal-normative approach adopted by the Conference soon faced the problem of legally defining the right to self-determination. Moreover, diplomatic and legal efforts saw two different and mutually exclusive ideological perspectives emerging. At the Brioni Conference in July 1991, representatives of Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, together with the EC Troika, agreed in the Declaration, which primarily aimed to stop hostilities that already engulfed Slovenia and Croatia, that “peoples of Yugoslavia should decide on the future of the country”. This principle, which should have guided further discussions on the dissolution of Yugoslavia, was very problematic for BiH as a historically multi-ethnic country. Unlike all other former republics of the SFRY, Bosnia was the only one where none of the dominant ethnic

THE GREAT POWERS AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 369 groups commanded an absolute majority,2 and it was particularly vulnerable to rising ethno-nationalism. In an interview in 1994, Bosnian politician Rasim Kadić said that Bosnia’s future was set by the adoption of the Brioni Declaration and the affirmation of the principle of self-determination of peoples to secession. Initially designed to stop the escalation of conflict in Slovenia and Croatia, the EC’s endorsement of the principle provided Serbian President Slobodan Milošević with a pretext for violating existing borders of Yugoslav republics and affirming the nationalist project of Greater Serbia. However, the opinions of the Badinter Commission followed a different logic. The Commission argued that the dissolution should happen along the borders of the existing republics employing the principle uti possidetis. This model was not acceptable for Serb politicians who advocated for the principle of self-determination for peoples, not states. An attempt to reconcile the two was made with the provisions of the Badinter Commission that gave primacy to the existing republics but included provisions for the protection of minority rights (Pellet, 1992, pp. 179–180). Tragically, Bosnia already had slid into ethnonationalist euphoria, which in practice precipitated the establishment of monoethnic territories within the state that could hardly be reversed by political aims (Kadić, 1994). The concept of self-determination of peoples, as stipulated in the United Nations Charter, extends the right of self-determination to all peoples but fails to define who the “people” are or how this right should be consummated. The only relatively successful application of this principle was the process of post-WWII decolonization, for the purpose of which the principle was ultimately established and enshrined in UN documents. Aware of this, the Badinter Committee asserted that provisions of international law do not make clear all the consequences that arise from the application of this principle; ergo, the Committee assumed a norma-

2

The census in 1991 shows Muslims (since 1993 Bosniaks) at 43,4%, Serbs at 31,2% and Croats at 17,4%. First post-war census in 2013 puts Bosniaks at 50,11%, Serbs at 30,8% and Croats at 15,4%. In 2013 Bosniaks emerged for the first time as marginal but an absolute majority in the country.

370 ADNAN HUSKIĆ tive role by providing a more precise definition of its attributes (Pellet, 1992). In effect, the Badinter Commission divorced territoriality and self-determination from the ethnic principle.

In December 1991, following the drafting of Maastricht Treaty which established the European Union, Germany, emboldened by unification and in opposition to France, the United Kingdom and the US began pushing for recognition of Yugoslav breakaway republics, breaking ranks with other member states who agreed not to recognize individual republics outside an overall agreement (Lewis, 1991). On December 23, 1991, Germany unilaterally recognized Slovenia and Croatia, followed shortly by its partner countries. The Badinter Commission suggested that Bosnia could seek independence following a referendum which took place on February 29 and March 1, 1992. Bosnia was recognized on April 6, marking the institutional implosion and beginning of widespread hostilities that soon deteriorated into an all-out war.

European efforts at finding a resolution continued, culminating in the Carrington-Cutileiro plan: the last attempt to stop the war in Bosnia. This plan was being negotiated against a permanently changing situation on the ground, ultimately failing in early May 1992. In August 1992 at the London Conference, the EU was no longer the exclusive broker in Yugoslavia as the conflict had become the subject of interest of an increasing number of international and transnational actors which now included the UN, the CSCE and the Red Cross. The culmination of the Yugoslav crisis coincided with the political and institutional consolidation of the EU. The Maastricht Treaty established the European Union as we know it today with the Common Foreign and Security Policy as an intergovernmental policy area.

The Soviet Union (USSR) and later the Russian Federation played a relatively marginal role in the earliest stages of the Yugoslav crisis. Under pressure to accept the dissolution along former boundary lines between republics, the Serbian leadership and military officials tried to turn to the Soviet Union for support. These first attempts at involving the Soviets in the Yugoslav crisis proved rather futile. Yugoslav Secretary of Defense General Veljko Kadijević met in secret with his hardline Soviet colleague Dimitri Yazov

THE GREAT POWERS AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 371 the day after the first meeting of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of SFRY (Silber and Little, 1996, pp. 126–127). His Soviet counterpart, though sympathetic to Kadijević’s position, explained that in the current situation, the USSR was not in position to engage actively with the severity of the domestic political crisis in mind (Bieber, 2008, p. 322). Shortly thereafter, Yazov took part in the August Coup with the aim of removing from power Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, whose policies of Perestroika and Glasnost were perceived by the hard-liners as destructive for the stability and very existence of the Soviet Union. And indeed, the USSR collapsed soon after, leaving in its place several new states and successor states of the USSR, the Russian Federation. Russia, now an independent actor, entered the stage in completely different shape and with severely limited maneuvering space or potential for exercising effective influence.3 Being unable to fully engage in Bosnia did not prevent Russia from not only providing support to Serbs in manpower and volunteers, but also in providing troops through the establishment of the Contact Group in 1994 (Huskić, 2020). Diplomatically, Russia began to re-engage in early 1994 during the Bosnian War as part of the Contact Group (Secrieru, 2019). Russian diplomat Vitaly Churkin, who was a Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation to the talks on Former Yugoslavia, was an active participant in discussions concerning conflict resolution in Bosnia. Russia was largely perceived as sympathetic to Serb goals, driven in part by the proclaimed Slavic ethnic ties and in part by strategic considerations that could be reminiscent of the Soviet anti-western and anti-NATO logic, but also an attempt to re-enter the international domain.

The violence that engulfed Bosnia put severe strains not just on the European countries, but also on the Islamic countries and Turkey. Turkey’s hesitation to engage more strongly in Bosnia stemmed from this majority Muslim country refraining from any actions where the issue of religion might come to fore. While Turkey’s pronounced secularist identity prevented the country from directly assisting its extended kin in Bosnia, Turkey took an active 3

See also the chapter on Russia in this volume.

372 ADNAN HUSKIĆ role in convening and hosting the meeting of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) in Istanbul where member states agreed to provide troops and equipment to the UN mission on the ground, opting for collective measures and arguing against any country taking unilateral actions. But these actions did little to address vocal demands from the Turkish population and media for stronger and more explicit support (Cowel, 1992). The population’s brewing resentment, which resulted from viewing the war in Bosnia as an ethnic war where Muslims were both outnumbered and surrounded by enemies, and where Europe or the West did little to protect them, culminated in a growing religious sentiment and the rising importance of Islam in Turkey’s political discourse (Anastasakis, 2012). Yet, as long as Turkey managed to successfully cling on to its secularism, they were hesitant to engage more directly in Bosnia.

Ironically, the Bosnian tragedy quickly became instrumental in the domestic, political struggle by the conservative Islamist Refah party. It was “(u)nder Erbakan … (that) … Refah exploited the Bosnian wars quite effectively to reawaken a Muslim consciousness in the public debate” (Anastasakis, 2012, p. 192). The current transformation of Turkish society and polity and strong de-secularization trends, which started with Erdogan’s utilization of Islam and religious and traditional sentiment, led in the end to contemporary Turkey’s change in approach, not just towards Bosnia and Bosnian Muslims, but towards Muslims at large.4 The third non-Western actor China remained almost completely outside the picture during this period. In the post-Tiananmen period, China did not look favorably at the rise of nationalism, seeing it as potentially destructive for its very fabric. For China, the Yugoslav crisis was primarily a European domain, and it tried to act constructively with the UN in that regard. While China supported the introduction of an arms embargo alongside the other four permanent and ten non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, it was nevertheless anxious in completely embracing the uncertain new world as familiar structures that characterized the bipolar world started to disappear (Zagoria, 1991). China was 4

See also the chapter on Turkey in this volume.

THE GREAT POWERS AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 373 consumed by the accelerated change within and a fundamental change outside, which rendered it disinterested in Bosnia and the region as such, until 1995 when a visit of the Taiwanese president to the US created frictions in relation with China, bringing China closer to countries opposing the US such as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (which was established in 1992 to unite Serbia and Montenegro, ‘rump Yugoslavia’) at the time.

Pax Americana (1994–2006) US perceptions of the Bosnian (or Yugoslav) conflict revolved around three aspects. It was first and foremost a conflict that was complex and difficult to understand. Secondly, it was unclear whether it was civil or international in nature, and finally, the notion of ancient ethnic hatreds that were mentioned and referred to throughout the conflict. The latter and the perception of the historically recursive character of intercommunal conflict kept both Presidents Bush Senior and Clinton from intervening in Bosnia. Robert D. Kaplan’s book Balkan Ghosts by was credited with informing Clinton’s decision to initially stay away from the Bosnian conflict (Berth, 1997). The Mogadishu disaster in October 1993 already had made the United States wary of deploying ground forces anywhere, during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, the US once again stood by., The US further refrained from military involvement in Bosnia until 1995 (Bowden, 2019). But the Bosnian conflict started receiving more attention in international media, resulting in greater public pressures to stop the war. The Markale Massacre in February 1994, in which a single mortar shell killed 68 and wounded another 144, sent shockwaves throughout European capitals and the US as calls for military intervention grew stronger. The worsening situation on the ground led some Europeans contemplating completely withdrawing from attempting to broker a deal, paving the way for the US to step in. Lord David Owen, a European negotiator for BiH, feared that unilateral intervention might split international unity along east-west fault lines and alienate Russia. UN civil official and seasoned Soviet diplomat Victor Andreyev also warned that great powers were once again unmistakably aligning over Bosnia (Silber

374 ADNAN HUSKIĆ and Little, 1996). However, the rift between NATO and the UN was growing wider. The Americans were pushing for an intervention at the opposition of the United Kingdom (UK). The UK position partly resulted from the fact that unlike Americans, the British had troops on the ground in Bosnia and therefore, in harm’s way of Serb retaliation (Simms, 2003).

After the Markale Massacre, NATO issued an ultimatum to Serbs to remove heavy weaponry around Sarajevo outside a 20km zone. British Prime Minister John Major, whose military general Michael Rose was UN commanding officer on the ground and a staunch opponent of any intervention, flew amid the ultimatum to Russia to meet with President Yeltsin. After the meeting Yeltsin reportedly criticized NATO’s attempt at unilateralism, underlining “that the West could take no decision in the Balkans without Russia’s consent” (Silber and Little, 1996, p. 317). Meanwhile, the composition of international actors dealing with the crisis changed with the introduction of the Contact Group, “a reminiscence of nineteenth-century Great Power politics” (Silber and Little, 1996, p.

336). Its establishment was also a recognition of the utter failure of EC/EU-led diplomacy in finding a resolution to the conflict in Bosnia. From early attempts aimed at devolution as a key principle for a settlement, European-brokered deals gradually evolved in the direction of establishing three more-or-less autonomous ethnic states within Bosnia. These trends were easily identifiable from the March 1992 Carrington-Cutileiro plan to the January–June 1993 VanceOwen plan to the August 1993 Owen-Stoltenberg plan.

Members of the Contact Group, which was established in London on April 26, were France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia and US, as well as the EU, NATO and the UN, and later joined by Italy.

Its composition was supposed to represent a symbol of international unity and multilateral character of diplomatic efforts to stop the war in Bosnia (Rupel, 2013). And despite the Group functioning without Russia as the Quint, the main actors in the Group were the US and Russia, whose seasoned diplomats dominated others (Silber and Little, 1996, p. 337). The Contact Group plan for BiH followed in the footsteps of previous European proposals which revolved around the ethno-territorial principle. The Contact Group

THE GREAT POWERS AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 375 proposed a solution in which Serbs would get 49% and BosniakCroat Federation 51% of the country’s territory, a percentage that would be embodied in the Dayton Agreement, the final deal that eventually ended the war.

A sudden breakthrough came in the form of the US-brokered Washington Agreement which mended broken relations between Croats and Bosniaks. All plans developed by the EU/UN negotiators in the aftermath of the Vance-Owen Plan were attempts at partition where percentages of territory allocated to each ethnic group were changing constantly. This allowed Bosnian Serbs who were armed by the Yugoslav National Army to make significant gains during the war, due to arms embargoes introduced at the beginning of the war which effectively targeted Bosniaks and Croats. As the war progressed, Bosniaks grew increasingly frustrated with both the UN and the Europeans. Americans put pressure on Croatia, threatening to turn it into a rogue state, like Serbia at the time, and place it under sanction unless they withdrew troops from Bosnia and ceased hostilities. Additional pressure came from Germany, which wielded significant leverage over Croatia. Washington held proximity talks w and crafted a deal that created a Federation of BiH. More importantly, the deal effectively stopped hostilities between Bosniaks and Croats (for instance, around Mostar). Changes in the military occurred as a result of the deal both in Bosnia and Croatia, effectively turning the tide in the war and pushing Serbs to negotiate in Dayton. The prominent role the US played in bringing the war in Bosnia to an end was apparent as the deal was struck during proximity talks in the US military base with the help of US negotiators. Thus, the Dayton Agreement, or the General Framework Agreement for Peace, was officially signed in Paris, granting concessions to Europeans, or rather the French who supported American interventionist positions towards the end of the war in Bosnia (Hoolbroke, 1999).5 Post-conflict Bosnia as envisaged in Dayton contained numerous sovereignties limiting provisions and significant authority

5

See also the chapter on the USA in this volume.

376 ADNAN HUSKIĆ vested in numerous international organizations on the ground. Initially designed to oversee the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and to facilitate the transfer of ownership to local authorities, but also faced with numerous obstructions, Western-dominated international actors upgraded their capacity in several steps.

In addition to the UN and the OSCE, the primary role was given to the Office of the High Representative. All High Representatives (HR) were prominent European diplomats, whereas the US kept the role of Principal Deputy High Representative, the chief of the OSCE Mission to BiH, and the military command of the NATO forces in Bosnia, both in Implementation Force (IFOR) and its successor, the SFOR Stabilization Force (SFOR). The mandate of the HR received several upgrades over time, all of which were approved by the UN Security Council. The Peace Implementation Conference was held in London in December 1995 with an aim “to mobilize international support for the Agreement”. Moreover, the Conference established both the Peace Implementation Council, whose goal was “to review progress and define the goals of peace implementation for the coming period”, and its executive arm, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board, both of which were chaired by the HR. Among the 55 member states and organizations of the PIC were the US, the European Commission (later EU), the Russian Federation and Turkey, but not China. The Steering Board members, meanwhile, were composed of Russia, the United States, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, and the OIC, which was represented by Turkey (OHR, 1995).

