Threats to Regional Security in Latin America The Revival of the FARC BY EMMA TRAYNOR
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n August 2019, ex-members of las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Colombia’s largest guerilla rebel group, whose name in English translates to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, announced a recall to arms against the Colombian government, in defiance of a three-year-old peace deal. Aside from being detrimental to peace in the region, the FARC’s resurgence has two potential implications for American national security and general global security. In 2009, Colombia produced an estimated 90 percent of total global cocaine exports, with North America and Western Europe as the main sources of demand; the FARC was responsible for 60 percent of Colombian cocaine that was exported to the U.S. that same year. A revival of the group’s criminal activity could cause U.S. cocaine imports to skyrocket, adding to the already record-high levels of cocaine production and, conversely, increasing the FARC’s funding. Additionally, Colombia’s proximity to Venezuela and disputed Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s relationship with the FARC jeopardize U.S. efforts to depose Maduro. Developed as a Marxist-Leninist group in 1964, the FARC was created in response to deeply-rooted economic inequality in Colombia due, in part, to disproportionate land ownership. The FARC recruits men and women of all ages from largely rural areas. Organized into “blocs” based on their region with a “Secretariat” of about 12 members who lead operations, the FARC’s central activities include attacking Colombian security forces, setting
landmines, and blowing up oil pipelines, bridges, and other infrastructure. In the 1990s, the group became involved in Colombia’s extensive cocaine production in an effort to increase funding. They also secured funding through extortion and kidnappings for ransom, which they vowed to stop in a statement in February 2012. In 2008, 2010, and 2011, several leaders of the group were killed, and in 2016, estimates put the FARC forces at around 6,000 to 7,000, down from 16,000 in 2001. In 2016, after 52 years of violence, the Colombian government, the FARC, and other rebel groups signed a peace agreement, the Havana Peace Accords. As a result, the FARC disarmed and transitioned to a political party, the Revolutionary Alternative Common Force, which currently has 10 mandated seats in the Congress of Colombia. Despite being officially disbanded, an estimated 1,700 to 3,000 members of the FARC continue to commit crimes and acts of violence. In August 2019, Iván Márquez, the leader of the FARC negotiating team during peace talks and a representative in the Colombian Congress, announced his intention to return to guerrilla warfare. He invoked the universal right of people to rise up against oppression and blamed the government for failing to honor the terms of the peace agreement. This is a sentiment echoed by human rights groups and ex-FARC fighters who criticize Colombian president Iván Duque Márquez and former president Álvaro Uribe for failing to implement important aspects of the peace deal. Two-thirds of the Havana Peace Accords’ 578 provisions have been ignored under Duque’s government. Yet, many ex-guerrillas do not want to rearm. Members of the newer political wing of the FARC, including former guerrilla leader and now party leader Rodrigo Londoño (also known as Timochenko), have condemned Márquez’s decision and reaffirmed their commitment to peace. Other ex-combatants, many of whom live in reincorporation zones, value the peace that they achieved “after all
Left: Iván Márquez, former FARC commander who has returned to arms Right: Disputed President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela
