Summer 2020 | Deals or Ideals: Negotiation in Modern Diplomacy

SUMMER 2020 | VOL. XLI | NO. 3

HIR

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

DEALS OR IDEALS N E G O T I AT I O N I N M O D E R N D I P LO M A C Y

ERNA SOLBERG

Prime Minister of Norway

BERNARD ARONSON

Former US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs HIR .HARVARD.EDU

H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

1

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

A LETTER FROM THE EDITORS History is narrative, and narrative celebrates defiance. From one Martin Luther to the other, humanity has revered those who refuse to compromise on their principles. By contrast, concession often feels a lot like cowardice. Winston Churchill, the “British Bulldog” who prevented Nazis from goose-stepping across Western Europe, ranks among the most respected leaders of the last century. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, Churchill’s predecessor and the capable leader who famously tried to appease a young Adolf Hitler, does not.

There are countless other examples of conciliatory policies being exploited on the world stage today. As John Berkay notes, when the US government inked an agreement with the Taliban in February, it left behind a broken nation that will surely be dominated by insurgents for decades to come. All too often, it seems, leaders who are desperate for peace deal away their principles in the process.

On the other hand, politics is no place for romantics—the stakes are too high. Reciprocity has underpinned the greatest peacebuilding efforts in human history, from the formation of the European Union to the Camp David Accords. Given that legacy, Will Schrepferman underscores the importance of establishing international agreements before entering a new age of space exploration. Likewise, Bernard Aronson, a US diplomat who worked on the Colombian peace process, leaves us with a crucial reminder: while no one gets everything in a negotiation, everyone gets something. Zero-sum mentalities are best left on the battlefield.

Beyond the cover topic, this issue features analysis of emerging issues in international relations. As the world deals with the fallout from COVID-19, Joy Ding considers the implications for intellectual property in the pharmaceutical industry. Kendrick Foster reviews the cultural significance of yerba mate, a lucrative crop for farmers in Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay that is now making the jump to the developed world. And Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg, a durable center-right voice in Scandinavian politics, provides her thoughts on the pandemic, her own growth as a leader, and the future of Europe.

The German sociologist Max Weber once said, “Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards. It takes both passion and perspective.” Most would agree that slow progress is better than no progress at all. Even so, political compromise is often unpopular, requiring the kind of courage recognized only in the footnotes of textbooks. There are times to take a stand, and there are times to work within the system. The greatest leaders are those who can tell the difference.

Until next time, Garrett Walker and Haig Cholakian

Flags of the EU and African countries participating in an EU-Africa summit. Lisbon, Portugal. December 2007.

2 // S U M M E R

2020

H VOL. XLI • NO. 3 • SUMMER 2020 SENIOR STAFF Editors-In-Chief // Garrett Walker & Haig Cholakian Chief-of-Staff // Indu Pandey Managing Editor // Lexa Brenner Senior Solicits Editors // Bonny Lemma & Kendrick Foster Senior Writing Editors // Brandon Chen, Justin Qi, Marc Leroux-Parra, Minjue Wu, & Otto Barenberg Design Director // Isabelle Blair Business Director // Paul Apostolicas GENERAL STAFF Business Associates Ammara Vaid, Hannah Pan, Joseph Wornom, Kira Trout, Oscar Berry Design Associates Ammara Vaid, Clara Guzman, Hunter Hawk, Katherine Ricca Staff Writers Alejandro Jimenez, Andy Wang, Becca Buehler, Brammy Rajakumar, Brendon Lee, Choetsow Tenzin, Eric Li, Galadriel Coury, Hunter Hawk, Ilyas Mardin, Ishan Bhatt, Jelena Dragicev' ic, John Berkay, Joseph Wornom, Joshua Park, Joy Ding, Katherine Ricca, Max Bahdanovich, Melinda Meng, Nick Nocita, Nidal Morrison, Nithyani Anandakugan, Octavio Vega, Olga Kiyan, Oscar Berry, Paige Anderson, Salome Garnier, Samar Ahmad, Satoshi Yanaizu, Skylar Smith, Sydney Young, Talia Blatt, Will Schrepferman, Yanxi Fang ^

The Harvard International Review is published quarterly by the Harvard International Relations Council, Inc. Copyright 2020 (ISSN 0739-1854) Harvard International Relations Council. No material appearing in this publication may be reproduced without permission of the publisher. The opinions expressed in this magazine are those of the contributors and are not necessarily shared by the editors. All editorial rights reserved. The Harvard International Review is indexed in the PAIS Bulletin, the Political Science Abstracts, and the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences. Microform and CD-ROM copies are available through Proquest Information and Learning, 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346. Tel. (800) 521-0600. http://www.il.proquest.com ADVERTISING: For advertising inquiries, please contact us at business@hir.harvard.edu or by mail at 59 Shepard St #205, Cambridge, MA 02138.

PERMISSIONS: Reprint requests should be addressed to the Business Chair, 59 Shepard St #205, Cambridge, MA 02138 or sent by e-mail to business@hir.harvard.edu. Back issues are available online at hir.harvard.edu/ volumes.

OFFICES: 59 Shepard St #205, Cambridge, MA 02138.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Individuals and Institutions: one year ($35), two years ($65), and three years ($90). Subscribe online at hir.harvard.edu.

PHOTO CREDITS: All photos licensed from AP Images unless stated otherwise. Photo on page 27 courtesy of Economia, Czech Republic.

H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

3

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK AUSSI: FRENCH LITERATURE AND 6 MOI CULTURE IN THE AGE OF #METOO Abby LaBreck, Staff Writer

POVERTY IN AFRICA WITH ONLINE EDUCATON 10 ENDING Eric Li, Staff Writer VIOLENCE IN MEXICO: MACHISMO, FEMICIDES, 14 GENDER AND CHILD’S PLAY Ines de la Morena, Staff Writer

PHARMACEUTICAL INTELLECTUAL 18 RETHINKING PROPERTY IN A POST-PANDEMIC WORLD Joy Ding, Associate Editor

GOLD: MAKING MONEY AND FIGHTING 22 GREEN DEFORESTATION WITH YERBA MATE Kendrick Foster, Senior Solicits Editor

WOMEN’S REVOLUTION: FEMALE ACTIVISM IN SUDAN 26 THE Sydney Young, Staff Writer AND THE EMERGING SPACE ARMS RACE 29 ANTI-WEAPONS Talia Blatt, Staff Writer

COVER DEAL OR PIPE DREAM? THE FARCE OF THE 35 PEACE FEBRUARY 2020 US-TALIBAN AGREEMENT John Berkay, Associate Editor

BLOCKADES: THE LEGACY OF THE OKA CRISIS 38 BLOODY Melinda Meng, Staff Writer A NEW SPACE FRAMEWORK? PLANET 42 WANT Will Schrepferman, Staff Writer DILEMMA IN PARADISE: THE FUTURE OF US-CUBA 46 ARELATIONS Yanxi Fang, Staff Writer

4 // S U M M E R

2020

CONTENTS

CONTENTS PERSPECTIVES PREDICTING THE POST-PANDEMIC WORLD: “DEEP GLOBALISM” OR ISOLATION? Pavlo Klimkin, Head of the European, Regional and Russian Studies Program Andreas Umland, Principal Investigator at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future

53

INTERVIEWS ON POST-SOVIET CONFLICT AND SIMULATING NEOGOTIATIONS: INTERVIEW WITH ARVID BELL Kendrick Foster, Senior Solicits Editor

56

A LOOK BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: INTERVIEW WITH MARK FREEMAN Bonny Lemma, Senior Solicits Editor

61

NEOGOTIATING PEACE IN COLOMBIA: INTERVIEW WITH BENARD ARONSON Kendrick Foster, Senior Solicits Editor

66

SCANDINAVIAN STABILITY FOR A WORLD IN FLUX: A CONVERSATION WITH NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER ERNA SOLBERG Garrett Walker, Editor-in-Chief

70

A boy walks past a mural of US peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, left, and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the leader of the Taliban delegation. Kabul, Afghanistan. May 2020.

H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

5

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

MOI AUSSI

FRENCH LITERATURE AND CULTURE IN THE AGE OF #METOO Abby LaBreck Staff Writer

"Maintenant On Agit" ("Now We Act") is projected on the Eiffel Tower on the eve of International Women's Day. Paris, France. March 2018.

6 // S U M M E R

2020

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK

“A very young girl is rather nicer, even if she very quickly becomes hysterical and as mad as when she is older.”

“Sometimes, I’ll have as many as four boys—from 8 to 14 years old— in my bed at the same time, and I’ll engage in the most exquisite lovemaking with them.”

S

uch depraved sentiments are those of Gabriel Matzneff, even now one of France’s most lauded authors.

Matzneff contributed to the literary scene for decades, penning numerous novels and diaries depicting his various sexual encounters with children.

His most well-known work, Les Moins Seize Ans, means “Under 16 Years Old.” Still, despite the overt pedophilic themes of his writing, Matzneff remained in print for years, and he was praised as a literary pioneer in the art of sexual liberation. His popularity knew no bounds, even garnering words of praise from former French President Francois Mitterand in 1984. Viewed as a creative and enlightened genius who candidly explored his sexual desires with children, Matzneff acquired an elite status in the realm of French authors. Somehow, he evaded harsh scrutiny for decades, continuing to engage in and document his sexual predation (despite it being illegal in France for an adult to have sex with an individual under the age of 15). The criminal charges leveled against the author in February 2020 seem long overdue. And they may be just what the French #MeToo movement needed to inch forward.

Matzneff’s fall began when publishing executive Vanessa Springora published a scathing exposé titled Le Consentement, detailing the suffering she experienced at the hands of the elderly French author when she was just 14 years old during the 1980s. She recounts years of psychological torment, detailing both physical and verbal assault

by Matzneff who wielded his status, age, and seductive nature as weapons of dominance over the young schoolgirl. Although Springora’s novel received the attention it deserved, the problems it reveals are far more ingrained in French society than this single instance. Sexual abuse was long viewed as and conflated with seduction, evoking an air of romance and sensual desire. Seductive literature, meanwhile, is a foundation-

al pillar in the world of French art. Gabriel Matzneff is not the first—or the last—perpetrator of his archaic tradition.

A Troubling Tradition The revelations about Matzneff have sparked a deeper exploration into the true longevity of the seductive tradition of French literature, bringing to light how abusive themes harken back to some of France’s earliest and greatest authors.

The 18th-century philosopher and author Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, was involved in numerous instances of sexual depravity. In his autobiographical work, The Confessions of JeanJacques Rousseau, he outlines the lengths he went to quell his sexual desires, writing, “I haunted dark alleys and hidden retreats, where I might be able to expose

French writer Simone de Beauvoir arrives at the Palace of Justice of Bobigny.

Paris, France. November 1972.

H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

7

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

myself to women in the condition in which I should have liked to have been in their company.”

This autobiographical work was widely read and enjoyed by those within France and beyond.

Even today, Rousseau is lauded for his contributions to society; his shadowy youth and his profane activities hardly even constitute a footnote in his story.

Rousseau is not alone. Author Marquis de Sade penned the story “120 Days in Sodom” while in prison serving an eight-year sentence for the abuse of young girls. The work of literature is rife with themes of pedophilia and sexual perversion, detailing the sexual manipulations of

four French libertines who rape, torture, and ultimately murder their young victims at a chateau in the Black Forest of Germany.

More unsettling than the content of the story itself is the popularity it has attracted throughout the centuries since its discovery.

The manuscript was sold for a staggering US$9.6 million and subsequently placed on display at an exhibit at the Parisian Museum of Letters and Manuscripts in 2014. Sade, the inspiration of the term “sadism” itself, had long been viewed as a liberated artist, contributing to cultural dialogue. A modern lens can critically assess the work of literature for what it truly is—a gro-

Demonstrator holds a poster reading "This is not consent" during a march about violence against women. Paris, France. November 2018.

8 // S U M M E R

2020

tesque account of the perverted abuse of innocent young victims.

A passage from another famous French novel written in 1857 also depicts seductive abuse masked under the pretense of literary romance between a fictitious man and the woman he is pursuing: “Smiling a strange smile, his pupil fixed, his teeth set, he advanced with outstretched arms. She recoiled trembling. She stammered: “Oh, you frighten me! You hurt me!

Let me go!’” The passage concludes with the words, “she gave herself up to him.” The offender this time? Gustave Flaubert in his renowned work Madame Bo-

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK

vary. These lines, while read for decades as an illustration of the classic seductive cat-and-mouse chase of a relationship, are now a stark example of the pervasive themes of masculine dominance found throughout centuries of French literature.

So it should not be surprising that contemporary French figures, like Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre, blurred the line between cultural liberation and blatant abuse; in truth, the line was already blurred in French society. The tumultuous relationship between de Beauvoir and Sartre was defined by their pact of “reciprocal liberty,” which allowed each of them to pursue relations apart from one another. During his time as a teacher, Sartre developed an obsessive passion for one 17-yearold pupil, before engaging romantically with her younger sister. De Beauvoir even aided Sartre in his relations with minors—grooming and teaching young girls before introducing them to him. Sartre perceived an intellectual link between seduction and writing. Sexual deviancy was part of his identity, as it was for all too many powerful French men in the 20th century.

Sexual liberation took on a new form in the 1970s, after French luminaries used revolutionary ideas following the Protest of 1968 to defend pedophilia.

Petitions circulated around the city, signed by countless prominent writers, that demanded the law acknowledge the right of children and adolescents “to have relations with whomever they choose.” Even beyond artistic circles, many viewed these beliefs as modern and daring,

highlighting the conflation of sexual liberation and abuse of the youth. David Gee, the brother of another accuser who has since come forward with her own experiences with Matzneff, spoke to this idea: “It was one of the very important things, socially speaking, to be established in the intelligentsia. That was more important than looking at the side effects of pedophilia.”

The protection of the youth and the condemnation of pedophilic acts were blatantly overlooked for the sake of creative and social success.

A Changing Culture When assessing the literary contributions of influential thinkers and authors, it is sometimes difficult to come to terms with their repugnant personal details. As victims of traumatic sexual abuse are finally gaining the confidence to come forward, validated by the ever-growing and globally recognized #MeToo movement, many French nationals find themselves at an ethical crossroads. To critique seductive literature for what it truly is and acknowledge its misogynistic underpinnings is to reject decades of beloved art. This dilemma has created a tense division, resulting in the #MeToo movement’s failure to gain traction in France as effectively as in other nations.

Beyond simple reluctance to support the movement, blatant opposition has also taken root.

In September of 2019, Sandra Muller, the creator of the French #MeToo campaign, was fined for defamation after accusing ex-TV boss Éric Brion of sexual harassment. Previously, Muller

had started the #balancetonporc (“rat on your pork”) hashtag, prompting the defamation suit.

He argued she was deliberately conflating “heavy-handed flirting and sexual harassment in the workplace.” Muller’s story reflects the reluctance of the public to point fingers at male perpetrators.

But things are starting to change. Frustrated by inaction, former member of Parliament Isabelle Attard declared, “the excuse we hear in France is that we have the French seduction type. And that you can’t say to men that they can’t seduce women, because it’s in our culture and our tradition and blah, blah, blah.” Slowly a coalition of French women, whether victims of sexual abuse or allies, are working to dismantle certain cultural norms. Alice Kantor, a French writer for the Financial Times and close friend of a woman who suffered sexual abuse, has a simple wish: “I hope French women find a way to have their voices heard.”

Untangling traditional mindsets that have become deeply ingrained in a national identity and culture is hardly an easy task. We do not live in a time when romance is defined by the dominance of a hero over a damsel in distress. No longer should the blatant abuse of minors be lauded as art that pushes the boundaries of literary and societal constructs. It is imperative to relinquish nostalgia and acknowledge the deeply flawed aspects of literary history; it is a time for new stories depicting the power, strength, and resilience of those who have been silenced for centuries. H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

9

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

ENDING POVERTY IN AFRICA WITH ONLINE EDUCATION Eric Li Staff Writer

E

ducation plays a critical role in ending poverty. For example, the winners of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2019 Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo found that schooling increases earnings relatively linearly, in that each additional year of primary education adds about eight percent to earnings for a child: over the standard six years of primary schooling, income would increase for a child by about 50 percent. These

10 // S U M M E R

2020

gains are especially important in sub-Saharan Africa, which has the highest out-of-school rates for all ages; 33 million of the 61 million global out-of-school children live in the region.

Despite the large benefits of widespread increased education, the logistics of education can be difficult. In an analysis of seven African countries, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) found that on the average school day, a fourth to a half of the teachers are ab-

sent, which results in a wasted school day for the students who do attend and lowers the actual effects of going to school.

Moreover, barriers in attending school, such as fees, traveling time, and child morbidity, prevent out-of-school rates from decreasing.

Online Education However, these roadblocks are not insurmountable. Online education has been on the rise in sub-Saharan Africa due to it

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK Mabuya Secondary School. Johannesburg, South Africa. May 2020.

being a cost-effective alternative to formal education as well as a way to widen educational opportunity. Already, this transition is being felt in the higher education category. Africa’s public universities are wrestling with expanding capacity without sacrificing quality which has allowed online-based institutions such as Unicaf, a pan-African university, to assert itself in the education system. Unicaf provides every student with a tablet and downloadable, offline

course materials. A similar program in India, the Indira Gandhi National Open University, educates over three million students. In light of these case studies, online education could serve as a powerful tool for poverty reduction.

Tackling Barriers to Education The primary reason that online education is so popular is for the convenience advantages for students. Specifically for students in poverty, online educa-

tion tackles a number of barriers including travel time, school cost, and labor schedule.

In their book, Improving Primary Education in Developing Countries, the World Bank describes how the most important determinant of primary school enrollment is proximity. This insight has also been corroborated by the Jameel Poverty Action Lab’s (JPAL) studies, which have shown that creating local schools resulted in very large gains in enrollment as many arH I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

11

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

eas with low enrollment rates are remote and affected by conflict. At the moment, 27 percent of school-age children in sub-Saharan Africa live more than two kilometers away from the nearest school, and the World Bank estimates that if these distances were reduced to less than two kilometers, their enrollment rates would rise by 15 percentage points. Clearly, the virtual aspect of online education would remove this issue of travel time and locality.

As an alternative to tax-based funding of education, a number of sub-Saharan African countries implemented school fees. However, they paid insufficient attention to the effect of these fees on access to education for the poor, which led to decreased primary school enrollment, especially among the poorest and most vulnerable children. In fact, a randomized controlled trial by Innovations for Poverty Action showed that students whose school fees were removed were 55 percent more likely to complete secondary school. Similarly, JPAL revealed that even reducing other schooling costs such as by providing free school uniforms or school meals also had positive impacts on attendance. Comparing the costs of universities in sub-Saharan Africa, it is clear that online institutions clearly win this competition; Unicaf costs US$4,000 for a degree compared to the average of US$3,000 per year of traditional universities. This suggests that, at least at the college level, online education is a very viable way to minimize costs.

