THE AGING WORLD
SIMON KOFE
SARAH HARPER
JAMES FOGGO
A LETTER FROM THE EDITORS
As we purchase new calendars, move forward yet another year, and once again find ourselves marveling that in the blink of an eye 2022 has raced into 2023, with the new year, as always, the Harvard International Review returns to you with a new team at the helm! The two of us, Shriya and Zeb, look forward to bring you another year of insightful and diverse coverage.
Together, it is our hope and commitment to continue to uphold and build upon the standard which generations of our writers have crafted of bringing to you considered, novel, and thorough reporting on world affairs, with a particular bent toward the un- or the underreported. Now, of course, you’re not holding this magazine in hand to listen to us babble on, so let us return and begin the great task before us.
The harrowing destruction of the Second World War was followed by a several decade long period of immense reconstruction. Initiatives like the Marshall Plan helped spark one side of a divided Europe into economic miracle, now looked back upon nostalgically as Les Trentes Glorieuses (“The Glorious Thirty,” referring to the period of 1945 to 1975) in France or the Wirtschaftswunder (“Economic Miracle”) in Germany. At the same time, thousands of miles away, after reeling from the devastation of the two nuclear bomb explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, not to mention dozens of heavily carpet- and firebombed cities, Japan too experienced remarkable growth, making it one of the world’s largest economies at its height. A heavily agrarian China come under the control of the Chinese Community Party in 1949, later, in the wake of the Nixon Administration’s first initiation of dialogue in 1972, very rapidly saw its own massive economic growth and industrialization reaching into today. And, of course, the United States entered into an age of unparalleled wealth and power on the global postwar chessboard.
The onset of these periods of growth saw a boom in populations, now known as the “baby boomer” generation, and particularly in Western Europe and Japan, as we shall examine in this issue, the generation of younger adults living in these more stable, secure, and wealthy, but then again expensive, environments saw dropping fertility rates. In China, state enforced policies like the “One-Child Policy” resulted in their own severely diminished rate of births.
In this issue, our cover topic will look at what the ramifications of aging populations in highly developed countries are today and tomorrow. Sarosh Nagar considers how an aging Japan fares in its influence and power in the East Asian region. Sam Meacham details how China can and cannot rely on various means of automation to meet the challenges of its own impending aging crisis. While Abby LaBreck looks at aging in the European Union and how this segment of the population is engaged and formative in the EU and member states’ cultural milieux.
Wishing you good reading and all the best, Shriya Yarlagadda and Zebulon Erdos
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The Harvard International Review is published quarterly by the Harvard International Relations Council, Inc. Copyright 2023 (ISSN 0739-1854) Harvard International Relations Council. No material appearing in this publication may be reproduced without permission of the publisher. The opinions expressed in this magazine are those of the contributors and are not necessarily shared by the editors. All editorial rights reserved. The Harvard International Review is indexed in the PAIS Bulletin, the Political Science Abstracts, and the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences
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CONTENTS
6 12 18 22 28
SHIFTING EURASIAN ENERGY POLITICS
Eytan Goldstein
SALVATION OR ANNIHILATION: IS MAD MAD?
Theo Harper
THE MAYAN TRAIN PROJECT: A CATALYST FOR CONTROVERSIES AND PUBLIC DEBATES
Kassandra Rodriguez
ARGENTINA’S ECONOMIC DOWNFALL: WHICH PARTY WILL SAVE THE CITIZENS?
Nicolette Reale
THE SETTING SUN: WHAT AN AGING JAPAN MEANS FOR THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EAST ASIA
Sarosh Nagar
34
BEIJING WELCOMES ITS NEW ROBOTIC COWORKERS: CHINA’S AGING CRISIS AND AUTOMATION
Sam Meacham
40
ARTS, CULTURE, AND AGING IN THE EU
Abby LaBreck
46 50 56
TUVALU’S FIGHT TO EXIST: INTERVIEW WITH MINISTER SIMON KOFE
Pranay Varada
“THE 21ST CENTURY IS CERTAINLY AFRICAN”: INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR SARAH HARPER
Dara Adamolekun
BY LAND AND BY SEA, CHALLENGES TODAY AND TOMORROW: INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL JAMES FOGGO
Zebulon Erdos
A truck at a gas station in Frankfurt, Germany. Jan. 27, 2023.
Eytan Goldstein Associate Editor
SHIFTING EURASIAN ENERGY POLITICS
As the war in Ukraine surpasses the one-year mark, the effort to divorce Russia from its oil supplies is still going strong. But some are asking: Is it working? Trying to bring the Russian economy to its knees, the US and its allies have escalated sanctions on the Russian economy. While many aspects of the sanctions packages have seen mixed results, it is clear that measures aimed at distancing the West from Russian energy supplies will form the crux of the attempt to punish Putin’s regime.
The Russian economy, and that of its predecessor the Soviet Union, have long relied on oil and gas revenues to prop up the country’s economic fortunes and to pay out the costs of geopolitical competition. The war in Ukraine requires increased Russian expenditures and therefore will cause the Russian government to look for other customers for its energy supplies. Though the full effects of the European decision to reduce Russian oil and gas have yet to be seen, it is clear that Russia is beginning to look towards growing Asian economies to fill the gap in its coffers.
How receptive Asian and Middle Eastern nations are to Russia’s overtures may signal the extent of Washington’s success in cordoning Russia off from world markets.
Tough Business
The importance of energy revenues to the Kremlin cannot be emphasized enough. In the early 2000s, a time in which Putin managed to consolidate one-party rule in the Russian Federation, major federal budget surpluses
were due in large part to high oil prices (pre-2008). Reorganizing the finances of the Russian Federation and ensuring the stability of the country’s pension system could be made possible by taking advantage of the country’s vast energy resources and potential. In writing an article on the importance of energy revenues to the country’s status as a great power in 1999, a younger Putin argued that the distribution of the profits could ensure better living conditions for the Russian people. The added benefit, of course, is that it can also discourage protests against the reigning regime. Clearly, the growth and maintenance of Putin’s domestic control is incumbent on bringing in high profits and spreading the wealth from nationalized industries.
Even as political relations
worsened, energy had previously remained a sphere of cooperation between Russia and Europe. Yet, on June 3rd, 2022, as part of the sixth package or round of sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, the European Union adopted a partial embargo on Russian oil. Despite the rocky relationship that had existed between the EU and Russia after Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014, the supply chains from Russia to Europe, particularly the energy-hungry economies of Western Europe remained. Therefore, the decision to embargo Russian oil was a major step for the European Union in confronting Russia over its aggression in Ukraine. As a result of the unprecedented condemnation of Russia’s largescale land war, policymakers across the European continent were able to come together and get the needed votes to agree on
Smoke rises from chimneys of coal-fired power plant Detmarovice near Ostrava, Czech Republic. High energy prices linked to Russia’s war in Ukraine have paved the way for coal’s comeback, endangering climate goals and threatening health from increased pollution. Nov. 10, 2022.
limiting Russian energy imports.
To reduce dependence on Ruso reduce dependence on Russian energy but avoid complete chaos in world energy markets, transatlantic leaders decided that the aforementioned energy embargo would only go into effect months later in December 2022. That delayed implementation gave European energy providers some time to find alternative energy sources. But that task hasn’t proven straightforward. Russia’s proximity and already-built infrastructure meant that Europe did not need to look farther afield, until very recently. As Europe scrambled to find new sellers, Russia has sought out new markets for its plentiful energy resources.
New Customers?
Europe’s decision to divest from Russian energy supplies has forced the Russian Federation to look for alternative buyers in order to fill rapidly depleting state funds. A recent report from Forbes Ukraine pegged the total cost of the war at somewhere around US$82 billion. Given that
estimating such a complex sum is difficult to make cumulative, and also that the war is showing no signs of ending, the need to come up with revenue is significant for the survival of the current Russian regime, and also to achieve the Kremlin’s war aims. Since international companies have left the country in droves, less revenue is available from the financial and manufacturing sectors. Therefore, leveraging its vast resources has been and will continue to be a major focal point for the Russian government.
Therefore, the question is, if not Europe, where can Russia sell its oil and gas? The first (and perhaps most obvious) place where Russia will seek to increase its contracts is in China. Given that energy ties between the two countries date back decades and China’s economy has been stably growing since ending their covid-lockdowns. The Russian oil and gas fields in Siberia are ideally situated to cater to the large cities and industrial plants in Manchuria and even farther afield, Beijing. On the diplomatic front, China has not complied with the price caps put in place
by European leaders to stop Russia from earning energy revenues there and has come out against them.
In 2014, the completion of the ‘Power of Siberia’ pipeline connecting gas fields in Irkutsk and Yakutia to China proved a milestone in facilitating such trade. In the present, as Russian gas company Gazprom scrambles to find new markets, this pipeline has served as a medium for a new contract. Press reports from Gazprom late in 2022 indicate that after a call from the Chinese state gas company CNPC to increase supply from Russia, record daily gas flows were recorded on December 9th, 2022. As ‘Power of Siberia’ ramps supply to hungry Chinese markets, a new pipeline is in the works: ‘Power of Siberia 2’. Taken together, the recent flurry of diplomatic overtures to China and the construction of a new pipeline to be operational in 2030 indicate that Moscow views the future of LNG and oil sales to lay in selling to Asian economies via the Russian Far East.
In aiming to sell in the East, Russia is not only looking to sell
Ukrainian demonstrators demand an embargo on Russian oil during a protest in front of EU institutions prior to an extraordinary meeting of EU leaders to discuss Ukraine, energy and food security at the Europa building in Brussels. May 30, 2022
to China. Initially pressured by the West to break ties with Russia, India has remained interested in importing Russian energy supplies. India imported Russian oil in record quantities throughout 2022, benefitting from the discounted prices. In an interview with Foreign Policy, Shivshankar Menon, former Indian national security advisor, underlined the deep energy ties between the two countries. He noted that Indian firms collectively have invested around US$16 billion in the Russian oil industry. Such deep investments indicate that even if the war drags on and the West continues to reduce consumption of Russian oil and gas, New Delhi will remain a key customer for Moscow. Besides China and India, other Asian nations importing large amounts of Russian oil and gas include South Korea and Japan.
An Unexpected Lifeline
As Russia hunts for new customers, it has already caught several breaks. The first is surprising
cooperation from the Gulf countries, which are US allies but also participate in OPEC alongside Russia. The UAE and Saudi Arabia both embarrassed the United States when they maintained robust relations with the Russian Federation after Western pressure to cut those ties following the brutal invasion of Ukraine. In the summer of 2022, Russia and India were able to use the UAE currency, the dirham, to conduct an energy deal. A port in the Emirates, Fujairah, has processed some of this Russian oil heading to South Asia. Indeed, the Gulf has lent Russia an outlet for conducting energy geopolitics with a freer hand outside of Europe.
The decisions of the Gulf states to continue partnering with Russia in OPEC and in oil refining/ storing operations did not go unnoticed in Washington. In late 2022, a diplomatic row between Riyadh and Washington caused President Biden to directly accuse the Saudi government of assisting the Russian war effort
and mentioned that there could be ‘consequences.’ Further rifts between Saudi Arabia and the US could pave the war to even deeper ties between Russia and the Gulf region. That would force the US into an even more challenging position in severing Russia from global energy markets. This decision reinforces a perception by many third parties to the conflict that supporting the principle of national sovereignty and reinforcing the US opposition to the Russian invasion to the detriment of one’s own economy may not be a choice that some countries are willing to make.
A New Eurasian Energy Equilibrium?
Growing pressures on natural resources and rapid economic growth result in a desperate need for energy supplies not only in China and India but elsewhere on the Eurasian landmass. The eagerness displayed by these customers for greater supplies of oil and natural gas indicates that Russia will still be able to raise
Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin talk to each other during their meeting in Beijing, China. Feb. 4, 2022
revenues for its ongoing invasion of Ukraine, even if the West cuts itself off completely of Russian oil and gas – a prospect that may not be out of the realm of possibility. This not only raises important questions for Western efforts to help Ukraine win the war, but also underscores the growing influence of countries like India and the UAE in geopolitics. Despite close ties to the US and European states, those nations have not adopted the Western positions on the Russo-Ukraine war. These conditions no doubt pose questions about the strength of US influence on Eurasian politics.
Russia’s ability to find new cus-
tomers, to some extent, argues for the US to adopt nuanced approaches to crippling the ability of the Russian state to fund the war in Ukraine. US leaders have underscored the grotesque human cost and grave blow that this war strikes to international law. US President Joe Biden argued that “This world should see these outrageous acts for what they are” before the UN at the 77th Session of the General Assembly. At a Quad summit earlier that year, he made special efforts to encourage Delhi and Tokyo to take harder stances against Russia. Given that Russia continues to sell copious amounts of gas, US leaders may look to offer sweeter energy deals to
prospective partners in Africa and Eurasia as a more convincing path to divorce Russia from large oil and gas revenues. With interest in clean energy on the rise globally, the Biden administration may have more tools at its disposal than it thinks to combat the global energy crisis. Taking the lead on driving clean energy technologies at home may be a long-term but necessary strategy for Washington to counter Moscow’s influence in worldwide energy markets. What is clear, however, is that whoever provides the world’s most populous countries with energy will gain a great advantage in the coming years.
Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Russian President Vladimir Putin talk before a working session of leaders at the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan. June 28, 2019
Theo Harper Staff Writer
OR ANNIHILIATION? IS MAD MAD?
“Suppose the Russians have invaded West Germany, Belgium, Holland, France? Suppose their tanks and troops have reached the English Channel? Suppose they are poised for an invasion? Is that the last resort?
No. Why not?
Well, we’d only fight a nuclear war to defend ourselves. How could we defend ourselves by committing suicide!
So what is the last resort? Piccadilly? Watford Gap service station? The Reform Club?”
So realizes the new British prime minister that nuclear weapons do not work in Yes, Prime Minister, the classic ‘80s British sitcom of dysfunctional government. For close to six decades, MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) has been at the center of military strategy for the world’s great powers, but as Russia once again heats up the rhetoric around nuclear weapons, it is worth asking whether the logic of MAD actually holds. Because if it does not, the world is in a far more precarious position than the neat balance of MAD would suggest.
The days when the public was prepared for nuclear war with nuclear fallout shelters and nuclear drills has long passed. It can be tempting to assume that the threat of nuclear war (or, for that matter, conventional war between nuclear powers) has also passed. After all, no nuclear weapon has been dropped in wartime in three quarters of a century, and (outside of India and Pakistan), nuclear armed powers have not fought openly since 1953. Meanwhile, the number of deployed nuclear warheads has fallen dramatically since the 1980s.
President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin, arrive to meet at the ‘Villa la Grange’, in Geneva, Switzerland. June 16, 2021.
Proponents of MAD would argue that it has played a critical role in stabilizing this status quo. However, that complacency belies a situation that warrants more concern—the risk of nuclear war remains as present as ever as Russia unleashes large-scale warfare in Europe. Even if MAD prevents nuclear war, it does not necessarily prevent conventional war between nuclear armed states, a threat promising terrifying consequences for the world.
The Theory
MAD has become military doctrinal orthodoxy since the development of reliable means of nuclear retaliation in the 1960s. The theory holds that a nuclear armed state will not use nuclear weapons in a first strike against another nuclear state provided that the targeted state has the capability to make a retaliatory strike, rendering the first strike self-destructive.
This theory requires a signifi-
cant number of caveats to be effective. First and most importantly, it is necessary that a credible response can be made. This tends to take the form of one of two main approaches. The United States and Russia both maintain a retaliatory strike capability utilizing strategic bombers to retaliate in the event of a nuclear attack at the direct instruction of their leader. Hence, the United States and Russia operate nuclear triads capable of providing not just the diplomatic nuance of strategic bombers, but also the second strike capacity of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles. Under this style of response, the first strike is deterred because the opposing side can, through an early awareness of the strike from radar, order a response before the initial annihilation of its country. Questions remain about the viability of the nuclear triad method, given the advanced surveillance and tracking techniques employed by the nuclear armed powers.
As a result of the vulnerability of strategic bombers in modern war, since the 1960s the more common form of MAD is through a socalled second strike (employed by the United States, Russia, and most other nuclear nations), in which the country maintains an unattackable nuclear capability that can respond in the event of a first strike regardless of the leader’s decision. The classic formulation of this approach is the British government’s letters of last resort, whereby a sealed letter containing instructions of what to do in the event of nuclear war and a first strike is placed in each British submarine, and so the result of a nuclear war is guaranteed to be mutual annihilation since all major nuclear nations maintain undetectable nuclear submarines at sea which are less subject to human temperaments.
A second problem for MAD is the potential for one side to develop the capability to shoot down nuclear missiles, thus enabling it to withstand a nuclear strike un-
A naval rocket is exhibited in Moscow’s Red Square past a banner of Vladimir Lenin, Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx during the annual May Day parade in the Soviet Union. May 1, 1963.
A Titan 1, Booster Missile body, left, is blown apart, right, by a high-powered chemical laser fired from a distance of sixth-tenths of a mile during a test at the White Sands Missile range in New Mexico. The experiment was conducted under President Reagan’s “Star Wars” program. Sept, 6, 1985.
harmed and act as though it were the only nuclear power. The most infamous attempt at this defense was Reagan’s Star Wars program (Strategic Defense Initiative or SDI), though numerous attempts have been made from the 1960s NikeZeus program to Trump’s SDI II program, while the Soviet Union also tested a number of strategies including lasers and space cannons. However, the prohibitive cost of these programs, the difficulty of ensuring complete efficacy, the development of nuclear weapons like hyper missiles that can evade them, and the destabilizing effect of a successful program have so far largely deterred further development of such programs.
An addendum to this description of the theory is to note that a nuclear war is likely to be complete and total in its devastation
under MAD. This outcome is not just probable because it is implied by MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction), but because a variety of war games have demonstrated that nuclear conflicts between nuclear powers always escalate to complete destruction. The most famous demonstration was Proud Prophet, a series of war games involving the US Cabinet and real US War Plans in 1983, where attempts at limited, de-escalatory, or tactical nuclear war consistently led to full-fledged salvo and the annihilation of at least half a billion people.
Overall, despite several caveats, MAD appears convincing and has been widely credited with ensuring that the Cold War remained cold.
Does MAD actually work?
MAD is called MAD for a reason. The term “MAD” was coined by the strategist Donald Brennan in 1962 precisely because a doctrine predicated on global annihilation was considered mad. Historically, most of the criticism against MAD has stressed the idea that it may be possible to disable a country’s ability to carry out a nuclear response, thus preventing MAD from working. However, there are more significant issues with the theory as it currently stands.
Essentially, the key problem is that nuclear weapons are disproportionately destructive. Even the hawkish President Reagan disliked their existence for this reason, describing MAD as a “suicide pact” that threatened all of humanity. In other words, the severity of actually carrying out a nuclear strike makes it difficult to believe that MAD could ever actually be employed as has been suggested, since it would require the merciless annihilation of millions of innocent civilians.
First is the case of using nuclear weapons in a first strike capacity. While MAD is, strictly speaking, a theory that prevents the employment of nuclear weapons as a first strike, it is often implicitly used to suggest that the threat of nuclear (first) strike could be used to prevent an event of the severity of a nuclear strike. If MAD is a legitimate strategy in the geopolitical toolkit, its usage is theoretically not limited to nuclear retaliation, but is also applicable to conventional attacks. Such a scenario plays out in Yes, Prime Minister. However, the problem is that the loss of Europe to the Russians is not as bad as a mutual apocalypse, so nuclear
Russian Topol M intercontinental ballistic missile launcher rolls along Red Square during the Victory Day military parade to celebrate 72 years since the end of WWII and the defeat of Nazi Germany, in Moscow, Russia. May 9, 2017
weapons could not actually be used.
This logic extends to straightup occupation of another country. Existence under occupation is better than mutual annihilation, so even if—as the Yes, Prime Minister advisor suggests—Russian tanks drove up the M1 motorway, it would not be rational to initiate a first response. As Winston Churchill noted, only “lunatics or dictators in the mood of Hitler when he found himself in his final dugout” might be expected to launch a first strike under occupation. Carrying on a war under occupation places a heavy burden on a population in the pursuit of victory, but that is different from the promise of total destruction under MAD; hence, only the former is reasonable.
These two examples have an
important consequence for the specific terms of MAD itself. Afterall, if you knew that a full strike had been launched against your own country, and there was nothing you could do to prevent your national obliteration, the morally correct response is not to retaliate and needlessly slaughter millions of the opponent’s citizens when victory is inevitably lost. As Reagan put it when proposing SDI, “is it not better to save lives than to avenge them?” Similarly, Edward Teller, a member of the Manhattan Project, wrote for the HIR as early as 1985 that “the MAD policy as a deterrent is totally ineffective if it becomes known that in case of attack, we would not retaliate against the aggressor.”
While MAD makes sense as a threat before nuclear weapons are launched, as soon as they are launched, the rationale switches against launching them. The
problem that arises from this logic is that if you are not, as few can be, willing to exterminate millions for the sake of extermination, then MAD no longer functions as a deterrent. While steps like the British letters of last resort or the Russian deadhand system have been taken to partially automate the process of retaliation removing human emotion, there is nothing stopping these methods from falling short (in the British case, you could write to do nothing, and
This dramatically changes nuclear policy, since there cannot be a circumstance in which MAD acts as a rational deterrent to nuclear war, nor can MAD act as a deterrent against opportunistic exercises in conventional power, from the invasion of Crimea to incursions into the Taiwanese Air Defense Identification Zone. It is the mistaken belief in MAD, and
and not MAD itself, which maintains world peace in an uneasy equilibrium.
Consequences
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has provoked significant nuclear concerns after Putin stated on April 20, 2022 that he “will use all the means at our disposal,” viewed as a threat to use nuclear weapons. However, analyzing the situation in light of MAD’s potential shortcomings helps explain why the invasion was able to happen, along with potential responses.
MAD is seen as the ultimate deterrence against foreign misbehavior (Russian in this case). However, as history has shown, the scale of nuclear destruction means that it cannot be a credible threat. As Timo Koster, NATO’s Director of Defense Policy and Capability, put it, “a massacre is taking place in Europe and the strongest military alliance in the world is staying out of it. We are deterred and Russia is not.” This dynamic helps explain the Russian invasion—the fact that Ukraine was a European democracy under Western protection could not protect it because it can never be worth it to enter a nuclear war with Russia over Ukraine.
For the same reason, the West could never actually launch a nuclear war in response to a conventional attack on Western protectorates like the Baltics or Finland. Concerningly, this also applies to Russia using tactical nuclear weapons against Kyiv, or even NATO allies in the Baltics. NATO could protest, rally international support, and strengthen
the sanctions regime, but it could never actually retaliate against Russia, for that would be self-destructive.
That said, NATO’s limited ability to respond goes both ways. At the conventional level, it suggests that the West has a greater ability to maneuver than it realizes. For example, despite Putin’s aggressive postering and threats, NATO has a far greater ability to help the Ukrainians than the threats of MAD would suggest. Russia’s conventional forces are humiliated and bruised, making a direct retaliation against NATO unlikely. This weakness effectively gives NATO a free hand to assist Ukraine far beyond what is currently being done. Even if NATO does not want to sacrifice soldiers, it could still provide Ukraine with as much military equipment and intelligence as Ukraine needs, as well as take direct actions against Russia such as supporting internal resistance operations and coups.
At a wider level, there might be far more scope for brinkmanship amongst the world’s great nations—free from the mistaken fear of an imminent apocalypse.
Heated disputes may arise in trade and diplomacy spheres, but (at least initially) not accompanied by nuclear posturing. In the longer term, a MAD-free world suggests that tactical nuclear weapons are possible, since as long as they are limited, a full strike could never be contem-
A Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile is launched from the northern Plesetsk cosmodrome in Russia. Oct. 1, 1999
plated. However, since this relies on knowing your opponent does not mistakenly believe in MAD this outcome likely remains distant since MAD game theory suggests that tactical uses of nuclear weapons always escalates to mutual destruction.
Embracing a MAD-free world is difficult. It will likely involve more conflict and more brinkmanship freer from the fear of accidentally triggering nuclear apocalypse. However, it is also a world where the West is free to stand up for itself, not deterred by a theory only one side really follows. And it is a world no longer reliant on a devoted but mistaken belief in MAD.
A marker points out a spot for inspection along the planned route of the
Kassandra Rodriguez Staff Writer
THE MAYAN TRAIN PROJECT
A CATALYST FOR CONTROVERSIES AND PUBLIC DEBATES
Mayan Train in Akumal, Quintana Roo, Mexico. Aug. 2, 2022
1,525 kilometers long and connecting the southeastern states of Quintana Roo, Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, and Yucatán, the Mayan Train Project will become the signature project of current Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Linking the major cities and tourist regions of the Yucatán Peninsula—from Cancun’s beaches to Tulum’s archaeological wonders—the train is expected to boost Mexico’s economy by creating jobs, increasing production, and promoting tourism.
Although the project’s benefits are clear to many, opposition has arisen from environmentalists, archeologists, political leaders, and everyday Mexican citizens. Environmentalists and archaeologists argue that plans to reroute the train line through the rainforest will cause irreversible damage to the environment, threaten ancient Maya sites, as well as threaten the Great Maya Aquifer which provides drinking water to millions of Mexicans. Largely, though, much of the controversy surrounding the creation of this railway line can be attributed to the tensions of domestic politics that have increased after Obrador’s election.
