Harvard International Review | Spring 2020

SPRING 2020 | VOL. XLI | NO. 2

HIR

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

EXHAUSTION, EROSION, EXTINCTION I N S T I T U T I O N A L FA I L U R E I N A ZERO-SUM WORLD

SIBUSISO MOYO Minister of Foreign Affairs & International Trade for the Republic of Zimbabwe

KOSTAS BAKOYANNIS Mayor of Athens, Greece YOICHI FUNABASHI Chairman of Asia PacificInitiative &

Former Editor-in-Chief of The Asahi Shimbun

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A LETTER FROM THE EDITORS Writing in 1928, the British statesman Arthur Balfour noted that “Our whole political machinery presupposes a people so fundamentally at one that they can safely afford to bicker.” Free expression, like many of the values we hold dear, relies on cultural tradition and the tacit agreement of the masses. Regular people hardly have to think about the rules and systems that allow society to function—at their best, social structures work without anyone noticing them at all. But ideals like harmony and civic responsibility seldom survive collision with reality. Today, after decades of partisan realignment and backsliding around the world, the viability of centuries-old institutions is in doubt.

The warning signs seem obvious in retrospect. First came exhaustion: many grew tired of the system as it is, with old statutes failing to accommodate new social orders and technologies. As Melinda Meng notes, some of Canada’s electoral rules have been on the books since 1657; no one could have anticipated the changes of the last 353 years. Next was the erosion of faith in institutions, as politicians across the ideological spectrum exploited popular dissatisfaction for zero-sum gain. Sahar Ahmad highlights the fallout from Citizens United, encapsulating the corrosive consequences of money in politics more generally.

Finally, with the traditional rules stripped away, we stand on the threshold of institutional extinction. Andy Wang’s elegy for the European center-left embodies the instability that will characterize our brave new world.

In addition to the cover topic, this issue includes reporting on an array of issues that are at once timely and timeless. Max Bahdanovich and Kendrick Foster interview Kostas Bakoyannis, the mayor of Athens, who reflects on the privilege of public service and the importance of keeping an ear to the ground.

Months after major media outlets moved on, Becca Buehler returns to Puerto Rico to assess the consequences of Hurricane Maria, the vacuum left by the US response, and the international aid organizations that had to fill in. And Joshua Park balances the profound opportunities and tough ethical questions introduced by artificial intelligence in the courtroom.

Global systems like capitalism and democracy have survived economic catastrophe, two world wars, communist revolution, rapid technological innovation, and radical social transformation. But something feels different about the majoritarian populism, ideological extremism, and partisan sorting of the past decade. Has the clock finally run out on the old world order? We will find out soon enough.

Until next time, Garrett Walker and Haig Cholakian

Thousands attend a candlelight vigil for victims of the Chinese government's military crackdown three decades ago on protesters. Beijing, China. June 2019.

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H VOL. XLI • NO. 2 • SPRING 2020 SENIOR STAFF Editors-In-Chief // Garrett Walker & Haig Cholakian Chief-of-Staff // Indu Pandey Managing Editor // Lexa Brenner Senior Solicits Editors // Bonny Lemma & Kendrick Foster Senior Writing Editors // Brandon Chen, Justin Qi, Marc Leroux-Parra, Minjue Wu, & Otto Barenberg Design Director // Isabelle Blair Business Director // Paul Apostolicas GENERAL STAFF Business Associates Ammara Vaid, Hannah Pan, Joseph Wornom, Kira Trout, & Oscar Berry Design Associates Ammara Vaid, Clara Guzman, Daniela Shuman, Hunter Hawk, & Katherine Ricca Staff Writers Alejandro Jimenez, Andy Wang, Becca Buehler, Brammy Rajakumar, Brendon Lee, Choetsow ' John Tenzin, Eric Li, Galadriel Coury, Hunter Hawk, Ilyas Mardin, Ishan Bhatt, Jelena Dragicevic, Berkay, Joseph Wornom, Joshua Park, Joy Ding, Katherine Ricca, Max Bahdanovich, Melinda Meng, Nick Nocita, Nidal Morrison, Nithyani Anandakugan, Octavio J Vega, Olga Kiyan, Oscar Berry, Paige Anderson, Salome Garnier, Samar Ahmad, Satoshi Yanaizu, Skylar Smith, Sydney Young, Talia Blatt, Will Schrepferman, & Yanxi Fang ^

The Harvard International Review is published quarterly by the Harvard International Relations Council, Inc. Copyright 2020 (ISSN 0739-1854) Harvard International Relations Council. No material appearing in this publication may be reproduced without permission of the publisher. The opinions expressed in this magazine are those of the contributors and are not necessarily shared by the editors. All editorial rights reserved. The Harvard International Review is indexed in the PAIS Bulletin, the Political Science Abstracts, and the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences. Microform and CD-ROM copies are available through Proquest Information and Learning, 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346. Tel. (800) 521-0600. http://www.il.proquest.com ADVERTISING: For advertising inquiries, please contact us at business@hir.harvard.edu or by mail at 59 Shepard St #205, Cambridge, MA 02138.

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PHOTO CREDITS: All photos licensed from AP Images unless stated otherwise. Photo on page 27 courtesy of Economia, Cezch Republic.

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CONTENTS GLOBAL NOTEBOOK

MARKETS: LNG AND ENERGY SECURITY IN 6 EVOLVING EUROPE Paul Apostolicas, Business Director

GROWING SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES: A NEW 11 AFRICA’S RENAISSANCE Bonny Lemma, Senior Solicits Editor

CRY FOR ME, AGAIN: THE RISK OF A NINTH 14 DON’T ARGENTINIAN DEFAULT Paige Anderson, Staff Writer

IN A CHINA SHOP? BIG MAN POLITICS AND THE 18 BULLS EROSION OF TAIWANESE ASYMMETRIC DETERRENCE Talia Blatt, Staff Writer

AND THE OLYMPICS: LOOKING TOWARD TOKYO 24 POLITICS 2020 AND BEYOND Nick Nocita, Staff Writer

ISLA OLVIDADA: INTERNATIONAL NGOS PICK UP THE 29 LA SLACK IN PUERTO RIC0 Becca Buehler, Staff Writer

737 MAX AND THE FUTURE OF COMMERCIAL 33 THE AVIATION Yanxi Fang, Staff Writer

FUTURE OF THE PACIFIC ALLIANCE 40 THE Kendrick Foster, Senior Solicits Editor HONOR, AI 46 YOUR Joshua Park, Staff Writer

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CONTENTS

COVER

49 UNMAKING DEMOCRACY: HOW CORPORATE INFLUENCE IS ERODING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 54

“BALKAN SPRING”: TWO STUDIES OF AUTOCRATIC STATES Jelena Dragičević, Staff Writer

Samar Ahmad, Staff Writer

58 UPHOLDING THE RULE OF LAW: WILL POLISH DEMOCRACY SURVIVE THE SIEGE ON ITS JUDICIARY? 64 THE DEATH OF THE EUROPEAN CENTER-LEFT Andy Wang, Staff Writer

Sydney Young, Staff Writer

WHY CANADA NEEDS ELECTORAL REFORM Melinda Meng, Staff Writer

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PERSPECTIVES ZIMBABWE’S SANCTIONED EMERGENCY: SIBUSISO MOYO Sibusiso Moyo, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for the Republic of Zimbabwe

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INTERVIEWS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF ATHENS: INTERVIEW WITH KOSTAS BAKOYANNIS Max Bahdanovich, Staff Writer Kendrick Foster, Senior Solicits Editor DISENTANGLING CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY: INTERVIEW WITH YOICHI FUNABASHI Satoshi Yanaizu, Staff Writer

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A Chilean ship moves alongside the Hurd Peninsula, where a hole in the ozone layer is located. Livingston Islands, Antarctica. January 2015.

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Tubes for the natural gas pipeline Nord Stream 2 from Russia to Germany. Sassnitz, Germany. December 2016.

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EVOLVING MARKETS LNG AND ENERGY SECURITY IN EUROPE Paul Apostolicas Business Director

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urope depends on Russia for natural gas, the fossil fuel critical for heating homes, generating electricity, and powering the European economy. As the continent’s domestic gas production declines, Europe’s demand for gas is increasing as it transitions away from coal, oil, and nuclear energy. In 2018, Europe imported 321 billion cubic meters (bcm), 54 percent of the natural gas it consumed. Russia maintained its place as the continent’s preeminent supplier, accounting for over two-thirds of Europe’s gas imports.

European relations with Russia have soured, however, leading to calls for Europe to diversify its energy supply. The gas crises of 2006 and 2009 culminated in Gazprom, the majority Russian state-owned natural gas giant, momentarily ending gas exports intended for Ukraine in the middle of the winter due to a collapse in contract negotiations.

Ukraine responded by siphoning off gas intended for other recipients in Europe, harming its reputation as a reliable transit country. Tensions continued escalating after Russia annexed Crimea in 2015, meddled in European elections, and conducted cyberattacks against Eastern European states. Amidst these controversies, some European politicians worry that Russia could threaten to withhold gas supplies in exchange for political concessions.

The most contentious issue of late is the Nord Stream 2 pipeline (NS2), which would circumvent Ukraine to provide 55 bcm of natural gas to Germany.

While German Chancellor An-

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gela Merkel and others see the pipeline as a means to providing energy security and meeting climate goals, Eastern European and American politicians largely see it as a means for Russia to control European politics via Gazprom. Estonia's Foreign Minister warned that gas suppliers such as Russia should be prevented from using “energy as a tool for political pressure."

Meanwhile, Polish officials referred to NS2 as “a new hybrid weapon” and a “poisoned pill of European security.” Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky agrees, claiming that dependence on Russia would weaken Europe’s political power.

On the other hand, Gazprom insists that it has no intention of weaponizing energy against its clients. Its management notes that Russia and Gazprom are heavily reliant on Europe, which accounts for the overwhelming majority of its gas exports––and 20 percent of the Russian state budget. European energy and utility companies such as ENI or E.ON have had longstanding relationships with Gazprom, and their management reflect in interviews that Gazprom has been a reliable partner. With the exceptions of the two gas crises, which can be interpreted as the result of Ukraine refusing to pay higher prices, there is little evidence that Gazprom has acted as anything but a normal profit-maximizing company in its international markets. However, there is stronger evidence that Gazprom acts as a political tool within Russia.

Injecting itself into the conversation, the American government took an extraordi-

nary measure to sanction Nord Stream 2, thereby halting its construction. American opposition to the pipeline is vehement and bipartisan: a letter from 40 senators described Russia’s gas business in Europe as “coercion and malign influence” and Rick Perry, former Secretary of Energy, called NS2 “a stake through the heart of European stability and security.”

A Supercooled Entrant Amidst the heated debate around NS2, liquefied natural gas (LNG) has fundamentally reshaped energy markets in Europe. Traditionally, gas is transported to its customers by pipeline, the way Europe has imported gas from Russia for decades.

However, gas can be supercooled to -162ºC to become a liquid, which decreases its volume by a factor of 600 and makes shipping it in special LNG tankers economically feasible.

While Europe confronted a gas shortage, the United States transformed into an energy superpower and the world’s biggest producer of oil and natural gas in the last decade. With American gas supply exceeding demand as a result of fracking, US producers sought to export their gas to Europe and Asia where gas sold for higher prices. The Trump Administration has energetically marketed and encouraged LNG, referring to it as “freedom gas” or “molecules or freedom.” American LNG exports surged by 60 percent in 2019, and the United States is expected to become the largest exporter of LNG by 2024.

Moreover, America is not the only nation with a rapidly grow-

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ing LNG industry—LNG trade has surged globally, growing at a rate of 8 percent per year. Australia, Qatar, Russia, Mozambique, and Nigeria are also leading the charge. Global export capacity meanwhile has reached 534 bcm a year, with 141 bcm under construction—together enough to fill European demand two times over.

LNG competes directly with Gazprom for the European market. Conventional wisdom asserts that US LNG is too expensive because companies have to take the extra steps of liquefaction, shipping, and regasification. Yet, Harvard Business School models show that because of Gazprom’s price discrimination, US LNG can compete in Eastern Europe with Russian gas under the right conditions such as weak Asian demand, a high price of oil, and low charter rates. Moreover, Qatari and Nigerian LNG are much less expensive to produce than American LNG and can consistently outcompete Russian piped gas on a long-term marginal cost basis.

A More Energy-Secure Europe?

Despite the contentious debate surrounding Nord Stream 2, LNG has meaningfully increased the security of Europe’s energy supply.

First, LNG has contributed to changes to Gazprom’s business strategy. Traditionally, Gazprom’s contracts calculated gas prices using formulas based on the price of oil and included controversial take-or-pay clauses where customers would pay for gas they did not want to receive. These contracts were thus

removed from the laws of supply and demand for natural gas.

Today, Gazprom’s contracts are shorter in duration, more flexible, and increasingly determined by the price of gas at natural gas hubs instead of the price of oil. In fact, in 2018, Gazprom began selling gas by making one-time deals at natural gas hubs via its Electronic Sales Platform, thereby receiving prices based solely on European market forces. In order to compete with other sources of natural

"LNG TRADE HAS SURGED GLOBALLY, GROWING AT A RATE OF 8 PERCENT PER YEAR." gas such as LNG, Gazprom has adjusted its sales practices in ways that make natural gas prices based on supply and demand and therefore less prone to political involvement.

Moreover, LNG has flooded the European market with gas, dramatically decreasing the price of natural gas at hubs. The excess quantity of LNG is filling Europe’s underground gas storage facilities, which act as “savings accounts” for natural gas.

Gazprom itself is continuing to partner with European nations to build more underground gas storage capacity, which should

increase the security of supply.

The increase in global LNG supply has also encouraged European nations to build more regasification facilities where they can transform LNG back into regular natural gas. LNG import terminals are expanding rapidly, and Europe’s regasification capacity of 241 bcm far exceeds its imports from Russia. By 2025, the Baltic nations’ regasification capacity will be 266 percent of their domestic consumption.

Europe has the infrastructure to import vast quantities of LNG in the unlikely scenario of a major gas crisis with Russia.

Finally, LNG has encouraged various pipeline projects that benefit European security. One such project is the Baltic Interconnector, which links Finland with the LNG importing Baltics. Poland is racing to become a natural gas hub by selling American LNG in Eastern European markets and is supporting various transmission projects to make its dream a reality. In summary, LNG is encouraging Europe to become more interconnected in terms of gas infrastructure—and thereby more secure since each nation can supply the others around it.

LNG is not a panacea for Europe’s energy challenges. Nonetheless, LNG has reshaped European energy markets by providing a feasible alternative and reliable backup to Russian gas.

Overdependence on any nation for a good as important as natural gas is unwise, but the demonization of Gazprom appears to be more based on political agendas than reality. After all, if Gazprom were to cut off supplies to Europe for political reasons, H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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its profits would immediately plummet along with the Russian state budget. In the longrun, such a measure would lose the trust built over decades of its most important market and send the Russian economy into recession.

In addition to harming the Russian economy, any decision to weaponize energy would result in political consequences detrimental to Putin’s goals. Depriving European nations of gas for an illegitimate reason would likely unite Europe against Russian aggression and disadvantage Putin-sympathetic candidates like France’s Marine Le Pen. Moreover, such a decision could result in NATO stationing more troops in Eastern Europe, an outcome Putin has publicly criticized.

The United States’ sanctions against NS2 are unlikely to prevent the pipeline’s completion, but the sanctions are likely to further fray transatlantic relations. If the United States is concerned about Europe’s energy

security, it should instead encourage Germany to proceed with its four regasification terminals to provide backups to Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2. It should also encourage the expansion of underground storage facilities. However, the United States should be cognizant of the limitations of LNG: for countries like Germany, gas from Russia is much less expensive than American LNG. The United States would be mistaken to expect Germany to snub Russia as its main supplier of natural gas in favor of the United States.

As an alternative approach, the United States could pursue domestic reforms such as banning flaring, or the burning of excess natural gas. Energy companies in Texas acquire natural gas as a byproduct of oil drilling, and they often choose to set the precious natural resource aflame. In addition to contributing to the climate crisis, the 14 bcm of natural gas the United States flared in 2018 constitutes enough energy to power the Bal-

A ship works in the Baltic Sea on the natural gas pipeline Nord Stream 2 . Laage, Germany. November 2018.

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tics three times over. The United States government should create incentives to export this natural gas to places like Europe instead of wasting it and creating unnecessary carbon emissions.

In the end, LNG has provided a superb opportunity for Europe to increase its energy security and for the United States to assert its role as the world’s newest energy superpower. American LNG is nonetheless a small part of US-Russian relations and will not fundamentally alter the interactions between the two countries, though sanctions on NS2 undoubtedly antagonize Russia. Neither complacency nor Gazprom-phobia should dictate European energy policy.

Instead, sober analysis of what LNG can and cannot accomplish will strengthen transatlantic relations and provide a more stable future for Europe’s energy economy.

This article is a continuation of a Harvard Business School case study co-written by the author. H

AFRICA’S GROWING SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES A NEW RENAISSANCE Bonny Lemma Senior Solicits Editor

Students use a balloon to launch a soda-cansized satellite. Koforidua, Ghana. May 2013.

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echnological change has always been one of the largest dividers between developed and developing countries. The scientific heavy-hitters have traditionally included the most economically powerful nations. According to the World Bank, every year, the United States, Germany, and Japan all spend upwards of 2.8 percent of GDP on research and development. However, global economic development in the 21st century has spurred increased investment in research and development worldwide, as science and technology have become increasingly critical in the global economy. The African continent has begun to take part in this growing sector as well, at a time when new infrastructure in education has created a promising young scientific workforce. Leaders in academia and industry now seek to mobilize these bright young minds towards a unifying rallying cry: “African solutions to African problems.”

The historical disadvantages faced by Africa’s economic and educational systems are wellknown. The political and economic disempowerment of colonialism left most of Africa’s new independent states struggling with violent political upheavals and devastating resource scarcities, allowing little stability or development. In the 21st century, Africans across the continent are changing that narrative.

Contemporary South African artist Mary Sibande, globetrotting Nigerian speaker and novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, and millionaire Egyptian philanthropist Mo Ibrahim are carving

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out spaces for African players by claiming the spotlight. This new do-it-yourself strategy has certainly unified the continent economically and politically. Originally a mantra strongly associated with the African Union, “African solutions to African problems” has come to apply to science as well, bridging industries, academics, and political thinkers in a wave of professional development and educational investment.

Many leaders in academia and industry have taken an international and collective approach that seeks to mobilize a new generation of policymakers, scientists, and engineers towards solving Africa’s problems, from unemployment and limited education to the looming crisis of climate change and sustainable development. For decades, numerous institutions and initiatives have been working on the training and professional development of scientists and researchers on the continent, including the network of African Institutions of Science and Technology in Sub-Saharan Africa. Other such networks across the continent, including the African Institute for Mathematical Sciences and the African School of Fundamental Physics and its Applications, select and train small classes of African students at various locations across the continent, furthering the collectivization of Africa’s scientific assets.

However, due to the centralization of major journal readerships in the United States and similar countries, African researchers at these newer institutions receive little global ex-

posure for their work. In an industry where patents and publications not only legitimize research areas but also make or break careers, invisibility is a large obstacle to professional growth. Economic and political opportunity ultimately drive many trained individuals to emigrate, contributing to brain drain on a massive scale.

In order to stem the outflow of trained talent, leaders in the scientific community are promoting the African solutions approach through action as well as rhetoric. The Scientific African, a pan-African peer-reviewed journal, was launched in 2018 to circulate, promote, and highlight African research within the continent and around the world. It is being published by the Next Einstein Forum (NEF), an initiative of the African Institute for

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Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame opens the Next Einstein Forum conference.