The UN Educational, Scien-

12 // S U M M E R

2020

tific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) reported that about a quarter of five to 14-year-olds in sub-Saharan Africa were engaged in child labor in 2004.

These working children faced attendance disadvantages of about 30 percent to 67 percent. Moreover, because a majority of the child laborers are working on subsistence agricultural farming for the family, online classes would also facilitate the education of those who have to farm during the school day so they can take classes later in the evening. The UN Girls’ Education Initiative also describes how for young girls, sibling care is a major barrier to education. Considering the gender gaps between school completion—36 percent for girls and 42 percent for boys—in sub-Saharan Africa for lower secondary school, online education offers hope of leveling the playing field. By having the ability to enroll in online courses, young girls would be able to learn at their own pace and on their own hours rather than on a rigid school day schedule.

Concerns Despite these benefits, there are a number of logistical concerns with the feasibility of extensive online education in sub-Saharan Africa.

One of the primary concerns is Internet access: a fundamental part of online education is the online part of it. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest Internet penetration of any region in the world at just 40 percent. Moreover, the gaps between Internet usage varied with income, up to a 29 percentage point difference between

high- and low-income earners in certain countries. Considering these lower Internet penetration rates, online education would be less suited to tackle the poorest of the poor, but could benefit those on the higher end of the poverty spectrum. However, these rates could change soon. A number of companies are working to bring universal Internet access across the globe. For instance, the US Federal Communications Commission recently approved aerospace company SpaceX to launch more than 4,000 satellites into space as part of their universal satellite Internet program Starlink. A number of other companies such as Amazon and Facebook are also pur-

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK

suing these types of satellite Internet plans.

Moreover, the quality of online education is another concern. In a report last year about online education, researchers at George Mason University revealed that, though general learning outcomes are similar for online and in-person courses, at-risk populations such as those of lower socioeconomic background underperform in the online setting as compared to the traditional setting. They suggest that those who are the most disadvantaged may end up experiencing a lower quality of education, because traditional classes offer valuable instructor-student interaction whereas online education does

not. Because schooling quality has significant impacts on later earnings, decreased quality of online education may diminish the effects that receiving an online education would have regarding social mobility.

Unfortunately, most online education in sub-Saharan Africa is at the tertiary education level, but only about 9 percent of the population even enrolls in tertiary education with only 23 percent of the population completing upper secondary education.

Truly tackling the barriers of education would involve increasing digital education opportunities for lower levels of education because that is where the most impact is needed.

An Interconnected World Ultimately, online education is an increasingly utilized, but still underused tool for tackling a lack of educational attendance in sub-Saharan Africa for its benefits of no travel time, cheaper costs, and flexible hours. However, concerns such as the existing digital infrastructure, quality of schooling, and targeted student population suggest that it alone is not enough to drive a welfare revolution in sub-Saharan Africa.

Online education may not end poverty, but it is a leap in the right direction, a critical tool for tackling inequality in the 21st century. H

Schoolchildren attend a class taught in the Shona language. Norton, Zimbabwe. September 2019.

H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

13

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W Feminists celebrate after a barrier is pulled down during a protest on International Women's Day. Mexico City, Mexico. March 2020.

GENDER VIOLENCE IN MEXICO

MACHISMO, FEMICIDES, AND CHILD’S PLAY Ines de la Morena Staff Writer

14 // S U M M E R

2020

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK

T

he year was 1993. In Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, the streets were empty, soaked in blood, with corpses hidden from plain sight. Twelve young girls and women had just been murdered, their bodies discarded like garbage after violence and abuse. Disposal was simply an afterthought for their perpetrators.

Tragically, there are a thousand stories like this one. Through the years, Mexico has seen everything: women stabbed, skinned, disemboweled, raped, and murdered. Little girls have been kidnapped from their preschools in broad daylight, corpses have often been discarded in canals, and at times. Girls as young as three and women as old as 74 are frequently abused and killed by men close to them. In the next ten minutes, approximately three women in Mexico will have been a victim of abuse. Ten femicides will occur by the end of the day.

The term femicide is not homicide of those that simply happen to be female, but rather females who are murdered because of the fact that they’re female. Ingrid, Nancy, Susana, Noelia, Laura, Malena, Adriana, Isabel, Yuritzi, Luz are just a few names in a long list of victims. A culture of violence is not one that can change overnight even if laws were to suddenly change. So, how did this culture develop?

History and Gender Roles The causes of gender violence are so much more complex than simple biology, and there is certainly no singular explanation. Rather, a diversity of fac-

tors have built upon one another. Some historians identify La Conquista, during which Spanish colonizers such as Hernán Cortes and his conquistadors arrived in the American continent and raped indigenous women, as the beginning of a culture of gender violence. La Conquista created “mestizos” or people with shared Spanish and indigneous ancestry. Psychologists suggest “mestizaje” creates a condition where mestizos “[envy] their Spanish father and despise their Indian mother—in cases as a result of his Oedipal complexes.”

For most historians, however, there is little doubt that sexism in Latin America was heightened by European colonization.

In the French Civil Code, which inspired much of early Mexican law, women were listed as dependents of men in all aspects of life from the law to finances. In line with European thinkers of the time, the general consensus in Mexico was that women were more well-suited to the domestic sphere as opposed to men who were born to think and act as independent agents.

From this, machismo was born in Latin America. Machismo, similar to toxic masculinity, is the set of ideals and beliefs that support the notion that men are superior to women. Men assume a dominant role in society where they may show little weakness and must protect the vulnerable, usually by exercising control over women. Because of this, women have been forced into more subservient roles in society for generations. Carmen Contreras, a government researcher for Instituto Mexicano de InvestiH I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

15

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

gación de Familia y Población (IMIFAP), elaborates that “machismo” paved the way for gender-based discrimination, which results in disparities in opportunities from a young age. These disparities range from education to labor, even skewing female representation in art where strong female characters are often absent in movies. Frustration with machismo is reflected in La Revuelta's, the first female-run feminist newspaper in Mexico, writings, “The movement arose… from the disenchantment, the dissatisfaction, the frustration that we, as women, experience in the isolation of everyday life, emerges the need to unite with other women, at first perhaps as pure instinct… the issue of women’s oppression is considered a secondary, subordinate problem that ‘will be resolved after social change.’ ” Despite feminist agitating, there are still tangible gender inequities in Mexico. To this day, there are 30 percent more men in corporate roles than women; women spend an average of 40 hours a week in domestic duties while men only spend around ten; and 75 percent of men report being the head of the household. Despite the recent strides towards increased economic equality, as Mercedes Olivera explains, “the Mexican economy is growing, but women’s safety is decreasing almost perpendicularly to it.” Perhaps, the recent uptick in violence against women is a cultural backlash to equalizing forces in other domains of life, such as economics.

Modern Times Gender discrimination and

16 // S U M M E R

2020

gender violence are different, but they feed on each other. While gender inequality has been present since time immemorial, rates of gender violence in Mexico have only been rising since 2006.

The cause of the recent bloodbath, as it has been called by some observers, is deeper than gender norms. Societal structure in Mexico demands that women must seek protection from the people who perpetrate violence against them, making safety for women a double-edged sword.

This need for safety is only compounded by the escalation of the Mexican Drug War, whose escalation matches perfectly with a rise in gender violence in Mexico. Corruption, money, and narcopolitics are fundamental drivers of violence that has seen a 236 percent increase in the past four years alone.

Corruption and Narcopolitics Increases in gender violence have coincided with increases in other forms of violence, especially those associated with drug cartels. For example, Ciudad Juarez, the city which experienced the appalling 1993 murders, is also the city where the Juarez drug cartel conducted the majority of its narco-operations, money laundering, and homicides for roughly 25 years.

Juarez plays an essential part of the ‘Golden Triangle,” where the states of Chihuahua, Durango and Sinaloa engage in vast drug production and trade, fueling not only the Mexican economy but the drug wars and addiction across the globe.

Efforts to reduce cartel related violence have failed. One reason

is that local governments often turn a blind eye to (or protect) drug operations in exchange for noteworthy but clandestine sums of money. There are reports of the Sinaloa cartel bribing the military and using the hands of law enforcement officers. In a famous trial, Manuel Fierro-Mendez, a police officer in Juarez with ties to local drug cartels, admitted to a significant connection between the cartels and local governments. He also claimed that nearly every person in his unit and every unit he knew was entangled in it too.

The elites that govern Mexico sometimes claim that “the violence devastating [for example] Ciudad Juárez is a positive outcome of the government’s war against organized crime.” Violence is viewed as a sign that the violent actions taken by the government to end narcotrafficking are working. However, the causal relationship between the two is tenuous at best: during the time of Peña Nieto’s presidency, where some of the most passive rather than ruthless policies and attitudes against crime were being followed, the country broke records in terms of homicide, violence and crime. Nonetheless, the state— severely infested with and poisoned by money, addiction, and corruption— has continued to perpetrate violence in its war against the cartels, which has undoubtedly led to increased incidence of gendered violence.

Advances in Congress Shockingly, despite this violence, Mexico has one of the world’s most progressive constitutions with regard to gen-

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK A women participates in the painting of the names of over 3,000 femicide victims on Plaza del Zócalo. Mexico City, Mexico. March 2020.

der and also leads the world in many feminist policies. United Nations Women congratulated Mexico for its historical 2014 constitutional reform where they mandated “political parties to ensure gender parity in their candidacies.” 2018 was declared “The Year of the Woman" in Mexico because female members of Congress exceeded 40 percent for the first time ever. As female representation in politics has increased in addition to other feminist organizing, gender violence has still persisted. Gender violence has consistently increased massively every year for the past twelve years. Femicide increased 137 percent in the past five years alone, four times the increase in the homicide rate. Is this the cartels fighting back? A broken government? Years of intergenerational abuse catching up to the statistics?

Failures in Mexico’s Judicial System While there is no one answer, an important issue is certainly that perpetrators feel as though they can get away with their crimes. In Mexico, 93 percent of all criminal defendants in cases of gender violence are men.

In Latin America, one in three women has been a victim of gender violence in their lifetimes. In Mexico, however, this number is actually two in three women. Despite the massive number of potential cases, few women choose to go to the legal system with 98 percent of all gender-related killings, mostly femicides, going completely unprosecuted.

Despite these worrying signs, many politicians are turning a blind eye. President Andres Manuel Lopez-Obrador claims that gender violence is a result of “neoliberal policies” and that the rising rate of femicides is just “part of a giant right-wing plot against him.” This rhetoric only serves to skirt around meaningful change, as argued by the United Nations.

After a feminist protest in February 2020, Obrador asked feminists not to demonstrate since the government is already working hard to eliminate femicides.

Beatriz Belmont, an international relations student at Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM), responded with “If trashing monuments makes authorities look at us and listen to our demands, then we will continue to do so, [the presi-

dent’s response] is unacceptable and unfitting for someone who should be acting as a national leader.” #ElMovimiento In March 2020, millions of women and men flooded the streets surrounding the Angel de la Independencia in Mexico City.

A few days after the march, millions of women refused to go to work as part of the protest #UnDiaSinNosotras, or #ADayWithoutUs. Moreover, local, state and federal government officials joined in the various protests as well. These movements build on the back of #NiUnaMenos to signal that not even one more femicide will be tolerated. They are giving the silenced a voice. They are changing the way we perceive women within Mexico and challenging insufficient change.

Change is slow and hard even as Mexico makes feminist strides in other areas, its issues with gender violence persist. But, there is momentum now for serious conversations about gender violence in Mexico, for a re-examination of the Mexican Drug War, for judicial reform, and for holding politicians accountable.

H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

17

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

Circles used to encourage social distancing line Dolores Park. San Francisco, California. May 2020.

18 // S U M M E R

2020

RETHINKING PHARMACEUTICAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A POST-PANDEMIC WORLD Joy Ding Associate Editor

H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

19

“D

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

ivisive” comes to mind when describing the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Most, if not all, countries are solely looking inwards in the war against coronavirus. Meanwhile, international relations, much less international collaboration, is fracturing amid the chaos of a global battleground where it is unclear whether coronavirus or nationalism is the true enemy. With the question of effective pandemic containment up in the air and escalating economic pressures, the world is looking to viable drug treatments for salvation. Given the current streak of countries taking unilateral actions instead of opting for multilateral cooperation, it is fair to ask whether intellectual property (IP) laws, backed by interests in profits and sentiments of nationalism, will foil efforts to fast-track drug development and provide battered countries with much-needed medical tools.

It is undeniable that intellectual property is indispensable as an incentive that stimulates innovation, and as a result, technological progress. At the same time, IP carries a problematic record of protecting the interests of developed countries and powerful corporations at the expense of poor, undeveloped countries.

In recent history, the South African government in 1998 promoted the generic production and sale of critical antiviral drugs for low prices during the HIV/ AIDS epidemic. In response, the Clinton administration spearheaded a joint lawsuit with 39 name-brand pharmaceutical companies against South Africa.

20 // S U M M E R

2020

Given IP’s complicated history and reputation, the question of whether it will further fragment common interests is more relevant than ever. In South Africa, the plaintiffs only dropped the lawsuit after facing immense global criticism. Now, with a pandemic the modern world has never been faced with before, relying on the current model supported by IP laws—that is, on technologies spearheaded by private corporations—may not be enough.

Attack on Big Pharma and IP International pressure on pharmaceutical companies to voluntarily forfeit IP privileges, at least temporarily, has been consistent and overwhelming.

Organizations worldwide have signed an open letter to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) asking the group and its constituents to support research and development on coronavirus, and to be flexible with IP rights during this period. As a testament to the informal power of the public voice, Gilead, the pharmaceutical company that has garnered attention for its coronavirus drug trials with test-drug remdesivir, recently made a surprising announcement to renounce the orphan drug status granted to the experimental treatment.

This designation, which the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) allocates to drugs targeting rare diseases, would have guaranteed Gilead tax breaks and several years of protection against competition from generic drug production. In addition to the undeniable fact that Coronavirus is by no means a rare

disease, the resulting backlash from the public health sector likely pressured Gilead to reject the FDA designation.

In most cases, however, public opinion, and even a united international front, lacks the power of enforcement in reality. When push comes to shove—for access to medical necessities during a pandemic no less—individual government action is the most effective. Caught in the middle of a public health crisis, Israel turned to compulsory licensing, a legal measure allowed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) whereby a country can circumvent IP laws to produce generic versions of patented medication only when facing a public health emergency. Once the Israeli government used compulsory licensing against AbbVie’s patent on an antiviral drug that was at the time believed to be effective against the Coronavirus, AbbVie moved to end patent enforcement on that drug in all countries. Coronavirus does not discriminate against wealthy and impoverished countries: the pandemic is taking a financial toll on all countries. Germany, China, and Chile, among others, followed suit, seeking legal measures to circumvent pharmaceutical patents.

Given the problematic implications of IP on drug pricing and therefore accessibility, it is clear why countries in crisis are opting for unilateral action against IP. The direct attack on IP by breaking patents, however, is at most a short-term solution.

The chief executive of Roche, a Swiss multinational healthcare company, has warned that mass

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK

disregard for IP laws will disincentivize drug development due to the lack of investment, a perspective that the pharmaceutical industry as a whole shares. Extreme measures can be tolerated during extreme circumstances, but after the crisis, the IP landscape, and how governments navigate it, must change.

No Return to Normalcy The real problem isn’t with IP itself, but with how entities employ IP. For example, on paper, compulsory licensing is a perfectly legal measure when a country is in the middle of a public health crisis. In the real world, however, patent holders of lifesaving drugs are corporations backed by powerful countries like the United States.

Developed countries in the past have supported big pharmaceuticals in pressuring or punishing developing countries that have tried to use compulsory licensing during health crises.

Now, these developed countries are the ones leading the pack in exploring licensing options.

Ironically, the pandemic has revealed that it’s ok when rich countries break patents to save their citizens, but not when poor countries do so. This hypocrisy, stemming from a lack of responsibility in those who have power, is something to be addressed if countries plan to reevaluate IP usage after the pandemic.

Individuals who call for a temporary emergency patent violation during the pandemic and then a post-pandemic return to normalcy in IP are not only neglecting the more serious problem of corporate and governmental responsibility, but don’t

realize that the pandemic may inevitably create changes. The significant volume of countries seeking compulsory licensing measures is evidence of this.

According to Ellen ‘t Hoen, an expert in global health at the University of Groningen, the pandemic will lead to renewed interest in addressing the patent issue—an issue of responsibility.

The Post-Pandemic Solution Tangible change, difficult as it might seem, may not be a far stretch. Despite the fractured

“IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER CORONAVIRUS OR NATIONALISM IS THE TRUE ENEMY.” political arena, there have been surprising stories of international cooperation on the drug development front. The Costa Rican government has proposed a voluntary patent pool—a collective resource of coronavirus-related technology, research, and data formed from a pooling of different organizations’ IP. The proposed patent pool will enable equal and low cost access to information and technology for poor countries disadvantaged in the fight to eradicate the virus.

The specific terms of the patent pool are yet to be decided, but

the World Health Organization (WHO) has accepted the proposal, recently including it in the new “Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator,” a global collaborative project towards COVID-19 vaccine development.

The hope that a voluntary pool will facilitate international cooperation between countries and pharmaceutical companies is not baseless. Previously, the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) allowed companies to share IP and licensing for treatments targeting HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis C, and Tuberculosis. The MPP has increased accessibility to these treatments in low-income countries. Similarly, it is possible that the use of a voluntary patent pool during the pandemic will be a step forward away from the status quo.

In the long term, countries might revisit the WHO, WTO, and WIPO’s 2003 plans for negotiating a more sustainable approach to research and development. From previous discussions for this plan, different sources of funding and cooperation is emphasized in order to counter the overreliance on IP and the abuse of IP rights. When the proposal was originally brought up, the USA and the EU vetoed the legislation. In light of recent events, and with growing international cooperation on drug development and accessibility, these initiatives might be more palatable to countries home to pharmaceutical monopolies. Moving forward, collective action—but even more so, collective responsibility—is necessary as the bedrock of an open, global, and post-pandemic world. H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

21

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

GREEN GOLD MAKING MONEY AND FIGHTING DEFORESTATION WITH YERBA MATE

Kendrick Foster Senior Solicits Editor

Oscar Brun shares his “mate” drink, made from yerba mate leaves, with a work colleague. Buenos Aires, Argentina. March 2020.

22 // S U M M E R

2020

T

he Misiones province in Argentina has a bit of a problem. As several local newspapers have reported, thefts of the province’s main agricultural commodity, often referred to simply as “the green leaf” or “green gold,” have risen, and authorities, despite making several arrests, are at a loss.

Misiones is not a hotbed of the coca trade, but rather a center of production for one of Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay’s most beloved commodities: yerba mate, the leaves used to prepare a herbal infusion called mate. As a Paraguayan villager told Harvard’s ReVista, drinking mate “is such an intrinsic part of us that you really don’t think about it until somebody else points it out.” However, unlike other caffeinated drinks like Italian coffees and Chinese teas, mate has not largely made it past the Southern Cone and into the United States’ globalized drink palate, likely because it is an acquired taste: one self-described “reluctant” mate drinker described it as a mix of “green tea and coffee, with hints of tobacco and oak.”