The Russian Federation’s presence in both bodies was merely symbolic as successive adaptations to the initial mandate of HR, most notably the beginning of using excessive executive powers since the Bonn meeting of the PIC in 1997, which took place with explicit Russian support. The Bonn Powers, which were endorsed by the United Nation Security Council (UNSC), rendered the HR a de facto governor, giving it the ability to adopt, legislate, adjudicate, and take binding decisions. As Chandler argued “the extension of the administrative powers of the UN High Representative, in particular, has meant that policy is made at international forums

THE GREAT POWERS AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 377 and implemented within Bosnia through a parallel system of internationally-run committees and task forces” (Chandler 2000, p. 55).

As international activism accelerated in years to come, HRs became more assertive with the use of Bonn Powers, culminating during Paddy Ashdown’s mandate as the High Representative 2002–2006.

His mandate marked both the peak and the sudden end to Western activism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Whereas 2006 certainly marked the change in terms of Russia-Western relations and their Bosnian manifestation, the true beginnings of this shift can be traced back to the 9/11 attacks on the US and the subsequent radical transformation of their foreign policy. Since 1994, the US-European partnership, both generally and in regard to Bosnia, functioned in a way where the US was “making the dinner” and the Europeans “doing the dishes” (Kagan, 2002). The US pushed for military intervention, and Europeans, some of them reluctantly, followed. The US assumed the primary role in Bosnia, putting their enormous diplomatic weight behind the HRs, which engaged in institutionand state-building in post-conflict Bosnia, with the Europeans following shortly behind. With the US interest in Bosnia waning as their preoccupation with the Middle East and the fight against terrorism started, Europeans lost the foundation upon which their soft power and influence in Bosnia was built. While the EU apparently welcomed the end of Pax-Americana in Bosnia, eager as they were in the early 1990s to share the burden and to assume responsibility, the absence of the US meant that European influence and the lure of membership soon proved unable to counter the rising influence of a number of emerging foreign actors in BiH.

Towards a post-Western Setup (2006–2019)?

It is difficult to establish the extent to which the Russian return to the region in the first half of the 2000s came as the result of US withdrawal or a general Russian rise to prominence and its conflict with the West. The significance of this shift for Bosnia after 2006 is best visible in the comparison of statements made during Paddy Ashdown’s visit to Russia in December 2002, where he spoke about the Euro-Atlantic integrations of Bosnia in the Duma’s Foreign Affairs

378 ADNAN HUSKIĆ Committee (OHR, 2002) and the explicitly negative position of Russian Federation regarding NATO and increasingly the EU accession of Bosnia. The conflict with Russia drove a wedge in the PIC in 2007 when Russia’s explicit disagreement took the form of a refusal to join in major PIC statements. A decade of monolithic and Westerndominated international presence in Bosnia came to an end over the failed Police reform (2006 to 2009) and amid the European takeover of Bosnian affairs from the US. Additionally, in 2006, there was an attempt to assemble the coalition behind a sweeping set of changes to the Bosnian constitution. These changes, which aimed to strengthen the state level allowing the country to function better, were seen as a graduation from its post-conflict assisted governance. This proposal, commonly labelled as the April Package, was defeated by a single vote margin in the BiH House of Representatives. An effort by several high-ranking US diplomats with support from a large spectrum of political parties, including progressives and ethno-nationalists, failed mainly because of its timing. Negotiations that started in 2005 took more than a year to complete due to broad consensus requirements, resulting in the final stage of negotiations overlapping with the unofficial beginning of campaigns for parliamentary elections in 2006 (Marko, 2006). The April Package’s failure diminished, destroying any chance of reaching a deal on constitutional reform in Bosnia. Soon after the vote in the BiH Parliament, most parties reverted to their original and diametrically opposed political positions, indicating the beginning of a protracted political crisis. The EU took over from the Americans and elevated the issue of constitutional reform to the top of the political agenda in the hope that they could achieve success.

The EU’s political leverage in Bosnia during this period rested on the assumption that democratization and state-building tendencies, which started during the interventionist decade, were on a set and largely irreversible course, and that its soft power and the normative direction would suffice to keep the momentum of positive change. Equally, the constitutional reform process remained in their focus. Various attempts at reaching a deal under EU auspices failed without ever reaching the parliament, frustrating the process and all those involved. Unlike the US, who prior to 2006 was more

THE GREAT POWERS AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 379 than willing to use more than just diplomatic pressures to push negotiations in the desired direction, Europeans instead tried to accommodate increasingly divergent positions of various actors in the country using their own method. Contrasting two perspectives Robert Kagan argued that unlike America who “remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might” Europeans had moved “beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation” (Kagan, 2002, p. 1). More concerned than domestic politicians with making progress, the EU was forced to use a very limited set of diplomatic tools at their disposal to achieve success. Bosnian politicians’ nationalist rants and stunts, fabricated crises and permanent bickering almost always met prompt reactions from the EU’s most important offices. In effect, the EU became instrumental in the domestic political struggle, whereas its unwillingness to name and shame or directly confront troublemakers undermined its credibility. By trying to remain outside the domestic political struggle, the EU adopted a policy of equidistance presented as impartiality and an unbiased approach in the domestic power game which only deepened the political crisis in the country. Generic reactions encouraged radical and unconstructive political behavior and actions. The constitutional reform process was gradually removed from institutions, the media and public scrutiny. The EU hosted a series of meetings of party leaders discussing constitutional reform behind closed doors, but despite their secrecy, which was sometimes a necessary ingredient, those ultimately failed.

Since 2006, Russia has been getting more involved in Bosnian affairs by forging stronger links to Republika Srpska (Serb Republic—the mainly Serb inhabited entity of Bosnia, RS) leader Milorad Dodik and establishing themselves as his supporter. Russia consistently advocated the closure of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the complete ownership transfer to domestic political elites, which given the leverage Russia had in the RS, one of two BiH entities and the broad consensus required to make decisions in

380 ADNAN HUSKIĆ BiH, suited Russia perfectly. Due to opposition from RS, Bosnia’s NATO accession process is permanently undermined by Dodik’s party SNSD (Alliance of Independent Social Democrats—Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata), despite previously committing themselves to it. In 2009, the Chairman of BiH Presidency Nebojša Radmanović from SNSD sent a letter to NATO confirming “Bosnia's desire to become a full member of NATO, which is a matter of strategic importance for BiH” (Huseinović, 2018). Since 2006, Russia has consistently backed Dodik in his conflicts and disputes with the international community in BiH. Most notably on several occasions Russia backed Dodik when even Serbia felt constrained to act, e.g., the referendum of January 9, which was ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of BiH. Russian officials, however, declared the referendum to be consistent with the spirit and the letter of Dayton, staying formally true to their commitment to Dayton BiH (Bechev, 2017). A superficial analysis of rhetoric and state visits confirms the view that Russia remains formally supportive of Dayton while at the same time backing Dodik’s constant challenges to Bosnian statehood. Relatively infrequent visits of the highest Russian officials to Bosnia always begin in Sarajevo and end in Banja Luka, and though they recently have started putting more emphasis on the three-ethnic character of BiH, they always reaffirm their commitment to Dayton (Huskić, 2020). Russia meanwhile has withdrawn their reluctant support for Bosnia’s NATO bid from early 2000s, emphasizing the need for a broad consensus when making such a decision. In a nutshell, Russia is content with having seized an integral element of Bosnia’s three-ethnic decision-making mechanism, Milorad Dodik and his SNSD. Bosnia is effectively halted in its tracks in terms of NATO membership and unable to make any decision that would go contrary to Russian interests. For example, Bosnia did not join Western sanctions against Russia that were introduced after the Russian annexation of Crimea. Russian and Dodik’s agenda in Bosnia converge around issues such as closure of the OHR and more generally Western interventionism, which they both reject as obsolete and reminiscent of the past period of Western dominance in Bosnia and a weak Russia. The altered

THE GREAT POWERS AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 381 global balance and a waning Western influence is frequently invoked by Dodik as a main reason for his demand for redress of relations in Bosnia and ever more open challenges to BiH statehood.

Russia’s energy interests have been secured on its most Western flank in the RS since 2007 when the oil industry of RS was bought

by Neftegazinkor, a company majority owned by the Russian state company Zarubezhneft. This obscure privatization deal was described as financially damaging to the RS. Furthermore, a possible money laundering operation by anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International (Transparency International BiH, 2009) coincided with the establishment of closer links between Russia and Milorad Dodik. The oil industry of RS has been generating losses since 2006, which in 2019 amounted to €1 billion but remains in Russian hands. This could point to the conclusion that the whole deal represents a payment for Russian political support.

Turkish influence in Bosnia since 2006 has been growing, too, during this period but unlike Russia, Turkey remains supportive of all the major goals and aims of the international community in BiH. The single instance of Turkey’s disagreement with the PIC Steering Board (PIC SBA, 2017) happened in February 2017 when Turkey disagreed with other countries expressing concern over a deteriorating political situation following the request by Party of Democratic Action—Stranka demokratske akcije (SDA) for a revision of the 2007 ruling of International Court of Justice in the case of BiH vs Serbia and Montenegro on the crime of genocide. Since 2006, Turkish presence and influence in Bosnia and the region has changed. Under the agile foreign minister Davutoğlu, Turkey used its significant economic leverage acting as a broker between Bosnia on one side and Serbia and Croatia on the other side within the framework of so-called tri-laterals. These meetings eventually stopped when Tomislav Nikolić was elected President of Serbia6.

With Davutoğlu’s political marginalization in 2015, Turkey abandoned the role of the constructive regional broker, opting instead 6

Tomislav Nikolić is a Serbian politician who split with convicted war criminal Vojislav Šešelj and his Serb Radical Party and went on to form Serbian Progressive Party. Shortly after he was joined by Aleksandar Vučić, who would eventually take over the party and replace Nikolić as the President of Serbia.

382 ADNAN HUSKIĆ for stronger direct contacts with political power figures in the region and appointing Bakir Izetbegovic, leader of SDA, as their primary contact in Bosnia. The failed 2016 coup in Turkey transformed already bitter relations between Fetulah Gülen and Recep Erdoğan into outright hostility when Erdoğan accused Gülen of orchestrating the coup. Around fifteen educational Hizmet institutions from pre-school to universities have functioned under the name Bosna Sema in Bosnia since 1997. The movement also started a short-lived media outlet Novo vrijeme. Until 2013, when conflict between Gülen and Erdoğan started, these institutions were endorsed and supported by SDA and the Bosniak political elite as they were seen as a natural extension of Turkish influence in BiH. Erdoğan himself attended the opening of Burch University in Sarajevo, which was part of the network in 2012. Purges that happened after the coup in Turkey spilled over into the whole region and into Bosnia. SDA and its media mouthpieces, some of which were funded by businessmen close to Erdoğan, such as Faktor and Stav, started with a negative campaign against Hizmet and Fetulah Gülen. Turkish pressures on SDA unfolded via official and unofficial channels demanding a stronger crackdown on both Hizmet-related institutions as well as several individuals the Turkish government deemed responsible for the coup. Despite pressures, SDA could not respond positively to these demands, which reportedly spoiled individual relations between Izetbegović and Erdoğan. The Bosnian powersharing setup prescribes relatively broad governing coalitions and decision-making processes which are subject to numerous veto points. Under such conditions, SDA could not meet Turkish demands for swift and decisive actions and focused instead on a vilification campaign. In December 2019, Bosnian authorities arrested Turkish citizen Fatih Keskin who was the headmaster of Una Sana College from Bihać, which is part of formerly Bosna Sema and now Richmond Park Education network. Keskin was detained in Sarajevo without charges as authorities only vaguely cited the national security concerns, prompting concern from Keskin’s lawyers that he might be extradited to Turkey in a similar way to Kosovo’s illegal deportation of a group of Turkish citizens demanded by Erdoğan in March. The BiH Court ordered Keskin’s release a few

THE GREAT POWERS AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 383 days later, stating that the OSA, the Bosnian intelligence agency, which is controlled by SDA, provided no evidence to support the claim that Keskin represents a threat to national security (N1 BiH, 2019). The whole action was seemingly designed to instill fear and a sense of uncertainty into Turkish nationals still residing in BiH. Unable to extradite them and meet Erdoğan’s demands, the SDA upholds pressure on them. Serious defeats, which Erdoğan suffered at local elections in Turkey in 2019 when his party lost Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir to opposition parties, revealed the nature of links with the SDA. When the newly elected mayor of Istanbul Ekrem İmamoğlu visited Sarajevo in December 2019, the Mayor of Sarajevo, who comes from SDA, refused to meet him (Buyuk, 2019), causing speculation that the Turkish embassy on the ground specifically requested this of SDA officials. Turkey’s relatively strong image in BiH is due partly to their strategic use of development aid and various other organizations, whereas their economic footprint remains small compared to the Western and neighboring countries.

Turkish International Development Agency (TIKA) assets were used strategically to boost the image of SDA with a sizable donation to Central Hospital in Sarajevo which was run by Izetbegović’s wife (Huskić, 2020). Turkey has since been trying to win hearts and minds by promoting Turkish language and culture. The Yunus Emre Institutes (Yunus Emre Enstitüsü) operate three centers in Bosnia (only Kosovo and BiH host three centers) which run Turkology projects actively supporting Turkish language teaching in schools. After the establishment of the Yunus Emre Foundation in 2007, Yunus Emre Institutes were established in 2009 and the first ever center outside Turkey was opened in Sarajevo (Biogradlija, 2019).

China’s presence in BiH increased with the arrival of Xi Jinping at the helm of the People’s Republic of China as several regional initiatives such as One Belt One Road (OBOR) or 17+1 included Bosnia in their ambitious agenda. Ever since China recognized Bosnia in 1995 and established diplomatic relations in 1996, their presence was merely symbolic. An assertive approach and opening towards Bosnia began after 2013. China was expressly in-

384 ADNAN HUSKIĆ terested in energy and infrastructure projects and was courting domestic politicians. In the Republika Srpska, it made a successful bid for the construction of Stanari Powerplant, which opened in 2016 and finalized the bid for the largest post-war energy project in the BiH, Tuzla Powerplant Block 7. Whereas China maintains a strict policy of noninvolvement in relatively complicated domestic affairs in Bosnia, refusing to favor any ethnic or political grouping, it could not stay out of disputes with the West. Chinese construction of Block 7 in Tuzla was subject to serious dispute between BiH and the European Energy Agency (Lakić, 2019), which could have grave consequences for the FBiH in the future. Undeterred, the FBiH government proceeded with the project.

China’s soft influence in Bosnia continues to grow. Two Confucius Institutes opened in Banja Luka and Sarajevo, and the RS government signed a deal in 2019 with a Confucius Institute in Beijing for the import of professional Chinese language teachers for the classes they plan to roll out in schools (Kovačević, 2019).

BiH FP Towards the Great Powers While this paper is subject to the analyses and focus on the foreign policies of the five selected actors, Bosnia’s foreign policy with these actors in all its dimensions cannot be neglected. In this sense, we can observe several levels of relations, each with its unique properties. Being one of the few policies originally vested in the state, which is a prototypical power-sharing government, BiH foreign policy generating capacity is constrained by the requirements of a broad and often completely absent consensus between three peoples. As a result, its foreign policy goals and objectives are rather broad and are enshrined in two documents from 2003 and 2018 which represent the fundamentals of the foreign policy goals and objectives.