Obrador’s Presidency
In 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) was elected as the 65th president of Mexico. His election was the first since 1988 that a president-elect’s political party also won the majority in both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, the two houses of Mexico’s legislature. For years, Mexico had been run by two major political parties: the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and
Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador answers questions from journalists at his daily 7 a.m. press conference at the National Palace in Mexico City. April 9, 2019
the National Action Party (PAN). AMLO unsuccessfully ran for the presidency in both 2006 and 2012, but it was not until 2018 that he was elected, introducing Morena, his political party, as the new ruling party.
The PRI was the country’s dominant political party from 1929 until the 2000s. The PAN emerged as the first party to run against the PRI in 1939, but didn’t take over until 2000 when Vicente Fox Quesada was named president, breaking the 71 years of continuous ruling of the PRI. Morena’s founding in 2011 and current takeover, was therefore one of the major turning points in Mexico’s history and both a political and economic shock for individuals who had a long history of government involvement. Both the PRI and the PAN had been known to have politicians
that sought not only positions of power but also personal enrichment through the illegal use of public funds or outright robbery. For instance former Veracruz governor Javier Duarte allegedly stole almost US$3 billion dollars from state funds and was further accused of redirecting approximately US$35 million in funding for social programs to pay “phantom” companies. This legacy of corruption has made many citizens skeptical of the government’s ability to represent their interests and to act in a transparent and accountable manner.
AMLO presents himself as the man of the people. Throughout his presidency, he has maintained a significant level of popular support, often attributed to his ability to connect with the concerns and aspirations of ordinary Mexicans. His emphasis on reducing corruption and improving the lives of the most
vulnerable have resonated with many citizens who feel neglected by traditional political elites from the PRI and the PAN. Six months after he took office, he kicked off strongly by pursuing his agenda: he “initiated a new worker training program for youth; canceled the construction of a new airport in Mexico City; suspended oil bids and auctions for renewables; gained congressional support to create a National Guard; launched a campaign to fight fuel theft; and raised the minimum wage.” As of now, several years into his presidency, some Mexican citizens are dissatisfied with his slowing progress. In addition, criticism has been directed towards some of his policies, which
are perceived by certain individuals as excessively populist in nature.
More Than a Train
The Mayan train is one of AMLO’s projects designed to help the economically depressed southeastern states and recognize Mexico’s unique culture. The expected completion date is December 23, 2023; 42 trains will be designed and built locally in the Mexican State of Hidalgo, achieving the objective of being a “Train for Mexico, built in Mexico.” He has promoted the train as a way to reduce poverty in Yucatan: it is predicted that the construction of the train will increase tourism
revenue by 20 percent and create more than 1 million jobs. This intervention comes at the perfect time—according to the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), poverty in Yucatán has grown 16.6 percent over the last three years.
AMLO suggested that there has been opposition to the train from a political mafia group. He stated that these individuals “feel like the owners of Mexico and that they try to stop the country’s transformation by wanting corruption and impunity to continue.” Although public
Tourists visit the archeological site of Tulum on Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula. Aug. 5, 2018
A masked protester holds up a sign with a message that reads in Spanish: “Your train of progress is the death express” during a march in Mexico City. Feb. 21, 2020
statements such as this one can make AMLO’s presidency seem as the cure and hope for Mexico’s political system, it is important to acknowledge the negative sentiments that have risen due to his presidency. Some argue that AMLO’s presidency has been recently associated with Mexico’s democratic backsliding; AMLO has expressed doubts about the importance of independent public agencies, reduced the funding allocated to autonomous agencies, appointed his finance minister without following the necessary legislative procedures, and initiated infrastructure projects like the Mayan train that potentially infringe upon environmental regulations and impact local indig-
enous communities. Therefore, when tracing back the opposition towards the Mayan train, political tensions are closely tied to it. Although it is challenging to establish a causal link between the two, the broader discontent with AMLO’s presidency has likely impacted the criticism surrounding the project. Thus, partisans strongly aligned with parties like PRI and PAN may connect the train’s construction to their overall dissatisfaction with AMLO’s administration.
What Comes Next
It is difficult to craft a clear solution and path for Mexico to fix its political system. Years of con-
finement with the same political groups have caused tremendous damage to the country, not only in terms of economic instability, but in erosion to Mexican citizens’ trust in their government. AMLO has proven to be a relief to some Mexican citizens, a sign of hope that things will improve. Supporters praise his commitment to social justice and the fight against corruption, while critics raise concerns about the long-term implications of his policies. The true measure of his legacy and impact on Mexico will become clearer over time, as his presidency progresses and the consequences of his actions unfold.
woman walks with her child on the highway during a protest in Buenos Aires, Argentina,. Social movements marched to the Social Development Ministry in Argentina to demand more welfare assistance for the poor, who have been particularly hard-hit by one of the world’s highest inflation rates. Sept. 8, 2022
A
WHICH PARTY WILL SAVE THE CITIZENS?
Nicolette Reale Staff Writer
Argentina is going to the polls later this year, and citizens seem conflicted about which direction the country should go. A third of the population support Frente de Todos (Everyone’s Front), a populist-leftist alliance, another third support Juntos por el Cambio (Together for Change), a liberal-conservative alliance, and the final third would prefer a candidate who does not belong to either coalition. Despite disagreeing about who should take office, the citizens seem to unanimously agree that the economic state of the country is the number one concern for the upcoming election. With inflation rising at a constant rate for over two decades now, Argentines are unable to come to a clear consensus on who could finally alleviate their economic problems. Some citizens believe that change may just make matters worse and that the current government is their best option for improvement, while others see the current government as the leading problem for their country’s disastrous economic situation.
How Did the Economy Get This Bad?
Serious financial problems arose for the country in the 1980s when markets collapsed, prices rose, currency depreciated, and wealthier citizens fled to more stable countries. During this debt crisis, the government turned to the central bank for financial assistance, leading to rapid inflation because of the increasing money in circulation and decreasing interest rate for borrowing. Since this initial problem, the country has been unable to recover. With the COVID pandemic, shrinking global food supplies, and tighter
energy markets, massive inflation has continued to increase in the Latin American nation.
On top of the external international pressures that have resulted in record-breaking inflation, the government has been implementing programs that it is unable to financially sustain; Argentina has deeply subsidized healthcare, energy, universities, and public transportation for its citizens, all of which the government can only afford to fund through the printing of more pesos. Accounting for all these unprecedented global problems and poorly planned government programs, prices have increased
massively since 2021 with the country hitting a 90 percent inflation rate (meaning a 90% year-toyear increase in prices) at the end of 2022.
International tensions have complicated Argentina’s economic recovery even more, as foreign nations continue to withdraw their financial support in light of Argentina’s ongoing political and economic challenges. Argentina’s largest default was in 2001 when the government decided to retract close to US $93 billion in loans, causing the nation to lose access to international debt markets, and a similar default happened in 2018. When the pandemic hit in 2020, foreign investors were even more hes-
A construction worker waits to clean up at a construction site in Palermo, an upper-middle-class neighborhood in Buenos Aires, Argentina. July 15, 2022.
itant to assist a country with an unstable financial history due to economic declines in countries across the globe. Therefore, in 2021, foreign investment stood at US $4.1 billion, which is 38 percent lower than the previous year. The national debt now stands at US $382 billion as of September 2022, which amounts to nearly 90 percent of Argentina’s GDP.
Currency Exchange and USD Dominance
The Argentine peso loses value almost daily, despite the government instituting an exchange rate that makes the currency seem more valuable than it really is. With national debt issues and growing inflation, citizens have
turned towards an underground exchange rate. This “blue” market currency is often used by locals and tourists who have done their research. The unofficial currency market gives foreigners almost double the amount of pesos that the official exchange rate would give. For example, the official exchange rate equates US $1 to 140 Argentine pesos, but the “blue” market values US $1 at 290 Argentine pesos. This is beneficial for both citizens and tourists because the government has strict restrictions on exchanging and withdrawing large sums of USD from official channels such as banks. Therefore, most people avoid paying with bank cards or using ATMs and try to utilize electronic money transfer services such as Western Union or WorldRemit.
With the multiple exchange rates and low value of the Argentine currency, many citizens make larger purchases, such as cars and homes, using US dollars. Argentina has some of the most US currency outside of the United States, amounting to almost US $230 billion. Argentines keep American bills hidden throughout their households to save for larger purchases because USD is not one of the official currencies of the nation, meaning that citizens are not officially allowed to use them for purchases. It has become the norm to engage in currency exchanges via the “blue” market because that is the only place where individuals can avoid government restrictions on buying USD.
The wealthier populations are able to keep up with the inflation rates because, while rents rise at nearly 50 percent a year, so do
their wages. For the richer population, inflation is manageable, but the same does not apply to lower income citizens. This is because the jobs of poor Argentinians typically do not have automatic wage increases to keep up with inflation, and they are unable to buy U.S. dollars. Consequently, the poor population is subject to an extremely small income in comparison to the wealthier population while the prices for every type of good and service increases around them. As of 2020, 40 percent of Argentina’s population lives below the national poverty line. 70 percent of children in the area surrounding Buenos Aires live below the poverty line. With pesos’ value falling so rapidly, poorer people are unable to afford food and goods. Many suburbs across the nation have turned towards “trueque” clubs where people, most of whom are women, exchange goods and food for other necessities. These clubs are bartering centers where citizens may obtain any necessities they are unable to afford by means of real currency. With financial situations becoming this severe, citizens are seriously debating which political party will be able to pull them out of the worsening economic crisis.
Political Parties and Polarization
The leading coalitions in the nation are Frente de Todos and Juntos por el Cambio. Frente de Todos is a populist-leftist alliance that encompasses the Peronist perspective on government, meaning they advocate for social justice, political sovereignty, and economic independence. Under this unique ideology, the
party does not align with the economic stances of capitalism or communism, but, rather, takes a more populist approach that advocates for the working class. The state advocates for working citizens by taking on the role as the negotiator in times of conflict between management and workers. Therefore, the main supporters consist of those who are in labor intensive jobs and in the poorest socioeconomic standing relative to other citizens. This coalition upholds the main ideals of Peronism and is currently in control of the presidency, with both President Alberto Fernández and Vice President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (no relation) being proud members. While in office, the presidential administration has increased taxes on exports and high-income households, lowered interest rates, and raised the minimum wage. The opposing party, Juntos por el Cambio, functions as a liberal-conservative alliance that was established by the UCR (Radical Civil Union) party and the PRO (Republican Proposal) party.
This centrist progressive party is in favor of limited spending to
reduce the national debt, judicial system reform, and promotionof human rights. This coalition has won the presidency nearly ten times over the past 100 years, including electing President Mauricio Macri in 2015, but it has not held the executive office since then. Despite their absence in the presidential office, the coalition currently holds the congressional majority.
With the growing economic issues in the country, there has also been an increase in political polarization. The tension between the current Frente de Todos presidential administration and former president Mauricio Macri, a member of the Juntos por el Cambio, has helped build strong connections between core supporters of each coalition and their respective leaders. This is because, in the last election, the alliances accounted for nearly 90 percent of the votes. Some of the strength is due to the fact thatArgentina has never allowed independent candidates, and there is a law that mandates primary elections and encourages competition within coalitions. However, the main reason for the coalition
strength lately is due to the parties’ complete opposition on important issues for the nation. The debate always boils down to the Peronist government vs. anti-Peronist opposition, which helps uphold the coalitional nature of the Argentine political system.
The Current Administration and Upcoming Elections
The nation has been wondering which party will be the one to pull them out of their current economic nightmare. President Fernández has rejected a decision by the Supreme Court to allocate more state funds towards the city of Buenos Aires and claims that former-president Macri is responsible for the economic downfall of the country. On top of the administration’s perspective on the nation’s economic situation, Fernández has denounced the recognition of Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s interim president and de Kirchner has expressed support for Maduro. The presidency has also
Argentina’s President Alberto Fernandez, left, holds hands with Sergio Massa during his swearing-in ceremony as new Economy Minister at the government house in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Aug. 3, 2022.
Lawmakers receive Sergio Massa who arrives to Congress to resign from his position as the head of the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Aug. 2, 2022.
withdrawn from a group of Latin American countries created to restore democracy in Venezuela, which hints at some international relation tensions within the administration.
At the discretion of the presidency, Argentina has gone through multiple economic ministers during the past four years, with three different ministers serving in one month alone as of 2022. Vice President Kirchner created some tension between the President and herself after forcing out the first economic minister, Martin Guzman, after he attempted to make a deal with the IMF that would give stricter control of money to the central bank. Recently, the presidential administration has appointed Sergio Massa as a new “super minister” of economy, production and agriculture. Massa aims to reduce public spending and boost foreign reserves with the US$3.8 billion he was given by the IMF.