Kigali, Rwanda. March 2018.

Mathematical Sciences (AIMS), which has worked to connect African science and policy with the global scientific community, particularly through the empowerment of young people.

Recently, the organization coordinated an Africa Science Week to unify the continent in the pursuit of scientific development.

These efforts continue to represent the energy growing on the continent for a scientific renaissance. In the words of the NEF: “We believe the next Einstein will be African.”

In addition to advocacy organizations, experts in various fields speak about untapped potential. In a 2019 interview about the latest IPCC global warming prediction report, Arona Diedhiou, Senior Research Director at the French National Research Institute for Development, ar-

gued that “For a long time, there has been a gulf between the sustainable development options suggested at the international level and the local African realities…. It is time for a paradigm shift in order to propose solutions for Africa, developed by Africans.” And describing the climate challenges that face the continent in the coming years, Diedhiou also stressed the possibility of educating and energizing young people.

While these institutions, organizations, and leaders have been instrumental in the growth of professional development, it is important to consider their drawbacks. By perpetuating the selection and elevation of “the best of the best,” these systems have the potential to exacerbate brain drain on a local level. Welltrained scientists cannot achieve

progress without comparably valued support teams, laboratory facilities, and financial investments; they can easily relocate to where those resources are available. But all is not lost. To bolster R&D infrastructure, the African scientific community has a couple of unexpected advantages: a rapidly growing population of young people hungry for education and employment, and the pressure of climate change necessitating innovative solutions.

Despite what the rest of the world may believe, Africa’s scientific aspirations are only growing as the 21st century goes on. In spite of the political and economic hardships embedded in the fabric of the continent’s history, leaders are turning the page. The African Renaissance is upon us. What a wondrous world it will bring. H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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DON’T CRY FOR ME, AGAIN

THE RISK OF A NINTH ARGENTINIAN DEFAULT Paige Anderson Staff Writer

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The day after the presidential elections, Susana Ordoñez cried as she recalled the suffering caused by one of the worst economic crises in recent years. Buenos Aires, Argentina. October 2019.

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rimary presidential elections in Argentina in August 2019 saw international coverage and plunging financial markets as then-President Mauricio Macri lost the primary election, and ultimately the general election, to the ticket of Alberto Fernández and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. The drop in both the stock market and the exchange rate was the latest in a recession that started in the second quarter of 2018. After the election, inflation soared until it reached its highest levels since 1991 at the end of 2019. The new administration in Argentina has tried to blame the crisis almost entirely on Macri’s economic policy, claiming that Macri left the country in “virtual default,” where the new administration cannot pay its debt.

However, drought affecting the Argentinian soy crop, increases in US interest rates, and economic trouble in Turkey all came at the wrong time for Macri’s desperate attempts to revitalize the economy, scaring away investors from emerging markets more broadly and hurting Argentina since it also falls in this group. Overspending has been the way of Argentinian populism for decades, and Macri’s gradualismo approach to spending cuts, intended to placate the population and retain favor, was not enough for foreign lenders.

The blame for the economic spiral of the past months cannot be pinned on any one person or administration. In fact, perhaps it is not economic trouble that stems from a repetitive cycle in government, but rather a populist government that consistently arises from a country trapped in a reH I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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strictive economic cycle.

The Perón Legacy Juan Perón’s address from the balcony of the presidential palace in 1945 marks the rise of Argentinian populism, sparking a trend that has continued in the country since that time. A charismatic leader promising benefits to the working class and advocating anti-United States and anti-British policy, he rose to power on the support of the laborer descamisados. The anti-elitist and anti-imperial stances he took are characteristic of populism, but the reforms that he initiated, like wage increases and financing public works, made him not just populist but popular. That is not to discount his authoritarian tendencies, though— his admiration for Mussolini was well known, and the restriction of constitutional freedoms and corruption within his administration were part of the motivators for the coup that ousted him.

However, time away emphasized his positive reforms and minimized the negatives of his administration, and so, in large part because of the ineffectual nature of the governments that followed him, he was welcomed back in 1972. The legacy that Perón created, especially after being clouded by time, left a population eager to relive a “golden age,” and a government willing to spend beyond its means to achieve it.

The economic context of Perón’s rise to power makes sense: after World War II, Argentina followed protectionist and inward-looking economic policies, which made it so foreign capital did not play as key a role

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in Argentina’s economy, and policies like import substitution cut off their economy. The Great Depression hit hard, leading to a dissatisfied population—another of the many factors contributing to the default in 1951. Finally, the government encouraged industrial growth during this period, which diverted investment from agriculture and led to a larger urban, working class population, creating the perfect conditions for leaders like Perón to gain popularity.

Legacy is also a huge part of what makes populism so prevalent in Argentina. Juan and Eva Perón were idolized when they were in power, but a resurgence of the popularity of the Peróns came in the context of repeated economic recessions in the 1970s and 1980s. During this time, their influence even spread beyond Argentinian borders. The Andrew Lloyd Webber musical Evita, which included the hugely popular song Don’t Cry for Me, Argentina, premiered just four years after Juan Perón’s death in 1974, and after his death he left his third wife Isabel Perón in power because she represented that same legacy. As history shows in Argentina, charismatic figures represent hope during economic turmoil, creating populist dynasties.

The more recent case of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner gives another example of charismatic figures that Argentina has latched on to in its love affair with populism.

Néstor was president from 2003 to 2007, and he stepped down and became First Gentleman for his wife Cristina, who was president from 2007 to 2015. They

came to power after a period of incredible instability after failed capitalist reforms in the late 90s, and their administration was responsible for restructuring debt after the massive 2001 default.

The series of defaults in Argentina and the fiscal upheaval that led up to them often came just before the election of populist leaders, who often promised to help and give more to people who had been saddled with all the responsibility for huge amounts of spending that came before their time. Populism makes promises to the people, and in Argentina, the lack of funds has never stopped the government from spending on those promises. The current financial crisis in Argentina is one instance of this, and accompanies a repetitive political cycle that has been in motion since the election of Juan Perón.

Repetitive indeed, because a country that was richer than France, Germany, and Italy at the beginning of the 20th century has defaulted eight times since its independence from Spain in 1816. That the political and economic trends seem to be locked in the same cycle, repeating the same destructive pattern over and over again, is the tragedy of the Argentinian economy.

Despite the fact that populism seems to be what Argentina turns to for relief when the people feel that the burden placed on them is unfair, the economic policies of Argentina’s many populist administrations were less than beneficial—economic mismanagement, corruption, and manipulation of statistics in the case of Fernández de Kirchner’s administration did nothing good for the Argentinian econo-

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my, and some, like TIME magazine, argue that she “ran the country into the ground.” Whatever the quality of Kirchner or Fernández de Kirchner’s economic policy, though, the trigger for the economic instability of their administration and the crisis that spanned the 2000’s was the 2001 default. It is biased to pin the state of the economy solely on Kirchner, or populism in general, since populism is what the Argentine people turned to in the face of that crisis. However, the administration’s chronic overspending initially increased Argentina’s debt even further, and then, once Argentina was shut out of capital markets, led to high inflation through printing more money.

Vultures and Carrion In 2015, Mauricio Macri inherited an Argentina excluded from global credit markets due to a bitter legal battle with holdout creditors. The dispute was left over from the massive 2001 default of almost US$100 billion, where some funds, called “vultures” or “vulture funds,” refused a renegotiated price of 30 cents to the dollar and demanded to be paid in full. Some of Macri’s first actions after taking office were settling with the holdouts, and lifting currency controls. He implemented a policy of slow and steady changes, or gradualismo, in the hope that he would avoid the unpopularity of previous leaders who tried to institute too many spending cuts.

When the Argentinian peso collapsed in 2018, Macri’s gradualismo was brought to a harsh end. In exchange for US$56 bil-

lion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), he significantly cut spending, which destroyed much of Macri’s popularity within the country. As a result, Argentina turned away from him and towards history.

Many Argentines dislike the IMF because it demanded austerity measures in order for them to receive a loan. The debt as percentage of GDP is 5 percent in Argentina, quite close in comparison to 4.5 percent in the United States, which means that the market in

"THE LEGACY THAT PERÓN CREATED, ESPECIALLY AFTER BEING CLOUDED BY TIME, LEFT A POPULATION EAGER TO RELIVE A 'GOLDEN AGE.'" the United States tolerates debt more than Argentina. That the United States is given more free rein on its debt is determined by the market and other factors, but populism appeals to those who feel that they have been slighted, whether by international markets or other countries.

Looking Forward The election of Alberto Fernández, with Cristina Fernández

de Kirchner as vice president, represents a swing towards the past and towards populism.

Even without Kirchner at the top, Fernández’s ticket still carries and represents the Kirchner name, and with populism, representation and perception is incredibly important. Like the Perón legacy, the legacy that is currently alive and well in Argentinian politics is one that advocates high spending and antagonism towards the IMF, the United States, and Great Britain.

But that is understandable, given that under Macri’s administration, things have not really gotten better. And so, as the risk of a ninth default looms, especially with continuing inflation and another collapse of the peso in late 2019, the Argentine people have turned to the ones who promise something better.

With a struggling economy and little international help without severe and painful spending cuts, the pro-business Macri has become a representation of a system that has failed them, again and again. As the economy deteriorates, as it has so many times in the past, Argentina has embraced a populist legacy. To turn again to populism is a risk, of course, because the recurrence of overspending means that the economy will likely stay locked in its current place, and future generations must suffer and shoulder the burden. However, Argentina could also just cast that burden off, like they have many times before. Investors have shown that they are willing to re-enter Argentina after a default, so why should now, or the next time—or the next—be any different? H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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BULLS IN A CHINA SHOP?

View of Taipei 101 Tower in Xinyi District.

Taipei, Taiwan. November 2003.

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BIG MAN POLITICS AND THE EROSION OF TAIWANESE ASYMMETRIC DETERRENCE Talia Blatt Staff Writer

Various countries' national flags are carried by the Tiananmen Gate to mark the countdown to the 2008 Olympics. Beijing, China. August 2007.

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aiwan has bounced between regimes for decades.

Under Japanese control for the 50 years between the First Sino-Japanese War and World War Two, it was then taken over by the Republic of China in 1945. After the victory of Mao Zedong and the Communist party in the nearby Chinese Civil War, Chiang Kaishek and the Kuomintang (KMT) party fled to and set up a dictatorial government in Taiwan, which was eventually democratized after the election of a non-KMT president, Chen Shui-bian, in 2000.

Tensions between Taiwan and China come down to the One China Policy, which says that China and Taiwan are part of a single nation, that will eventually be ruled by one government. For China, this means the belief that Taiwan is part of China and will inevitably be reunified with the mainland under the Chinese Communist Party. In extension of this principle, China requires that all countries with diplomatic connections to China break all official ties with Taiwan.

Essentially, China sees an independent Taiwan as a violation of Chinese sovereignty, and has historically gone to great lengths to ensure Taiwan doesn’t stray too far from the “one country, two

systems” agreement reached in 1992, known as the 1992 Conensus. In 1995, China refused crossstrait diplomatic talks to protest Taiwan’s deepened relations with the US, and a year later, China tested missiles near Taiwan as action against Taiwan’s first democratic presidential election.

This prompted arguably the closest brush with war between the US and China in recent decades, when President Bill Clinton sent two carrier groups to the Taiwan Strait in response. After the tense 1990s, the 2000s saw increased positive relations between the PRC and Taiwan, marked by increased high-level talks and economic cooperation.

Since 2000, Taiwanese politics has been split between the pro-reunification KMT, which views the One China Policy as something that could eventually result in a single nation ruled from Taipei, and their opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is more in favor of clear-cut Taiwanese independence. In 2016, for the first time ever, the KMT lost the majority of Taiwan’s legislative body, and DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen was elected president, marking a decisive rise for the DPP. However, the recent rise of the

The Taiwanese military practices loading a gun on the 53rd anniversary of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Kinmen, Taiwan. August 2011.

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DPP and the election of Tsai indicates a sharp downturn in relations. Following Tsai’s 2016 victory and her subsequent refusal to endorse the 1992 Consensus, Beijing suspended the cross-strait communication mechanism. In January 2020, Tsai was reelected, a sharply negative referendum on Beijing.

A History of American Ambiguity After relations gradually warmed under the Nixon administration and the ROC lost its UN seat to the PRC, the US eventually switched its recognition to the PRC and the One China Policy under President Jimmy Carter in 1979. However, despite severing formal diplomatic ties with Taipei under the One China Policy, the US also passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) the same year. The TRA, which stipulates that the US will sell arms to Taiwan to help Taiwan defend itself, has since been the cornerstone of US-Taiwan relations.

Since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the US has maintained a policy known as strategic or deliberate ambiguity: the refusal to make a firm commitment to defend the island in the case of a China-Taiwan conflict. This is a historically suc-

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cessful deterrence strategy based on the logic of uncertainty-driven balance, which relies on the belief that countries are unlikely to provoke each other if they are uncertain about US commitment, and by extension, the outcome of the conflict. Thus, the balance of tensions has been fragile, but stable.

The awkward dance between the One China Policy and the TRA has dictated US policy towards Taiwan for decades, allowing both formal recognition that Beijing represents China, and a thriving economic and defense relationship with Taipei.

The Trump-Tsai Call In December of 2016 President Donald Trump spoke directly on the telephone with President Tsai, the first time there has been vocal communication between the leader of the island and the American president since 1979. This previously unprecedented event was therefore a threat of parting from decades of US adherence to the One China Policy.

2017 legislation deepened Beijing’s Taiwan concerns when Trump signed into law the Taiwan Travel Act, which allows high level officials to travel and meet with their Taiwanese counterparts. Congress also debated al-

lowing more military-to-military cooperation in the Taiwan Security Act, and added provisions regarding Taiwan’s undersea warfare capabilities and participation in joint military exercises with the US to the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. These actions creeped closer to diplomatic parity for Taiwan, prompting the Chinese Ambassador Cui Tiankai to threaten “severe consequences” for the US-China relationship.

“Big Man” Diplomacy Tensions over Taiwan arose during the reigns of two “big men”: President Trump and President Xi Jinping. Xi has consolidated power––for example, eliminating term limits, creating a cult of personality around himself reminiscent of Mao Zedong, purging his enemies, and grounding CCP legitimacy in expansion and conquest, most notably in the South and East China Seas. This nationalist push has manifested in increasingly aggressive rhetoric towards Taiwan. He has ramped up the invasion threat, calling for unification more aggressively than his predecessors.

Hong Kong is a case study for the problems with Xi’s big man, nationalism via territorial restoration approach to policy. From

1997 to 2012, the first fifteen years after Britain ceded Hong Kong to China, the one country, two systems scheme created tensions in Hong Kong, but they were manageable. In 2012, with Xi’s accession, Beijing tightened the reins, and Xi made Hong Kong reintegration central to his personal priorities. Although the recent demonstrations were ostensibly triggered by a controversial extradition bill proposed by Hong Kong chief Executive Carrie Lam, even Chinese officials blame in part the gradual loss of freedom in the city under Xi’s rule, and fault internal miscommunications and decision making. The failures of Xi’s approach manifested in Tsai’s 2020 reelection, when Tsai used Hong Kong as a cautionary tale for Taiwan.

Xi’s dangerous, one-man approach to foreign policy is mirrored in the US: Trump campaigned on ‘America First,’ presenting an anti-China view that continues in his trade war, which shares the same personal prestige element and lack of internal cohesion as Xi’s approach to Taiwan and Hong Kong. But for Taiwan, Trump’s foreign policy inconsistencies are a nightmare: he is capable of both the offensive rhetoric to inflame China, but also the

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isolationist instincts not to come to Taiwan’s side during a crisis, disrupting strategic ambiguity.

Essentially, Xi and Trump are playing a domestic politics-fueled game of international nuclear chicken: as both tie more of their legitimacy to ‘winning’ and being the strongest, backing out becomes less tenable and escalation more risky.

The Beijing Honor Guard marcg on the 70th anniversary of the founding of Communist China. Beijing, China. October 2019.

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Asymmetric Defense Outlook Perhaps the most destabilizing recent change in this big man politics era is the shift in arms sales.

In late 2019, Trump authorized the sale of 66 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan, a move that shifted away from Obama’s strategy and text of the Taiwan Relations Act, which only calls for selling arms of a “defensive character.” This infuriated Beijing––China has historically tried to block Taiwanese attempts to acquire similar weapons platforms, and sees the sale of fighter jets as crossing an implicit red line. China responded by sending J-11 jets across the median line of the Taiwan Strait, violating the long-held agreement that neither party would cross the median.

The sale of the F-16s does not drastically alter the military balance between China and Taiwan.

The jets may even be functionally useless if Beijing were to put military pressure on the island. China’s air force is still more than four times larger than Taiwan’s, and China’s thousands of ballistic and cruise missiles could keep these fighter jets from leaving the ground. In simulated air battles that assume an F-16-armed Taiwan, the Taiwanese air force still suffers massive losses. And in the case of an all-out amphibious invasion, the numbers are even less

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favorable for Taiwan. The 2017 Taiwanese defense budget was a meager US$10 billion compared to China’s US$144 billion; Taiwan has only 130,000 ground active duty troops compared to China’s 800,000. Proportionally, that’s about half a percent of the Taiwanese population, and less than a tenth of a percent of China’s.

The issue for China is that these weapons are built for offensive power projection, not for defense against invasion or targeted Chinese aggression. Taiwan is buying US systems designed for US interests and tactics: projecting supremacy across large distances and overwhelming opponents with military dominance. Taiwan doesn’t need to do that––neither political party in Taiwan is currently calling for offensive military projection––nor can it, as the numbers prove.

A war between Taiwan and China would likely take the form of a huge Chinese missile barrage to annihilate Taiwanese air defenses, specifically Taiwan’s long range air defense missiles, followed by aerial bombing to destroy the remaining Taiwanese fighter jets. In such a war, Taiwan would need

to win a war of attrition: defensive weapons for small distances, which would increase Taiwan’s ability to withstand Chinese attacks. This asymmetric strategy–– acknowledging a stronger opponent, and maximizing the weaknesses of the opponent to create a strong defense––requires the opposite of what weapons like the F-16s do.

The F-16 sales rely on the tacit assumption, grounded in the TRA, that the US will come to Taiwan’s aid, that Taiwan only needs to last a little while before a US intervention. Not only is this assumption particularly faulty in the age of Trump, when isolationist rhetoric is strong and allies cannot rely on US participation or coherent international dialogue, it is also not militarily pragmatic given China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities: a form of power projection designed to limit other countries’ freedom of movement in a strategic zone. China uses two key strategies: ballistic and cruise missiles positioned to threaten US military bases to deny access, and air missile defense systems coupled with fighter aircrafts to deny free access.

These capabilities could make US intervention prohibitively costly, and selling Taiwan small sets of offensive weapons does not help Taiwan in a world in which the US cannot––or will not––come to Taiwan’s rescue. Additionally, purchasing such weapons could impose fiscal limits on Taiwanese asymmetric defense efforts. The Taiwanese defense budget is constrained, and highly visible weapons systems like F-16s are vulnerable to China’s precision-guided missiles so expensive that they trade-off with the development of an indigenous asymmetric defense system. In sum, the F-16s anger China because of their offensive capabilities, but those very capabilities do little to prepare Taiwan for a crisis.

Both Xi and Trump are using political strategies that risk the erosion of balance in a fragile security trilemma. With the recent shift from foreign policy statements to military action, big man politics has become less of an abstract threat and more of an imminent crisis. Whether Taiwan remains as it is––precarious, but stable––could be determined in the next few months. H

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen celebrates her victory with supporters. Taipei, Taiwan. January 2020.