Yet mate’s global popularity has finally started to increase in the last decade or so. Entrepreneurs have started to tap into the growing American market for alternative teas—and into Gen Z’s preference for more ecologically and socially conscious products—with shade-grown yerba mate. Since mate production provides an economic incentive to reforest the Atlantic rainforest in Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, these emerging companies demonstrate how ecological restoration and prof-

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK

it can go hand in hand.

Ecology of Mate Production Yerba mate has been around a long time. Sixteenth-century Spanish colonizers in Paraguay marvelled at how the indigenous Guaraní people who imbibed the infusion could work longer and harder than them.

After the Guaraní ignored a 1616 ban of the green leaf, Jesuit missionaries noticed its value to their indigenous laborers and planted it alongside other agricultural commodities at their missions; it soon became a valuable export commodity for the missionaries, who could claim a tax exemption to the chagrin of profit-seeking Paraguayan merchants. After Spanish monarch Carlos III, who wanted to reduce the church’s influence in the Spanish realms, expelled the Jesuits, they abandoned their plantations, although Paraguayans still harvested the natural stands that grew in the Atlantic rainforest.

Large-scale plantation agriculture did not return until the 1890s, when a massive influx of European immigrants—German, Ukrainian, Polish, and others—arrived in Argentina and Brazil’s yerba mate belt. German colonists in the area astutely noticed that they would have to adopt crops already adapted to the soil and climatic conditions in order to survive, and mate fit the bill perfectly. By 1915, the plantation system had become widespread in Misiones, and Argentina overtook Brazil and Paraguay as the largest producer of mate. After all, plantation agriculture had double the yields of solely exploit-

ing the native forests.

While plantation agriculture increases production, it also has an ecological cost. As with other deforested ecosystems, yerba mate plantations are more exposed to soil erosion and degradation, which poor soil management practices exacerbate. Unsurprisingly, abandoned mate plantations have lower levels of nitrogen and phosphorus than the virgin ecosystem.

Such an extractive model, though, is unsustainable. As a result, yerba mate planters have gradually started adopting an agroforestry model, which involves growing other trees alongside the mate trees. While this model decreases the productivity of plantations when viewed alone, the ecosystem as a whole benefits because the other trees provide shade for the mate trees that helps the leaves to retain more nutrients and flavor, additional organic material which improve soil moisture, and another root system to prevent erosion. Intercropping with Paraná pine, for instance, reduced soil erosion and moisture loss while improving soil fertility. When managed sustainably, such intercropping can also help farmers diversify their plots with another source of income— primarily timber and fruit—and contribute to the reforestation of the Atlantic rainforest.

Putting Trees in “Paper Parks” That rainforest, largely coexistent with the mate belt, has seen better days: across Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, it has lost more than 93 percent of its land cover. While mate planta tions have certainly contribH I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

23

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

uted to deforestation, other culprits have emerged in the past ten years: soybean production and cattle ranching. Argentina and Paraguay both rank within the top five soybean exporters by value, and rising demand for both products has driven rapid expansion into the Atlantic rainforest. In Paraguay alone, soybeans and beef exports comprise 90 percent of combined exports, meaning that the country is dependent on just a few commodities—commodities that also drive deforestation.

To combat this deforestation, international NGOs have seized upon agroforestry as a sustainable and income-generating solution, and shade-grown yerba mate is a primary example.

For instance, the World Wildlife Fund started a program in 2001 to create forest corridors that linked previously fragmented forest areas by using yerba mate to secure the buy-in of local communities and funding local female-owned cooperatives such as La Hoja Completa. Around the same time, local cooperative Titrayju sprung up to benefit the indigenous community with organic and eco-friendly production practices. Guyra Paraguay, meanwhile, bought 7,000 hectares of land within San Rafael National Park, regarded as a “paper park” within the country, to develop shade-grown mate agriculture alongside several indigenous communities. Finally, Fundación Moisés Bertoni seeded 856 hectares with around 1.3 million mate seedlings as part of a broader World Bank project to reforest the Paraná rainforest.

These programs have largely

24 // S U M M E R

2020

succeeded in preserving existing forest habitat because they reduce the economic incentives for deforestation; destroying a forest that already has an income-generating activity makes little economic sense. At the same time, agroforestry projects that plant trees can slowly yet surely reforest areas that were once exclusively yerba mate plantations and add new habitat for local wildlife. Whether farmers plant mate plants in previously existing forests or new trees to augment previous mate plantations, both options create new carbon sinks as well, since mate and shade trees both take carbon out of the atmosphere.

And of course, the projects generated income for the local community, especially women and indigenous people.

A New Way to Caffeinate Even while yerba mate is increasingly becoming the solution to an ecological crisis in the mate belt, its demand abroad has started to increase. That ecological role, in turn, plays a central role in an increasingly savvy marketing campaign by companies espousing principles of “market-driven regeneration.”

Profit is definitely on these companies’ minds, but ultimately, the story of mate shows how profit and environmentalism are not mutually incompatible.

In 1996, a group of five Californian friends founded Guayaki, widely recognized as the pioneer of this model. Having founded the company right out of college, Guayaki’s founders seized on college students, with their insatiable desire for caffeine, as a key market by using

the tried-and-true technique of collegiate brand ambassadors.

Beyond marketing its triple bottom line of social, environmental, and financial performance, the company touts mate’s benefits, especially when compared to coffee or other energy drinks: a more balanced stimulant effect with more natural antioxidants than coffee and fewer artificial chemicals than energy drinks.

It also helps that its products are not straight yerba mate, but sparkling beverages with mate as a key ingredient instead.

That marketing campaign has paid off, especially as the markets for organic products, healthy beverages, and “exotic” flavors have started to expand.

Campus papers at the University of California-San Diego and Occidental College reported that mate had become a staple at dining halls and off-campus convenience stores. As one Occidental student said, “Every day I will see someone in class with a drink.” Guayaki now makes more than US$40 million a year in sales, and the company reported that it had sold 390,000 cans across 171 universities in 2017 and 2018.

The company’s two other bottom lines have prospered as well. It has stewarded more than 81,000 acres of rainforest, planted 8,800 native trees, and created 670 jobs that paid a living wage of around 2.3 million guaranís (US$357) per month since organic, shade-grown mate can fetch two to three times the yield per pound than plantation-grown mate. These increased wages are critical in a region where the average farmer makes far less than that.

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK Paola Garcia walks past herbal “mate” mugs at the shop where she works in Buenos Aires, Argentina. March 2020.

Other companies have emulated Guayaki’s sustainable business model and have started to compete with it. Mi Mate, founded by students at UCSD, follows it almost to the letter, purchasing its mate from an independent farm that pays its workers a living wage and has contributed to the construction of local schools. Eco Teas also specializes in organic mate, and Clean Cause uses 50 percent of its profits to support teens recovering from drug addiction.

Others have seized upon the product but not necessarily the mission: teaRIOT has incorporated a mate flavor into one of its drinks, German brand ClubMate has developed a matebased soft drink, and even Pepsi has its own mate brand. Yerba mate is “green gold” for more than just Argentines.

That status has attracted some criticism, which highlights the neoliberalism inherent in “exotic” marketing and the dubious

ethics of white men profiting off an indigenous commodity.

These arguments certainly make a valid point, given the long history of U.S. companies profiting off Latin American commodities. However, they also ignore the lengths companies like Guayaki and Mi Mate have gone to consult the indigenous communities involved, fund projects of actual interest to the community, and pay far more than market price for mate. Indeed, both Argentine and indigenous growers alike appreciate the company’s focus on environmental consciousness and the extra income the mate provides.

The Future of Yerba Mate With international companies getting on the mate bandwagon, yerba mate looks destined for a future more oriented towards the Global North than the Global South. Overall, it seems that this commodity—previously limited by its small geograph-

ic range only in the Southern Cone—will become yet another local taste adapted for a global audience. Two trends will likely continue as mate continues its path of globalization. First, young people will lead the craze as they search for new and exciting beverages that still have social and environmental benefits. Second, straight yerba mate will not be the bestseller; rather, mixed beverages with mate as a component will succeed, since consumers generally dislike its otherwise strong taste.

This increasing global demand for mate will have local benefits, but only if more companies adopt the agroforestry model that Guayakí has adopted and pay attention to local and indigenous concerns. It will be a slow battle—after all, neither shade trees nor mate trees spring up overnight. But with the Atlantic rainforest and local livelihoods at stake, it is a battle worth fighting. H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

25

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W Sudanese psychologist Sulima Ishaq Sharif listens during an interview with a victim of rape. Khartoum, Sudan. January 2020.

THE WOMEN’S REVOLUTION FEMALE ACTIVISM IN SUDAN

Sydney Young Staff Writer

A

fter 30 years of military rule under an oppressive dictatorship, Sudan finally overthrew its President, Omar al-Bashir, in April 2019.

Throughout his rule, al-Bashir was responsible for widespread rights abuses. He sent child soldiers along with militias to fight the war in Yemen. In the Darfur region of Sudan, he killed between 200,000 to 400,000 peo-

26 // S U M M E R

2020

ple in his ethnic cleansing campaign against the non-Arab population and allowed the military to rape the civilian population.

He also allowed the military to bomb villages during his anti-insurgent campaign in South Sudan.

Women, in particular, had to endure years of injustice under al-Bashir’s rule. In 1996, alBashir passed the Public Or-

der laws that prohibited women from violating certain dress codes and standards of behavior. For example, women could be whipped for choosing to wear pants or not covering their hair, and they were not allowed to spend time with any non-relative man. Additionally, Sudan has one of the highest rates of female genital mutilation (FGM) in the world, and Sudanese

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK

law allows fathers to force their daughters to marry as young as age 10.

The end of al-Bashir’s rule is a significant step in combating these widespread rights abuses. Notably, this victory would not have been possible without opposition activists, especially women, who constituted 70 percent of the protestors.

A 2016 report from Human Rights Watch titled “‘Good Girls Don’t Protest’: Repression and Abuse of Women Human Rights Defenders, Activists, and Protestors in Sudan” indicated that Sudanese authorities have historically silenced women activists with libel and rape threats.

In light of these attempts to silence women activists and render them invisible to the public eye, it is critical to document and share their stories. Doing so ensures that women are not solely portrayed as the passive victims of oppressive regimes, but as individuals who actively drive change.

A Timeline of Resistance The protests in recent years were not the only time that alBashir saw political unrest since the beginning of his rule in 1989.

It is helpful to place these attempts at resistance in the context of a broader historical timeline. After al-Bashir assumed power, he instituted Sharia law in Sudan. This decision ultimately created a source of tension between Sudan’s northern Muslim population and its southern Christian population.

When non-Arabs started to rise up against al-Bashir’s dictatorial rule in 2003, he launched a campaign of ethnic cleansing.

In response to these longstanding tensions, South Sudan seceded in July 2011, taking ownership of the majority of Sudan’s oil fields. As a result of rising commodity prices, more protests broke out in January 2018. When these protests evolved into resistance against al-Bashir himself, the government cracked down on the opposition, marking the beginning of Sudan’s Third Revolution.

When protestors gathered in front of the military headquarters in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, the government responded violently, cutting off access to social media and killing many protestors. The army finally arrested and overthrew al-Bashir in a coup on April 11, 2019. Afterward, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) took control of the government and was met with further resistance from protestors who wanted to establish democracy in the country. Just as al-Bashir had responded violently to protests, so did the TMC, which sent troops to attack the opposition. It was not until July 5 that the TMC announced that civilians and the military would share power over the next few years. They signed this power sharing agreement in August 2019 and formed the sovereign council, a new ruling body. This political transition, made possible by many women protestors, has been referred to as the “Women’s Revolution.”

The Stories of Sudan’s Female Activists Women played an instrumental role in the protests leading up to the overthrow of al-Bashir on

April 11. These female activists hoped to overturn the many discriminatory laws against women and promote gender equality in Sudan. These efforts should not be misread as attempts to criticize Islam. Rather, women were criticizing how the government used religion to oppress its citizens. “They imprisoned us in the name of religion, burned us in the name of religion,” said one 22-year-old protestor, Alaa Salah. “But Islam is innocent.

Islam tells us to speak up and fight against tyrants…the bullet doesn’t kill. What kills is the silence of the people.”

Women like Salah refused to remain silent in the face of state-sanctioned gender discrimination under al-Bashir, using protest as a way to challenge his regime. The government responded to their efforts with violence and targeted female activists. “Break the girls, because if you break the girls, you break the men,” said one official. According to protestor Rifga Abdelrahman, some women were “beaten up, their hair shaved off, insulted, treated in a way that no Sudanese girl should be treated.” One protestor, Wifaq Quraishi, recalled how soldiers forced her to undress and then photographed her, threatening to use the pictures as blackmail.

However, the stories of women like Quraishi are not narratives of victimhood. Quraishi’s choice to share her story should be seen as a reclamation of agency—a way to assert her own personhood in the face of a government that attempted to silence her.

Despite the military’s violent response, many women have taken a similar path as Quraishi H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

27

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

and refused to be silenced. Another protestor, Lina Marwan, was at a protest when she was arrested, taken to jail, and beaten with sticks. Despite her experience at the hands of the military, she continued protesting, participating in the demonstrations in Khartoum. Marwan reflected on one of her memories from the protests, when one of her friends’ fathers—who had previously been opposed to his daughter’s participation in the protests—came to join them in the demonstrations: “at that moment, they were fighting for the same thing” and “they weren’t afraid anymore.” One woman, Khadija Saleh, had been abroad for six years, but she still returned in order to participate in the protests: “I came back from a safer place because I want a better future for this country.”

While women like Saleh and Marwan participated directly in the protests, other women found different ways to contribute.

For example, one grandmother, Awadia Mahmoud Koko, persuaded a group of restaurants and tea vendors to donate food to the protests. She then oversaw a group of female volunteers who cooked food for the protests in Khartoum. Another woman, Khalda Saber, who worked at a primary school at the time of the revolution, contributed to the revolution by inspiring teachers to join the protests: “I was telling them that there is nothing to lose, compared with what we have already lost. I was telling them that we have to take to the streets, demonstrate and express our rejection to what’s happening,” she said.

Even though she was arrested,

28 // S U M M E R

2020

detained, and beaten by security officers, eventually spending 40 days in detention, Saber still joined the protests at the military headquarters in Khartoum.

It was the unrelenting dedication of women like Salah, Abdelrahman, Marwan, Saleh, Quraishi, Koko, and Sabar that gave Sudan’s Third Revolution its nickname: The Women’s Revolution. Sharing their stories is a way to pay respect to their efforts and challenge the notion that men are the primary drivers of revolutionary change.

The Transitional Government In the wake of the revolution, the transitional government has repealed some of the discriminatory laws that were in place under al-Bashir. Since his overthrow, the government has repealed the Public Order laws that regulated how women can behave and dress in public. The government has also made FGM illegal, threatening anyone who conducts the operations with fines and three years in prison.

Although these legal changes represent significant milestones in the fight against gender discrimination, they are not enough to stop rights abuses that many women face. Perpetrators who conduct FGM operations do not always face prosecution because those who have seen or undergone the procedure are afraid to share their story. Furthermore, many think of FGM as a necessary prerequisite to marriage and are reluctant to challenge it. Now that al-Bashir is out of office, some degree of cultural change is necessary to challenge rights violations. For example, one young woman in

Kenya, named Nice Leng’ete, has been convincing elders to replace FGM with a different tradition. “It’s just the cut that’s wrong,” said Leng’ete. “All the other things—the blessings, putting on the traditional clothes, dancing, all that—that’s beautiful. But whatever is harmful, whatever brings pain, whatever takes away the dreams of our girls—let’s just do away with that.”

Despite women’s participation in the protests prior to the power-sharing agreement, there is also still much progress to be made in ensuring women’s representation in the new government. During the negotiations leading up to the power-sharing agreement, men excluded women from critical meetings.

The current Sovereign Council has 11 members, but only two women hold positions. Women are still fighting for greater representation while the transitional government develops its new legislative council and selects new governors.

Just like in the case of the Public Order laws and FGM, both women and men must commit to challenging the culture of male domination in order to increase female representation in government. Building upon the momentum of the Women’s Revolution is critical. Increasing female participation in government would aid further promotion of women’s rights as well as send a continuing signal that women can be part of Sudan’s new generation of leaders. There are significant cultural and legal barriers to overcome, but Sudanese women have shown they are ready for a fight. H

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK

Mission Shakti, an anti-satellite missile, is arranged for display a day before DefExpo, a defence exhibition.

Lucknow, India. February 2020.

ANTI-SATELITTE WEAPONS AND THE EMERGING SPACE ARMS RACE

ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS AND THE EMERGING SPACE ARMS RACE

Talia Blatt Associate Editor

Talia Blatt Associate Editor

Mission Shakti, an anti-satellite missile, is arranged for display a day before DefExpo, a defence exhibition. Lucknow, India. February 2020.

H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

29

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

A

space race with Russia and China may seem like a concern of the 20th century, not the 21st. It has been decades since the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I and Americans landed on the moon.

In that time, the Berlin Wall has fallen, the Soviet Union has dissolved, and China has become one of the United States’ largest trading partners.

Nevertheless, a space race born from the Cold War continues to unfold. While the current space race may not have the same monopoly on the American imagination as the sprint to the moon during the 1950s and 60s, it deserves our equal attention. We are now witnessing the rapid and increasingly international development of anti-satellite weapons. The race for these weapons not only increases the risk of global conflict—it could jeopardize all future space exploration.

What are Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATs)?

Difficult to define, ASATs occupy a gray zone in international arms control. On one level, they are exactly what the term suggests: weapons designed to destroy or limit satellites for military purposes, such as undermining the command and control centers of an adversary’s military. ASATs can function in several ways. For example, kinetic energy ASATs (KE-ASATs) destroy satellites by physically colliding with them at high velocities. Drones, ballistic missiles, and explosives detonated near satellites can all function as KE-ASATs. Non-kinetic ASATs, by con-

30 // S U M M E R

2020

trast, use any non-physical mechanism to render a satellite inoperative, such as blinding satellites with lasers, launching cyberattacks, or jamming frequencies.

But definitional issues arise because any technology that can physically or non-kinetically damage a satellite can be considered an ASAT weapon. For example, supposedly benign technology aimed at removing defunct satellites or other space junk—known as Active Debris Removal (ADR) technology— can also remove active satellites.

With ostensibly civil but covertly military capabilities or functions, many space technologies, including ADR, are put in a category commonly known as “dual-use.” The dual-use nature of space infrastructure makes differentiating between weapon and non-weapon nearly impossible. As a result, regulating ASATs—and many other spacebased weapons systems—is extremely difficult.