All five were PIC members (China resigned in May 2000), and the remaining four are also present in the PIC Steering Board, where Turkey represents the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). The US, EU and Russia are also signatories to the General Framework Agreement for Peace, which established contemporary

THE GREAT POWERS AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 385 Bosnia as it is. Expectedly, the five Great powers maintain permanent diplomatic presence in Bosnia headed by an ambassador, and the same is true vice versa. Bosnia maintains permanent diplomatic missions in each of them headed by an ambassador. Bosnian ambassadors are appointed exclusively by the Presidency of BiH, and Bosnian diplomatic corps represents a mixture of career diplomats, seasoned politicians and complete newcomers to diplomacy. For example, the current ambassador to the US, appointed by Serb member of the Presidency Milorad Dodik, is a former tennis player and the former CEO of the IT company connected with Dodik’s family. Bosnian ambassador to Turkey, appointed by Bosniak member of the Presidency Šefik Džaferović, is a former advisor who studied in Turkey and presided over an alumni association of students from Turkish universities in BiH. Ambassadors to Russia and China could be considered career diplomats, as well as the head of BiH diplomatic mission to the EU. A dimension of sub-state diplomacy, which is mostly exercised by the RS, should not be neglected.

RS opened eight permanent representation offices, among other places in Washington, Moscow and Brussels.

Nature of Change and Domestic Agency The three periods described above represent an overview of three turbulent decades in Bosnia with the focus on the role of five major players: the EU, US, Russia, Turkey and China. The Bosnian setup was in this sense reflective of the overall global and regional configuration. Other actors, particularly neighboring Serbia and Croatia, kinstates of two of the three major Bosnian ethnic groups, at times wielded a much stronger influence. Domestic agency, though neglected above, has played a significant role in reinforcing or diminishing the influence of international actors, particularly since 2006. Many have come to describe the post-2006 situation as the end of Western ideational and strategic global domination (Levitte, 2019). Throughout the early 2000s, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region already witnessed a change in the configuration of Western presence. As the US refocused elsewhere, the European influence and role became prevalent. In Bosnia, this change manifested in

386 ADNAN HUSKIĆ both the decreased role of international actors and a hasty transfer of ownership to domestic actors. The Bosnian Dayton state opened for renegotiation as part of the constitutional reform process which spanned across more than a decade and opened the door for external influences as domestic actors garnered support. These, however, were primarily reduced to two neighboring countries, and only the rise in identity politics seems to have allowed for the stronger entry of Russia and Turkey. Strategic and partly energy considerations certainly play a role in explaining stronger Russian involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia secured the support of one of the main political actors in the country, which provided it with enough leverage to have its interests served in Bosnia, whether it is stopping Bosnia’s advance to NATO or not joining the West in sanctions against Russia. Identity also plays a stronger role in the case of Turkish re-engagement in Bosnia. Similarities between SDA and Justice and Development Party (AKP) in terms of their conservative and religious character helped forge strong ties between the two. These ties, however, are subject to change in the case of political upset in Turkey, the beginnings of which were visible at the local elections in 2019.

China’s emphasis on the economic benefits of cooperation, which certainly have a strategic component, have managed to result so far in increased friction with the EU. China’s soft power is on the rise and this certainly remains a force to be reckoned with.

There is no identifiable specific interest in Bosnia outside the wider regional and global context.

Regardless of the changes described above, the Western influence in Bosnia remains dominant in both a normative and practical sense. The role of non-Western countries, though exaggerated in the public perception, is the result of the US departure from the region and the EU’s loss of credibility and power (and desire) to reengage. The recent suspension of the enlargement process and the ensuing internal debate on the future of the EU after Brexit threatens to further undermine the EU’s leverage and its importance in the region. With the benefit of hindsight, we can say that the ideational pull during the decade of 1996–2006 was so strong that even the slightest reduction in Western presence and influence caused

THE GREAT POWERS AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 387 dramatic changes. The vacant space and ideological confusion allowed for the entry of non-western actors with relatively limited resources. The importance of quality in these new relations is in fact the negative element of contemporary Bosnia which is almost completely captured by domestic political elites and where rampant corruption hinders any development. For these elites, non-Western actors represent a welcome partner with whom they are able to achieve a high level of interest convergence, aimed primarily at maintaining the status quo and staying in power.

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KOSOVO: A GREAT POWERS’ EUROPEAN AND BALKAN PROJECTION Gëzim Krasniqi

Introduction This chapter explores the intersection of international politics in Kosovo with special attention on the influence and impact of the European Union (EU), the United States (US), Russia, China and Turkey. The main focus examines the implications of great powers’ policies in Kosovo, above all, regarding its statehood question, as well as its Euro-Atlantic integration, security and stability. Kosovo for at least two decades has been an arena of international politics. In essence, Kosovo owes its very existence to the role of great powers, in particular the US and the EU, which remain heavily involved in the country to date.

More than twenty years since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) military intervention to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and over a decade since the declaration of independence, Kosovo remains preoccupied with its statehood issue, sovereignty, territoriality and international recognition. This has had two important implications for Kosovo: first, external actors’ support for recognition of Kosovo, membership of international bodies and political and economic assistance in the state-building process has been a major factor shaping Kosovo’s external linkages; second, Kosovo’s preoccupation with contested statehood and deep dependency towards other states for obtaining diplomatic recognition and securing membership of international bodies has prohibited the country from developing a genuine foreign policy and taking a stance on regional and global matters (Visoka, 2018). In fact, Kosovo’s dependence on the US and the EU, places the country somewhere between a state with a ‘compliant foreign policy’ and a ‘satellite’ or ‘client’ state (Krasniqi, 2014a).

392 GËZIM KRASNIQI The chapter draws on the English School of International Relations perspective, which emphasizes the centrality of the state, not only as an independent actor that engages externally but also as an issue of (contested) sovereignty and territoriality, as well as the role of history, to analyze the case of Kosovo. According to this perspective, international relations is about “the politics of states with regard to their external aspects” (Devlen et al., 2005, p. 180). Nevertheless, given Kosovo’s particular position stemming from its contested status as well as its being part of a wider security complex in the Balkans, “statist explanations are therefore insufficient, but the state is at the center of most struggles” (Buzan and Weaver, 2012, p. 384). Thus, the analysis draws on the complementary Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) (Buzan and Waever, 2003), making Kosovo seen as part of a wider regional “security complex”, which is “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another” (Buzan, 2009, p.

160).

The main argument of this chapter is twofold. First, the chapter argues that despite decades-long efforts to forge an independent foreign policy of its own, given state contestation and on-going state-building challenges, Kosovo is still more an arena for, than the agent of, power politics regionally and internationally. Kosovo remains an arena for power politics and competition between its sponsor states, the US, the EU and Turkey, on the one hand, and Serbia and its allies, Russia, and to a lesser degree China, on the other hand. In other words, Kosovo remains as a great powers’ European and Balkan projection. Second, due to historical factors and external states’ position towards its status, Kosovo’s foreign policy choices are conditioned externally. To put it differently, being a state of international (i.e., US and EU) design, its foreign policy is firmly oriented towards European (EU) and transatlantic (NATO) structures. Meanwhile, Russia and China’s non-recognition policy towards Kosovo means that the new republic does not have meaningful formal ties with these two major global powers. In particular, China—a rising global power—is remarkably absent in Kosovo.

A GREAT POWERS’ EUROPEAN AND BALKAN PROJECTION 393 The chapter is divided into three main sections. The following section explores Kosovo’s historical links with the US and the EU, as key powers, as well as Turkey, Russia and China, that played a crucial role in the process that led to Kosovo’s independence. The second section looks at Kosovo’s foreign policy objectives and priorities in relation to those five powers. The third section examines Kosovo’s foreign policy structures and the role of great powers in shaping them. It also discusses the emergence, for the first time in a long time, of a rivalry between the US and the EU.

Kosovo’s History as a History of International State-Building Kosovo’s recent history as well as its statehood are inextricably linked to the role of the great powers, primarily, the US and the EU. Since the early 1990s, Albanian nationalism in Kosovo was closely connected to the concept of Euro-Atlantic integration and values.

The EU and its project of enlargement provided new opportunities for Yugoslav Albanians to project themselves politically without becoming a fully-fledged nation-state. The main Kosovo Albanian leader of the 1990s, Ibrahim Rugova, made constant references to the idea of European integration in articulating his peaceful democratic cause (Krasniqi, 2014b).

Prior to Kosovo’s independence, there were three main phases of international involvement in Kosovo. In the first phase (early 1990s), Kosovo was mostly ignored by key international actors involved in the Yugoslav crisis. Despite efforts by Kosovo leaders to be included in the process, Kosovo was formally excluded from the internationally mediated negotiation process on the Yugoslav dissolution, the then European Community’s Conference on Yugoslavia and the Dayton Conference, thus ensuring that the question of Kosovo would be effectively removed from the international agenda (Weller, 2009; Caplan, 1998). In fact, for most of the 1990s, Kosovo was treated by key global and regional powers as a human rights issue. Therefore, the main organizations that were at the

394 GËZIM KRASNIQI helm of the independence movement in Kosovo sought to gain international legitimacy for their national and political goals by reference to human rights violations in Kosovo (Krasniqi, 2014b).

Only in the late 1990s, the US, the United Kingdom (UK), France, Italy, Germany and Russia, through the Contact Group, a mechanism initially established in 1994 to address the Bosnian crisis, began to take an increased interest in Kosovo (Weller, 2009, p.

81). Despite significant differences among its members, the Contact Group managed to maintain some sort of unity until the failed attempts to reach an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) at the Rambouillet Conference (February, 1999), which aimed to find a political solution to the conflict.

The second stage includes NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. The signing of the Rambouillet Agreement by the Kosovar Delegation and the refusal of the Yugoslav delegation paved the way for NATO’s decision to start a military campaign against Yugoslavia, without United Nation (UN) authorization and in the face of Russian and Chinese opposition. The initiation of hostilities was strongly criticized by Russia and China in the UN Security Council, presaging the controversy over the moral and legal justification of NATO's action (Weller, 2009, p. 155).

In many ways, NATO’s 1999 air campaign against Yugoslavia in addition to Western pressure for a settlement both before and afterwards, was a vindication of Rugova’s and the Kosovo Liberation Army’s (KLA) strategy aimed at drawing in external involvement (Buzan and Weaver, 2012, p. 383). Moreover, this event was crucial in determining the future relations between Kosovo and the intervening powers, with the US and EU countries taking a central role, but also in cementing Russia’s and, to a lesser degree, China’s anti-Kosovo stance in the decades to come. NATO’s decision to launch Operation Allied Force on March 24, 1999 was instrumental not only in stopping the oppression of Kosovo Albanians by the Milošević regime but also, importantly, in setting in motion a military, a diplomatic and political process that first liberated Kosovo from Serbian rule and then set the course for the establishment of new institutions of self-governance under the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) auspices.

A GREAT POWERS’ EUROPEAN AND BALKAN PROJECTION 395 The third stage includes the period after the Kosovo war, when different international organizations had established their presence in Kosovo following the adoption of Resolution 1244 by the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC) that placed the territory of Kosovo under UN administration. UNMIK was a ‘coalition’ between the UN (responsible for civil administration, police and justice), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (institution building) and the EU (economic reconstruction) (Papadimitriou and Petrov, 2012, p. 753). A 50,000 strong army of NATO states and other neutral and non-aligned countries was in charge of security.

Without a doubt, the US played the key role in NATO’s intervention, as well as in steering the political process that helped Kosovo’s post-war reconstruction, establishment of its self-governing institutions and march towards independence (Phillips, 2012). The continued American political, military and economic investment in Kosovo since the 1990s has turned it into an indispensable actor on the ground. Camp Bondsteel, the NATO Force (KFOR) base where US forces in Kosovo are located, is the symbol of US involvement and influence in Kosovo. Consequently, Kosovo continues to have strong emotional, political and economic bonds to the US, with many surveys suggesting it has the highest—88 percent—approval of US leadership globally (Dezfuli, 2018; KCSS, 2018, p. 17).

Equally, the EU has been an important actor, which together with the US played a crucial role in the process of reconstruction, democratization and state-building in Kosovo. The EU’s role in post-war economic recovery is enormous; between 1999 and 2008 it invested 2.3 billion euros (Džihić and Kramer, 2009, p. 14). EU member state involvement in Kosovo was extensive and grew over time. Their involvement included participation in various international organizations and agencies (UNMIK, OSCE, NATO, UNHCR etc.) as well as establishment of direct relations with Kosovo.

Over time, most of the EU member states established Liaison Offices in Prishtina, which were precursors to full diplomatic missions, thus enabling them to enhance cooperation with Kosovo’s self-governing institutions. Especially after the March 2004 riots,

396 GËZIM KRASNIQI the diplomatic representation of the US and prominent EU countries such as the UK, Germany, France and Italy increased their direct engagement with Kosovo institutions, which were eager to communicate directly and via UNMIK with foreign governments in their attempt to gain support for the final status settlement (Visoka, 2018, p. 71).

In addition to the US and the EU, Turkey as a regional power, has played an important role in Kosovo. Despite historical links that go back to the Ottoman Empire and a sense of shared religious identity, Turkey’s policy towards Kosovo for most of the 1990s was, in fact, very cautious, rejecting calls from Kosovar leaders for stronger involvement and help (Gangloff, 2004). Turkey’s stance was dictated by its long-established policy of neutrality as well as the Kurdish question internally. Therefore, it is no surprise that for a long time Turkey has followed the path of the US and other major powers in the region. The Turkish air force participated in NATO air strikes on the FRY, and after June 1999 it contributed to the international peacekeeping force stationed in Kosovo with around 1000 soldiers. Moreover, NATO’s action corresponded with the emergence of a new Ottoman discourse that depicted Kosovars as ‘brethren’. Importantly, the claim to an Ottoman legacy, which had been previously exclusively made by nationalist and Islamist circles, emerged in official discourses (Gangloff, 2004).

Turkey’s involvement in post-war Kosovo was strengthened significantly after 2002 when the Justice and Development Party (AKP)—a political party devoted to political Islam—came to power. This enhanced cooperation created suitable conditions for a higher presence and increased activity of Turkish cultural, educational and faith-based state agencies and NGOs, such as Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), Diyanet (the Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey), and other organizations and educational institutions which are part of the Gülen Movement network (Krasniqi, 2011, p. 200).

The AKP government and Foreign Ministers Abdullah Gül and later on Ahmet Davutoğlu introduced a new policy perspective that surpassed the confines of conventional diplomacy and high politics, reaching out into the micro-level of community organizations

A GREAT POWERS’ EUROPEAN AND BALKAN PROJECTION 397 and grassroots politics in cooperation with religious networks and charities (Öktem, 2012, p. 31). The presence of a Turkish minority in Kosovo, the proximity of the Turks to the forms of Islamic tradition in Kosovo and the mostly positive image of Turkey among Albanians eased the former’s exercise of influence (Krasniqi, 2011, p.

200).