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POLITICS AND THE OLYMPICS

LOOKING TOWARD TOKYO 2020 AND BEYOND Nick Nocita Staff Writer

Fireworks light up the sky near the illuminated Olympic rings. Tokyo, Japan. January, 2020

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n January 10, 2020, President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) Thomas Bach proclaimed that the Olympic Games “are not, and must never be, a platform to advance political or any other potentially divisive ends.”

With the Tokyo 2020 Games later this year, Bach drew a line in the sand concerning political statements by Olympic athletes with his opening speech at the 135th IOC Session, hosted in Lausanne, Switzerland. By citing the “values” of the Olympic Games and demanding neutrality “in every respect,” Bach is now emphasizing an agenda that he and the IOC may be unable to carry out.

According to Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter––one of the rules by which the IOC governs the Olympic Games and all related events––Bach and the IOC have the right to enforce such a policy. The rule states that any form of “advertising/publicity or any kind of demonstrations or political, religious and racial propaganda” is strictly prohibited in the Olympic Village and any other Olympic events or sites. The Olympic Charter calls for “disqualification of the person or delegation concerned, or withdrawal of the accreditation of the person or delegation concerned” upon violation of Rule 50, albeit transgressions are taken on a case-by-case basis according to the guidelines specifically set for Tokyo 2020.

With such ambiguity among the legislation conflicting with Bach’s sentiments of “neutrality,” historical precedent may hold influential power on potential rulings if athletes participate

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Opening Ceremonies of the Olympic Games. Rome, Italy.

August 1960.

in any political demonstrations this summer.

Taiwanese Athletes “UNDER PROTEST” in Rome One of the first instances of political statements being made by athletes at the Olympic Games came in Rome in 1960. With continued disputes over the legitimacy of Mao Zedong’s regime in mainland China versus the Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan, China withdrew from the Olympics two years in advance because Mao wanted Taiwan banned.

Meanwhile, the Taiwanese delegation wanted to compete under the name “The Republic of China” to assert legitimacy. In an attempt to compromise, the IOC set Taiwanese athletes to compete under “Formosa,” the name commonly used in Europe

for the island of Taiwan until the early 20th century.

On September 18, 1960, the 73 athletes of the Taiwanese delegation marched into the Opening Ceremony with the lead athlete carrying a sign saying “Under Protest.” Sitting IOC President Avery Brundage needed to be persuaded against banning the Taiwanese athletes and delegation from competing at the games, so the 73 protesting athletes continued to compete under the name of “Formosa,” which they felt did not represent them for the subsequent weeks in Rome.

While this statement by the Taiwanese delegation demonstrated Olympic athletes’ ability to wield global political influence, Brundage was unaware of how events at the Games eight H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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years later would both politically and socially eclipse those that he dealt with in Rome.

Controversial Medal Ceremonies in Mexico City 1968 was a year rife with tumultuous social and political conflicts, and two of them—the American Civil Rights Movement and the Prague Spring— appeared on the medal stands at the Games in Mexico City.

One of the most memorable political statements by any athlete in history came during the medal ceremony for the men’s 200-meter sprint. As the winning runners stepped onto the

Tommie Smith (center) and John Carlos (right) during the Olympics awards ceremony. Mexico City, Mexico. October 1968.

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podium, John Carlos, a black American man, wore a bead neckalce to represent the history of lynching of black Americans with a black t-shirt that covered his “USA” logo on his jersey. Tommie Smith of the United States wore a black scarf, and both Carlos and Smith wore no shoes with black socks to represent black poverty in the United States. Peter Norman of Australia even volunteered to show solidarity by wearing a button from a political movement on human rights and racial and ethnic equality in sport. The truly controversial moment rose when Smith and Carlos bowed

their heads and held gloved fists high in the air for the national anthem of the United States in honor of the Black Power movement.

In this case, however, it was the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) that took matters into their own hands, suspending both American athletes from the games and sending them home within days of their silent protest. Their medals were not revoked. Despite their punishment, Tommie Smith, in a 2018 documentary, still claims, “The most important thing was the reality of the black athletes banding together and making a stand against a system which did not represent black people.”

Two days after the 200-meter race, U.S. athletes also swept the 400-meter dash, and, following their victory, all three runners stepped onto the podium for their medal ceremony wearing black berets in solidarity with the Black Power movement.

Yet once the anthem began, all three removed their hats, decreasing the magnitude of their political statements. The third transgression of the U.S. track and field team came in the long jump when gold medal-winner, Bob Beaman, wore no shoes and black socks onto the podium.

In all three of these instances, only one of the groups was punished, and that punishment was administered separately by the USOC instead of the IOC. The IOC, despite the political unrest, did not take any direct action in enforcing the rules in place.

That said, IOC President Brundage wrote in a letter months later that “The actions of these negroes [Smith and Carlos] was an

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insult to the Mexican hosts and a disgrace to the United States.”

Meanwhile in gymnastics, Czech athlete Věra Čáslavská was set to win all five individual events. Controversy erupted at the floor exercise apparatus final when a judge retroactively altered Soviet gymnast Larisa Petrik’s score to pull her up to tie with Čáslavská for the gold. Many judges felt that it would be inappropriate to allow one gymnast to win every event.

Sadly, this meant that the events of the Prague Spring between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were brought into the National Auditorium in Mexico City, and many Czech citizens and athletes felt that they needed Čáslavská to defeat the Soviet athletes because the USSR had invaded Prague so aggressively.

When she was forced to share the podium with Petrik, Čáslavská made her point. Per Olympic custom, the national anthem of the Olympic champion is performed while the flags are raised during the medal ceremony, but, because there were two champions, two national anthems were heard. First, the Czech, then the Soviet national anthem played, and Čáslavská protested the Soviet invasion of Prague. She looked away and refused to acknowledge the Soviet flag and anthem while standing adjacent to Petrik on the podium.

In the subsequent weeks, Čáslavská was not just left unscathed by the IOC and the Czech Olympic Committee, she was celebrated globally and nicknamed, “The Bride of Mexico.” She made a clearly political statement about the Sovi-

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Vera Cáslavská (left) and Larisa Petrik (right) during the Olympics awards ceremony. Mexico City, Mexico. October 1968.

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et Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia, yet the IOC forced no consequences, continuing to set a precedent of inaction.

A Lap Around the Track for the Aboriginal Flag Cathy Freeman entered the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games as a top sprinter for Australia, already with a silver medal from the 1996 Games. She was even a figurehead for the Games with her role of lighting the Olympic torch in the Opening Ceremony as an Australian, Anoriginal woman. All eyes were on Freeman on September 25th, when more than 110,000 spectators filled Stadium Australia to watch the women’s 400-meter race.

When Freeman crossed the finish line first, she proceeded to take a victory lap as custom. Australians celebrated as she fulfilled her destiny for the Sydney Games, and she proudly carried the flag of her country alongside the flag of her people—Aboriginal Australians— around the track. The Aboriginal

flag is not formally recognized as a national flag by the IOC, and because of the social status of the Aboriginal people in Australia as a historically oppressed minority, Freeman was making a statement by representing her heritage on the track. Neither the IOC nor the Australian Olympic Committee took any action against Freeman despite her conscious decision to show representation of a marginalized demographic in elite athletics, which, according to Rule 50, is not allowed. Rule 50 clearly defined any political statements as inappropriate, so the IOC must have classified Freeman’s lap as deserving no punishment despite that it technically violated the rules of the Olympic Charter.

Tokyo, Beijing, and Beyond Despite the history of athletes making political statements at the Olympic Games, there is minimal precedent of the IOC taking any action to punish athletes for politically motivated actions in Olympic venues. If PresH I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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ident Thomas Bach hopes to stay true to the sentiments he espoused in his speech at the beginning of the year, then he may break decades of precedent. In his speech, Bach claimed that the “political neutrality [of the Games] is undermined” by athlete statements, “as legitimate as they may be.” Even Freeman’s uncontroversial lap with the Aboriginal flag may be considered a threat to the neutrality of the Olympic Games in the future according to Bach’s rhetoric. If an athlete at the upcoming Games chooses to make a statement of similar magnitude to Cathy Freeman’s victory lap, Bach will need to choose whether or not he truly wants to enforce his definition of neutrality at the Olympic Games. Perhaps he will soften on his original claims while still maintaining a stricter stance on athletes that make more inflammatory statements.

In the case of Tokyo 2020, Bach

Cathy Freeman celebrates her victory with the Aboriginal flag. Sydney, Australia. September 2000.

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faces numerous potential issues, and he seems to have anticipated many of the most substantial methods of protest used in contemporary sports given the most recent publication of Rule 50 by the IOC. Examples of protest specifically outlawed in the document include “displaying any political messaging, including signs or armbands,” and “gestures of a political nature, like a hand gesture or kneeling.” The IOC seems to be prepared to address any statements that athletes plan to use to bring current issues to attention. With many social and political issues reaching what seems to be fever pitch in 2020, the question seems to be less if athletes will make statements and more what the IOC will do in response.

Thomas Bach has laid down the law, and if he carries out his plans beyond Tokyo 2020, then he may fundamentally change the definition of neutrality with

respect to the Olympic Games and the International Olympic Committee. For example, in the case of Rome 1960, the IOC needed to make a decision concerning the Taiwanese delegation that would favor one political bloc or the other. The athletes were then expected to participate in the Olympic Games without making any statements.

The IOC has historically needed to make political decisions that will not always leave every country or government equally pleased, and it will likely be pulled into another political crisis in 2022 when Beijing, China hosts the Winter Olympics if the Chinese government continues to commit human rights violations such as those in the Xinjiang region. If the IOC plans on preventing any political statements by Olympic athletes in future games, it is likely to come at the expense of the athletes’ freedom of speech. H

Seniors who live in a nursing home sit outside their home after being evacuated due to an earthquake. Ponce, Puerto Rico. September 2018.

LA ISLA OLVIDADA

INTERNATIONAL NGOS PICK UP THE UNITED STATE’S SLACK Becca Buehler IN PUERTO RICO Staff Writer

A damaged Puerto Rican national flag hangs from the facade of a business after Hurricane Maria.

San Juan, Puerto Rico. September 2018.

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any Puerto Ricans call their home la isla olvidada—the forgotten island. This nickname reflects Puerto Rico’s sense of neglect by the United States government, especially in the aftermath of natural disasters.

Puerto Rico is a commonwealth of the United States and its inhabitants are American citizens. They enjoy benefits such as a limited version of Medicaid and US military protection.

However, citizenship does not guarantee them political representation: Puerto Ricans cannot participate in presidential elections, and the territory does not have voting representatives in Congress. While they are denied a voice in government, they share plenty of responsibilities with mainland citizens. Puerto Ricans do not pay income tax unless they are employed by the US government, but they do pay

payroll, business, estate, import, export, commodity, and social security taxes, and they can be drafted into the US Army. Their money and service supports and protects the United States, but many Puerto Ricans feel that the country does not return the favor.

Is History Repeating Itself?

As Puerto Rico continues to recover from the devastation of Hurricane Maria, a series of earthquakes have renewed its sense of abandonment. However, while the current administration may have “forgotten” its island territory, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have not.

The earthquakes began on December 28, 2019 and have continued into the new year. In the past several weeks, additional temblors and hundreds of aftershocks have rocked Puerto Rico.

Airline staff secure generators in a cargo plane, all donated by AIDS Healthcare Foundation, to support Puerto Rico’s hurricane relief efforts.

Miami, Florida. September 2017.

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One even recorded a magnitude of 6.4, the largest quake the island has seen in a century. Many say that the constant threat and unpredictability of the ongoing temblors make them worse than Hurricane Maria. The seismic activity has caused tremendous damage to the island, collapsing homes, schools, and churches.

Widespread power outages pose a serious safety threat to patients in hospitals and nursing homes, and many affected schools have been unable to reopen. For residents whose houses remain standing, the fear of collapse forces them to sleep outside. Access to clean water, food, electricity, and supplies remains a major problem.

In a press release on January 7, 2020, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi implored President Donald Trump to react with “urgency and compassion” to the earthquakes in order to avoid

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“a repeat of the same failed response” to Hurricane Maria. The following day, Trump signed an emergency declaration that authorized the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to fund relief efforts in Puerto Rico.

However, despite this action, many feel that history continues to repeat itself.

Helping or Hindering?

In 2017, Hurricane Maria resulted in the deaths of 2,975 people in Puerto Rico. Many attribute this death toll in part to the Trump administration’s slow response, whether it was the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s delayed release of funding notices to the island, or Trump’s deliberate stalling of a disaster relief bill. As of May 2019, the island saw less than US$14 billion of the federally promised US$42.5 billion in relief funds. As of November 2019,

FEMA—an organization supported by Puerto Rican taxpayers—has funded only 190 longterm relief projects out of the more than 1,500 requested.

Global nonprofit organizations played a major role in the immediate response to Hurricane Maria and are still actively supporting recovery efforts. International NGOs such as Save the Children, International Medical Corps, Mercy Corps, and Oxfam International provided immediate aid in the form of water filters, solar lanterns, meals, generators, and hard cash. They also initiated long-term programs to promote continued recovery and resilience. Oxfam forged alliances between local organizations, introduced alternative energy sources to restore electricity, and offered legal aid to families whose claims were rejected

by FEMA. Mercy Corps helped farmers and fishermen rebuild their businesses, revived the tourism industry with rehabilitation and promotion of popular sites, and nurtured not only economic recovery but economic growth.

A Rocky Recovery Now, Puerto Rico is facing a new disaster, and it is receiving the same response. According to Dr. Adi Martínez-Roman, a senior policy analyst on Puerto Rico for Oxfam America, “The US continues to deny its citizens the help they deserve.… These earthquakes once again expose the unacceptably slow pace of recovery and absolutely shameful US federal government response.” As a result, international NGOs such as Oxfam have stepped in to supplement insuf-

ficient federal aid.

Oxfam America is a sector of Oxfam International, a nonprofit organization committed to eradicating global poverty. Oxfam International responds to crises in impoverished nations by providing immediate humanitarian aid and long-term recovery programs. It is currently supporting refugees of the violent conflicts in Myanmar, Syria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, victims of hunger crises in Yemen and South Sudan, and those affected by devastating cyclones in Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.

After Hurricane Maria, Oxfam America President Abby Maxman acknowledged that it was unusual for Oxfam to respond to disasters in the United States and other wealthy countries.

The United Nations classifies the eight aforementioned nations where Oxfam works as “developing economies,” while the United States is a “major developed economy.” However, due to insufficient federal aid, the situation in Puerto Rico is dire enough for Oxfam to become involved. The organization has been providing physical and emotional support in the form of tents and psychological counseling. It has also been supporting the installation of solar and other alternative energy sources on the island.

A Problematic Pattern In 2017, Maxman described Oxfam’s involvement as rare.

Now, it may be becoming a pattern. The American government’s reluctance or refusal to send sufficient disaster aid means that international orgaH I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W Protestors demonstrate as anger grows over emergency aid that sat unused in a warehouse since Hurricane Maria. San Juan, Puerto Rico. January 2020.

nizations have to pick up the slack. However, as non-profits they have limited resources. In 2019, Oxfam’s revenue from donors, grants, and other contributors was just over US$88 million. This number pales in comparison to the United States’s budget for disaster relief spending in 2019, which totaled over US$17 billion. The year before, the enacted budget was nearly US$70.8 billion. These numbers suggest that the United States is not unable to send aid—it is simply unwilling.

The United States’s neglect of Puerto Rico hurts the millions of American citizens living there. But it may also have a detrimental impact globally.

Sending money, supplies, and personnel to Puerto Rico means

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reducing the aid that Oxfam and other NGOs can provide to other nations that tend to be poverty-stricken and crisis-wracked.

As developing economies, they do not have access to the same resources as the US federal government. Unlike the United States, it is not a question of whether they are willing to send aid, but whether they are able.

A Promise to Keep When President Woodrow Wilson granted US citizenship to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, he insisted that the government take moral, not just territorial, ownership of the island: “We must be free from every unnecessary burden or embarrassment; and there is no better way… than to fulfil our promis-

es and promote the interests of those dependent on us most.”

It is hard to know whether Wilson would qualify the United States’s neglect of Puerto Rico and consequent reliance on international charity an “embarrassment.” However, the federal government’s slow and insufficient disaster relief efforts undeniably create an “unnecessary burden.” This burden falls on the people of Puerto Rico struggling to recover from yet another natural disaster, and on international NGOs that are already addressing countless global catastrophes. For the sake of American citizens in Puerto Rico and crisis victims around the world, the United States needs to remember the island it has forgotten. H

A United Airlines jet taking off from Newark Liberty International Airport flies with the moon in the background.

West Orange, New Jersey. April 2012.

THE 737 MAX AND THE FUTURE OF COMMERICAL AVIATION Yanxi Fang Staff Writer

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n October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610 crashed into the Java Sea, killing all 189 onboard. In light of Indonesia’s poor aviation safety record, which includes a 11-year operating ban in the European Union, this tragedy would not have been particularly surprising had the aircraft involved not been a brand-new Boeing 737 MAX, the latest version of the world’s most popular commercial aircraft at the time. These fatalities shocked the world, coming just more than a year after the model first entered commercial service. Preliminary investigations focused on a failure with the plane’s anti-stalling system, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), and the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) soon issued an emergency directive warning to flight crews about the proper procedures that would allow them to address similar issues.

An even greater shock came less than five months later. On March 10, 2019, another brandnew Boeing 737 MAX, operated

by Ethiopian Airlines as Flight 302, plunged into the ground outside Addis Ababa, killing all onboard. Unlike Lion Air, which has been criticized for its lax stance on safety, Ethiopian Airlines has maintained a good safety record throughout its history, adding to the scrutiny of the aircraft involved. In the aftermath of this second disaster, public confidence in the 737 MAX all but vanished, particularly after preliminary speed data was released, showing similarities to the Lion Air crash. As a result, airlines and countries around the world took the rare

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step of grounding the 737 MAX. In a first for a traditionally Western-dominated industry, China led the world in implementing a country-wide ban, grounding all 737 MAX aircraft within 24 hours of the crash.

Other countries and agencies followed, with the European Union suspending flights just one day later across its member nations. Notably, the last country to follow through was the United States, where the FAA remained defiant and insisted on the US-made jet’s airworthiness until a full day after the European decision. The speed at which these decisions were implemented was unprecedented, and the loss of 346 lives onboard the two next-generation Boeing jets is grave. The consequences of United States’ conduct, including both Boeing and the FAA, will erode the United States’ dominant role in the market for commercial aircraft, while also opening the industry to emerging competitors.

The Rise of American Aviation As the aviation industry grew and became more sophisticated in the 1920s and 1930s, the role of American firms on the global market increased significantly.

For example, the United States pioneered the use of all-metal aircraft, such as the Boeing 247 and the very popular Douglas DC-3, which greatly improved safety and found customers around the world. This early commercial success was interrupted by the significant military needs of World War II, although all-metal aircraft proved useful as military transports.

The end of the war coincid-

ed with the beginning of the jet age. In 1949, the world’s first commercial jet, the de Havilland Comet, took its maiden flight in the United Kingdom, which had a robust commercial aviation industry prior to the war. However, the Comet’s design had multiple fatal flaws, and early on, the model experienced several high-profile crashes that irreparably damaged not only its reputation, but also the reputation of the British aviation industry as a whole. This also coincided with the postwar geopolitical realignment in which the United States became a dominant world power, allowing it to exercise great influence over the West, particularly economic matters like the purchase of high-value commercial aircraft.