A Brief History of ASAT Proliferation The earliest ASAT testing began during the Cold War, when the success of Sputnik I in October of 1957 catalyzed American fears about the Soviet Union’s potential goal of developing nuclear armed satellites capable of circling the globe. In response, the US developed its first ASAT: Bold Orion, an airlaunched ballistic missile. The Soviet Union responded with its own ASAT program, developing weapons through the 1960s and 70s known as co-orbitals.

Unlike previous KE-ASAT designs, these co-orbitals worked

by syncing up with a target satellite’s orbit, then detonating.

The United States responded to Soviet co-orbitals in the 1980s with the ASM-135 weapon, an air-launched KE-ASAT distinguished by its hit-to-kill method. Unlike the Soviet co-orbitals, the hit-to-kill system did not require explosives; it just used the energy generated by the collision between the craft and the satellite, making delivery more stable. In a 1985 demonstration authorized by President Ronald Reagan, an ASM-135 successfully destroyed a defunct satellite.

Roughly 30 years later, China joined the space race. In 2007, China successfully tested a KEASAT, destroying an old weather satellite with a ballistic missile. And just last year, India also successfully tested an ASAT in what the Indian government referred to as Mission Shakti.

As of 2018, Russia and China were still developing more advanced non-kinetic ASATs. Russia is specifically developing an ASAT system known as Nudol, which operates in Lower Earth Orbit and can move between orbital paths, threatening more satellites than weapons limited to just one orbital path. So, despite the end of the Cold War era, more and more nations are jumping into a space arms race that is resulting in the rapid proliferation of advanced space weaponry.

The ASAT Appeal A global fixation on anti-satellite weapons is arguably the logical end result of the main American project of the late 20th and early 21st century: the movement to digital communi-

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK Visitors walk past a Chinese-made anti-aircraft missile. Beijing, China.

March 2007.

cations. Via the telephone, computers, and eventually the internet, the United States pioneered the use of space-based communications for most civil and military functions. The benefits of satellite-based communications—namely increased efficiency, precision, and volume of information transmitted––are self-evident; however, the US lead in the transition to spacebased systems posed a threat: relying on satellites for military use more than any other country created an asymmetric dependency. In other words, an unexpected denial of space-enabled information or capabilities would be more debilitating to the United States than to any other country because no other country is as dependent on satellite communications.

In an era of US hegemony, powers like Russia, China, and India are looking for arenas in which they can make the most gains against a conventionally stronger opponent. The space race has an asymmetric nature: the more the United States de-

velops in space, the more it has to lose. Thus, space warfare provides an arena where emerging powers can gain a strategic advantage relative to the US. More broadly, ASATs are also desirable because they can function as conflict deterrents. If a conflict arises, countries may be less likely to escalate if they believe their opponents are capable of essentially blinding their military. Just as two nuclear armed opponents risk mutually assured destruction (MAD), two ASAT armed countries risk mutual impotence. If they both can “turn off” each other’s militaries—or deny access to the satellites upon which their opponent’s conventional and nuclear forces rely—both countries are rendered close to defenseless, a risk they would be extremely reluctant to take.

A Uniquely Dangerous Arms Race Despite their deterrent functions, ASATs are more likely to provoke or exacerbate conflicts than dampen them, especially

given the risk they pose to early warning satellites. These satellites are a crucial element of US ballistic missile defense, capable of detecting missiles immediately after launch and tracking their paths.

Suppose a US early warning satellite goes dark, or is shut down. Going dark could signal a glitch, but in a world in which other countries have ASATs, it could also signal the beginning of an attack. Without early warning satellites, the United States is much more susceptible to nuclear missiles. Given the strategy of counterforcing—targeting nuclear silos rather than populous cities to prevent a nuclear counterattack—the Americans might believe their nuclear weapons are imminently at risk. It could be twelve hours before the United States regains satellite function, which is too long to wait to put together a nuclear counterattack. The United States, therefore, might move to mobilize a nuclear attack against Russia or China over what might just be a piece of debris shutting off a satH I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

31

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

ellite.

Additionally, accidental warfare, or strategic miscalculation, is uniquely likely in space. It is much easier to hold an adversary’s space systems in jeopardy with destructive ASATs than it is to sustainably defend a system, which is expensive and in some cases not technologically feasible because of limitations on satellite movement. Space is therefore considered offense-dominant; offensive tactics like weapons development are prioritized over defensive measures, such as improving GPS or making satellites more resistant to jamming.

As a result, countries are left with poorly defended space systems and rely on offensive posturing, which increases the risk that their actions are perceived as aggressive and incentivizes rapid, risky counterattacks because militaries cannot rely on their spaced-based systems after

32 // S U M M E R

2020

first strikes.

There are several hotspots in which ASATs and offensive-dominant systems are particularly relevant. Early warning satellites play a central role in US readiness in the event of a conflict involving North Korea. News of North Korean missile launches comes from these satellites. Given North Korea’s history of nuclear provocations, unflinchingly hostile rhetoric towards the United States and South Korea, and diplomatic opacity, North Korea is always a threatening, unknowable adversary, but recent developments have magnified the risk. With the health of Kim Jong-un potentially in jeopardy, a succession battle or even civil war on the peninsula raises the chances of loose nukes. If the regime is terminal, traditional MAD risk calculus will become moot; with nothing to lose, North Korea would be incentivized to at-

tempt a nuclear lash-out against the United States. Or, China might decide to seize military assets and infrastructure of the regime. If the US does not have its early warning satellites because they have been taken out in an ASAT attack, the US, South Korea, and Japan are all in imminent nuclear peril, while China could be in a position to fundamentally reshape East Asian geopolitics.

The South China Sea is another hotspot in which ASATs could risk escalation. China is developing Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) in the South China Sea, a combination of long range radar with air and maritime defense meant to deny US freedom of navigation in the region. Given the disputed nature of territory in the South China Sea, the United States and its allies do not want China to successfully close off the region.

But the most effective way to

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK

break an A2/AD system would be with anti-satellite weapons.

ASATs could neutralize the maritime surveillance China relies upon to deny access to the region and guide cruise missiles.

Thus, China is extremely wary of US ASAT development: risks to Beijing’s South China Sea strategy are seen as threats to China itself because of territorial sovereignty claims that are deeply important to the regime and have only become more pronounced under President Xi Jinping. If a Chinese satellite went dark, Beijing might perceive it as a US ASAT designed to undermine the A2/AD approach, and escalate with conventional force.

An Even Greater Risk Many of these conflict scenarios start with the loss of satellite function, which may seem unlikely. But ASATs threaten satellites through more than just direct attack. ASAT testing, rather

than deployment, risks the exponential accumulation of debris, which endangers satellites and creates a host of other problems.

KE-ASATs rely on smashing satellites into thousands of pieces, so each test adds tremendous amounts of space debris. The 2007 Chinese KE-ASAT test alone increased the number of objects in orbit by 20 percent, producing more than two thousand pieces of debris large enough to be tracked and likely thousands more too small to be counted that will remain in orbit for centuries.

Even the smallest pieces of debris can do great damage; traveling at more than 15,000 miles per hour, they can crash into other debris in a proliferation known as the Kessler Syndrome. The situation in space could approach a critical mass in which collision cascading occurs even if all launches were halted,

choking orbits with debris until all satellites are destroyed and spaceflight rendered impossible. Compared to the negligible debris created during commercial launches, ASAT tests—especially if the arms race continues to escalate and countries with less developed space programs join with cruder designs—may accelerate the debris in space closer and closer to this critical mass.

If debris knocks out a satellite, an increasingly likely possibility in a world with ASAT tests, then the aforementioned conflict scenarios become more likely.

Conflict aside, ASAT-based debris clouds are terrifying in their own right. Public health, transportation, climate science, and a litany of other crucial infrastructures are dependent on satellites that are now at risk. Satellite GPS is a cornerstone of the modern economy; some pundits believe that the slightest glitch

Intercontinental ballistic missiles are paraded through Pyongyang, North Korea. April 2017.

H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

33

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

in GPS satellites could shock the stock market and further destabilize an unstable global economy. During the pandemic, satellites are playing a crucial role in geospatial data collection for infectious disease modeling.

Essentially, it is hard to imagine a world without satellites, but that is a possible outcome given that there are no reliable methods of withdrawing debris from space.

A Solution? Start Small There are two conflicting views on how the US could mitigate the worst effects of an ASAT arms race. The first, put forward by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld in 2001, is fairly simple: Space militarization is inevitable, and the United States will have to rely on superior capabilities to prevent conflict—essentially, end the arms race by winning it. This is classic escalation dominance theory: the idea that sustainable deterrence can be created when a nation escalates conflict to a level greater than their adversary can match.

However, the nature of an arms race makes escalatory advantages inherently ephemeral, and the advances Russia and China have made since Rumsfeld’s 2001 report suggest that relying on US space superiority might be a poor strategy. Even if it were possible, attaining escalation dominance would require near constant weapons testing, which produces more debris.

The second viewpoint calls for an end to the arms race not by winning it but by calling it off entirely, through comprehensive space arms control. Such

34 // S U M M E R

2020

regulations are complicated and have a long history, but could be a more sustainable solution than an endless proliferation of weapons.

The first iteration of arms control in space came in the 1960s.

The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) banned nuclear weapons tests in outer space, and the more comprehensive 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), considered the cornerstone of peaceful space development, prohibited any military activity on celestial bodies including stationing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in space. Both treaties are still in effect today, but despite additional treaties in recent decades, there are still no international regulations banning weapons other than WMD in space.

The most recent attempt at an ASAT ban was proposed by Russia and China in 2014. A revision of a draft from 2008, the Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) was rejected by the United States because it lacked verification and permitted the stockpiling of terrestrial-based ASAT systems. It only banned space-based ASATs, which would enable China and Russia to continue developing groundlaunched systems known as direct-ascent ASATs. The PPWT was an empty solution for an arms race, clearly designed to benefit Russia and China rather than prevent additional weapons development.

But a comprehensive agreement that the US, Russia, and China all find satisfactory seems un-

likely. The Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space Treaty (PAROS) has been discussed since the 1980s without much progress.

Perhaps a more feasible solution is a limited test ban treaty: an agreement to stop testing debris-producing ASATs. It has precedent—the PTBT successfully prevented the testing of nuclear weapons in space—and could stave off the worst effects of debris accumulation by eliminating debris-producing tests.

Additionally, in the long term, a test ban could reduce countries’ confidence in their ASATs; capabilities atrophy without regular testing, meaning countries would be less likely to base their military strategies on ASATs in the event of a conflict.

By banning specific systems, a test ban treaty is not too vague as to be unenforceable like the PPWT, but it could be limited enough to not affect broader space development. Russia and China might find the terms acceptable; after all, debris threatens their satellites too, and they have a reciprocal interest in reining in US weapons development.

It’s hard to conceive of a future for humanity that does not feature space in some capacity.

Big businesses are already pursuing space commerce more aggressively, with visions of space colonies and large scale resource extraction. But the continued, unchecked proliferation of ASATs could close off space entirely—and help induce a nuclear war. Now, more than ever, it remains urgent and imperative that international negotiations reach an arms control treaty. H

US peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, left, and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban group’s top political leader, sign a peace agreement. Doha, Qatar. February 2020.

PEACE DEAL OR PIPE DREAM?

THE FARCE OF THE FEBRUARY 2020 US-TALIBAN AGREEMENT John Berkay

Associate Editor

Afghan special forces stand guard at the site of a suicide bomber attack. Kabul, Afghanistan. April 2020.

H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

35

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

F

ebruary 29, 2020 marked the signing of the most recent, and at first glance the most promising, peace deal between the United States and the Taliban. The self-proclaimed author of the peace deal, President Donald Trump, believes he has again solved a political deadlock which neither his predecessors nor international counterparts so far have been able to untangle. The stakes are high; since 2001, the conflict in Afghanistan has cost the United States almost US$1 trillion, claimed over 147,000 American and Afghan lives, and left the Central Asian nation of 35 million with little hope for peace, stability, or prosperity. Included in the deal is the phased reduction of United States and coalition troops stationed in Afghanistan, a mutual prisoner swap between the United States and the Taliban, a commitment on the part of the Taliban to cease being a safe haven of terrorist activities against the West, and the expectation that the Taliban will soon begin to engage in further peace negotiations and cooperate with the Afghan civilian government of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani.

However, that last element of the deal—the assumption that

the Taliban and Ghani’s government will be able to successfully engage in productive negotiation—brings to focus the crux of Afghan’s political reality, and highlights the naïvité of the deal’s scope and goals. From the very beginning, the prevailing view, especially in the West, was that any long-term solution should be “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned,” reflecting the principle that modern democracy cannot be imported; it must be domestically cultivated through a process of reconciliation between the dominant interest groups within the nation. On the surface, the February 2020 deal seems to adhere to these guidelines, aiming to reduce the presence of the US military and set a precedent for intra-Afghan negotiations. Indeed, international headlines on the day the deal was signed indicated optimism and hope, suggesting that the almost two-decade long conflict could be coming to an end.

However, under the praise, the deal is really a formalized roadmap for ending the US presence in Afghanistan, shifting responsibility for further peace negotiations to the Taliban and the civilian government. The move is

A rally to celebrate the US-Taliban agreement.

Quetta, Pakistan. March 2020.

36 // S U M M E R

2020

based more on false optimism than a true understanding of the power dynamic within Afghanistan. It is unclear what future Taliban-government cooperation would even look like; the deal does not, for example, make any specific demands of the Taliban or the Afghan government regarding the rights of Afghan women, an issue which has been of central concern due to the Taliban’s record of extremely harsh treatment of women and girls.

It would of course be ideal for the Taliban and the civilian government to negotiate their own settlement, but the complex interests on both sides complicate any peace process. As Seth Jones of the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes, “I find it very hard to believe that [senior Taliban officials will] have fought for 18 years only to agree to a situation where they’re serving in an Afghan government led by someone like President Ghani.… And I don’t see, at this point, a lot of opportunity and position where the two will agree.” President Ghani’s tenuous hold on power has raised concerns about his legitimacy, and it begs the question: if the constituents of the Afghan government do not have full confidence in their president, how can Taliban leaders be expected to form a functioning government alongside him?

Indeed, the civilian government has its own leadership problems and does not seem to be in any position to articulate a clear set of demands and concessions to the Taliban. The Afghan people went to the polls on September 28, 2019 to elect their new president, and even though

COVER

Ashraf Ghani was declared winner on February 18, 2020 (just two days before the US-Taliban deal) after months of delay over corruption disputes, his opponent Abdullah Abdullah rejected the result and claimed he would form his own “inclusive government.” On May 17, 2020, they finally agreed on a power-sharing deal in which Abdullah will lead peace talks with the Taliban, yet the fact that it took three months for the election results to be translated into an actual government does not send an encouraging message for the possibility of peace talks. Their feud is nothing new; Ghani and Abdullah had also gone head to head in the 2014 election, which only ended when US Secretary of State John Kerry intervened to create a power-sharing agreement in which Ghani continued as the dominant figure. Such is the nature of Afghan politics.

History offers little reason to suggest that the Taliban and the civilian government will be able to make any tangible progress.

The deal posits that intra-Afghan negotiations were to begin on March 10, 2020. While it is true that Ghani and the Taliban finally agreed on March 25, 2020 to start trading prisoners by the end of the month, this was likely due to US pressure on Ghani: US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced on March 23 that the United States would be cutting US$1 billion of aid funds to Afghanistan due to the standoff between Ghani and Abdullah. Further, he threatened, an additional US$1 billion would be cut by 2021 if the United States was not satisfied with the Afghan government’s progress. Miraculous-

ly, two days after the announcement, Ghani’s government agreed to the prisoner swap.

The fact that the decision to cut aid came so quickly highlights the impulsive nature of the Trump administration on the question of Afghanistan. The United States signed the February 2020 deal with the Taliban, realized shortly thereafter that their optimism was misplaced, and soon began cowed the Ghani government into talks with the Taliban to save face. Instead of implementing a ceasefire and using that opportunity to move toward peace talks

"SEVERAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THE TALIBAN HAD NO INTENTION OF TRULY HONORING THE DEAL." afterward, the United States hoped that if the Taliban and the civilian government were to start talks first, a ceasefire would soon follow. The administration had some reason to believe this—the Taliban had previously hinted at the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire. But like the rest of the deal, the ceasefire was (and still is) a pipe dream, as the Taliban conducted over 70 attacks on Afghan government forces for the week following the deal’s signing. And if Trump follows through on his proposed aid cuts, he will cripple

the Afghan government’s ability to defend against the Taliban, eliminating the primary reason for the Taliban making concessions. On top of everything, several intelligence sources have confirmed that the Taliban had no intention of truly honoring the deal, and may have signed it merely to celebrate the symbolic withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan. Trump himself seemed to acknowledge the risks, declaring on March 6 that the Taliban could “possibly” overrun the civilian government if the United States proceeded with withdrawal. Paul D. Miller, professor at Georgetown University and former National Security Council official, compared it to the Nixon administration’s conduct in the Vietnam war, when US diplomats negotiated a deal with North Vietnam and forced their allies in Saigon to accept it. Two years later, the North Vietnamese forces captured Saigon.

There is a time and place for troop withdrawal. The United States can no longer sustain the sort of all-encompassing foreign policy from the days of the Pax Americana, so the administration’s fatigue and desire to withdraw troops is understandable.

Trump has made it clear that he no longer wants boots on the ground in Afghanistan, and he is attempting to follow through on that. However, the February 2020 agreement is a peace deal in name only, exacerbated by Trump’s subsequent assumptions about intra-Afghan peace talks and the intentions of the Taliban. The Graveyard of Empires is now the Graveyard of Ceasefires as well. H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

37

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W An art piece entitled "Quilt of Belonging," representing all Canada’s first peoples, on display in the G20 summit.

Toronto, Canada. June 2010.

I

t’s a tale as old as Canada itself: contested First Nations land rights, a lucrative land development, escalating tensions leading to excessive force and damaged relations. For those who know of the Oka Crisis of 1990, history seems to be repeating itself with the latest conflict over the development of a gas pipeline running through Wet’suwet’en territory in British Columbia. The prevailing strategy for dealing with First Nations land rights does not appear to have changed substantially in the last 30 years, leaving many wondering what it will take for the Canadian government to finally learn from its dismal re-

38 // S U M M E R

2020

cord of protecting First Nations’ rights and commit to the path of reconciliation.

Oka is a small village less than an hour outside of Montreal. Its original name is Kanehsatà:ke, a name given to it by the Kanien’kehà:ka (or Mohawk) who are the traditional custodians of the land. In 1717, the Seminary of St-Sulpice mission in Montreal was told to relocate, and French King Louis XV granted them the land encompassing Kanehsatà:ke. The understanding was that the Sulpicians would hold the land in trust for its First Nations inhabitants, but they reneged on this commitment and claimed sole

ownership rights. With these newfound rights the Sulpicians began clearing land and selling off plots to European settlers, marking the beginning of a new era.