With elections approaching, the nation is noticeably divided on who they would prefer to see controlling the government. Frente de Todos has support from about 25 percent of the population considering that President Fernández is seeking re-election. Juntos por el Cambio has about five different contenders for the presidency and about 35 percent of the population would be in favor of their control. Another 38 percent of citizens admitted that they were open to a new “political party governing.” Despite these varying percentages, some who stated that they were in favor of opposing parties to the current government also claimed that the incumbent might have the best chance at winning the 2023 election. The leading concerns for citizens in this upcoming election are economic outlook, inflation, and corruption of the government.
Throughout the nation’s history all three of these concerns have plagued the government. Every attempt at change in the government and their economic standing has left voters discontent in the past. Leading up to the previous election in 2019, almost two thirds of the population had reported dissatisfaction with the nation’s democracy, which has been a common trend since 1983. However, the consensus that change in government has dissatisfied voters in the past may not apply to the upcoming election. Since nearly 75 percent of citizens believe that anyone except the incumbent government could do a better job, this election may be the first time in decades that the Argentine population is satisfied with a change.
.in government control.
In the eyes of Peronists, ensuring that a large change doesn’t happen at the end of this year seems to be the most feasible way to prevent problems from worsening. Some citizens are starting to believe that a familiar political force may be needed to solve this crisis, despite them being at the forefront of the current economic situation and instigators of political tension. On the other hand, supporters of Juntos Por el Cambio believe that a change in government is the only way to combat this economic crisis. With large divisions among the nation on who to support, the upcoming election will ultimately answer which coalition the nation believes can save their economy.
A girl embraces a woman on a sidewalk as they protest demanding more subsidies amid spiking inflation, in front of a wall reading in Spanish “No worker below the basic basket” in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Sept. 27, 2022.
Sarosh Nagar Executive Content Editor
THE SETTING SUN
WHAT AN AGING JAPAN MEANS FOR THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EAST ASIA
A woman with protective mask walks across the tramcar tracks in Tokyo. April 14, 2020
AHarvard University course from previous years once called Japan Asia’s “underperformer.” Other scholars more charitably describe Japan as a declining power, with its influence in East Asia shrinking year after year. A commonly cited cause of this problem is Japan’s aging population, which Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida himself said that fixing the country’s low birthrate is an issue that “cannot wait.”
Indeed, Japan is getting older. Compared to other highly industrialized countries, including those in Asia, Japan historically has had one of the lowest birth rates, and fertility rates have declined to 1.3 births per woman over the last several decades— one of the lowest in Asia. Many of the consequences of this aging population have been extensively discussed in global media: higher public spending on social services, ballooning government debt, and a shrinking workforce. However, the role that aging plays in Japanese foreign policy has often been overlooked.
A Geriatric Peace?
In foreign policy realms, the effect of aging populations on geopolitical stability is partially explained by Geriatric Peace Theory, which predicts that aging societies will require more young workers to sustain the social safety net. Hence, aging societies have fewer young people to recruit for military service, and this reduced military capacity makes them act more peacefully. Social scientists have collected evidence for this claim, highlighting that rapidly aging countries tend to
be more peaceful overall.
Yet, though Geriatric Peace Theory posits that aging societies become more peaceful, Japan appears to be an exception. Prime Minister Kishida’s recent defense budget will bump Japan’s GDP spending from under one percent to roughly two percent of total GDP by 2027, and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) are now due to receive their largest modernization in recent history, including enhancing local productions of missiles, aircraft, and other military equipment. This puzzling case raises a number of questions. How does Japan’s military rearmament square with the Geriatric Peace Theory? How can an aging society adequately maintain the tax base and military manpower needed to project power?
The most potent explanation for Japan’s rearmament is the rise of Chinese power in the region. The People’s Republic of China, which has had strained relations with Tokyo since the end of World War II, has experienced rapid economic growth and has undertaken extensive military
modernization. However, while the rising threat from China certainly plays a role, the issue of aging complicates Japan’s foreign policy stances. Traditional military and geopolitical doctrines, especially those that rely on larger manpower pools or a strong employment and manufacturing base, is simply not an option for an aging Japan. Many have used this fact to argue that Japan is in terminal decline.
However, contrary to conventional wisdom, Japan’s aging population does not necessarily mean the country is in terminal decline either. Indeed, as Japan has gotten older, many of the country’s politicians have become increasingly concerned about transitioning Japan to a military doctrine and grand strategy that will enable it to project power even as the country begins to lose its key taxpaying base and employment-age workforce. These concerns are driving Tokyo to transition to a more high-technology, low-personnel military and develop deeper regional ties with allies (such as India) to stab-
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida speaks during a Diet session at the Lower House of the Parliament in Tokyo. Jan. 23, 2023
ilize the regional balance of power despite Japan’s aging population. Indeed, with the right changes, it is possible that an aging Japan may be as or even more influential in some aspects as compared to the Japan of the last two decades.
Towards a Technopolar Doctrine
What does aging do to a country’s military? Most obviously, an older population means that there are fewer individuals of fighting age who can be recruited for service. Additionally, aging countries face budgetary pressures to support social services for seniors, especially in liberal democracies, where senior citizens are an influential part of the electorate. In these states, politi-
cians may reallocate funds from military spending toward maintaining social services.
Japan is no exception to this general principle. An aging population means Japan is increasingly running out of manpower for the JSDF. The JSDF, at present, is numerically capped, limiting the amount of manpower that Japan must call on, but in the event of a conflict or wide-scale mobilization, it is increasingly likely that Japan may not have the requisite manpower needed for such defensive actions.
However, this dynamic is exacerbated in Japan by the increasing divide between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Japan’s population. Much of the Japanese population remains ar-
dently opposed to amendments to Japan’s post-war constitution, including the famous Article 9, which renounces the use of war except for self-defense. Not only does the population present a political obstacle to Kishida’s rearmament efforts, but its opposition to future conflicts would likely limit the ability of the JSDF to recruit more troops.
Facing these challenges, Japan has increasingly adopted a technology-focused arms doctrine. Recent Japanese defense whitepapers have increasingly admitted that Japan will lack the manpower for a large army, an unusual admission in military circles. Instead, Japanese elites have begun increasingly investing in drones, aircraft, and other high-tech capabilities designed to
A woman and a child look at submarines of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in Yokosuka, south of Tokyo. May 15, 2015
compensate for the disadvantages of an aging population. Japan is now pioneering a military doctrine that focuses on maintaining a small but elite set of military forces.
For orthodox believers of a numbers-first military doctrine, Japan’s shift may seem misguided or unrealistic. However, given Japan’s declining population, its shift in military strategy may be the only possible approach. Furthermore, a technology-first military doctrine offers important strategic benefits. Most notably, if the JSDF relies less on manpower and conscripts, the result could limit potential casualties in a conflict and minimize public opposition or distrust that occurs as a result of the war. Additionally, as displayed in Ukraine, drones and other technological
tools are also quite cost-effective, especially against larger or more numerically superior adversaries.
Japan’s new doctrine appears very similar to the United States’ own force modernization plans for 2030. While this parallel may be coincidental, it could have important benefits for the US-Japanese alliance. As Tokyo’s and Washington’s defense planners increasingly rely on smaller but more advanced military forces, leaders from both countries will be able to share insights and lessons learned, enabling both forces to increase their readiness. By incorporating these new doctrines into joint military drills, Washington and Tokyo could help ensure that both countries’ forces have experience working together, improving both their
readiness and regional deterrence capacity. Thus, counterintuitively, Japan’s declining population might permit the country to adopt a technology-first defensive posture that stabilizes its power and supports its regional cooperation in an uncertain time.
The End of the Underperformer
Japan’s aging population is not, however, likely only to have a military impact. Rather, it will likely affect how Japan chooses to carry out its foreign policy. For decades, Japan has often been called the great “underperformer” in international relations circles, owing to the fact that the country is the world’s third-largest economy yet wields far less clout in global alliances
Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, center, stands in a vehicle as he reviews troops of the Japan Self-Defense Forces at the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Camp Asaka in Tokyo, Japan. Nov. 27, 2021
and international institutions than countries like Germany or Canada, which have smaller economies.
However, in recent years, the so-called underperformer seems to be stirring to life. During the pandemic, Japan made largescale investments in vaccine production in Vietnam and throughout the region. Japan is now an active player in international supply chains and has taken a leading role in investing in Southeast Asia as part of the Quad, the regional grouping of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India.
What is driving Japan to wake up? Many will point to China or a more conservative government as potential factors, which are undoubtedly relevant. However, aging may also be playing a role.
According to Nikkei, Japan’s leading newspaper, many younger Japanese investors and companies are turning their focus abroad as their country’s aging population and stagnant growth lead them to believe that foreign companies throughout
Asia might be better investment destinations.
At first glance, this shift of young Japanese investing overseas may seem like a problem to Japanese politicians seeking domestic investment. However, increased foreign investment by Japanese companies throughout Asia will shore up Japan’s relative geopolitical position, endowing it with friends from Bangkok to Jakarta. Improved ties with Southeast Asia will give Japan weight in international circles, especially in ASEAN, which will allow Japan to promote democratic values in the region and end its underperformer status. It will also reinforce efforts made by the United States and Australia to improve their outreach in Southeast Asia, strengthening the position of the Quad more broadly.
If trends continue, Japan’s aging population will cause a continuing outflow of investment from the country across Southeast Asia, which will reap returns for Japanese companies and strengthen Japan’s regional alliances more broadly. In the
event of a conflict in a region, such ties could benefit Japan, including offering Japanese companies new markets to sell their products if access to traditional consumer bases is restricted.
Growing Old, Growing Strong?
Japan’s aging population is considered by many to be the greatest challenge facing the country. As Japan wrestles with caring for its elderly population, it is worth considering how this aging population will affect Japan’s foreign policy. It may drive Japan towards a more technology-focused military doctrine and deepen its influence in Southeast Asia. But will aging truly weaken Japan? The conventional answer is yes, but the true answer may be more complicated.
As automation comes to dominate 21st-century economies, capital-rich Japanese companies will be at the forefront of this revolution. Combined with a technology-focused, low-manpower military and a dynamic regional foreign policy, Japan might exercise more international power even as its population ages. But the real question is: for what will Tokyo wield this power? Japan could attempt to wield its power silently, as it has traditionally done. Alternatively, it might look to link up with the Quad and its allies to assert its influence in Southeast Asia, or it could chart some middle ground between the two. Whatever the case, it would be amiss to write off Japan—for even as the sun eventually sets in the West, it always rises again in the East.
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, left, U.S. President Joe Biden, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi are greeted by Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, right, during his arrival to the Quad leaders summit at Kantei Palace in Tokyo. May 24, 2022
Sam Meacham
Associate Editor
BEIJING WELCOMES ITS NEW ROBOTIC COWORKERS
CHINA’S AGING CRISIS AND AUTOMATION
China’s population is falling.
In 2022, for the first time since 1961, more people died than were born in China. For years, observers have been clamoring about a coming demographic crisis, as a steady decline in the birth rate, combined with continued population aging, transforms the size and structure of the Chinese population. In accordance, China’s new economic normal was destined to include a smaller labor force, more elderly citizens dependent on the younger generations for their well-being, and strained welfare and pension systems. With the new data, the heralded crisis appears to have arrived.
The Roots of the Crisis
To some extent, China’s troubling demographic landscape is not unique. There is a well-documented negative correlation between per capita income and fertility rates across countries and periods of time, showing that, as a country becomes richer, it should expect fewer births per woman. At the same time, higher per capita incomes are associated with greater longevity. The Chinese experience bears this out, as state health authorities project that the proportion of the population over 65 years of age will increase from below 20 percent today to over 30 percent by 2035.
The demographic trends associated with China’s past four decades of rapid economic growth is roughly in line with the experiences of other countries such as Japan, as lower fertility and greater longevity combine to create a proportionally older population. But the Chinese experience includes one distinctive force that has magnified the size of the demographic crisis: the one-child policy.
A man takes photos with his cellphone of a Siasun greeting robot in a demonstration hall of Siasun Robot and Automation in Shenyang in northeastern China’s Liaoning Province. July 23, 2019
In 1979, Chinese leaders, fearing the country’s then-rapid population growth would outrun the ability of the economy and state welfare systems to provide for Chinese citizens, instituted a policy limiting the vast majority of families to a single child. Legally effective from 1980 until its termination in 2016, the policy was enforced by restricting contraceptive access, imposing economic sanctions, and, in some cases, mandating sterilizations and abortions.
The one-child policy—and the culture of fear it produced—succeeded in achieving the Chinese government’s stated goal of reducing the fertility rate. Over the course of the one-child policy’s lifetime, fertility declined from 2.74 births per woman in 1980 to just 1.77 in 2016. And despite active governmental efforts to increase fertility, including a 2021 “three-child policy” and new financial incentives for having more children, China’s fertility rate has fallen further to 1.18 births per woman in 2022. This places China below the population replacement rate of 2.1 births per woman. China’s persistently low fertility rate in spite of these measures reveals the difficulty Beijing will have in changing the culture of reluctance to have children forged by years of legal and social sanction. Below-replacement fertility rates, combined with the unwillingness of individual families to have more children, all but ensure that aging and population decline will be irreversible.