In response to the Comet’s devastating crashes, and still with a desire for the great speed associated with jet aircraft, most airlines in the Western sphere of influence naturally gravitated toward the American-built Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 aircraft. These were essentially the only jet products offered by the West: the Soviet Union had developed the Tu-104 jet, which was off-limits to due the realities of the Cold War, while economic pressures forced a Canadian firm to end the development of its Avro C102. However, the American role in aviation was not only built upon a lack of alternatives: only several years after the 707 took flight, Boeing revealed the 747, which not only revolutionized air travel with its high seating capacity but also remained an icon of economic prosperity for decades.

Over time, business merg-

G LO BA L N OT E BO O K Stewardesses pose in front of the first Boeing 737. Seattle, Washington.

January 1967.

ers and other financial realities led Boeing to become the lone American player on the global market. However, the American dominance from the early days of the jet age has faded away as other firms from various Western and Western-aligned regions of the world emerged—particularly Europe’s Airbus, Canada’s Bombardier, and Brazil’s Embraer. Today, the American role in the market is at a crossroads.

Recently, Boeing has experienced significant problems with quality control, while China and Russia have begun to invest heavily in their own alternatives through state-owned firms with high hopes for at least some foreign success. In light of the historical and recent developments, the 737 MAX disasters represent not only heavy economic losses for Boeing, but also the latest erosion of American influence on the global stage.

A New Design––From the 1960s As a modern aircraft with

state-of-the-art technology, the Boeing 737 MAX stands in stark contrast with the seemingly primitive designs of the early and mid-20th century. However, Boeing’s problems actually stem from modifications to a design that dates back almost 60 years.

The first model of the Boeing 737 was developed in the mid-1960s, when wide-spread jet travel was still in its infancy and airport infrastructure was lacking, with limited mechanized equipment for essential services such as catering and luggage handling. Since food and baggage were loaded by hand, aircraft that were closer to the ground were easier for airports to handle. Meanwhile, the launch airline Lufthansa envisioned the 737 as a short-haul plane, which required a set of built-in folding stairs to maximize efficiency. These preferences for a lower height were integrated into Boeing’s 737 and actually proved critical for its success.

However, as the 737 rapidly

gained popularity, particularly after the deregulation of US airlines in 1978, this early accommodation proved problematic. Airlines demanded jets that could seat more people, creating a need for larger and more powerful engines. Since the aircraft was still close to the ground, the larger engines had to be positioned differently on the wing, affecting the plane’s flying behavior. These changes were generally minor, particularly because any significant deviation from the existing design would have required costly training protocols for both pilots and airlines. Accordingly, as the 737 evolved, the FAA simply reviewed and approved these changes rather than approaching new variations with a holistic view; so long as the new design was linked to the original 1967 design on paper, Boeing was able to avoid lengthy scrutiny. This approval process was also economically attractive for airlines since they only H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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needed to provide a brief online course on how to fly the plane, rather than having their pilots go through the expensive and time-consuming flight simulator training that is required for all new aircraft models. Over the decades, these types of modifications attracted limited attention and allowed the 737 family to gain a reputation as the world’s most popular plane series until it was surpassed by the A320 in the wake of the two MAX crashes.

Nonetheless, this seemingly relaxed system of regulation was not the most significant contributor to the fatal design flaws found in the 737 MAX. Instead, the FAA—the American agency tasked with providing a “safe and efficient” use of domestic airspace—delegated much of the safety certification work to Boeing under Congressional approval. The rationale was that private-sector work would allow the agency to “leverage its limited resources.” A recent phenomenon, this practice has proven devastating to the global reputation of Boeing and the American aviation industry at large. In particular, although the FAA’s airworthiness approval has not lost its value because of the geopolitical influence of the United States, the value of the Boeing name, and by extension, perhaps the rest of the American aviation sector, has drastically declined.

The European Moment and Other Challengers In 1969, just a few years after the first Boeing 737 was put into service, several European countries joined to create Airbus In-

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dustrie, which quickly devoted its resources to the design of the Airbus A300. This two-engined widebody aircraft came in an era where three-engined airliners dominated the long-haul market, such as the Lockheed L-1011 and the Douglas DC-10, both of which were American-made.

Like the 737, the A300’s new design initially found a limited reception, but airlines were eventually attracted by the economical two-person cockpit and the safer hydraulic controls. After US-based Eastern Air Lines placed an order for the A300 in 1978, the aircraft found its footing on the global market. The ensuing popularity of the homegrown Airbus A300, and later the narrow-body A320 series, not only challenged the postWWII American hegemony on the commercial aircraft market but also convinced initially skeptical European governments to allocate more funding and subsidies for Airbus, all but guaranteeing its continued success.

Other countries around the world are also starting to catch up technologically, and some have made significant inroads toward their own aircraft programs with varying degrees of success. For instance, Canada’s Bombardier, known for its Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ) and recently the CSeries aircraft, was quite successful in the 1990s and 2000s, although it focused on producing smaller, short-haul aircraft. In recent years, it has experienced significant cost overruns with the CSeries program, causing the Quebecoise government to be increasingly hesitant about the size of subsidies

and bailouts. This has caused financial difficulties at Bombardier, which has now sold the CRJ to Mitsubishi of Japan and the CSeries to Airbus—where it is now being rebranded as the A220. Meanwhile, the other significant player in the jet market, Embraer of Brazil, has entered a Boeing-controlled joint venture partnership and is no longer independent from US influence. Since these alternatives have proven financially impractical with existing levels of government subsidies, it is clear that the ongoing Airbus-Boeing duopoly cannot be broken without even greater levels of government intervention.

The Authoritarian Alternatives As Europe continues its rise in the international aviation market, alternatives have emerged in Russia and China, both of which have invested significantly in the development of domestic commercial aircraft manufacturing. As with the Airbus A300, which paved the way for the European consortium to become the world’s largest aircraft manufacturer, these traditional US rivals have high hopes for entering the global mainstream. Although non-Western aircraft have traditionally been perceived as inferior, creating a significant barrier to global economic success, both the Russian and Chinese governments have demonstrated a desire to substantially fund and subsidize their aircraft manufacturers to the point of outright state ownership. In addition, Russia has gathered significant experience in building aircraft throughout the Cold War, and although

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the passenger safety record is lackluster, several models have proven enormously popular on the world stage such as the Antonov 124 designed and built in modern-day Ukraine.

Somewhat surprisingly, these Russian and Chinese investments have only come to limited fruition outside their home countries, despite the significant funding streams and the low purchase cost compared to Western aircraft. For example, Russia’s Sukhoi Superjet 100 has been in service with Mexican low-cost carrier Interjet, which has even used the aircraft on flights serving the United States, although the airline is returning the planes due to a lack of spare parts. Meanwhile, although China’s COMAC ARJ21 and C919 aircraft have received interest from Ghana and perhaps other countries in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the only confirmed orders thus far are from Chinese state-owned airlines. At the same time, there have been severe setbacks such as a recent deadly crash of a Superjet 100 at

a Moscow airport as well as the lack of European or American approval for the Chinese projects.

These programs have also experienced other underlying issues, such as a critical supply chain issue for the Sukhoi Superjet, which make the aircraft much less desirable. For example, such technical problems may prevent an airline from being able to operate the aircraft according to its operational needs, which can prove much more costly than the one-time cost of buying a more expensive Western-made aircraft. However, these problems are not insurmountable given time, and even Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner suffered issues early on. Moreover, China and Russia also have plans to work together on a widebody jet, the CR929, set to enter service later this decade even after delays, and unlike their current regional aircraft, the CR929 is designed for longhaul, international routes. Even though there is the possibility that neither the FAA nor the

EASA will certify the CR929, the aircraft could still be used to directly connect China and Russia with countries in their expanding sphere of influence.

An Uncertain Future for Aircraft Diplomacy While the commercial intentions may seem benign, the geopolitical consequences are serious. A Russian or Chinese aircraft would be formidable on the world stage because the two governments have the financial capability—and do not need political will—to heavily subsidize their domestic manufacturers, perhaps to the point of outspending Boeing and Airbus on research and development.

More significantly, a successful non-Western aircraft would increase the appeal for many developing countries to join their spheres of influence. This is particularly true given the fact that commercial aviation is seen almost universally as a concrete symbol of progress and economic prosperity, and the inexpensive prices that non-Western

A memorial wall to remember those who died when Ethiopian Airlines flight ET302 crashed shortly after takeoff. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. March 2020.

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manufacturers have traditionally offered would allow countries to rapidly build up local airline industries. This is not simply a theory: in September 2019, China allegedly offered subsidized aircraft to Kiribati in return for the island nation dropping its existing diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. Additionally, various countries have occasionally used high-value purchases of Western aircraft as goodwill gestures to aid diplomatic efforts, meaning that aviation autonomy in Russia and China could even mean the worsening of economic relations with the West.

With so much effort already spent toward disrupting the Airbus-Boeing duopoly, Russia and China have caught a break. The 737 MAX crashes have severely damaged Boeing’s reputation around the world, and airlines have cancelled orders—to the extent that Boeing has reported net negative orders in 2019. This adds to the skepticism already held by leaders and citizens in countries that have traditionally shunned the Western-led world order and redirects their attention to the less expensive—and perhaps more politically prudent—alternatives from Russia and China. Perhaps more significantly, the very poor reputation of the 737 MAX thus far has virtually put it on the same level as many Soviet-era commercial aircraft since both are perceived by the public as dangerous and inferior to alternatives available on the market. This allows Russia and China to make broad inroads; their aircraft are now considered to be no worse than the 737 MAX from a passenger safe-

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ty perspective, even though they may lack some of the most modern technologies. In this sense, a sizable window of opportunity has opened. As Boeing’s market share suffers, it is not necessarily just Airbus that fills in the gap, but rather non-Western manufacturers with their emerging products.

Thus, the 737 MAX crashes and the consequent loss of public confidence in Boeing are only the latest additions to the virtual collapse of the American-led status quo on the global aviation market. While the European rise in aviation is not surprising, and perhaps even inevitable in the long-term vision of European post-WWII recovery, the Russian and Chinese rise is quite troubling. While more aircraft options may be beneficial for the industry as a whole, the reality is that the design and certification of these new models will have limited transparency—much like the governments that oversee them, perhaps making them less safe than Western-built aircraft. Moreover, should Chinese and Russian aircraft become alternative global standards of aviation, the West, and particularly the United States, will have lost yet another tool of foreign policy, which only adds to the gradual erosion of the existing world order. To prevent this, it is imperative that the FAA and Boeing implement stricter regulations for the 737 MAX and future aircraft, both to make flying safer and to win back the hearts and minds of those around the world who have been disillusioned by the failures of two brand-new American jets. H

G LO BA L N OT E BO O K Airplanes are lined up on the tarmac at the international airport of Orly, the day of its closure, due to a drop in traffic. Paris, France.

April 2020.

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THE FUTURE

A woman places banners on the sidewalk against the signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Santiago, Chile. March 2018.

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G LO BA L N OT E BO O K

OF THE PACIFIC ALLIANCE Kendrick Foster Senior Solicits Editor

D

onald Trump has strident—and well-known —views on trade. He has fulfilled campaign promises to renegotiate NAFTA and withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which he called at one point “a continuing rape of our country.” The administration’s trade war against China has made frequent headlines, while Trump seems to be slapping tariffs left and right on products from even American allies.

South of the Rio Grande, however, several Latin American countries have wholeheartedly embraced the concept of free trade. While Mexico, Peru, and Chile helped to pick up the pieces of the TPP to form the Comprehensive and Progressive

Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the three countries, along with Colombia, agreed to form a trade bloc known as the Pacific Alliance in 2011. Since then, the group has survived a number of challenges, including presidential changes in all four countries in a region where power transitions often lead to drastic changes in economic and foreign policy. At the Lima Summit in June 2019, the group reaffirmed its commitment to the principles of free trade.

However, protests in Chile and Peru have highlighted economic discontent associated with the end of a long-lasting commodity boom. Meanwhile, Trump’s presidency has brought ideas of protectionism to the forefront of

the international political stage, in an era where the traditional institutions of liberalism— and especially the global trading system—are under siege. These economic and political crosscurrents could easily make the Pacific Alliance the latest in a string of failed attempts to integrate Latin America—or a beacon of integration and free trade in the Western Hemisphere.

The Pacfic Alliance is likely to continue its position as the latter, thanks to the generally strong political will within the Alliance and its members’ views that the Alliance will counter damage done by protectionism elsewhere. However, its rise does not necessarily spell benefits for the United States, as it has become a vehicle for Latin AmeriH I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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can countries to turn away from the “American pond” in the Caribbean and towards the Pacific.

Reaping the “Early Harvests” Despite largely being under the radar in the American public debate surrounding trade, the Pacific Alliance has actually achieved a fair modicum of success in its short period of existence. Perhaps this is due to the Pacific Alliance’s current small size and pragmatic goals, which have meant that it is taking the route of the tortoise, not the hare, in achieving economic integration. As the Center for Strategic and International Studies described it, this “early harvest” stratagem paid dividends by making incremental progress on nuts-and-bolts issues rather than focusing on grand designs of regional integration that were likely to fail.

Nonetheless, it has proceeded with reforms at a fairly rapid clip. In the year after its founding in April 2011, it held four presidential summits, which served to summarize progress made and articulate clear policy recommendations. In that year, it created the institutions that would drive all future actions, established the baseline for an integrated stock market among the countries, organized joint trade missions to Asian partners, and inaugurated an organization for police and customs cooperation. Moreover, Mexico liberalized its visa policies towards Colombian and Peruvian nationals to enable freedom of movement.

In 2014, the four countries made progress on tariffs, agreeing to eliminate 92 percent of tar-

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iffs on intra-Alliance trade and create a timetable for the elimination of the other eight percent while loosening the bloc’s cumulative rules of origin, which helps to stimulate trade. The Alliance also finally integrated the Mexican stock exchange into its integrated stock markets, while the four parties also announced measures to improve support for small and medium businesses and scholarship initiatives to further educational collaboration.

The next few summits made less progress on the economic playing field and more on the political one as the Alliance reaffirmed its commitments in the wake of global political events such as the election of Donald Trump and Brexit. In 2016, Chile explicitly called out the isolationism inherent in Brexit and reaffirmed its own commitment to globalism as the bloc sought closer ties with the European Union, while the financial side saw the advent of new rules designed to give pension funds more access to the whole Alliance market and encourage infrastructure spending.

In 2017 and 2018, the Alliance made progress in instituting a common regional framework to fight climate change, initializing negotiations with Mercosur, a trade bloc composed of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, improving its relations with Asian countries, and rebuking President Trump’s protectionism.

At its most recent summit in Lima, the Alliance launched a flurry of new activity in both arenas. It signed declarations of cooperation with Japan, the Eur-

asian Economic Union, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, launched negotiations to upgrade Ecuador to full membership, and pledged to deal with plastic waste more sustainably.

At the Lima Summit, the future for the Alliance looked bright, yet the Alliance would soon face challenges that struck much closer to home than Trump.

Challenges from the Rio Grande to the Rio Mapocho Those challenges came in the form of protests that racked the region in the latter half of 2019.

In Chile, a subway fare increase in Santiago caused long-simmering student discontent over the country’s privatized and expensive system of higher education to bubble over. Since then, the protests have revealed other economic gripes surrounding the end of the commodity boom, such as rising inequality, underfunded pension systems, and disparate access to health care.

At the same time, Peruvian president Martin Vizcarra’s move to dissolve Congress in order to more effectively fight corruption sparked a political crisis. Although it soon ended, it had political ramifications: the previous two presidents who had fought for the Alliance, Ollanta Humala and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, found themselves under lock and key, accused of corruption, while Alan Garcia, the man who spearheaded the Alliance, took his own life rather than face charges.

Chile’s case especially illustrates the biggest challenge that the Pacific Alliance must face as it enters the new decade: the

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economic stagnation as the commodities boom of the early 2010s fades and the discontent that has accompanied, and will accompany, that stagnation. Ever since China’s rapid growth started to slow, it has taken Latin American economies, too dependent on resource exports to the Asian economic giant, down with it. In fact, Latin America has the lowest growth rate of any region in the world.

As a result, policymakers in the region have found themselves in a double bind: either extend Keynesian policies to ease their citizens’ suffering yet draw the ire of international institutions like the International Monetary Fund, or impose IMFbacked austerity measures and suffer defeat at the ballot box.

Although the members of the Pacific Alliance have the highest growth rates in the region and the best ability to recover, they have not been immune from the waves of protest that some have called the “Latin Spring.” Unfortunately, the Financial Times has

indicated that these protests are likely to continue throughout 2020 as the region continues to confront poor economic growth and entrenched inequality.

The trade war between the United States and China has also negatively impacted Latin America. Chile was “caught in the middle,” its Minister of Finance Felipe Larraín told the Financial Times. “Although our country has the widest web of free trade agreements in the world . . . we have had a very tough first half” of 2019, he said. And since trade wars have no winners, a continued slowdown in the economies of both the United States and China would spell problems for the Alliance, whose exports largely go to the two warring countries. Likewise, the newly-ratified US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) stands poised to hurt Mexico. With new rules that would effectively increase the minimum wage of Mexican autoworkers to US$16 an hour, economists have warned that

many automakers would move production to Asian countries like Vietnam or the Philippines with lower wages, standing to hurt Mexican exports.

In the current day and age, maintaining the support of the four member countries might also prove challenging. Although the Alliance has survived power transitions in Peru and Colombia, and even a shift from right- to left-leaning presidents in Chile, maintaining Mexican support presented a challenge after the election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a self-proclaimed left-wing populist. Although he ruffled feathers when he did not attend the Lima Summit, sending instead his Ministers of Economics and Foreign Affairs, the Alliance fits perfectly within his stated policy goals of increasing trade with other Latin American nations, opening up to China and Asian markets more generally, and with diversifying its export markets away from the United States. In short, while López Ob-

Fishermen return to port as a military ship patrols the waters near the venue of the fifth Presidential Pacific Alliance Summit. Paracas, Peru. July 2015.

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rador has not been as strident of a champion as his predecessor, enough political will in Mexico exists to keep it.

Looking to the Pacific and the Atlantic Of course, the three other Pacific Alliance countries share those policy goals and represent the three main opportunities for the Pacific Alliance.

First and foremost, it stands to increase connectivity and integration among Latin American countries. As Trump excoriated NAFTA and threatened to totally dissolve it, the three oth-

A Panama Canal worker docks a Chinese container ship at the Cocoli Locks. Panama City, Panama. December 2018.

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er full members publicly stood with Mexico against the threat.

The bloc allowed Mexico to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the NAFTA renegotiation since it offers the country a new market for its goods; it should also reduce uncertainty surrounding the implementation of the new USMCA. Although the rules surrounding cumulative countries of origin certainly benefit Mexico, other rules surrounding investments in infrastructure and pension funds, to name a few, can certainly benefit the three other countries as well.

More broadly, the Pacific Alli-

ance fits in with broader Latin American desires to reduce dependence on export markets in the United States.

There is also further potential for integration. The Pacific Alliance has repeatedly reached out to Mercosur, arguing that the Pacific Alliance can serve as Mercosur’s bridge to Asia. Integration with Mercosur would pose substantial benefits, almost doubling the size of the free trade bloc, allowing for more complicated value chains, and furthering Latin American integration, although the political feasibility of that integration remains in

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doubt. Additionally, the members of the alliance have indicated that Ecuador will likely join the Alliance later this year, expanding the economic potential of the alliance’s expansion.

But the Pacific Alliance is not just an inter-American project, as it noted in its entreaties to Mercosur, and one of the alliance’s original goals was to improve relations with Asia and the Pacific, as its name indicates. China is vastly increasing its presence in Latin America and has already inked free trade agreements with Peru and Chile on their own. In a sign of Chinese support, Xinhua, the Chinese state-run news agency, hailed the alliance’s goals of further integration with Asian markets and the Chinese market more specifically.