Even though they were not legally recognized as the owners of the land, the Mohawk continued to build their community around Kanehsatà:ke. An 1881 government initiative to force indigenous inhabitants to leave was largely unsuccessful, and five years later the Mohawk would create the land of “the Pines” that would become the center of the Oka Crisis over a century later. This land consisted of a mountain area where

COVER

BLOODY BLOCKADES THE LEGACY OF THE OKA CRISIS

Melinda Meng Staff Writer

70,000 to 80,000 pine trees were planted by Mohawk with the help of non-native settlers, after sand avalanches caused by a lack of stabilizing tree roots in the ground threatened the area.

Over time the Pines became the home of a Mohawk burial ground, which only added to the controversy when the town decided to build a golf course on the land without the consent of the Mohawk. While the initial golf course development was successfully completed, a critical line was crossed with the announcement of plans to expand the golf course into the cemetery.

In March of 1990, the Mohawk

erected a blockade to prevent the arrival of bulldozers scheduled to break ground on the golf course expansion. The municipality was granted an injunction ordering the dismantling of the barricade, but instead of giving up, the Mohawk strengthened their barricade and warriors were seen patrolling the pines.

After a second injunction was served in late June, members from the neighbouring Mohawk communities of Kahnawà:ke and Akwesasne arrived to help defend the land and set up a protest camp. By July, the mayor of Oka had decided that the impasse had gone on for long enough and called for the Sûreté

du Québec, Quebec’s provincial police, to come in and enforce the injunction. An early morning raid staged with 100 police officers equipped with tear gas, concussion grenades, and assault rifles went terribly wrong when shooting broke out between the two groups, leading to the death of Corporal Marcel Lemay of the SQ. The police retreated, abandoning their cruisers and a bulldozer, and the prevailing Mohawk warriors used these to barricade the highway running through Kanehsatà:ke. The Mohawk warriors of Kahnawà:ke constructed a blockade in solidarity on the Honoré Mercier Bridge, one of H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

39

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

the four main bridges connecting the metropolitan island of Montreal to the residential hubs of the south shore. Other First Nations communities in Canada followed suit, with people in places as far as British Columbia blockading roads and railways.

The blockading of the Honoré Mercier Bridge proved to be a tipping point for the many Canadians who previously had merely been onlookers to the tensions brewing in Kanehsatà:ke. The disruption caused to thousands of peoples’ daily commutes prompted an extremely racist backlash, with the residents of neighbouring Chateauguay attacking Mohawks driving through and lighting a Mohawk effigy on fire. Supplies to the entirety of Kanehsatà:ke were quickly cut off, even though there were still many civilians and children in the community. Already with one police officer dead and now facing daily outbreaks of violence, Premier of Quebec Robert Bourassa called on the federal government to intervene and send in the Canadian Armed Forces.

On August 20th, the Canadian Armed Forces were deployed, with 4,000 soldiers stationed in the area around Kanehsatà:ke and Kahnawà:ke. The armed forces successfully negotiated the removal of the blockade on the Honoré Mercier Bridge, but were not as successful on the Kanehsatà:ke front. Authorities instructed the citizens of Oka to evacuate, and fearing for their lives many of the elders, women, and children of Kanehsatà:ke fled by car into Montreal. Along the way they were greeted by angry rock-throwing mobs, resulting in several people being injured. In the end, the two sides reached a deal whereby the blockades would be taken down in return for the permanent cancellation of the golf course expansion. With the armed forces not expecting the sudden exodus from the surrender of the final remaining protestors, the closing act of the crisis quickly descended into chaos. During the ensuing altercation, Waneek Horn Miller, a 14 year old Mohawk resident of Kanehsatàke, was accidentally

Mohawk warriors use golf carts after a police assault to remove Mohawk barricades at the Kahnesetake reserve. Oka, Quebec. July 1990.

40 // S U M M E R

2020

bayoneted in the chest. Luckily she survived, but Waneek was just one of the many civilians who came to harm during this conflict.

Finally after 78 days, the crisis came to an end, leaving a provincial police officer dead and hundreds of Mohawk civilians injured. The events led to the creation of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, tasked with deepening consultation and cooperation between First Nations and governments across Canada. Now, 30 years later, how close are Canadians to actually achieving reconciliation with the First Nations who have been systematically abused for centuries? Despite the moratorium on further development in the Pines, the ownership of the Mohawk over the land has still not been recognized and is still legally held by developers and local government. This “on-going collusion of land fraud” has been formally decried and protested by First Nations activists, but so far the government has not moved to give the land back to its rightful owners. One of the

COVER

Oka developers recently offered to “gift” some of the land back to the people of Kanehsatà:ke, a move that has been criticized for the tax benefits that the developer would still be extracting from land that does not belong to him. More importantly, the land would still not be directly held by the Mohawk but by the federal government, who would have the final say in its administration.

The history of the Oka Crisis and its impact is especially salient when taken into consideration with the Wet’suwet’en protests that began in late 2018.

This time the conflict was centered around the construction of a natural gas pipeline planned to pass through traditional Wet’suwet’en territory in the province of British Columbia. Once again blockades were erected across Canada, beginning with roads leading to the actual site of development and expanding to encompass railway lines across Canada. The peaceful protest, similar to the blockading of the Honoré Mercier Bridge in 1990, was successful in increasing the visibility of the dispute and putting pressure on the federal government to come up with a resolution.

However, the economic disruption this entailed made the movement unpopular with many Canadians, and there has been an increase in hate speech and violent threats made against First Nations peoples.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) was dispatched to enforce a court injunction and remove a blockade in Wet’suwet’en territory, resulting in the arrest of 14 protestors. The pub-

lication of a report alleging the RCMP was instructed to use lethal force in the enforcement of the injunction, a claim that has not been verified or confirmed by the RCMP or reputable news media sources in Canada but seems to be supported by video footage of RCMP officers armed with rifles circling a blockade outpost, further aggravated the situation. The arrests and accusations of excessive force sparked significant controversy and a new wave of protests across Canada. Thankfully there have yet to be any fatal incidents recorded in this latest episode of land disputes between First Nations and the Canadian government, but there is no clear resolution in sight.

The Oka Crisis taught First Nations communities across Canada that the fastest way to make Canadians pay attention to their issues and come to the negotiating table was to disrupt their daily lives. Blockades were the perfect tool to accomplish this goal peacefully, but escalation motivated in part by a lingering racist colonial history led to violence and a breakdown in negotiations. Clearly, the Canadian government continues to fail to live up to its obligations to protect the rights of First Nations and correct historical injustices that have scarred indigenous communities for generations.

“Reconciliation” becomes nothing more than window-dressing, a public relations motto that deflects from the costly issue of land ownership and reparations. Raising awareness of these injustices through the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and more

recently the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls is all well and good, but what continues to be lacking are concrete actions seeking to rectify these wrongs. The government seems as eager as ever to call in armed forces instead of meeting at the negotiating table, and without a clear framework for land repatriation, reconciliation is a pipe dream destined to be enmired in pipeline development nightmares.

While the repatriation of all unceded land, which includes the major metropolis of Montreal, might not be the most feasible solution, that does not mean that partial repatriation and other compensatory measures should not be pursued. At the very least the government should ensure the return of land that has yet to be developed, like the Pines, to the Mohawk, and begin making payments towards the purchase of land that they are not willing to repatriate. This would ensure a steady flow of income for First Nations communities that can be used to provide community support services, cultural educational programs, and dependable infrastructure like electricity and potable water, essential resources which the Canadian government has been negligent in providing. Canada sadly cannot return to the past and fix its mistakes, but what the government can do is learn from history and leave a legacy future generations will be proud to uphold. The alternative is facing a major crisis every few decades and apologizing afterwards, a pattern that will take meaningful change to break. H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

41

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

WANT A NEW SPACE FRAMEWORK? PLANET

Will Schrepferman Staff Writer

The moon starts passing in front of the sun during a solar eclipse.

Northern Cascades National Park, Washington. August 2017.

42 // S U M M E R

2020

I

n 2014, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) announced plans to launch a spacecraft that would capture, relocate, and return samples from an asteroid.

The mission raises enormous— even cosmic—legal questions.

Who gets to claim extraterrestrial property? Who owns the terrain? Who gets to decide the answers to these questions? Although it was ultimately canceled due to cost, NASA’s asteroid relocation mission highlights the nebulous nature of legality in the final frontier. As humanity designs an equitable legal framework for our exploration of the cosmos, we must consider the history, interpretation, contemporary technological landscape, and future of space law.

The Province of All Mankind After the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the United Nations moved to establish the governing principles of international law in space. The end result was the 1967 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” commonly referred to as the Outer Space Treaty (OST). The treaty has served as the basis for all legal considerations of space for 50 years, but it is far from a comprehensive document.

A mere 2,200 words, the OST is more set of principles than technical manual. (The massive United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, on the other hand, outlines every aspect of international maritime law.)

Chief among OST principles is

COVER

the idea that exploration and use of outer space should be conducted for the benefit of all nations, as outer space is “the province of all mankind.” The OST also declares space free for exploration and use by all, but prohibits claims of sovereignty over any celestial body or the use of nuclear weapons in space.

By remaining flexible by design, the treaty has thus far successfully kept space a peaceful place open to all nations and not subject to Age of Exploration-style territory grabs.

Its openness to interpretation proves difficult, though, when considering whether or not nations or companies can retain and profit from resources extracted from space. Henry Hertzfeld, a professor of space policy at George Washington University, calls the issue an “international open argument.”

Creative Interpretations It was not always this way. In the absence of technology to actually extract or benefit from resources in outer space, individuals have issued meaningless— and therefore harmless—claims of property ownership in space for decades.

In the 1700s, King Frederick the Great of Prussia bequeathed ownership of the moon to a healer as a reward for the miraculous cures he offered. Martin Jurgen, a descendant of that healer, attempted to formally claim ownership of the entire moon over two hundred years later; scholars at the Institute of Air and Space Law formally denied the legitimacy of Jurgen’s attempt.

In 1948, Chicago native James

Thomas Mangan claimed all of space as its own country, called Celestia, with him its “First Representative.” He filed a formal charter with his county’s recorder of deeds, which the state attorney general actually recognized in a 2,000-word opinion.

Mangan applied for recognition by the United Nations, even flying the flag of Celestia in front of the UN headquarters in 1958 to a television audience of millions, but was ignored until his death in 1970.

And in 1996, NASA launched a space probe to observe an asteroid called 433 Eros. Taking advantage of the fact that the OST prohibits property claims by nation-states and not individuals, self-described “space activist” Greg Nemitz attempted to personally claim ownership of the asteroid. He issued NASA an invoice for a US$20 parking ticket on his property, which resulted in a federal lawsuit that was dismissed by a judge for “a lack of cognizable legal theory.”

While these examples are comical, they serve to illustrate the lack of an exhaustive legal framework to settle disputes and litigate property claims in space. New technologies mean that questions of rights and ownership matter more than ever before.

Technology Outpacing Law Unfortunately, as legal challenges mount, space exploration is increasingly falling outside the purview of national governments who can set sensible standards. Public agencies like NASA are ceding responsibility to billionaire-funded private companies like SpaceX and H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

43

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W A SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket lifts off with NASA astronauts from the Kennedy Space Center. Titusville, Florida. May 2020.

Blue Origin. Over time, these companies are taking more and more responsibility for satellite launches, exploration, and space tourism. That said, these large companies do not pose a significant legal challenge to the OST: they still work for the government and are bound to comply with its free-use, anti-sovereignty, and anti-militarization guidelines.

The same cannot be said of other private endeavors. US Senator Ted Cruz has predicted that “the first trillionaire will be made in space,” with good reason. In recent years, several companies––including one called Planetary Resources that is funded by Google co-founder Larry Page––have set a goal of mining asteroids. The idea is not as far-fetched as it sounds. The potential value of mining for minerals that are rare on Earth but abundant in asteroids, like platinum, is more than enough to justify costs. Additionally,

44 // S U M M E R

2020

asteroids containing hydrogen and oxygen could become valuable sources of water and fuel for deep space exploration. Even beyond asteroids, private companies are pushing for robotic landers to mine the moon or establish extractive lunar bases.

These companies exist in a gray area of the OST, which does not contain explicit provisions for private companies or restrictions on resource extraction. Instead, it simply prohibits claims of national sovereignty over territory. International space law may need to evolve so that technology does not outpace it.

What Should We Do? The United States has unilaterally interpreted that the OST allows companies or nations to do what they wish with the resources they extract from space, so long as operations are peaceful and no territory is explicitly claimed. This idea is codified in the 2015 Commercial Space

Launch Competitiveness Act, which allows companies to do whatever they want with materials they extract from a celestial body. Luxembourg passed a similar law to offer European space resource-extraction firms legal certainty. But several nations, including Russia, take issue with these laws; they argue that resources themselves are celestial bodies and are therefore subject to OST prohibitions.

As it stands, no entity exists to provide recourse in these disputes. While disagreements remain theoretical for now, what would happen if two rival companies, one American and one Russian, target the same asteroid for resource extraction or exploration? International maritime law provides a potential solution. The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), part of the previously mentioned body of UN law, provides a forum for nations to take up disputes with one an-

COVER

other, in some cases offering opinions on the legitimacy of a country’s claims to the continental shelf.

The nearest equivalent for space law is the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). The PCA is an international court with no relationship to the UN that represents a forum for a broad range of international disputes. With regards to space, it currently provides guidelines for issues between states over satellite communications. However, the PCA is better equipped to handle specific disputes than interpret an entire branch of international law. In a future of widespread private and public resource extraction and exploration of outer space, the UN may need to set up a body comparable to ITLOS to ensure consistent interpretation of the OST.

Additionally, some critics have argued that the OST is now too dated to resolve any outstanding questions of space travel. Many point to the fact that the treaty was written at a time when the only two entities that could reach space were the United States and Soviet Union; now, dozens of countries and companies routinely operate in space. Humanity, these critics argue, needs a new comprehensive treaty to address modern concerns.

However, this approach misses the point of the OST. The treaty was never intended to be an exhaustive framework. Subsequent treaties have dealt with specific concerns, from the liability of damage caused by spacecraft to the rescue of astronauts to the registration of space objects. Space officials, as-

tronauts, and lawyers strongly oppose renegotiating the OST and favor a more targeted approach to new concerns as they arise. For example, the question of whether resources are classified as celestial bodies or not will likely require a new agreement. Matt Schaefer, a law professor at the University of Nebraska, has stated that “to try to make rules in advance [is] pretty impractical.” Instead, a dynamic approach resting on the principles of the OST could be more effective as a means to keep pace with evolving technology and solve issues as they arise.

The “province of all mankind” ought to be protected from militarization or nationalization; but that is only possible if humanity comes to terms with an evolving technological and legal landscape. H

US President Lyndon Johnson signs a treaty that bars nuclear weapons and military bases from outer space and prohibits any nation from claiming sovereignty in space. Washington, DC. October 1967.

H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

45

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

A DILEMMA IN PARADISE THE FUTURE OF US-CUBA RELATIONS Yanxi Fang Staff Writer

46 // S U M M E R

2020

An image of Ernesto "Che" Guevara hangs across the doorway from a US flag tacked to a wall. Havana, Cuba. March 2016.

H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

47

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

T

he year is 1950. Cuba is a vibrant and modern country, with the fifth highest per capita income and the third highest life expectancy in the Western hemisphere. Along with having the most television sets per person, the island is also home to a democratic and progressive system of government under a constitution passed just a decade earlier. Within half a century, however, virtually all of this disappeared. By 2000, Cuba’s per capita consumption was little more than half of its 1950 levels, and a single-party dictatorship ruled the country with an iron fist. Driven by the rise of communism, these changes were part of a larger political process that not only led to significantly lower standards of living for many Cubans, but also fundamentally changed the country’s relationship with the United States, a neighbor and major world power sitting just 90 miles away.

This geographic proximity has long been a double-edged sword for Cuba, particularly throughout the Cold War. Although the United States may have served as an omnipresent and existential threat to the communist regime, Cuba successfully leveraged that perception to obtain substantial military and economic aid from the Soviet bloc. This strategic partnership presented a severe threat to the United States that was particularly heightened by the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Today, despite recent efforts to normalize diplomacy, the country continues to be a proxy for world powers generally hostile to American interests: China has great-

48 // S U M M E R

2020

ly increased its economic investment in Cuba, while Russia has made a number of smaller gestures meant to reignite the countries’ historical partnership. Unsurprisingly, this history has been well reflected in American public opinion, although in recent years, Americans have become generally divided in their views about Cuba.

The prospect of nuclear warfare has substantially diminished since the 1960s, but Cuba’s role as a proxy continues to threaten American national security. Unfortunately, the obvious solution of diplomacy is problematic. Today, the Cuban government ignores human rights, detains political prisoners, and fails to provide even basic necessities for its citizens, despite promises of a better future after the 2018 transition of power from the Castro brothers to current President Miguel Díaz-Canel. Russia and China have ignored these abuses, making American engagement more difficult. However, although it is important to consider the human consequences of the current regime, it is still in the United States’ best interest to negotiate with Cuba—not just to mitigate the potential threat of geopolitical conflict, but also to enable mutually beneficial trade and exchange as neighbors. This is the dilemma that has manifested itself throughout the history of American foreign policy: choosing between authoritarianism or a military threat as the greater evil. In the context of Cuba, it is not impossible to address both of these challenges, especially because commerce can act as an additional incentive for preserv-

ing a friendly relationship.

A Complicated Past Being so close to the United States, Cuba has always maintained a special relationship with its northern neighbor. Although the island was a Spanish colony until the late 19th century, the United States had constantly coveted the riches of its agricultural industry.

The American desire for influence over Cuba is not merely a Cold War-era phenomenon: this idea was expressed as early as 1823 through the Monroe Doctrine, and reiterated by the attempted purchase of Cuba with the Ostend Manifesto in 1854.

By the dawn of the 20th century, after the Spanish-American War—made possible by the explosion of the USS Maine in Havana Harbor—the United States acquired Cuba outright.

However, the traditional American notions of freedom and democracy did not necessarily carry over into territories like Cuba. After the signing of the Platt Amendment in 1903, which granted independence and self-governance but still allowed the United States to intervene in domestic affairs, Cuba spent more than three decades under the rule of a cycle of mostly corrupt dictators. A significant shift came in 1940 with the signing of a new constitution, which provided universal suffrage and placed restrictions on the presidency. This new system was initially successful: the first president, Fulgencio Batista, promptly stepped down at the end of his term in 1944 and allowed his opponent to take power. Nonetheless, the pow-

COVER

er grabs of previous decades continued to haunt Cuba, and in 1952, Batista seized power in a military coup upon realizing that he would not win the popular vote for the presidency.

Once again, the United States intervened. Despite the human rights violations associated with his suspension of both civil liberties and the 1940 constitution itself, Batista was viewed as a reliable ally in preventing the rise of communism. Under the Batista regime, American businesses in Cuba flourished and became dominant players in providing essential services, and the island was increasingly viewed as a glamorous destination in popular culture. The United States also provided limited military support to Cuba, as part of a general program meant to protect American interests against Soviet influence throughout much of Latin America.