Russia, a major global power and a historical ally of Serbia, has traditionally sought to oppose and undermine the West’s policy on Kosovo. Russia has used its Security Council veto to oppose any initiatives that did not have Belgrade’s consent. However, in spring 1999, Russia was part of a Troika of interlocutors, composed of Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari for the EU, Strobe Talbott for the US and Viktor Chernomyrdin for Russia, that convinced Serbia to withdraw its military and administrative control from Kosovo, effectively paving the way for Kosovo to be placed under UN administration (Weller, 2009, p. 177). Having failed to deploy its own peacekeeping contingent to Kosovo without coordinating with NATO, a move that had triggered fears of a division of Kosovo, the Russian leadership agreed, reluctantly, to serve in KFOR, a de facto NATO-led peacekeeping operation.

Russia’s presence in post-war Kosovo has been materialized through its participation in the UNMIK structure and KFOR. However, its presence became negligible following the withdrawal of its KFOR contingent in 2003. Like many other countries, Russia opened a Liaison Diplomatic Office in Prishtina (accredited under United Nations Mission in Kosovo framework)—as a branch of the Russian Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia—but refrained from establishing direct contacts with Kosovo institutions (Kallaba, 2017). Albeit the conflict in Kosovo played a pivotal role in cementing today’s close ties between Russia and Serbia, as “for more than two decades, the Kremlin has primarily viewed the Kosovo dispute as part and parcel of its complicated relations with the West'' (Samorkuov, 2019). In particular, under Vladimir Putin’s second rule, Kosovo came back on Russia’s agenda amid heightened tensions with the West in the mid-2000s (Bechev, 2017, p. 48).

Of all the great powers discussed here, China is the least interested in Kosovo. The Chinese position towards Kosovo was in large

398 GËZIM KRASNIQI part shaped by its concerns with the US proclivity to intervene in the Balkans and its push for a new global order where the principle of state sovereignty could be overridden (Marsh and Gvosdev, 2006). However, unlike Russia, during the Yugoslav crisis in the 1990s, China generally took a neutral standpoint and supported the decisions made by the UN Security Council (Weller, 2009, p. 166).

The Kosovo crisis of 1999, came as a real shock to the Chinese: “Not only had Western powers intervened militarily in the Kosovo conflict without seeking prior authorization of the UNSC, more dramatically, NATO had also mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade'' (Stähle, 2008, p. 646). Yet, Beijing abstained in the vote on establishing the UN mission in Kosovo and on authorizing the NATO-led Kosovo force (KFOR) to enforce the peace in June 1999. According to the then Chinese representative at the UN, in essence, the “human rights over sovereignty” theory serves to infringe upon the sovereignty of other states and to promote hegemonism under the pretext of human rights, thus countering the purposes and principles of the UN Charter (UN, 1999). Despite the fact that China maintains a Liaison Office in Prishtina and a significant increase in imports from China over the years, its formal presence in post-war Kosovo remains minimal.

Overall, under UNMIK, “Kosovo was not allowed any diplomatic representation or a foreign ministry, yet it was required to participate in a complex and highly-charged diplomatic process involving many diplomatic actors” (Ross, 2007, p. 192). Regardless of such caveats, Kosovo politicians and institutions actively engaged in forging closer ties and developing bilateral relations with other countries and international organizations. These ties and relations were intensified at the time of negotiations about Kosovo’s status and reached their peak in the aftermath of the declaration of independence and the recognition of Kosovo by other countries. Just like in 1999, the Contact Group countries were in charge of determining Kosovo’s political status as part of a process formally led by the UN (Weller, 2008, pp. 21–22). Thus, on March 14, 2007, the Special Envoy for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, published the Final Comprehensive proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement, which proposed internationally supervised independence for Kosovo and

A GREAT POWERS’ EUROPEAN AND BALKAN PROJECTION 399 laid down the contours of the future Kosovar state. Kosovo, the US and most of the EU countries supported the plan whereas Serbia and Russia opposed it.

The Kosovo status settlement process (2006–2008) was in effect a re-enactment of great powers’ confrontation from the wartime that pitted the US and the EU against Russia and China. As a result of Russia’s opposition to Kosovo’s independence without Serbia’s consent, Kosovo was forced to embark on a legally unilateral but politically concerted effort to statehood and independent existence, which culminated in the declaration of independence on February 17, 2018. However, this time, cracks appeared in the transatlantic alliance as well as various EU members expressing their reservations and opposition towards Kosovo’s independence, thus forcing the EU to formally establish a neutral position vis-à-vis Kosovo’s statehood.

Contemporary Policies: Continued Reliance on Old Friends More than twenty years since the end of the war and twelve years since the declaration of independence, Kosovo remains trapped in a state of contestation and political and legal limbo with serious repercussions in many fields, including foreign policy. As a result, Kosovo continues to remain an arena for power politics and competition between major powers and has its foreign policy choices externally conditioned. In other words, being a state of international (i.e., US and EU) design, its foreign policy polity as well as politics are firmly oriented towards European (EU) and transatlantic (NATO) structures.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diplomatic Service of Kosovo was established in March 2008, just weeks after the declaration of independence. Months later, Kosovo decreed the opening of the first Kosovar embassies in the US, the UK, Germany, Italy, France, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Albania and Turkey and appointed its first foreign representatives (chargé d’affaires) (SETimes, 2008).

The configuration and timing of Kosovo’s diplomatic missions reflected both the dynamic of recognition from other countries as well

400 GËZIM KRASNIQI as Kosovo’s foreign policy priorities. Thus, it is of no surprise that Kosovo opened its first embassies in the US and the main EU countries, which at the same time were the main sponsors and supporters of Kosovo’s independence (Krasniqi, 2014a, p. 203).

In terms of foreign policy priorities, successive Kosovar governments since 2008 have been unambiguous on the focus in accelerating the process of international recognition of Kosovo and deepening special relations with the US and the EU (Visoka, 2018, pp. 79–81). According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Kosovo, “cultivating close and special relations with the United States of America remains a particular priority for Kosovo’s foreign policy, as this relation continues to play a strategic role in maintaining the peace and stability in the country and region” (2013). Regardless of the ruling parties, partnership with the US and the EU have been taking pride of place in Kosovo’s foreign policy priorities. The US in particular is seen as a great power with which Kosovo enjoys a ‘special connection’ and ‘eternal friendship’. In many respects, Kosovo remains a US protégé. Apart from being one of the first countries to recognize Kosovo, US administrations (both Republican and Democratic) have pledged continuous political, economic and diplomatic support to Kosovo and have been very active in lobbying for more recognition and membership in international institutions. Some four months after Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the former US President George W. Bush organized an official reception at the White House for Kosovo’s President and Prime Minister in a move that was aimed at boosting international support for Kosovo (White House, 2008). Furthermore, high US officials, including the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, have made regular visits to Kosovo over the years.

The history of US-Kosovo relations dates back to the 1990s when the United States first opened a US Information Service Office in Kosovo in 1996. Between 1999 and 2008, the US Office in Prishtina operated as the diplomatic mission of the United States in Kosovo. After Kosovo’s independence in 2008, the United States officially established diplomatic relations with Kosovo and the Office became an Embassy. The US government has been investing about

A GREAT POWERS’ EUROPEAN AND BALKAN PROJECTION 401 $2 billion in Kosovo since 1999, including a newly constructed multi-million-dollar Embassy building located in Prishtina (US Embassy Kosovo, 2020). Since 2017, Kosovo has been selected to participate in Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)—an innovative and independent US foreign assistance agency that helps lead the fight against global poverty-threshold and compact programs.

A Kosovo-Iowa National Guard Partnership has been in place since 2011, and in 2012, Kosovo signed a status of forces agreement with the US (State Department, 2012).

While Kosovo largely owes its independence to US political and military support, this ‘special friendship’ has a downside: namely, Kosovo’s continuous dependence on US support. Apart from the influence that the US exercises in Kosovo’s internal affairs through its Embassy in Prishtina, US influence stretches in the domain of foreign policy as well. This has resulted in Kosovo’s nascent foreign policy being a ‘compliant foreign policy’, which is typical for a small state whose actions are in alignment with the desires of a more powerful country and whose decisions are undertaken only after the decision makers of a more powerful state have exerted their influence (Breuning, 2007, p. 152). Therefore, irrespective of the fact that it seeks to increase the number of countries recognizing its independence, Kosovo has adopted a very cautious approach towards the states that are seen as problematic or anti-US, such as Iran, Syria, North Korea, Venezuela, and Cuba.

Moreover, as Kosovo’s failed bids to join UNESCO and Interpol attest, overreliance on the US and other partners’ support for securing recognitions and membership in international organizations could have backfired due to unintentional multilateral entanglements. In both cases, Kosovo’s bid was entangled with that of Palestine, whose efforts to join international organizations were strongly opposed by the US, thus limiting the US ability to support Kosovo (Visoka, 2018, pp. 189–190). The US exerted its pressure over the Kosovar Parliament to amend the constitution in 2015 to allow the creation of a highly unpopular (among Kosovo Albanians) and controversial ‘special court’, based in The Hague, to investigate alleged war crimes committed by ethnic Albanian fighters during the war in the 1990s (Hehir, 2019, pp. 267–70).

402 GËZIM KRASNIQI Kosovo’s attitude towards the EU remains unchanged, too. In fact, its role in Kosovo has increased significantly since 2008. During this time, the EU assumed an increased and double-hatted role in Kosovo as a state-builder (through its European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)) and as an anchor of reforms through its policy of conditionality. However, because of the lack of consensus at the UN and the EU (Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia have refuse to recognize Kosovo’s independence until today), EULEX was deployed in Kosovo—under the general framework of United Nations Security Resolution 1244,—which conditions it to adopt a ‘status neutral’ approach. Over the years, this has become a thorn in the EU’s relations with Kosovo. In 2011, the EU also acquired the role of a facilitator in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue on normalization of relations between the two.

Despite being a product of the EU’s endeavor in external statebuilding, hosting the largest EU mission abroad to date, and being engaged in EU-facilitated negotiations with Serbia, Kosovo’s relations with the EU remain confined within the EU’s formula of ‘creative ambiguity’ and ‘status neutrality.’ While Serbia has effectively used the Brussels dialogue to make significant advances on its EU path, Kosovo’s gains from the process have been far more modest.

In October 2015, Kosovo and the EU signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), the first step towards closer cooperation with the EU and eventual membership. However, the failure of the EU to speak with a single voice hindered Kosovo’s EU perspective, evidenced by the visa liberalization process. Kosovo remains the only country in the region whose citizens need a visa to travel to the Schengen Area even though it formally fulfilled all the criteria set by the European Commission (EC) long ago. This disillusionment with the EU has had an impact on the popular support for EU integration, too, which in 2019 went down to 69% (from 84% in 2017) (RCC, 2019).

Notwithstanding complex relations with the EU, Kosovo’s relations with key EU states have strengthened over the time at a political, diplomatic and economic level. The EU is by far Kosovo’s main trading partner. According to data from 2018, Kosovo's exports to EU countries amounted to 110.8 million Euros, or about

A GREAT POWERS’ EUROPEAN AND BALKAN PROJECTION 403 30.2% of total exports. Meanwhile, Kosovo's imports from EU countries amounted to 1,457.3 million Euros, or 43.5% of total imports (ASK, 2018). Even without counting remittances from the large Kosovar diaspora in Europe or foreign direct investment (FDI), this data is a clear indicator of the EU’s overwhelming economic involvement in Kosovo.

Turkey is another power that has strengthened its role in Kosovo. The existence of multi-level ties—historic, political, religious, and personal—between Kosovo Albanians and Turkey makes the latter an important actor and ally. Turkey was one of the first countries in the world to recognize Kosovo’s independence and provided a substantial contribution especially towards the consolidation of the state of Kosovo internationally and through offering expertise and training to Kosovo’s new institutions. For several years, Turkey has lobbied individual states as well as sponsored resolutions, calling on Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) member states to recognize Kosovo (Visoka, 2018, p. 189). Statesmen from both states have exchanged innumerable visits in recent years and both countries have signed a number of bilateral agreements on the economy, defense and diplomacy. According to surveys, some 74.5% of respondents in Kosovo believe that Turkey is a friendly partner (KCSS, 2018, p. 23).

Over the years, Turkey has continued to strengthen its economic footprint in Kosovo. Turkish contractors are also involved in various regional infrastructure projects, including the construction of highways that connect Kosovo to Albania and Macedonia, the construction of the new Prishtina airport, and the privatization of Kosovo Electricity Distribution Company (Aydıntaşbaş, 2019). Kosovo's imports from Turkey stand at 10.1% of the overall figure, and this is expected to increase after the Free Trade Agreement between the two countries enters into force in 2019 (RFE/RL, 2019). However, relations with Turkey have not been without their problems.

Turkey’s increased economic and religious influence has raised concerns among many in Kosovo that it has taken advantage of recent Western disinterest to expand its influence and push its ‘neoOttomanism’ agenda in Kosovo (Edwards and Colborne, 2019). Alt-

404 GËZIM KRASNIQI hough Turkey’s image as a ‘trustworthy’ partner of Kosovo Albanians still prevails, Kosovo leaders seem to be cautious not to move too close to Turkey for the fear of jeopardizing the country’s EuroAtlantic and pro-Western foreign policy orientation. This dilemma will only increase in the future as a result of growing incompatibility between Turkey’s and the EU’s agendas in the region.

Kosovo's main trading partners 2018 50 40 30 20 10 0 EU

US Imports

Turkey

China

Exports

Table 5: Kosovo’s exports and imports to the EU, US, Turkey and China (there is no available data for Russia).

Source: Kosovo Statistical Agency (2018).

In regards to the Russian Federation, its attitude towards Kosovo has not changed in the years after independence. When Kosovo declared independence in 2008, Russia used its authority in the UN Security Council and worked with parts of the international community to prevent full recognition of Kosovo. Aiming to disqualify Western Balkan states from NATO and EU membership, Russia also used the Serbian minority in Kosovo to uphold the specter of partition and blocked Kosovo from entering the UN (Bugajski, 2017, p. 3). Regardless of the lack of formal ties with Kosovo—its Liaison Office in Kosovo does not engage with Kosovo’s institutions—it remains an important factor in the Kosovo status quagmire. After Serbia itself, Russia remains the strongest and most active opponent of Kosovo’s independence internationally. Hence it

A GREAT POWERS’ EUROPEAN AND BALKAN PROJECTION 405 is no surprise that 85% of people in Kosovo perceive Russia as very hostile (KCSS, 2018, p. 21).

Russia’s efforts against Kosovo’s independence include diplomatic activities in support of Serbia’s campaign to persuade states to revoke Kosovo’s recognition. More recently, Russia has been instrumental in influencing around a dozen small states in Africa and Oceania to withdraw their recognition of Kosovo. Further, Russia has eagerly used this decision as proof that the Kosovo statehood project has failed and should be abandoned (Samorkuov, 2019). Internally, Russia has intensified its meddling campaign against Kosovo using fake news worldwide to portray it as a ‘failed state’, as well as political ties between the Kosovo Serb party Srpska Lista to the ruling party United Russia, and Russian influence over the Serbian Orthodox Church (Kallaba, 2017). Overall, Russia primarily views the Kosovo issue as part of its complicated relations with the West and has used it as a precedent to justify its recognition of two Georgian breakaway provinces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008, and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as to increase its influence in Serbia. Albeit Russia’s long-standing policy is to accept any outcome that Serbia consents to, with Moscow recently showing little enthusiasm for the prospects of a successful outcome from the Serbia-Kosovo talks, insisting that the EU is incapable of mediating the conflict effectively (Samorukov, 2019). In fact, Russia’s factorization is largely a result of the fact that the EU and the US have failed in their efforts to resolve the Kosovo-Serbia dispute.

Similar to Russia, China’s policy towards Kosovo has not changed much since 2008. China’s stance is shaped by concerns that Kosovo’s declaration is not in line with international law and that recognition might set a precedent in relation to sensitive domestic issues such as the restive regions of Tibet and Xinjiang (Marsh and Gvosdev, 2006). China’s position is also in line with its stance on the importance of domestic non‐interference. Remarkably, Kosovo’s distant attitude towards Taiwan, whose recognition of Kosovo in 2008 has not been reciprocated, has not had a notable impact on China’s position. However, unlike Russia, China recognized Kosovar passports in 2008, a move which has facilitated trade

406 GËZIM KRASNIQI links between the two countries. Imports from China have increased over the years, accounting for 9.3% of the total in 2018 (Chart 1). Nevertheless, Kosovo is one of the few countries on earth with almost no Chinese economic footprint to speak of (Mardell, 2020). It is the only Western Balkan country that is not part of the China—Central and Eastern European Countries meeting—known as the “17+1”. This has created opportunities for China’s main rival in Asia—Japan—to step in and strengthen ties with Kosovo, including the opening of an embassy in Prishtina in 2020 (Hammond, 2020).

In sum, Kosovo’s relations with the five powers have been largely determined by the latter’s attitude towards the political and legal processes that precede independence and have not undergone significant changes. Whereas Kosovo has strengthened relations with the US, the EU and Turkey, its relations with Russia and China remain frosty. While the formers have been crucial in supporting Kosovo’s state-building efforts internally and externally and provided a credible voice in support of Kosovo’s case during the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which in 2010 concluded that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law, the latter have been unequivocal in supporting Serbia’s position, thus effectively leaving Kosovo in a state of limbo internationally.

Foreign Policy Structures: Overlapping Institutions, Deepening Political Polarization Successive Kosovo governments have reaffirmed their commitment to a) a principled foreign policy that is guided by the same values and democratic principles and from international norms; b) recognition of Kosovo’s independence and establishment of diplomatic relations with these countries; c) the cultivation of close and special relations with the US as the main strategic partner; d) building a strategic partnership with the EU and NATO, including establishing contractual relations with these organizations on the path towards Euro-Atlantic integration; e) Kosovo’s membership in

A GREAT POWERS’ EUROPEAN AND BALKAN PROJECTION 407 international organizations; and f) developing good neighborly relations and regional cooperation (Government of the Republic of Kosovo, 2015; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo, n.d.).

The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diplomatic Service of Kosovo in March 2008 was soon followed by the opening of the first Kosovar embassies in the U.S, the UK, Germany, Italy, France, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Albania and Turkey in June 2008 (SETimes, 2008). Over the years Kosovo opened more embassies in EU member states, as well as in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Australia and Latin America, bringing the total number to about 30. Kosovo has the highest level of diplomatic representation (embassy) in the US, in 15 out of 27 EU member states and in Turkey, as well as a network of consular missions.

However, Kosovo does not have any representation in Russia or China.

Overall, Kosovo’s foreign policy was characterized by institutional overlap, lack of coordination and even internal party and personal rivalry to claim credit for recognition, which has been the main focus of its foreign policy over the years. In the period between 2008–2010 under the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) coalition, Kosovo’s first Foreign Minister, Skënder Hyseni, was at the helm of Kosovo’s foreign policy representing Kosovo abroad, lobbying at the UN during the General Assembly sessions (where he was occasionally joined by the prime minister and president) and coordinating the process of defending Kosovo’s declaration of independence at the ICJ. Matters worsened in 2010–2014 with the creation of a new government between PDK and Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AKR), when a new pattern of foreign policy organization was established. In the new government, apart from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Enver Hoxhaj, and his two deputies, there was a Minister for European Integration and two deputy prime ministers who were engaged in foreign affairs. Deputy Prime Minister Behxhet Pacolli was charged with the special task of obtaining more recognitions while Deputy Prime Minister Edita Tahiri, led Kosovo’s negotiating team in the dialogue with Serbia, also serving as Kosovo’s foreign policy envoy.

408 GËZIM KRASNIQI Kosovo’s previous president Atifete Jahjaga was also very active in foreign affairs. Being the first female president from the region, she was particularly active in various international networks and initiatives on women’s rights, as well as on war victims. Nonetheless, this model of proliferation of external representation has led to a situation in which there is an overlap of competencies and the MFA is in many ways subordinated. The MFA (re)established its dominance in foreign policy in late 2014 with the election of Hashim Thaçi as first deputy-prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in the PDK-LDK coalition led by Isa Mustafa. Nevertheless, of all the different institutional leaders, Thaçi has over the years been the key factor in Kosovo’s relations with the outside world. As the dominant political figure in Kosovo from 2008 until 2020, when he resigned to face a war crime trial, he had established himself as an indispensable political actor in Kosovo.

However, Thaçi’s election as President of Kosovo in 2015 and his tendency to personalize foreign policy as well as the dialogue with Serbia put him on a collision course with the previous government (2017–2019) led by Ramush Haradinaj Albin Kurti’s shortlived Vetëvendosje-LDK coalition government (Feb–March 2020).

The manner in which political rivalries have inhibited institutional coordination and cohesion has been a long-standing problem within Kosovo (Hehir and Emini, 2020). Moreover, it has also drawn in Kosovo’s key partners. The first major clash happened in March 2018 and it involved Turkey, too. Kosovo’s security institutions arrested and deported six Turkish nationals at Turkey’s request over alleged links to schools financed by the Gülen movement, which Ankara blamed for a failed 2016 coup. Prime Minister Haradinaj, who claimed not to be aware of the issue, later sacked his interior minister and country’s secret service chief for failing to inform him about the arrests (Reuters, 2018). Haradinaj’s actions did not go over well with Turkish officials. Days later, in an unprecedented diplomatic gesture, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan slammed Haradinaj publicly, accusing him of siding with terrorists, and at the same time praised Thaçi, who was allegedly behind the deportation. “I would like to thank Kosovo President [Thaçi]. I say: Shame on you, Kosovar prime minister,” added Erdogan at a public

A GREAT POWERS’ EUROPEAN AND BALKAN PROJECTION 409 event in Turkey (SCF, 2018). Unprecedented as it was, this spat did not have any major repercussions for Kosovo’s relations with Turkey.

Following Kosovo’s general election in 2017, and the creation of a new government comprising a ‘warwing’ coalition of parties— the PDK, Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AKK) and Social Democratic Initiative (NISMA)—each led by former KLA commanders, a group of parliament members from within the coalition, supported by President Thaçi, attempted to revoke the special court in Kosovo’s Assembly. The effort was abandoned only after extraordinary international pressure from the US, UK and other EU member state ambassadors. They warned that if the effort succeeded, it would have profoundly negative implications for Kosovo’s future as part of Europe and would isolate Kosovo internationally (Hehir, 2019, p. 276). This was the first time since independence that Kosovo’s leaders clashed openly and strongly with Kosovo’s strategic partners on a matter of great relevance.

A far bigger polarization emerged in Kosovo in 2018 between President Thaçi and Prime Minister Haradinaj related to the issue of the dialogue with Serbia. The EU-mediated dialogue not only failed to make any meaningful progress towards solving the longstating political dispute, but under Frederica Mogherini—the previous EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy—it also degraded into a discussion on border change and territorial exchange. Although Haradinaj had initially consented that Thaçi led the dialogue, he accused Thaçi (as well as Albania’s Prime Minister, Edi Rama) of conspiring with his Serbian counterpart, Aleksandar Vučić, to divide Kosovo. In a matter of weeks in late 2018, Haradinaj pushed for two important political decisions: first, he introduced 100% customs tariffs on Serbian imports in response to Serbia’s aggressive international campaign against Kosovo’s recognition and its membership in international organizations, and second, he pushed legislation through parliament to transform Kosovo’s Security Force into a professional army amid protests from Serbia, NATO (the US approved the move though) and the EU (Surk, 2019). However, Haradinaj’s refusal to lift tariffs without

410 GËZIM KRASNIQI clear guarantees for recognition of Kosovo from Serbia put his government on a collision course with its main strategic partners. Both the EU and the US opposed tariffs on the grounds that they harm trade as well as Kosovo’s economy and, most importantly, as an obstacle to the resumption of Kosovo-Serbia dialogue on the normalization of relations between the two. Consequently, for the first time in decades, Kosovo found itself on the receiving end of international criticism, with the West effectively succumbing to Serbia’s position that there would not be any dialogue without full and unconditional lifting of the tariffs.

Thaçi and Vučić’s initiative to reach a compromise solution that aimed to solve the Kosovo issue through some sort of border adjustment or demarcation, divided local, regional and international actors (Zivanovic, 2018). While senior EU officials, including former EU officials Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn, did not rule out a consensual solution that guaranteed regional stability, Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, rejected any changes to borders. In 2018, the then US National Security Advisor, John Bolton, made it clear that the US was open to an exchange of territory between Kosovo and Serbia as part of a deal.

The political rivalry between Haradinaj and Thaçi openly manifested internationally, including at important international fora such as the EU Summit in Berlin in 2019 (Surk, 2019). Worse, this rivalry coalesced with a transatlantic political consensus that was weakened by the day as a result of Donald Trump’s presidency and the EU’s inability to reform and lack of actorness. Today, for the first time in decades, the West is shown not only to be divided when it comes to the Kosovo issue but also, worse, lacking a clear strategy.

A combination of external pressures and internal political disputes and competition effectively brought down the government of Haradinaj, who resigned in July 2019 after being summoned for questioning by the special court in The Hague, thus triggering an early election. Haradinaj’s gamble to capitalize on the tariffs issue backfired in the October 2019 elections. The governing parties, all of them led by important military figures from the 1998–1999 war,

A GREAT POWERS’ EUROPEAN AND BALKAN PROJECTION 411 suffered a sweeping defeat, paving the way for a pro-reformist government coalition comprising the Self-Determination Movement (VV), a leftist protest party, and Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), a center-right traditional party that promised to fight corruption and lower unemployment.

A new VV-LDK Government was established in February 2020 with Albin Kurti as Prime Minister. Like Haradinaj before him, Kurti challenged Thaçi’s dominant role in foreign policy and the dialogue with Serbia. The rivalry between the two also manifested at the 2020 Munich Security Forum, during which the lack of coordination at the highest levels led to Kosovo being represented by two diametrically opposite stances toward the dialogue and regional cooperation (Hehir and Emini, 2020). However, as the coronavirus health crisis was spreading to Europe and Kosovo, the issue of tariffs quickly regained momentum and the government’s focus to deliver the long-term domestic reforms and promote economic growth shifted under the pressure of US administration and the US presidential envoy for peace talks between Kosovo and Serbia, Ambassador Richard Grenell. Grenell pressured Kurti to abolish tariffs unconditionally and to refrain from imposing reciprocity trade measures against Serbia. Kurti’s strategy to compromise on the partial and conditional lifting of the tariffs turned his junior coalition partner LDK against the government, while Washington suspended bilateral foreign aid programs in Kosovo through the MCC and threatened to withdraw troops from Kosovo (Bytyci, 2020). The escalating US pressure combined with internal coalition disagreements triggered by Kurti’s decision to sack the interior minister without prior consultation prompted LDK to side with opposition parties and initiate a no-confidence vote in the Parliament, bringing down Kurti’s government in the midst of a global pandemic.

The political crisis and the US pressure in Kosovo not only split the pro-reformist coalition but it also showed a widening rift between the US and European capitals in their strategy and actions on Kosovo. Whereas Germany and France called on the LDK to reconsider the no-confidence vote and focus on overcoming the health crisis, the US Ambassador in Prishtina tweeted his support for the vote. The US position to support the fall of the government,

412 GËZIM KRASNIQI in the midst of the looming health crisis, remains perplexing and unseen in the last two decades of strong and continuous US support for Kosovo’s democracy. The Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Eliot L. Engel, criticized the US administration’s tactics, saying that “(s)trong-arming a small democracy is the act of a bully” (VOA News, 2020). The new LDK-led government abolished tariffs and agreed to sign an agreement on economic normalization with Serbia that was brokered by Grenell and signed in Washington in September 2020 in President Trumps’ presence (Gearan, 2020). A major political element, if not the main one (from Kosovo’s perspective), of the agreement is Kosovo’s commitment to set up its Israel mission in Jerusalem in exchange for Israel’s recognition.

In sum, while the issue of tariffs has been an important element in Kosovo’s recent fall from grace internationally, the real cause lies elsewhere: namely, the decade-long, short-sighted approach adopted by the EU and the US in the Kosovo-Serbia dispute.

While there have rarely been more envoys and special representatives—in early 2020 the EU appointed Miroslav Lajčák as the Special Representative for the Belgrade-Prishtina Dialogue—mandated to help solve the Kosovo-Serbia dispute, paradoxically, it is hard to think of a time where there has been so little coordination, political and diplomatic vision and clear plans to deal with the issue. Unfortunately, Kosovo’s prolonged status saga has not only hindered its ability to forge an independent foreign policy but at a time of shifting priorities for both the US and the EU, it is also testing Kosovo’s relations with its key strategic partners, as well as the transatlantic partnership in the region.

Conclusion More than twenty years after the NATO military intervention to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the young republic remarkably finds itself isolated internationally and at odds with the very powers—the European Union and the United States of America—that made its existence possible in the first place. Ultimately, this exposes Kosovo’s complex relationship with and dependency on

A GREAT POWERS’ EUROPEAN AND BALKAN PROJECTION 413 great powers. According to Coggins, recognition by great powers “constitute the most critical of the critical mass required to surpass the threshold to secure external sovereignty” (2014, p. 42). Yet, not all great powers recognize Kosovo. To date, Russia and China oppose Kosovo’s statehood. Moreover, the two great powers that are Kosovo’s strategic partners, the US and the EU, not only have been incapable of pushing a Kosovo-Serbia deal over the finish line but they also have never been less coordinated or aimless in their policy towards Kosovo. This, coupled with the attitude of Russia and China that treats Kosovo as part of their complicated relations with the West, have waned international support for Kosovo and limited its foreign policy choices. However, the new Biden Administration’s pledge to restore the US-EU partnership is likely to provide a new impetus to the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue.

Despite decades-long efforts to forge an independent foreign policy of its own, given state contestation and ongoing state-building challenges, Kosovo still remains an arena for, rather than the agent of, power politics regionally and internationally. Remarkably, the position of various great powers involved in Kosovo, directly or indirectly, has not changed since the 1998–9 war. In the last two decades of peace— and state-building, Kosovo has relied heavily on the support of its strategic partners the US, the EU, as well as Turkey, but has failed to make any breakthroughs in relations with Russia and China. In many ways, great powers’ (unchanging) positions on Kosovo’s status have conditioned the latter’s foreign policy orientation as an aspiring country to join the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Furthermore, Kosovo’s statehood, sovereignty and territoriality issues continue to limit its foreign policy potential and strategic choices and often entangle with great powers’ (especially China and Russia) own territoriality and sovereignty issues, much to its detriment.