Beyond the obvious potential of trade relations with China, the Alliance admitted Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand as associate members in 2017, indicating its seriousness at improving trade relations in the broader Pacific region. All three have signaled their desire to deepen relations with the bloc: Singapore sees itself as a bridge between Southeast Asia and Latin America, while the bloc has entered into negotiations with Australia to establish a free trade agreement. Bloc-to-bloc negotiations also look promising, as the Pacific Alliance and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have explored cooperation in matters such as ecommerce, sustainable development, and small businesses, beyond the usual trade discussions. However, the bloc still needs to look towards clarifying

the status of associate members and implementing the policy recommendations that emerge from these discussions.

Even though the alliance has primarily looked to the Pacific, it has also found itself strengthening connections with Europe.

The European Union and the Pacific Alliance share goals of economic integration and multilateralism, which has provided a solid foundation for talks between the two groups. In September 2019, the two blocs signed a memorandum of understanding, with discussions ensuing on topics similar to those being discussed with ASEAN. On the state level, Germany and Spain, among others, have hailed the Alliance, viewing their observer status in the Alliance and the close relations between the Alliance and the European Union as beneficial to developing trade ties with Asia.

Growing the “Thinking Man’s Axis” Overall, the future of the Pacific Alliance looks strong. Even though it still has a long way to go in terms of increasing trade between its member states, the Pacific Alliance has maintained enough political will in its member countries to continue progress, partly because of the countries’ like-minded political cultures and partly because the pragmatic approach to integration means there is less opportunity for disagreement over hot-button political issues. Indeed, that nuts-and-bolts approach gives it plenty of opportunity to make progress on financial issues that international experts have identified as key

areas of concern.

Viewing the Pacific Alliance solely as a free trade area also misses the point. Indeed, the Alliance exists partially to brand its members as open for investment, ready to look towards the Pacific region, and champions of the ideas of liberalization, globalization, and integration. It has certainly succeeded on that point, especially given its further opportunities for growth in the Asia-Pacific region and its frequent denunciations of protectionism a la Trump. As The Atlantic trumpeted in a 2014 headline, the Alliance is the “most important alliance you’ve never heard of.”

Given the Alliance’s focus on increasing collaboration and connections with Asia, Latin America’s longstanding relationships between the United States, and the potential for increased integration with Europe, the Alliance has the perfect opportunity to become a bridge linking all three economies—under a U.S. administration dedicated to promoting free trade.

And while the rise of populism and protectionism may challenge other institutions, the Pacific Alliance views those challenges as opportunities to advance its own vision for economic integration and continued economic cooperation. As Peru’s former president Kuczynski told the Wall Street Journal, “We set out to create the Pacific Alliance because we wanted to set ourselves apart from the populists … We wanted a thinking man’s axis.” And in order to survive the coming decade, it must think deeply about its future—and act on that promise. H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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YOUR HONOR, AI Joshua Park Staff Writer

J

ust imagine for a moment that you have a fight with your landlord. Perhaps he is unreasonably raising your rent. Or perhaps he expects you to pay for certain defects in the property which you are not responsible for. Whatever the scenario may be, let’s imagine for a moment that you and your landlord have a dispute and it escalates to legal proceedings. You file a small claim for US$5000 and expect to meet with a lawyer or plead your case before a judge. This might be true for almost every county and country in the world, except Estonia.

Over the course of 2019, the Estonian Ministry of Justice, in conjunction with Estonia’s Chief Data Officer, have developed and piloted an artificial intelli-

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gence (AI) software to hear and decide on small claims disputes less than 7000 euros. The program is still just starting out and could potentially be the very beginning of a global wave of AI in the judiciary, but before all that happens, we must consider our past with integrating technology and the judiciary and carefully weigh the pros and cons.

Estonia’s Chief Data Officer, 28-year-old Ott Velsberg, wants to “eliminate the human element.”Although this sounds frighteningly similar to images evoked in Brave New World, 1984, and other dystopian science fiction stories, automation has already been increasingly integrated into the judiciary.

For example, across the world, digital cameras and software

have completely replaced any and all need for human interactions with the police or judge in relation to traffic offences, such as speeding or running red lights. Should you exceed the speed limit, a camera simply takes a photo of your license plate, which links to your name, address, and registration information to forward you a fine, whose amount is predetermined. While that might have been met with hostility upon introduction, they populate roads all across the world without much notice or remark.

But of course, this is still starkly different from Estonia’s proposal of an AI judge. AI differentiates itself from machine automation through a slightly perverse sense of self-thinking and

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self-growing––the very characteristics that we humans use to differentiate ourselves from machines. By definition, humans possess skills that machines cannot; in the case of the judiciary, it is the ability to critically analyse a situation and be sufficiently flexible to decide on fair judgements while adapting to a range of scenarios and consideration factors. A simple input/output, of speed for instance, is ok, but a thinking, analyzing entity? That sounds extreme.

Introduction of AI in the Judiciary Even before Estonia took the first deep dive into a “robot judge,”, other countries have slowly progressed their automation into AI. Taking the automated traffic fines example, Australia has expanded the system by implementing cameras supplemented with AI technology that look through your windscreen and analyse whether the driver is on their phone—a world first.

Perhaps this was not quite the AI integration into justice that the science fiction stories made it out to be, but it was still met with a slight sense of unease and invasion. Critiques aside, the system has now largely been accepted as the norm.

AI has been expanding into the judiciary, not just in the field of law enforcement but also in the previously-exclusive field of litigation. In 2014, a chatbot lawyer, called DoNotPay, carved out a niche for itself in being the world’s first AI lawyer. It had a very simple goal, which was to appeal parking tickets in the city of London. DoNotPay performed this bureaucratic task,

usually a job lawyers charge for, for free. Over the course of the first 21 months since its inception, it worked on 250,000 cases and won 160,000 of them. It is not a perfect score, but over US$4 million in overturned parking fines for an AI lawyer is impressive indeed. Although software like DoNotPay has a long way to go, its accuracy and effectiveness even in its early stages of development shows that even the profession of lawyering is prone to AI encroachment.

Permeating into all aspects of the litigation sphere, select cities and provinces in China, like Hangzhou, have also developed an AI judge in a cyber court setting, much like the model presented by Estonia. It was only in December 2019, that China’s highest court, the Supreme People’s Court, revealed that they had been utilising an AI judge.

In fact, they had been using the cyber court system since 2017.

This “Internet Court” engages with matters that involve the digital world to some respect, such as e-commerce disputes and copyright.

China’s cyber court holds two key distinctions from Estonia’s more radical change. First, the system is not government facilitated. Rather than Estonia’s official government channels, China’s court occurs as a function on WeChat, China’s predominant social media platform and a private company. So despite the formal sounding title, it is more akin to alternative dispute resolution like mediation. Second, as a consequence of being a non-government feature, it is an opt-in system. Users must mu-

tually agree to take the case up to the AI judge, but they can still pursue the traditional routes should they prefer.

Estonia, a small European country with just 1.3 million citizens, is by far the world’s biggest change when it comes to integrating AI with the judiciary; it will take over the small claims dispute resolution. This project is aided by the fact that Estonia has exponentially integrated with technology, with nation-wide ID cards and the vast majority of Estonians filing government documents online. Small claims often hamper judges from working on bigger, more important matters, and the cases create huge backlogs both for those needing to deliver justice and those seeking compensation. Estonia’s Ministry of Justice hopes to solve all that with this new initiative.

Benefits of an AI Judiciary For the Estonian and Chinese governments, the benefits are clear. AI judges are faster, they can process multiple cases at the one time, and they can find relevant legal documents almost instantly. Not only is this beneficial for the judges to focus on more important rulings, it is also helpful for the citizens who do not want to be caught up in the lengthy, expensive, and stressful litigation process.

AI judges also have the potential to be fairer than human judges. A joint study between Australia’s Swinburne University Law School and Queensland University of Technology found that courts in the status quo were influenced by arbitrary factors like race or socioeconomH I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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ic status. Moreover, because the judiciary as a collective body is composed of hundreds, if not thousands, of different judges, lawyers, and legal professionals, judgements were inconsistent across different courts. To illustrate, the study found that one court in Victoria, Australia’s second most populous state, was three times more likely to imprison offenders than other courts in the state. One centralised, consistent judge would be the logical solution, a physically impossible feat until now, with the development of AI. Moreover, in the particular case of AI lawyers as is in the United Kingdom, legal representation and just recourse has become much more accessible.

The biggest criticisms of the legal system is that it is too expensive to hire a lawyer and many are not aware of their options in gaining legal advice. A digital system allows individuals to access legal services for free and in their own time. This means that for the low and middle class, they can navigate any legal disputes for free and get the justice they deserve without having to sacrifice a work day or substan-

tial portions of their salary.

Dangers of an AI Judiciary Like with any technological innovation, the potential for hacking proposes a substantial risk.

This is particularly important when concerned with legal matters. Although the systems presently do not involve high stakes cases such as criminal trials, the courts have the potential to save or ruin lives, build or cripple companies, and set incredibly significant social precedents whose effects flow on for centuries. Already, the world has seen the impact of hacking into other branches of government through cases like electoral interference, and more technological integration into the judiciary is an invitation for vulnerability.

Moreover, because AI relies on having a vast database of past cases to then predict judgements for future cases, AI judges would recreate the past mistakes and implicit prejudices of past cases overseen by humans into perpetuity. AI does not have the capacity to adapt flexibly with the social mores of the time or recalibrate for errors of the past. And when the courts

are often used as social barometers with an ear towards the changes in social norms, it is imperative that the judges are not informed solely by the past.

Final Questions for the Future The arc of the judiciary towards AI integration has been an exceptionally slow one, and it probably will be very slow in the future. And with just reason, since the court system is one of the most impactful institutions in the world and one steeped in deep tradition and history. Any new step must be taken with extreme caution and be made sure that it is indeed a step in the right direction.

On one hand AI promises efficiency, consistency, and accessibility. On the other hand, it risks vulnerability to external influence and propagation of past injustices. Should justice be compromised for speed? What role does human interaction play in the justice system? Is an unemotional, purely consistent arbitrator even a good thing? How does technology grow with the times?

Going forward, legislators and innovators alike must grapple with these big questions. H

San Francisco District Attorney George Gascon discusses using an AI tool to remove potential bias in charging decisions. San Francisco, California. June 2019.

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“BALKAN SPRING” TWO STUDIES OF AUTOCRATIC STATES

Jelena Dragičević Staff Writer

People light torches in front of the Serbian parliament building during a protest march against populist President Aleksandar Vucic. Belgrade, Serbia. February 2019.

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n February 15, 2019, thousands of demonstrators marched in the streets of Belgrade, Serbia, calling for President Aleksandar Vucic’s resignation. “#1od5miliona” (1 in 5 million) decorated banners that spanned the crowd.

The slogan was a snide counterattack against Vucic, who had once said that he would never give in to the demands of demonstrators, even if there were five million of them. The demands: fairer elections, free press, and an end to authoritarian government. Essentially, protests in Serbia symbolized the country’s struggle for a functioning democracy. That same day, approximately 300 miles southwest of Belgrade, a similar protest against Montenegro’s President Milo Djukanovic took place in the capital of Podgorica.

The spring of 2019 brought something unexpected to the people of the Western Balkans: uniform political goals that transcended ethnic lines and divisions. Although not formally aligned, demonstrators in the Western Balkans all fought for reform within their state governments. Protests across the region, including the country Bosnia & Herzegovina, continued for months and ultimately led to a “Balkan Spring.” However, the corruption that has undermined democracy in the Western Balkans has been a persistent problem for decades now. Further complicating the issue is the EU’s difficult decision of whether or not to finally accept the corruption taking place in favor of speeding up the admission of Western Balkan nation-states into the EU.

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A man holds a banner during a protest against President Milo Djukanovic. Podgorica, Montenegro. March 2019.

Presently, the EU is set on holding back their admission of any new Western Balkan nation-states. EU reports state that countries like Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia & Herzegovina will have to overcome corruption to gain access to the EU. Serbia and Montenegro have both remained official candidate states for the EU since 2012 and 2010, respectively, and Bosnia & Herzegovina has remained a potential candidate state since 2003. But unlike Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro’s official EU candidacy accentuates the urgency for these two nation-states to resolve government corruption. One of the first steps to solve a problem is to

recognize there is one: Vucic and Djukanovic adamantly deny allegations of corruption, despite there being convincing evidence that suggests otherwise.

Serbia At the beginning of every new year, the Transparency International group releases a “Corruption Perceptions Index” that ranks 180 countries’ levels of corruption for the preceding year. Using the “2019 Corruption Perceptions Index,” there is insightful information on conditions in Serbia. On a scale of 0 to 100, 0 being “highly corrupt” and 100 being “very clean,” Serbia was rated 39 out of 100. This resulted in Serbia being ranked

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A couple wait at a bus station by graffiti that shows old Montenegro war flag, left, and old Montenegro flag, right. Inscription reads ''Do not touch our holy sites.'' Belgrade, Serbia. February 2020.

91 out of 180 for most corrupt countries in the world (with 1 being the least corrupt and 180 being the most).

Unsurprisingly, money is at the heart of Serbia’s corruption.

During the 1990s, Serbia was weakened by the Yugoslavian Civil War and NATO’s intervention in the 1999 Kosovo War. Serbia’s economy collapsed soon thereafter, culminating in high rates of poverty and unemployment across the country.

Policymakers have since undertaken initiatives to improve Serbia’s economy and standards of living, including a US$1.5 billion allocation from the EU meant to aid Serbia’s “economic development,” a necessary condi-

tion of EU admission. But despite some progress, 25 percent of the country remains poor, defined as struggling to earn a consistent paycheck and therefore unable to lead comfortable lives.

Worse, 7.3 percent of the country is absolutely poor, or unable to provide for even basic necessities like food. Compounding the problem of poverty are the high rates of unemployment that drastically fluctuate year to year.

In 2017, the overall unemployment rate in Serbia reached a high of nearly 15 percent. In 2019, it reached a high of roughly 13 percent. Youth unemployment rates in Serbia have been even worse, averaging 40 per-

cent from 2008 to 2019. Consequently, younger populations are emigrating from Serbia at an alarming rate to find jobs, further weakening Serbia’s workforce and GDP. Understanding the economic crisis of Serbia helps illustrate why people in this country may feel compelled to accept bribes in return for political favors and votes. In 2017, Vucic’s campaign offered money, jobs, and food for people willing to vote for him. Voter coercion and political corruption extend beyond individual candidates; as a member of the “Savez Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata” (SNS, translated as Alliance of Independent Social Democrats), Vucic and other H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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party members have often made SNS party membership a requirement for employees seeking a job in the public sector, despite Serbia having a “multi-party system.”

Vucic and his SNS party’s autocratic rule in Serbia have created an environment of fear for independent journalists, one that ultimately violates a central tenet of democracy: free press.

For years, journalists have been threatened and assaulted for investigating or publishing stories critical of Vucic and SNS. In December 2018, a supervisor at Serbia’s Belgrade airport had newspapers critical of the country’s government removed from stands. A year later, a reporter named Milan Jovanovic, who was writing an article on “local government corruption,” found his house burned to the ground.

Independent journalists in Serbia have obvious reason to believe that attacks are being ordered by public officials. However, the government disputes their account: an investigation into Jovanovic’s case found evidence that Dragoljub Simonovic, a prominent SNS member, was likely the one who ordered the attack. Taking all of these past and present violations of free press into account, Freedom House has given Serbia a “partly free” rating for their annual “Freedom of the Press” report since 2006, when the country formally became a sovereign, democratic nation-state.

Individual cases aside, it is evident that Vucic is keen on taking advantage of Serbia’s people and the dire circumstances of his country in order to gain political power. The violations com-

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mitted by Vucic and his government stand in direct contradiction to democratic values the EU supposedly cherishes. While Vucic continues to profess his desire to get Serbia into the EU, his actions show otherwise. Unless Serbia’s government chooses to acknowledge the “five million” demonstrators, Serbia will be entering a new decade as a country unable to answer the demands of its people—that is, a country unable to embrace democracy.

"MONTENEGRINS, AS THE BALKAN SPRING PROTESTS SHOWED, ARE AWARE OF THE THREAT THAT DJUKANOVIC AND HIS GOVERNMENT AND FAMILY POSE FOR THE COUNTRY. " Montenegro Montenegro did not experience nearly as much infrastructural damage as Serbia during the Yugoslavian Civil War, leading to superior economic opportunity. Further, Montenegro’s coastal location on the Adriatic Sea with mountainous terrain makes for a beautiful vaca-

tion spot for hundreds of thousands of tourists a year. Even so, the favorable conditions in Montenegro belie the country’s persistent struggle with corruption: oligarchs like Djukanovic pollute the public service sector with personal business interests. Montenegro is rated 45 out of 100 on the “2018 Corruption Perceptions Index,” putting it 66 out of 180 overall in the world for corruption.

The Montenegrin “Balkan Spring” further illustrated people’s acknowledgement and discontent with the corruption going on in Montenegro. Protests escalated after a leaked video showed a prominent, local businessman giving money to a “party associate” of Djukanovic in order to be allowed to continue his “shady business practices.” Djukanovic has a history of illegally abusing his power to obtain money and enrich himself and his family, making conflicts of interest and nepotism major components of Montenegro’s collapsed democracy.

Djukanovic has been in the public service sector for more than 30 years, where his track record shows a history of shifting alliances and “flexible” political ideology.

Once a supporter and close ally of Slobodan Milosevic, former President of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and later President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Djukanovic has since become a friend of the West, complicating anti-corruption efforts.

Western Europe is increasingly tolerant of the corruption going on in Montenegro, in part to preserve a strategic foothold in the region. Accordingly, Djukanovic

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has been able to deny allegations of his corruption, depicting critics as Russia-backed instigators trying to block Montenegro’s admission into the EU. In reality, though, most anti-government demonstrators in Montenegro and the Western Balkans are not critical of entering the EU. They simply object to the EU’s increasing tolerance of autocratic leaders while still claiming the importance of “democracy.”

The effects are clear. In 2005, Italian prosecutors accused Djukanovic and 14 other people, many of whom were Montenegrin officials, of illicit cigarette smuggling between the two countries during the 1990s.

During that decade, Djukanovic served as Montenegro’s Prime Minister three times. The reports extensively detail how Djukanovic helped orchestrate smuggling operations with the local mafia in Montenegro.

Charges against Djukanovic, however, were dropped when he declared diplomatic immunity in 2009. Since then, Djukanovic has continued to deny the allegations, all while having personally profited from the operation. As Ratko Knezovic, “former insider” in Montenegro’s government, notes, “Today Djukanovic’s family and a few associates control every piece of economic activity in the country.”

The questionable activity did not stop there. In 2006, Djukanovic created a council to oversee the privatization of public companies. He put himself as the president of that commission. When Montenegro’s Niksic Bank, since renamed First Bank,

put up 30 percent of its shares for purchase, Djukanovic helped his brother Aco Djukanovic secure the purchase. Since then, Djukanovic and his sister, Ana Kolarevic, have gained significant shares in the bank, as well.

Since the bank is a major source of income for the Djukanovic family, Djukanovic successfully campaigned to bail out the bank during the 2008 financial crisis.

Likewise, in 2008, he created the Montenegrin Investment Promotion Agency in order to encourage foreign direct investments in the country’s growing tourist industry. The committee has disguised its true intent of serving corrupt politicians through a parliamentary campaign claiming a “national interest.”

Watchdog groups in Montenegro have complained that Djukanovic’s private investments make his position in government a conflict of interest. Montenegro’s Commission for Determining Conflict of Interest, controlled by Djukanovic’s party, disagrees, pointing out that the government still owns some shares in the First Bank, and that investment in the tourist industry is of national interest. In light of those facts, the commission argues that Djukanovic is allowed to serve as an official of Montenegro’s government.

Djukanovic has also used his authority to secure important political and economic roles for his family and ultimately ensure himself more power.

As a New York Times article explained, “The president’s sister is the nation’s top lawyer, helping foreign investors join in the building boom sweeping across

the coast. His brother owns First Bank, the country’s largest financial institution. His son runs the country’s biggest power plant. His nephew is involved in the country’s largest tourism projects.”

Thus, the biggest threat to Montenegro’s democratization and entry into the EU is not “foreign Russian conspirators,” as Djukanovic would have the public believe; it is Djukanovic himself and the autocratic state he has created after more than 30 years in “public service.” Montenegrins, as the Balkan Spring protests showed, are aware of the threat that Djukanovic and his government and family pose for the country. Unfortunately, he is allowed to continue corrupt behavior, largely because other European states support a man whose hatred of Russia automatically makes him part of a strategic alliance against Russia. The relationship between the West and Djukanovic shows that some leaders are focused on geopolitical alliances and interests, even if it comes at the expense of democracy. And as the situation in Montenegro shows, sometimes those painted as “foreign conspirators” are unsung heroes fighting for democracy.

Thus, voter coercion, freepress violations, cigarette smuggling, conflict of interest, and nepotism united Western Balkan demonstrators against varying forms of autocracy in their countries. Unfortunately, the EU’s growing impatience, and the complex alliances between the West and public officials in Eastern Europe, have delayed reviving democracy in the Western Balkans. H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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UNMAKING DEMOCRACY HOW CORPORATE INFLUENCE IS ERODING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE Samar Ahmad Senior Writer

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an money be separated from politics? With billions of dollars being raised and spent on federal elections in the United States, it seems that the answer is a resounding no. The presence of money in politics is universally recognized and problematized by political figures on both sides of the aisle, despite the necessity of funding in ensuring that the messages of different candidates reach voters. As a result of this tension, there is ongoing disagreement about the extent

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to which money should infiltrate the political sphere. Should the system be revered, reformed, or accepted as inevitable?

The Age of Citizens United Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) is a landmark US Supreme Court case that upheld unlimited election spending by corporations, dismissing an egalitarian vision of democracy in favor of a libertarian conception of an unregulated marketplace of ideas. Campaign finance is now considered

a form of political speech that is protected by the First Amendment. Following Citizens United, outside spending groups such as super political action committees (PACs) and questionable political nonprofits have funneled unprecedented amounts of money into political advertisements and donations.

While Citizens United did not affect contribution limits, a subsequent case, McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014), did. It ruled that the government could not prevent citizens

COVER Activists pose as super PACs, corporate sponsors, and wealthy donors in a protest to get big money out of politics. Denver, Colorado. October 2012.

from giving campaign contributions to as many different candidates and political parties as they wanted. Research shows that perhaps the largest impact of these landmark cases is who funds elections, with wealthy individuals, known as “mega-donors,” contributing millions of dollars to federal candidates and parties. With each seven-figure check these mega-donors write, they establish closer ties with the politicians they endorse and overwhelm the efforts of thousands, if not millions, of small

donors.

This form of access is not considered unconstitutional, as it is not an explicit quid pro quo. But many, including Federal Election Commission member Ellen Weintraub, have called this influence into question. “One billionaire has so much more influence than thousands of voters combined. And that’s not the way the system should work,” Weintraub argues. Only 0.5 percent of Americans made a campaign contribution of US$200 or more in the 2018 midterm elec-

tion. The biggest political players in federal elections have become almost synonymous with the wealthiest individual donors, including figures like Michael Bloomberg and Sheldon Adelson. Unregulated flows of money into politics reinforce the idea that the government is beholden to the wealthy and that democratic participation for those who fall outside the upper echelons of society is of little value.

However, others argue that fewer regulations on campaign H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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finance are beneficial to voters.

Conservative campaign finance lawyer and former chairman of the Federal Election Commission Bradley Smith contends that more money in politics “has been shown to increase voter knowledge of candidates and issues.” But, even if it is true that more money can spur political speech, what actors like Smith fail to defend is the possibility for corruption that stems from allowing political entities to not disclose their funding sources. These secretive, dark money groups have spent billions of dollars in the past decade, with voters not knowing the source of the information they are receiving. The largest of such groups include center-right organizations like the National Rifle Association, Americans for Prosperity, and the US Chamber of Commerce. While these groups usually have very specific interest areas, they often take vague or unassuming names, thereby undermining the flow of accurate information and the democratic process.

Corporate spending additionally entrenches harms with lasting impacts, proving that the interests of money often fail to coincide with those of the public.

When it comes to drug pricing, for example, Americans have spent US$535 billion on prescription drugs in 2018, which marks an increase of 50 percent since 2010. Even though pharmaceutical companies receive substantial assistance from the government that lowers the cost of production, they continue to charge exorbitant prices for medications. As a result of such policies, one in four Americans with

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diabetes have engaged in insulin rationing—the dangerous and potentially fatal practice of using less insulin than is needed to make the doses last longer. Politicians are in the pockets of the pharmaceutical industry, passing legislation that undermines the ability to prevent the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives.

In the age of Citizens United, companies have become big players in government, tacitly using the state to enhance their own legitimacy while undermining that of the state itself.

When state actors become exceedingly concerned with profit, there is a direct trade-off with concern for the public good.

These consequences are not limited to the United States. There is a growing trend of companies taking control of the government and accordingly taking control out of the hands of the people those governments are intended to serve.

Cambridge Analytica The reach of Citizens United crosses borders. Robert Mercer, a prominent conservative donor who gave millions of dollars to Citizens United between 2012 and 2014, partnered with British firm Strategic Communications Limited Group (SCL) in 2013. SCL is the parent company of the political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica, which has been accused of manipulating the personal data of Indian citizens to affect the outcome of elections.

By claiming to be “the most sophisticated political research and data hub in the country,” SCL was allegedly able to facilitate a landslide victory for the

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the 2014 general elections. SCL documents include descriptions of its proposed “operations centre,” which housed a large team of consultants that provided guidance and information to party workers. The services it offered to Indian parties for the 2014 polls include, but are not limited to, research about how caste affiliation influences voting, target audience analysis, and legal support. While it is unclear whether any of India’s political parties worked with either Cambridge Analytica or SCL, both the BJP and the opposing Indian National Congress party have leveled accusations at one another.

Cambridge Analytica’s meddling did not stop there. Brittany Kaiser, former head of business development, revealed that the firm conducted work for the Leave.EU campaign and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) prior to the 2016 referendum on European Union membership. While Leave.EU and UKIP have denied such claims, Arron Banks, the co-founder of Leave.EU, has publicly stated that his group hired the firm. Banks has since backtracked on that confession, but internal emails provided by Kaiser bring to light discussions about early-stage voter analysis.

Kaiser has additionally testified that Cambridge Analytica had sent an invoice of 41,500 pounds to UKIP so that the firm could analyze its internal data. Nigel Farage, former Leave.EU and UKIP leader, is a close friend of Trump, Mercer, and Bannon, which establishes clear linkages between the Trump adminis-

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tration, the British right, and the European right. That is to say, wealthy individuals do not act alone, especially when it comes to exporting their beliefs and platforms on a massive scale.

One such connection includes that between Cambridge Analytica and Steve Bannon, which laid the groundwork for manipulating particular segments of the American voter population and fueling the alt-right prior to the 2016 elections. The Trump campaign hired Cambridge Analytica to lead its digital advertising platform in June 2016, and it was considered integral to his success. Furthermore, in 2018, Christopher Wylie, Cambridge Analytica’s former director of research, released a cache of documents revealing the company’s unauthorized possession of the private data of upwards of 50 million Facebook users so that it could create psychological profiles of voters. Wylie argued that this collection and exploitation of data for the purpose of targeted advertisements was part and parcel of “an insurgency in the United States.” His testimonies suggest that the firm wanted to promote conspiratorial and racist ideation to exacerbate those views among white voters and suppress turnout among black voters.

Cambridge Analytica is a shadowy global network of big data, billionaire investments, and transnational power grabs.

The events in India, Britain, and America are wholly intertwined and speak to a broader phenomenon of companies being used as tools of political subversion.

The firm’s unlawful use of private data in particular resem-

bles an authoritarian surveillance state, even more so than simple voter analysis. Cambridge Analytica’s documented relationship with the defense establishment and military clientele proves that their work was never meant to be a benign op-

"WITH EACH SEVEN-FIGURE CHECK THESE MEGA-DONORS WRITE, THEY ESTABLISH CLOSER TIES WITH THE POLITICIANS THEY ENDORSE AND OVERWHELM THE EFFORTS OF THOUSANDS, IF NOT MILLIONS, OF SMALL DONORS." eration—it was about using military strategies like infiltration and manipulation on civilian populations to further murky interests. Microtargeting does not create the conditions for a robust democracy or a marketplace of

ideas. Similar to the aftermath of Citizens United, Cambridge Analytica represents the demise of clear and transparent information and points to the fragility of democratic institutions in a world where billionaires are increasing their control and reach.

What Comes Next?

That brings us to our original question: what is to be done about the unprecedented scale to which money pervades and structures global governance?

Cambridge Analytica’s abuses of powers were, in many ways, enabled by institutional failure to prevent and respond to such unlawful acts. Moreover, the messages that the firm was able to disseminate reflect how democracy can easily be subverted by monopolizing on background noise and cultural anxieties that have persisted for centuries and will continue to persist in a world where technology continues to advance.

Regardless of whether court cases are overturned or corporations are condemned, wealthy individuals will inevitably have influence, but that is exactly the reason that average people cannot fall victim to their tactics and fail to interrogate the information they receive and the organizations they participate in. Vigilance, conscious consumption of information, and increased awareness will all have to improve in an increasingly deceptive world. Democracy works when we rewrite the rules that have failed to work in the past, and demand change. Preventing corporate capture of our government requires that everyone is making those demands. H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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Anti-Brexit protesters outside of the Houses of Parliament. London, England. February 2020.

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THE DEATH OF THE EUROPEAN CENTER-LEFT Andy Wang Senior Writer

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n 2019, the European Union (EU) held parliamentary elections, one that would serve not only to seat a new legislature, but also to act as a referendum on the state of Europe. In the years since the last elections in 2014, the European Union had been battered by challenges to its core: a refugee crisis, financial failures, and Brexit. In response, voters across the continent began electing far-right and nationalistic governments domestically. Fidesz in Hungary, The League in Italy, and the Freedom Party of Austria rose to power on platforms against immigrants and European integration. At the same time, the rise of the climate crisis meant a wave of left-leaning green parties, usually called the Green Party, ascending to national governance. After losing voters on both sides, it was no surprise that the election results were dismal for the center in Europe. The far-right had increased their representation in the European Parliament to 25 percent, and the Greens had added 25 seats to their bloc, both largely at the expense of the European center-left.

This unprecedented blow to the traditional political order meant that the long-ruling Grand Coalition of the center-left and the center-right received only 44 percent of seats in the parliament. But on a larger level, the European elections were simply a reflection of the center-left’s fall from grace within the European countries, including the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Germany, the Socialist Party of France, and Labor in the UK. Without the center-left, governance in Europe has lost its stabilizing force. Since 1945, the center-left has played a vital role in almost every major democracy

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in Europe by being part of either the government or the opposition.

The center-left’s failure to reform and adapt to the present challenges of the EU has had shockwaves beyond the parties themselves, including feeding into alternative political parties as well as the loss of cohesive social policy across Europe.

Embracing the Market In a way, the decline of the center-left was somewhat foreseeable.

The market-regulatory policies ushered in by the center-left after World War II created a remarkable period of stability within the European economy. The flood of investment from the Marshall Plan and a boom in industry brought a high increase in the quality of life for almost all West Europeans. But while recognizing the economic growth through increased capitalism, European center-left leaders were skeptical of its stabilizing effects. In previous decades, speculative markets and lack of security had contributed to the Great Depression, financial insecurity, and the rise of nationalistic sentiment. Therefore, strong trade unions, government saving, and sustainable growth became focuses of these governments. Through these policies aiming to prevent economic windfalls, the following quarter century was the period of highest growth in Europe, according to data from the World Bank.

The center-left leaders also realized the limits of capitalism in equitable development, and thus redirected vast amounts of funds to stronger welfare states, propping up education and healthcare to redistribute the economic boom to its citizens. In return, European countries were able to deal with

social issues with fair stability. In doing so, the center-left presided over a period of stability both economically and socially.

The center-left of the last decade has failed to reflect any of these sentiments by straying away from their post-war roots. Instead of cushioning workers and voters from the destabilizing effects of the market, many European center-left parties instead turned to an embrace of the market. While nonetheless supporting a social security net, leaders like Gerhard Schroeder of the SPD in Germany stopped their critique of capitalism as the source of inequality itself. Instead, at some points, these “Third Way” parties became indistinguishable from the center-right in many of the same countries. Tony Blair’s New Labor in the UK separated itself from the labor unions that had traditionally been its backbone. And amidst the disastrous financial crisis in 2008, the center-left bailed out big banks just like the center right, while imposing austerity measures onto their workers to pay for it.

Since then, in the instances where they have governed, center-left parties have been in leadership at a time when wages are gradually becoming more inequitable, and more of corporate profits are going to shareholders. Data from the OECD notes that income inequality now is even worse than it was one generation ago. In essence, the center-left has failed to curb the very issues they were voted in office to solve.

A Changing Society A key source of the post-war stability in Europe was also the sense of solidarity that the center-left parties provided, often tied

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to the idea of a paternalistic state.

Strong social security systems gave individuals a sense of certainty, knowing that their governments had their backs in a worst case scenario. In return, voters felt a strong sense of national loyalty towards their states, electing the center-left and center-right and agreeing to their program of higher taxes. Yet, in the last few decades, the social order of Europe itself has changed. The signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1985, leading to free movement between EU countries, has led to greater internal migration. Simultaneously, more immigrants also have been coming from outside the European Union from countries such as Turkey and Morocco.

Social and cultural tensions resulting from a changing society chipped at the cohesive fabric in Western European states, which have largely been ethnic nation-states. Especially after the September 11 attacks, public anxiety about Muslim immigrants has made integration more difficult for some immigrants. The center-left’s inability to address these social issues with coherent policy resulted in many wondering what the center-left stood for. There was no direct rebuke to the nationalistic and sometime racist rhetoric of the far right, which views immigration in a much more negative light. Unable to craft a coherent narrative about their vision of society going forward, center-left parties were unable to amass the social and political capital needed to support their traditional program of the welfare state and high taxes.

In their absence, the far-right has been able to gain significant traction. Instead of shying away from

discussions about globalization and multiculturalism, parties such as the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) have addressed the topics head on and presented them as lethal challenges to a country. Their main support base has come from the traditional voters of the center-left: workers, lower-income families, and individuals of lower education, precisely those who perceive they have the most to lose by social and cultural changes. The right’s rhetoric about strong leadership has a very strong appeal to those who perceive the loss of stability in their lives, whether from immigration or from globalization. In the wake of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to open up Germany to refugees from Syria and other key zones in 2015, the AfD presented themselves as the only “defender” of the German national identity.

By providing a clear “alternative path”, the AfD was able to launch an almost-deadly threat to the traditional order in the Bundestag after the elections in 2017, becoming the third largest party with 13 percent of seats. At the same time, the SPD, which had internal party strife over their vision for Europe, gained only 20.5 percent of votes, the lowest since WWII. The populist movement gained steam on economic issues, but has remained at the forefront of European politics due to its opposition to cultural liberalization and their emphasis on perceived loss of national sovereignty through mass immigration. By using immigration as a key political talking point, the populists across Europe also attack the multinational organizations that have traditionally promoted stability and order.

They have been winning so far,

with the ANO party in Czechia and the far-right anti-immigration League in Italy as prime examples.

These rises in power are usually directly correlated with losses for the center-left, even in liberal bulwark Scandinavia, where the rise of nativist parties are growing.

At the same time, the populist right does not prioritize liberal democracy or human rights. They often attack the free media as being unfair to them and the systems of checks and balances biased against them. Focus on solidarity of race or ethnicity ostracizes and even invites violence and harassment against minorities. These stand in stark opposition to the core European values of equality and rule of law, as written into the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. If the populist right is left unchecked, their hold over Europe can only grow.

A Green Wave Before the May 2019 elections, 77 percent of a sample of EU voters cited global warming as one of their key issues for the election.

This poll was indicative of a trend over the last few years, with the environmental movement coming out of the fringes and making its way toward the mainstream. Individuals like Greta Thunberg mobilized young people, while groups like Extinction Rebellion drew awareness to the issue. The results of the European Election displayed this acute awareness as well. The European Green bloc surged to become the fourth largest group in the European Parliament, making them an essential party whether in opposition or governance. As a show of their legislative sway, the new Commission President, Ursula von der H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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Climate activist Greta Thunberg, center, attends the "Friday For Future" rally. Berlin, Germany. March 2019.

Leyen, put forth a “Green Deal” package.

Much of this surge in the Green Party was at the expense of the center-left. The Green parties are strongest in the well-off nations in the North and West of Europe: Germany, Benelux, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries. The majority of the supporters of the Greens are young, university-educated, and middle class. In the past, much of the Green Party’s success was due to its alignment, for better or for worse, with the social democratic left, which was slow to respond to the environmental questions posed by the movement. In Germany, the Greens were often junior coalition partners with the SPD, while in Spain and the United Kingdom, the center-left have vied for votes against the Greens.

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Now, the Greens have opened themselves up to governing as a minority partner with a conservative parties, as in the case of Hesse and Baden-Württemberg in Germany. In such cases, the Greens and Conservatives govern conservatively, both economically and socially.

Indeed, the middle-class and educated voters of the traditional center-left seem to have flocked toward the Greens, who seem to be addressing their most pressing issue. In 2017, the Green Left Party in the Netherlands won 14 seats in Parliament, greatly boosting their vote over the four seats they had in 2012. Their leader, the charismatic 30-year old Jesse Klaver, advocated a platform of social unity, reduced coal emissions, and a plastics tax. In doing so, the Greens emerged as a large force in oppo-

sition to the majority-conservative government formed directly after.

So has been the pattern all across Europe, with the Greens gaining steam for their environmental focus. The social democratic left has lessons to learn from them about voters’ key priorities.

What Comes Next The competition between the center-left and the center-right has been the source of much of Europe’s stability in the post-war period. The two parties balanced each other out, offering diverse solutions to issues while never moving too far from the center.

However, now that the center-left is beginning to approach its death in much of Europe, the very organization of democratic politics has become unraveling. In Germany, five parties sit in the Bund-

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estag, leading to the longest coalition talks in history, while in the United Kingdom, Labor could not even make up its mind over their approach to Brexit. With many of the new parties focused on single issues, such as the environment or immigration, larger and overarching issues such as market regulation, social integration, and equal distribution are left untouched. As such, it seems that many of the issues currently plaguing Europe will be unresolved for the foreseeable future, feeding into more nationalist and populist fuel.

Perhaps more dangerously, the lack of a center-left has meant coalitions tread on dangerous ground. In the German state of Thuringia, state elections resulted in a large split in parliament, especially with large parliamentary blocs with the leftist Die Lin-

ke party and the nationalist Alternativ Für Deutschland party. In a stunning secret ballot upset, the leader of the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), the libertarian party, was elected as minister president of the state despite the FDP barely clinching above the five percent threshold. In addition to the support of his own party, Thomas Kemmerich of the FDP gained votes of the Christian Democratic Union and the AfD. It was the first time in German history either of the center two parties had entered government with the support of the far-right party. Even more upsetting to many members of the German public was evidence of a possible internal deal between the parties.