This prioritization of strategic influence over democracy and freedom is not surprising in the context of the 1950s, the dawn of the nuclear age and the beginning of the Cold War. However, this had serious consequences beyond Batista’s repression: for instance, the dominance of American-owned businesses in Cuban society generated significant resentment, which partly enabled Fidel Castro’s rise to power as a liberator. In this context, the American willingness to ignore the will of the Cuban people came at a great cost, and ironically led to the destruction of the very partnership that the United States had hoped to maintain by supporting Batista.

This phenomenon is not unique to Cuba, and has manifested it-

self elsewhere during the postWWII era: for example, the 1953 CIA intervention in Iran sustained an unpopular regime that would be toppled less than three decades later by vehemently anti-American clerics, while American support for the corrupt South Vietnamese government led to a protracted war and an entire region hostile to US interests. Thus, history shows that

"THE AMERICAN DESIRE FOR INFLUENCE OVER CUBA IS NOT MERELY A COLD WAR-ERA PHENOMENON: THIS IDEA WAS EXPRESSED AS EARLY AS 1823 THROUGH THE MONROE DOCTRINE" the long-term sustainability of a geopolitical relationship can depend on the presence of democracy, offering a critical lesson as the United States reconsiders its future with Cuba in the 21st century.

The Shock of 1959 The “loss” of Cuba to communism as a result of Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolution dealt a shock to the American foreign policy ap-

paratus, not in the least because an American-backed dictator had fallen to a guerilla fighting force. At the time, Nationalist China had fallen only ten years earlier, and the Korean War had just concluded with a semi-permanent partition of the peninsula despite heavy American involvement, both of which led to a marked increase in the number of people living under communist rule. Further adding to the tension was the Soviet Union’s successful launch of Sputnik I just two years earlier, sparking the space race and increased concerns about military technology. These developments overshadowed American successes in Iran and Guatemala, where CIA-backed action thwarted the rise of two nationalist leaders perceived as hostile toward American business and strategic interests.

This development irreversibly changed US-Cuba relations for the worse. While the United States initially recognized Castro’s government, his decisions to nationalize all foreign-owned assets and businesses—many of which were American-owned— rapidly soured relations with Washington, and led to the end of diplomatic relations in early 1961. The infamous Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 further solidified the antagonism between the two countries, while the Cuban Missile Crisis the following year made it clear that Cuba had officially embraced the Soviet bloc. By this point, the United States had lost all influence over Cuba, and had to stand idly by as Castro’s government executed thousands of its own people accused of being dissidents.

H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

49

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

This rapid progression from ally to foe—and from the relatively lesser evils of the Batista years to the greater evils of execution and starvation under Castro— was perhaps the unfortunate product of misplaced American priorities.

A communist government in Cuba carried serious consequences throughout the Cold War. For instance, the Soviet Union installed one of its first overseas listening posts in Lourdes, Cuba, in 1967, with the clear intention of surveilling the United States. The USSR also provided a substantial amount of exports to the island, allowing the Castro regime—and all of its nondemocratic realities—to survive and persist even through periods of economic downturn and crop failures. Although this Soviet aid was similar to the amount of American aid given in the pre-Castro era, the motives were quite different: while the United States had many private business interests in Cuba that lobbied for continued aid and protection from Washington, the USSR was driven mostly by the military uses of the island, and to a lesser extent, for propaganda promoting a socialist world.

The Sinking Mother Ship These early trends of hostility toward the United States continued throughout much of the Cold War. Although Castro also found alliances with other countries not aligned with American interests, such as turning to China amid the Sino-Soviet split, Cuba was still heavily tied to the USSR. The island remained a constant threat less than 100

50 // S U M M E R

2020

miles from Florida, serving as a constant reminder of the Soviet global influence.

Beginning in the 1980s, however, the facade of communist success began to crack. Popular movements emerged throughout Eastern Europe on a much greater scale than before, while the ill-fated Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dragged on at a severe economic cost. This economic drain had severe impacts on Cuba as well: in particular, a 1990 trade agreement, signed to last just one year, marked the beginning of significantly reduced trade and a significant curtailing of the USSR’s generosity. In September 1991, the USSR withdrew all of its troops stationed in Cuba in response to pressure from Washington, virtually signaling the end of Cuba as a military threat to the United States.

Even after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Yeltsin administration in Russia continued to curtail not only the substantial aid, but also the favorable trade terms that Cuba had enjoyed for both its agricultural exports and its imports from the former Soviet bloc.

Even in light of these significant developments, the United States failed to capitalize on the opportunity to bring Cuba into the American sphere of influence. In fact, Congress passed the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992, further tightening the existing sanctions on Cuba. Since Castro naturally had no interest in renouncing the authoritarian policies he carried out over the prior three decades, he turned away from the United States as a potential economic savior for his country. Other countries

quickly responded, and in particular, socialist Venezuela under Hugo Chavez was eager to fill in the gap left behind by the USSR. With its vast supply of oil, and an ideologically similar regime also focused on reducing reliance on the West, Venezuela was uniquely positioned, and a steady trade stream of oil, food, security forces, and doctors soon began.

In focusing so heavily on the repressive nature of the Castro regime in Cuba, the United States failed to bring the island back within its sphere of influence. The timing of Cuba’s economic downturn was ripe for the prosperous United States to step in with the aid needed to feed the Cuban people, with the potential to allow for a gradual transition of power away from Castro. Instead, the United States hardened its stance on Castro’s regime with the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, further isolating Cuba from the American sphere on account of human rights violations. Although the legislation was intended to represent a major part of the response to Cuba’s shootdown of two American civilian planes on a humanitarian mission, it gave Castro no choice but to continue his association with countries perceived as antagonistic toward the United States and the liberal world order.

Unfortunately, the well-intentioned premise of the American embargo has led to even worse results for the Cuban people.

Authoritarianism still persists despite the death of Fidel Castro and his brother Raúl’s recent transition of power. Today, more than six decades after the

COVER

revolution that promised material improvement for the people, the economy has remained mostly stagnant and will soon be facing the challenge of an aging population. Accordingly, it seems that current American efforts at forcing the communist regime out have only caused great pain, which can only create future resentment should the United States choose to engage with Cuba once again.

Winning Hearts and Minds— of Political Leaders In the 21st century, the challenge of appealing to Cuba and its leadership has become even more complex. Although the traditional problem of human rights still persists as a key barrier to effective negotiations, the United States has also recently lost its position as the only major bidder on a Cuban strategic partnership. For example, throughout the past two decades, China has risen both economically and politically, expressing grand ambitions for global influence through large-scale foreign investment efforts like the Belt and

Road Initiative. This has included substantial investment and debt forgiveness in Cuba. Surprisingly, though, China has not received much materially in return, which further complicates the future of US-Cuban relations. Given the history of American interventions and their entanglement with business interests, the backwardness and relatively low productivity of the Cuban economy makes it difficult to justify significant American investment into the island— particularly if China is willing to increase its bid to maintain its influence in response to any American gesture.

Furthermore, the rapid technological advances of the past two decades also present new challenges to future American engagement. In particular, American technology of the post-WWII era has been traditionally acknowledged as the best available in the world, and getting access to that technology has been a key reason for engaging with the West—for instance, Iran has long desired Western aircraft, and eagerly placed or-

ders as soon as sanctions were lifted as part of its 2015 nuclear pact. However, Chinese technology has improved substantially in recent years, and the range of Chinese exports now includes Huawei’s 5G cellular infrastructure, high-speed railways and rolling stock, and will soon include passenger jet aircraft, including a model currently being developed with substantial Sino-Russian cooperation. With the American advantage in technology declining in a world of viable alternatives, the United States must offer many more incentives to sway Cuba back into its sphere of influence.

The alternative—preserving the status quo of isolating Cuba—is even more devastating. For example, Cuba is home to a listening post that was mothballed in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, and recently, Russia has reactivated the station at great expense.

While modern technology may be more resistant to this type of spying, Russian investment suggests otherwise, opening the possibility that the security of

Cuban expats wave Cuban and American flags in reaction to Fidel Castro resigning as Cuba's president. Miami, Florida. February 2008.

H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

51

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

nearby American military bases could be compromised. The strategic implications of Cuba’s proximity were also highlighted in 2017, when American diplomats and family members in Cuba were impacted by apparent sonic attacks, with similar symptoms found in China the following year. While the causes of the Americans’ discomfort are still unclear, these incidents serve as a reminder that, although quite unlikely, it is not impossible that parts of the American mainland could become a target for similar attacks in the future.

Perhaps the most appealing part of Russian and Chinese engagement with Cuba, though, is that both countries have virtually no requirements or expectations for human rights or democracy. Under such terms, members of the Cuban ruling class are able to maintain their powerful positions and have nothing to lose. In contrast, cooperation with the United States would most likely be coupled with a requirement to move toward democracy and a more open market, which would most likely threaten the interests of the elite. With history in mind, and in moving forward, the United States must carefully consider this balance between advocacy for democracy and the national security implications of Cuba as a proxy for traditional American rivals. As seen throughout the 20th century, these two challenges are intertwined in a zero-sum game, and unless both are simultaneously addressed, there cannot be a sustainable relationship between the United States and Cuba.

52 // S U M M E R

2020

Rediscovering Paradise On a less pessimistic note, increasing American interaction with Cuba has significant benefits for both countries. In particular, Cuba’s economy is heavily dependent on its tourism industry, and the current US restrictions on travel have resulted in significant declines in tourist numbers—and thus revenue. With the Cuban government controlling a majority of this sector, the stakes are even more clear for the politicians in charge.

Meanwhile, American businesses also benefit from this wave of tourism: for instance, when Americans were briefly able to travel on commercial flights to the island a few years ago, virtually all of the major airlines fought for government approval to run the flights, implying strong demand and the prospect of significant profits. Besides tourism, other industries such as agriculture could gain from mutual trade. Again, the close proximity of the two countries makes a notable difference: tourism would not be nearly as significant without the relatively inexpensive airfare, while the exchange of goods is particularly attractive due to much lower shipping costs. These benefits would not be difficult to reap, but they all require a better US-Cuban relationship.

Unfortunately, the current situation is a stalemate that is increasingly difficult to solve. Previously, the Obama administration’s detente with Cuba offered much hope with its extensive concessions for Havana that included lifting sanctions, opening de facto tourist travel, and ending

the wet-foot, dry-foot policy that gave fleeing Cuban citizens legal status in the United States. However, these historic policy shifts have not shown notable success: for example, Raul Castro symbolically transferred power in 2018, a year after the Trump administration reversed the changes. Even worse, US-Cuban relations have recently dropped to a historic low, with Washington considering whether to designate Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism due to its strong ties with Nicolás Maduro’s regime in Venezuela.

The alternative of preserving the status quo of isolating Cuba is even more devastating.

The United States would have to commit to a long-term normalization of relations, as well as significant economic aid to replace the subsidized oil currently offered by Venezuela. However, there is an important caveat: to ensure that Washington is continually motivated to provide this aid, Cuba would have to gradually sever ties with Maduro, which could greatly aid the apparent American campaign to remove him from power. Simultaneously, this scheme would provide an opportunity for the Cuban government to take a first step in affirming the notions of democracy and human rights, even if those rights initially take hold elsewhere.

While this scenario is unlikely, it does raise a critical point that American policymakers should consider in moving forward: the United States has the financial resources that Cuba needs, and in return, Cuba can offer some of the political influence that the United States wants. H

A couple wearing face masks look at their mobile phones in front of a big poster. Hong Kong, China. July 2020.

PREDICTING THE POST-PANDEMIC WORLD “DEEP GLOBALISM” OR ISOLATION?

Pavlo Klimkin Head of the European, Regional and Russian Studies Program Andreas Umland Principal Investigator at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

53

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

Pavlo Klimkin was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine from 2014 to 2019, and is Head of the European, Regional and Russian Studies Program of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future in Kyiv.

Andreas Umland is General Editor of the book series "Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society" at ibidem Press in Stuttgart, and a Principal Investigator at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future.

T

oday most thoughtful politicians and serious experts share a general understanding of the pandemic’s tremendous implications for global systems. But there remains no common, clearly articulated understanding about the exact nature of these repercussions or the ways to combat them. Many leading thinkers are still fixated on cautious inferences, forecasts, and proposals.

Being employed at a Kyiv think tank called “Ukrainian Institute for the Future,” we have decided to do the opposite. We are now starting a series of texts about how the world system could and should change, when it is still unknown how the new world disorder will unfold. To be sure, a transformation of the international system is by its very nature hard to predict. Yet inaccuracy is no reason to reject prediction entirely. A transition to some new world order seems already under way.

It is likely to become contested.

If we start deliberating it sooner rather than later, it might just turn out for the better.

54 // S U M M E R

2020

As a result of the current crisis, national and international public institutions are likely to obtain stronger popular mandates. In the future, they will play a bigger, and in some cases more authoritative, role in society than today: changing public demands will alter relations between the people and their states. In some cases, the transfer of new powers to governmental, semi-governmental, national, and international agencies may be well-defined and limited. In other cases, as in President Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, this has led or will lead to reinforcement of executive prerogatives undermining democracy. Not all such new mandates must necessarily lead to more authoritarianism, though; state organs’ novel powers can be used in different ways.

The desire to ensure better public protection and professional expertise may strengthen the innumerable bureaucrats and public servants working behind the scenes.

Members of this class are assumed to combine patriotic devotion to their country ​​with high professionalism in their public service. If COVID-19 is not the last global challenge of our era, a trend of strengthening governmental structures as a whole, and of the “deep state” in particular, may come to pass.

On the international stage, the renewed importance of state institutions can mean one of two things. It could either imply a strengthening of zero-sum dynamics and increased competition between

different national institutions, or it could lead to new levels of collaboration between governments and the “deep states” of many different countries.

The latter scenario may lead to the formation of a “deep globalism” that would be markedly different from existing transcontinental structures like the United Nations.

It could mean properly institutionalized, funded, and empowered global networks of experts, or “epistemic communities,” which collect and analyze critical information across borders. And ideally, these international associations of specialists would have sufficient authority to make and implement decisions based on their unrivaled knowledge of specific fields.

Deep globalism would mean that classic representative democracy and international relations between governments will no longer operate as they do now. To formulate an international, expertise-driven, and value-based contract would constitute a considerable political challenge. But it is obvious that current models of interaction and cooperation between nation-states have become gravely inadequate. They are able to produce only piecemeal responses to the medical, economic, environmental, and migratory crises of the present and future.

As for now, though, the old paradigm of zero-sum competition seems to be winning out.

And we are far from the end of the pandemic, the challenges of the national model of crisis management are already vis-

PERSPECTIVES US Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell wears a mask as he rides the Senate Subway. Washington, DC. July 2020.

ible. The worldwide hunt for face masks in March and April 2020, for example, raised troubling questions about equity and access. Even in that case, a stopgap international agreement to divide material may not have been enough.

For that reason, a new global Marshall Plan has been bandied about, a spiritual successor to the rebuilding effort the United States undertook in Western Europe after World War II. Any project to support the world economy should be welcomed, but global anti-crisis measures will remain incomplete so long as they are only about transnational financial transfers and investment incentives. Without a parallel political rebooting of the international system, economic programs will not prevent the continuation of past and current problems. Unfortunately, the issue of determining which institutions or groups should initiate, formulate, and implement global answers to humanity’s shared challenges remains unresolved.

Some speculate that a new it-

eration of the current international system would lead to the emergence of a new kind of world government. However, the chances of such an institution appearing any time soon, even with limited powers, are low. The establishment of a permanent supranational institution would require nation-states relinquishing their powers to a world cabinet—an optimistic goal, to say the least.

In spite of its common values, geography, and heritage, Europe has largely failed to transform the European Commission created in 1951 (then as the European Coal and Steel Community) into a functioning supranational government under the European Union.

One could imagine, however, a worldwide structure which would act only in the event of emergencies and would have the task of temporarily providing ad hoc coordination between countries in order to ensure the resolution of acute crises. As the current pandemic continues and more global disasters compound its effects, such an idea may find great-

er support among politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats, and ordinary people around the world. And instead of politicians, such an institution could have a supervisory board consisting primarily or exclusively of scientists and other internationally-respected experts.

Obviously, the creation of a global body would be difficult, and at the moment remains unlikely. Suffice it to say, the exact conditions under which a supranational structure would take over for nation-states would be difficult to formulate. Many governments of the world may perhaps support the idea in principle, but some of those same governments will try to resist any real power-sharing even in the event of a global emergency. Still, future transnational crises similar to the current pandemic could gradually reduce such resistance. Freak events are impossible to foresee; for that reason, while we can predict a few possible scenarios, our exact future is, as it has always been, shrouded in uncertainty. H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

55

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W Birds fly over a monument to a Russian revolutionary.

Artemivsk, Ukraine. March 2015.

ON POST-SOVIET CONFLICT AND SIMULATING NEGOTIATIONS INTERVIEW WITH ARVID BELL

Kendrick Foster Senior Solicits Editor

56 // S U M M E R

2020

Arvid Bell is the director of the Negotiation Task Force at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. He focuses on negotiations in the post-Soviet sphere and designing immersive negotiation simulations, including the NTF’s annual Red Horizon exercise.

C

ould you start off by telling us more about your work at the Negotiation Task Force?

The Negotiation Task Force is applying negotiation analysis methods to security and other problems across the Eurasian sphere. We're looking at conflicts ranging from Europe, especially Eastern Europe, Central Asia, all the way to Asia. And we are trying to make sense of them from a negotiation perspective. And then we do research and training work. We have different offerings for Harvard students all the way to senior practitioners from the government and military who participate in our advanced negotiation training programs.

Could you talk about your approach to Red Horizon, given that these are experienced negotiation practitioners and the approach to bringing together knowing and doing will be a little different than for undergrads?

Absolutely. Red Horizon is the most advanced training scenario we have in our portfolio. It is a three day, highly advanced workshop, which features a day long, highly immersive systemic negotiation and crisis management exercise for up to 70 participants, most of who are seH I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

57

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

nior government or military officials. Over the course of almost a year, our research team analyzed and then duplicated the internal decision making structures of the United States, Russia, China, and NATO as it relates to political and military chains of command in crisis situations. We have the top political and military leadership reflected in this scenario, and it's a very, very immersive, highly realistic exercise. It unfolds over dozens of rooms that we decorate as political or military headquarters. We have a digital combat simulator where people can track their military assets in real time. For example, if you are based in the American military room, you have all these screens on the wall with where bombers and fighters and aircraft carriers are positioned. If political leadership decides to make certain decisions, the military leaders need to figure out how they can adjust the force posture accordingly and move units around.

Other countries will be able to track these movements through their military headquarters in real time, and then their military leaders consult with their political leaders and must figure out a response. It's a very advanced system.

In addition to this military side, all actors also have the option to engage in political action.