The Demographic Disaster
A forty-year shortfall of new births accompanied by more el-
derly retirees has created a perfect storm for China. The country’s age pyramid is becoming increasingly skewed toward older adults, who will make up a larger and larger proportion of the Chinese population. China will likely face an absolute decline in the working-age population by about 260 million by 2050. Furthermore, China’s dependency ratio—the ratio of the population not of working age (aged zero to 14 and 65 and older) to the working-age population— will increase to over 76 percent in 2055, up from 45 percent in 2021. Such an age structure would place China well above the projected global average of 61 percent dependency in 2055, creating new risks for China’s labor market. Population aging is associated across countries with lower labor supply and slower economic growth, as cohorts of older adults exhibit lower labor force participation and tend to be less productive.
In practice, this will mean a greater burden on the backs of those of working age; this burden can take many forms. Younger workers may have to spend more time and money caring for aging family members. An older population means a higher proportion of GDP spent on healthcare. And, to address what is perhaps the concern most directly associated with a rising dependency ratio, pension funds—which rely on the contributions of younger workers to pay for current retirees—will come under greater strain as the number of retirees per worker grows. Indeed, Chinese state pension funds may run dry by 2035, owing to the declining workforce.
Facing pension and healthcare crises, the Chinese government might be forced into the unenviable position of choosing between lower living standards for the elderly, higher corporate or personal taxes, and reduced government spending in other areas—each one a threat to economic growth. Labor shortfalls, too, may play a role in slowing growth. The World Economic Forum projects an annual labor shortage of 11.8 million people over the next decade, and, while some of this gap is due to shortfalls in education and skills, most is attributable to falling birth rates.
It is extremely difficult for any country to sustain robust economic growth with a shrinking workforce. This is particularly true for China, whose rapid growth over the past several decades was driven by low-cost production and abundant labor. The International Monetary Fund projects China’s growth to continue to slow to an average of three percent after 2027, far below its past trajectory. This slowgrowth trajectory would mean stagnating living standards in one of the world’s most populous countries, as well as dire consequences for global economic growth, which has been buoyed by a developing China.
Automation: A Balm for China?
China, of course, is not taking this crisis lying down. But, going through some of the potential ways to rejuvenate the labor force, one might be forgiven for remaining pessimistic. Immigration, a surefire way to address declines in domestic fertility
appears an infeasible solution; China’s net migration is currently negative, meaning more people leave the country than enter on an annual basis, and the Chinese government appears committed to its restrictive immigration policies. Increasing the birth rate has been met with resistance by families, and comes with a twenty-year time lag. And the Chinese government itself has admitted that the prospective raising of the retirement age will have a negligible effect on the labor force, serving, at best, as a temporary solution.
But one potential solution stands out: robots. Often viewed in the West as an antagonist—the fears of “robots taking our jobs” have become pervasive in the news media and US presidential
campaigns alike—labor-saving automation could be the key to renovating China’s economic prospects. These technologies, ranging from industrial robots automating assembly-line production to emerging chatbots which may reduce the demand for white-collar workers, can substitute for human labor in the tasks they perform, enabling companies to produce the same output with less available labor.
Countries facing aging populations often avert the worst potential economic consequences by shifting productive tasks to robots. Within manufacturing, firms tend to respond to the scarcity of middle-aged production workers and the consequent increase in labor costs by automating certain tasks. And, in
these aging countries, automation tends to have positive effects on labor productivity within the manufacturing sector. Where labor is plentiful, the fears that robots will outcompete human workers is plausible. Where labor is scarce, as will be the case for China in the near future, robots seem more likely to augment human labor, helping firms reap the economic benefits.
At least for now, the Chinese government seems to recognize the potential for automation to contribute to economic growth in a world where labor is more scarce. In 2022, the government released a five-year plan calling for China to become a global leader in industrial automation. The specific problems China faces as a result of its increas-
A woman carries a child near government propaganda promoting filial piety on the streets of Beijing, China. March 8, 2016
ing dependency ratio could be meaningfully addressed by automation. Enhanced productivity could ensure young workers higher pay and greater ability to contribute to pension funds. And maintaining a higher growth rate than currently projected could help China to manage its fiscal affairs more easily, balancing the imperative of healthcare spending and social services for the elderly with sufficient spending in other areas.
But the path to a new robotic industrial economy will not necessarily be a smooth one. Already, concerns are being raised within China’s manufacturing sector about the devaluation of skilled labor associated with the installment of industrial robotics and the adoption of advanced manufacturing techniques. Because of the advanced nature of many new industrial technologies, these technologies can perform the tasks previously performed by skilled workers, demoting
them to more routine, lower-paying positions.
If automation works too well, a scarcity of labor may not be sufficient to save Chinese production workers from the threats automation may pose to countries with higher labor costs, such as the United States or United Kingdom, including pay cuts, a reduction in worker bargaining power, and increased unemployment. Research on robot adoption in China backs this up, suggesting
A Chinese woman works amid orange robot arms at Rapoo Technology factory in southern Chinese industrial boomtown of Shenzhen. August 21, 2015
that increased firm-level adoption of robots decreases the probability of employment for manufacturing workers. Already some Chinese firms have expressed their desire to use automation not only to make up for a scarcity of labor, but to replace existing labor. Though, at the firm level and the national level, automation may do more good than it does harm, it may not be individually beneficial for much of China’s working class.
As China transitions to a service- and consumption-driven economy and begins to de-emphasize its traditional economic core of manufacturing, the gov-
ernment is betting big on automation to offset the population decline and aging crisis it is experiencing today. The rise of the industrial robot and the chatbot shows us that no job is safe, but this new reality may be a saving grace for China even as it presents a threat in the United States and Western Europe.
The data tells us that, where countries weather the storm of aging and low fertility, they typically have automation to thank. China appears to recognize this potential, and may be headed in the right direction in safeguarding the economy against stagnation. But this does not excuse
the government from taking into account the distributional consequences of automation and the potential for displacement to overwhelm the augmentation of labor. As long as robots serve to enhance human well-being, though, current investments are more than worth it.
Despite the traditional fears associated with technological advancements in the workplace, Chinese workers perhaps ought to welcome their new robot overlords—or, to be more accurate, their new robot coworkers. The future of their country may demand it.
Visitors look at a Chinese-made industrial robot at the World Robot Conference at the Yichuang International Conference and Exhibition Centre in Beijing, Aug. 18, 2022.
Abby LaBreck
Executive Content Editor
ARTS, CULTURE, AND AGING IN THE EU
A visitor stands in front of the painting ‘View of Dresden by moonlight’ (1839) by Johan Christian Dahl during the press preview of the exhibition ‘Dahl and Friedrich. Romantic Landscapes’ in the Albertinum, a museum of the Dresden State Art Collection (SKD), in Dresden, Germany, Feb. 5, 2015
The age profile of the European Union (EU) is increasing at a rapid pace. By 2100, more than 30 percent of the European Union’s population will be over the age of 65. The age dependency ratio—or ratio of those above the age of 65 as compared to the working age population—is expected to leap to 57:100, rising sharply from the 2021 ratio of 32:100. In more than two-thirds of the EU member states, the old-age dependency ratio will exceed 50 percent by 2050. While these statistics may seem a bit abstract, ballooning elderly populations have very real implications for the European Union. With a greater proportion of the population retired from the labor force, coupled with more elders dependent on healthcare re-
sources, strains on the EU social safety net are inevitable. Conversations surrounding the societal implications of an aging population dominate the discourse in the European Union at present, especially in light of numerous countries attempting to mitigate the societal impact through policy changes. French President Emmanuel Macron, for example, recently unveiled a plan to increase the French retirement age by 2 years, from 62 to 64, as a way to cut costs within France’s pension system, a plan that prompted more than one million French citizens to join a day of strikes and protests throughout 200 French cities on January 19, 2023. France’s internal debate on raising the retirement age is just one
example of many when looking at the European scramble to address aging populations, yet this predominantly negative framing of the situation is causing more harm.
Shifting Focus
While it is critical to address the myriad challenges posed by an aging population, the disproportionate focus on the detriments of an aging population creates a vortex of negative discourse, exacerbating ageist sentiments. Data reveals that ageism—or the “stereotypes, prejudices, and discrimination towards others or oneself based on age”—is a pervasive challenlenge in the European Union at present. According
Elderly people walk in downtown Milan, Italy, Oct.12, 2011
to the first Global United Nations Report on Ageism from 2021, one in three people in Europe report having been the target of ageism. The report also found that ageist sentiment was particularly high in Eastern European countries including Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. Critically, the report links ageist sentiment within Europe to reduced quality of life for elderly citizens, particularly highlighting the negative impact on both one’s physical and mental health. The report calls for a greater societal investment into “intergenerational solidarity,” with the aim of fostering more empathy and respect between citizens, regardless of age.
Intergenerational Solidarity: An Artistic Approach
While ageist sentiment remains unfortunately rampant within the European Union, there exist valuable initiatives working to shift the rhetoric around aging in Europe. As a collective body, the European Union is largely considered an adept soft power, boasting competences in the cultural sector. The European Commission in particular works to “ensure that the social and economic role of culture is acknowledged in wider EU policy making and actions.” Building on these competences, EU member state nations have begun to link art with the concept of aging as a tool to highlight creativity, celebrate life, and showcase the vitality of elderly populations so as to engage the public in fostering intergenerational solidarity.
Powerful mediums, namely theater and dramatic performances, have emerged as creative tools to engage with the
topic of aging in Europe. Such performances, some of which emerged as early as 2015, allow senior citizens to participate and engage with art and society, offering opportunities for both social interaction and creative expression. Additionally, such performances center on themes relating to aging, offering a look at the elder experience and inviting audience members to engage with the concept of aging from a positive perspective with the aim of shifting the ageist narrative in Europe.
The 2015 artistic project, “The Art of Aging,” developed by the European Theatre Convention and initiated under the late esteemed author Etel Adnan in coordination with the Culture Programme of the European Union, was the culmination of five, multicultural original stage productions centered on “the phenomena of Europe’s aging societies.” The productions were performed as part of the “1st European and Science Festival,” held in Romania in 2015. The production embodied three key objectives: initiate debate on the challenges of an aging Europe; raise awareness about the societal impact; and, perhaps most importantly, encourage multigenerational participation in arts and society. The five performances, each centered on a different theme, focus on relevant topics related to aging, including enduring love, caring for younger family members, and collective and personal memory through the years. The performances gave meaningful voice and artistry to elderly performers, capturing the very essence of what it means to age in Romania and Germany, among other countries. Similar themes
and motivations underpinned the 2018 project, spearheaded in Malta and entitled, “The Culture of Ageing.” The film project and lecture program engaged with the question of “how societies deal with an aging population and what role seniors play in various societies.” The project was also intentional about incorporating senior perspectives into the creative process through the employment of educational programming involving Maltese and Dutch senior citizens and interviews gauging elder perspectives.
Additionally, while not an artistic platform itself, the AGE Platform Europe strives to be “The Voice of Older Persons at the EU Level.” The platform similarly works to increase awareness and spark conversations at the public and policy levels relating to the well-being of elders in Europe. The AGE Platform is a European network of nonprofit organizations composed of and expressly advocating for those in Europe ages 50 and older. The key goal of the network is to ensure elderly perspectives and priorities are present in EU policy debates. AGE also actively engages in art campaigns to foster dialogue and conversation on the realities of aging in Europe. For example, in light of the 2015 “The Art of Aging” project, the former AGE Platform Vice-President, Ebbe Johanssen, took part in a public panel entitled “Scientific Findings of the Aging Phenome in Artistic Dialogue with Civil Society and Policymakers.”
Not only can the art sector offer a powerful platform for senior citizens to actively engage in society and culture and vocalize
their lived experience through creative expression, art has also proven beneficial for the health of the elderly. Between 2019 and 2021, researchers from Amsterdam UMC and Leyden Academy on Vitality and Aging conducted a large-scale national study in the Netherlands focused on the intersection between vitality, aging, and the arts. Four hundred seventy micro-narratives collected through the study revealed that senior citizens engaged in the arts in the Netherlands reported developing “a positive feeling, personal and artistic growth, and deep contacts” as a result of their participation. The study
concluded that “by collaborating with more artists, the care sector and the social domain can better respond to the need for challenge and lifelong learning of today’s older people, and also play a role in improving the well-being and health of the elderly and loneliness problems in the Netherlands.”
This study implies that there exists an important relationship between arts, culture, and healthy, vibrant aging. Should more countries strive to incorporate initiatives and opportunities for the elderly to engage in artistic activities, namely music and the-
ater performances, there could be marked improvements in the quality of life of older citizens.