The center-left has hope for the future, if they can reflect internally and realign themselves. The “Golden Ages” of European center-left parties, as in directly following the World Wars, is no longer attainable. The rise of multinational corporations, the trend of intercontinental migration, and the trend towards individualism have changed the rules of the game. But the values for which the center-left once stood––for bridging the gap between what workers desire and the inherent social structure of capitalism––has as much relevance, if not more, than ever.

To start, the center-left must acknowledge the current challenges faced by working people across Europe and listen to their voices. The goal is not to shun multiculturalism, globalism, or social changes, as in the instance of the far-right, but to confront the issues within society and to regulate their influence. Just as many people protest growing inequali-

ty, this means returning to a role of advocating for a stronger social welfare state and decrying the neoliberal influence of the Third Way over the last decades. Without doing so, there is no one in Europe who hears and addresses complaints of inequality, societal alienation, and unemployment. By actually listening to their voters, the center-left can be able to defeat the narrative of the farright that governments have neglected to care for its citizens.

Moreover, the center-left must realize that the environmental movement is deeply rooted in the future of Europe and listen to the voters’ demands. No talk of development or equality can ignore the issue any longer, especially as voters leave en masse to a party focusing on these issues. The future of social democracy rests in either being able to collaborate closely with the Greens or perhaps even a merger of the two movements. The Green Left, in the Netherlands, for example, is a merger of four progressive parties who agreed on a unified environmental and social justice platform. A “Green New Deal” in the vein of what has been proposed in America can also be a reconciliation of the social and environmental agendas.

The time to act for the center-left in Europe is now. The European elections of 2019 should have served as a wake-up call, indicating that Europe believes the current state of the center-left does align with their vision any more.

In the face of a rapidly changing world, the center-left cannot wait any longer. If they refuse to adapt, then they will become obsolete–– and Europe will take much longer to recover from its current political situation. H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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UPHOLDING THE RULE OF LAW H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

WILL POLISH DEMOCRACY SURVIVE THE SIEGE ON ITS JUDICIARY?

Sydney Young Senior Writer

Protestors stand outside of the Supreme Court. Warsaw, Poland. January 2020.

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fter the fall of communism in Europe, many scholars and political analysts thought Poland had the best chances for a successful democratic transition. However, the Polish government of the modern era has taken a different path. The right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS), which assumed power after the 2015 elections, regularly censors media outlets, prevents freedom of assembly, and tries to restrict the activities of non-governmental associations. Perhaps the greatest threat to Polish democracy is the PiS’s unrelenting attack on judicial independence, a move that could summon sharp criticism from the European Union.

What explains Poland’s departure from the path to democracy? How could a country built on democratic values suddenly descend into illiberal populism? Is the shift in Polish governance a symptom of a broader retreat from the rule of law? The rise of PiS, driven by its leaders’ commitment to wealth redistribution, its lack of political opposition, and Poland’s long history of territorial division, now marks the country’s descent into populism that now threatens to weaken the rule of law and place Poland’s membership in the European Union (EU) in danger.

Judgement Day On January 11, 2020, thousands of judges and lawyers took to the streets, protesting against Poland’s proposed judicial reforms: the newly minted PiS party leaders had packed Poland’s highest court, the Constitutional Tribunal, with judges loyal to the current administra-

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tion. They also took control over the National Council of the Judiciary, the body of government with the power to appoint new judges. A bill passed this February mandates that judges who criticize the new government’s judicial appointments and reforms will be punished.

Party officials have spun the reform as a revival of the judicial system. They argue that the courts are filled with incapable, corrupt judges who need to be removed in order for the Polish government to be restored.

“What is happening is a deepening of democracy,” said Polish President Andrzej Duda. “The judges will no longer rule themselves. They aren’t some extraordinary caste; they are servants of the Polish people.” However, this narrative seems to be a means of hiding the party’s actual motivations for passing the reforms. By clearing the courts of any judges who oppose the party's agenda, the PiS will essentially eliminate judicial independence.

Judicial independence refers to the concept that a nation’s court system must remain free from any outside influences that could sway judges to render judgements based on factors unrelated to the case being decided upon. As John MacMenamin, a judge on the Irish Supreme Court, puts it, “If judges are not independent, they are not judges.” If Polish judges know they will face punishment for criticizing the PiS, they will likely rule in favor of the PiS because they fear the consequences of ruling in the opposite direction.

By packing the courts with judges loyal to the party, the PiS will

continue to chip away at any checks on its power, and as history has shown us, unchecked power is a recipe for authoritarianism and the death-knell for democracy.

The Narrative that Propelled the Rise of Law and Justice The Law and Justice judicial reforms, while uniquely destabilizing for Polish democracy, reflects a broader transition to populism in the country. The 2015 electoral victory stands out as a major milestone in this transition, since it marks the first time since Poland’s independence in 1989 that a left-wing party does not control the government. However, the story of how the PiS was able to rise to power begins long before the fall of communism.

During the 18th century, Poland was partitioned three times

by Russia, Prussia, and Austria: once in 1772, once in 1793, and once in 1795, respectively. After the final partition, Poland ceased to exist as an independent state until 1918. Poland was again defeated by an outside power in 1939, except this time, it surrendered after being invaded by Nazi Germany. Poland remained under communist leadership until 1989, when the Polish labor union Solidarity finally forged an agreement to create an independent Poland.

However, this pact with the former communist government created a power sharing agreement in which some of the former party leaders received amnesty. The members of Solidarity who despised communism and championed the ideals of liberal democracy scoffed at the H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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agreement, which they thought gave too much power to the old elites.

Thus, the foundation for the eventual victory of Poland’s incumbent party, Law and Justice, was laid. The narrative that spurred the party’s victory was ultimately a result of continued animus about the pacted agreement with the communist government, religious conservatism, xenophobia, and national sentiment that some Polish citizens had been excluded from the nation’s recent economic gains.

Referencing the Partitions of Poland, the invasions of World War II, and communist rulership, PiS leaders argued that Poland had long been the victim of outside intervention, and the country desperately needed to re-assert its national identity. The party has now created “LGBT-Free” zones, asserted Catholic values, and illegalized suggestions that Poland aided in perpetuating the Holocaust. These attacks on minority populations are part of the PiS strategy to present itself as the defender of a nation that has long suffered at the hands of outsiders. Leaders subsequently demonize anyone who opposes the PiS as an enemy of the people.

The current leader of Law and Justice, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, drew on this narrative in order to justify reforms that erode judicial independence and the rule of law. He said that the pact created in 1989 benefitted liberal elites at the expense of the common people, and the current court system only serves the interests of these wealthy elites.

The courts cannot serve the masses unless they are a reflec-

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tion of the party, and the only way for the courts to be a reflection of the party is by banning judges from engaging in any acts of opposition.

However, this narrative alone cannot explain why the PiS rose to power when it did. Since division and outside invasion were already deep set after Poland broke free of communist rule in 1989, why was it only in 2015 that a party like PiS acquired a majority in government?

Empty Pocketbooks and a Weak Opposition While Poland’s history explains why the PiS formed its central narrative the way it did, financial concerns and the weakness of the opposition explain how the party was able to come to power more recently. The PiS offered 500 zloty, or the equivalent of US$130, per month to each child in a family. While some die-hard PiS supporters would have voted for the party regardless of this financial policy, this offer of expanded childcare allowed it to attract voters who might normally be wary of voting for an administration that embraces anti-democratic values. As one reluctant PiS voter said, “500 zloty, even though I am against that kind of government spending, is sometimes helpful.” Since the opposition emphasized infrastructure spending over childcare, voters had no choice but to vote PiS if they wanted this expanded financial support.

The Global Happiness and Political Attitudes Survey, after conducting thousands of interviews in 15 different countries, found that 37 percent of

people say that their children’s happiness is the most important part of their lives. They concluded that the rise of populism can be attributed to widespread government failure to prioritize its citizens’ happiness. It’s not a complete surprise, then, that the expanded childcare benefits offered by the populist PiS gave the party a significant upper hand over the opposition.

Besides failing to promote a welfare state popular with a wider constituency, the opposition faced two more roadblocks.

First, it’s not clear who leads the opposition to Law and Justice. The most common response polls that asked Polish citizens who was the leader of the opposition was either “don’t know/ hard to say” or “no clear leader.” In one poll, the officials that received the most votes included Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council, and Robert Biedron, an outgoing mayor at the time the poll was conducted, neither of whom were even involved in Polish domestic politics. Secondly, while the PiS has a well-defined narrative, the opposition cannot say the same.

Their strategy is to build their platform on being anti-PiS and to criticize the incumbent party for any scandals that emerge.

However, this method is ineffective when the PiS has been proposing popular policies such as expanded childcare, which the opposition cannot criticize without losing support.

Thus, the opposition, unable to counter the increasingly powerful PiS, was defeated.

One might argue that the opposition is making a comeback given their performance in the most

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recent elections, where it gained a narrow majority in the upper chamber of parliament. However, this slight gain can hardly be called a true win for the opposition, or a sign that it will prevail over PiS, especially given the current court reforms. As long as Law and Justice maintains control over the Supreme Court, there may not be checks on an invalid election, meaning that the opposition will face an uphill battle to achieve a decisive victory.

Zooming Out One might wonder if the Law and Justice party’s firm grip on the levers of power and its concerted effort to alter the judiciary in its favor have any implica-

tions for global politics. There is no clear answer, but PiS reforms will threaten its status in the European Union (EU).

The bill to punish judges who oppose the PiS has sparked concern in the EU. A few politicians have proposed suspending some financial grants to Poland if it fails to promote the rule of law. “You can’t be a member of the European Union if you don’t have independent, impartial courts operating in accordance with fair trial rule, upholding union law,” said Koen Lenaerts, the President of the European Court of Justice.

Whether or not the EU will attempt to censure Poland, or whether Poland will leave the EU, is all up for debate, but one

trend is clear: Poland’s withering support for the rule of law reflects a broader European battle with populism. A long list of countries, including Hungary, Italy, and Germany, have all seen the rising popularity of right-wing parties in recent years, and concerns about the survival of the rule of law are not limited to Poland. Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, has placed restrictions on non-governmental organizations, media, and the courts that have all faced criticism from members of the EU. Until political parties restore voters’ trust that strong liberal institutions can secure their happiness and well-being, democracy will be caught playing defense. H

Judges of the "Iustitia" association release a report of the judges and prosecutors who are facing reprisals for questioning the recent changes to the court system. Warsaw, Poland. February 2020.

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Toronto, Canada. July 2015.

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

WHY CANADA NEEDS ELECTORAL REFORM Melina Meng Staff Writer

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he road to establishing democracy in Canada has been a long one, with the first instances of popular elections taking place in what was then the colony of New France, now the province of Quebec. Special members of the colonial council in Quebec City, called syndics, were elected to serve as mediums through which the council and electors could communicate to each other. This purely communicative role was later expanded into that of a full council member. By 1657, it was decreed that there should be four popularly-elected candidates on the council who would be determined by a single-member plurality vote, meaning whichever candidate attained the most votes in their

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district would win the seat. This foundational mechanism has remained essentially unchanged ever since.

The rest of the political system and electoral conditions have evolved throughout the years, taking on considerable influence from the British following the removal of French governance with the 1763 Treaty of Paris. At the time, what is now Canada was still a collection of separate colonial territories, each with their own methods of governance and organization; it would not be until 1867, the year of Confederation and the creation of the Dominion of Canada, that the territories would be unified. Between these events, one of the main obstacles to democracy was that the upper

houses of government, which were appointed, could block legislation approved by the lower houses, which were elected.

Although technically still possible, as a bill must receive approval from both houses before it can pass into law, convention strongly dictates that the upper house should approve bills which pass in the lower house.

With the unification of Canada into a single country, uniform standards could then be applied across the provinces, leading to slow and incremental change. Women were given the right to vote in federal elections in 1918, although the franchise would only be formally defined by federal legislation in 1920.

First Nations peoples living on reserves were given the right to

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vote in 1960, and the minimum voting age was lowered from 21 to 18 in 1970. Generally, subsequent attempts to restrict eligible voters due to incarceration, occupation, mental capacity, or other similar reasons have been struck down. With this steady trend towards a more inclusive and fair democracy, it is curious that the fundamental mechanism for electing representatives has not changed since 1657. It seems that after a long period of evolution and modernization, the Canadian electoral system has come to a standstill, leading to increasing voter dissatisfaction and diminishing participation rates which threaten the very foundation of democracy.

Canada’s political system is officially a constitutional monarchy with the Queen of Canada, Queen Elizabeth II of England, a holdover from Canada’s former colonial status, at its head. The Queen’s role, however, is purely symbolic, and she is said to rule but not to govern.

The legislative branch of government, collectively referred to as Parliament, is divided between the Senate and the House of Commons, the latter of which is popularly elected while members of the former are appointed. There are currently 338 seats in the House of Commons, each representing an electoral district established through a representation formula outlined in the Constitution. In order to win a seat in the House of Commons, a candidate only needs to achieve a plurality of votes, meaning the greatest number of votes compared to other candidates, rather than a simple majority. This is a single-member plurality sys-

tem, commonly referred to as first-past-the-post (FPTP). Rather than voting for a political party, voters elect the individual who may or may not be affiliated with a political party. Still, the overwhelming majority of elected Members of Parliament (MPs) are from official political parties, with the party winning the most seats in the House of Commons forming government.

The leader of that party is then asked by the Governor General, the Queen’s official representative, to assume the role of Prime Minister and head the executive branch of government. This system prioritizes the party in power holding a majority of seats in Parliament in order to encourage the formation of a strong and stable government. However, in recent decades there have been growing calls for electoral reform due to the recurrent disproportionality of elections and legislature, as well as the exaggeration and perpetuation of regional divisions.

The Failures of First-Past-ThePost The most common grievance Canadians have with the current electoral system is how the legislature consistently misrepresents the popular vote, often quite drastically. In the most recent election for example, the Liberal Party of Canada obtained 46.4 percent of the seats in the House of Commons with only 33.1 percent of the popular vote. This allowed them to form government, despite the Conservative Party of Canada earning a slightly larger percentage of the popular vote with 34.4 percent.

This example is far from being

an outlier. The FPTP system often produces these disproportionate results; back in 2015, the Liberal Party won a majority of seats in government with only 39.5 percent of the popular vote.

Such results clearly do not accurately reflect the will and opinions of the Canadian population as a whole, and they suffer from a lack of predictability. Geography comes to play a decisive role when it comes to political representation in single-member plurality constituencies, and this leads to a multitude of problems. Each party may only run one candidate per riding, a specific geographic division determined by demographic and population size, and electors cast a single vote for their preferred representative in their assigned constituency. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat, and there is no minimum threshold or margin of votes by which the candidate must win over the runner-up. Parties which acquire a significant portion of the popular vote but fail to come in first in a riding get nothing; the votes which go to parties with runner-up candidates are essentially wasted, as they do not translate into any form of representation in the government. This characteristic of the current electoral system often leads to “strategic” voting, where electors cast votes not for their preferred candidate, who could hail from a smaller or less popular party in their riding, but for the candidate most likely to beat their least preferred option.

The political landscape thus devolves into a two-party system split between the most estabH I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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lished parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, even though Canada possesses a multi-party system with many alternatives.

The FPTP system makes it hard for these alternative parties to gain a significant foothold in the House of Commons, despite the popular vote proving that they are, in fact, quite popular.

In addition to the prevalence of strategic voting, the dependence of FPTP on geographically-defined ridings makes the system susceptible to gerrymandering, the practice of defining constituencies in such a way that a specific party is inherently favored due to the distribution of partisan voters. Even without gerrymandering, the small geographic size of many ridings—determined by population density—means that voting populations are necessarily split up, making it harder to ensure an appropriate proportionality between electors and the legislature. In metropolitan areas, ridings usually encompass only a handful of neighbourhoods that are very demographically diverse, whereas in rural areas they are much larger but also more homogenous. Rural areas tend to come off stronger in elections because the voters are more unified, whereas in the urban population vote-splitting is a common occurrence.

For parties besides the Liberals and Conservatives, a very high concentration of regional support is needed for success.

The system works in favor of region-specific interest groups, hindering parties with platforms that have more general appeal across the entire country.

Case in point, during the 2019

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federal election, the were major upsets between the Bloc Québécois, a party which only exists in the province of Quebec, the Green Party, Canada’s dedicated environmentalist party, and the New Democratic Party, a socialist democratic party that is traditionally third-largest in Parliament. The Bloc Québécois secured 7.7 percent of the popular vote while the Green Party obtained a comparable 6.5 percent, but the Bloc Québécois came away with 32 seats in the House of Commons while the Green Party only got three. Even more jarring was that the New Democratic Party earned 15.9 percent of the popular vote, more than double that of the Bloc Québécois, yet they only secured 24 seats. The tactics required of political parties in order to succeed in this system tend to exaggerate and encourage regional divisions across provinces and communities, since parties will often choose to prioritize region-specific issues to secure a voting stronghold. As a result, election results create the impression that Canadians are far more divided than they really are, as small shifts in the popular vote can lead to extreme changes in the legislature.

Why Canadians Need Change These are but a few of the well-documented discrepancies continually produced by the single-member plurality system. However, if the government has managed to function so far, what’s the point in changing now? A compelling argument for electoral reform is Canada’s diminishing voter participation, as well as overall low

participation from young voters. Between the years of 1945 and 1988, approximately 75 percent of eligible voters cast their ballot on election day. This has since dropped to 60 percent, a trend that shows little sign of reversing. Furthermore, it is especially worrying that this decline is happening in large part due to a lack of participation from young voters, with people in the age groups from 18 to 29 having the lowest voter turnout.

Adopting an alternative electoral system that produces a more representative legislature is one way of tackling low voter participation rates. Studies have shown that proportional representation systems, which aim to translate the proportions which emerge in popular votes into the legislative body, increase voter turnout. It is suggested that one of the main reasons for this increase in participation is that every vote counts towards representation, instead of only the votes going towards winning candidates in individual districts. Currently, people will often decide not to vote if their riding traditionally leans very strongly towards one party, as they see no point in casting a ballot that is unlikely to make a difference.

Another issue with the Canadian political system that could potentially be improved through the adoption of a proportional representation voting system is the underrepresentation of women and minority groups in Parliament. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made headlines when he appointed Canada’s first gender-balanced Cabinet upon his election in 2015, but

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discrepancies still exist in overall representation. The results of the latest election have only 29 percent of seats in the House of Commons held by women, and although they make up 5 percent of the population, just under 3 percent of seats are filled

by First Nations representatives.

Studies show that major democracies using proportional representation systems consistently outrank major democracies that still use FPTP in the percentage of seats held by women. In the case of ethnic and cultural minority candidates, they tend to only have strong chances of being elected in ridings with a large minority group population. This is another instance of the primacy and necessity of a high territorial concentration of support, something that is rarely guaranteed in many of the highly mixed and multicultural metropolitan areas where a sig-

nificant portion of the Canadian population lives.

While retiring the FPTP system has been a significant topic of debate in Canada since the 1990s, the issue gained new momentum during the 2015 federal election. Electoral reform was included in the platforms of all major political parties, with the Liberal Party under Trudeau pledging to ensure that 2015 would be the last federal election to use FPTP. Although the Liberal Party won the election with a decisive majority of seats, electoral reform was dropped from the agenda by 2017. Trudeau justified the breaking of this seminal campaign promise by claiming that Canadians did not agree on which alternative system of voting to adopt and voicing his own opposition to proportional representation. He instead offered the ranked ballot method, where voters classi-

fy a certain number of candidates based on preference, stating that it would result in greater political unity for Canadians.