For reasons of history and politics, Kosovo’s statehood and external engagement cannot be disentangled from the role of the great powers, both those that support and oppose its independence. To paraphrase Buzan and Waever (2012, p. 391), it is not the United States, EU, Turkey, Russia or China as such that have been present in Kosovo, it is their European and Balkan projection, and thus, it

414 GËZIM KRASNIQI is still reasonable to see Kosovo as a subcomplex of the Balkan (regional) security complex. In other words, Kosovo continues to be a great powers’ European and Balkan projection.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS— THE POTENTIAL AND PITFALLS OF A NEW EASTERN QUESTION Soeren Keil und Bernhard Stahl This volume has shed light onto the role of different international actors—The United States (US), the European Union (EU), Russia, China and Turkey in the post-Yugoslav states (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Serbia, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo). While it is easy to talk about a new geopolitical rivalry (Alexandrova-Arbatova, 2012) or a new ‘Great Game’ of international confrontation in Southeastern Europe (Roick, 2021), the picture that emerges from the contributions in this book is much more complex, diverse and multi-layered.

The Euro-Atlantic integration perspective remains the most promising foreign policy focus for all post-Yugoslav states, and neither the revival of Russia and Turkey, nor the arrival of China on the scene has changed this basic fact. None of these three non-Western actors can offer as much as the EU and the US—namely the integration in European and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) structures, as well as the related economic, political and security benefits. It is therefore not surprising that despite an obvious slow-down of EU integration, none of the post-Yugoslav states has stated openly the intention to withdraw from its integration process in the European Union. Instead, political elites across the region keep emphasizing how important the integration into European structures remains for them and their countries’ futures. In English School terminology, the legitimacy of the enlargement system still remains intact. This, of course, is in stark contrast to the actual speed and progress—EU enlargement has slowed down, and some would argue, come to an end for the foreseeable future (Economides, 2020).

In this conclusion, we aim to bring together the results of the previous chapters and highlight the complex, diverse and multi-

420 SOEREN KEIL UND BERNHARD STAHL layered role that external actors play in the post-Yugoslav states.

We do so by focusing first on what we consider to be ‘Great Powers’, which are relevant in Southeastern Europe, namely Russia, Turkey, China, the US and the EU (outside-in perspective). We highlight how the foreign policies of these actors towards the postYugoslav countries are characterized by a variety of interests and wider foreign policy priorities that often go well beyond the Western Balkan region. We then look at the foreign policies of post-Yugoslav states and their foreign policy evolution in recent years (inside-out perspective). What can be observed is a widening foreign policy focus, in which Euro-Atlantic integration still remains dominant but does not represent the only foreign policy priority anymore. Moreover, we argue that foreign policy is more than ever a reflection of internal developments in the post-Yugoslav states. A major reason for an increased visibility of Russia, Turkey and China is the rise of authoritarianism in the region, hence these three big players offer authoritarian elites legitimacy and short-term gains when the EU is ever-more increasing its conditionality for the postYugoslav states. Nevertheless, we argue that the focus on ‘A New Eastern Question’ is too short-sighted, only serving those believing in realist International Relations theory, where conflict seems inevitable. Our findings look much more complex and point to historical continuities and changes, with foreign policy evolution over time and with a common theme—what happens in the post-Yugoslav states, however complex, usually reflects wider global political developments. We demonstrate this by returning to the English School in International Relations and revisiting the discussions on the Great Powers and the post-Yugoslav states in light of core aspects of the English School thinking.

The Perspective of the Great Powers Evidently, the regional international society or the regional security complex has been changing: More actors play an active role in the post-Yugoslav states, economically, socially, culturally and politically. While not completely new, the new visibility of Russian and Turkish influences has less to do with an increase in activity per se,

CONCLUDING REMARKS 421 and more with the concrete measures they undertake, as pointed out by Maxim Samorukov (Russia) and Zeynep Arkan Tuncel (Turkey). Russia, so Samorukov’s argument, is not exactly interested in the Western Balkan states, but defines its policies and engagement with the region in a much wider geopolitical calculation—Southeastern Europe mirrors simply the more complex relationship between post-Soviet Union Russia and the West more generally. Likewise, Arkan points out that Turkey has not acted as a spoiler in the Balkans, even when the relations between the EU and Ankara started to deteriorate. It, too, has a wider geopolitical plan, focused on a neo-Ottoman foreign policy which would allow Ankara to play a main role in its near neighborhood and in former Ottoman territories. Yet, considering the massive resources that Turkey has to mobilize to keep engaged in Syria and its wider involvement in Libya and other Middle Eastern and North African countries, it remains to be seen how much the Balkans will continue to be a priority for Turkish foreign policy in the future. Here, Turkey has little to gain—but also little to lose, unlike, for example in Cyprus or indeed in Syria. China, by contrast, is a newcomer in the post-Yugoslav states. Its role was minimal during the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, and even in the first post-war decade, it played a marginal role in the countries. However, this has changed in recent years as China is now more and more one of the most important direct investors in the region, as well as a political actor. In Serbia, as Mladen Mladenov highlights in his contribution, China has overtaken Russia as the protector state, and its Corona-diplomacy has further contributed to China and its President as a protector and savior of the Serbian people (Dzihic, 2020). Nevertheless, China is not conflicting with Western interests per se, as highlighted in the contribution by Nina Pejič, Saša Istenič Kotar and Zlatko Šabič in this volume. Instead, it has certain economic interests in Southeastern Europe and sees the countries of the former Yugoslavia as an important building block of its new Belt and Road Initiative and as an access point to the markets of major EU countries. While Chinese delivery of security equipment to Serbia, the financial support for unviable infrastructure projects in Montenegro, or its growing technological influence across the region through the use of companies such as

422 SOEREN KEIL UND BERNHARD STAHL Huawei might cause concern in Brussels and Washington D.C, Pejič et al argue that China’s role should be analyzed from a more holistic—and less realist—geopolitical perspective. Chinese investment has the potential to improve the infrastructure and economic situation in many post-Yugoslav countries, and it has given strong support for the EU integration of all countries of the region. In other words, China is not perceived as a threat per se; its interests and involvement are complex and multi-layered, and it can be seen as both, a partner and a threat—but it is surely there to stay and to be engaged with (Markovic Kaze and Wang, 2021).

While Russia, Turkey and China have substantially increased their visibility, and to a certain extent also their actual engagement and involvement in the post-Yugoslav states, it is far too early to write off the two major Western power blocs—the EU and the US. As Kurt Bassuener highlights for the latter, while a certain re-orientation of American foreign policy has taken place in recent years, US support for NATO enlargement of the countries in the region, as well as continued American participation in international missions in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrates that the US is still involved. While clearly American foreign policy has refocused on the Middle East and developments in other parts of the world, one should not mistake a foreign policy re-adjustment as an end of US engagement. In the absence of a viable EU integration perspective, NATO membership has served as a key motivation in countries such as Montenegro, North Macedonia and Albania (which is not discussed in this book) to implement important reforms and strengthen democratic institutions (Goldgeier and Itzkowitz Shifrinson, 2020). One should also not underestimate the security implications of NATO enlargement towards the post-Yugoslav states. NATO’s Southeastern flank is now completely secured, and NATO membership for countries such as Montenegro and possibly Bosnia in the future will also limit the possibilities for Russian irredentism in its interactions with the West and NATO. Beyond security, the EU remains the most powerful actor in the post-Yugoslav states. After the European failure to effectively deal with the Yugoslav wars in the early 1990s, the EU emerged as the most important driver of democratization, institutional change

CONCLUDING REMARKS 423 and political consolidation in the new states of the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, the EU membership of Slovenia in 2004 and Croatia’s entry in July 2013 seemed to confirm the EU’s Thessaloniki promise—namely that the future of all post-Yugoslav states lies within the EU. It seemed as if the ‘Hour of Europe’ was not the period of the 1990s—the ‘Hour’ to end the violent conflicts in the region, but the ‘Hour’ of stabilization, democratization and ultimate EU integration (Keil, 2013). However, the initial motivation for EU integration, and the positive effects of EU conditionality on the political systems of the post-Yugoslav states soon faded, namely when indecisiveness and division began to characterize EU policy towards the region. These divisions first emerged in 2007 and 2008 in the runup to an ultimate solution for the status of Kosovo (see the Introduction). They further emerged in Bosnia in relation to the future of the Office of the High Representative and its ‘Bonn Powers’, which allowed him to impose laws and dismiss elected officials.

Further divisions emerged after the European financial crisis in 2009 in relation to the future of enlargement, before the refugee crisis of 2015 and the Brexit referendum of 2016 resulted in full-blown enlargement fatigue across major European states. Already in 2014, the former European Commission President famously announced that ‘[t]here will be no new enlargement in the next five years’ (Alexe, 2014)—pointing towards the need for internal EU consolidation and institutional reform before any further enlargement. In light of the subsequent crises, it is therefore no surprise that membership remains very elusive for the remaining non-EU post-Yugoslav states. At the same time, it is clear to see how the EU has lost substantial credibility, and with its influence, in the region, as a result of its own backtracking from promises made earlier. This inability of the EU to engage the countries and push its enlargement agenda further has resulted not only in disappointment and a foreign policy reorientation in several post-Yugoslav states (Dzankic, Keil and Kmezic, 2019), but it has also had a substantial impact on the political systems and the rise of new authoritarian structures across the region (Bieber, 2020). In terms of the English School’s parlance, some primary institutions in the region have undergone

424 SOEREN KEIL UND BERNHARD STAHL change. While international law (and its enlargement twin, the acquis communautaire) and the EU’s hegemonic diplomacy have become weaker, traditional state diplomacy and great power management has grown in importance.

The Perspective from the Post-Yugoslav States What is often lacking when discussing foreign influences in the post-Yugoslav states is a recognition that these countries are independent foreign policy actors (see for example Gibas-Krzak, 2020; Panagiotou, 2021). Instead, they are often treated as objects of international politics, of passive recipients rather than active participants in the making and shaping of international rules and decision-making (Keil and Stahl, 2015). Instead, the discussions in the second part of the book—which focus on the foreign policies of the post-Yugoslav states—have centered around these countries as important actors in international politics. That is not to deny their status as “small states” and their limited foreign policy capabilities (Kovacevic, 2019), but it is important to recognize that they are not just the receivers of political, economic and cultural influences from abroad; rather, they engage with these external influences, invite or resist them, use them for their own foreign policy priorities and for their own domestic advantages. In the post-Yugoslav states, foreign policy is intrinsically linked to domestic priorities, and political elites use foreign affairs to push for their domestic agenda. For example, Neven Andjelic (2020) demonstrates the link between foreign policy choices in several post-Yugoslav states and the rise of hybrid and neo-authoritarian regimes. Countries such as Serbia look for foreign partners that approve and support their agenda at home, including their attack on fundamental democratic institutions such as media freedom and the rule of law. It is therefore no surprise that first Russia, and more recently China, are considered important strategic partners for Serbia, as discussed in Mladen Mladenov’s chapter.

What is surprising, however, is the fact that neither the European Union nor the US have been effectively countering anti-democratic and authoritarian tendencies in some post-Yugoslav states,

CONCLUDING REMARKS 425 despite clear signs that local elites undermine fundamental democratic principles. Much scholarly ink has been spilled on the failure of the Euro-Atlantic partners to deal with problematic local elites that have abused their positions to remain in power, undermine the fight against corruption and use access to political positions as a tool to capture and exploit the state (Perry and Keil, 2018; Keil, 2018; Richter and Wunsch, 2020). Moreover, admittedly, EU interference in national election campaigns and the promotion of allegedly proEU politicians—as in the Serbian case (Mladenov and Stahl, 2015)— did not turn out to be successful. While Euroscepticism has risen across the region (Damjanovski, Lavric and Naterer, 2020), it nevertheless is surprising that countries such as Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina have not seen a substantial improvement of their democratic governance, despite heavy foreign policy reliance on the EU and the US, as highlighted by Gezim Krasniqi and Adnan Huskić. In other words, even when the EU has had the tools to directly intervene in domestic political decisions—as has been the case in Bosnia and Kosovo for numerous years—there is still a lack of deep-rooted democratic consolidation and functional statehood.

Instead, countries such as Russia in the case of Bosnia, and Turkey in the case of Kosovo (and the US under President Donald Trump) have become more active and at times countered European reform efforts, or limited the effects of European conditionality in these countries. More worryingly, as pointed out by Ana Boijnovic-Fenko and Faris Kočan, as well as Senada Šelo Šabić , democratic stabilization as well as a clear foreign policy agenda are also lacking in Slovenia and Croatia, despite their EU membership. While EU integration might explain the absence of a coherent post-integration foreign policy agenda, it does not account for some of the democratic backsliding we have seen in both cases, which is connected to a wider crisis of democracy in Eastern Europe that is also visible in Hungary and Poland (Krastev, 2018; Diamond, 2020).

In addition to the connection between internal developments, foreign policy and continued questions over the future European integration process of the region, we are also observing some important foreign policy continuities and changes in the post-Yugoslav states. As the English School would put it: history matters and

426 SOEREN KEIL UND BERNHARD STAHL past patterns of behavior remain relevant for understanding current trends. Russia’s alliance with Serbia goes back to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century, while Turkey’s renewed interest in Bosnia and Kosovo is the result of its own neo-Ottoman foreign policy. Countries such as Montenegro, Bosnia and Kosovo, where internal divisions are reflected in foreign policy choices, see contrasting Great Power interests—for example Bosniaks seeking support from Serbia while Bosnian Serbs looking to Russia for political support of their agenda within the country. Likewise, Montenegro’s deep societal divisions are reflected in foreign policy issues such as NATO membership or the wider relationship with Russia, as pointed out by Bojan Baća and Kenneth Morrison in this book. What is more, as Jakob Rebic Avguštin argues in his chapter on Yugoslav foreign policy and the behavior of Great Powers during the breakup, continued reference to the Yugoslav legacy matters in numerous post-Yugoslav states, such as Serbia’s continued focus on the non-alignment movement, or Slovenia’s and Croatia’s early orientation towards Western Europe and the EU (Lindstrom, 2003). While continuity matters, we are also observing some fundamental foreign policy change in the relations between the post-Yugoslav states and the Great Powers.

There is, for example, divergence in reference to NATO membership, with all post-Yugoslav states bar Serbia, Bosnia and Kosovo, now members of NATO. While Kosovo is committed to NATO integration in the future, in Bosnia this topic is disputed between the three constituent peoples, as pointed out by Adnan Huskić. Serbia is the only country of the post-Yugoslav states that has committed to a neutral foreign policy and rejects full integration into NATO structures. Instead, as Mladen Mladenov points out, it continues to engage in military exercises with Russian forces, despite its already existing links to NATO. Cvete Koneska underlines that North Macedonia’s foreign policy towards China at some point was disruptive and provocative, but was quickly corrected when China reacted strongly within the United Nations as a result of Macedonia’s official recognition of Taiwan. Likewise, all post-Yugoslav states bar Serbia and Bosnia have recognized the independence of Kosovo,

CONCLUDING REMARKS 427 despite strong opposition to this amongst parts of the Montenegrin population.