For example, they can attend UN Security Council meetings and try to negotiate issues diplomatically. Because it's a global scenario, it features a variety of different hotspots where the situation can spiral out of control depending on what negotiators do. The main crisis is about

58 // S U M M E R

2020

a North Korean regime collapse, but because actors have assets positioned all around the globe and because the scenario is very deep in terms of its realism, the situation in Europe may escalate, something could happen in Africa or someplace else. It's very challenging to manage all these conflicts simultaneously.

Moving away from negotiation exercises into negotiations themselves, can you talk about the most recent developments in the real world from the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine? Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky met Vladimir Putin in December 2019.

How did that turn out? Did anything come of that?

So I think it still remains to be seen if there will be some real sustainable change on the ground. The situation in Ukraine is still an ongoing conflict; that's something we often forget. There are still people dying. Yes, it's not as bad as the hot phase of the war, but this is not a frozen conflict.

There are some hopeful signs; the Ukrainian and Russian presidents made some moves towards de-escalation. But the conflict in Ukraine is so intertwined with the relationship between the United States, Russia, and the European Union, it's very difficult for negotiators on the ground to make meaningful progress without being given a little more breathing space. Of course, the pandemic has added an additional layer of complication. I think there's still hope that things will change, but because of these interconnections between the local conflict and

the broader strategic issues, it's a bit of a complicated situation.

What do you think caused the failure of the talks to renew the INF Treaty with Russia in 2019?

When it comes to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which was negotiated in the late 1980s between Reagan and Gorbachev, it makes sense to distinguish between political and technical aspects of these negotiations. This treaty was pretty revolutionary when it was signed, because it did away with an entire weapons category. Namely, all nuclear and conventional ground launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers in the possession of the United States and the Soviet Union back then were destroyed, not just in Europe, but worldwide, even though it was mostly about the European theater. Since then, not only has technology evolved significantly, but the overall political situation has also changed dramatically.

I think this is where two issues need to be resolved. First, negotiators have to figure out how they can account for the development of new weapons categories and systems in a renegotiated INF Treaty. Tactical nuclear weapons, long-range precision strike technology, hypersonic glide vehicles, etc. This is complicated because then the issue becomes not just about an extension of a treaty but a renegotiation, which is very difficult. It’s not made easier by the fact that a lot of the technical arms control expertise in the respective foreign ministries has eroded since the end of the Cold War,

INTERVIEW

so you simply don't have that many people left dealing with all these technical details. The second aspect are the political circumstances, which might be the bigger problem. This relates not only to the very complicated relationship between Washington and Moscow, but also to the question of other actors who have these missiles. How do you bring China into the equation, for example? Because the Chinese have not voiced any desire to be part of any intermediate range nuclear forces disarmament or arms control regime, should Washington and Moscow move forward without them, or should they try to bring them in? If so, how?

One way to look at that is to think about it from the short term perspective of the United States and Russia. You might say the good thing is to get rid of those shackles, and we can invest in all these weapon systems; arguably, it's way less problematic for American security than

for Russian security that this treaty goes away. And the current US administration does not seem to be a fan of international agreements in general, as they pulled out of INF, Open Skies, the Iran nuclear deal, and the Paris Agreement. But there are at least two things that you don’t consider coming from that perspective. The first is the security of America’s European allies, who are deeply worried about an arms race on the European continent because they would have to carry the burden of that if the situation gets out of control. Maybe if the Europeans were a bit more vocal about their security interests, it could influence the calculus in Washington. The other thing is also, isn't there something to be said about the United States and Russia now taking the lead on arms control, as long as they still are in the position to shape the global arms control regime before China's rise accelerates even more?

Wouldn’t it make sense for Mos-

cow and Washington to figure out where they actually share some interests? The nuclear issue is still pretty much a bilateral game between the United States and Russia. By far, the vast majority of the nuclear stock globally is American or Russian. So there's also a sense of shared responsibility that these two countries have.

Unfortunately, the INF Treaty has now collapsed. And experts say that the next treaty to sadly go away might be New START, which is coming up for an extension next year. I think it's one of those situations where leaders in both countries need to look beyond the short term interests and think about the long term interests here. In the long run, you do de-escalate some of the great power tension through smart, renegotiated arms control, allow your country to spend its limited resources on other important priorities, and you make the world a more secure place for everyone.

A carnival float depicts Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin cutting the INF Treaty. Duesseldorf, Germany. March 2019.

H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

59

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W Opposition demonstrators protest police violence and the government's policies toward Russia. Tbilisi, Georgia. June 2019.

In the last iteration of the post-Soviet conflict class, you did an immersive simulation to these three conflicts. Were there any things in the simulation that give you hope for these three conflicts or these three negotiations moving forward?

Let me say two things. For our capstone exercise on the future of Georgia, we brought in a couple of external participants to negotiate directly with our students.

One thing that was very interesting to see as we conducted this negotiation exercise was that people who had more experience or prior training were more effective negotiators. I was also very happy to see that the students taking this class did a couple of things that good negotiators do, such as asking more questions, not just talking all the time, or looking beyond someone’s position and trying to figure out their underlying interest. That's something that my students have in common with some of the people who are more experienced and have seen it over a decade or so of negotiation experience.

60 // S U M M E R

2020

That gives me hope that training and knowledge and education matters. It matters if you're genuinely interested in international affairs as a Harvard student, and that attitude of curiosity carries over into your professional life.

So that gives me hope.

The other aspect is somewhat related. We had an interesting development, also in our Georgia negotiation, where we had large teams negotiating, maybe four or five people on one team, on the Russia team or the America team or the Georgia team.

And I should note that we really had, in addition to the Harvard students, individuals from Russia and a few with Georgian backgrounds who participated in this. There was a moment when tensions between two teams were very, very high.

I think it had to do more with developing this “us versus them” mentality without a reality check on whether they were reading the other side correctly. One of the mediators, who represented the OSCE, was able to very skillfully de-escalate tensions by

pointing out some misperceptions that one team had about the other side. And I think this is something that is also very true for a lot of complex conflicts: If you have third parties who can provide a different perspective of looking at issues, you might be able to force actors who are very entrenched to rethink some of their assumptions. It might be as simple as, “Are you really so sure that everyone on the other side is not even interested in this agreement?” Or, “Yes, maybe there was this one public statement that was rather harsh, but don't you think there are people in this other ministry on the other side who are very interested in negotiating? Maybe we should talk to them.” It's very easy to see the other side as a monolith, but once you dig a little deeper and ask a lot of questions, you will see that it’s actually so much more nuanced. Somewhere there is an opening for negotiations.

You just have to find it.

This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity. H

A LOOK BEHIND CLOSED DOORS INTERVIEW WITH MARK FREEMAN

Bonny Lemma Senior Solicits Editor

A rebel fighter for FARC hangs a banner with the message, "Our dream is peace with social justice." Antioquia, Colombia. June 2016.

H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

61

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

Mark Freeman is the founder and Executive Director of the Institute for Integrated Transitions, which aims to integrate the fragmented disciplines of transitional justice to strengthen peace, democracy, and human rights. Published

by Cambridge University Press in 2019, his most recent book Negotiating Transitional Justice details the art and science behind the Colombian peace negotiations that began in 2012.

W

hat motivated you to found the Institute for Integrated Transitions, and what is the organization’s main intervention in peace processes worldwide?

The Institute for Integrated Transitions was set up at the onset of the Arab Spring. It was very much motivated by the idea of creating a think tank that would make easy and accessible key lessons about negotiations––and in particular transitions––available in the context of the Arab Spring, and more generally, to countries that might be emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule.

Another key motivation for setting up the Institute was that the world of international support for countries that might be entering transitions or seeking to enter into transitions is very siloed and very specialized. If you want to know about elections, there’s a whole host of organizations and think tanks that can help with that. If you want to know about disarmament or inclusive economic growth, again there are lots of organizations. But there wasn't an organization that tried to bring the best available knowledge with-

62 // S U M M E R

2020

in and across these different areas. A basic lesson of the transitions that had occurred in other regions of the world is that if you don't take up a holistic view, a multidisciplinary view, then the risks increase that you'll be blind in an area that could threaten the whole transition very quickly.

We sought to assemble a group of experts that could enable civil leaders, political leaders, and others to think about the most important lessons from the field then develop their own local responses. In the process of building the Institute, what became clear to us very quickly is that negotiation as a topic was as important as transition. Even when a transition begins, it is in a sense the beginning of a whole series of negotiations within society—horizontally between different major groups in society, about their future, and also a vertical conversation between state actors and citizens about the direction of the country. We set up with a focus on transitions, but very quickly realized that in order to do this work well, we would need to specialize and have expertise equally in negotiations and transitions.

Have you noticed any standard sequence or pattern that conflicts and negotiations follow?

Let me maybe give a slightly longer response to just set up how I think about negotiations in my work, because I've been doing this for 25 years or so. Over that period, you learn things that help you structure your own work better with every new experience.

The first thing I’d mention is

that there are a set of structural conditions that either facilitate or complicate the possibility of a negotiation to succeed. There's a concept that was developed a long time ago about the ripeness of a conflict for a settlement. Sometimes the conditions exist in a way that makes a conflict ripe for settlement, and other times they don't, and there's a whole set of variables that will determine what the minimal conditions are. There's not a maximal thing.

One of those obviously is a sense of recognition by the key conflict actors that their best option, or their least worst option, is to settle. But that’s only a minimal starting point, and one of the things that we focus on in our work is what's called process design. So even if you have a reasonably good, minimal set of structural conditions in terms of the subjective perceptions of the conflict actors about the utility of settlement, then there has to also be a lot of thought put into the design of a process within which settlement can actually occur.

It's not enough that there might be a willingness on the part of the conflict actors, which is not a static thing. I mean, it's going to evolve. Sometimes parties begin with a willingness and then events change on the ground, and one or both or all the parties may change their calculations and decide actually, “We don't think that settlement is as useful for us as we did six months ago.” But for the possibility of settlement to exist, you have to design a format, a framework, a process within which settlement is more likely

INTERVIEW

than not to occur. That’s called process design, and it’s probably the most under-theorized, underdeveloped aspect of peace processes.

If you do that really well, it doesn't guarantee that you'll reach a settlement, but it increases the chances that you will. And by contrast, if that's underdeveloped or designed in the wrong way, you can essentially ruin the opportunity that may have existed under a better structure. You could basically waste the ripeness conditions that maybe existed at one point simply because the design of the structure or the format of the process wasn't sufficiently conducive for the substantive issues to be resolved.

What was the most challenging or intractable conflict that you’ve worked on? Why was it so challenging to negotiate?

I can't say that there's one in particular that stands out as the most intractable. These are iterative processes in the sense that they have peaks and valleys, ups and downs. Sometimes you can have a very promising start, and then things fall apart unexpectedly for any number of possible reasons.

A current case that we're working on which remains difficult is Venezuela, where there is no civil war or armed conflict, but there is a profound political conflict between the government and a group of opposition parties. We continue to do a lot of work that tries to produce conditions for a political settlement to be achieved, in part to avoid the risk of some kind of very deeply violent conflict. It's

not that there isn't violence taking place already in Venezuela, but I don't think anyone would characterize it as a civil war or an armed conflict in the typical way that those terms might be understood. But there is a risk all the time present of [outright armed conflict] in our view.

And what we've been working towards for the last few years, are the conditions for a political settlement to occur, and there was an exploratory process that we assisted in developing. And we've tried to provide support to that.

Sometimes, it's also important to highlight for your readers that sometimes there are efforts to achieve peace that are secret, secret in the sense that the public is unaware that there is a process underway in which the disputing parties are trying to assess whether there's the possibility of a negotiated settlement.

Not all processes are known to the public. That was also the case in Venezuela. Often, preceding a public phase, public in the sense of publicly known peace process or political settlement process, there's an exploratory phase, which almost always will be secret, so that the parties can test each other out, explore together whether there's a basis for settlement, whether they agree on the core issues in dispute, et cetera.

The main point here is to say that these are dimensions of a process which I think probably the average person doesn't really think about. The average person would think about a peace negotiation once it's announced at some level, but they may not appreciate all of the effort, some-

times for years, often for years, that takes place behind the cameras, behind the scenes to build this.

And so it's a long way of answering your question, but Venezuela has proven difficult so far, even though there have been multiple attempts. Even in the last three and a half years, there have been multiple processes, some public, some secret, but the core issues in dispute haven't yet lent themselves to a full solution. But we continue to work on it. We're convinced that it is resolvable through negotiation and that [negotiation] is the necessary path the parties have to reach. The country can't become governable and stable and democratic in the absence of the negotiated resolution.

“FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT TO EXIST, YOU HAVE TO DESIGN A FORMAT, A FRAMEWORK, A PROCESS WITHIN WHICH SETTLEMENT IS MORE LIKELY THAN NOT TO OCCUR.” H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

63

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

You recently wrote a book on the Colombian peace process called Negotiating Transitional Justice. Based on your experience in that peace process, what do you think its main lessons were?

For sure, one of the key aspects that allowed the negotiation to culminate in a peace agreement was the sophistication of the process design and the methodological rigor that was in evidence while planning it, throughout the exploratory phase which lasted a couple of years, including six months of talks in Havana, Cuba. That's an example of a design choice, to hold the talks outside of Colombia and in particular, in Cuba.

There are all kinds of strategic and tactical considerations that led to that choice.

I was more or less based there for a year and a half, which was the period that corresponded to the negotiation of the chapter

Government supporters rest after a government-organized march.

Caracas, Venezuela. January 2020.

64 // S U M M E R

2020

on victims. They had a six-point agenda which was made public in 2012, but everyone was aware at the time that the hardest issue was going to be the question of victims, achieving the right balance between accountability for past crimes and the need for inclusive political participation by the FARC. To put it in a very simple way, there was a public expectation that the FARC leaders would have some form of legal accountability or it would not be possible to get public support. At the same time, FARC leaders were not going to negotiate any conditions that would make them legally accountable, without their military and political counterparts on the other side also being held to the same standard. It was a very, very delicate issue.

The parties managed to reach what I would call a reasonable settlement. It involves components of truth seeking and truth

telling, it involves components of prevention of future violations, it involves a post-conflict justice model that all the parties agreed that they would subject themselves to, something unprecedented for a direct negotiation, and it also had a reparations component for the victims.

But I would again underscore that, in the absence of a well-designed process, there was simply no way that that issue could have been resolved. The parties believed in the rules of the process. Even if they didn't trust each other, they trusted the process that they had essentially built together, and that was one of the key enablers of the resolution of this question of how to balance peace and justice.

What are the biggest questions we have yet to address in conflict management and peace negotiation?

I think a lot is known about what constitutes good methodology, even if process design is still underdeveloped, comparatively speaking. Harvard has had a negotiation program for many, many years which tackles questions of negotiation in a very, very broad way. It’s brought some science to negotiation that has advanced practice, even if, in my personal opinion, the aspects of how to design a process, including how to design a secret exploratory phase, are massively under considered. It's where we've done a lot of pioneering work as an organization.

What I believe are our new frontiers that we have to confront now are primarily in relation to two key things. One is the

INTERVIEW

untypical actors. I would mention two in particular: the mafia and cartels. These are groups that have no outward political ambitions. Their fundamental goals have to do with self-enrichment. If you think about a country like Mexico, there are over two hundred large organized crime groups operating in different parts of the country with violent crime rates that exceed most countries where there are civil wars taking place. To what extent should we consider negotiation with such groups?

I think it's very difficult to persuade the public to negotiate with such groups. I think part of it has to do with the difficulty of imagining those groups transforming into some new form that society can exist with. One of the premises of negotiating with the FARC in Colombia is that they would transit or transform from an armed, politically motivated group into an unarmed political party, They can transform into something that society is prepared to coexist with, that society could imagine as a natural transit out of war and into peace. They have to become something. But it's very difficult to imagine what the Sinaloa Cartel might become.

What would you negotiate them for them to become? These are questions nevertheless that have to be assessed very, very rigorously, and there are negotiations that take place with such groups.

Again, they just remain secret, overwhelmingly, because they're politically or publicly unacceptable, until the public can become persuaded that such groups should be the subject of

negotiation.

The same goes what we could call deeply religious-inspired groups, not just jihadist groups.

Even the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda was notionally motivated by a very deranged belief in the 10 commandments.

I mean, it wasn't an Islamic group. It was a Christian fundamentalist group. But again, one of the questions is, is it possible?

Is it desirable to negotiate with groups like this? Should negotiation always be off the table or should it also be one of the tools that should be considered in order to reduce or end violence on a massive scale in the public interest?

What can or should be negotiated with groups of these sorts?

We're doing work on those issues in our organization precisely because we see them as gaps. If you looked up negotiating with organized crime groups, you'd find there's very, very little written. So we've just conducted a very large set of interviews with people who are willing to go on the record that have actually conducted negotiations with violent organized crime groups, and we're trying to capture the lessons so that we can help advance thinking about that kind of question. We have to actually grapple with these questions because these are growing phenomena. The face of violence is rarely today the typical, politically-motivated armed group in the way that it was for decades during the Cold War in particular, and even for several decades after.

And of course, the final thing is the new kinds of conflict that

we can expect related to the climate emergency. There's going to be a level of chaotic violence that I think we can anticipate reasonably, that have to do with the effects of the climate emergency in terms of the movement of people and the conflicts that I think will naturally be created. You can see it in places like Nigeria right now. Even within that country, where there's a certain amount of mobility because of desertification that puts pressure even within and among communities as a result of the effects of the climate crisis. It's trickier because it’s less organized.

But I think this is going to be a major, major challenge. I believe personally that the art and science of negotiation has a lot to offer, but it's going to require thinking carefully, rigorously, about what is or is not transferable to those specific kinds of conflicts. But nevertheless, it's an unusual situation. It's going to require thinking ahead about useful adaptations of negotiation methodology to apply in an effective way to those kinds of conflicts.

Those are some of the frontier issues that are not even on the horizon. I think they're here already, but we're not ready enough, in my opinion, to apply negotiation techniques and methodologies in an adequate way. We have to move quickly in order to make sure that those adaptations and applications of negotiation science are well suited to those kinds of conflicts and those kinds of groups.

This interview was lightly edited for clarity and condensed. H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

65

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W Birds fly over the covered photograph of an assassinated member of the Patriotic Union political party.

Bogota, Colombia. October 2012.

NEGOTIATING PEACE IN COLOMBIA INTERVIEW WITH BERNARD ARONSON Kendrick Foster Senior Solicits Editor

Bernard Aronson served as US Special Representative to the Colombian Peace Process from 2016 to 2019. He previously served as the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, where he also helped negotiate the peace agreement that ended El Salvador’s Civil War.

I

n the case of the Colombian negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), where did the negotiations stand when you were appointed as Special Representative, and what were the political motivations of appointing an American special envoy in those negotiations?