This stance drew a fair amount of criticism, mainly because political theorists predict the Liberal Party would benefit the most from a ranked ballot system.

Notwithstanding the lack of consensus on which voting system is most suited to Canada, it is clear that Canadians care about their government and the fairness of elections. The Liberal Party lost its chance to push through reform on its own terms when it lost its majority government in the 2019 election and will now have to rely on cooperation with other parties to pass legislation. Canadians can only hope that the other parties push electoral reform onto the agenda, or else wait another five years for a new government to be elected. H

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau talks to journalists during a press conference.

Singapore. November 2018.

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ZIMBABWE’S SANCTIONED EMERGENCY Sibusiso Moyo Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for the Republic of Zimbabwe

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A child stands stands in line to receive food aid.

Mudzi, Zimbabwe. February 2020.

he UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Hilal Elver is right: Zimbabwe is staring down the barrel of a food emergency. By the end of January 2020, up to eight million citizens could be in need of assistance, with women and children disproportionately impacted. Elver, following her visit to my country, identified natural disasters, corruption, and economic sanctions as some of the causes of this crisis. The situation is urgent.

How exactly did Zimbabwe, once the breadbasket of Africa, arrive here? From a narrow perspective, the latest drought is deep and severe and has halved the maize harvest, the country’s staple. In March, preceding the drought, a tropical cyclone battered the nation. Wherever it struck in the fertile Eastern Highlands and the South, crops were almost entirely destroyed.

Climate change hasn’t caused extreme weather just this year— droughts have become periodic.

Though we experienced a normal season in 2016, when we also recorded our highest harvest of maize since 2000, the annual rains during four of the past five years have been erratic, with significant consequences for yields. No longer freak events, this seems to be the new normal.

In the longer term, economic mismanagement, policy missteps and the scourge of corruption have also yielded the current crisis. Unfortunately, given their contribution over the years their impact has been widely felt and, in some cases, structurH I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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al. Corruption in particular will take years to expunge from the system. Still, we hope the new Anti-Corruption Commissions recent high-profile ministerial arrests signals that the era of impunity is over.

That said, there are certain actions that fall beyond the government’s control. We cannot, for instance, limit other countries’ carbon emissions. Not today, not tomorrow, not—as most keenly experienced now— in the past. But what we can change within our own country, we are attempting to do so. And I believe the invitation for Special Rapporteur Elver’s visit indicates this.

Her criticism is welcome. It not only points to the challenges we have to address but their prioritization. Zimbabwe’s Foreign Affairs and International Trade Ministry, together with the Justice Ministry, facilitated the meetings for Elver because we appreciate this engagement.

Though her observations paint a distressing image of the current situation, they enable us to see it more clearly. And only when a problem is in focus can it be properly addressed.

Amongst the remedies, Elver’s report stressed the need for reforms in farming, though these will take some time to take full effect. In September, before Elver’s visit, the government announced that banks in Zimbabwe have agreed to help finance small-scale farmers. Under the loans-for-seed program, the government will provide guarantees to encourage the process. Specialised agricultural

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equipment is also being imported to boost production, with recent large orders to agricultural machinery producers in the US and Belarus. And investment is being sought for new dams and downstream irrigation infrastructure—which currently cover just five percent of Zimbabwe—to protect my country against droughts in the future.

In tenure and property rights, farmers whose land was expropriated under the previous administration are being compensated, and racially-discriminatory leases have been abolished.

This action should help redress injustices of the past, while also encouraging experts to return to agriculture; a significant amount of Zimbabwe’s arable land is currently underused.

The report also states that the international community should remove unilateral sanctions.

This, in principle, does not require any active assistance: simply the voiding of legislation.

Yet it would grant Zimbabwe a fair chance to take its economic destiny in its own hands. Elver reported that sanctions negatively affect the perception of the country, to the extent that international humanitarian aid to Zimbabwe in the wake of Cyclone Idai last year was lower than surrounding countries.

Imagine the effect these decisions have on prospective business and foreign investment.

This government is cognizant of these modern realities. And the reality of the 21st century is interconnectedness. Without reintegration to the international community, we may never be

able to deliver on Zimbabwe’s promise. We therefore call on other nations and international organizations to reunite with us.

Surely the best route to prosperity and fulfillment of rights lies in cooperation, partnership, and friendship.

To anybody who believes that freedom precedes economics, they should read Elver’s comments. Stable economies do not automatically develop out of the upholding of human rights. We must strive for both. But a struggling economy strips away human rights. As Elver made clear, “In a desperate effort to find alternative means of livelihood, some women and children are resorting to coping mechanisms that violate their most fundamental human rights and freedoms.” Economics and human rights therefore reinforce one another.

The hunger emergency in Zimbabwe is man-made, though its causes are many; some are easier to fix than others. Carbon-driven climate change is an existential threat facing the globe and requires global action. As our representative made clear at the General Assembly of the United Nations this year, the necessary coordination will be extremely difficult. Efforts like reforming governance after some 20 years of neglect, inattention, and impunity may be equally challenging.

However, others are easy.

Voiding sanctions––which hurt Zimbabwe’s economy, and by extension, its food security––requires no inventive thinking, nor time or resources. H

An ancient marble head of Greek warrior-king Alexander the Great is displayed at the Acropolis Museum.

Athens, Greece. October 2014.

ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF ATHENS INTERVIEW WITH KOSTAS BAKOYANNIS

Max Bahdanovich Staff Writer

Kendrick Foster Senior Solicits Editor H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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Kostas Bakoyannis is the mayor of Athens, Greece. He also served as Governor of Central Greece (20142019) and mayor of his home town of Karpenisi (2011-2014). The HIR sat down with him after his keynote address at the Harvard Center for European Studies’ 50th anniversary celebration to talk about his experience as mayor and the influence of his education and family on his career path.

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oming from a wellknown political family, was there an expectation of you going into politics? How did your family background impact your career?

I am extremely proud of my family. I am as proud of my [maternal] grandfather, who served as a Prime Minister of Greece, as of my other grandfather, who

was a priest in a remote village up in the mountains. Families are always important. Both of mine instilled in me a sense of duty and a love for public service. But our choices are our own—after all, we are the ones who have to live with the consequences of our decisions. So what drew me into public service was my love for my hometown of Karpenisi, which I served as mayor ten years ago.

Then, I continued as a governor of Central Greece. Today, I have the privilege to be the Mayor of Athens.

Do you have any models in your family that you try to emulate as a public servant? Is there someone you look up to?

I look up to many people and I try to learn from others. I believe

Pedestrians walk past graffiti by famous street artist Achilles. Athens, Greece. June 2019.

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one of the main challenges for us as public servants is to talk less and listen more. I draw inspiration from my grandfather who, as I’ve told before, was a priest.

At that time in Greece, priests were also teachers, psychologists, marriage counselors; they even helped give birth. From him, I learned empathy: how important it is to connect, to put myself into someone else’s shoes and to be able to understand where everyone is coming from.

What was the first thing you did when you became mayor?

The first thing I did, early in the morning, I went to where the sanitation workers gather and start their rounds. I wanted to show how important their work is, to be with them, and send the message that our workers are

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very important to us. I wanted to show that the improvement of the daily lives of the citizens is about working from bottom up, rather than top down.

One thing that’s different between Greek politics and American politics is there are a lot more strikes that happen in Greece. What’s your approach to municipal workers who go on strike?

It’s their legal and constitutional right. I may agree or disagree with them, but I cannot deny them the right to strike.

There have been [a couple of strikes since I took office]: for three or four days there was a sanitation workers’ strike because they opposed a law that was passed [opening doors for the privatization of sanitation

services], but we actually cooperated quite well to ensure that the city would be kept as clean as possible, and so that trash wouldn’t pile up on the sidewalks.

Do you see yourself running for reelection to stay as a mayor, or do you plan to move into parliament or some other higher office?

I would certainly love to run for reelection. I hope the Athenians will keep me around.

There’s a lot of work to be done that exceeds my four-year term.

Athens is at a crossroads now, as we speak. We have a very clear vision: we want to build a city that is equally proud of its modern self as it is of ancient heritage. We have a very clear roadmap, and we are optimistic

about the future.

Athens is often praised for its vibrant past, especially by visitors. However, its present culture is often overlooked. As mayor, did you have to deal with the tension between cities past and present?

I think there is a harmonious symbiosis in Athens: of the past, present, and future; of our ancient heritage; of our modern, vibrant culture. It is a city that is full of surprises. Plato’s Academy is a good example of the city’s potential. Actually, I took my Oath of Office in the park of Plato’s Academy, because it is an incredible, unique archaeological area. It also functions as a park today, which, however, is in a neglected neighborhood. So, if we turn this neighborhood around by focusing on the park, we can turn the whole city around. By taking advantage of our past, we can build a better future.

You’ve served as mayor of both Karpenisi and Athens. What are the major differences between being a mayor of a small town of about 15,000 and the capital, a conglomeration of millions of people?

There are tons of quantitative differences, starting from the population, to the [geographic] size, but qualitatively, it is actually the same. One is called upon to make real decisions about real people. One has to deal with people. So, I think it is the same methodology, if I may use this word.

A man climbs the steps at the old Anafiotika district. Athens, Greece. April 2018.

You talked at the Center for European Studies about making H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

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Athens more resilient and sustainable. There was a plan to uncover the river Ilyssos, because it had been paved over as the city expanded. Could you just talk a little about that plan?

We’ll see about the river Ilyssos, it’s a bit too soon to tell. We have to make sure that if we uncover the river, there’s actually water there. Athens has the Hippodromios water irrigation system, an ancient water system.

It’s still functioning today, and now we’re trying to showcase it.

As a mayor, what’s the problem that is causing you the most headache at this point?

Well, every hour it’s something else. Our work is as rich

Fireworks explode over the Parthenon temple. Athens, Greece. April 2020.

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and diverse as the life of the city.

There’s never just one thing— that’s what’s so exciting about being a mayor. And it’s what keeps me going.

How can one make the most out of their time at Harvard?

What in your education influenced your success as a politician most?

I would underline two things.

The first is the people you meet and the friends you make. Fifty percent of one’s education is inside the classroom, and the other fifty is outside: talking to different people and learning from them. The second is the importance of skills. You cultivate skills, from fast reading to de-

cision-making models. All of it has come in handy in my case.

At Harvard, a lot of students are contemplating a career in politics. Do you have any advice for them?

Wow! I never thought I would find myself in a position of offering advice. I would suggest staying true to themselves. And to remember, it is never about the messenger—it is always about the message. I would also tell students to keep their feet on the ground, look down rather than up, and never forget that public service is a great privilege.

This interview has been lightly edited for style and clarity. H

Magazines featuring Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump's trade war at a roadside bookstand. Hong Kong, China. July 2019.

DISENTANGLING CHINA’S

GRAND STRATEGY INTERVIEW WITH YOICHI FUNABASHI

Satoshi Yanaizu Staff Writer

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Dr. Yoichi Funabashi is a former editor-in-chief of The Asahi Shimbun, Japan's second-most circulated newspaper. He now serves as a head of Asia Pacific Initiative, an independent think tank based in Tokyo.

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ow do you assess the impact of the current "Phase One" partial US-China trade deal? Does its limited degree of tariff reductions and ambiguous reference to China's purchase of agricultural products provide relief to the economy of respective countries?

The issue with this "Phase One" agreement is that it would not achieve the sustainable reduction of the US trade deficit— despite it being the primary reason why the Trump administration commenced this trade war.

The administration has the conviction that a trade deficit is bad and that China, a country with the largest trade surplus, is exploiting the United States. However, unless the structure of the US economy (and specifically the relationship between saving and investment) changes, artificially limiting Chinese exports to the United States does not meet this objective. China can still sell its goods to the United States via a third country, or US companies can purchase goods from other countries.

If the Trump Administration understands that tariffs alone cannot reduce trade deficits, it may choose exchange rate regimes as another medium for US-China competition. Last August, the US Treasury designated China as a currency manipulator after the Chinese yuan weakened past the psycholog-

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ically significant point of seven yuan to the US dollar for the first time in more than a decade.

Although the United States dropped this designation on January 13, 2019, the development raised concerns that China is arbitrarily devaluing its currency to make its exports competitive.

My prediction is that, if Trump wins a second term, he will even more strongly demand Chinese currency appreciation. We may witness some agreement similar to the Plaza Accord, a joint agreement in 1985 that depreciated the US dollar against the Japanese yen and German mark, but with a focus on Asian nations, including China, South Korea, and Malaysia.

Another issue at play in this US-China economic dispute is technology. The current deal does not address this point, be it China's industrial policies or the treatment of Chinese tech companies such as Huawei. On this, US-Japan negotiation on semiconductors in the 1980s provides a relevant precedent. At the time, Japanese firms boasted half of the world's semiconductor production, and US manufacturers heavily relied on Japanese semiconductors. On a national security basis, the United States insisted strongly that Japan should stop its dumping and industrial policies that protect its semiconductor industry, and the agreement in 1986 obliged Japan to secure 20 percent of its domestic semiconductor market for foreign producers. This was the most contentious issue in the US-Japan trade war in the 1980s. I believe that technology will be a significant

challenge to the settlement of the US-China trade war as well.

Overall, I would say that this deal involves less concession on the part of China than the United States. With the 2020 US presidential election in sight, the Trump administration chose to showcase tangible progress in the US-China negotiation irrespective of the substance of the agreement.

Given this context of technological rivalry and the US government's concern over Chinese industrial policies, what are the challenges facing the Phase Two negotiation?

One challenge facing the negotiation is the rise of nationalistic sentiment in China. Popular support for anti-American rhetoric would make it more difficult for the reformist wing within the Chinese government to utilize US pressure as an excuse to advance structural reform.

For example, some reformists within the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) side with the US government in their opposition to China's preferential treatment for state-owned enterprises. They are concerned that such a measure would hinder the development of private enterprises and harm the long-term health of Chinese economy. Nevertheless, China's increasingly nationalistic public puts them in a political deadlock if they are to challenge President Xi's defiant attitude toward the trade war.

There is also a risk on the US side. Let's say China executes the structural reform of its economy as the United States has demanded. The Chinese economy could become more robust

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and sustainable as a result: some in the United States might see this undesirable from a strategic viewpoint. One approach in strategic competitions is to make the opponent weaker. Those who want to undermine China's geopolitical clout relative to the United States may attempt to shift the agenda of the negotiation from pushing China's economic reform to encouraging China's inefficient investment in military and other sectors, trying to exhaust China's economic vitality.

A woman protests against the extradition bill in Hong Kong’s financial district. Hong Kong, China. August 2019.

How do you assess China's efforts to assert global leadership in critical technologies such as 5G telecommunication networks, quantum computing, and biotechnology?

It would be practically impossible, from my perspective, to prevent China from dominatProtesters wave flags that read "Hong Kong Independence" during a rally.

Hong Kong, China. January 2020.

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ing these fields. Throughout history, nations achieved innovations through importing stateof-the-art goods and technology from more advanced nations.

Japan, for instance, successfully integrated Western technology and their industrial system into its society after the Meiji restoration. China's Qing dynasty, on the other hand, maintained its isolation from the outside world and failed to recognize its technological inferiority to Western powers, which led to its demise. The current Chinese government is keen to learn from this mistake. It has invested an enormous amount of resources in learning from other nations' historical lessons in technological development and multinational negotiations.

My point is that we should not underestimate the prospect of China's state-sponsored technological development just because its political system is undemocratic. The widespread view is that China's repressive social order and the lack of political freedom kills human imaginations, discouraging scientific progress and innovation. I myself find it doubtful whether China's political system, one that drives people with fear, is sustainable in the very long run. However, as far as the status quo is concerned, China's massive marketization of mobile payment and bike-sharing demonstrates its success. In a technological rivalry among nations, the ability to commercialize emerging technologies, disseminate them to a wide array of customers, and maintain them as social infrastructure is as crucial as the invention of technol-

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ogies itself. China's edge in this systematic deployment will position the country on a path to assert technological leadership.

What would be the implications of China's state-sponsored technological development on its political system and economic model?

For these latest technologies that China is eager to develop, the main customer is the CCP government. Whether it is 5G networks, Big Data, they are tools for CCP to maintain their regime, never to repeat the equivalent of the Soviet Union's collapse. Chinese government's plan to create a special economic zone for digital currencies in Shenzhen and Suzhou is another display of its risk-taking attitude to enhance economic security. It aims to establish a closed payment mechanism independent of the US dollar, which would make Chinese financial institutions less susceptible to potential US sanctions on them (Patriot Act Section 311) and prevent capital flight.

Besides, China-produced mobile payment methods, namely Alipay and Wechat Pay, are expanding their businesses in countries involved in China's Belt and Road Initiative. Combined with digital currencies and surveillance technologies, China is capable of exporting its economic model of digital Leninism. It is a worrying trend in the context of privacy protection; yet there is a positive aspect. This government-monitored system of finance, if purely functions around its social credit system, can prove more inclusive to those who other-

wise have not enjoyed access to traditional types of banks. This is because one's credibility as a borrower would be the only factor to consider when lending, as opposed to other backgrounds such as gender and ethnicity. It may empower a large number of women and rural populations.

What do you think is a longterm threat to the Chinese economy?

There are two major threats to its economy. The first is demographics. Its population is quickly aging, mainly because of its past policy to limit the number of children one couple can have.

The government is yet to establish an effective social welfare system that would sustain its ever-growing elderly class. The second issue is ecological degradation. China will suffer from deforestation and the potential depletion of water in two of its most important rivers, the Yellow River and the Yangtze. Climate change endangers the water supply of not only China but also Southeast Asian nations, including India and Bangladesh.

How do you see the political uncertainty in Hong Kong unfolding?

The economic significance of Hong Kong to Beijing's central government has decreased.

When Hong Kong returned to China, it accounted for 18 percent of China's GDP. Now it is only around three percent.

Shenzhen's GDP overtook that of Hong Kong in 2018 for the first time. However, as we can see from the initial public offering of Alibaba that happened in Hong Kong, the city still pro-

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vides and will continue to provide an intangible yet crucial network of global finance to the Chinese mainland—a role that other Chinese cities cannot easily replace. Beijing is not fully aware of Hong Kong's importance beyond its economic size, and this lack of awareness will prolong the political unrest within the city.

What would be the longterm response from the United States to China's ambition to construct its economic model and disseminate its political ideology abroad?

It is becoming more and more of a bipartisan consensus that Obama’s approach of strategic engagement with China has ended and that China is now a

strategic competitor and a disruptive force against the traditional US-led liberal international order. However, it is unlikely that US policymakers see China as a pressing military threat over the next ten years: China itself does not have an intention to overhaul the existing political arrangement between the two nations. The United States and China will probably compete in almost every domain short of war.

If the aspect of US-China relations as a strategic competition gets emphasized more, some US policymakers might consider taking more intrusive measures aimed at destabilizing China's social cohesion, for example supporting the separationist movement in Xinjiang. Still,

we should keep in mind the risk that this kind of intervention works counter to its objective.

When the CCP faces domestic unrest and pressures, it often resorts to more confrontational measures overseas, fueling nationalistic sentiment. Increased tension in, say, the South China Sea is likely when the United States attempts to question the legitimacy of CCP rule from the inside. In fact, the world has never witnessed China as powerful as it is today. Since the Opium War, China was subject to Western expansion and exploitation. We need a paradigm shift in how we approach this awakened giant.

This interview has been lightly edited for style and clarity. H

President Donald Trump watches as Chinese Vice Premier Liu He speaks to US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer. Washington, DC. October 2019.

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