What do the above garnered insights mean for the interstate relations (see the graph in the Introduction)? Joining the EU would create a ‘confederate’ regional international society while the different national pathways to this end—mindful of the regatta principle—represent a society of ‘convergence’. Even ‘cooperation’—the next stage below—would require some common efforts for conflict resolution and economic interdependence. Further down the ladder, we arrive at ‘coexistence’ (the typical Westphalian model) and further down, ‘power political’ relationships which even include violence and coercion. The overall impression of this book’s findings is that even the confederate stage (for Slovenia and Croatia) has not been solving traditional issues of order—as the persistence of the Piran Bay quarrel demonstrates. By contrast, issues of justice (rule of law, democratic institutions, good governance) are haunting the societies of the two countries even after their accession. Because enlargement de facto has come to a standstill, the Western Balkan states find themselves in a state between cooperation and coexistence. As recent crises such as the ‘Balkan route of migration’ and the COVID-19 pandemic indicate, interstate relations are fragile and power political foreign policy behavior remains a looming feature (Bojinović Fenko and Stahl, 2019).

A New Eastern Question?

Are we really witnessing the emergence of “A New Eastern Question” in the post-Yugoslav states? Does the EU resemble a staggering giant whose demise results in a fatal power vacuum? Are geopolitical forces clashing in Southeastern Europe, and will this create the same disruptive and destructive tensions that we have seen in the run-up to WWI? While the theoretical framework for this book, namely the English School in International Relations theory, will tell us that history matters, it also rejects the idea that history will necessarily repeat itself and that there is such a thing as a deterministic reading of historical events. In other words, the world today is very different from the world at the beginning of the 20th century.

428 SOEREN KEIL UND BERNHARD STAHL This is not to say that it is unlikely or even impossible that we will see a clash of superpowers in the future—especially the rise of China and its growing global ambitions, as well as US resistance to these ambitions, have the potential to result in conflict (Toje, 2018).

Yet, such a clash will most likely not occur in the Balkans but in Northeast Asia. Still, the likelihood of war in the Western Balkans remains slim. We also hold that, until today, the balance of power politics does not apply to the region either. Considering that it was the omnipresence of this primary institution which enabled the fatal chain of events leading to WWI, the smart non-alliance policy of Socialist Yugoslavia (see Jakob Avguštin’s contribution) and, more recently the benevolent hegemon EU have been superseding balance of power politics for 70 years. Yet, the careless fiddling around with great power rivalries by some national élites may pave the way for a more active balance of power politics.1 In the Russian case, this looks already obvious (see the contributions of Adnan Huskić on Bosnia, Mladen Mladenov on Serbia, and Maxim Samorukov on Russia), but it needs more than one power to revive the primary institution of the balance of power.

This said, re-projecting an Eastern question to Southeastern Europe looks premature at best. While the EU enlargement process in the region is admittedly in crisis and has lost much of its initial ability to result in deep-rooted reforms in the states of the former Yugoslavia, the Euro-Atlantic integration perspective nevertheless remains the most powerful foreign policy option for all post-Yugoslav states. Neither Russia nor newly-emerging China can offer the countries of the region any foreign policy incentives that come even close to the collective security provisions of NATO or the economic and political benefits of EU membership. Great power interventions in the respective states come in very different ways, to different extents and with different motives. In comparison to the Kosovo war and its aftermath, great power management has been changing. Concerted action in the form of the Contact Group and the subsequent creation of secondary institutions (stability pact for SEE, 1

The recent events around the ‚Covid-diplomacy’ in the region confirm this impression, see below.

CONCLUDING REMARKS 429 Special Representatives, EULEX, KFOR) has been replaced by discord regarding Kosovo’s independence and led to a unilateral intervention mode today. In other words, the great powers instrumentalize the region for their interests, picking and choosing their cooperation partners due to opportunity and historical affinity.

This, in sum, means that the region has not fused with the EU security complex yet. As Buzan and Waever (2003, pp. 377–379) already argued two decades ago, the Balkans remain stuck between a European sub-complex and a separate regional security complex, which they formed in the past. Hence, some security issues may stay within the region without spreading to the EU, but in most of the cases, security threats have an impact on a two-way street: Kosovo incidents and ethnic quarrels in BiH immediately act on the EU’s foreign policy while EU affairs such as Brexit and Macron’s proposals on enlargement resonate in the European sub-complex.

The Post-Yugoslav States and the Great Powers— Questions for the Future Donald Rumsfeld famously pointed to the “Known-Unknowns” in the fight against terrorism as facts that we know that we do not know them. Like Rumsfeld’s statement, we too have a number of known-unknowns when looking at the relationship between the post-Yugoslav states and the ‘Great Powers’. It has been highlighted that wider global challenges, from the rise of China to a global backsliding of democracy, can all be observed in the postYugoslav states. Yet, time never stands still, and regional and global dynamics are ever-emerging and changing. We know for example that the reparation of the transatlantic relationship has been a key priority for the Biden administration, yet it has to be seen what this means for the post-Yugoslav states. While Donald Trump’s policies were clearly disruptive to the transatlantic alliance and the joint effort to pacify and democratize the post-Yugoslav region, as pointed out by Kurt Bassuener in this volume, we will have to wait and see if Biden will prioritize the region again, especially as he has continued the discourse on countering the rise of China as America’s main foreign policy priority. In any case, as mentioned above, it looks

430 SOEREN KEIL UND BERNHARD STAHL very unlikely that the only superpower will engage in a balance of power game in the Western Balkans security complex.

It also remains to be seen if recent electoral victories for longterm opposition parties in Montenegro and Kosovo will result in fundamental foreign policy changes. Montenegro is particularly interesting as at least one major party of the current (as of July 2021) coalition government is highly sceptical of the country’s NATO membership and promotes the establishment of closer ties with Russia. In Kosovo, Albin Kurti and his Vetevendosje party have yet to demonstrate how their previous discourse on Greater Albania and scepticism towards international involvement in the country will result in concrete foreign policy changes. It is too early to assess either governmental change and its effect on foreign policy, though foreign policy shifts are emerging in Slovenia and Croatia, which have recently published a ‘non-paper’ that suggested the redrawing of borders along ethnic lines in the post-Yugoslav states (Mujanovic, 2021). In the terms of the English School, the question of nationalism raises its head again, recalling that it was nationalism— take the Serb and Greek uprisings as historical examples—which played in the hands of external great powers and ceased the “Eastern questions” (Mazower, 2000, pp. 86–115). In the Balkans, unlike Western Europe, nationalism did not go away with democracy.

Therefore, EU integration—with the EU as a post-modern power (Soerensen, 2001)—was also meant to leave the ugly faces of violent manifestations of nationalism behind. It remains to be seen, however, if we are seeing a substantial nationalist shift in Slovenia’s and Croatia’s foreign policy away from wider European Union priorities, or if this is a short-lived experiment of particularistic elites sympathizing with illiberal actors in other EU member states.

In the light of nationalism, two other primary institutions deserve attention: sovereignty and territoriality. Implicitly, the Copenhagen criteria and the Stabilization and Association Agreement amendments for the Western Balkans demanded that only saturated nation-states should accede to the Union (see Keil’s and Stahl’s contribution on the EU in this book). Yet, as the ongoing constitutional stalemate in BiH (see Adnan Huskić’s contribution)

CONCLUDING REMARKS 431 and the contested stateness of Kosovo (see Gezim Krasniqi’s contribution) reveal, the EU did not succeed in solving the state-nation problems of the region. The notable exception was the name dispute regarding Macedonia—largely beyond the EU’s efforts—only to be followed by Bulgaria’s intransigence hindering North Macedonia’s opening of negotiations (see Cvete Koneska’s contribution).

Hence, territoriality and sovereignty issues remain on the regional table, providing a temptation inroad for nationalist politicians.

What is more, as transition theory tells us (Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 5–86), ongoing territoriality problems will mean a severe burden for democratization.

Finally, we need to acknowledge that the global COVID-19 pandemic will have a substantial impact on all levels of analysis used in this book. It may change the region in the long-term, and some changes have already become visible in the short-term with Serbia becoming a key destination for ‘vaccine tourism’. Further, the Union is not yet seeing the full economic and social impact of the pandemic, and how this has bearings for the EU’s role in the world. One can seriously question the perspective that in a postCorona pandemic world, enlargement will once again become a priority, taking into account how little attention the Union’s elite dedicated to enlargement before the COVID-19 crisis. The global shifts in the wake of the Corona pandemic are also still emerging.

While China’s role in the pandemic remains opaque, its long-term consequences for ‘China’s rise’ are hard to guess. Alternatively, one can argue that innovation, technical investments and vaccine diplomacy might revive the US (and Western) image across the globe, which may leave its mark on the post-Yugoslav states.

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INDEX

Adriatic Sea 74, 97 Al Qaeda 116 9/11 107, 116, 117, 121, 125, 134, 147, 377 invasion of Iraq 107, 117, 121, 125, 130, 232

Albania 28, 84, 92, 95, 118, 133, 149, 179, 191, 200, 205, 208, 210, 211, 213, 215, 232, 269, 286, 291, 328, 399, 403, 407, 422, 430 Alliance for Europe 261, 262, 278 Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AKK) 19, 407, 409 Anatolia 202, 204, 212 Ankara 52, 103, 209, 210, 220, 221, 230, 240, 245, 246, 261, 272, 383, 408, 421 Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution (Montenegro) 315 Armenian 202 Atlanticism 107 Australia 187, 407 Authoritarianism 48, 99, 102, 337, 432 Badinter Commission 343, 369, 370

Balkan 11, 13, 15, 19, 34, 35, 36, 42, 43, 49, 50, 52, 76, 79, 81, 84, 88, 89, 91, 96, 99, 100, 103, 114, 116, 117, 127, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 147, 148, 149, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 162, 164, 166, 168, 169, 179, 181, 184, 187, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 228, 253, 258, 266, 269, 275, 278, 283, 285, 287, 291, 305, 306, 310, 315, 328, 330, 332, 335, 336, 340, 351, 361, 362, 365, 373, 391, 392, 404, 406, 413, 416, 418, 420, 421, 427, 432 Balkan Pact 205, 206, 287, 310 Balkan peninsula 200, 201, 205, 216, 218 Christian Balkans 202

Balkan Wars 35, 134, 205, 306, 351 de-Islamization 203 de-Ottomanization 203

Bandung Conference (Turkey) 207 Battle of Kosovo 288 Belgrade 6, 36, 57, 68, 69, 70, 73, 121, 122, 126, 128, 143, 146, 147, 150, 154, 155, 159, 176, 177, 183, 185, 186, 187, 193, 272, 287, 292, 293, 296, 297, 301, 302, 308, 309, 316, 317, 318, 319, 321, 322, 324, 326, 327, 337, 368, 397, 412

436 INDEX NATO bombing 176, 193, 296, 321

Belgrade-Budapest railway 186 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 19, 169, 170, 173, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 187, 190, 193, 194, 195, 252, 273, 283, 296, 336, 421 Berlin 13, 43, 50, 57, 59, 68, 78, 113, 118, 196, 259, 305, 323, 340, 410, 415 Berlin Wall 59, 259 Biden administration 429

BiH Croats 108 Black Sea 100, 140, 141, 148, 157, 234, 265, 310, 336, 415, 432 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 84, 87, 419 Brioni 72, 368 Agreement 72 Declaration 369

Brnabić, Ana 291, 299, 308 Bulgaria 28, 35, 85, 91, 95, 98, 142, 148, 161, 179, 184, 191, 197, 200, 205, 232, 233, 234, 236, 246, 265, 351 Bush Bush administration 106, 108, 109, 111, 116, 117, 122, 125, 126, 350 Bush, George W. 39, 106, 108, 109, 111, 116, 117, 121, 122, 125, 126, 129, 130, 133, 134, 231, 232, 279, 350, 361, 363, 373, 400 Christmas warning 111, 112, 121, 123

Byzantium 202, 221, 284, 433 Catholic missionaries 171 Caucasus 159, 211, 217

Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) 19, 84, 89, 91, 179, 240, 250, 406 Central Asia 208, 211, 212, 217 China 5, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 24, 27, 34, 40, 46, 47, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 79, 84, 86, 96, 120, 130, 159, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 196, 197, 218, 225, 227, 233, 234, 235, 240, 241, 242, 243, 245, 247, 248, 250, 253, 255, 258, 260, 261, 262, 264, 269, 273, 274, 276, 278, 283, 284, 295, 296, 297, 300, 301, 302, 304, 305, 308, 310, 312, 330, 331, 332, 340, 341, 344, 353, 354, 355, 358, 359, 361, 362, 365, 366, 372, 376, 383, 384, 385, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 397, 398, 399, 404, 405, 406, 407, 413, 415, 416, 417, 419, 420, 421, 422, 424, 426, 428, 429 Chinese Communist Party 19, 171, 178 Churchill, Winston 109, 133 Clark, Wesley 124 Clinton, Bill 39, 108, 109, 111, 112, 114, 116, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 133, 134, 296, 373 Cold War 24, 28, 36, 58, 59, 71, 78, 80, 81, 82, 87, 107, 109, 111, 116, 123, 129, 130, 138, 139, 144, 145, 146, 161, 162, 170, 172, 173, 194, 201, 208, 216, 217, 221, 230, 252, 254, 259, 269, 287, 288, 308, 309, 362, 367, 390 post-Cold War order 208, 211

INDEX 437 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 19, 292, 370

Davutoğlu, Ahmet 211, 212, 213, 215, 220, 272, 361, 381, 396

Conditionality 15, 100, 101, 102, 103, 306, 309, 310, 432, 433

Dayton Peace Accords 108, 112, 121

Confucius Institutes 183, 302, 384

Dayton Peace Conference 87 Declaration on Slovenian Foreign Policy 229, 233

Congress of, 35 Contact Group 65, 74, 119, 176, 371, 374, 394, 398, 428 Corruption 337 Council of Europe 57, 129, 263, 327, 356 COVID-19 pandemic 84, 95, 168, 427, 431 Crimean 23, 35, 203 Crimean War 23, 35, 203

Croatia 24, 27, 28, 38, 43, 45, 47, 62, 63, 72, 73, 74, 79, 84, 87, 89, 92, 93, 95, 110, 114, 121, 148, 149, 158, 163, 179, 185, 186, 190, 191, 193, 209, 210, 213, 232, 234, 243, 246, 252, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 316, 317, 337, 341, 342, 343, 361, 362, 366, 368, 370, 375, 381, 385, 419, 425, 427, 430 Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 20, 126, 259, 261, 263, 264, 282, 366 Cultural Revolution (China) 169, 172 Cyprus 58, 118, 129, 207, 246, 402, 421

