ORNOV GANGULY, DR. SHARRYN KASMIR
ANTHROPOLOGY DEPARTMENT
BRITISH AND FRENCH RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SPANISH REPUBLICAN REFUGEES: CONSEQUENCES OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NON-INTERVENTION IN REGARDS TO THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR
Given British and French power over European commerce and foreign relations and the failure of the policy of noninterventionism/appeasement, What are the international responsibilities for Spanish exiles and refugees during the Civil War?
AUTHORS
SPECIAL THANKS
Ornov Ganguly -- History Department Sharryn Kasmir, PhD -- Anthropology Department
A great deal of thanks is owed to the staff at the Axinn Library for their research assistance. In particular, Dr. Woolwine's guidance. As to the survivors, analysts, and humanitarians of the time whose accounts form the basis for this project.
THE RELEVANT POWERS
INTRODUCTION The Spanish Civil War began in 1936
"ALLIES"
after a fascist military coup begins.
ROME-BERLIN AXIS
Britain promotes a policy of nonintervention in the conflict, which was intended to prevent WWII, and despite
SPAIN: Semi-new republic embroiled in a civil war sparked by fascist military coup; headed by a leftist “popular front” government.
GERMANY: Recently elected and empowered Nazi party in power, wishes to make alliances across the globe in its military and economic interests.
initial resistance by French premier Léon Blum, France eventually agreed
FRANCE: Under a similar popular front government; allied with ITALY: Similarly fascist government in power for Britain as postwar bulwarks against Germany and Italy; cautious longer than Germany; holds less sway than their ally, but pressures French and Spanish decisions. alliance with Spain.
to aid neither the Spanish Republic nor the Rebels. Cosigners such as Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany would flout the agreement soon after, contributing to a growing refugee crisis at the French
BRITAIN: Under Conservative leadership; afraid of Spanish instability leaking into Europe; removed from immediate continental conflict by sea.
Improper Preparation:
border, and yet the British and French governments would refuse to aid the Republic.
USSR: Under Stalin; strong political sway over Comintern countries such as France and Spain.
The Faces of Britain Anthony Eden: Foreign Secretary (1935-1938) Conservative politician who would later denounce appeasement. Suggested to Delbos not to intervene in Spain, causing an implicit understanding of British policy.
Spanish refugees fleeing to France expected "Liberté, égalité, fraternité" but were instead herded into concentration camps whose conditions would worsen with time and the beginning of WWII.
The Faces of France Neville Chamberlain: Prime Minister (1937-1940) Father of appeasement -- beyond mere nonintervention. Not only blocked governmental aid to Spanish government, but outlawed civilian aid as well. Began repatriation effort against ~4k Basque refugee children in the UK whom he reluctantly accepted. Seized British food shipments to Spain.
Léon Blum: Premier (1936 – 1937)
British delegation at Nyons, signing the Non-Intervention Agreement.
Socialist prime minister elected through the Front Populaire; highly sympathetic towards Spain, but incompetent as a leader. Flimsiness on the matter of supporting Spain caused a split in his cabinet. DID NOT make France's decision to join the Non-Intervention Agreement
Yvon Delbos (L), Camille Chautemps (R) Cabinet members of Blum's government, Foreign Minister and Minister of State respectively. Prematurely afraid that Britain would no longer support France if Blum provided military aid to Spain; began independently discussing joining NIA with British officials.
Fascist Bombing of Guernica, 1937
The Bifurcation of Aid
The 1937 Bombing of Guernica blazed existing Aid Spain movements in Britain and France to new heights. In Britain, the National Joint Committee for Spanish for Spanish Relief (NJC), empowered through Labour, demands the government to take in ~4k Basque children refugees, which the larger government reluctantly does, handicapping the efficacy of the aid all the while before ultimately dooming them to repatriation. "Even during this relative peak in British aid, the War Office was directly charging the NJC '5 per cent on £6,800 for the first thirty days and 25 per cent for each 30 days thereafter'" France could not be so choosy about refugees, however. The border was overwhelmed by the quantity of Spanish refugees, which the government could not handle. French border guards were underfunded at least as far back as 1933, when German refugees flooded into France's northeast, prompting then-premier Édouard Daladier to establish the Interministerial Commission for German Refugees, which remained in a reduced form by 1936; secretive and watchful yet ineffective.
BRITISH GRASSROOTS AID: The International Brigades would collect donations and volunteers (medical, military, or otherwise) as a grassroots effort. The Basque refugees, even before the government eschewed their responsibility, were taken care of by charitable British families. Afterwards, they were in the care of charitable families in Wales who tried their best to shield them from repatriation. BRITISH GOVERNMENTAL AID: A vocal aspect of the Labour party became dedicated to supporting the Spanish Republic via the NJC, responsible for most all aid for Spain prior to its weaponization. FRENCH GRASSROOTS AID: Besides the International Brigades, Quaker groups came to France in the hopes of making camp conditions better. FRENCH GOVERNMENTAL AID: In addition to Blum's allowance to Spanish refugees (quickly stopped after his premiership ended), camp guards would happily accept aid from neutral parties such as the Quakers, as they made conditions better for all involved parties.
ANALYISIS
Pablo Picasso's "Guernica," a painting that encapsulates the depraved suffering of the bombing.
CONCLUSION
The British and French governments had plenty of power to enable aid to Spain or at least to allow the Spanish Republic to have a fair supply of arms as the Rebels did.
By splitting aid between the private and governmental spheres, efficacy can be increased on the one hand while jeopardized when authority is given enough value.