The talks, both the secret informal preliminary talks and the formal talks, altogether took six years. I was not involved with

66 // S U M M E R

2020

the preliminary secret negotiations, as I wasn't in the government at the time. But they made a lot of progress in defining the agenda, and then they started talks in Havana. They made good progress on counter-narcotics and political participation, but they were really stuck on some major issues, which were transitional justice; DDR, which is demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration; and security for all the actors postpeace agreement. President Santos has had conversations with President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry over the years, and they have been strongly supportive of the peace effort.

And in one conversation, President Santos said he thought that maybe the time was right

for the United States to become more engaged. And so President Obama and Secretary Kerry made a decision to appoint a U.S. envoy and asked me to do that. I had significant involvement in the peace processes in Central America, in the war in El Salvador, so I had some relevant experience. And the then-Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson and the then-US ambassador to Colombia Kevin Whitaker had both been part of my team. They worked for me when I was Assistant Secretary of State, so that was an easy fit. But I think they wanted me to play as a kind of catalyst to jumpstart the negotiations in these very tough, difficult issues that had stymied progress for quite a few months.

INTERVIEW

Could you talk a little bit more about your negotiation work in El Salvador and the lessons that you've applied to negotiating for the Colombian peace process?

The negotiations were structured differently. It's important to recognize that in El Salvador, the United Nations oversaw the negotiations. They provided a mediator, and they had the power to convene meetings, to propose drafts, to compel the parties to come together.

And neither of those things existed in Colombia. Negotiations were just bilateral between the FARC and the government.

They were friends in the process, there was Cuba, Norway, and two accompanying countries, Venezuela and Chile. But they didn't have the role of a mediator. None of the guarantor countries or accompanying countries had the power to say, “Sit at the table” and convene a meeting or say, “I want you both to bring me a draft in a week.”

In a way, I took the role of a mediating platform, the role of a mediator, to some extent. But of course I wasn’t neutral either.

Of course, I was a supporter of Colombian government, and I was representing the US government.

But you asked me some things that we learned in El Salvador that are applicable for Colombia.

I'd say one is that the correlation of forces on the battleground has to be such that the guerrillas no longer believe that time is on their side, that if they keep fighting things would get better and eventually they would take power. In the case of El Salvador, they launched a final offen-

sive in November 1989, brought in thousands of combatants to the city, and shocked the army and the government. But they didn't succeed, and the people didn't rise up. And I think they came to believe that they were suffering from attrition, losing cadre, and they thought they’d better negotiate while they still had leverage, because they were losing leverage on the battlefield every year. I think that was also true of the FARC. Their numbers had been trending way down.

There was a time when they had about 25,000 soldiers in the field.

When the peace negotiations were going on, they had about 8,000 full time and another five or six part time militias, but that was about half of what they once had.

And then secondly, I think I came to appreciate in the Central American negotiations the importance of deadlines and to push the party along from the outside, because with any peace negotiations ending a civil war, you have to create and sustain momentum. If you show the government of El Salvador and the FMLN guerrillas the final agreement at the beginning of the negotiations, they never would have signed onto negotiations because they think that such an agreement would have been possible. And at that stage of the process, they worked with the impossible. And so I think a similar dynamic was the case in the FARC. We had to build confidence, really build towards the more transient issues and not tackle them in the beginning.

I think I also learned the importance of being very candid and clear about the US position.

I told the Colombian guerrillas something very similar to what I told the FMLN guerrillas: Your problem with the United States is not that you're trying to do away with human rights abuses and economic injustice and dictatorship and the like. The problem is that you want to achieve all the changes through violent struggle, as opposed to embracing democracy. And both the FARC and the Salvadorans went into a process where they made that transition.

And also I reinforced my belief that you have to treat your adversaries or your friends with respect. You have to tell them the truth, be honest with them, admit when they're right, not assume that everything that they say is evil because you’re the enemy. You have to listen to their narrative, even if you don't buy all the gestures they make or the conclusion. You have to accept that they have a narrative that is relevant. It's about repression and that they suffered from repression.

Going back to Colombia, could you briefly walk us through what your initial negotiating strategy was heading into your involvement with the negotiations?

The process of negotiation is like broken field running in football. You wait to see there's an opening and you try to get through it. You can't strategize and plan out ahead of time because it's constantly moving, processing. Things change and things happen and you have to just try to be responsive and handle things as they come at you.

You can't go off in an office with H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

67

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

a bunch of experts and come up with some game plan and expect it to have any real relevance. It just doesn't work that way.

Yesenia, a 19-year-old FARC soldier, stands in the guerrilla group’s hidden camp. Antioquia, Colombia. January 2016.

68 // S U M M E R

2020

You mentioned a couple of the main sticking points in the Colombian negotiations as being things like transitional justice and protection for combatants after the negotiations. Could you walk us through how those sticking points were resolved?

In the case of transitional justice, neither side was coming forward, neither side was putting a proposal out, perhaps because it was too sensitive an issue for both of them. Then I suggested that we create a subcommittee: Each side would appoint three lawyers who are experts in human rights and social justice.

And they would work separately from the main table, because otherwise, we would not make any progress if that was being negotiated.

The two sides appointed a group of lawyers, you know, each side picked three. First, that's an issue of international law, human rights law, you needed experts to deal with it.

Secondly, these are professionals. They might have had their sympathies on one side or another, and they did, but, you know, the group itself didn't polarize.

It came together, almost like the Supreme Court judges often negotiate and come up with some kind of a middle ground. Maybe that's not the best analogy, but these guys were able to leave behind all the political baggage that the two parties brought and raise it to the level of the rule of law, precedent, and what was required by the Rome Convention.

It also tackled some other issues.

Extradition was a very big issue to the FARC, and we were able to resolve that, so I think the creation of that separate committee was a good vehicle to move things along.

What do you consider the main turning point in the negotiations?

Well, there were many turning points. Negotiation is in significant part a matter of confidence building between the two sides.

These are people who've been killing each other for 52 years— to get them to trust each other and to make an agreement or compromise was no easy task.

So everything became a significant turning point, even when there were crises. A couple of times, our ability to fix the crises and not let them blow up the negotiation strengthened the process.

But I think resolving transitional justice was a big one because the guerrilla leadership was very clear they weren't going to be the first guerrilla leaders in the history of Latin America to negotiate themselves into prison. Yet there were lots of Colombians who were rightfully bitter about what the FARC had done, the kidnapping and killing and all that. So that was a very tough issue, but I think we were able to resolve it the way I mentioned to you.

With the benefit of hindsight, is there anything that you wish had been done differently in the process?

I think that the process went on so long that negotiations fatigue set in on Colombians. They kept

INTERVIEW

being told there's been a breakthrough every time one issue or set of issues had been resolved, but negotiations just kept going. I think they had the feeling of being taken to the mountaintop and then going back down and over again. I think that reduced sort of engagement in the process, and that probably led to some of the loss in the referendum, so I think that mechanism to speed up the process, if possible, would have helped a lot.

And then I think particularly on the security issues, we should have added some guarantees about how that would be implemented, because the current government has really not held up its side of the agreement on security. While the United Nations oversees and monitors their compliance, they don't have the ability to compel them to do something.

Considering the failure in the referendum, what was your overall assessment of the peace deal’s success?

Well, I think the referendum revealed that Colombia is a polarized country, and there were very different feelings about this particular issue, about justice and the sentencing of the FARC for their actions. I mean, the margin was very, very tiny.

It was a very small margin. And there were some things that happened that that cost votes for the “yes” side. In particular, there were these torrential rains for several days in the northern coast, which was a strong bastion of support for President Santos in his elections. People were flooded from their homes, so they couldn't vote. Really,

tens and tens of thousands of people couldn't get to the polling places.

Secondly, the “no” campaign had spread a lot of disinformation. They claimed that the agreement had language and conditions it didn't have, but they were able to scare a lot of people, including both evangelicals and the Catholic Church.

Third, I think the polls showed that people supported the peace agreement by a pretty good margin. I think a lot of its supporters thought that there's no question that it’ll pass, so they didn’t bother to vote. After the “no” vote won narrowly, hundreds of thousands of people went to the streets in support of the peace agreement. So I think it was unfortunate.

It was also right after Brexit and before Trump, but it sort of captured some of that populist anti-elite feeling that was going on in a lot of countries such as Britain with Brexit.

What do you think are the main takeaways of the peace process for negotiation in Latin America specifically, but also negotiation processes more generally?

First, you cannot divorce prospects for negotiation from the military situation. Like I said, at least the guerrillas, and sometimes the government, have to come to recognize that they’re losing on the battlefield. Otherwise, they're not going to negotiate in a serious way.

Second, you need a president, head of government, who has the political courage to spend and risk his political capital by pursuing a peace negotiation that may have failed in the

past and could fail again. He has to be clearly dedicated and engaged in that. It helps to have, on the government side, negotiators who have the right qualities, who are able to sit down with people who may have harmed members of their family or kidnapped them or whatever and still be able to get along and build a cordial, or at least a respectful, relationship.

It's also very important to have strong regional and international and multilateral support for the negotiating process, for the peace process. This was particularly true in El Salvador, but also in Colombia. When you raise the peace negotiations to an international level, the whole world is engaged in supporting them.

We had unanimous votes in the Security Council of the United Nations in support of the peace agreement, or to send experts to support it.

You had some states from Europe and elsewhere coming to see the parties, speaking out.

You had the Pope. You had the dedicated US special envoy, the dedicated EU special envoy.

And that creates something that especially the guerrillas hadn’t had before. These people had been living in the bush for decades, fighting a very harsh and bloody war. All of a sudden, all these world leaders are sitting there saying, “We want you to make peace.” It puts pressure on both sides not to be the spoiler, not to be the one who has to kill the peace. So I think regional and international support is quite important.

This interview was lightly edited for clarity and condensed. H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

69

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

SCANDINAVIAN STABILITY FOR A WORLD IN FLUX A CONVERSATION WITH NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER ERNA SOLBERG

Garrett Walker Editor-in-Chief

Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg speaks prior to a group photo at an EU summit. Brussels, Belgium. March 2019.

70 // S U M M E R

2020

INTERVIEW

Erna Solberg has served as Prime Minister of Norway since 2013, longer than any other Conservative prime minister in the nation’s history. After Solberg’s unyielding approach earned her the nickname “Iron Erna,” she pushed the Conservative Party toward a more pragmatic vision for Norway.

I

n the wake of COVID-19, different styles of management have emerged in different countries. What are your government’s primary considerations as you face this crisis? And what have you learned about international approaches to leadership?

There is a high level of trust between the general population and the authorities in Norway. However, the coronavirus pandemic has created a challenging situation in our country as well. We have been using the government's almost daily press conferences to inform the public and explain the reasons behind the measures we have introduced. Over the past two months, I have held two press conferences for children. We have used the Norwegian concept of “dugnad,” or community help, to highlight the fact that we must all do our part for the common good.

Norway's high degree of digitization ensures that we can interact effectively at all levels of society. This gives us an advantage in a situation where people need to work from home and keep their distance from others.

Norway's low population density is another advantage in this situation.

We are currently opening up society again cautiously and

gradually. We are still emphasizing the importance of following the advice of the health authorities on social distancing, good hand hygiene, and staying at home when we are ill.

You have worked extensively with the United Nations on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Five years after their enactment, what do you see as their greatest successes and ongoing challenges?

Achieving the 2030 Agenda is an immense challenge. At the same time, it offers opportunities to address the root causes of poverty, marginalization, and climate change. Many countries report that resources have been reallocated and tax systems adjusted to improve progress towards the SDGs. Issues like gender equality, food security, health, education, climate change, and job creation are higher on national agendas. This has all been done in only five years, which I think is quite an achievement.

However, the coronavirus pandemic has shown us that the gains we have made can easily be lost again. It has exposed fundamental weaknesses in our global system. It has shown how the prevalence of poverty, inadequate health systems, lack of education, and lack of global cooperation can exacerbate a crisis.

There can be no doubt that we are all dependent on each other. If one country fails to combat the virus, it will continue to pose a risk to the rest of the world as well. The need to work together goes to the very core of Agenda 2030. This is why we are investing in developing vaccines

against COVID-19, why we proposed to UN Secretary-General António Guterres that a new UN multi-donor trust fund be established to assist countries in mitigating the long-term effects of the pandemic, and why we are increasing our assistance to the poorest countries in Africa and funding for global health and humanitarian efforts.

I believe that if we manage to maintain and build on the innovative partnerships and the global solidarity that this crisis has spurred, we have a unique opportunity to adjust our course on several issues. In the words of the UN Secretary-General, we must “build back better,” guided by the SDGs. Given that you served in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, how do you understand the future of the transatlantic relationship? Is there still room for multilateralism on the international stage?

The transatlantic relationship has been crucial to peace and prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic since just after the Second World War. We encounter many challenges that we must tackle together. The current pandemic is only the most recent example. There is no contradiction between multilateralism and strong, responsible states.

On the contrary, democratic and efficient states are the building blocks of multilateralism. NATO is an excellent example of this: when each country takes its own security seriously, we become stronger as an alliance. Over the past weeks there have been digital NATO meetings, and on March 27, North-Macedonia H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

71

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

was adopted as a new member of the alliance. I think this shows that NATO is relevant and that it is able to adjust.

The ongoing pandemic is only the most recent example of the need for multilateralism, solidarity, and international cooperation to solve global problems.

Norway is a strong supporter of the United Nations—both politically and financially—and as a consistent long-term partner we are seeking a seat on the UN Security Council for the period 2021-2022.

Norway leads the world in many metrics of gender equality, an issue close to your heart.

Why do you think Norwegians have been so supportive of women’s empowerment, even compared to other progressive European populations?

Norway is an egalitarian society with a high level of social equality. Women have traditionally held a strong position. Fishermen and sailors needed women who could take responsibility at home when they were absent for long periods of time. In addition, it has long been considered important for Norway’s political system to be representative of the whole population.

Ever since the 1980s, around 40 percent of the members of our parliament have been women.

Women politicians have shone a spotlight on women’s everyday lives and the need to find a good work-life balance.

We also know from experience that gender equality is smart economics. Equal access to high-quality education is vital for achieving gender parity in the labor market and equal

72 // S U M M E R

2020

participation in society. Failure to promote women's participation in paid work means wasting half of a country's skills and capacity. Therefore, we will not be able to respond successfully to the pandemic or recover from it if women are left out of the equation.

"WE HAVE USED THE NORWEGIAN CONCEPT OF 'DUGNAD,' OR COMMUNITY HELP, TO HIGHLIGHT THE FACT THAT WE MUST ALL DO OUR PART FOR THE COMMON GOOD." Your party has traditionally taken a strong stance on human rights, notably supporting Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo in 2010. After the subsequent diplomatic freeze with China,

what drove you to reopen relations? And how do you balance national values with pragmatic statecraft?

It is important for Norway to have a working relationship with China, and we welcomed the resumption of normal relations. Support for human rights is an integral part of Norway’s foreign policy. Our relations with China have expanded significantly since 2016, and our bilateral dialogue includes discussions on issues about where we disagree. The balance between fundamental values and pragmatism is too often portrayed as a binary choice. This kind of balancing act is never easy, but our starting point is always an analysis of what is in Norway’s interests in both the short and the long term.

Oil and gas production make up about 20 percent of Norway’s economy. Given that energy prices have plummeted in recent months, do you have plans to further diversify Norway’s financial systems?

The Norwegian economy is currently experiencing a historic economic downturn due to infection control measures, a high level of uncertainty, the global recession, and lower oil and gas prices. The government has introduced a range of measures to mitigate the economic consequences of the pandemic.

To address low oil and gas prices and control the spread of the virus, oil and gas companies are currently reducing planned investments and non-critical maintenance. The Norwegian government has adopted measures to maintain activity in the

INTERVIEW

oil and gas industry and the supply industry, including temporary targeted changes to the taxation system. Furthermore, the government has decided to cut oil production to help stabilize the oil market.

We have known for a long time that oil and gas production and related investments would decline over the coming decades.

Successive governments have therefore taken steps to diversify the economy and avoid the resource curse, and this approach has been a cornerstone of Norway’s economic policy. Norway has a petroleum wealth management system that delinks petroleum spending from petroleum earnings via a fund invested in financial assets abroad. This insulates the domestic economy from volatility in oil and gas prices. The fiscal framework also provides us with the fiscal space necessary to counter economic setbacks like the one we are currently experiencing.

You have long been an outspoken advocate for refugees and displaced people across the world; what relationship do you see between that work and your efforts to limit immigration to Norway?

Norway’s overall aim is to save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect human dignity in humanitarian crises. We put people’s needs and vulnerabilities before other considerations when responding to humanitarian crises. The number of people who are forced to flee their homes because of conflict has increased dramatically in recent years. Regrettably, there is a growing gap between

global humanitarian needs and the resources available. Norway therefore gives priority to the groups who are most in need, including refugees and internally displaced people.

Norway has offered resettlement for 3,000 refugees in 2020.

The COVID-19 pandemic is causing delays in all global resettlement activity, and this will also affect our program. Norway will continue to resettle refugees beyond 2020, following annual budget processes to determine the quota. Relative to population size, Norway is one of the countries in Europe that provides the largest number of resettlement places.

However, resettlement is a last resort and the most costly option. To find employment in Norway, people generally need high qualifications and a good command of Norwegian; there are few unskilled jobs.

This makes it difficult for many people to find a way into the labor market. Ending up without work and relying on benefits— in permanent poverty—is not a good prospect for anyone. This is why Norway’s approach is, wherever possible, to provide refugees with assistance in host countries near their countries of origin.

Despite your party’s desire to join the European Union, only about three in ten Norwegian citizens favor full EU membership. In the future, how do you think Norway can maintain strong relationships on the continent without representation in Brussels?

Although Norway is not an EU member, we participate

in the single market through the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA). This gives Norwegian companies the same market access as EU companies, and Norwegian citizens the same rights as EU citizens to travel, study and work in the 30 countries of the European Economic Area. Norway is also an associate member of the Schengen Area, so that Norwegians enjoy passport-free travel in Europe.

The practical differences between EU membership and EEA membership are therefore limited, for both businesses and citizens. This may also help to explain why support for the EEA Agreement is at an all-time high, whereas support for EU membership has declined.

I support EU membership because it would give Norway a seat at the table where much of our continent’s future is decided. However, the EEA Agreement is a national compromise that has served us well for more than 25 years and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

The current crisis has strengthened our relations with the European Union. We participate in weekly meetings of the health ministers and ministers of the interior to coordinate the fight against the pandemic. Close cooperation to deal with the consequences of the pandemic will be needed for years to come. This will offer opportunities to further strengthen cooperation arrangements between Norway and the European Union.

This interview was lightly edited for clarity and condensed. H H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

73

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

74 // S U M M E R

2020

ADVERTISEMENTS

Certified CleanCo is the Highest Level of Cleanliness and Sanitation in the Parking Industry The Charles Square Garage is Proud to be a Certified CleanCo Garage Book Your Space Online at HarvardSquareParking.com

Pro MOBILITY

One Bennett Street | Cambridge, MA 02138 H I R . H A R V A R D . E D U //

75

H A R VA R D I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E V I E W

76 // S U M M E R

2020