Demirel, Suleyman 271 Democracy 78, 100, 102, 132, 133, 134, 135, 334, 337, 388, 432 Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) 20, 407, 408, 411 Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) 21, 407, 408, 409 Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) 19, 25, 312, 316, 319, 332, 333 Democratic Party Serbia (DS) 19, 299, 300 Democratization 13, 24, 102, 132, 136, 432 Deng leadership (China) 169 Détente 207 Development of Democratic Infrastructure (Montenegro) 320 Diyanet (Turkey) 215, 221, 396, 416 Dubrovnik 186, 260, 317 Duda, Andrzej 265 Đukanović, Milo 57, 73, 79, 114, 315, 319, 321, 325, 329, 330, 332, 336 Eastern bloc 168

Czechoslovakia 109, 110, 144, 171, 336

English School (ES) 17, 19, 25, 26, 32, 49, 51, 85, 97, 98, 100, 392, 414, 419, 420, 423, 425, 427, 430

Dačić, Ivica 128, 299

Entente Cordiale 205

Greek Cypriots 207

Thrace region 205

438 INDEX Erdoğan, Tayyip 128, 211, 215, 276, 277, 298, 382, 408, 417 Ethno-national 259 European Union (EU) 17, 19, 22, 24, 43, 49, 51, 70, 73, 74, 78, 83, 84, 89, 91, 92, 93, 100, 101, 102, 106, 107, 118, 138, 168, 170, 186, 188, 190, 192, 194, 199, 225, 249, 253, 257, 259, 261, 266, 277, 279, 283, 300, 307, 312, 326, 331, 334, 339, 344, 362, 365, 367, 370, 376, 390, 391, 402, 412, 419, 424, 430, 433 Europeanization 29, 51, 91, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 239, 242, 249, 275, 337, 432 Euroscepticism 85, 100, 103, 276, 425, 432 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 230 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 62, 176, 290, 311, 394 Foreign policy 178, 241, 258, 298, 300, 357 Gazprom 148, 157, 158, 238, 294, 309 Georgievski, Ljubcho 354 German Reich 206 Gligorov, Kiro 341, 357, 361 Grabar-Kitarović, Kolinda 264, 265, 268, 272, 277, 281 Great Wall of China 211 Greece 28, 35, 36, 95, 98, 109, 129, 155, 158, 179, 191, 200, 205, 206, 207, 211, 233, 246, 287, 296, 343, 345, 346, 347, 348, 350, 351, 352, 353, 356, 357, 359, 362, 402 Greek Civil War 109

Greek Orthodox Church 203 Hague Conference 317 Hallerstein, Ferdinand Avguštin 171 Haradinaj, Ramush 408, 409, 410, 411, 417 Helsinki Summit 218 High Representative 13, 20, 42, 51, 84, 107, 108, 117, 124, 127, 189, 292, 307, 376, 379, 389, 409, 423 Hong Kong 175, 260 Huawei 187, 188, 274, 310, 422 Hungary 35, 45, 58, 75, 95, 98, 115, 118, 142, 143, 144, 168, 179, 234, 236, 246, 263, 265, 286, 313, 336, 425 India 58, 59, 63, 67, 68, 187, 359 Interim Accords 345, 356 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 291 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 331 Istanbul Convention 263 Italy 35, 40, 66, 109, 118, 119, 205, 214, 246, 287, 309, 311, 314, 317, 318, 374, 394, 396, 399, 407 Izetbegović, Bakir 215, 382 Jewish 202 Josipović, Ivo 264 Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma PartisiAKP) 19, 219, 386, 396 Kingdom of Yugoslavia 58, 228, 287, 305, 314

INDEX 439 Kosovo 11, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 28, 31, 34, 37, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 74, 80, 84, 88, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128,129, 131, 133, 134, 136, 138, 146, 149, 150, 156, 158, 161, 163, 164, 165, 169, 175, 176, 177, 179, 182, 185, 190, 192, 209, 210, 213, 221, 225, 284, 289, 292, 294, 295, 299, 300, 303, 304, 306, 307, 308, 309, 321, 325, 328, 335, 341, 349, 351, 362, 383, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 422, 423, 425, 426, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432 Kurdish separatism 207 Kurti, Albin 25, 119, 128, 411, 430 Liquefied natural gas 20 Macedonia 13, 20, 21, 22, 24, 28, 42, 43, 46, 47, 49, 66, 72, 74, 84, 90, 92, 94, 95, 97, 98, 102, 107, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 125, 128, 132, 133, 148, 149, 152, 154, 155, 158, 177, 179, 181, 185, 190, 191, 192, 193, 209, 210, 211, 213, 216, 232, 269, 291, 328, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 403, 415, 419, 422, 431, 432

Marrakesh Declaration 263 Membership Action Plan (MAP) 328 Merkel, Angela 278, 306, 410 Mesić, Stjepan 261, 264, 267, 279, 280 Middle East 45, 58, 59, 62, 86, 205, 207, 208, 212, 217, 239, 353, 362, 377, 407, 421, 422 Migration 103, 252, 263 Milanović, Zoran 262, 280 Milošević, Slobodan 40, 41, 73, 108, 110, 114, 115, 116, 123, 136, 144, 145, 146, 175, 287, 290, 311, 315, 316, 319, 321, 322, 323, 324, 332, 337, 369, 394 Minorities 12 Mogherini, Federica 84, 96, 99, 101, 189, 409, 410 Montenegro 13, 21, 25, 28, 35, 43, 45, 46, 47, 66, 84, 92, 95, 97, 98, 99, 102, 114, 148, 152, 153, 154, 156, 158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 179, 181, 182, 185, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 225, 226, 251, 269, 286, 291, 296, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 346, 351, 373, 381, 419, 421, 422, 426, 430, 432 Moscow 14, 36, 38, 41, 69, 131, 138, 139, 143, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 237, 244, 245, 246, 260, 293, 302, 328, 329, 332, 385, 405 Multilateral 389

440 INDEX Muslim 46, 112, 117, 140, 200, 202, 203, 209, 210, 213, 216, 219, 232, 298, 353, 371 Muslim-Croat Federation 112, 210

Peacekeeping 78, 79, 133, 362, 417 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 178

Nationalism 12, 13, 37, 49, 50, 220, 253, 336

Plenković, Andrej 264, 270, 273, 274

Neo-Ottoman 272, 363

Podgorica 20, 148, 314, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 328, 330, 332, 335, 336, 337

New Eastern Question 419, 420, 427 Niš 159, 188, 295, 302, 307 Non-Aligned Movement 13, 57, 58, 69, 110, 144, 172, 207, 229, 315, 341 Nord Stream 2 project 237 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 25, 63, 108, 145, 168, 226, 257, 287, 312, 339, 419 Obama, Barack 106, 109, 126, 127, 130, 134, 135 October Revolution 228 Ohrid Framework Agreement 122, 125, 349 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 176, 356, 395 Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) 403 Ottoman 34, 46, 109, 140, 141, 142, 200, 202, 203, 205, 208, 212, 213, 215, 216, 219, 221, 229, 272, 284, 285, 298, 313, 340, 341, 343, 396, 421, 426 Palestine 58, 59, 62, 233, 401 Pan-Slavism 313 Partisan 235 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 328 Peace Implementation Council (PIC) 118, 376

Poland 45, 95, 98, 115, 118, 144, 147, 168, 179, 234, 246, 263, 265, 425 Post-Yugoslav 11, 13, 17, 23, 28, 47, 49, 83, 102, 137, 199, 254, 281, 308, 309, 335, 336, 362, 416, 424, 429, 433 Powell Doctrine 123 Prishtina 128, 146, 149, 155, 283, 300, 395, 397, 398, 400, 401, 403, 406, 411, 412, 415, 416 Putin, Vladimir 131, 149, 151, 163, 164, 232, 237, 293, 298 Rama, Edi 215, 409 Rambouillet Conference 40, 394 Realpolitik 257 Reconstruction 19, 331 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) 27, 392 Republic of China (ROC) 171 Republic of Turkey 204, 220, 396

INDEX 441 Russia 5, 14, 17, 24, 27, 31, 35, 40, 42, 45, 46, 47, 64, 65, 67, 68, 74, 84, 86, 94, 96, 99, 119, 120, 123, 130, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 192, 193, 203, 218, 225, 227, 229, 230, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 238, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 247, 248, 249, 252, 253, 255, 258, 260, 261, 262, 264, 269, 270, 271, 276, 283, 284, 285, 292, 293, 294, 295, 297, 300, 301, 302, 304, 305, 308, 309, 311, 312, 313, 328, 329, 330, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 340, 341, 348, 350, 351, 352, 358, 359, 360, 361, 365, 366, 371, 373, 374, 376, 377, 379, 381, 384, 385, 387, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 397, 398, 399, 404, 405, 406, 407, 413, 414, 416, 419, 420, 421, 422, 424, 425, 426, 428, 430, 433

Serbia 5, 11, 19, 21, 24, 27, 28, 35, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 51, 73, 78, 84, 88, 89, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 102, 103, 109, 114, 115, 118, 119, 120, 122, 124, 128, 129, 136, 142, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166, 175, 179, 181, 182, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 210, 213, 216, 221, 225, 267, 272, 275, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 313, 314, 316, 317, 318, 319, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 327, 328, 329, 331, 334, 335, 336, 337, 346, 351, 367, 368, 373, 375, 380, 381, 385, 392, 394, 397, 399, 402, 404, 405, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 417, 418, 419, 421, 424, 426, 428, 431, 432, 433

Sarajevo 11, 74, 142, 162, 173, 195, 272, 323, 333, 374, 380, 382, 384

Slavic 79, 138, 139, 141, 143, 145, 154, 160, 162, 166, 203, 228, 229, 237, 309, 313, 336, 351, 371, 432

Semi-authoritarian 309

Silk Road 184, 306

442 INDEX Slovenia 14, 17, 24, 25, 28, 38, 43, 45, 47, 56, 62, 63, 66, 67, 72, 73, 84, 87, 92, 94, 96, 110, 118, 121, 148, 161, 179, 182, 187, 191, 193, 209, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 245, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 262, 265, 334, 341, 342, 343, 344, 361, 367, 368, 370, 419, 423, 425, 427, 430, 433 Social Democratic Initiative (NISMA) 409 Social Democratic Union (SDSM) 357 Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 57 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 311, 367 Socialization 168, 194 South Eastern Europe (SEE) 89 South Stream 148, 157, 294 Soviet Union 22, 24, 51, 59, 75, 76, 80, 87, 110, 143, 144, 171, 172, 206, 207, 209, 229, 231, 241, 259, 315, 342, 370, 421 Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) 290, 402 Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) 86, 290 Stalin, Josep 109, 206, 229, 254, 287, 334 Superpower 387 Tadić, Boris 298

Tibet 175, 296, 405 Tito, Joisp Broz 37, 68, 109, 136, 143, 172, 206, 207, 229, 254, 255, 287, 308, 315, 334 Tito-Stalin split 143, 315 Treaty of Lisbon 74, 90 Treaty of Maastricht 91 Tripartite Alliance 206 Troika 368, 397 Truman Doctrine 109 Trump, Donald 94, 106, 107, 119, 127, 130, 136, 166, 291, 306, 417, 425 Tuđman, Franjo (Croatia) 115, 259, 260, 269, 271, 273, 282 Turkey 5, 15, 17, 24, 27, 28, 31, 34, 41, 42, 46, 47, 84, 86, 94, 96, 97, 98, 102, 109, 119, 120, 128, 130, 192, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 225, 227, 229, 230, 233, 234, 235, 238, 239, 240, 243, 244, 245, 247, 258, 260, 262, 269, 271, 272, 276, 283, 284, 287, 295, 297, 300, 302, 307, 311, 312, 332, 340, 343, 352, 353, 358, 359, 360, 361, 363, 365, 366, 371, 372, 376, 381, 384, 385, 388, 391, 392, 393, 396, 397, 399, 403, 404, 406, 407, 408, 413, 419, 420, 421, 422, 425 TurkStream 161, 298

Taiwan 15, 66, 171, 175, 177, 193, 354, 405, 426

Ukraine 14, 120, 138, 148, 151, 152, 154, 155, 157, 217, 270, 294, 306, 310

Thaçi, Hashim 119, 408, 409, 410

United Arab Emirates (UAE) 312

Thessaloniki Summit 89, 91, 218

INDEX 443 United Kingdom (UK) 66, 84, 241, 347, 374, 394 United Nations (UN) 33, 56, 284, 316, 344, 367 Versailles peace conference 340 Vienna 57, 78, 195, 340 Visegrád region 191 Vučić, Aleksander 119, 164, 215, 283, 291, 292, 293, 295, 297, 299, 300, 306, 308, 381, 409 Warsaw Pact 110, 143, 207, 351 Washington 49, 57, 69, 79, 100, 107, 108, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 121, 125, 126, 129, 130, 134, 135, 139, 146, 196, 210, 231, 245, 246, 260, 320, 334, 375, 385, 411, 412, 415, 422

Western Balkans 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 28, 48, 51, 73, 84, 85, 89, 91, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 106, 118, 119, 127, 132, 133, 134, 161, 162, 164, 165, 168, 169, 173, 184, 185, 188, 189, 191, 194, 195, 196, 214, 215, 219, 220, 222, 239, 247, 249, 252, 255, 266, 267, 277,281, 291, 293, 297, 303, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 330, 337, 361, 362, 388, 390, 414, 416, 428, 430, 431, 432, 433 World Trade Organization (WTO) 33, 356 Yugoslav National Army (YNA) 230 Yugoslav People’s Army (YNA) 315, 354 Yunus Emre Institute 215, 272, 383 Zagreb 14, 15, 80, 267, 272, 273, 277, 280 Zimmermann, Warren 56, 73, 78, 82, 231, 288

BALKAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY Edited by Jelena Dzankic and Soeren Keil

1

Valery Perry (ed.)

Extremism and Violent Extremism in Serbia 21st Century Manifestations of an Historical Challenge ISBN 978-3-8382-1260-9

2

James Riding The Geopolitics of Memory A Journey to Bosnia ISBN 978-3-8382-1311-8

3

Ian Bancroft Dragon’s Teeth Tales from North Kosovo ISBN 978-3-8382-1364-4

4

Viktoria Potapkina Nation Building in Contested States Comparative Insights from Kosovo, Transnistria, and Northern Cyprus ISBN 978-3-8382-1381-1

5

Soeren Keil, Bernhard Stahl (eds.)

A New Eastern Question?

Great Powers and the Post-Yugoslav States ISBN 978-3-8382-1375-0

6

Senada Zatagic A Neglected Right Prospects for the Protection of the Right to Be Elected in Bosnia and Herzegovina ISBN 978-3-8382-1521-1

7

Aarif Abraham A Constitution of the People and How to Achieve It What Bosnia and Britain Can Learn From Each Other ISBN 978-3-8382-1516-7

8

Giustina Selvelli The Alphabet of Discord The Ideologization of Writing Systems on the Balkans since the Breakup of Multiethnic Empires ISBN 978-3-8382-1537-2

9

Anastasiia Kudlenko (ed.)

Security Governance in Times of Complexity The EU and Security Sector Reform in the Western Balkans, 1991–2013 ISBN 978-3-8382-1720-8

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