COVID and the Arts
Furthermore, of particularly relevant interest is the way in which art and aging intersect in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. While not an EU member state, Wales boasted a successful merging of arts and society, with the presence of a digital theater production centered on “countering the views of older people as vulnerable and frail in the face of coronavirus.” The nine-person theater company, sponsored by the charity Re-Live, based in Cardiff created a Zoom production entitled, “Secret Country,” which “enabled the cast to demonstrate resilience” in light of the ongoing pandemic which disproportionately impacted elderly persons. The online production is yet another manifestation of the power of aging creatively—in this instance a production with very timely relevance.
Arts and Aging: A New Form of Demographic Diplomacy
The connection between the arts and aging and the myriad benefits of this relationship for reshaping the narrative around aging has been demonstrated in numerous instances within the European Union. Important lessons can be gleaned from EU member states that have been intentional about investing in and implementing policies focused on cultivating the passions, interests, and well-being of their aging populations. Providing elderly citizens with opportunities to engage in the arts enables them to remain active and involved in
A visitor looks at Pablo Picasso’s 1911-1912 oil on canvas “Homme a la guitare”, left, next to Francisco de Zurbaran’s 1630-1634 oil on canvas “Saint-Francois d’Assise dans sa tombe” exhibited at the Grand Palais museum in Paris. Oct. 6, 2008.
society, asserting their vocality and perspectives while also benefiting from the health benefits associated with social interaction and peer engagement. Projects focused on providing a platform for elderly voices are vital for reframing societal perspectives, effectively working to combat ageism through models of arts and culture.
Critically, these models could be replicated beyond the European Union itself, extending to other countries around the world facing aging populations and the detrimental side effect of rampant ageist sentiments within societies. The incorporation of arts and culture initiatives, supported and funded by key inst-
resents a form of “demographic diplomacy,” a model that could be replicated and applied in other countries. Demographic diplomacy can be defined as “a globally beneficial consultative mechanism to address the issues of demographic diversity and population-development dynamics by recognising that we all live in a connected world, our circumstances affect each other, and that we are cognizant and empathic of each other’s circumstances.”
While most often used in reference to migration and diversity-related topics as they pertain to population dynamics, this theory of demographic diplomacy has relevant implications for
phy-based structural changes within society—of which age is especially salient—arts and culture policies addressing elderly populations fit neatly within this framework. The policies of the European Union, as evidenced by various projects, have yielded positive benefits as member states undergo critical population changes.
Rather than perpetuating negative rhetoric surrounding aging populations, other countries might similarly discover the ways in which the narrative can shift in a far more positive direction—simply by enabling and encouraging older generations to take center center stage.
People visit the exhibition ‘Neo Rauch - Die Abwaegung’ (The Balancing Act) in the Kunstsammlungen in Chemnitz, eastern Germany, Jan. 16, 2013
Pranay Varada
Solicits Chair
TUVALU’S FIGHT TO EXIST
INTERVIEW WITH MINISTER SIMON KOFE
Simon Kofe, Minister of Justice, Communications and Foreign Affairs of Tuvalu. Image provided by Minister Kofe.
Funafuti, the main island of the nation state of Tuvalu, is seen from a Royal New Zealand airforce C130 aircraft as it approaches at Funafuti, Tuvalu, South Pacific. October 13, 2011
Simon Kofe currently serves as the Minister of Justice, Communications and Foreign Affairs of Tuvalu. He previously contributed to constitutional reform projects as Senior Magistrate. Throughout his career, Minister Kofe has demonstrated a deep commitment to serving the people of Tuvalu and advancing their interests on the global stage. His leadership, expertise, and dedication have earned him a reputation as one of Tuvalu’s most respected and effective public servants.
Given Tuvalu’s extremely small population, just around 12,000, how do you convince the world that the country’s sinking is a problem of the present just as much as it is one of the future?
Tuvalu is one of the smallest countries in the world. Our average height above sea level is around two meters, so we’re quite vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, in particular sea level rise. Living with this reality obviously gives us the ur-
gency and the drive to advocate for countries to take stronger climate action, because we recognize that climate change is an issue that needs to be addressed by all countries, by the global community. So we’ve been doing that for some years, we’ve been quite active in trying to draw people’s attention to the issues that we’re facing [and] bringing awareness to the world. But despite all our efforts, we’re still quite short of where we need to be. So it is quite disappointing in that respect, that the scientists are predicting that Tuvalu could be fully submerged in the next 50 to 100 years.
What symptoms of climate change do you observe in the present?
With sea level rise, we’re seeing erosion on our coastal areas. We’re experiencing stronger cyclones. The ocean actually seeps through the water lens, contaminating [it] and making it hard for us to grow things here in
Tuvalu. We’ve also been experiencing drought – we announced a state of emergency towards the end of last year because of severe drought.
There seems to be a tragic sense of inevitability surrounding the possibility that Tuvalu may no longer exist by the end of the century. How are the Tuvaluan people managing this realization, and is there any talk of relocation?
There is a constant flow of people migrating to Australia and New Zealand, and we have an arrangement in place with New Zealand to take in migrants from Tuvalu. Obviously, there’s a number of factors why people leave: for greater opportunities, education for children, and also, I believe, because of what we’re going through [with the climate], people are considering moving overseas. But in terms of a planned relocation by the government, the plan we have is to prepare, first of all, a framework
that enables us to continue to function effectively as a government, regardless of where we are in the world. We’ve also been working to get recognition by countries that Tuvalu’s statehood is permanent regardless of the impacts of climate change.
We’ve been careful in how we promote relocation as a solution to the climate crisis. We don’t want big emitters to use that as a solution, that once they provide land for relocation, [this] would solve the climate crisis. So we’ve been very careful in how we talk about relocation, because we feel that the primary solution to the climate crisis right now is for countries to take stronger climate action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. And so that’s the message that we continue to share to the global community.
Over the past two years, you’ve been Tuvalu’s most visible spokesperson with regards to the threat of rising sea levels. How successful have your efforts been in mustering the direction of global resources towards this issue?
Obviously, we’ve gained a lot of attention, we’ve raised awareness globally [with] people that [were] probably not fully aware of these issues. A video that I shot in the water two years ago went viral, so there was a lot of media attention around that as well. And so that’s part of our objective to raise awareness, not just for leaders, but for the wider public, so people that are aware that climate change is an issue that affects everyone, and also particularly our future generations. So I guess in that regard, it’s successful; we’ve reached a
wider audience.
But if we were to measure it in terms of climate action, and [greater awareness] actually translating to concrete action from big countries, I think we fall short of that. Countries have been making some positive steps, but scientists are saying that [we] still fall short of the targets that we’ve set up for ourselves. And we’re still looking at a worst case scenario for Tuvalu.
In 2019, you turned down offers from Chinese companies to launch a $400 million project to build artificial islands, which you saw as a backhanded attempt to draw Tuvalu away from its longstanding relationship with Taiwan. Now, do you see there being any point in the future at which you would look to China for direct assistance, given their economic muscle?
Just to be [clear] on that, there were approaches to the communities here, some years back, and obviously, [they were] not accepted. The media that interviewed me at the time asked me what my response would be if China were to approach us, and my response was that we wouldn’t be able to accept anything from them, given our association with Taiwan. Obviously, any approaches from China would be coming with the condition that we end our relationship with Taiwan and to recognize the One-China policy. And so that’s [where] the government is at the moment; we have very strong diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and we see that relationship enduring into the future.
I recognize that we are in the minority; very few countries in
the world [are still aligned with] Taiwan. But the basis of our relationship is based on common values and principles that underpin democracy. Those are values that are very important to us, and in our foreign policy, our traditional cultural values, which emphasize loyalty, trust, and building authentic relationships, [are] at the forefront of everything we do. So that’s the government’s stance on that issue.
In November, you gave a speech to COP27 in which you said that Tuvalu has “no choice but to become the world’s first digital nation.” How do you envision the transfer of an entire country to the metaverse, particularly Tuvalu’s unique culture and history? Can technology be Tuvalu’s savior?
Well, firstly, I distinguish between a digital nation and the metaverse. The digital nation, in my definition, is a nation that has migrated all its core governance and administrative systems online, to enable it to remotely operate as a state and fulfill all its obligations under international law. And this is tied, obviously, to our efforts to get recognition that our statehood is permanent. It’s part of a broader plan for future-proofing Tuvalu for a worstcase scenario, which we call the Future Now Project. And so if the world recognizes our statehood as being permanent, similar to what we see as a government in exile, then we would need a framework to enable us to continue to function, so [parliamentary] elections, [for example], can be done online.
Obviously, the metaverse is also an important part of that because
Tuvalu’s Prime Minister Kausea Natano remotely addresses the 76th Session of the U.N. General Assembly at United Nations headquarters in New York. Sept. 25, 2021. Credit: Pool Reuters via AP
the metaverse is a platform that we feel would best communicate our culture to future generations and to anyone who wants to learn more about Tuvalu. We feel that the metaverse provides an immersive experience for people, and building a virtual copy of Tuvalu not only preserves our culture, it improves accessibility. It allows us to also upload data, make projections on the impacts of climate change, [and] track fishing activities in our waters. It’s also a revenue opportunity for Tuvalu. So there’s a lot we see in the potential of building in the metaverse, but we see that as being part of the bigger picture of getting recognition [as] a digital nation.
Is there a timeline for these digital projects geared towards preserving Tuvalu in a digital space?
We’re trying to get things done this year, but we’ve been working on this initiative for two years now. We’ve received recognition from nine countries
in the world on the legal proposition that Tuvalu’s statehood is permanent, and that our claims on maritime zones are also permanent. So there are a number of initiatives that we’re working on, and they’re all connected, getting this recognition as a permanent state, and also building a digital nation. I have one year left in my term in office, so we are moving fast to get things done.
Why is it so important that Tuvalu is able to preserve its maritime claims, even given the risk of sea level rise?
Firstly, we have a very strong connection to our oceans and to our land. We’ve lived here for centuries, our ancestors are buried here. There’s a lot of spiritual connection and tradition related to the ocean. There’s also the revenue that it generates for us: the fishing industry brings in the bulk of Tuvalu’s revenue each year, [mainly] with tuna. So it’s a valuable sovereign asset that we want to retain our claims to. So what we’ve been doing is to get
countries to recognize that if we do lose our physical territory in the future, these oceans will still be recognized as belonging to the nation of Tuvalu.
What lessons does Tuvalu present for places all around the world that are waking up to the consequences of rising seas today?
I think Tuvalu plays a very important role in forewarning the world of the impacts of climate change, because climate change is not something that only affects Tuvalu. It takes many forms –we’re seeing floods in New Zealand, bushfires in different parts of the world, cyclones, the earthquakes in [Türkiye]. These things are all connected to this climate crisis. And I feel a great sense of responsibility, being at the forefront of this, to warn the world of what is to come. It’s important that the world really gets its act together and takes really strong climate action, because the window of opportunity is closing very quickly. That’s where we speak with greater urgency, hoping that the world comes together and really addresses this issue. We hope for the best, but we’re also preparing for the worst-case scenario, and that’s part of the many initiatives that we’ve undertaken.
Varada spoke with Kofe on February 19, 2023. This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.
Dara Adamolekun Solicits Associate
“THE 21ST CENTURY IS CERTAINLY AFRICAN”
INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR
SARAH HARPER
Professor Sarah Harper, Director of Oxford Institute of Population Ageing. Image provided by Professor Harper
Professor Sarah Harper is the first Professor of Gerontology at Oxford University and the Director of the Oxford Institute of Population Ageing, the UK’s first population center on the demography and economics of ageing populations. Her current research on demographic change addresses the global and regional impact of falling fertility and increasing longevity, with a particular interest in Asia and Africa. She has focused on women’s education and empowerment in sub-Saharan Africa, and the impact of this on falling fertility rates.
To begin, I’d like to ask you to briefly answer the question your recent book “How Population Change will Transform our World” poses within the context of sub-Saharan Africa. What are the overarching trends in demographic changes you’ve noted in sub-Saharan Africa, and what do you believe the implications of those trends will be?
Sub-Saharan Africa is really interesting because of what is happening to what we call the fertility transition. Our research has suggested that in all other regions of the world, as we allow women to be empowered through education and to have improved health and well-being and more control over decisions, they tend to choose to have fewer children.
The really interesting thing, however, is that desired family size still [remains] high in most Sub-Saharan African countries. We first picked this up while doing some anthropological work in Uganda, where we found that highly educated middle-class women still wanted to have
INTERVIEWS
Somalis who fled drought-stricken areas carry their belongings as they arrive at a makeshift camp for the displaced on the outskirts of Mogadishu, Somalia, June 30, 2022.
three, four, or five children, even though they were beginning to restrict their childbearing. We then looked at the Demographic and Health Surveys, which is a very large, very robust data set with about over 150 countries in it. And it was very clear that in most sub-Saharan African countries, women who are educated are beginning to control their fertility, but their desired family size is still staying high.
That’s really interesting because it means that sub-Saharan Africa will probably go through the full demographic transition maybe later in the 21st century than we thought, given that mortality is coming down and morbidity is beginning to come down as well. And we’re seeing a growing number of older adults. This is probably going to coincide with a large number of children still being born [and] a growing number of older adults in the population, so there is going to be a massive youth bulge which is hopefully going to lead to a demographic dividend. It is likely that the population in that
part of the world is going to continue to grow and the number of dependents is also going to stay very high, probably far longer into the end of the 21st century than we originally thought.
How have you found women’s education and empowerment to affect the desired family size across the region?
There’s a group of people who argue that it’s all to do with the availability of modern forms of contraception. And yet, we have data [that] shows very clearly that women in many countries, regardless of their education, are aware of modern forms of contraception. So we know that it isn’t that women don’t just have an unmet need for contraception. [They don’t] feel that they can take advantage of contraception.
There are two other broad drivers [of fertility]: one is health. We know that as women’s health and well-being increase, infant and child mortality tends to go down. Then, women will choose to reduce the number of children they have; they will prefer to have a
few [healthy] children rather than many, many children because they know that their children will have a much better chance of surviving through childhood and into adulthood. But overridingly, education seems to be important [to fertility] and that operates in a variety of different ways.
Firstly, it keeps girls out of the marriage market. If we take Nigeria for example, where on average women are still having eight to nine children, we know that particularly in rural areas, two-thirds of the girls leave primary school, and don’t really go on to secondary school. They’re married by twelve and are having their first child at thirteen or fourteen. Obviously, at that age, it’s very, very difficult for those young girls to be able to stand out against [their] society, which at the moment is saying have as many children as you can. And if we can keep girls in school, we can empower them. We can change attitudes to communities, but also we can give them the skills [to] understand that although being a mother is important, there are other things that they can do [to] make an economic contribution and take control of their lives. So improving health [and] giving [women] access to family planning is really important, but education is absolutely vital.
Could you outline the differing attitudes towards aging in sub-Saharan Africa? Have these attitudes influenced demographic changes in the region?
What is interesting is when we say aging, if we think of an old person in North America, for
example, we typically nowadays are thinking of someone who’s probably over seventy-five [or] eighty. And they haven’t been very productive in their lives. [They’re] probably now retired or [they’ve] cut back on their economic production. If we think of an older person in many sub-Saharan African countries, we may be talking about [a person in] in their 50s and that is because the risk of illness, frailty, and morbidity happens so much earlier. And particularly, women may be the mainstays for the family. So it could be that you have a woman in their 50s and they are economically looking after the grandchildren and even the great-grandchildren because that middle generation maybe has died or migrated out.
And therefore, they are a mainstay of the family. So although they’re much younger, they’re still recognized [as old] in their 50s and 60s. And if something happens to them, then that family in the household can be very significantly affected. So when we think about age, it isn’t really chronological. It’s more to do with life course and generation and illness and disease.
Do aging populations in sub-Saharan Africa tend to face any specific disparities in trying to access healthcare? If so, how can they be mitigated?
If you grow old in a country that is aging, that’s very different from growing old in a young country. Without any doubt, most countries throughout Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, [are] countries of youth. They are countries where there is still huge pressure on conquering
child, infant, and
maternal mortality, where there are still infectious diseases, or acute medicine is still really important. And that’s not to say that the chronic diseases of later life were ignored, but obviously, when you are still a very small percentage of the population, it’s more difficult for you to get those resources. Of course, what we’re seeing if we look in terms of sheer numbers of older adults [is that] the growth in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of numbers is quite dramatic. But if we look [at it] as a percentage of [the] population, it’s still relatively small. And I think, therefore, raising awareness [about] older adults is really important. They are important economically, they’re important socially. They’re important within a family, and there is just an innate importance of being a person and you don’t lose that when you become old.
Traders carry baskets of vegetables through muddy pathways in Atkilt Tera, the largest open-air vegetable market, in the capital Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Sept. 10, 2020
I think that’s really, really vital, but it’s very difficult.
UNFPA [and] these big UN agencies, they are constantly pointing out that Africa is aging. It’s aging slowly, but there are huge numbers of older people. I think as we see, we understand more of the vulnerabilities of older adults to climate change, drought, [and] civil strife. If there is some kind of a crisis, older people often find it very difficult to escape from [the] crisis. They tend to get trapped. I would say at the moment, the really important thing is good research data that points out the needs of older people. The tremendous work that the charity and political international section is doing highlights the importance of older people.
Considering that sub-Saharan Africa has one of the most rap-
idly aging populations in the world, do you consider the region to be an underrepresented research area? Why or why not?
African gerontology is very young, but I have to say that if you do a review over the last 30 years of the research that has been done, it is booming. It comes from a very, very low base, but really there’s a huge amount of interest in this area. The research community has grown so much over the last few decades, and I think more resources are being poured into this area, which is good.
What about these trends and implications are similar to other regions you have studied, and what makes them unique to sub-Saharan Africa?
As I said at the beginning, I mean, the whole idea about aging, of course, isn’t just about cooling mortality, which means people are living longer. It is a decrease in the number of children being born. So the average age of your population goes up. So this structural change is really, really important. And you go from a society where there are huge numbers and percentages of younger people and very few older adults to a much more balanced age structure. Africa is going through that very rapidly at the moment but is still predominantly a young part of the world.
And so I think from this perspective, we can say that we’re probably looking to the second half of the 21st century before we will really see Africa become an aged region. Asia has been aging very dramatically, [and] at the moment Latin America is
too; obviously, the Global North [has] aged already. So the really exciting [thing] is that Africa is aging at a time when we do have climate change, but we also have new technology, and who knows how new technology is going to affect our lives. So for the first time, we’re going to see the sort of aging of a [continent] against this very rapid change in technology, and that’s going to affect the way we work, the way we live, [and] our healthcare. And so it’s a particularly interesting area to study at the moment.
You mentioned a relationship between climate change and aging in Sub-Saharan Africa. How have you already seen this relationship manifested or why do you anticipate it happening?
Yes, so I think one of the problems with climate change is that vulnerable peoples tend to be most affected. And obviously, older people are very susceptible to both heat and cold. They’re very susceptible to drought and famine. They find it very difficult if there is a climate event, to be able to escape from that event whether that is a fire or a flood.
And as a consequence, I suppose one of the issues is that the impact on people is going to be particularly acute in Africa as the population ages because obviously, climate change is going to affect that part of the world. We believe we’re going to have more and more vulnerable older people. Many older adults simply don’t have the educational resources that younger people do. Older people in different parts of the world had a very good education system when they were younger. Of course, in many
parts of sub-Saharan Africa, that simply wasn’t possible. And so we do have an older population who may, because they’re less educated, have [fewer] resources that they can call upon in order to help them, and maybe are much more dependent on sort of traditional ways of thinking which sometimes are very, very good but sometimes make it more difficult. I mean, there has been research which has suggested that there are a whole lot of myths that tend to circulate in a society, and if you’re educated, you can stand back and say, “Well, I don’t believe that, because my education tells me that that can’t be true.” If you haven’t had the advantage of education, which broadens your mind and enables you to think in different ways, I think you’re more vulnerable to being taken in by certain myths. And so we might see communities of older people behaving in a certain way, refusing vaccinations, refus-
ing medicines, because they are taken in more by the stories and narratives and myths that sometimes falsely arise, and I think that is a problem.
What impact might sub-Saharan African demographic changes have on the world, considering that a much higher proportion of the world’s population will come from this region in the future?
I would say the 21st century is certainly African without any doubt at all, particularly the second half. You’re absolutely right. [Among] older populations that growth is slowing everywhere, except in sub-Saharan Africa. I think that’s where [to attain] the demographic dividend, which means [benefiting] from the tremendous energy of younger people in your economy. You do need to have a very good framework, you need a good educa-
tion, you need good health, and you need good governance and financial structures. And all [of] those infrastructures are [typical of] an urban environment which supports good, strong economic growth. But if Africa can do that, then not only [does it have] a huge, bright future, but it also, in theory, will be able to provide many of the skills that the rest of the world needs. Because as we age, not only Europe and North America but also South America and actually parts of Asia are going to have a massive skill shortage. And a vibrant, well-educated, healthy African young population could really help the world cope with the extreme aging that the rest of the world will be going through.
Adamolekun spoke with Harper on March 3, 2023. This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.
People in a slum work in a saw mill with downtown in the distance in Lagos, Nigeria. May 12, 2020
Children walk through the informal settlement of Vlakfontein outside Johannesburg, South Africa, Dec. 9, 2021
BY LAND AND BY SEA, CHALLENGES TODAY AND TOMORROW
INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL JAMES
G. FOGGO
Zebulon Erdos Editor-in-Chief
Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (ret.) Image provided by Admiral Foggo
Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (ret.), is the Dean of the Center for Maritime Strategy. Admiral Foggo is the former commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa, and Allied Joint Force Command, Naples. He Commanded BALTOPS in 2015 and 2016 as well as Exercise Trident Juncture in 2018.
It isn’t often that one gets to sit across from an Admiral like you, so allow me to begin by asking, you were born at Mönchengladbach-Rheindahlen at NATO’s Northern Army Group. For how many generations has your family been in the service? What was your father’s service like?
I grew up in a Commonwealth family. All of my [ancestors] were Scots who emigrated to Canada. And then, at the beginning of the war, World War One in 1914, they went back to fight in Europe, but they returned to Canada, and my father was born there. During World War Two, his father took him to the recruiter and signed him up for the Canadian Forces, and he arrived on the beaches of Normandy, “D plus 45,” so 45 days after D-Day. But that didn’t mean that it was a cakewalk. He got into firefights with SS Panzergrenadiers almost right away with the 4th Canadian Armored Division. Then for a year and a half, they drove through France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and up into Germany, and then finally demobilized in May of 1945. So a lot of combat, lost a lot of friends.
Then he went back to Canada, stayed in the army, and found himself posted to NATO Northern Army Group in 1959. And that’s when I was born. I left a year later, went back to Canada,
grew up there, and then my dad was posted to Washington DC as a Canadian Army attaché at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. That was in the middle of the Vietnam War—I was eight years old when I came here in ‘68. I grew up in the American system and then was naturalized as an American. I then went to the US Naval Academy.
Was there an expectation in your family that you would also enlist?
My father was a colonel. Living in the United States was expensive. He, throughout his life, never really was able to save anything. So when it came time for me to go to school, you know, my options were local community college, or try to get loans, or go to a military academy, which essentially [means] you’re mortgaging five years of your life to get an education, and that’s what I did. I ended up at the Naval Academy, which was probably one of the best decisions I ever made.
I saw that eventually you would go on to serve on submarines. Was that your choice or were you assigned?
I was a chemistry major, and I went to the Naval Academy thinking I could go to medical school and be a navy doctor. They stopped that program for those who were physically qualified to go into the line, meaning sail ships, because that’s what you get paid to do. So I figured, well, if I can’t get an advanced education through med school, then I’m going to get the best education I can through the Nuclear Power School. I interviewed with
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, and for some strange reason he took me into the program.
As a chemistry major, I struggled. I had a GPA of about a 3.4, which I thought was pretty good. It could have been better. But then when I went to Nuclear Power School, it was tough. It was six months of intense science training down in Orlando, Florida, and then a land-based prototype in Saratoga Springs, New York, and then a submarine school. You’re in school for a year and a half after you graduate. That’s almost like getting a master’s degree in nuclear engineering. Then they put you on a boat, and you qualify as an engineer, then you qualify as an officer of the deck, and then you go back to Naval Reactors and take this brutal exam. At the time I did, it was about an eight-hour exam with oral nterviews to become a professional engineer in the Submarine Force, and you’re qualified to do any department head job. You can be a weapons officer, a navigator, or an engineer. And then you move on to your department head tour, CO [commanding officer] tour… And my goal was to get to be a CO, and I thought if I made that before the end of 20 years, then I would have satisfied my goals and objectives, and if I departed the Navy, I could get a pension and go do something else. In my case, I didn’t stay for 20. I stayed for 40.
Which of the three areas did you choose?
I was a navigator, Navigation Operations Officer on USS Mariano G. Vallejo. It was a great boat. It was 30 years old, but
it was the number one boat in the squadron. It got the Battle Efficiency “E” and it was a ballistic missile submarine. So I learned: how does the Navy perform nuclear deterrence with our intercontinental ballistic missiles? Fascinating.
What’s the longest time you spent submerged?
75 days. Over Christmas.
How long was your longest tour away from family?
Typically, we deploy for six months. Sometimes that was extended, so not more than six and a half months.
Now, before I move onto my further questions, and I apologize for my total laymanship with this one, allow me to ask: books and movies always show submarines in moments of great tension, even when they sail in times of relative peace. Do you encounter tense moments like that? Where there is a risk of escalation?
It’s not just a risk of escalation. The submarine force is a risky business. You have a tube that’s, in my case, a 688 Los Angeles class submarine, named USS Oklahoma City, the tube is 360 feet long, 35 feet wide, and it has a sail that sticks 25 feet above the tube. Inside the tube are 140 men—and now women because we brought women into the submarine force after I was a CO—and in those 360 feet, there are lethal weapons, Tomahawk cruise missiles, torpedoes, mines that can carry a harpoon cruise missile.
There are 2000-pound hydraulics and air systems. Under pressure, there is a nuclear propulsion plant with a uranium pile that’s in a primary and a secondary containment, and it gets really, really hot, because you’re boiling water to turn a steam turbine to turn a shaft which is massive. There are hydraulic lube oil systems that get very, very hot and are under pressure. And if any one of these things leaks or pops, you’ve got high pressure, really hot liquids. In some cases, if you had a reactor problem, you would have contaminated liquids or spray coming into what we call the “people tank.”
The other thing is when you go down to test depth, and I’m not authorized to tell you how deep that is, the pressure of the ocean is significant, and if you had a failure of the hull, or failure of a main seawater valve, then that water comes in faster than you could pump it out. So you’ve got to be on your toes and keeping track of all valves, all systems, at all times. If anybody doesn’t do their job of those 140 people, that’s the weakest link in the chain, that can kill you and kill the ship. When you go out to sea, it’s a very risky environment.
[This is] the reason [why] Admiral Rickover was so fastidious about requirements and redundant systems and training and the human brain, not a computer, but a human mind, keeping track of everything that happens on board that ship with a view towards safety. [At the same time] the main purpose of the submarine is lethality: to kill the enemy, sink enemy ships, win wars. So there’s a balance there that has to be struck, and the way you do
it is you recruit the best people, you train them in the best facilities, and you give them the best equipment, and that’s what he did. So yeah, it’s a challenging environment. It’s not for everybody. If you don’t want to be in a tube with 140 guys for six months, it ain’t for you.
I’d be happy to sign you up.
Thank you. And if, fortunately, we are not at war and we haven’t been at war for, depending on how you would define it, some amount of time, how do you maintain training amongst men to be prepared for war?
So you don’t think we’ve been at war?
No, I do think we’ve been at war.
I think we’ve been in war since 1946.
I fully agree with that.
The Cold War.
Yes, but if we haven’t sunk a ship in some time, I’m not sure when the last time was that a submarine sank a ship, are you able to keep wartime-level of training across all tubes?
The whole point of having submarines, whether they’re ballistic or attack submarines, is deterrence. So in the case of a ballistic missile submarine with a nuclear warhead, the idea is you keep Vladimir Putin from launching a tactical short range nuke in Ukraine, because he knows that if he does, it’s total war with the United States. And then we will
flatten Russia, with intercontinental ballistic missiles. No doubt about it. That’s why we put so much effort and money into the nuclear deterrence program, the triad [of] bombers, submarines, and missiles. But the most relevant and the most stealthy, and the most reliable portion of that triad is the submarine. we’re building a new one called the Columbia. It’s a very expensive boat: the first one is going to be $16 billion. And we’re going to have 12 that replace the Tritons.
So there’s nuclear deterrence, then there’s conventional deterrence. [Faced with] an attack submarine, the reason for an attack submarine is again to sink the enemy’s shipping, and to keep the Chinese from invading Taiwan, or Guam, which is a US territory, you want them to think twice. You want them to say, “the Americans are at peak proficiency in that if we send our fleet to Taiwan, send our fleet to take over an island in the South China Sea that doesn’t belong to China, today is not the day.” That’s deterrence.
Throughout the entire Cold War until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, we were in a war at sea. I call it the Third Battle of the Atlantic. And then we tried to reset with the Russians. It didn’t work. And today we’re in the Fourth Battle of the Atlantic. It’s a war that the American people do not see in the undersea domain that goes on every day. It’s not a shooting war. Neither was the Cold War, right? Not a shot was fired. But with a cost imposing strategy, we brought the Soviet Union to its knees and [it] disintegrated. It’s the same
thing happening today. And because the other side is afraid to act, we deter them from shooting. But “integrated deterrence,” which is the new policy, the national defense strategy, and this administration didn’t keep Putin from invading Ukraine. We failed there, and there’s a shooting war going on in Ukraine. So I don’t buy the premise that we’re not at war. We’ve been at war for a long time. Unfortunately, the American people don’t see that.
Before I transition to Ukraine, when would you say this Fourth Battle of the Atlantic began?
The Russians started to resurge after ‘91 in about the [early] 2000s. If you look at their actions, when they started to regain their economy, they started to put money back into their armed forces, and particularly into their navy, and particularly into their submarine force. When I was at the North Pole back in 2001, you know, that picture up there [behind you] is me near the North Pole in 1985, I went back in 2001, in command of my own boat, the difference in 16 years was less ice. The first picture is smack dab in the middle of the Cold War, and so full on with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact against the US and NATO. 16 years later, less ice, and when you went up topside, and you looked down in the Azure blue waters of the Arctic, you saw plastic, so more pollution. We have a climate change problem. We have an environmental problem. And the Russians were back. They were operating again. So at about that point 2000-2010, they started to resurge, they went into Crimea, with the illegal annexation of Crimea in ’14. Game on again, you know. When I say
the Fourth Battle of the Atlantic, I’m not just talking about the Atlantic Ocean. I’m talking about all the creeks and tributaries that feed into the Atlantic Ocean: the Arctic Ocean, the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Black Sea. Look what’s happening in the Black Sea. We’ve essentially ceded that sea space to the Russians. We don’t have a lot of NATO ships in there right now. Again, kind of an extension of my thesis, that we’re in a quasi-war with the Russians right now. And the Chinese.
Would you characterize that as a separate war? Or would you characterize it as one in which the Russians and the Chinese are in a way allied against us?
The Russians and the Chinese are “frenemies.” You’ve heard that expression? They have banded together because they have one common thread, the United States of America, because we’re the hegemonic power. But our power is declining because of the civil unrest in the country and the divisiveness in the country, which when I became an American didn’t exist. I’ve watched the country since I became an American in 1977, and it’s disturbing to me to see how we have split apart. That weakens us.
So, Russia and China have this marriage of convenience right now, but I wouldn’t say that it’s an alliance. If you saw what happened in Uzbekistan recently, Xi poured cold water on Putin and basically told him, sue for a ceasefire, and Xi is getting a lot of pressure, not just from us but from everybody, on collaboration with the Russians. He hasn’t given them any lethal aid; he’s given
them non-lethal aid in the form of buying their gas and buying their grain, which they steal from Ukraine. So, he’s skirted economic sanctions to help the Russian economy stay afloat amidst this crushing set of global sanctions that have been levied upon the Russians. Sooner or later, it’s going to destroy the economy of Russia. If the Chinese were such great friends, which they publicly make out that they are in these press conferences with the Russians, then the Chinese would be giving them weapons. The only people giving them weapons are the Iranians and the North Koreans, and when you can only count on the Iranians and the North Koreans as your friends, you’ve got a problem. The United States at least has lots of friends. The last administration didn’t help by dissing NATO, but the Biden administration has tried to correct that, and they’ve done a pretty good job.
Speaking of NATO, how would you say NATO has and will continue to evolve in the wake of war in Ukraine?
Well, NATO has been revivified here with the war in Ukraine, and frankly the war saved NATO, because it was on the downslope. The allies were all bickering, Trump was hammering them for 2% of their GDP into their military industrial complex, and it wasn’t happening. There was a divergence [in] the traditional bridge between
the United States of America and the NATO alliance that’s been repaired. It happens every time there’s a threat, right? I mean, Joe Nye would say, the economy can be stimulated by
war, and the military industrial complex can be stimulated by threat.
If there’s a threat out there, then you’re going to pour more money into defense, like [after] 9/11. A trillion-dollar War on Terror which ended up with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, which was a debacle, and the pending withdrawal from Iraq. So we got 20 years of our boots and our heads in the sand, meanwhile, Russia and China started building things like hypersonic missiles that we don’t have, capabilities we don’t have, now we’re playing catch up. I don’t disagree with the Biden Administration for pulling out of Afghanistan, but they didn’t execute it properly. It was a debacle, and [it was] embarrassing to the United States, and [it] makes us look weak to our adversaries, which is why they take risks. That’s why Putin wanted Ukraine and didn’t think we’d do anything, and he was surprised, and so was Xi. So I think Xi’s watching this very carefully and thinking about, “what happens if I go on to Taiwan? Same thing going to happen to me? Am I going to be crushed by global economic sanctions? Are the Americans going to feed weapons to the Taiwanese that defeat my systems as they come across the streets?” I think he’s thinking pretty hard about that.
Do you think there’ll be any structural changes to how the NATO alliance works? Or is it only revivified and sort of re-founded each time there’s a threat?
Yeah, I think there [are] struc-
tural changes going on right now. Poland is asking for a permanent presence, and so are other countries in the Eastern Bloc. There’s Romania: we have a multinational corp there. In fact, the Romanian chief of defense is coming in next week [as compared to the time of this interview] to talk about that with us at a private roundtable. So you’re going to see a more permanent presence. Where we tried to withdraw in the peace dividend in between the Third and Fourth Battle of the Atlantic, we’re now pushing more people over and establishing more permanence on the European continent. And that’s going to be around for a long time because Russia is not going to stop meddling. I don’t think Russia is going to go away, so we’re going to have to maintain that connectivity with the NATO alliance.
When you put more people on the ground, you need more headquarters, more command and control. And I think we’ve learned a lesson from this campaign, just as the Russians said, and that is, logistics is the sixth domain of warfare. If you don’t have logistics, you will fail on the battlefield. That means we’ve got to boost our infrastructure and our supply chain, and that means ordinance because we’re throwing a lot of ordinance at the problem. That means we’ve got to spin up our industrial base and start producing more Javelin missiles to take the place of the ones that shot down the Russian aircraft and tanks. It’s the Stingers. It’s going to be a long time before we pull back to the preUkrainian War levels that we had in NATO. So yeah, I think a lot of structural changes are taking
place, and as far as the alliance is concerned, we’re going to add two new allies, Sweden and Finland. I never thought I’d see that in my lifetime. Another gift from Putin. That’s a big change. And then there will be more that want to come on board: Moldova, Ukraine is asking for membership. Will Georgia turn the corner and ask for membership? Will NATO give them membership? Those are all questions that you’ll have to answer in your studies. I don’t know the answer.
I read, in an article published on the Center for Maritime Strategy’s website, that ideally, we may need 15 carriers in peacetime deployed across the world now. Now, if we have 11 or 12 right now and 15 would be the ideal, technologically, are we prepared for a more escalated world chessboard?
No. The industrial base is not capable of producing 15 carriers right now. We’ve got two under construction at Huntington Ingalls in Newport News, Virginia—that’s the only yard in the United States that can make a carrier. There are other places that can build amphibious ships, but [building a] super carrier like the Ford of the Nimitz has got to be done on the dry docks down there. The John F. Kennedy will be out of drydock in about a year. It has the nukes on board. So the propulsion system is on board and the nukes are monitoring it. They’re finishing up the decks and the hall and the mechanical and the electrical. The next one that comes along is the Enterprise, CVN 80, and the one after that will be CVN 81, which is the USS “Dorie” Miller. We’ll have 12 carriers at the peak, and the
Nimitz class will start to be decommissioned, and then we’ll determine whether we build any more. But we’re at industrial capacity right now, so we would have to build new yards and new shipbuilders.
We have something like seven to nine shipbuilding yards right now. We can produce about nine ships a year. That’s down from triple that number during the Cold War. During World War Two, if you listen to [one of] my previous podcast[s], one I did with Professor Paul Kennedy at Yale, we were producing during World War Two one aircraft carrier per month for the Pacific campaign. Nimitz [had] one aircraft carrier effectively operating in the Pacific prior to 1942, and then we ramped up in ’43 because if we hadn’t we’d have lost the war—the margins were that thin.
We’re at that kind of crossroads now. We started preparing for World War Two in 1938. Things didn’t look good, and we really started to put money into the industrial base. We have this thing called the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) and it was supposed to be $26 billion to help refurbish and modernize our dry docks. I think the estimates were low balled and that number should be inflated to something like $44 billion. We started recovering some of that infrastructure up in Maine at Bath Iron Works and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. We’ve got a lot of work to do down in Norfolk, at Norfolk Naval Shipyard. These are the public yards that are owned by the government and run by the government. Norfolk Naval Shipyards, dry docks, in some cases, were built
by slave labor during the Confederate times, so they need to be recapitalized and shored up and there’s a lot of money that has to go into that. That money is trickling in, but not fast enough to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan by 2027, which some pundits say could happen. I’m not sure.
Should investments then be intensified beginning today?
Absolutely. And yesterday.
Erdos spoke with Foggo on November 4, 2022. This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.
María Esther Febre, 85, sits in her wheelchair after getting a shot of the vaccine for COVID-19 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Feb. 24, 2021